1 50 8 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/56ea22ad8d0078dc9b4b9c7da02c584a.pdf 12ef72988562beccc44139ee467ae92e PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 2019 147 CONTRIBUTORS R. VLADIMIR BAUMGARTEN (Ph.D., Florida State University), is an independent scholar in Florida. He is co-author (with Joseph Stefka) of The National Slovak Society, a JOO Year History, 18901990 (Pittsburgh, 1990) as well as articles in popular and scholarly journals. MICHAEL CUDE (Ph.D. , Colorado) is an Assistant Professor in the history department at Schreiner University in Kerrville, Texas. He does research on Central and Eastern Europe and transatlantic migration, particularly on transatlantic Slovak national identity. FRANK HENSCHEL (Ph.D. , University of Leipzig) wrote his dissertation on multilingualism and magyarization in Kassa/Kosice in the period of dualism in Hungary, and it was published by the Collegium Carolinum in 2017. He is now doing post-doctoral research on the biopolitics of childhood in socialist Czehoslovakia at the University of Kiel. PETR KUBIK (Ph.D., Charles University, Prague) is an independent historian in the Czech Republic who focuses on the Second World War and Czechs and Slovaks in exile. He has published books on Soviet War Crimes (Prague, 2003) and Slovak-Italian Relationships, 1939-1945 (Bratislava, 2009). ELLEN L. PAUL (Ph.D. , University of Kansas), is an Associate Professor of History at Fort Lewis College in Durango, Colorado, where she teaches modem European history. �148 SLOVAKIA 2019 GUIDELINES FOR MANUSCRIPTS Manuscripts for possible publication should be sent to the editor. Articles should normally not exceed twenty-five pages in length, should be typed double-spaced, should include footnotes at the bottom of the page, and should be submitted in electronic format (stolarik@uottawa.ca), using either MicrosoftWord or WordPerfect. Text and format should adhere to the Chicago Manual of Style. Proper orthography and diacritical marks must be supplied for all foreign words. All articles wi ll be sent to an outside reader for evaluation . Books for review are to be sent to the editor. Unso li cited book reviews are not encouraged. ��THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA A civic and cultural federation of Americans of Slovak Ancestry Organized in 1907 W. NINA HOLY Secretary - Treasurer DANIEL F. TANZONE President Dr. Mikulas A. Halko st 1 Vice President Vice Presidents Justine Wesnak 2 nd Vice President Gabriel Kovac 3'd Vice President Executive Board Daniel F. Tanzone, W. Nina Holy, Dr. Mikulas A. Halko, Eileen S. Wilson, Stephanie Seigel, John A. Holy, Cynthia M. Maleski , Andrew M. Rajec, Michael J. Horvath, Theresa M. Kluchinski, David M. Blazek, Sue Ann. M. Seich , Kenneth A. Arendt, Scott T. Pogorelec, Linda M. Strom , Mary Jo Savidge Milan Cuba, Youth Director Martha Catalano, Dr. Ladislav Korcek, Joseph Goda, Auditors SLOVAK FRATERNAL ORGANIZATIONS AFFILIATED WITH THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA FIRST CATHOLIC SLOVAK LADIES ASSOCIATION Beachwood, Ohio FIRST CATHOLIC SLOVAK UNION OF THE U.S.A. AND CANADA Independence, Ohio SLOVAK CATHOLIC SOKOL Passaic, New Jersey NATIONAL SLOVAK SOCIETY OF THE U.S.A. McMurray, Pennsylvania LADIES PENNSYLVANIA SLOVAK CATHOLIC UNION Wilkes - Barre, Pennsylvania THE SLOVAK NEWSPAPERMEN'S ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA SLOVAKIA $ 10.00 per issue � SLOVAKIA 2019 147 CONTRIBUTORS R. VLADIMIR BAUMGARTEN (Ph.D., Florida State University), is an independent scholar in Florida. He is co-author (with Joseph Stefka) of The National Slovak Society, a JOO Year History, 18901990 (Pittsburgh, 1990) as well as articles in popular and scholarly journals. MICHAEL CUDE (Ph.D. , Colorado) is an Assistant Professor in the history department at Schreiner University in Kerrville, Texas. He does research on Central and Eastern Europe and transatlantic migration, particularly on transatlantic Slovak national identity. FRANK HENSCHEL (Ph.D. , University of Leipzig) wrote his dissertation on multilingualism and magyarization in Kassa/Kosice in the period of dualism in Hungary, and it was published by the Collegium Carolinum in 2017. He is now doing post-doctoral research on the biopolitics of childhood in socialist Czehoslovakia at the University of Kiel. PETR KUBIK (Ph.D., Charles University, Prague) is an independent historian in the Czech Republic who focuses on the Second World War and Czechs and Slovaks in exile. He has published books on Soviet War Crimes (Prague, 2003) and Slovak-Italian Relationships, 1939-1945 (Bratislava, 2009). ELLEN L. PAUL (Ph.D. , University of Kansas), is an Associate Professor of History at Fort Lewis College in Durango, Colorado, where she teaches modem European history. �148 SLOVAKIA 2019 GUIDELINES FOR MANUSCRIPTS Manuscripts for possible publication should be sent to the editor. Articles should normally not exceed twenty-five pages in length, should be typed double-spaced, should include footnotes at the bottom of the page, and should be submitted in electronic format (stolarik@uottawa.ca), using either MicrosoftWord or WordPerfect. Text and format should adhere to the Chicago Manual of Style. Proper orthography and diacritical marks must be supplied for all foreign words. All articles wi ll be sent to an outside reader for evaluation . Books for review are to be sent to the editor. Unso li cited book reviews are not encouraged. ��THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA A civic and cultural federation of Americans of Slovak Ancestry Organized in 1907 W. NINA HOLY Secretary - Treasurer DANIEL F. TANZONE President Dr. Mikulas A. Halko st 1 Vice President Vice Presidents Justine Wesnak 2 nd Vice President Gabriel Kovac 3'd Vice President Executive Board Daniel F. Tanzone, W. Nina Holy, Dr. Mikulas A. Halko, Eileen S. Wilson, Stephanie Seigel, John A. Holy, Cynthia M. Maleski , Andrew M. Rajec, Michael J. Horvath, Theresa M. Kluchinski, David M. Blazek, Sue Ann. M. Seich , Kenneth A. Arendt, Scott T. Pogorelec, Linda M. Strom , Mary Jo Savidge Milan Cuba, Youth Director Martha Catalano, Dr. Ladislav Korcek, Joseph Goda, Auditors SLOVAK FRATERNAL ORGANIZATIONS AFFILIATED WITH THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA FIRST CATHOLIC SLOVAK LADIES ASSOCIATION Beachwood, Ohio FIRST CATHOLIC SLOVAK UNION OF THE U.S.A. AND CANADA Independence, Ohio SLOVAK CATHOLIC SOKOL Passaic, New Jersey NATIONAL SLOVAK SOCIETY OF THE U.S.A. McMurray, Pennsylvania LADIES PENNSYLVANIA SLOVAK CATHOLIC UNION Wilkes - Barre, Pennsylvania THE SLOVAK NEWSPAPERMEN'S ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA SLOVAKIA $ 10.00 per issue � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2019, Vol. 44 Description An account of the resource Vol. 44 (No. 82-83), 2019. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 2019 147 CONTRIBUTORS R. VLADIMIR BAUMGARTEN (Ph.D., Florida State University), is an independent scholar in Florida. He is co-author (with Joseph Stefka) of The National Slovak Society, a JOO Year History, 18901990 (Pittsburgh, 1990) as well as articles in popular and scholarly journals. MICHAEL CUDE (Ph.D. , Colorado) is an Assistant Professor in the history department at Schreiner University in Kerrville, Texas. He does research on Central and Eastern Europe and transatlantic migration, particularly on transatlantic Slovak national identity. FRANK HENSCHEL (Ph.D. , University of Leipzig) wrote his dissertation on multilingualism and magyarization in Kassa/Kosice in the period of dualism in Hungary, and it was published by the Collegium Carolinum in 2017. He is now doing post-doctoral research on the biopolitics of childhood in socialist Czehoslovakia at the University of Kiel. PETR KUBIK (Ph.D., Charles University, Prague) is an independent historian in the Czech Republic who focuses on the Second World War and Czechs and Slovaks in exile. He has published books on Soviet War Crimes (Prague, 2003) and Slovak-Italian Relationships, 1939-1945 (Bratislava, 2009). ELLEN L. PAUL (Ph.D. , University of Kansas), is an Associate Professor of History at Fort Lewis College in Durango, Colorado, where she teaches modem European history. 148 SLOVAKIA 2019 GUIDELINES FOR MANUSCRIPTS Manuscripts for possible publication should be sent to the editor. Articles should normally not exceed twenty-five pages in length, should be typed double-spaced, should include footnotes at the bottom of the page, and should be submitted in electronic format (stolarik@uottawa.ca), using either MicrosoftWord or WordPerfect. Text and format should adhere to the Chicago Manual of Style. Proper orthography and diacritical marks must be supplied for all foreign words. All articles wi ll be sent to an outside reader for evaluation . Books for review are to be sent to the editor. Unso li cited book reviews are not encouraged. THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA A civic and cultural federation of Americans of Slovak Ancestry Organized in 1907 W. NINA HOLY Secretary - Treasurer DANIEL F. TANZONE President Dr. Mikulas A. Halko st 1 Vice President Vice Presidents Justine Wesnak 2 nd Vice President Gabriel Kovac 3'd Vice President Executive Board Daniel F. Tanzone, W. Nina Holy, Dr. Mikulas A. Halko, Eileen S. Wilson, Stephanie Seigel, John A. Holy, Cynthia M. Maleski , Andrew M. Rajec, Michael J. Horvath, Theresa M. Kluchinski, David M. Blazek, Sue Ann. M. Seich , Kenneth A. Arendt, Scott T. Pogorelec, Linda M. Strom , Mary Jo Savidge Milan Cuba, Youth Director Martha Catalano, Dr. Ladislav Korcek, Joseph Goda, Auditors SLOVAK FRATERNAL ORGANIZATIONS AFFILIATED WITH THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA FIRST CATHOLIC SLOVAK LADIES ASSOCIATION Beachwood, Ohio FIRST CATHOLIC SLOVAK UNION OF THE U.S.A. AND CANADA Independence, Ohio SLOVAK CATHOLIC SOKOL Passaic, New Jersey NATIONAL SLOVAK SOCIETY OF THE U.S.A. McMurray, Pennsylvania LADIES PENNSYLVANIA SLOVAK CATHOLIC UNION Wilkes - Barre, Pennsylvania THE SLOVAK NEWSPAPERMEN'S ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA SLOVAKIA $ 10.00 per issue  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 44 (No. 82-83) Description An account of the resource includes Contributors; Guidelines for Manuscripts Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/989aea1ca9f085022dc25871553920c9.pdf 482921d8a99b9a8147575ead644d8335 PDF Text Text REVIEWS ��SLOVAKIA 2019 133 Tiinde Lengyelova. Zivot na sl'achtickom dvore. Odev, strava, domacnost, hygenia, vo/'ny cas. Bratislava: Slovart, 2015 , 248pp. Notes, bibliography, illustrations, list of noble families , index of names and places. (Baron) PETER MARIASSY Kosice, Slovak Republic The author, who works for the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, specializes in the history of the nobility and of women in the early modem period. Her book on Life in the Court of the Nobility ... is an original contribution to a history of the 16th and 17th centuries in the Kingdom of Hungary, which at that time was partitioned between the Habsburgs, who controlled Upper Hungary and the Ottoman Turks, who occupied the Hungarian Plains and controlled its vassal province of Transylvania. Lengyelova's main contribution consists of a realistic and uncensored look into the life of Hungarian noble society, which at that time suffered from three heavy burdens : to maintain its existence vis-a-vis the Ottoman threat, the Germanizing Habsburg court, and the various wars with both powers. A major contribution of the book is a detailed description of the leading role of nobles ' wives in supporting their husbands who were running the Kingdom or had gone off to war. Based upon extensive archival research, the book reveals for the first time how noble women very capably functioned and supported their husbands in a patriarchal society where the men were much more educated and recognized. In a sense, the women were more than equal partners of their husbands. The reader will be rewarded by unique descriptions of noble life through their dress, their cuisine, the running of their households, questions of hygiene and leisure activities. All of these aspects of life had to function in a time of many wars and uprisings. This book illustrates how life carried on even in the hardest of times, because the noble men and women divided their tasks and admirably carried them out. I recommend this book not only to professional historians, but also to the general public which might be interested in life in early �134 SLOVAKIA 2019 modern Hungary, especially in its cuisine, its dress, and amusements in this very difficult era. In the future , I would like to see the author compare the dress and other aspects of life of the warring sides. It would also have been useful to have had a conclusion to the book, in which the author would not only summarize her findings , but also indicate her further direction of research. Kenneth Janda. The Emperor and the Peasant: Two Men at the Start of the Great War and End of the Habsburg Empire. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co. 2018. X-277 pp. Illustrated, maps, charts, graphs, notes. bibliography, index. M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa This is a popular history of the Great War by a retired Professor of Political Science from Northwestern University. It concerns the Slovak peasant Samuel Mozolak from the village of Krajne in the Myjava region and Habsburg Emperor Franz Josef of AustriaHungary. Janda, a Czech-American, was motivated by the British television series Upstairs Downstairs and Downtown Abby to write the story of his Slovak wife's grandfather and his descendants and compare it with that of the second-last Habsburg Emperor. This is an engaging book. In fourteen well-written chapters, Janda traces the fortunes of Franz Josef and Samuel Mozolak from just before the outbreak of the Great War to its end. He traces Mozolak and his wife back to their voyage and marriage in New York City between 1902 and 1906, their return to Slovakia in 1906, where they dropped off their twins with Mozolaks mother and their return to America until 1914, when they once again returned to Slovakia. Soon after Franz Josef decided to declare war upon Serbia in July of 1914, Samuel Mozolak was drafted into the Hungarian 15 th Honved (Home Army) regiment, based in the city of Trencin, fought on the Russian, Romanian and Italian Fronts, and died in the Battle of the Piave on June 19, 1918. Emperor Franz Josef, on the other hand, declared war upon Serbia on July 28 , 1914, in retaliation for the assassination of his neph- �SLOVAKIA 2019 135 ew Franz Ferdinand by a Serbian terrorist exactly one month earlier. This precipitated the start of the First World War, with the German Empire, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria supporting the Habsburgs while Russia, France, Great Britain, Italy and Romania opposed them. Since both Austria-Hungary and Germany failed in their objectives to defeat and conquer Serbia and France by December, 1914, they lost the war, Janda concluded, despite the fact that it dragged on for four more years. Jandas account is particularly good in describing the Habsburg armies, their ethnic composition, supplies and materials, and devastating defeats. He points out that the Eastern Front, which is often downplayed by Western historians, actually involved more soldiers than in the West, and counted 1,000,000 more casualties than on the Western Front. Janda concluded that, even though Samuel Mozolak died during the Great War, his family , like his countrymen, made great gains from the war, while the Habsburgs lost everything. By joining with the Czechs in creating the new Republic of Czechoslovakia upon the ruins of the Habsburg Empire in 1918, the Slovaks gained their independence, the use of their language in the public sphere and a democratic government. The Habsburgs, by contrast, lost not only their empire, but their thrones and even the right to live in their homeland, from which they were banned after the war. The descendants of Samuel Mozolak moved to the USA after the war and eventually prospered. Thus, the peasant triumphed over the emperor. Since Janda is not an historian, he made a few unfortunate mistakes, which a good editor should have spotted. Thus, on page 44 he mixed up Greek Catholics (Uniates) with the Orthodox; he mistakenly dated the codification of Slovak to 1852, when it was first codified in 1787 and a second time in 1846 (page 48); he was unaware of the existence of the weekly Slowik v Amerike in New York City before the Great War (page 82); he mistakenly referred to the Austrian province of Galicia as having been in Hungary's northeast region ; and he seemed to be unaware that the Czechoslovak Constitution of 1968, which was still in effect in 1992, allowed for the dissolution of the Republic (page 238). In spite of these shortcomings, The Emperor and the Peasant makes for good reading and the general public will undoubtedly �136 SLOVAKIA 2019 learn a lot from it about Slovak immigration to America, and the Habsburg Empire's decline and fall during the Great War. Janda is to be congratulated for this tribute to the Mozolak famly. John Palka, My Slovakia, My Family: One Family's Role in the Birth of a Nation. Minneapolis: Kirk House Publishers, 2012. Paper, 424 pages, with illustrations, appendix, index. $24.95 . ISBN 978-1933794-55-6. KENNETH JANDA Emeritus, Northwestern University This book by a Slovak-American immigrant about his ancestors' homeland is remarkably different from others. It reflects life among the Slovak intelligentsia, rather than peasant roots . Both sides of John Palka's family not only belonged to the intelligentsia, but also played major roles in the literary, religious, economic, and political development of the Slovak nation and its people. Palka's book is divided into three parts with a substantial Appendix. Part I recounts his family's two escapes to America, first fleeing Fascism and then Communism. Part II intertwines his family's history with that of Slovakia. Part III resembles a diary, reporting Palka's contemporary connections with his Slovak heritage. His Appendix contains historical information, maps, genealogical charts, a Slovak language pronunciation guide, and thirty pages of color plates- each one keyed to the text. The research is solid and well-documented. In a way, John Palka is the unintentional chronicler of his forefathers. After retiring in 2002 as a distinguishedd Professor of Biology at the University of Washington, he benefitted from the Slovak government's belated recognition of grandfather Milan Hodza's contributions as Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia from 1935 to 1938. The Slovak government invited John as an honored guest to the reburial of his grandfather's remains from Chicago's Bohemian National Cemetery to the Slovak National Cemetery in Martin. Inspiredd by that experience, unintentional benefactor became intentional historian and author of this absorbing volume. Part I begins in 1935-1938 Prague as Hitler exploited the Western powers' appeasement policies and dismembered and annexed the �SLOVAKIA 2019 137 Czech part of Czechoslovakia. Palka recounts Prime Minister Hodfa's helplessness as allies deserted hi s country. Drawing from family sources, Palka documents the family trauma that forced them to flee their homeland. Theys fled at midnight by train, despite hi s mother's advanced pregnancy. John was born in Paris in 1939, only two weeks after they escaped from Prague. After eluding the SS for nearly two years in occupied France, Palka's family made its way to neutral Portugal in 1941 , using fake passports. In Lisbon, they managed to board a Pan Am Clipper making one of its last flights from warring Europe to New York. Like the many thou sands of Slovak immigrants before them, the Palkas found it hard to adjust to America. Unlike most other Slovaks, they were well-educated and upper class. In Chicago, his multilingual father (Slovak, French, German, Hungarian) and former business owner in the Slovak leather industry was not employable in the American leather industry because he did not speak English. His work on the assembly line of a Slovak-owned electrical parts manufacturing plant produced little income. As Palka tells it, the arrival of his famous grandfather later in 1941 complicated rather than improved the family situation. Not only was Milan Hodza ill before he arrived, but Czechoslovakia's former Prime Minister clashed with its former President, Edvard Benes. Palka said that they divided over three issues : Hodza's insistence on Slovak autonomy within Czechoslovakia, hi s opposition to Soviet influence in hi s country, and hi s support for a federation of Central Europe. Despite speaking often and widely to emigre groups, Hodza failed to win them over before dyi ng in 1944. Obituaries in major world newspapers praised his life and hi s funeral in Chicago was widely attended. Palka says his family's hopes soared with the end of World War II . By 1946 the family was back in Slovakia and optimistic. Two years later, Communists took over the government, and soon the family again fled Czechoslovakia, this time from Bratislava. Palka was old enough to remember their escape. He described crawling under barbed wire, dodging searchlights, and dashing across a field to freedom in Austria. By the end of the year, the Palkas again found themselves on their way to America, this time to New York. �138 SLOVAKIA 2019 By Palka's account, the family fared better in New York than in Chicago. His mother became a translator for Radio Free Europe, and Johnny quickly learned English. He obtained a scholarship at a small private school in Connecticut before entering Swarthmore College, where he met his future wife, Yvonne. Both went to India to do research, married there, and subsequently earned PhDs in neurosciences at UCLA. They eventually landed in Seattle-John at the University of Washington and Yvonne at Antioch University. During that time, Palka had little contact with Slovaks (other than his parents) except for a trip to Czechoslovakia in 1976, where he re-experienced communist oppression. His last chapter in Part I tells how Palka eventually learned of his father's clandestine activities against the Nazis in Slovakia before fleeing in 1941 to join his family in Paris. Part II is primarily about Slovakia's history but also about the roles played by his maternal and paternal ancestors in that history. The first chapters outline his genealogical connections to the Hodfas and Palkas. Whereas most Slovak immigrants' ancestors were peasants, Palka's were also pastors and craftsmen in an emerging middle class. In three chapters, Palka links the personal lives of two special ancestors with the rise of Slovak nationalism in the mid-19 th century. Through his successful leatherworks business, Palka's great-great grand uncle, Ondrej Palka ( 1800-1877), financed the pastoral and cultural activities of Michal Miloslav Hodfa (1811-1870), a great grand uncle who-along with I:udovit Stur and Josef Miloslav Hurban-helped codify Slovak as a literary language. Michal Miloslav Hodfa also became famous for his revolutionary activities in the 1848 uprising against Magyar rule. Although the Austrian emperor pardoned him for his political activities, Slovak magyarones-those who curried favor with the Hungarian government- stripped Hodfa of his salary, his position, and drove him to the borderland. Long after his death, the Slovak government retrieved his remains for an honored burial in Liptovsky Mikulas, where he served as pastor. Ironically, one speaker at his funeral was his nephew, Milan Hodfa-who later would also die in exile and also be returned to Slovakia for reburial with honor. Palka's chapters about other distant relatives-Michael Miloslav's Hodfa's daughter Marina and the Bella family, kin to Palka's great-grandmother-portray accomplished women, which differs sharply from most accounts of Slovaks living in Austria-Hungary. �SLOVAKIA 2019 139 His longest chapter is on grandfather Jan Palka, labeled "the most captivating character" in his family. Inheriting his father's leather business, Jan Palka employed modem manufacturing techniques, and amassed a fortune large enough to own a sumptuous villa with a Bosendoerfer grand piano inside and a tennis court outside. Despite his wealth, he was a utopian socialist who instituted profitsharing, worker participation in management, limited work hours, paid vacations, and children's scholarships. Jan Palka's reforms cut into his company's profits, which also suffered from market losses in Austria-Hungary with the formation of Czechoslovakia. His grandfather lost virtually everything in the Great Depression. Whereas Palka's distant paternal ancestors distinguished themselves in business (and in support of Slovak national causes), his maternal ancestors-the Hodfas- distinguished themselves in "the nation's service"- in Slovak literary, religious, and political activities. Palka ends his chapter, "Four Generations of National Service" sadly, by recounting the high prices the Hodfas paid in jail, persecution, and exile . Palka concludes Part II by returning to grandfather Milan Hodfa, Czechoslovakia's Prime Minister in the mid-1930s . He retraces Hodfa's life from birth, through school, as journalist, during military service, and in politics. Palka's final paragraph says, "And so the story that we began when Milan Hodfa's remains were finally transferred home to his beloved Slovakia, fifty-eight years after his death, is now complete." Part III concludes the book with six chapters providing insight into the author's personal "Slovak awakening." Palka admits to "an emotional experience" each time he returns to the homeland "of a family that has a place in national history." Understandably sentimental, he revisits places and people that played roles in his family's drama, and thus in the nation's history. John Palka assumed the responsibility of documenting his family's life and accomplishments. Not only did he do his duty, but he did it with distinction . �140 SLOVAKIA 2019 Jan Hirka: Pod ochranou Marie - Pastier v sluzbe Cirkvi. Presov: Greckokatolicka teologicka fakulta, 2013. 568 pp. Afterword by Andrej Rusnak. Index, abbreviations, bibliography, photos. DANIEL CERNY Kosice There is a Latin proverb, which probably best fits the review of the book Pod ochranou Marie - Pastier v sluzbe Cirkvi, by the late Bishop of Presov, the Most Reverend Jan Hirka (1923-2014). This proverb is as follows : Verba volant, scripta manent which means "spoken words fly away, written words remain. " History is not only about events and dates, but is also based on great personalities, true leaders, who leave behind them significant imprints and are thus remembered in the hearts of those who knew them . One of the greatest leaders of the Greek Catholic Church in Slovakia in the 20 th century was Bishop Jan Hirka, who served as the Administrator of the then Eparchy of Presov from 1968 to 1989 and then as the resident bishop from 1989 to his retirement in 2002. Bishop Hirka is definitely worth remembering. This autobiography was finished in 2013 and Bishop Hirka gave the first copies to those who came to see him for his jubilee. It was a paradox that the one who was supposed to receive gifts, was distributing them. This book, which is so far the largest vo lume dedicated in Slovak to a single Greek Catholic person, was written towards the end of his life. On the positive side, the book covers almost the comth plete life span of Bishop Hirka, from his youth to his 90 birthday, which also serves as the occasion for its publication. This book deserves to be in the library of every historian who focuses on the life of the Church in 20 th century Central Europe. The title of the book reflects the inscription from the bishop ' s coat of arms of- Under the protection of Mary. Bishop Hirka mentions his devotion to the Mother of God throughout the book. He started to work on the manuscript, with the help of his personal secretary, Father Andrej Rusnak, only after his retirement in 2002. The entire volume is divided into several chapters, which could be summarized into three parts: The first part, which after a description of his early years, focuses on the abolition of the Greek Catholic Church in 1950, his secret pastoral ministry afterwards, his arrest, trial and imprisonment, fol- �SLOVAKIA 2019 141 lowed by exile from eastern Slovakia. He then worked as a simple electrician. His description of his imprisonment and the trial in Prague is stunning. So are his memories of prison work in a Czech mine, his time after release, when he was forced to stay outside of eastern Slovakia and needed to earn his daily bread through manual labor. The second part starts with the events of the Prague Spring and rebirth of the Greek Catholic Church in the former Czecho-Slovakia in 1968. At this time Father Hirka was appointed to lead the Greek Catholic Church, but only as an Apostolic Administrator, as his episcopal ordination was not permitted by the communist regime. It contains a detailed list of events and places he visited, texts of several of his sermons and letters, a compilation of newspaper reports, sermons and homilies. The joy of the Prague Spring of 1968 was very quickly replaced with the foreign military invasion and the period of normalization with many restrictions on the religious life of the citizens. The third part follows Hirka, after he was appointed as the Greek Catholic Bishop of Presov, his memorable ordination in the sport hall of Presov, attended by bishops from all over the world and thousands of the faithful. The papal visit in 1995 to Presov and the beatification of Bishop Gojdic in 2001 are among the highlights of this time. This was a period of increased apostolic activity and marvelous building projects, where people were happy to see their Church free. Among the greatest successes dear to the heart of Bishop Hirka was the reestablishment of the Seminary and of the Theological faculty , which was accomplished in 1990, but for which he struggled from 1968. Bishop Hirka lived long enough to see many important changes in Slovak society at the end of the 20 th century. The Velvet Revolution in 1989 and the dissolution of Czecho-Slovakia in 1993 were important and affected the life of the Church. In 1996 a special Exarchate was created for Greek Catholics in the Czech Republic, who formerly belonged to the Eparchy in Presov, and in 1997 the Exarchate of Kosice was erected, creating a second Greek Catholic jurisdiction in Slovakia. All this led to the elevation of the Church to Metropolitan status, for which Bishop Hirka worked, and was able to see it happen (even though already in retirement) in 2008. Any reader of this book, who has at least some knowledge about �142 SLOVAKIA 2019 the history of the Greek Catholic Church in the former CzechoSlovakia, might feel at the end a bit perplexed. While the first part, speaking about the life and deeds of the young boy, later seminarian and young priest is absolutely stunning, the second and third parts following the path of Father Hirka, who became in 1968 Apostolic Administrator of the Eparchy of Presov and later a bishop--do not possess the quality of the first part. Many of the author's personal decisions, or inner opinions are omitted or hidden. Thus many conflicts or problems, which were publicly known, are not even mentioned. The book gives several wrong impressions. One of them is that the 1990's were a period of complete happiness and zeal. To a certain extent yes, but there were also several problems. It is wellknown that the author's personal relations with his former auxiliary and later Exarch of Kosice, the Most Reverend Milan Chautur, were after an initial period, not very positive, and this resulted in many strange situations, like the fact that, for a time the auxiliary bishop was denied the post of Vicar-General, but was instead appointed to administer a parish himself1 The reader does not need to know everything, but to pretend that there was no problem at all in an autobiography of more than 500 pages is a serious mistake and an injustice to its readers. There is also no mention of two additional phenomena. For instance, the priests of Zemplin lobbied for a second bishopric in Slovakia (the Exarchate of Kosice), which was another unpleasant surprise for Hirka. We know from other documents and publications that these efforts date back to December of 1989. There is also silence regarding those who, during the communist era were secretly ordained, including bishops of the underground church. This phenomenon was common to the Church in the former Czecho-Slovakia. Another negative example is the omission of several personalities who became legends. Among them was Father Jifi Novotny SJ, a Jesuit, who came in the early l 990's to help at the Theological Faculty in Presov and more than ten years after his departure everyone remembered stories about him. He taught numerous subjects, all of them on a very high level, thanks to his knowledge of several languages, his academic background and unique personality. In a book of more than 500 pages this is a serious omission. Yet, the overall impression is positive, as there is no other book �SLOVAKIA 2019 143 which could be compared to this one. Since Bishop Hirka was initially reluctant to put anything on paper, one has to admire the huge work done by Father Andrej Rusnak. To be fair, one has to say that Bishop Hirka was tired, almost exhausted, especially due to constant fighting with the communist authorities . But this is also one of the negatives of the book. It started to be written very late in the life of Bishop Jan, thus reducing several events and some details and depending too much on his declining health. Approximately 150 photos add great value to the book, as does a special chapter on the beatification of the new-martyrs P. P. Gojdic and B. Hopko, which were started in 1985 in the USA, but after the fall of the Iron Curtain transferred to the Eparchy of Presov. Resumes in several languages are a great plus, as is the final word by the editor, Father Andrej Rusnak. Thanks also to Father Marek Petro, who helped to finalize the creation of the book, and who provided footnotes to the text. The register of names will be appreciated by all. As Bishop Hirka wrote in the Preface, the famous professor and Roman Catholic priest Stefan Hlavac inspired him to write his memoirs. The latter said that if other nations had lived through such turbulent times, many books, plays and scholarly works would already be published. This book tries to fill this gap and offers a structured and detailed (although not perfect) account of events and deeds of one of the greatest personalities of the Greek Catholics in Slovakia the late Bishop Jan Hirka. Machacek, Michal. Gustav Husak. Praha: Vysehrad, 2017 . 631 pp. Notes, bibliography, photographs and index. JOZEFHYRJA Heidelberg University In order to understand the most rigid period of Czechoslovak history in the 20 th century, we need to know the person who was behind the so-called "normalization." For two decades Gustav Husak (19131991) represented cultural and economic stagnation, restrictions, repressions and an omnipresent fear in the population of that state. �144 SLOVAKIA 2019 Written by the young Czech historian Michal Machacek, this is the first complete biography of the long-time Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the country ' s last communist President. The author covered Husak's life from his birth in the little Slovak village of Dubravka (now part of the capital city Bratislava), until his death as a lonely, defeated and forgotten former communist leader. Machacek did extensive research in archives in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Canada, the USA and Russia, where he discovered new documents. His research led him to the private archives of Husak' s relatives, their oral testimonies and the reminiscences of his contemporaries. He worked on this monograph for almost ten years, which thus became one of the most anticipated books by Slovak and Czech historians. The biography consists of seven chapters listed in chronological order, which provide a detailed insight into the development of Husak's political career as well as his private life. Machacek was influenced neither by Marxist historiography nor by the dissident discourse, which tends to be too emotionally involved in anti-communist views. He represents a new generation of historians, not burdened by the shadows of the past. The result is an objective and wellbalanced biography. Despite coming from a Czech cultural environment, Machacek, is well-acquainted with contemporary Slovak realities, nationalist sentiments, national demands towards the government in Prague and with Slovak historiography. This asset, often lacking in Czech academic discourse, is important for understanding the complicated relations between the Slovak and Czech nations in their common state and it is definitely valuable to understanding Husak's role and involvement in the federalization of Czechoslovakia (January 1, 1969). The narrative's strongest part, the first chapter entitled Young Radical 1913-1938 (pp. 27-96), describes the interwar period, when Gustav Husak lived and studied in Bratislava. Machacek managed to accurately reconstruct those years of his life and he presents a very plastic image--not only of Husak's youth and activities--but also of Slovak intellectual life in Bratislava between the two World Wars and the development of the communist movement. However, he was part of the Slovak intellectual milieu not only in the communist scene but also in the wider spectrum, which included other political and non-political groups. Machacek emphasized the connections and �SLOVAKIA 2019 145 friendships Husak developed, which helped him on many future occasions. One out of many listed in the book was his friendship with the distinguished Slovak economist Imrich Karvas , who was Husak's professor at Comenius University in Bratislava. Husak attended his lectures and seminars and Karvas grew fond of his student. From this moment "their relationship grew in importance during World War II, when Karvas, now as Governor of the Slovak National Bank, many times helped Husak escape his troubles" (p. 72). An impressive element of Machacek's work is that he skilfully links politics, often on the highest level, with Husak's private life. He provides an interesting insight into Husak's relationship with his second wife Viera, who had a significant influence on his personality as well as his decision-making. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bohuslav Chnoupek, recalled how "Husak in general didn 't like official state visits, but precisely because of the initiative of Viera Husakova they, for example, managed to organize( ... ) a state visit to India, or the following June 1977 to Iraq" (pp. 460-61 ). After the tragic death of his wife in a helicopter crash, it appeared "as if [Husak had] lost his supporter and the visits ceased" (p. 461 ). Where the author could have been more specific and could have developed his arguments more, are the details about Husak's relations with the Church in the 1970s. Before that date, Machacek describes exhaustively not only Husak's attitude towards religion, but also that of his parents and his Catholic family background. However, in 1977, when Pope Paul VI elevated the Archdiocese of Tmava to metropolitan status (under the communist regime!), Machacek does not sufficiently explain Husak's role in this process. The creation of the Archdiocese was an important milestone in the history of Slovakia, which could have been examined in more detail, especially from the point of view church-state relations, but the author dedicates only one sentence to it (p. 466). Despite some minor unintentional factual errors, the overall impression of the book is favorable . The author provides the reader with a complete picture of the longest-serving Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. It contains a wealth of new information and gives the reader an interesting insight not only into the political, but also the personal level. Machacek's grasp of the �146 SLOVAKIA 2019 topic is excellent, with more than 2,300 footnotes and an extensive bibliography at the end of the monograph. His book is very readable and contrary to a significant number of preceding scholarly works, it is objective and a valuable contribution to the study of the communist regimes in Central Europe. � REVIEWS ��SLOVAKIA 2019 133 Tiinde Lengyelova. Zivot na sl'achtickom dvore. Odev, strava, domacnost, hygenia, vo/'ny cas. Bratislava: Slovart, 2015 , 248pp. Notes, bibliography, illustrations, list of noble families , index of names and places. (Baron) PETER MARIASSY Kosice, Slovak Republic The author, who works for the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, specializes in the history of the nobility and of women in the early modem period. Her book on Life in the Court of the Nobility ... is an original contribution to a history of the 16th and 17th centuries in the Kingdom of Hungary, which at that time was partitioned between the Habsburgs, who controlled Upper Hungary and the Ottoman Turks, who occupied the Hungarian Plains and controlled its vassal province of Transylvania. Lengyelova's main contribution consists of a realistic and uncensored look into the life of Hungarian noble society, which at that time suffered from three heavy burdens : to maintain its existence vis-a-vis the Ottoman threat, the Germanizing Habsburg court, and the various wars with both powers. A major contribution of the book is a detailed description of the leading role of nobles ' wives in supporting their husbands who were running the Kingdom or had gone off to war. Based upon extensive archival research, the book reveals for the first time how noble women very capably functioned and supported their husbands in a patriarchal society where the men were much more educated and recognized. In a sense, the women were more than equal partners of their husbands. The reader will be rewarded by unique descriptions of noble life through their dress, their cuisine, the running of their households, questions of hygiene and leisure activities. All of these aspects of life had to function in a time of many wars and uprisings. This book illustrates how life carried on even in the hardest of times, because the noble men and women divided their tasks and admirably carried them out. I recommend this book not only to professional historians, but also to the general public which might be interested in life in early �134 SLOVAKIA 2019 modern Hungary, especially in its cuisine, its dress, and amusements in this very difficult era. In the future , I would like to see the author compare the dress and other aspects of life of the warring sides. It would also have been useful to have had a conclusion to the book, in which the author would not only summarize her findings , but also indicate her further direction of research. Kenneth Janda. The Emperor and the Peasant: Two Men at the Start of the Great War and End of the Habsburg Empire. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co. 2018. X-277 pp. Illustrated, maps, charts, graphs, notes. bibliography, index. M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa This is a popular history of the Great War by a retired Professor of Political Science from Northwestern University. It concerns the Slovak peasant Samuel Mozolak from the village of Krajne in the Myjava region and Habsburg Emperor Franz Josef of AustriaHungary. Janda, a Czech-American, was motivated by the British television series Upstairs Downstairs and Downtown Abby to write the story of his Slovak wife's grandfather and his descendants and compare it with that of the second-last Habsburg Emperor. This is an engaging book. In fourteen well-written chapters, Janda traces the fortunes of Franz Josef and Samuel Mozolak from just before the outbreak of the Great War to its end. He traces Mozolak and his wife back to their voyage and marriage in New York City between 1902 and 1906, their return to Slovakia in 1906, where they dropped off their twins with Mozolaks mother and their return to America until 1914, when they once again returned to Slovakia. Soon after Franz Josef decided to declare war upon Serbia in July of 1914, Samuel Mozolak was drafted into the Hungarian 15 th Honved (Home Army) regiment, based in the city of Trencin, fought on the Russian, Romanian and Italian Fronts, and died in the Battle of the Piave on June 19, 1918. Emperor Franz Josef, on the other hand, declared war upon Serbia on July 28 , 1914, in retaliation for the assassination of his neph- �SLOVAKIA 2019 135 ew Franz Ferdinand by a Serbian terrorist exactly one month earlier. This precipitated the start of the First World War, with the German Empire, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria supporting the Habsburgs while Russia, France, Great Britain, Italy and Romania opposed them. Since both Austria-Hungary and Germany failed in their objectives to defeat and conquer Serbia and France by December, 1914, they lost the war, Janda concluded, despite the fact that it dragged on for four more years. Jandas account is particularly good in describing the Habsburg armies, their ethnic composition, supplies and materials, and devastating defeats. He points out that the Eastern Front, which is often downplayed by Western historians, actually involved more soldiers than in the West, and counted 1,000,000 more casualties than on the Western Front. Janda concluded that, even though Samuel Mozolak died during the Great War, his family , like his countrymen, made great gains from the war, while the Habsburgs lost everything. By joining with the Czechs in creating the new Republic of Czechoslovakia upon the ruins of the Habsburg Empire in 1918, the Slovaks gained their independence, the use of their language in the public sphere and a democratic government. The Habsburgs, by contrast, lost not only their empire, but their thrones and even the right to live in their homeland, from which they were banned after the war. The descendants of Samuel Mozolak moved to the USA after the war and eventually prospered. Thus, the peasant triumphed over the emperor. Since Janda is not an historian, he made a few unfortunate mistakes, which a good editor should have spotted. Thus, on page 44 he mixed up Greek Catholics (Uniates) with the Orthodox; he mistakenly dated the codification of Slovak to 1852, when it was first codified in 1787 and a second time in 1846 (page 48); he was unaware of the existence of the weekly Slowik v Amerike in New York City before the Great War (page 82); he mistakenly referred to the Austrian province of Galicia as having been in Hungary's northeast region ; and he seemed to be unaware that the Czechoslovak Constitution of 1968, which was still in effect in 1992, allowed for the dissolution of the Republic (page 238). In spite of these shortcomings, The Emperor and the Peasant makes for good reading and the general public will undoubtedly �136 SLOVAKIA 2019 learn a lot from it about Slovak immigration to America, and the Habsburg Empire's decline and fall during the Great War. Janda is to be congratulated for this tribute to the Mozolak famly. John Palka, My Slovakia, My Family: One Family's Role in the Birth of a Nation. Minneapolis: Kirk House Publishers, 2012. Paper, 424 pages, with illustrations, appendix, index. $24.95 . ISBN 978-1933794-55-6. KENNETH JANDA Emeritus, Northwestern University This book by a Slovak-American immigrant about his ancestors' homeland is remarkably different from others. It reflects life among the Slovak intelligentsia, rather than peasant roots . Both sides of John Palka's family not only belonged to the intelligentsia, but also played major roles in the literary, religious, economic, and political development of the Slovak nation and its people. Palka's book is divided into three parts with a substantial Appendix. Part I recounts his family's two escapes to America, first fleeing Fascism and then Communism. Part II intertwines his family's history with that of Slovakia. Part III resembles a diary, reporting Palka's contemporary connections with his Slovak heritage. His Appendix contains historical information, maps, genealogical charts, a Slovak language pronunciation guide, and thirty pages of color plates- each one keyed to the text. The research is solid and well-documented. In a way, John Palka is the unintentional chronicler of his forefathers. After retiring in 2002 as a distinguishedd Professor of Biology at the University of Washington, he benefitted from the Slovak government's belated recognition of grandfather Milan Hodza's contributions as Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia from 1935 to 1938. The Slovak government invited John as an honored guest to the reburial of his grandfather's remains from Chicago's Bohemian National Cemetery to the Slovak National Cemetery in Martin. Inspiredd by that experience, unintentional benefactor became intentional historian and author of this absorbing volume. Part I begins in 1935-1938 Prague as Hitler exploited the Western powers' appeasement policies and dismembered and annexed the �SLOVAKIA 2019 137 Czech part of Czechoslovakia. Palka recounts Prime Minister Hodfa's helplessness as allies deserted hi s country. Drawing from family sources, Palka documents the family trauma that forced them to flee their homeland. Theys fled at midnight by train, despite hi s mother's advanced pregnancy. John was born in Paris in 1939, only two weeks after they escaped from Prague. After eluding the SS for nearly two years in occupied France, Palka's family made its way to neutral Portugal in 1941 , using fake passports. In Lisbon, they managed to board a Pan Am Clipper making one of its last flights from warring Europe to New York. Like the many thou sands of Slovak immigrants before them, the Palkas found it hard to adjust to America. Unlike most other Slovaks, they were well-educated and upper class. In Chicago, his multilingual father (Slovak, French, German, Hungarian) and former business owner in the Slovak leather industry was not employable in the American leather industry because he did not speak English. His work on the assembly line of a Slovak-owned electrical parts manufacturing plant produced little income. As Palka tells it, the arrival of his famous grandfather later in 1941 complicated rather than improved the family situation. Not only was Milan Hodza ill before he arrived, but Czechoslovakia's former Prime Minister clashed with its former President, Edvard Benes. Palka said that they divided over three issues : Hodza's insistence on Slovak autonomy within Czechoslovakia, hi s opposition to Soviet influence in hi s country, and hi s support for a federation of Central Europe. Despite speaking often and widely to emigre groups, Hodza failed to win them over before dyi ng in 1944. Obituaries in major world newspapers praised his life and hi s funeral in Chicago was widely attended. Palka says his family's hopes soared with the end of World War II . By 1946 the family was back in Slovakia and optimistic. Two years later, Communists took over the government, and soon the family again fled Czechoslovakia, this time from Bratislava. Palka was old enough to remember their escape. He described crawling under barbed wire, dodging searchlights, and dashing across a field to freedom in Austria. By the end of the year, the Palkas again found themselves on their way to America, this time to New York. �138 SLOVAKIA 2019 By Palka's account, the family fared better in New York than in Chicago. His mother became a translator for Radio Free Europe, and Johnny quickly learned English. He obtained a scholarship at a small private school in Connecticut before entering Swarthmore College, where he met his future wife, Yvonne. Both went to India to do research, married there, and subsequently earned PhDs in neurosciences at UCLA. They eventually landed in Seattle-John at the University of Washington and Yvonne at Antioch University. During that time, Palka had little contact with Slovaks (other than his parents) except for a trip to Czechoslovakia in 1976, where he re-experienced communist oppression. His last chapter in Part I tells how Palka eventually learned of his father's clandestine activities against the Nazis in Slovakia before fleeing in 1941 to join his family in Paris. Part II is primarily about Slovakia's history but also about the roles played by his maternal and paternal ancestors in that history. The first chapters outline his genealogical connections to the Hodfas and Palkas. Whereas most Slovak immigrants' ancestors were peasants, Palka's were also pastors and craftsmen in an emerging middle class. In three chapters, Palka links the personal lives of two special ancestors with the rise of Slovak nationalism in the mid-19 th century. Through his successful leatherworks business, Palka's great-great grand uncle, Ondrej Palka ( 1800-1877), financed the pastoral and cultural activities of Michal Miloslav Hodfa (1811-1870), a great grand uncle who-along with I:udovit Stur and Josef Miloslav Hurban-helped codify Slovak as a literary language. Michal Miloslav Hodfa also became famous for his revolutionary activities in the 1848 uprising against Magyar rule. Although the Austrian emperor pardoned him for his political activities, Slovak magyarones-those who curried favor with the Hungarian government- stripped Hodfa of his salary, his position, and drove him to the borderland. Long after his death, the Slovak government retrieved his remains for an honored burial in Liptovsky Mikulas, where he served as pastor. Ironically, one speaker at his funeral was his nephew, Milan Hodfa-who later would also die in exile and also be returned to Slovakia for reburial with honor. Palka's chapters about other distant relatives-Michael Miloslav's Hodfa's daughter Marina and the Bella family, kin to Palka's great-grandmother-portray accomplished women, which differs sharply from most accounts of Slovaks living in Austria-Hungary. �SLOVAKIA 2019 139 His longest chapter is on grandfather Jan Palka, labeled "the most captivating character" in his family. Inheriting his father's leather business, Jan Palka employed modem manufacturing techniques, and amassed a fortune large enough to own a sumptuous villa with a Bosendoerfer grand piano inside and a tennis court outside. Despite his wealth, he was a utopian socialist who instituted profitsharing, worker participation in management, limited work hours, paid vacations, and children's scholarships. Jan Palka's reforms cut into his company's profits, which also suffered from market losses in Austria-Hungary with the formation of Czechoslovakia. His grandfather lost virtually everything in the Great Depression. Whereas Palka's distant paternal ancestors distinguished themselves in business (and in support of Slovak national causes), his maternal ancestors-the Hodfas- distinguished themselves in "the nation's service"- in Slovak literary, religious, and political activities. Palka ends his chapter, "Four Generations of National Service" sadly, by recounting the high prices the Hodfas paid in jail, persecution, and exile . Palka concludes Part II by returning to grandfather Milan Hodfa, Czechoslovakia's Prime Minister in the mid-1930s . He retraces Hodfa's life from birth, through school, as journalist, during military service, and in politics. Palka's final paragraph says, "And so the story that we began when Milan Hodfa's remains were finally transferred home to his beloved Slovakia, fifty-eight years after his death, is now complete." Part III concludes the book with six chapters providing insight into the author's personal "Slovak awakening." Palka admits to "an emotional experience" each time he returns to the homeland "of a family that has a place in national history." Understandably sentimental, he revisits places and people that played roles in his family's drama, and thus in the nation's history. John Palka assumed the responsibility of documenting his family's life and accomplishments. Not only did he do his duty, but he did it with distinction . �140 SLOVAKIA 2019 Jan Hirka: Pod ochranou Marie - Pastier v sluzbe Cirkvi. Presov: Greckokatolicka teologicka fakulta, 2013. 568 pp. Afterword by Andrej Rusnak. Index, abbreviations, bibliography, photos. DANIEL CERNY Kosice There is a Latin proverb, which probably best fits the review of the book Pod ochranou Marie - Pastier v sluzbe Cirkvi, by the late Bishop of Presov, the Most Reverend Jan Hirka (1923-2014). This proverb is as follows : Verba volant, scripta manent which means "spoken words fly away, written words remain. " History is not only about events and dates, but is also based on great personalities, true leaders, who leave behind them significant imprints and are thus remembered in the hearts of those who knew them . One of the greatest leaders of the Greek Catholic Church in Slovakia in the 20 th century was Bishop Jan Hirka, who served as the Administrator of the then Eparchy of Presov from 1968 to 1989 and then as the resident bishop from 1989 to his retirement in 2002. Bishop Hirka is definitely worth remembering. This autobiography was finished in 2013 and Bishop Hirka gave the first copies to those who came to see him for his jubilee. It was a paradox that the one who was supposed to receive gifts, was distributing them. This book, which is so far the largest vo lume dedicated in Slovak to a single Greek Catholic person, was written towards the end of his life. On the positive side, the book covers almost the comth plete life span of Bishop Hirka, from his youth to his 90 birthday, which also serves as the occasion for its publication. This book deserves to be in the library of every historian who focuses on the life of the Church in 20 th century Central Europe. The title of the book reflects the inscription from the bishop ' s coat of arms of- Under the protection of Mary. Bishop Hirka mentions his devotion to the Mother of God throughout the book. He started to work on the manuscript, with the help of his personal secretary, Father Andrej Rusnak, only after his retirement in 2002. The entire volume is divided into several chapters, which could be summarized into three parts: The first part, which after a description of his early years, focuses on the abolition of the Greek Catholic Church in 1950, his secret pastoral ministry afterwards, his arrest, trial and imprisonment, fol- �SLOVAKIA 2019 141 lowed by exile from eastern Slovakia. He then worked as a simple electrician. His description of his imprisonment and the trial in Prague is stunning. So are his memories of prison work in a Czech mine, his time after release, when he was forced to stay outside of eastern Slovakia and needed to earn his daily bread through manual labor. The second part starts with the events of the Prague Spring and rebirth of the Greek Catholic Church in the former Czecho-Slovakia in 1968. At this time Father Hirka was appointed to lead the Greek Catholic Church, but only as an Apostolic Administrator, as his episcopal ordination was not permitted by the communist regime. It contains a detailed list of events and places he visited, texts of several of his sermons and letters, a compilation of newspaper reports, sermons and homilies. The joy of the Prague Spring of 1968 was very quickly replaced with the foreign military invasion and the period of normalization with many restrictions on the religious life of the citizens. The third part follows Hirka, after he was appointed as the Greek Catholic Bishop of Presov, his memorable ordination in the sport hall of Presov, attended by bishops from all over the world and thousands of the faithful. The papal visit in 1995 to Presov and the beatification of Bishop Gojdic in 2001 are among the highlights of this time. This was a period of increased apostolic activity and marvelous building projects, where people were happy to see their Church free. Among the greatest successes dear to the heart of Bishop Hirka was the reestablishment of the Seminary and of the Theological faculty , which was accomplished in 1990, but for which he struggled from 1968. Bishop Hirka lived long enough to see many important changes in Slovak society at the end of the 20 th century. The Velvet Revolution in 1989 and the dissolution of Czecho-Slovakia in 1993 were important and affected the life of the Church. In 1996 a special Exarchate was created for Greek Catholics in the Czech Republic, who formerly belonged to the Eparchy in Presov, and in 1997 the Exarchate of Kosice was erected, creating a second Greek Catholic jurisdiction in Slovakia. All this led to the elevation of the Church to Metropolitan status, for which Bishop Hirka worked, and was able to see it happen (even though already in retirement) in 2008. Any reader of this book, who has at least some knowledge about �142 SLOVAKIA 2019 the history of the Greek Catholic Church in the former CzechoSlovakia, might feel at the end a bit perplexed. While the first part, speaking about the life and deeds of the young boy, later seminarian and young priest is absolutely stunning, the second and third parts following the path of Father Hirka, who became in 1968 Apostolic Administrator of the Eparchy of Presov and later a bishop--do not possess the quality of the first part. Many of the author's personal decisions, or inner opinions are omitted or hidden. Thus many conflicts or problems, which were publicly known, are not even mentioned. The book gives several wrong impressions. One of them is that the 1990's were a period of complete happiness and zeal. To a certain extent yes, but there were also several problems. It is wellknown that the author's personal relations with his former auxiliary and later Exarch of Kosice, the Most Reverend Milan Chautur, were after an initial period, not very positive, and this resulted in many strange situations, like the fact that, for a time the auxiliary bishop was denied the post of Vicar-General, but was instead appointed to administer a parish himself1 The reader does not need to know everything, but to pretend that there was no problem at all in an autobiography of more than 500 pages is a serious mistake and an injustice to its readers. There is also no mention of two additional phenomena. For instance, the priests of Zemplin lobbied for a second bishopric in Slovakia (the Exarchate of Kosice), which was another unpleasant surprise for Hirka. We know from other documents and publications that these efforts date back to December of 1989. There is also silence regarding those who, during the communist era were secretly ordained, including bishops of the underground church. This phenomenon was common to the Church in the former Czecho-Slovakia. Another negative example is the omission of several personalities who became legends. Among them was Father Jifi Novotny SJ, a Jesuit, who came in the early l 990's to help at the Theological Faculty in Presov and more than ten years after his departure everyone remembered stories about him. He taught numerous subjects, all of them on a very high level, thanks to his knowledge of several languages, his academic background and unique personality. In a book of more than 500 pages this is a serious omission. Yet, the overall impression is positive, as there is no other book �SLOVAKIA 2019 143 which could be compared to this one. Since Bishop Hirka was initially reluctant to put anything on paper, one has to admire the huge work done by Father Andrej Rusnak. To be fair, one has to say that Bishop Hirka was tired, almost exhausted, especially due to constant fighting with the communist authorities . But this is also one of the negatives of the book. It started to be written very late in the life of Bishop Jan, thus reducing several events and some details and depending too much on his declining health. Approximately 150 photos add great value to the book, as does a special chapter on the beatification of the new-martyrs P. P. Gojdic and B. Hopko, which were started in 1985 in the USA, but after the fall of the Iron Curtain transferred to the Eparchy of Presov. Resumes in several languages are a great plus, as is the final word by the editor, Father Andrej Rusnak. Thanks also to Father Marek Petro, who helped to finalize the creation of the book, and who provided footnotes to the text. The register of names will be appreciated by all. As Bishop Hirka wrote in the Preface, the famous professor and Roman Catholic priest Stefan Hlavac inspired him to write his memoirs. The latter said that if other nations had lived through such turbulent times, many books, plays and scholarly works would already be published. This book tries to fill this gap and offers a structured and detailed (although not perfect) account of events and deeds of one of the greatest personalities of the Greek Catholics in Slovakia the late Bishop Jan Hirka. Machacek, Michal. Gustav Husak. Praha: Vysehrad, 2017 . 631 pp. Notes, bibliography, photographs and index. JOZEFHYRJA Heidelberg University In order to understand the most rigid period of Czechoslovak history in the 20 th century, we need to know the person who was behind the so-called "normalization." For two decades Gustav Husak (19131991) represented cultural and economic stagnation, restrictions, repressions and an omnipresent fear in the population of that state. �144 SLOVAKIA 2019 Written by the young Czech historian Michal Machacek, this is the first complete biography of the long-time Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the country ' s last communist President. The author covered Husak's life from his birth in the little Slovak village of Dubravka (now part of the capital city Bratislava), until his death as a lonely, defeated and forgotten former communist leader. Machacek did extensive research in archives in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Canada, the USA and Russia, where he discovered new documents. His research led him to the private archives of Husak' s relatives, their oral testimonies and the reminiscences of his contemporaries. He worked on this monograph for almost ten years, which thus became one of the most anticipated books by Slovak and Czech historians. The biography consists of seven chapters listed in chronological order, which provide a detailed insight into the development of Husak's political career as well as his private life. Machacek was influenced neither by Marxist historiography nor by the dissident discourse, which tends to be too emotionally involved in anti-communist views. He represents a new generation of historians, not burdened by the shadows of the past. The result is an objective and wellbalanced biography. Despite coming from a Czech cultural environment, Machacek, is well-acquainted with contemporary Slovak realities, nationalist sentiments, national demands towards the government in Prague and with Slovak historiography. This asset, often lacking in Czech academic discourse, is important for understanding the complicated relations between the Slovak and Czech nations in their common state and it is definitely valuable to understanding Husak's role and involvement in the federalization of Czechoslovakia (January 1, 1969). The narrative's strongest part, the first chapter entitled Young Radical 1913-1938 (pp. 27-96), describes the interwar period, when Gustav Husak lived and studied in Bratislava. Machacek managed to accurately reconstruct those years of his life and he presents a very plastic image--not only of Husak's youth and activities--but also of Slovak intellectual life in Bratislava between the two World Wars and the development of the communist movement. However, he was part of the Slovak intellectual milieu not only in the communist scene but also in the wider spectrum, which included other political and non-political groups. Machacek emphasized the connections and �SLOVAKIA 2019 145 friendships Husak developed, which helped him on many future occasions. One out of many listed in the book was his friendship with the distinguished Slovak economist Imrich Karvas , who was Husak's professor at Comenius University in Bratislava. Husak attended his lectures and seminars and Karvas grew fond of his student. From this moment "their relationship grew in importance during World War II, when Karvas, now as Governor of the Slovak National Bank, many times helped Husak escape his troubles" (p. 72). An impressive element of Machacek's work is that he skilfully links politics, often on the highest level, with Husak's private life. He provides an interesting insight into Husak's relationship with his second wife Viera, who had a significant influence on his personality as well as his decision-making. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bohuslav Chnoupek, recalled how "Husak in general didn 't like official state visits, but precisely because of the initiative of Viera Husakova they, for example, managed to organize( ... ) a state visit to India, or the following June 1977 to Iraq" (pp. 460-61 ). After the tragic death of his wife in a helicopter crash, it appeared "as if [Husak had] lost his supporter and the visits ceased" (p. 461 ). Where the author could have been more specific and could have developed his arguments more, are the details about Husak's relations with the Church in the 1970s. Before that date, Machacek describes exhaustively not only Husak's attitude towards religion, but also that of his parents and his Catholic family background. However, in 1977, when Pope Paul VI elevated the Archdiocese of Tmava to metropolitan status (under the communist regime!), Machacek does not sufficiently explain Husak's role in this process. The creation of the Archdiocese was an important milestone in the history of Slovakia, which could have been examined in more detail, especially from the point of view church-state relations, but the author dedicates only one sentence to it (p. 466). Despite some minor unintentional factual errors, the overall impression of the book is favorable . The author provides the reader with a complete picture of the longest-serving Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. It contains a wealth of new information and gives the reader an interesting insight not only into the political, but also the personal level. Machacek's grasp of the �146 SLOVAKIA 2019 topic is excellent, with more than 2,300 footnotes and an extensive bibliography at the end of the monograph. His book is very readable and contrary to a significant number of preceding scholarly works, it is objective and a valuable contribution to the study of the communist regimes in Central Europe. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2019, Vol. 44 Description An account of the resource Vol. 44 (No. 82-83), 2019. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document REVIEWS SLOVAKIA 2019 133 Tiinde Lengyelova. Zivot na sl'achtickom dvore. Odev, strava, domacnost, hygenia, vo/'ny cas. Bratislava: Slovart, 2015 , 248pp. Notes, bibliography, illustrations, list of noble families , index of names and places. (Baron) PETER MARIASSY Kosice, Slovak Republic The author, who works for the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, specializes in the history of the nobility and of women in the early modem period. Her book on Life in the Court of the Nobility ... is an original contribution to a history of the 16th and 17th centuries in the Kingdom of Hungary, which at that time was partitioned between the Habsburgs, who controlled Upper Hungary and the Ottoman Turks, who occupied the Hungarian Plains and controlled its vassal province of Transylvania. Lengyelova's main contribution consists of a realistic and uncensored look into the life of Hungarian noble society, which at that time suffered from three heavy burdens : to maintain its existence vis-a-vis the Ottoman threat, the Germanizing Habsburg court, and the various wars with both powers. A major contribution of the book is a detailed description of the leading role of nobles ' wives in supporting their husbands who were running the Kingdom or had gone off to war. Based upon extensive archival research, the book reveals for the first time how noble women very capably functioned and supported their husbands in a patriarchal society where the men were much more educated and recognized. In a sense, the women were more than equal partners of their husbands. The reader will be rewarded by unique descriptions of noble life through their dress, their cuisine, the running of their households, questions of hygiene and leisure activities. All of these aspects of life had to function in a time of many wars and uprisings. This book illustrates how life carried on even in the hardest of times, because the noble men and women divided their tasks and admirably carried them out. I recommend this book not only to professional historians, but also to the general public which might be interested in life in early 134 SLOVAKIA 2019 modern Hungary, especially in its cuisine, its dress, and amusements in this very difficult era. In the future , I would like to see the author compare the dress and other aspects of life of the warring sides. It would also have been useful to have had a conclusion to the book, in which the author would not only summarize her findings , but also indicate her further direction of research. Kenneth Janda. The Emperor and the Peasant: Two Men at the Start of the Great War and End of the Habsburg Empire. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co. 2018. X-277 pp. Illustrated, maps, charts, graphs, notes. bibliography, index. M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa This is a popular history of the Great War by a retired Professor of Political Science from Northwestern University. It concerns the Slovak peasant Samuel Mozolak from the village of Krajne in the Myjava region and Habsburg Emperor Franz Josef of AustriaHungary. Janda, a Czech-American, was motivated by the British television series Upstairs Downstairs and Downtown Abby to write the story of his Slovak wife's grandfather and his descendants and compare it with that of the second-last Habsburg Emperor. This is an engaging book. In fourteen well-written chapters, Janda traces the fortunes of Franz Josef and Samuel Mozolak from just before the outbreak of the Great War to its end. He traces Mozolak and his wife back to their voyage and marriage in New York City between 1902 and 1906, their return to Slovakia in 1906, where they dropped off their twins with Mozolaks mother and their return to America until 1914, when they once again returned to Slovakia. Soon after Franz Josef decided to declare war upon Serbia in July of 1914, Samuel Mozolak was drafted into the Hungarian 15 th Honved (Home Army) regiment, based in the city of Trencin, fought on the Russian, Romanian and Italian Fronts, and died in the Battle of the Piave on June 19, 1918. Emperor Franz Josef, on the other hand, declared war upon Serbia on July 28 , 1914, in retaliation for the assassination of his neph- SLOVAKIA 2019 135 ew Franz Ferdinand by a Serbian terrorist exactly one month earlier. This precipitated the start of the First World War, with the German Empire, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria supporting the Habsburgs while Russia, France, Great Britain, Italy and Romania opposed them. Since both Austria-Hungary and Germany failed in their objectives to defeat and conquer Serbia and France by December, 1914, they lost the war, Janda concluded, despite the fact that it dragged on for four more years. Jandas account is particularly good in describing the Habsburg armies, their ethnic composition, supplies and materials, and devastating defeats. He points out that the Eastern Front, which is often downplayed by Western historians, actually involved more soldiers than in the West, and counted 1,000,000 more casualties than on the Western Front. Janda concluded that, even though Samuel Mozolak died during the Great War, his family , like his countrymen, made great gains from the war, while the Habsburgs lost everything. By joining with the Czechs in creating the new Republic of Czechoslovakia upon the ruins of the Habsburg Empire in 1918, the Slovaks gained their independence, the use of their language in the public sphere and a democratic government. The Habsburgs, by contrast, lost not only their empire, but their thrones and even the right to live in their homeland, from which they were banned after the war. The descendants of Samuel Mozolak moved to the USA after the war and eventually prospered. Thus, the peasant triumphed over the emperor. Since Janda is not an historian, he made a few unfortunate mistakes, which a good editor should have spotted. Thus, on page 44 he mixed up Greek Catholics (Uniates) with the Orthodox; he mistakenly dated the codification of Slovak to 1852, when it was first codified in 1787 and a second time in 1846 (page 48); he was unaware of the existence of the weekly Slowik v Amerike in New York City before the Great War (page 82); he mistakenly referred to the Austrian province of Galicia as having been in Hungary's northeast region ; and he seemed to be unaware that the Czechoslovak Constitution of 1968, which was still in effect in 1992, allowed for the dissolution of the Republic (page 238). In spite of these shortcomings, The Emperor and the Peasant makes for good reading and the general public will undoubtedly 136 SLOVAKIA 2019 learn a lot from it about Slovak immigration to America, and the Habsburg Empire's decline and fall during the Great War. Janda is to be congratulated for this tribute to the Mozolak famly. John Palka, My Slovakia, My Family: One Family's Role in the Birth of a Nation. Minneapolis: Kirk House Publishers, 2012. Paper, 424 pages, with illustrations, appendix, index. $24.95 . ISBN 978-1933794-55-6. KENNETH JANDA Emeritus, Northwestern University This book by a Slovak-American immigrant about his ancestors' homeland is remarkably different from others. It reflects life among the Slovak intelligentsia, rather than peasant roots . Both sides of John Palka's family not only belonged to the intelligentsia, but also played major roles in the literary, religious, economic, and political development of the Slovak nation and its people. Palka's book is divided into three parts with a substantial Appendix. Part I recounts his family's two escapes to America, first fleeing Fascism and then Communism. Part II intertwines his family's history with that of Slovakia. Part III resembles a diary, reporting Palka's contemporary connections with his Slovak heritage. His Appendix contains historical information, maps, genealogical charts, a Slovak language pronunciation guide, and thirty pages of color plates- each one keyed to the text. The research is solid and well-documented. In a way, John Palka is the unintentional chronicler of his forefathers. After retiring in 2002 as a distinguishedd Professor of Biology at the University of Washington, he benefitted from the Slovak government's belated recognition of grandfather Milan Hodza's contributions as Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia from 1935 to 1938. The Slovak government invited John as an honored guest to the reburial of his grandfather's remains from Chicago's Bohemian National Cemetery to the Slovak National Cemetery in Martin. Inspiredd by that experience, unintentional benefactor became intentional historian and author of this absorbing volume. Part I begins in 1935-1938 Prague as Hitler exploited the Western powers' appeasement policies and dismembered and annexed the SLOVAKIA 2019 137 Czech part of Czechoslovakia. Palka recounts Prime Minister Hodfa's helplessness as allies deserted hi s country. Drawing from family sources, Palka documents the family trauma that forced them to flee their homeland. Theys fled at midnight by train, despite hi s mother's advanced pregnancy. John was born in Paris in 1939, only two weeks after they escaped from Prague. After eluding the SS for nearly two years in occupied France, Palka's family made its way to neutral Portugal in 1941 , using fake passports. In Lisbon, they managed to board a Pan Am Clipper making one of its last flights from warring Europe to New York. Like the many thou sands of Slovak immigrants before them, the Palkas found it hard to adjust to America. Unlike most other Slovaks, they were well-educated and upper class. In Chicago, his multilingual father (Slovak, French, German, Hungarian) and former business owner in the Slovak leather industry was not employable in the American leather industry because he did not speak English. His work on the assembly line of a Slovak-owned electrical parts manufacturing plant produced little income. As Palka tells it, the arrival of his famous grandfather later in 1941 complicated rather than improved the family situation. Not only was Milan Hodza ill before he arrived, but Czechoslovakia's former Prime Minister clashed with its former President, Edvard Benes. Palka said that they divided over three issues : Hodza's insistence on Slovak autonomy within Czechoslovakia, hi s opposition to Soviet influence in hi s country, and hi s support for a federation of Central Europe. Despite speaking often and widely to emigre groups, Hodza failed to win them over before dyi ng in 1944. Obituaries in major world newspapers praised his life and hi s funeral in Chicago was widely attended. Palka says his family's hopes soared with the end of World War II . By 1946 the family was back in Slovakia and optimistic. Two years later, Communists took over the government, and soon the family again fled Czechoslovakia, this time from Bratislava. Palka was old enough to remember their escape. He described crawling under barbed wire, dodging searchlights, and dashing across a field to freedom in Austria. By the end of the year, the Palkas again found themselves on their way to America, this time to New York. 138 SLOVAKIA 2019 By Palka's account, the family fared better in New York than in Chicago. His mother became a translator for Radio Free Europe, and Johnny quickly learned English. He obtained a scholarship at a small private school in Connecticut before entering Swarthmore College, where he met his future wife, Yvonne. Both went to India to do research, married there, and subsequently earned PhDs in neurosciences at UCLA. They eventually landed in Seattle-John at the University of Washington and Yvonne at Antioch University. During that time, Palka had little contact with Slovaks (other than his parents) except for a trip to Czechoslovakia in 1976, where he re-experienced communist oppression. His last chapter in Part I tells how Palka eventually learned of his father's clandestine activities against the Nazis in Slovakia before fleeing in 1941 to join his family in Paris. Part II is primarily about Slovakia's history but also about the roles played by his maternal and paternal ancestors in that history. The first chapters outline his genealogical connections to the Hodfas and Palkas. Whereas most Slovak immigrants' ancestors were peasants, Palka's were also pastors and craftsmen in an emerging middle class. In three chapters, Palka links the personal lives of two special ancestors with the rise of Slovak nationalism in the mid-19 th century. Through his successful leatherworks business, Palka's great-great grand uncle, Ondrej Palka ( 1800-1877), financed the pastoral and cultural activities of Michal Miloslav Hodfa (1811-1870), a great grand uncle who-along with I:udovit Stur and Josef Miloslav Hurban-helped codify Slovak as a literary language. Michal Miloslav Hodfa also became famous for his revolutionary activities in the 1848 uprising against Magyar rule. Although the Austrian emperor pardoned him for his political activities, Slovak magyarones-those who curried favor with the Hungarian government- stripped Hodfa of his salary, his position, and drove him to the borderland. Long after his death, the Slovak government retrieved his remains for an honored burial in Liptovsky Mikulas, where he served as pastor. Ironically, one speaker at his funeral was his nephew, Milan Hodfa-who later would also die in exile and also be returned to Slovakia for reburial with honor. Palka's chapters about other distant relatives-Michael Miloslav's Hodfa's daughter Marina and the Bella family, kin to Palka's great-grandmother-portray accomplished women, which differs sharply from most accounts of Slovaks living in Austria-Hungary. SLOVAKIA 2019 139 His longest chapter is on grandfather Jan Palka, labeled "the most captivating character" in his family. Inheriting his father's leather business, Jan Palka employed modem manufacturing techniques, and amassed a fortune large enough to own a sumptuous villa with a Bosendoerfer grand piano inside and a tennis court outside. Despite his wealth, he was a utopian socialist who instituted profitsharing, worker participation in management, limited work hours, paid vacations, and children's scholarships. Jan Palka's reforms cut into his company's profits, which also suffered from market losses in Austria-Hungary with the formation of Czechoslovakia. His grandfather lost virtually everything in the Great Depression. Whereas Palka's distant paternal ancestors distinguished themselves in business (and in support of Slovak national causes), his maternal ancestors-the Hodfas- distinguished themselves in "the nation's service"- in Slovak literary, religious, and political activities. Palka ends his chapter, "Four Generations of National Service" sadly, by recounting the high prices the Hodfas paid in jail, persecution, and exile . Palka concludes Part II by returning to grandfather Milan Hodfa, Czechoslovakia's Prime Minister in the mid-1930s . He retraces Hodfa's life from birth, through school, as journalist, during military service, and in politics. Palka's final paragraph says, "And so the story that we began when Milan Hodfa's remains were finally transferred home to his beloved Slovakia, fifty-eight years after his death, is now complete." Part III concludes the book with six chapters providing insight into the author's personal "Slovak awakening." Palka admits to "an emotional experience" each time he returns to the homeland "of a family that has a place in national history." Understandably sentimental, he revisits places and people that played roles in his family's drama, and thus in the nation's history. John Palka assumed the responsibility of documenting his family's life and accomplishments. Not only did he do his duty, but he did it with distinction . 140 SLOVAKIA 2019 Jan Hirka: Pod ochranou Marie - Pastier v sluzbe Cirkvi. Presov: Greckokatolicka teologicka fakulta, 2013. 568 pp. Afterword by Andrej Rusnak. Index, abbreviations, bibliography, photos. DANIEL CERNY Kosice There is a Latin proverb, which probably best fits the review of the book Pod ochranou Marie - Pastier v sluzbe Cirkvi, by the late Bishop of Presov, the Most Reverend Jan Hirka (1923-2014). This proverb is as follows : Verba volant, scripta manent which means "spoken words fly away, written words remain. " History is not only about events and dates, but is also based on great personalities, true leaders, who leave behind them significant imprints and are thus remembered in the hearts of those who knew them . One of the greatest leaders of the Greek Catholic Church in Slovakia in the 20 th century was Bishop Jan Hirka, who served as the Administrator of the then Eparchy of Presov from 1968 to 1989 and then as the resident bishop from 1989 to his retirement in 2002. Bishop Hirka is definitely worth remembering. This autobiography was finished in 2013 and Bishop Hirka gave the first copies to those who came to see him for his jubilee. It was a paradox that the one who was supposed to receive gifts, was distributing them. This book, which is so far the largest vo lume dedicated in Slovak to a single Greek Catholic person, was written towards the end of his life. On the positive side, the book covers almost the comth plete life span of Bishop Hirka, from his youth to his 90 birthday, which also serves as the occasion for its publication. This book deserves to be in the library of every historian who focuses on the life of the Church in 20 th century Central Europe. The title of the book reflects the inscription from the bishop ' s coat of arms of- Under the protection of Mary. Bishop Hirka mentions his devotion to the Mother of God throughout the book. He started to work on the manuscript, with the help of his personal secretary, Father Andrej Rusnak, only after his retirement in 2002. The entire volume is divided into several chapters, which could be summarized into three parts: The first part, which after a description of his early years, focuses on the abolition of the Greek Catholic Church in 1950, his secret pastoral ministry afterwards, his arrest, trial and imprisonment, fol- SLOVAKIA 2019 141 lowed by exile from eastern Slovakia. He then worked as a simple electrician. His description of his imprisonment and the trial in Prague is stunning. So are his memories of prison work in a Czech mine, his time after release, when he was forced to stay outside of eastern Slovakia and needed to earn his daily bread through manual labor. The second part starts with the events of the Prague Spring and rebirth of the Greek Catholic Church in the former Czecho-Slovakia in 1968. At this time Father Hirka was appointed to lead the Greek Catholic Church, but only as an Apostolic Administrator, as his episcopal ordination was not permitted by the communist regime. It contains a detailed list of events and places he visited, texts of several of his sermons and letters, a compilation of newspaper reports, sermons and homilies. The joy of the Prague Spring of 1968 was very quickly replaced with the foreign military invasion and the period of normalization with many restrictions on the religious life of the citizens. The third part follows Hirka, after he was appointed as the Greek Catholic Bishop of Presov, his memorable ordination in the sport hall of Presov, attended by bishops from all over the world and thousands of the faithful. The papal visit in 1995 to Presov and the beatification of Bishop Gojdic in 2001 are among the highlights of this time. This was a period of increased apostolic activity and marvelous building projects, where people were happy to see their Church free. Among the greatest successes dear to the heart of Bishop Hirka was the reestablishment of the Seminary and of the Theological faculty , which was accomplished in 1990, but for which he struggled from 1968. Bishop Hirka lived long enough to see many important changes in Slovak society at the end of the 20 th century. The Velvet Revolution in 1989 and the dissolution of Czecho-Slovakia in 1993 were important and affected the life of the Church. In 1996 a special Exarchate was created for Greek Catholics in the Czech Republic, who formerly belonged to the Eparchy in Presov, and in 1997 the Exarchate of Kosice was erected, creating a second Greek Catholic jurisdiction in Slovakia. All this led to the elevation of the Church to Metropolitan status, for which Bishop Hirka worked, and was able to see it happen (even though already in retirement) in 2008. Any reader of this book, who has at least some knowledge about 142 SLOVAKIA 2019 the history of the Greek Catholic Church in the former CzechoSlovakia, might feel at the end a bit perplexed. While the first part, speaking about the life and deeds of the young boy, later seminarian and young priest is absolutely stunning, the second and third parts following the path of Father Hirka, who became in 1968 Apostolic Administrator of the Eparchy of Presov and later a bishop--do not possess the quality of the first part. Many of the author's personal decisions, or inner opinions are omitted or hidden. Thus many conflicts or problems, which were publicly known, are not even mentioned. The book gives several wrong impressions. One of them is that the 1990's were a period of complete happiness and zeal. To a certain extent yes, but there were also several problems. It is wellknown that the author's personal relations with his former auxiliary and later Exarch of Kosice, the Most Reverend Milan Chautur, were after an initial period, not very positive, and this resulted in many strange situations, like the fact that, for a time the auxiliary bishop was denied the post of Vicar-General, but was instead appointed to administer a parish himself1 The reader does not need to know everything, but to pretend that there was no problem at all in an autobiography of more than 500 pages is a serious mistake and an injustice to its readers. There is also no mention of two additional phenomena. For instance, the priests of Zemplin lobbied for a second bishopric in Slovakia (the Exarchate of Kosice), which was another unpleasant surprise for Hirka. We know from other documents and publications that these efforts date back to December of 1989. There is also silence regarding those who, during the communist era were secretly ordained, including bishops of the underground church. This phenomenon was common to the Church in the former Czecho-Slovakia. Another negative example is the omission of several personalities who became legends. Among them was Father Jifi Novotny SJ, a Jesuit, who came in the early l 990's to help at the Theological Faculty in Presov and more than ten years after his departure everyone remembered stories about him. He taught numerous subjects, all of them on a very high level, thanks to his knowledge of several languages, his academic background and unique personality. In a book of more than 500 pages this is a serious omission. Yet, the overall impression is positive, as there is no other book SLOVAKIA 2019 143 which could be compared to this one. Since Bishop Hirka was initially reluctant to put anything on paper, one has to admire the huge work done by Father Andrej Rusnak. To be fair, one has to say that Bishop Hirka was tired, almost exhausted, especially due to constant fighting with the communist authorities . But this is also one of the negatives of the book. It started to be written very late in the life of Bishop Jan, thus reducing several events and some details and depending too much on his declining health. Approximately 150 photos add great value to the book, as does a special chapter on the beatification of the new-martyrs P. P. Gojdic and B. Hopko, which were started in 1985 in the USA, but after the fall of the Iron Curtain transferred to the Eparchy of Presov. Resumes in several languages are a great plus, as is the final word by the editor, Father Andrej Rusnak. Thanks also to Father Marek Petro, who helped to finalize the creation of the book, and who provided footnotes to the text. The register of names will be appreciated by all. As Bishop Hirka wrote in the Preface, the famous professor and Roman Catholic priest Stefan Hlavac inspired him to write his memoirs. The latter said that if other nations had lived through such turbulent times, many books, plays and scholarly works would already be published. This book tries to fill this gap and offers a structured and detailed (although not perfect) account of events and deeds of one of the greatest personalities of the Greek Catholics in Slovakia the late Bishop Jan Hirka. Machacek, Michal. Gustav Husak. Praha: Vysehrad, 2017 . 631 pp. Notes, bibliography, photographs and index. JOZEFHYRJA Heidelberg University In order to understand the most rigid period of Czechoslovak history in the 20 th century, we need to know the person who was behind the so-called "normalization." For two decades Gustav Husak (19131991) represented cultural and economic stagnation, restrictions, repressions and an omnipresent fear in the population of that state. 144 SLOVAKIA 2019 Written by the young Czech historian Michal Machacek, this is the first complete biography of the long-time Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the country ' s last communist President. The author covered Husak's life from his birth in the little Slovak village of Dubravka (now part of the capital city Bratislava), until his death as a lonely, defeated and forgotten former communist leader. Machacek did extensive research in archives in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Canada, the USA and Russia, where he discovered new documents. His research led him to the private archives of Husak' s relatives, their oral testimonies and the reminiscences of his contemporaries. He worked on this monograph for almost ten years, which thus became one of the most anticipated books by Slovak and Czech historians. The biography consists of seven chapters listed in chronological order, which provide a detailed insight into the development of Husak's political career as well as his private life. Machacek was influenced neither by Marxist historiography nor by the dissident discourse, which tends to be too emotionally involved in anti-communist views. He represents a new generation of historians, not burdened by the shadows of the past. The result is an objective and wellbalanced biography. Despite coming from a Czech cultural environment, Machacek, is well-acquainted with contemporary Slovak realities, nationalist sentiments, national demands towards the government in Prague and with Slovak historiography. This asset, often lacking in Czech academic discourse, is important for understanding the complicated relations between the Slovak and Czech nations in their common state and it is definitely valuable to understanding Husak's role and involvement in the federalization of Czechoslovakia (January 1, 1969). The narrative's strongest part, the first chapter entitled Young Radical 1913-1938 (pp. 27-96), describes the interwar period, when Gustav Husak lived and studied in Bratislava. Machacek managed to accurately reconstruct those years of his life and he presents a very plastic image--not only of Husak's youth and activities--but also of Slovak intellectual life in Bratislava between the two World Wars and the development of the communist movement. However, he was part of the Slovak intellectual milieu not only in the communist scene but also in the wider spectrum, which included other political and non-political groups. Machacek emphasized the connections and SLOVAKIA 2019 145 friendships Husak developed, which helped him on many future occasions. One out of many listed in the book was his friendship with the distinguished Slovak economist Imrich Karvas , who was Husak's professor at Comenius University in Bratislava. Husak attended his lectures and seminars and Karvas grew fond of his student. From this moment "their relationship grew in importance during World War II, when Karvas, now as Governor of the Slovak National Bank, many times helped Husak escape his troubles" (p. 72). An impressive element of Machacek's work is that he skilfully links politics, often on the highest level, with Husak's private life. He provides an interesting insight into Husak's relationship with his second wife Viera, who had a significant influence on his personality as well as his decision-making. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bohuslav Chnoupek, recalled how "Husak in general didn 't like official state visits, but precisely because of the initiative of Viera Husakova they, for example, managed to organize( ... ) a state visit to India, or the following June 1977 to Iraq" (pp. 460-61 ). After the tragic death of his wife in a helicopter crash, it appeared "as if [Husak had] lost his supporter and the visits ceased" (p. 461 ). Where the author could have been more specific and could have developed his arguments more, are the details about Husak's relations with the Church in the 1970s. Before that date, Machacek describes exhaustively not only Husak's attitude towards religion, but also that of his parents and his Catholic family background. However, in 1977, when Pope Paul VI elevated the Archdiocese of Tmava to metropolitan status (under the communist regime!), Machacek does not sufficiently explain Husak's role in this process. The creation of the Archdiocese was an important milestone in the history of Slovakia, which could have been examined in more detail, especially from the point of view church-state relations, but the author dedicates only one sentence to it (p. 466). Despite some minor unintentional factual errors, the overall impression of the book is favorable . The author provides the reader with a complete picture of the longest-serving Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. It contains a wealth of new information and gives the reader an interesting insight not only into the political, but also the personal level. Machacek's grasp of the 146 SLOVAKIA 2019 topic is excellent, with more than 2,300 footnotes and an extensive bibliography at the end of the monograph. His book is very readable and contrary to a significant number of preceding scholarly works, it is objective and a valuable contribution to the study of the communist regimes in Central Europe.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Book Reviews, Slovakia, Vol. 44 (No. 82-83) Description An account of the resource includes:<br /><ul><li>Tünde Lengyelová, Život na šľachtickom dvore (Peter Máriássy), p. 133</li> <li>Kenneth Janda, The Emperor and the Peasant: Two Men at the Start of the Great War and End of the Habsburg Empire (M. Mark Stolarik), p. 134</li> <li>John Palka, My Slovakia, My Family: One Family's Role in the Birth of a Nation (Kenneth Janda), p. 136</li> <li>Ján Hirka, Pod ochranou Márie - Pastier v službe Cirkvi (Daniel Černý), p. 140</li> <li>Michal Macháček, Gustáv Husák (Jozef Hyrja), p. 143</li> </ul> Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Černý. Daniel Hyrja, Jozef Janda, Kenneth Máriássy, Peter Stolarik, M. Mark, 1943- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 LCNAF name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/635b6ed1c68bba1673b6a0d1ff764bbc.pdf cf43258673a41d9008eacf50c98385b5 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 2019 7 DISPUTED DIVERSITY: "GUARDIANS OF THE NATION" AND THE MULTILINGUAL URBAN SPACES OF KASSA/KOSICE IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 19TH CENTURY Frank Henschel Introduction The Slovak historian Pavel Hapak claimed that the cities of Upper Hungary (Slovakia) as part of the Kingdom of Hungary before 1918 epitomized "centers of a violent maygarization," 1 that is, the forceful assimilation of non-Magyar speakers like Slovaks or Germans or of other ethnic groups, into the Magyar language and culture One important city in the region was Kassa, today's Kosice, the second largest city in Slovakia. 2 By focusing on ethnic groups and on violent magyarization, Hapak, among others, contributed to a dominant historiographic narrative of Hungary as part of the East Central European region. Jeremy King and Rogers Brubaker characterized this narrative as "ethnicism" and "groupism" because it concentrates on antagonisms of national groups, ethnic tensions and fights for cultural hegemony as driving forces of history in the region. 3 The past was ethniczed by projecting today's national affiliations back into a time when there actually was no clear idea about one's national identity, making this an inappropriate term for historical analysis. 4 As other studies of the multilingual, multinational and multi-confessional cities of East Central Europe like Kassa/Kosice convincing1 Hapak, Pavel, " Das Nationalitiitenproblem in den slowakischen Stiidten am Beispiel von Gewerbe, Industrie und den Geldinstituten vom ausgehenden 19. Jahrhundert bis zum Zusammenbruch der Monarchie," in Die Stiidte Mitteleuropas im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. by Wilhelm Rausch (Linz, 1984), 127--48, here 127. 2 For a deeper analysis of the historiography about Kosice since the 18 th century see Ondrej Ficeri. Kos ice v slovenskej historiografli (Kos ice, 2016) 3 Jeremy King, "The Nationalization of Eastern Central Europe: Ethnicism, Ethnicity, and Beyond," in Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, ed. by Maria Sueur and Nancy M. Wingfield (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 200 I), 112- 52.; Rogers Brubaker, "Ethnicity without Groups," European Journal of Sociology 43, no. 2 (2002): 163-89. 4 Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, "Beyond "Identity," Theory and Society 29, no. 1 (2000): 1--47. �8 SLOVAKIA 2019 ly argued, most people's everyday life in the 19'" century and fin-desiecle was less determined by ethnic identity than by social status, class, profession, religious affiliation, education, wealth, position in the community, local or regional origin, political standpoint etc. 5 I am aware that there actually were nationalist activities and endeavors, not least in the Hungarian part of the Habsburg Monarchy, where the government, nationalist press and cultural institutions aimed at spreading national Magyar culture and language in order to marginalize or repress other languages like Slovak and German, and thus to homogenize the mostly diverse urban societies in nationalist terms. However, we have to trace back these processes to their original propagators and institutional contexts, not just repeat nationalist demands and claims as issues of an actual, fixed national or ethnic group and thus mistake them as realities and facts .6 In Kassa/Kosice, a considerable number of people advocated nationalist or ethnicist concepts of identity and awarded them relevance in the everyday urban life by centering all other social, cultural, religious or professional affiliations around this concept in order to strengthen and legitimate their position and reputation in the local society. With Pieter Judson I would like to call these activists "Guardians of the Nation". 7 They were not just nationalist intellectuals or pure men of action, but a specific blend of both. There was not a single collective organization, which served as a specific basis for their activities, but several local institutions and different occasions, where the "guardians" appeared and operated. They followed a specific ethno-national mindset, which they connected to single categories of history, culture, language, religion and which dominated their perception of urban space, the population and cohabitation. In order to realize their perceptions, they engaged in municipal politics, local 5 Balint Varga, " Multilingualism in Urban Hungary: 1880-1910," Nationalities Papers 42 (2014): 1-16; Tara Zahra, "Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis," Slavic Review 69, no. I (2010): 93- 119; Eleonora Babejova, Fin-de-siecle Pressburg: Conflict and Cultural Coexistence in Bratislava 1897- 1914 (New York: East European Monographs, Distributed by Columbia University Press), 617. 6 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. (Repr. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997), I 0-18 . 7 Pieter M. Judson, Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press), 2006 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 9 cultural institutions like the theatre, in cultural or economic associations, in schools or churches, in memory culture. In all these spheres of urban life, the "guardians of the nation" sought influence and tried to infuse urban life and institutions with their concepts of ethnonational identity. 8 Using the example of Kassa/ Kosice I would like to illustrate some aspects of the struggle of national activists to fully homogenize, i.e. magyarize, the city in the second half of the l 9•h century and the limits of their endeavors. First, I will present some facts and figures about Kassa/Kosice from 1870 to the First World War. Then, I will show some results of my investigation concerning the magyarization of urban cultural spaces in Kassa/Kosice, namely the theatre, cultural associations and church communities. 9 Kassa/Kosice 1870-191 8 10 In the second half of the 19'" century, Kassa/Kos ice was one of the twenty largest cities in the Kingdom of Hungary and the second largest in Upper Hungary. The population grew from 22,000 to 45 ,000 and was nourished by both regional migration from the surrounding county of Abauj-Toma and from other regions of the monarchy. Although the economic relevance of Kassa/Kosice in compar8 Referring to Brubaker again, it is hard to distinguish between a "civic" (national, liberal) and "ethnic" (primordial) concept of identity because both aspects are deeply intertwined. Thus, there is also no rational purpose in classifying the first as "positive" and the latter as "negative" because both aimed at separating human collectives according to specific categories like language, culture, origin, religion etc. and excluding, marginalizing, even fighting the "others" not belonging to a such perceived collective. Rogers Brubaker, "The Manichean Myth: Rethinking the Distin ction between 'Civic' and 'Ethnic' Nationalism," in Nation and National Identity: Th e European Experience in Perspective, ed. by Hanspeter Kriesi et al. (Chur: Ruegger, I 999), 55- 71. 9 For a detailed investigation and analysis see Frank Henschel, "Das Fluidum der Stadt ... ": Urbane Lebenswelten in Kassa/Kosice/Kaschau zwischen Sprachenvielfalt und Magyarisierung 1867- 191 8 (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 20 I 7). 10 Because in 20 13 Kosice was awarded the title "European Capital of Culture," there was an increased interest in the city, resulting in a couple of richly illustrated academic publications which investigated some aspects of the local and regional history: Veronika Gayer, ed. Remembering the City: A Guide through the Past of Kos ice (Budapest: Terra Recognita Foundation, 2013); Stefan Sutaj and Nikoleta Dzurikaninova, eds. Struktury a fragmenty historickeho vyvoja Kasie (Kosice, 2014) . �10 SLOVAKIA 2019 ison to Budapest, Pozony/Pressburg (later Bratislava) or the mining di stricts in the north decreased, the city remained a regional center of culture, district administration, education and trade, not to mention that it was a self-governing autonomous municipality. Kassa/Kosice was quite "bourgeois." Some twenty percent of the population could be classified as living in bourgeois upper and upper-middle-class circumstances, regarding wealth, profession and rights. One of the most important feature s of Kassa/Kosice was its confessional diversity. The Roman Catholic Church remained dominant, but the smaller communities consolidated and even gained new members. Between 1880 and 1910, the percentage of Roman Catholics declined from seventy to sixty-three percent. By contrast, the percentage of Greek Catholics increased from 6.5 to eight percent, Calvinists went from four to eight percent, and the Jews expanded from eleven to fifteen percent. Only the Lutherans lost in population - down from nearly eight to 5.5 percent. Regarding the linguistic proportions, despite all the criticism of these instruments of identity politics and sources of ethnicized historiography, 11 I have had to rely on official censuses to at least give a sizeable hint: in 1880 Slovak and Magyar each were claimed as the mother tongue by about 40% of the population, German by some 17%. By 1910 the official Magyar language of administration increased so dramatically that three quarters of the population were declared as Magyars, 15 % as Slovaks and only 7 % as Germans. 12 However, these figure s say nothing about bi - or even trilingualism and they do not show the distribution, use and social hierarchy of the languages in everyday life. As the great writer Sandor Marai , born in 1900 in Kassa/Kosice wrote in his "memoir novel" not yet translated into English - the city undoubtedly carried a Magyar "atmosphere." But at the same time, Marai continued, it was characterized by an omnipresent multilingualism: the bourgeoisie in private preferred the German language, whereas the peasants from 11 Wolfgang Giiderle, Zensus und Ethnizitiit: Zur Herstellung von Wissen iiber soziale Wirklichkeiten im Habsburgerreich zwischen 1848 und I 910 (Giittingen: Wallstein Verlag, 201 6); Theodore M. Porter, The Rise of Statistical Thinking: 1820-1 900 (Princeton: Princeton Uni versity Press, 1986). 12 Joachim von Puttkamer, " Mehrsprachi gkeit und Sprachenzwang in Oberungam und Siebenbiirgen 1867-1 9 14: Eine statistische Untersuchung," Zeitschrift fo r siebenbiirgische Landeskunde 26, no. I (2003): 7--40. �SLOVAKIA 2019 11 the "hinterland," the domestic servants and the urban poor often spoke in Slovak. In many cases people used two or more languages in different situations. 13 Multilingualism was a characteristic of the local society and it did not necessarily correspond with one's national affiliation or patriotic attitude. However, for some, the "guardians" of language and culture, it in fact did. I will now tum to three distinct spheres of urban life in order to demonstrate their endeavors for ethno-national identity and at the same time point to the limits of their activism. The Theatre as an Arena of Magyarization 14 The first cultural space as a domain of the urban bourgeoisie was the theatre. Due to the widespread bilingual character of this class, national activists especially targeted bourgeois cultural institutions for magyarization. German, although widely regarded as a civilized language by the local bourgeoisie and not an obstacle to a patriotic affiliation to Hungary, was displaced step-by-step. The "cathedral" of bourgeois culture, the local theater, after renovations, reopened in 1899 as the "Nemzeti Szinhaz" (the National Theatre), and as a completely monolingual space. The Board for Theatre Affairs, a municipal committee, had already banned non-Magyar ensembles in the 1870s, only allowing some guest performances on summer open-air stages. This neglect of linguistic and cultural diversity, together with the often-blamed low quality of most pieces, resulted in poor attendance even in the new prestigious theater building. Thus, the new ensemble director Janos Komjathy, in charge from 1902 to 1912, tried to balance artistic quality, financial responsibility and the demands of the Municipal Theatre Committee for the promotion of Magyar national culture. Despite his success for most of the time, he was unable to avoid some scandals in the first years of his engagement. In 1903 Komjathy invited an ensemble from Brno, which resulted in a furious press campaign against this "Slavic invasion." The opera, which would have been staged by eighty actors and musicians, had to be cancelled. Soon, a similar protest broke out, 13 Sandor Marai , Bekenntnisse eines Biirgers: Erinnerungen (Miinchen: Piper, 2000), 18. 14 For detailed literature and source material see Henschel , Das Fluidum der Stadt, 110-124 (fn . 9). �12 SLOVAKIA 2019 accusing him of "germanization" of the theatre. The incident took place during a performance. Lacking a professional orchestra, Komjathy depended upon the local imperial army orchestra. Once during the performance of a national-romantic piece, including the "Kossuth-Dal," a song for the leader of the Hungarian Revolutionary War in 1848/49, the musicians skipped some parts, whereupon the audience, led by a group of students from the local Academy of Law, staged a noisy protest. The musicians left and Komjathy had to do a lot of diplomatic work not to lose the support of the orchestra for good. Such scandals were not repeated in the future , so it can be concluded that the director learned a lesson about the Magyar national demarcation of the Kassa/Kosice theatre. The local "guardians" regarded it as a space for explicit national cultural performances, including the exclusive use of the Magyar language. Clubs and Associations: Instruments of Nationalism? 15 However, not all spaces of bourgeois cultural life in Kassa/Kosice were charged so strongly with national ideology. The noble and bourgeois clubs (called Casinos) worked rather as rooms of social segregation. High fees and strict charters excluded unwanted members of urban society, such as the petty bourgeoisie and lower classes. Ethno-national segregation, however, did not play a role here. Rather, party politics and confessional differences led to separation : liberal and conservative, Catholic and Jewish . In the end, the Casinos were spaces of socializing and entertainment without strong political or ethno-national implications. Nevertheless, they also served for the promotion of Magyar patriotism amongst their members . Especially after the tum of the century, the multilingual character of the clubs disappeared due to the exclusive use of the Magyar language. Besides Casinos, civil society was also constituted by cultural associations. They had different aims than the Casinos, as demon15 For detailed literature and source material see Ibid. , 124-52 ; Frank Henschel , Vereinswesen und Erinnerungskultur in Kaschau I Kosice I Kassa zwischen Nationalismus und stadtbiirger/ichem P··.1gmatismus (1867- 1918). Working Paper Series for the Research Academy in Lei pzig 12. Leipzig: Leipziger Univ.-Verl. , 20 I 3. �13 SLOVAK.IA 2019 strated by two examples: the "Society for Education" and the "Kazinczy-Circle" (named after the famous reformer of the Magyar language, Ferenc Kazinczy). Both aimed at magyarizing the city, but in a division of labor. The Society offered Magyar-language courses for workers and organized popular patriotic events (readings, amateur-theatre) for the lower classes. Also, teachers and pupils were rewarded for success in school. In order to magyarize the Slovak hinterland, children from the surrounding villages were invited into the Nemzeti Szinhaz, where they were shown patriotic pieces in order to evoke national (Magyar) consciousness. This list of activities should not be mistaken as proof of unlimited success, since these were mostly single events. In 1913, the Committee of the Society for Education had to admit that their endeavors were disappointing, since the commitment of their members, both financially and personally, was low and the effects of linguistic assimilation were also low. The second association, the Kazinczy-Circle, addressed the bourgeoisie. Its foundation in 1898 was inspired by the Toldi-Circle in Pressburg or the Petofi-Circle in Budapest. It organized scientific and reading events, promoting progress in Magyar national culture, literature and science. However, struggling with the same problems as the Society, the Circle failed in reaching a broader share of the upper classes, which preferred to spend their leisure time in the casinos. The Churches : Magyarizing Broader Society? 16 The third, and last urban cultural space under investigation did not constitute an exclusive habitat of the bourgeoisie. Churches were basically open to all people and therefore they are quite interesting for the study of nationalizing practices. As already mentioned, Kassa/Kosice was characterized by a wide diversity of religious affiliations: Roman and Greek Catholics, Lutheran and Calvinist Protes17 tants as well as Orthodox and Reform Jewry. 16 For detailed literature and source material see Henschel , Fluidum der Stadt, 15379 (fn. 9); Frank Henschel , "Religions and the Nation in Kassa before World War I," Hungarian Historical Review 3, no. 4 (2014): 850-74. 17 There is an excellent investigation of the past and present of the Jewish community of Ko sice using the approach of cultural anthropology: Vanda Vitti, (Trans-) Formationen jiidischer Lebenswelten nach 1989: Eine Ethnografie in zwei slowa- �14 SLOVAKIA 2019 In the nationalizing atmosphere of the l 9•h century, though , every church community had to cope with the challenge of nationalist ideology and to adapt to the new thinking. On the front lines, Magyar national activists fought for linguistic homogenization of church services and the inner administration. Secondly, church representatives themselves were in favor of the Magyar nation, trying to distingui sh their community from others in respect of national loyalty. The only community whose Magyar character wasn't in doubt at all were the Calvinists, who saw themselves as "the" Magyar confession and fostered the Magyar language from the beginning. All other church communities were multilingual and, therefore, had to find an arrangement with nationali st claims. Only two chose the way of complete self-magyarization, though not before the first decade of the 20•h century: The first was the Jewish Reform community, which had split from Jewish Orthodoxy due to a country-wide schism of Hungarian Jewry in 1869. In 1904 the community's assembly voted for the exclusive use of Magyar in church services, correspondence and meetings. Before that, Jews in a strange cooperation of nationalist-liberal and conservative Catholic press were accused of being "Germanisers" due to their German-language use in public and within associations. The self-magyarization, thus, can be interpreted as an assimilative strategy according to Viktor Karady 's analysis of the integration of the Hungarian Jewry. 18 The second community, which voted for self-magyarization, likewise as a step towards integration, were the Greek Catholics. They used Orthodox rites and liturgy but stood under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church. Despite their Slavic origin and language, the nationalist press did not attack them as it did attack Jews and - as I will show- the Roman Catholic Church. By contrast, Greek Catholics enjoyed a pretty established status, as is proven by the fact, that many non-members contributed funds for the erection of a Greek Catholic Church building in the last decade of the 19'" century. However, in 1909 the Greek Catholic leadership abolished the use of Old Church Slavonic in its services and quite smoothly kischen Stiidten. Ethnografische Perspektiven auf das ostliche Europa I (Bielefeld : Transcript, 2015) . 18 Victor Karady, " Aspects of Unequal Assimilation in Liberal Hungary: Social Geography of the Movement to Magyarise Alien Surnames before 19 I 8," CEU History Department Yearbook 1997-1998 ( 1999): 49- 67 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 15 adapted to the claims of the Magyar national idea. Although Roman Catholicism was the largest denomination in Kassa/Kosice and many representatives were involved in institutions and events promoting Magyar national culture and magyarization, nationalist attacks against the multilingual character and "missing" national loyalty were omnipresent. The Dominican Order was accused of slovakizing the city by maintaining Slovak-language services. The monks argued that the believers should be offered services in their mother tongue and that this had nothing to do with the promotion of a separate national idea. In fact, there had been some incidents when church-goers protested against services in the Magyar language and demanded Slovak instead. However, to interpret this as the manifestation of a strong national consciousness would be misleading. It was more a demand for language use as usual and appropriate. Therefore, although their number was reduced, Slovak language services survived until 1918 in all Roman Catholic churches of Kassa/Kosice. A very interesting case was the Lutheran community. Up to 1861 three divided communities existed, a Magyar, a German and a Slovak one. Then the Magyar and the German ones merged into the "First" Lutheran community, sharing the church building with an officially named "Second" community, which actually was run in the Slovak language. The attempt to avoid the interpretation of an ethnonational segregation is obvious. However, during the last quarter of the l 9•h century, representatives of both communities tried to realize a final fusion which should have resulted in the abolition of all nonMagyar services. There was widespread fear that the nationalist movement could gain influence in the Slovak community. In the end, despite multiple round-tables and several appeals to the believers of the second community, that they show "national morals," the unification never succeeded and the Lutherans of Kassa/Kosice remained linguistically separated. Conclusion In investigating multiethnic, multicultural and multilingual societies, it is necessary to concentrate not on "groups" but on categories and practices of activists, their perceptions, purposes and endeavors. As illustrated by the brief examples in the history of Kas- �16 SLOVAKIA 2019 sa/Kosice, the most important category for the local nationalist "guardians" was language. It served not only for the definition of one's ethno-national identity (being "a Slovak," "a German," "a Magyar") but its use also was seen as an expression of patriotism and national loyalty. Thus, German or Slovak-speaking people of Kassa/Kosice could be accused of "betraying" the Magyar nation and threatening Magyardom. As a consequence, local forms of magyarization were initialized, aimed at homogenizing the city. Not by accident did the "guardians" concentrate on language as the primary marker of national identity and loyalty. Although there was not much unifying them - different political affiliation, origin, age, religion, even mother tongue - they shared a specific attribute. It was their status as representatives of the free professions: 19 teachers, lawyers, journalists, in general persons engaged in the cultural sector. Magyar as the dominant and official state language, which some of these activists due to their actual descent from "Slovak" or "German" familie s only acquired as a second or third language, was their most important resource in order to gain and defend a higher social position in the local society. They even became members of the city council , which for a long time was dominated by nobles and the wealthy bourgeoisie. Thus, the "guardians" connected their social , political and cultural engagement with efforts for linguistic homogenization, precisely because magyarization, of Kassa/Kosice, was legitimized by the nationalist idea of Magyar hegemony in the city as well as in the entire country. Local magyarization was a multilayered project, aimed at different classes in different ways : in cultural institutions, associations, churches, schools, enterprises and the public. Whereas in the first decades of the investigated time German language use within the bourgeoisie was attacked, in the l 890's Slovak language use of the urban poor and the peasants of the surrounding areas became the target. However, there was no violent, repressive magyarization suddenly ambushing the population. Perhaps as a feature of small and middle sized cities, with their close and personal contacts among the citizens and policy-makers, magyarization was sometimes harsh in 10 Hannes Siegrist, "The Professions in Nineteenth-Century Europe" in The European Way: European Societies during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, ed. by Hartmut Kaelbe (New York : Berghahn, 2004), 68- 88 . �SLOVAK.IA 2019 17 its tone, especially in the nationalist local press, but quite smooth in practice. It was definitely limited by the actual everyday life of using several languages. Bourgeois urban spaces indeed became magyarized quickly, but rather superficially. Thus, multilingualism as well as the national indifference of most inhabitants remained characteristic features of Kassa/Kosice up to the Second World War and reflects the atmosphere of the city to this day. � SLOVAKIA 2019 7 DISPUTED DIVERSITY: "GUARDIANS OF THE NATION" AND THE MULTILINGUAL URBAN SPACES OF KASSA/KOSICE IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 19TH CENTURY Frank Henschel Introduction The Slovak historian Pavel Hapak claimed that the cities of Upper Hungary (Slovakia) as part of the Kingdom of Hungary before 1918 epitomized "centers of a violent maygarization," 1 that is, the forceful assimilation of non-Magyar speakers like Slovaks or Germans or of other ethnic groups, into the Magyar language and culture One important city in the region was Kassa, today's Kosice, the second largest city in Slovakia. 2 By focusing on ethnic groups and on violent magyarization, Hapak, among others, contributed to a dominant historiographic narrative of Hungary as part of the East Central European region. Jeremy King and Rogers Brubaker characterized this narrative as "ethnicism" and "groupism" because it concentrates on antagonisms of national groups, ethnic tensions and fights for cultural hegemony as driving forces of history in the region. 3 The past was ethniczed by projecting today's national affiliations back into a time when there actually was no clear idea about one's national identity, making this an inappropriate term for historical analysis. 4 As other studies of the multilingual, multinational and multi-confessional cities of East Central Europe like Kassa/Kosice convincing1 Hapak, Pavel, " Das Nationalitiitenproblem in den slowakischen Stiidten am Beispiel von Gewerbe, Industrie und den Geldinstituten vom ausgehenden 19. Jahrhundert bis zum Zusammenbruch der Monarchie," in Die Stiidte Mitteleuropas im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. by Wilhelm Rausch (Linz, 1984), 127--48, here 127. 2 For a deeper analysis of the historiography about Kosice since the 18 th century see Ondrej Ficeri. Kos ice v slovenskej historiografli (Kos ice, 2016) 3 Jeremy King, "The Nationalization of Eastern Central Europe: Ethnicism, Ethnicity, and Beyond," in Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, ed. by Maria Sueur and Nancy M. Wingfield (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 200 I), 112- 52.; Rogers Brubaker, "Ethnicity without Groups," European Journal of Sociology 43, no. 2 (2002): 163-89. 4 Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, "Beyond "Identity," Theory and Society 29, no. 1 (2000): 1--47. �8 SLOVAKIA 2019 ly argued, most people's everyday life in the 19'" century and fin-desiecle was less determined by ethnic identity than by social status, class, profession, religious affiliation, education, wealth, position in the community, local or regional origin, political standpoint etc. 5 I am aware that there actually were nationalist activities and endeavors, not least in the Hungarian part of the Habsburg Monarchy, where the government, nationalist press and cultural institutions aimed at spreading national Magyar culture and language in order to marginalize or repress other languages like Slovak and German, and thus to homogenize the mostly diverse urban societies in nationalist terms. However, we have to trace back these processes to their original propagators and institutional contexts, not just repeat nationalist demands and claims as issues of an actual, fixed national or ethnic group and thus mistake them as realities and facts .6 In Kassa/Kosice, a considerable number of people advocated nationalist or ethnicist concepts of identity and awarded them relevance in the everyday urban life by centering all other social, cultural, religious or professional affiliations around this concept in order to strengthen and legitimate their position and reputation in the local society. With Pieter Judson I would like to call these activists "Guardians of the Nation". 7 They were not just nationalist intellectuals or pure men of action, but a specific blend of both. There was not a single collective organization, which served as a specific basis for their activities, but several local institutions and different occasions, where the "guardians" appeared and operated. They followed a specific ethno-national mindset, which they connected to single categories of history, culture, language, religion and which dominated their perception of urban space, the population and cohabitation. In order to realize their perceptions, they engaged in municipal politics, local 5 Balint Varga, " Multilingualism in Urban Hungary: 1880-1910," Nationalities Papers 42 (2014): 1-16; Tara Zahra, "Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis," Slavic Review 69, no. I (2010): 93- 119; Eleonora Babejova, Fin-de-siecle Pressburg: Conflict and Cultural Coexistence in Bratislava 1897- 1914 (New York: East European Monographs, Distributed by Columbia University Press), 617. 6 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. (Repr. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997), I 0-18 . 7 Pieter M. Judson, Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press), 2006 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 9 cultural institutions like the theatre, in cultural or economic associations, in schools or churches, in memory culture. In all these spheres of urban life, the "guardians of the nation" sought influence and tried to infuse urban life and institutions with their concepts of ethnonational identity. 8 Using the example of Kassa/ Kosice I would like to illustrate some aspects of the struggle of national activists to fully homogenize, i.e. magyarize, the city in the second half of the l 9•h century and the limits of their endeavors. First, I will present some facts and figures about Kassa/Kosice from 1870 to the First World War. Then, I will show some results of my investigation concerning the magyarization of urban cultural spaces in Kassa/Kosice, namely the theatre, cultural associations and church communities. 9 Kassa/Kosice 1870-191 8 10 In the second half of the 19'" century, Kassa/Kos ice was one of the twenty largest cities in the Kingdom of Hungary and the second largest in Upper Hungary. The population grew from 22,000 to 45 ,000 and was nourished by both regional migration from the surrounding county of Abauj-Toma and from other regions of the monarchy. Although the economic relevance of Kassa/Kosice in compar8 Referring to Brubaker again, it is hard to distinguish between a "civic" (national, liberal) and "ethnic" (primordial) concept of identity because both aspects are deeply intertwined. Thus, there is also no rational purpose in classifying the first as "positive" and the latter as "negative" because both aimed at separating human collectives according to specific categories like language, culture, origin, religion etc. and excluding, marginalizing, even fighting the "others" not belonging to a such perceived collective. Rogers Brubaker, "The Manichean Myth: Rethinking the Distin ction between 'Civic' and 'Ethnic' Nationalism," in Nation and National Identity: Th e European Experience in Perspective, ed. by Hanspeter Kriesi et al. (Chur: Ruegger, I 999), 55- 71. 9 For a detailed investigation and analysis see Frank Henschel, "Das Fluidum der Stadt ... ": Urbane Lebenswelten in Kassa/Kosice/Kaschau zwischen Sprachenvielfalt und Magyarisierung 1867- 191 8 (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 20 I 7). 10 Because in 20 13 Kosice was awarded the title "European Capital of Culture," there was an increased interest in the city, resulting in a couple of richly illustrated academic publications which investigated some aspects of the local and regional history: Veronika Gayer, ed. Remembering the City: A Guide through the Past of Kos ice (Budapest: Terra Recognita Foundation, 2013); Stefan Sutaj and Nikoleta Dzurikaninova, eds. Struktury a fragmenty historickeho vyvoja Kasie (Kosice, 2014) . �10 SLOVAKIA 2019 ison to Budapest, Pozony/Pressburg (later Bratislava) or the mining di stricts in the north decreased, the city remained a regional center of culture, district administration, education and trade, not to mention that it was a self-governing autonomous municipality. Kassa/Kosice was quite "bourgeois." Some twenty percent of the population could be classified as living in bourgeois upper and upper-middle-class circumstances, regarding wealth, profession and rights. One of the most important feature s of Kassa/Kosice was its confessional diversity. The Roman Catholic Church remained dominant, but the smaller communities consolidated and even gained new members. Between 1880 and 1910, the percentage of Roman Catholics declined from seventy to sixty-three percent. By contrast, the percentage of Greek Catholics increased from 6.5 to eight percent, Calvinists went from four to eight percent, and the Jews expanded from eleven to fifteen percent. Only the Lutherans lost in population - down from nearly eight to 5.5 percent. Regarding the linguistic proportions, despite all the criticism of these instruments of identity politics and sources of ethnicized historiography, 11 I have had to rely on official censuses to at least give a sizeable hint: in 1880 Slovak and Magyar each were claimed as the mother tongue by about 40% of the population, German by some 17%. By 1910 the official Magyar language of administration increased so dramatically that three quarters of the population were declared as Magyars, 15 % as Slovaks and only 7 % as Germans. 12 However, these figure s say nothing about bi - or even trilingualism and they do not show the distribution, use and social hierarchy of the languages in everyday life. As the great writer Sandor Marai , born in 1900 in Kassa/Kosice wrote in his "memoir novel" not yet translated into English - the city undoubtedly carried a Magyar "atmosphere." But at the same time, Marai continued, it was characterized by an omnipresent multilingualism: the bourgeoisie in private preferred the German language, whereas the peasants from 11 Wolfgang Giiderle, Zensus und Ethnizitiit: Zur Herstellung von Wissen iiber soziale Wirklichkeiten im Habsburgerreich zwischen 1848 und I 910 (Giittingen: Wallstein Verlag, 201 6); Theodore M. Porter, The Rise of Statistical Thinking: 1820-1 900 (Princeton: Princeton Uni versity Press, 1986). 12 Joachim von Puttkamer, " Mehrsprachi gkeit und Sprachenzwang in Oberungam und Siebenbiirgen 1867-1 9 14: Eine statistische Untersuchung," Zeitschrift fo r siebenbiirgische Landeskunde 26, no. I (2003): 7--40. �SLOVAKIA 2019 11 the "hinterland," the domestic servants and the urban poor often spoke in Slovak. In many cases people used two or more languages in different situations. 13 Multilingualism was a characteristic of the local society and it did not necessarily correspond with one's national affiliation or patriotic attitude. However, for some, the "guardians" of language and culture, it in fact did. I will now tum to three distinct spheres of urban life in order to demonstrate their endeavors for ethno-national identity and at the same time point to the limits of their activism. The Theatre as an Arena of Magyarization 14 The first cultural space as a domain of the urban bourgeoisie was the theatre. Due to the widespread bilingual character of this class, national activists especially targeted bourgeois cultural institutions for magyarization. German, although widely regarded as a civilized language by the local bourgeoisie and not an obstacle to a patriotic affiliation to Hungary, was displaced step-by-step. The "cathedral" of bourgeois culture, the local theater, after renovations, reopened in 1899 as the "Nemzeti Szinhaz" (the National Theatre), and as a completely monolingual space. The Board for Theatre Affairs, a municipal committee, had already banned non-Magyar ensembles in the 1870s, only allowing some guest performances on summer open-air stages. This neglect of linguistic and cultural diversity, together with the often-blamed low quality of most pieces, resulted in poor attendance even in the new prestigious theater building. Thus, the new ensemble director Janos Komjathy, in charge from 1902 to 1912, tried to balance artistic quality, financial responsibility and the demands of the Municipal Theatre Committee for the promotion of Magyar national culture. Despite his success for most of the time, he was unable to avoid some scandals in the first years of his engagement. In 1903 Komjathy invited an ensemble from Brno, which resulted in a furious press campaign against this "Slavic invasion." The opera, which would have been staged by eighty actors and musicians, had to be cancelled. Soon, a similar protest broke out, 13 Sandor Marai , Bekenntnisse eines Biirgers: Erinnerungen (Miinchen: Piper, 2000), 18. 14 For detailed literature and source material see Henschel , Das Fluidum der Stadt, 110-124 (fn . 9). �12 SLOVAKIA 2019 accusing him of "germanization" of the theatre. The incident took place during a performance. Lacking a professional orchestra, Komjathy depended upon the local imperial army orchestra. Once during the performance of a national-romantic piece, including the "Kossuth-Dal," a song for the leader of the Hungarian Revolutionary War in 1848/49, the musicians skipped some parts, whereupon the audience, led by a group of students from the local Academy of Law, staged a noisy protest. The musicians left and Komjathy had to do a lot of diplomatic work not to lose the support of the orchestra for good. Such scandals were not repeated in the future , so it can be concluded that the director learned a lesson about the Magyar national demarcation of the Kassa/Kosice theatre. The local "guardians" regarded it as a space for explicit national cultural performances, including the exclusive use of the Magyar language. Clubs and Associations: Instruments of Nationalism? 15 However, not all spaces of bourgeois cultural life in Kassa/Kosice were charged so strongly with national ideology. The noble and bourgeois clubs (called Casinos) worked rather as rooms of social segregation. High fees and strict charters excluded unwanted members of urban society, such as the petty bourgeoisie and lower classes. Ethno-national segregation, however, did not play a role here. Rather, party politics and confessional differences led to separation : liberal and conservative, Catholic and Jewish . In the end, the Casinos were spaces of socializing and entertainment without strong political or ethno-national implications. Nevertheless, they also served for the promotion of Magyar patriotism amongst their members . Especially after the tum of the century, the multilingual character of the clubs disappeared due to the exclusive use of the Magyar language. Besides Casinos, civil society was also constituted by cultural associations. They had different aims than the Casinos, as demon15 For detailed literature and source material see Ibid. , 124-52 ; Frank Henschel , Vereinswesen und Erinnerungskultur in Kaschau I Kosice I Kassa zwischen Nationalismus und stadtbiirger/ichem P··.1gmatismus (1867- 1918). Working Paper Series for the Research Academy in Lei pzig 12. Leipzig: Leipziger Univ.-Verl. , 20 I 3. �13 SLOVAK.IA 2019 strated by two examples: the "Society for Education" and the "Kazinczy-Circle" (named after the famous reformer of the Magyar language, Ferenc Kazinczy). Both aimed at magyarizing the city, but in a division of labor. The Society offered Magyar-language courses for workers and organized popular patriotic events (readings, amateur-theatre) for the lower classes. Also, teachers and pupils were rewarded for success in school. In order to magyarize the Slovak hinterland, children from the surrounding villages were invited into the Nemzeti Szinhaz, where they were shown patriotic pieces in order to evoke national (Magyar) consciousness. This list of activities should not be mistaken as proof of unlimited success, since these were mostly single events. In 1913, the Committee of the Society for Education had to admit that their endeavors were disappointing, since the commitment of their members, both financially and personally, was low and the effects of linguistic assimilation were also low. The second association, the Kazinczy-Circle, addressed the bourgeoisie. Its foundation in 1898 was inspired by the Toldi-Circle in Pressburg or the Petofi-Circle in Budapest. It organized scientific and reading events, promoting progress in Magyar national culture, literature and science. However, struggling with the same problems as the Society, the Circle failed in reaching a broader share of the upper classes, which preferred to spend their leisure time in the casinos. The Churches : Magyarizing Broader Society? 16 The third, and last urban cultural space under investigation did not constitute an exclusive habitat of the bourgeoisie. Churches were basically open to all people and therefore they are quite interesting for the study of nationalizing practices. As already mentioned, Kassa/Kosice was characterized by a wide diversity of religious affiliations: Roman and Greek Catholics, Lutheran and Calvinist Protes17 tants as well as Orthodox and Reform Jewry. 16 For detailed literature and source material see Henschel , Fluidum der Stadt, 15379 (fn. 9); Frank Henschel , "Religions and the Nation in Kassa before World War I," Hungarian Historical Review 3, no. 4 (2014): 850-74. 17 There is an excellent investigation of the past and present of the Jewish community of Ko sice using the approach of cultural anthropology: Vanda Vitti, (Trans-) Formationen jiidischer Lebenswelten nach 1989: Eine Ethnografie in zwei slowa- �14 SLOVAKIA 2019 In the nationalizing atmosphere of the l 9•h century, though , every church community had to cope with the challenge of nationalist ideology and to adapt to the new thinking. On the front lines, Magyar national activists fought for linguistic homogenization of church services and the inner administration. Secondly, church representatives themselves were in favor of the Magyar nation, trying to distingui sh their community from others in respect of national loyalty. The only community whose Magyar character wasn't in doubt at all were the Calvinists, who saw themselves as "the" Magyar confession and fostered the Magyar language from the beginning. All other church communities were multilingual and, therefore, had to find an arrangement with nationali st claims. Only two chose the way of complete self-magyarization, though not before the first decade of the 20•h century: The first was the Jewish Reform community, which had split from Jewish Orthodoxy due to a country-wide schism of Hungarian Jewry in 1869. In 1904 the community's assembly voted for the exclusive use of Magyar in church services, correspondence and meetings. Before that, Jews in a strange cooperation of nationalist-liberal and conservative Catholic press were accused of being "Germanisers" due to their German-language use in public and within associations. The self-magyarization, thus, can be interpreted as an assimilative strategy according to Viktor Karady 's analysis of the integration of the Hungarian Jewry. 18 The second community, which voted for self-magyarization, likewise as a step towards integration, were the Greek Catholics. They used Orthodox rites and liturgy but stood under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church. Despite their Slavic origin and language, the nationalist press did not attack them as it did attack Jews and - as I will show- the Roman Catholic Church. By contrast, Greek Catholics enjoyed a pretty established status, as is proven by the fact, that many non-members contributed funds for the erection of a Greek Catholic Church building in the last decade of the 19'" century. However, in 1909 the Greek Catholic leadership abolished the use of Old Church Slavonic in its services and quite smoothly kischen Stiidten. Ethnografische Perspektiven auf das ostliche Europa I (Bielefeld : Transcript, 2015) . 18 Victor Karady, " Aspects of Unequal Assimilation in Liberal Hungary: Social Geography of the Movement to Magyarise Alien Surnames before 19 I 8," CEU History Department Yearbook 1997-1998 ( 1999): 49- 67 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 15 adapted to the claims of the Magyar national idea. Although Roman Catholicism was the largest denomination in Kassa/Kosice and many representatives were involved in institutions and events promoting Magyar national culture and magyarization, nationalist attacks against the multilingual character and "missing" national loyalty were omnipresent. The Dominican Order was accused of slovakizing the city by maintaining Slovak-language services. The monks argued that the believers should be offered services in their mother tongue and that this had nothing to do with the promotion of a separate national idea. In fact, there had been some incidents when church-goers protested against services in the Magyar language and demanded Slovak instead. However, to interpret this as the manifestation of a strong national consciousness would be misleading. It was more a demand for language use as usual and appropriate. Therefore, although their number was reduced, Slovak language services survived until 1918 in all Roman Catholic churches of Kassa/Kosice. A very interesting case was the Lutheran community. Up to 1861 three divided communities existed, a Magyar, a German and a Slovak one. Then the Magyar and the German ones merged into the "First" Lutheran community, sharing the church building with an officially named "Second" community, which actually was run in the Slovak language. The attempt to avoid the interpretation of an ethnonational segregation is obvious. However, during the last quarter of the l 9•h century, representatives of both communities tried to realize a final fusion which should have resulted in the abolition of all nonMagyar services. There was widespread fear that the nationalist movement could gain influence in the Slovak community. In the end, despite multiple round-tables and several appeals to the believers of the second community, that they show "national morals," the unification never succeeded and the Lutherans of Kassa/Kosice remained linguistically separated. Conclusion In investigating multiethnic, multicultural and multilingual societies, it is necessary to concentrate not on "groups" but on categories and practices of activists, their perceptions, purposes and endeavors. As illustrated by the brief examples in the history of Kas- �16 SLOVAKIA 2019 sa/Kosice, the most important category for the local nationalist "guardians" was language. It served not only for the definition of one's ethno-national identity (being "a Slovak," "a German," "a Magyar") but its use also was seen as an expression of patriotism and national loyalty. Thus, German or Slovak-speaking people of Kassa/Kosice could be accused of "betraying" the Magyar nation and threatening Magyardom. As a consequence, local forms of magyarization were initialized, aimed at homogenizing the city. Not by accident did the "guardians" concentrate on language as the primary marker of national identity and loyalty. Although there was not much unifying them - different political affiliation, origin, age, religion, even mother tongue - they shared a specific attribute. It was their status as representatives of the free professions: 19 teachers, lawyers, journalists, in general persons engaged in the cultural sector. Magyar as the dominant and official state language, which some of these activists due to their actual descent from "Slovak" or "German" familie s only acquired as a second or third language, was their most important resource in order to gain and defend a higher social position in the local society. They even became members of the city council , which for a long time was dominated by nobles and the wealthy bourgeoisie. Thus, the "guardians" connected their social , political and cultural engagement with efforts for linguistic homogenization, precisely because magyarization, of Kassa/Kosice, was legitimized by the nationalist idea of Magyar hegemony in the city as well as in the entire country. Local magyarization was a multilayered project, aimed at different classes in different ways : in cultural institutions, associations, churches, schools, enterprises and the public. Whereas in the first decades of the investigated time German language use within the bourgeoisie was attacked, in the l 890's Slovak language use of the urban poor and the peasants of the surrounding areas became the target. However, there was no violent, repressive magyarization suddenly ambushing the population. Perhaps as a feature of small and middle sized cities, with their close and personal contacts among the citizens and policy-makers, magyarization was sometimes harsh in 10 Hannes Siegrist, "The Professions in Nineteenth-Century Europe" in The European Way: European Societies during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, ed. by Hartmut Kaelbe (New York : Berghahn, 2004), 68- 88 . �SLOVAK.IA 2019 17 its tone, especially in the nationalist local press, but quite smooth in practice. It was definitely limited by the actual everyday life of using several languages. Bourgeois urban spaces indeed became magyarized quickly, but rather superficially. Thus, multilingualism as well as the national indifference of most inhabitants remained characteristic features of Kassa/Kosice up to the Second World War and reflects the atmosphere of the city to this day. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2019, Vol. 44 Description An account of the resource Vol. 44 (No. 82-83), 2019. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 2019 7 DISPUTED DIVERSITY: "GUARDIANS OF THE NATION" AND THE MULTILINGUAL URBAN SPACES OF KASSA/KOSICE IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 19TH CENTURY Frank Henschel Introduction The Slovak historian Pavel Hapak claimed that the cities of Upper Hungary (Slovakia) as part of the Kingdom of Hungary before 1918 epitomized "centers of a violent maygarization," 1 that is, the forceful assimilation of non-Magyar speakers like Slovaks or Germans or of other ethnic groups, into the Magyar language and culture One important city in the region was Kassa, today's Kosice, the second largest city in Slovakia. 2 By focusing on ethnic groups and on violent magyarization, Hapak, among others, contributed to a dominant historiographic narrative of Hungary as part of the East Central European region. Jeremy King and Rogers Brubaker characterized this narrative as "ethnicism" and "groupism" because it concentrates on antagonisms of national groups, ethnic tensions and fights for cultural hegemony as driving forces of history in the region. 3 The past was ethniczed by projecting today's national affiliations back into a time when there actually was no clear idea about one's national identity, making this an inappropriate term for historical analysis. 4 As other studies of the multilingual, multinational and multi-confessional cities of East Central Europe like Kassa/Kosice convincing1 Hapak, Pavel, " Das Nationalitiitenproblem in den slowakischen Stiidten am Beispiel von Gewerbe, Industrie und den Geldinstituten vom ausgehenden 19. Jahrhundert bis zum Zusammenbruch der Monarchie," in Die Stiidte Mitteleuropas im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. by Wilhelm Rausch (Linz, 1984), 127--48, here 127. 2 For a deeper analysis of the historiography about Kosice since the 18 th century see Ondrej Ficeri. Kos ice v slovenskej historiografli (Kos ice, 2016) 3 Jeremy King, "The Nationalization of Eastern Central Europe: Ethnicism, Ethnicity, and Beyond," in Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, ed. by Maria Sueur and Nancy M. Wingfield (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 200 I), 112- 52.; Rogers Brubaker, "Ethnicity without Groups," European Journal of Sociology 43, no. 2 (2002): 163-89. 4 Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, "Beyond "Identity," Theory and Society 29, no. 1 (2000): 1--47. 8 SLOVAKIA 2019 ly argued, most people's everyday life in the 19'" century and fin-desiecle was less determined by ethnic identity than by social status, class, profession, religious affiliation, education, wealth, position in the community, local or regional origin, political standpoint etc. 5 I am aware that there actually were nationalist activities and endeavors, not least in the Hungarian part of the Habsburg Monarchy, where the government, nationalist press and cultural institutions aimed at spreading national Magyar culture and language in order to marginalize or repress other languages like Slovak and German, and thus to homogenize the mostly diverse urban societies in nationalist terms. However, we have to trace back these processes to their original propagators and institutional contexts, not just repeat nationalist demands and claims as issues of an actual, fixed national or ethnic group and thus mistake them as realities and facts .6 In Kassa/Kosice, a considerable number of people advocated nationalist or ethnicist concepts of identity and awarded them relevance in the everyday urban life by centering all other social, cultural, religious or professional affiliations around this concept in order to strengthen and legitimate their position and reputation in the local society. With Pieter Judson I would like to call these activists "Guardians of the Nation". 7 They were not just nationalist intellectuals or pure men of action, but a specific blend of both. There was not a single collective organization, which served as a specific basis for their activities, but several local institutions and different occasions, where the "guardians" appeared and operated. They followed a specific ethno-national mindset, which they connected to single categories of history, culture, language, religion and which dominated their perception of urban space, the population and cohabitation. In order to realize their perceptions, they engaged in municipal politics, local 5 Balint Varga, " Multilingualism in Urban Hungary: 1880-1910," Nationalities Papers 42 (2014): 1-16; Tara Zahra, "Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis," Slavic Review 69, no. I (2010): 93- 119; Eleonora Babejova, Fin-de-siecle Pressburg: Conflict and Cultural Coexistence in Bratislava 1897- 1914 (New York: East European Monographs, Distributed by Columbia University Press), 617. 6 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. (Repr. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997), I 0-18 . 7 Pieter M. Judson, Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press), 2006 . SLOVAKIA 2019 9 cultural institutions like the theatre, in cultural or economic associations, in schools or churches, in memory culture. In all these spheres of urban life, the "guardians of the nation" sought influence and tried to infuse urban life and institutions with their concepts of ethnonational identity. 8 Using the example of Kassa/ Kosice I would like to illustrate some aspects of the struggle of national activists to fully homogenize, i.e. magyarize, the city in the second half of the l 9•h century and the limits of their endeavors. First, I will present some facts and figures about Kassa/Kosice from 1870 to the First World War. Then, I will show some results of my investigation concerning the magyarization of urban cultural spaces in Kassa/Kosice, namely the theatre, cultural associations and church communities. 9 Kassa/Kosice 1870-191 8 10 In the second half of the 19'" century, Kassa/Kos ice was one of the twenty largest cities in the Kingdom of Hungary and the second largest in Upper Hungary. The population grew from 22,000 to 45 ,000 and was nourished by both regional migration from the surrounding county of Abauj-Toma and from other regions of the monarchy. Although the economic relevance of Kassa/Kosice in compar8 Referring to Brubaker again, it is hard to distinguish between a "civic" (national, liberal) and "ethnic" (primordial) concept of identity because both aspects are deeply intertwined. Thus, there is also no rational purpose in classifying the first as "positive" and the latter as "negative" because both aimed at separating human collectives according to specific categories like language, culture, origin, religion etc. and excluding, marginalizing, even fighting the "others" not belonging to a such perceived collective. Rogers Brubaker, "The Manichean Myth: Rethinking the Distin ction between 'Civic' and 'Ethnic' Nationalism," in Nation and National Identity: Th e European Experience in Perspective, ed. by Hanspeter Kriesi et al. (Chur: Ruegger, I 999), 55- 71. 9 For a detailed investigation and analysis see Frank Henschel, "Das Fluidum der Stadt ... ": Urbane Lebenswelten in Kassa/Kosice/Kaschau zwischen Sprachenvielfalt und Magyarisierung 1867- 191 8 (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 20 I 7). 10 Because in 20 13 Kosice was awarded the title "European Capital of Culture," there was an increased interest in the city, resulting in a couple of richly illustrated academic publications which investigated some aspects of the local and regional history: Veronika Gayer, ed. Remembering the City: A Guide through the Past of Kos ice (Budapest: Terra Recognita Foundation, 2013); Stefan Sutaj and Nikoleta Dzurikaninova, eds. Struktury a fragmenty historickeho vyvoja Kasie (Kosice, 2014) . 10 SLOVAKIA 2019 ison to Budapest, Pozony/Pressburg (later Bratislava) or the mining di stricts in the north decreased, the city remained a regional center of culture, district administration, education and trade, not to mention that it was a self-governing autonomous municipality. Kassa/Kosice was quite "bourgeois." Some twenty percent of the population could be classified as living in bourgeois upper and upper-middle-class circumstances, regarding wealth, profession and rights. One of the most important feature s of Kassa/Kosice was its confessional diversity. The Roman Catholic Church remained dominant, but the smaller communities consolidated and even gained new members. Between 1880 and 1910, the percentage of Roman Catholics declined from seventy to sixty-three percent. By contrast, the percentage of Greek Catholics increased from 6.5 to eight percent, Calvinists went from four to eight percent, and the Jews expanded from eleven to fifteen percent. Only the Lutherans lost in population - down from nearly eight to 5.5 percent. Regarding the linguistic proportions, despite all the criticism of these instruments of identity politics and sources of ethnicized historiography, 11 I have had to rely on official censuses to at least give a sizeable hint: in 1880 Slovak and Magyar each were claimed as the mother tongue by about 40% of the population, German by some 17%. By 1910 the official Magyar language of administration increased so dramatically that three quarters of the population were declared as Magyars, 15 % as Slovaks and only 7 % as Germans. 12 However, these figure s say nothing about bi - or even trilingualism and they do not show the distribution, use and social hierarchy of the languages in everyday life. As the great writer Sandor Marai , born in 1900 in Kassa/Kosice wrote in his "memoir novel" not yet translated into English - the city undoubtedly carried a Magyar "atmosphere." But at the same time, Marai continued, it was characterized by an omnipresent multilingualism: the bourgeoisie in private preferred the German language, whereas the peasants from 11 Wolfgang Giiderle, Zensus und Ethnizitiit: Zur Herstellung von Wissen iiber soziale Wirklichkeiten im Habsburgerreich zwischen 1848 und I 910 (Giittingen: Wallstein Verlag, 201 6); Theodore M. Porter, The Rise of Statistical Thinking: 1820-1 900 (Princeton: Princeton Uni versity Press, 1986). 12 Joachim von Puttkamer, " Mehrsprachi gkeit und Sprachenzwang in Oberungam und Siebenbiirgen 1867-1 9 14: Eine statistische Untersuchung," Zeitschrift fo r siebenbiirgische Landeskunde 26, no. I (2003): 7--40. SLOVAKIA 2019 11 the "hinterland," the domestic servants and the urban poor often spoke in Slovak. In many cases people used two or more languages in different situations. 13 Multilingualism was a characteristic of the local society and it did not necessarily correspond with one's national affiliation or patriotic attitude. However, for some, the "guardians" of language and culture, it in fact did. I will now tum to three distinct spheres of urban life in order to demonstrate their endeavors for ethno-national identity and at the same time point to the limits of their activism. The Theatre as an Arena of Magyarization 14 The first cultural space as a domain of the urban bourgeoisie was the theatre. Due to the widespread bilingual character of this class, national activists especially targeted bourgeois cultural institutions for magyarization. German, although widely regarded as a civilized language by the local bourgeoisie and not an obstacle to a patriotic affiliation to Hungary, was displaced step-by-step. The "cathedral" of bourgeois culture, the local theater, after renovations, reopened in 1899 as the "Nemzeti Szinhaz" (the National Theatre), and as a completely monolingual space. The Board for Theatre Affairs, a municipal committee, had already banned non-Magyar ensembles in the 1870s, only allowing some guest performances on summer open-air stages. This neglect of linguistic and cultural diversity, together with the often-blamed low quality of most pieces, resulted in poor attendance even in the new prestigious theater building. Thus, the new ensemble director Janos Komjathy, in charge from 1902 to 1912, tried to balance artistic quality, financial responsibility and the demands of the Municipal Theatre Committee for the promotion of Magyar national culture. Despite his success for most of the time, he was unable to avoid some scandals in the first years of his engagement. In 1903 Komjathy invited an ensemble from Brno, which resulted in a furious press campaign against this "Slavic invasion." The opera, which would have been staged by eighty actors and musicians, had to be cancelled. Soon, a similar protest broke out, 13 Sandor Marai , Bekenntnisse eines Biirgers: Erinnerungen (Miinchen: Piper, 2000), 18. 14 For detailed literature and source material see Henschel , Das Fluidum der Stadt, 110-124 (fn . 9). 12 SLOVAKIA 2019 accusing him of "germanization" of the theatre. The incident took place during a performance. Lacking a professional orchestra, Komjathy depended upon the local imperial army orchestra. Once during the performance of a national-romantic piece, including the "Kossuth-Dal," a song for the leader of the Hungarian Revolutionary War in 1848/49, the musicians skipped some parts, whereupon the audience, led by a group of students from the local Academy of Law, staged a noisy protest. The musicians left and Komjathy had to do a lot of diplomatic work not to lose the support of the orchestra for good. Such scandals were not repeated in the future , so it can be concluded that the director learned a lesson about the Magyar national demarcation of the Kassa/Kosice theatre. The local "guardians" regarded it as a space for explicit national cultural performances, including the exclusive use of the Magyar language. Clubs and Associations: Instruments of Nationalism? 15 However, not all spaces of bourgeois cultural life in Kassa/Kosice were charged so strongly with national ideology. The noble and bourgeois clubs (called Casinos) worked rather as rooms of social segregation. High fees and strict charters excluded unwanted members of urban society, such as the petty bourgeoisie and lower classes. Ethno-national segregation, however, did not play a role here. Rather, party politics and confessional differences led to separation : liberal and conservative, Catholic and Jewish . In the end, the Casinos were spaces of socializing and entertainment without strong political or ethno-national implications. Nevertheless, they also served for the promotion of Magyar patriotism amongst their members . Especially after the tum of the century, the multilingual character of the clubs disappeared due to the exclusive use of the Magyar language. Besides Casinos, civil society was also constituted by cultural associations. They had different aims than the Casinos, as demon15 For detailed literature and source material see Ibid. , 124-52 ; Frank Henschel , Vereinswesen und Erinnerungskultur in Kaschau I Kosice I Kassa zwischen Nationalismus und stadtbiirger/ichem P··.1gmatismus (1867- 1918). Working Paper Series for the Research Academy in Lei pzig 12. Leipzig: Leipziger Univ.-Verl. , 20 I 3. 13 SLOVAK.IA 2019 strated by two examples: the "Society for Education" and the "Kazinczy-Circle" (named after the famous reformer of the Magyar language, Ferenc Kazinczy). Both aimed at magyarizing the city, but in a division of labor. The Society offered Magyar-language courses for workers and organized popular patriotic events (readings, amateur-theatre) for the lower classes. Also, teachers and pupils were rewarded for success in school. In order to magyarize the Slovak hinterland, children from the surrounding villages were invited into the Nemzeti Szinhaz, where they were shown patriotic pieces in order to evoke national (Magyar) consciousness. This list of activities should not be mistaken as proof of unlimited success, since these were mostly single events. In 1913, the Committee of the Society for Education had to admit that their endeavors were disappointing, since the commitment of their members, both financially and personally, was low and the effects of linguistic assimilation were also low. The second association, the Kazinczy-Circle, addressed the bourgeoisie. Its foundation in 1898 was inspired by the Toldi-Circle in Pressburg or the Petofi-Circle in Budapest. It organized scientific and reading events, promoting progress in Magyar national culture, literature and science. However, struggling with the same problems as the Society, the Circle failed in reaching a broader share of the upper classes, which preferred to spend their leisure time in the casinos. The Churches : Magyarizing Broader Society? 16 The third, and last urban cultural space under investigation did not constitute an exclusive habitat of the bourgeoisie. Churches were basically open to all people and therefore they are quite interesting for the study of nationalizing practices. As already mentioned, Kassa/Kosice was characterized by a wide diversity of religious affiliations: Roman and Greek Catholics, Lutheran and Calvinist Protes17 tants as well as Orthodox and Reform Jewry. 16 For detailed literature and source material see Henschel , Fluidum der Stadt, 15379 (fn. 9); Frank Henschel , "Religions and the Nation in Kassa before World War I," Hungarian Historical Review 3, no. 4 (2014): 850-74. 17 There is an excellent investigation of the past and present of the Jewish community of Ko sice using the approach of cultural anthropology: Vanda Vitti, (Trans-) Formationen jiidischer Lebenswelten nach 1989: Eine Ethnografie in zwei slowa- 14 SLOVAKIA 2019 In the nationalizing atmosphere of the l 9•h century, though , every church community had to cope with the challenge of nationalist ideology and to adapt to the new thinking. On the front lines, Magyar national activists fought for linguistic homogenization of church services and the inner administration. Secondly, church representatives themselves were in favor of the Magyar nation, trying to distingui sh their community from others in respect of national loyalty. The only community whose Magyar character wasn't in doubt at all were the Calvinists, who saw themselves as "the" Magyar confession and fostered the Magyar language from the beginning. All other church communities were multilingual and, therefore, had to find an arrangement with nationali st claims. Only two chose the way of complete self-magyarization, though not before the first decade of the 20•h century: The first was the Jewish Reform community, which had split from Jewish Orthodoxy due to a country-wide schism of Hungarian Jewry in 1869. In 1904 the community's assembly voted for the exclusive use of Magyar in church services, correspondence and meetings. Before that, Jews in a strange cooperation of nationalist-liberal and conservative Catholic press were accused of being "Germanisers" due to their German-language use in public and within associations. The self-magyarization, thus, can be interpreted as an assimilative strategy according to Viktor Karady 's analysis of the integration of the Hungarian Jewry. 18 The second community, which voted for self-magyarization, likewise as a step towards integration, were the Greek Catholics. They used Orthodox rites and liturgy but stood under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church. Despite their Slavic origin and language, the nationalist press did not attack them as it did attack Jews and - as I will show- the Roman Catholic Church. By contrast, Greek Catholics enjoyed a pretty established status, as is proven by the fact, that many non-members contributed funds for the erection of a Greek Catholic Church building in the last decade of the 19'" century. However, in 1909 the Greek Catholic leadership abolished the use of Old Church Slavonic in its services and quite smoothly kischen Stiidten. Ethnografische Perspektiven auf das ostliche Europa I (Bielefeld : Transcript, 2015) . 18 Victor Karady, " Aspects of Unequal Assimilation in Liberal Hungary: Social Geography of the Movement to Magyarise Alien Surnames before 19 I 8," CEU History Department Yearbook 1997-1998 ( 1999): 49- 67 . SLOVAKIA 2019 15 adapted to the claims of the Magyar national idea. Although Roman Catholicism was the largest denomination in Kassa/Kosice and many representatives were involved in institutions and events promoting Magyar national culture and magyarization, nationalist attacks against the multilingual character and "missing" national loyalty were omnipresent. The Dominican Order was accused of slovakizing the city by maintaining Slovak-language services. The monks argued that the believers should be offered services in their mother tongue and that this had nothing to do with the promotion of a separate national idea. In fact, there had been some incidents when church-goers protested against services in the Magyar language and demanded Slovak instead. However, to interpret this as the manifestation of a strong national consciousness would be misleading. It was more a demand for language use as usual and appropriate. Therefore, although their number was reduced, Slovak language services survived until 1918 in all Roman Catholic churches of Kassa/Kosice. A very interesting case was the Lutheran community. Up to 1861 three divided communities existed, a Magyar, a German and a Slovak one. Then the Magyar and the German ones merged into the "First" Lutheran community, sharing the church building with an officially named "Second" community, which actually was run in the Slovak language. The attempt to avoid the interpretation of an ethnonational segregation is obvious. However, during the last quarter of the l 9•h century, representatives of both communities tried to realize a final fusion which should have resulted in the abolition of all nonMagyar services. There was widespread fear that the nationalist movement could gain influence in the Slovak community. In the end, despite multiple round-tables and several appeals to the believers of the second community, that they show "national morals," the unification never succeeded and the Lutherans of Kassa/Kosice remained linguistically separated. Conclusion In investigating multiethnic, multicultural and multilingual societies, it is necessary to concentrate not on "groups" but on categories and practices of activists, their perceptions, purposes and endeavors. As illustrated by the brief examples in the history of Kas- 16 SLOVAKIA 2019 sa/Kosice, the most important category for the local nationalist "guardians" was language. It served not only for the definition of one's ethno-national identity (being "a Slovak," "a German," "a Magyar") but its use also was seen as an expression of patriotism and national loyalty. Thus, German or Slovak-speaking people of Kassa/Kosice could be accused of "betraying" the Magyar nation and threatening Magyardom. As a consequence, local forms of magyarization were initialized, aimed at homogenizing the city. Not by accident did the "guardians" concentrate on language as the primary marker of national identity and loyalty. Although there was not much unifying them - different political affiliation, origin, age, religion, even mother tongue - they shared a specific attribute. It was their status as representatives of the free professions: 19 teachers, lawyers, journalists, in general persons engaged in the cultural sector. Magyar as the dominant and official state language, which some of these activists due to their actual descent from "Slovak" or "German" familie s only acquired as a second or third language, was their most important resource in order to gain and defend a higher social position in the local society. They even became members of the city council , which for a long time was dominated by nobles and the wealthy bourgeoisie. Thus, the "guardians" connected their social , political and cultural engagement with efforts for linguistic homogenization, precisely because magyarization, of Kassa/Kosice, was legitimized by the nationalist idea of Magyar hegemony in the city as well as in the entire country. Local magyarization was a multilayered project, aimed at different classes in different ways : in cultural institutions, associations, churches, schools, enterprises and the public. Whereas in the first decades of the investigated time German language use within the bourgeoisie was attacked, in the l 890's Slovak language use of the urban poor and the peasants of the surrounding areas became the target. However, there was no violent, repressive magyarization suddenly ambushing the population. Perhaps as a feature of small and middle sized cities, with their close and personal contacts among the citizens and policy-makers, magyarization was sometimes harsh in 10 Hannes Siegrist, "The Professions in Nineteenth-Century Europe" in The European Way: European Societies during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, ed. by Hartmut Kaelbe (New York : Berghahn, 2004), 68- 88 . SLOVAK.IA 2019 17 its tone, especially in the nationalist local press, but quite smooth in practice. It was definitely limited by the actual everyday life of using several languages. Bourgeois urban spaces indeed became magyarized quickly, but rather superficially. Thus, multilingualism as well as the national indifference of most inhabitants remained characteristic features of Kassa/Kosice up to the Second World War and reflects the atmosphere of the city to this day.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Disputed Diversity: "Guardians of the Nation" and the Multilingual Urban Spaces of Kassa/Košice in the Second Half of the 19th Century Description An account of the resource Frank Henschel Slovakia, Vol. 44 (No. 82-83), 2019 pp. 7-17 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Henschel, Frank Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/c97c679af730353a337e4d5f611ea38c.pdf 355a2abe7e3006d0f4e1a803db45e6b6 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA Published By THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA ��SLOVAKIA VOLUMEXLIV 2019 NUMBERS 82-83 A scholarly annual devoted to the hi story, literature and cu lture of the Slovaks the world over Editor M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa Ed itorial Board GREGO RY C. FERENCE Salisbury University ROBERT K. EV ANSON University of Mi ssouri JAMES R. FELAK University of Washington PETE R PETRO Un iversity of British Co lumbia CAROL S. LEFF University of Illinoi s PATRICIA KRAFCIK The Evergreen State Co ll ege Publisher Slovak League of America 205 Madison Street Passaic, NJ 07055 , USA Inquiries regarding subscriptions should be sent to the above address. The cost of a single issue is $10.00. Manuscripts for possible publication and books for review shou ld be sent to the editor at 22 Bren-Maur Road, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K2J 3Z7 stolarik@uottawa.ca ��Table of Contents ARTICLES Disputed Diversity: "Guardians of the Nation" and the Multilingual Urban Spaces of Kassa/Kos ice in the Second Half th of the 19 Century Frank Henschel .... .. ....... ...... ... ........ ...... ... .... .... .... .... ... .... .. .. .. .. ...... 7 The Transatlantic Slovak Question during the Interwar Years Michael Cude ... ........ ........... ... ...... ... .... ... ........ .. ... .. ..... .. .... .. .. .. .... 18 Imagining a Separate Slovakia : Anti-Communi st Slovak Exiles ' Struggle for an Independent Homeland Ellen L. Paul .. .. ... ........ ........ .. .. ...... .. .. .. ..... ............................... .. . 55 Slovak Emigres in the Reports of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs- Actions against Ferdinand Durcansky and Jozef Kirschbaum ( 1961-1966/68) Petr Kubik ....................... .. .... .. ..... .. .. ... .... .... .... .. .. .... .. ...... .. ..... .... 72 Russophiles without Russia Vladimir Bauamgarten .............. ... ......... ............ .......... ... .... ..... ... 83 REVIEWS Tiinde Lengyelova, Zivot na s/'achtickom dvore Peter Mariassy ......... .. ............. ..... .... ............ .. ........ .... .. .. .... .. .. .. 133 Kenneth Janda, Th e Emperor and the Peasant M. Mark Stolarik .. .. .... .... .. .. ...................... ........... .. ................... 134 John Palka, My Slovakia, My Family Kenn eth Janda ........ ..... ........ ..... .... ..... ...... .... .... ... .. ...... .... ...... .... 136 Jan Hirka, Pod ochranou Marie Daniel Cerny .. ............ ... ........ ...... .. .... .. ...... .. ...... ....................... 140 �4 SLOV AKIA-2017 Michal Machacek, Gustav Husak Jozef Hyria ........... .................................................... ................ . 143 Contributors .............................................................................. 147 Guidelines for Manuscripts ..... .... .... ......................................... 148 �ARTICLES �� SLOVAKIA Published By THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA ��SLOVAKIA VOLUMEXLIV 2019 NUMBERS 82-83 A scholarly annual devoted to the hi story, literature and cu lture of the Slovaks the world over Editor M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa Ed itorial Board GREGO RY C. FERENCE Salisbury University ROBERT K. EV ANSON University of Mi ssouri JAMES R. FELAK University of Washington PETE R PETRO Un iversity of British Co lumbia CAROL S. LEFF University of Illinoi s PATRICIA KRAFCIK The Evergreen State Co ll ege Publisher Slovak League of America 205 Madison Street Passaic, NJ 07055 , USA Inquiries regarding subscriptions should be sent to the above address. The cost of a single issue is $10.00. Manuscripts for possible publication and books for review shou ld be sent to the editor at 22 Bren-Maur Road, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K2J 3Z7 stolarik@uottawa.ca ��Table of Contents ARTICLES Disputed Diversity: "Guardians of the Nation" and the Multilingual Urban Spaces of Kassa/Kos ice in the Second Half th of the 19 Century Frank Henschel .... .. ....... ...... ... ........ ...... ... .... .... .... .... ... .... .. .. .. .. ...... 7 The Transatlantic Slovak Question during the Interwar Years Michael Cude ... ........ ........... ... ...... ... .... ... ........ .. ... .. ..... .. .... .. .. .. .... 18 Imagining a Separate Slovakia : Anti-Communi st Slovak Exiles ' Struggle for an Independent Homeland Ellen L. Paul .. .. ... ........ ........ .. .. ...... .. .. .. ..... ............................... .. . 55 Slovak Emigres in the Reports of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs- Actions against Ferdinand Durcansky and Jozef Kirschbaum ( 1961-1966/68) Petr Kubik ....................... .. .... .. ..... .. .. ... .... .... .... .. .. .... .. ...... .. ..... .... 72 Russophiles without Russia Vladimir Bauamgarten .............. ... ......... ............ .......... ... .... ..... ... 83 REVIEWS Tiinde Lengyelova, Zivot na s/'achtickom dvore Peter Mariassy ......... .. ............. ..... .... ............ .. ........ .... .. .. .... .. .. .. 133 Kenneth Janda, Th e Emperor and the Peasant M. Mark Stolarik .. .. .... .... .. .. ...................... ........... .. ................... 134 John Palka, My Slovakia, My Family Kenn eth Janda ........ ..... ........ ..... .... ..... ...... .... .... ... .. ...... .... ...... .... 136 Jan Hirka, Pod ochranou Marie Daniel Cerny .. ............ ... ........ ...... .. .... .. ...... .. ...... ....................... 140 �4 SLOV AKIA-2017 Michal Machacek, Gustav Husak Jozef Hyria ........... .................................................... ................ . 143 Contributors .............................................................................. 147 Guidelines for Manuscripts ..... .... .... ......................................... 148 �ARTICLES �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2019, Vol. 44 Description An account of the resource Vol. 44 (No. 82-83), 2019. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA Published By THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA SLOVAKIA VOLUMEXLIV 2019 NUMBERS 82-83 A scholarly annual devoted to the hi story, literature and cu lture of the Slovaks the world over Editor M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa Ed itorial Board GREGO RY C. FERENCE Salisbury University ROBERT K. EV ANSON University of Mi ssouri JAMES R. FELAK University of Washington PETE R PETRO Un iversity of British Co lumbia CAROL S. LEFF University of Illinoi s PATRICIA KRAFCIK The Evergreen State Co ll ege Publisher Slovak League of America 205 Madison Street Passaic, NJ 07055 , USA Inquiries regarding subscriptions should be sent to the above address. The cost of a single issue is $10.00. Manuscripts for possible publication and books for review shou ld be sent to the editor at 22 Bren-Maur Road, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K2J 3Z7 stolarik@uottawa.ca Table of Contents ARTICLES Disputed Diversity: "Guardians of the Nation" and the Multilingual Urban Spaces of Kassa/Kos ice in the Second Half th of the 19 Century Frank Henschel .... .. ....... ...... ... ........ ...... ... .... .... .... .... ... .... .. .. .. .. ...... 7 The Transatlantic Slovak Question during the Interwar Years Michael Cude ... ........ ........... ... ...... ... .... ... ........ .. ... .. ..... .. .... .. .. .. .... 18 Imagining a Separate Slovakia : Anti-Communi st Slovak Exiles ' Struggle for an Independent Homeland Ellen L. Paul .. .. ... ........ ........ .. .. ...... .. .. .. ..... ............................... .. . 55 Slovak Emigres in the Reports of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs- Actions against Ferdinand Durcansky and Jozef Kirschbaum ( 1961-1966/68) Petr Kubik ....................... .. .... .. ..... .. .. ... .... .... .... .. .. .... .. ...... .. ..... .... 72 Russophiles without Russia Vladimir Bauamgarten .............. ... ......... ............ .......... ... .... ..... ... 83 REVIEWS Tiinde Lengyelova, Zivot na s/'achtickom dvore Peter Mariassy ......... .. ............. ..... .... ............ .. ........ .... .. .. .... .. .. .. 133 Kenneth Janda, Th e Emperor and the Peasant M. Mark Stolarik .. .. .... .... .. .. ...................... ........... .. ................... 134 John Palka, My Slovakia, My Family Kenn eth Janda ........ ..... ........ ..... .... ..... ...... .... .... ... .. ...... .... ...... .... 136 Jan Hirka, Pod ochranou Marie Daniel Cerny .. ............ ... ........ ...... .. .... .. ...... .. ...... ....................... 140 4 SLOV AKIA-2017 Michal Machacek, Gustav Husak Jozef Hyria ........... .................................................... ................ . 143 Contributors .............................................................................. 147 Guidelines for Manuscripts ..... .... .... ......................................... 148 ARTICLES  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 44 (No. 82-83) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/ccf1873d68d6bbc109cf0e0c93827068.pdf fb3f1fdee228aec2f6105f14134c17ac PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 2019 55 IMAGINING A SEP ARA TE SLOVAK.IA: ANTICOMMUNIST SLOVAK EXILES' STRUGGLE FOR AN INDEPENDENT HOMELAND 1 Ellen L. Paul In January 1993, the principle of self-determination reigned supreme as the post-communist Czech and Slovak Federative Republic became Slovakia and the Czech Republic. In many ways, this peaceful separation was the logical outcome of decades of anti-communist Slovak emigre efforts. To be sure, Cold War exiles who left Czechoslovakia after 1945 and the February 1948 communist takeover had many disagreements amongst themselves, especially over leadership and direction of their numerous political organizations.2 Over time, however, many of the Slovak exile organizations arrived at some kind of consensus, and by the last two decades of the Cold War, the right of political self-determination provided Slovak emigres with a unifying theme. After all, in August 1968 when the Warsaw Pact armies quashed the Prague Spring, the Soviet Union brutally reminded the world of its firm control over Czechoslovakia. Yet, that event inspired two reasons for hope among Slovak exiles: l . the longpromised federalism of Czechoslovakia and 2. the creation in 1970 of a unifying new organization of Slovak exiles, the Slovak World Congress. As exiles in the free and democratic West, Cold War-era Slovak political exiles not only fought Soviet Communism and advocated for human rights in the homeland, they also defended the unique development of the Slovak nation in Central European history and informed the West about Slovakia, often refuting what many saw as misinformation spread by the Czechs. A recurring theme at the heart of the publications about Slovak history and culture was the dream of political independence for the Slovak nation. 1 A version of thi s paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, Polish American Historical Association panel on 7 January 2017 in Denver, Colorado. 2 Igor Lukes, "Czechoslovak Political Ex ile in the Cold War: the earl y years," Polish Review 47 , no. 3 (2002): 332-43. �56 SLOVAKIA 2019 From the early 20 th century, Slovaks in the West became convinced that democracy and the ethnic principle of self-determination went hand-in-hand with political independence. A small group of Slovak exiles favored political union with their Czech neighbors, but others insisted on autonomy and even independence based on the ethnic principle of self-determination. Throughout the Cold War, the groups favoring independence consistently fought for a separate Slovak identity and "equal rights with the other free and democratic nations of Europe and the world." 3 In 1993, the fruit of their struggles resulted in the peaceful split of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic into Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Politically active Slovak exiles in Western Europe, the United States, and Canada can be roughly categorized into three basic groups. These categories are a helpful framework for understanding the issue of Slovak independence and especially the ways exiles aligned themselves in the early years of the Cold War. 1. Czechoslovakists: Slovaks who wanted a close union with the Czechs. 2. Federalists: moderate Slovak nationalists who pursued cooperation with the Czechs, but wanted recognition of a separate Slovak identity and political autonomy both for Slovakia and within the exile organizations. These included figures such as Stefan Osusky and Slovak Democratic Party members sent into exile after the communist coup in February 1948. 4 It is notable that the majority-but not all- of these first two groups came from Slovakia' s Lutheran minority. 3. Slovak autonomists : these Slovaks were decidedly nationalist and predominantly Catholic. They were also the most contentious. They supported Slovak independence, completely eschewing union with the Czechs-and rejecting the idea of a "Czechoslovak nation." They fled into exile right away in 1945, ahead of the Red Army and the returning Czechoslovak government. Among them were academics and journalists, such as historian Konstantin Culen, poet Mikulas Sprinc, and journalist Jozef 3 Joseph M. Kirschbaum, "Americki Slovaci a myslienka slovenskej samostatnosti," Kato/icky kalendar Jednota 87 (I 984), 177-84, 184. 4 The 1948 generation tended to be professionals or factory owners and, generally, among the most skilled and educated. In exile, many worked to resist Communism and return Czechoslovakia to democracy. �SLOVAKIA 2019 57 Pauco. In addition, the group featured several politicians and diplomats from the wartime Slovak state, such as Jozef Kirschbaum, Karol Sidor, and Ferdinand Durcansky. The majority of Slovak autonomists migrated to Canada, with some gaining entry into the United States. Although exact membership figures are unknown, there were far more Slovak autonomist and federalist exile groups in North America. This paper focuses almost exclusively on the autonomist and federalist Slovak exiles. Over time their differences faded, especially after the failed Prague Spring reform movement in 1968. Another reason for this shift was that as post-war emigres died, a younger generation of autonomists and federalists gradually united in their goals for self-determination and political independence for Slovakia. In 1958, linguist and Franciscan priest, Bonaventure S. Bue, categorized Slovak emigres into only two groups, lumping the federalists and autonomists into, simply, the autonomists . He explained the rift between the Czechoslovakists and the autonomists with a question: "Are we Czechs or are we Slovaks? To this question the Czechoslovak would answer: I am a Czech; the Autonomist: I am a Slovak." 5 Bue continued " ... the majority of Slovaks have always felt and professed to be an ethnographically, historically, and culturally distinct nation from the Czechs" and suggested that by the late 1950s the Czechoslovakist versus autonomist conflict was " losing its original raison d 'etre."6 In large part that was because even the Slovaks who wished to preserve the state of Czecho-Slovakia by then had "abandoned the highly disputed fiction of the 'Czechoslovak nation"' and agreed on the distinctness of the Slovaks. 7 The remaining issue was about the best alliance or political form for the nation's survival. Many historians trace the ethnogenesis of the Slovak nation back to the Great Moravian Empire of the ninth century, largely based on oral accounts and the Christianizing and linguistic legacy of Saints Cyril and Methodius. Solid documentary evidence of Slovak linguistic uniqueness harks back to the 1700s, when the Catholic intelli5 B. S. Bue, "Conflicts of Slovak Nationalism," Slovakia 8, no . 2 ( 1958), 1-1 7: 7 and 16. 6 Bue, 15. 7 Buc,16-17. �58 SLOVAK.IA 2019 gentsia in northern Hungary first suggested a separate identity for the Slovak language-as opposed to a Czech or Czechoslovak language. To them, it no longer made sense to use the more developed Czech language, and so Catholic clergy began writing in the Slovak vernacular even though the majority culture was distinctly Magyar. 8 In the 19 th century, language became "the center of the new national idea," but this was not enough to create a national identity for the Slovaks, who were under increasing pressure to assimi late to Magyar language and culture. In The Slovak National Awakening ( 1976), Peter Brock explains that as the intelligentsia began to promote the Slovak language and nation, and shift from using the Czech language, ideas about political unity with the Czechs also faded. 9 In 1848, I.',udovit Stur and other young Protestant intellectuals formed a short-lived Slavonic nation of their own, but thereafter the process of creating a Slovak political nation was interrupted by Magyarization, which meant the imposition of Magyar culture and language on young intellectuals in the Hungarian half of Austria-Hungary. The impetus to assert a separate Slovak identity with a language that was neither Czech nor Magyar had been well under way by the 1840s, involved both Catholics and Protestants, and was an important step toward declaring a distinct Slovak national identity. Toward that end, in the early 1860s the Matica slovenska (Slovak Cultural Institute) was founded to aid the continuing development of Slovak literature and culture. A political merger between Czechs and Slovaks came in 1918 following the breakup of Austria-Hungary and the calamity of the First World War, but that union was not predestined. Despite their linguistic similarities and geographical proximity, Czechs and Slovaks had very different histories and cultural influences. For hundreds of years, the Czech lands were part of the Holy Roman Empire, ruled by the House of Habsburg, and much influenced by German culture and the Reformation (and the Czech reformer Jan Hus). During that time, the Kingdom of Hungary ruled over the Slovak 8 Ismo Nurmi, Slovakia-a Playground for Nationalism and National Identity: Manifestations of National identity of the Slo vaks 191 8-1920, Biblioteca Historica 42 (Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 1999), 9-10, and Peter Brock, The Slovak National Awakening (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1976), 1837 and 53-4. 9 Brock, 7 & 20-37 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 59 lands, inside the boundaries of the Habsburg Monarchy. While both small nations struggled against strong neighbors, their nineteenth century trajectories to national awakening and political agency were distinctly different. Firstly, the Slovak lands remained largely agricultural while the Czech lands underwent industrialization. Secondly, the Czechs achieved some successes in gaining cultural and linguistic rights at home and a measure of political representation in Vienna. Whereas to the east, the Slovaks faced increasing Magyarization and the loss of their culture. Since the tenth century, the lands of Slovakia had been ruled by foreigners and what had kept the Slovaks from assimilating, disappearing, or dispersing were "language, geography, and tradition ." 10 Not surprisingly, these vastly divergent experiences dramatically shaped the outlook and soul of each nation. Although Slovak culture was repressed in the homeland, the impact of the efforts of the Matica slovenska, Catholic clergy, and Slovak intelligentsia to keep Slovak language and culture alive became apparent by the late 19 th century, when notable numbers of emigres began arriving in the United States and identified themselves as Slovak. By the early twentieth century, the U.S.A. was home to the most influential Slovak diaspora. 11 In 1890, they established two important early exile organizations: the National Slovak Society and the First Catholic Slovak Union. In 1907, the Slovak League of America formed and united all Slovak groups in America. While based "on a wide platform of love for [the] Slovak nation," the Slovak League of America's mission at the time was to cast off the Hungarian tyrant ruling over Slovaks in the homeland. 12 Unity among exiles, however, became much harder to achieve after the dissolution of AustriaHungary during the First World War and particularly after the declaration of the First Czechoslovak Republic in 1918. During World War I, politicians began deliberating the future of Central Europe. The most important negotiations regarding Czechoslovak statehood took place in North America among representatives of both the Czechs and Slovaks. The Czechs knew that Slovak par10 Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 37-8. 11 Jozef Pauco, " Slovaks Abroad and their Relationship with Slovakia," in Slovakia in th e 19th and 20th Centuries, 2 nd edition, ed. Jozef M. Kirschbaum (Toronto: Slovak World Congress, 1978), 415-24, 415. 12 Ibid., 417. �60 SLOVAK.IA 2019 ticipation was vital to their cause. With that knowledge, Slovaks were able to leverage some influence by demanding " recognition of an independent Slovak identity and Slovak political autonomy in exchange for their support." 13 Many Slovak exiles believed that "through their immigration to America ... they had helped preserve Slovak national identity" and that "American democracy provided them something they felt would prove beneficial" for Slovaks back home. 14 In the negotiations over Czechoslovakia and its constitution, the efforts of Slovak Stefan Osusky stand out. He worked closely with Tomas G. Masaryk for federalism and for Slovakia to be regarded "as an equal partner by the Czechs in the Czecho-Slovak state." 15 In 1918, the (First) Czechoslovak Republic was created with Masaryk as its president. Unfortunately, Masaryk- whose father was Slovak and mother was Moravian/Czech-did not believe the Slovaks to be a separate nation. In addition, "a fateful ambiguity crept into the very first political statement published by independent Slovak politicians, the Slovak National Council. .. " which although declaring Slovakia a "nation," also suggested Slovak as a "branch of the unified Czechoslovak nation ." 16 The confusion resulted in "misunderstandings, confused government policies, enmity, and even tragedy .. .. [And] politically, it led to all sorts of excesses, including Czech chauvinism and Slovak Czechophobia." 17 The final documents of the new combined state referred only to the "Czechoslovaks" and completely omitted any mention of autonomy for Slovakia. 13 Michael R. Cude, "The Imagined Exiles : Slovak-Ameri cans and the Slovak Question during the First Czechoslovak Republi c," in From Exsilium to Exile: Coercion in Migration, Studia Historica Gedanensia, vol. 5, ed . Anna Mazurkiewicz (Gdansk : University of Gdansk Historical Institute, 2014), 287-305 , 287. 14 Cude writes that Slovak exi les viewed "their experi ence in America" as proof "that the Slovaks could very much develop independently and did not need the strict oversight of the Czechs. As such , the Slovak-American activ ists gradually adopted a role as an 'ex iled' national voice aga inst Prague centra lism," 298 . 15 Joseph A. Mikus, "Comments," in Slovakia in th e l <J'h and 2dh Centuries, 97-100, 97 . 16 Peter Petro, A History of Slovak Literature, Montreal [Que.] : MQUP, 1995. Ebook Collection (EBSCO host), EBSCOhost (accessed 29 Nov. 2016), 13 1. 17 Petro, 131. �SLOVAKIA 2019 61 In dismissing the wishes of Slovak nationalists in America, and subsequently in Slovakia as well, Masaryk and his supporters were putting the new Republic into j eopardy. The various Czech-dominated governments that ruled the new Republic recruited Slovaks of the 'Czechoslovak ' persuasion (largely Lutherans) to join their ruling coalition. American Czechoslovaks approved of this arrangement. .. . Slovak nationalists, however, were left out in the cold. 18 The centralism 19 of the government in Prague during the First Czechoslovak Republic can be viewed as helping continue the defensive nature of the Slovak national movement, which had begun under the duress of Magyarization. 2° For example, Slovaks seldom felt like equal partners in the new state. Even though in 1918 "the very real existential problems caused by the attempted liquidation of Slovak culture through Magyarization [had] disappeared ... the positive aspect of this momentous change for liberated Slovak culture was somewhat tempered by a paternalistic attitude emanating from Prague." But it was not "always ill-meant and unjustified; from Prague also came tremendous support and help, particularly in the cultural and educational fields ." 21 The perception of inequality, however, became consequential in the late 1930s, when Czechoslovakia found itself under the heel of Nazi Germany. On 14 March 1939, several months after the Munich Pact gave Nazi Germany control over the Sudetenland (in a failed exchange for peace), Catholic Slovak leaders declared the Slovak Republic, albeit under Nazi influence. Six years later, the first Slovak state came to an end. The short-lived, authoritarian Slovak state caused much conflict among exiles in the early post-war years. Among the Catholic autonomists, the Slovak Republic inspired nostalgia and resolve to continue the fight for political independence. But the federalist and Czech18 M. Mark Stolarik, "The Role of Slovak Emigres in North America in the Emancipation of the Slovak Nation," Drustvena istrazivanja [Journal fo r General Social Issues ] 7, no. 1-2 (1998), 75-88, 78. 19 In Czechoslovakia, "centralism" refers to the concentration of political power in the capital, Prague. It often operated in opposition to regional desires for decentralization, self-administration, and autonomy. 20 Nurmi , 18 I. 21 Petro, 13 1. �62 SLOVAKIA 2019 oslovakist Slovak exiles generally condemned that group as, among other things, undemocratic.22 In turn, the Catholic autonomists condemned the federalists as having sold out the Slovaks to communist oppression after the war. The Catholic autonomists defended the wartime Slovak state as a rational decision done for national survival, as "the only way out under the given political circumstances" of Czechoslovakia having fallen under the rule of Nazi German~, and "as the logical conclusion of their former national endeavors." 3 Although controversial and brief, this experiment in political independence gave the Slovaks a new and lasting sense of worthiness among nations. While Masaryk had been a disappointment to many Slovaks, post-war Slovak emigres- autonomists and federalists alike-expressly despised the second Czechoslovak president and wartime leader of the Czechoslovak government-in-exi le in London, Edvard Benes (1935-38 & 1939-48). In a variety of publications during and after World War II, (federalist) politician Stefan Osusky blamed Benes for the breakup of Czecho-Slovakia in 1938 and for the postwar subjugation of Czecho-Slovakia by the Soviet Union. Former diplomat and historian Joseph A. Mikus (an autonomist) voiced similarly strong views of Benes, holding him responsible not only for the communist takeover in 1948 but also for the failure of the reform movement under Alexander Dubcek in 1968. 24 In general, the Slovak 22 Petro writes "The backlash that led to the super-nationalism of some writers during the existence of the Slovak Republic can be ascribed not to some inbred propensity for political extremism, but to a desperate desire for national self-assertion," 131 -32. 23 B.S. Bue, " Federative Tendencies of Slovak Nationalism," Slovakia 8, no. 3 ( 1958), 25-32, 30. "The short-lived existence of this independent state gave to Slovak nationalism what it had hitherto lacked, namely, a uniform will to live independently and a conviction that it will know how to stand its ground as an equally worthy member among the other nations." 24 Mikus, "Comments," in Slovakia in the 19th and 2dh Centuries, 400-405 . In response to a presentation by Kurt Glaser regarding the question of national states and federali sm in Central Europe, Mikus argued "The record of Czechoslovakia is particularly sad, since during World War II Benes had laid the comer-stone of his foreign policy out of collaboration with the Soviet Union, a non-Western and communist power. The guilt complex resulting from [Benes's] 1945 solution of the Sudeten German problem threw him into the arms of the Soviet Union . That embrace became so strong that [Alexander] Dubcek's effort to extricate Czecho- �SLOVAKIA 2019 63 exiles with close ties to the Catholic Slovak Republic felt particularly snubbed by Czechoslovakia's wartime representatives in London and Washington. Slovak politician, diplomat, and later prolific scholar Jozef M. Kirschbaum was unflinching both in his support for Slovak independence and in his criticism of the Czechs: "Unfortunately, Western diplomats displayed little understanding for the aspirations of the Slovak people and mostly adhered to the concept of the Czech exiled politicians" led by Benes. 25 In the late 1940s and early '50s, Slovak exile groups contacted a variety of governmental offices in the U.S. and Canada requesting freedom from Soviet domination and independence for Slovakia. 26 Bitterness and rivalries among the groups, however, limited their impact. 27 Ever since the declaration of Czechoslovakia in 1918, Slovak exiles had embraced the mission of speaking on behalf of the silenced Slovak people back home in Czechoslovakia. They resumed that role after World War II as Slovak exiles reacted to the "rigid centralism" imposed by the post-war Czechoslovak regime. In addition, Slovak exiles in the West were troubled by the ruthlessness of the Stalinist system, with its "political and religious persecution, economic discrimination, and prohibition of contacts with Western countries." 28 So, American and Canadian Slovaks responded to the new status quo by resuming their role as "interpreters of the aspirations of the Slovak people for freedom, democracy, and independence." 29 With a renewed sense of hope, a few dozen post-war exiles took up the challenge of informing the world about Slovakia and " .. .published hundreds of books and articles about the history of Slovakia and the Slovaks. [In the process, they] helped keep the 'Slovak cause ' in the public eye, as well as give it some credence in Slovakia from it was in vain. The occupation of Czecho-Slovakia has its roots in that fitiful pactomania of Benes with Moscow," 403. 5 J.M. Kirschbaum, " Diplomatic and Consular Relations of Slovakia with Neutral States," Slovakia 23 , 46 ( 1973), 111-22, 119. 26 Pauco, 423. 27 Stolarik, "The Role of Slovak Emigres in North America in the Emancipation of the Slovak Nation," 82 . 28 J.M. Kirschbaum, " Slovaks Abroad and their Role in Slovakia 's Struggle for Freedom," Slovakia 24, 47 (1974), 63-6, 63-4. 29 Ibid. 63-4. �64 SLOVAKIA 2019 the academic and intellectual circles in North America."30 One important publication with that goal was the academic journal, Slovakia, edited by Filip A. Hrobak and first published in 1951. The journal's purpose was twofold: to defend Slovak political rights and to publicize Slovak national and cultural activities.31 After 26 years as editor of the journal, the Slovak League of America lauded Hrobak as a defender of "the sacred cause of Slovak national freedom. " 32 Exiled Slovaks seldom agreed on what exactly comprised the Slovak cause but many believed that the West would be receptive to their homeland 's plight. The Slovak Question (i.e. rights to autonomy, self-determination, statehood, etc .) continually caused tension, especially among exile organizations consisting of both Czechs and Slovaks. One of the most influential of those, created one year after the communist coup of February 1948, was the Council of Free Czechoslovakia (CFC). The U.S. government relied on the Council for policy advice, but to the Slovaks' dismay Washington paid little attention to the Slovak Question. 33 The many feuds over Slovak autonomy led Slovaks such as Stefan Osusky to demand separate recognition in the Council of Free Czechoslovakia and parity in its leadership . However, achieving an equal voice in that organization 34 took over twenty years. In 1948 the Slovak National Council Abroad was founded by Karol Sidor, Jozef Kirschbaum, Peter Privdavok, and Konstantin Culen. The Slovak Leagues of America and Canada recognized the Slovak National Council as the representative body of Slovak politi30 M. Mark Stolarik, "Slovak Historians in Exile in North America, 1945- 1992," Human Affairs 6, no. I ( 1996), 34-44, 34. 31 Pauco, 422 32 Joseph C. Krajsa, ed., "First Catholic Slovak Union (Jednota) of the U.S. and Canada," in Slovaks in America: A Bicentennial Study (M iddletown, PA : Slovak League of America, 1978), IO 1-68, 128. 33 Michael R. Cude, Transatlantic Perspectives on th e Slo vak Question, /914-1948 (PhD Diss., Univers ity of Colorado-Boulder, 20 13) and Cude, "The Imagined Exiles." 34 The first reconciliation in 1952 attempted to address this issue by givi ng the Slovaks separate recognition with separate votes on programs within the CFC. In 1960, the moderate nationalists in the Council formed the Permanent Confe rence of Slovak Democratic Exiles and formally split from the CFC to join with other Czech dissenters to form the Committee of Free Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovakists remained invo lved in the Counci l, and as part of its 1973 reorgani zation, the CFC established Czech-Slovak parity in its leadership. �SLOVAK.IA 2019 65 cal exiles. 35 Another exile group also promoted the nationalist cause. The Slovak Liberation Committee, led by Ferdinand Durcansly and others, defended "the right of self-determination for the Slovak nation." 36 Additionally, many smaller organizations and societies from Australia to Buenos Aires promoted the idea of political independence for Slovakia. 37 The inability of the various organizations to unite, however, hampered their overall impact on Western policy and understanding, especially in the first two and a half decades after the war . . The Prague Spring of 1968 was a turning point for many of the squabbling exiles. In the wake of the failed reform movement, thousands of the disappointed migrated out of Czechoslovakia. The newcomers were received with skepticism, and although there was little that unified Slovak emigres after 1968, Frantisek Braxator suggested that a common ideological platform might be that no compromise with Communism was possible, "human face" or otherwise. He reassuringly concluded that nobody wanted to resurrect the authoritarian wartime state. 38 In many ways, the diversity and energy of the new exiles added much to the cause of Slovak emigres in the West. Indeed, there is evidence that the last two decades of exile activity were more productive than the early decades of the Cold War. By then the political goals of Slovak-Americans and Slovak-Canadians were generally two-fold: continue heritage preservation and call attention in the West to the persecution of Slovaks under communist rule in Czechoslovakia. 39 After the Soviet invasion, the thousands of Prague Spring arrivals to North America and the earlier post-war political exiles from Slovakia, more than ever before, were able to find common purpose, even unity, in their identity as Slovaks. The unprecedented unity came in large part from a new umbrella organization, the Slovak World Congress (Svetovy kongres Slovakov), 35 Pauco, 423. Ibid. Some of the others included Stefan Polakovic, Alojz Macek, and Stanislav Meciar. 37 Ibid., 423-4. 38 Frantisek Braxator, " Slovaks Abroad and Their Relationship to Czechoslovakia," in Slovakia in th e 19th and 20'" Centuries, 425-33. He concluded that "there was "definitely no support for the idea that the majority of this emigration regards aid to Slovakia as taking the form of an effort to revive the Slovak Republic of 1939 to 1945 " 432 39 Kr;jsa, "First Catholic Slovak Union," in Slovaks in America, l O1-68, 126. 36 �66 SLOVAKIA 2019 founded in New York in June 1970. Between 1970 and 1989, the SWC brought together Slovak organizations from North and South America, Western Europe, and Oceania. It absorbed a wide variety of emigre Slovak organizations and individuals, from Catholics and Lutherans to a range of political figures , from the federalist-leaning Stefan Osusky to the ardent nationalist Ferdinand Durcansky. Leadership of the Slovak World Congress encompassed the diversity of Slovaks in exile as well. In addition to the old-guard leaders, 1968generation Slovak exiles such as the Lutheran pastor Dusan T6th and the Jewish ex-communist Eugen Lob! held high positions in the organization. The SWC aimed to resist Communism in the name of democracy, religious freedom , and the principle of self-determination, specifically meaning self-rule and political independence. In 1973, the Slovak World Congress published symposium proceedings to inform and update the West about Slovaks and their long history in Central Europe. Many contributors thought that too few histories of Europe had appreciated the Slovaks' ninth-century state organization. Furthermore, they had neglected to mention Slovak contributions to Slavic civi lizations, such as by Saints Cyril and Methodius. Slovak World Congress organizers were also concerned that when Slovak history was presented, it was "in a distorted light." 40 Founder and benefactor Stephen B. Roman noted the unith th queness of the symposium and resulting book on 19 and 20 century Slovak history: [A} fl the authors, including those of non-Slovak origin, subscribe to the thesis that the Slovaks developed through the centuries into a distin ct Central European nation, and that their language, literature and culture also developed independently of other Slavic nations. From this premise, the right to selfdetermination and equality of rights for the Slovak people be41 came a logical conclusion for all contributors. The Slovak World Congress' mission was to represent "the cultural, social, and political aspirations of the Slovak people in the Western hemisphere" and to "contribute to the search for historical 40 41 Stephen B. Roman, "Preface," Slovakia in th e 19th and 20th Centuries, 5. Roman, " Preface," 6. �SLOVAKIA 2019 67 truth about the Slovaks and thereby to help bring about better understanding and cooperation among the nations of Central Europe."42 Founder Roman declared that the SWC strongly believed "that peoples of that vital area" could "regain their political freedom and build their future through close cooperation and the recognition by each of the equal rights to independence of the others."43 Notably, the Slovak World Congress claimed to work toward freedom and independence not only for Slovakia but for other small European nations as well. In 1978 in the "Introduction to the Second Edition" of the Slovak World Congress proceedings, Slovakia in the 1911' and 20th Centuries, editor Joseph M. Kirschbaum further emphasized the balanced and informational nature of the volume: Until very recently Slovak history was presented to the West either by the adherents of the "Czechoslovak" school which denied the separate historical development of Slovakia, or by the historians of the Slovak nationalist school who insisted on the independent political and cultural development of Slovakia . ...By publishing this edition, the Slovak World Congress has no other aim but to help acquaint Western readers with Slovakia and [its} rise to nationhood, and to contribute to the search for freedom and cooperation among the nations of Central and Eastern Europe.44 Despite the Slovak World Congress' reputation as the leading late Cold War organization for Slovaks in the West, it was never completely successful in uniting the Slovak exiles. The Czechoslovakists and some of the moderate nationalists disavowed involvement because of the strong views of the Catholic autonomists, especially those with "unclean pasts.,,4s To accommodate the diversity of interests, the SWC comprised three factions regarding constitutional questions: federalization within Czechoslovakia, confederation, and independence. 46 On behalf of the Slovak diaspora, leader Roman had 42 Ibid. Ibid. 44 J.M . Kirschbaum, Slo vakia in the / 9th and 20th Centuries, 8. 45 Jozef Spetko, "Slovenska exilova a emigrantska politika v rokoch 1945-1989," Historicky casopis 39, no . 3 ( I99 I), 24 1-61: 256. 46 Ibid., 257-8. 43 �68 SLOVAK.IA 2019 wanted the organization to "speak as one voice and act according to a single plan" on behalf of the silenced Slovaks in the homeland. But achieving consensus among the exiles, especially about independence and resolution of the Slovak Question, was impossible from the very beginning of the SWC. 47 Nevertheless, the Slovak World Congress devised anti-communist propaganda campaigns, held scholarly conferences and cultural festivals , and even aided the protest movements in Slovakia in the 1980s.48 The organization collaborated with figures such as the Slovak-Canadian hockey player Marian St'astny and the Camogursky family-leading members of the organization-and even organized overseas protests to promote religious freedom in conjunction with the candlelight protests in Bratislava on March 25, 1988. In 1989, the Slovak World Congress officially supported the Velvet Revolution. However, "once the Communists surrendered power to Czech and Slovak dissidents ... the Slovak World Congress began to fracture ." 49 In the wake of the fall of the Czechoslovak communist regime, the SWC organized visits and programs in Slovakia. But relations between the SWC and the post-communist Czechoslovak government quickly became strained, mostly over the issue of Slovak autonomy, which most, but not all, members of the Slovak World Congress still very much supported. 50 Within weeks of the revolution, Secretary-General of the SWC Dusan T6th, who had fled Czechoslovakia after the Soviet invasion in 1968, visited his family in Slovakia and appeared at some political rallies in the capital, Bratislava. The " intoxicated crowds" welcomed him warmly and "listened intently as he told them about the [Slovak 47 Ibid. , 255. M. Mark Stolarik, Where is my Hom e? Slovak Immigration to North America (/870-20/0) (Bern: Peter Lang, 2012), 281-2. 49 Ibid., 287. The groups were the Civic Forum (Obcanske forum) and the Public Against Violence (Verejnost' proti nasiliu) in the Czech lands and Slovakia, respectively. 50 The Slovak World Congress began to decline after Roman's death in 1988, especially since he had bankrolled the organization. After the Velvet Divorce in I993, its functions declined even more, with its most notable achievement being to convince the U.S. and Slovak governments to allow dual citizenship. By 2000, the SWC was functionally gone. See Stolarik, Where ... , 279-95. 48 �SLOVAKIA 2019 69 World] Congress and its aspirations for freedom in Slovakia." 5 1 After all, the topic of political independence had been a taboo for forty years. For its part, the SWC tried to engage the Slovak government in talks about independence in early 1990, but Slovak politicians had more immediate concerns such as figuring out how to navigate the new political landscape. "Many were new politicians who faced the task of learning not only the art of political maneuvering, but above all that of public discourse in a democratic society. They were the ones who dealt with the issue of Czecho-Slovak relations which found resolution in the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. " 52 The first post-communist elections in Slovakia were for representatives to the Slovak National Council. Although results of the voting in early June 1990 demonstrated the predictable rejection of Communism, they also " indicated that ' the Slovak question' was still on the political agenda. " 53 The biggest surprise was the third place finish for the Slovak National Party (Slovenska narodna strana orSNS), the only party with independence in its platform. "It is quite likely that one particular event preceding the election contributed to the [SNS ' s] success" in the parliamentary elections.54 Trouble began in March 1990 in the Federal Assembly in Czechoslovakia. Vaclav Havel, who had recently become the new president, was a vocal proponent of federalism and continuing the Czech union with Slovakia. The dispute started when Slovak politicians wanted to return to the original ( 1918-1920) way of writing the country's name: Czecho-Slovakia. Tensions grew when the Czechs agreed that Slovakia could do so, but neither the Czechs nor the federal government of Czechoslovakia would hyphenate. The "hyphen war" showed "how very different were the Czech and Slovak conceptions of their common state and brought into the open the need to reexamine the state of Czech-Slovak relations." 55 For the next two years, the discourse around that reexamination exposed ever more disparities and decades-old animosities . 51 Anne C.R. Roman, "Slovak Expats Remember 1989, too," Slovak Spectator, 29 November 1999, https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20009411 /slovak-expats-remember1989-too.html. 52 S. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia, 251-2. 53 Ibid., 255. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid . �70 SLOVAKIA 2019 Economic concerns took center stage, including the question of how quickly to move away from a socialist command economy to a capitalist market economy. While Slovaks feared a continuation of Prague centralism, including federal conduct and policies that favored Czech-and discounted Slovak- economic contributions, Czechs complained about subsidizing the Slovak economy. 56 The contrasting way the Slovaks and Czechs viewed this issue underscores some of the key reasons for their separation in 1993. One Czech-American historian argues that the peaceful separation of Czechs and Slovaks was a "necessity," based on their lack of "shared positive historical experience." 57 History and the "interplay of a series of factors" indeed influenced the breakup of Czechoslovakia. 58 Stanislav Kirschbaum suggests the root of the problem goes back to "the pursuit of [Slovak] national development in cooperation with the Czechs."59 From its inception in 1918 the "ultimate failure" of the Czechoslovak state was that it did not "provide an acceptable framework for Slovak national development," and despite all the benefits and progress, "the common state put Slovaks in a position of having to continue their struggle for survival." 60 In retrospect, the unraveling of Czechoslovakia in the early 1990s is not surprising; nor is the fact of its peaceful evolution. In the eyes of many Slovak exiles, the fall of Communism meant more than just getting rid of the Communists and returning to democracy. Indeed, " ... it was all of this plus home rule," commented M. Mark Stolarik, scholar and former president of the Canadian Slovak 56 S. Kirschbaum, 256-68. Igor Lukes, " Strangers in One House: Czechs and Slovaks, 1918-1992," Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism/Revue Canadienne des Etudes sur le Nationalisme 27, 1-2 2000, 33-43 , 41 . 58 S. Kirschbaum, 270. The factors include the following: "The inability of the Czechoslovak state to solve certain social and constitutional problems since 1918; the legacy of the Communist regime; the adaptation crisis resulting from the passage of a single-party state to democratic pluralism ; the lack of experience of the leaders of the Velvet Revolution ; the absence of Czechoslovak parties in the postCommunist era; and the provision in the 1968 constitutional law that allowed Slovak deputies to block federal legislation that was not deemed to be in Slovakia's interest" so that the Slovaks could not be outvoted by the Czech majority." . 59 S. Kirschbaum, 270-71. 60 Ibid., 271. 57 �SLOVAK.IA 2019 71 League, on the tenth anniversary of the Velvet Revolution.6 1 In the United States and Canada, Slovak exiles' experiences of democracy and freedom guided them forward before and after the toppling of the hardline communist regime in Czechoslovakia. 62 Their influence on politics in the homeland has yet to be clearly documented, but it is quite possible that Slovak exiles and their endeavor to keep alive the drive for the self-determination and political independence of the Slovak nation provided not only legitimacy in the West, but also moral and political encouragement to their homeland as the nation moved toward independence in the early 1990s. 61 A. Roman, " Slovak Expats Remember 1989, too." Francis D. Raska, Long Road to Victory: A History or Czechoslovak Exile Organizations after I 968 (Boulder: East European Monographs, 20 12). Raska concludes that the influence of exile groups in the fa ll of Communism in Czechoslovakia "was unquestionabl y positive," 172. 62 � SLOVAKIA 2019 55 IMAGINING A SEP ARA TE SLOVAK.IA: ANTICOMMUNIST SLOVAK EXILES' STRUGGLE FOR AN INDEPENDENT HOMELAND 1 Ellen L. Paul In January 1993, the principle of self-determination reigned supreme as the post-communist Czech and Slovak Federative Republic became Slovakia and the Czech Republic. In many ways, this peaceful separation was the logical outcome of decades of anti-communist Slovak emigre efforts. To be sure, Cold War exiles who left Czechoslovakia after 1945 and the February 1948 communist takeover had many disagreements amongst themselves, especially over leadership and direction of their numerous political organizations.2 Over time, however, many of the Slovak exile organizations arrived at some kind of consensus, and by the last two decades of the Cold War, the right of political self-determination provided Slovak emigres with a unifying theme. After all, in August 1968 when the Warsaw Pact armies quashed the Prague Spring, the Soviet Union brutally reminded the world of its firm control over Czechoslovakia. Yet, that event inspired two reasons for hope among Slovak exiles: l . the longpromised federalism of Czechoslovakia and 2. the creation in 1970 of a unifying new organization of Slovak exiles, the Slovak World Congress. As exiles in the free and democratic West, Cold War-era Slovak political exiles not only fought Soviet Communism and advocated for human rights in the homeland, they also defended the unique development of the Slovak nation in Central European history and informed the West about Slovakia, often refuting what many saw as misinformation spread by the Czechs. A recurring theme at the heart of the publications about Slovak history and culture was the dream of political independence for the Slovak nation. 1 A version of thi s paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, Polish American Historical Association panel on 7 January 2017 in Denver, Colorado. 2 Igor Lukes, "Czechoslovak Political Ex ile in the Cold War: the earl y years," Polish Review 47 , no. 3 (2002): 332-43. �56 SLOVAKIA 2019 From the early 20 th century, Slovaks in the West became convinced that democracy and the ethnic principle of self-determination went hand-in-hand with political independence. A small group of Slovak exiles favored political union with their Czech neighbors, but others insisted on autonomy and even independence based on the ethnic principle of self-determination. Throughout the Cold War, the groups favoring independence consistently fought for a separate Slovak identity and "equal rights with the other free and democratic nations of Europe and the world." 3 In 1993, the fruit of their struggles resulted in the peaceful split of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic into Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Politically active Slovak exiles in Western Europe, the United States, and Canada can be roughly categorized into three basic groups. These categories are a helpful framework for understanding the issue of Slovak independence and especially the ways exiles aligned themselves in the early years of the Cold War. 1. Czechoslovakists: Slovaks who wanted a close union with the Czechs. 2. Federalists: moderate Slovak nationalists who pursued cooperation with the Czechs, but wanted recognition of a separate Slovak identity and political autonomy both for Slovakia and within the exile organizations. These included figures such as Stefan Osusky and Slovak Democratic Party members sent into exile after the communist coup in February 1948. 4 It is notable that the majority-but not all- of these first two groups came from Slovakia' s Lutheran minority. 3. Slovak autonomists : these Slovaks were decidedly nationalist and predominantly Catholic. They were also the most contentious. They supported Slovak independence, completely eschewing union with the Czechs-and rejecting the idea of a "Czechoslovak nation." They fled into exile right away in 1945, ahead of the Red Army and the returning Czechoslovak government. Among them were academics and journalists, such as historian Konstantin Culen, poet Mikulas Sprinc, and journalist Jozef 3 Joseph M. Kirschbaum, "Americki Slovaci a myslienka slovenskej samostatnosti," Kato/icky kalendar Jednota 87 (I 984), 177-84, 184. 4 The 1948 generation tended to be professionals or factory owners and, generally, among the most skilled and educated. In exile, many worked to resist Communism and return Czechoslovakia to democracy. �SLOVAKIA 2019 57 Pauco. In addition, the group featured several politicians and diplomats from the wartime Slovak state, such as Jozef Kirschbaum, Karol Sidor, and Ferdinand Durcansky. The majority of Slovak autonomists migrated to Canada, with some gaining entry into the United States. Although exact membership figures are unknown, there were far more Slovak autonomist and federalist exile groups in North America. This paper focuses almost exclusively on the autonomist and federalist Slovak exiles. Over time their differences faded, especially after the failed Prague Spring reform movement in 1968. Another reason for this shift was that as post-war emigres died, a younger generation of autonomists and federalists gradually united in their goals for self-determination and political independence for Slovakia. In 1958, linguist and Franciscan priest, Bonaventure S. Bue, categorized Slovak emigres into only two groups, lumping the federalists and autonomists into, simply, the autonomists . He explained the rift between the Czechoslovakists and the autonomists with a question: "Are we Czechs or are we Slovaks? To this question the Czechoslovak would answer: I am a Czech; the Autonomist: I am a Slovak." 5 Bue continued " ... the majority of Slovaks have always felt and professed to be an ethnographically, historically, and culturally distinct nation from the Czechs" and suggested that by the late 1950s the Czechoslovakist versus autonomist conflict was " losing its original raison d 'etre."6 In large part that was because even the Slovaks who wished to preserve the state of Czecho-Slovakia by then had "abandoned the highly disputed fiction of the 'Czechoslovak nation"' and agreed on the distinctness of the Slovaks. 7 The remaining issue was about the best alliance or political form for the nation's survival. Many historians trace the ethnogenesis of the Slovak nation back to the Great Moravian Empire of the ninth century, largely based on oral accounts and the Christianizing and linguistic legacy of Saints Cyril and Methodius. Solid documentary evidence of Slovak linguistic uniqueness harks back to the 1700s, when the Catholic intelli5 B. S. Bue, "Conflicts of Slovak Nationalism," Slovakia 8, no . 2 ( 1958), 1-1 7: 7 and 16. 6 Bue, 15. 7 Buc,16-17. �58 SLOVAK.IA 2019 gentsia in northern Hungary first suggested a separate identity for the Slovak language-as opposed to a Czech or Czechoslovak language. To them, it no longer made sense to use the more developed Czech language, and so Catholic clergy began writing in the Slovak vernacular even though the majority culture was distinctly Magyar. 8 In the 19 th century, language became "the center of the new national idea," but this was not enough to create a national identity for the Slovaks, who were under increasing pressure to assimi late to Magyar language and culture. In The Slovak National Awakening ( 1976), Peter Brock explains that as the intelligentsia began to promote the Slovak language and nation, and shift from using the Czech language, ideas about political unity with the Czechs also faded. 9 In 1848, I.',udovit Stur and other young Protestant intellectuals formed a short-lived Slavonic nation of their own, but thereafter the process of creating a Slovak political nation was interrupted by Magyarization, which meant the imposition of Magyar culture and language on young intellectuals in the Hungarian half of Austria-Hungary. The impetus to assert a separate Slovak identity with a language that was neither Czech nor Magyar had been well under way by the 1840s, involved both Catholics and Protestants, and was an important step toward declaring a distinct Slovak national identity. Toward that end, in the early 1860s the Matica slovenska (Slovak Cultural Institute) was founded to aid the continuing development of Slovak literature and culture. A political merger between Czechs and Slovaks came in 1918 following the breakup of Austria-Hungary and the calamity of the First World War, but that union was not predestined. Despite their linguistic similarities and geographical proximity, Czechs and Slovaks had very different histories and cultural influences. For hundreds of years, the Czech lands were part of the Holy Roman Empire, ruled by the House of Habsburg, and much influenced by German culture and the Reformation (and the Czech reformer Jan Hus). During that time, the Kingdom of Hungary ruled over the Slovak 8 Ismo Nurmi, Slovakia-a Playground for Nationalism and National Identity: Manifestations of National identity of the Slo vaks 191 8-1920, Biblioteca Historica 42 (Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 1999), 9-10, and Peter Brock, The Slovak National Awakening (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1976), 1837 and 53-4. 9 Brock, 7 & 20-37 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 59 lands, inside the boundaries of the Habsburg Monarchy. While both small nations struggled against strong neighbors, their nineteenth century trajectories to national awakening and political agency were distinctly different. Firstly, the Slovak lands remained largely agricultural while the Czech lands underwent industrialization. Secondly, the Czechs achieved some successes in gaining cultural and linguistic rights at home and a measure of political representation in Vienna. Whereas to the east, the Slovaks faced increasing Magyarization and the loss of their culture. Since the tenth century, the lands of Slovakia had been ruled by foreigners and what had kept the Slovaks from assimilating, disappearing, or dispersing were "language, geography, and tradition ." 10 Not surprisingly, these vastly divergent experiences dramatically shaped the outlook and soul of each nation. Although Slovak culture was repressed in the homeland, the impact of the efforts of the Matica slovenska, Catholic clergy, and Slovak intelligentsia to keep Slovak language and culture alive became apparent by the late 19 th century, when notable numbers of emigres began arriving in the United States and identified themselves as Slovak. By the early twentieth century, the U.S.A. was home to the most influential Slovak diaspora. 11 In 1890, they established two important early exile organizations: the National Slovak Society and the First Catholic Slovak Union. In 1907, the Slovak League of America formed and united all Slovak groups in America. While based "on a wide platform of love for [the] Slovak nation," the Slovak League of America's mission at the time was to cast off the Hungarian tyrant ruling over Slovaks in the homeland. 12 Unity among exiles, however, became much harder to achieve after the dissolution of AustriaHungary during the First World War and particularly after the declaration of the First Czechoslovak Republic in 1918. During World War I, politicians began deliberating the future of Central Europe. The most important negotiations regarding Czechoslovak statehood took place in North America among representatives of both the Czechs and Slovaks. The Czechs knew that Slovak par10 Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 37-8. 11 Jozef Pauco, " Slovaks Abroad and their Relationship with Slovakia," in Slovakia in th e 19th and 20th Centuries, 2 nd edition, ed. Jozef M. Kirschbaum (Toronto: Slovak World Congress, 1978), 415-24, 415. 12 Ibid., 417. �60 SLOVAK.IA 2019 ticipation was vital to their cause. With that knowledge, Slovaks were able to leverage some influence by demanding " recognition of an independent Slovak identity and Slovak political autonomy in exchange for their support." 13 Many Slovak exiles believed that "through their immigration to America ... they had helped preserve Slovak national identity" and that "American democracy provided them something they felt would prove beneficial" for Slovaks back home. 14 In the negotiations over Czechoslovakia and its constitution, the efforts of Slovak Stefan Osusky stand out. He worked closely with Tomas G. Masaryk for federalism and for Slovakia to be regarded "as an equal partner by the Czechs in the Czecho-Slovak state." 15 In 1918, the (First) Czechoslovak Republic was created with Masaryk as its president. Unfortunately, Masaryk- whose father was Slovak and mother was Moravian/Czech-did not believe the Slovaks to be a separate nation. In addition, "a fateful ambiguity crept into the very first political statement published by independent Slovak politicians, the Slovak National Council. .. " which although declaring Slovakia a "nation," also suggested Slovak as a "branch of the unified Czechoslovak nation ." 16 The confusion resulted in "misunderstandings, confused government policies, enmity, and even tragedy .. .. [And] politically, it led to all sorts of excesses, including Czech chauvinism and Slovak Czechophobia." 17 The final documents of the new combined state referred only to the "Czechoslovaks" and completely omitted any mention of autonomy for Slovakia. 13 Michael R. Cude, "The Imagined Exiles : Slovak-Ameri cans and the Slovak Question during the First Czechoslovak Republi c," in From Exsilium to Exile: Coercion in Migration, Studia Historica Gedanensia, vol. 5, ed . Anna Mazurkiewicz (Gdansk : University of Gdansk Historical Institute, 2014), 287-305 , 287. 14 Cude writes that Slovak exi les viewed "their experi ence in America" as proof "that the Slovaks could very much develop independently and did not need the strict oversight of the Czechs. As such , the Slovak-American activ ists gradually adopted a role as an 'ex iled' national voice aga inst Prague centra lism," 298 . 15 Joseph A. Mikus, "Comments," in Slovakia in th e l <J'h and 2dh Centuries, 97-100, 97 . 16 Peter Petro, A History of Slovak Literature, Montreal [Que.] : MQUP, 1995. Ebook Collection (EBSCO host), EBSCOhost (accessed 29 Nov. 2016), 13 1. 17 Petro, 131. �SLOVAKIA 2019 61 In dismissing the wishes of Slovak nationalists in America, and subsequently in Slovakia as well, Masaryk and his supporters were putting the new Republic into j eopardy. The various Czech-dominated governments that ruled the new Republic recruited Slovaks of the 'Czechoslovak ' persuasion (largely Lutherans) to join their ruling coalition. American Czechoslovaks approved of this arrangement. .. . Slovak nationalists, however, were left out in the cold. 18 The centralism 19 of the government in Prague during the First Czechoslovak Republic can be viewed as helping continue the defensive nature of the Slovak national movement, which had begun under the duress of Magyarization. 2° For example, Slovaks seldom felt like equal partners in the new state. Even though in 1918 "the very real existential problems caused by the attempted liquidation of Slovak culture through Magyarization [had] disappeared ... the positive aspect of this momentous change for liberated Slovak culture was somewhat tempered by a paternalistic attitude emanating from Prague." But it was not "always ill-meant and unjustified; from Prague also came tremendous support and help, particularly in the cultural and educational fields ." 21 The perception of inequality, however, became consequential in the late 1930s, when Czechoslovakia found itself under the heel of Nazi Germany. On 14 March 1939, several months after the Munich Pact gave Nazi Germany control over the Sudetenland (in a failed exchange for peace), Catholic Slovak leaders declared the Slovak Republic, albeit under Nazi influence. Six years later, the first Slovak state came to an end. The short-lived, authoritarian Slovak state caused much conflict among exiles in the early post-war years. Among the Catholic autonomists, the Slovak Republic inspired nostalgia and resolve to continue the fight for political independence. But the federalist and Czech18 M. Mark Stolarik, "The Role of Slovak Emigres in North America in the Emancipation of the Slovak Nation," Drustvena istrazivanja [Journal fo r General Social Issues ] 7, no. 1-2 (1998), 75-88, 78. 19 In Czechoslovakia, "centralism" refers to the concentration of political power in the capital, Prague. It often operated in opposition to regional desires for decentralization, self-administration, and autonomy. 20 Nurmi , 18 I. 21 Petro, 13 1. �62 SLOVAKIA 2019 oslovakist Slovak exiles generally condemned that group as, among other things, undemocratic.22 In turn, the Catholic autonomists condemned the federalists as having sold out the Slovaks to communist oppression after the war. The Catholic autonomists defended the wartime Slovak state as a rational decision done for national survival, as "the only way out under the given political circumstances" of Czechoslovakia having fallen under the rule of Nazi German~, and "as the logical conclusion of their former national endeavors." 3 Although controversial and brief, this experiment in political independence gave the Slovaks a new and lasting sense of worthiness among nations. While Masaryk had been a disappointment to many Slovaks, post-war Slovak emigres- autonomists and federalists alike-expressly despised the second Czechoslovak president and wartime leader of the Czechoslovak government-in-exi le in London, Edvard Benes (1935-38 & 1939-48). In a variety of publications during and after World War II, (federalist) politician Stefan Osusky blamed Benes for the breakup of Czecho-Slovakia in 1938 and for the postwar subjugation of Czecho-Slovakia by the Soviet Union. Former diplomat and historian Joseph A. Mikus (an autonomist) voiced similarly strong views of Benes, holding him responsible not only for the communist takeover in 1948 but also for the failure of the reform movement under Alexander Dubcek in 1968. 24 In general, the Slovak 22 Petro writes "The backlash that led to the super-nationalism of some writers during the existence of the Slovak Republic can be ascribed not to some inbred propensity for political extremism, but to a desperate desire for national self-assertion," 131 -32. 23 B.S. Bue, " Federative Tendencies of Slovak Nationalism," Slovakia 8, no. 3 ( 1958), 25-32, 30. "The short-lived existence of this independent state gave to Slovak nationalism what it had hitherto lacked, namely, a uniform will to live independently and a conviction that it will know how to stand its ground as an equally worthy member among the other nations." 24 Mikus, "Comments," in Slovakia in the 19th and 2dh Centuries, 400-405 . In response to a presentation by Kurt Glaser regarding the question of national states and federali sm in Central Europe, Mikus argued "The record of Czechoslovakia is particularly sad, since during World War II Benes had laid the comer-stone of his foreign policy out of collaboration with the Soviet Union, a non-Western and communist power. The guilt complex resulting from [Benes's] 1945 solution of the Sudeten German problem threw him into the arms of the Soviet Union . That embrace became so strong that [Alexander] Dubcek's effort to extricate Czecho- �SLOVAKIA 2019 63 exiles with close ties to the Catholic Slovak Republic felt particularly snubbed by Czechoslovakia's wartime representatives in London and Washington. Slovak politician, diplomat, and later prolific scholar Jozef M. Kirschbaum was unflinching both in his support for Slovak independence and in his criticism of the Czechs: "Unfortunately, Western diplomats displayed little understanding for the aspirations of the Slovak people and mostly adhered to the concept of the Czech exiled politicians" led by Benes. 25 In the late 1940s and early '50s, Slovak exile groups contacted a variety of governmental offices in the U.S. and Canada requesting freedom from Soviet domination and independence for Slovakia. 26 Bitterness and rivalries among the groups, however, limited their impact. 27 Ever since the declaration of Czechoslovakia in 1918, Slovak exiles had embraced the mission of speaking on behalf of the silenced Slovak people back home in Czechoslovakia. They resumed that role after World War II as Slovak exiles reacted to the "rigid centralism" imposed by the post-war Czechoslovak regime. In addition, Slovak exiles in the West were troubled by the ruthlessness of the Stalinist system, with its "political and religious persecution, economic discrimination, and prohibition of contacts with Western countries." 28 So, American and Canadian Slovaks responded to the new status quo by resuming their role as "interpreters of the aspirations of the Slovak people for freedom, democracy, and independence." 29 With a renewed sense of hope, a few dozen post-war exiles took up the challenge of informing the world about Slovakia and " .. .published hundreds of books and articles about the history of Slovakia and the Slovaks. [In the process, they] helped keep the 'Slovak cause ' in the public eye, as well as give it some credence in Slovakia from it was in vain. The occupation of Czecho-Slovakia has its roots in that fitiful pactomania of Benes with Moscow," 403. 5 J.M. Kirschbaum, " Diplomatic and Consular Relations of Slovakia with Neutral States," Slovakia 23 , 46 ( 1973), 111-22, 119. 26 Pauco, 423. 27 Stolarik, "The Role of Slovak Emigres in North America in the Emancipation of the Slovak Nation," 82 . 28 J.M. Kirschbaum, " Slovaks Abroad and their Role in Slovakia 's Struggle for Freedom," Slovakia 24, 47 (1974), 63-6, 63-4. 29 Ibid. 63-4. �64 SLOVAKIA 2019 the academic and intellectual circles in North America."30 One important publication with that goal was the academic journal, Slovakia, edited by Filip A. Hrobak and first published in 1951. The journal's purpose was twofold: to defend Slovak political rights and to publicize Slovak national and cultural activities.31 After 26 years as editor of the journal, the Slovak League of America lauded Hrobak as a defender of "the sacred cause of Slovak national freedom. " 32 Exiled Slovaks seldom agreed on what exactly comprised the Slovak cause but many believed that the West would be receptive to their homeland 's plight. The Slovak Question (i.e. rights to autonomy, self-determination, statehood, etc .) continually caused tension, especially among exile organizations consisting of both Czechs and Slovaks. One of the most influential of those, created one year after the communist coup of February 1948, was the Council of Free Czechoslovakia (CFC). The U.S. government relied on the Council for policy advice, but to the Slovaks' dismay Washington paid little attention to the Slovak Question. 33 The many feuds over Slovak autonomy led Slovaks such as Stefan Osusky to demand separate recognition in the Council of Free Czechoslovakia and parity in its leadership . However, achieving an equal voice in that organization 34 took over twenty years. In 1948 the Slovak National Council Abroad was founded by Karol Sidor, Jozef Kirschbaum, Peter Privdavok, and Konstantin Culen. The Slovak Leagues of America and Canada recognized the Slovak National Council as the representative body of Slovak politi30 M. Mark Stolarik, "Slovak Historians in Exile in North America, 1945- 1992," Human Affairs 6, no. I ( 1996), 34-44, 34. 31 Pauco, 422 32 Joseph C. Krajsa, ed., "First Catholic Slovak Union (Jednota) of the U.S. and Canada," in Slovaks in America: A Bicentennial Study (M iddletown, PA : Slovak League of America, 1978), IO 1-68, 128. 33 Michael R. Cude, Transatlantic Perspectives on th e Slo vak Question, /914-1948 (PhD Diss., Univers ity of Colorado-Boulder, 20 13) and Cude, "The Imagined Exiles." 34 The first reconciliation in 1952 attempted to address this issue by givi ng the Slovaks separate recognition with separate votes on programs within the CFC. In 1960, the moderate nationalists in the Council formed the Permanent Confe rence of Slovak Democratic Exiles and formally split from the CFC to join with other Czech dissenters to form the Committee of Free Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovakists remained invo lved in the Counci l, and as part of its 1973 reorgani zation, the CFC established Czech-Slovak parity in its leadership. �SLOVAK.IA 2019 65 cal exiles. 35 Another exile group also promoted the nationalist cause. The Slovak Liberation Committee, led by Ferdinand Durcansly and others, defended "the right of self-determination for the Slovak nation." 36 Additionally, many smaller organizations and societies from Australia to Buenos Aires promoted the idea of political independence for Slovakia. 37 The inability of the various organizations to unite, however, hampered their overall impact on Western policy and understanding, especially in the first two and a half decades after the war . . The Prague Spring of 1968 was a turning point for many of the squabbling exiles. In the wake of the failed reform movement, thousands of the disappointed migrated out of Czechoslovakia. The newcomers were received with skepticism, and although there was little that unified Slovak emigres after 1968, Frantisek Braxator suggested that a common ideological platform might be that no compromise with Communism was possible, "human face" or otherwise. He reassuringly concluded that nobody wanted to resurrect the authoritarian wartime state. 38 In many ways, the diversity and energy of the new exiles added much to the cause of Slovak emigres in the West. Indeed, there is evidence that the last two decades of exile activity were more productive than the early decades of the Cold War. By then the political goals of Slovak-Americans and Slovak-Canadians were generally two-fold: continue heritage preservation and call attention in the West to the persecution of Slovaks under communist rule in Czechoslovakia. 39 After the Soviet invasion, the thousands of Prague Spring arrivals to North America and the earlier post-war political exiles from Slovakia, more than ever before, were able to find common purpose, even unity, in their identity as Slovaks. The unprecedented unity came in large part from a new umbrella organization, the Slovak World Congress (Svetovy kongres Slovakov), 35 Pauco, 423. Ibid. Some of the others included Stefan Polakovic, Alojz Macek, and Stanislav Meciar. 37 Ibid., 423-4. 38 Frantisek Braxator, " Slovaks Abroad and Their Relationship to Czechoslovakia," in Slovakia in th e 19th and 20'" Centuries, 425-33. He concluded that "there was "definitely no support for the idea that the majority of this emigration regards aid to Slovakia as taking the form of an effort to revive the Slovak Republic of 1939 to 1945 " 432 39 Kr;jsa, "First Catholic Slovak Union," in Slovaks in America, l O1-68, 126. 36 �66 SLOVAKIA 2019 founded in New York in June 1970. Between 1970 and 1989, the SWC brought together Slovak organizations from North and South America, Western Europe, and Oceania. It absorbed a wide variety of emigre Slovak organizations and individuals, from Catholics and Lutherans to a range of political figures , from the federalist-leaning Stefan Osusky to the ardent nationalist Ferdinand Durcansky. Leadership of the Slovak World Congress encompassed the diversity of Slovaks in exile as well. In addition to the old-guard leaders, 1968generation Slovak exiles such as the Lutheran pastor Dusan T6th and the Jewish ex-communist Eugen Lob! held high positions in the organization. The SWC aimed to resist Communism in the name of democracy, religious freedom , and the principle of self-determination, specifically meaning self-rule and political independence. In 1973, the Slovak World Congress published symposium proceedings to inform and update the West about Slovaks and their long history in Central Europe. Many contributors thought that too few histories of Europe had appreciated the Slovaks' ninth-century state organization. Furthermore, they had neglected to mention Slovak contributions to Slavic civi lizations, such as by Saints Cyril and Methodius. Slovak World Congress organizers were also concerned that when Slovak history was presented, it was "in a distorted light." 40 Founder and benefactor Stephen B. Roman noted the unith th queness of the symposium and resulting book on 19 and 20 century Slovak history: [A} fl the authors, including those of non-Slovak origin, subscribe to the thesis that the Slovaks developed through the centuries into a distin ct Central European nation, and that their language, literature and culture also developed independently of other Slavic nations. From this premise, the right to selfdetermination and equality of rights for the Slovak people be41 came a logical conclusion for all contributors. The Slovak World Congress' mission was to represent "the cultural, social, and political aspirations of the Slovak people in the Western hemisphere" and to "contribute to the search for historical 40 41 Stephen B. Roman, "Preface," Slovakia in th e 19th and 20th Centuries, 5. Roman, " Preface," 6. �SLOVAKIA 2019 67 truth about the Slovaks and thereby to help bring about better understanding and cooperation among the nations of Central Europe."42 Founder Roman declared that the SWC strongly believed "that peoples of that vital area" could "regain their political freedom and build their future through close cooperation and the recognition by each of the equal rights to independence of the others."43 Notably, the Slovak World Congress claimed to work toward freedom and independence not only for Slovakia but for other small European nations as well. In 1978 in the "Introduction to the Second Edition" of the Slovak World Congress proceedings, Slovakia in the 1911' and 20th Centuries, editor Joseph M. Kirschbaum further emphasized the balanced and informational nature of the volume: Until very recently Slovak history was presented to the West either by the adherents of the "Czechoslovak" school which denied the separate historical development of Slovakia, or by the historians of the Slovak nationalist school who insisted on the independent political and cultural development of Slovakia . ...By publishing this edition, the Slovak World Congress has no other aim but to help acquaint Western readers with Slovakia and [its} rise to nationhood, and to contribute to the search for freedom and cooperation among the nations of Central and Eastern Europe.44 Despite the Slovak World Congress' reputation as the leading late Cold War organization for Slovaks in the West, it was never completely successful in uniting the Slovak exiles. The Czechoslovakists and some of the moderate nationalists disavowed involvement because of the strong views of the Catholic autonomists, especially those with "unclean pasts.,,4s To accommodate the diversity of interests, the SWC comprised three factions regarding constitutional questions: federalization within Czechoslovakia, confederation, and independence. 46 On behalf of the Slovak diaspora, leader Roman had 42 Ibid. Ibid. 44 J.M . Kirschbaum, Slo vakia in the / 9th and 20th Centuries, 8. 45 Jozef Spetko, "Slovenska exilova a emigrantska politika v rokoch 1945-1989," Historicky casopis 39, no . 3 ( I99 I), 24 1-61: 256. 46 Ibid., 257-8. 43 �68 SLOVAK.IA 2019 wanted the organization to "speak as one voice and act according to a single plan" on behalf of the silenced Slovaks in the homeland. But achieving consensus among the exiles, especially about independence and resolution of the Slovak Question, was impossible from the very beginning of the SWC. 47 Nevertheless, the Slovak World Congress devised anti-communist propaganda campaigns, held scholarly conferences and cultural festivals , and even aided the protest movements in Slovakia in the 1980s.48 The organization collaborated with figures such as the Slovak-Canadian hockey player Marian St'astny and the Camogursky family-leading members of the organization-and even organized overseas protests to promote religious freedom in conjunction with the candlelight protests in Bratislava on March 25, 1988. In 1989, the Slovak World Congress officially supported the Velvet Revolution. However, "once the Communists surrendered power to Czech and Slovak dissidents ... the Slovak World Congress began to fracture ." 49 In the wake of the fall of the Czechoslovak communist regime, the SWC organized visits and programs in Slovakia. But relations between the SWC and the post-communist Czechoslovak government quickly became strained, mostly over the issue of Slovak autonomy, which most, but not all, members of the Slovak World Congress still very much supported. 50 Within weeks of the revolution, Secretary-General of the SWC Dusan T6th, who had fled Czechoslovakia after the Soviet invasion in 1968, visited his family in Slovakia and appeared at some political rallies in the capital, Bratislava. The " intoxicated crowds" welcomed him warmly and "listened intently as he told them about the [Slovak 47 Ibid. , 255. M. Mark Stolarik, Where is my Hom e? Slovak Immigration to North America (/870-20/0) (Bern: Peter Lang, 2012), 281-2. 49 Ibid., 287. The groups were the Civic Forum (Obcanske forum) and the Public Against Violence (Verejnost' proti nasiliu) in the Czech lands and Slovakia, respectively. 50 The Slovak World Congress began to decline after Roman's death in 1988, especially since he had bankrolled the organization. After the Velvet Divorce in I993, its functions declined even more, with its most notable achievement being to convince the U.S. and Slovak governments to allow dual citizenship. By 2000, the SWC was functionally gone. See Stolarik, Where ... , 279-95. 48 �SLOVAKIA 2019 69 World] Congress and its aspirations for freedom in Slovakia." 5 1 After all, the topic of political independence had been a taboo for forty years. For its part, the SWC tried to engage the Slovak government in talks about independence in early 1990, but Slovak politicians had more immediate concerns such as figuring out how to navigate the new political landscape. "Many were new politicians who faced the task of learning not only the art of political maneuvering, but above all that of public discourse in a democratic society. They were the ones who dealt with the issue of Czecho-Slovak relations which found resolution in the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. " 52 The first post-communist elections in Slovakia were for representatives to the Slovak National Council. Although results of the voting in early June 1990 demonstrated the predictable rejection of Communism, they also " indicated that ' the Slovak question' was still on the political agenda. " 53 The biggest surprise was the third place finish for the Slovak National Party (Slovenska narodna strana orSNS), the only party with independence in its platform. "It is quite likely that one particular event preceding the election contributed to the [SNS ' s] success" in the parliamentary elections.54 Trouble began in March 1990 in the Federal Assembly in Czechoslovakia. Vaclav Havel, who had recently become the new president, was a vocal proponent of federalism and continuing the Czech union with Slovakia. The dispute started when Slovak politicians wanted to return to the original ( 1918-1920) way of writing the country's name: Czecho-Slovakia. Tensions grew when the Czechs agreed that Slovakia could do so, but neither the Czechs nor the federal government of Czechoslovakia would hyphenate. The "hyphen war" showed "how very different were the Czech and Slovak conceptions of their common state and brought into the open the need to reexamine the state of Czech-Slovak relations." 55 For the next two years, the discourse around that reexamination exposed ever more disparities and decades-old animosities . 51 Anne C.R. Roman, "Slovak Expats Remember 1989, too," Slovak Spectator, 29 November 1999, https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20009411 /slovak-expats-remember1989-too.html. 52 S. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia, 251-2. 53 Ibid., 255. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid . �70 SLOVAKIA 2019 Economic concerns took center stage, including the question of how quickly to move away from a socialist command economy to a capitalist market economy. While Slovaks feared a continuation of Prague centralism, including federal conduct and policies that favored Czech-and discounted Slovak- economic contributions, Czechs complained about subsidizing the Slovak economy. 56 The contrasting way the Slovaks and Czechs viewed this issue underscores some of the key reasons for their separation in 1993. One Czech-American historian argues that the peaceful separation of Czechs and Slovaks was a "necessity," based on their lack of "shared positive historical experience." 57 History and the "interplay of a series of factors" indeed influenced the breakup of Czechoslovakia. 58 Stanislav Kirschbaum suggests the root of the problem goes back to "the pursuit of [Slovak] national development in cooperation with the Czechs."59 From its inception in 1918 the "ultimate failure" of the Czechoslovak state was that it did not "provide an acceptable framework for Slovak national development," and despite all the benefits and progress, "the common state put Slovaks in a position of having to continue their struggle for survival." 60 In retrospect, the unraveling of Czechoslovakia in the early 1990s is not surprising; nor is the fact of its peaceful evolution. In the eyes of many Slovak exiles, the fall of Communism meant more than just getting rid of the Communists and returning to democracy. Indeed, " ... it was all of this plus home rule," commented M. Mark Stolarik, scholar and former president of the Canadian Slovak 56 S. Kirschbaum, 256-68. Igor Lukes, " Strangers in One House: Czechs and Slovaks, 1918-1992," Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism/Revue Canadienne des Etudes sur le Nationalisme 27, 1-2 2000, 33-43 , 41 . 58 S. Kirschbaum, 270. The factors include the following: "The inability of the Czechoslovak state to solve certain social and constitutional problems since 1918; the legacy of the Communist regime; the adaptation crisis resulting from the passage of a single-party state to democratic pluralism ; the lack of experience of the leaders of the Velvet Revolution ; the absence of Czechoslovak parties in the postCommunist era; and the provision in the 1968 constitutional law that allowed Slovak deputies to block federal legislation that was not deemed to be in Slovakia's interest" so that the Slovaks could not be outvoted by the Czech majority." . 59 S. Kirschbaum, 270-71. 60 Ibid., 271. 57 �SLOVAK.IA 2019 71 League, on the tenth anniversary of the Velvet Revolution.6 1 In the United States and Canada, Slovak exiles' experiences of democracy and freedom guided them forward before and after the toppling of the hardline communist regime in Czechoslovakia. 62 Their influence on politics in the homeland has yet to be clearly documented, but it is quite possible that Slovak exiles and their endeavor to keep alive the drive for the self-determination and political independence of the Slovak nation provided not only legitimacy in the West, but also moral and political encouragement to their homeland as the nation moved toward independence in the early 1990s. 61 A. Roman, " Slovak Expats Remember 1989, too." Francis D. Raska, Long Road to Victory: A History or Czechoslovak Exile Organizations after I 968 (Boulder: East European Monographs, 20 12). Raska concludes that the influence of exile groups in the fa ll of Communism in Czechoslovakia "was unquestionabl y positive," 172. 62 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2019, Vol. 44 Description An account of the resource Vol. 44 (No. 82-83), 2019. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 2019 55 IMAGINING A SEP ARA TE SLOVAK.IA: ANTICOMMUNIST SLOVAK EXILES' STRUGGLE FOR AN INDEPENDENT HOMELAND 1 Ellen L. Paul In January 1993, the principle of self-determination reigned supreme as the post-communist Czech and Slovak Federative Republic became Slovakia and the Czech Republic. In many ways, this peaceful separation was the logical outcome of decades of anti-communist Slovak emigre efforts. To be sure, Cold War exiles who left Czechoslovakia after 1945 and the February 1948 communist takeover had many disagreements amongst themselves, especially over leadership and direction of their numerous political organizations.2 Over time, however, many of the Slovak exile organizations arrived at some kind of consensus, and by the last two decades of the Cold War, the right of political self-determination provided Slovak emigres with a unifying theme. After all, in August 1968 when the Warsaw Pact armies quashed the Prague Spring, the Soviet Union brutally reminded the world of its firm control over Czechoslovakia. Yet, that event inspired two reasons for hope among Slovak exiles: l . the longpromised federalism of Czechoslovakia and 2. the creation in 1970 of a unifying new organization of Slovak exiles, the Slovak World Congress. As exiles in the free and democratic West, Cold War-era Slovak political exiles not only fought Soviet Communism and advocated for human rights in the homeland, they also defended the unique development of the Slovak nation in Central European history and informed the West about Slovakia, often refuting what many saw as misinformation spread by the Czechs. A recurring theme at the heart of the publications about Slovak history and culture was the dream of political independence for the Slovak nation. 1 A version of thi s paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, Polish American Historical Association panel on 7 January 2017 in Denver, Colorado. 2 Igor Lukes, "Czechoslovak Political Ex ile in the Cold War: the earl y years," Polish Review 47 , no. 3 (2002): 332-43. 56 SLOVAKIA 2019 From the early 20 th century, Slovaks in the West became convinced that democracy and the ethnic principle of self-determination went hand-in-hand with political independence. A small group of Slovak exiles favored political union with their Czech neighbors, but others insisted on autonomy and even independence based on the ethnic principle of self-determination. Throughout the Cold War, the groups favoring independence consistently fought for a separate Slovak identity and "equal rights with the other free and democratic nations of Europe and the world." 3 In 1993, the fruit of their struggles resulted in the peaceful split of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic into Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Politically active Slovak exiles in Western Europe, the United States, and Canada can be roughly categorized into three basic groups. These categories are a helpful framework for understanding the issue of Slovak independence and especially the ways exiles aligned themselves in the early years of the Cold War. 1. Czechoslovakists: Slovaks who wanted a close union with the Czechs. 2. Federalists: moderate Slovak nationalists who pursued cooperation with the Czechs, but wanted recognition of a separate Slovak identity and political autonomy both for Slovakia and within the exile organizations. These included figures such as Stefan Osusky and Slovak Democratic Party members sent into exile after the communist coup in February 1948. 4 It is notable that the majority-but not all- of these first two groups came from Slovakia' s Lutheran minority. 3. Slovak autonomists : these Slovaks were decidedly nationalist and predominantly Catholic. They were also the most contentious. They supported Slovak independence, completely eschewing union with the Czechs-and rejecting the idea of a "Czechoslovak nation." They fled into exile right away in 1945, ahead of the Red Army and the returning Czechoslovak government. Among them were academics and journalists, such as historian Konstantin Culen, poet Mikulas Sprinc, and journalist Jozef 3 Joseph M. Kirschbaum, "Americki Slovaci a myslienka slovenskej samostatnosti," Kato/icky kalendar Jednota 87 (I 984), 177-84, 184. 4 The 1948 generation tended to be professionals or factory owners and, generally, among the most skilled and educated. In exile, many worked to resist Communism and return Czechoslovakia to democracy. SLOVAKIA 2019 57 Pauco. In addition, the group featured several politicians and diplomats from the wartime Slovak state, such as Jozef Kirschbaum, Karol Sidor, and Ferdinand Durcansky. The majority of Slovak autonomists migrated to Canada, with some gaining entry into the United States. Although exact membership figures are unknown, there were far more Slovak autonomist and federalist exile groups in North America. This paper focuses almost exclusively on the autonomist and federalist Slovak exiles. Over time their differences faded, especially after the failed Prague Spring reform movement in 1968. Another reason for this shift was that as post-war emigres died, a younger generation of autonomists and federalists gradually united in their goals for self-determination and political independence for Slovakia. In 1958, linguist and Franciscan priest, Bonaventure S. Bue, categorized Slovak emigres into only two groups, lumping the federalists and autonomists into, simply, the autonomists . He explained the rift between the Czechoslovakists and the autonomists with a question: "Are we Czechs or are we Slovaks? To this question the Czechoslovak would answer: I am a Czech; the Autonomist: I am a Slovak." 5 Bue continued " ... the majority of Slovaks have always felt and professed to be an ethnographically, historically, and culturally distinct nation from the Czechs" and suggested that by the late 1950s the Czechoslovakist versus autonomist conflict was " losing its original raison d 'etre."6 In large part that was because even the Slovaks who wished to preserve the state of Czecho-Slovakia by then had "abandoned the highly disputed fiction of the 'Czechoslovak nation"' and agreed on the distinctness of the Slovaks. 7 The remaining issue was about the best alliance or political form for the nation's survival. Many historians trace the ethnogenesis of the Slovak nation back to the Great Moravian Empire of the ninth century, largely based on oral accounts and the Christianizing and linguistic legacy of Saints Cyril and Methodius. Solid documentary evidence of Slovak linguistic uniqueness harks back to the 1700s, when the Catholic intelli5 B. S. Bue, "Conflicts of Slovak Nationalism," Slovakia 8, no . 2 ( 1958), 1-1 7: 7 and 16. 6 Bue, 15. 7 Buc,16-17. 58 SLOVAK.IA 2019 gentsia in northern Hungary first suggested a separate identity for the Slovak language-as opposed to a Czech or Czechoslovak language. To them, it no longer made sense to use the more developed Czech language, and so Catholic clergy began writing in the Slovak vernacular even though the majority culture was distinctly Magyar. 8 In the 19 th century, language became "the center of the new national idea," but this was not enough to create a national identity for the Slovaks, who were under increasing pressure to assimi late to Magyar language and culture. In The Slovak National Awakening ( 1976), Peter Brock explains that as the intelligentsia began to promote the Slovak language and nation, and shift from using the Czech language, ideas about political unity with the Czechs also faded. 9 In 1848, I.',udovit Stur and other young Protestant intellectuals formed a short-lived Slavonic nation of their own, but thereafter the process of creating a Slovak political nation was interrupted by Magyarization, which meant the imposition of Magyar culture and language on young intellectuals in the Hungarian half of Austria-Hungary. The impetus to assert a separate Slovak identity with a language that was neither Czech nor Magyar had been well under way by the 1840s, involved both Catholics and Protestants, and was an important step toward declaring a distinct Slovak national identity. Toward that end, in the early 1860s the Matica slovenska (Slovak Cultural Institute) was founded to aid the continuing development of Slovak literature and culture. A political merger between Czechs and Slovaks came in 1918 following the breakup of Austria-Hungary and the calamity of the First World War, but that union was not predestined. Despite their linguistic similarities and geographical proximity, Czechs and Slovaks had very different histories and cultural influences. For hundreds of years, the Czech lands were part of the Holy Roman Empire, ruled by the House of Habsburg, and much influenced by German culture and the Reformation (and the Czech reformer Jan Hus). During that time, the Kingdom of Hungary ruled over the Slovak 8 Ismo Nurmi, Slovakia-a Playground for Nationalism and National Identity: Manifestations of National identity of the Slo vaks 191 8-1920, Biblioteca Historica 42 (Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 1999), 9-10, and Peter Brock, The Slovak National Awakening (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1976), 1837 and 53-4. 9 Brock, 7 & 20-37 . SLOVAKIA 2019 59 lands, inside the boundaries of the Habsburg Monarchy. While both small nations struggled against strong neighbors, their nineteenth century trajectories to national awakening and political agency were distinctly different. Firstly, the Slovak lands remained largely agricultural while the Czech lands underwent industrialization. Secondly, the Czechs achieved some successes in gaining cultural and linguistic rights at home and a measure of political representation in Vienna. Whereas to the east, the Slovaks faced increasing Magyarization and the loss of their culture. Since the tenth century, the lands of Slovakia had been ruled by foreigners and what had kept the Slovaks from assimilating, disappearing, or dispersing were "language, geography, and tradition ." 10 Not surprisingly, these vastly divergent experiences dramatically shaped the outlook and soul of each nation. Although Slovak culture was repressed in the homeland, the impact of the efforts of the Matica slovenska, Catholic clergy, and Slovak intelligentsia to keep Slovak language and culture alive became apparent by the late 19 th century, when notable numbers of emigres began arriving in the United States and identified themselves as Slovak. By the early twentieth century, the U.S.A. was home to the most influential Slovak diaspora. 11 In 1890, they established two important early exile organizations: the National Slovak Society and the First Catholic Slovak Union. In 1907, the Slovak League of America formed and united all Slovak groups in America. While based "on a wide platform of love for [the] Slovak nation," the Slovak League of America's mission at the time was to cast off the Hungarian tyrant ruling over Slovaks in the homeland. 12 Unity among exiles, however, became much harder to achieve after the dissolution of AustriaHungary during the First World War and particularly after the declaration of the First Czechoslovak Republic in 1918. During World War I, politicians began deliberating the future of Central Europe. The most important negotiations regarding Czechoslovak statehood took place in North America among representatives of both the Czechs and Slovaks. The Czechs knew that Slovak par10 Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 37-8. 11 Jozef Pauco, " Slovaks Abroad and their Relationship with Slovakia," in Slovakia in th e 19th and 20th Centuries, 2 nd edition, ed. Jozef M. Kirschbaum (Toronto: Slovak World Congress, 1978), 415-24, 415. 12 Ibid., 417. 60 SLOVAK.IA 2019 ticipation was vital to their cause. With that knowledge, Slovaks were able to leverage some influence by demanding " recognition of an independent Slovak identity and Slovak political autonomy in exchange for their support." 13 Many Slovak exiles believed that "through their immigration to America ... they had helped preserve Slovak national identity" and that "American democracy provided them something they felt would prove beneficial" for Slovaks back home. 14 In the negotiations over Czechoslovakia and its constitution, the efforts of Slovak Stefan Osusky stand out. He worked closely with Tomas G. Masaryk for federalism and for Slovakia to be regarded "as an equal partner by the Czechs in the Czecho-Slovak state." 15 In 1918, the (First) Czechoslovak Republic was created with Masaryk as its president. Unfortunately, Masaryk- whose father was Slovak and mother was Moravian/Czech-did not believe the Slovaks to be a separate nation. In addition, "a fateful ambiguity crept into the very first political statement published by independent Slovak politicians, the Slovak National Council. .. " which although declaring Slovakia a "nation," also suggested Slovak as a "branch of the unified Czechoslovak nation ." 16 The confusion resulted in "misunderstandings, confused government policies, enmity, and even tragedy .. .. [And] politically, it led to all sorts of excesses, including Czech chauvinism and Slovak Czechophobia." 17 The final documents of the new combined state referred only to the "Czechoslovaks" and completely omitted any mention of autonomy for Slovakia. 13 Michael R. Cude, "The Imagined Exiles : Slovak-Ameri cans and the Slovak Question during the First Czechoslovak Republi c," in From Exsilium to Exile: Coercion in Migration, Studia Historica Gedanensia, vol. 5, ed . Anna Mazurkiewicz (Gdansk : University of Gdansk Historical Institute, 2014), 287-305 , 287. 14 Cude writes that Slovak exi les viewed "their experi ence in America" as proof "that the Slovaks could very much develop independently and did not need the strict oversight of the Czechs. As such , the Slovak-American activ ists gradually adopted a role as an 'ex iled' national voice aga inst Prague centra lism," 298 . 15 Joseph A. Mikus, "Comments," in Slovakia in th e l <J'h and 2dh Centuries, 97-100, 97 . 16 Peter Petro, A History of Slovak Literature, Montreal [Que.] : MQUP, 1995. Ebook Collection (EBSCO host), EBSCOhost (accessed 29 Nov. 2016), 13 1. 17 Petro, 131. SLOVAKIA 2019 61 In dismissing the wishes of Slovak nationalists in America, and subsequently in Slovakia as well, Masaryk and his supporters were putting the new Republic into j eopardy. The various Czech-dominated governments that ruled the new Republic recruited Slovaks of the 'Czechoslovak ' persuasion (largely Lutherans) to join their ruling coalition. American Czechoslovaks approved of this arrangement. .. . Slovak nationalists, however, were left out in the cold. 18 The centralism 19 of the government in Prague during the First Czechoslovak Republic can be viewed as helping continue the defensive nature of the Slovak national movement, which had begun under the duress of Magyarization. 2° For example, Slovaks seldom felt like equal partners in the new state. Even though in 1918 "the very real existential problems caused by the attempted liquidation of Slovak culture through Magyarization [had] disappeared ... the positive aspect of this momentous change for liberated Slovak culture was somewhat tempered by a paternalistic attitude emanating from Prague." But it was not "always ill-meant and unjustified; from Prague also came tremendous support and help, particularly in the cultural and educational fields ." 21 The perception of inequality, however, became consequential in the late 1930s, when Czechoslovakia found itself under the heel of Nazi Germany. On 14 March 1939, several months after the Munich Pact gave Nazi Germany control over the Sudetenland (in a failed exchange for peace), Catholic Slovak leaders declared the Slovak Republic, albeit under Nazi influence. Six years later, the first Slovak state came to an end. The short-lived, authoritarian Slovak state caused much conflict among exiles in the early post-war years. Among the Catholic autonomists, the Slovak Republic inspired nostalgia and resolve to continue the fight for political independence. But the federalist and Czech18 M. Mark Stolarik, "The Role of Slovak Emigres in North America in the Emancipation of the Slovak Nation," Drustvena istrazivanja [Journal fo r General Social Issues ] 7, no. 1-2 (1998), 75-88, 78. 19 In Czechoslovakia, "centralism" refers to the concentration of political power in the capital, Prague. It often operated in opposition to regional desires for decentralization, self-administration, and autonomy. 20 Nurmi , 18 I. 21 Petro, 13 1. 62 SLOVAKIA 2019 oslovakist Slovak exiles generally condemned that group as, among other things, undemocratic.22 In turn, the Catholic autonomists condemned the federalists as having sold out the Slovaks to communist oppression after the war. The Catholic autonomists defended the wartime Slovak state as a rational decision done for national survival, as "the only way out under the given political circumstances" of Czechoslovakia having fallen under the rule of Nazi German~, and "as the logical conclusion of their former national endeavors." 3 Although controversial and brief, this experiment in political independence gave the Slovaks a new and lasting sense of worthiness among nations. While Masaryk had been a disappointment to many Slovaks, post-war Slovak emigres- autonomists and federalists alike-expressly despised the second Czechoslovak president and wartime leader of the Czechoslovak government-in-exi le in London, Edvard Benes (1935-38 & 1939-48). In a variety of publications during and after World War II, (federalist) politician Stefan Osusky blamed Benes for the breakup of Czecho-Slovakia in 1938 and for the postwar subjugation of Czecho-Slovakia by the Soviet Union. Former diplomat and historian Joseph A. Mikus (an autonomist) voiced similarly strong views of Benes, holding him responsible not only for the communist takeover in 1948 but also for the failure of the reform movement under Alexander Dubcek in 1968. 24 In general, the Slovak 22 Petro writes "The backlash that led to the super-nationalism of some writers during the existence of the Slovak Republic can be ascribed not to some inbred propensity for political extremism, but to a desperate desire for national self-assertion," 131 -32. 23 B.S. Bue, " Federative Tendencies of Slovak Nationalism," Slovakia 8, no. 3 ( 1958), 25-32, 30. "The short-lived existence of this independent state gave to Slovak nationalism what it had hitherto lacked, namely, a uniform will to live independently and a conviction that it will know how to stand its ground as an equally worthy member among the other nations." 24 Mikus, "Comments," in Slovakia in the 19th and 2dh Centuries, 400-405 . In response to a presentation by Kurt Glaser regarding the question of national states and federali sm in Central Europe, Mikus argued "The record of Czechoslovakia is particularly sad, since during World War II Benes had laid the comer-stone of his foreign policy out of collaboration with the Soviet Union, a non-Western and communist power. The guilt complex resulting from [Benes's] 1945 solution of the Sudeten German problem threw him into the arms of the Soviet Union . That embrace became so strong that [Alexander] Dubcek's effort to extricate Czecho- SLOVAKIA 2019 63 exiles with close ties to the Catholic Slovak Republic felt particularly snubbed by Czechoslovakia's wartime representatives in London and Washington. Slovak politician, diplomat, and later prolific scholar Jozef M. Kirschbaum was unflinching both in his support for Slovak independence and in his criticism of the Czechs: "Unfortunately, Western diplomats displayed little understanding for the aspirations of the Slovak people and mostly adhered to the concept of the Czech exiled politicians" led by Benes. 25 In the late 1940s and early '50s, Slovak exile groups contacted a variety of governmental offices in the U.S. and Canada requesting freedom from Soviet domination and independence for Slovakia. 26 Bitterness and rivalries among the groups, however, limited their impact. 27 Ever since the declaration of Czechoslovakia in 1918, Slovak exiles had embraced the mission of speaking on behalf of the silenced Slovak people back home in Czechoslovakia. They resumed that role after World War II as Slovak exiles reacted to the "rigid centralism" imposed by the post-war Czechoslovak regime. In addition, Slovak exiles in the West were troubled by the ruthlessness of the Stalinist system, with its "political and religious persecution, economic discrimination, and prohibition of contacts with Western countries." 28 So, American and Canadian Slovaks responded to the new status quo by resuming their role as "interpreters of the aspirations of the Slovak people for freedom, democracy, and independence." 29 With a renewed sense of hope, a few dozen post-war exiles took up the challenge of informing the world about Slovakia and " .. .published hundreds of books and articles about the history of Slovakia and the Slovaks. [In the process, they] helped keep the 'Slovak cause ' in the public eye, as well as give it some credence in Slovakia from it was in vain. The occupation of Czecho-Slovakia has its roots in that fitiful pactomania of Benes with Moscow," 403. 5 J.M. Kirschbaum, " Diplomatic and Consular Relations of Slovakia with Neutral States," Slovakia 23 , 46 ( 1973), 111-22, 119. 26 Pauco, 423. 27 Stolarik, "The Role of Slovak Emigres in North America in the Emancipation of the Slovak Nation," 82 . 28 J.M. Kirschbaum, " Slovaks Abroad and their Role in Slovakia 's Struggle for Freedom," Slovakia 24, 47 (1974), 63-6, 63-4. 29 Ibid. 63-4. 64 SLOVAKIA 2019 the academic and intellectual circles in North America."30 One important publication with that goal was the academic journal, Slovakia, edited by Filip A. Hrobak and first published in 1951. The journal's purpose was twofold: to defend Slovak political rights and to publicize Slovak national and cultural activities.31 After 26 years as editor of the journal, the Slovak League of America lauded Hrobak as a defender of "the sacred cause of Slovak national freedom. " 32 Exiled Slovaks seldom agreed on what exactly comprised the Slovak cause but many believed that the West would be receptive to their homeland 's plight. The Slovak Question (i.e. rights to autonomy, self-determination, statehood, etc .) continually caused tension, especially among exile organizations consisting of both Czechs and Slovaks. One of the most influential of those, created one year after the communist coup of February 1948, was the Council of Free Czechoslovakia (CFC). The U.S. government relied on the Council for policy advice, but to the Slovaks' dismay Washington paid little attention to the Slovak Question. 33 The many feuds over Slovak autonomy led Slovaks such as Stefan Osusky to demand separate recognition in the Council of Free Czechoslovakia and parity in its leadership . However, achieving an equal voice in that organization 34 took over twenty years. In 1948 the Slovak National Council Abroad was founded by Karol Sidor, Jozef Kirschbaum, Peter Privdavok, and Konstantin Culen. The Slovak Leagues of America and Canada recognized the Slovak National Council as the representative body of Slovak politi30 M. Mark Stolarik, "Slovak Historians in Exile in North America, 1945- 1992," Human Affairs 6, no. I ( 1996), 34-44, 34. 31 Pauco, 422 32 Joseph C. Krajsa, ed., "First Catholic Slovak Union (Jednota) of the U.S. and Canada," in Slovaks in America: A Bicentennial Study (M iddletown, PA : Slovak League of America, 1978), IO 1-68, 128. 33 Michael R. Cude, Transatlantic Perspectives on th e Slo vak Question, /914-1948 (PhD Diss., Univers ity of Colorado-Boulder, 20 13) and Cude, "The Imagined Exiles." 34 The first reconciliation in 1952 attempted to address this issue by givi ng the Slovaks separate recognition with separate votes on programs within the CFC. In 1960, the moderate nationalists in the Council formed the Permanent Confe rence of Slovak Democratic Exiles and formally split from the CFC to join with other Czech dissenters to form the Committee of Free Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovakists remained invo lved in the Counci l, and as part of its 1973 reorgani zation, the CFC established Czech-Slovak parity in its leadership. SLOVAK.IA 2019 65 cal exiles. 35 Another exile group also promoted the nationalist cause. The Slovak Liberation Committee, led by Ferdinand Durcansly and others, defended "the right of self-determination for the Slovak nation." 36 Additionally, many smaller organizations and societies from Australia to Buenos Aires promoted the idea of political independence for Slovakia. 37 The inability of the various organizations to unite, however, hampered their overall impact on Western policy and understanding, especially in the first two and a half decades after the war . . The Prague Spring of 1968 was a turning point for many of the squabbling exiles. In the wake of the failed reform movement, thousands of the disappointed migrated out of Czechoslovakia. The newcomers were received with skepticism, and although there was little that unified Slovak emigres after 1968, Frantisek Braxator suggested that a common ideological platform might be that no compromise with Communism was possible, "human face" or otherwise. He reassuringly concluded that nobody wanted to resurrect the authoritarian wartime state. 38 In many ways, the diversity and energy of the new exiles added much to the cause of Slovak emigres in the West. Indeed, there is evidence that the last two decades of exile activity were more productive than the early decades of the Cold War. By then the political goals of Slovak-Americans and Slovak-Canadians were generally two-fold: continue heritage preservation and call attention in the West to the persecution of Slovaks under communist rule in Czechoslovakia. 39 After the Soviet invasion, the thousands of Prague Spring arrivals to North America and the earlier post-war political exiles from Slovakia, more than ever before, were able to find common purpose, even unity, in their identity as Slovaks. The unprecedented unity came in large part from a new umbrella organization, the Slovak World Congress (Svetovy kongres Slovakov), 35 Pauco, 423. Ibid. Some of the others included Stefan Polakovic, Alojz Macek, and Stanislav Meciar. 37 Ibid., 423-4. 38 Frantisek Braxator, " Slovaks Abroad and Their Relationship to Czechoslovakia," in Slovakia in th e 19th and 20'" Centuries, 425-33. He concluded that "there was "definitely no support for the idea that the majority of this emigration regards aid to Slovakia as taking the form of an effort to revive the Slovak Republic of 1939 to 1945 " 432 39 Kr;jsa, "First Catholic Slovak Union," in Slovaks in America, l O1-68, 126. 36 66 SLOVAKIA 2019 founded in New York in June 1970. Between 1970 and 1989, the SWC brought together Slovak organizations from North and South America, Western Europe, and Oceania. It absorbed a wide variety of emigre Slovak organizations and individuals, from Catholics and Lutherans to a range of political figures , from the federalist-leaning Stefan Osusky to the ardent nationalist Ferdinand Durcansky. Leadership of the Slovak World Congress encompassed the diversity of Slovaks in exile as well. In addition to the old-guard leaders, 1968generation Slovak exiles such as the Lutheran pastor Dusan T6th and the Jewish ex-communist Eugen Lob! held high positions in the organization. The SWC aimed to resist Communism in the name of democracy, religious freedom , and the principle of self-determination, specifically meaning self-rule and political independence. In 1973, the Slovak World Congress published symposium proceedings to inform and update the West about Slovaks and their long history in Central Europe. Many contributors thought that too few histories of Europe had appreciated the Slovaks' ninth-century state organization. Furthermore, they had neglected to mention Slovak contributions to Slavic civi lizations, such as by Saints Cyril and Methodius. Slovak World Congress organizers were also concerned that when Slovak history was presented, it was "in a distorted light." 40 Founder and benefactor Stephen B. Roman noted the unith th queness of the symposium and resulting book on 19 and 20 century Slovak history: [A} fl the authors, including those of non-Slovak origin, subscribe to the thesis that the Slovaks developed through the centuries into a distin ct Central European nation, and that their language, literature and culture also developed independently of other Slavic nations. From this premise, the right to selfdetermination and equality of rights for the Slovak people be41 came a logical conclusion for all contributors. The Slovak World Congress' mission was to represent "the cultural, social, and political aspirations of the Slovak people in the Western hemisphere" and to "contribute to the search for historical 40 41 Stephen B. Roman, "Preface," Slovakia in th e 19th and 20th Centuries, 5. Roman, " Preface," 6. SLOVAKIA 2019 67 truth about the Slovaks and thereby to help bring about better understanding and cooperation among the nations of Central Europe."42 Founder Roman declared that the SWC strongly believed "that peoples of that vital area" could "regain their political freedom and build their future through close cooperation and the recognition by each of the equal rights to independence of the others."43 Notably, the Slovak World Congress claimed to work toward freedom and independence not only for Slovakia but for other small European nations as well. In 1978 in the "Introduction to the Second Edition" of the Slovak World Congress proceedings, Slovakia in the 1911' and 20th Centuries, editor Joseph M. Kirschbaum further emphasized the balanced and informational nature of the volume: Until very recently Slovak history was presented to the West either by the adherents of the "Czechoslovak" school which denied the separate historical development of Slovakia, or by the historians of the Slovak nationalist school who insisted on the independent political and cultural development of Slovakia . ...By publishing this edition, the Slovak World Congress has no other aim but to help acquaint Western readers with Slovakia and [its} rise to nationhood, and to contribute to the search for freedom and cooperation among the nations of Central and Eastern Europe.44 Despite the Slovak World Congress' reputation as the leading late Cold War organization for Slovaks in the West, it was never completely successful in uniting the Slovak exiles. The Czechoslovakists and some of the moderate nationalists disavowed involvement because of the strong views of the Catholic autonomists, especially those with "unclean pasts.,,4s To accommodate the diversity of interests, the SWC comprised three factions regarding constitutional questions: federalization within Czechoslovakia, confederation, and independence. 46 On behalf of the Slovak diaspora, leader Roman had 42 Ibid. Ibid. 44 J.M . Kirschbaum, Slo vakia in the / 9th and 20th Centuries, 8. 45 Jozef Spetko, "Slovenska exilova a emigrantska politika v rokoch 1945-1989," Historicky casopis 39, no . 3 ( I99 I), 24 1-61: 256. 46 Ibid., 257-8. 43 68 SLOVAK.IA 2019 wanted the organization to "speak as one voice and act according to a single plan" on behalf of the silenced Slovaks in the homeland. But achieving consensus among the exiles, especially about independence and resolution of the Slovak Question, was impossible from the very beginning of the SWC. 47 Nevertheless, the Slovak World Congress devised anti-communist propaganda campaigns, held scholarly conferences and cultural festivals , and even aided the protest movements in Slovakia in the 1980s.48 The organization collaborated with figures such as the Slovak-Canadian hockey player Marian St'astny and the Camogursky family-leading members of the organization-and even organized overseas protests to promote religious freedom in conjunction with the candlelight protests in Bratislava on March 25, 1988. In 1989, the Slovak World Congress officially supported the Velvet Revolution. However, "once the Communists surrendered power to Czech and Slovak dissidents ... the Slovak World Congress began to fracture ." 49 In the wake of the fall of the Czechoslovak communist regime, the SWC organized visits and programs in Slovakia. But relations between the SWC and the post-communist Czechoslovak government quickly became strained, mostly over the issue of Slovak autonomy, which most, but not all, members of the Slovak World Congress still very much supported. 50 Within weeks of the revolution, Secretary-General of the SWC Dusan T6th, who had fled Czechoslovakia after the Soviet invasion in 1968, visited his family in Slovakia and appeared at some political rallies in the capital, Bratislava. The " intoxicated crowds" welcomed him warmly and "listened intently as he told them about the [Slovak 47 Ibid. , 255. M. Mark Stolarik, Where is my Hom e? Slovak Immigration to North America (/870-20/0) (Bern: Peter Lang, 2012), 281-2. 49 Ibid., 287. The groups were the Civic Forum (Obcanske forum) and the Public Against Violence (Verejnost' proti nasiliu) in the Czech lands and Slovakia, respectively. 50 The Slovak World Congress began to decline after Roman's death in 1988, especially since he had bankrolled the organization. After the Velvet Divorce in I993, its functions declined even more, with its most notable achievement being to convince the U.S. and Slovak governments to allow dual citizenship. By 2000, the SWC was functionally gone. See Stolarik, Where ... , 279-95. 48 SLOVAKIA 2019 69 World] Congress and its aspirations for freedom in Slovakia." 5 1 After all, the topic of political independence had been a taboo for forty years. For its part, the SWC tried to engage the Slovak government in talks about independence in early 1990, but Slovak politicians had more immediate concerns such as figuring out how to navigate the new political landscape. "Many were new politicians who faced the task of learning not only the art of political maneuvering, but above all that of public discourse in a democratic society. They were the ones who dealt with the issue of Czecho-Slovak relations which found resolution in the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. " 52 The first post-communist elections in Slovakia were for representatives to the Slovak National Council. Although results of the voting in early June 1990 demonstrated the predictable rejection of Communism, they also " indicated that ' the Slovak question' was still on the political agenda. " 53 The biggest surprise was the third place finish for the Slovak National Party (Slovenska narodna strana orSNS), the only party with independence in its platform. "It is quite likely that one particular event preceding the election contributed to the [SNS ' s] success" in the parliamentary elections.54 Trouble began in March 1990 in the Federal Assembly in Czechoslovakia. Vaclav Havel, who had recently become the new president, was a vocal proponent of federalism and continuing the Czech union with Slovakia. The dispute started when Slovak politicians wanted to return to the original ( 1918-1920) way of writing the country's name: Czecho-Slovakia. Tensions grew when the Czechs agreed that Slovakia could do so, but neither the Czechs nor the federal government of Czechoslovakia would hyphenate. The "hyphen war" showed "how very different were the Czech and Slovak conceptions of their common state and brought into the open the need to reexamine the state of Czech-Slovak relations." 55 For the next two years, the discourse around that reexamination exposed ever more disparities and decades-old animosities . 51 Anne C.R. Roman, "Slovak Expats Remember 1989, too," Slovak Spectator, 29 November 1999, https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20009411 /slovak-expats-remember1989-too.html. 52 S. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia, 251-2. 53 Ibid., 255. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid . 70 SLOVAKIA 2019 Economic concerns took center stage, including the question of how quickly to move away from a socialist command economy to a capitalist market economy. While Slovaks feared a continuation of Prague centralism, including federal conduct and policies that favored Czech-and discounted Slovak- economic contributions, Czechs complained about subsidizing the Slovak economy. 56 The contrasting way the Slovaks and Czechs viewed this issue underscores some of the key reasons for their separation in 1993. One Czech-American historian argues that the peaceful separation of Czechs and Slovaks was a "necessity," based on their lack of "shared positive historical experience." 57 History and the "interplay of a series of factors" indeed influenced the breakup of Czechoslovakia. 58 Stanislav Kirschbaum suggests the root of the problem goes back to "the pursuit of [Slovak] national development in cooperation with the Czechs."59 From its inception in 1918 the "ultimate failure" of the Czechoslovak state was that it did not "provide an acceptable framework for Slovak national development," and despite all the benefits and progress, "the common state put Slovaks in a position of having to continue their struggle for survival." 60 In retrospect, the unraveling of Czechoslovakia in the early 1990s is not surprising; nor is the fact of its peaceful evolution. In the eyes of many Slovak exiles, the fall of Communism meant more than just getting rid of the Communists and returning to democracy. Indeed, " ... it was all of this plus home rule," commented M. Mark Stolarik, scholar and former president of the Canadian Slovak 56 S. Kirschbaum, 256-68. Igor Lukes, " Strangers in One House: Czechs and Slovaks, 1918-1992," Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism/Revue Canadienne des Etudes sur le Nationalisme 27, 1-2 2000, 33-43 , 41 . 58 S. Kirschbaum, 270. The factors include the following: "The inability of the Czechoslovak state to solve certain social and constitutional problems since 1918; the legacy of the Communist regime; the adaptation crisis resulting from the passage of a single-party state to democratic pluralism ; the lack of experience of the leaders of the Velvet Revolution ; the absence of Czechoslovak parties in the postCommunist era; and the provision in the 1968 constitutional law that allowed Slovak deputies to block federal legislation that was not deemed to be in Slovakia's interest" so that the Slovaks could not be outvoted by the Czech majority." . 59 S. Kirschbaum, 270-71. 60 Ibid., 271. 57 SLOVAK.IA 2019 71 League, on the tenth anniversary of the Velvet Revolution.6 1 In the United States and Canada, Slovak exiles' experiences of democracy and freedom guided them forward before and after the toppling of the hardline communist regime in Czechoslovakia. 62 Their influence on politics in the homeland has yet to be clearly documented, but it is quite possible that Slovak exiles and their endeavor to keep alive the drive for the self-determination and political independence of the Slovak nation provided not only legitimacy in the West, but also moral and political encouragement to their homeland as the nation moved toward independence in the early 1990s. 61 A. Roman, " Slovak Expats Remember 1989, too." Francis D. Raska, Long Road to Victory: A History or Czechoslovak Exile Organizations after I 968 (Boulder: East European Monographs, 20 12). Raska concludes that the influence of exile groups in the fa ll of Communism in Czechoslovakia "was unquestionabl y positive," 172. 62  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Imagining a Separate Slovakia: Anti-Communist Slovak Exiles' Struggle for an Independent Homeland Description An account of the resource Ellen L. Paul Slovakia, Vol. 44 (No. 82-83), 2019 pp. 55-71 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Paul, Ellen L. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/9b607f90c3dd9a49f7fca1ce7e120b68.pdf 529bb88cf46f523dfd6737d72b749b3d PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 2019 83 RUSSOPHILES WITHOUT RUSSIA R. Vladimir Baumgarten (Dedicated to the Memory ofNikolaj Ordos) The Carpatho-Rusyns, technically a stateless people, have been dubbed the "Kurds of Central Europe." They straddle the northern and southern slopes of the Carpathian mountains in the border re1 gions of Slovakia, Poland, Ukraine and Romania. Since the 1989 revolutions and the collapse of Communism in East Central Europe, both the Slovak and Polish governments have recognized the Carpatho-Rusyns as a distinct nationality. Ukraine, where the largest number of Rusyns dwell, does not. After World War II, incoming communist governments classified the Rusyns as Ukrainians by administrative fiat for reasons of convenience, which shall be explained below. The current post-communist government of Ukraine adamantly adheres to this position. 2 Further west, across the Uz river, many Carpatho-Rusyns in eastern Slovakia have voluntari ly assimilated into the Slovak nationality, for reasons which shall likewise be explained in this essay. The first impetus for the Rusyn national awakening came from a belief that they were part of a Great Russian nation, extending "from the Poprad River [in eastern Slovakia] to the Pacific." 3 The Russophile tradition influenced Carpatho-Rusyn culture and politics for a full century. An examination of its history reveals more than a few 1 Paul Robert Magocsi , " Mapping Stateless Peoples: The East Slavs of the Carpathians," Canadian Slavonic Papers, XXIX, Nos. 3-4 ( 1997), 301-54. 2 The Ukrainophile viewpoint was exemplified by Viacheslav Chomovil ( 19371999). During the Brezhnev era, Chomovil was a dissident journalist and human rights activist. He was sent to the labor camps several times for separatist activities. In the late I 980's he was one of the leaders of the People's Movement of Ukraine (better-known as Rukh). After the Soviet Union disintegrated and Ukraine became independent, Chomovil became alarmed by the Rusyn political renaissance. He considered it separatist and urged the Prosecutor General's office in Kiev to file charges aga inst its protagonists. 3 Paul Robert Magocsi , "The Nationalist lntelligentia and the Peasantry in Twentieth Century Subcarpathian Rus "', in Magocs i, Of the Making of Nationalities Th ere is No End, Vol. I (New York, 1999), 19. �84 SLOVAKIA 2019 ironies. In retrospect, it seems remarkable that the Russophile tradition lasted as long as it did. Indeed, remnants of it exist to this day. The current essay is an attempt to explain its rise and fall. The Russophile Tradition in Habsburg Hungary, Galicia and America The homeland of the Carpatho-Rusyns has been alternatively referred to as Ruthenia, Podkarpatska Rus' (Subcarpathian Rus '), Transcarpathia and Carpatho-Ukraine. For reasons of convenience, this author shall refer to it as Podkarpatska Rus' . It was part of the Kingdom of Hungary for about 900 years. Much of Podkarpatska Rus' was a game preserve for the Hungarian nobility. Its Eastern Slav peasants, shepherds and lumberjacks were forbidden to hunt the deer, even when the latter devoured the people's meagre cabbage plots. Starvation was common. The Rusyns were the most impoverished and illiterate ethnic group in the Hungarian kingdom. Originally a bastion of the Russian Orthodox Church, the homeland of the Carpatho-Rusyns was a battleground and passageway in the ongoing struggle between the Austrian Habsburgs and the Transylvanian princes. In order to wean these people away from any allegiance to the Transylvanian princes, most of whom were Calvinists, the Habsburgs decided to incorporate them into the Roman Catholic Church. They accomplished this by creating a Slavonic/Greek Rite of the church. At the Union of Uzhorod (April 24, 1646), 63 Orthodox priests pledged to recognize the primacy of the pope and the sanctity of Roman Catholic doctrine in exchange for keeping the Slavonic liturgy and a married clergy.4 These clergymen were exempted from the feudal burdens of serfdom, received an income from their parishioners, and could send their sons to seminaries in the Habsburg Monarchy for higher education. Despite this favorable concession from the Imperial House, the Rusyns remained generally loyal to their Magyar lords. This was especially the case of the Kuruc (Crusader) uprising and freedom war of Ferenc Rakoczi II ( 1703-1711 ). 4 For the most comprehensive study of this event, see Michal Lacko, "The Union of Uzhorod," Slovak Studies, VI ( 1966), 7-190. �SLOVAK.IA 2019 85 The contribution of the Rusyns was sufficiently valorous for them to receive the title gens fidelissima ("the most faithful people").5 In the first half of the nineteenth century, when the various Slavic nationalities of the Habsburg Monarchy-Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs and Croats-launched their own national revivals, the Rusyns were slow to respond. No Rusyns attended the Slav Congress during the revolutionary year 1948. On the contrary, Greek Catholic seminarians in Uzhorod abandoned their intended vocations in order to volunteer for the Hungarian honveds (National Guard) during Hungary' s 1848-1849 war of independence.6 A few educated Rusyns were aware of a certain kinship with Russia. In 1791 Ivan Orlai ( 1771-1829) emigrated to Russia. A schoolteacher, he had been denied advancement in the Austrian system of education. In St. Petersburg he studied medicine and ultimately became court surgeon, actively working in the reorganization of the Russian medical profession. He advised the Ministry of Education to invite other educated Rusyns "since they usually know Church Slavonic thoroughly." 7 Orlai served as Mentor to Nikolaj Gogol, author of Taras Bulba, the Russified Ukrainian who ultimately became one of the literary giants of nineteenth-century Russia. Orlai encouraged other Russian scholars to take an interest in their kinsmen on the other side of the Carpathians. Meanwhile, a Greek Catholic eparchy was established in Presov, eastern Slovakia, in 1818. Its eparch (bishop), Hrihory Tarkovych, was an active pioneer of Russian culture. In expanding his library, he imported the complete works of the eighteenth-century Russian intellectual and scientist Mikhail Lomonosov.8 5 The Rusyns gained this title as a result of a battle fought near Trencin castle in western Slovakia on August 4, 1708. During the fi ghting Rakoczi vaulted across a ravine on horseback. He was thrown forward , striking his head and losing consciousness. His Carpatho-Rusyn peasant infantry held its ground long enough for him to be carried from the fi eld. Outnumbered and outgunned by the Imperial regulars, these Rusyns were subsequently massacred. 6 Paul Robert Magocsi, The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus: / 848-1 948 (Cambridge, MA: 1978), 43. 7 Elaine Rusinko, Straddling Borders: Literature and Identity in Subcarpathian Rus ' (Toronto, 2008), 99. 8 Athanasius Pekar, The History of the Church in Carpathian Rus' (New York, 1992), 89. �86 SLOVAKIA 2019 The first real impetus for the Carpatho-Rusyn awakening came as a result of the Russian military intervention against the Hungarian war of independence in 1849. It was not undertaken to liberate the Slavs of Hungary who were in a state of revolt against Magyar tyranny. Tsar Nicholas I of Russia employed far more autocratic powers than did the House of Habsburg and regarded the stamping out of the fires of revolution, which had swept Europe since the previous year, as a self-evident duty. Polish revolutionary veterans were serving on the Hungarian side and he feared the spread of revolution to his Polish possessions. Nicholas was no Pan-Slav. Two years earlier a nest of such agitators had been discovered in Kiev. It called itself "The Brotherhood of Sts . Cyril and Methodius," and, according to Nicholas, its adherents had invented some monstrosity called the Ukrainian nationality. One of its leading members was not only Ukraine's best poet, but its best painter as well. His people sought ties with the Czechs and Slovaks. Nicholas saw to it that several of them were jailed and he had Taras Schevcenko drafted into the Russian army for ten years, during which time he was forbidden to write or sketch. 9 A number of Russian Pan-Slav politically conservative individuals sympathized with the Slovak people. Tsar Nicholas admonished the Slavophile journalist Ivan Aksakov ( 1823-1886) that, under the guise of a general Slav alliance, subversive elements in the Kingdom of Hungary wished to create a struggle which was not in the name of 0 God, but in a spirit of mutiny, which was dangerous to Russia. ' The Russian military commanders carefully studied the earlier conflicts between the Habsburgs and the Transylvanian princes . They observed that The Austrians had traditionally moved against Transylvania by starting from Kosice in eastern Slovakia. It was considered safer to cross the Hornad and Tisa rivers in the Carpathian 11 foothills than to assault Transylvania from the Hungarian plain. On June 9, the main Russian army commanded by Field Marshal Ivan Paskievitch, consisting of 70,890 soldiers and 240 cannon poured into Slovakia through the Dukla Pass from partitioned Po9 Pav lo Zaitsev, Taras Shevchenko. A Life (Toronto, 1989), 139-57. °Cudovit Holotik, "The Slovaks: An Integrating or Disintegrating Force?" Austrian 1 Histo ry Yearbook, III , Part 2 ( 1967): 2. 11 William Stiles, Austria in 1848-50, II (New York, 1850), 294. Stiles was the American charge d'affaires in Vienna during the revolutionary events of 1848-49. �SLOVAKIA 2019 87 land. The Russians captured Presov on June 20 and took Kosice five days later. To supply their army, the Russians stockpiled large amounts of foodstuffs at the northern end of the Dukla Pass. However, the military bureaucracy of Tsar Nicholas was inefficient. Provisions were made to transport the artillery but not the food . Austrian quartermasters, who also had a supply of food , and were allied with the Russians, had fled the area. The Russian soldiers, hungry and exasperated, turned to plunder. Don Cossacks looted a number of Slovak villages so thoroughly that the inhabitants fled into the for12 ests . The Russian intervention in this area would be remembered with ill-feelings by Magyars and non-Magyars alike. There were Slovak Pan-Slavs who were willing to overlook Russian misconduct. They convinced themselves that Grand Duke Konstantin was preparing to transfer his headquarters from Warsaw to Kosice, where he would proclaim a new Slav state. Slovak leaders appealed to the Russian embassy and military mission in Vienna for recognition. They requested that Slovak advisors and regional administrators be attached to the Russian military in eastern Slovakia. Tsar Nicholas replied to one such request "I received the same thing yesterday from Danilevsky [the Russian consul in Belgrade]. I have no time for such matters." 13 On the other hand, the reception of Russian military intervention was not universally negative. Rusyn peasants in the highlands witnessed a mighty Slav army in their region for the first time. They were awed. They gave fruits and nuts to the invaders. Aleksander Dukhnovych, soon to become an awakener among the Rusyns, later wrote, "One thing really gave me joy in life, and that was in 1849 when I first saw the glorious Rus sian army .. .I can't describe the feeling of gladness at seeing the first Cossacks on the streets of Presov. I danced and cried with delight. .. It was truly the first, perhaps the last, joy of my life." 14 Aleksander Dukhnovych (1803-1865) was born in the village of Topol 'a in the Humenne region of eastern Slovakia. He was descended from Greek Catholic priests and was consequently educated 12 John Shelton Curtis, The Russian Army under Nicholas I, 1925-/ 854 (Durham, NC, 1865), 298 . 13 Holotik, 383. 14 Quoted in Magocsi, The Shaping of a National Identity, 45. �88 SLOVAKIA 2019 at the Theological Seminary in Uzhorod. After ordination as a priest in 1827, he was assigned to the bishop 's chancellery in Presov. His relatively progressive views clashed with those of the more conservative Tarkovych, who then assigned him to a relatively remote rural parish. Dukhnovych regarded his assignment as a godsend. In Uzhorod he had received a Hungarian education, which influenced his early writings. In the rural parish he discovered, or re-discovered, "the people." He was influenced by the Slovak National Awakening and applied its precepts to the awakening of his own Rusyn people. After the death of Tarkovych, Dukhnovych was reassigned to Presov and appointed eparchical canon in 1843 . He remained closely associated with the city-considered a Rusyn cultural center in spite of its Slovak majority- for the rest of his life. In 1850, after the suppression of the Hungarian revolution, Dukhnovych established the first Rusyn cultural association, the Presov Literary Society. His own literary contribution was considerable. In 1851 he composed the poem "Vruchanie," whose opening lines "I was, am, and will remain a Rusyn" became the motif for the unofficial anthem of the Carpatho-Rusyn people. He researched and wrote extensively on the Rusyn people. His monumental achievement was the play "Virtue is More Important than Riches," which is still performed regularly in regional theatres in eastern Slovakia and western Ukraine. 15 The ethical values expressed in this play mirror Dukhnovych 's role as a social reformer. He campaigned vigorously against illiteracy, alcoholism, and the lingering pagan superstitions which persisted among his people. The literary language employed-indeed, invented by Dukhnovych-was peculiar. It was a blend of Old Church Slavonic, standard Russian and the native dialect. His later disciples called it "the traditional Carpatho-Rusyn langage," while his critics derrided it as "jazychije" (macaronic jargon). 16 Indeed, while Dukhnovych was the greatest of the Rusyn awakeners, he inhibited the establishment of a distinctive Rusyn identity by his unequivocal adherence to the Great Russian idea. 15 For an English-language translation, see Aleksander Duchnovych, Virtue is More Important than Riches, ed. by Elai ne Rusinko (New York, 1994). 16 See the entry "Dukhnovych, Aleksander," in Paul Robert Magocs i and Robert Popp, eds. , Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture (Toronto, 2005), I06. �SLOVAKIA 2019 89 If Dukhnovych was the unquestioned giant among the Rusyns in the realm of culture, then Adolf Dobrian' skyi ( 1817-1901) fulfilled this function in the realm of politics. Dobrian'skyi was born in Rudl'ov, Zemplin county, Slovakia, the son of a Greek Catholic priest. He attended secondary schools in Levoca, Roznava and Misko le, and then studied philosophy in Kos ice ( 1833 ), law in Eger (1834-36) and mining at the Academy of Mines and Forests in Banska Stiavnica, central Slovakia. He was fluent in several foreign languages, including Magyar, German, French, English and Italian. He visited Bohemia, where he was influenced by Frantisek Palacky, Karel Havlicek and other Czech national awakeners. Dobrian'skyi initially welcomed Hungary' s 1848 Revolution for the liberal reforms that it promised. But when the Slovak district of Banska Bystrica elected him as its representative to the Hungarian Diet, the Hungarian government rejected his mandate on the grounds of Pan-Slavism. Dobrian'skyi then indeed became a Pan-Slav. He moved to Presov, where he built a following which advocated a political union of the Rusyns of Hungary with those of Austrian Galicia. When the Russians prepared to invade Hungary, the Austrian government appointed him as its liason with Paskievitch. Dobrian 'skyi then served as advisor to the Russian military. After the defeat of revolutionary Hungary, the Austrian government imposed a centralist bureaucratic regime. Dobrian' skyi then became advisor to the Uzhorod Civil District, which encompassed four counties. He regarded the civil district as a prelude to the establishment of an autonomous Rusyn state under the Emperor of Austria. 17 Defeated in the Austro-Sardinian war of 1859, The Habsburg Monarchy was substantially weakened. It was forced to retreat from bureaucratic centralism and make concessions to the Magyars. Dobrian' skyi was recalled , and the old nobles began to reoccupy county positions. In 1866 Austria suffered another defeat, this time at the hands of Prussia, and resigned itself in 1867 to accepting the Magyar nobility as equal partners in the renamed Dual Monarchy of AustriaHungary. Emperor Franz-Josef allowed himself to be crowned King of Hungary in Budapest and the Hungarian nobles were granted complete self-government in internal affairs. By now their obsession 17 See the entry " Dobrian' skyi, Adolf," in Magocsi and Popp, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 93. �90 SLOVAK.IA 2019 with Pan-Slavism reached paranoid proportions . They viewed the magyarization of Hungary's Slavic minorities as imperative. Persecution of Slovak and Carpatho-Rusyn educational and cultural institutions became the order of the day. A similar course evolved in Galicia, the Austrian province of partitioned Poland. Shortly after the 1867 Compromise with Hungary came into effect, Empreor Franz-Josef appointed his trusted Polish confidant Count Agenor Goluchowski as Viceroy of Galicia. Goluchowski gained for his Polish nobles a degree of autonomy that mirrored that of the Magyars. The education system was polonized. This posed a direct threat to the advancement of the Rusyns. Educated Rusyns became politically divided. The Ukrainian movement gained the greatest strength . However, there were still Rusyns who adhered to the traditions of old Rus' .They stubbornly continued to write in Old Church Slavonic and isolated themselves from the people. Cultureally, these Old Ruthenians identified with Russia, but professed allegiance to the Austrian Emperor. Such a dual allegiance became more difficult to maintain as the nineteenth-century ran its course. Austria and Russia were no longer allies, and were in fact competing for hegemony in the Balkans. Similarly, the Rusyns of Galicia found themselves cast in the role of a political football in the rivalry of the two empires. A case in point was the career of Ivan Naumovych (1826-1891), who was born Galicia in 1836. In his youth he was strongly influenced by the Polish national movement. However, he experienced a turning point during the revolutionary year of 1848, when there was a brief uprising in the city of Lviv. Naumovych was observing the fighting from a hillside when imperial soldiers spotted him and assumed he was a Polish rebel. They arrested him, but Naumovych persuaded them to release him by convincing the Austrians that he was a Russian. 18 Being Russian, Naumovych decided, carried certain privileges. After 1850, when Naumovych was ordained a Greek Catholic priest, he became staunchly Russophile in cultural orientation. He organized opposition to a campaign organized by the Roman Catholic Polish clergy to latinize the liturgy of the Greek rite. In this ca18 Keith Dyrud, The Quest fo r th e Rusyn Soul: The Politics of Religion and Culture in Eastern Europ e and America, 1890-World War I (Philadelphia, 1992), 28. �SLOVAKIA 2019 91 pacity he sought Russian support. At this point, Naumovych did not convert to Orthodoxy . He still regarded the Greek Catholic (Uniate) church as a potential bridge between Eastern and Western Christendom. Nontheless, inspired by his activism, an entire village in eastern Galicia converted to Orthodoxy in May of 1877. More conversions followed in the next three years. The Galician authorities charged Naumovych with treason. In their view his activity was not religious but political. Naumovych had indeed maintained contact with Russian Pan-Slav agents. 19In July of 1882 he was finally convicted and sentenced to eight months in jail. Other Rusyns who converted to Orthodoxy likewise found themselves hauled into court, although, surprisingly, a Polish jury acquitted them. Both the Austrian government and Polish patriots understood the necessity of not pushing the Old Ruthenians to the point of open subversion. The Ukrainophile movement predominated in Galicia, but the Russophile tradition was not going to go away. Galicia, unlike Russian Ukraine, was not a particularly productive agricultural region. Much of the countryside is hilly and the soil is poor. A bad harvest usually resulted in famine , and this happened at the beginning of the twentieth century. Russian Pan-Slavs responded by founding the Galician-Russian Benevolent Association in St. Petersburg on February 9, 1903. At the opening meeting acertain Father Petrov delivered the inaugural address. American historian Keith Dyrud described the subsequent address as follows: He likened the world to an artist's palette or a musician 's instrument. God was that artist or musician. The nationalities of the world were like colors on the palette or strings on the instrument. If some of the colors or strings are missing, the painting or music will be incomplete and this is a crime against the spirit. This crime against the spirit occurs when a culture allows itself to become divided. The separation of the people of Galicia and Carpatho-Russia (Subcarpathia) from the Russian nation was just such a crime . It is the obligation of a national culture to unite its people into a united nation. In other words, the orator was suggesting that it was 19 Ibid ., 28 . �92 SLOVAK.IA 2019 the obligation of Russia to unite in a single nation all people with a Russian culture. He included the Galicians and Subcarpathians 20 among the people with a Russian culture. Under the leadership of Count Vladimir Bobrinski , the GalicianRussian Benevolent Association extended financia l relief to famine victims of Galicia. Tsarist Russia, the most despotic and reactionary among the Great Powers, could appear benevolent while working to expand its influence. Bobrinski likewise dispatched agents to Podparkarpatska Rus ' , where starvation was an everyday occurrence, rather than a momentous event. The Hungarian government was less hesitant than its Austrian counterpart to prosecute Rusyns for conversion to the Orthodox faith. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the first converts to the Orthodox faith in Podkarpatska Rus ' materialized in the vi llage of Iza. They were simple peasants who disliked their pastor, a magyarized Rusyn, who replaced their language with Magyar in the parish school. Led by the cantor-teacher Andry Vladymir, they appealed to the Serbian patriarch, who had nominal authority over all Orthodox subjects of the Habsburg Monarchy, to send them an Orthodox priest. Greek Catholic priest and historian Athanasius Pekar, himself a Ukrainophile, later admitted: "All that needed to be done to liquidate the so-called 'Orthodox movement' in Iza was to appoint a new village pastor and reopen the parish school." 2 1 Instead, the Hungarian government arrested the participants late in 1903 for alleged ties with Russia, and in the following year placed them on trial in Marmaros. All the defendants were found gui lty of treason. The Maramaros trial made a deep impression on the mind of a simple woodcutter of Iasnyia named Aleksander Kabaliu (18771947). He had just been released from the army, where he had been persecuted by Hungarian officers for his Pan-Slav inclinations. Kabuliak had a pronounced inclination towards a monastic life . He made religious pilgrimages to Russia, Jerusalem and Mount Athos in Greece. At a Russian monastery in the last-named location, he was received into the Orthodox fold . He turned his home in Iasnyia into a veritable Russian museum, collecting and displaying icons. Fearing 20 21 Ibid. , 49-50. Pekar, I 05 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 93 persecution by Hungarian authorities, Kabaliuk emigrated to the Russian Empire, where he was tonsured as a monk in 1910. The Russian Orthodox Church initially intended that Kabaliuk wou ld go to America and assume custody of a modest parish in Pittsburgh.22 Instead, he decided to return to Hungary to share in the martyrdom of the villagers of Iza. The Hungarian authorities were happy to oblige him. At the end of 1913 there was a second Maramaros trial, in which Kabaliuk and 94 peasants were the defendants. The Hungarians were hopeful that the trial would expose the activities of Count Bobrinskii and his associates. All it achieved was international condemnation of Magyar policies . Nonetheless, Kabaliuk was sentenced to four and a half years in jail, while 32 others were sentenced to one or two years and various fines. The rest were dismissed for lack of evidence. It was also at the tum of the century that many Rusyns followed the example of their Slovak kinsmen and neighbors in emigrating to America. Although members of both groups originated in the dirtpoor hill country of the eastern Carpathians, they tended to gravitate towards industrial centers in the United States. Surprisingly, America provided both stimulus for the Russophile tradition and a resurgence of the Russian Orthodox faith. Dyrud writes: The majority of the Rusyn immigrants came to the United States as illiterate peasants and had not participated in the intellectual and cultural conflicts that were raging in the old country. Thus it was in this country that Rusyn peasants from Galicia and Subcarpathia first lived together and found that they did not have as much in common as it first seemed. And it was in the United States that many of them first heard of the Ukrainian movement. And it was there that the Rusyns from Subcarpathia felt free to express national sentiments without the pressures of magyarization. It was in the United States that most of the Rusyn immigrants were told for the first time by the Russian Orthodox mission that they were really Russians. 23 22 See the entry "Kabaliuk, Aleksander," in Magocsi and Popp, eds., Encyclopedia o[ Ru syn History and Culture, 223. 2 Dyrud, 58 . �94 SLOVAK.IA 2019 Ironically, the Russian cause was indirectly aided by a most unlikely element: Irish American Catholic priests. Many of the latter resented the fact that Greek Catholic candidates for the priesthood were permitted to marry while they were not. Most outstanding was Archbishop John Ireland of Minneapolis-St. Paul. On December 19, 1889, he was visited by a Greek Catholic priest named Alexis Toth. Toth had been dispatched by the Presov eparchy to assume the pastorship of St. Mary ' s, a modest church recently constructed by the Rusyn community of Minneapolis. When Father Toth presented his credentials, Archbishop Ireland became greatly agitated. He informed Toth that he did not consider him to be a genuine Catholic, and denied him permission to administer the sacraments. 24 After consultation with the parishioners of St. Mary's, Toth conferred with Russian Orthodox Metropolitan Vladimir of San Francisco. The latter was eager and willing to accept the parish of St. Mary's into the Orthodox fold. Aside from Alaska, which Russia had sold to the United States earlier, there were up to the 1870s only three Orthodox churches in the United States. In addition to San Francisco, there was a Russian parish in New York City and a Greek Orthodox church in New Orleans. Native converts in America were exclusively Alaskan Aleuts and Eskimos . Now, however, the wave of Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants indicated a potential source of growth. Since nearly all Rusyn immigrants were in the eastern half of the United States, New York rather than San Francisco was delegated as an episcopal seat. In 1890 the construction of St. Nicholas Cathedral was completed in New York. Tsar Nicholas II personally donated 5,000 roubles to this project. His government subsidized the construction of other churches and supported activities of the Orthodox Missionary Society founded in Moscow. In Minneapolis, Father Toth founded the Russian Mutual Aid Society. These prosletization efforts exceeded all expectations. By the time of the outbreak of World War I in 1914, over one-third of all Rusyn immigrants in the United States had converted to Orthodoxy. 25 They served as enthusiastic supporters of the Russian cause in the Great War. World War I brought with it the culmination of the historic struggle for the Carpathians, and caused great suffering among the 24 25 Ibid 65-6 Ibid: 65 . • �SLOVAK.IA 2019 95 Rusyns of Galicia, eastern Slovakia and Podkarpatska Rus' . By early September 1914 Russian armies had overrun much of eastern Galicia. Count Georgii Bobrinskii, brother of Count Vladimir, was made governor-general, and started a campaign to eradicate the Ukrainian movement. All Ukrainian cultural organizations, cooperatives and journals were shut down. The Russian language replaced Ukrainian in the school system. Hundreds of Greek Catholic priests were deported into the depths of Russia. There was admittedly some dissent in Russian governmental circles. Noted statesman Pavel Miliukov described Russian conduct in Galicia as a European scandal. Yet Foreign Minister Sergei Sazanov stated unequivocally: "Now is exactly the right moment to rid ourselves of the Ukrainian movement once and for all." 26 The Ukrainophiles had a measure of revenge when the AustroHungarian military reoccupied the province in the following year. They denounced their Russophile neighbors for alleged collaboration with the invaders. Hungarian troops carried out mass hangings. At the same time, Polish nobles spread rumors that the Ukrainophiles were covertly pro-Russian, so as to reassert their own authority in Galicia. In truth, thousands of Russophiles and Ukrainophiles alike suffered internment in Austrian concentration camps. The most notorious of these camps was Talerhof, near Graz. Sanitary conditions were deplorable, and an estimated 1,767 persons died of typhus and 27 other diseases. Austria's parliament was scandalized, and Emperor Karl ordered Talerhof closed early in 1917. Early in 1915, for the second of three occasions in the course of a century, the Russian military crossed through the Dukla Pass. This move came as a result of the seige of Przemysl, Austria-Hungary's principal fortress in Galicia. Russian troops occupied the Carpathian mountain passes to the south to prevent the Austro-Hungarian military from sending reinforcements to break the siege. Casualties on both sides of the winter war of 1914-15 were appalling. It is likely that more soldiers succumbed to the "White Death" (hypothermia) than were killed by enemy bullets. 28 Ultimately, the Austrian side 26 Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A History (Toronto, Buffalo and London, 2009), 343. See the entry "Talerhof," in Magocsi and Pop, eds,. Encyclopedia of Rusy n History and Culture, 488 . 28 For rhe most recent account of the winter campaign, see Traydon A. Tumstell, Blood on the Snow: The Carpathian Winter War of I 9 I 5 (Lawrence, KD, 20 I 0). 27 �96 SLOVAKIA 2019 gave way first. Russian soldiers under General Lavrl' Kornilov pushed through the southern end of Dukla Pass and advanced as far as the village of Lodomirova, just north of the town of Svidnik. Here they established a military cemetery for their dead. Lodomirova eventually became the site of a Russian cultural center in northeastern Slovakia, which shall be discussed in due course. The Russians did not remain in occupation of this toehold in Slovakia for long. Germany, Austria-Hungary's senior partner, launched a counteroffensive eastward across Poland, albeit at the cost of having enough troops to capture Paris. Russian troops painfully withdrew north of the Carpathians. They were now demoralized and ripe for revolution. Mass mutinies forced Tsar Nicholas II to abdicate on March 15, 1917. The reign of the Romanov dynasty had ended. Tsarist Russia was destroyed. Politically speaking, the Russophi-le orientation was now a dead letter. Culturally, its future was now an openended question . At this point Russophiles among the Rusyns looked with growing interest at the now ascendant Czechoslovak independence movement. The Rusyns in Interwar Czechoslovakia and Poland The Czechoslovak independence movement was a curious article. For almost a century, there existed an intellectual tradition which maintained that Czechs and Slovaks were two branches of the same nationality. Yet the concept of a politically united Czechoslovak state was largely the invention to Tomas Garrigue Masaryk ( 18501937), a Czech philosophy professor and notorious defender of unpopular causes. Perceiving that World War I would result in AustriaHungary coming increasingly under the domination of Kaiser Wilhelm ' s Germany, Masaryk decided to lobby among the opposing Western powers for Czecho-Slovak independence. In Geneva, in neutral Switzerland, he was joined by his protege, the sociology professor Edvard Benes. Together they proceeded to Paris, where they were joined by Milan Rastislav Stefanik, a young Slovak serving as an officer in the French Air Force. This triumvirate formed a Czech Action Committee Abroad, which was eventually expanded and renamed the Czechoslovak National Council. Given his position on this body, the French eventually gave Stefanik genera l' s rank. He raised a Czechoslovak Legion from prisoners of war and deserters �SLOVAKIA 2019 97 from the Austro-Hungarian Army. The Czechoslovak Legion distinguished itself on the Western, Eastern and eventually Italian fronts, and gained increased Allied favor in the struggle for the recognition of the independence movement. 29 In 1918 Masaryk visited the United States, not only to gain official American recognition, but also a mandate from the Slovak community in America, since Slovakia itself was politically gagged. In October of 1915 the Bohemian National Alliance and the Slovak League of America had already concluded a preliminary agreement for cooperation in Cleveland. Masaryk proceeded to Pittsburgh to conclude a more formal agreement for a Czecho-Slovak merger. Masaryk's visit to the Mecca of the American Slovaks was greeted by a large manifestation of support which included South Slavs as well as Czechs and Slovaks. Yet the negotiations undertaken at Moose Hall on May 29-31 were not without controversy. Masaryk pledged Slovakia an administration, a school system and linguistic rights, but not its own parliament, as specified by the earlier Cleveland Agreement. Here Jozef Husek of the Slovak Catholic Jednota raised strenuous objections. Albert Mamatey, president of the Slovak League, impressed Masaryk with the seriousness of losing the support of the largest single Slovak organization. The delegates were evenly divided, and Masaryk finally broke the deadlock by signing a revised draft with all the proposals. 30 The steel towns of the greater Pittsburgh area were also heavily populated by Rusyns from Hungary. Following the lead of the Slovaks, many joined fraternal organizations, which not only provided 29 The Czechoslovak Legion in Russia was the most instrumental military force in attaining Allied recognition of the independence movement. With Russia withdrawing from the war in 1918, Czechoslovak legionnaires wished to be evacuated and sent to France, where a German offensive to capture Paris was anticipated. Attempts by the Bolsheviks to disarm them resu lted in their capture of the Trans-Siberian Railway and a legendary odyssey to the Pacific coast. It also gave the Western Allies a pretext to intervene in the Russian Civil War. The experience of the Czechoslovak Legion in Russia boats of a sizable amount of literature. The best Englishlanguage studies are authored by Victor M. Fie, The Revolutionary War for Independence and the Russian Question: The Czechoslovak Army in Russia 1914-191 8 (New Delhi, 1977) and The Bolsheviks and the Czechoslovak Legion. The Origins of Their Armed Conflict: March to May 1918 (New Delhi , 1978). 30 See Marian Mark Stolarik, "The Role of American Slovaks in the Creation of Czecho-Slovakia" Slo vak Studies, VIII ( 1968), 48-5 1 �98 SLOVAKIA 2019 benefits to workers but published newspapers as well. Its members had acquired a measure of political awareness. One such organization was the Greek Catholic Union, headquartered in the HomesteadMunhall district. Another was the United Societies of America, which contained both Greek Catholic and Orthodox members, based in McKeesport. At the time of Masaryk's pilgrimage to Pittsburgh, the Czech independence leader was approached by Nicholas Pachuta, editor of the Greek Catholic Union's newspaper Rus 'kii Viestnik. Pachuta had recently converted to Orthodoxy. Up until this point he had advocated the incorporation of Podkarpatska Rus' into the Russian Empire. Now that there was no more Russian Empire, Pachuta approached Masaryk with the idea of union with a Czecho-Slovak state. He was soon afterwards expelled from the Greek Catholic Union. 3 1 Overall, the Greek Catholic clergy wished their homeland to remain part of Hungary. Many laymen wanted union with Galicia but insisted Galicia was Russian rather than Ukrainian. The end to the Great War was approaching, and territorial changes could be anticipated. One of President Woodrow Wilson's celebrated Fourteen Points for peace was "self-determination for the peoples of AustriaHungary." It was necessary to have a common program. Members of both organizations met in Homestead on July 23, 1918 to form the American National Council of Uhro-Rusyns. The subsequent Homestead Resolution read as follows: If the pre-war boundaries remain, Rusyns, as the most loyal people-gens fidelissima-deserve that Hungary provide [them} with autonomy. If new boundaries are made, they should be made according to nationality; thus, Uhro-Rusyns can belong nowhere else than to their nearest brothers by blood, language and faith, to the Galician and Bukovinian Rusyns. But if we are divided by foreign aspirations from Ukrainians and Old-Russians [Galician Russophiles}, the National Council demands in this case autonomy for Uhro-Rusyns so they can pre32 serve their national character. 31 Magocsi, Th e Shaping of a National Identity, 81. The original text of the Homestead Resolution appears under the heading " Do Vpukh Vhro-Rusynov zhivlych v Soed" in Prosvita, August 8, 1918 32 �SLOVAKIA 2019 99 The Rusyns commissioned a young Pittsburgh lawyer named Gregory Zsatkovich ( 1886-1967) to represent their interests to the United States government. Pennsylvania congressman Guy Campbell arranged a meeting between Zsatkovich and President Wilson on October 21. Wilson thought it unfeasible to grant full independence to so small a nation in a geopolitically sensitive region, and consequently recommended that Zsatkovich seek autonomy in a larger state. He referred Zsatkovich to Masaryk, whose independence movement had been recently recognized by the U.S. State Department, Zsatkovich met with Masaryk in Philadelphia, where the latter hosted a congress called the Mid-European Democratic Union on October 23-26. According to Zsatkovich's memoir afterwards, Masaryk assured him: "If the Rusyns decide to join the Czechoslovak Republic, they shall constitute a fully autonomous state." 33 There remained a sticky issue. Rusyn territorial claims included several counties in eastern Slovakia. Here there were numerous Rusyns in the northern mountain districts whereas elsewhere the population consisted of either Slovaks or Rusyns who had already voluntarily assimilated into the Slovak nationality. Masaryk was further alleged to declare on this point: "The frontiers will be so determined that the 34 Rusyns will be satisfied." On November 12, at a meeting of the National Council of UhroRusyns in Scranton, Pennsylvania, the Czechoslovak option was provisionally adopted, albeit including the demand for the counties of eastern Slovakia. A subsequent plebiscite among the American Rusyn fraternals provided Zsatkovich with the desired results: out of 1,102 votes submitted, 732 (67 percent) were for union with Czechoslovakia and 310 (28 percent) for union with Ukraine. Additionally, there were 27 votes for complete independence, 10 votes for union with Russia, and 9 votes for remaining part ofHungary. 35 Back in the Old Country, the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in October of 1918 led to a power vacuum in many areas of the Carpathians. Several different national councils were organized by Rusyns, each of which had its own program for the fu- 33 Gregory Zsatkovich, Otkryhote-Expose bydaltelho gubernatori Podkarpatskoj Rusi (Homestead, PA , 1921 ), 5. 34 Ibid 5 35 Ma~o~si , Th e Shaping of a National Identity, 85. �100 SLOVAK.IA 2019 ture affiliation of the people. A Russophile group in eastern Slovakia, based in Stara Cubovna, initially wanted a merger with Galicia. Dissenters among them, led by the lawyer Antonii Beskyd ( 1855-1933), considered such a move impractical. They reconvened in Presov and declared themselves for union with Czechoslovakia instead. A new revolutionary government in Hungary pledged to grant the Rusyns territorial autonomy. A group of Greek Catholic priests in Uzhorod declared themselves in favor of this option. Another pro-Hungarian group met in Khust, but its speakers were shouted down by Pro-Ukrainian elements led by the lawyer Iulii Braschaiko (1879-1955). The Ukrainophle orientation had at last taken hold in Podkarpatska Rus ', and would grow progressively stronger. Most dramatic of all were events in the easternmost Hutsul region, centered around Iasnyia. Here the populace favored union with Ukraine, but, pending further developments, took matters into their own hands. In the early morning of January 7, 1919, a group of demobilized Rusyn soldiers, aided by troops sent by the West Ukrainian Republic, drove out the Hungarian garrison of 250 militiamen. On February 5 the victorious Rusyns proclaimed their own "Hutsul Republic," with a 42-member elected council and a four-man government. This little state existed until June 11, when the area was occupied by advancing Romanian troops.36 Late in 1918, Czechoslovak legionnaires returning from the Italian Front had begun a military occupation of Slovakia, and advanced across the Uz River. Uzhorod was occupied on January 10, 1919. The Czechoslovak position was strengthened as a result of a Bolshevik government assuming power in Hungary, much to the alarm of the Western powers. This Hungarian government wished to build upon the "Ruska Kraina" declared by its predecessor, the Karolyi regime. It went to extremes attempting to implement communist rule, threatening the death penalty for even the smallest commercial transactions. This decree became impossible to enforce, since the commissars were themselves profiteering. 37 Podkarpatska Rus' was soon engulfed in counterrevolution. 36 See Paul Robert Magocsi, "The Rusyn Decision to Unite With Czechoslovakia" in Magocsi, Of the Making of Natio nalities, 134. 37 Ibid, 140-42 �SLOVAKIA 2019 101 Even before the establishment of the Bolshevik regime, members of the Uzhorod Council began experiencing doubts concerning the viability of remaining part of Hungary. A leading member of the Council, Reverend Avhustyn Voloshyn (1874-1945), began negotiating with Slovak leader Milan Hodza. Voloshyn was joined by supporters of both Beskid and Brashchaiko. The Russophiles realized that the Russia they had loved and believed in was unlikely to return from the dead. The Ukrainophiles realized that an independent Ukraine was unlikely to survive the turmoil of the Russian Civil War. Members of both orientations were willing to form a single body representing their mutual interests. It was in this spirit that the Central Russian National Council was formed in Uzhorod on May 8, 1919. Zsatkovich arrived with the text of the Scranton Resolution, which was endorsed unanimously. It remained to the Western peacemakers gathered in Paris to give sanction to Podkarpatska Rus' being granted to Czechoslovakia. Yet, contrary to later Hungarian revisionist claims, the victorious Western Allies did not arbitrarily hand the region over to the Czechs. The decision to unite with Czechoslovakia was that of the Rusyn people themselves .38 The realities of being part of the Czechoslovakia disappointed the expectations of many educated Rusyns. Autonomy was not forthcoming. They could send representatives to parliament in Prague, but did not have their own regional parliament. Prague apparently decided that the Rusyns, like the Slovaks, were not ready for autonomy. Zsatkovich became the first provincial governor, but the actual administration lay in the hands of a centralized Czech bureaucracy. Zsatkovich eventually resigned in disgust and returned to America. The disputed counties in eastern Slovakia remained under Slovak administration. To complicate matters further, there was now a group of Rusyns who considered themselves their own nationality, in addition to the existing Russophile and Ukrainophile orientations. Politically, on the local level, Prague would support one and then another orientation, depending upon its convenience at a particular moment. The Czechoslovak administration made great strides in education, virtually eliminating illiteracy in twenty years . The government poured tremendous amounts of money into Podkarpatska Rus ', and liberally funded cultural activities of all three orientations. 38 Ibid, 146. �102 SLOVAKIA 2019 On April 29, 1920, there was a meeting of local leaders in Uzhorod, headed by Iulii Brashchaiko. Its purpose was to establish a cultural organization encompassing all Podkarpatska Rus '. Nothing resulted from this meeting since Russophiles led by Anthonii Beskyd raised angry objections to the Ukrainophile cultural orientation of Brashchaiko ' s group. On May 9 Brashchaiko's fol lowers established the Prosvita Society, modeled along the lines of the Ukrainian society of the same name in Galicia. Its task was to publish all kinds of popular and scholarly books "written in the national tongue and accessible to every Subcarpathian Ru syn." 39 The Czechoslovak Pros vita was reinforced by many educated Ga li cian Ukrainians who found Polish rul e objectionable. On th e May 23 , 1923, those Russophiles who boycotted the Prosvita met in Uzhorod to establish their own organization, which was called the Dukhnovych Society. Its stated goals were to foster "the cultural deve lopment of the Ru ssian people living within Czechoslovakia, and most importantly to educate them in a moral , patriotic and Ru ssian spirit, exclusive of al l political activity." 40 The contrast between the two rival societies was visib le. The old tricolor Ru ssian flag flew over the reading rooms of the Dukhnovych Society, whereas Prosvita reading rooms displayed the blue and ye llow Ukrainian national colors. In terms of literature, the new Dukhnovych Society championed the great Russian masters : Pushkin, Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, etc. The Prosvita Society advanced the writings of Shevchenko and other less known Ukrainian awakeners. Both Russophiles and Ukrainophiles expanded their activities from literature to theater. The Ru ssophiles tended to produce hi storical dramas, whereas the Ukrainophi les focused on folk songs and ballads. The latter used standard Ukrainian as the language of performance, whereas the Russophiles had to translate their productions into a Rusyn dia lect. It must be frankly admitted that the Ukrainophile orientation gained the upper hand in popularity during the course of the kulturkampf for Podkarpatska Rus' in the First Czechoslovak Republic. Avtustyn Voloshyn had become a convert to the Ukrainophile orien39 Statul tova,ystva 'Prosvita • Podkarpatska Rus ·, (Uzhorod, 1920), 6. Usta v Rusakogo ku/'turna-prosvete/'noga obshchturni Aleksandra Duchnovychovicha , (Uzhorod, 1923), 40 �SLOVAK.IA 2019 103 tation. He and his associates were astute and learned men-teachers and scholars who kept closely in touch with Rusyn cultural life. By contrast, the Dukhnovych Society fell increasingly under the influence of Stefan Fentsik ( 1892-1946), a local politician who used the organization as a platform to propagate a his own views, his political ties with Poland and Hungary-which shall be di scussed in due course-became common knowledge by 1937, and did much to compromise the Dukhnovych Society. 41 Russian culture survived more comfortably in eastern Slovakia, since 1928 elevated to the official status of a province. In large measure this direction was due to the efforts of Iulii Lazho (18671929), a native of Svidnik and senator for the Social Democratic Party in the Czechoslovak parliament. Earlier, Lazho had emigrated to America, where he converted to Orthodoxy and also rose in the construction industry. He returned home to start his own construction firm, and also to seek revenge against his former Greek Catholic pastor. As mayor of Ladomirova, where the Russian military cemetery was located, Lazho invited Vital ii Maksimenko ( 1873-1960), former archimandrite of the monastery at Pochaiev (in Polish Volhynia), to establish a missionary headquarters there. Lazho also procured a Cyrillic alphabet printing press which Czechoslovak legionnaires in Russia had appropriated, shipped all the way to Vladivostok on the Pacific coast, and which made its way to Prague. During two decades of activity the Ladomirova mission published over I 00 Orthodox church books, the newspaper Pravoslavnaia Karpatskaje Rus ' (1928-1944), the journal for young people Diestvo I ivnost Khristi ( 1935-1941 ), a scholarly journal Pravoslavny put' ( 1938-1940) and the annual almanac Pravnoslavny ruskii/Ruskii narodnyi kalendar ( 1924-1944). The Russian monks also worked to inculcate Russian culture among the native Rusyns, hosting such events as an annual Russian Day in the summers and the tree-lighting ceremony for Orthodox Christmas. 42 In approaching the causes of the Orthodox revival in interwar Czechoslovakia, it is necessary to understand the world view of the 41 Magocsi, "Nationalist Intelligentsia and the Peasantry" in Of th e Making of Nationalities, 200. 42 See the entry "Ladomirova Monastery" in Magocsi and Pop, eds. , En cyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 266 . �104 SLOVAKIA 2019 national-state's founding father. T.G. Masaryk was a complex individual. As one biographer expressed it: "This man wanted to emancipate workers without embracing Marxism, liberate women without promoting feminism, and educate the young without celebrating youth. " 43 He was considered in the West to be an expert on Russia. He had written extensively on the great writer Dostoevsky, whom he regarded as the classic representative of Russian thought. There were elements of the Russian national psychology which Masaryk found disturbing. Like Havlicek before him, he felt that the Western Slavs, especially the Czechs, should follow a different path . As a proponent of Westeren humanism, Masaryk disparaged the mystical tradition of the Eastern Orthodox faith .44 Yet Masaryk reserved even greater hostility for the Roman Catholi c Church. He drew inspiration from Jan Hus, the great Bohemian religious reformer who was burned at the stake for heresy in 1415 . In 1905, while celebrating the anniversary of Hus ' death, Masaryk coined the slogan "Away from Rome! " Politics in the first years of the Czechoslovak Republic had a distinctly anti-Catholic flavor. His government favored the appointment of Lutherans for administration in Slovakia at the expense of the Catholic majority. In Podkarpatska Rus ', where there were virtua lly no Protestants, such a policy was impossible. Here Czechoslovak authorities fostered a revival of Orthodoxy. One Czech mini ster assessed the impact as follows: It seemed to some Russophile politicians, both in Prague and in Ruthenia ... that the right time had come to convert the Rutheni an peasant back to the Greek Orthodox religion. This opinion was shared by many Russian emigres who flocked to Czechoslovak ia ... after 1919. A drive for 'Orthodoxy ' was started in Rutheni a ... It is a question of how much of this movement was spontaneous and due to the pro-Russian feeling of the population and to its di slike for the purely magyarized Uniate clergy, and how much of its strength it owed to the propaganda and preaching of the Russian Orthodox emigres and clergy and to the support of some Czech political circles. 43 Bruce Garver, "Masaryk and Czech Politics 1900-1914" in Stanley B. Winters, ed. , T G. Masaryk (1850- 193 7) Vo lum e I Thinker and Politician (London, 1990), 22 . 44 See Paul 1. Tresky, " Masaryk and Dostoyevsky" in Harry Hanak, ed., T G. Masa1y k (/ 850- 193 7) Volum e II/ Statesman and Cultural Force (London, 1990), 161-77. �SLOVAKIA 2019 105 However, it certainly added one more element to the confusion reigning in Ruthenia and led to animosities which, in the end, turned against the Prague Government itself.45 Reverend Voloshyn bitterly remonstrated against the situation in Prague in 1929: The agitation usually began in the local tavern, where the agitator met the most notorious brawlers in the village. After a short talk, emboldened by 'noisy' arguments and vodka, the peasants would begin to shout abuse against the village pastor. In a matter of two or three days a ' committee' made up of the pastor's 'opponents ' would be formed. The committee did not immediately begin advocating Orthodoxy; instead, it showered the bishop with complaints and delegations, demanding that there be an investigation against the pastor or that he be removed outright. Then followed other forms of harassment, demonstrations, threats against the pastor, intimidation of church curators, and such . The committee would send the pastor letters demanding that he leave the vi llage. As time went on, the committee made increasingly bolder threats that the pastor get out ' or else!' .. .. If, despite such harassment, the priest remained in his parish, the threats escalated. Someone would break his windows, shoot into his windows, poison hi s well , set fire to his grain or stables, and in some cases even the parish house, assault and beat the priest, etc. The government remained indifferent to all this under the pretext of ' Freedom of conscience! Freedom ofreligion!' 46 This state of affairs could not permitted to go on indefinitely. Czechoslovakia was, after all, a republic governed by law. The Vatican made its own contribution to improved church-state relations by transferring Bishop Antonii Papp of Mukachevo to Hungary and replacing him with canon Petro Gebej on July 16, 1924. At the same time, in response to forthcoming parliamentary elections, President Masaryk cryptically declared that "the Catholics will get as many rights as they win." 47 Rusyn voters supported Czech Catho lic political parties which gained an increased measure of strength in parliament. The rights accorded to Greek Catholics by the constitution in 45 Frantisek Nemec and Vladimir Modry, Th e Soviet Seizure of Subcarpathian Ruthenia (Toronto, 1955), 38-9. 46 Avhustyn Voloshyn, " Relihijni vidnozny na Podkarpats ' kyi" in Acta Conventia Pragensis pro Studii Orentalibus n. 1919, (Olomouc, 1930), 218-9. 47 Pekar, 11 8. �106 SLOVAKIA 2019 any case were now enforced. Violence and vandalism were now prosecuted and soon ceased. In some instances church property was restored. Bishop Gebej led a religious revival which resulted in priests maintaining closer contact with their parishioners. A number of converts to Orthodoxy returned to the Greek Catholic faith. The Orthodox revival was one of the sources of survival for the Russophile orientation. Another source was, ironically, Hungarian funding . The fall of Bela Kun's communist regime in August of 1919 was followed by the restoration of the nobility in Hungary. Counterrevolutionary White terror now followed Red terror. Right wing elements who rallied under Admiral Miklos Horthy, soon elevated to the position of regent of Hungary, wanted to regain Slovakia and Podkarpatska Rus' but had to go about it covertly.48 The victorious Western powers would not recognize any government in Hungary which would not accept their peace tenns . On June 4, 1920, Hungary was compelled to sign the Treaty of Trianon, which ceded Slovakia and Podkarpatska Rus' to Czechoslovakia, Transylvania to Romania, and Croatia and the Voivodina to what became known as Yugoslavia. Trianon psychologically scarred Hungarian society for a full generation. France offered to soften the blow by extending to Hungary financial credits, particularly in the area of railway development, in exchange for compliance. Hungarian Prime Minister Istvan Bethlen cheerfully accepted the financial aid and outwardly complied with Trianon. Yet his government covertly subsidized elements in Slovakia and Podkarpatska Rus' who were disgruntled with Czechoslovak centrali sm. Having previously denied these peoples autonomy, the Hungarians now championed their right to selfdetern1ination as a first step toward regaining them. One of the recipients of Hungarian financial aid was Stefan Fentsik. Another was Andrei Brodii ( 1895-1946), a journalist, teacher and chairman of the Autonomous Agricultural Union/Autonomyi Zenled'skij Sojuz (AZS). Fentsik yielded leadership of the Russophile movement to Brodii during the 1930s. Ukrainophile historian Peter Stercho later maintained that Brodii, Fentsik and other select 48 As a precedent to future collaboration in this matter, Poland allowed itself to be used as a staging ground for Hungarian subversion of Czechos lovak administration . A "Magyar-S lovak League" was established in Krakow, and dispatched armed vo lunteers across the border into Slovakia. �SLOVAKIA 2019 107 Russophile leaders had to conceal their ties with Hungary from their followers, since even the latter were opposed to territorial revision. 49 Polish policy towards the Rusyns of Galicia followed a similar pattern. In the area directly north of the Dukla Pass lived people belonging to a branch of the Rusyns known as the Lemkos. They can be geographically divided by the San River. The Ukrainian movement penetrated the area east of the San early in the twentieth century and accounted for numerous followers. In November 1918 Lemkos from about 30 villages gathered in the village of Komancza (Komancha in Rusyn) to form their own little republic. This Komancha Republic was viewed as a transitional state, pending merger with a greater Ukraine. West of the San the Lemkos still adhered to the traditions of old Rus'. In autumn 1918 they wanted union with Russia. Since this was obviously never going to happen, the Polish government could afford to humor these Lemkos, The Poles were preoccupied with the West Ukrainian Republic which was proclaimed in Lviv on November 1, 1918, and event which plunged Galicia into an ethnic civil war. On December 5, some 500 Lemko Rusyns representing 130 vi1lages and towns of western Lemkovyna met in Florynka (in Grybow district) to form a government. While the Polish military crushed the Komancha Republic in January 1919, it tended to view the Florynka Lemko Rusyn Republic as a potential ally against the Ukrainians. Polish officials who were present offered the former town hall of Grybow as a political headquarters, while the Polish Army provided arms for a Lemko national guard. Schools and cooperatives were soon organized. Amazingly, the Lemko Rusyn Republic survived a full sixteen months. It was governed by an executive council headed by Reverend Mykhal Iurchakevych and a central national council headed by the lawyer Iaroslaw Kachmarchyk. The Poles were disappointed with the results. The Lemkos were happy to accept whatever aid the Polish government and military were willing to offer but nonetheless were unwilling to take up arms against their errant brethren to the east. Additionally, Kachmarchyk's government rejected the notion of union with a Bolshevik Russia, and began looking at the example of 49 Peter Stercho, Diplomacy of Double Morality: Europe's Crossroads in CarpathoUkraine /9/9-/939(NewYork , 1971), 171. �108 SLOVAKIA 2019 their brethren of the south side of the Carpathians. A union with Czechoslovakia now seemed a viable option. Unfortunately, in 1920 relations between Poland and Czechoslovakia were at a particularly low point, owing to border disputes concerning Tesin in Silesia and Orava-Spis in Slovakia. Before the end of March the Poles arrested Kachmarchyk and members of his government. They were tried on June 10, 1921. A Polish jury acquitted them, which was only reasonable insofar as the Poles had encouraged their activities in the first place. But the event marked the death knell of Lemko statehood. 50 Yet the Poles still had use for the Lernkos in the interwar period. The Greek Catholic Church was strongly identified with the Ukrainian national movement. The leadership of the Polish military, overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, encouraged the movement to convert the Lemkos to Orthodoxy, and thus express a Russian character at the expense of the Ukrainian .51 It was a classic case of Divide and Rule. Elsewhere, in Volhynia, adherents of the Ukrainian national movement were Orthodox. Here militant Polish nationalists attacked and vandalized Orthodox monasteries and schools. At the same time, for reasons of security, Poland wished to have a common border with Hungary. For this reason the Polish government supported Hungarian efforts to regain Podkarpatska Rus' . The events which accompanied the international crisis in 1938 are well-known. The present author shall limit himself to summarizing key particulars. The Munich "diktat" of September 1938 resulted in Czechoslovakia being forced to yield the Gennan populated Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. Deprived of her most vital border defenses, Czechoslovakia was now rendered militarily defenseless. Hostile neighbors, Poland and Hungary, were now encouraged to make their own territorial claims. Moreover, the Prague government could no longer resist demands for autonomy on the part of Slovakia and Podkarpatska Rus ' . 50 See Paul Robert Magocsi, "The Lemko Rusyn Republic ( 1918-1920) and Political Thought in Western Rus' -Ukraine" in Magocsi, Of the Making of Nationalities, 303315. 51 See Mykola Kucherpa, "The Nationality Policy of Poland towards Ukrainians before World War II" in Paul Berst and Jaroslav Mokolak, eds., Th e Lemko Region 1939-1947, War, Occupation and Deportation (New Haven and Krakow, 2002), 3949. �SLOVAKIA 2019 109 In the case of Podkarpatska Rus', a cabinet was formed on October 11 which consisted of both Russophiles and Ukrainophiles. Russophiles predominated, with Brodii as prime minister and Fentsik as deputy prime minister. Brodii was convinced that, if a plebiscite was held, the majority of Rusyns would vote for reunion with Hungary. Brodii 's ministry lasted only fifteen days. An alarmed central government summoned Brodii and Fentsik to Prague. There Brodii was arrested, while Fentsik found asylum in the Polish embassy. 52 Prague authorized Voloshyn, who was a member of the cabinet, to form a new government. Voloshyn proclaimed the province as an autonomous nation with the new name of Carpatho-Ukraine on November 3. The victory of the Ukrainophiles was at last complete. Autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine got off to a rough start. Hungary was prepared to re-annex the region, although conservative circles of the Hungarian government confined their claims to areas which were predominantly Magyar. Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy opted to appear in the role of peacemakers in this territorial dispute between Czechoslovakia and Hungary. They arbitrated a compromise settlement in Vienna on November 2, 1938. By terms of the First Vienna Award, Kosice, in southern Slovakia, and Uzhorod and Mukachevo, the two leading cities of Carpatho-Ukraine, were restored to Hungary. The government of Carpatho-Ukraine was forced to relocate to Khust, which was little more than an oversized village. Militant Hungarian nationalists regarded the First Vienna Award as a temporary expedient, and worked for the complete annexation of CarpathoUkraine. Under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense, a covert paramilitary group known as the "Ragged Guard" was organized to infiltrate Carpatho-Ukraine and conduct terrorist acts designed to destabilize the regime. Poland likewise dispatched paramilitary units for the same purpose. If the credible research of Ukrainophile historian Stercho is to be believed, the Polish paramilitary units outpaced their Hungarian counterparts in acts of terrorism. 53 Carpatho-Ukraine was in need of allies, and these were forthcoming. Militant Ukrainian nationalists from Poland crossed the mountains to organize the Riflemen of the Carpathian Sich. It has been argued by Russophile opponents that the Riflemen of the Car52 53 Magocs i, The Shaping of a National Identity, 238. Stercho, 302. �110 SLOVAKIA 2019 pathian Sich inaugurated the reign of "Ukrainian terror." It is true that they focu sed more on the Russophile domestic opposition than they did on Polish or Hungarian infiltrators. A detention camp was established for dissident Russophiles and Rusynophiles at Dumen . Yet conditions of internment were relaxed. Political differences extended to the family leve l, and prisoners under guard where permitted to attend social events in neighboring Rakhiv.54 There was a conflict of interest between the Carpathian Sich and the Voloshyn regime. Sich rifl emen viewed Carpatho-Ukraine as the cornerstore of a future greater Ukraine, and counted on the support of Nazi Germany. Voloshyn , by contrast, decided that adherence to Czecho-Slovakia (now officially spelled with a hyphen) was a necessary expedient. In March of 1939 there were clashes between the Carpathian Sich and the regular Czechoslovak military. This confl ict was abruptly terminated when German leader Adolf Hitler moved to eliminate what remained of Czecho-Slovakia . As he prepared to militarily occupy Prague, he disappointed Ukrainophi les by giving his consent for Hungary to annex the province. Under German pressure, Slovakia declared its independence on March 14. CarpathoUkraine was now cut off from the Czech lands. With Hungarian troops already crossing the border, Voloshyn symbo li cally proclaimed Carpatho-Ukraine's independence on March 15 . Carpatho-Ukraine existed as an independent state for all of a day . On the 16 th , Hungarian military units were fighting for Khust. The Riflemen of the Carpathian Sich resisted with admirab le resolve , but its units were scattered and no match for the Hungarian army. They later regrouped in the mountains or were pushed across the border to Eastern Slovakia, thus encouraging Hungary to invade the latter as well. 55 Hungarian troops reached the Polish border by the end of the I 61\ and were eagerly embraced by their opposite numbers. The region was renamed Subcarpathia and governed directly from Budapest. There was some vague talk in the Hungarian parliament about according autonomy to the most recently annexed portion , but not to Uzhorod or Mukachevo, which were now considered 54 Paul Robert Magocsi , "The Nationality Problem in Subcarpathian Rus ' I 9381939: A Reappraisal" in Magocsi , Of th e Making of Nationalities, 228 . 55 This invasion of Eastern Slovakia resulted in portions of the disputed counties likewise being annexed by Hungary. It also resulted in the Slovak Republic placing itself under the military protection of Nazi Germany. �SLOVAKIA 2019 111 directly part of Hungary. Autonomy was del ayed indefinitely. As World War II progressed, the Hungarian military vehemently opposed autonomy for security reaso ns . The Ukrainophiles were particularly singled out for political persecution, while the Russophiles were more or less set aside. Interestingly, the Hungarian government began cultivating the idea that the Rusyns were their own separate nationality, an idea which ultimately became the wave of the future. 56 The resto ration of Hungarian rule dis illusioned the Russophil es. It stood to reason that, once Hungary went down to defeat with Nazi Germany, Andrei Brodii would come to a bad end . He did not attempt to flee when Soviet forces reached the area in the autumn of 1944, but attempted to negotiate with them. He was arrested by the Soviet counterintelligence unit SMERSH, charged as a fascist co ll aborator, and executed on November 7, 1946. A similar fate awa ited Stefan Fentsik: he was shot in the courtyard of the Uzhorod prison on March 30, 1946. Their Ukrainophile rival Voloshyn fared no better. Having taken up res idence in Prague during the war years, he taught at the Ukrainian Free University. In June 1945 he was arrested by SMERSH and transported to Moscow. He died in Lefortovo prison on July 19, undoubtedl y murdered. An ironic footnote of hi story is worth mentioning. Both Brodii and Fentsik were posthumously rehabilitated after the breakup of the Soviet Union. No such rehabilitation has been granted to Voloshyn. World War II and Ukrainiazation If the Russophiles in Podkarpatska Rus' were fatally compromised by collaboration with the Hungarians, then in Eastern Slovakia they earned acclamation for their role in an anti-fascist struggle. A leading force in the resistance to the pro-German regime of president-priest Jozef Ti so was the Slovak Communist Party. George Kennan , at that time charge d 'affa ires to the U.S. embassy in Prague, assessed the pro-communist sentiment in Eastern Slovakia as being a "bird of a different color [which] in former circumstances would have little chance of success." He added, however, that owing to 56 Magocs i, The Shaping of a National Identity, 248-9 . �112 SLOVAKIA 2019 guidance from Moscow, the Communists could become the most formidable resistance group of all. 57 Kennan's prognosis was largely accurate, though certain qualifying feature s must be noted. The Communists did not have a monopoly on the resistance movement. In prewar Czechoslovakia they were strongest in Podkarpatska Rus ', but in Eastern Slovakia they were never ab le to muster more than seven percent of the vote among the Ru syns in the interwar period. Not wishing to be isolated from other Rusyns in organized resistance to the Tiso regime, local Communi sts opted to join the Carpatho-Russian Council for National Liberation (KRASNO), which shall be introduced shortly. The view of the autonomous and later independent Slovak state on the Rusyns was that the latter were "S lovaks of the Greek Catholic faith ." This view was exemp li fied by Andrej Dudas, who in 1940 was appointed regional administrator of Eastern Slovakia. He was convinced that the idea of a Rusyn nationality was created by the Hungarians, a position he maintained a full three decades later as an emigre in Argentina.58 In early 1939, the Rusyn Nationa l Committee and the Carpatho-Russian Nationa l Counci l were banned by the Slovak government, and the activity of the Dukhnovych Society was restricted. The Ukrainian movement among the Rusyns was particularly loathed by the Slovak nationalist leadership. Slovak police reports up until November 1938 indicate that Rusyns in the Presov Region supported union with their brethren east of the Uz Ri ver. Yet, in November, the same police reports indicate a significant change. The Ukrainian movement was even more alien to the Presov Region Rusyns than was Slovak nationalism, and they were henceforth opposed to a revision of borders which was favorable to CarpathoUkraine. 59 Rusyns shared in the economic prosperity of the Slovak Republic which characterized the first half of World War II. Workers in Germany sent money home to their families, whi le locally a number 57 Report written about May I, 1939 on conditions in Slovakia in George Ken nan, From Prague After Munich. Diplomatic Papers 1938-1 940 (Princeton, 1968), 139140. 58 Andrej Dudas, Rusinska otazka ajej uzadie (B uenos Aires, 1971), 25 . 59 See the entry " Carpatho-Russian Autonomous Counci l for National Liberation/Karpatorusskii avtonomyi sovet natsional'nmyi osvonodenyi (KRASNO)" in Magocsi and Pop, eds ., Encyclopedia of Rusy n Histo1y and Culture, 58. �SLOVAKIA 2019 113 of Rusyns profited from the expropriation of Jewish property. Yet once it became obvious that the Slovak Republic was on the losing side of the war, a number of Rusyns began to organize, The Carpatho-Russian Autonomous Council for National Liberation (Karpatorusskii avtonomyi sovet national'nogo obsvobzhdenii-KRASNO) was founded in Presov in September 1943. Its goals were to aid escaped Soviet prisoners of war and partisans and to cooperate with other underground elements opposed to what it considered a clericofascist regime. Its members envisioned a restored Czechoslovakia in which Rusyns would be equal partners with Czechs and Slovaks. Although its orientation was pro-Soviet and decidedly leftist, KRASNO was not a communist front organization. It was founded by civic and cultural leaders of varied political orientation. Vasyl' Karaman ( 1903-1961) was born in the village of Nagov, in Slovakia. After completing his education at the Commercial Academy in Mukachevo (1924-1927), be returned to eastern Slovakia, where he worked as a civil servant in Presov from 1927 to 1933 , and then served in various towns as secretary for the pro-government Agrarian Republican Party. When Czecho-Slovakia was being partitioned in the fall of 1938, he opposed the pro-Ukrainian orientation of the Voloshyn government. He was elected as chairman of a newly re-established Central Russian National Council. Its members included both Russophiles and Rusynophiles who wished to retain ties with what remained of Czecho-Slovakia, unlike the followers of Brodii and Fentsik. Unable to realize his objectives, he returned to the Presov Region. Here he joined a Committee of Rusyns which tried to reach an accommodation with the Slovak government. This was not possible, since Slovak nationalist officials distrusted his Russophile orientation. After Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June of 1941, Karaman was arrested. He spent a year and a half in jail, and after his release made contact with the Zhydovs'kyi brothers, Ivan and Petro. Together the three men were among the founders of KRASNO. 60 Ivan Zhydovs'kyi (1897-1982) was born in the village of Sarisske Jastrabie. His secondary school education at the Piarist gymnasium in Sabinov was interrupted in 1915, when he was drafted 60 See the entry " Karaman, Vasyl"' in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 228. �114 SLOVAKIA 2019 into the Austro-Hungarian Army. A year later he was captured on the Eastern Front. Like many prisoners of War, he embraced the Bolshevik cause during the Russian Revolution. During the Russian Civil War Zhydovs ' kyi served as a political commissar in the 216 th International Communist Brigade. When he returned home, he discontinued the role of agitator and became at least outwardly conformist. He completed his secondary education in 1919, and then studied law at the Comenius University in Bratislava, obtaining a degree in 1924. He worked for a time as a tax inspector in Uzhorod. By the I 930s he had a law practice in Uzhorod and he was director of the Presov branch of the Uzhorod-based Subcarpathia Bank. As a Russophile, Zhydovs ' kyi was prominent in the Central Russian National Council and in the Dukhnovych Society. Although opposed to the separatist Slovak government, he kept a lower profile then Kamman and was never arrested. He operated a law practice in Giraltovce prior to his invol ve ment with KRASNO .61 His older brother Petro Zhydovs'kyi (1890-1947) was likewise born in Sarisske Jastrabie. As a teenager Petro emigrated to America in 1905 . Although he acquired little formal education, he returned home on the eve of World War I detern1ined to work for the advancement of the Rusyn people. Drafted into the Austro-Hungarian Army, he deserted, then was captured and sentenced to prison. After the establishment of Czechoslovakia, he joined the Agrarian Republican Party and served as deputy to parliament from 1935 to 1938 . During the crisis of 1938 Zhydovs'kyi joined with Ivan P' ieshchak in submitting a memorandum to the British envoy Lord Runciman, calling for the unification of the Presov Region with an autonomous Podkarpatska Rus' .62 Ivan P' ieshchak ( 1904-1972) was born in the village of Vel'ky Lipnik. After graduating from the gymnasium of Mukachevo and the Presov Greek Catholic Teachers' Co llege, he taught in the regional elementary school s. P ' ieshchak was active in the Union of Rusyn Teachers in Slovakia and helped organize the Union of Rusyn Youth in Slovakia (1933). At the same time he studied law, and attained a 61 See the entry "Zhydovs'kyi, Ivan" in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 55 l. 62 See the entry "Zhydovs' kyi , Petro" in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 551-2. �SLOVA.KIA 2019 115 doctoral degree from Charles University in Prague in the same year. By the mid 1930s P 'ieshchak was a prominent figure on the Rusyn political and cultural scene. He joined Andrei Brodii's Autonomous Agricultural Union and served as its representative in parliament. Interestingly, at this time he also worked closely with Andrej Hlinka's Slovak People's Party in the parliament's autonomist bloc . When Podkarpatska Rus' attained autonomy, P'ieshchak served as state secretary in Brodii 's brief-lived cabinet. After Brodii 's demise, he returned to Slovakia, where he maintained a law practice prior to his involvement with KRASNO .63 KRASNO rapidly expanded its network. By the summer of 1944 it controlled 3 7 villages in a sort of "partisan republic" between Medzilaborce and Stropkov. Intensification of partisan activityreinforced by Soviet partisans parachuted across the Carpathiansled to German military intervention in Slovakia at the end of August 1944. The clandestine military center of dissident Slovak Army officers , headquartered in Banska Bystrica, was already in touch with the Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile in London. Its members had to proclaim the Slovak Nationa l Uprising under premature circumstances on August 29. 64 The Slovak National Uprising was a highly complex affair, which goes well beyond the limits of this study. It is sufficient to note here that it was dependent upon Soviet military support. Contrary to allegations by later critics, the Soviets did not deliberately betray the uprising. Their military capacity to cross the Carpathians was severely limited, particularly after the Germans occupied the Dukla pass. Yet the Soviets did not wish to forfeit the political influence they expected to enjoy in postwar Czechoslovakia, and rendered military assistance. In this capacity the Russian military 63 See the entry "P'ieshchak, Ivan" in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 384-5 . 64 Slovak soldiers, under the influence of Captain Piotr Alekseyevitch Velitchko intercepted members of a German military mission passing through Slovakia in the vicinity of Turciansky Sviity Martin. The Slovak soldiers escorted the Germans to the local barracks. It was Velitchko 's intention that the Germans would be disarmed there and that they would be sent to Ukrainian Partisan Headquarters in Kiev. But when the Germans attempted to depart, they were massacred by the Slovaks. Berlin then decided on a complete military occupation of Slovakia. At this point Lieutenant-Colonel Golian in Banska Bystrica issued the order to start the uprising. �116 SLOVAK.IA 2019 crossed through the Dukla pass for a third time in a military campaign that has been immortalized by local historiography. The Carpatho-Dukla operation, initiated on September 8, was undertaken by the 38 1h Soviet Army, led by General Kyril Moskalenko, supported by the 1s i Czechoslovak Army Corps, led by General Ludvik Svoboda. Many of the troops of the Is 1 Army Corps were Rusyns. In the autumn of 1939, as a result of the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, the Soviets had annexed eastern Galicia and merged it with the Ukrainian S.S.R. An estimated 30,000 Rusyns who were disgruntled with Hungarian rule crossed the mountains into eastern Galicia, expecting to be cordially received by their Slavic brethren. Instead, every single one of them was arrested by the NKVD (Soviet State Security) and received an eight to ten year sentence for the illegal border crossing. A full sixty percent of them perished in the Gulag by the time Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June of 1941. The survivors were released to join the I s i Czechoslovak Army Corps . Any Pan-Slav feeling- Russophile or Ukrainophi le alikewhich the Rusyn s may have had earlier had been beaten out of them in the Gulag. They merely wished to return home. In the autumn of 1944 it appeared that they would be the vanguard in the liberation of their homeland. Instead, they were committed to the meat-grinder of the Dukla Pass, where their casualties exceeded sixty percent. 65 The storming of the Duk la Pass was finally completed on October 6th. In the fighting which followed, the monastery community of Ladomirova was severely damaged. Most of the buildings, including the print shop but not the church, were destroyed. Now, too , the NKVD began rounding up Russian emigres in Slovakia. The monks fled to Bratislava, and from there fourteen of them emigrated to the United States. They entered the recently established Holy Trinity Monastery in Jordanville, in upstate New York, where Archbishop Maksimenko now served as archimandrite. They built a church that was a replica of its predecessor in Ladomirova. A young Rusyn novitiate from the village, Vasyl' Shkurla (born 1928), ultimately became Archbishop Lavrl' , one of the leading figures of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad. By the 1980s Holy Trinity had become a major 65 See Vladimir Baumgarten, "Fifty Years Later: An Inquiry into Soviet Military Policy During the Slovak Uprising" in Lewis White, ed., On All Fronts: Czechoslovaks During World War ff Part 2 (Washington , 1995), 2 19-28. �SLOVAKIA 2019 117 cultural center for Russian emigres. When the cello virtuoso Mstislav Rostropovich defected to the United States, he chose to settle in Jordanville in order to be near Holy Trinity. 66 The Germans torched large areas in eastern Slovakia as they were forced to retreat, including the town of Svidnik. General Svoboda was nonetheless hailed as a hero and liberator when he entered it on October 28 .67 After the liberation of Svidnik, the Allies temporarily went on the defensive. KRASNO partisans continued fighting in the hills north of Presov. In October their adherents welcomed a declaration by the Slovak National Council that a resurrected Czechoslovakia would consist of three equal nations- Czechs, Slovaks and Rusyns. It must be understood that Rusyns did not fight in partisan units exclusively of their own nationality. Jozef Rodak, longtime director of the East Slovak Military Museum in Svidnik, asserted that most partisan groups in the region had a mixed composition of Slovaks and Rusyns.68 To this day many people in eastern Slovakia have a dual sense of identity : they consider themselves Rusyns by heritage and Slovaks by citizenship. The realities of liberation at the end of World War II disappointed the aspirations of many Rusyns, particularly Russophiles. It undoubtedly di sconcerted them to discover that Moscow now considered them to be Ukrainians. There was already a precedent for thi s aspect of Soviet policy . In 1923 the delegation of Rusyn Communists attended a Party Congress in Soviet Ukraine and declared their acceptance of Ukrainian nationality. It was altogether practical for Soviet authorities to reaffirm acceptance of this principle at the end of 66 See the entry " Ladomirova Monastery" in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 266. 67 General Svoboda was designated as an honorary citizen of Svidnik. As president of Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring of 1968, Svoboda gave the town its first hospital. In I 979, the year of the old man's death, a statue of him was erected in Svidnik. Owing to the damage of autumn 1944, Svidnik is a modem town . Most of the buildings are constructed in the so-called "social realist" style. Svoboda ' s statue looks strangely at home among the imposing, unattractive concrete structures. 68 As a graduate student of Safarik University in Prefov who specialized in the history of his region during World War 11 , Rodak was frequently delegated to carry the briefcases of Soviet military visitors. He remained outwardly conformist throughout the Soviet era. After the 1989 revolution and the coll apse of the communist system, Rodak wrote a series of articles for newspapers in eastern Slovakia and southeas tern Poland in which he exonerated partisans who had fallen into disfa vor. �118 SLOVAKIA 2019 World War II. Throughout the war, the Soviets had pledged themselves to the recognition of Czechoslovakia' prewar frontiers . Yet now Moscow infom1ed the Czechoslovak government that it could not ignore "the will of the people." In the wake of the Red Army's occupation of Podkarpatska Rus ' , various National Committees were established to vote in favor of the province being merged with the Ukrainian S.S.R. In all fairness to these communities, they overall enjoyed popular support. 69 The region was officially ceded at the end of June, 1945. Across the Uz River, in the Presov Region , the Russophile leaders of the defunct KRASNO drew the politically correct conclusion. Now, they too, considered themselves Ukrainian. They reorganized themselves as the Ukrainian National Council of the Presov Region. They envisioned that the long disputed counties of eastern Slovakia would be included in the territorial transfer. Indeed, even before the war ended, Vasyl' Karaman and the Zhysov ' skyi brothers planned to stage a meeting in Presov in February 1945 calling for the merger. A Soviet military major explained to them that such a meeting would be inopportune. The war was still on, and the Soviet Union intended to honor its obligations to Czechoslovakia.70 With eastern Slovakia excluded from the territorial settlement, the Ukrainian National Council of the Presov Region now called for the resurrected Czechoslovakia to consist of three equal nations: Czechs, Slovaks and Ukrainians. The Slovak National Council had already expressed itself in favor of autonomy for the Rusyns. Now, in light of Ukrainian irredentism, it declared its Ukrainian counter• 1·d 11 part as mva 1 . Even after the Rusyns were officially classified as Ukrainian, the Russophile tradition not only persisted but predominated in the Presov Region . It must be noted that the Soviet 3gth Army was composed of elite Guards regiments, the cream of the Soviet military. Its soldiers conducted themselves in a correct and disciplined manner in 69 Yaroslav Pylynsky, Rising Ethnic Self-Awareness. Carpatho-Rusyns- Birth of a New Nation or a Political Game? (Copenhagen, 1998), 20. 70 Memorandum on the Ukrainian movement in Eastern Slovakia. Kosice. February 16, 1945 , in Nemec and Modry, Th e Soviet Seizure of Ruthenia, Document no.77 , 359-60 71 Magocsi , "National Assimilation: The Case of the Rusyn-Ukrainians of Czechoslovakia" in Of the Making of Nationalities, 262 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 119 their interactions with the locals after forcing their way through the Dukla Pass. This was in striking contrast with the soldiers of the 4 th Ukrainian Front, who penetrated Slovakia from the south, and who engaged in rape and widespread looting. This author can personally attest to the fact that citizens of the Svidnik area remember the Russians fondly as having assisted them through a bitter winter, and afterwards helped the locals plant their spring crops. Historian Mykola Musynka, himself a Ukrainophi le, summarizes the local attitudes as follows: The culmination of Russophilism in the cultural life of the Rusyns of the Prefo v Region occurred in the years just after World War II, when due to the Red Army's defeat of German fascism, th e Soviet Union enjoyed considerable authority among Rusyn-Ukrainians as well as Czechs and Slovaks. Everything "Soviet" was perceived as "Russian." Political propaganda attempted to portray the Soviet Union as an ideal country in which all peoples were united around the "Great Russian people. " The Russian language, Russian culture, the Russian individual, and the "Russian Soul " all symbolized the acme ofp e,:fection. 72 Russian Elementary and secondary schools proliferated after World War II, in addition to the Russian gymnasium in Presov, an additional Russian gymnasium was established in Medzilaborce on February 23, 1945, and trade schoo ls were opened in which Russian was the language of instruction. According to official statistics for the 1948-49 school year, there were 43 kindergartens, 276 elementary schools, 38 incomplete and 6 complete secondary schools with instruction in the Russian language, totaling 23, 11 2 pupils.73 After the Ukrainian National Council of the Presov Region was abolished, it was replaced by a new organization, the cultural Union of Ukrainian Workers (Kul'tumy sojuz'ukrajans'kyi trudjascychKSUT), which was staunchly supportive of the Communist Party. KSUT initiated numerous publications in the Ukrainian language. 72 Mykola Musynka, "The Postwar Development of the Regional Culture of the Rusyn-Ukrainians of Czechoslovakia' in Paul Robert Magocsi, ed., The Persistence of Regional Cultures: Rusyns and Ukrainians in the Carpathian Hom eland and Abroad (New York, 1993), 55. 73 Ibid, 56. �120 SLOVAKIA 2019 Beginning on June 28, 1952, by decree of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia, the language of instruction in all Russian elementary and secondary schools of Eastern Slovakia was changed to Ukrainian . The change in the school system was torturous for all parties. It was implemented too quickly. Instructors who had never studied literary Ukrainian were assigned to take month-long courses, after which they were expected to teach in that language. The vast majority of teachers detested it. There was a shortage of textbooks, dictionaries and other printed materials. Ukrainiazation nonetheless made significant strides in popular culture . In January 1953 , KSUT sponsored the first professional song and dance ensemble in Medzilaborce under the artistic direction of Jurij Kostjik. It was eventually reorganized as the Dukla Ukrainian Folk Ensemble. In September of that year, a Department of Ukrainian Language and Literature was established at the Presov Pedagogical Institute, which in 1959 became the Philosophical Faculty of Safarik University, under the direction of Petro Bungansyn. Literary works by Rusyns in the Presov Region reached an unprecedented level of publication in the course of a decade in the Ukrainian language. After 1959, the Ukrainian division of the Slovak Pedagogical Publishing House had a monopoly on the release of Ukrainian books in the Presov Region. During a thirty-year period it published 373 literary and scholarly works. Not all of them withstood the test of time. Many employed the so-called "socialist realist" style, reflecting a Marxist-Leninist ideological bent which conformed to Party dogma. Yet the Presov Region has produced works which have assumed a permanent place in the history of literature. 74 A number of former Russophiles moved with the times and adopted Ukrainian literary norms. Those Russophiles who remained outside the Communist Party could not expect a triumphal finish . Such was the case of Vasyl' Karaman, who, after the abolition of the body he had chaired, was accused of being a "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist." The allegation was blatantly absurd: Karaman steadfactly believed that the future of the Rusyns was closely bound to the Soviet Union . He was nonetheless removed from political and cultural life in the Presov Region. Similarily, Ivan P'ieshchak was ac74 Ibid, 65 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 121 cused of bourgeois nationalism, driven from his home in 1952, and forbidden to practice law for nearly a decade. Ironically, some of the greatest beneficiaries of the new socialist order were those Rusyns of the 1st Czechoslovak Anny Corps who had survived the ordeal of the Dukla Pass. In spite of their suffering in the Gulag, they had fought bravely and well under General Svoboda, in fact becoming his favorite soldiers. 75 The treaty transferring Podkarpatska Rus ' to Soviet Ukraine contained a certain "exemption" clause. Those Rusyns with a record of service in the Czechoslovak Army could retain Czechoslovak citizenship. About half of them chose to do so, relocating west of the Uz. Svoboda redressed the balance for them as much as humanly possible, obtaining jobs for them in the military and especially in the security services. One might suppose that, after their experience in the Gulag, they would have been averse to serving as agents of repression. Instead, thanks to Svoboda' s generous patronage, they became overrepresented in the secret police, not only in eastern Slovakia but in Prague and Bratislava as well. This role fueled the hostility of their fellow citizens. Animosities smoldered beneath the surface for a full generation. During the Prague spring of 1968, the Slovak press suddenly became articulate in its denunciations: " ... this 15 year anti-Slovak movement in eastern ... Slovakia must be liquidated." 76 Slovak nationalists in particular resented the fact that the city of Presov served as a bastion of Ukrainophile activity. Slogans appeared on a number of buildings: "Presov was and will be only- and only- a Slovak city" and "Ukrainians, get out of Presov! " 77 The Slovak element of eastern Slovakia was not the only one which opposed the Ukrainian movement. Passive opposition was expressed by many Rusyns themselves . If they could not be themselves, the Rusyns opted for the closest thing, and voluntarily assimilated into the Slovak nationality. 78 The local dialect spoken was not foreign to them, unlike that of the Ukrainian textbooks imported from Kiev. Whenever local citizens were questioned by the police, they declared themselves as Slo75 Magocsi, "Magyars and Carpatho-Rusyns in Czechoslovakia" in Of the Making of Nationalities, 175. 76 Cited in Kulturny zivot (Bratislava) April 15, 1968 and Vychod (Kosice) November 29, 1968. 77 Magocsi, "National Assimilation", 283. 78 fbid, 264-70. �122 SLOVAKIA 2019 vak, fearing deportation to the Soviet Union. Finally, the relatively more advanced Slovak economy drew many to the industrial valleys farther south, where the process was completed. For those Rusyns who continued to consider themselves Ukrainian , yet another shock awaited in the following generation. After the 1989 revolutions and the collapse of communism in East Central Europe, first the Slovak and then the Polish government recognized the Carpatho-Rusyns as a distinct nationality. Many young Rusyns eagerly embraced the new orientation. 79 Conclusion. Unrepentant Russophiles: Yurkovsky, Kabuliak, Sidor and Karabelesh The demise of the Russophile orientation among the CarpathoRusyn people was undoubtedly, to employ a Marxist cliche, historically inevitable. An interesting story revealing the pathetic depths to which it had descended by World War II is provided by Marian Zgomiak, later a professor at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow , Poland. At the outbreak of World War II, Zgomiak was a 15 year-old Polish youth. When Poland was militarily crushed by Nazi Germany in September of 1939, Poli sh Army veterans hoped to escape to the West to fight again. Since most of the Polish soldiers fleeing abroad were between the ages of 17 and 30, two groups of people played disproportionately large roles in the domestic resistance movement organized by the Polish Home Army (Armija Krajowa- AK). One of them was Polish teenagers, who acted as couriers escorting the fugitive s to the border with Slovakia. Another was the Lemkos, who acted as guides. 79 The rejection of Ukrainian identity is by no means unanimous. On November 17, 1990, at the First Congress of the Ru syn Renaissance Society in Medzilaborce, spokesman Mychal Turok-Heter stressed that "while it is vital to preserve national pride, it is wrong to attack the Ukrai nians and the Ukrainian language . Gradually, the Ru syns will write and advance toward the common path which will lead them to fulfilling thei r mi ssive of peace for us all." See Myslenka, 75. Frequently, on the local level , there ex ists a certa in pluralism. In Svidnik, the Museu m of UkrainianRus'Culture acknowledges kinship with the former while stressing the regional identity of the latter. See the entry " Museum of Ukrainian Rus' Culture in Svidnik" in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusy n Histo1y and Cu lture, 337. �SLOVAK.IA 2019 123 Young Zgorniak was active in these border expeditions. On July 2, 1942, he and his father were arrested by the Gestapo. After the usual beatings and interrogation in the basement of the Gestapo headquarters in Gorlice, Zgorniak was transferred to the prison in Jaslo. Here he bonded with a Lemko prisoner named Yurkovsky. This Yurkovsky was an unrepentant Russophile. During World War I he and his father were hauled off to internment in Talerhof. Yurkovsky senior died there during the typhus epidemic. Yurkovsky junior returned to the mountain districts of Lemkovyna to serve as a teacher in the interwar years. He did not consider himself a Rusyn or even a Lemko, but a Russian. He was not receptive to Polish efforts to sponsor a separate Lemko identity. After the invasion of the Soviet Union in June of I 941 , the Nazi Government General (to which Lemkos west of the San River where subject) rounded up Lemkos known for their pro-Russian sentiments. In this manner Yurkovsky found himself in the prison of Jaslo. Both the quality and quantity of food in the prison of Jaslo left much to be desired. In September of 1942 German authorities loosened the regime to the point where Lemkos (but not Poles) could receive food packages. Arrangements were made for Zgomiak's mother to send food to Yurkovsky, who shared it with her son. Working together in the hospital section of the prison, they had the opportunity to engage in intellectual discussions. Zgorniak records the following: During one of the discussions I asked whether or how he could coordinate the Carpatho-Rusyn orientation on the Russia ruled by the Tsar with an orientation on a Russia ruled by the Bolsheviks who had overthrown and murdered the Tsar and his family. He said he could do so because "after the death a/father in Talerhof I had the dream . In it my father appeared and said 'the cause for which both are fighting shall be successful! ' That dream I keep in mind and I believe it will prove to be true. "80 80 Marian Zgomiak, " Meeting with Lemko leaders who had been arrested by the Gestapo and who were in prison in Jaslo 1942" in Best and Moklak, eds ., The Lemko Region, /939-194 7, 129. �124 SLOVAKIA 2019 Zgomiak asserts that he was convinced Yurkovsky and other Lemkos could have been released had they declared themselves Ukrainians. They declined to do so. Eventually, Yurkovsky was transferred to a concentration camp in Pruszkow, from which he was liberated before the end of the war. Yurkovsky then became sold on the plan jointly agreed upon by the Polish and Soviet governments to encourage Lemkos to emigrate to the east. Those whose villages had been destroyed during the Carpatho-Dukla operation went willingly. Others followed Yurkovsky across the border. They were by no means satisfied with living conditions in Soviet Ukraine, and turned on Yurkovsky for encouraging them to leave in the first place. He suffered something akin to a nervous breakdown and developed heart disease. Zgomiak concluded: "I remember him as an intelligent fellow who despite hi s various interests was fatally attracted to the idea for which he fought." 81 In light of its ignominious end in the realm of politics, what remains of the Russophile tradition among the Carpatho-Rusyns in the realm of culture? Here the author wishes to turn to the areas of religion and literature. In the area of reli gion, the Orthodox faith has provided a certain legacy. It must be understood that the majority of Rusyns professing any religious belief adhere to the Greek Catholic rather than the Orthodox Church . Yet the Orthodox revival of the early twentieth century made an enduring impact which was embraced by the communist regimes after World War II. Its most enthusiastic protagonist was Aleksander Kabuliak. At the end of World War I he was released from prison and became a major figure of the Orthodox revival in Czechoslovakia. There was a sc hi sm within the Orthodox Church in the 1920s. Its adherents were subject to the Serbian patriarchate, whereas Czech converts to Orthodoxy wanted their own autocephalous Orthodox Church. They appealed to the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople. On March 4, 1923 he consecrated the archimandrite Savritij as bishop. Bi shop Savritij 's leadership was contested by Bishop Gorazd, the Serbian patriarch 's representative. Kabuliak sided with the Serbian patriarchate in this di spute. With the Orthodox Church temporarily paralyzed and depri ved of an acting bishop, Kabuliak assumed the role of administrator. The Hungar81 Ibid, 129. �SLOVAKIA 2019 125 ians did not molest him during World War II, nor did he do anything to provoke them. But on November 18, 1944, on behalf of the Orthodox believers of Podkarpatska Rus ', Kabuliak wrote a letter to no less a personage than Soviet leader J. V. Stalin. He recommended the establishment of a Carpatho-Russian Soviet Republic encompassing territory extending "from Iasnyia to Poprad and from Uzhok Pass to Debrecen." 82 Since Moscow was already planning to incorporate Podkarpatska Rus' into the Ukrainian S.S.R., this was not an option. Yet in the following month Kabuliak led a delegation to Moscow requesting the transfer of episcopal jurisdiction from the Serbian to the Moscow patriarchate. Here his efforts were crowned with success. In posthumous recognition of his achievement, in 200 I the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow patriarchate) canonized Kabuliak as the first Carpatho-Rusyn saint. Eastern Galicia, like Podkarpatska Rus ', was ceded to Soviet Ukraine at the end of the war. In both areas incoming communist regimes declared the Greek Catholic Church abolished and transferred its parishes to the jurisdiction of the Orthodox Church. In Galicia most of the clergy accepted the formal change and retained their old parishes. The Ukrainian character of the church consequently survived . In Transcarpathia the Greek Catholic clergy was more resistant to Orthodoxy and it was imposed more forcefully. Bishop Teodor Romza of Mukachevo was brutally murdered, while lesser clergymen were arrested and deported.83 They were replaced by Russian priests di spatched from Moscow. The Orthodox Church here acquired an expressively Russian character. From the standpoint of Rusyn culture, inclusion into the Russian Orthodox Church was a double-edged sword. In America, Reverend Alexis Toth had sought to convince his flock that the best way to preserve their rite, tradition and identity was through conversion to Orthodoxy. Yet St. Alexis (He too was canonized) had a great love for the variety of liturgical music known as Carpathian plainchant. 82 See the entry "Kabuliak, Aleksander" in Magocsi and Pop, eds. , Encyclopedia of Rusyn Hist01:y and Culture, 223 . 83 Pekar, 151 -4. �126 SLOVAK.IA 2019 This and another native aspects of worship were submerged by Russian liturgical tradition .84 In Czechoslovakia the legal status of the Greek Catholic Church was restored as a result of the liberal reforms of the Prague spring of 1968. Yet it lost its Rusyn character and became a force for slovakization. Much church property has been restored since the collapse of the communist system in 1989. Yet there remain adherents of the Orthodox faith in northeastern Slovakia. This author has an endearing memory of a visit to an Orthodox church in Svidnik. It was a modest, prefabricated structure, erected in the L990s. The morning was cold. There was only room inside the church for elderly parishioners. Yet a sizable crowd of young people remained standing outside. They displayed enough reverence to refrain from smoking throughout the Divine Liturgy. If the Rusyns can no longer be considered Great Russians, then the Russian government, and especially the Orthodox Church, wishes to retain whatever bonds still exist. While seminarians of the autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church have received their education in Ukraine, those who adhere to the Moscow patriarchate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church have been educated in Russia. Such was the case of Dmitri Sidor, born March 29, 1955, currently rector of the Church of the Exaltation of the Cross in Uzhorod. Reverend Sidor heads a movement demanding autonomy for Rusyns of Ukraine. He stresses the religious character of his people, and the similarity of their language with Old Church Slavonic. On December 19, 2008 , the Rusyn issue was raised at an international conference held on the Don, southern Russia. The conference was entitled "Genocide and Cultural Ethnocide of the Rusyns of Carpathian Rus' [from the end of the nineteenth to the beginning of the twenty first century]." A resolution was adopted. It stated that, alongside the Armenians, the Rusyns were the first victims of genocide in the twentieth century, thi s in reference to the policy of the Austro-Hungarian military during the First World War. Today, the resolution continued, Kiev engaged in a "policy of cultural ethno- 84 Paul Robert Magocsi, "Adaptati on Wi thout Assimilati on: The Genius of the Greek Catholic Church of Mukachevo" in Of the Making of Nationalities, Volume 11 , 202. �SLOVAKIA 2019 127 cide." It pointed out that the Rusyns were recognized as a distinct nationality by numerous countries, but not Ukraine. 85 The Ukrainophile orientation responded to the Rostov conference. One articulate response may be found in the working paper "Political and Ethno-Cultural Aspects of the Rusyns' Problem: A Ukrainian Perspective," by Natalya Belitzer of the Py lip Orlyk Institute for Democracy in Kiev. She outlines the tortutous, complex evolution of the history of a region which has been subject to numerous rulers. She echoes her colleague M. Lanchuk in asserting that the main issue at stake has not been the ethno-cultural identity of the Rusyns but rather what has been termed "political Ruthenianism," which many Ukrainians perceive as a threat. 86 According to Belitzer, the disintegration of the Soviet Union was accompanied by an artificial politicization of the Rusyn question. Belitzer is not opposed to Ru syn autonomy in principle. Yet, as a Ukrainophile, she considers the Rusyn tongue as a mere dialect of the Ukrainian language. Belitzer makes a particularly revealing admission when she states that "Ukrainian democracy is ... quite benevolent to the ideas and practices of the restoration of minorities ' own identity, but at the same time strongly denies Rusyn identity as being separate from the Ukrainian.,,s1 Therein lies the rub. If the Rusyn tongue is a dialect of the Ukrainian language, why is its use not permitted in schools? Rusyn schoolchildren speak one way at home but are required to speak another way at school. Such practices are grist to Dmitri Sidor's mill. Aside from the fact that Ukraine has an army and the Rusyns do not, Father Dmitri's movement faces two serious obstacles. For one, he is an Orthodox priest, whereas the majority of Rusyns still profess (or have resumed professing) the Greek Catholic faith. Secondly, while a majority of the Rusyns in the Presov Region and Lemkovyna 85 Resolution of the International conference "Genocide and Cultural Ethnocide of Ru syns in Carpathian Rus' [from the end of the nineteenth to the beginning of the twenty first century] Rostov on the Don, Russia. December 2 1, 2008 www.podkar~atskarus.eu 6 M. Panchuk, " Political Rutheni ani sm" in Demons of Peace and Messengers of War(Kiev, 1997), 323. 87 Natalya Belitzer, "Political and Ethno-Cultural Aspects of the Rusyns' Problem : A Ukrainian Perspective". Research paper prepared within the framework of the Programme on European Security (PROGRES) sponsored by the Center for European Security Studies and the University of Gronigen (Netherlands). Undated, 12. �128 SLOVAKIA 2019 consider themselves their own nationality, a majority of them in Transcarpathia consider themselves Ukrainian. Yet the movement has a growing popular appeal. In a state where bureaucratic centralism has had a constipating effect, autonomy can be a powerful laxative. Moreover, the Rusyns now possess a certain bargaining chip . A full eighty percent of all Russian petroleum and natural gas which is sold to Europe passes through pipelines in the area of Uzhorod. If the Rusyns were to succeed in establishing an independent state, they would be eligible to receive billions of dollars of gas transit profits from Kiev.88 In the realm of literature, the Russophile tradition has likewise established an enduring legacy. This is especially exemplified by the writings of Andrii Karabelesh ( 1906-1964). Karabelesh was born in the Transcarpathian village of Tibala, near Mukachevo. When he first attended the gymnasium in Mukachevo the language of instruction was still Magyar. This changed due to the arrival in Podkarpatska Rus ' of many Russian emigres fleeing the revolution. Karabelesh adapted to the russification of the school system so enthusiastically that he became the first secular writer among Rusyn Russophi les. He went on to study at the Theological Seminary in Uzhorod ( 1925-1928). While still a student he published- in Russian- two collections of poetry, lzbrany e stikhovtvorenia (1928) and V buchalh rassvieta ( 1929). These works have been characterized as "dominated by mysticism, a pessimistic outlook on life, and a love of Russian culture." 89 He did not complete his studies at the Theological Seminary because he converted to Orthodoxy. His conversion was less for religious than for cultural reasons. As literary historian Elaine Rusinko writes: "Karabelesh ' s deity is not the conventional God of the Greek Catholic catechism, but an amorphous, spiritual force that provides metaphysical potential and philosophical substance for the poet." 9 Karabelesh went on to Prague, where he obtained a degree in philosophy from Charles University in 1934. ° 88 See " Ukraine Laun ches Moderni zation of Urengog-Ponary-U zhorod Pipeline," Ukra inian News Agency, Jul y 19, 2011 . 89 See the entry " Karabelesh, Andrii " in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 223. 90 Ru sinko, 350. �SLOVAKIA 2019 129 Karabelesh continued writing exclusively in standard Russian. Unlike earlier Russophiles, he did not look towards Russia for the deliverance of the Rusyn people. In his estimation, it was no longer a matter of what Holy Mother Russia could do for Podkarpatska Rus'. It was a matter of what Carpathian-Rus' could do for Holy Mother Russia. In his enthusiasm for the great Russian literary giants, Karabelesh exhibited a tendency towards plagiarism, using some of their phrases directly in his own poetry. Karabelesh 's special favorite was Mikhail Lennontov, who merits attention here. Like his predecessor, the great Russian Romantic Alexander Pushkin, Lermontov wrote passionately, lived wildly and was killed in a duel. Unlike Pushkin, Lermontov created a literary genre in which the psychology of the protagonist played a leading role. This served as a precedent for the great novels of Dostoyevsky later in the century.91 In his poem "Nevdol'strie" (Dissatisfaction), Karabelesh quotes Lermontov's Pechorin: "I was not born for happiness. " 92 Anyone who studies the course of Karabelesh 's life would probably agree. He taught secondary school for a time in Podkarpatska Rus ', but when the Hungarians reoccupied the region he fled to Bohemia. Karabelesh participated in the Czech Resistance against the Nazis, heading a small underground group in Litamsyl. In this capacity he was arrested by the Gestapo in 1942. He passed the remainder of the war in the concentration camps of Mauthausen and Buchenwald. After the war he remained for a time in western Czechoslovakia, serving as principal of the gymnasium of Svitavy (19451953). Then he moved to the Presov Region, where he taught Russian language and literature at Safarik University. Although a member of the Ukrainian section of the Slovak Writers Union, he continued to write exclusively in Russian. It was not simply a case of Karabelesh being unwilling to move with the times. The red banner of the October Revolution replaced the grey skies in "V karpatikh osin" (Autumn in the Carpathians ). 93 Yet the apolitical, pessimistic tone of Karabelesh 's poetry became increasingly an object of attack by communist ideologues. In 1956, when the Soviet Communist Party was 91 See Semyon Eks hut, " Pushkin 's Heir" Russian Life, 42 , No, 6 (October/November 1999), 20-32. 92 Rusinko, 353. 93 Ibid, 362. �130 SLOVAKIA 2019 in a state of ideological crisis in the aftermath of Stalin's death , Karabelesh raised his voice in criticism of the imposed ukrainization of the Rusyn people. He was subsequently expelled from the Slovak Writers Union and returned to Bohemia. In the homeland, literary hi storian and defender of the "social realist" genre Iurii Bolega opened an ideological offensive against Karabelesh ' s work, condemning it as having a Russian chauvinist and anti-social character. One may ask why Karabelesh would wish to return home under such circumstances. Yet the years he spent in concentration camps had undennined hi s health, and Karabelesh was of the opinion "Where you are born, there you should die! " 94 Terminally ill, Karabelesh finally returned home in 1964. He died in Mukachevo on September 4 . In the post-communist era his poetry has experienced a revival of popularity. The Eastern Carpathians constitute an area of scenic beauty, but also in many places one of the depressing poverty. In his poem " Moi Narod" (My Nation), Karabelesh focuses on "fences and of abandoned gardens," "dried out grape vines," "bars of broken down churches," "unplowed fields," and so on. His writing reflects the mixture of beauty and melancholia that is essential to the brooding Slavic soul. If the Russophile tradition never reached the level of popularity that the Ukrainophile orientation attained, it nonetheless remains an essential part of the cultural landscape. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author wishes to thank and express his deep appreciation to Bob Broedel , president of the Tallahassee-Krasnodar Sister City Program, for hi s technical assistance in accessing material published in Russia and Ukraine. 94 Ibid, 359. � SLOVAKIA 2019 83 RUSSOPHILES WITHOUT RUSSIA R. Vladimir Baumgarten (Dedicated to the Memory ofNikolaj Ordos) The Carpatho-Rusyns, technically a stateless people, have been dubbed the "Kurds of Central Europe." They straddle the northern and southern slopes of the Carpathian mountains in the border re1 gions of Slovakia, Poland, Ukraine and Romania. Since the 1989 revolutions and the collapse of Communism in East Central Europe, both the Slovak and Polish governments have recognized the Carpatho-Rusyns as a distinct nationality. Ukraine, where the largest number of Rusyns dwell, does not. After World War II, incoming communist governments classified the Rusyns as Ukrainians by administrative fiat for reasons of convenience, which shall be explained below. The current post-communist government of Ukraine adamantly adheres to this position. 2 Further west, across the Uz river, many Carpatho-Rusyns in eastern Slovakia have voluntari ly assimilated into the Slovak nationality, for reasons which shall likewise be explained in this essay. The first impetus for the Rusyn national awakening came from a belief that they were part of a Great Russian nation, extending "from the Poprad River [in eastern Slovakia] to the Pacific." 3 The Russophile tradition influenced Carpatho-Rusyn culture and politics for a full century. An examination of its history reveals more than a few 1 Paul Robert Magocsi , " Mapping Stateless Peoples: The East Slavs of the Carpathians," Canadian Slavonic Papers, XXIX, Nos. 3-4 ( 1997), 301-54. 2 The Ukrainophile viewpoint was exemplified by Viacheslav Chomovil ( 19371999). During the Brezhnev era, Chomovil was a dissident journalist and human rights activist. He was sent to the labor camps several times for separatist activities. In the late I 980's he was one of the leaders of the People's Movement of Ukraine (better-known as Rukh). After the Soviet Union disintegrated and Ukraine became independent, Chomovil became alarmed by the Rusyn political renaissance. He considered it separatist and urged the Prosecutor General's office in Kiev to file charges aga inst its protagonists. 3 Paul Robert Magocsi , "The Nationalist lntelligentia and the Peasantry in Twentieth Century Subcarpathian Rus "', in Magocs i, Of the Making of Nationalities Th ere is No End, Vol. I (New York, 1999), 19. �84 SLOVAKIA 2019 ironies. In retrospect, it seems remarkable that the Russophile tradition lasted as long as it did. Indeed, remnants of it exist to this day. The current essay is an attempt to explain its rise and fall. The Russophile Tradition in Habsburg Hungary, Galicia and America The homeland of the Carpatho-Rusyns has been alternatively referred to as Ruthenia, Podkarpatska Rus' (Subcarpathian Rus '), Transcarpathia and Carpatho-Ukraine. For reasons of convenience, this author shall refer to it as Podkarpatska Rus' . It was part of the Kingdom of Hungary for about 900 years. Much of Podkarpatska Rus' was a game preserve for the Hungarian nobility. Its Eastern Slav peasants, shepherds and lumberjacks were forbidden to hunt the deer, even when the latter devoured the people's meagre cabbage plots. Starvation was common. The Rusyns were the most impoverished and illiterate ethnic group in the Hungarian kingdom. Originally a bastion of the Russian Orthodox Church, the homeland of the Carpatho-Rusyns was a battleground and passageway in the ongoing struggle between the Austrian Habsburgs and the Transylvanian princes. In order to wean these people away from any allegiance to the Transylvanian princes, most of whom were Calvinists, the Habsburgs decided to incorporate them into the Roman Catholic Church. They accomplished this by creating a Slavonic/Greek Rite of the church. At the Union of Uzhorod (April 24, 1646), 63 Orthodox priests pledged to recognize the primacy of the pope and the sanctity of Roman Catholic doctrine in exchange for keeping the Slavonic liturgy and a married clergy.4 These clergymen were exempted from the feudal burdens of serfdom, received an income from their parishioners, and could send their sons to seminaries in the Habsburg Monarchy for higher education. Despite this favorable concession from the Imperial House, the Rusyns remained generally loyal to their Magyar lords. This was especially the case of the Kuruc (Crusader) uprising and freedom war of Ferenc Rakoczi II ( 1703-1711 ). 4 For the most comprehensive study of this event, see Michal Lacko, "The Union of Uzhorod," Slovak Studies, VI ( 1966), 7-190. �SLOVAK.IA 2019 85 The contribution of the Rusyns was sufficiently valorous for them to receive the title gens fidelissima ("the most faithful people").5 In the first half of the nineteenth century, when the various Slavic nationalities of the Habsburg Monarchy-Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs and Croats-launched their own national revivals, the Rusyns were slow to respond. No Rusyns attended the Slav Congress during the revolutionary year 1948. On the contrary, Greek Catholic seminarians in Uzhorod abandoned their intended vocations in order to volunteer for the Hungarian honveds (National Guard) during Hungary' s 1848-1849 war of independence.6 A few educated Rusyns were aware of a certain kinship with Russia. In 1791 Ivan Orlai ( 1771-1829) emigrated to Russia. A schoolteacher, he had been denied advancement in the Austrian system of education. In St. Petersburg he studied medicine and ultimately became court surgeon, actively working in the reorganization of the Russian medical profession. He advised the Ministry of Education to invite other educated Rusyns "since they usually know Church Slavonic thoroughly." 7 Orlai served as Mentor to Nikolaj Gogol, author of Taras Bulba, the Russified Ukrainian who ultimately became one of the literary giants of nineteenth-century Russia. Orlai encouraged other Russian scholars to take an interest in their kinsmen on the other side of the Carpathians. Meanwhile, a Greek Catholic eparchy was established in Presov, eastern Slovakia, in 1818. Its eparch (bishop), Hrihory Tarkovych, was an active pioneer of Russian culture. In expanding his library, he imported the complete works of the eighteenth-century Russian intellectual and scientist Mikhail Lomonosov.8 5 The Rusyns gained this title as a result of a battle fought near Trencin castle in western Slovakia on August 4, 1708. During the fi ghting Rakoczi vaulted across a ravine on horseback. He was thrown forward , striking his head and losing consciousness. His Carpatho-Rusyn peasant infantry held its ground long enough for him to be carried from the fi eld. Outnumbered and outgunned by the Imperial regulars, these Rusyns were subsequently massacred. 6 Paul Robert Magocsi, The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus: / 848-1 948 (Cambridge, MA: 1978), 43. 7 Elaine Rusinko, Straddling Borders: Literature and Identity in Subcarpathian Rus ' (Toronto, 2008), 99. 8 Athanasius Pekar, The History of the Church in Carpathian Rus' (New York, 1992), 89. �86 SLOVAKIA 2019 The first real impetus for the Carpatho-Rusyn awakening came as a result of the Russian military intervention against the Hungarian war of independence in 1849. It was not undertaken to liberate the Slavs of Hungary who were in a state of revolt against Magyar tyranny. Tsar Nicholas I of Russia employed far more autocratic powers than did the House of Habsburg and regarded the stamping out of the fires of revolution, which had swept Europe since the previous year, as a self-evident duty. Polish revolutionary veterans were serving on the Hungarian side and he feared the spread of revolution to his Polish possessions. Nicholas was no Pan-Slav. Two years earlier a nest of such agitators had been discovered in Kiev. It called itself "The Brotherhood of Sts . Cyril and Methodius," and, according to Nicholas, its adherents had invented some monstrosity called the Ukrainian nationality. One of its leading members was not only Ukraine's best poet, but its best painter as well. His people sought ties with the Czechs and Slovaks. Nicholas saw to it that several of them were jailed and he had Taras Schevcenko drafted into the Russian army for ten years, during which time he was forbidden to write or sketch. 9 A number of Russian Pan-Slav politically conservative individuals sympathized with the Slovak people. Tsar Nicholas admonished the Slavophile journalist Ivan Aksakov ( 1823-1886) that, under the guise of a general Slav alliance, subversive elements in the Kingdom of Hungary wished to create a struggle which was not in the name of 0 God, but in a spirit of mutiny, which was dangerous to Russia. ' The Russian military commanders carefully studied the earlier conflicts between the Habsburgs and the Transylvanian princes . They observed that The Austrians had traditionally moved against Transylvania by starting from Kosice in eastern Slovakia. It was considered safer to cross the Hornad and Tisa rivers in the Carpathian 11 foothills than to assault Transylvania from the Hungarian plain. On June 9, the main Russian army commanded by Field Marshal Ivan Paskievitch, consisting of 70,890 soldiers and 240 cannon poured into Slovakia through the Dukla Pass from partitioned Po9 Pav lo Zaitsev, Taras Shevchenko. A Life (Toronto, 1989), 139-57. °Cudovit Holotik, "The Slovaks: An Integrating or Disintegrating Force?" Austrian 1 Histo ry Yearbook, III , Part 2 ( 1967): 2. 11 William Stiles, Austria in 1848-50, II (New York, 1850), 294. Stiles was the American charge d'affaires in Vienna during the revolutionary events of 1848-49. �SLOVAKIA 2019 87 land. The Russians captured Presov on June 20 and took Kosice five days later. To supply their army, the Russians stockpiled large amounts of foodstuffs at the northern end of the Dukla Pass. However, the military bureaucracy of Tsar Nicholas was inefficient. Provisions were made to transport the artillery but not the food . Austrian quartermasters, who also had a supply of food , and were allied with the Russians, had fled the area. The Russian soldiers, hungry and exasperated, turned to plunder. Don Cossacks looted a number of Slovak villages so thoroughly that the inhabitants fled into the for12 ests . The Russian intervention in this area would be remembered with ill-feelings by Magyars and non-Magyars alike. There were Slovak Pan-Slavs who were willing to overlook Russian misconduct. They convinced themselves that Grand Duke Konstantin was preparing to transfer his headquarters from Warsaw to Kosice, where he would proclaim a new Slav state. Slovak leaders appealed to the Russian embassy and military mission in Vienna for recognition. They requested that Slovak advisors and regional administrators be attached to the Russian military in eastern Slovakia. Tsar Nicholas replied to one such request "I received the same thing yesterday from Danilevsky [the Russian consul in Belgrade]. I have no time for such matters." 13 On the other hand, the reception of Russian military intervention was not universally negative. Rusyn peasants in the highlands witnessed a mighty Slav army in their region for the first time. They were awed. They gave fruits and nuts to the invaders. Aleksander Dukhnovych, soon to become an awakener among the Rusyns, later wrote, "One thing really gave me joy in life, and that was in 1849 when I first saw the glorious Rus sian army .. .I can't describe the feeling of gladness at seeing the first Cossacks on the streets of Presov. I danced and cried with delight. .. It was truly the first, perhaps the last, joy of my life." 14 Aleksander Dukhnovych (1803-1865) was born in the village of Topol 'a in the Humenne region of eastern Slovakia. He was descended from Greek Catholic priests and was consequently educated 12 John Shelton Curtis, The Russian Army under Nicholas I, 1925-/ 854 (Durham, NC, 1865), 298 . 13 Holotik, 383. 14 Quoted in Magocsi, The Shaping of a National Identity, 45. �88 SLOVAKIA 2019 at the Theological Seminary in Uzhorod. After ordination as a priest in 1827, he was assigned to the bishop 's chancellery in Presov. His relatively progressive views clashed with those of the more conservative Tarkovych, who then assigned him to a relatively remote rural parish. Dukhnovych regarded his assignment as a godsend. In Uzhorod he had received a Hungarian education, which influenced his early writings. In the rural parish he discovered, or re-discovered, "the people." He was influenced by the Slovak National Awakening and applied its precepts to the awakening of his own Rusyn people. After the death of Tarkovych, Dukhnovych was reassigned to Presov and appointed eparchical canon in 1843 . He remained closely associated with the city-considered a Rusyn cultural center in spite of its Slovak majority- for the rest of his life. In 1850, after the suppression of the Hungarian revolution, Dukhnovych established the first Rusyn cultural association, the Presov Literary Society. His own literary contribution was considerable. In 1851 he composed the poem "Vruchanie," whose opening lines "I was, am, and will remain a Rusyn" became the motif for the unofficial anthem of the Carpatho-Rusyn people. He researched and wrote extensively on the Rusyn people. His monumental achievement was the play "Virtue is More Important than Riches," which is still performed regularly in regional theatres in eastern Slovakia and western Ukraine. 15 The ethical values expressed in this play mirror Dukhnovych 's role as a social reformer. He campaigned vigorously against illiteracy, alcoholism, and the lingering pagan superstitions which persisted among his people. The literary language employed-indeed, invented by Dukhnovych-was peculiar. It was a blend of Old Church Slavonic, standard Russian and the native dialect. His later disciples called it "the traditional Carpatho-Rusyn langage," while his critics derrided it as "jazychije" (macaronic jargon). 16 Indeed, while Dukhnovych was the greatest of the Rusyn awakeners, he inhibited the establishment of a distinctive Rusyn identity by his unequivocal adherence to the Great Russian idea. 15 For an English-language translation, see Aleksander Duchnovych, Virtue is More Important than Riches, ed. by Elai ne Rusinko (New York, 1994). 16 See the entry "Dukhnovych, Aleksander," in Paul Robert Magocs i and Robert Popp, eds. , Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture (Toronto, 2005), I06. �SLOVAKIA 2019 89 If Dukhnovych was the unquestioned giant among the Rusyns in the realm of culture, then Adolf Dobrian' skyi ( 1817-1901) fulfilled this function in the realm of politics. Dobrian'skyi was born in Rudl'ov, Zemplin county, Slovakia, the son of a Greek Catholic priest. He attended secondary schools in Levoca, Roznava and Misko le, and then studied philosophy in Kos ice ( 1833 ), law in Eger (1834-36) and mining at the Academy of Mines and Forests in Banska Stiavnica, central Slovakia. He was fluent in several foreign languages, including Magyar, German, French, English and Italian. He visited Bohemia, where he was influenced by Frantisek Palacky, Karel Havlicek and other Czech national awakeners. Dobrian'skyi initially welcomed Hungary' s 1848 Revolution for the liberal reforms that it promised. But when the Slovak district of Banska Bystrica elected him as its representative to the Hungarian Diet, the Hungarian government rejected his mandate on the grounds of Pan-Slavism. Dobrian'skyi then indeed became a Pan-Slav. He moved to Presov, where he built a following which advocated a political union of the Rusyns of Hungary with those of Austrian Galicia. When the Russians prepared to invade Hungary, the Austrian government appointed him as its liason with Paskievitch. Dobrian 'skyi then served as advisor to the Russian military. After the defeat of revolutionary Hungary, the Austrian government imposed a centralist bureaucratic regime. Dobrian' skyi then became advisor to the Uzhorod Civil District, which encompassed four counties. He regarded the civil district as a prelude to the establishment of an autonomous Rusyn state under the Emperor of Austria. 17 Defeated in the Austro-Sardinian war of 1859, The Habsburg Monarchy was substantially weakened. It was forced to retreat from bureaucratic centralism and make concessions to the Magyars. Dobrian' skyi was recalled , and the old nobles began to reoccupy county positions. In 1866 Austria suffered another defeat, this time at the hands of Prussia, and resigned itself in 1867 to accepting the Magyar nobility as equal partners in the renamed Dual Monarchy of AustriaHungary. Emperor Franz-Josef allowed himself to be crowned King of Hungary in Budapest and the Hungarian nobles were granted complete self-government in internal affairs. By now their obsession 17 See the entry " Dobrian' skyi, Adolf," in Magocsi and Popp, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 93. �90 SLOVAK.IA 2019 with Pan-Slavism reached paranoid proportions . They viewed the magyarization of Hungary's Slavic minorities as imperative. Persecution of Slovak and Carpatho-Rusyn educational and cultural institutions became the order of the day. A similar course evolved in Galicia, the Austrian province of partitioned Poland. Shortly after the 1867 Compromise with Hungary came into effect, Empreor Franz-Josef appointed his trusted Polish confidant Count Agenor Goluchowski as Viceroy of Galicia. Goluchowski gained for his Polish nobles a degree of autonomy that mirrored that of the Magyars. The education system was polonized. This posed a direct threat to the advancement of the Rusyns. Educated Rusyns became politically divided. The Ukrainian movement gained the greatest strength . However, there were still Rusyns who adhered to the traditions of old Rus' .They stubbornly continued to write in Old Church Slavonic and isolated themselves from the people. Cultureally, these Old Ruthenians identified with Russia, but professed allegiance to the Austrian Emperor. Such a dual allegiance became more difficult to maintain as the nineteenth-century ran its course. Austria and Russia were no longer allies, and were in fact competing for hegemony in the Balkans. Similarly, the Rusyns of Galicia found themselves cast in the role of a political football in the rivalry of the two empires. A case in point was the career of Ivan Naumovych (1826-1891), who was born Galicia in 1836. In his youth he was strongly influenced by the Polish national movement. However, he experienced a turning point during the revolutionary year of 1848, when there was a brief uprising in the city of Lviv. Naumovych was observing the fighting from a hillside when imperial soldiers spotted him and assumed he was a Polish rebel. They arrested him, but Naumovych persuaded them to release him by convincing the Austrians that he was a Russian. 18 Being Russian, Naumovych decided, carried certain privileges. After 1850, when Naumovych was ordained a Greek Catholic priest, he became staunchly Russophile in cultural orientation. He organized opposition to a campaign organized by the Roman Catholic Polish clergy to latinize the liturgy of the Greek rite. In this ca18 Keith Dyrud, The Quest fo r th e Rusyn Soul: The Politics of Religion and Culture in Eastern Europ e and America, 1890-World War I (Philadelphia, 1992), 28. �SLOVAKIA 2019 91 pacity he sought Russian support. At this point, Naumovych did not convert to Orthodoxy . He still regarded the Greek Catholic (Uniate) church as a potential bridge between Eastern and Western Christendom. Nontheless, inspired by his activism, an entire village in eastern Galicia converted to Orthodoxy in May of 1877. More conversions followed in the next three years. The Galician authorities charged Naumovych with treason. In their view his activity was not religious but political. Naumovych had indeed maintained contact with Russian Pan-Slav agents. 19In July of 1882 he was finally convicted and sentenced to eight months in jail. Other Rusyns who converted to Orthodoxy likewise found themselves hauled into court, although, surprisingly, a Polish jury acquitted them. Both the Austrian government and Polish patriots understood the necessity of not pushing the Old Ruthenians to the point of open subversion. The Ukrainophile movement predominated in Galicia, but the Russophile tradition was not going to go away. Galicia, unlike Russian Ukraine, was not a particularly productive agricultural region. Much of the countryside is hilly and the soil is poor. A bad harvest usually resulted in famine , and this happened at the beginning of the twentieth century. Russian Pan-Slavs responded by founding the Galician-Russian Benevolent Association in St. Petersburg on February 9, 1903. At the opening meeting acertain Father Petrov delivered the inaugural address. American historian Keith Dyrud described the subsequent address as follows: He likened the world to an artist's palette or a musician 's instrument. God was that artist or musician. The nationalities of the world were like colors on the palette or strings on the instrument. If some of the colors or strings are missing, the painting or music will be incomplete and this is a crime against the spirit. This crime against the spirit occurs when a culture allows itself to become divided. The separation of the people of Galicia and Carpatho-Russia (Subcarpathia) from the Russian nation was just such a crime . It is the obligation of a national culture to unite its people into a united nation. In other words, the orator was suggesting that it was 19 Ibid ., 28 . �92 SLOVAK.IA 2019 the obligation of Russia to unite in a single nation all people with a Russian culture. He included the Galicians and Subcarpathians 20 among the people with a Russian culture. Under the leadership of Count Vladimir Bobrinski , the GalicianRussian Benevolent Association extended financia l relief to famine victims of Galicia. Tsarist Russia, the most despotic and reactionary among the Great Powers, could appear benevolent while working to expand its influence. Bobrinski likewise dispatched agents to Podparkarpatska Rus ' , where starvation was an everyday occurrence, rather than a momentous event. The Hungarian government was less hesitant than its Austrian counterpart to prosecute Rusyns for conversion to the Orthodox faith. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the first converts to the Orthodox faith in Podkarpatska Rus ' materialized in the vi llage of Iza. They were simple peasants who disliked their pastor, a magyarized Rusyn, who replaced their language with Magyar in the parish school. Led by the cantor-teacher Andry Vladymir, they appealed to the Serbian patriarch, who had nominal authority over all Orthodox subjects of the Habsburg Monarchy, to send them an Orthodox priest. Greek Catholic priest and historian Athanasius Pekar, himself a Ukrainophile, later admitted: "All that needed to be done to liquidate the so-called 'Orthodox movement' in Iza was to appoint a new village pastor and reopen the parish school." 2 1 Instead, the Hungarian government arrested the participants late in 1903 for alleged ties with Russia, and in the following year placed them on trial in Marmaros. All the defendants were found gui lty of treason. The Maramaros trial made a deep impression on the mind of a simple woodcutter of Iasnyia named Aleksander Kabaliu (18771947). He had just been released from the army, where he had been persecuted by Hungarian officers for his Pan-Slav inclinations. Kabuliak had a pronounced inclination towards a monastic life . He made religious pilgrimages to Russia, Jerusalem and Mount Athos in Greece. At a Russian monastery in the last-named location, he was received into the Orthodox fold . He turned his home in Iasnyia into a veritable Russian museum, collecting and displaying icons. Fearing 20 21 Ibid. , 49-50. Pekar, I 05 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 93 persecution by Hungarian authorities, Kabaliuk emigrated to the Russian Empire, where he was tonsured as a monk in 1910. The Russian Orthodox Church initially intended that Kabaliuk wou ld go to America and assume custody of a modest parish in Pittsburgh.22 Instead, he decided to return to Hungary to share in the martyrdom of the villagers of Iza. The Hungarian authorities were happy to oblige him. At the end of 1913 there was a second Maramaros trial, in which Kabaliuk and 94 peasants were the defendants. The Hungarians were hopeful that the trial would expose the activities of Count Bobrinskii and his associates. All it achieved was international condemnation of Magyar policies . Nonetheless, Kabaliuk was sentenced to four and a half years in jail, while 32 others were sentenced to one or two years and various fines. The rest were dismissed for lack of evidence. It was also at the tum of the century that many Rusyns followed the example of their Slovak kinsmen and neighbors in emigrating to America. Although members of both groups originated in the dirtpoor hill country of the eastern Carpathians, they tended to gravitate towards industrial centers in the United States. Surprisingly, America provided both stimulus for the Russophile tradition and a resurgence of the Russian Orthodox faith. Dyrud writes: The majority of the Rusyn immigrants came to the United States as illiterate peasants and had not participated in the intellectual and cultural conflicts that were raging in the old country. Thus it was in this country that Rusyn peasants from Galicia and Subcarpathia first lived together and found that they did not have as much in common as it first seemed. And it was in the United States that many of them first heard of the Ukrainian movement. And it was there that the Rusyns from Subcarpathia felt free to express national sentiments without the pressures of magyarization. It was in the United States that most of the Rusyn immigrants were told for the first time by the Russian Orthodox mission that they were really Russians. 23 22 See the entry "Kabaliuk, Aleksander," in Magocsi and Popp, eds., Encyclopedia o[ Ru syn History and Culture, 223. 2 Dyrud, 58 . �94 SLOVAK.IA 2019 Ironically, the Russian cause was indirectly aided by a most unlikely element: Irish American Catholic priests. Many of the latter resented the fact that Greek Catholic candidates for the priesthood were permitted to marry while they were not. Most outstanding was Archbishop John Ireland of Minneapolis-St. Paul. On December 19, 1889, he was visited by a Greek Catholic priest named Alexis Toth. Toth had been dispatched by the Presov eparchy to assume the pastorship of St. Mary ' s, a modest church recently constructed by the Rusyn community of Minneapolis. When Father Toth presented his credentials, Archbishop Ireland became greatly agitated. He informed Toth that he did not consider him to be a genuine Catholic, and denied him permission to administer the sacraments. 24 After consultation with the parishioners of St. Mary's, Toth conferred with Russian Orthodox Metropolitan Vladimir of San Francisco. The latter was eager and willing to accept the parish of St. Mary's into the Orthodox fold. Aside from Alaska, which Russia had sold to the United States earlier, there were up to the 1870s only three Orthodox churches in the United States. In addition to San Francisco, there was a Russian parish in New York City and a Greek Orthodox church in New Orleans. Native converts in America were exclusively Alaskan Aleuts and Eskimos . Now, however, the wave of Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants indicated a potential source of growth. Since nearly all Rusyn immigrants were in the eastern half of the United States, New York rather than San Francisco was delegated as an episcopal seat. In 1890 the construction of St. Nicholas Cathedral was completed in New York. Tsar Nicholas II personally donated 5,000 roubles to this project. His government subsidized the construction of other churches and supported activities of the Orthodox Missionary Society founded in Moscow. In Minneapolis, Father Toth founded the Russian Mutual Aid Society. These prosletization efforts exceeded all expectations. By the time of the outbreak of World War I in 1914, over one-third of all Rusyn immigrants in the United States had converted to Orthodoxy. 25 They served as enthusiastic supporters of the Russian cause in the Great War. World War I brought with it the culmination of the historic struggle for the Carpathians, and caused great suffering among the 24 25 Ibid 65-6 Ibid: 65 . • �SLOVAK.IA 2019 95 Rusyns of Galicia, eastern Slovakia and Podkarpatska Rus' . By early September 1914 Russian armies had overrun much of eastern Galicia. Count Georgii Bobrinskii, brother of Count Vladimir, was made governor-general, and started a campaign to eradicate the Ukrainian movement. All Ukrainian cultural organizations, cooperatives and journals were shut down. The Russian language replaced Ukrainian in the school system. Hundreds of Greek Catholic priests were deported into the depths of Russia. There was admittedly some dissent in Russian governmental circles. Noted statesman Pavel Miliukov described Russian conduct in Galicia as a European scandal. Yet Foreign Minister Sergei Sazanov stated unequivocally: "Now is exactly the right moment to rid ourselves of the Ukrainian movement once and for all." 26 The Ukrainophiles had a measure of revenge when the AustroHungarian military reoccupied the province in the following year. They denounced their Russophile neighbors for alleged collaboration with the invaders. Hungarian troops carried out mass hangings. At the same time, Polish nobles spread rumors that the Ukrainophiles were covertly pro-Russian, so as to reassert their own authority in Galicia. In truth, thousands of Russophiles and Ukrainophiles alike suffered internment in Austrian concentration camps. The most notorious of these camps was Talerhof, near Graz. Sanitary conditions were deplorable, and an estimated 1,767 persons died of typhus and 27 other diseases. Austria's parliament was scandalized, and Emperor Karl ordered Talerhof closed early in 1917. Early in 1915, for the second of three occasions in the course of a century, the Russian military crossed through the Dukla Pass. This move came as a result of the seige of Przemysl, Austria-Hungary's principal fortress in Galicia. Russian troops occupied the Carpathian mountain passes to the south to prevent the Austro-Hungarian military from sending reinforcements to break the siege. Casualties on both sides of the winter war of 1914-15 were appalling. It is likely that more soldiers succumbed to the "White Death" (hypothermia) than were killed by enemy bullets. 28 Ultimately, the Austrian side 26 Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A History (Toronto, Buffalo and London, 2009), 343. See the entry "Talerhof," in Magocsi and Pop, eds,. Encyclopedia of Rusy n History and Culture, 488 . 28 For rhe most recent account of the winter campaign, see Traydon A. Tumstell, Blood on the Snow: The Carpathian Winter War of I 9 I 5 (Lawrence, KD, 20 I 0). 27 �96 SLOVAKIA 2019 gave way first. Russian soldiers under General Lavrl' Kornilov pushed through the southern end of Dukla Pass and advanced as far as the village of Lodomirova, just north of the town of Svidnik. Here they established a military cemetery for their dead. Lodomirova eventually became the site of a Russian cultural center in northeastern Slovakia, which shall be discussed in due course. The Russians did not remain in occupation of this toehold in Slovakia for long. Germany, Austria-Hungary's senior partner, launched a counteroffensive eastward across Poland, albeit at the cost of having enough troops to capture Paris. Russian troops painfully withdrew north of the Carpathians. They were now demoralized and ripe for revolution. Mass mutinies forced Tsar Nicholas II to abdicate on March 15, 1917. The reign of the Romanov dynasty had ended. Tsarist Russia was destroyed. Politically speaking, the Russophi-le orientation was now a dead letter. Culturally, its future was now an openended question . At this point Russophiles among the Rusyns looked with growing interest at the now ascendant Czechoslovak independence movement. The Rusyns in Interwar Czechoslovakia and Poland The Czechoslovak independence movement was a curious article. For almost a century, there existed an intellectual tradition which maintained that Czechs and Slovaks were two branches of the same nationality. Yet the concept of a politically united Czechoslovak state was largely the invention to Tomas Garrigue Masaryk ( 18501937), a Czech philosophy professor and notorious defender of unpopular causes. Perceiving that World War I would result in AustriaHungary coming increasingly under the domination of Kaiser Wilhelm ' s Germany, Masaryk decided to lobby among the opposing Western powers for Czecho-Slovak independence. In Geneva, in neutral Switzerland, he was joined by his protege, the sociology professor Edvard Benes. Together they proceeded to Paris, where they were joined by Milan Rastislav Stefanik, a young Slovak serving as an officer in the French Air Force. This triumvirate formed a Czech Action Committee Abroad, which was eventually expanded and renamed the Czechoslovak National Council. Given his position on this body, the French eventually gave Stefanik genera l' s rank. He raised a Czechoslovak Legion from prisoners of war and deserters �SLOVAKIA 2019 97 from the Austro-Hungarian Army. The Czechoslovak Legion distinguished itself on the Western, Eastern and eventually Italian fronts, and gained increased Allied favor in the struggle for the recognition of the independence movement. 29 In 1918 Masaryk visited the United States, not only to gain official American recognition, but also a mandate from the Slovak community in America, since Slovakia itself was politically gagged. In October of 1915 the Bohemian National Alliance and the Slovak League of America had already concluded a preliminary agreement for cooperation in Cleveland. Masaryk proceeded to Pittsburgh to conclude a more formal agreement for a Czecho-Slovak merger. Masaryk's visit to the Mecca of the American Slovaks was greeted by a large manifestation of support which included South Slavs as well as Czechs and Slovaks. Yet the negotiations undertaken at Moose Hall on May 29-31 were not without controversy. Masaryk pledged Slovakia an administration, a school system and linguistic rights, but not its own parliament, as specified by the earlier Cleveland Agreement. Here Jozef Husek of the Slovak Catholic Jednota raised strenuous objections. Albert Mamatey, president of the Slovak League, impressed Masaryk with the seriousness of losing the support of the largest single Slovak organization. The delegates were evenly divided, and Masaryk finally broke the deadlock by signing a revised draft with all the proposals. 30 The steel towns of the greater Pittsburgh area were also heavily populated by Rusyns from Hungary. Following the lead of the Slovaks, many joined fraternal organizations, which not only provided 29 The Czechoslovak Legion in Russia was the most instrumental military force in attaining Allied recognition of the independence movement. With Russia withdrawing from the war in 1918, Czechoslovak legionnaires wished to be evacuated and sent to France, where a German offensive to capture Paris was anticipated. Attempts by the Bolsheviks to disarm them resu lted in their capture of the Trans-Siberian Railway and a legendary odyssey to the Pacific coast. It also gave the Western Allies a pretext to intervene in the Russian Civil War. The experience of the Czechoslovak Legion in Russia boats of a sizable amount of literature. The best Englishlanguage studies are authored by Victor M. Fie, The Revolutionary War for Independence and the Russian Question: The Czechoslovak Army in Russia 1914-191 8 (New Delhi, 1977) and The Bolsheviks and the Czechoslovak Legion. The Origins of Their Armed Conflict: March to May 1918 (New Delhi , 1978). 30 See Marian Mark Stolarik, "The Role of American Slovaks in the Creation of Czecho-Slovakia" Slo vak Studies, VIII ( 1968), 48-5 1 �98 SLOVAKIA 2019 benefits to workers but published newspapers as well. Its members had acquired a measure of political awareness. One such organization was the Greek Catholic Union, headquartered in the HomesteadMunhall district. Another was the United Societies of America, which contained both Greek Catholic and Orthodox members, based in McKeesport. At the time of Masaryk's pilgrimage to Pittsburgh, the Czech independence leader was approached by Nicholas Pachuta, editor of the Greek Catholic Union's newspaper Rus 'kii Viestnik. Pachuta had recently converted to Orthodoxy. Up until this point he had advocated the incorporation of Podkarpatska Rus' into the Russian Empire. Now that there was no more Russian Empire, Pachuta approached Masaryk with the idea of union with a Czecho-Slovak state. He was soon afterwards expelled from the Greek Catholic Union. 3 1 Overall, the Greek Catholic clergy wished their homeland to remain part of Hungary. Many laymen wanted union with Galicia but insisted Galicia was Russian rather than Ukrainian. The end to the Great War was approaching, and territorial changes could be anticipated. One of President Woodrow Wilson's celebrated Fourteen Points for peace was "self-determination for the peoples of AustriaHungary." It was necessary to have a common program. Members of both organizations met in Homestead on July 23, 1918 to form the American National Council of Uhro-Rusyns. The subsequent Homestead Resolution read as follows: If the pre-war boundaries remain, Rusyns, as the most loyal people-gens fidelissima-deserve that Hungary provide [them} with autonomy. If new boundaries are made, they should be made according to nationality; thus, Uhro-Rusyns can belong nowhere else than to their nearest brothers by blood, language and faith, to the Galician and Bukovinian Rusyns. But if we are divided by foreign aspirations from Ukrainians and Old-Russians [Galician Russophiles}, the National Council demands in this case autonomy for Uhro-Rusyns so they can pre32 serve their national character. 31 Magocsi, Th e Shaping of a National Identity, 81. The original text of the Homestead Resolution appears under the heading " Do Vpukh Vhro-Rusynov zhivlych v Soed" in Prosvita, August 8, 1918 32 �SLOVAKIA 2019 99 The Rusyns commissioned a young Pittsburgh lawyer named Gregory Zsatkovich ( 1886-1967) to represent their interests to the United States government. Pennsylvania congressman Guy Campbell arranged a meeting between Zsatkovich and President Wilson on October 21. Wilson thought it unfeasible to grant full independence to so small a nation in a geopolitically sensitive region, and consequently recommended that Zsatkovich seek autonomy in a larger state. He referred Zsatkovich to Masaryk, whose independence movement had been recently recognized by the U.S. State Department, Zsatkovich met with Masaryk in Philadelphia, where the latter hosted a congress called the Mid-European Democratic Union on October 23-26. According to Zsatkovich's memoir afterwards, Masaryk assured him: "If the Rusyns decide to join the Czechoslovak Republic, they shall constitute a fully autonomous state." 33 There remained a sticky issue. Rusyn territorial claims included several counties in eastern Slovakia. Here there were numerous Rusyns in the northern mountain districts whereas elsewhere the population consisted of either Slovaks or Rusyns who had already voluntarily assimilated into the Slovak nationality. Masaryk was further alleged to declare on this point: "The frontiers will be so determined that the 34 Rusyns will be satisfied." On November 12, at a meeting of the National Council of UhroRusyns in Scranton, Pennsylvania, the Czechoslovak option was provisionally adopted, albeit including the demand for the counties of eastern Slovakia. A subsequent plebiscite among the American Rusyn fraternals provided Zsatkovich with the desired results: out of 1,102 votes submitted, 732 (67 percent) were for union with Czechoslovakia and 310 (28 percent) for union with Ukraine. Additionally, there were 27 votes for complete independence, 10 votes for union with Russia, and 9 votes for remaining part ofHungary. 35 Back in the Old Country, the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in October of 1918 led to a power vacuum in many areas of the Carpathians. Several different national councils were organized by Rusyns, each of which had its own program for the fu- 33 Gregory Zsatkovich, Otkryhote-Expose bydaltelho gubernatori Podkarpatskoj Rusi (Homestead, PA , 1921 ), 5. 34 Ibid 5 35 Ma~o~si , Th e Shaping of a National Identity, 85. �100 SLOVAK.IA 2019 ture affiliation of the people. A Russophile group in eastern Slovakia, based in Stara Cubovna, initially wanted a merger with Galicia. Dissenters among them, led by the lawyer Antonii Beskyd ( 1855-1933), considered such a move impractical. They reconvened in Presov and declared themselves for union with Czechoslovakia instead. A new revolutionary government in Hungary pledged to grant the Rusyns territorial autonomy. A group of Greek Catholic priests in Uzhorod declared themselves in favor of this option. Another pro-Hungarian group met in Khust, but its speakers were shouted down by Pro-Ukrainian elements led by the lawyer Iulii Braschaiko (1879-1955). The Ukrainophle orientation had at last taken hold in Podkarpatska Rus ', and would grow progressively stronger. Most dramatic of all were events in the easternmost Hutsul region, centered around Iasnyia. Here the populace favored union with Ukraine, but, pending further developments, took matters into their own hands. In the early morning of January 7, 1919, a group of demobilized Rusyn soldiers, aided by troops sent by the West Ukrainian Republic, drove out the Hungarian garrison of 250 militiamen. On February 5 the victorious Rusyns proclaimed their own "Hutsul Republic," with a 42-member elected council and a four-man government. This little state existed until June 11, when the area was occupied by advancing Romanian troops.36 Late in 1918, Czechoslovak legionnaires returning from the Italian Front had begun a military occupation of Slovakia, and advanced across the Uz River. Uzhorod was occupied on January 10, 1919. The Czechoslovak position was strengthened as a result of a Bolshevik government assuming power in Hungary, much to the alarm of the Western powers. This Hungarian government wished to build upon the "Ruska Kraina" declared by its predecessor, the Karolyi regime. It went to extremes attempting to implement communist rule, threatening the death penalty for even the smallest commercial transactions. This decree became impossible to enforce, since the commissars were themselves profiteering. 37 Podkarpatska Rus' was soon engulfed in counterrevolution. 36 See Paul Robert Magocsi, "The Rusyn Decision to Unite With Czechoslovakia" in Magocsi, Of the Making of Natio nalities, 134. 37 Ibid, 140-42 �SLOVAKIA 2019 101 Even before the establishment of the Bolshevik regime, members of the Uzhorod Council began experiencing doubts concerning the viability of remaining part of Hungary. A leading member of the Council, Reverend Avhustyn Voloshyn (1874-1945), began negotiating with Slovak leader Milan Hodza. Voloshyn was joined by supporters of both Beskid and Brashchaiko. The Russophiles realized that the Russia they had loved and believed in was unlikely to return from the dead. The Ukrainophiles realized that an independent Ukraine was unlikely to survive the turmoil of the Russian Civil War. Members of both orientations were willing to form a single body representing their mutual interests. It was in this spirit that the Central Russian National Council was formed in Uzhorod on May 8, 1919. Zsatkovich arrived with the text of the Scranton Resolution, which was endorsed unanimously. It remained to the Western peacemakers gathered in Paris to give sanction to Podkarpatska Rus' being granted to Czechoslovakia. Yet, contrary to later Hungarian revisionist claims, the victorious Western Allies did not arbitrarily hand the region over to the Czechs. The decision to unite with Czechoslovakia was that of the Rusyn people themselves .38 The realities of being part of the Czechoslovakia disappointed the expectations of many educated Rusyns. Autonomy was not forthcoming. They could send representatives to parliament in Prague, but did not have their own regional parliament. Prague apparently decided that the Rusyns, like the Slovaks, were not ready for autonomy. Zsatkovich became the first provincial governor, but the actual administration lay in the hands of a centralized Czech bureaucracy. Zsatkovich eventually resigned in disgust and returned to America. The disputed counties in eastern Slovakia remained under Slovak administration. To complicate matters further, there was now a group of Rusyns who considered themselves their own nationality, in addition to the existing Russophile and Ukrainophile orientations. Politically, on the local level, Prague would support one and then another orientation, depending upon its convenience at a particular moment. The Czechoslovak administration made great strides in education, virtually eliminating illiteracy in twenty years . The government poured tremendous amounts of money into Podkarpatska Rus ', and liberally funded cultural activities of all three orientations. 38 Ibid, 146. �102 SLOVAKIA 2019 On April 29, 1920, there was a meeting of local leaders in Uzhorod, headed by Iulii Brashchaiko. Its purpose was to establish a cultural organization encompassing all Podkarpatska Rus '. Nothing resulted from this meeting since Russophiles led by Anthonii Beskyd raised angry objections to the Ukrainophile cultural orientation of Brashchaiko ' s group. On May 9 Brashchaiko's fol lowers established the Prosvita Society, modeled along the lines of the Ukrainian society of the same name in Galicia. Its task was to publish all kinds of popular and scholarly books "written in the national tongue and accessible to every Subcarpathian Ru syn." 39 The Czechoslovak Pros vita was reinforced by many educated Ga li cian Ukrainians who found Polish rul e objectionable. On th e May 23 , 1923, those Russophiles who boycotted the Prosvita met in Uzhorod to establish their own organization, which was called the Dukhnovych Society. Its stated goals were to foster "the cultural deve lopment of the Ru ssian people living within Czechoslovakia, and most importantly to educate them in a moral , patriotic and Ru ssian spirit, exclusive of al l political activity." 40 The contrast between the two rival societies was visib le. The old tricolor Ru ssian flag flew over the reading rooms of the Dukhnovych Society, whereas Prosvita reading rooms displayed the blue and ye llow Ukrainian national colors. In terms of literature, the new Dukhnovych Society championed the great Russian masters : Pushkin, Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, etc. The Prosvita Society advanced the writings of Shevchenko and other less known Ukrainian awakeners. Both Russophiles and Ukrainophiles expanded their activities from literature to theater. The Ru ssophiles tended to produce hi storical dramas, whereas the Ukrainophi les focused on folk songs and ballads. The latter used standard Ukrainian as the language of performance, whereas the Russophiles had to translate their productions into a Rusyn dia lect. It must be frankly admitted that the Ukrainophile orientation gained the upper hand in popularity during the course of the kulturkampf for Podkarpatska Rus' in the First Czechoslovak Republic. Avtustyn Voloshyn had become a convert to the Ukrainophile orien39 Statul tova,ystva 'Prosvita • Podkarpatska Rus ·, (Uzhorod, 1920), 6. Usta v Rusakogo ku/'turna-prosvete/'noga obshchturni Aleksandra Duchnovychovicha , (Uzhorod, 1923), 40 �SLOVAK.IA 2019 103 tation. He and his associates were astute and learned men-teachers and scholars who kept closely in touch with Rusyn cultural life. By contrast, the Dukhnovych Society fell increasingly under the influence of Stefan Fentsik ( 1892-1946), a local politician who used the organization as a platform to propagate a his own views, his political ties with Poland and Hungary-which shall be di scussed in due course-became common knowledge by 1937, and did much to compromise the Dukhnovych Society. 41 Russian culture survived more comfortably in eastern Slovakia, since 1928 elevated to the official status of a province. In large measure this direction was due to the efforts of Iulii Lazho (18671929), a native of Svidnik and senator for the Social Democratic Party in the Czechoslovak parliament. Earlier, Lazho had emigrated to America, where he converted to Orthodoxy and also rose in the construction industry. He returned home to start his own construction firm, and also to seek revenge against his former Greek Catholic pastor. As mayor of Ladomirova, where the Russian military cemetery was located, Lazho invited Vital ii Maksimenko ( 1873-1960), former archimandrite of the monastery at Pochaiev (in Polish Volhynia), to establish a missionary headquarters there. Lazho also procured a Cyrillic alphabet printing press which Czechoslovak legionnaires in Russia had appropriated, shipped all the way to Vladivostok on the Pacific coast, and which made its way to Prague. During two decades of activity the Ladomirova mission published over I 00 Orthodox church books, the newspaper Pravoslavnaia Karpatskaje Rus ' (1928-1944), the journal for young people Diestvo I ivnost Khristi ( 1935-1941 ), a scholarly journal Pravoslavny put' ( 1938-1940) and the annual almanac Pravnoslavny ruskii/Ruskii narodnyi kalendar ( 1924-1944). The Russian monks also worked to inculcate Russian culture among the native Rusyns, hosting such events as an annual Russian Day in the summers and the tree-lighting ceremony for Orthodox Christmas. 42 In approaching the causes of the Orthodox revival in interwar Czechoslovakia, it is necessary to understand the world view of the 41 Magocsi, "Nationalist Intelligentsia and the Peasantry" in Of th e Making of Nationalities, 200. 42 See the entry "Ladomirova Monastery" in Magocsi and Pop, eds. , En cyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 266 . �104 SLOVAKIA 2019 national-state's founding father. T.G. Masaryk was a complex individual. As one biographer expressed it: "This man wanted to emancipate workers without embracing Marxism, liberate women without promoting feminism, and educate the young without celebrating youth. " 43 He was considered in the West to be an expert on Russia. He had written extensively on the great writer Dostoevsky, whom he regarded as the classic representative of Russian thought. There were elements of the Russian national psychology which Masaryk found disturbing. Like Havlicek before him, he felt that the Western Slavs, especially the Czechs, should follow a different path . As a proponent of Westeren humanism, Masaryk disparaged the mystical tradition of the Eastern Orthodox faith .44 Yet Masaryk reserved even greater hostility for the Roman Catholi c Church. He drew inspiration from Jan Hus, the great Bohemian religious reformer who was burned at the stake for heresy in 1415 . In 1905, while celebrating the anniversary of Hus ' death, Masaryk coined the slogan "Away from Rome! " Politics in the first years of the Czechoslovak Republic had a distinctly anti-Catholic flavor. His government favored the appointment of Lutherans for administration in Slovakia at the expense of the Catholic majority. In Podkarpatska Rus ', where there were virtua lly no Protestants, such a policy was impossible. Here Czechoslovak authorities fostered a revival of Orthodoxy. One Czech mini ster assessed the impact as follows: It seemed to some Russophile politicians, both in Prague and in Ruthenia ... that the right time had come to convert the Rutheni an peasant back to the Greek Orthodox religion. This opinion was shared by many Russian emigres who flocked to Czechoslovak ia ... after 1919. A drive for 'Orthodoxy ' was started in Rutheni a ... It is a question of how much of this movement was spontaneous and due to the pro-Russian feeling of the population and to its di slike for the purely magyarized Uniate clergy, and how much of its strength it owed to the propaganda and preaching of the Russian Orthodox emigres and clergy and to the support of some Czech political circles. 43 Bruce Garver, "Masaryk and Czech Politics 1900-1914" in Stanley B. Winters, ed. , T G. Masaryk (1850- 193 7) Vo lum e I Thinker and Politician (London, 1990), 22 . 44 See Paul 1. Tresky, " Masaryk and Dostoyevsky" in Harry Hanak, ed., T G. Masa1y k (/ 850- 193 7) Volum e II/ Statesman and Cultural Force (London, 1990), 161-77. �SLOVAKIA 2019 105 However, it certainly added one more element to the confusion reigning in Ruthenia and led to animosities which, in the end, turned against the Prague Government itself.45 Reverend Voloshyn bitterly remonstrated against the situation in Prague in 1929: The agitation usually began in the local tavern, where the agitator met the most notorious brawlers in the village. After a short talk, emboldened by 'noisy' arguments and vodka, the peasants would begin to shout abuse against the village pastor. In a matter of two or three days a ' committee' made up of the pastor's 'opponents ' would be formed. The committee did not immediately begin advocating Orthodoxy; instead, it showered the bishop with complaints and delegations, demanding that there be an investigation against the pastor or that he be removed outright. Then followed other forms of harassment, demonstrations, threats against the pastor, intimidation of church curators, and such . The committee would send the pastor letters demanding that he leave the vi llage. As time went on, the committee made increasingly bolder threats that the pastor get out ' or else!' .. .. If, despite such harassment, the priest remained in his parish, the threats escalated. Someone would break his windows, shoot into his windows, poison hi s well , set fire to his grain or stables, and in some cases even the parish house, assault and beat the priest, etc. The government remained indifferent to all this under the pretext of ' Freedom of conscience! Freedom ofreligion!' 46 This state of affairs could not permitted to go on indefinitely. Czechoslovakia was, after all, a republic governed by law. The Vatican made its own contribution to improved church-state relations by transferring Bishop Antonii Papp of Mukachevo to Hungary and replacing him with canon Petro Gebej on July 16, 1924. At the same time, in response to forthcoming parliamentary elections, President Masaryk cryptically declared that "the Catholics will get as many rights as they win." 47 Rusyn voters supported Czech Catho lic political parties which gained an increased measure of strength in parliament. The rights accorded to Greek Catholics by the constitution in 45 Frantisek Nemec and Vladimir Modry, Th e Soviet Seizure of Subcarpathian Ruthenia (Toronto, 1955), 38-9. 46 Avhustyn Voloshyn, " Relihijni vidnozny na Podkarpats ' kyi" in Acta Conventia Pragensis pro Studii Orentalibus n. 1919, (Olomouc, 1930), 218-9. 47 Pekar, 11 8. �106 SLOVAKIA 2019 any case were now enforced. Violence and vandalism were now prosecuted and soon ceased. In some instances church property was restored. Bishop Gebej led a religious revival which resulted in priests maintaining closer contact with their parishioners. A number of converts to Orthodoxy returned to the Greek Catholic faith. The Orthodox revival was one of the sources of survival for the Russophile orientation. Another source was, ironically, Hungarian funding . The fall of Bela Kun's communist regime in August of 1919 was followed by the restoration of the nobility in Hungary. Counterrevolutionary White terror now followed Red terror. Right wing elements who rallied under Admiral Miklos Horthy, soon elevated to the position of regent of Hungary, wanted to regain Slovakia and Podkarpatska Rus' but had to go about it covertly.48 The victorious Western powers would not recognize any government in Hungary which would not accept their peace tenns . On June 4, 1920, Hungary was compelled to sign the Treaty of Trianon, which ceded Slovakia and Podkarpatska Rus' to Czechoslovakia, Transylvania to Romania, and Croatia and the Voivodina to what became known as Yugoslavia. Trianon psychologically scarred Hungarian society for a full generation. France offered to soften the blow by extending to Hungary financial credits, particularly in the area of railway development, in exchange for compliance. Hungarian Prime Minister Istvan Bethlen cheerfully accepted the financial aid and outwardly complied with Trianon. Yet his government covertly subsidized elements in Slovakia and Podkarpatska Rus' who were disgruntled with Czechoslovak centrali sm. Having previously denied these peoples autonomy, the Hungarians now championed their right to selfdetern1ination as a first step toward regaining them. One of the recipients of Hungarian financial aid was Stefan Fentsik. Another was Andrei Brodii ( 1895-1946), a journalist, teacher and chairman of the Autonomous Agricultural Union/Autonomyi Zenled'skij Sojuz (AZS). Fentsik yielded leadership of the Russophile movement to Brodii during the 1930s. Ukrainophile historian Peter Stercho later maintained that Brodii, Fentsik and other select 48 As a precedent to future collaboration in this matter, Poland allowed itself to be used as a staging ground for Hungarian subversion of Czechos lovak administration . A "Magyar-S lovak League" was established in Krakow, and dispatched armed vo lunteers across the border into Slovakia. �SLOVAKIA 2019 107 Russophile leaders had to conceal their ties with Hungary from their followers, since even the latter were opposed to territorial revision. 49 Polish policy towards the Rusyns of Galicia followed a similar pattern. In the area directly north of the Dukla Pass lived people belonging to a branch of the Rusyns known as the Lemkos. They can be geographically divided by the San River. The Ukrainian movement penetrated the area east of the San early in the twentieth century and accounted for numerous followers. In November 1918 Lemkos from about 30 villages gathered in the village of Komancza (Komancha in Rusyn) to form their own little republic. This Komancha Republic was viewed as a transitional state, pending merger with a greater Ukraine. West of the San the Lemkos still adhered to the traditions of old Rus'. In autumn 1918 they wanted union with Russia. Since this was obviously never going to happen, the Polish government could afford to humor these Lemkos, The Poles were preoccupied with the West Ukrainian Republic which was proclaimed in Lviv on November 1, 1918, and event which plunged Galicia into an ethnic civil war. On December 5, some 500 Lemko Rusyns representing 130 vi1lages and towns of western Lemkovyna met in Florynka (in Grybow district) to form a government. While the Polish military crushed the Komancha Republic in January 1919, it tended to view the Florynka Lemko Rusyn Republic as a potential ally against the Ukrainians. Polish officials who were present offered the former town hall of Grybow as a political headquarters, while the Polish Army provided arms for a Lemko national guard. Schools and cooperatives were soon organized. Amazingly, the Lemko Rusyn Republic survived a full sixteen months. It was governed by an executive council headed by Reverend Mykhal Iurchakevych and a central national council headed by the lawyer Iaroslaw Kachmarchyk. The Poles were disappointed with the results. The Lemkos were happy to accept whatever aid the Polish government and military were willing to offer but nonetheless were unwilling to take up arms against their errant brethren to the east. Additionally, Kachmarchyk's government rejected the notion of union with a Bolshevik Russia, and began looking at the example of 49 Peter Stercho, Diplomacy of Double Morality: Europe's Crossroads in CarpathoUkraine /9/9-/939(NewYork , 1971), 171. �108 SLOVAKIA 2019 their brethren of the south side of the Carpathians. A union with Czechoslovakia now seemed a viable option. Unfortunately, in 1920 relations between Poland and Czechoslovakia were at a particularly low point, owing to border disputes concerning Tesin in Silesia and Orava-Spis in Slovakia. Before the end of March the Poles arrested Kachmarchyk and members of his government. They were tried on June 10, 1921. A Polish jury acquitted them, which was only reasonable insofar as the Poles had encouraged their activities in the first place. But the event marked the death knell of Lemko statehood. 50 Yet the Poles still had use for the Lernkos in the interwar period. The Greek Catholic Church was strongly identified with the Ukrainian national movement. The leadership of the Polish military, overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, encouraged the movement to convert the Lemkos to Orthodoxy, and thus express a Russian character at the expense of the Ukrainian .51 It was a classic case of Divide and Rule. Elsewhere, in Volhynia, adherents of the Ukrainian national movement were Orthodox. Here militant Polish nationalists attacked and vandalized Orthodox monasteries and schools. At the same time, for reasons of security, Poland wished to have a common border with Hungary. For this reason the Polish government supported Hungarian efforts to regain Podkarpatska Rus' . The events which accompanied the international crisis in 1938 are well-known. The present author shall limit himself to summarizing key particulars. The Munich "diktat" of September 1938 resulted in Czechoslovakia being forced to yield the Gennan populated Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. Deprived of her most vital border defenses, Czechoslovakia was now rendered militarily defenseless. Hostile neighbors, Poland and Hungary, were now encouraged to make their own territorial claims. Moreover, the Prague government could no longer resist demands for autonomy on the part of Slovakia and Podkarpatska Rus ' . 50 See Paul Robert Magocsi, "The Lemko Rusyn Republic ( 1918-1920) and Political Thought in Western Rus' -Ukraine" in Magocsi, Of the Making of Nationalities, 303315. 51 See Mykola Kucherpa, "The Nationality Policy of Poland towards Ukrainians before World War II" in Paul Berst and Jaroslav Mokolak, eds., Th e Lemko Region 1939-1947, War, Occupation and Deportation (New Haven and Krakow, 2002), 3949. �SLOVAKIA 2019 109 In the case of Podkarpatska Rus', a cabinet was formed on October 11 which consisted of both Russophiles and Ukrainophiles. Russophiles predominated, with Brodii as prime minister and Fentsik as deputy prime minister. Brodii was convinced that, if a plebiscite was held, the majority of Rusyns would vote for reunion with Hungary. Brodii 's ministry lasted only fifteen days. An alarmed central government summoned Brodii and Fentsik to Prague. There Brodii was arrested, while Fentsik found asylum in the Polish embassy. 52 Prague authorized Voloshyn, who was a member of the cabinet, to form a new government. Voloshyn proclaimed the province as an autonomous nation with the new name of Carpatho-Ukraine on November 3. The victory of the Ukrainophiles was at last complete. Autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine got off to a rough start. Hungary was prepared to re-annex the region, although conservative circles of the Hungarian government confined their claims to areas which were predominantly Magyar. Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy opted to appear in the role of peacemakers in this territorial dispute between Czechoslovakia and Hungary. They arbitrated a compromise settlement in Vienna on November 2, 1938. By terms of the First Vienna Award, Kosice, in southern Slovakia, and Uzhorod and Mukachevo, the two leading cities of Carpatho-Ukraine, were restored to Hungary. The government of Carpatho-Ukraine was forced to relocate to Khust, which was little more than an oversized village. Militant Hungarian nationalists regarded the First Vienna Award as a temporary expedient, and worked for the complete annexation of CarpathoUkraine. Under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense, a covert paramilitary group known as the "Ragged Guard" was organized to infiltrate Carpatho-Ukraine and conduct terrorist acts designed to destabilize the regime. Poland likewise dispatched paramilitary units for the same purpose. If the credible research of Ukrainophile historian Stercho is to be believed, the Polish paramilitary units outpaced their Hungarian counterparts in acts of terrorism. 53 Carpatho-Ukraine was in need of allies, and these were forthcoming. Militant Ukrainian nationalists from Poland crossed the mountains to organize the Riflemen of the Carpathian Sich. It has been argued by Russophile opponents that the Riflemen of the Car52 53 Magocs i, The Shaping of a National Identity, 238. Stercho, 302. �110 SLOVAKIA 2019 pathian Sich inaugurated the reign of "Ukrainian terror." It is true that they focu sed more on the Russophile domestic opposition than they did on Polish or Hungarian infiltrators. A detention camp was established for dissident Russophiles and Rusynophiles at Dumen . Yet conditions of internment were relaxed. Political differences extended to the family leve l, and prisoners under guard where permitted to attend social events in neighboring Rakhiv.54 There was a conflict of interest between the Carpathian Sich and the Voloshyn regime. Sich rifl emen viewed Carpatho-Ukraine as the cornerstore of a future greater Ukraine, and counted on the support of Nazi Germany. Voloshyn , by contrast, decided that adherence to Czecho-Slovakia (now officially spelled with a hyphen) was a necessary expedient. In March of 1939 there were clashes between the Carpathian Sich and the regular Czechoslovak military. This confl ict was abruptly terminated when German leader Adolf Hitler moved to eliminate what remained of Czecho-Slovakia . As he prepared to militarily occupy Prague, he disappointed Ukrainophi les by giving his consent for Hungary to annex the province. Under German pressure, Slovakia declared its independence on March 14. CarpathoUkraine was now cut off from the Czech lands. With Hungarian troops already crossing the border, Voloshyn symbo li cally proclaimed Carpatho-Ukraine's independence on March 15 . Carpatho-Ukraine existed as an independent state for all of a day . On the 16 th , Hungarian military units were fighting for Khust. The Riflemen of the Carpathian Sich resisted with admirab le resolve , but its units were scattered and no match for the Hungarian army. They later regrouped in the mountains or were pushed across the border to Eastern Slovakia, thus encouraging Hungary to invade the latter as well. 55 Hungarian troops reached the Polish border by the end of the I 61\ and were eagerly embraced by their opposite numbers. The region was renamed Subcarpathia and governed directly from Budapest. There was some vague talk in the Hungarian parliament about according autonomy to the most recently annexed portion , but not to Uzhorod or Mukachevo, which were now considered 54 Paul Robert Magocsi , "The Nationality Problem in Subcarpathian Rus ' I 9381939: A Reappraisal" in Magocsi , Of th e Making of Nationalities, 228 . 55 This invasion of Eastern Slovakia resulted in portions of the disputed counties likewise being annexed by Hungary. It also resulted in the Slovak Republic placing itself under the military protection of Nazi Germany. �SLOVAKIA 2019 111 directly part of Hungary. Autonomy was del ayed indefinitely. As World War II progressed, the Hungarian military vehemently opposed autonomy for security reaso ns . The Ukrainophiles were particularly singled out for political persecution, while the Russophiles were more or less set aside. Interestingly, the Hungarian government began cultivating the idea that the Rusyns were their own separate nationality, an idea which ultimately became the wave of the future. 56 The resto ration of Hungarian rule dis illusioned the Russophil es. It stood to reason that, once Hungary went down to defeat with Nazi Germany, Andrei Brodii would come to a bad end . He did not attempt to flee when Soviet forces reached the area in the autumn of 1944, but attempted to negotiate with them. He was arrested by the Soviet counterintelligence unit SMERSH, charged as a fascist co ll aborator, and executed on November 7, 1946. A similar fate awa ited Stefan Fentsik: he was shot in the courtyard of the Uzhorod prison on March 30, 1946. Their Ukrainophile rival Voloshyn fared no better. Having taken up res idence in Prague during the war years, he taught at the Ukrainian Free University. In June 1945 he was arrested by SMERSH and transported to Moscow. He died in Lefortovo prison on July 19, undoubtedl y murdered. An ironic footnote of hi story is worth mentioning. Both Brodii and Fentsik were posthumously rehabilitated after the breakup of the Soviet Union. No such rehabilitation has been granted to Voloshyn. World War II and Ukrainiazation If the Russophiles in Podkarpatska Rus' were fatally compromised by collaboration with the Hungarians, then in Eastern Slovakia they earned acclamation for their role in an anti-fascist struggle. A leading force in the resistance to the pro-German regime of president-priest Jozef Ti so was the Slovak Communist Party. George Kennan , at that time charge d 'affa ires to the U.S. embassy in Prague, assessed the pro-communist sentiment in Eastern Slovakia as being a "bird of a different color [which] in former circumstances would have little chance of success." He added, however, that owing to 56 Magocs i, The Shaping of a National Identity, 248-9 . �112 SLOVAKIA 2019 guidance from Moscow, the Communists could become the most formidable resistance group of all. 57 Kennan's prognosis was largely accurate, though certain qualifying feature s must be noted. The Communists did not have a monopoly on the resistance movement. In prewar Czechoslovakia they were strongest in Podkarpatska Rus ', but in Eastern Slovakia they were never ab le to muster more than seven percent of the vote among the Ru syns in the interwar period. Not wishing to be isolated from other Rusyns in organized resistance to the Tiso regime, local Communi sts opted to join the Carpatho-Russian Council for National Liberation (KRASNO), which shall be introduced shortly. The view of the autonomous and later independent Slovak state on the Rusyns was that the latter were "S lovaks of the Greek Catholic faith ." This view was exemp li fied by Andrej Dudas, who in 1940 was appointed regional administrator of Eastern Slovakia. He was convinced that the idea of a Rusyn nationality was created by the Hungarians, a position he maintained a full three decades later as an emigre in Argentina.58 In early 1939, the Rusyn Nationa l Committee and the Carpatho-Russian Nationa l Counci l were banned by the Slovak government, and the activity of the Dukhnovych Society was restricted. The Ukrainian movement among the Rusyns was particularly loathed by the Slovak nationalist leadership. Slovak police reports up until November 1938 indicate that Rusyns in the Presov Region supported union with their brethren east of the Uz Ri ver. Yet, in November, the same police reports indicate a significant change. The Ukrainian movement was even more alien to the Presov Region Rusyns than was Slovak nationalism, and they were henceforth opposed to a revision of borders which was favorable to CarpathoUkraine. 59 Rusyns shared in the economic prosperity of the Slovak Republic which characterized the first half of World War II. Workers in Germany sent money home to their families, whi le locally a number 57 Report written about May I, 1939 on conditions in Slovakia in George Ken nan, From Prague After Munich. Diplomatic Papers 1938-1 940 (Princeton, 1968), 139140. 58 Andrej Dudas, Rusinska otazka ajej uzadie (B uenos Aires, 1971), 25 . 59 See the entry " Carpatho-Russian Autonomous Counci l for National Liberation/Karpatorusskii avtonomyi sovet natsional'nmyi osvonodenyi (KRASNO)" in Magocsi and Pop, eds ., Encyclopedia of Rusy n Histo1y and Culture, 58. �SLOVAKIA 2019 113 of Rusyns profited from the expropriation of Jewish property. Yet once it became obvious that the Slovak Republic was on the losing side of the war, a number of Rusyns began to organize, The Carpatho-Russian Autonomous Council for National Liberation (Karpatorusskii avtonomyi sovet national'nogo obsvobzhdenii-KRASNO) was founded in Presov in September 1943. Its goals were to aid escaped Soviet prisoners of war and partisans and to cooperate with other underground elements opposed to what it considered a clericofascist regime. Its members envisioned a restored Czechoslovakia in which Rusyns would be equal partners with Czechs and Slovaks. Although its orientation was pro-Soviet and decidedly leftist, KRASNO was not a communist front organization. It was founded by civic and cultural leaders of varied political orientation. Vasyl' Karaman ( 1903-1961) was born in the village of Nagov, in Slovakia. After completing his education at the Commercial Academy in Mukachevo (1924-1927), be returned to eastern Slovakia, where he worked as a civil servant in Presov from 1927 to 1933 , and then served in various towns as secretary for the pro-government Agrarian Republican Party. When Czecho-Slovakia was being partitioned in the fall of 1938, he opposed the pro-Ukrainian orientation of the Voloshyn government. He was elected as chairman of a newly re-established Central Russian National Council. Its members included both Russophiles and Rusynophiles who wished to retain ties with what remained of Czecho-Slovakia, unlike the followers of Brodii and Fentsik. Unable to realize his objectives, he returned to the Presov Region. Here he joined a Committee of Rusyns which tried to reach an accommodation with the Slovak government. This was not possible, since Slovak nationalist officials distrusted his Russophile orientation. After Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June of 1941, Karaman was arrested. He spent a year and a half in jail, and after his release made contact with the Zhydovs'kyi brothers, Ivan and Petro. Together the three men were among the founders of KRASNO. 60 Ivan Zhydovs'kyi (1897-1982) was born in the village of Sarisske Jastrabie. His secondary school education at the Piarist gymnasium in Sabinov was interrupted in 1915, when he was drafted 60 See the entry " Karaman, Vasyl"' in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 228. �114 SLOVAKIA 2019 into the Austro-Hungarian Army. A year later he was captured on the Eastern Front. Like many prisoners of War, he embraced the Bolshevik cause during the Russian Revolution. During the Russian Civil War Zhydovs ' kyi served as a political commissar in the 216 th International Communist Brigade. When he returned home, he discontinued the role of agitator and became at least outwardly conformist. He completed his secondary education in 1919, and then studied law at the Comenius University in Bratislava, obtaining a degree in 1924. He worked for a time as a tax inspector in Uzhorod. By the I 930s he had a law practice in Uzhorod and he was director of the Presov branch of the Uzhorod-based Subcarpathia Bank. As a Russophile, Zhydovs ' kyi was prominent in the Central Russian National Council and in the Dukhnovych Society. Although opposed to the separatist Slovak government, he kept a lower profile then Kamman and was never arrested. He operated a law practice in Giraltovce prior to his invol ve ment with KRASNO .61 His older brother Petro Zhydovs'kyi (1890-1947) was likewise born in Sarisske Jastrabie. As a teenager Petro emigrated to America in 1905 . Although he acquired little formal education, he returned home on the eve of World War I detern1ined to work for the advancement of the Rusyn people. Drafted into the Austro-Hungarian Army, he deserted, then was captured and sentenced to prison. After the establishment of Czechoslovakia, he joined the Agrarian Republican Party and served as deputy to parliament from 1935 to 1938 . During the crisis of 1938 Zhydovs'kyi joined with Ivan P' ieshchak in submitting a memorandum to the British envoy Lord Runciman, calling for the unification of the Presov Region with an autonomous Podkarpatska Rus' .62 Ivan P' ieshchak ( 1904-1972) was born in the village of Vel'ky Lipnik. After graduating from the gymnasium of Mukachevo and the Presov Greek Catholic Teachers' Co llege, he taught in the regional elementary school s. P ' ieshchak was active in the Union of Rusyn Teachers in Slovakia and helped organize the Union of Rusyn Youth in Slovakia (1933). At the same time he studied law, and attained a 61 See the entry "Zhydovs'kyi, Ivan" in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 55 l. 62 See the entry "Zhydovs' kyi , Petro" in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 551-2. �SLOVA.KIA 2019 115 doctoral degree from Charles University in Prague in the same year. By the mid 1930s P 'ieshchak was a prominent figure on the Rusyn political and cultural scene. He joined Andrei Brodii's Autonomous Agricultural Union and served as its representative in parliament. Interestingly, at this time he also worked closely with Andrej Hlinka's Slovak People's Party in the parliament's autonomist bloc . When Podkarpatska Rus' attained autonomy, P'ieshchak served as state secretary in Brodii 's brief-lived cabinet. After Brodii 's demise, he returned to Slovakia, where he maintained a law practice prior to his involvement with KRASNO .63 KRASNO rapidly expanded its network. By the summer of 1944 it controlled 3 7 villages in a sort of "partisan republic" between Medzilaborce and Stropkov. Intensification of partisan activityreinforced by Soviet partisans parachuted across the Carpathiansled to German military intervention in Slovakia at the end of August 1944. The clandestine military center of dissident Slovak Army officers , headquartered in Banska Bystrica, was already in touch with the Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile in London. Its members had to proclaim the Slovak Nationa l Uprising under premature circumstances on August 29. 64 The Slovak National Uprising was a highly complex affair, which goes well beyond the limits of this study. It is sufficient to note here that it was dependent upon Soviet military support. Contrary to allegations by later critics, the Soviets did not deliberately betray the uprising. Their military capacity to cross the Carpathians was severely limited, particularly after the Germans occupied the Dukla pass. Yet the Soviets did not wish to forfeit the political influence they expected to enjoy in postwar Czechoslovakia, and rendered military assistance. In this capacity the Russian military 63 See the entry "P'ieshchak, Ivan" in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 384-5 . 64 Slovak soldiers, under the influence of Captain Piotr Alekseyevitch Velitchko intercepted members of a German military mission passing through Slovakia in the vicinity of Turciansky Sviity Martin. The Slovak soldiers escorted the Germans to the local barracks. It was Velitchko 's intention that the Germans would be disarmed there and that they would be sent to Ukrainian Partisan Headquarters in Kiev. But when the Germans attempted to depart, they were massacred by the Slovaks. Berlin then decided on a complete military occupation of Slovakia. At this point Lieutenant-Colonel Golian in Banska Bystrica issued the order to start the uprising. �116 SLOVAK.IA 2019 crossed through the Dukla pass for a third time in a military campaign that has been immortalized by local historiography. The Carpatho-Dukla operation, initiated on September 8, was undertaken by the 38 1h Soviet Army, led by General Kyril Moskalenko, supported by the 1s i Czechoslovak Army Corps, led by General Ludvik Svoboda. Many of the troops of the Is 1 Army Corps were Rusyns. In the autumn of 1939, as a result of the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, the Soviets had annexed eastern Galicia and merged it with the Ukrainian S.S.R. An estimated 30,000 Rusyns who were disgruntled with Hungarian rule crossed the mountains into eastern Galicia, expecting to be cordially received by their Slavic brethren. Instead, every single one of them was arrested by the NKVD (Soviet State Security) and received an eight to ten year sentence for the illegal border crossing. A full sixty percent of them perished in the Gulag by the time Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June of 1941. The survivors were released to join the I s i Czechoslovak Army Corps . Any Pan-Slav feeling- Russophile or Ukrainophi le alikewhich the Rusyn s may have had earlier had been beaten out of them in the Gulag. They merely wished to return home. In the autumn of 1944 it appeared that they would be the vanguard in the liberation of their homeland. Instead, they were committed to the meat-grinder of the Dukla Pass, where their casualties exceeded sixty percent. 65 The storming of the Duk la Pass was finally completed on October 6th. In the fighting which followed, the monastery community of Ladomirova was severely damaged. Most of the buildings, including the print shop but not the church, were destroyed. Now, too , the NKVD began rounding up Russian emigres in Slovakia. The monks fled to Bratislava, and from there fourteen of them emigrated to the United States. They entered the recently established Holy Trinity Monastery in Jordanville, in upstate New York, where Archbishop Maksimenko now served as archimandrite. They built a church that was a replica of its predecessor in Ladomirova. A young Rusyn novitiate from the village, Vasyl' Shkurla (born 1928), ultimately became Archbishop Lavrl' , one of the leading figures of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad. By the 1980s Holy Trinity had become a major 65 See Vladimir Baumgarten, "Fifty Years Later: An Inquiry into Soviet Military Policy During the Slovak Uprising" in Lewis White, ed., On All Fronts: Czechoslovaks During World War ff Part 2 (Washington , 1995), 2 19-28. �SLOVAKIA 2019 117 cultural center for Russian emigres. When the cello virtuoso Mstislav Rostropovich defected to the United States, he chose to settle in Jordanville in order to be near Holy Trinity. 66 The Germans torched large areas in eastern Slovakia as they were forced to retreat, including the town of Svidnik. General Svoboda was nonetheless hailed as a hero and liberator when he entered it on October 28 .67 After the liberation of Svidnik, the Allies temporarily went on the defensive. KRASNO partisans continued fighting in the hills north of Presov. In October their adherents welcomed a declaration by the Slovak National Council that a resurrected Czechoslovakia would consist of three equal nations- Czechs, Slovaks and Rusyns. It must be understood that Rusyns did not fight in partisan units exclusively of their own nationality. Jozef Rodak, longtime director of the East Slovak Military Museum in Svidnik, asserted that most partisan groups in the region had a mixed composition of Slovaks and Rusyns.68 To this day many people in eastern Slovakia have a dual sense of identity : they consider themselves Rusyns by heritage and Slovaks by citizenship. The realities of liberation at the end of World War II disappointed the aspirations of many Rusyns, particularly Russophiles. It undoubtedly di sconcerted them to discover that Moscow now considered them to be Ukrainians. There was already a precedent for thi s aspect of Soviet policy . In 1923 the delegation of Rusyn Communists attended a Party Congress in Soviet Ukraine and declared their acceptance of Ukrainian nationality. It was altogether practical for Soviet authorities to reaffirm acceptance of this principle at the end of 66 See the entry " Ladomirova Monastery" in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 266. 67 General Svoboda was designated as an honorary citizen of Svidnik. As president of Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring of 1968, Svoboda gave the town its first hospital. In I 979, the year of the old man's death, a statue of him was erected in Svidnik. Owing to the damage of autumn 1944, Svidnik is a modem town . Most of the buildings are constructed in the so-called "social realist" style. Svoboda ' s statue looks strangely at home among the imposing, unattractive concrete structures. 68 As a graduate student of Safarik University in Prefov who specialized in the history of his region during World War 11 , Rodak was frequently delegated to carry the briefcases of Soviet military visitors. He remained outwardly conformist throughout the Soviet era. After the 1989 revolution and the coll apse of the communist system, Rodak wrote a series of articles for newspapers in eastern Slovakia and southeas tern Poland in which he exonerated partisans who had fallen into disfa vor. �118 SLOVAKIA 2019 World War II. Throughout the war, the Soviets had pledged themselves to the recognition of Czechoslovakia' prewar frontiers . Yet now Moscow infom1ed the Czechoslovak government that it could not ignore "the will of the people." In the wake of the Red Army's occupation of Podkarpatska Rus ' , various National Committees were established to vote in favor of the province being merged with the Ukrainian S.S.R. In all fairness to these communities, they overall enjoyed popular support. 69 The region was officially ceded at the end of June, 1945. Across the Uz River, in the Presov Region , the Russophile leaders of the defunct KRASNO drew the politically correct conclusion. Now, they too, considered themselves Ukrainian. They reorganized themselves as the Ukrainian National Council of the Presov Region. They envisioned that the long disputed counties of eastern Slovakia would be included in the territorial transfer. Indeed, even before the war ended, Vasyl' Karaman and the Zhysov ' skyi brothers planned to stage a meeting in Presov in February 1945 calling for the merger. A Soviet military major explained to them that such a meeting would be inopportune. The war was still on, and the Soviet Union intended to honor its obligations to Czechoslovakia.70 With eastern Slovakia excluded from the territorial settlement, the Ukrainian National Council of the Presov Region now called for the resurrected Czechoslovakia to consist of three equal nations: Czechs, Slovaks and Ukrainians. The Slovak National Council had already expressed itself in favor of autonomy for the Rusyns. Now, in light of Ukrainian irredentism, it declared its Ukrainian counter• 1·d 11 part as mva 1 . Even after the Rusyns were officially classified as Ukrainian, the Russophile tradition not only persisted but predominated in the Presov Region . It must be noted that the Soviet 3gth Army was composed of elite Guards regiments, the cream of the Soviet military. Its soldiers conducted themselves in a correct and disciplined manner in 69 Yaroslav Pylynsky, Rising Ethnic Self-Awareness. Carpatho-Rusyns- Birth of a New Nation or a Political Game? (Copenhagen, 1998), 20. 70 Memorandum on the Ukrainian movement in Eastern Slovakia. Kosice. February 16, 1945 , in Nemec and Modry, Th e Soviet Seizure of Ruthenia, Document no.77 , 359-60 71 Magocsi , "National Assimilation: The Case of the Rusyn-Ukrainians of Czechoslovakia" in Of the Making of Nationalities, 262 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 119 their interactions with the locals after forcing their way through the Dukla Pass. This was in striking contrast with the soldiers of the 4 th Ukrainian Front, who penetrated Slovakia from the south, and who engaged in rape and widespread looting. This author can personally attest to the fact that citizens of the Svidnik area remember the Russians fondly as having assisted them through a bitter winter, and afterwards helped the locals plant their spring crops. Historian Mykola Musynka, himself a Ukrainophi le, summarizes the local attitudes as follows: The culmination of Russophilism in the cultural life of the Rusyns of the Prefo v Region occurred in the years just after World War II, when due to the Red Army's defeat of German fascism, th e Soviet Union enjoyed considerable authority among Rusyn-Ukrainians as well as Czechs and Slovaks. Everything "Soviet" was perceived as "Russian." Political propaganda attempted to portray the Soviet Union as an ideal country in which all peoples were united around the "Great Russian people. " The Russian language, Russian culture, the Russian individual, and the "Russian Soul " all symbolized the acme ofp e,:fection. 72 Russian Elementary and secondary schools proliferated after World War II, in addition to the Russian gymnasium in Presov, an additional Russian gymnasium was established in Medzilaborce on February 23, 1945, and trade schoo ls were opened in which Russian was the language of instruction. According to official statistics for the 1948-49 school year, there were 43 kindergartens, 276 elementary schools, 38 incomplete and 6 complete secondary schools with instruction in the Russian language, totaling 23, 11 2 pupils.73 After the Ukrainian National Council of the Presov Region was abolished, it was replaced by a new organization, the cultural Union of Ukrainian Workers (Kul'tumy sojuz'ukrajans'kyi trudjascychKSUT), which was staunchly supportive of the Communist Party. KSUT initiated numerous publications in the Ukrainian language. 72 Mykola Musynka, "The Postwar Development of the Regional Culture of the Rusyn-Ukrainians of Czechoslovakia' in Paul Robert Magocsi, ed., The Persistence of Regional Cultures: Rusyns and Ukrainians in the Carpathian Hom eland and Abroad (New York, 1993), 55. 73 Ibid, 56. �120 SLOVAKIA 2019 Beginning on June 28, 1952, by decree of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia, the language of instruction in all Russian elementary and secondary schools of Eastern Slovakia was changed to Ukrainian . The change in the school system was torturous for all parties. It was implemented too quickly. Instructors who had never studied literary Ukrainian were assigned to take month-long courses, after which they were expected to teach in that language. The vast majority of teachers detested it. There was a shortage of textbooks, dictionaries and other printed materials. Ukrainiazation nonetheless made significant strides in popular culture . In January 1953 , KSUT sponsored the first professional song and dance ensemble in Medzilaborce under the artistic direction of Jurij Kostjik. It was eventually reorganized as the Dukla Ukrainian Folk Ensemble. In September of that year, a Department of Ukrainian Language and Literature was established at the Presov Pedagogical Institute, which in 1959 became the Philosophical Faculty of Safarik University, under the direction of Petro Bungansyn. Literary works by Rusyns in the Presov Region reached an unprecedented level of publication in the course of a decade in the Ukrainian language. After 1959, the Ukrainian division of the Slovak Pedagogical Publishing House had a monopoly on the release of Ukrainian books in the Presov Region. During a thirty-year period it published 373 literary and scholarly works. Not all of them withstood the test of time. Many employed the so-called "socialist realist" style, reflecting a Marxist-Leninist ideological bent which conformed to Party dogma. Yet the Presov Region has produced works which have assumed a permanent place in the history of literature. 74 A number of former Russophiles moved with the times and adopted Ukrainian literary norms. Those Russophiles who remained outside the Communist Party could not expect a triumphal finish . Such was the case of Vasyl' Karaman, who, after the abolition of the body he had chaired, was accused of being a "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist." The allegation was blatantly absurd: Karaman steadfactly believed that the future of the Rusyns was closely bound to the Soviet Union . He was nonetheless removed from political and cultural life in the Presov Region. Similarily, Ivan P'ieshchak was ac74 Ibid, 65 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 121 cused of bourgeois nationalism, driven from his home in 1952, and forbidden to practice law for nearly a decade. Ironically, some of the greatest beneficiaries of the new socialist order were those Rusyns of the 1st Czechoslovak Anny Corps who had survived the ordeal of the Dukla Pass. In spite of their suffering in the Gulag, they had fought bravely and well under General Svoboda, in fact becoming his favorite soldiers. 75 The treaty transferring Podkarpatska Rus ' to Soviet Ukraine contained a certain "exemption" clause. Those Rusyns with a record of service in the Czechoslovak Army could retain Czechoslovak citizenship. About half of them chose to do so, relocating west of the Uz. Svoboda redressed the balance for them as much as humanly possible, obtaining jobs for them in the military and especially in the security services. One might suppose that, after their experience in the Gulag, they would have been averse to serving as agents of repression. Instead, thanks to Svoboda' s generous patronage, they became overrepresented in the secret police, not only in eastern Slovakia but in Prague and Bratislava as well. This role fueled the hostility of their fellow citizens. Animosities smoldered beneath the surface for a full generation. During the Prague spring of 1968, the Slovak press suddenly became articulate in its denunciations: " ... this 15 year anti-Slovak movement in eastern ... Slovakia must be liquidated." 76 Slovak nationalists in particular resented the fact that the city of Presov served as a bastion of Ukrainophile activity. Slogans appeared on a number of buildings: "Presov was and will be only- and only- a Slovak city" and "Ukrainians, get out of Presov! " 77 The Slovak element of eastern Slovakia was not the only one which opposed the Ukrainian movement. Passive opposition was expressed by many Rusyns themselves . If they could not be themselves, the Rusyns opted for the closest thing, and voluntarily assimilated into the Slovak nationality. 78 The local dialect spoken was not foreign to them, unlike that of the Ukrainian textbooks imported from Kiev. Whenever local citizens were questioned by the police, they declared themselves as Slo75 Magocsi, "Magyars and Carpatho-Rusyns in Czechoslovakia" in Of the Making of Nationalities, 175. 76 Cited in Kulturny zivot (Bratislava) April 15, 1968 and Vychod (Kosice) November 29, 1968. 77 Magocsi, "National Assimilation", 283. 78 fbid, 264-70. �122 SLOVAKIA 2019 vak, fearing deportation to the Soviet Union. Finally, the relatively more advanced Slovak economy drew many to the industrial valleys farther south, where the process was completed. For those Rusyns who continued to consider themselves Ukrainian , yet another shock awaited in the following generation. After the 1989 revolutions and the collapse of communism in East Central Europe, first the Slovak and then the Polish government recognized the Carpatho-Rusyns as a distinct nationality. Many young Rusyns eagerly embraced the new orientation. 79 Conclusion. Unrepentant Russophiles: Yurkovsky, Kabuliak, Sidor and Karabelesh The demise of the Russophile orientation among the CarpathoRusyn people was undoubtedly, to employ a Marxist cliche, historically inevitable. An interesting story revealing the pathetic depths to which it had descended by World War II is provided by Marian Zgomiak, later a professor at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow , Poland. At the outbreak of World War II, Zgomiak was a 15 year-old Polish youth. When Poland was militarily crushed by Nazi Germany in September of 1939, Poli sh Army veterans hoped to escape to the West to fight again. Since most of the Polish soldiers fleeing abroad were between the ages of 17 and 30, two groups of people played disproportionately large roles in the domestic resistance movement organized by the Polish Home Army (Armija Krajowa- AK). One of them was Polish teenagers, who acted as couriers escorting the fugitive s to the border with Slovakia. Another was the Lemkos, who acted as guides. 79 The rejection of Ukrainian identity is by no means unanimous. On November 17, 1990, at the First Congress of the Ru syn Renaissance Society in Medzilaborce, spokesman Mychal Turok-Heter stressed that "while it is vital to preserve national pride, it is wrong to attack the Ukrai nians and the Ukrainian language . Gradually, the Ru syns will write and advance toward the common path which will lead them to fulfilling thei r mi ssive of peace for us all." See Myslenka, 75. Frequently, on the local level , there ex ists a certa in pluralism. In Svidnik, the Museu m of UkrainianRus'Culture acknowledges kinship with the former while stressing the regional identity of the latter. See the entry " Museum of Ukrainian Rus' Culture in Svidnik" in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusy n Histo1y and Cu lture, 337. �SLOVAK.IA 2019 123 Young Zgorniak was active in these border expeditions. On July 2, 1942, he and his father were arrested by the Gestapo. After the usual beatings and interrogation in the basement of the Gestapo headquarters in Gorlice, Zgorniak was transferred to the prison in Jaslo. Here he bonded with a Lemko prisoner named Yurkovsky. This Yurkovsky was an unrepentant Russophile. During World War I he and his father were hauled off to internment in Talerhof. Yurkovsky senior died there during the typhus epidemic. Yurkovsky junior returned to the mountain districts of Lemkovyna to serve as a teacher in the interwar years. He did not consider himself a Rusyn or even a Lemko, but a Russian. He was not receptive to Polish efforts to sponsor a separate Lemko identity. After the invasion of the Soviet Union in June of I 941 , the Nazi Government General (to which Lemkos west of the San River where subject) rounded up Lemkos known for their pro-Russian sentiments. In this manner Yurkovsky found himself in the prison of Jaslo. Both the quality and quantity of food in the prison of Jaslo left much to be desired. In September of 1942 German authorities loosened the regime to the point where Lemkos (but not Poles) could receive food packages. Arrangements were made for Zgomiak's mother to send food to Yurkovsky, who shared it with her son. Working together in the hospital section of the prison, they had the opportunity to engage in intellectual discussions. Zgorniak records the following: During one of the discussions I asked whether or how he could coordinate the Carpatho-Rusyn orientation on the Russia ruled by the Tsar with an orientation on a Russia ruled by the Bolsheviks who had overthrown and murdered the Tsar and his family. He said he could do so because "after the death a/father in Talerhof I had the dream . In it my father appeared and said 'the cause for which both are fighting shall be successful! ' That dream I keep in mind and I believe it will prove to be true. "80 80 Marian Zgomiak, " Meeting with Lemko leaders who had been arrested by the Gestapo and who were in prison in Jaslo 1942" in Best and Moklak, eds ., The Lemko Region, /939-194 7, 129. �124 SLOVAKIA 2019 Zgomiak asserts that he was convinced Yurkovsky and other Lemkos could have been released had they declared themselves Ukrainians. They declined to do so. Eventually, Yurkovsky was transferred to a concentration camp in Pruszkow, from which he was liberated before the end of the war. Yurkovsky then became sold on the plan jointly agreed upon by the Polish and Soviet governments to encourage Lemkos to emigrate to the east. Those whose villages had been destroyed during the Carpatho-Dukla operation went willingly. Others followed Yurkovsky across the border. They were by no means satisfied with living conditions in Soviet Ukraine, and turned on Yurkovsky for encouraging them to leave in the first place. He suffered something akin to a nervous breakdown and developed heart disease. Zgomiak concluded: "I remember him as an intelligent fellow who despite hi s various interests was fatally attracted to the idea for which he fought." 81 In light of its ignominious end in the realm of politics, what remains of the Russophile tradition among the Carpatho-Rusyns in the realm of culture? Here the author wishes to turn to the areas of religion and literature. In the area of reli gion, the Orthodox faith has provided a certain legacy. It must be understood that the majority of Rusyns professing any religious belief adhere to the Greek Catholic rather than the Orthodox Church . Yet the Orthodox revival of the early twentieth century made an enduring impact which was embraced by the communist regimes after World War II. Its most enthusiastic protagonist was Aleksander Kabuliak. At the end of World War I he was released from prison and became a major figure of the Orthodox revival in Czechoslovakia. There was a sc hi sm within the Orthodox Church in the 1920s. Its adherents were subject to the Serbian patriarchate, whereas Czech converts to Orthodoxy wanted their own autocephalous Orthodox Church. They appealed to the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople. On March 4, 1923 he consecrated the archimandrite Savritij as bishop. Bi shop Savritij 's leadership was contested by Bishop Gorazd, the Serbian patriarch 's representative. Kabuliak sided with the Serbian patriarchate in this di spute. With the Orthodox Church temporarily paralyzed and depri ved of an acting bishop, Kabuliak assumed the role of administrator. The Hungar81 Ibid, 129. �SLOVAKIA 2019 125 ians did not molest him during World War II, nor did he do anything to provoke them. But on November 18, 1944, on behalf of the Orthodox believers of Podkarpatska Rus ', Kabuliak wrote a letter to no less a personage than Soviet leader J. V. Stalin. He recommended the establishment of a Carpatho-Russian Soviet Republic encompassing territory extending "from Iasnyia to Poprad and from Uzhok Pass to Debrecen." 82 Since Moscow was already planning to incorporate Podkarpatska Rus' into the Ukrainian S.S.R., this was not an option. Yet in the following month Kabuliak led a delegation to Moscow requesting the transfer of episcopal jurisdiction from the Serbian to the Moscow patriarchate. Here his efforts were crowned with success. In posthumous recognition of his achievement, in 200 I the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow patriarchate) canonized Kabuliak as the first Carpatho-Rusyn saint. Eastern Galicia, like Podkarpatska Rus ', was ceded to Soviet Ukraine at the end of the war. In both areas incoming communist regimes declared the Greek Catholic Church abolished and transferred its parishes to the jurisdiction of the Orthodox Church. In Galicia most of the clergy accepted the formal change and retained their old parishes. The Ukrainian character of the church consequently survived . In Transcarpathia the Greek Catholic clergy was more resistant to Orthodoxy and it was imposed more forcefully. Bishop Teodor Romza of Mukachevo was brutally murdered, while lesser clergymen were arrested and deported.83 They were replaced by Russian priests di spatched from Moscow. The Orthodox Church here acquired an expressively Russian character. From the standpoint of Rusyn culture, inclusion into the Russian Orthodox Church was a double-edged sword. In America, Reverend Alexis Toth had sought to convince his flock that the best way to preserve their rite, tradition and identity was through conversion to Orthodoxy. Yet St. Alexis (He too was canonized) had a great love for the variety of liturgical music known as Carpathian plainchant. 82 See the entry "Kabuliak, Aleksander" in Magocsi and Pop, eds. , Encyclopedia of Rusyn Hist01:y and Culture, 223 . 83 Pekar, 151 -4. �126 SLOVAK.IA 2019 This and another native aspects of worship were submerged by Russian liturgical tradition .84 In Czechoslovakia the legal status of the Greek Catholic Church was restored as a result of the liberal reforms of the Prague spring of 1968. Yet it lost its Rusyn character and became a force for slovakization. Much church property has been restored since the collapse of the communist system in 1989. Yet there remain adherents of the Orthodox faith in northeastern Slovakia. This author has an endearing memory of a visit to an Orthodox church in Svidnik. It was a modest, prefabricated structure, erected in the L990s. The morning was cold. There was only room inside the church for elderly parishioners. Yet a sizable crowd of young people remained standing outside. They displayed enough reverence to refrain from smoking throughout the Divine Liturgy. If the Rusyns can no longer be considered Great Russians, then the Russian government, and especially the Orthodox Church, wishes to retain whatever bonds still exist. While seminarians of the autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church have received their education in Ukraine, those who adhere to the Moscow patriarchate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church have been educated in Russia. Such was the case of Dmitri Sidor, born March 29, 1955, currently rector of the Church of the Exaltation of the Cross in Uzhorod. Reverend Sidor heads a movement demanding autonomy for Rusyns of Ukraine. He stresses the religious character of his people, and the similarity of their language with Old Church Slavonic. On December 19, 2008 , the Rusyn issue was raised at an international conference held on the Don, southern Russia. The conference was entitled "Genocide and Cultural Ethnocide of the Rusyns of Carpathian Rus' [from the end of the nineteenth to the beginning of the twenty first century]." A resolution was adopted. It stated that, alongside the Armenians, the Rusyns were the first victims of genocide in the twentieth century, thi s in reference to the policy of the Austro-Hungarian military during the First World War. Today, the resolution continued, Kiev engaged in a "policy of cultural ethno- 84 Paul Robert Magocsi, "Adaptati on Wi thout Assimilati on: The Genius of the Greek Catholic Church of Mukachevo" in Of the Making of Nationalities, Volume 11 , 202. �SLOVAKIA 2019 127 cide." It pointed out that the Rusyns were recognized as a distinct nationality by numerous countries, but not Ukraine. 85 The Ukrainophile orientation responded to the Rostov conference. One articulate response may be found in the working paper "Political and Ethno-Cultural Aspects of the Rusyns' Problem: A Ukrainian Perspective," by Natalya Belitzer of the Py lip Orlyk Institute for Democracy in Kiev. She outlines the tortutous, complex evolution of the history of a region which has been subject to numerous rulers. She echoes her colleague M. Lanchuk in asserting that the main issue at stake has not been the ethno-cultural identity of the Rusyns but rather what has been termed "political Ruthenianism," which many Ukrainians perceive as a threat. 86 According to Belitzer, the disintegration of the Soviet Union was accompanied by an artificial politicization of the Rusyn question. Belitzer is not opposed to Ru syn autonomy in principle. Yet, as a Ukrainophile, she considers the Rusyn tongue as a mere dialect of the Ukrainian language. Belitzer makes a particularly revealing admission when she states that "Ukrainian democracy is ... quite benevolent to the ideas and practices of the restoration of minorities ' own identity, but at the same time strongly denies Rusyn identity as being separate from the Ukrainian.,,s1 Therein lies the rub. If the Rusyn tongue is a dialect of the Ukrainian language, why is its use not permitted in schools? Rusyn schoolchildren speak one way at home but are required to speak another way at school. Such practices are grist to Dmitri Sidor's mill. Aside from the fact that Ukraine has an army and the Rusyns do not, Father Dmitri's movement faces two serious obstacles. For one, he is an Orthodox priest, whereas the majority of Rusyns still profess (or have resumed professing) the Greek Catholic faith. Secondly, while a majority of the Rusyns in the Presov Region and Lemkovyna 85 Resolution of the International conference "Genocide and Cultural Ethnocide of Ru syns in Carpathian Rus' [from the end of the nineteenth to the beginning of the twenty first century] Rostov on the Don, Russia. December 2 1, 2008 www.podkar~atskarus.eu 6 M. Panchuk, " Political Rutheni ani sm" in Demons of Peace and Messengers of War(Kiev, 1997), 323. 87 Natalya Belitzer, "Political and Ethno-Cultural Aspects of the Rusyns' Problem : A Ukrainian Perspective". Research paper prepared within the framework of the Programme on European Security (PROGRES) sponsored by the Center for European Security Studies and the University of Gronigen (Netherlands). Undated, 12. �128 SLOVAKIA 2019 consider themselves their own nationality, a majority of them in Transcarpathia consider themselves Ukrainian. Yet the movement has a growing popular appeal. In a state where bureaucratic centralism has had a constipating effect, autonomy can be a powerful laxative. Moreover, the Rusyns now possess a certain bargaining chip . A full eighty percent of all Russian petroleum and natural gas which is sold to Europe passes through pipelines in the area of Uzhorod. If the Rusyns were to succeed in establishing an independent state, they would be eligible to receive billions of dollars of gas transit profits from Kiev.88 In the realm of literature, the Russophile tradition has likewise established an enduring legacy. This is especially exemplified by the writings of Andrii Karabelesh ( 1906-1964). Karabelesh was born in the Transcarpathian village of Tibala, near Mukachevo. When he first attended the gymnasium in Mukachevo the language of instruction was still Magyar. This changed due to the arrival in Podkarpatska Rus ' of many Russian emigres fleeing the revolution. Karabelesh adapted to the russification of the school system so enthusiastically that he became the first secular writer among Rusyn Russophi les. He went on to study at the Theological Seminary in Uzhorod ( 1925-1928). While still a student he published- in Russian- two collections of poetry, lzbrany e stikhovtvorenia (1928) and V buchalh rassvieta ( 1929). These works have been characterized as "dominated by mysticism, a pessimistic outlook on life, and a love of Russian culture." 89 He did not complete his studies at the Theological Seminary because he converted to Orthodoxy. His conversion was less for religious than for cultural reasons. As literary historian Elaine Rusinko writes: "Karabelesh ' s deity is not the conventional God of the Greek Catholic catechism, but an amorphous, spiritual force that provides metaphysical potential and philosophical substance for the poet." 9 Karabelesh went on to Prague, where he obtained a degree in philosophy from Charles University in 1934. ° 88 See " Ukraine Laun ches Moderni zation of Urengog-Ponary-U zhorod Pipeline," Ukra inian News Agency, Jul y 19, 2011 . 89 See the entry " Karabelesh, Andrii " in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 223. 90 Ru sinko, 350. �SLOVAKIA 2019 129 Karabelesh continued writing exclusively in standard Russian. Unlike earlier Russophiles, he did not look towards Russia for the deliverance of the Rusyn people. In his estimation, it was no longer a matter of what Holy Mother Russia could do for Podkarpatska Rus'. It was a matter of what Carpathian-Rus' could do for Holy Mother Russia. In his enthusiasm for the great Russian literary giants, Karabelesh exhibited a tendency towards plagiarism, using some of their phrases directly in his own poetry. Karabelesh 's special favorite was Mikhail Lennontov, who merits attention here. Like his predecessor, the great Russian Romantic Alexander Pushkin, Lermontov wrote passionately, lived wildly and was killed in a duel. Unlike Pushkin, Lermontov created a literary genre in which the psychology of the protagonist played a leading role. This served as a precedent for the great novels of Dostoyevsky later in the century.91 In his poem "Nevdol'strie" (Dissatisfaction), Karabelesh quotes Lermontov's Pechorin: "I was not born for happiness. " 92 Anyone who studies the course of Karabelesh 's life would probably agree. He taught secondary school for a time in Podkarpatska Rus ', but when the Hungarians reoccupied the region he fled to Bohemia. Karabelesh participated in the Czech Resistance against the Nazis, heading a small underground group in Litamsyl. In this capacity he was arrested by the Gestapo in 1942. He passed the remainder of the war in the concentration camps of Mauthausen and Buchenwald. After the war he remained for a time in western Czechoslovakia, serving as principal of the gymnasium of Svitavy (19451953). Then he moved to the Presov Region, where he taught Russian language and literature at Safarik University. Although a member of the Ukrainian section of the Slovak Writers Union, he continued to write exclusively in Russian. It was not simply a case of Karabelesh being unwilling to move with the times. The red banner of the October Revolution replaced the grey skies in "V karpatikh osin" (Autumn in the Carpathians ). 93 Yet the apolitical, pessimistic tone of Karabelesh 's poetry became increasingly an object of attack by communist ideologues. In 1956, when the Soviet Communist Party was 91 See Semyon Eks hut, " Pushkin 's Heir" Russian Life, 42 , No, 6 (October/November 1999), 20-32. 92 Rusinko, 353. 93 Ibid, 362. �130 SLOVAKIA 2019 in a state of ideological crisis in the aftermath of Stalin's death , Karabelesh raised his voice in criticism of the imposed ukrainization of the Rusyn people. He was subsequently expelled from the Slovak Writers Union and returned to Bohemia. In the homeland, literary hi storian and defender of the "social realist" genre Iurii Bolega opened an ideological offensive against Karabelesh ' s work, condemning it as having a Russian chauvinist and anti-social character. One may ask why Karabelesh would wish to return home under such circumstances. Yet the years he spent in concentration camps had undennined hi s health, and Karabelesh was of the opinion "Where you are born, there you should die! " 94 Terminally ill, Karabelesh finally returned home in 1964. He died in Mukachevo on September 4 . In the post-communist era his poetry has experienced a revival of popularity. The Eastern Carpathians constitute an area of scenic beauty, but also in many places one of the depressing poverty. In his poem " Moi Narod" (My Nation), Karabelesh focuses on "fences and of abandoned gardens," "dried out grape vines," "bars of broken down churches," "unplowed fields," and so on. His writing reflects the mixture of beauty and melancholia that is essential to the brooding Slavic soul. If the Russophile tradition never reached the level of popularity that the Ukrainophile orientation attained, it nonetheless remains an essential part of the cultural landscape. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author wishes to thank and express his deep appreciation to Bob Broedel , president of the Tallahassee-Krasnodar Sister City Program, for hi s technical assistance in accessing material published in Russia and Ukraine. 94 Ibid, 359. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2019, Vol. 44 Description An account of the resource Vol. 44 (No. 82-83), 2019. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 2019 83 RUSSOPHILES WITHOUT RUSSIA R. Vladimir Baumgarten (Dedicated to the Memory ofNikolaj Ordos) The Carpatho-Rusyns, technically a stateless people, have been dubbed the "Kurds of Central Europe." They straddle the northern and southern slopes of the Carpathian mountains in the border re1 gions of Slovakia, Poland, Ukraine and Romania. Since the 1989 revolutions and the collapse of Communism in East Central Europe, both the Slovak and Polish governments have recognized the Carpatho-Rusyns as a distinct nationality. Ukraine, where the largest number of Rusyns dwell, does not. After World War II, incoming communist governments classified the Rusyns as Ukrainians by administrative fiat for reasons of convenience, which shall be explained below. The current post-communist government of Ukraine adamantly adheres to this position. 2 Further west, across the Uz river, many Carpatho-Rusyns in eastern Slovakia have voluntari ly assimilated into the Slovak nationality, for reasons which shall likewise be explained in this essay. The first impetus for the Rusyn national awakening came from a belief that they were part of a Great Russian nation, extending "from the Poprad River [in eastern Slovakia] to the Pacific." 3 The Russophile tradition influenced Carpatho-Rusyn culture and politics for a full century. An examination of its history reveals more than a few 1 Paul Robert Magocsi , " Mapping Stateless Peoples: The East Slavs of the Carpathians," Canadian Slavonic Papers, XXIX, Nos. 3-4 ( 1997), 301-54. 2 The Ukrainophile viewpoint was exemplified by Viacheslav Chomovil ( 19371999). During the Brezhnev era, Chomovil was a dissident journalist and human rights activist. He was sent to the labor camps several times for separatist activities. In the late I 980's he was one of the leaders of the People's Movement of Ukraine (better-known as Rukh). After the Soviet Union disintegrated and Ukraine became independent, Chomovil became alarmed by the Rusyn political renaissance. He considered it separatist and urged the Prosecutor General's office in Kiev to file charges aga inst its protagonists. 3 Paul Robert Magocsi , "The Nationalist lntelligentia and the Peasantry in Twentieth Century Subcarpathian Rus "', in Magocs i, Of the Making of Nationalities Th ere is No End, Vol. I (New York, 1999), 19. 84 SLOVAKIA 2019 ironies. In retrospect, it seems remarkable that the Russophile tradition lasted as long as it did. Indeed, remnants of it exist to this day. The current essay is an attempt to explain its rise and fall. The Russophile Tradition in Habsburg Hungary, Galicia and America The homeland of the Carpatho-Rusyns has been alternatively referred to as Ruthenia, Podkarpatska Rus' (Subcarpathian Rus '), Transcarpathia and Carpatho-Ukraine. For reasons of convenience, this author shall refer to it as Podkarpatska Rus' . It was part of the Kingdom of Hungary for about 900 years. Much of Podkarpatska Rus' was a game preserve for the Hungarian nobility. Its Eastern Slav peasants, shepherds and lumberjacks were forbidden to hunt the deer, even when the latter devoured the people's meagre cabbage plots. Starvation was common. The Rusyns were the most impoverished and illiterate ethnic group in the Hungarian kingdom. Originally a bastion of the Russian Orthodox Church, the homeland of the Carpatho-Rusyns was a battleground and passageway in the ongoing struggle between the Austrian Habsburgs and the Transylvanian princes. In order to wean these people away from any allegiance to the Transylvanian princes, most of whom were Calvinists, the Habsburgs decided to incorporate them into the Roman Catholic Church. They accomplished this by creating a Slavonic/Greek Rite of the church. At the Union of Uzhorod (April 24, 1646), 63 Orthodox priests pledged to recognize the primacy of the pope and the sanctity of Roman Catholic doctrine in exchange for keeping the Slavonic liturgy and a married clergy.4 These clergymen were exempted from the feudal burdens of serfdom, received an income from their parishioners, and could send their sons to seminaries in the Habsburg Monarchy for higher education. Despite this favorable concession from the Imperial House, the Rusyns remained generally loyal to their Magyar lords. This was especially the case of the Kuruc (Crusader) uprising and freedom war of Ferenc Rakoczi II ( 1703-1711 ). 4 For the most comprehensive study of this event, see Michal Lacko, "The Union of Uzhorod," Slovak Studies, VI ( 1966), 7-190. SLOVAK.IA 2019 85 The contribution of the Rusyns was sufficiently valorous for them to receive the title gens fidelissima ("the most faithful people").5 In the first half of the nineteenth century, when the various Slavic nationalities of the Habsburg Monarchy-Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs and Croats-launched their own national revivals, the Rusyns were slow to respond. No Rusyns attended the Slav Congress during the revolutionary year 1948. On the contrary, Greek Catholic seminarians in Uzhorod abandoned their intended vocations in order to volunteer for the Hungarian honveds (National Guard) during Hungary' s 1848-1849 war of independence.6 A few educated Rusyns were aware of a certain kinship with Russia. In 1791 Ivan Orlai ( 1771-1829) emigrated to Russia. A schoolteacher, he had been denied advancement in the Austrian system of education. In St. Petersburg he studied medicine and ultimately became court surgeon, actively working in the reorganization of the Russian medical profession. He advised the Ministry of Education to invite other educated Rusyns "since they usually know Church Slavonic thoroughly." 7 Orlai served as Mentor to Nikolaj Gogol, author of Taras Bulba, the Russified Ukrainian who ultimately became one of the literary giants of nineteenth-century Russia. Orlai encouraged other Russian scholars to take an interest in their kinsmen on the other side of the Carpathians. Meanwhile, a Greek Catholic eparchy was established in Presov, eastern Slovakia, in 1818. Its eparch (bishop), Hrihory Tarkovych, was an active pioneer of Russian culture. In expanding his library, he imported the complete works of the eighteenth-century Russian intellectual and scientist Mikhail Lomonosov.8 5 The Rusyns gained this title as a result of a battle fought near Trencin castle in western Slovakia on August 4, 1708. During the fi ghting Rakoczi vaulted across a ravine on horseback. He was thrown forward , striking his head and losing consciousness. His Carpatho-Rusyn peasant infantry held its ground long enough for him to be carried from the fi eld. Outnumbered and outgunned by the Imperial regulars, these Rusyns were subsequently massacred. 6 Paul Robert Magocsi, The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus: / 848-1 948 (Cambridge, MA: 1978), 43. 7 Elaine Rusinko, Straddling Borders: Literature and Identity in Subcarpathian Rus ' (Toronto, 2008), 99. 8 Athanasius Pekar, The History of the Church in Carpathian Rus' (New York, 1992), 89. 86 SLOVAKIA 2019 The first real impetus for the Carpatho-Rusyn awakening came as a result of the Russian military intervention against the Hungarian war of independence in 1849. It was not undertaken to liberate the Slavs of Hungary who were in a state of revolt against Magyar tyranny. Tsar Nicholas I of Russia employed far more autocratic powers than did the House of Habsburg and regarded the stamping out of the fires of revolution, which had swept Europe since the previous year, as a self-evident duty. Polish revolutionary veterans were serving on the Hungarian side and he feared the spread of revolution to his Polish possessions. Nicholas was no Pan-Slav. Two years earlier a nest of such agitators had been discovered in Kiev. It called itself "The Brotherhood of Sts . Cyril and Methodius," and, according to Nicholas, its adherents had invented some monstrosity called the Ukrainian nationality. One of its leading members was not only Ukraine's best poet, but its best painter as well. His people sought ties with the Czechs and Slovaks. Nicholas saw to it that several of them were jailed and he had Taras Schevcenko drafted into the Russian army for ten years, during which time he was forbidden to write or sketch. 9 A number of Russian Pan-Slav politically conservative individuals sympathized with the Slovak people. Tsar Nicholas admonished the Slavophile journalist Ivan Aksakov ( 1823-1886) that, under the guise of a general Slav alliance, subversive elements in the Kingdom of Hungary wished to create a struggle which was not in the name of 0 God, but in a spirit of mutiny, which was dangerous to Russia. ' The Russian military commanders carefully studied the earlier conflicts between the Habsburgs and the Transylvanian princes . They observed that The Austrians had traditionally moved against Transylvania by starting from Kosice in eastern Slovakia. It was considered safer to cross the Hornad and Tisa rivers in the Carpathian 11 foothills than to assault Transylvania from the Hungarian plain. On June 9, the main Russian army commanded by Field Marshal Ivan Paskievitch, consisting of 70,890 soldiers and 240 cannon poured into Slovakia through the Dukla Pass from partitioned Po9 Pav lo Zaitsev, Taras Shevchenko. A Life (Toronto, 1989), 139-57. °Cudovit Holotik, "The Slovaks: An Integrating or Disintegrating Force?" Austrian 1 Histo ry Yearbook, III , Part 2 ( 1967): 2. 11 William Stiles, Austria in 1848-50, II (New York, 1850), 294. Stiles was the American charge d'affaires in Vienna during the revolutionary events of 1848-49. SLOVAKIA 2019 87 land. The Russians captured Presov on June 20 and took Kosice five days later. To supply their army, the Russians stockpiled large amounts of foodstuffs at the northern end of the Dukla Pass. However, the military bureaucracy of Tsar Nicholas was inefficient. Provisions were made to transport the artillery but not the food . Austrian quartermasters, who also had a supply of food , and were allied with the Russians, had fled the area. The Russian soldiers, hungry and exasperated, turned to plunder. Don Cossacks looted a number of Slovak villages so thoroughly that the inhabitants fled into the for12 ests . The Russian intervention in this area would be remembered with ill-feelings by Magyars and non-Magyars alike. There were Slovak Pan-Slavs who were willing to overlook Russian misconduct. They convinced themselves that Grand Duke Konstantin was preparing to transfer his headquarters from Warsaw to Kosice, where he would proclaim a new Slav state. Slovak leaders appealed to the Russian embassy and military mission in Vienna for recognition. They requested that Slovak advisors and regional administrators be attached to the Russian military in eastern Slovakia. Tsar Nicholas replied to one such request "I received the same thing yesterday from Danilevsky [the Russian consul in Belgrade]. I have no time for such matters." 13 On the other hand, the reception of Russian military intervention was not universally negative. Rusyn peasants in the highlands witnessed a mighty Slav army in their region for the first time. They were awed. They gave fruits and nuts to the invaders. Aleksander Dukhnovych, soon to become an awakener among the Rusyns, later wrote, "One thing really gave me joy in life, and that was in 1849 when I first saw the glorious Rus sian army .. .I can't describe the feeling of gladness at seeing the first Cossacks on the streets of Presov. I danced and cried with delight. .. It was truly the first, perhaps the last, joy of my life." 14 Aleksander Dukhnovych (1803-1865) was born in the village of Topol 'a in the Humenne region of eastern Slovakia. He was descended from Greek Catholic priests and was consequently educated 12 John Shelton Curtis, The Russian Army under Nicholas I, 1925-/ 854 (Durham, NC, 1865), 298 . 13 Holotik, 383. 14 Quoted in Magocsi, The Shaping of a National Identity, 45. 88 SLOVAKIA 2019 at the Theological Seminary in Uzhorod. After ordination as a priest in 1827, he was assigned to the bishop 's chancellery in Presov. His relatively progressive views clashed with those of the more conservative Tarkovych, who then assigned him to a relatively remote rural parish. Dukhnovych regarded his assignment as a godsend. In Uzhorod he had received a Hungarian education, which influenced his early writings. In the rural parish he discovered, or re-discovered, "the people." He was influenced by the Slovak National Awakening and applied its precepts to the awakening of his own Rusyn people. After the death of Tarkovych, Dukhnovych was reassigned to Presov and appointed eparchical canon in 1843 . He remained closely associated with the city-considered a Rusyn cultural center in spite of its Slovak majority- for the rest of his life. In 1850, after the suppression of the Hungarian revolution, Dukhnovych established the first Rusyn cultural association, the Presov Literary Society. His own literary contribution was considerable. In 1851 he composed the poem "Vruchanie," whose opening lines "I was, am, and will remain a Rusyn" became the motif for the unofficial anthem of the Carpatho-Rusyn people. He researched and wrote extensively on the Rusyn people. His monumental achievement was the play "Virtue is More Important than Riches," which is still performed regularly in regional theatres in eastern Slovakia and western Ukraine. 15 The ethical values expressed in this play mirror Dukhnovych 's role as a social reformer. He campaigned vigorously against illiteracy, alcoholism, and the lingering pagan superstitions which persisted among his people. The literary language employed-indeed, invented by Dukhnovych-was peculiar. It was a blend of Old Church Slavonic, standard Russian and the native dialect. His later disciples called it "the traditional Carpatho-Rusyn langage," while his critics derrided it as "jazychije" (macaronic jargon). 16 Indeed, while Dukhnovych was the greatest of the Rusyn awakeners, he inhibited the establishment of a distinctive Rusyn identity by his unequivocal adherence to the Great Russian idea. 15 For an English-language translation, see Aleksander Duchnovych, Virtue is More Important than Riches, ed. by Elai ne Rusinko (New York, 1994). 16 See the entry "Dukhnovych, Aleksander," in Paul Robert Magocs i and Robert Popp, eds. , Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture (Toronto, 2005), I06. SLOVAKIA 2019 89 If Dukhnovych was the unquestioned giant among the Rusyns in the realm of culture, then Adolf Dobrian' skyi ( 1817-1901) fulfilled this function in the realm of politics. Dobrian'skyi was born in Rudl'ov, Zemplin county, Slovakia, the son of a Greek Catholic priest. He attended secondary schools in Levoca, Roznava and Misko le, and then studied philosophy in Kos ice ( 1833 ), law in Eger (1834-36) and mining at the Academy of Mines and Forests in Banska Stiavnica, central Slovakia. He was fluent in several foreign languages, including Magyar, German, French, English and Italian. He visited Bohemia, where he was influenced by Frantisek Palacky, Karel Havlicek and other Czech national awakeners. Dobrian'skyi initially welcomed Hungary' s 1848 Revolution for the liberal reforms that it promised. But when the Slovak district of Banska Bystrica elected him as its representative to the Hungarian Diet, the Hungarian government rejected his mandate on the grounds of Pan-Slavism. Dobrian'skyi then indeed became a Pan-Slav. He moved to Presov, where he built a following which advocated a political union of the Rusyns of Hungary with those of Austrian Galicia. When the Russians prepared to invade Hungary, the Austrian government appointed him as its liason with Paskievitch. Dobrian 'skyi then served as advisor to the Russian military. After the defeat of revolutionary Hungary, the Austrian government imposed a centralist bureaucratic regime. Dobrian' skyi then became advisor to the Uzhorod Civil District, which encompassed four counties. He regarded the civil district as a prelude to the establishment of an autonomous Rusyn state under the Emperor of Austria. 17 Defeated in the Austro-Sardinian war of 1859, The Habsburg Monarchy was substantially weakened. It was forced to retreat from bureaucratic centralism and make concessions to the Magyars. Dobrian' skyi was recalled , and the old nobles began to reoccupy county positions. In 1866 Austria suffered another defeat, this time at the hands of Prussia, and resigned itself in 1867 to accepting the Magyar nobility as equal partners in the renamed Dual Monarchy of AustriaHungary. Emperor Franz-Josef allowed himself to be crowned King of Hungary in Budapest and the Hungarian nobles were granted complete self-government in internal affairs. By now their obsession 17 See the entry " Dobrian' skyi, Adolf," in Magocsi and Popp, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 93. 90 SLOVAK.IA 2019 with Pan-Slavism reached paranoid proportions . They viewed the magyarization of Hungary's Slavic minorities as imperative. Persecution of Slovak and Carpatho-Rusyn educational and cultural institutions became the order of the day. A similar course evolved in Galicia, the Austrian province of partitioned Poland. Shortly after the 1867 Compromise with Hungary came into effect, Empreor Franz-Josef appointed his trusted Polish confidant Count Agenor Goluchowski as Viceroy of Galicia. Goluchowski gained for his Polish nobles a degree of autonomy that mirrored that of the Magyars. The education system was polonized. This posed a direct threat to the advancement of the Rusyns. Educated Rusyns became politically divided. The Ukrainian movement gained the greatest strength . However, there were still Rusyns who adhered to the traditions of old Rus' .They stubbornly continued to write in Old Church Slavonic and isolated themselves from the people. Cultureally, these Old Ruthenians identified with Russia, but professed allegiance to the Austrian Emperor. Such a dual allegiance became more difficult to maintain as the nineteenth-century ran its course. Austria and Russia were no longer allies, and were in fact competing for hegemony in the Balkans. Similarly, the Rusyns of Galicia found themselves cast in the role of a political football in the rivalry of the two empires. A case in point was the career of Ivan Naumovych (1826-1891), who was born Galicia in 1836. In his youth he was strongly influenced by the Polish national movement. However, he experienced a turning point during the revolutionary year of 1848, when there was a brief uprising in the city of Lviv. Naumovych was observing the fighting from a hillside when imperial soldiers spotted him and assumed he was a Polish rebel. They arrested him, but Naumovych persuaded them to release him by convincing the Austrians that he was a Russian. 18 Being Russian, Naumovych decided, carried certain privileges. After 1850, when Naumovych was ordained a Greek Catholic priest, he became staunchly Russophile in cultural orientation. He organized opposition to a campaign organized by the Roman Catholic Polish clergy to latinize the liturgy of the Greek rite. In this ca18 Keith Dyrud, The Quest fo r th e Rusyn Soul: The Politics of Religion and Culture in Eastern Europ e and America, 1890-World War I (Philadelphia, 1992), 28. SLOVAKIA 2019 91 pacity he sought Russian support. At this point, Naumovych did not convert to Orthodoxy . He still regarded the Greek Catholic (Uniate) church as a potential bridge between Eastern and Western Christendom. Nontheless, inspired by his activism, an entire village in eastern Galicia converted to Orthodoxy in May of 1877. More conversions followed in the next three years. The Galician authorities charged Naumovych with treason. In their view his activity was not religious but political. Naumovych had indeed maintained contact with Russian Pan-Slav agents. 19In July of 1882 he was finally convicted and sentenced to eight months in jail. Other Rusyns who converted to Orthodoxy likewise found themselves hauled into court, although, surprisingly, a Polish jury acquitted them. Both the Austrian government and Polish patriots understood the necessity of not pushing the Old Ruthenians to the point of open subversion. The Ukrainophile movement predominated in Galicia, but the Russophile tradition was not going to go away. Galicia, unlike Russian Ukraine, was not a particularly productive agricultural region. Much of the countryside is hilly and the soil is poor. A bad harvest usually resulted in famine , and this happened at the beginning of the twentieth century. Russian Pan-Slavs responded by founding the Galician-Russian Benevolent Association in St. Petersburg on February 9, 1903. At the opening meeting acertain Father Petrov delivered the inaugural address. American historian Keith Dyrud described the subsequent address as follows: He likened the world to an artist's palette or a musician 's instrument. God was that artist or musician. The nationalities of the world were like colors on the palette or strings on the instrument. If some of the colors or strings are missing, the painting or music will be incomplete and this is a crime against the spirit. This crime against the spirit occurs when a culture allows itself to become divided. The separation of the people of Galicia and Carpatho-Russia (Subcarpathia) from the Russian nation was just such a crime . It is the obligation of a national culture to unite its people into a united nation. In other words, the orator was suggesting that it was 19 Ibid ., 28 . 92 SLOVAK.IA 2019 the obligation of Russia to unite in a single nation all people with a Russian culture. He included the Galicians and Subcarpathians 20 among the people with a Russian culture. Under the leadership of Count Vladimir Bobrinski , the GalicianRussian Benevolent Association extended financia l relief to famine victims of Galicia. Tsarist Russia, the most despotic and reactionary among the Great Powers, could appear benevolent while working to expand its influence. Bobrinski likewise dispatched agents to Podparkarpatska Rus ' , where starvation was an everyday occurrence, rather than a momentous event. The Hungarian government was less hesitant than its Austrian counterpart to prosecute Rusyns for conversion to the Orthodox faith. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the first converts to the Orthodox faith in Podkarpatska Rus ' materialized in the vi llage of Iza. They were simple peasants who disliked their pastor, a magyarized Rusyn, who replaced their language with Magyar in the parish school. Led by the cantor-teacher Andry Vladymir, they appealed to the Serbian patriarch, who had nominal authority over all Orthodox subjects of the Habsburg Monarchy, to send them an Orthodox priest. Greek Catholic priest and historian Athanasius Pekar, himself a Ukrainophile, later admitted: "All that needed to be done to liquidate the so-called 'Orthodox movement' in Iza was to appoint a new village pastor and reopen the parish school." 2 1 Instead, the Hungarian government arrested the participants late in 1903 for alleged ties with Russia, and in the following year placed them on trial in Marmaros. All the defendants were found gui lty of treason. The Maramaros trial made a deep impression on the mind of a simple woodcutter of Iasnyia named Aleksander Kabaliu (18771947). He had just been released from the army, where he had been persecuted by Hungarian officers for his Pan-Slav inclinations. Kabuliak had a pronounced inclination towards a monastic life . He made religious pilgrimages to Russia, Jerusalem and Mount Athos in Greece. At a Russian monastery in the last-named location, he was received into the Orthodox fold . He turned his home in Iasnyia into a veritable Russian museum, collecting and displaying icons. Fearing 20 21 Ibid. , 49-50. Pekar, I 05 . SLOVAKIA 2019 93 persecution by Hungarian authorities, Kabaliuk emigrated to the Russian Empire, where he was tonsured as a monk in 1910. The Russian Orthodox Church initially intended that Kabaliuk wou ld go to America and assume custody of a modest parish in Pittsburgh.22 Instead, he decided to return to Hungary to share in the martyrdom of the villagers of Iza. The Hungarian authorities were happy to oblige him. At the end of 1913 there was a second Maramaros trial, in which Kabaliuk and 94 peasants were the defendants. The Hungarians were hopeful that the trial would expose the activities of Count Bobrinskii and his associates. All it achieved was international condemnation of Magyar policies . Nonetheless, Kabaliuk was sentenced to four and a half years in jail, while 32 others were sentenced to one or two years and various fines. The rest were dismissed for lack of evidence. It was also at the tum of the century that many Rusyns followed the example of their Slovak kinsmen and neighbors in emigrating to America. Although members of both groups originated in the dirtpoor hill country of the eastern Carpathians, they tended to gravitate towards industrial centers in the United States. Surprisingly, America provided both stimulus for the Russophile tradition and a resurgence of the Russian Orthodox faith. Dyrud writes: The majority of the Rusyn immigrants came to the United States as illiterate peasants and had not participated in the intellectual and cultural conflicts that were raging in the old country. Thus it was in this country that Rusyn peasants from Galicia and Subcarpathia first lived together and found that they did not have as much in common as it first seemed. And it was in the United States that many of them first heard of the Ukrainian movement. And it was there that the Rusyns from Subcarpathia felt free to express national sentiments without the pressures of magyarization. It was in the United States that most of the Rusyn immigrants were told for the first time by the Russian Orthodox mission that they were really Russians. 23 22 See the entry "Kabaliuk, Aleksander," in Magocsi and Popp, eds., Encyclopedia o[ Ru syn History and Culture, 223. 2 Dyrud, 58 . 94 SLOVAK.IA 2019 Ironically, the Russian cause was indirectly aided by a most unlikely element: Irish American Catholic priests. Many of the latter resented the fact that Greek Catholic candidates for the priesthood were permitted to marry while they were not. Most outstanding was Archbishop John Ireland of Minneapolis-St. Paul. On December 19, 1889, he was visited by a Greek Catholic priest named Alexis Toth. Toth had been dispatched by the Presov eparchy to assume the pastorship of St. Mary ' s, a modest church recently constructed by the Rusyn community of Minneapolis. When Father Toth presented his credentials, Archbishop Ireland became greatly agitated. He informed Toth that he did not consider him to be a genuine Catholic, and denied him permission to administer the sacraments. 24 After consultation with the parishioners of St. Mary's, Toth conferred with Russian Orthodox Metropolitan Vladimir of San Francisco. The latter was eager and willing to accept the parish of St. Mary's into the Orthodox fold. Aside from Alaska, which Russia had sold to the United States earlier, there were up to the 1870s only three Orthodox churches in the United States. In addition to San Francisco, there was a Russian parish in New York City and a Greek Orthodox church in New Orleans. Native converts in America were exclusively Alaskan Aleuts and Eskimos . Now, however, the wave of Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants indicated a potential source of growth. Since nearly all Rusyn immigrants were in the eastern half of the United States, New York rather than San Francisco was delegated as an episcopal seat. In 1890 the construction of St. Nicholas Cathedral was completed in New York. Tsar Nicholas II personally donated 5,000 roubles to this project. His government subsidized the construction of other churches and supported activities of the Orthodox Missionary Society founded in Moscow. In Minneapolis, Father Toth founded the Russian Mutual Aid Society. These prosletization efforts exceeded all expectations. By the time of the outbreak of World War I in 1914, over one-third of all Rusyn immigrants in the United States had converted to Orthodoxy. 25 They served as enthusiastic supporters of the Russian cause in the Great War. World War I brought with it the culmination of the historic struggle for the Carpathians, and caused great suffering among the 24 25 Ibid 65-6 Ibid: 65 . • SLOVAK.IA 2019 95 Rusyns of Galicia, eastern Slovakia and Podkarpatska Rus' . By early September 1914 Russian armies had overrun much of eastern Galicia. Count Georgii Bobrinskii, brother of Count Vladimir, was made governor-general, and started a campaign to eradicate the Ukrainian movement. All Ukrainian cultural organizations, cooperatives and journals were shut down. The Russian language replaced Ukrainian in the school system. Hundreds of Greek Catholic priests were deported into the depths of Russia. There was admittedly some dissent in Russian governmental circles. Noted statesman Pavel Miliukov described Russian conduct in Galicia as a European scandal. Yet Foreign Minister Sergei Sazanov stated unequivocally: "Now is exactly the right moment to rid ourselves of the Ukrainian movement once and for all." 26 The Ukrainophiles had a measure of revenge when the AustroHungarian military reoccupied the province in the following year. They denounced their Russophile neighbors for alleged collaboration with the invaders. Hungarian troops carried out mass hangings. At the same time, Polish nobles spread rumors that the Ukrainophiles were covertly pro-Russian, so as to reassert their own authority in Galicia. In truth, thousands of Russophiles and Ukrainophiles alike suffered internment in Austrian concentration camps. The most notorious of these camps was Talerhof, near Graz. Sanitary conditions were deplorable, and an estimated 1,767 persons died of typhus and 27 other diseases. Austria's parliament was scandalized, and Emperor Karl ordered Talerhof closed early in 1917. Early in 1915, for the second of three occasions in the course of a century, the Russian military crossed through the Dukla Pass. This move came as a result of the seige of Przemysl, Austria-Hungary's principal fortress in Galicia. Russian troops occupied the Carpathian mountain passes to the south to prevent the Austro-Hungarian military from sending reinforcements to break the siege. Casualties on both sides of the winter war of 1914-15 were appalling. It is likely that more soldiers succumbed to the "White Death" (hypothermia) than were killed by enemy bullets. 28 Ultimately, the Austrian side 26 Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A History (Toronto, Buffalo and London, 2009), 343. See the entry "Talerhof," in Magocsi and Pop, eds,. Encyclopedia of Rusy n History and Culture, 488 . 28 For rhe most recent account of the winter campaign, see Traydon A. Tumstell, Blood on the Snow: The Carpathian Winter War of I 9 I 5 (Lawrence, KD, 20 I 0). 27 96 SLOVAKIA 2019 gave way first. Russian soldiers under General Lavrl' Kornilov pushed through the southern end of Dukla Pass and advanced as far as the village of Lodomirova, just north of the town of Svidnik. Here they established a military cemetery for their dead. Lodomirova eventually became the site of a Russian cultural center in northeastern Slovakia, which shall be discussed in due course. The Russians did not remain in occupation of this toehold in Slovakia for long. Germany, Austria-Hungary's senior partner, launched a counteroffensive eastward across Poland, albeit at the cost of having enough troops to capture Paris. Russian troops painfully withdrew north of the Carpathians. They were now demoralized and ripe for revolution. Mass mutinies forced Tsar Nicholas II to abdicate on March 15, 1917. The reign of the Romanov dynasty had ended. Tsarist Russia was destroyed. Politically speaking, the Russophi-le orientation was now a dead letter. Culturally, its future was now an openended question . At this point Russophiles among the Rusyns looked with growing interest at the now ascendant Czechoslovak independence movement. The Rusyns in Interwar Czechoslovakia and Poland The Czechoslovak independence movement was a curious article. For almost a century, there existed an intellectual tradition which maintained that Czechs and Slovaks were two branches of the same nationality. Yet the concept of a politically united Czechoslovak state was largely the invention to Tomas Garrigue Masaryk ( 18501937), a Czech philosophy professor and notorious defender of unpopular causes. Perceiving that World War I would result in AustriaHungary coming increasingly under the domination of Kaiser Wilhelm ' s Germany, Masaryk decided to lobby among the opposing Western powers for Czecho-Slovak independence. In Geneva, in neutral Switzerland, he was joined by his protege, the sociology professor Edvard Benes. Together they proceeded to Paris, where they were joined by Milan Rastislav Stefanik, a young Slovak serving as an officer in the French Air Force. This triumvirate formed a Czech Action Committee Abroad, which was eventually expanded and renamed the Czechoslovak National Council. Given his position on this body, the French eventually gave Stefanik genera l' s rank. He raised a Czechoslovak Legion from prisoners of war and deserters SLOVAKIA 2019 97 from the Austro-Hungarian Army. The Czechoslovak Legion distinguished itself on the Western, Eastern and eventually Italian fronts, and gained increased Allied favor in the struggle for the recognition of the independence movement. 29 In 1918 Masaryk visited the United States, not only to gain official American recognition, but also a mandate from the Slovak community in America, since Slovakia itself was politically gagged. In October of 1915 the Bohemian National Alliance and the Slovak League of America had already concluded a preliminary agreement for cooperation in Cleveland. Masaryk proceeded to Pittsburgh to conclude a more formal agreement for a Czecho-Slovak merger. Masaryk's visit to the Mecca of the American Slovaks was greeted by a large manifestation of support which included South Slavs as well as Czechs and Slovaks. Yet the negotiations undertaken at Moose Hall on May 29-31 were not without controversy. Masaryk pledged Slovakia an administration, a school system and linguistic rights, but not its own parliament, as specified by the earlier Cleveland Agreement. Here Jozef Husek of the Slovak Catholic Jednota raised strenuous objections. Albert Mamatey, president of the Slovak League, impressed Masaryk with the seriousness of losing the support of the largest single Slovak organization. The delegates were evenly divided, and Masaryk finally broke the deadlock by signing a revised draft with all the proposals. 30 The steel towns of the greater Pittsburgh area were also heavily populated by Rusyns from Hungary. Following the lead of the Slovaks, many joined fraternal organizations, which not only provided 29 The Czechoslovak Legion in Russia was the most instrumental military force in attaining Allied recognition of the independence movement. With Russia withdrawing from the war in 1918, Czechoslovak legionnaires wished to be evacuated and sent to France, where a German offensive to capture Paris was anticipated. Attempts by the Bolsheviks to disarm them resu lted in their capture of the Trans-Siberian Railway and a legendary odyssey to the Pacific coast. It also gave the Western Allies a pretext to intervene in the Russian Civil War. The experience of the Czechoslovak Legion in Russia boats of a sizable amount of literature. The best Englishlanguage studies are authored by Victor M. Fie, The Revolutionary War for Independence and the Russian Question: The Czechoslovak Army in Russia 1914-191 8 (New Delhi, 1977) and The Bolsheviks and the Czechoslovak Legion. The Origins of Their Armed Conflict: March to May 1918 (New Delhi , 1978). 30 See Marian Mark Stolarik, "The Role of American Slovaks in the Creation of Czecho-Slovakia" Slo vak Studies, VIII ( 1968), 48-5 1 98 SLOVAKIA 2019 benefits to workers but published newspapers as well. Its members had acquired a measure of political awareness. One such organization was the Greek Catholic Union, headquartered in the HomesteadMunhall district. Another was the United Societies of America, which contained both Greek Catholic and Orthodox members, based in McKeesport. At the time of Masaryk's pilgrimage to Pittsburgh, the Czech independence leader was approached by Nicholas Pachuta, editor of the Greek Catholic Union's newspaper Rus 'kii Viestnik. Pachuta had recently converted to Orthodoxy. Up until this point he had advocated the incorporation of Podkarpatska Rus' into the Russian Empire. Now that there was no more Russian Empire, Pachuta approached Masaryk with the idea of union with a Czecho-Slovak state. He was soon afterwards expelled from the Greek Catholic Union. 3 1 Overall, the Greek Catholic clergy wished their homeland to remain part of Hungary. Many laymen wanted union with Galicia but insisted Galicia was Russian rather than Ukrainian. The end to the Great War was approaching, and territorial changes could be anticipated. One of President Woodrow Wilson's celebrated Fourteen Points for peace was "self-determination for the peoples of AustriaHungary." It was necessary to have a common program. Members of both organizations met in Homestead on July 23, 1918 to form the American National Council of Uhro-Rusyns. The subsequent Homestead Resolution read as follows: If the pre-war boundaries remain, Rusyns, as the most loyal people-gens fidelissima-deserve that Hungary provide [them} with autonomy. If new boundaries are made, they should be made according to nationality; thus, Uhro-Rusyns can belong nowhere else than to their nearest brothers by blood, language and faith, to the Galician and Bukovinian Rusyns. But if we are divided by foreign aspirations from Ukrainians and Old-Russians [Galician Russophiles}, the National Council demands in this case autonomy for Uhro-Rusyns so they can pre32 serve their national character. 31 Magocsi, Th e Shaping of a National Identity, 81. The original text of the Homestead Resolution appears under the heading " Do Vpukh Vhro-Rusynov zhivlych v Soed" in Prosvita, August 8, 1918 32 SLOVAKIA 2019 99 The Rusyns commissioned a young Pittsburgh lawyer named Gregory Zsatkovich ( 1886-1967) to represent their interests to the United States government. Pennsylvania congressman Guy Campbell arranged a meeting between Zsatkovich and President Wilson on October 21. Wilson thought it unfeasible to grant full independence to so small a nation in a geopolitically sensitive region, and consequently recommended that Zsatkovich seek autonomy in a larger state. He referred Zsatkovich to Masaryk, whose independence movement had been recently recognized by the U.S. State Department, Zsatkovich met with Masaryk in Philadelphia, where the latter hosted a congress called the Mid-European Democratic Union on October 23-26. According to Zsatkovich's memoir afterwards, Masaryk assured him: "If the Rusyns decide to join the Czechoslovak Republic, they shall constitute a fully autonomous state." 33 There remained a sticky issue. Rusyn territorial claims included several counties in eastern Slovakia. Here there were numerous Rusyns in the northern mountain districts whereas elsewhere the population consisted of either Slovaks or Rusyns who had already voluntarily assimilated into the Slovak nationality. Masaryk was further alleged to declare on this point: "The frontiers will be so determined that the 34 Rusyns will be satisfied." On November 12, at a meeting of the National Council of UhroRusyns in Scranton, Pennsylvania, the Czechoslovak option was provisionally adopted, albeit including the demand for the counties of eastern Slovakia. A subsequent plebiscite among the American Rusyn fraternals provided Zsatkovich with the desired results: out of 1,102 votes submitted, 732 (67 percent) were for union with Czechoslovakia and 310 (28 percent) for union with Ukraine. Additionally, there were 27 votes for complete independence, 10 votes for union with Russia, and 9 votes for remaining part ofHungary. 35 Back in the Old Country, the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in October of 1918 led to a power vacuum in many areas of the Carpathians. Several different national councils were organized by Rusyns, each of which had its own program for the fu- 33 Gregory Zsatkovich, Otkryhote-Expose bydaltelho gubernatori Podkarpatskoj Rusi (Homestead, PA , 1921 ), 5. 34 Ibid 5 35 Ma~o~si , Th e Shaping of a National Identity, 85. 100 SLOVAK.IA 2019 ture affiliation of the people. A Russophile group in eastern Slovakia, based in Stara Cubovna, initially wanted a merger with Galicia. Dissenters among them, led by the lawyer Antonii Beskyd ( 1855-1933), considered such a move impractical. They reconvened in Presov and declared themselves for union with Czechoslovakia instead. A new revolutionary government in Hungary pledged to grant the Rusyns territorial autonomy. A group of Greek Catholic priests in Uzhorod declared themselves in favor of this option. Another pro-Hungarian group met in Khust, but its speakers were shouted down by Pro-Ukrainian elements led by the lawyer Iulii Braschaiko (1879-1955). The Ukrainophle orientation had at last taken hold in Podkarpatska Rus ', and would grow progressively stronger. Most dramatic of all were events in the easternmost Hutsul region, centered around Iasnyia. Here the populace favored union with Ukraine, but, pending further developments, took matters into their own hands. In the early morning of January 7, 1919, a group of demobilized Rusyn soldiers, aided by troops sent by the West Ukrainian Republic, drove out the Hungarian garrison of 250 militiamen. On February 5 the victorious Rusyns proclaimed their own "Hutsul Republic," with a 42-member elected council and a four-man government. This little state existed until June 11, when the area was occupied by advancing Romanian troops.36 Late in 1918, Czechoslovak legionnaires returning from the Italian Front had begun a military occupation of Slovakia, and advanced across the Uz River. Uzhorod was occupied on January 10, 1919. The Czechoslovak position was strengthened as a result of a Bolshevik government assuming power in Hungary, much to the alarm of the Western powers. This Hungarian government wished to build upon the "Ruska Kraina" declared by its predecessor, the Karolyi regime. It went to extremes attempting to implement communist rule, threatening the death penalty for even the smallest commercial transactions. This decree became impossible to enforce, since the commissars were themselves profiteering. 37 Podkarpatska Rus' was soon engulfed in counterrevolution. 36 See Paul Robert Magocsi, "The Rusyn Decision to Unite With Czechoslovakia" in Magocsi, Of the Making of Natio nalities, 134. 37 Ibid, 140-42 SLOVAKIA 2019 101 Even before the establishment of the Bolshevik regime, members of the Uzhorod Council began experiencing doubts concerning the viability of remaining part of Hungary. A leading member of the Council, Reverend Avhustyn Voloshyn (1874-1945), began negotiating with Slovak leader Milan Hodza. Voloshyn was joined by supporters of both Beskid and Brashchaiko. The Russophiles realized that the Russia they had loved and believed in was unlikely to return from the dead. The Ukrainophiles realized that an independent Ukraine was unlikely to survive the turmoil of the Russian Civil War. Members of both orientations were willing to form a single body representing their mutual interests. It was in this spirit that the Central Russian National Council was formed in Uzhorod on May 8, 1919. Zsatkovich arrived with the text of the Scranton Resolution, which was endorsed unanimously. It remained to the Western peacemakers gathered in Paris to give sanction to Podkarpatska Rus' being granted to Czechoslovakia. Yet, contrary to later Hungarian revisionist claims, the victorious Western Allies did not arbitrarily hand the region over to the Czechs. The decision to unite with Czechoslovakia was that of the Rusyn people themselves .38 The realities of being part of the Czechoslovakia disappointed the expectations of many educated Rusyns. Autonomy was not forthcoming. They could send representatives to parliament in Prague, but did not have their own regional parliament. Prague apparently decided that the Rusyns, like the Slovaks, were not ready for autonomy. Zsatkovich became the first provincial governor, but the actual administration lay in the hands of a centralized Czech bureaucracy. Zsatkovich eventually resigned in disgust and returned to America. The disputed counties in eastern Slovakia remained under Slovak administration. To complicate matters further, there was now a group of Rusyns who considered themselves their own nationality, in addition to the existing Russophile and Ukrainophile orientations. Politically, on the local level, Prague would support one and then another orientation, depending upon its convenience at a particular moment. The Czechoslovak administration made great strides in education, virtually eliminating illiteracy in twenty years . The government poured tremendous amounts of money into Podkarpatska Rus ', and liberally funded cultural activities of all three orientations. 38 Ibid, 146. 102 SLOVAKIA 2019 On April 29, 1920, there was a meeting of local leaders in Uzhorod, headed by Iulii Brashchaiko. Its purpose was to establish a cultural organization encompassing all Podkarpatska Rus '. Nothing resulted from this meeting since Russophiles led by Anthonii Beskyd raised angry objections to the Ukrainophile cultural orientation of Brashchaiko ' s group. On May 9 Brashchaiko's fol lowers established the Prosvita Society, modeled along the lines of the Ukrainian society of the same name in Galicia. Its task was to publish all kinds of popular and scholarly books "written in the national tongue and accessible to every Subcarpathian Ru syn." 39 The Czechoslovak Pros vita was reinforced by many educated Ga li cian Ukrainians who found Polish rul e objectionable. On th e May 23 , 1923, those Russophiles who boycotted the Prosvita met in Uzhorod to establish their own organization, which was called the Dukhnovych Society. Its stated goals were to foster "the cultural deve lopment of the Ru ssian people living within Czechoslovakia, and most importantly to educate them in a moral , patriotic and Ru ssian spirit, exclusive of al l political activity." 40 The contrast between the two rival societies was visib le. The old tricolor Ru ssian flag flew over the reading rooms of the Dukhnovych Society, whereas Prosvita reading rooms displayed the blue and ye llow Ukrainian national colors. In terms of literature, the new Dukhnovych Society championed the great Russian masters : Pushkin, Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, etc. The Prosvita Society advanced the writings of Shevchenko and other less known Ukrainian awakeners. Both Russophiles and Ukrainophiles expanded their activities from literature to theater. The Ru ssophiles tended to produce hi storical dramas, whereas the Ukrainophi les focused on folk songs and ballads. The latter used standard Ukrainian as the language of performance, whereas the Russophiles had to translate their productions into a Rusyn dia lect. It must be frankly admitted that the Ukrainophile orientation gained the upper hand in popularity during the course of the kulturkampf for Podkarpatska Rus' in the First Czechoslovak Republic. Avtustyn Voloshyn had become a convert to the Ukrainophile orien39 Statul tova,ystva 'Prosvita • Podkarpatska Rus ·, (Uzhorod, 1920), 6. Usta v Rusakogo ku/'turna-prosvete/'noga obshchturni Aleksandra Duchnovychovicha , (Uzhorod, 1923), 40 SLOVAK.IA 2019 103 tation. He and his associates were astute and learned men-teachers and scholars who kept closely in touch with Rusyn cultural life. By contrast, the Dukhnovych Society fell increasingly under the influence of Stefan Fentsik ( 1892-1946), a local politician who used the organization as a platform to propagate a his own views, his political ties with Poland and Hungary-which shall be di scussed in due course-became common knowledge by 1937, and did much to compromise the Dukhnovych Society. 41 Russian culture survived more comfortably in eastern Slovakia, since 1928 elevated to the official status of a province. In large measure this direction was due to the efforts of Iulii Lazho (18671929), a native of Svidnik and senator for the Social Democratic Party in the Czechoslovak parliament. Earlier, Lazho had emigrated to America, where he converted to Orthodoxy and also rose in the construction industry. He returned home to start his own construction firm, and also to seek revenge against his former Greek Catholic pastor. As mayor of Ladomirova, where the Russian military cemetery was located, Lazho invited Vital ii Maksimenko ( 1873-1960), former archimandrite of the monastery at Pochaiev (in Polish Volhynia), to establish a missionary headquarters there. Lazho also procured a Cyrillic alphabet printing press which Czechoslovak legionnaires in Russia had appropriated, shipped all the way to Vladivostok on the Pacific coast, and which made its way to Prague. During two decades of activity the Ladomirova mission published over I 00 Orthodox church books, the newspaper Pravoslavnaia Karpatskaje Rus ' (1928-1944), the journal for young people Diestvo I ivnost Khristi ( 1935-1941 ), a scholarly journal Pravoslavny put' ( 1938-1940) and the annual almanac Pravnoslavny ruskii/Ruskii narodnyi kalendar ( 1924-1944). The Russian monks also worked to inculcate Russian culture among the native Rusyns, hosting such events as an annual Russian Day in the summers and the tree-lighting ceremony for Orthodox Christmas. 42 In approaching the causes of the Orthodox revival in interwar Czechoslovakia, it is necessary to understand the world view of the 41 Magocsi, "Nationalist Intelligentsia and the Peasantry" in Of th e Making of Nationalities, 200. 42 See the entry "Ladomirova Monastery" in Magocsi and Pop, eds. , En cyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 266 . 104 SLOVAKIA 2019 national-state's founding father. T.G. Masaryk was a complex individual. As one biographer expressed it: "This man wanted to emancipate workers without embracing Marxism, liberate women without promoting feminism, and educate the young without celebrating youth. " 43 He was considered in the West to be an expert on Russia. He had written extensively on the great writer Dostoevsky, whom he regarded as the classic representative of Russian thought. There were elements of the Russian national psychology which Masaryk found disturbing. Like Havlicek before him, he felt that the Western Slavs, especially the Czechs, should follow a different path . As a proponent of Westeren humanism, Masaryk disparaged the mystical tradition of the Eastern Orthodox faith .44 Yet Masaryk reserved even greater hostility for the Roman Catholi c Church. He drew inspiration from Jan Hus, the great Bohemian religious reformer who was burned at the stake for heresy in 1415 . In 1905, while celebrating the anniversary of Hus ' death, Masaryk coined the slogan "Away from Rome! " Politics in the first years of the Czechoslovak Republic had a distinctly anti-Catholic flavor. His government favored the appointment of Lutherans for administration in Slovakia at the expense of the Catholic majority. In Podkarpatska Rus ', where there were virtua lly no Protestants, such a policy was impossible. Here Czechoslovak authorities fostered a revival of Orthodoxy. One Czech mini ster assessed the impact as follows: It seemed to some Russophile politicians, both in Prague and in Ruthenia ... that the right time had come to convert the Rutheni an peasant back to the Greek Orthodox religion. This opinion was shared by many Russian emigres who flocked to Czechoslovak ia ... after 1919. A drive for 'Orthodoxy ' was started in Rutheni a ... It is a question of how much of this movement was spontaneous and due to the pro-Russian feeling of the population and to its di slike for the purely magyarized Uniate clergy, and how much of its strength it owed to the propaganda and preaching of the Russian Orthodox emigres and clergy and to the support of some Czech political circles. 43 Bruce Garver, "Masaryk and Czech Politics 1900-1914" in Stanley B. Winters, ed. , T G. Masaryk (1850- 193 7) Vo lum e I Thinker and Politician (London, 1990), 22 . 44 See Paul 1. Tresky, " Masaryk and Dostoyevsky" in Harry Hanak, ed., T G. Masa1y k (/ 850- 193 7) Volum e II/ Statesman and Cultural Force (London, 1990), 161-77. SLOVAKIA 2019 105 However, it certainly added one more element to the confusion reigning in Ruthenia and led to animosities which, in the end, turned against the Prague Government itself.45 Reverend Voloshyn bitterly remonstrated against the situation in Prague in 1929: The agitation usually began in the local tavern, where the agitator met the most notorious brawlers in the village. After a short talk, emboldened by 'noisy' arguments and vodka, the peasants would begin to shout abuse against the village pastor. In a matter of two or three days a ' committee' made up of the pastor's 'opponents ' would be formed. The committee did not immediately begin advocating Orthodoxy; instead, it showered the bishop with complaints and delegations, demanding that there be an investigation against the pastor or that he be removed outright. Then followed other forms of harassment, demonstrations, threats against the pastor, intimidation of church curators, and such . The committee would send the pastor letters demanding that he leave the vi llage. As time went on, the committee made increasingly bolder threats that the pastor get out ' or else!' .. .. If, despite such harassment, the priest remained in his parish, the threats escalated. Someone would break his windows, shoot into his windows, poison hi s well , set fire to his grain or stables, and in some cases even the parish house, assault and beat the priest, etc. The government remained indifferent to all this under the pretext of ' Freedom of conscience! Freedom ofreligion!' 46 This state of affairs could not permitted to go on indefinitely. Czechoslovakia was, after all, a republic governed by law. The Vatican made its own contribution to improved church-state relations by transferring Bishop Antonii Papp of Mukachevo to Hungary and replacing him with canon Petro Gebej on July 16, 1924. At the same time, in response to forthcoming parliamentary elections, President Masaryk cryptically declared that "the Catholics will get as many rights as they win." 47 Rusyn voters supported Czech Catho lic political parties which gained an increased measure of strength in parliament. The rights accorded to Greek Catholics by the constitution in 45 Frantisek Nemec and Vladimir Modry, Th e Soviet Seizure of Subcarpathian Ruthenia (Toronto, 1955), 38-9. 46 Avhustyn Voloshyn, " Relihijni vidnozny na Podkarpats ' kyi" in Acta Conventia Pragensis pro Studii Orentalibus n. 1919, (Olomouc, 1930), 218-9. 47 Pekar, 11 8. 106 SLOVAKIA 2019 any case were now enforced. Violence and vandalism were now prosecuted and soon ceased. In some instances church property was restored. Bishop Gebej led a religious revival which resulted in priests maintaining closer contact with their parishioners. A number of converts to Orthodoxy returned to the Greek Catholic faith. The Orthodox revival was one of the sources of survival for the Russophile orientation. Another source was, ironically, Hungarian funding . The fall of Bela Kun's communist regime in August of 1919 was followed by the restoration of the nobility in Hungary. Counterrevolutionary White terror now followed Red terror. Right wing elements who rallied under Admiral Miklos Horthy, soon elevated to the position of regent of Hungary, wanted to regain Slovakia and Podkarpatska Rus' but had to go about it covertly.48 The victorious Western powers would not recognize any government in Hungary which would not accept their peace tenns . On June 4, 1920, Hungary was compelled to sign the Treaty of Trianon, which ceded Slovakia and Podkarpatska Rus' to Czechoslovakia, Transylvania to Romania, and Croatia and the Voivodina to what became known as Yugoslavia. Trianon psychologically scarred Hungarian society for a full generation. France offered to soften the blow by extending to Hungary financial credits, particularly in the area of railway development, in exchange for compliance. Hungarian Prime Minister Istvan Bethlen cheerfully accepted the financial aid and outwardly complied with Trianon. Yet his government covertly subsidized elements in Slovakia and Podkarpatska Rus' who were disgruntled with Czechoslovak centrali sm. Having previously denied these peoples autonomy, the Hungarians now championed their right to selfdetern1ination as a first step toward regaining them. One of the recipients of Hungarian financial aid was Stefan Fentsik. Another was Andrei Brodii ( 1895-1946), a journalist, teacher and chairman of the Autonomous Agricultural Union/Autonomyi Zenled'skij Sojuz (AZS). Fentsik yielded leadership of the Russophile movement to Brodii during the 1930s. Ukrainophile historian Peter Stercho later maintained that Brodii, Fentsik and other select 48 As a precedent to future collaboration in this matter, Poland allowed itself to be used as a staging ground for Hungarian subversion of Czechos lovak administration . A "Magyar-S lovak League" was established in Krakow, and dispatched armed vo lunteers across the border into Slovakia. SLOVAKIA 2019 107 Russophile leaders had to conceal their ties with Hungary from their followers, since even the latter were opposed to territorial revision. 49 Polish policy towards the Rusyns of Galicia followed a similar pattern. In the area directly north of the Dukla Pass lived people belonging to a branch of the Rusyns known as the Lemkos. They can be geographically divided by the San River. The Ukrainian movement penetrated the area east of the San early in the twentieth century and accounted for numerous followers. In November 1918 Lemkos from about 30 villages gathered in the village of Komancza (Komancha in Rusyn) to form their own little republic. This Komancha Republic was viewed as a transitional state, pending merger with a greater Ukraine. West of the San the Lemkos still adhered to the traditions of old Rus'. In autumn 1918 they wanted union with Russia. Since this was obviously never going to happen, the Polish government could afford to humor these Lemkos, The Poles were preoccupied with the West Ukrainian Republic which was proclaimed in Lviv on November 1, 1918, and event which plunged Galicia into an ethnic civil war. On December 5, some 500 Lemko Rusyns representing 130 vi1lages and towns of western Lemkovyna met in Florynka (in Grybow district) to form a government. While the Polish military crushed the Komancha Republic in January 1919, it tended to view the Florynka Lemko Rusyn Republic as a potential ally against the Ukrainians. Polish officials who were present offered the former town hall of Grybow as a political headquarters, while the Polish Army provided arms for a Lemko national guard. Schools and cooperatives were soon organized. Amazingly, the Lemko Rusyn Republic survived a full sixteen months. It was governed by an executive council headed by Reverend Mykhal Iurchakevych and a central national council headed by the lawyer Iaroslaw Kachmarchyk. The Poles were disappointed with the results. The Lemkos were happy to accept whatever aid the Polish government and military were willing to offer but nonetheless were unwilling to take up arms against their errant brethren to the east. Additionally, Kachmarchyk's government rejected the notion of union with a Bolshevik Russia, and began looking at the example of 49 Peter Stercho, Diplomacy of Double Morality: Europe's Crossroads in CarpathoUkraine /9/9-/939(NewYork , 1971), 171. 108 SLOVAKIA 2019 their brethren of the south side of the Carpathians. A union with Czechoslovakia now seemed a viable option. Unfortunately, in 1920 relations between Poland and Czechoslovakia were at a particularly low point, owing to border disputes concerning Tesin in Silesia and Orava-Spis in Slovakia. Before the end of March the Poles arrested Kachmarchyk and members of his government. They were tried on June 10, 1921. A Polish jury acquitted them, which was only reasonable insofar as the Poles had encouraged their activities in the first place. But the event marked the death knell of Lemko statehood. 50 Yet the Poles still had use for the Lernkos in the interwar period. The Greek Catholic Church was strongly identified with the Ukrainian national movement. The leadership of the Polish military, overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, encouraged the movement to convert the Lemkos to Orthodoxy, and thus express a Russian character at the expense of the Ukrainian .51 It was a classic case of Divide and Rule. Elsewhere, in Volhynia, adherents of the Ukrainian national movement were Orthodox. Here militant Polish nationalists attacked and vandalized Orthodox monasteries and schools. At the same time, for reasons of security, Poland wished to have a common border with Hungary. For this reason the Polish government supported Hungarian efforts to regain Podkarpatska Rus' . The events which accompanied the international crisis in 1938 are well-known. The present author shall limit himself to summarizing key particulars. The Munich "diktat" of September 1938 resulted in Czechoslovakia being forced to yield the Gennan populated Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. Deprived of her most vital border defenses, Czechoslovakia was now rendered militarily defenseless. Hostile neighbors, Poland and Hungary, were now encouraged to make their own territorial claims. Moreover, the Prague government could no longer resist demands for autonomy on the part of Slovakia and Podkarpatska Rus ' . 50 See Paul Robert Magocsi, "The Lemko Rusyn Republic ( 1918-1920) and Political Thought in Western Rus' -Ukraine" in Magocsi, Of the Making of Nationalities, 303315. 51 See Mykola Kucherpa, "The Nationality Policy of Poland towards Ukrainians before World War II" in Paul Berst and Jaroslav Mokolak, eds., Th e Lemko Region 1939-1947, War, Occupation and Deportation (New Haven and Krakow, 2002), 3949. SLOVAKIA 2019 109 In the case of Podkarpatska Rus', a cabinet was formed on October 11 which consisted of both Russophiles and Ukrainophiles. Russophiles predominated, with Brodii as prime minister and Fentsik as deputy prime minister. Brodii was convinced that, if a plebiscite was held, the majority of Rusyns would vote for reunion with Hungary. Brodii 's ministry lasted only fifteen days. An alarmed central government summoned Brodii and Fentsik to Prague. There Brodii was arrested, while Fentsik found asylum in the Polish embassy. 52 Prague authorized Voloshyn, who was a member of the cabinet, to form a new government. Voloshyn proclaimed the province as an autonomous nation with the new name of Carpatho-Ukraine on November 3. The victory of the Ukrainophiles was at last complete. Autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine got off to a rough start. Hungary was prepared to re-annex the region, although conservative circles of the Hungarian government confined their claims to areas which were predominantly Magyar. Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy opted to appear in the role of peacemakers in this territorial dispute between Czechoslovakia and Hungary. They arbitrated a compromise settlement in Vienna on November 2, 1938. By terms of the First Vienna Award, Kosice, in southern Slovakia, and Uzhorod and Mukachevo, the two leading cities of Carpatho-Ukraine, were restored to Hungary. The government of Carpatho-Ukraine was forced to relocate to Khust, which was little more than an oversized village. Militant Hungarian nationalists regarded the First Vienna Award as a temporary expedient, and worked for the complete annexation of CarpathoUkraine. Under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense, a covert paramilitary group known as the "Ragged Guard" was organized to infiltrate Carpatho-Ukraine and conduct terrorist acts designed to destabilize the regime. Poland likewise dispatched paramilitary units for the same purpose. If the credible research of Ukrainophile historian Stercho is to be believed, the Polish paramilitary units outpaced their Hungarian counterparts in acts of terrorism. 53 Carpatho-Ukraine was in need of allies, and these were forthcoming. Militant Ukrainian nationalists from Poland crossed the mountains to organize the Riflemen of the Carpathian Sich. It has been argued by Russophile opponents that the Riflemen of the Car52 53 Magocs i, The Shaping of a National Identity, 238. Stercho, 302. 110 SLOVAKIA 2019 pathian Sich inaugurated the reign of "Ukrainian terror." It is true that they focu sed more on the Russophile domestic opposition than they did on Polish or Hungarian infiltrators. A detention camp was established for dissident Russophiles and Rusynophiles at Dumen . Yet conditions of internment were relaxed. Political differences extended to the family leve l, and prisoners under guard where permitted to attend social events in neighboring Rakhiv.54 There was a conflict of interest between the Carpathian Sich and the Voloshyn regime. Sich rifl emen viewed Carpatho-Ukraine as the cornerstore of a future greater Ukraine, and counted on the support of Nazi Germany. Voloshyn , by contrast, decided that adherence to Czecho-Slovakia (now officially spelled with a hyphen) was a necessary expedient. In March of 1939 there were clashes between the Carpathian Sich and the regular Czechoslovak military. This confl ict was abruptly terminated when German leader Adolf Hitler moved to eliminate what remained of Czecho-Slovakia . As he prepared to militarily occupy Prague, he disappointed Ukrainophi les by giving his consent for Hungary to annex the province. Under German pressure, Slovakia declared its independence on March 14. CarpathoUkraine was now cut off from the Czech lands. With Hungarian troops already crossing the border, Voloshyn symbo li cally proclaimed Carpatho-Ukraine's independence on March 15 . Carpatho-Ukraine existed as an independent state for all of a day . On the 16 th , Hungarian military units were fighting for Khust. The Riflemen of the Carpathian Sich resisted with admirab le resolve , but its units were scattered and no match for the Hungarian army. They later regrouped in the mountains or were pushed across the border to Eastern Slovakia, thus encouraging Hungary to invade the latter as well. 55 Hungarian troops reached the Polish border by the end of the I 61\ and were eagerly embraced by their opposite numbers. The region was renamed Subcarpathia and governed directly from Budapest. There was some vague talk in the Hungarian parliament about according autonomy to the most recently annexed portion , but not to Uzhorod or Mukachevo, which were now considered 54 Paul Robert Magocsi , "The Nationality Problem in Subcarpathian Rus ' I 9381939: A Reappraisal" in Magocsi , Of th e Making of Nationalities, 228 . 55 This invasion of Eastern Slovakia resulted in portions of the disputed counties likewise being annexed by Hungary. It also resulted in the Slovak Republic placing itself under the military protection of Nazi Germany. SLOVAKIA 2019 111 directly part of Hungary. Autonomy was del ayed indefinitely. As World War II progressed, the Hungarian military vehemently opposed autonomy for security reaso ns . The Ukrainophiles were particularly singled out for political persecution, while the Russophiles were more or less set aside. Interestingly, the Hungarian government began cultivating the idea that the Rusyns were their own separate nationality, an idea which ultimately became the wave of the future. 56 The resto ration of Hungarian rule dis illusioned the Russophil es. It stood to reason that, once Hungary went down to defeat with Nazi Germany, Andrei Brodii would come to a bad end . He did not attempt to flee when Soviet forces reached the area in the autumn of 1944, but attempted to negotiate with them. He was arrested by the Soviet counterintelligence unit SMERSH, charged as a fascist co ll aborator, and executed on November 7, 1946. A similar fate awa ited Stefan Fentsik: he was shot in the courtyard of the Uzhorod prison on March 30, 1946. Their Ukrainophile rival Voloshyn fared no better. Having taken up res idence in Prague during the war years, he taught at the Ukrainian Free University. In June 1945 he was arrested by SMERSH and transported to Moscow. He died in Lefortovo prison on July 19, undoubtedl y murdered. An ironic footnote of hi story is worth mentioning. Both Brodii and Fentsik were posthumously rehabilitated after the breakup of the Soviet Union. No such rehabilitation has been granted to Voloshyn. World War II and Ukrainiazation If the Russophiles in Podkarpatska Rus' were fatally compromised by collaboration with the Hungarians, then in Eastern Slovakia they earned acclamation for their role in an anti-fascist struggle. A leading force in the resistance to the pro-German regime of president-priest Jozef Ti so was the Slovak Communist Party. George Kennan , at that time charge d 'affa ires to the U.S. embassy in Prague, assessed the pro-communist sentiment in Eastern Slovakia as being a "bird of a different color [which] in former circumstances would have little chance of success." He added, however, that owing to 56 Magocs i, The Shaping of a National Identity, 248-9 . 112 SLOVAKIA 2019 guidance from Moscow, the Communists could become the most formidable resistance group of all. 57 Kennan's prognosis was largely accurate, though certain qualifying feature s must be noted. The Communists did not have a monopoly on the resistance movement. In prewar Czechoslovakia they were strongest in Podkarpatska Rus ', but in Eastern Slovakia they were never ab le to muster more than seven percent of the vote among the Ru syns in the interwar period. Not wishing to be isolated from other Rusyns in organized resistance to the Tiso regime, local Communi sts opted to join the Carpatho-Russian Council for National Liberation (KRASNO), which shall be introduced shortly. The view of the autonomous and later independent Slovak state on the Rusyns was that the latter were "S lovaks of the Greek Catholic faith ." This view was exemp li fied by Andrej Dudas, who in 1940 was appointed regional administrator of Eastern Slovakia. He was convinced that the idea of a Rusyn nationality was created by the Hungarians, a position he maintained a full three decades later as an emigre in Argentina.58 In early 1939, the Rusyn Nationa l Committee and the Carpatho-Russian Nationa l Counci l were banned by the Slovak government, and the activity of the Dukhnovych Society was restricted. The Ukrainian movement among the Rusyns was particularly loathed by the Slovak nationalist leadership. Slovak police reports up until November 1938 indicate that Rusyns in the Presov Region supported union with their brethren east of the Uz Ri ver. Yet, in November, the same police reports indicate a significant change. The Ukrainian movement was even more alien to the Presov Region Rusyns than was Slovak nationalism, and they were henceforth opposed to a revision of borders which was favorable to CarpathoUkraine. 59 Rusyns shared in the economic prosperity of the Slovak Republic which characterized the first half of World War II. Workers in Germany sent money home to their families, whi le locally a number 57 Report written about May I, 1939 on conditions in Slovakia in George Ken nan, From Prague After Munich. Diplomatic Papers 1938-1 940 (Princeton, 1968), 139140. 58 Andrej Dudas, Rusinska otazka ajej uzadie (B uenos Aires, 1971), 25 . 59 See the entry " Carpatho-Russian Autonomous Counci l for National Liberation/Karpatorusskii avtonomyi sovet natsional'nmyi osvonodenyi (KRASNO)" in Magocsi and Pop, eds ., Encyclopedia of Rusy n Histo1y and Culture, 58. SLOVAKIA 2019 113 of Rusyns profited from the expropriation of Jewish property. Yet once it became obvious that the Slovak Republic was on the losing side of the war, a number of Rusyns began to organize, The Carpatho-Russian Autonomous Council for National Liberation (Karpatorusskii avtonomyi sovet national'nogo obsvobzhdenii-KRASNO) was founded in Presov in September 1943. Its goals were to aid escaped Soviet prisoners of war and partisans and to cooperate with other underground elements opposed to what it considered a clericofascist regime. Its members envisioned a restored Czechoslovakia in which Rusyns would be equal partners with Czechs and Slovaks. Although its orientation was pro-Soviet and decidedly leftist, KRASNO was not a communist front organization. It was founded by civic and cultural leaders of varied political orientation. Vasyl' Karaman ( 1903-1961) was born in the village of Nagov, in Slovakia. After completing his education at the Commercial Academy in Mukachevo (1924-1927), be returned to eastern Slovakia, where he worked as a civil servant in Presov from 1927 to 1933 , and then served in various towns as secretary for the pro-government Agrarian Republican Party. When Czecho-Slovakia was being partitioned in the fall of 1938, he opposed the pro-Ukrainian orientation of the Voloshyn government. He was elected as chairman of a newly re-established Central Russian National Council. Its members included both Russophiles and Rusynophiles who wished to retain ties with what remained of Czecho-Slovakia, unlike the followers of Brodii and Fentsik. Unable to realize his objectives, he returned to the Presov Region. Here he joined a Committee of Rusyns which tried to reach an accommodation with the Slovak government. This was not possible, since Slovak nationalist officials distrusted his Russophile orientation. After Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June of 1941, Karaman was arrested. He spent a year and a half in jail, and after his release made contact with the Zhydovs'kyi brothers, Ivan and Petro. Together the three men were among the founders of KRASNO. 60 Ivan Zhydovs'kyi (1897-1982) was born in the village of Sarisske Jastrabie. His secondary school education at the Piarist gymnasium in Sabinov was interrupted in 1915, when he was drafted 60 See the entry " Karaman, Vasyl"' in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 228. 114 SLOVAKIA 2019 into the Austro-Hungarian Army. A year later he was captured on the Eastern Front. Like many prisoners of War, he embraced the Bolshevik cause during the Russian Revolution. During the Russian Civil War Zhydovs ' kyi served as a political commissar in the 216 th International Communist Brigade. When he returned home, he discontinued the role of agitator and became at least outwardly conformist. He completed his secondary education in 1919, and then studied law at the Comenius University in Bratislava, obtaining a degree in 1924. He worked for a time as a tax inspector in Uzhorod. By the I 930s he had a law practice in Uzhorod and he was director of the Presov branch of the Uzhorod-based Subcarpathia Bank. As a Russophile, Zhydovs ' kyi was prominent in the Central Russian National Council and in the Dukhnovych Society. Although opposed to the separatist Slovak government, he kept a lower profile then Kamman and was never arrested. He operated a law practice in Giraltovce prior to his invol ve ment with KRASNO .61 His older brother Petro Zhydovs'kyi (1890-1947) was likewise born in Sarisske Jastrabie. As a teenager Petro emigrated to America in 1905 . Although he acquired little formal education, he returned home on the eve of World War I detern1ined to work for the advancement of the Rusyn people. Drafted into the Austro-Hungarian Army, he deserted, then was captured and sentenced to prison. After the establishment of Czechoslovakia, he joined the Agrarian Republican Party and served as deputy to parliament from 1935 to 1938 . During the crisis of 1938 Zhydovs'kyi joined with Ivan P' ieshchak in submitting a memorandum to the British envoy Lord Runciman, calling for the unification of the Presov Region with an autonomous Podkarpatska Rus' .62 Ivan P' ieshchak ( 1904-1972) was born in the village of Vel'ky Lipnik. After graduating from the gymnasium of Mukachevo and the Presov Greek Catholic Teachers' Co llege, he taught in the regional elementary school s. P ' ieshchak was active in the Union of Rusyn Teachers in Slovakia and helped organize the Union of Rusyn Youth in Slovakia (1933). At the same time he studied law, and attained a 61 See the entry "Zhydovs'kyi, Ivan" in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 55 l. 62 See the entry "Zhydovs' kyi , Petro" in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 551-2. SLOVA.KIA 2019 115 doctoral degree from Charles University in Prague in the same year. By the mid 1930s P 'ieshchak was a prominent figure on the Rusyn political and cultural scene. He joined Andrei Brodii's Autonomous Agricultural Union and served as its representative in parliament. Interestingly, at this time he also worked closely with Andrej Hlinka's Slovak People's Party in the parliament's autonomist bloc . When Podkarpatska Rus' attained autonomy, P'ieshchak served as state secretary in Brodii 's brief-lived cabinet. After Brodii 's demise, he returned to Slovakia, where he maintained a law practice prior to his involvement with KRASNO .63 KRASNO rapidly expanded its network. By the summer of 1944 it controlled 3 7 villages in a sort of "partisan republic" between Medzilaborce and Stropkov. Intensification of partisan activityreinforced by Soviet partisans parachuted across the Carpathiansled to German military intervention in Slovakia at the end of August 1944. The clandestine military center of dissident Slovak Army officers , headquartered in Banska Bystrica, was already in touch with the Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile in London. Its members had to proclaim the Slovak Nationa l Uprising under premature circumstances on August 29. 64 The Slovak National Uprising was a highly complex affair, which goes well beyond the limits of this study. It is sufficient to note here that it was dependent upon Soviet military support. Contrary to allegations by later critics, the Soviets did not deliberately betray the uprising. Their military capacity to cross the Carpathians was severely limited, particularly after the Germans occupied the Dukla pass. Yet the Soviets did not wish to forfeit the political influence they expected to enjoy in postwar Czechoslovakia, and rendered military assistance. In this capacity the Russian military 63 See the entry "P'ieshchak, Ivan" in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 384-5 . 64 Slovak soldiers, under the influence of Captain Piotr Alekseyevitch Velitchko intercepted members of a German military mission passing through Slovakia in the vicinity of Turciansky Sviity Martin. The Slovak soldiers escorted the Germans to the local barracks. It was Velitchko 's intention that the Germans would be disarmed there and that they would be sent to Ukrainian Partisan Headquarters in Kiev. But when the Germans attempted to depart, they were massacred by the Slovaks. Berlin then decided on a complete military occupation of Slovakia. At this point Lieutenant-Colonel Golian in Banska Bystrica issued the order to start the uprising. 116 SLOVAK.IA 2019 crossed through the Dukla pass for a third time in a military campaign that has been immortalized by local historiography. The Carpatho-Dukla operation, initiated on September 8, was undertaken by the 38 1h Soviet Army, led by General Kyril Moskalenko, supported by the 1s i Czechoslovak Army Corps, led by General Ludvik Svoboda. Many of the troops of the Is 1 Army Corps were Rusyns. In the autumn of 1939, as a result of the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, the Soviets had annexed eastern Galicia and merged it with the Ukrainian S.S.R. An estimated 30,000 Rusyns who were disgruntled with Hungarian rule crossed the mountains into eastern Galicia, expecting to be cordially received by their Slavic brethren. Instead, every single one of them was arrested by the NKVD (Soviet State Security) and received an eight to ten year sentence for the illegal border crossing. A full sixty percent of them perished in the Gulag by the time Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June of 1941. The survivors were released to join the I s i Czechoslovak Army Corps . Any Pan-Slav feeling- Russophile or Ukrainophi le alikewhich the Rusyn s may have had earlier had been beaten out of them in the Gulag. They merely wished to return home. In the autumn of 1944 it appeared that they would be the vanguard in the liberation of their homeland. Instead, they were committed to the meat-grinder of the Dukla Pass, where their casualties exceeded sixty percent. 65 The storming of the Duk la Pass was finally completed on October 6th. In the fighting which followed, the monastery community of Ladomirova was severely damaged. Most of the buildings, including the print shop but not the church, were destroyed. Now, too , the NKVD began rounding up Russian emigres in Slovakia. The monks fled to Bratislava, and from there fourteen of them emigrated to the United States. They entered the recently established Holy Trinity Monastery in Jordanville, in upstate New York, where Archbishop Maksimenko now served as archimandrite. They built a church that was a replica of its predecessor in Ladomirova. A young Rusyn novitiate from the village, Vasyl' Shkurla (born 1928), ultimately became Archbishop Lavrl' , one of the leading figures of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad. By the 1980s Holy Trinity had become a major 65 See Vladimir Baumgarten, "Fifty Years Later: An Inquiry into Soviet Military Policy During the Slovak Uprising" in Lewis White, ed., On All Fronts: Czechoslovaks During World War ff Part 2 (Washington , 1995), 2 19-28. SLOVAKIA 2019 117 cultural center for Russian emigres. When the cello virtuoso Mstislav Rostropovich defected to the United States, he chose to settle in Jordanville in order to be near Holy Trinity. 66 The Germans torched large areas in eastern Slovakia as they were forced to retreat, including the town of Svidnik. General Svoboda was nonetheless hailed as a hero and liberator when he entered it on October 28 .67 After the liberation of Svidnik, the Allies temporarily went on the defensive. KRASNO partisans continued fighting in the hills north of Presov. In October their adherents welcomed a declaration by the Slovak National Council that a resurrected Czechoslovakia would consist of three equal nations- Czechs, Slovaks and Rusyns. It must be understood that Rusyns did not fight in partisan units exclusively of their own nationality. Jozef Rodak, longtime director of the East Slovak Military Museum in Svidnik, asserted that most partisan groups in the region had a mixed composition of Slovaks and Rusyns.68 To this day many people in eastern Slovakia have a dual sense of identity : they consider themselves Rusyns by heritage and Slovaks by citizenship. The realities of liberation at the end of World War II disappointed the aspirations of many Rusyns, particularly Russophiles. It undoubtedly di sconcerted them to discover that Moscow now considered them to be Ukrainians. There was already a precedent for thi s aspect of Soviet policy . In 1923 the delegation of Rusyn Communists attended a Party Congress in Soviet Ukraine and declared their acceptance of Ukrainian nationality. It was altogether practical for Soviet authorities to reaffirm acceptance of this principle at the end of 66 See the entry " Ladomirova Monastery" in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 266. 67 General Svoboda was designated as an honorary citizen of Svidnik. As president of Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring of 1968, Svoboda gave the town its first hospital. In I 979, the year of the old man's death, a statue of him was erected in Svidnik. Owing to the damage of autumn 1944, Svidnik is a modem town . Most of the buildings are constructed in the so-called "social realist" style. Svoboda ' s statue looks strangely at home among the imposing, unattractive concrete structures. 68 As a graduate student of Safarik University in Prefov who specialized in the history of his region during World War 11 , Rodak was frequently delegated to carry the briefcases of Soviet military visitors. He remained outwardly conformist throughout the Soviet era. After the 1989 revolution and the coll apse of the communist system, Rodak wrote a series of articles for newspapers in eastern Slovakia and southeas tern Poland in which he exonerated partisans who had fallen into disfa vor. 118 SLOVAKIA 2019 World War II. Throughout the war, the Soviets had pledged themselves to the recognition of Czechoslovakia' prewar frontiers . Yet now Moscow infom1ed the Czechoslovak government that it could not ignore "the will of the people." In the wake of the Red Army's occupation of Podkarpatska Rus ' , various National Committees were established to vote in favor of the province being merged with the Ukrainian S.S.R. In all fairness to these communities, they overall enjoyed popular support. 69 The region was officially ceded at the end of June, 1945. Across the Uz River, in the Presov Region , the Russophile leaders of the defunct KRASNO drew the politically correct conclusion. Now, they too, considered themselves Ukrainian. They reorganized themselves as the Ukrainian National Council of the Presov Region. They envisioned that the long disputed counties of eastern Slovakia would be included in the territorial transfer. Indeed, even before the war ended, Vasyl' Karaman and the Zhysov ' skyi brothers planned to stage a meeting in Presov in February 1945 calling for the merger. A Soviet military major explained to them that such a meeting would be inopportune. The war was still on, and the Soviet Union intended to honor its obligations to Czechoslovakia.70 With eastern Slovakia excluded from the territorial settlement, the Ukrainian National Council of the Presov Region now called for the resurrected Czechoslovakia to consist of three equal nations: Czechs, Slovaks and Ukrainians. The Slovak National Council had already expressed itself in favor of autonomy for the Rusyns. Now, in light of Ukrainian irredentism, it declared its Ukrainian counter• 1·d 11 part as mva 1 . Even after the Rusyns were officially classified as Ukrainian, the Russophile tradition not only persisted but predominated in the Presov Region . It must be noted that the Soviet 3gth Army was composed of elite Guards regiments, the cream of the Soviet military. Its soldiers conducted themselves in a correct and disciplined manner in 69 Yaroslav Pylynsky, Rising Ethnic Self-Awareness. Carpatho-Rusyns- Birth of a New Nation or a Political Game? (Copenhagen, 1998), 20. 70 Memorandum on the Ukrainian movement in Eastern Slovakia. Kosice. February 16, 1945 , in Nemec and Modry, Th e Soviet Seizure of Ruthenia, Document no.77 , 359-60 71 Magocsi , "National Assimilation: The Case of the Rusyn-Ukrainians of Czechoslovakia" in Of the Making of Nationalities, 262 . SLOVAKIA 2019 119 their interactions with the locals after forcing their way through the Dukla Pass. This was in striking contrast with the soldiers of the 4 th Ukrainian Front, who penetrated Slovakia from the south, and who engaged in rape and widespread looting. This author can personally attest to the fact that citizens of the Svidnik area remember the Russians fondly as having assisted them through a bitter winter, and afterwards helped the locals plant their spring crops. Historian Mykola Musynka, himself a Ukrainophi le, summarizes the local attitudes as follows: The culmination of Russophilism in the cultural life of the Rusyns of the Prefo v Region occurred in the years just after World War II, when due to the Red Army's defeat of German fascism, th e Soviet Union enjoyed considerable authority among Rusyn-Ukrainians as well as Czechs and Slovaks. Everything "Soviet" was perceived as "Russian." Political propaganda attempted to portray the Soviet Union as an ideal country in which all peoples were united around the "Great Russian people. " The Russian language, Russian culture, the Russian individual, and the "Russian Soul " all symbolized the acme ofp e,:fection. 72 Russian Elementary and secondary schools proliferated after World War II, in addition to the Russian gymnasium in Presov, an additional Russian gymnasium was established in Medzilaborce on February 23, 1945, and trade schoo ls were opened in which Russian was the language of instruction. According to official statistics for the 1948-49 school year, there were 43 kindergartens, 276 elementary schools, 38 incomplete and 6 complete secondary schools with instruction in the Russian language, totaling 23, 11 2 pupils.73 After the Ukrainian National Council of the Presov Region was abolished, it was replaced by a new organization, the cultural Union of Ukrainian Workers (Kul'tumy sojuz'ukrajans'kyi trudjascychKSUT), which was staunchly supportive of the Communist Party. KSUT initiated numerous publications in the Ukrainian language. 72 Mykola Musynka, "The Postwar Development of the Regional Culture of the Rusyn-Ukrainians of Czechoslovakia' in Paul Robert Magocsi, ed., The Persistence of Regional Cultures: Rusyns and Ukrainians in the Carpathian Hom eland and Abroad (New York, 1993), 55. 73 Ibid, 56. 120 SLOVAKIA 2019 Beginning on June 28, 1952, by decree of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia, the language of instruction in all Russian elementary and secondary schools of Eastern Slovakia was changed to Ukrainian . The change in the school system was torturous for all parties. It was implemented too quickly. Instructors who had never studied literary Ukrainian were assigned to take month-long courses, after which they were expected to teach in that language. The vast majority of teachers detested it. There was a shortage of textbooks, dictionaries and other printed materials. Ukrainiazation nonetheless made significant strides in popular culture . In January 1953 , KSUT sponsored the first professional song and dance ensemble in Medzilaborce under the artistic direction of Jurij Kostjik. It was eventually reorganized as the Dukla Ukrainian Folk Ensemble. In September of that year, a Department of Ukrainian Language and Literature was established at the Presov Pedagogical Institute, which in 1959 became the Philosophical Faculty of Safarik University, under the direction of Petro Bungansyn. Literary works by Rusyns in the Presov Region reached an unprecedented level of publication in the course of a decade in the Ukrainian language. After 1959, the Ukrainian division of the Slovak Pedagogical Publishing House had a monopoly on the release of Ukrainian books in the Presov Region. During a thirty-year period it published 373 literary and scholarly works. Not all of them withstood the test of time. Many employed the so-called "socialist realist" style, reflecting a Marxist-Leninist ideological bent which conformed to Party dogma. Yet the Presov Region has produced works which have assumed a permanent place in the history of literature. 74 A number of former Russophiles moved with the times and adopted Ukrainian literary norms. Those Russophiles who remained outside the Communist Party could not expect a triumphal finish . Such was the case of Vasyl' Karaman, who, after the abolition of the body he had chaired, was accused of being a "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist." The allegation was blatantly absurd: Karaman steadfactly believed that the future of the Rusyns was closely bound to the Soviet Union . He was nonetheless removed from political and cultural life in the Presov Region. Similarily, Ivan P'ieshchak was ac74 Ibid, 65 . SLOVAKIA 2019 121 cused of bourgeois nationalism, driven from his home in 1952, and forbidden to practice law for nearly a decade. Ironically, some of the greatest beneficiaries of the new socialist order were those Rusyns of the 1st Czechoslovak Anny Corps who had survived the ordeal of the Dukla Pass. In spite of their suffering in the Gulag, they had fought bravely and well under General Svoboda, in fact becoming his favorite soldiers. 75 The treaty transferring Podkarpatska Rus ' to Soviet Ukraine contained a certain "exemption" clause. Those Rusyns with a record of service in the Czechoslovak Army could retain Czechoslovak citizenship. About half of them chose to do so, relocating west of the Uz. Svoboda redressed the balance for them as much as humanly possible, obtaining jobs for them in the military and especially in the security services. One might suppose that, after their experience in the Gulag, they would have been averse to serving as agents of repression. Instead, thanks to Svoboda' s generous patronage, they became overrepresented in the secret police, not only in eastern Slovakia but in Prague and Bratislava as well. This role fueled the hostility of their fellow citizens. Animosities smoldered beneath the surface for a full generation. During the Prague spring of 1968, the Slovak press suddenly became articulate in its denunciations: " ... this 15 year anti-Slovak movement in eastern ... Slovakia must be liquidated." 76 Slovak nationalists in particular resented the fact that the city of Presov served as a bastion of Ukrainophile activity. Slogans appeared on a number of buildings: "Presov was and will be only- and only- a Slovak city" and "Ukrainians, get out of Presov! " 77 The Slovak element of eastern Slovakia was not the only one which opposed the Ukrainian movement. Passive opposition was expressed by many Rusyns themselves . If they could not be themselves, the Rusyns opted for the closest thing, and voluntarily assimilated into the Slovak nationality. 78 The local dialect spoken was not foreign to them, unlike that of the Ukrainian textbooks imported from Kiev. Whenever local citizens were questioned by the police, they declared themselves as Slo75 Magocsi, "Magyars and Carpatho-Rusyns in Czechoslovakia" in Of the Making of Nationalities, 175. 76 Cited in Kulturny zivot (Bratislava) April 15, 1968 and Vychod (Kosice) November 29, 1968. 77 Magocsi, "National Assimilation", 283. 78 fbid, 264-70. 122 SLOVAKIA 2019 vak, fearing deportation to the Soviet Union. Finally, the relatively more advanced Slovak economy drew many to the industrial valleys farther south, where the process was completed. For those Rusyns who continued to consider themselves Ukrainian , yet another shock awaited in the following generation. After the 1989 revolutions and the collapse of communism in East Central Europe, first the Slovak and then the Polish government recognized the Carpatho-Rusyns as a distinct nationality. Many young Rusyns eagerly embraced the new orientation. 79 Conclusion. Unrepentant Russophiles: Yurkovsky, Kabuliak, Sidor and Karabelesh The demise of the Russophile orientation among the CarpathoRusyn people was undoubtedly, to employ a Marxist cliche, historically inevitable. An interesting story revealing the pathetic depths to which it had descended by World War II is provided by Marian Zgomiak, later a professor at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow , Poland. At the outbreak of World War II, Zgomiak was a 15 year-old Polish youth. When Poland was militarily crushed by Nazi Germany in September of 1939, Poli sh Army veterans hoped to escape to the West to fight again. Since most of the Polish soldiers fleeing abroad were between the ages of 17 and 30, two groups of people played disproportionately large roles in the domestic resistance movement organized by the Polish Home Army (Armija Krajowa- AK). One of them was Polish teenagers, who acted as couriers escorting the fugitive s to the border with Slovakia. Another was the Lemkos, who acted as guides. 79 The rejection of Ukrainian identity is by no means unanimous. On November 17, 1990, at the First Congress of the Ru syn Renaissance Society in Medzilaborce, spokesman Mychal Turok-Heter stressed that "while it is vital to preserve national pride, it is wrong to attack the Ukrai nians and the Ukrainian language . Gradually, the Ru syns will write and advance toward the common path which will lead them to fulfilling thei r mi ssive of peace for us all." See Myslenka, 75. Frequently, on the local level , there ex ists a certa in pluralism. In Svidnik, the Museu m of UkrainianRus'Culture acknowledges kinship with the former while stressing the regional identity of the latter. See the entry " Museum of Ukrainian Rus' Culture in Svidnik" in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusy n Histo1y and Cu lture, 337. SLOVAK.IA 2019 123 Young Zgorniak was active in these border expeditions. On July 2, 1942, he and his father were arrested by the Gestapo. After the usual beatings and interrogation in the basement of the Gestapo headquarters in Gorlice, Zgorniak was transferred to the prison in Jaslo. Here he bonded with a Lemko prisoner named Yurkovsky. This Yurkovsky was an unrepentant Russophile. During World War I he and his father were hauled off to internment in Talerhof. Yurkovsky senior died there during the typhus epidemic. Yurkovsky junior returned to the mountain districts of Lemkovyna to serve as a teacher in the interwar years. He did not consider himself a Rusyn or even a Lemko, but a Russian. He was not receptive to Polish efforts to sponsor a separate Lemko identity. After the invasion of the Soviet Union in June of I 941 , the Nazi Government General (to which Lemkos west of the San River where subject) rounded up Lemkos known for their pro-Russian sentiments. In this manner Yurkovsky found himself in the prison of Jaslo. Both the quality and quantity of food in the prison of Jaslo left much to be desired. In September of 1942 German authorities loosened the regime to the point where Lemkos (but not Poles) could receive food packages. Arrangements were made for Zgomiak's mother to send food to Yurkovsky, who shared it with her son. Working together in the hospital section of the prison, they had the opportunity to engage in intellectual discussions. Zgorniak records the following: During one of the discussions I asked whether or how he could coordinate the Carpatho-Rusyn orientation on the Russia ruled by the Tsar with an orientation on a Russia ruled by the Bolsheviks who had overthrown and murdered the Tsar and his family. He said he could do so because "after the death a/father in Talerhof I had the dream . In it my father appeared and said 'the cause for which both are fighting shall be successful! ' That dream I keep in mind and I believe it will prove to be true. "80 80 Marian Zgomiak, " Meeting with Lemko leaders who had been arrested by the Gestapo and who were in prison in Jaslo 1942" in Best and Moklak, eds ., The Lemko Region, /939-194 7, 129. 124 SLOVAKIA 2019 Zgomiak asserts that he was convinced Yurkovsky and other Lemkos could have been released had they declared themselves Ukrainians. They declined to do so. Eventually, Yurkovsky was transferred to a concentration camp in Pruszkow, from which he was liberated before the end of the war. Yurkovsky then became sold on the plan jointly agreed upon by the Polish and Soviet governments to encourage Lemkos to emigrate to the east. Those whose villages had been destroyed during the Carpatho-Dukla operation went willingly. Others followed Yurkovsky across the border. They were by no means satisfied with living conditions in Soviet Ukraine, and turned on Yurkovsky for encouraging them to leave in the first place. He suffered something akin to a nervous breakdown and developed heart disease. Zgomiak concluded: "I remember him as an intelligent fellow who despite hi s various interests was fatally attracted to the idea for which he fought." 81 In light of its ignominious end in the realm of politics, what remains of the Russophile tradition among the Carpatho-Rusyns in the realm of culture? Here the author wishes to turn to the areas of religion and literature. In the area of reli gion, the Orthodox faith has provided a certain legacy. It must be understood that the majority of Rusyns professing any religious belief adhere to the Greek Catholic rather than the Orthodox Church . Yet the Orthodox revival of the early twentieth century made an enduring impact which was embraced by the communist regimes after World War II. Its most enthusiastic protagonist was Aleksander Kabuliak. At the end of World War I he was released from prison and became a major figure of the Orthodox revival in Czechoslovakia. There was a sc hi sm within the Orthodox Church in the 1920s. Its adherents were subject to the Serbian patriarchate, whereas Czech converts to Orthodoxy wanted their own autocephalous Orthodox Church. They appealed to the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople. On March 4, 1923 he consecrated the archimandrite Savritij as bishop. Bi shop Savritij 's leadership was contested by Bishop Gorazd, the Serbian patriarch 's representative. Kabuliak sided with the Serbian patriarchate in this di spute. With the Orthodox Church temporarily paralyzed and depri ved of an acting bishop, Kabuliak assumed the role of administrator. The Hungar81 Ibid, 129. SLOVAKIA 2019 125 ians did not molest him during World War II, nor did he do anything to provoke them. But on November 18, 1944, on behalf of the Orthodox believers of Podkarpatska Rus ', Kabuliak wrote a letter to no less a personage than Soviet leader J. V. Stalin. He recommended the establishment of a Carpatho-Russian Soviet Republic encompassing territory extending "from Iasnyia to Poprad and from Uzhok Pass to Debrecen." 82 Since Moscow was already planning to incorporate Podkarpatska Rus' into the Ukrainian S.S.R., this was not an option. Yet in the following month Kabuliak led a delegation to Moscow requesting the transfer of episcopal jurisdiction from the Serbian to the Moscow patriarchate. Here his efforts were crowned with success. In posthumous recognition of his achievement, in 200 I the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow patriarchate) canonized Kabuliak as the first Carpatho-Rusyn saint. Eastern Galicia, like Podkarpatska Rus ', was ceded to Soviet Ukraine at the end of the war. In both areas incoming communist regimes declared the Greek Catholic Church abolished and transferred its parishes to the jurisdiction of the Orthodox Church. In Galicia most of the clergy accepted the formal change and retained their old parishes. The Ukrainian character of the church consequently survived . In Transcarpathia the Greek Catholic clergy was more resistant to Orthodoxy and it was imposed more forcefully. Bishop Teodor Romza of Mukachevo was brutally murdered, while lesser clergymen were arrested and deported.83 They were replaced by Russian priests di spatched from Moscow. The Orthodox Church here acquired an expressively Russian character. From the standpoint of Rusyn culture, inclusion into the Russian Orthodox Church was a double-edged sword. In America, Reverend Alexis Toth had sought to convince his flock that the best way to preserve their rite, tradition and identity was through conversion to Orthodoxy. Yet St. Alexis (He too was canonized) had a great love for the variety of liturgical music known as Carpathian plainchant. 82 See the entry "Kabuliak, Aleksander" in Magocsi and Pop, eds. , Encyclopedia of Rusyn Hist01:y and Culture, 223 . 83 Pekar, 151 -4. 126 SLOVAK.IA 2019 This and another native aspects of worship were submerged by Russian liturgical tradition .84 In Czechoslovakia the legal status of the Greek Catholic Church was restored as a result of the liberal reforms of the Prague spring of 1968. Yet it lost its Rusyn character and became a force for slovakization. Much church property has been restored since the collapse of the communist system in 1989. Yet there remain adherents of the Orthodox faith in northeastern Slovakia. This author has an endearing memory of a visit to an Orthodox church in Svidnik. It was a modest, prefabricated structure, erected in the L990s. The morning was cold. There was only room inside the church for elderly parishioners. Yet a sizable crowd of young people remained standing outside. They displayed enough reverence to refrain from smoking throughout the Divine Liturgy. If the Rusyns can no longer be considered Great Russians, then the Russian government, and especially the Orthodox Church, wishes to retain whatever bonds still exist. While seminarians of the autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church have received their education in Ukraine, those who adhere to the Moscow patriarchate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church have been educated in Russia. Such was the case of Dmitri Sidor, born March 29, 1955, currently rector of the Church of the Exaltation of the Cross in Uzhorod. Reverend Sidor heads a movement demanding autonomy for Rusyns of Ukraine. He stresses the religious character of his people, and the similarity of their language with Old Church Slavonic. On December 19, 2008 , the Rusyn issue was raised at an international conference held on the Don, southern Russia. The conference was entitled "Genocide and Cultural Ethnocide of the Rusyns of Carpathian Rus' [from the end of the nineteenth to the beginning of the twenty first century]." A resolution was adopted. It stated that, alongside the Armenians, the Rusyns were the first victims of genocide in the twentieth century, thi s in reference to the policy of the Austro-Hungarian military during the First World War. Today, the resolution continued, Kiev engaged in a "policy of cultural ethno- 84 Paul Robert Magocsi, "Adaptati on Wi thout Assimilati on: The Genius of the Greek Catholic Church of Mukachevo" in Of the Making of Nationalities, Volume 11 , 202. SLOVAKIA 2019 127 cide." It pointed out that the Rusyns were recognized as a distinct nationality by numerous countries, but not Ukraine. 85 The Ukrainophile orientation responded to the Rostov conference. One articulate response may be found in the working paper "Political and Ethno-Cultural Aspects of the Rusyns' Problem: A Ukrainian Perspective," by Natalya Belitzer of the Py lip Orlyk Institute for Democracy in Kiev. She outlines the tortutous, complex evolution of the history of a region which has been subject to numerous rulers. She echoes her colleague M. Lanchuk in asserting that the main issue at stake has not been the ethno-cultural identity of the Rusyns but rather what has been termed "political Ruthenianism," which many Ukrainians perceive as a threat. 86 According to Belitzer, the disintegration of the Soviet Union was accompanied by an artificial politicization of the Rusyn question. Belitzer is not opposed to Ru syn autonomy in principle. Yet, as a Ukrainophile, she considers the Rusyn tongue as a mere dialect of the Ukrainian language. Belitzer makes a particularly revealing admission when she states that "Ukrainian democracy is ... quite benevolent to the ideas and practices of the restoration of minorities ' own identity, but at the same time strongly denies Rusyn identity as being separate from the Ukrainian.,,s1 Therein lies the rub. If the Rusyn tongue is a dialect of the Ukrainian language, why is its use not permitted in schools? Rusyn schoolchildren speak one way at home but are required to speak another way at school. Such practices are grist to Dmitri Sidor's mill. Aside from the fact that Ukraine has an army and the Rusyns do not, Father Dmitri's movement faces two serious obstacles. For one, he is an Orthodox priest, whereas the majority of Rusyns still profess (or have resumed professing) the Greek Catholic faith. Secondly, while a majority of the Rusyns in the Presov Region and Lemkovyna 85 Resolution of the International conference "Genocide and Cultural Ethnocide of Ru syns in Carpathian Rus' [from the end of the nineteenth to the beginning of the twenty first century] Rostov on the Don, Russia. December 2 1, 2008 www.podkar~atskarus.eu 6 M. Panchuk, " Political Rutheni ani sm" in Demons of Peace and Messengers of War(Kiev, 1997), 323. 87 Natalya Belitzer, "Political and Ethno-Cultural Aspects of the Rusyns' Problem : A Ukrainian Perspective". Research paper prepared within the framework of the Programme on European Security (PROGRES) sponsored by the Center for European Security Studies and the University of Gronigen (Netherlands). Undated, 12. 128 SLOVAKIA 2019 consider themselves their own nationality, a majority of them in Transcarpathia consider themselves Ukrainian. Yet the movement has a growing popular appeal. In a state where bureaucratic centralism has had a constipating effect, autonomy can be a powerful laxative. Moreover, the Rusyns now possess a certain bargaining chip . A full eighty percent of all Russian petroleum and natural gas which is sold to Europe passes through pipelines in the area of Uzhorod. If the Rusyns were to succeed in establishing an independent state, they would be eligible to receive billions of dollars of gas transit profits from Kiev.88 In the realm of literature, the Russophile tradition has likewise established an enduring legacy. This is especially exemplified by the writings of Andrii Karabelesh ( 1906-1964). Karabelesh was born in the Transcarpathian village of Tibala, near Mukachevo. When he first attended the gymnasium in Mukachevo the language of instruction was still Magyar. This changed due to the arrival in Podkarpatska Rus ' of many Russian emigres fleeing the revolution. Karabelesh adapted to the russification of the school system so enthusiastically that he became the first secular writer among Rusyn Russophi les. He went on to study at the Theological Seminary in Uzhorod ( 1925-1928). While still a student he published- in Russian- two collections of poetry, lzbrany e stikhovtvorenia (1928) and V buchalh rassvieta ( 1929). These works have been characterized as "dominated by mysticism, a pessimistic outlook on life, and a love of Russian culture." 89 He did not complete his studies at the Theological Seminary because he converted to Orthodoxy. His conversion was less for religious than for cultural reasons. As literary historian Elaine Rusinko writes: "Karabelesh ' s deity is not the conventional God of the Greek Catholic catechism, but an amorphous, spiritual force that provides metaphysical potential and philosophical substance for the poet." 9 Karabelesh went on to Prague, where he obtained a degree in philosophy from Charles University in 1934. ° 88 See " Ukraine Laun ches Moderni zation of Urengog-Ponary-U zhorod Pipeline," Ukra inian News Agency, Jul y 19, 2011 . 89 See the entry " Karabelesh, Andrii " in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 223. 90 Ru sinko, 350. SLOVAKIA 2019 129 Karabelesh continued writing exclusively in standard Russian. Unlike earlier Russophiles, he did not look towards Russia for the deliverance of the Rusyn people. In his estimation, it was no longer a matter of what Holy Mother Russia could do for Podkarpatska Rus'. It was a matter of what Carpathian-Rus' could do for Holy Mother Russia. In his enthusiasm for the great Russian literary giants, Karabelesh exhibited a tendency towards plagiarism, using some of their phrases directly in his own poetry. Karabelesh 's special favorite was Mikhail Lennontov, who merits attention here. Like his predecessor, the great Russian Romantic Alexander Pushkin, Lermontov wrote passionately, lived wildly and was killed in a duel. Unlike Pushkin, Lermontov created a literary genre in which the psychology of the protagonist played a leading role. This served as a precedent for the great novels of Dostoyevsky later in the century.91 In his poem "Nevdol'strie" (Dissatisfaction), Karabelesh quotes Lermontov's Pechorin: "I was not born for happiness. " 92 Anyone who studies the course of Karabelesh 's life would probably agree. He taught secondary school for a time in Podkarpatska Rus ', but when the Hungarians reoccupied the region he fled to Bohemia. Karabelesh participated in the Czech Resistance against the Nazis, heading a small underground group in Litamsyl. In this capacity he was arrested by the Gestapo in 1942. He passed the remainder of the war in the concentration camps of Mauthausen and Buchenwald. After the war he remained for a time in western Czechoslovakia, serving as principal of the gymnasium of Svitavy (19451953). Then he moved to the Presov Region, where he taught Russian language and literature at Safarik University. Although a member of the Ukrainian section of the Slovak Writers Union, he continued to write exclusively in Russian. It was not simply a case of Karabelesh being unwilling to move with the times. The red banner of the October Revolution replaced the grey skies in "V karpatikh osin" (Autumn in the Carpathians ). 93 Yet the apolitical, pessimistic tone of Karabelesh 's poetry became increasingly an object of attack by communist ideologues. In 1956, when the Soviet Communist Party was 91 See Semyon Eks hut, " Pushkin 's Heir" Russian Life, 42 , No, 6 (October/November 1999), 20-32. 92 Rusinko, 353. 93 Ibid, 362. 130 SLOVAKIA 2019 in a state of ideological crisis in the aftermath of Stalin's death , Karabelesh raised his voice in criticism of the imposed ukrainization of the Rusyn people. He was subsequently expelled from the Slovak Writers Union and returned to Bohemia. In the homeland, literary hi storian and defender of the "social realist" genre Iurii Bolega opened an ideological offensive against Karabelesh ' s work, condemning it as having a Russian chauvinist and anti-social character. One may ask why Karabelesh would wish to return home under such circumstances. Yet the years he spent in concentration camps had undennined hi s health, and Karabelesh was of the opinion "Where you are born, there you should die! " 94 Terminally ill, Karabelesh finally returned home in 1964. He died in Mukachevo on September 4 . In the post-communist era his poetry has experienced a revival of popularity. The Eastern Carpathians constitute an area of scenic beauty, but also in many places one of the depressing poverty. In his poem " Moi Narod" (My Nation), Karabelesh focuses on "fences and of abandoned gardens," "dried out grape vines," "bars of broken down churches," "unplowed fields," and so on. His writing reflects the mixture of beauty and melancholia that is essential to the brooding Slavic soul. If the Russophile tradition never reached the level of popularity that the Ukrainophile orientation attained, it nonetheless remains an essential part of the cultural landscape. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author wishes to thank and express his deep appreciation to Bob Broedel , president of the Tallahassee-Krasnodar Sister City Program, for hi s technical assistance in accessing material published in Russia and Ukraine. 94 Ibid, 359.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Russophiles without Russia Description An account of the resource R. Vladimir Baumgarten Slovakia, Vol. 44 (No. 82-83), 2019 pp. 83-130 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Baumgarten, R. Vladimir Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/43238533a84c77e42113ebf07f3426a1.pdf ef777dbe49c69f4a4bc73ef517c5cad9 PDF Text Text 72 SLOVAKIA 2019 SLOVAK EMIGRES IN THE REPORTS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ACTIONS AGAINST FERDINAND DURCANSKY AND JOZEF KIRSCHBAUM (1961-1966/68) Petr Kubik Large quantities of material concerning the Slovak post-war emigration have been preserved in the archives of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague and are now available to researchers. The post-war Czechoslovak government and foreign offices all over the world followed the activities of various exile leaders and organizations regardless of what country they lived in. Two of these emigre groups were closely watched by the new leaders in power si nce the summer of 1945 - the (Czech General Lev) Prchala Group and Slovak "separatists."' This led to a paradox - often those who were actively involved in following and reporting on the exile leaders between 1945-4 7 went into exile themselves in the spring of 1948. These new exiles would also be followed by their communist successors in the Czechoslovak embassies. 2 It is interesting to compare the state and quality of the different archival materials according to the countries covered. The most informative collections concern the emigres in North and South America. Unlike Australia, where there was little information regarding exiles, the Czechoslovak authorities in Argentina, Canada and USA mapped the situation in a very thorough manner. Regarding Europe, many materials were preserved on Italy (Rome and the Vatican), some in Germany but only scant information from other countries such as France, Switzerland, Austria, Great Britain and Spain. In the present study, using archival materials, I would like to de- 1 The Prchala Group were Czech anti-Benes and anti-Communists, led by General Lev Prchala. They were forbidden to return to their homeland, which was ruled by Benes and the Communists. Slovak "separatists" were supporters of Slovak inderendence, a name given to them by Czechoslovak propaganda. E.g. Vladimir Vanek, Jan Pauliny-T6th (Rome), Frantisek Schwarzenberg (the Vatican), Frantisek Nemec (Ottawa) and Josef Kotrly (Montreal) . �SLOVAKIA 2019 73 scribe how the Czechoslovak authorities in the l 960's took major actions against key Slovak figures in exile. In Canada it was against Dr. Jozef Kirschbaum, former Secretary-General of the Slovak People 's Party in 1939-1940 and in Germany it was against Dr. Ferdinand Durcansky, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, 1939-1940. For administrative reasons Durcansky and the former leader of the German ethnic group in Slovakia, Franz Karmasin, were treated together in the Prague archives. Actions Against Ferdinand Durcansky and Franz Karmasin During 1961-1968 On I 6/02/ 196 I the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (UV KSC) adopted a resolution to prepare and execute a campaign against Ferdinand Durcansky and Franz Karmasin. This was a part of the ongoing campaign against "the West German Revanchists" by the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry charged Karmasin with being "a war criminal," and Durcansky, who also lived in Germany, "the leader of the Slovak fascist emigration." Writing a propaganda brochure about "the fascist activities" of the two aforementioned leaders was assigned to Slovak regime historians -- Cubomir Liptak of the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences (HU SA V) and Lieutenant Colonel Navratil from the Military History Institute (VHU), both in Bratislava. On 02/ 11/1961 Liptak and Navratil went to Prague 's office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss and finalize some details for their publication, Ve znameni dvou kfizu (In the Sign of the Double Cross). 3 The secret propaganda materials were completed in the winter of 196 1/1962. 3,000 vo lumes of the publication In the Sign of the Double Cross were printed in German, with a planned distribution in Germany and other Western countries . The Czech News Agency (CTK) planned a series of propaganda activities supporting the work by Navratil and Liptak. The Czechoslovak Military Film Institute produced a 25-minute documentary concerning mainl y Franz Karmasi n. During this time, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Justice was 3 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box NSR 2, fi le 033964/61 -3 �74 SLOVAKIA 2019 preparing extradition requests for Durcansky and Karmasin, although their officers didn ' t believe that they would be successful. In addition, the Regional Court of Bratislava issued new arrest warrants for 4 Durcansky ( on 15/02/1962) and Karmas in (on 14/05/ 1962). In the spring of 1962, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foregin Affairs presented extradition papers regarding Durcansky and Karmasin to the Embassy of the USA in Prague, because the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) did not have diplomatic relations.5 This took place publicly on 29/05/ l 962 with the official transmission of the diplomatic note to the government of the FRG via the American embassy. There was no response from the FRG. It was a conscious decision of the German authorities not to respond to this Czechoslovak provocation . Next, the Prague regime appealed to the Austrian authorities - the Czechoslovak embassy in Vienna issued an arrest warrant for Durcansky to the Austrian authorities . Despite Czechoslovak insistence on the extradition of Durcansky (a notice written on 22/ 12/ 1962), 6 there was no reaction. In the summer of 1963 , there was still no response from either German or Austrian authorities. Durcansky maintained his activities, even to the extent that he presided at the meeting of the GermanSlovak Society in Munich, held on the occasion of the 24th anniversary of the creation of the Slovak State on 13/03/ l 963. On the occasion of the Sudetenland Day on 3/6/ 1963, the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs started a new action with the goal of transmitting new diplomatic notes regarding the arrest of Durcansky to all Western countries. They transmitted again another urgent diplomatic note to the FRG government through the American embassy in Prague.7 On 10/08/ 1965 a Czechoslovak diplomatic note, focusing on Karmasin, 8 was finally transmitted to the American embassy, which passed it on to the German Foreign Office on 23/08/1965. On 4 Ibid, file 0 16696/62-80. In the present study the designation Federal Republic of Germany is used for the West Germany. 6 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box NSR 2, file 0 16696/62-80. 7 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box NSR 2, file 025560/63 . 8 Ibid, file 02648 1/65-3 . No justification for this delay is mentioned in the documents. 5 �SLOVAKIA 2019 75 07 /0 l/ 1966 the German Office responded categorically in the negative to the request regarding the extradition. The reason that the German authorities gave was because of the German Constitutional Basic Law and the Extradition Law, with Karmasin being a citizen of Germany and Durcansky being only involved in political activities. 9 The Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs then decided to transmit the matter to the Czechoslovak Governmental Commission Charged with Identifying Nazi War Criminals, which was not successful. This Commission was in session on 14/05/1966 and it insisted on the extradition request. They intended to continue publishing propaganda materials and also to requesting the assistance of the Munich Public Prosecutor's Office in investigating Karmasin. 10 The office of the Munich Public Prosecutor sent a letter to Prague on 29/5/1966, asking for more evidence against Karmasin, as the information they had was insufficient to bring charges against him. The Commission took its time and only on 10/ l l/ 1966 did it decide 11 to help the Munich investigation by collecting more evidence. During this time, the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a new note to the FRG Foreign Office via the US embassy on 10/ 10/1966, repeating the extradition request. It was rejected by the FRG Foreign Office on 11/7/ 196. It based its decision on the London Agreement of 08/08/ 1945 and the UN Resolution of 11/12/ 1946, that created no legal precedent for extraditing citizens. In response, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared another diplomatic note, attacking the FRG for this position and demanding the extradition of Durcansky and Karmasin. Otherwise, the Czechoslovaks would refuse to help with the Karmasin process in Munich. The arrival of the Prague Spring in 1968 did not halt this action. Another diplomatic note was delivered to the US embassy on 05/04/ 1968, and during April of 1968 all the embassies of W estem countries and Yugoslavia were notified. 12 The Czechoslovak authorities continued other diplomatic measures against Durcansky. In September of 1968 they protested to the Austrian government against his stay in Austria and in October of 1968 they protested to the US authorities against his travel to the 9 Ibid, file 02230 I /66-4. Ibid, file 024471 /66-4 . 11 Ibid, file 120894/66-4 . 12 Ibid, file 120894/66-4. 10 �76 SLOVAKIA 2019 USA . But the extradition issue was about to end. On 04/10/1968 Mr. Kastl , the head of the Department for Socialist Countries of the Bonn Freign Office, communicated to the Czechoslovak trade representative that he had prepared a negative response to the Czechoslovak diplomatic note from 05/04/1968 . He would not send it officially yet, due to the events of the Prague Spring of August of 1968. The Czechoslovak Commission for War Crimes stated, during their reunion on 05/ 11 / 1968, the impossibility of obtaining the extradition of Durcansky and Karmasin and communicated this information to the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Prague Ministry had expected this to happen for some time. 13 The Action Against Jozef Kirschbaum in 1962-1965 At the beginning of the I 960's, the Czechoslovak authorities in Canada (the Embassy in Ottawa and the Consulate General in Montreal) started to worry about the growing influence of Jozef Kirschbaum within the Canadian Slovak League, as well as with Canadian politicians in general. During this time Jozef Kirschbaum lectured at the University of Toronto . In December of 1961 Canadian Prime Minister Diefenbaker received Kirschbaum, as a member of the delegation of the Captive EuropeanNations, and on 08/02/1 962 Kirschbaum was elected vice-president of the Canadian Ethnic Press Association. In addition, his friend and collaborator, the influential entrepreneur Stefan B. Roman , had many contacts with Canadian politicians, especially with Paul Martin, the future Minister of Foreign Affairs . The Czechoslovak authorities started a propaganda campaign against Kirschbaum with the aim of discreditng all Slovak emigres in Canada. On 26/0 I/ 1962 the Czechoslovak Consulate General in Montreal created an extensive document entitled Proposal for Executing the Action Against the Slovak Separatist, Professor Kirschbaum . They proposed to make use of the recent legal proceedings of Israel against the German war criminal Adolf Eichmann and raised the matter of possible other war criminals at large to the attention of the world. Furthermore, they planned to use the anti-Semitic measures taken by the government of Slovakia in 1939-1940 to slander 13 Ibid, file 11 7841 /68-6 . �SLOVAK.IA 2019 77 Kirschbaum, one of the leading figures of the Slovak separatist emigres. It would be a huge political coup for Czechoslovak authorities to discredit Kirschbaum. They planned to proceed in several ways, with the Czechoslovak authorities remaining in the background: a) publish several articles against Kirschbaum in the Canadian procommunist Slovak newspaper Eudove zvesti, b) publish a book in English about Kirschbaum which was being prepared in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and disseminate it in Canada, especially among Jews, c) use the Czechoslovak socialist student organizations in Canada to tum students at the University of Toronto against Kirschbaum, and d) review the preparation of an extradition diplo14 matic note. At the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs two sessions regarding Kirschbaum were held in February of I 962 . On 19/2/ 1962 it was decided that the book would be changed in order to point out the "fascist activities" of Kirschbaum in 1939-1940, but without offending the Canadian government. They also examined the possibility of extraditing Kirschbaum. At the second session, held on 28/02/ l 962, the final plans were formulated. To prevent the action from looking like a political persecution of Kirschbaum by the communist authorities, all the accusations would be presented by the Jewish Community of Prague, without the official involvement of the Czechoslovak Embassy. All the arguments regarding Kirschbaum 's political activism against the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic would be deleted, but they would focus instead on the anti-Semitic measures of the Slovak State and its collaboration with Eichmann. The first part of the action would consist of sending a small book about Kirschbaum 's activities, printed in English and in French, to several places in Canada. At the beginning of April 1962, Comenius University in Bratislava would contact the University of Toronto and try to discredit Kirschbaum and obtain his dismissal. The second part of the action would come after three weeks of publishing a series of articles in Eudove zvesti, focused not only on Kirschbaum, but against the Slovak exiles in general. Once these actions were finished , an extradition request would be considered. 15 14 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965- 1969, box Kanada I, number 020/62-A . 15 Ibid, file 023325/62-6/ 1. �78 SLOVAKIA 2019 The text of the book that severely slandered Kirschbaum was modified many times during the spring of 1962. It contained many false statements and sheer nonsense, in line with the highest communist propaganda. The book stated that the "enraged fascist" Kirschbaum was responsible for the war against the USSR and the elimination of the political opponents of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party (HSI.:S). With the approval of then Prime Minister Vojtech Tuka and Minister of the Interior Alexander Mach, Kirschbaum allegdly led the Slovak embassy in Rome and Bern and he was allegedly a close collaborator of Eichmann . The text was approved on 27 /03/ I 962 by the head of the 3rd department, a certain Mr. Mikestik, with the focus on Kirschbaum 's allegedly anti-Semitic actions. A few changes were approved by Lieutenant Colonel Fejlek from the VHU on 06/04/ 1962, to accentuate the alleged Kirschbaum connection to Eichmann. 16 On 20/04/1962 the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified the Czechoslovak Embassy in Ottawa that the action against Kirschbaum was almost complete . The di stribution of the books would start at the beginning of May, especially to Jewish organizations . The Embassy was asked to pick 30-40 people from the University of Toronto to distribute the book. Ottawa answered affirmatively on 02/05/1962, together with an item for Minister of Northern Affaires and National Resources Walter Dinsdale in the name of a Slovak cultural officer. According to the wishes of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Czechoslovak Council of Jewish Communities was invo lved in this action. The Council informed the Ministry about its actions on 14/06/ 1962. They published the article against Kirschbaum in their special edition of the Informationsbulletin des Rates der judischen Gemeinden in der bohmischen Liindern , which was published in English and German and sent to 479 addresses in Canada, the USA and other countries of the world. 17 In Canada a crucial article against Kirschbaum, entitled Th e Kirschbaum Enigma, was published in the The Canadian Jewish News . On 28/06/1962 the "progressive" Eudove zvesti and later the 16 ibid, files 023794/62-6/ 1, 024172/62 . Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, file 024907/62 and number 073 /62. 17 �SLOVAKIA 2019 79 Czech weekly Nase hlasy joined in. 18 The Czechoslovak Consulate General in Montreal in its report about the Slovak emigration from 27/06/ 1962 reiterated the importance of accusing Kirschbaum as a helper of the Nazis, which would also weaken the position of Stefan B. Roman. 19 The slander campaign against Kirschbaum received a certain reaction in the Canadian press in the summer of 1962 and also provoked some disputes among the leaders of the Canadian Slovak League, which pleased the Czechoslovak authorities. However, the original aim to totally discredit Kirschbaum was not achieved. 20 Kirschbaum defended himself in the press, the American-Canadian Committee for the Defense of Slovak Honour was founded to support him, and Stefan B. Roman supported him as well. Kirschbaum successfully sued The Canadian Jewish News in June of 1963 and the newspaper apologized, publishing "Our Sincere Statement to Dr. Kirschbaum." 21 The publishing of this apology was explained by a letter of 06/08/ 1963, written by a Jewish functionary from Toronto, Herman Landau, who sent it to the Czechoslovak Council for Jewish Communities in Prague. The editor-in-chief, Mr. Niiremberger, was obliged to publish the apology, because he faced a million dollar fine and he would have no witnesses to prove the anti-Kirschbaum statements before a court. Without a living witness, there was no chance to prove before the court the alleged encounter between Kirschbaum and Eichmann. The existing testimony of Dr. Jozef Falath from Austria had no value, since Falath had since changed his mind and was 18 The pro-Czechoslovak newspaper Nase hlasy attacked Kirschbaum already in the spring of 1962, after he was elected vice-president of the Canadian Ethnic Press Association . He was accused of helping the German Nazis in Slovakia. 19 Archives MZV Prague, f. Political reports, box Kanada-Montreal 1948-1973, number 079/62. 20 The secretary of the Canadian Slovak League, Frantisek Kvetan, who often disagreed with Kirschbaum and Roman, welcomed the Jewish critiques of Kirschbaum and refused to apologize, even after the failure of the slander campaign . The issue wasn ' t resolved until 1965 when Kvetan resigned his position. The Czechoslovak authorities followed this issue, which can be shown in the report "Conflicts in the Direction of the Canadian Slovak League", 20/3/ 1965 - Po litical Reports Kanada, Montreal 1948-1973 , number 026/65 . 21 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, fil e 027282/63. �80 SLOVAKIA 2019 22 now willing to testify on behalf of Kirschbaum. The festivities of the 1100th anniversary of the arrival of Saints Cyril and Methodius on Slovak territory, held in Toronto on 2930/06/1963 , and attemded by 15,000 people, infuriated the Czechoslovak authorities. Paul Martin, Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs , took part in these festivities and severely condemned Communi sm and supported the liberation of Eastern Europe from Soviet domination. This provoked an official Czechoslovak protest to the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs . Martin, together with Roman , also publicly met with Kirschbaum and expressed their confidence in him. The Czechoslovak Embassy in Ottawa considered this a provocation and on 08/07/1963 it urgently demanded new materials concerning Kirschbaum's alleged collaboration with the Nazis. 23 On I 7/07/1963 the Prague authorities considered their next steps. They faced the danger that Kirschbaum would sue the newspaper Eudove zvesti, which would mean its financial ruin. They decided to protect Eudove zvesti and to reinvolve the Prague Council of Jewish Communities, which would then provide additional arguments to the Canadian Jewish press. It was also necessary to find more of Kirschbaum 's alleged crimes. The meeting held a month later, on 17/08/ 1963 , had a similar aim . The Council of Jewish Communities was asked to spread new incriminating documents to the world. The Slovak Academy of Sciences, particularly their pro-communist historian Liptak, would investigate more of Kirschbaum 's activities. Another extradition request whould be prepared, to include the extradition ofDurcansky and Karmasin from the FRG. 24 The Czechoslovak Embassy in Canada wasn't very optimistic. Ottawa and Montreal wrote a joint report about Kirschbaum on 16/07 / I 963 , stating that Kirschbaum was being strongly defended by all the Slovak separatist emigrants. Canadian politicians assured them that nothing wou ld happen to Kirschbaum, unless he was proven guilty. Also, the editors of Eudove zvesti, Nase hlasy and the communist Canadian Tribune, in danger of being sued, asked for 22 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, fil e 027282/63. 23 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada 2, file 028246/63 . 24 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, files 027282/63 and 027406/63 . �SLOVAK.IA 2019 81 new materials against Kirschbaum. 25 The functionaries in Prague and Bratislava, with the participation of the Ministry of the Interior and The Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, feverishly searched for new documents. They also gathered files from 1946/4 7, dealing with previous efforts to put Kirschbaum on the United Nations list of war criminals. 26 Kirschbaum and his lawyers were not in a hurry to sue the aforementioned newspapers. They asked Eudove zvesti to publish an apology and pay $5,000 before 27/ 10/ 1963, otherwise they would take them to court. Nevertheless, the editor-in-chief of Eudove zvesti, Jozef Durjancik, after having consulted with Czechoslovak authorities, didn't do anything and time passed without any action.27 During the winter of 1963/64, Durjancik kept on asking for new materials and assured himself of the support of the Czechoslovak authorities. In February of 1964, he commited an indiscretion by sending a letter by regular mail to Prague. The Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs was worried that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) would find out that everything was being directed from Prague, even though the RCMP already suspected it. 28 In March of 1965 Kirschbaum ended up suing the Nase hlasy newspaper. Then, a strange cooperation began began between the Czechoslovak communist authorities, Durjancik, the Council of Jewish Communities in Prague and the Czech emigrant newspaper Nase hlasy, which, despite being anti-communist, wasn ' t ashamed to collaborate with the communists against Kirschbaum. The lawyers for Nase hlasy, Mr. Pepper and Mr. Gellner, visited the Czechoslovak Republic on 20-23/04/ 1965, as the Czechoslovak embassy in Ottawa had recommended. They were unsuccessful in Prague, but in Slovakia, they appreciated the collaboration of the pro-communist historian Liptak and the archivist Michal Chreno. In August of 1965, Liptak sent them, via the Canadian embassy in Prague, 51 photocopies and I 08 photographs alleging that Kirschbaum was a Nazi collaboratot and, in return, he was sent many history books from the West. Chreno also sent several photographs, but he was dissatisfied 25 Ibid, file 027424/63. Ibid, file 029762/63 . 27 Ibid, number 076/63. 28 Archi ves MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965- 1969, box Kanada 1, fil e 021444/64. 26 �82 SLOVAKIA 2019 with his reward. In the autumn of 1965, Chreno complained to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the State Bank refused to pay him $1 06CDN for his parcel. The bank wanted to transfer the payment directly to the National Archives account but he felt that the bank did not appreciate his work. This was the tragicomic end to the action called Kirschbaum , which is conserved in the archives of the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs .29 The slander campaigns in the I 960 ' s against Jozef Kirschbaum in Canada and Ferdinand Durcansky in Germany show the unflagging efforts of the Czechoslovak communist authorities to discredit Slovak nationalist emigres around the world. The communist authorities frequently used their subordinate organizations, e.g. the Prague Jewish Community or the Hi storical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences (where Cubomir Liptak played an important role and later was praised by many people). 3 From a long-term perspective, the slander campaigns were unsuccessful, but they left bitter traces and needlessly complicated the lives of many exi le politicians. The extradition requests were always unsuccessful. Such were the activities of commnist authorities against Slovak nationalists who worked for the overthrow of the communist regime and for the independence of Slovakia. ° 29 Ibid. °For examples of such praise see "Zomrel Cubomir Liptak," Sm e (Bratislava), Oc- 3 tober 22, 2003 . � 72 SLOVAKIA 2019 SLOVAK EMIGRES IN THE REPORTS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ACTIONS AGAINST FERDINAND DURCANSKY AND JOZEF KIRSCHBAUM (1961-1966/68) Petr Kubik Large quantities of material concerning the Slovak post-war emigration have been preserved in the archives of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague and are now available to researchers. The post-war Czechoslovak government and foreign offices all over the world followed the activities of various exile leaders and organizations regardless of what country they lived in. Two of these emigre groups were closely watched by the new leaders in power si nce the summer of 1945 - the (Czech General Lev) Prchala Group and Slovak "separatists."' This led to a paradox - often those who were actively involved in following and reporting on the exile leaders between 1945-4 7 went into exile themselves in the spring of 1948. These new exiles would also be followed by their communist successors in the Czechoslovak embassies. 2 It is interesting to compare the state and quality of the different archival materials according to the countries covered. The most informative collections concern the emigres in North and South America. Unlike Australia, where there was little information regarding exiles, the Czechoslovak authorities in Argentina, Canada and USA mapped the situation in a very thorough manner. Regarding Europe, many materials were preserved on Italy (Rome and the Vatican), some in Germany but only scant information from other countries such as France, Switzerland, Austria, Great Britain and Spain. In the present study, using archival materials, I would like to de- 1 The Prchala Group were Czech anti-Benes and anti-Communists, led by General Lev Prchala. They were forbidden to return to their homeland, which was ruled by Benes and the Communists. Slovak "separatists" were supporters of Slovak inderendence, a name given to them by Czechoslovak propaganda. E.g. Vladimir Vanek, Jan Pauliny-T6th (Rome), Frantisek Schwarzenberg (the Vatican), Frantisek Nemec (Ottawa) and Josef Kotrly (Montreal) . �SLOVAKIA 2019 73 scribe how the Czechoslovak authorities in the l 960's took major actions against key Slovak figures in exile. In Canada it was against Dr. Jozef Kirschbaum, former Secretary-General of the Slovak People 's Party in 1939-1940 and in Germany it was against Dr. Ferdinand Durcansky, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, 1939-1940. For administrative reasons Durcansky and the former leader of the German ethnic group in Slovakia, Franz Karmasin, were treated together in the Prague archives. Actions Against Ferdinand Durcansky and Franz Karmasin During 1961-1968 On I 6/02/ 196 I the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (UV KSC) adopted a resolution to prepare and execute a campaign against Ferdinand Durcansky and Franz Karmasin. This was a part of the ongoing campaign against "the West German Revanchists" by the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry charged Karmasin with being "a war criminal," and Durcansky, who also lived in Germany, "the leader of the Slovak fascist emigration." Writing a propaganda brochure about "the fascist activities" of the two aforementioned leaders was assigned to Slovak regime historians -- Cubomir Liptak of the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences (HU SA V) and Lieutenant Colonel Navratil from the Military History Institute (VHU), both in Bratislava. On 02/ 11/1961 Liptak and Navratil went to Prague 's office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss and finalize some details for their publication, Ve znameni dvou kfizu (In the Sign of the Double Cross). 3 The secret propaganda materials were completed in the winter of 196 1/1962. 3,000 vo lumes of the publication In the Sign of the Double Cross were printed in German, with a planned distribution in Germany and other Western countries . The Czech News Agency (CTK) planned a series of propaganda activities supporting the work by Navratil and Liptak. The Czechoslovak Military Film Institute produced a 25-minute documentary concerning mainl y Franz Karmasi n. During this time, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Justice was 3 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box NSR 2, fi le 033964/61 -3 �74 SLOVAKIA 2019 preparing extradition requests for Durcansky and Karmasin, although their officers didn ' t believe that they would be successful. In addition, the Regional Court of Bratislava issued new arrest warrants for 4 Durcansky ( on 15/02/1962) and Karmas in (on 14/05/ 1962). In the spring of 1962, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foregin Affairs presented extradition papers regarding Durcansky and Karmasin to the Embassy of the USA in Prague, because the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) did not have diplomatic relations.5 This took place publicly on 29/05/ l 962 with the official transmission of the diplomatic note to the government of the FRG via the American embassy. There was no response from the FRG. It was a conscious decision of the German authorities not to respond to this Czechoslovak provocation . Next, the Prague regime appealed to the Austrian authorities - the Czechoslovak embassy in Vienna issued an arrest warrant for Durcansky to the Austrian authorities . Despite Czechoslovak insistence on the extradition of Durcansky (a notice written on 22/ 12/ 1962), 6 there was no reaction. In the summer of 1963 , there was still no response from either German or Austrian authorities. Durcansky maintained his activities, even to the extent that he presided at the meeting of the GermanSlovak Society in Munich, held on the occasion of the 24th anniversary of the creation of the Slovak State on 13/03/ l 963. On the occasion of the Sudetenland Day on 3/6/ 1963, the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs started a new action with the goal of transmitting new diplomatic notes regarding the arrest of Durcansky to all Western countries. They transmitted again another urgent diplomatic note to the FRG government through the American embassy in Prague.7 On 10/08/ 1965 a Czechoslovak diplomatic note, focusing on Karmasin, 8 was finally transmitted to the American embassy, which passed it on to the German Foreign Office on 23/08/1965. On 4 Ibid, file 0 16696/62-80. In the present study the designation Federal Republic of Germany is used for the West Germany. 6 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box NSR 2, file 0 16696/62-80. 7 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box NSR 2, file 025560/63 . 8 Ibid, file 02648 1/65-3 . No justification for this delay is mentioned in the documents. 5 �SLOVAKIA 2019 75 07 /0 l/ 1966 the German Office responded categorically in the negative to the request regarding the extradition. The reason that the German authorities gave was because of the German Constitutional Basic Law and the Extradition Law, with Karmasin being a citizen of Germany and Durcansky being only involved in political activities. 9 The Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs then decided to transmit the matter to the Czechoslovak Governmental Commission Charged with Identifying Nazi War Criminals, which was not successful. This Commission was in session on 14/05/1966 and it insisted on the extradition request. They intended to continue publishing propaganda materials and also to requesting the assistance of the Munich Public Prosecutor's Office in investigating Karmasin. 10 The office of the Munich Public Prosecutor sent a letter to Prague on 29/5/1966, asking for more evidence against Karmasin, as the information they had was insufficient to bring charges against him. The Commission took its time and only on 10/ l l/ 1966 did it decide 11 to help the Munich investigation by collecting more evidence. During this time, the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a new note to the FRG Foreign Office via the US embassy on 10/ 10/1966, repeating the extradition request. It was rejected by the FRG Foreign Office on 11/7/ 196. It based its decision on the London Agreement of 08/08/ 1945 and the UN Resolution of 11/12/ 1946, that created no legal precedent for extraditing citizens. In response, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared another diplomatic note, attacking the FRG for this position and demanding the extradition of Durcansky and Karmasin. Otherwise, the Czechoslovaks would refuse to help with the Karmasin process in Munich. The arrival of the Prague Spring in 1968 did not halt this action. Another diplomatic note was delivered to the US embassy on 05/04/ 1968, and during April of 1968 all the embassies of W estem countries and Yugoslavia were notified. 12 The Czechoslovak authorities continued other diplomatic measures against Durcansky. In September of 1968 they protested to the Austrian government against his stay in Austria and in October of 1968 they protested to the US authorities against his travel to the 9 Ibid, file 02230 I /66-4. Ibid, file 024471 /66-4 . 11 Ibid, file 120894/66-4 . 12 Ibid, file 120894/66-4. 10 �76 SLOVAKIA 2019 USA . But the extradition issue was about to end. On 04/10/1968 Mr. Kastl , the head of the Department for Socialist Countries of the Bonn Freign Office, communicated to the Czechoslovak trade representative that he had prepared a negative response to the Czechoslovak diplomatic note from 05/04/1968 . He would not send it officially yet, due to the events of the Prague Spring of August of 1968. The Czechoslovak Commission for War Crimes stated, during their reunion on 05/ 11 / 1968, the impossibility of obtaining the extradition of Durcansky and Karmasin and communicated this information to the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Prague Ministry had expected this to happen for some time. 13 The Action Against Jozef Kirschbaum in 1962-1965 At the beginning of the I 960's, the Czechoslovak authorities in Canada (the Embassy in Ottawa and the Consulate General in Montreal) started to worry about the growing influence of Jozef Kirschbaum within the Canadian Slovak League, as well as with Canadian politicians in general. During this time Jozef Kirschbaum lectured at the University of Toronto . In December of 1961 Canadian Prime Minister Diefenbaker received Kirschbaum, as a member of the delegation of the Captive EuropeanNations, and on 08/02/1 962 Kirschbaum was elected vice-president of the Canadian Ethnic Press Association. In addition, his friend and collaborator, the influential entrepreneur Stefan B. Roman , had many contacts with Canadian politicians, especially with Paul Martin, the future Minister of Foreign Affairs . The Czechoslovak authorities started a propaganda campaign against Kirschbaum with the aim of discreditng all Slovak emigres in Canada. On 26/0 I/ 1962 the Czechoslovak Consulate General in Montreal created an extensive document entitled Proposal for Executing the Action Against the Slovak Separatist, Professor Kirschbaum . They proposed to make use of the recent legal proceedings of Israel against the German war criminal Adolf Eichmann and raised the matter of possible other war criminals at large to the attention of the world. Furthermore, they planned to use the anti-Semitic measures taken by the government of Slovakia in 1939-1940 to slander 13 Ibid, file 11 7841 /68-6 . �SLOVAK.IA 2019 77 Kirschbaum, one of the leading figures of the Slovak separatist emigres. It would be a huge political coup for Czechoslovak authorities to discredit Kirschbaum. They planned to proceed in several ways, with the Czechoslovak authorities remaining in the background: a) publish several articles against Kirschbaum in the Canadian procommunist Slovak newspaper Eudove zvesti, b) publish a book in English about Kirschbaum which was being prepared in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and disseminate it in Canada, especially among Jews, c) use the Czechoslovak socialist student organizations in Canada to tum students at the University of Toronto against Kirschbaum, and d) review the preparation of an extradition diplo14 matic note. At the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs two sessions regarding Kirschbaum were held in February of I 962 . On 19/2/ 1962 it was decided that the book would be changed in order to point out the "fascist activities" of Kirschbaum in 1939-1940, but without offending the Canadian government. They also examined the possibility of extraditing Kirschbaum. At the second session, held on 28/02/ l 962, the final plans were formulated. To prevent the action from looking like a political persecution of Kirschbaum by the communist authorities, all the accusations would be presented by the Jewish Community of Prague, without the official involvement of the Czechoslovak Embassy. All the arguments regarding Kirschbaum 's political activism against the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic would be deleted, but they would focus instead on the anti-Semitic measures of the Slovak State and its collaboration with Eichmann. The first part of the action would consist of sending a small book about Kirschbaum 's activities, printed in English and in French, to several places in Canada. At the beginning of April 1962, Comenius University in Bratislava would contact the University of Toronto and try to discredit Kirschbaum and obtain his dismissal. The second part of the action would come after three weeks of publishing a series of articles in Eudove zvesti, focused not only on Kirschbaum, but against the Slovak exiles in general. Once these actions were finished , an extradition request would be considered. 15 14 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965- 1969, box Kanada I, number 020/62-A . 15 Ibid, file 023325/62-6/ 1. �78 SLOVAKIA 2019 The text of the book that severely slandered Kirschbaum was modified many times during the spring of 1962. It contained many false statements and sheer nonsense, in line with the highest communist propaganda. The book stated that the "enraged fascist" Kirschbaum was responsible for the war against the USSR and the elimination of the political opponents of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party (HSI.:S). With the approval of then Prime Minister Vojtech Tuka and Minister of the Interior Alexander Mach, Kirschbaum allegdly led the Slovak embassy in Rome and Bern and he was allegedly a close collaborator of Eichmann . The text was approved on 27 /03/ I 962 by the head of the 3rd department, a certain Mr. Mikestik, with the focus on Kirschbaum 's allegedly anti-Semitic actions. A few changes were approved by Lieutenant Colonel Fejlek from the VHU on 06/04/ 1962, to accentuate the alleged Kirschbaum connection to Eichmann. 16 On 20/04/1962 the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified the Czechoslovak Embassy in Ottawa that the action against Kirschbaum was almost complete . The di stribution of the books would start at the beginning of May, especially to Jewish organizations . The Embassy was asked to pick 30-40 people from the University of Toronto to distribute the book. Ottawa answered affirmatively on 02/05/1962, together with an item for Minister of Northern Affaires and National Resources Walter Dinsdale in the name of a Slovak cultural officer. According to the wishes of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Czechoslovak Council of Jewish Communities was invo lved in this action. The Council informed the Ministry about its actions on 14/06/ 1962. They published the article against Kirschbaum in their special edition of the Informationsbulletin des Rates der judischen Gemeinden in der bohmischen Liindern , which was published in English and German and sent to 479 addresses in Canada, the USA and other countries of the world. 17 In Canada a crucial article against Kirschbaum, entitled Th e Kirschbaum Enigma, was published in the The Canadian Jewish News . On 28/06/1962 the "progressive" Eudove zvesti and later the 16 ibid, files 023794/62-6/ 1, 024172/62 . Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, file 024907/62 and number 073 /62. 17 �SLOVAKIA 2019 79 Czech weekly Nase hlasy joined in. 18 The Czechoslovak Consulate General in Montreal in its report about the Slovak emigration from 27/06/ 1962 reiterated the importance of accusing Kirschbaum as a helper of the Nazis, which would also weaken the position of Stefan B. Roman. 19 The slander campaign against Kirschbaum received a certain reaction in the Canadian press in the summer of 1962 and also provoked some disputes among the leaders of the Canadian Slovak League, which pleased the Czechoslovak authorities. However, the original aim to totally discredit Kirschbaum was not achieved. 20 Kirschbaum defended himself in the press, the American-Canadian Committee for the Defense of Slovak Honour was founded to support him, and Stefan B. Roman supported him as well. Kirschbaum successfully sued The Canadian Jewish News in June of 1963 and the newspaper apologized, publishing "Our Sincere Statement to Dr. Kirschbaum." 21 The publishing of this apology was explained by a letter of 06/08/ 1963, written by a Jewish functionary from Toronto, Herman Landau, who sent it to the Czechoslovak Council for Jewish Communities in Prague. The editor-in-chief, Mr. Niiremberger, was obliged to publish the apology, because he faced a million dollar fine and he would have no witnesses to prove the anti-Kirschbaum statements before a court. Without a living witness, there was no chance to prove before the court the alleged encounter between Kirschbaum and Eichmann. The existing testimony of Dr. Jozef Falath from Austria had no value, since Falath had since changed his mind and was 18 The pro-Czechoslovak newspaper Nase hlasy attacked Kirschbaum already in the spring of 1962, after he was elected vice-president of the Canadian Ethnic Press Association . He was accused of helping the German Nazis in Slovakia. 19 Archives MZV Prague, f. Political reports, box Kanada-Montreal 1948-1973, number 079/62. 20 The secretary of the Canadian Slovak League, Frantisek Kvetan, who often disagreed with Kirschbaum and Roman, welcomed the Jewish critiques of Kirschbaum and refused to apologize, even after the failure of the slander campaign . The issue wasn ' t resolved until 1965 when Kvetan resigned his position. The Czechoslovak authorities followed this issue, which can be shown in the report "Conflicts in the Direction of the Canadian Slovak League", 20/3/ 1965 - Po litical Reports Kanada, Montreal 1948-1973 , number 026/65 . 21 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, fil e 027282/63. �80 SLOVAKIA 2019 22 now willing to testify on behalf of Kirschbaum. The festivities of the 1100th anniversary of the arrival of Saints Cyril and Methodius on Slovak territory, held in Toronto on 2930/06/1963 , and attemded by 15,000 people, infuriated the Czechoslovak authorities. Paul Martin, Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs , took part in these festivities and severely condemned Communi sm and supported the liberation of Eastern Europe from Soviet domination. This provoked an official Czechoslovak protest to the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs . Martin, together with Roman , also publicly met with Kirschbaum and expressed their confidence in him. The Czechoslovak Embassy in Ottawa considered this a provocation and on 08/07/1963 it urgently demanded new materials concerning Kirschbaum's alleged collaboration with the Nazis. 23 On I 7/07/1963 the Prague authorities considered their next steps. They faced the danger that Kirschbaum would sue the newspaper Eudove zvesti, which would mean its financial ruin. They decided to protect Eudove zvesti and to reinvolve the Prague Council of Jewish Communities, which would then provide additional arguments to the Canadian Jewish press. It was also necessary to find more of Kirschbaum 's alleged crimes. The meeting held a month later, on 17/08/ 1963 , had a similar aim . The Council of Jewish Communities was asked to spread new incriminating documents to the world. The Slovak Academy of Sciences, particularly their pro-communist historian Liptak, would investigate more of Kirschbaum 's activities. Another extradition request whould be prepared, to include the extradition ofDurcansky and Karmasin from the FRG. 24 The Czechoslovak Embassy in Canada wasn't very optimistic. Ottawa and Montreal wrote a joint report about Kirschbaum on 16/07 / I 963 , stating that Kirschbaum was being strongly defended by all the Slovak separatist emigrants. Canadian politicians assured them that nothing wou ld happen to Kirschbaum, unless he was proven guilty. Also, the editors of Eudove zvesti, Nase hlasy and the communist Canadian Tribune, in danger of being sued, asked for 22 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, fil e 027282/63. 23 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada 2, file 028246/63 . 24 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, files 027282/63 and 027406/63 . �SLOVAK.IA 2019 81 new materials against Kirschbaum. 25 The functionaries in Prague and Bratislava, with the participation of the Ministry of the Interior and The Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, feverishly searched for new documents. They also gathered files from 1946/4 7, dealing with previous efforts to put Kirschbaum on the United Nations list of war criminals. 26 Kirschbaum and his lawyers were not in a hurry to sue the aforementioned newspapers. They asked Eudove zvesti to publish an apology and pay $5,000 before 27/ 10/ 1963, otherwise they would take them to court. Nevertheless, the editor-in-chief of Eudove zvesti, Jozef Durjancik, after having consulted with Czechoslovak authorities, didn't do anything and time passed without any action.27 During the winter of 1963/64, Durjancik kept on asking for new materials and assured himself of the support of the Czechoslovak authorities. In February of 1964, he commited an indiscretion by sending a letter by regular mail to Prague. The Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs was worried that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) would find out that everything was being directed from Prague, even though the RCMP already suspected it. 28 In March of 1965 Kirschbaum ended up suing the Nase hlasy newspaper. Then, a strange cooperation began began between the Czechoslovak communist authorities, Durjancik, the Council of Jewish Communities in Prague and the Czech emigrant newspaper Nase hlasy, which, despite being anti-communist, wasn ' t ashamed to collaborate with the communists against Kirschbaum. The lawyers for Nase hlasy, Mr. Pepper and Mr. Gellner, visited the Czechoslovak Republic on 20-23/04/ 1965, as the Czechoslovak embassy in Ottawa had recommended. They were unsuccessful in Prague, but in Slovakia, they appreciated the collaboration of the pro-communist historian Liptak and the archivist Michal Chreno. In August of 1965, Liptak sent them, via the Canadian embassy in Prague, 51 photocopies and I 08 photographs alleging that Kirschbaum was a Nazi collaboratot and, in return, he was sent many history books from the West. Chreno also sent several photographs, but he was dissatisfied 25 Ibid, file 027424/63. Ibid, file 029762/63 . 27 Ibid, number 076/63. 28 Archi ves MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965- 1969, box Kanada 1, fil e 021444/64. 26 �82 SLOVAKIA 2019 with his reward. In the autumn of 1965, Chreno complained to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the State Bank refused to pay him $1 06CDN for his parcel. The bank wanted to transfer the payment directly to the National Archives account but he felt that the bank did not appreciate his work. This was the tragicomic end to the action called Kirschbaum , which is conserved in the archives of the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs .29 The slander campaigns in the I 960 ' s against Jozef Kirschbaum in Canada and Ferdinand Durcansky in Germany show the unflagging efforts of the Czechoslovak communist authorities to discredit Slovak nationalist emigres around the world. The communist authorities frequently used their subordinate organizations, e.g. the Prague Jewish Community or the Hi storical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences (where Cubomir Liptak played an important role and later was praised by many people). 3 From a long-term perspective, the slander campaigns were unsuccessful, but they left bitter traces and needlessly complicated the lives of many exi le politicians. The extradition requests were always unsuccessful. Such were the activities of commnist authorities against Slovak nationalists who worked for the overthrow of the communist regime and for the independence of Slovakia. ° 29 Ibid. °For examples of such praise see "Zomrel Cubomir Liptak," Sm e (Bratislava), Oc- 3 tober 22, 2003 . � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2019, Vol. 44 Description An account of the resource Vol. 44 (No. 82-83), 2019. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 72 SLOVAKIA 2019 SLOVAK EMIGRES IN THE REPORTS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ACTIONS AGAINST FERDINAND DURCANSKY AND JOZEF KIRSCHBAUM (1961-1966/68) Petr Kubik Large quantities of material concerning the Slovak post-war emigration have been preserved in the archives of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague and are now available to researchers. The post-war Czechoslovak government and foreign offices all over the world followed the activities of various exile leaders and organizations regardless of what country they lived in. Two of these emigre groups were closely watched by the new leaders in power si nce the summer of 1945 - the (Czech General Lev) Prchala Group and Slovak "separatists."' This led to a paradox - often those who were actively involved in following and reporting on the exile leaders between 1945-4 7 went into exile themselves in the spring of 1948. These new exiles would also be followed by their communist successors in the Czechoslovak embassies. 2 It is interesting to compare the state and quality of the different archival materials according to the countries covered. The most informative collections concern the emigres in North and South America. Unlike Australia, where there was little information regarding exiles, the Czechoslovak authorities in Argentina, Canada and USA mapped the situation in a very thorough manner. Regarding Europe, many materials were preserved on Italy (Rome and the Vatican), some in Germany but only scant information from other countries such as France, Switzerland, Austria, Great Britain and Spain. In the present study, using archival materials, I would like to de- 1 The Prchala Group were Czech anti-Benes and anti-Communists, led by General Lev Prchala. They were forbidden to return to their homeland, which was ruled by Benes and the Communists. Slovak "separatists" were supporters of Slovak inderendence, a name given to them by Czechoslovak propaganda. E.g. Vladimir Vanek, Jan Pauliny-T6th (Rome), Frantisek Schwarzenberg (the Vatican), Frantisek Nemec (Ottawa) and Josef Kotrly (Montreal) . SLOVAKIA 2019 73 scribe how the Czechoslovak authorities in the l 960's took major actions against key Slovak figures in exile. In Canada it was against Dr. Jozef Kirschbaum, former Secretary-General of the Slovak People 's Party in 1939-1940 and in Germany it was against Dr. Ferdinand Durcansky, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, 1939-1940. For administrative reasons Durcansky and the former leader of the German ethnic group in Slovakia, Franz Karmasin, were treated together in the Prague archives. Actions Against Ferdinand Durcansky and Franz Karmasin During 1961-1968 On I 6/02/ 196 I the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (UV KSC) adopted a resolution to prepare and execute a campaign against Ferdinand Durcansky and Franz Karmasin. This was a part of the ongoing campaign against "the West German Revanchists" by the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry charged Karmasin with being "a war criminal," and Durcansky, who also lived in Germany, "the leader of the Slovak fascist emigration." Writing a propaganda brochure about "the fascist activities" of the two aforementioned leaders was assigned to Slovak regime historians -- Cubomir Liptak of the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences (HU SA V) and Lieutenant Colonel Navratil from the Military History Institute (VHU), both in Bratislava. On 02/ 11/1961 Liptak and Navratil went to Prague 's office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss and finalize some details for their publication, Ve znameni dvou kfizu (In the Sign of the Double Cross). 3 The secret propaganda materials were completed in the winter of 196 1/1962. 3,000 vo lumes of the publication In the Sign of the Double Cross were printed in German, with a planned distribution in Germany and other Western countries . The Czech News Agency (CTK) planned a series of propaganda activities supporting the work by Navratil and Liptak. The Czechoslovak Military Film Institute produced a 25-minute documentary concerning mainl y Franz Karmasi n. During this time, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Justice was 3 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box NSR 2, fi le 033964/61 -3 74 SLOVAKIA 2019 preparing extradition requests for Durcansky and Karmasin, although their officers didn ' t believe that they would be successful. In addition, the Regional Court of Bratislava issued new arrest warrants for 4 Durcansky ( on 15/02/1962) and Karmas in (on 14/05/ 1962). In the spring of 1962, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foregin Affairs presented extradition papers regarding Durcansky and Karmasin to the Embassy of the USA in Prague, because the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) did not have diplomatic relations.5 This took place publicly on 29/05/ l 962 with the official transmission of the diplomatic note to the government of the FRG via the American embassy. There was no response from the FRG. It was a conscious decision of the German authorities not to respond to this Czechoslovak provocation . Next, the Prague regime appealed to the Austrian authorities - the Czechoslovak embassy in Vienna issued an arrest warrant for Durcansky to the Austrian authorities . Despite Czechoslovak insistence on the extradition of Durcansky (a notice written on 22/ 12/ 1962), 6 there was no reaction. In the summer of 1963 , there was still no response from either German or Austrian authorities. Durcansky maintained his activities, even to the extent that he presided at the meeting of the GermanSlovak Society in Munich, held on the occasion of the 24th anniversary of the creation of the Slovak State on 13/03/ l 963. On the occasion of the Sudetenland Day on 3/6/ 1963, the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs started a new action with the goal of transmitting new diplomatic notes regarding the arrest of Durcansky to all Western countries. They transmitted again another urgent diplomatic note to the FRG government through the American embassy in Prague.7 On 10/08/ 1965 a Czechoslovak diplomatic note, focusing on Karmasin, 8 was finally transmitted to the American embassy, which passed it on to the German Foreign Office on 23/08/1965. On 4 Ibid, file 0 16696/62-80. In the present study the designation Federal Republic of Germany is used for the West Germany. 6 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box NSR 2, file 0 16696/62-80. 7 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box NSR 2, file 025560/63 . 8 Ibid, file 02648 1/65-3 . No justification for this delay is mentioned in the documents. 5 SLOVAKIA 2019 75 07 /0 l/ 1966 the German Office responded categorically in the negative to the request regarding the extradition. The reason that the German authorities gave was because of the German Constitutional Basic Law and the Extradition Law, with Karmasin being a citizen of Germany and Durcansky being only involved in political activities. 9 The Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs then decided to transmit the matter to the Czechoslovak Governmental Commission Charged with Identifying Nazi War Criminals, which was not successful. This Commission was in session on 14/05/1966 and it insisted on the extradition request. They intended to continue publishing propaganda materials and also to requesting the assistance of the Munich Public Prosecutor's Office in investigating Karmasin. 10 The office of the Munich Public Prosecutor sent a letter to Prague on 29/5/1966, asking for more evidence against Karmasin, as the information they had was insufficient to bring charges against him. The Commission took its time and only on 10/ l l/ 1966 did it decide 11 to help the Munich investigation by collecting more evidence. During this time, the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a new note to the FRG Foreign Office via the US embassy on 10/ 10/1966, repeating the extradition request. It was rejected by the FRG Foreign Office on 11/7/ 196. It based its decision on the London Agreement of 08/08/ 1945 and the UN Resolution of 11/12/ 1946, that created no legal precedent for extraditing citizens. In response, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared another diplomatic note, attacking the FRG for this position and demanding the extradition of Durcansky and Karmasin. Otherwise, the Czechoslovaks would refuse to help with the Karmasin process in Munich. The arrival of the Prague Spring in 1968 did not halt this action. Another diplomatic note was delivered to the US embassy on 05/04/ 1968, and during April of 1968 all the embassies of W estem countries and Yugoslavia were notified. 12 The Czechoslovak authorities continued other diplomatic measures against Durcansky. In September of 1968 they protested to the Austrian government against his stay in Austria and in October of 1968 they protested to the US authorities against his travel to the 9 Ibid, file 02230 I /66-4. Ibid, file 024471 /66-4 . 11 Ibid, file 120894/66-4 . 12 Ibid, file 120894/66-4. 10 76 SLOVAKIA 2019 USA . But the extradition issue was about to end. On 04/10/1968 Mr. Kastl , the head of the Department for Socialist Countries of the Bonn Freign Office, communicated to the Czechoslovak trade representative that he had prepared a negative response to the Czechoslovak diplomatic note from 05/04/1968 . He would not send it officially yet, due to the events of the Prague Spring of August of 1968. The Czechoslovak Commission for War Crimes stated, during their reunion on 05/ 11 / 1968, the impossibility of obtaining the extradition of Durcansky and Karmasin and communicated this information to the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Prague Ministry had expected this to happen for some time. 13 The Action Against Jozef Kirschbaum in 1962-1965 At the beginning of the I 960's, the Czechoslovak authorities in Canada (the Embassy in Ottawa and the Consulate General in Montreal) started to worry about the growing influence of Jozef Kirschbaum within the Canadian Slovak League, as well as with Canadian politicians in general. During this time Jozef Kirschbaum lectured at the University of Toronto . In December of 1961 Canadian Prime Minister Diefenbaker received Kirschbaum, as a member of the delegation of the Captive EuropeanNations, and on 08/02/1 962 Kirschbaum was elected vice-president of the Canadian Ethnic Press Association. In addition, his friend and collaborator, the influential entrepreneur Stefan B. Roman , had many contacts with Canadian politicians, especially with Paul Martin, the future Minister of Foreign Affairs . The Czechoslovak authorities started a propaganda campaign against Kirschbaum with the aim of discreditng all Slovak emigres in Canada. On 26/0 I/ 1962 the Czechoslovak Consulate General in Montreal created an extensive document entitled Proposal for Executing the Action Against the Slovak Separatist, Professor Kirschbaum . They proposed to make use of the recent legal proceedings of Israel against the German war criminal Adolf Eichmann and raised the matter of possible other war criminals at large to the attention of the world. Furthermore, they planned to use the anti-Semitic measures taken by the government of Slovakia in 1939-1940 to slander 13 Ibid, file 11 7841 /68-6 . SLOVAK.IA 2019 77 Kirschbaum, one of the leading figures of the Slovak separatist emigres. It would be a huge political coup for Czechoslovak authorities to discredit Kirschbaum. They planned to proceed in several ways, with the Czechoslovak authorities remaining in the background: a) publish several articles against Kirschbaum in the Canadian procommunist Slovak newspaper Eudove zvesti, b) publish a book in English about Kirschbaum which was being prepared in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and disseminate it in Canada, especially among Jews, c) use the Czechoslovak socialist student organizations in Canada to tum students at the University of Toronto against Kirschbaum, and d) review the preparation of an extradition diplo14 matic note. At the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs two sessions regarding Kirschbaum were held in February of I 962 . On 19/2/ 1962 it was decided that the book would be changed in order to point out the "fascist activities" of Kirschbaum in 1939-1940, but without offending the Canadian government. They also examined the possibility of extraditing Kirschbaum. At the second session, held on 28/02/ l 962, the final plans were formulated. To prevent the action from looking like a political persecution of Kirschbaum by the communist authorities, all the accusations would be presented by the Jewish Community of Prague, without the official involvement of the Czechoslovak Embassy. All the arguments regarding Kirschbaum 's political activism against the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic would be deleted, but they would focus instead on the anti-Semitic measures of the Slovak State and its collaboration with Eichmann. The first part of the action would consist of sending a small book about Kirschbaum 's activities, printed in English and in French, to several places in Canada. At the beginning of April 1962, Comenius University in Bratislava would contact the University of Toronto and try to discredit Kirschbaum and obtain his dismissal. The second part of the action would come after three weeks of publishing a series of articles in Eudove zvesti, focused not only on Kirschbaum, but against the Slovak exiles in general. Once these actions were finished , an extradition request would be considered. 15 14 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965- 1969, box Kanada I, number 020/62-A . 15 Ibid, file 023325/62-6/ 1. 78 SLOVAKIA 2019 The text of the book that severely slandered Kirschbaum was modified many times during the spring of 1962. It contained many false statements and sheer nonsense, in line with the highest communist propaganda. The book stated that the "enraged fascist" Kirschbaum was responsible for the war against the USSR and the elimination of the political opponents of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party (HSI.:S). With the approval of then Prime Minister Vojtech Tuka and Minister of the Interior Alexander Mach, Kirschbaum allegdly led the Slovak embassy in Rome and Bern and he was allegedly a close collaborator of Eichmann . The text was approved on 27 /03/ I 962 by the head of the 3rd department, a certain Mr. Mikestik, with the focus on Kirschbaum 's allegedly anti-Semitic actions. A few changes were approved by Lieutenant Colonel Fejlek from the VHU on 06/04/ 1962, to accentuate the alleged Kirschbaum connection to Eichmann. 16 On 20/04/1962 the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified the Czechoslovak Embassy in Ottawa that the action against Kirschbaum was almost complete . The di stribution of the books would start at the beginning of May, especially to Jewish organizations . The Embassy was asked to pick 30-40 people from the University of Toronto to distribute the book. Ottawa answered affirmatively on 02/05/1962, together with an item for Minister of Northern Affaires and National Resources Walter Dinsdale in the name of a Slovak cultural officer. According to the wishes of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Czechoslovak Council of Jewish Communities was invo lved in this action. The Council informed the Ministry about its actions on 14/06/ 1962. They published the article against Kirschbaum in their special edition of the Informationsbulletin des Rates der judischen Gemeinden in der bohmischen Liindern , which was published in English and German and sent to 479 addresses in Canada, the USA and other countries of the world. 17 In Canada a crucial article against Kirschbaum, entitled Th e Kirschbaum Enigma, was published in the The Canadian Jewish News . On 28/06/1962 the "progressive" Eudove zvesti and later the 16 ibid, files 023794/62-6/ 1, 024172/62 . Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, file 024907/62 and number 073 /62. 17 SLOVAKIA 2019 79 Czech weekly Nase hlasy joined in. 18 The Czechoslovak Consulate General in Montreal in its report about the Slovak emigration from 27/06/ 1962 reiterated the importance of accusing Kirschbaum as a helper of the Nazis, which would also weaken the position of Stefan B. Roman. 19 The slander campaign against Kirschbaum received a certain reaction in the Canadian press in the summer of 1962 and also provoked some disputes among the leaders of the Canadian Slovak League, which pleased the Czechoslovak authorities. However, the original aim to totally discredit Kirschbaum was not achieved. 20 Kirschbaum defended himself in the press, the American-Canadian Committee for the Defense of Slovak Honour was founded to support him, and Stefan B. Roman supported him as well. Kirschbaum successfully sued The Canadian Jewish News in June of 1963 and the newspaper apologized, publishing "Our Sincere Statement to Dr. Kirschbaum." 21 The publishing of this apology was explained by a letter of 06/08/ 1963, written by a Jewish functionary from Toronto, Herman Landau, who sent it to the Czechoslovak Council for Jewish Communities in Prague. The editor-in-chief, Mr. Niiremberger, was obliged to publish the apology, because he faced a million dollar fine and he would have no witnesses to prove the anti-Kirschbaum statements before a court. Without a living witness, there was no chance to prove before the court the alleged encounter between Kirschbaum and Eichmann. The existing testimony of Dr. Jozef Falath from Austria had no value, since Falath had since changed his mind and was 18 The pro-Czechoslovak newspaper Nase hlasy attacked Kirschbaum already in the spring of 1962, after he was elected vice-president of the Canadian Ethnic Press Association . He was accused of helping the German Nazis in Slovakia. 19 Archives MZV Prague, f. Political reports, box Kanada-Montreal 1948-1973, number 079/62. 20 The secretary of the Canadian Slovak League, Frantisek Kvetan, who often disagreed with Kirschbaum and Roman, welcomed the Jewish critiques of Kirschbaum and refused to apologize, even after the failure of the slander campaign . The issue wasn ' t resolved until 1965 when Kvetan resigned his position. The Czechoslovak authorities followed this issue, which can be shown in the report "Conflicts in the Direction of the Canadian Slovak League", 20/3/ 1965 - Po litical Reports Kanada, Montreal 1948-1973 , number 026/65 . 21 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, fil e 027282/63. 80 SLOVAKIA 2019 22 now willing to testify on behalf of Kirschbaum. The festivities of the 1100th anniversary of the arrival of Saints Cyril and Methodius on Slovak territory, held in Toronto on 2930/06/1963 , and attemded by 15,000 people, infuriated the Czechoslovak authorities. Paul Martin, Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs , took part in these festivities and severely condemned Communi sm and supported the liberation of Eastern Europe from Soviet domination. This provoked an official Czechoslovak protest to the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs . Martin, together with Roman , also publicly met with Kirschbaum and expressed their confidence in him. The Czechoslovak Embassy in Ottawa considered this a provocation and on 08/07/1963 it urgently demanded new materials concerning Kirschbaum's alleged collaboration with the Nazis. 23 On I 7/07/1963 the Prague authorities considered their next steps. They faced the danger that Kirschbaum would sue the newspaper Eudove zvesti, which would mean its financial ruin. They decided to protect Eudove zvesti and to reinvolve the Prague Council of Jewish Communities, which would then provide additional arguments to the Canadian Jewish press. It was also necessary to find more of Kirschbaum 's alleged crimes. The meeting held a month later, on 17/08/ 1963 , had a similar aim . The Council of Jewish Communities was asked to spread new incriminating documents to the world. The Slovak Academy of Sciences, particularly their pro-communist historian Liptak, would investigate more of Kirschbaum 's activities. Another extradition request whould be prepared, to include the extradition ofDurcansky and Karmasin from the FRG. 24 The Czechoslovak Embassy in Canada wasn't very optimistic. Ottawa and Montreal wrote a joint report about Kirschbaum on 16/07 / I 963 , stating that Kirschbaum was being strongly defended by all the Slovak separatist emigrants. Canadian politicians assured them that nothing wou ld happen to Kirschbaum, unless he was proven guilty. Also, the editors of Eudove zvesti, Nase hlasy and the communist Canadian Tribune, in danger of being sued, asked for 22 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, fil e 027282/63. 23 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada 2, file 028246/63 . 24 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, files 027282/63 and 027406/63 . SLOVAK.IA 2019 81 new materials against Kirschbaum. 25 The functionaries in Prague and Bratislava, with the participation of the Ministry of the Interior and The Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, feverishly searched for new documents. They also gathered files from 1946/4 7, dealing with previous efforts to put Kirschbaum on the United Nations list of war criminals. 26 Kirschbaum and his lawyers were not in a hurry to sue the aforementioned newspapers. They asked Eudove zvesti to publish an apology and pay $5,000 before 27/ 10/ 1963, otherwise they would take them to court. Nevertheless, the editor-in-chief of Eudove zvesti, Jozef Durjancik, after having consulted with Czechoslovak authorities, didn't do anything and time passed without any action.27 During the winter of 1963/64, Durjancik kept on asking for new materials and assured himself of the support of the Czechoslovak authorities. In February of 1964, he commited an indiscretion by sending a letter by regular mail to Prague. The Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs was worried that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) would find out that everything was being directed from Prague, even though the RCMP already suspected it. 28 In March of 1965 Kirschbaum ended up suing the Nase hlasy newspaper. Then, a strange cooperation began began between the Czechoslovak communist authorities, Durjancik, the Council of Jewish Communities in Prague and the Czech emigrant newspaper Nase hlasy, which, despite being anti-communist, wasn ' t ashamed to collaborate with the communists against Kirschbaum. The lawyers for Nase hlasy, Mr. Pepper and Mr. Gellner, visited the Czechoslovak Republic on 20-23/04/ 1965, as the Czechoslovak embassy in Ottawa had recommended. They were unsuccessful in Prague, but in Slovakia, they appreciated the collaboration of the pro-communist historian Liptak and the archivist Michal Chreno. In August of 1965, Liptak sent them, via the Canadian embassy in Prague, 51 photocopies and I 08 photographs alleging that Kirschbaum was a Nazi collaboratot and, in return, he was sent many history books from the West. Chreno also sent several photographs, but he was dissatisfied 25 Ibid, file 027424/63. Ibid, file 029762/63 . 27 Ibid, number 076/63. 28 Archi ves MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965- 1969, box Kanada 1, fil e 021444/64. 26 82 SLOVAKIA 2019 with his reward. In the autumn of 1965, Chreno complained to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the State Bank refused to pay him $1 06CDN for his parcel. The bank wanted to transfer the payment directly to the National Archives account but he felt that the bank did not appreciate his work. This was the tragicomic end to the action called Kirschbaum , which is conserved in the archives of the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs .29 The slander campaigns in the I 960 ' s against Jozef Kirschbaum in Canada and Ferdinand Durcansky in Germany show the unflagging efforts of the Czechoslovak communist authorities to discredit Slovak nationalist emigres around the world. The communist authorities frequently used their subordinate organizations, e.g. the Prague Jewish Community or the Hi storical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences (where Cubomir Liptak played an important role and later was praised by many people). 3 From a long-term perspective, the slander campaigns were unsuccessful, but they left bitter traces and needlessly complicated the lives of many exi le politicians. The extradition requests were always unsuccessful. Such were the activities of commnist authorities against Slovak nationalists who worked for the overthrow of the communist regime and for the independence of Slovakia. ° 29 Ibid. °For examples of such praise see "Zomrel Cubomir Liptak," Sm e (Bratislava), Oc- 3 tober 22, 2003 .  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovak Émigrés in the Reports of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Actions against Ferdinand Ďurčanský and Jozef Kirschbaum (1961-1966/68) Description An account of the resource Petr Kubík Slovakia, Vol. 44 (No. 82-83), 2019 pp. 72-82 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kubík, Petr, 1963- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/006f0e8f1b2b40dd7a01877c9000076b.pdf 2d6648d8c8f73dc1a78c92eebb9f6f72 PDF Text Text 18 SLOVAKIA 2019 THE TRANSATLANTIC SLOVAK QUESTION DURING THE INTERW AR YEARS Michael Cude The relationship of the Slovaks to the Czechs is an issue that has persisted through the modem hi story of the two peoples. From the 19 th century ' national awakenings ' in Austria-Hungary to the Velvet Divorce between the Slovaks and Czechs in 1993, this 'Slovak question' was at the center of key events, including the creation of the First Czechoslovak Republic in 1918, its breakup and reestablishment after World War II, and the 1968 Prague Spring. 1 While many recent works have addressed the Slovak question, many have underappreciated the extent to which modem Slovak national identity formation was a transatlantic phenomenon. Historians examining this topic from the domestic Slovak perspective rarely delve deeply beyond Slovak borders, while histories of Slovaks abroad have focused predominantly on the Slovaks' place as immigrant communities . In doing so, such histories overlook how interlinked Slovak national politics in Slovakia were to Slovak communities abroad, particularly in North America, and the critical role they played in shaping Slovak national identity formation. Addressed by only a handful of recent works, the transatlantic Slovak question requires more attention.2 1 Reference key for shortened arc hi val ci tations: IHRC : Slovak American Collection, Immi gratio n History Research Center, University of Minneso ta. fil: Slovak Institute, Cleveland, OH. DoS CS 1910-44: Records of th e U.S. Department of Stale Relating to th e Internal Affairs of Czechoslovakia 1910-1944, Microfilm (Washin gton D.C.: National Archives and Records Service, 1982). 2 For some examples of sc holarship considering the Slovak question from a transatlantic perspective, see: M. Mark Sto larik, Where is my Home? Slovak Immigration to North America ( /8 70-2010) (Bern : Peter Lang, 2012). M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak League of America and the Canadian Slovak League in the Struggle for the Self-determination of the Nation, 1907- 1992," Slovakia, 39, 72 & 73 (2007), 7-35 . Marian Mark Stolarik, "The Role of American Slovaks in the Creation of CzechoSlovakia, 1914-19 I 8," Slovak Studies, 8, Hi stori ca 5 ( 1968), 7-82. Stefan Kucik, Podiel americkych S!ovakov na aulonomistickom hnuti na Slovensku 191 8-/938 (Martin: Matica slovenska, 20 I I). Gregory Curtis Ference, Sixteen Months of Indecision : Slovak American Viewpoints Toward Compatriots and the Homeland from �SLOVAKIA 2019 19 The Slovak efforts abroad during World War I remain the best told component of this story. The foundation of the transatlantic Slovak question was laid in the periods leading up to the First World War, when Slovak-American organizations began to campaign for Slovak political autonomy within the Kingdom of Hungary. The central organization for Slovak national activism became the Slovak League of America (SLA), founded in May 1907 by Slovak-American leaders to unify the disparate Slovak groups in the United States in common political action. The SLA ' s main objectives were to develop the cultural and political life of the Slovaks in America as a means of supporting the cultural and political life of the Slovaks in the homeland and to fight for Slovak national self-determination. 3 World War I and its accompanying 'Wilsonian moment' entrenched important symbols of Slovak national self-determination, as Slovak immigrant communities contributed to the establishment of the new Czechoslovak Republic. The wartime Czechoslovak National Council and its leaders, including Thomas G. Masaryk and Milan R. Stefanik, utilized Slovak-American organizations for financial , military, and diplomatic support. Consequently, Slovak-American demands led to the creation of the most important document relating to Slovak nationalism for the following twenty years: the Pittsburgh Agreement. Signed on 31 May 1918, this document declared common action between the Czechs and Slovaks in the formation of a democratic republic. Nevertheless, the agreement made a clear assertion for Slovak autonomy, under the terms that the Slovaks would I 9 I 4 to I 9 I 5 as Viewed by the Slovak Language Press in Pennsylvania (Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna Uni versity Press, 1995). Michael Cude, "The Imagined Exiles: Slovak-Americans and the Slovak Question during the First Czechoslovak Republic," in From Exsilium to Exile: Coercion in Migration, Studia Historica Gedanensia, vo l. 5, ed. Anna Mazurkiewicz (Gdansk, Poland: University of Gdansk History Institute, 20 14), 287-305 3 Konstantin Culen, History of Slovaks in America, Daniel C. Necas, trans. (St. Paul, MN : Czechoslovak Genealogical Society, 2007). Jan Pankuch, History of the Slovaks of Cleveland and Lakewood, Rasto Gallo, trans. (Cleveland: Czechoslovak Genealogical Society & Western Reserve Historical Society, 2001), 29-38. Stolarik, " Rol e," 7-82 . Stephanie 0. Husek, "Slovak American Fraternal, Cultural, and Civic Organizations to 19 I 4," in Slovaks in America: A Bicentennial Study, Joseph C. Krajsa, ed. (Middletown: Slovak League of America, 1978), 23 -38 . Joseph A. Mikus "The Slovak League of America: A Historical Survey," in Slovaks, Krajsa, ed., 3956. R. Vladimir Baumgarten & Joseph Stefka, The National Slovak Society: JOO Year History, I 890-1990 (Pittsburgh: National Slovak Society, 1990), 17-33. �20 SLOVAKIA 2019 have their "own administration, own parliament, and own courts." In the short term, the Pittsburgh Agreement appeased the Slovak-Americans, who consolidated their support around the budding state, while Masaryk used the agreement to legitimize Czech-Slovak coop4 eration in his diplomatic efforts. This campaign allowed Slovak-American leaders a sense of direct influence on the affairs of their homeland, although the Czechoslovak National Council quickly stymied this hope. While the Slovak-Americans had been able to pressure Masaryk into symbolically accepting their goals for Slovak autonomy, their influence only extended to his need to provide evidence of Slovak participation in his political program as he sought recognition from the Entente powers. As a result, the Slovak-Americans found themselves on the margins during the building of the state . Accordingly, many historians consider the Pittsburgh Agreement as a matter of domestic Slovak politics after its initial signing, with little further consideration for the Slovaks abroad. In doing so, they neglect the fact that transatlantic activities continued through the interwar period.5 With the establishment of Czechoslovakia following the war, Slovak national activists on both sides of the Atlantic, hereto identi- 4 "Pittsburgska Dohoda" in Dok:umenty slovenskej narodnej identity a statnosti, vol. I, eds. Jan Benko, et al (Narodne literame centrum: Dom slovenskej literatury, 1998), 484-7. " Masaryk to Mamatey, 22 September 1918," SLA Cabinet, F:llth Congress, Slovak Institute (S I), Cleveland, OH. Pankuch, History, 145-50. Stolarik, "Role," 32-54. Karo l Sidor, ''The Slovak League of America and the Slovak Nation 's Struggle for Autonomy," Slovakia I 7, 40 ( I 967), 39-46. Peter P. Hletko, "The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact," Slovakia l 8, 41 ( 1968), 5-54. Stanislav J. Kirschbaum , "The Cleveland and Pittsburgh Documents," in Slovakia 36, 66 & 67 ( 1998), 81-97. lmrich Mazar, A History of the Binghamton Slovaks : Over a Period of Forty Years, 1879-1919, ed. Wilhelmina Mazar Salina, trans. Thomas Janacek (Phoenix: Via Press, 2003), 203-17. Baumgarten & Stefka, National, 81-3. 5 James Ramon Felak, At the Price of the Republic: Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, 1929-1938 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, I 994). Peter A. Toma & Dusan Kovac, Slovakia: From Samo to Dzurinda (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 200 I). Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia : The Struggle for Survival, 2nd ed. (New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). Jan Rychlik, "Czech-Slovak Relations in Czechoslovakia, I 918-1939," in Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist and Fascist Europe, 1918- 1948, eds . Mark Cornwall, R.J.W . Evans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 13-26. Elisabeth Bakke, "Czechoslovakism in Slovak History," in Slovakia in History, eds. Mikulas Teich, et al (Cambridge: Cambridge Univers ity Press, 2011), 247-68. �SLOVAKIA 2019 21 fied as the Slovak 'autonomists,' had full expectations of a federal relationship that would recognize Slovak cultural uniqueness and grant the Slovaks civic equality with autonomy over domestic affairs under the terms of the Pittsburgh Agreement. In contrast, most Czech leaders wanted a strongly centralized state, justified by arguments of the commonality of the Czechs and Slovaks, the threat of Hungarian and German irredentism, and the believed necessity of Czech oversight to modernize Slovakia. They relied on support from Slovak ' centralists,' who identified the Czechs and Slovaks as a common people. Slovak autonomists, who saw the Slovaks as a culturally distinct people from the Czechs, perceived this ' Prague centralism' as a form of cultural and political hegemony. In response, they replanted their fight over the Slovak question against the newly formed government in Prague. Both autonomists and centralists mobilized Slovaks at home and abroad behind their version of the state, with the transatlantic component focused on lobbying foreign governments. As with many other nationality groups, Slovak leaders saw the postwar peace process as a key moment to make their case. With the centralists represented at the Versailles Peace Conference by the formal delegation from Czechoslovakia, the autonomists attempted to present their own view, including a flurry of correspondence from Slovak-Americans to United States President Woodrow Wilson and an unofficial delegation led by Slovak nationalist leader Andrej Hlinka. The autonomists appealed for recognition of an independent Slovak identity and the establishment of a federalist system in Czechoslovakia that granted greater domestic political autonomy to Slovakia. Wilson and other western leaders, however, prioritized economic and political modernity as a necessary quality for selfgovernrnent. Czechoslovakia's centralist leaders appealed to the Wilsonian prioritization of modernism to gain American acceptance of their vision, and used a proposed uplift of the Slovaks into modernity to advance this cause. They nonetheless pursued this objective in a way that often cast the Slovaks in a disparaging light and sowed further discord. The Conference in turn legitimated this organization of the Czechoslovak state and ignored Slovak autonomist appeals. 6 6 For more, see : Michael Cude, "Wilsonian National Self-determination and the Slovak Question during th e Founding of Czechoslovakia, 1918-192 1," Diplomatic Histo,y (2016) 40, I: 155-80 �22 SLOVAKIA 2019 This failure at Versailles did not dissuade transatlantic Slovak activities. From the conclusion of the Treaty of Trianon in June 1920 to the Munich Agreement in September 1938, the Slovak question persisted in the First Czechoslovak Republic. The interwar period saw the Slovak autonomist movement survive with the Czechoslovak state arrayed against them . Slovak autonomists regularly looked across the Atlantic for support in pressuring Prague to change its stance. The Slovak autonomists continued to reference the spirit and goals of Wilsonianism to justify their claims for autonomy, and the Pittsburgh Agreement became their primary symbol. SlovakAmerican autonomists accepted their leading role of defending the Slovaks internationally, and they remained hopeful of convincing world leaders, particularly those in the United States, to embrace their view. This task remained an uphill battle, given the autonomists' inability to match the resources or international connections maintained by Prague, as centralists worked to discredit the idea of domestic autonomy for Slovakia. The Czech and Slovak centralists polarized the issue as a support for state unity through centralism or support for the destruction of the state through autonomy. In international appeals, the centralists disparaged Slovak capabilities for selfgovernment, and presented the Slovak autonomists as a parochial fringe, ignorant of world affairs. Accordingly, this transatlantic debate heavily contributed to the failure of the Czechoslovak concept in the interwar period by helping sow the entrenched distrust that culminated in the splintering of the Czechoslovak Republic in March of 1939. The question of Slovak autonomy remained a principal component of Slovak politics during the First Czechoslovak Republic. The Slovaks split into three general categories on the Slovak question. The smallest of these groups were the Czechoslovakists, who wanted a close, non-differential linkage with the Czechs. Vavro Srobar, the first appointed Minister for Slovakia in 1918, exemplified this faction. Another group consisted of moderate nationalists who pursued cooperation with the Czechs, but wanted recognition of separate Slovak identity and political autonomy. Milan Hodza, Prime Minister of the republic in the late 1930s and leader of the Agrarian Party, best exemplified this faction. Hodza and others supported a federalist model to address national minority questions. Most of the former two groups came from Slovakia's Lutheran minority. The Slovak auton- �SLOVAKIA 2019 23 omists, who were predominantly Catholics, were the most controversial. The Reverend Andrej Hlinka represented them as leader of the Slovak People 's Party. Hlinka and his supporters pushed for complete autonomy within Czechoslovakia, although the radical end of the party increasingly sought greater independence while a smaller minority even promoted a return to Hungary under a promise of autonomy. The Slovak People's Party (SPP) remained the most popular party in Slovakia and mixed cooperation with opposition to push for Slovak autonomy. The Agrarian Party followed in popular support, and it gradually pushed for more autonomy, albeit in a more deliberate fashion than the SPP. The Slovak National Party, the Slovak Communists, and the Hungarian Parties joined them in support of autonomy.7 Politically, some Slovaks took prominent positions in the central government, most notably Hodza. Prague allowed Slovak autonomists to organize and hold seats in Parliament, but it continued to censor nationali st viewpoints and it regularly pursued smear campaigns against Slovak autonomist leaders. The SPP joined the government in 1927, arranged by Hodza after promises of Slovak autonomy, but Hodza's plan proceeded in a watered-down fashion. The SPP participation lasted only two years before accusations of treason against radical politician Vojtech Tuka led to the SPP's withdrawal from the government. The SPP later exploited the Munich Agreement to force Prague's hand to achieve autonomy during the short-lived Second Republic, and then seceded from the state in March of 1939.8 7 Prague regularly promoted the idea that most of the Slovak people opposed autonomy, because the SPP only maintained 30-35% of the electorate in Slovakia. Although it is difficult to determine the true popular support of autonomy based strictly on the electoral support of each party, the support in Slovakia for Prague's version of centralism was probably we ll in the minority when one considers that the three largest parties-SPP, Agrarian, and Communists- all embraced some level of Slovak autonomy. 8 For more on this period in Slovak hi story, see: Yeshayahu A. Jelinek, The Lust for Power: Nationalism, Slovakia, and the Communists 1918- 1948 (New York: Columbia University, 1983). Susan Mikula, "The Politics of Frustration : The Slovak Politica l Experience, 191 8-1938," in Reflections on Slovak Histo ry, eds. Stanislav Kirschbaum & Anne C. Rom an (Toronto: Slovak World Congress, 1987), 73 -88. James Felak, "Slovak Considerations of the Slovak Question: The Ludak, Agrarian, Socialist, and Communi st views in lnterwar Czechoslovakia" in The Czech and Slovak Experience, ed . John Morison (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), 136-62. Felak, At the �24 SLOVAKIA 2019 The Slovak-A mericans also consolidated their positions on the issue in a similar fas hi on. After an early divide, the leaders of the Slovak League of America gave up on Prague and embraced the autonomist position, as did the large Catholic fraternal organization the First Catholic Slovak Union, and other, smaller organizations, such as the Friends of Slovak Freedom (FSF), an organization formed in the 1920s w ith the singul ar goal of addressing the Slovak question . The large, secular and large ly Protestant, fraternal organizations, the National Slovak Society and the Slovak Evangeli cal Un ion, at first embraced the centralist Slovaks, but nationalist pressure ultimatel y led them to try to moderate between the centrali st and autonomist positions. They ultim ate ly embraced the gradualist position of Hodza. In response, the Czechoslovaki sts established the Slovak National A lliance to serve as the arm of Prague among the SlovakAmericans, along with the Slovak Gymnastic Union Sokol. Consisting mostl y of secularists and some Lutherans, these organizations regularly attacked the SLA for its Catholic and autonomist leanings and promoted the strict uni ty of the Czechs and Slovaks. 9 As the Slovak question became entrenched in Czechoslovak politics, each competing side pursued a voluminous international lobby ing campaign to build western support for its respective position. This included a fact ion demanding a revision of the Trianon Treaty to return Slovakia to Hungary. The primary international Slovak advocate of this position was the Reverend Francis Jehlicka and hi s organization, the Slovak Council , founded in 1933 . Jehlicka had attended the Paris Peace Conference wi th Hlinka, but decided afterwards that the Slovaks could not trust the Czechs. Jehlicka remained abroad, where he lobbied fo r a Slovak reunion with Hungary based on Hun ga ri an promises of Slovak autonomy. He attempted to build Price of th e Republic. Toma & Kovac, Slovakia, 78-1 06. Kirsc hbaum, History of Slovakia , 155-84. Ryc hlik, "Czec h-Sl ovak Relations," in Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist, 13-2 6. R.J.W. Evans, " Hungarians, Czechs, and Slovaks : Some Mutual Perceptions," in Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist, I 09-22 . Mary Heimann, Czechoslovakia : The State that Failed (New Haven: Yale Uni vers ity Press, 2009), 48-86. Nata lia Kraj covicova, " Slovakia in Czechoslovakia," in Slovakia in History, 137-56. 9 Joseph Pauco, "Slovaks Abroad and Their Relati onship with Slovakia," in Slo vakia in the 19th & 20th Centuries, ed. Joseph M. Kirschbaum (Toronto: Slovak World Congress, 1973), 333-42. Josep h V. Adamec, "The Slovak Cath olic Federation," in Slovaks in America, 223-32 . Baumgarten & Stetl<a, National, 85-7. Pankuch, History, 177-86 . Stolarik, " Slovak League," 7-35 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 25 support from the Slovak-Americans by appealing to Slovakia's historical and economic roots in Hungary and exposing claimed mistreatment of the Slovaks by Prague. ' 0 Jehlicka could express his voice abroad because of support from Budapest and later Nazi Germany, and he convinced a few figures in the West, most notably the British publi sher Lord Rothermere, who campaigned on behalf of Hungary internationally. Jehlicka ' s arguments nevertheless carried little weight in other circles . Scottish historian R. W. Seton-Watson, a prominent supporter of the Czechoslovak Republic , pursued a constant back and forth against Jehlicka, and, on both sides of the Atlantic, Slovaks and Czechs of different politica l views unified against Slovakia ' s return to Hungary. The Slovak autonomi sts and centralists , for example, collaborated in an open letter denouncing Jehlicka . 11 Slovak-Americans likewise continued to lobby against Hungarian claims, reminding readers about the old magyarization policy to eliminate Slovak national identity. Slovak-American publisher Jan Pankuch claimed that this was the sole occas ion when the Slovak-American autonomi sts, Czech-Americans, and Slovak10 Anthony Pessenl ehner, "Czechoslovakia' s Ri ght to Statehood Assa iled," Current History, 14, 5 (Aug. I 92 1), 845-8. Dr. F. Jehlicka: Kto on je a co chce (C leveland: 1920). Francis Jehlicka, Reply to Mr. R. W. Seton-Watson 's Book 'Slovakia Th en and Now ' (Vienn a, 1932). The Slovak Co uncil , Th e Unsolved Slovak Problem (Vienna: Slovak Council, 1933). The Slovak Co un cil , Bolsevizmus a slovenska otazka (Geneva: Slovak Council , 193 6), in : 8 : Resolutions, Memoranda, Proclamations, SI. The Slovak Council , Sh ould Great Britain go to Wa r- fo r Czechoslovakia: An Appeal to British Common Sense for th e Sake of Wo rld Peace (London: Haze l, Watson, & Viney, 1937) . Francis Jehli cka, Fa1her Hlinka 's Struggle fo r Slovak Freedom (London: Slova k Council , 1938), 34-5. "The German Minister in Czechoslovaki a (Eisenlohr) to the German Foreign Ministry (Doc 57)," Documen1s on German Foreign Policy, Seri es D, V2 (Was hington, D.C. : U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947), 132-3 . 11 R.W. Seton-Watson, Treaty Revision and the Hungarian Frontiers ( London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1934). " Seton-Watson to Alois Ka lisek" (Doc I 32) in R. W. SetonWa tson and His Relations with the Czechs and Slovaks: Documents, / 906- 195 1, vol. I, eds. Jan Ryc hlik, et al (Prague: Ustav T. G. Masaryka, I 995), 393-6. "The Situati on in Slova ki a and the Magyar Minori ty" (Doc 139) in Seton-Watson, 409-25. "Seton-Watson to Martin Razus" (Doc 155 ) in Seton- Watson, 454-5 . "Fedor Ruppeldt to Seton-Watson" (Doc I 60) in Seton-Watson, 465-9. C. L Orbach, "Czechoslovakia ' s Place in the Sun," Current Histo1y, 14, 6 (Sept I 92 1), 944-5. Anonymous, "Another Defense of Czechoslovaki a" Curren/ History, 14, 6 (Sept 192 1), 945-6. Adam Poliak, "Czechos lova ki a's Right to Statehood," Current History, I 5, 3 (Dec I 92 1), 499. " Slovaki a' s Pro test" (Doc 156) in Seton-Watson, 456-9. �26 SLOVAKIA 2019 American centralists came together in common cause, although the resolution almost failed when the two sides sparred over whether the text should declare the Slovaks and Czechs as one nation. The proHungarian autonomists, thus, remained on the periphery of the Sio• 12 va k question. The unified opposition against Hungarian irredentism otherwise did little to ease the conflict between the centralists and autonomists. The Czech and Slovak centralists made the Slovak question a primary component of their international propaganda, and they often perpetuated negative stereotypes of the Slovaks to promote the Czechoslovak vision. The official press in Prague released ample publications by Czech nationali st leaders in the English language on the topic. President Masaryk, for example, made clear his disappointment with the "po litical immaturity" of the Slovak autonomist movement. Masaryk, who continued to highlight his own partial Slovak heritage, likewise claimed to have proven his great love for Slovakia by having liberated it from Hungary and he asserted that Slovak nationalists could prove their own love by embracing Prague 's authority. 13 Edvard Benes, who served as Foreign Minister until succeeding Masaryk to the presidency in 1935, in tum argued that the Czechs and Slovaks remained unified, except for a "fringe minority," working for a return to the pre-war order, and the "dictates of local , provin12 "Rezolucie Vznesene Ustrednym Vyborom Slovenskej Ligy v Amerike na schodzi , vzdrziavanej IO novembra 1920," Person File (PF): Bielek, SI. Association of Slovak Newspapermen of America, Count Albert Apponyi or Revival of Magyar Propaganda in America (Scranton, Pa: Bosak Press, 1923), in: B: Resolutions, SI. American Citizens of Slovak Origin, The Refutation to the Arguments of the Hungarian Kossuth Delegation ( 1928), in: The Podkrivacky, Adam Papers, B: 17, Slovak American Collection, Immigration History Research Center (IHRC), Uni versity of Minnesota. "What the Magyars Forget," The National Slovak Society (NSS) of the US.A . Records, B: 168, F: Slovak League of America (SLA), lHRC. "The Cleveland District Assembly of the SLA to Hoover," 4 December 1929, F#: 860F.00/306, Records of the U.S. Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Czechoslovakia 1910-1944 (DoS CS 1910-44), Microfilm (Washington D.C .: National Archi ves and Records Service, 1982). Pankuch, History, 186-90. 13 Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, The Making of a State: Memories and Observations, 1914-1918, trans. Henry Wickham Steed (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1927), 2 1, 41 , 208-11 , 338, 361. Thomas G. Masaryk, Masa,yk on Thought and Life: Conversations with Karel Capek, reprint ed., trans. M. & R. Weatherall (New York: Arno Press, 1971 ). "T.G. Masaryk on the Pittsburgh Agreement" (Doc 30) in Slovakia : Political, 209- 10. �SLOVAKIA 2019 27 cial, factional and individualist interests ." 14 Czech scholars, journalists and officials also contributed to this campaign, mostly through studies of the Czechs that glossed over the Slovaks except to praise 15 how the Czechs had liberated them. For example, Czech historian Albert Prazak praised the Czech ro le in uplifting the Slovaks, and condemned Hlinka and the SPP as tools of Hungary and as part of a Catholic conspiracy to take over Central Europe. Prazak then dismissed the Pittsburgh Agreement as "merely a flight of fancy ," rooted in "immaturity of political judgment and lack of understanding." 16 Czech journalist Ales Broz likewise condemned the Slovaks as " retarded in their development" versus the " well educated, practical, realistic" Czechs, and praised the direction of Slovakia under the Czechs for allowing the two peoples to become "one stock, one cul. ,, I 7 ture, one nat10n . Centralist Slovaks also contributed to this campaign, including articles by Interior Minister Juraj Slavik and Minister to France Stefan Osusky on the nationality questions in Czec hoslovakia, as well as one by Education Minister Anton Stefanek praising Prague ' s 14 Eduard Benes, My War Memoirs, trans. Paul Seiver (London : George Allen & Unwin, 1928), 348, 448, 469, 472-8 1. Edvard Benes, Christmas Message (Prague: Orb is, 193 7), 17. Edvard Benes, "Of Czechoslovak Unity" in We Were and We Shall Be: Th e Czechoslovak Spirit th rough th e Centuries , eds. Zdenk a & Jan Mun zer (New York : Un gar, 1941), 164-6. 15 Kami I Krofta & Jiri Hoetzel, A Short Histo,y of Czechoslovakia ( ew York: Robert McBride & Co, 1934), 137-8, 142, 149-52. Kami! Krofta, "Czechs and Slovaks (I)" The Slavonic and East European Review, 13, 38 (January 1935), 363-7 1. Kami I Kroft a, "Czechs and Slovaks ( II )" The Slavonic and East European Review, I 3, 39 (April 1935), 6 11-26. Josef Borovicka, Ten Years of Czechoslovak Politics (Prague: Orbis, 1929), 7-8, 13 , 20-1 , 44, 111-1 2, I I 9-20, I 24-6. Emanuel Capek, "The Background of Political Parti es in Czechoslovaki a" The Sla vonic and East European Review, I 0, 28 (June 193 1), 90- 104. Ales Broz, " Minori ty Ri ghts in th e Czechoslova k State," Foreign Affairs, 6, I (October 1927), 158-60. Ales Broz, " President Masaryk, Creator of the Czechos lovak Republic," Current Histo,y , 24, I (April I 926), 48-53. 16 Prague appointed Prazak, a Czech, to erve at Comenius Uni versity in Brati slava as its primary hi stori an of the Slova ks. The Slavonic Review labeled Prazak the "foremost li ving authority on Slovak History." Albert Prazak, " Review : The ew Slovaki a by R. W. Seton-W atso n" The Slavonic Review, 3, 9 (March 1925), 71 3-20. 17 Ales Broz, "Czech and Slovak at Odds: Both Sides of the Controversy - From the Czech Standpoint," Curren/ Histo,y, 22 , 5 (Aug 1925), 784-8 . �28 SLOVAKIA 2019 development of Slovak education. 18 Slovak Social Democrat, and rigid Czechoslovakist, [van Derer's short book on the Pittsburgh Agreement provided the most thorough effort in English to discredit the Slovak autonomists . Derer claimed that most Slovaks embraced the state as constructed, and that only a " pro-Magyar" minority supported autonomy. He likewise dismissed the Slovak-American signers of the Pittsburgh Agreement as not " true" Slovak nationals, because they lived in America. Derer argued that the document had meant simply local administrative autonomy, which he claimed Prague had granted. He then portrayed the Czechs as the Slovaks' saviors and condemned Slovak autonomy: In return for their having helped Slovakia when things were at th eir worst, in return for their having saved our liberty and an independent state apparatus, railway and postal communications, and a Slovak system of education at the tim e when the Slovaks th emselves were weak, unprepared, often distrustful and inclined rather to continue to live under their thousand-year yoke than to live in freedom, in return for having shed their blood for our country on the battlefronts in the Great War, and in the fights against Bolshevist Hungary in I 9 I 9 and thus saving Slovakia from a new occupation by the Magyars -in return for all this are we to remove the Czechs from Slovakia ? 19 Prague also maintained support from American and Eng lish academics and journalists in perpetuating Czechoslovakism. SetonWatson remained a staunch supporter of the idea, boasting how he regularly discredited "cantankerous Slovaks who accused Masaryk and hi s friend s of 'Czec hi sation."' He publicly condemned Hlinka and the SPP and repudiated their criticisms of Prague. Seton-Watson a lso actively denied Slovak agency in Slovak national development. 18 Juraj Slavik, "The Nationality Question in Slovakia," Central European Observer, 11 , 26 (Dec 18, 1933), 463-5 . Stefan Osusky, " Wh y Czechoslovakia?" Foreign Affairs, 15 , 3 (Apri l 1937), 455-71. Anton Stefanek, " Education in Slovakia," Th e Slavonic Review, 2, 5 (Dec 1923), 308-27. 19 Ivan Derer, The Unity of th e Czechs and Slovaks: Has th e Pittsburgh Declaration Been Carried Out? (Prague: Orbis, 193 8). �SLOVAKIA 2019 29 The Slovaks should therefore be thankful that fate has made them dependent upon a race so efficient, so well-educated and well-disciplined as the Czechs ... .At the critical moment, the Slovaks made the impression of a helpless animal fascinated by the approach of the boa-constrictor, and Prague was literally the sole hope.-'0 On the Slovak question, Seton-Watson blamed the " hypersensitive" Slovaks as simply being too parochial, religiously backward and ill developed, and he dismissed autonomist arguments as the "wild talk of extremists." Even in a work of collected essays designed to "show that the Slovaks themselves have had a much greater share in the reconstruction of their country than is often supposed," Seton-Watson turned predominantly to centralist Slovaks whose contributions consisted mostly of self-promotion and praise for the merits of centralism.21 The American philanthropist and writer Kenneth D. Miller was another avid promoter of Czechoslovakism. "Everything points to the wisdom of a cultural as well as political union between the two nationalities. No matter what the cultural development may be, neither nationality can well maintain its political independence without the other." He likewise felt that the Slovak question would disappear with the development of the "slow, passive Slovak," who yet lacked initiative, and who was prone to immorality and drunkenness, and to "religious vagary or fanaticism." 22 Other presentations ranged from industrialist and diplomat John Crane, who attacked the "backward ignorance" of the Slovaks for resisting secularization, to YMCA secretary Fred Rindge who criticized a claimed lack of Slovak interest 20 R.W. Seton-Watson , Th e New Slovakia (Prague: Fr. Borovy, 1924), 3, 23-4. R.W. Seton-Watson, Masaryk in England (New York: Macmillan, 1943), 61. "Seton-Watson Open Letter to Hlinka" (Doc 108), in Seton-Watson, 343-4. "SetonWatson to Alois Kolisek" (Doc 135), in Seton-Watson, 401-2. R.W. Seton-Watson, ed. Slovakia Then and Now: A Political Survey (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1931). When planning the book, Seton-Watson expressed his desire to have an article from a SPP leader, so that Slovak autonomists could not accuse him of onesidedness. He considered an article on the issue of autonomy, but decided only to allow an article on Slovak religion by Hlinka. "Seton-Watson to Milan Hodza" (Docs 144 & 145), in Seton-Watson, 431-2 . 22 Kenneth D. Mill er, The Czecho-Slovaks in America (New York: Doran Company, 1922), 14-25, 121-122, 158-160. 21 �30 SLOVAK.IA 2019 in the arts. Journalist C.J.C. Street claimed, "The Slovak dream was always to regain their lost unity with the Czechs and as a united nation to secure the tolerable conditions of existence. " 23 The Slovak autonomists in Slovakia pursued a few efforts during the interwar period to counter this campaign, although they lacked equivalent resources and connections to those held by Prague. The SPP' s most notable attempt was the Zilina Memorandum of 1922. Released to the western press and governments, the document sought to expose the Slovak question to the world, beginning with its sensationalist title, "a country doomed to death, a nation in her last agonies implores the civilized world for help." It decried the failures of Wilsonianism, which had allowed Prague to "bamboozle" the Slovaks "out of the freedom promised to them ." The text went on to explain their issues with the Czechs, discussing concerns from the treatment of religion, to economic exploitation, and the denial of autonomy. The memorandum also condemned Czechoslovakism as simply a tool for domination. The Czechs and Slovaks have been always forming two separate little worlds with a very different character due to their different geographical and economic conditions, their different way of thinking, of feeling and of mind. We have a different view of life, other morals and other traditions; we have a different social structure, different legal rules and different ideas about political economy and culture. The document ultimately claimed the world could still save the Slovaks if it acted quickly. The key of the iron cage in which the Slo vak Nation is being mercilessly incarcerated lays in the hands of the Great Powers. This memorial is our last expedient and our last weap23 John 0. Crane, "Church and State in Czechoslovakia" The Slavonic Review, 6, 17 (Dec. 1927), 364-78. Fred H. Rindge, Jr. "The Charm of Czechoslovakia" Current History, 22, 3 (June 1925), 447-50. C. J. C. Street, Slovakia Past and Present (Westm inster, UK: P.S. King & Son, 1928). For more examples, see: Robert Machray, "Czechoslova ki a a Pioneer in Central European Politics" Current Hislo ry, 25, 6 (Mar. 1927), 839-43 . J. H. Wallis, "The Upbuilding of Czechoslovakia," Curren/ Histo1y, 14, 5 (Aug. 192 1), 835-45 . �SLOVAK.IA 2019 31 on ... Though only clad in the rags of our torn freedom we nevertheless appear as accusers before the world, charging the rulers of Prague who are still deluding the powers, and the powers themselves for having out of sheer ignorance become their accomplices. To ignore the Slovak case, thus, would be to support the trampling of liberty. 24 After the Zilina Memorandum bore no fruit, the Slovak autonomists pursued fewer efforts to court the west. They made a few sporadic attempts, such as a translation of the SPP •program in 1930, written by Jozef Tiso, which outlined the SPPs vision of a Slovak national Christian democracy, and appealed for autonomy as a protection of the Slovak cultural tradition. It argued that the Slovak nation's religious roots encouraged it toward a peaceful selfpreservation, unlike other nations that turned toward national chauvinism. 25 Slovak priest and publicist Anton Kompanek also produced an article that emphasized Slovak Christianity as a symbol of Slovak worthiness for self-government. Kompanek believed Slovakia served as an example of how the Church and state could find balance in the modem world. 26 These publications, however, remained exceptions, as the Slovak autonomists in Slovakia maintained little faith in western governments, recognizing Prague's stranglehold over their image internationally. They instead relied on the Slovak-Americans to lead the way in their defense internationally. Slovak nationalist politician Karol Sidor claimed that despite a continued interest in the homeland, the Slovak-Americans began to lose their "onetime vitality and ardor" during the interwar period. He linked this outcome to greater assimilation and a decreasing knowledge of the Slovak language.27 This claim is somewhat true. The energy of the war years certainly diminished, particularly in the 24 "Zilina Memorandum" (Doc I 02) & "Covering Letter for the Zilina Memorandum" (Doc I 03), in Seton-Watson, pp. 319-33 . 25 Jozef Tiso, The Ideology of th e Slovak Populist Party (Prague: 1930). 26 Anton Kompanek, "The Catholic Church in Slovakia" Th e Sla vonic and East European Review, 12, 36 (April 1934), 611-21. 27 Sidor, "Slovak League," 59-62. �32 SLOVAKIA 2019 1930s with the onset of the Great Depression.28 Sidor, however, understated how much the Slovak-Americans remained at the forefront of the international efforts to gain recognition of the Slovak question. Historian Jozef Pauco 's interpretation is much more accurate: "For twenty years the Slovak League of America defended the spirit and letter of the Pittsburgh Pact and by using the freedom of the press and the freedom of assembly on American soil, they did so more freely and energetically than the two political parties in their homeland." 29 Based on the volume of publications and direct communications with government officials on both side of the Atlantic, it is clear that the Slovak question continued to dominate the transatlantic interests of the Slovak Americans, as they bolstered their compatriots' activities within Czechoslovakia by applying external pressure on Prague. The Slovak fraternal organizations made constant efforts to keep their members linked to their Slovak cultural identity, and to aid in the fight for autonomy in the homeland. They pursued these efforts through education programs such as national lectures, art and photography tours, but also symbolic actions such as erecting a statue of General Milan R. Stefanik in Cleveland in 1924 and the planting of a Linden Tree on Capitol Hill in honor of Stefanik in 1934. 30 The Slovak question remained high on the list of Slovak-American concerns, and the various Slovak organizations produced a flurry of pamphlets and informative documents on the issue. The Pittsburgh Agreement remained at the center of this debate, with Slovak autonomists on both sides of the Atlantic continuing to affirm its legality against the centralist dismissals that it was simply a non-binding text designed to placate the Slovak-Americans during the war. Autonomist publica28 June Alexander, for example, shows how assimilation became an internal issue for Slovak-Americans, as the older generations struggled to assure that their American born children maintained links to their ethnic heritage. June Granatir Alexander, Ethnic Pride, American Patriotism: Slovaks and Other New Immigrants in the Jn terwar Era (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2004), 93-19 I. 29 Pauco, "S lovaks Abroad," 333-42. 30 "Ot. Svec to Podkrivacky," 3 Oct. 1938," PF: Adam Podkrivacky, SI. "S LA to Jakub Vitostak, 30 Nov 1923 ," The First Catholic Slovak Union of America (FCSU) Records, F: 1303, IHRC. "Jan Kocur to Michael Senko, 30 Nov 1926," FCSU, F: 1304, IHRC. 0. D. Koreff, Milan Rastisla v Stefanik: A Short Biography (Cleveland: Slovak League of America, 1924), 82-3 . "SLA to Arthur Colegrove," NSS, 8 : 168, F: SLA, IHRC. �SLOVAKIA 2019 33 tions looked to inform about the Slovaks, to expose the failed promises of Prague on autonomy, and to defend against the accusations of Prague centralists. The Slovak League remained at the forefront, hoping that exposure of the situation to the American press and pub1ic would spur sympathy and support? In many cases, the Slovak-Americans directed these publications at Prague, with the hope of convincing a change in policy . They, nevertheless, would consecutively produce English versions, which they then sent to the American President, members of Congress, the Department of State, and assorted press outlets. For example, in 1921 the SLA wrote to Masaryk calling for the immediate implementation of the Pittsburgh Agreement. When Prague did not respond, the League followed up with a more detailed Memorandum on November 9, 1922. This document called on Prague to make good on the Pittsburgh Agreement in the name of natural rights and to reward the sacrifices made by Slovak-Americans during World War I. It highlighted Masaryk's role in the formation of the Agreement, and then provided a photograph of the original text as well as a series of letters between the SLA and various Czechoslovak officials that had promised its implementation to show how promises made to the Slovak-Americans never lived up to reality. The text then defended the legitimacy of Slovak autonomy. We are convinced that the honest and upright materialization of the Pittsburgh Pact in no way will harm the unity of the State; on the contrary it will mean a considerable reinforcement within and without and make possible united co-operation of all patriotic forces against the elements of disintegration, depriving them of a dangerous weapon, which they cannot effectively employ against the Republic, fanning discontent, mistrust and spreading hatred between both nations comprising the state. The League made clear, however, that this good will rested "solely upon a sincere Czecho-Slovak reciprocity." It then gave an alternative: 31 "Telegram to Ivan Bielek on 29 Nov 1934," NSS, B: 168, F: SLA , IHRC. �34 SLOVAKIA 2019 We feel it is our duty to emphasize that if our sincere and friendly attempt, which has at its heart the welfare, interest and future of the Republic, should fail to meet with success, the Slovak l eague of America would not be able to prevent the American Slovaks and their factors from turning to the Court of Public Opinion of the civilized world. While the Slovak autonomists in Slovakia acknowledged the letter, Prague neglected to respond. 32 The SLA then passed a follow-up resolution. Asserting that it "fights with fire and sword with everyone who is in favor of autonomy of the Slovak nation," it admonished Prague for manipulating the world into believing the Czechoslovakist image and for leading a smear campaign against the SLA. It then provided a list of examples of hostility, including efforts to undermine its finances , blackmail, the bullying of Slovak-American leaders and press, and attempts to send government officials to propagandize against them . It once again emphasized how the League had made every effort to resolve the Slovak question within the confines of the Czechoslovak Republic , but it would soon submit the issue "to the judgment of public opinion of the civilized world," if Prague continued to treat them with disdain.33 Many more publications followed. The Friends of Slovak Freedom , for example, released two protests in 1923. These texts defended the va lidi ty of the Slovak-Americans as representatives of the Slovak people, and condemned Prague's actions against Slovak autonomists, including such accusations as "false signatures or resolutions, false numbers of people attending their lectures, insulting the Slovak journalists, insulting the Slovak League as anti-state, and many other lies," as well as criticisms about press censorship in Slo- 32 SLA , Memorandum S/ovenskej Ligy v Amerike upra vene na vladu a Narodne Shromai denie Cesko-Slo venskej Republiky v zaujme vtelenia Pittsburgskej Dohody do ustavy C.-S. Republiky (Pittsburgh: Slovak League of America, 1922). Both the full Slovak and English versions of this Document are avai lab le at: SLA Cab, F: Memorandum /922 v Zaum e Pitts. Dohody, SI. Also avai lable in: " Memorandum Slovenskej Ligy v Arnerike" in Dokumenty, Vol 2, 138-44. 33 " An Appeal of the Slovak League of America to All Political Factors of th e Czecho-S lovak Republic," PF: Bielek, SI. �SLOVAKIA 2019 35 vakia. 34 After reading Masaryk's criticism of Hlinka, the Slovak League then produced a pamphlet that challenged the idea that Masaryk personally had liberated the Slovaks. It reminded readers of the Slovak-American war contribution, and then remarked how the SLA and the Pittsburgh Agreement were certainly valid in Masaryk's eyes when he needed Slovak-American support in 1918. The document then included a text from former Czechoslovak ambassador to Japan, Karel Pergler, arguing that both the Slovaks and Czechs had unequivocally recognized the Pittsburgh Agreement upon its signing. 35 Next to these direct appeals, the Slovak-American autonomists also released many publications geared directly toward an American audience. They designed these works to inform about the Slovaks, expose their continued fight for self-determination and to link the Slovak question to American democratic values. These publications included several biographies of Milan R. Stefanik, a translated history by Slovak historian Joseph Skultety that directly challenged images of Slovak backwardness and other stereotypes, and a short pamphlet on Czechoslovakism by Slovak-American historian Ol'ga Husek warning that the concept meant for the Slovaks "the rejection of their cultural past and the stunting of their future growth." 36 They also attempted to rally America to their cause by showing their valiance in the face of domination. An SLA article distributed to the American Press praised how the Slovak-Americans continued to fight even with "the entire machinery of government set against them, calumnies upon calumnies by a government subsidized press, heaped upon the heads of those who take up their cause, and bug- 34 Friends of Slovak Freedom, " Resolution, November 28, 1923," & " Protest against Censorship and Confiscation of Slovak Publications by the Government in Slovakia" in Pankuch , Slo vaks of Cleveland, l 82-6. 35 Slovenska Liga v Amerike, V Zaujme Pra vdy! (In the Interest of Truth !) (Pittsburgh: P. Jamriska, 1930). Found in : SLA Cabinet, F: SLA Presidents, SI. Prague responded to these letters, but it simply reasserted the usual rebutta ls, claiming that 75% of the Slovaks supported centralization and that the Pittsburgh Agreement was simply an American document. "Ohlas Americkeho Memoranda u Nas," 8 : Slovak League of America (SLA) , SI. 36 0. D. Koreff, Milan Rastislav Stefanik: A Short Biography (Cleveland: Slovak League of America, 1924). Andrew Slabey, General Milan R. Stefanik (Leisenring, PA: Griglak Printery, 1937). Joseph Skultety, Sketches from Slovak History, O.D. Koreff, trans . (Middletown, PA : First Catholic Slovak Union, I 930) . Ol'ga Husek, The Czechoslovak Fallacy (Middletown, PA : Jednota, 1935). �36 SLOVAK.IA 2019 bears turned loose to scare those who are not acquainted with conditions. " 37 Religion became a major component of Slovak-American advocacy on the Slovak question in the interwar period. Slovak-American journalist Stephen J. Palickar published many articles in general Catholic publications, including a five-month tit-for-tat with Czech diplomat Josef Hane in defense of Slovak religiosity. He also provided some of the first Slovak-American attempts to link Slovak religiosity to anti-Communism. Palickar likewise defended Slovak agency, and appealed for a lifting of Prague centralism to allow the Slovaks an opportunity to prove their abi lity for self-government. 38 While most of these publications were shorter, more direct works, the Slovak-Americans released a couple of longer exposes on the Slovak question. The first, written by then SLA president Peter P. Hletko on behalf of the Slovak Catholic Federation of America, looked to inform the American people about the Pittsburgh Agreement as an American product in line with "the principles of democracy and self-determination of small nations." Hletko praised how the Slovak "has an inherent love for liberty and freedom , and enjoys fostering his national spirit," which had spurred his immigration to America in a "quest for a land of true liberty," and he argued that American democracy had allowed the Slovaks in America to assert their national identity as an independent people. He asserted how the Slovaks had only joined the Czechoslovak movement on the premise that they would be treated fairly and as equals and highlighted a reg37 "The conflict between Czechs and Slovaks," NSS Records, B: 168, F: SLA, IHRC. For many examples, see: "The Slovaks- Past and Present," in Stephen J. Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism to Atheistic Czech Communism (Cambridge, MA : Hampshire Press, 1948), 40-3 . Stephen J. Palickar, "Czech and Slovak at Odds: Both Sides of the Controversy - From the Slovak Standpoint," Current History, 22 , 5 (Aug 1925), 784-6. "A Dark Spot in Czecho-Slovakia," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism , 43-45 . "Who is Masaryk?," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 49-51 . "S lovakia-whither bound," in Palickar, Slovakia : From Hungarian Despotism, 76-83. "Slovak Catholicism vs. Czech Communism," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 84-86. "Slovak Grievance," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 70-72 . "President Masaryk and his State," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 61-62. "Scotus Viator Surveys Slovakia," in Palickar, Slo vakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 72-75. Stephen J. Palickar, Slovakia of Today (A Lecture), December 12, 1933 , Columbi a University (New York: Slovak Library Association, 1933). 38 �SLOVAKIA 2019 37 ular sense of duplicity and condescension the Slovaks felt from the Czechs. Hlekto praised the Pittsburgh Agreement as having resolved these conflicts, before Masaryk ultimately betrayed his promise, and he gave a detailed defense of its validity and of the right of the Slovak-Americans to speak for their nation during the war. 39 The Slovak-American autonomists shortly thereafter produced an even longer book on the topic . Written by Peter P. Hletko under the pseudonym , "An Autonomist," it served as the most exhaustive consideration of the Slovak question in Eng lish in the early 20 th century. Hletko placed blame on Czech intransigence for fueling the issue unnecessarily. The book argued that the Czechos lovak revolution relied on American money and manpower and "should the President (Masaryk) have failed to dispel the fear and dissatisfaction of the Slovaks through the Moscow and Pittsburgh Agreements, there certainly would not be a Czecho-Slovakia today. " The book then deconstructed Prague 's policies toward the Slovaks, to show Czechoslovakism as a means of hegemony. Hletko considered every issue from the Czech obfuscation on autonomy, the complicity of the Slovak centrali sts, the language issue, schools, and the economy, and he explained the claims of Slovak neediness and incompetence, as we ll as the claimed threat of Hungary, as only a fa<;:ade to justify Czech dominance. He likewise gave examples of Slovak intellectuals to dispute the claim that the Slovaks needed the Czechs to serve that role. He then detailed the domination of Slovakia's administration, civi l service, education system, and cultura l institutions by Slovak centralists and Czechs, and the press censorship and smear campaigns. Ultimately, he concluded that Czechoslovakism was undermining the state and mu st be reversed. Hletko concluded: Th e motive that has promoted us to write this work is not one of revenge, nor a desire to arouse bad feeling, but simply to expose falsehood and reveal truth. It is our sincere hope that, the truth being known, it will enable the Czechs and Slovaks to form a more stable union which will promote justice, trust, and good 39 Slovak Catholi c Federation of America, The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact (S lovak Cath olic Federation of America, 1934). Joseph C. Krajsa, " Dr. Peter Hletko, Most Elite of American Slovaks," Slovakia, 22, 45 ( 1972), 57-9. �38 SLOVAKIA 2019 will, and thereby insure national integrity both at home and abroad. 40 A few non-Slovak publications did favor Slovak autonomy . For example, some historians of the First World War, such as Jan Opocensky and C. A. Macartney, attempted to present a balanced consideration of the Slovak question, giving voice to Slovak autonomist concerns.4 1 There were also several publications that utilized the Slovak question to criticize the broader Versailles system . Writer and journalist E. Alexander Powell , for example, highlighted the differences between the Czechs and Slovaks as an example of the precariousness of the region ' s political stability. Although not particularly admiring of the Slovaks, Powell was highly critical of the Czech treatment of them. He commented, "The Czechs, an energetic, ambitious, progressive, and aggressive people, who outnumber the Slovaks three to one, look with condescension, if not contempt, on their less literate, slower thinking, more easy-going partners, whom, if the truth be known , they regard as immensely inferior to themselves." These scholars all argued that the Czechs needed to treat their minorities with more respect and make good on promises for Slovak autonomy for the sake of the survival of the state. 42 A few works were even somewhat favorable to the Slovaks. One such example came from writer Kenneth L. Roberts , who after visiting Czechoslovakia complained, "The Czechs want to socialize everything in sight, and the Slovaks are not poignantly eager to be social- 40 An Autonomist, Slovakia 's Plea for Autonomy (Middletown, Pa: Slovak Literary Society, 1935). 41 Jan Opocensky, The Collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Mon archy and the Rise of the Czechoslovak Stale (Prague: Orbis, 1928), 153-68, I 93-214. C. A. MaCartney, National States and National Min orities (London : Oxford Uni versity Press, 1934), 117, 201 ,208. 42 E. Alexander Powell , The Danger on th e Danube (New York: Century Company, 1928), 56-8, 62-8, 72-4. M. W. Fodor, South of Hiller (Boston : Houghton Mifflin, 1939). For oth er examples, see : C. A. Macartney, Hungary and her Successors: The Treaty of Trianon and its Consequences, 1919-193 7 (London : Oxford University Press, 1937/ 1965), 73-148. Frank H. Simonds, Can Europe Keep th e Peace? (New York : Harper, I 93 I), 92-10 I. Isaiah Bowman, The New World: Problems in Political Geography, 4th ed. (Yonkers, NY : World Book, 1928). Harold Temperley, " How the Hungari an Frontiers were Drawn," Foreign Affairs, 6, 3 (April 1928), 432-47 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 39 ized." Comparing the Czechs in Slovakia to U.S. Civil War carpetbaggers, he criticized the Czech administration of Slovakia, their denial of autonomy, and called out Czechoslovakism as a lie. He alternatively praised the Slovaks as "among the most attractive and lovable peasant people of the many I have seen." An article by journalist Robert Sage, after a visit to Slovakia, likewise chided the Czechs for using claims of generosi ty as a mirage for domination over Slovakia. 43 The SLA ultimately made good on its threat to take the issue to the world stage, presenting the Slovak question to the League of Nations in 1932. It produced a long legal brief, which appealed for a cessation of wrongdoing against the Slovaks and the granting of political and cultural autonomy. It then begged the League of Nations to recognize the Slovaks as an independent nation, to demand the implementation of the Pittsburgh Agreement, to investigate ill treatment, and to grant recognition of the Slovaks as a true minority in Czechoslovakia. It pointed out how the Slovak-Americans had made multiple attempts to reach out to Prague to explain their concerns and offer an olive branch towards a solution, but that Prague had ignored their appeals and through censorship had silenced their brothers in Slovakia. The document then went on to detail the history of the founding of the state and the Pittsburgh Agreement, their complaints of ill-treatment against the Slovaks, and their view as to why the 44 Slovaks were an independent people. This appeal was unsuccessful. Slovak-Americans also regularly wrote to U.S. government officials. One such example was an "Open Letter" to Masaryk in 1923 that the Slovak Catholic Federation in America also sent to President Coolidge, members of Congress, all the embassies in Prague, and to the American press. The document started with an image of Masaryk approaching the Slovak-Americans as equals during the war, to 43 Kenneth L. Roberts, Europe's Morning After (New York: Harper Brothers, 1921 ), 121-73. Kenneth L. Roberts, Why Europe l eaves Home (New York: Bobbs-Merrill , 1922), 28-31 . Robert Sage, "There's no such Nationality as Czecho-Slovak," Chicago Daily Tribune, Jan 2, 1930, 6. For other examples, see: Felix John Vondracek, The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia / 918-1935 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937), 377-9. Alexander Szana, Die Geschichte der Slowakei (Bratislava: Grenzenbote Verlag, 1930). Robert Nowak, Der Kiinstliche Staal: Ostprobleme der Tschecho-Slowakei (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling, 1938). 44 "To the Supreme Council of the League of Nations at Geneva," SlA Cabinet, F: Supreme Council of the l eague of Na tions at Geneva, 1932, SI. �40 SLOVAKIA 2019 which they responded with loyalty and support. Masaryk then betrayed them, treating the Slovaks "in step-mother fashion, nay, even like slaves," having lured them into "an invisible net of imperialistic aspirations, renounced openly that which is to every nation and to us 'ignorant' Slovaks inviolable, priceless, sacred." It bemoaned that the Slovaks again felt endangered in their national existence, and how the Czechs misled the world on the issue. It appealed for Masaryk "to acknowledge and fulfill that which you had promised us, the American Slovaks," for the sake of Czech-Slovak unity and the secu45 rity of the state. This letter elicited a response from the Slovak-American centralists. The National Slovak Society, the Slovak Sokol, and assorted editors produced a counter response to Masaryk, which they then sent to Coolidge and Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes. This document asserted open support for the idea that the Czechs and Slovaks were one nation. It criticized the SCF letter for having "a spirit of narrow sectarianism," in contrast to "the great majority of the American Slovaks," who supported Masaryk "heart and soul." The document praised Masaryk and the Czechoslovak state for bringing cultural and economic development to Slovakia and it mentioned the centralist Slovaks in the government as a sign of Czech inclusiveness. The text also apologized for the Czech administration of Slovakia, bemoaning that Slovakia lacked enough competent officials. It then claimed that Prague had carried out the Pittsburgh Agreement in full , adding that "during the war neither the Czechs nor the Slovaks demanded self-determination for each separately; they demanded self-determination for the Czechoslovaks." 46 To the frustration of the Slovak autonomists, this campaign barely registered among U.S. officials in Washington. American officials at the U.S. Embassy in Prague paid slightly more attention, although most addressed it only passively and most often from the Czechoslo45 Slovak Catholic Federation of America, Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk, President of the Czecho-S/ovak Republic (Slovak Catholic Federation of America : 1923). Found in : "Einstein to SoS, No. 611 ," 20 February 1924, F#: 860F.0l / 162, DoS CS 1910-44. The New York Times reported on the letter: " Slovak Protest to All Nations," New York Times, Mar. 12, 1924, 34. 46 National Slovak Society, et al. , An Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk, President of Czechoslovakia ( I 924), in "Joseph Jan eek to Coolidge," 3 May 1924, F# : 860F.0l / 164, Dos cs 1910-44 �SLOVAKIA 2019 41 vakist perspective. The American Ambassador during the 1920s, Lewis Einstein, for example, reported on the SCF letter, misrepresenting it as "a violent indictment of Czech policy in Slovakia," and praised Prague for "accomplishing there a work of civilization. By introducing education and schools in a population where a high degree of illiteracy existed, by bringing in public hygiene, orderly justice and a better fiscal system, they are laying the foundations for the future. " Accordingly, in his view the Slovaks only needed proper education to unify with the Czechs . Ultimately, "Only one thing can be excluded, which is Slovakian autonomy." 47 In another attempt at outreach, Adam Podkrivacky as President of the FCSU wrote to John Hickerson, acting Chief of Western European Affairs at the U.S . State Department. Podkrivacky complained about the U.S. Consul General in Prague sending out correspondence to Slovakia in the Czech language instead of Slovak. He also requested that the State Department use the hyphen when writing 'Czecho-Slovakia. ' Podkrivacky then supplied Hickerson a copy of an autonomist political pamphlet, to "acquaint better with the political situation just as it exists between the Slovaks and the Czechs in Czecho-Slovakia." Hickerson forwarded the letter to the embassy in Prague and asked for a report on the Slovak question. Charge d' affaires J. Web Benton responded, declaring the letter unacceptable due to the threat posed by Czechoslovakia's neighbors. He also made the usual ethnographic arguments, adding how "Czech culture has contributed measurably to the advancement of Slovakia," and predicted the issue would dissipate. Benton dismissed the pamphlet as simply "anti-government propaganda ... the request for autonomy, in the sense of a separate parliament as mentioned in the Pittsburgh Pact, is something that no truly patriotic and far-seeing Slovak could at present afford to advocate." He added, "I assume that the Department will pay no further attention to his communications, but it seems not inopportune to observe that Czech is the official language of this country."48 While a few U.S. diplomats from the period, notably Lewis Einstein, came to develop a more nuanced view on the topic, this ended each time new embassy staff took over. 47 "Einstein to SoS , No . 611 ," DoS CS 1910-44. "Adam Podkrivac ky to John Hickerson," 29 March 1937, F#: 860F.0l / 18 1, DoS CS 1910-44. " Movement for Slovak Autonomy," 30 April 1937, F#: 860F .01 /184, DoS CS 1910-44. 48 �42 SLOVAKIA 2019 The dismissal of Slovak-American pleas stood in contrast to a disproportionate concern among American officials about the proHungarian Slovaks living abroad. The Rothermere campaign spurred some interest, and while some Americans expressed some sympathy to it, including chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee William Borah and publisher William Randolph Hearst, the U.S. Embassy in Prague wrote profusely about how the Slovaks remained opposed to a return to Hungary. When the exiled nationalist communist Slovak Vince Mihalus created an exile Slovak government in 1928, the State Department gave him disproportionate consideration, even though he held little popular support in Slovakia. Jehlicka reached out to Washington, calling for support against "Czech tyranny" and requesting support for recognition of the Slovaks as a minority in the League of Nations. The Czechoslovak embassy directed the State Department in its response, simply informing U.S. officials that Jehlicka only organized a "small number of Slovak renegades, mostly of Hungarian origin." 49 This flurry of publishing was very much a product of the widespread transatlantic interaction between Slovakia and the United States, as Slovak leaders on both sides of the Atlantic travelled between Europe and North America as they attempted to coordinate common political action. In the early 1920s, Prague still had hopes of guiding the Slovak-Americans to the centralist cause, despite the sentiment building against it. One major effort was the creation of a Slovak League in Slovakia by centralist Slovaks, designed to serve 49 Czechoslovak Ambassador Vladimir Hurban exchanged several letters with Hearst on the issue, facilitated by the State Department, eventually convincing Hearst to no longer give a voice to Rothermere and his supporters. "Einstein to SoS, No. 1355," 30 July 1927, F#: 860F.4016/4, DoS CS 1910-44. "J. Butler Wright to SoS, No. 62," 15 Oct 1927, F#: 860F.4016/9, DoS CS 1910-44. "Vladimir Hurban to William Randolph Hearst," 27 May 1937, & " Hurban to Cordell Hull," 4 June 1937, F#: 860F.00/437 & 438 , DoS CS 1910-44. "Council of State of Slovakia to SoS," 6 Nov 1928, F#: 860F.01 / 171 & 172, DoS CS 1910-44. "Nelson Torsler Johnson to Einstein," 28 Jan 1929, F#: 860F.01 / 171 , DoS CS 1910-44. "Gittings to SoS, No. 1747," 28 Feb 1929, F#: 860F.0l/173, DoS CS 1910-44. "Gittings to SoS, No. 1756," 9 Mar 1929, F#: 860F.0l / 174, DoS CS 1910-44. "Washburn to SoS, No. 2153." "Einstein to SoS, No. 516," 20 Sep 1923, F#: 860F.00/2 14, DoS CS 1910-44. "SoS to Geneva and Prague," 30 July 1933, F#: 860F.00/345, DoS CS 1910-44. "Prentiss B. Gilbert to SoS, No. 650," 8 Aug 1933 , F#: 860F.00/346, DoS CS 191044. "SoS to Geneva and Prague," 29 Aug 1933, F#: 860F.00/346, DoS CS 1910-44. �SLOVAKIA 2019 43 as a counterpart to the SLA and to build common action across the Atlantic. This effort failed, however, after the Slovak League of America refused to cooperate with it. 50 With autonomist sentiment among the American Slovaks sharpening, Prague sent Slovak centralist leader Vavro Srobar to the United States in 1923. While Srobar attempted to unify the Slovak-Americans behind centralism, his visit had the opposite effect of galvanizing the Slovak-American autonomists. Srobar received support from sympathetic groups such as the Slovak Sokol, but the SLA and other autonomist organizations boycotted his speeches. Prague sent other figures to agitate for centralism, including the priest Jozef Rudinsky and agrarian politician Fedor Ruppeldt. Seton-Watson also reached out to the SlovakAmericans in several letters and later in a visit in 1935 , during which he appealed to the Slovak-Americans to encourage the Slovaks in . · 51 SI ova k ia against autonomy. The efforts by centralists did not change the status quo, as the Slovak-American autonomists remained firm in their opinions and openly repudiated centralist arguments. Pankuch, for example, felt that the only result of Srobar's visit was to destroy Czech-Slovak 52 unity and the internal unity of the Slovak-Americans. Ruppelt in tum complained how even among the Slovak Lutherans he constantly had to fight against autonomist sentiment. 53 With the dividing lines firmly set, the Slovak-American centralists and autonomists quit mutual involvement in each other's organizations and the centralists began a continuous propaganda campaign against the SLA backed by Prague. For example, after Slovak-American autonomists 50 Ignac Gessay, Kratke Dejiny S/ovenskej Ligy Na S/ovensku: od Zalozenia po 1. 0kt. 1926 (Bratislava: Slovenska Liga na Slovensku, 1926). "Nova ohlavka- stary kon. Pozor na Slovensku ligu!" 27 Oct 1924, Bratislava (No 68), in Jozef Tiso, Prejavy a Clanky (1913-193 8), eds. Miroslav Fabricius & Ladislav Susko (Bratislava: Historicky 'ustav SA V, 2002),), 196-7. 51 "An Appeal ," PF: Bie/ek, SI. Pankuch, Histo ry, 177-86. "Seton-Watson to Vojtech Mastny" (Doc 124), in Seton -Watson, 375-6. "Odkaz Scotus Viatora Americkym Slovakom" (Doc 125), in Seton-Watson, 377-80. "Seton-Watson to Stefan Osusky "' (Doc 128) & "Osusky to Seton-Watson" (Doc 129), in Seton-Watson, 3857. Mikus, "Slovak League," 46-7. Karol Sidor, Andrej Hlinka, 1864-1926 (Bratislava: Knihtlaciarne Sv. Andreja, 1934), 503-5 . Palickar, "Czech and Slovak." Tomas Capek, Nase Amerika (Prague: Nakladem Narodni Rady Ceskoslovenske, 1926), 113. 52 Pankuch, History, 180. 53 " Fedor Ruppeldt to Seton-Watson" (Doc 149), in Seton-Watson, 441-2 . �44 SLOVAKIA 2019 confronted him, Srobar reportedly lashed out at them as "knownothing drunkards" and traitors against the Republic. 54 While the Slovaks in America had been legitimate Slovaks when Masaryk needed them during the war, once they became a threat, the centralists began to categorize them as United States citizens, whose influence should not extend beyond America. 55 When the Czechoslovak Government offered a special commendation to the SLA on Czechoslovakia's l 0th anniversary in 1928, for its role in the creation of the state, the Slovak League of America rejected it. 56 The Slovak autonomists in Slovakia perceived things quite differently. Many Slovak nationalist leaders believed that the nation as an ethnic and cultural foundation transcended the state, and offered regular praise of the Slovak-Americans as fighters for Slovak liberty and autonomy. Figures such as Hlinka and Lutheran autonomist leader Emil Stodola openly praised the Slovak-Americans and their role in the fight for autonomy, and argued that their past actions allowed the American Slovaks an equal right to speak about the fate of the Slovak homeland. 57 SPP leader Jozef Tiso extolled, "In this (Pittsburgh) agreement we see the heritage of our own American brothers, for which we will fight with the honor and the tenacity of the Slovak spirit, which is not intimidated by prison, the malice of the world, nor the cynicism of centralist agents." Tiso praised the "real Slovak patriots," working in the "free air of America," and he even posited that the Slovak-Americans had a better claim to speak for the Slovaks than the Slovak centralists did, because the SlovakAmericans had made the revolution successful with their blood, treasure and propaganda.58 Slovak scholars also published multiple 54 "A. S. Ambrose to Seton-Watson" (Doc 126) in Seton-Watson, 381-2. "Aby uz raz bolo jasno a aby prestaly r6zne narknutia proti Slov. Lige," PF: Bielek, SI. 55 Masaryk, for example, used such logic to dismiss the Pittsburgh Agreement, which he called a "local understanding between American Czechs and Slovaks," whose "signatories were mainly American citizens, only two of them being nonAmericans." Masaryk, Making, 208-11. 56 Stolarik, Where is my Hom e?, 98 . 57 "Hlinka on Scotus Viator" (Doc 109), in Seton-Watson, 345-53. Emil Stodola, Pre/om: Spomienky, Uvahy, Studie (Praha: L. Mazac, 1933), 193-4. 58 "Novy vykrik bratov z Ameriky," 24 Feb 1924, Bratislava (No 43), in Tiso, Prejavy, 157-9. " Pittsburghska dohoda - neplatna?!" 29 May 1924, Bratislava (no 57), in Tiso, Prejavy, 179-80. "Parliamentary Speech," 25 Nov 1931, Prague (No I 64), in Ti so, Preja vy, 347. "Speech to Public Assembly of the Slovak People 's �SLOVAKIA 2019 45 studies of the Slovak-Americans and their role m Slovak national development. 59 Slovak autonomists openly expressed these sentiments through regular trips to the United States. These attempts at direct engagement were nonetheless slow to start. Prague regularly prevented such trips, including the denial of a passport to Bishop Jan Vojtassak out of concern that he would agitate for autonomy and collect money for the SPP while in the United States. The barrier broke in 1926 when Hlinka accepted an invitation to visit America from editor Jozef Husek and the Friends of Slovak Freedom, sponsored by the SLA, the FCSU, and the First Catholic Slovak Ladies Union (FCSLU). Hlinka desired to visit the United States to thank the Slovak-Americans in person for their support for Slovak self-determination, to explain firsthand the political situation in Slovakia, and to encourage them to keep fighting. After stalling on the process, Prague ultimately relented to avoid the resulting outrage had they refused. They issued Hlinka a passport to attend the Eucharistic Congress in Chicago. Hlinka's visit lasted from June 5 to October 13. Although Hlinka expressed some trepidation that Slovak-American centralists would treat him with hostility, Slovak-American autonomist leaders Josef Husek and Anton Kompanek convinced him the experience would prove the opposite. This claim proved true, as Hlinka received hundreds of invitations to speak to overflowing crowds on each occasion. Demand was so high that, then SLA president Ivan Bielek had to write an article emphasizing Hlinka's time limitations to try to tame expectations. During his visit, Hlinka travelled around the U.S. East and Midwest, visiting local Slovak communities. He regularly attended and celebrated Mass and held meetings with SlovakAmerican organizations, including the SLA from whom he received an honorary membership . Hlinka visited assorted Slovak-American institutions, surveying Slovak-American newsrooms, printeries, Party," 18 August 1937 & 25 August 1937, Bratislava (No 251 & 252), in Tiso, Prejavy, 523-4. "Nase narodnopo liticke palladium," 5 June 1938 (No 260), in Tiso, Prejavy, 543-4. Kon stantin Culen, Po Sviitop/ukovi druha nasa h/ava: Zivot Dr. Jozefa Tisu (Cleveland: First Catholic Slovak Union, 1947), 182-3. 59 Jozef Rudinsky, V Amerike a doma (Ruzomberok: Rudinsky, 1921 ). Karol Sidor, S/ovaci v zahranicnom odboji (Bratislava: Jednota, 1928). Matica Slovenska, S/ovenskej verejenosti v Amerike (Mati ca slovenska , 1937). Konstantin Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda (Bratislava: Knihtlaciarei'l Andreja, 193 7) . �46 SLOVAK.IA 2019 schools, and churches. Overall, Hlinka held rallies at 80 locations, gave 200 speeches, and visited more than 100 Slovak parishes. Hlinka's visit spurred a level of excitement and activity among the Slovak-Americans that would never recur. 60 Hlinka kept his goal of directly exposing the Slovak question during his visit. He regularly spoke on the issue, and carried a copy of a censored Slovak nationalist newspaper as evidence. During his visit, Hlinka could not help but contrast the image of America with his experience in Czechoslovakia. In one such speech, he made clear that the Slovaks .. . would prefer not to quarrel with the Bohemians, but when they preach democracy and at the same time practice deceptions and aggression, we have no choice but to oppose them ... America is a superior nation and a master democratic republic. It has a splendid constitution which not only guarantees the rights and liberties to the people, but sees that they get them as well. Hlinka likewise extolled the "firm individuality" that the SlovakAmericans had gained, and he highlighted the sense of natural connection between Slovaks and Americans. "A good Slovak who comes to America makes a good American, and all good SlovakAmericans, including the new generations born in America from Slovak extraction will appreciate what they have inherited from their Slovak ancestry. Neither will they forget Slovakia." In his farewell speech, Hlinka expressed how the Slovak-Americans had filled him with national pride. He affirmed, "I saw the large affl uence of Slovaks, these Slovaks who under the Tatras suffered from hardship and physical and spiritual want," and prai sed how they helped sustain the Slovak nation. He finally asked of them, "do not forget that under the Tatras stand your cradle and your old homeland, our hard-tested and suffering Slovakia!" 61 60 Adamec, "Slovak Catholic Federation ," 223-32. Sidor, Hlinka, 503-5, 510-1 I, 543 -52 . Sidor, "The Slovak League," 57-9. Mikus, "S lovak League," 46-7 . Jozef Pauco, "75 Years of the First Catholic Slovak Union," Furdek, 5 ( 1966), 65 -74. 61 Palickar, " Monsignor Hlinka- The Man," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism , 51-6, 55 . Palickar, " My Interview with Msgr. Hlinka," in Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 56-9. Sidor, Andrej Hlinka, 543-52. �SLOVAKIA 2019 47 In the 1930s, the Slovak-Americans experienced a few more visits from notable figures. One such visit was from the Slovak cultural organization Matica slovenska, in 1935 . The Slovak-Americans had regular contact with the Matica in the 1920s and there remained regular efforts to create an American branch of the organization.62 With the outbreak of the Great Depression, however, interest and funding for Slovak cultural programs in America declined. The Matica decided a visit to America was necessary to reverse thi s process, which they interpreted as the Slovak-Americans becoming too Americanized. The organization ' s director, the writer Jozef C. Hronsky, led the delegation, but it also included historian Konstantin Culen, and the artist Jozef Cincik, among others. These individuals gave many lectures and supplied ample literature and art, including a donation of libraries of Slovak material to the cities of New York, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and Chicago.63 While they found that some second and third generation Slovak-Americans had lost touch with Slovak culture, the delegates gave high praise to the Slovak-Americans for the interest they showed in the lectures, music, art and other cultural information the Matica provided. The experience led Culen to adopt the task of writing a history of Slovak-Americans. The linguist Jozef G. Konus likewise noted how "the Slovak spirit opens up more in free America than the lush fantasie s at home could imagine." When the White House wrote a statement for a Slovak-American information brochure praising the Slovaks as a "healthy minded, freedomloving and determined people," the Matica hailed it as evidence of Slovak democratic bona tides. Ultimately, the delegation praised the trip as very much a success, and took back ample material on the Slovak-Americans for placement in the Slovak National Library. The Matica left satisfied that Slovak culture remained firm in America, although it put pressure on the Slovak-Americans to improve their direct cultural linkages with the homeland. 64 62 To see many examples of this communicati on, see: The Ma tica slovenskti, Martin, Slovakia, re: American Slovaks Papers, IHRC . 63 According to Mark Stol arik, th e Mati ca brought 84 crates of books, totaling 4 I ,000 volumes, while visiting 98 separate Slovak-American communities. Stolarik, Wh ere is my Home?, 96-100. 64 "Vianoce Maticnej delegacie," Slovensko, 2, 5 & 6 (Jan-Feb 1936), 87-8. Konstantin Culen, "Co m6ze dat' Amerika slovenskej historii ," Slovensko, 2, 7 (Mar 1936), 87-8. Jozef C. Hronsky, " Mati ca v Amerike," Slovensko, 2, 7 (March 1936), 110-13. Jozef G. Konus, " Matica v Amerike," Slovensko, 2, 7 (Mar 1936), I I6-18 . �48 SLOVAK.IA 2019 The final major figure to visit America was the Reverend Jozef Tiso in 1937, with the Catholic cultural organization Spolok Sv. Vojtecha. Much like Hlinka, Tiso celebrated mass and heard confessions during his visit, spoke at public assemblies and met with many American priests, journalists, and Slovak-American leaders. He also attended other broader Catholic events, including the National Catholic Welfare Conference, and met with the Papal delegation in Washington, D.C. Tiso made a broad effort to learn about American political life, to determine what Slovak leaders could transfer back to Slovakia. He particularly admired American technical prowess in organization and publishing, which he saw as facilitating a more efficient Catholic organization and action, and conceptualized a plan to send young Slovak leaders to America to learn American methods of organization. Tiso also praised the Slovak-American sense of independence and pride in their Slovak identity. Seeing how the Slovaks had developed on independent terms in the vast American melting pot, Tiso interpreted the Slovak-American experience as proof of Slovak capabilities and their merit for self-determination. Tiso never gave up his sense of solidarity with the Slovak-Americans, and referenced his visit to affirm his desired direction for the Slovaks. 65 The only visit to the United States by a Slovak official to gamer much attention from Washington was Srobar's in 1923. American diplomat Einstein provided notice of the visit, adding that it was "doubtless intended to counteract the seditious anti-Czech propaganda which has been going on for some time both in Slovakia, where it is fomented by Magyar intrigues, and among the Slovak clericals in the United States." Although, he noted that the Slovak autonomy movement remained "noisy and violent in its methods but unaided it can do little and it is not at present causing here any serious conJozef G. Konu s, "Matica v Amerike," Slovensko, 2, 7 (Mar 1936), 116-18. Jozef Hronsky, "Na margo americkeho zapisnika," S/o vensko, 2, IO & I I (June-July 1936), 177-80. Jozef Cincik, "Na margo americkeho zapisnaka," Slo vensko , 2, IO & 11 (June-July 1936), 181-6. " Maticna vystava v Clevelande," Slo vensko, 2, IO & 11 (June-July 1936), 181-4. " President Roosevelt pozdravuje slovensky narod," Slovensko , 2, 5 & 6 (Jan-Feb 1936), 79. "Slovenska Amerika sa hybe," S/ovensko, 4, 3 (Nov 1937), 32-3. "SLA to Sku ltety, I June 1935,".PF: Mamatey, SI. Stolarik, "Slovak League." J.A. Berta, "Slovak America and the Matica Slovenska," Furdek, 23 (1984), 163-71. 65 Culen, Po Sviiloplukovi, 182-9. "Speech about the state account balance from 1926," 23 February 1938, Prague (No 258), in Tiso, Prejavy, 533-6. �SLOVAKIA 2019 49 cem." 66 Several Slovak-American autonomists wrote to the State Department to complain about Srobar's visit, including a letter from a Slovak-American World War I veteran asking the Department to halt Srobar's lectures for sowing discord among the Slovaks in the United States. The most notable letter, however, came from the Reverend John Porubsky on behalf of the Slovak Newspapermen's Association. Porubsky criticized Srobar's claimed "cultural visit" as a ruse to propagandize on behalf of Czechoslovakism. He presented it as part of an effort by Prague, "To inoculate the masses of our people in America as a contracting party with such misconception and ethnographical nonsense," and to discredit the Pittsburgh Agreement. Claiming that Srobar "forgot the scope of his mission, even forgot himself in outbursts against leading Slovak American gentlemen, calling them vile names unworthy of a man of his position," Porubsky asked Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes to have him expelled from the country.67 This effort also spurred a response by Prague and its allies in the United States. These letters, in an organized campaign, all repeated versions of the same arguments. They complained that the opposition to Srobar consisted of "Jesuits and Bolsheviks" and other "enemies of the state" that were working for Czechoslovakia's destruction. Srobar was, alternatively, a great statesman fighting against them to bring cultural development to Slovakia. They also personally targeted Porubsky and the Slovak Newspapermen's Association: "The great majority of intelligent American Slovaks are heart and soul in accord with Dr. Srobar's patriotic works; only the ignorant and reactionary masses are ignobly and ignorantly supporting the destructive work of Rev. Porubsky and his few brawling associates." 68 Likewise, the Slovak Sokol, which had arranged Srobar's visit from the American end, took credit for the visit, praising how Srobar had "proved to 66 " Einstein to SoS, No. 502 ," 29 Aug 1923, F#: 860F .0 I/ I 48, DoS CS 1910-44. "John Porubsky to Charles Evans Hughes," 31 Oct 1923 , F#: 860F.0 l/149, DoS CS 1910-44. "John J. Nedorostek to Hughes," 13 Nov 1923 , F#: 860F.01/150, DoS cs 1910-44. 68 "V. Krali cek to Hughes," 12 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0l / 151 , DoS CS 1910-44. "J. Joscak to Hughes," 14 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0l / 154, DoS CS 1910-44. "Henry Russek to Hughes," 15 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0l/156, DoS CS 1910-44. "C lement lhrisky & Joscak to Hughes," 15 Nov 1923 , F#: 860F.0 l/152, DoS CS 1910-44. " Michael Kovalovsky to Hughes," 16 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0 1/157, DoS CS 1910-44. " Michael Olsavicki to Hughes," 19 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0 1/ 155, DoS CS 1910-44. 67 �50 SLOVAKIA 2019 the Slovaks of America that any fears as to the future of their former country are unfounded." 69 The State Department only sent back formulaic verification of receipts to these letters, except for one to John Zeman of the Slovak Sokol, thanking him for "setting forth the real purposes of the visit." William Phillips then requested President Coolidge to meet with Srobar, calling him "one of the five men who founded the Republic of Czechoslovakia," to which Coolidge obliged. 70 In 193 7, the Reverend Francis Dubosh of Lakewood, Ohio, attempted to arrange a meeting between officers of the SCF A, Jozef Tiso, and President Roosevelt, with the help of Monsignor Michael J. Ready at the Catholic University of America. The White House staff supported this meeting, but Roosevelt wanted to first confirm with the State Department so as not "to get mixed up in a Slovak controversy." After consulting with Czechoslovak Ambassador Vladimir Hurban, the State Department reported that the embassy made no official complaint, but that they themselves discouraged the visit with "the opinion that these persons are not of sufficient prominence for the President to receive them." After a back and forth in consideration of the issue, the White House ultimately declined, claiming 71 that the President was simply too busy. The Slovak-Americans also visited Slovakia. The most significant of these occurred in 193 8 in the tense period leading up to the Munich Agreement, when the Slovak League sent a delegation to celebrate the 20 th anniversary of the Pittsburgh Agreement. Led by its President, Peter P. Hletko, the delegation, as a deliberate gesture, made its first formal visit in Slovakia to Andrej Hlinka in Rufomberok. The delegation travelled into Slovakia through Poland, to 69 "J. Zeman to Hughes," 18 Nov 1923 , F#: 860F.01 / 153 , DoS CS 1910-44. "W. R. Castle to Association of Slovak Newspapermen of America," 6 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0l / l49, DoS CS 1910-44. "J. B. Wright to Kralicek," 20 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0l/15I, DoS CS 1910-44. "Castle to Joscak," 20 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.01/l54, DoS CS 1910-44. "Castle to Zeman," I Dec 1923, F#: 860F.0l / l53 , DoS CS 191044. "William Phillips to G. B. Slemp, 12 Nov 1923," & "Slemp to Phillips, 12 Nov 1923," Coolidge Papers, Series I, 742. 71 "Roosevelt to M. H. McIntyre, 22 Oct 1937," " McIntyre to George F. Summerlin, 23 Oct 193 7," "Spruks to Summerlin, 27 Oct 193 7," "McIntyre to Roosevelt, 29 Oct 1937," "McIntyre to Summerlin, 3 Nov 1937," President 's Personal File (PPF), F: 639, Slovak Catholic Federation of America, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (FDR), Hyde Park, New York. 70 �SLOVAKIA 2019 51 avoid Prague and Bratislava, and the Polish government hosted the delegation on their way through. Both the Slovak autonomists and the Slovak centralists sent representatives to corral them before they entered Slovakia. The centralists were, however, sent back early after Warsaw and Slovak-Americans embraced the SPP delegation as the official one. After arriving in Slovakia, the delegation showed the original of the Pittsburgh Agreement to Hlinka and spent most of the trip associating with the Slovak autonomists. Its activities included several visits to the Matica slovenska in Martin, to which it gifted an authenticated copy of the Pittsburgh Agreement and made clear commitments toward transatlantic cultural programs, including joint publications and a transatlantic cultural council. Prime Minister Milan Hodza also led a continued effort to meet and work with the visiting delegation, believing he could convince them to break their close affiliation with the SPP and align with the Agrarians instead. Out of respect, the delegation did meet with centralist officials, including Hodza and President Eduard Benes, whom they encouraged the granting of autonomy to Slovakia for the sake of unity in those very tense times. In a speech in Prague, Hletko made clear their objectives stating, "Our love for Slovakia and the Czechoslovak Republic has induced us to come here. The object of the Pittsburgh Declaration, the original of which we have brought with us, is not to weaken but to strengthen the Republic ." 72 When describing his meetings, Hletko said that Hodza promised a movement towards autonomy, yet Prague still rejected them. 73 Likewise, Ivan Derer was extremely critical of the SlovakAmericans during their visit, accusing them of having been brainwashed. He also dismissed them as representing a small, vocal minority, and smeared them as deliberate Hungarian, German, or Polish agents, if not otherwise simply duped by the machinations of these neighboring rivals. Derer complained, "This delegation, composed most of autonomists, expressed its separatist convictions during every opportunity, expressed anti-Czech interests, made light of work of 72 "Visit of American Slovak Delegation to Jubilee Congress, Bratislava; Slovak Demands for Autonomy," 6 June 1938, F#: 860F.00/534, DoS CS 1910-44. 73 Hletko, "The Slovaks," 5-54. "Narodna Politika Roku 1938 : Ked Bol P. Hletko na Slovensku," B: Karol Sidor - Diplomat 1901-1958 - Vol 2, SI. Pavel KuklisKunovsky, Ako je na Slovensku ? Z vlastnych skusenosti napisa/ a vydal v mesiaci )uni /940 v Pittsburghu, Pa., U.S.A. (Pittsburgh: Narodne noviny, 1940), 4-7. �52 SLOVAK.IA 2019 the Czechoslovak government successes in Slovakia, ironized Czechoslovak oriented Slovaks." He was extremely derisive of Hletko, accusing him of not being truly Slovak, having been born in the United States, and as being "politically inexperienced, unknowledgeable about the conditions of Europe, Czechoslovakia and Slovakia." 74 The SLA visit culminated in the Jubilee Congress for the anniversary of the Pittsburgh Agreement on June 4, 1938 in Bratislava. A massive rally was organized where Hlinka, Tiso, and Hletko, among others, gave speeches. A large facsimile of the Pittsburgh Agreement surrounded on each side by the American and Slovak flags served as a backdrop. In his speech, Hletko showed the original copy of the Pittsburgh Agreement to the crowd, and praised the attention given to the Agreement. A formal proposal by the SPP in the Czechoslovak Parliament to amend the constitution to implement Slovak autonomy then followed. The centralists, led by Hodza, held a counter-rally two days later. They declared the rally more ambiguously as a celebration of the Slovak farmer, although Prague and the centralists promoted the event afterwards as a pro-state rally in opposition to autonomy. The SLA delegation also attended this celebration and Hletko gave a speech, simply affirming that the SLA continued to work for Slovak freedom . Hletko later claimed that the delegation warned the Czech and Slovak leaders they had met about the need to come to an accommodation on the Slovak question, in favor of autonomy, fearing that the issue might become larger with Adolph Hitler rattling his saber. Hletko claimed, however, that no one took this warning seriously. The delegation departed shortly before Hlinka's death in August of 1938, but the SPP sent a piece of earth from Hlinka's graveside to America. 75 74 Ivan Derer, S/ovensky vyvoj a /ud'acka zrada (Prague: K vasnicka a Hamp) , 1946), 183-9 . Derer was convinced the SLA was part of a Polish conspiracy to absorb Slovaki a, led by Karol Sidor. The SLA, however, openly rebuked Polish calls for absorption of Slovakia during its stop th ere. 75 The exact number of participants in each rally is unclear, but most accounts reflected similar participation rates (around one hundred thousand each) and photos of the Slovak Jubilee show a massive crowd. The urn containing the soil is still on display at the Slovak Institute in Cleveland. Hletko, "The Slovaks," 5-54. " Wilbur Carr to SoS, no 122," 9 June 1938, F#: 860F.00/518, DoS CS 1910-44. " Farmers' Day at Bratislava; Demonstration of Slovak Branch of Czechoslovak Agrarian Party," IO June 1938, F#: 860F.00/531 , DoS CS 1910-44. " Po odchode delegatov Slov- �SLOVAKIA 2019 53 The U.S. Embassy took an interest in the SLA visit to Czechoslovakia in 1938, and U.S . Ambassador Wilbur Carr agreed to meet with the delegation. Carr reported that the visit was cordial and that the delegation affirmed to him that its visit was simply to promote good will and it did not desire to interfere in domestic issues in Czechoslovakia. Carr then stated that the SLA's visit to Czechoslovakia annoyed Prague, due to the enflamed minority issues of the time, but that Czechoslovak officials tried to maintain good will with the delegation, although this sentiment "lacked a ring of sincerity." Accordingly, Hletko admitted to Carr that the timing was not the best, but that it was not by design, since they had come simply for the anniversary celebration. Carr expected no harm from the visit. While Carr described the autonomy proposal and reported statements by Hletko and Jozef Rusek complementing the support of the Pittsburgh Agreement among the Slovaks, he countered by providing the text of an anti-autonomy speech by Derer and a section of Masaryk' s memoirs. Carr then misrepresented the Slovak-Americans as having felt embarrassed for having been "utilized by the Hlinka Party for partisan and election purposes." While Carr reported on each of the two rallies, he praised the Farmer's Day as turning into "a spontaneous demonstration of Czechoslovak unity, homage to Benes, and allegiance and confidence in its leader," hostility to autonomy, and featuring a much larger participation.76 While Czech and Slovak centralists worked to keep the SlovakAmericans at a distance after early efforts to court them failed, the Slovak autonomists on both sides of the Atlantic worked around Prague to coordinate their activities. Nevertheless, the autonomists had no means of pushing Prague towards changes on the Slovak question. The Slovak autonomists, however, continued their fight and never gave up. The transatlantic Slovak question during the interwar period established the roots for the eventual Slovak-Czech split. The failure to find a compromise between Slovak autonomists and centralists saw an entrenched distrust that contributed to the fall of the First Republic . When the Munich Agreement formally handed the enskej Ligy v Amerike," Slovensko, 5 ( I 939), 16-17. Sidor, "The Slovak League," 59-62. 76 "Carr to SoS , no 112," 31 May 1938, F#: 860F.00/5 l 0, DoS CS 1910-44. "Visit of American Slovak." "Carr to SoS, no 121 ," 8 June 1938, F#: 860F.00/517, DoS CS 1910-44. "Carr to SoS , No 122." "Farmers ' Day. " �54 SLOVAKIA 2019 Sudetenland to Germany in September of 1938, the Slovak autonomists in Slovakia demanded and received autonomy until the new SPP-led government there declared independence on March 14, 1939, following Nazi Germany's invasion of Bohemia and Moravia. Slovak-American autonomists, although distrustful of Nazi Germany, openly embraced the shift toward Slovak autonomy in the shortlived Second Republic, believing they could no longer trust the Czechs. Peter Hletko, for example, cheered how the Slovaks had "fought and won the victory." 77 Although initially hesitant to support complete independence, most Slovak-American autonomists, the moderates excepted, came to support the World War II Slovak State as a symbol of Slovak self-determination, even as they supported Allied victory in the war. While World War II and the subsequent Cold War limited direct linkages between Slovakia and North America, the same rifts on the Slovak question persisted on both sides of the Atlantic until the 1993 Velvet Divorce. 78 77 Jozef Pauco, "75 Years of the First Catholic Slovak Union," Furdek, 5 ( 1966), 6574. 78 For more on this topic during World War II and beyond, see: Michael Cude, Transatlantic Perspectives on the Slovak Question, I 9 I 4-/ 948 (PhD Diss., University of Co lorado-Boulder, 20 13 ). M. Mark Stolarik, Wh ere is my Home? Slovak Immigration to North America (/870-2010) (Bern: Peter Lang, 2012). M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak League of America and the Canadian League in the Struggle for the Self-determination of the Nation, 1907-1992," Slovakia, 39, 72 & 73 (2007), 7-35. � 18 SLOVAKIA 2019 THE TRANSATLANTIC SLOVAK QUESTION DURING THE INTERW AR YEARS Michael Cude The relationship of the Slovaks to the Czechs is an issue that has persisted through the modem hi story of the two peoples. From the 19 th century ' national awakenings ' in Austria-Hungary to the Velvet Divorce between the Slovaks and Czechs in 1993, this 'Slovak question' was at the center of key events, including the creation of the First Czechoslovak Republic in 1918, its breakup and reestablishment after World War II, and the 1968 Prague Spring. 1 While many recent works have addressed the Slovak question, many have underappreciated the extent to which modem Slovak national identity formation was a transatlantic phenomenon. Historians examining this topic from the domestic Slovak perspective rarely delve deeply beyond Slovak borders, while histories of Slovaks abroad have focused predominantly on the Slovaks' place as immigrant communities . In doing so, such histories overlook how interlinked Slovak national politics in Slovakia were to Slovak communities abroad, particularly in North America, and the critical role they played in shaping Slovak national identity formation. Addressed by only a handful of recent works, the transatlantic Slovak question requires more attention.2 1 Reference key for shortened arc hi val ci tations: IHRC : Slovak American Collection, Immi gratio n History Research Center, University of Minneso ta. fil: Slovak Institute, Cleveland, OH. DoS CS 1910-44: Records of th e U.S. Department of Stale Relating to th e Internal Affairs of Czechoslovakia 1910-1944, Microfilm (Washin gton D.C.: National Archives and Records Service, 1982). 2 For some examples of sc holarship considering the Slovak question from a transatlantic perspective, see: M. Mark Sto larik, Where is my Home? Slovak Immigration to North America ( /8 70-2010) (Bern : Peter Lang, 2012). M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak League of America and the Canadian Slovak League in the Struggle for the Self-determination of the Nation, 1907- 1992," Slovakia, 39, 72 & 73 (2007), 7-35 . Marian Mark Stolarik, "The Role of American Slovaks in the Creation of CzechoSlovakia, 1914-19 I 8," Slovak Studies, 8, Hi stori ca 5 ( 1968), 7-82. Stefan Kucik, Podiel americkych S!ovakov na aulonomistickom hnuti na Slovensku 191 8-/938 (Martin: Matica slovenska, 20 I I). Gregory Curtis Ference, Sixteen Months of Indecision : Slovak American Viewpoints Toward Compatriots and the Homeland from �SLOVAKIA 2019 19 The Slovak efforts abroad during World War I remain the best told component of this story. The foundation of the transatlantic Slovak question was laid in the periods leading up to the First World War, when Slovak-American organizations began to campaign for Slovak political autonomy within the Kingdom of Hungary. The central organization for Slovak national activism became the Slovak League of America (SLA), founded in May 1907 by Slovak-American leaders to unify the disparate Slovak groups in the United States in common political action. The SLA ' s main objectives were to develop the cultural and political life of the Slovaks in America as a means of supporting the cultural and political life of the Slovaks in the homeland and to fight for Slovak national self-determination. 3 World War I and its accompanying 'Wilsonian moment' entrenched important symbols of Slovak national self-determination, as Slovak immigrant communities contributed to the establishment of the new Czechoslovak Republic. The wartime Czechoslovak National Council and its leaders, including Thomas G. Masaryk and Milan R. Stefanik, utilized Slovak-American organizations for financial , military, and diplomatic support. Consequently, Slovak-American demands led to the creation of the most important document relating to Slovak nationalism for the following twenty years: the Pittsburgh Agreement. Signed on 31 May 1918, this document declared common action between the Czechs and Slovaks in the formation of a democratic republic. Nevertheless, the agreement made a clear assertion for Slovak autonomy, under the terms that the Slovaks would I 9 I 4 to I 9 I 5 as Viewed by the Slovak Language Press in Pennsylvania (Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna Uni versity Press, 1995). Michael Cude, "The Imagined Exiles: Slovak-Americans and the Slovak Question during the First Czechoslovak Republic," in From Exsilium to Exile: Coercion in Migration, Studia Historica Gedanensia, vo l. 5, ed. Anna Mazurkiewicz (Gdansk, Poland: University of Gdansk History Institute, 20 14), 287-305 3 Konstantin Culen, History of Slovaks in America, Daniel C. Necas, trans. (St. Paul, MN : Czechoslovak Genealogical Society, 2007). Jan Pankuch, History of the Slovaks of Cleveland and Lakewood, Rasto Gallo, trans. (Cleveland: Czechoslovak Genealogical Society & Western Reserve Historical Society, 2001), 29-38. Stolarik, " Rol e," 7-82 . Stephanie 0. Husek, "Slovak American Fraternal, Cultural, and Civic Organizations to 19 I 4," in Slovaks in America: A Bicentennial Study, Joseph C. Krajsa, ed. (Middletown: Slovak League of America, 1978), 23 -38 . Joseph A. Mikus "The Slovak League of America: A Historical Survey," in Slovaks, Krajsa, ed., 3956. R. Vladimir Baumgarten & Joseph Stefka, The National Slovak Society: JOO Year History, I 890-1990 (Pittsburgh: National Slovak Society, 1990), 17-33. �20 SLOVAKIA 2019 have their "own administration, own parliament, and own courts." In the short term, the Pittsburgh Agreement appeased the Slovak-Americans, who consolidated their support around the budding state, while Masaryk used the agreement to legitimize Czech-Slovak coop4 eration in his diplomatic efforts. This campaign allowed Slovak-American leaders a sense of direct influence on the affairs of their homeland, although the Czechoslovak National Council quickly stymied this hope. While the Slovak-Americans had been able to pressure Masaryk into symbolically accepting their goals for Slovak autonomy, their influence only extended to his need to provide evidence of Slovak participation in his political program as he sought recognition from the Entente powers. As a result, the Slovak-Americans found themselves on the margins during the building of the state . Accordingly, many historians consider the Pittsburgh Agreement as a matter of domestic Slovak politics after its initial signing, with little further consideration for the Slovaks abroad. In doing so, they neglect the fact that transatlantic activities continued through the interwar period.5 With the establishment of Czechoslovakia following the war, Slovak national activists on both sides of the Atlantic, hereto identi- 4 "Pittsburgska Dohoda" in Dok:umenty slovenskej narodnej identity a statnosti, vol. I, eds. Jan Benko, et al (Narodne literame centrum: Dom slovenskej literatury, 1998), 484-7. " Masaryk to Mamatey, 22 September 1918," SLA Cabinet, F:llth Congress, Slovak Institute (S I), Cleveland, OH. Pankuch, History, 145-50. Stolarik, "Role," 32-54. Karo l Sidor, ''The Slovak League of America and the Slovak Nation 's Struggle for Autonomy," Slovakia I 7, 40 ( I 967), 39-46. Peter P. Hletko, "The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact," Slovakia l 8, 41 ( 1968), 5-54. Stanislav J. Kirschbaum , "The Cleveland and Pittsburgh Documents," in Slovakia 36, 66 & 67 ( 1998), 81-97. lmrich Mazar, A History of the Binghamton Slovaks : Over a Period of Forty Years, 1879-1919, ed. Wilhelmina Mazar Salina, trans. Thomas Janacek (Phoenix: Via Press, 2003), 203-17. Baumgarten & Stefka, National, 81-3. 5 James Ramon Felak, At the Price of the Republic: Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, 1929-1938 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, I 994). Peter A. Toma & Dusan Kovac, Slovakia: From Samo to Dzurinda (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 200 I). Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia : The Struggle for Survival, 2nd ed. (New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). Jan Rychlik, "Czech-Slovak Relations in Czechoslovakia, I 918-1939," in Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist and Fascist Europe, 1918- 1948, eds . Mark Cornwall, R.J.W . Evans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 13-26. Elisabeth Bakke, "Czechoslovakism in Slovak History," in Slovakia in History, eds. Mikulas Teich, et al (Cambridge: Cambridge Univers ity Press, 2011), 247-68. �SLOVAKIA 2019 21 fied as the Slovak 'autonomists,' had full expectations of a federal relationship that would recognize Slovak cultural uniqueness and grant the Slovaks civic equality with autonomy over domestic affairs under the terms of the Pittsburgh Agreement. In contrast, most Czech leaders wanted a strongly centralized state, justified by arguments of the commonality of the Czechs and Slovaks, the threat of Hungarian and German irredentism, and the believed necessity of Czech oversight to modernize Slovakia. They relied on support from Slovak ' centralists,' who identified the Czechs and Slovaks as a common people. Slovak autonomists, who saw the Slovaks as a culturally distinct people from the Czechs, perceived this ' Prague centralism' as a form of cultural and political hegemony. In response, they replanted their fight over the Slovak question against the newly formed government in Prague. Both autonomists and centralists mobilized Slovaks at home and abroad behind their version of the state, with the transatlantic component focused on lobbying foreign governments. As with many other nationality groups, Slovak leaders saw the postwar peace process as a key moment to make their case. With the centralists represented at the Versailles Peace Conference by the formal delegation from Czechoslovakia, the autonomists attempted to present their own view, including a flurry of correspondence from Slovak-Americans to United States President Woodrow Wilson and an unofficial delegation led by Slovak nationalist leader Andrej Hlinka. The autonomists appealed for recognition of an independent Slovak identity and the establishment of a federalist system in Czechoslovakia that granted greater domestic political autonomy to Slovakia. Wilson and other western leaders, however, prioritized economic and political modernity as a necessary quality for selfgovernrnent. Czechoslovakia's centralist leaders appealed to the Wilsonian prioritization of modernism to gain American acceptance of their vision, and used a proposed uplift of the Slovaks into modernity to advance this cause. They nonetheless pursued this objective in a way that often cast the Slovaks in a disparaging light and sowed further discord. The Conference in turn legitimated this organization of the Czechoslovak state and ignored Slovak autonomist appeals. 6 6 For more, see : Michael Cude, "Wilsonian National Self-determination and the Slovak Question during th e Founding of Czechoslovakia, 1918-192 1," Diplomatic Histo,y (2016) 40, I: 155-80 �22 SLOVAKIA 2019 This failure at Versailles did not dissuade transatlantic Slovak activities. From the conclusion of the Treaty of Trianon in June 1920 to the Munich Agreement in September 1938, the Slovak question persisted in the First Czechoslovak Republic. The interwar period saw the Slovak autonomist movement survive with the Czechoslovak state arrayed against them . Slovak autonomists regularly looked across the Atlantic for support in pressuring Prague to change its stance. The Slovak autonomists continued to reference the spirit and goals of Wilsonianism to justify their claims for autonomy, and the Pittsburgh Agreement became their primary symbol. SlovakAmerican autonomists accepted their leading role of defending the Slovaks internationally, and they remained hopeful of convincing world leaders, particularly those in the United States, to embrace their view. This task remained an uphill battle, given the autonomists' inability to match the resources or international connections maintained by Prague, as centralists worked to discredit the idea of domestic autonomy for Slovakia. The Czech and Slovak centralists polarized the issue as a support for state unity through centralism or support for the destruction of the state through autonomy. In international appeals, the centralists disparaged Slovak capabilities for selfgovernment, and presented the Slovak autonomists as a parochial fringe, ignorant of world affairs. Accordingly, this transatlantic debate heavily contributed to the failure of the Czechoslovak concept in the interwar period by helping sow the entrenched distrust that culminated in the splintering of the Czechoslovak Republic in March of 1939. The question of Slovak autonomy remained a principal component of Slovak politics during the First Czechoslovak Republic. The Slovaks split into three general categories on the Slovak question. The smallest of these groups were the Czechoslovakists, who wanted a close, non-differential linkage with the Czechs. Vavro Srobar, the first appointed Minister for Slovakia in 1918, exemplified this faction. Another group consisted of moderate nationalists who pursued cooperation with the Czechs, but wanted recognition of separate Slovak identity and political autonomy. Milan Hodza, Prime Minister of the republic in the late 1930s and leader of the Agrarian Party, best exemplified this faction. Hodza and others supported a federalist model to address national minority questions. Most of the former two groups came from Slovakia's Lutheran minority. The Slovak auton- �SLOVAKIA 2019 23 omists, who were predominantly Catholics, were the most controversial. The Reverend Andrej Hlinka represented them as leader of the Slovak People 's Party. Hlinka and his supporters pushed for complete autonomy within Czechoslovakia, although the radical end of the party increasingly sought greater independence while a smaller minority even promoted a return to Hungary under a promise of autonomy. The Slovak People's Party (SPP) remained the most popular party in Slovakia and mixed cooperation with opposition to push for Slovak autonomy. The Agrarian Party followed in popular support, and it gradually pushed for more autonomy, albeit in a more deliberate fashion than the SPP. The Slovak National Party, the Slovak Communists, and the Hungarian Parties joined them in support of autonomy.7 Politically, some Slovaks took prominent positions in the central government, most notably Hodza. Prague allowed Slovak autonomists to organize and hold seats in Parliament, but it continued to censor nationali st viewpoints and it regularly pursued smear campaigns against Slovak autonomist leaders. The SPP joined the government in 1927, arranged by Hodza after promises of Slovak autonomy, but Hodza's plan proceeded in a watered-down fashion. The SPP participation lasted only two years before accusations of treason against radical politician Vojtech Tuka led to the SPP's withdrawal from the government. The SPP later exploited the Munich Agreement to force Prague's hand to achieve autonomy during the short-lived Second Republic, and then seceded from the state in March of 1939.8 7 Prague regularly promoted the idea that most of the Slovak people opposed autonomy, because the SPP only maintained 30-35% of the electorate in Slovakia. Although it is difficult to determine the true popular support of autonomy based strictly on the electoral support of each party, the support in Slovakia for Prague's version of centralism was probably we ll in the minority when one considers that the three largest parties-SPP, Agrarian, and Communists- all embraced some level of Slovak autonomy. 8 For more on this period in Slovak hi story, see: Yeshayahu A. Jelinek, The Lust for Power: Nationalism, Slovakia, and the Communists 1918- 1948 (New York: Columbia University, 1983). Susan Mikula, "The Politics of Frustration : The Slovak Politica l Experience, 191 8-1938," in Reflections on Slovak Histo ry, eds. Stanislav Kirschbaum & Anne C. Rom an (Toronto: Slovak World Congress, 1987), 73 -88. James Felak, "Slovak Considerations of the Slovak Question: The Ludak, Agrarian, Socialist, and Communi st views in lnterwar Czechoslovakia" in The Czech and Slovak Experience, ed . John Morison (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), 136-62. Felak, At the �24 SLOVAKIA 2019 The Slovak-A mericans also consolidated their positions on the issue in a similar fas hi on. After an early divide, the leaders of the Slovak League of America gave up on Prague and embraced the autonomist position, as did the large Catholic fraternal organization the First Catholic Slovak Union, and other, smaller organizations, such as the Friends of Slovak Freedom (FSF), an organization formed in the 1920s w ith the singul ar goal of addressing the Slovak question . The large, secular and large ly Protestant, fraternal organizations, the National Slovak Society and the Slovak Evangeli cal Un ion, at first embraced the centralist Slovaks, but nationalist pressure ultimatel y led them to try to moderate between the centrali st and autonomist positions. They ultim ate ly embraced the gradualist position of Hodza. In response, the Czechoslovaki sts established the Slovak National A lliance to serve as the arm of Prague among the SlovakAmericans, along with the Slovak Gymnastic Union Sokol. Consisting mostl y of secularists and some Lutherans, these organizations regularly attacked the SLA for its Catholic and autonomist leanings and promoted the strict uni ty of the Czechs and Slovaks. 9 As the Slovak question became entrenched in Czechoslovak politics, each competing side pursued a voluminous international lobby ing campaign to build western support for its respective position. This included a fact ion demanding a revision of the Trianon Treaty to return Slovakia to Hungary. The primary international Slovak advocate of this position was the Reverend Francis Jehlicka and hi s organization, the Slovak Council , founded in 1933 . Jehlicka had attended the Paris Peace Conference wi th Hlinka, but decided afterwards that the Slovaks could not trust the Czechs. Jehlicka remained abroad, where he lobbied fo r a Slovak reunion with Hungary based on Hun ga ri an promises of Slovak autonomy. He attempted to build Price of th e Republic. Toma & Kovac, Slovakia, 78-1 06. Kirsc hbaum, History of Slovakia , 155-84. Ryc hlik, "Czec h-Sl ovak Relations," in Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist, 13-2 6. R.J.W. Evans, " Hungarians, Czechs, and Slovaks : Some Mutual Perceptions," in Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist, I 09-22 . Mary Heimann, Czechoslovakia : The State that Failed (New Haven: Yale Uni vers ity Press, 2009), 48-86. Nata lia Kraj covicova, " Slovakia in Czechoslovakia," in Slovakia in History, 137-56. 9 Joseph Pauco, "Slovaks Abroad and Their Relati onship with Slovakia," in Slo vakia in the 19th & 20th Centuries, ed. Joseph M. Kirschbaum (Toronto: Slovak World Congress, 1973), 333-42. Josep h V. Adamec, "The Slovak Cath olic Federation," in Slovaks in America, 223-32 . Baumgarten & Stetl<a, National, 85-7. Pankuch, History, 177-86 . Stolarik, " Slovak League," 7-35 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 25 support from the Slovak-Americans by appealing to Slovakia's historical and economic roots in Hungary and exposing claimed mistreatment of the Slovaks by Prague. ' 0 Jehlicka could express his voice abroad because of support from Budapest and later Nazi Germany, and he convinced a few figures in the West, most notably the British publi sher Lord Rothermere, who campaigned on behalf of Hungary internationally. Jehlicka ' s arguments nevertheless carried little weight in other circles . Scottish historian R. W. Seton-Watson, a prominent supporter of the Czechoslovak Republic , pursued a constant back and forth against Jehlicka, and, on both sides of the Atlantic, Slovaks and Czechs of different politica l views unified against Slovakia ' s return to Hungary. The Slovak autonomi sts and centralists , for example, collaborated in an open letter denouncing Jehlicka . 11 Slovak-Americans likewise continued to lobby against Hungarian claims, reminding readers about the old magyarization policy to eliminate Slovak national identity. Slovak-American publisher Jan Pankuch claimed that this was the sole occas ion when the Slovak-American autonomi sts, Czech-Americans, and Slovak10 Anthony Pessenl ehner, "Czechoslovakia' s Ri ght to Statehood Assa iled," Current History, 14, 5 (Aug. I 92 1), 845-8. Dr. F. Jehlicka: Kto on je a co chce (C leveland: 1920). Francis Jehlicka, Reply to Mr. R. W. Seton-Watson 's Book 'Slovakia Th en and Now ' (Vienn a, 1932). The Slovak Co uncil , Th e Unsolved Slovak Problem (Vienna: Slovak Council, 1933). The Slovak Co un cil , Bolsevizmus a slovenska otazka (Geneva: Slovak Council , 193 6), in : 8 : Resolutions, Memoranda, Proclamations, SI. The Slovak Council , Sh ould Great Britain go to Wa r- fo r Czechoslovakia: An Appeal to British Common Sense for th e Sake of Wo rld Peace (London: Haze l, Watson, & Viney, 1937) . Francis Jehli cka, Fa1her Hlinka 's Struggle fo r Slovak Freedom (London: Slova k Council , 1938), 34-5. "The German Minister in Czechoslovaki a (Eisenlohr) to the German Foreign Ministry (Doc 57)," Documen1s on German Foreign Policy, Seri es D, V2 (Was hington, D.C. : U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947), 132-3 . 11 R.W. Seton-Watson, Treaty Revision and the Hungarian Frontiers ( London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1934). " Seton-Watson to Alois Ka lisek" (Doc I 32) in R. W. SetonWa tson and His Relations with the Czechs and Slovaks: Documents, / 906- 195 1, vol. I, eds. Jan Ryc hlik, et al (Prague: Ustav T. G. Masaryka, I 995), 393-6. "The Situati on in Slova ki a and the Magyar Minori ty" (Doc 139) in Seton-Watson, 409-25. "Seton-Watson to Martin Razus" (Doc 155 ) in Seton- Watson, 454-5 . "Fedor Ruppeldt to Seton-Watson" (Doc I 60) in Seton-Watson, 465-9. C. L Orbach, "Czechoslovakia ' s Place in the Sun," Current Histo1y, 14, 6 (Sept I 92 1), 944-5. Anonymous, "Another Defense of Czechoslovaki a" Curren/ History, 14, 6 (Sept 192 1), 945-6. Adam Poliak, "Czechos lova ki a's Right to Statehood," Current History, I 5, 3 (Dec I 92 1), 499. " Slovaki a' s Pro test" (Doc 156) in Seton-Watson, 456-9. �26 SLOVAKIA 2019 American centralists came together in common cause, although the resolution almost failed when the two sides sparred over whether the text should declare the Slovaks and Czechs as one nation. The proHungarian autonomists, thus, remained on the periphery of the Sio• 12 va k question. The unified opposition against Hungarian irredentism otherwise did little to ease the conflict between the centralists and autonomists. The Czech and Slovak centralists made the Slovak question a primary component of their international propaganda, and they often perpetuated negative stereotypes of the Slovaks to promote the Czechoslovak vision. The official press in Prague released ample publications by Czech nationali st leaders in the English language on the topic. President Masaryk, for example, made clear his disappointment with the "po litical immaturity" of the Slovak autonomist movement. Masaryk, who continued to highlight his own partial Slovak heritage, likewise claimed to have proven his great love for Slovakia by having liberated it from Hungary and he asserted that Slovak nationalists could prove their own love by embracing Prague 's authority. 13 Edvard Benes, who served as Foreign Minister until succeeding Masaryk to the presidency in 1935, in tum argued that the Czechs and Slovaks remained unified, except for a "fringe minority," working for a return to the pre-war order, and the "dictates of local , provin12 "Rezolucie Vznesene Ustrednym Vyborom Slovenskej Ligy v Amerike na schodzi , vzdrziavanej IO novembra 1920," Person File (PF): Bielek, SI. Association of Slovak Newspapermen of America, Count Albert Apponyi or Revival of Magyar Propaganda in America (Scranton, Pa: Bosak Press, 1923), in: B: Resolutions, SI. American Citizens of Slovak Origin, The Refutation to the Arguments of the Hungarian Kossuth Delegation ( 1928), in: The Podkrivacky, Adam Papers, B: 17, Slovak American Collection, Immigration History Research Center (IHRC), Uni versity of Minnesota. "What the Magyars Forget," The National Slovak Society (NSS) of the US.A . Records, B: 168, F: Slovak League of America (SLA), lHRC. "The Cleveland District Assembly of the SLA to Hoover," 4 December 1929, F#: 860F.00/306, Records of the U.S. Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Czechoslovakia 1910-1944 (DoS CS 1910-44), Microfilm (Washington D.C .: National Archi ves and Records Service, 1982). Pankuch, History, 186-90. 13 Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, The Making of a State: Memories and Observations, 1914-1918, trans. Henry Wickham Steed (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1927), 2 1, 41 , 208-11 , 338, 361. Thomas G. Masaryk, Masa,yk on Thought and Life: Conversations with Karel Capek, reprint ed., trans. M. & R. Weatherall (New York: Arno Press, 1971 ). "T.G. Masaryk on the Pittsburgh Agreement" (Doc 30) in Slovakia : Political, 209- 10. �SLOVAKIA 2019 27 cial, factional and individualist interests ." 14 Czech scholars, journalists and officials also contributed to this campaign, mostly through studies of the Czechs that glossed over the Slovaks except to praise 15 how the Czechs had liberated them. For example, Czech historian Albert Prazak praised the Czech ro le in uplifting the Slovaks, and condemned Hlinka and the SPP as tools of Hungary and as part of a Catholic conspiracy to take over Central Europe. Prazak then dismissed the Pittsburgh Agreement as "merely a flight of fancy ," rooted in "immaturity of political judgment and lack of understanding." 16 Czech journalist Ales Broz likewise condemned the Slovaks as " retarded in their development" versus the " well educated, practical, realistic" Czechs, and praised the direction of Slovakia under the Czechs for allowing the two peoples to become "one stock, one cul. ,, I 7 ture, one nat10n . Centralist Slovaks also contributed to this campaign, including articles by Interior Minister Juraj Slavik and Minister to France Stefan Osusky on the nationality questions in Czec hoslovakia, as well as one by Education Minister Anton Stefanek praising Prague ' s 14 Eduard Benes, My War Memoirs, trans. Paul Seiver (London : George Allen & Unwin, 1928), 348, 448, 469, 472-8 1. Edvard Benes, Christmas Message (Prague: Orb is, 193 7), 17. Edvard Benes, "Of Czechoslovak Unity" in We Were and We Shall Be: Th e Czechoslovak Spirit th rough th e Centuries , eds. Zdenk a & Jan Mun zer (New York : Un gar, 1941), 164-6. 15 Kami I Krofta & Jiri Hoetzel, A Short Histo,y of Czechoslovakia ( ew York: Robert McBride & Co, 1934), 137-8, 142, 149-52. Kami! Krofta, "Czechs and Slovaks (I)" The Slavonic and East European Review, 13, 38 (January 1935), 363-7 1. Kami I Kroft a, "Czechs and Slovaks ( II )" The Slavonic and East European Review, I 3, 39 (April 1935), 6 11-26. Josef Borovicka, Ten Years of Czechoslovak Politics (Prague: Orbis, 1929), 7-8, 13 , 20-1 , 44, 111-1 2, I I 9-20, I 24-6. Emanuel Capek, "The Background of Political Parti es in Czechoslovaki a" The Sla vonic and East European Review, I 0, 28 (June 193 1), 90- 104. Ales Broz, " Minori ty Ri ghts in th e Czechoslova k State," Foreign Affairs, 6, I (October 1927), 158-60. Ales Broz, " President Masaryk, Creator of the Czechos lovak Republic," Current Histo,y , 24, I (April I 926), 48-53. 16 Prague appointed Prazak, a Czech, to erve at Comenius Uni versity in Brati slava as its primary hi stori an of the Slova ks. The Slavonic Review labeled Prazak the "foremost li ving authority on Slovak History." Albert Prazak, " Review : The ew Slovaki a by R. W. Seton-W atso n" The Slavonic Review, 3, 9 (March 1925), 71 3-20. 17 Ales Broz, "Czech and Slovak at Odds: Both Sides of the Controversy - From the Czech Standpoint," Curren/ Histo,y, 22 , 5 (Aug 1925), 784-8 . �28 SLOVAKIA 2019 development of Slovak education. 18 Slovak Social Democrat, and rigid Czechoslovakist, [van Derer's short book on the Pittsburgh Agreement provided the most thorough effort in English to discredit the Slovak autonomists . Derer claimed that most Slovaks embraced the state as constructed, and that only a " pro-Magyar" minority supported autonomy. He likewise dismissed the Slovak-American signers of the Pittsburgh Agreement as not " true" Slovak nationals, because they lived in America. Derer argued that the document had meant simply local administrative autonomy, which he claimed Prague had granted. He then portrayed the Czechs as the Slovaks' saviors and condemned Slovak autonomy: In return for their having helped Slovakia when things were at th eir worst, in return for their having saved our liberty and an independent state apparatus, railway and postal communications, and a Slovak system of education at the tim e when the Slovaks th emselves were weak, unprepared, often distrustful and inclined rather to continue to live under their thousand-year yoke than to live in freedom, in return for having shed their blood for our country on the battlefronts in the Great War, and in the fights against Bolshevist Hungary in I 9 I 9 and thus saving Slovakia from a new occupation by the Magyars -in return for all this are we to remove the Czechs from Slovakia ? 19 Prague also maintained support from American and Eng lish academics and journalists in perpetuating Czechoslovakism. SetonWatson remained a staunch supporter of the idea, boasting how he regularly discredited "cantankerous Slovaks who accused Masaryk and hi s friend s of 'Czec hi sation."' He publicly condemned Hlinka and the SPP and repudiated their criticisms of Prague. Seton-Watson a lso actively denied Slovak agency in Slovak national development. 18 Juraj Slavik, "The Nationality Question in Slovakia," Central European Observer, 11 , 26 (Dec 18, 1933), 463-5 . Stefan Osusky, " Wh y Czechoslovakia?" Foreign Affairs, 15 , 3 (Apri l 1937), 455-71. Anton Stefanek, " Education in Slovakia," Th e Slavonic Review, 2, 5 (Dec 1923), 308-27. 19 Ivan Derer, The Unity of th e Czechs and Slovaks: Has th e Pittsburgh Declaration Been Carried Out? (Prague: Orbis, 193 8). �SLOVAKIA 2019 29 The Slovaks should therefore be thankful that fate has made them dependent upon a race so efficient, so well-educated and well-disciplined as the Czechs ... .At the critical moment, the Slovaks made the impression of a helpless animal fascinated by the approach of the boa-constrictor, and Prague was literally the sole hope.-'0 On the Slovak question, Seton-Watson blamed the " hypersensitive" Slovaks as simply being too parochial, religiously backward and ill developed, and he dismissed autonomist arguments as the "wild talk of extremists." Even in a work of collected essays designed to "show that the Slovaks themselves have had a much greater share in the reconstruction of their country than is often supposed," Seton-Watson turned predominantly to centralist Slovaks whose contributions consisted mostly of self-promotion and praise for the merits of centralism.21 The American philanthropist and writer Kenneth D. Miller was another avid promoter of Czechoslovakism. "Everything points to the wisdom of a cultural as well as political union between the two nationalities. No matter what the cultural development may be, neither nationality can well maintain its political independence without the other." He likewise felt that the Slovak question would disappear with the development of the "slow, passive Slovak," who yet lacked initiative, and who was prone to immorality and drunkenness, and to "religious vagary or fanaticism." 22 Other presentations ranged from industrialist and diplomat John Crane, who attacked the "backward ignorance" of the Slovaks for resisting secularization, to YMCA secretary Fred Rindge who criticized a claimed lack of Slovak interest 20 R.W. Seton-Watson , Th e New Slovakia (Prague: Fr. Borovy, 1924), 3, 23-4. R.W. Seton-Watson, Masaryk in England (New York: Macmillan, 1943), 61. "Seton-Watson Open Letter to Hlinka" (Doc 108), in Seton-Watson, 343-4. "SetonWatson to Alois Kolisek" (Doc 135), in Seton-Watson, 401-2. R.W. Seton-Watson, ed. Slovakia Then and Now: A Political Survey (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1931). When planning the book, Seton-Watson expressed his desire to have an article from a SPP leader, so that Slovak autonomists could not accuse him of onesidedness. He considered an article on the issue of autonomy, but decided only to allow an article on Slovak religion by Hlinka. "Seton-Watson to Milan Hodza" (Docs 144 & 145), in Seton-Watson, 431-2 . 22 Kenneth D. Mill er, The Czecho-Slovaks in America (New York: Doran Company, 1922), 14-25, 121-122, 158-160. 21 �30 SLOVAK.IA 2019 in the arts. Journalist C.J.C. Street claimed, "The Slovak dream was always to regain their lost unity with the Czechs and as a united nation to secure the tolerable conditions of existence. " 23 The Slovak autonomists in Slovakia pursued a few efforts during the interwar period to counter this campaign, although they lacked equivalent resources and connections to those held by Prague. The SPP' s most notable attempt was the Zilina Memorandum of 1922. Released to the western press and governments, the document sought to expose the Slovak question to the world, beginning with its sensationalist title, "a country doomed to death, a nation in her last agonies implores the civilized world for help." It decried the failures of Wilsonianism, which had allowed Prague to "bamboozle" the Slovaks "out of the freedom promised to them ." The text went on to explain their issues with the Czechs, discussing concerns from the treatment of religion, to economic exploitation, and the denial of autonomy. The memorandum also condemned Czechoslovakism as simply a tool for domination. The Czechs and Slovaks have been always forming two separate little worlds with a very different character due to their different geographical and economic conditions, their different way of thinking, of feeling and of mind. We have a different view of life, other morals and other traditions; we have a different social structure, different legal rules and different ideas about political economy and culture. The document ultimately claimed the world could still save the Slovaks if it acted quickly. The key of the iron cage in which the Slo vak Nation is being mercilessly incarcerated lays in the hands of the Great Powers. This memorial is our last expedient and our last weap23 John 0. Crane, "Church and State in Czechoslovakia" The Slavonic Review, 6, 17 (Dec. 1927), 364-78. Fred H. Rindge, Jr. "The Charm of Czechoslovakia" Current History, 22, 3 (June 1925), 447-50. C. J. C. Street, Slovakia Past and Present (Westm inster, UK: P.S. King & Son, 1928). For more examples, see: Robert Machray, "Czechoslova ki a a Pioneer in Central European Politics" Current Hislo ry, 25, 6 (Mar. 1927), 839-43 . J. H. Wallis, "The Upbuilding of Czechoslovakia," Curren/ Histo1y, 14, 5 (Aug. 192 1), 835-45 . �SLOVAK.IA 2019 31 on ... Though only clad in the rags of our torn freedom we nevertheless appear as accusers before the world, charging the rulers of Prague who are still deluding the powers, and the powers themselves for having out of sheer ignorance become their accomplices. To ignore the Slovak case, thus, would be to support the trampling of liberty. 24 After the Zilina Memorandum bore no fruit, the Slovak autonomists pursued fewer efforts to court the west. They made a few sporadic attempts, such as a translation of the SPP •program in 1930, written by Jozef Tiso, which outlined the SPPs vision of a Slovak national Christian democracy, and appealed for autonomy as a protection of the Slovak cultural tradition. It argued that the Slovak nation's religious roots encouraged it toward a peaceful selfpreservation, unlike other nations that turned toward national chauvinism. 25 Slovak priest and publicist Anton Kompanek also produced an article that emphasized Slovak Christianity as a symbol of Slovak worthiness for self-government. Kompanek believed Slovakia served as an example of how the Church and state could find balance in the modem world. 26 These publications, however, remained exceptions, as the Slovak autonomists in Slovakia maintained little faith in western governments, recognizing Prague's stranglehold over their image internationally. They instead relied on the Slovak-Americans to lead the way in their defense internationally. Slovak nationalist politician Karol Sidor claimed that despite a continued interest in the homeland, the Slovak-Americans began to lose their "onetime vitality and ardor" during the interwar period. He linked this outcome to greater assimilation and a decreasing knowledge of the Slovak language.27 This claim is somewhat true. The energy of the war years certainly diminished, particularly in the 24 "Zilina Memorandum" (Doc I 02) & "Covering Letter for the Zilina Memorandum" (Doc I 03), in Seton-Watson, pp. 319-33 . 25 Jozef Tiso, The Ideology of th e Slovak Populist Party (Prague: 1930). 26 Anton Kompanek, "The Catholic Church in Slovakia" Th e Sla vonic and East European Review, 12, 36 (April 1934), 611-21. 27 Sidor, "Slovak League," 59-62. �32 SLOVAKIA 2019 1930s with the onset of the Great Depression.28 Sidor, however, understated how much the Slovak-Americans remained at the forefront of the international efforts to gain recognition of the Slovak question. Historian Jozef Pauco 's interpretation is much more accurate: "For twenty years the Slovak League of America defended the spirit and letter of the Pittsburgh Pact and by using the freedom of the press and the freedom of assembly on American soil, they did so more freely and energetically than the two political parties in their homeland." 29 Based on the volume of publications and direct communications with government officials on both side of the Atlantic, it is clear that the Slovak question continued to dominate the transatlantic interests of the Slovak Americans, as they bolstered their compatriots' activities within Czechoslovakia by applying external pressure on Prague. The Slovak fraternal organizations made constant efforts to keep their members linked to their Slovak cultural identity, and to aid in the fight for autonomy in the homeland. They pursued these efforts through education programs such as national lectures, art and photography tours, but also symbolic actions such as erecting a statue of General Milan R. Stefanik in Cleveland in 1924 and the planting of a Linden Tree on Capitol Hill in honor of Stefanik in 1934. 30 The Slovak question remained high on the list of Slovak-American concerns, and the various Slovak organizations produced a flurry of pamphlets and informative documents on the issue. The Pittsburgh Agreement remained at the center of this debate, with Slovak autonomists on both sides of the Atlantic continuing to affirm its legality against the centralist dismissals that it was simply a non-binding text designed to placate the Slovak-Americans during the war. Autonomist publica28 June Alexander, for example, shows how assimilation became an internal issue for Slovak-Americans, as the older generations struggled to assure that their American born children maintained links to their ethnic heritage. June Granatir Alexander, Ethnic Pride, American Patriotism: Slovaks and Other New Immigrants in the Jn terwar Era (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2004), 93-19 I. 29 Pauco, "S lovaks Abroad," 333-42. 30 "Ot. Svec to Podkrivacky," 3 Oct. 1938," PF: Adam Podkrivacky, SI. "S LA to Jakub Vitostak, 30 Nov 1923 ," The First Catholic Slovak Union of America (FCSU) Records, F: 1303, IHRC. "Jan Kocur to Michael Senko, 30 Nov 1926," FCSU, F: 1304, IHRC. 0. D. Koreff, Milan Rastisla v Stefanik: A Short Biography (Cleveland: Slovak League of America, 1924), 82-3 . "SLA to Arthur Colegrove," NSS, 8 : 168, F: SLA, IHRC. �SLOVAKIA 2019 33 tions looked to inform about the Slovaks, to expose the failed promises of Prague on autonomy, and to defend against the accusations of Prague centralists. The Slovak League remained at the forefront, hoping that exposure of the situation to the American press and pub1ic would spur sympathy and support? In many cases, the Slovak-Americans directed these publications at Prague, with the hope of convincing a change in policy . They, nevertheless, would consecutively produce English versions, which they then sent to the American President, members of Congress, the Department of State, and assorted press outlets. For example, in 1921 the SLA wrote to Masaryk calling for the immediate implementation of the Pittsburgh Agreement. When Prague did not respond, the League followed up with a more detailed Memorandum on November 9, 1922. This document called on Prague to make good on the Pittsburgh Agreement in the name of natural rights and to reward the sacrifices made by Slovak-Americans during World War I. It highlighted Masaryk's role in the formation of the Agreement, and then provided a photograph of the original text as well as a series of letters between the SLA and various Czechoslovak officials that had promised its implementation to show how promises made to the Slovak-Americans never lived up to reality. The text then defended the legitimacy of Slovak autonomy. We are convinced that the honest and upright materialization of the Pittsburgh Pact in no way will harm the unity of the State; on the contrary it will mean a considerable reinforcement within and without and make possible united co-operation of all patriotic forces against the elements of disintegration, depriving them of a dangerous weapon, which they cannot effectively employ against the Republic, fanning discontent, mistrust and spreading hatred between both nations comprising the state. The League made clear, however, that this good will rested "solely upon a sincere Czecho-Slovak reciprocity." It then gave an alternative: 31 "Telegram to Ivan Bielek on 29 Nov 1934," NSS, B: 168, F: SLA , IHRC. �34 SLOVAKIA 2019 We feel it is our duty to emphasize that if our sincere and friendly attempt, which has at its heart the welfare, interest and future of the Republic, should fail to meet with success, the Slovak l eague of America would not be able to prevent the American Slovaks and their factors from turning to the Court of Public Opinion of the civilized world. While the Slovak autonomists in Slovakia acknowledged the letter, Prague neglected to respond. 32 The SLA then passed a follow-up resolution. Asserting that it "fights with fire and sword with everyone who is in favor of autonomy of the Slovak nation," it admonished Prague for manipulating the world into believing the Czechoslovakist image and for leading a smear campaign against the SLA. It then provided a list of examples of hostility, including efforts to undermine its finances , blackmail, the bullying of Slovak-American leaders and press, and attempts to send government officials to propagandize against them . It once again emphasized how the League had made every effort to resolve the Slovak question within the confines of the Czechoslovak Republic , but it would soon submit the issue "to the judgment of public opinion of the civilized world," if Prague continued to treat them with disdain.33 Many more publications followed. The Friends of Slovak Freedom , for example, released two protests in 1923. These texts defended the va lidi ty of the Slovak-Americans as representatives of the Slovak people, and condemned Prague's actions against Slovak autonomists, including such accusations as "false signatures or resolutions, false numbers of people attending their lectures, insulting the Slovak journalists, insulting the Slovak League as anti-state, and many other lies," as well as criticisms about press censorship in Slo- 32 SLA , Memorandum S/ovenskej Ligy v Amerike upra vene na vladu a Narodne Shromai denie Cesko-Slo venskej Republiky v zaujme vtelenia Pittsburgskej Dohody do ustavy C.-S. Republiky (Pittsburgh: Slovak League of America, 1922). Both the full Slovak and English versions of this Document are avai lab le at: SLA Cab, F: Memorandum /922 v Zaum e Pitts. Dohody, SI. Also avai lable in: " Memorandum Slovenskej Ligy v Arnerike" in Dokumenty, Vol 2, 138-44. 33 " An Appeal of the Slovak League of America to All Political Factors of th e Czecho-S lovak Republic," PF: Bielek, SI. �SLOVAKIA 2019 35 vakia. 34 After reading Masaryk's criticism of Hlinka, the Slovak League then produced a pamphlet that challenged the idea that Masaryk personally had liberated the Slovaks. It reminded readers of the Slovak-American war contribution, and then remarked how the SLA and the Pittsburgh Agreement were certainly valid in Masaryk's eyes when he needed Slovak-American support in 1918. The document then included a text from former Czechoslovak ambassador to Japan, Karel Pergler, arguing that both the Slovaks and Czechs had unequivocally recognized the Pittsburgh Agreement upon its signing. 35 Next to these direct appeals, the Slovak-American autonomists also released many publications geared directly toward an American audience. They designed these works to inform about the Slovaks, expose their continued fight for self-determination and to link the Slovak question to American democratic values. These publications included several biographies of Milan R. Stefanik, a translated history by Slovak historian Joseph Skultety that directly challenged images of Slovak backwardness and other stereotypes, and a short pamphlet on Czechoslovakism by Slovak-American historian Ol'ga Husek warning that the concept meant for the Slovaks "the rejection of their cultural past and the stunting of their future growth." 36 They also attempted to rally America to their cause by showing their valiance in the face of domination. An SLA article distributed to the American Press praised how the Slovak-Americans continued to fight even with "the entire machinery of government set against them, calumnies upon calumnies by a government subsidized press, heaped upon the heads of those who take up their cause, and bug- 34 Friends of Slovak Freedom, " Resolution, November 28, 1923," & " Protest against Censorship and Confiscation of Slovak Publications by the Government in Slovakia" in Pankuch , Slo vaks of Cleveland, l 82-6. 35 Slovenska Liga v Amerike, V Zaujme Pra vdy! (In the Interest of Truth !) (Pittsburgh: P. Jamriska, 1930). Found in : SLA Cabinet, F: SLA Presidents, SI. Prague responded to these letters, but it simply reasserted the usual rebutta ls, claiming that 75% of the Slovaks supported centralization and that the Pittsburgh Agreement was simply an American document. "Ohlas Americkeho Memoranda u Nas," 8 : Slovak League of America (SLA) , SI. 36 0. D. Koreff, Milan Rastislav Stefanik: A Short Biography (Cleveland: Slovak League of America, 1924). Andrew Slabey, General Milan R. Stefanik (Leisenring, PA: Griglak Printery, 1937). Joseph Skultety, Sketches from Slovak History, O.D. Koreff, trans . (Middletown, PA : First Catholic Slovak Union, I 930) . Ol'ga Husek, The Czechoslovak Fallacy (Middletown, PA : Jednota, 1935). �36 SLOVAK.IA 2019 bears turned loose to scare those who are not acquainted with conditions. " 37 Religion became a major component of Slovak-American advocacy on the Slovak question in the interwar period. Slovak-American journalist Stephen J. Palickar published many articles in general Catholic publications, including a five-month tit-for-tat with Czech diplomat Josef Hane in defense of Slovak religiosity. He also provided some of the first Slovak-American attempts to link Slovak religiosity to anti-Communism. Palickar likewise defended Slovak agency, and appealed for a lifting of Prague centralism to allow the Slovaks an opportunity to prove their abi lity for self-government. 38 While most of these publications were shorter, more direct works, the Slovak-Americans released a couple of longer exposes on the Slovak question. The first, written by then SLA president Peter P. Hletko on behalf of the Slovak Catholic Federation of America, looked to inform the American people about the Pittsburgh Agreement as an American product in line with "the principles of democracy and self-determination of small nations." Hletko praised how the Slovak "has an inherent love for liberty and freedom , and enjoys fostering his national spirit," which had spurred his immigration to America in a "quest for a land of true liberty," and he argued that American democracy had allowed the Slovaks in America to assert their national identity as an independent people. He asserted how the Slovaks had only joined the Czechoslovak movement on the premise that they would be treated fairly and as equals and highlighted a reg37 "The conflict between Czechs and Slovaks," NSS Records, B: 168, F: SLA, IHRC. For many examples, see: "The Slovaks- Past and Present," in Stephen J. Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism to Atheistic Czech Communism (Cambridge, MA : Hampshire Press, 1948), 40-3 . Stephen J. Palickar, "Czech and Slovak at Odds: Both Sides of the Controversy - From the Slovak Standpoint," Current History, 22 , 5 (Aug 1925), 784-6. "A Dark Spot in Czecho-Slovakia," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism , 43-45 . "Who is Masaryk?," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 49-51 . "S lovakia-whither bound," in Palickar, Slovakia : From Hungarian Despotism, 76-83. "Slovak Catholicism vs. Czech Communism," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 84-86. "Slovak Grievance," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 70-72 . "President Masaryk and his State," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 61-62. "Scotus Viator Surveys Slovakia," in Palickar, Slo vakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 72-75. Stephen J. Palickar, Slovakia of Today (A Lecture), December 12, 1933 , Columbi a University (New York: Slovak Library Association, 1933). 38 �SLOVAKIA 2019 37 ular sense of duplicity and condescension the Slovaks felt from the Czechs. Hlekto praised the Pittsburgh Agreement as having resolved these conflicts, before Masaryk ultimately betrayed his promise, and he gave a detailed defense of its validity and of the right of the Slovak-Americans to speak for their nation during the war. 39 The Slovak-American autonomists shortly thereafter produced an even longer book on the topic . Written by Peter P. Hletko under the pseudonym , "An Autonomist," it served as the most exhaustive consideration of the Slovak question in Eng lish in the early 20 th century. Hletko placed blame on Czech intransigence for fueling the issue unnecessarily. The book argued that the Czechos lovak revolution relied on American money and manpower and "should the President (Masaryk) have failed to dispel the fear and dissatisfaction of the Slovaks through the Moscow and Pittsburgh Agreements, there certainly would not be a Czecho-Slovakia today. " The book then deconstructed Prague 's policies toward the Slovaks, to show Czechoslovakism as a means of hegemony. Hletko considered every issue from the Czech obfuscation on autonomy, the complicity of the Slovak centrali sts, the language issue, schools, and the economy, and he explained the claims of Slovak neediness and incompetence, as we ll as the claimed threat of Hungary, as only a fa<;:ade to justify Czech dominance. He likewise gave examples of Slovak intellectuals to dispute the claim that the Slovaks needed the Czechs to serve that role. He then detailed the domination of Slovakia's administration, civi l service, education system, and cultura l institutions by Slovak centralists and Czechs, and the press censorship and smear campaigns. Ultimately, he concluded that Czechoslovakism was undermining the state and mu st be reversed. Hletko concluded: Th e motive that has promoted us to write this work is not one of revenge, nor a desire to arouse bad feeling, but simply to expose falsehood and reveal truth. It is our sincere hope that, the truth being known, it will enable the Czechs and Slovaks to form a more stable union which will promote justice, trust, and good 39 Slovak Catholi c Federation of America, The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact (S lovak Cath olic Federation of America, 1934). Joseph C. Krajsa, " Dr. Peter Hletko, Most Elite of American Slovaks," Slovakia, 22, 45 ( 1972), 57-9. �38 SLOVAKIA 2019 will, and thereby insure national integrity both at home and abroad. 40 A few non-Slovak publications did favor Slovak autonomy . For example, some historians of the First World War, such as Jan Opocensky and C. A. Macartney, attempted to present a balanced consideration of the Slovak question, giving voice to Slovak autonomist concerns.4 1 There were also several publications that utilized the Slovak question to criticize the broader Versailles system . Writer and journalist E. Alexander Powell , for example, highlighted the differences between the Czechs and Slovaks as an example of the precariousness of the region ' s political stability. Although not particularly admiring of the Slovaks, Powell was highly critical of the Czech treatment of them. He commented, "The Czechs, an energetic, ambitious, progressive, and aggressive people, who outnumber the Slovaks three to one, look with condescension, if not contempt, on their less literate, slower thinking, more easy-going partners, whom, if the truth be known , they regard as immensely inferior to themselves." These scholars all argued that the Czechs needed to treat their minorities with more respect and make good on promises for Slovak autonomy for the sake of the survival of the state. 42 A few works were even somewhat favorable to the Slovaks. One such example came from writer Kenneth L. Roberts , who after visiting Czechoslovakia complained, "The Czechs want to socialize everything in sight, and the Slovaks are not poignantly eager to be social- 40 An Autonomist, Slovakia 's Plea for Autonomy (Middletown, Pa: Slovak Literary Society, 1935). 41 Jan Opocensky, The Collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Mon archy and the Rise of the Czechoslovak Stale (Prague: Orbis, 1928), 153-68, I 93-214. C. A. MaCartney, National States and National Min orities (London : Oxford Uni versity Press, 1934), 117, 201 ,208. 42 E. Alexander Powell , The Danger on th e Danube (New York: Century Company, 1928), 56-8, 62-8, 72-4. M. W. Fodor, South of Hiller (Boston : Houghton Mifflin, 1939). For oth er examples, see : C. A. Macartney, Hungary and her Successors: The Treaty of Trianon and its Consequences, 1919-193 7 (London : Oxford University Press, 1937/ 1965), 73-148. Frank H. Simonds, Can Europe Keep th e Peace? (New York : Harper, I 93 I), 92-10 I. Isaiah Bowman, The New World: Problems in Political Geography, 4th ed. (Yonkers, NY : World Book, 1928). Harold Temperley, " How the Hungari an Frontiers were Drawn," Foreign Affairs, 6, 3 (April 1928), 432-47 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 39 ized." Comparing the Czechs in Slovakia to U.S. Civil War carpetbaggers, he criticized the Czech administration of Slovakia, their denial of autonomy, and called out Czechoslovakism as a lie. He alternatively praised the Slovaks as "among the most attractive and lovable peasant people of the many I have seen." An article by journalist Robert Sage, after a visit to Slovakia, likewise chided the Czechs for using claims of generosi ty as a mirage for domination over Slovakia. 43 The SLA ultimately made good on its threat to take the issue to the world stage, presenting the Slovak question to the League of Nations in 1932. It produced a long legal brief, which appealed for a cessation of wrongdoing against the Slovaks and the granting of political and cultural autonomy. It then begged the League of Nations to recognize the Slovaks as an independent nation, to demand the implementation of the Pittsburgh Agreement, to investigate ill treatment, and to grant recognition of the Slovaks as a true minority in Czechoslovakia. It pointed out how the Slovak-Americans had made multiple attempts to reach out to Prague to explain their concerns and offer an olive branch towards a solution, but that Prague had ignored their appeals and through censorship had silenced their brothers in Slovakia. The document then went on to detail the history of the founding of the state and the Pittsburgh Agreement, their complaints of ill-treatment against the Slovaks, and their view as to why the 44 Slovaks were an independent people. This appeal was unsuccessful. Slovak-Americans also regularly wrote to U.S. government officials. One such example was an "Open Letter" to Masaryk in 1923 that the Slovak Catholic Federation in America also sent to President Coolidge, members of Congress, all the embassies in Prague, and to the American press. The document started with an image of Masaryk approaching the Slovak-Americans as equals during the war, to 43 Kenneth L. Roberts, Europe's Morning After (New York: Harper Brothers, 1921 ), 121-73. Kenneth L. Roberts, Why Europe l eaves Home (New York: Bobbs-Merrill , 1922), 28-31 . Robert Sage, "There's no such Nationality as Czecho-Slovak," Chicago Daily Tribune, Jan 2, 1930, 6. For other examples, see: Felix John Vondracek, The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia / 918-1935 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937), 377-9. Alexander Szana, Die Geschichte der Slowakei (Bratislava: Grenzenbote Verlag, 1930). Robert Nowak, Der Kiinstliche Staal: Ostprobleme der Tschecho-Slowakei (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling, 1938). 44 "To the Supreme Council of the League of Nations at Geneva," SlA Cabinet, F: Supreme Council of the l eague of Na tions at Geneva, 1932, SI. �40 SLOVAKIA 2019 which they responded with loyalty and support. Masaryk then betrayed them, treating the Slovaks "in step-mother fashion, nay, even like slaves," having lured them into "an invisible net of imperialistic aspirations, renounced openly that which is to every nation and to us 'ignorant' Slovaks inviolable, priceless, sacred." It bemoaned that the Slovaks again felt endangered in their national existence, and how the Czechs misled the world on the issue. It appealed for Masaryk "to acknowledge and fulfill that which you had promised us, the American Slovaks," for the sake of Czech-Slovak unity and the secu45 rity of the state. This letter elicited a response from the Slovak-American centralists. The National Slovak Society, the Slovak Sokol, and assorted editors produced a counter response to Masaryk, which they then sent to Coolidge and Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes. This document asserted open support for the idea that the Czechs and Slovaks were one nation. It criticized the SCF letter for having "a spirit of narrow sectarianism," in contrast to "the great majority of the American Slovaks," who supported Masaryk "heart and soul." The document praised Masaryk and the Czechoslovak state for bringing cultural and economic development to Slovakia and it mentioned the centralist Slovaks in the government as a sign of Czech inclusiveness. The text also apologized for the Czech administration of Slovakia, bemoaning that Slovakia lacked enough competent officials. It then claimed that Prague had carried out the Pittsburgh Agreement in full , adding that "during the war neither the Czechs nor the Slovaks demanded self-determination for each separately; they demanded self-determination for the Czechoslovaks." 46 To the frustration of the Slovak autonomists, this campaign barely registered among U.S. officials in Washington. American officials at the U.S. Embassy in Prague paid slightly more attention, although most addressed it only passively and most often from the Czechoslo45 Slovak Catholic Federation of America, Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk, President of the Czecho-S/ovak Republic (Slovak Catholic Federation of America : 1923). Found in : "Einstein to SoS, No. 611 ," 20 February 1924, F#: 860F.0l / 162, DoS CS 1910-44. The New York Times reported on the letter: " Slovak Protest to All Nations," New York Times, Mar. 12, 1924, 34. 46 National Slovak Society, et al. , An Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk, President of Czechoslovakia ( I 924), in "Joseph Jan eek to Coolidge," 3 May 1924, F# : 860F.0l / 164, Dos cs 1910-44 �SLOVAKIA 2019 41 vakist perspective. The American Ambassador during the 1920s, Lewis Einstein, for example, reported on the SCF letter, misrepresenting it as "a violent indictment of Czech policy in Slovakia," and praised Prague for "accomplishing there a work of civilization. By introducing education and schools in a population where a high degree of illiteracy existed, by bringing in public hygiene, orderly justice and a better fiscal system, they are laying the foundations for the future. " Accordingly, in his view the Slovaks only needed proper education to unify with the Czechs . Ultimately, "Only one thing can be excluded, which is Slovakian autonomy." 47 In another attempt at outreach, Adam Podkrivacky as President of the FCSU wrote to John Hickerson, acting Chief of Western European Affairs at the U.S . State Department. Podkrivacky complained about the U.S. Consul General in Prague sending out correspondence to Slovakia in the Czech language instead of Slovak. He also requested that the State Department use the hyphen when writing 'Czecho-Slovakia. ' Podkrivacky then supplied Hickerson a copy of an autonomist political pamphlet, to "acquaint better with the political situation just as it exists between the Slovaks and the Czechs in Czecho-Slovakia." Hickerson forwarded the letter to the embassy in Prague and asked for a report on the Slovak question. Charge d' affaires J. Web Benton responded, declaring the letter unacceptable due to the threat posed by Czechoslovakia's neighbors. He also made the usual ethnographic arguments, adding how "Czech culture has contributed measurably to the advancement of Slovakia," and predicted the issue would dissipate. Benton dismissed the pamphlet as simply "anti-government propaganda ... the request for autonomy, in the sense of a separate parliament as mentioned in the Pittsburgh Pact, is something that no truly patriotic and far-seeing Slovak could at present afford to advocate." He added, "I assume that the Department will pay no further attention to his communications, but it seems not inopportune to observe that Czech is the official language of this country."48 While a few U.S. diplomats from the period, notably Lewis Einstein, came to develop a more nuanced view on the topic, this ended each time new embassy staff took over. 47 "Einstein to SoS , No . 611 ," DoS CS 1910-44. "Adam Podkrivac ky to John Hickerson," 29 March 1937, F#: 860F.0l / 18 1, DoS CS 1910-44. " Movement for Slovak Autonomy," 30 April 1937, F#: 860F .01 /184, DoS CS 1910-44. 48 �42 SLOVAKIA 2019 The dismissal of Slovak-American pleas stood in contrast to a disproportionate concern among American officials about the proHungarian Slovaks living abroad. The Rothermere campaign spurred some interest, and while some Americans expressed some sympathy to it, including chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee William Borah and publisher William Randolph Hearst, the U.S. Embassy in Prague wrote profusely about how the Slovaks remained opposed to a return to Hungary. When the exiled nationalist communist Slovak Vince Mihalus created an exile Slovak government in 1928, the State Department gave him disproportionate consideration, even though he held little popular support in Slovakia. Jehlicka reached out to Washington, calling for support against "Czech tyranny" and requesting support for recognition of the Slovaks as a minority in the League of Nations. The Czechoslovak embassy directed the State Department in its response, simply informing U.S. officials that Jehlicka only organized a "small number of Slovak renegades, mostly of Hungarian origin." 49 This flurry of publishing was very much a product of the widespread transatlantic interaction between Slovakia and the United States, as Slovak leaders on both sides of the Atlantic travelled between Europe and North America as they attempted to coordinate common political action. In the early 1920s, Prague still had hopes of guiding the Slovak-Americans to the centralist cause, despite the sentiment building against it. One major effort was the creation of a Slovak League in Slovakia by centralist Slovaks, designed to serve 49 Czechoslovak Ambassador Vladimir Hurban exchanged several letters with Hearst on the issue, facilitated by the State Department, eventually convincing Hearst to no longer give a voice to Rothermere and his supporters. "Einstein to SoS, No. 1355," 30 July 1927, F#: 860F.4016/4, DoS CS 1910-44. "J. Butler Wright to SoS, No. 62," 15 Oct 1927, F#: 860F.4016/9, DoS CS 1910-44. "Vladimir Hurban to William Randolph Hearst," 27 May 1937, & " Hurban to Cordell Hull," 4 June 1937, F#: 860F.00/437 & 438 , DoS CS 1910-44. "Council of State of Slovakia to SoS," 6 Nov 1928, F#: 860F.01 / 171 & 172, DoS CS 1910-44. "Nelson Torsler Johnson to Einstein," 28 Jan 1929, F#: 860F.01 / 171 , DoS CS 1910-44. "Gittings to SoS, No. 1747," 28 Feb 1929, F#: 860F.0l/173, DoS CS 1910-44. "Gittings to SoS, No. 1756," 9 Mar 1929, F#: 860F.0l / 174, DoS CS 1910-44. "Washburn to SoS, No. 2153." "Einstein to SoS, No. 516," 20 Sep 1923, F#: 860F.00/2 14, DoS CS 1910-44. "SoS to Geneva and Prague," 30 July 1933, F#: 860F.00/345, DoS CS 1910-44. "Prentiss B. Gilbert to SoS, No. 650," 8 Aug 1933 , F#: 860F.00/346, DoS CS 191044. "SoS to Geneva and Prague," 29 Aug 1933, F#: 860F.00/346, DoS CS 1910-44. �SLOVAKIA 2019 43 as a counterpart to the SLA and to build common action across the Atlantic. This effort failed, however, after the Slovak League of America refused to cooperate with it. 50 With autonomist sentiment among the American Slovaks sharpening, Prague sent Slovak centralist leader Vavro Srobar to the United States in 1923. While Srobar attempted to unify the Slovak-Americans behind centralism, his visit had the opposite effect of galvanizing the Slovak-American autonomists. Srobar received support from sympathetic groups such as the Slovak Sokol, but the SLA and other autonomist organizations boycotted his speeches. Prague sent other figures to agitate for centralism, including the priest Jozef Rudinsky and agrarian politician Fedor Ruppeldt. Seton-Watson also reached out to the SlovakAmericans in several letters and later in a visit in 1935 , during which he appealed to the Slovak-Americans to encourage the Slovaks in . · 51 SI ova k ia against autonomy. The efforts by centralists did not change the status quo, as the Slovak-American autonomists remained firm in their opinions and openly repudiated centralist arguments. Pankuch, for example, felt that the only result of Srobar's visit was to destroy Czech-Slovak 52 unity and the internal unity of the Slovak-Americans. Ruppelt in tum complained how even among the Slovak Lutherans he constantly had to fight against autonomist sentiment. 53 With the dividing lines firmly set, the Slovak-American centralists and autonomists quit mutual involvement in each other's organizations and the centralists began a continuous propaganda campaign against the SLA backed by Prague. For example, after Slovak-American autonomists 50 Ignac Gessay, Kratke Dejiny S/ovenskej Ligy Na S/ovensku: od Zalozenia po 1. 0kt. 1926 (Bratislava: Slovenska Liga na Slovensku, 1926). "Nova ohlavka- stary kon. Pozor na Slovensku ligu!" 27 Oct 1924, Bratislava (No 68), in Jozef Tiso, Prejavy a Clanky (1913-193 8), eds. Miroslav Fabricius & Ladislav Susko (Bratislava: Historicky 'ustav SA V, 2002),), 196-7. 51 "An Appeal ," PF: Bie/ek, SI. Pankuch, Histo ry, 177-86. "Seton-Watson to Vojtech Mastny" (Doc 124), in Seton -Watson, 375-6. "Odkaz Scotus Viatora Americkym Slovakom" (Doc 125), in Seton-Watson, 377-80. "Seton-Watson to Stefan Osusky "' (Doc 128) & "Osusky to Seton-Watson" (Doc 129), in Seton-Watson, 3857. Mikus, "Slovak League," 46-7. Karol Sidor, Andrej Hlinka, 1864-1926 (Bratislava: Knihtlaciarne Sv. Andreja, 1934), 503-5 . Palickar, "Czech and Slovak." Tomas Capek, Nase Amerika (Prague: Nakladem Narodni Rady Ceskoslovenske, 1926), 113. 52 Pankuch, History, 180. 53 " Fedor Ruppeldt to Seton-Watson" (Doc 149), in Seton-Watson, 441-2 . �44 SLOVAKIA 2019 confronted him, Srobar reportedly lashed out at them as "knownothing drunkards" and traitors against the Republic. 54 While the Slovaks in America had been legitimate Slovaks when Masaryk needed them during the war, once they became a threat, the centralists began to categorize them as United States citizens, whose influence should not extend beyond America. 55 When the Czechoslovak Government offered a special commendation to the SLA on Czechoslovakia's l 0th anniversary in 1928, for its role in the creation of the state, the Slovak League of America rejected it. 56 The Slovak autonomists in Slovakia perceived things quite differently. Many Slovak nationalist leaders believed that the nation as an ethnic and cultural foundation transcended the state, and offered regular praise of the Slovak-Americans as fighters for Slovak liberty and autonomy. Figures such as Hlinka and Lutheran autonomist leader Emil Stodola openly praised the Slovak-Americans and their role in the fight for autonomy, and argued that their past actions allowed the American Slovaks an equal right to speak about the fate of the Slovak homeland. 57 SPP leader Jozef Tiso extolled, "In this (Pittsburgh) agreement we see the heritage of our own American brothers, for which we will fight with the honor and the tenacity of the Slovak spirit, which is not intimidated by prison, the malice of the world, nor the cynicism of centralist agents." Tiso praised the "real Slovak patriots," working in the "free air of America," and he even posited that the Slovak-Americans had a better claim to speak for the Slovaks than the Slovak centralists did, because the SlovakAmericans had made the revolution successful with their blood, treasure and propaganda.58 Slovak scholars also published multiple 54 "A. S. Ambrose to Seton-Watson" (Doc 126) in Seton-Watson, 381-2. "Aby uz raz bolo jasno a aby prestaly r6zne narknutia proti Slov. Lige," PF: Bielek, SI. 55 Masaryk, for example, used such logic to dismiss the Pittsburgh Agreement, which he called a "local understanding between American Czechs and Slovaks," whose "signatories were mainly American citizens, only two of them being nonAmericans." Masaryk, Making, 208-11. 56 Stolarik, Where is my Hom e?, 98 . 57 "Hlinka on Scotus Viator" (Doc 109), in Seton-Watson, 345-53. Emil Stodola, Pre/om: Spomienky, Uvahy, Studie (Praha: L. Mazac, 1933), 193-4. 58 "Novy vykrik bratov z Ameriky," 24 Feb 1924, Bratislava (No 43), in Tiso, Prejavy, 157-9. " Pittsburghska dohoda - neplatna?!" 29 May 1924, Bratislava (no 57), in Tiso, Prejavy, 179-80. "Parliamentary Speech," 25 Nov 1931, Prague (No I 64), in Ti so, Preja vy, 347. "Speech to Public Assembly of the Slovak People 's �SLOVAKIA 2019 45 studies of the Slovak-Americans and their role m Slovak national development. 59 Slovak autonomists openly expressed these sentiments through regular trips to the United States. These attempts at direct engagement were nonetheless slow to start. Prague regularly prevented such trips, including the denial of a passport to Bishop Jan Vojtassak out of concern that he would agitate for autonomy and collect money for the SPP while in the United States. The barrier broke in 1926 when Hlinka accepted an invitation to visit America from editor Jozef Husek and the Friends of Slovak Freedom, sponsored by the SLA, the FCSU, and the First Catholic Slovak Ladies Union (FCSLU). Hlinka desired to visit the United States to thank the Slovak-Americans in person for their support for Slovak self-determination, to explain firsthand the political situation in Slovakia, and to encourage them to keep fighting. After stalling on the process, Prague ultimately relented to avoid the resulting outrage had they refused. They issued Hlinka a passport to attend the Eucharistic Congress in Chicago. Hlinka's visit lasted from June 5 to October 13. Although Hlinka expressed some trepidation that Slovak-American centralists would treat him with hostility, Slovak-American autonomist leaders Josef Husek and Anton Kompanek convinced him the experience would prove the opposite. This claim proved true, as Hlinka received hundreds of invitations to speak to overflowing crowds on each occasion. Demand was so high that, then SLA president Ivan Bielek had to write an article emphasizing Hlinka's time limitations to try to tame expectations. During his visit, Hlinka travelled around the U.S. East and Midwest, visiting local Slovak communities. He regularly attended and celebrated Mass and held meetings with SlovakAmerican organizations, including the SLA from whom he received an honorary membership . Hlinka visited assorted Slovak-American institutions, surveying Slovak-American newsrooms, printeries, Party," 18 August 1937 & 25 August 1937, Bratislava (No 251 & 252), in Tiso, Prejavy, 523-4. "Nase narodnopo liticke palladium," 5 June 1938 (No 260), in Tiso, Prejavy, 543-4. Kon stantin Culen, Po Sviitop/ukovi druha nasa h/ava: Zivot Dr. Jozefa Tisu (Cleveland: First Catholic Slovak Union, 1947), 182-3. 59 Jozef Rudinsky, V Amerike a doma (Ruzomberok: Rudinsky, 1921 ). Karol Sidor, S/ovaci v zahranicnom odboji (Bratislava: Jednota, 1928). Matica Slovenska, S/ovenskej verejenosti v Amerike (Mati ca slovenska , 1937). Konstantin Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda (Bratislava: Knihtlaciarei'l Andreja, 193 7) . �46 SLOVAK.IA 2019 schools, and churches. Overall, Hlinka held rallies at 80 locations, gave 200 speeches, and visited more than 100 Slovak parishes. Hlinka's visit spurred a level of excitement and activity among the Slovak-Americans that would never recur. 60 Hlinka kept his goal of directly exposing the Slovak question during his visit. He regularly spoke on the issue, and carried a copy of a censored Slovak nationalist newspaper as evidence. During his visit, Hlinka could not help but contrast the image of America with his experience in Czechoslovakia. In one such speech, he made clear that the Slovaks .. . would prefer not to quarrel with the Bohemians, but when they preach democracy and at the same time practice deceptions and aggression, we have no choice but to oppose them ... America is a superior nation and a master democratic republic. It has a splendid constitution which not only guarantees the rights and liberties to the people, but sees that they get them as well. Hlinka likewise extolled the "firm individuality" that the SlovakAmericans had gained, and he highlighted the sense of natural connection between Slovaks and Americans. "A good Slovak who comes to America makes a good American, and all good SlovakAmericans, including the new generations born in America from Slovak extraction will appreciate what they have inherited from their Slovak ancestry. Neither will they forget Slovakia." In his farewell speech, Hlinka expressed how the Slovak-Americans had filled him with national pride. He affirmed, "I saw the large affl uence of Slovaks, these Slovaks who under the Tatras suffered from hardship and physical and spiritual want," and prai sed how they helped sustain the Slovak nation. He finally asked of them, "do not forget that under the Tatras stand your cradle and your old homeland, our hard-tested and suffering Slovakia!" 61 60 Adamec, "Slovak Catholic Federation ," 223-32. Sidor, Hlinka, 503-5, 510-1 I, 543 -52 . Sidor, "The Slovak League," 57-9. Mikus, "S lovak League," 46-7 . Jozef Pauco, "75 Years of the First Catholic Slovak Union," Furdek, 5 ( 1966), 65 -74. 61 Palickar, " Monsignor Hlinka- The Man," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism , 51-6, 55 . Palickar, " My Interview with Msgr. Hlinka," in Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 56-9. Sidor, Andrej Hlinka, 543-52. �SLOVAKIA 2019 47 In the 1930s, the Slovak-Americans experienced a few more visits from notable figures. One such visit was from the Slovak cultural organization Matica slovenska, in 1935 . The Slovak-Americans had regular contact with the Matica in the 1920s and there remained regular efforts to create an American branch of the organization.62 With the outbreak of the Great Depression, however, interest and funding for Slovak cultural programs in America declined. The Matica decided a visit to America was necessary to reverse thi s process, which they interpreted as the Slovak-Americans becoming too Americanized. The organization ' s director, the writer Jozef C. Hronsky, led the delegation, but it also included historian Konstantin Culen, and the artist Jozef Cincik, among others. These individuals gave many lectures and supplied ample literature and art, including a donation of libraries of Slovak material to the cities of New York, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and Chicago.63 While they found that some second and third generation Slovak-Americans had lost touch with Slovak culture, the delegates gave high praise to the Slovak-Americans for the interest they showed in the lectures, music, art and other cultural information the Matica provided. The experience led Culen to adopt the task of writing a history of Slovak-Americans. The linguist Jozef G. Konus likewise noted how "the Slovak spirit opens up more in free America than the lush fantasie s at home could imagine." When the White House wrote a statement for a Slovak-American information brochure praising the Slovaks as a "healthy minded, freedomloving and determined people," the Matica hailed it as evidence of Slovak democratic bona tides. Ultimately, the delegation praised the trip as very much a success, and took back ample material on the Slovak-Americans for placement in the Slovak National Library. The Matica left satisfied that Slovak culture remained firm in America, although it put pressure on the Slovak-Americans to improve their direct cultural linkages with the homeland. 64 62 To see many examples of this communicati on, see: The Ma tica slovenskti, Martin, Slovakia, re: American Slovaks Papers, IHRC . 63 According to Mark Stol arik, th e Mati ca brought 84 crates of books, totaling 4 I ,000 volumes, while visiting 98 separate Slovak-American communities. Stolarik, Wh ere is my Home?, 96-100. 64 "Vianoce Maticnej delegacie," Slovensko, 2, 5 & 6 (Jan-Feb 1936), 87-8. Konstantin Culen, "Co m6ze dat' Amerika slovenskej historii ," Slovensko, 2, 7 (Mar 1936), 87-8. Jozef C. Hronsky, " Mati ca v Amerike," Slovensko, 2, 7 (March 1936), 110-13. Jozef G. Konus, " Matica v Amerike," Slovensko, 2, 7 (Mar 1936), I I6-18 . �48 SLOVAK.IA 2019 The final major figure to visit America was the Reverend Jozef Tiso in 1937, with the Catholic cultural organization Spolok Sv. Vojtecha. Much like Hlinka, Tiso celebrated mass and heard confessions during his visit, spoke at public assemblies and met with many American priests, journalists, and Slovak-American leaders. He also attended other broader Catholic events, including the National Catholic Welfare Conference, and met with the Papal delegation in Washington, D.C. Tiso made a broad effort to learn about American political life, to determine what Slovak leaders could transfer back to Slovakia. He particularly admired American technical prowess in organization and publishing, which he saw as facilitating a more efficient Catholic organization and action, and conceptualized a plan to send young Slovak leaders to America to learn American methods of organization. Tiso also praised the Slovak-American sense of independence and pride in their Slovak identity. Seeing how the Slovaks had developed on independent terms in the vast American melting pot, Tiso interpreted the Slovak-American experience as proof of Slovak capabilities and their merit for self-determination. Tiso never gave up his sense of solidarity with the Slovak-Americans, and referenced his visit to affirm his desired direction for the Slovaks. 65 The only visit to the United States by a Slovak official to gamer much attention from Washington was Srobar's in 1923. American diplomat Einstein provided notice of the visit, adding that it was "doubtless intended to counteract the seditious anti-Czech propaganda which has been going on for some time both in Slovakia, where it is fomented by Magyar intrigues, and among the Slovak clericals in the United States." Although, he noted that the Slovak autonomy movement remained "noisy and violent in its methods but unaided it can do little and it is not at present causing here any serious conJozef G. Konu s, "Matica v Amerike," Slovensko, 2, 7 (Mar 1936), 116-18. Jozef Hronsky, "Na margo americkeho zapisnika," S/o vensko, 2, IO & I I (June-July 1936), 177-80. Jozef Cincik, "Na margo americkeho zapisnaka," Slo vensko , 2, IO & 11 (June-July 1936), 181-6. " Maticna vystava v Clevelande," Slo vensko, 2, IO & 11 (June-July 1936), 181-4. " President Roosevelt pozdravuje slovensky narod," Slovensko , 2, 5 & 6 (Jan-Feb 1936), 79. "Slovenska Amerika sa hybe," S/ovensko, 4, 3 (Nov 1937), 32-3. "SLA to Sku ltety, I June 1935,".PF: Mamatey, SI. Stolarik, "Slovak League." J.A. Berta, "Slovak America and the Matica Slovenska," Furdek, 23 (1984), 163-71. 65 Culen, Po Sviiloplukovi, 182-9. "Speech about the state account balance from 1926," 23 February 1938, Prague (No 258), in Tiso, Prejavy, 533-6. �SLOVAKIA 2019 49 cem." 66 Several Slovak-American autonomists wrote to the State Department to complain about Srobar's visit, including a letter from a Slovak-American World War I veteran asking the Department to halt Srobar's lectures for sowing discord among the Slovaks in the United States. The most notable letter, however, came from the Reverend John Porubsky on behalf of the Slovak Newspapermen's Association. Porubsky criticized Srobar's claimed "cultural visit" as a ruse to propagandize on behalf of Czechoslovakism. He presented it as part of an effort by Prague, "To inoculate the masses of our people in America as a contracting party with such misconception and ethnographical nonsense," and to discredit the Pittsburgh Agreement. Claiming that Srobar "forgot the scope of his mission, even forgot himself in outbursts against leading Slovak American gentlemen, calling them vile names unworthy of a man of his position," Porubsky asked Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes to have him expelled from the country.67 This effort also spurred a response by Prague and its allies in the United States. These letters, in an organized campaign, all repeated versions of the same arguments. They complained that the opposition to Srobar consisted of "Jesuits and Bolsheviks" and other "enemies of the state" that were working for Czechoslovakia's destruction. Srobar was, alternatively, a great statesman fighting against them to bring cultural development to Slovakia. They also personally targeted Porubsky and the Slovak Newspapermen's Association: "The great majority of intelligent American Slovaks are heart and soul in accord with Dr. Srobar's patriotic works; only the ignorant and reactionary masses are ignobly and ignorantly supporting the destructive work of Rev. Porubsky and his few brawling associates." 68 Likewise, the Slovak Sokol, which had arranged Srobar's visit from the American end, took credit for the visit, praising how Srobar had "proved to 66 " Einstein to SoS, No. 502 ," 29 Aug 1923, F#: 860F .0 I/ I 48, DoS CS 1910-44. "John Porubsky to Charles Evans Hughes," 31 Oct 1923 , F#: 860F.0 l/149, DoS CS 1910-44. "John J. Nedorostek to Hughes," 13 Nov 1923 , F#: 860F.01/150, DoS cs 1910-44. 68 "V. Krali cek to Hughes," 12 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0l / 151 , DoS CS 1910-44. "J. Joscak to Hughes," 14 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0l / 154, DoS CS 1910-44. "Henry Russek to Hughes," 15 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0l/156, DoS CS 1910-44. "C lement lhrisky & Joscak to Hughes," 15 Nov 1923 , F#: 860F.0 l/152, DoS CS 1910-44. " Michael Kovalovsky to Hughes," 16 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0 1/157, DoS CS 1910-44. " Michael Olsavicki to Hughes," 19 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0 1/ 155, DoS CS 1910-44. 67 �50 SLOVAKIA 2019 the Slovaks of America that any fears as to the future of their former country are unfounded." 69 The State Department only sent back formulaic verification of receipts to these letters, except for one to John Zeman of the Slovak Sokol, thanking him for "setting forth the real purposes of the visit." William Phillips then requested President Coolidge to meet with Srobar, calling him "one of the five men who founded the Republic of Czechoslovakia," to which Coolidge obliged. 70 In 193 7, the Reverend Francis Dubosh of Lakewood, Ohio, attempted to arrange a meeting between officers of the SCF A, Jozef Tiso, and President Roosevelt, with the help of Monsignor Michael J. Ready at the Catholic University of America. The White House staff supported this meeting, but Roosevelt wanted to first confirm with the State Department so as not "to get mixed up in a Slovak controversy." After consulting with Czechoslovak Ambassador Vladimir Hurban, the State Department reported that the embassy made no official complaint, but that they themselves discouraged the visit with "the opinion that these persons are not of sufficient prominence for the President to receive them." After a back and forth in consideration of the issue, the White House ultimately declined, claiming 71 that the President was simply too busy. The Slovak-Americans also visited Slovakia. The most significant of these occurred in 193 8 in the tense period leading up to the Munich Agreement, when the Slovak League sent a delegation to celebrate the 20 th anniversary of the Pittsburgh Agreement. Led by its President, Peter P. Hletko, the delegation, as a deliberate gesture, made its first formal visit in Slovakia to Andrej Hlinka in Rufomberok. The delegation travelled into Slovakia through Poland, to 69 "J. Zeman to Hughes," 18 Nov 1923 , F#: 860F.01 / 153 , DoS CS 1910-44. "W. R. Castle to Association of Slovak Newspapermen of America," 6 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0l / l49, DoS CS 1910-44. "J. B. Wright to Kralicek," 20 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0l/15I, DoS CS 1910-44. "Castle to Joscak," 20 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.01/l54, DoS CS 1910-44. "Castle to Zeman," I Dec 1923, F#: 860F.0l / l53 , DoS CS 191044. "William Phillips to G. B. Slemp, 12 Nov 1923," & "Slemp to Phillips, 12 Nov 1923," Coolidge Papers, Series I, 742. 71 "Roosevelt to M. H. McIntyre, 22 Oct 1937," " McIntyre to George F. Summerlin, 23 Oct 193 7," "Spruks to Summerlin, 27 Oct 193 7," "McIntyre to Roosevelt, 29 Oct 1937," "McIntyre to Summerlin, 3 Nov 1937," President 's Personal File (PPF), F: 639, Slovak Catholic Federation of America, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (FDR), Hyde Park, New York. 70 �SLOVAKIA 2019 51 avoid Prague and Bratislava, and the Polish government hosted the delegation on their way through. Both the Slovak autonomists and the Slovak centralists sent representatives to corral them before they entered Slovakia. The centralists were, however, sent back early after Warsaw and Slovak-Americans embraced the SPP delegation as the official one. After arriving in Slovakia, the delegation showed the original of the Pittsburgh Agreement to Hlinka and spent most of the trip associating with the Slovak autonomists. Its activities included several visits to the Matica slovenska in Martin, to which it gifted an authenticated copy of the Pittsburgh Agreement and made clear commitments toward transatlantic cultural programs, including joint publications and a transatlantic cultural council. Prime Minister Milan Hodza also led a continued effort to meet and work with the visiting delegation, believing he could convince them to break their close affiliation with the SPP and align with the Agrarians instead. Out of respect, the delegation did meet with centralist officials, including Hodza and President Eduard Benes, whom they encouraged the granting of autonomy to Slovakia for the sake of unity in those very tense times. In a speech in Prague, Hletko made clear their objectives stating, "Our love for Slovakia and the Czechoslovak Republic has induced us to come here. The object of the Pittsburgh Declaration, the original of which we have brought with us, is not to weaken but to strengthen the Republic ." 72 When describing his meetings, Hletko said that Hodza promised a movement towards autonomy, yet Prague still rejected them. 73 Likewise, Ivan Derer was extremely critical of the SlovakAmericans during their visit, accusing them of having been brainwashed. He also dismissed them as representing a small, vocal minority, and smeared them as deliberate Hungarian, German, or Polish agents, if not otherwise simply duped by the machinations of these neighboring rivals. Derer complained, "This delegation, composed most of autonomists, expressed its separatist convictions during every opportunity, expressed anti-Czech interests, made light of work of 72 "Visit of American Slovak Delegation to Jubilee Congress, Bratislava; Slovak Demands for Autonomy," 6 June 1938, F#: 860F.00/534, DoS CS 1910-44. 73 Hletko, "The Slovaks," 5-54. "Narodna Politika Roku 1938 : Ked Bol P. Hletko na Slovensku," B: Karol Sidor - Diplomat 1901-1958 - Vol 2, SI. Pavel KuklisKunovsky, Ako je na Slovensku ? Z vlastnych skusenosti napisa/ a vydal v mesiaci )uni /940 v Pittsburghu, Pa., U.S.A. (Pittsburgh: Narodne noviny, 1940), 4-7. �52 SLOVAK.IA 2019 the Czechoslovak government successes in Slovakia, ironized Czechoslovak oriented Slovaks." He was extremely derisive of Hletko, accusing him of not being truly Slovak, having been born in the United States, and as being "politically inexperienced, unknowledgeable about the conditions of Europe, Czechoslovakia and Slovakia." 74 The SLA visit culminated in the Jubilee Congress for the anniversary of the Pittsburgh Agreement on June 4, 1938 in Bratislava. A massive rally was organized where Hlinka, Tiso, and Hletko, among others, gave speeches. A large facsimile of the Pittsburgh Agreement surrounded on each side by the American and Slovak flags served as a backdrop. In his speech, Hletko showed the original copy of the Pittsburgh Agreement to the crowd, and praised the attention given to the Agreement. A formal proposal by the SPP in the Czechoslovak Parliament to amend the constitution to implement Slovak autonomy then followed. The centralists, led by Hodza, held a counter-rally two days later. They declared the rally more ambiguously as a celebration of the Slovak farmer, although Prague and the centralists promoted the event afterwards as a pro-state rally in opposition to autonomy. The SLA delegation also attended this celebration and Hletko gave a speech, simply affirming that the SLA continued to work for Slovak freedom . Hletko later claimed that the delegation warned the Czech and Slovak leaders they had met about the need to come to an accommodation on the Slovak question, in favor of autonomy, fearing that the issue might become larger with Adolph Hitler rattling his saber. Hletko claimed, however, that no one took this warning seriously. The delegation departed shortly before Hlinka's death in August of 1938, but the SPP sent a piece of earth from Hlinka's graveside to America. 75 74 Ivan Derer, S/ovensky vyvoj a /ud'acka zrada (Prague: K vasnicka a Hamp) , 1946), 183-9 . Derer was convinced the SLA was part of a Polish conspiracy to absorb Slovaki a, led by Karol Sidor. The SLA, however, openly rebuked Polish calls for absorption of Slovakia during its stop th ere. 75 The exact number of participants in each rally is unclear, but most accounts reflected similar participation rates (around one hundred thousand each) and photos of the Slovak Jubilee show a massive crowd. The urn containing the soil is still on display at the Slovak Institute in Cleveland. Hletko, "The Slovaks," 5-54. " Wilbur Carr to SoS, no 122," 9 June 1938, F#: 860F.00/518, DoS CS 1910-44. " Farmers' Day at Bratislava; Demonstration of Slovak Branch of Czechoslovak Agrarian Party," IO June 1938, F#: 860F.00/531 , DoS CS 1910-44. " Po odchode delegatov Slov- �SLOVAKIA 2019 53 The U.S. Embassy took an interest in the SLA visit to Czechoslovakia in 1938, and U.S . Ambassador Wilbur Carr agreed to meet with the delegation. Carr reported that the visit was cordial and that the delegation affirmed to him that its visit was simply to promote good will and it did not desire to interfere in domestic issues in Czechoslovakia. Carr then stated that the SLA's visit to Czechoslovakia annoyed Prague, due to the enflamed minority issues of the time, but that Czechoslovak officials tried to maintain good will with the delegation, although this sentiment "lacked a ring of sincerity." Accordingly, Hletko admitted to Carr that the timing was not the best, but that it was not by design, since they had come simply for the anniversary celebration. Carr expected no harm from the visit. While Carr described the autonomy proposal and reported statements by Hletko and Jozef Rusek complementing the support of the Pittsburgh Agreement among the Slovaks, he countered by providing the text of an anti-autonomy speech by Derer and a section of Masaryk' s memoirs. Carr then misrepresented the Slovak-Americans as having felt embarrassed for having been "utilized by the Hlinka Party for partisan and election purposes." While Carr reported on each of the two rallies, he praised the Farmer's Day as turning into "a spontaneous demonstration of Czechoslovak unity, homage to Benes, and allegiance and confidence in its leader," hostility to autonomy, and featuring a much larger participation.76 While Czech and Slovak centralists worked to keep the SlovakAmericans at a distance after early efforts to court them failed, the Slovak autonomists on both sides of the Atlantic worked around Prague to coordinate their activities. Nevertheless, the autonomists had no means of pushing Prague towards changes on the Slovak question. The Slovak autonomists, however, continued their fight and never gave up. The transatlantic Slovak question during the interwar period established the roots for the eventual Slovak-Czech split. The failure to find a compromise between Slovak autonomists and centralists saw an entrenched distrust that contributed to the fall of the First Republic . When the Munich Agreement formally handed the enskej Ligy v Amerike," Slovensko, 5 ( I 939), 16-17. Sidor, "The Slovak League," 59-62. 76 "Carr to SoS , no 112," 31 May 1938, F#: 860F.00/5 l 0, DoS CS 1910-44. "Visit of American Slovak." "Carr to SoS, no 121 ," 8 June 1938, F#: 860F.00/517, DoS CS 1910-44. "Carr to SoS , No 122." "Farmers ' Day. " �54 SLOVAKIA 2019 Sudetenland to Germany in September of 1938, the Slovak autonomists in Slovakia demanded and received autonomy until the new SPP-led government there declared independence on March 14, 1939, following Nazi Germany's invasion of Bohemia and Moravia. Slovak-American autonomists, although distrustful of Nazi Germany, openly embraced the shift toward Slovak autonomy in the shortlived Second Republic, believing they could no longer trust the Czechs. Peter Hletko, for example, cheered how the Slovaks had "fought and won the victory." 77 Although initially hesitant to support complete independence, most Slovak-American autonomists, the moderates excepted, came to support the World War II Slovak State as a symbol of Slovak self-determination, even as they supported Allied victory in the war. While World War II and the subsequent Cold War limited direct linkages between Slovakia and North America, the same rifts on the Slovak question persisted on both sides of the Atlantic until the 1993 Velvet Divorce. 78 77 Jozef Pauco, "75 Years of the First Catholic Slovak Union," Furdek, 5 ( 1966), 6574. 78 For more on this topic during World War II and beyond, see: Michael Cude, Transatlantic Perspectives on the Slovak Question, I 9 I 4-/ 948 (PhD Diss., University of Co lorado-Boulder, 20 13 ). M. Mark Stolarik, Wh ere is my Home? Slovak Immigration to North America (/870-2010) (Bern: Peter Lang, 2012). M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak League of America and the Canadian League in the Struggle for the Self-determination of the Nation, 1907-1992," Slovakia, 39, 72 & 73 (2007), 7-35. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2019, Vol. 44 Description An account of the resource Vol. 44 (No. 82-83), 2019. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 18 SLOVAKIA 2019 THE TRANSATLANTIC SLOVAK QUESTION DURING THE INTERW AR YEARS Michael Cude The relationship of the Slovaks to the Czechs is an issue that has persisted through the modem hi story of the two peoples. From the 19 th century ' national awakenings ' in Austria-Hungary to the Velvet Divorce between the Slovaks and Czechs in 1993, this 'Slovak question' was at the center of key events, including the creation of the First Czechoslovak Republic in 1918, its breakup and reestablishment after World War II, and the 1968 Prague Spring. 1 While many recent works have addressed the Slovak question, many have underappreciated the extent to which modem Slovak national identity formation was a transatlantic phenomenon. Historians examining this topic from the domestic Slovak perspective rarely delve deeply beyond Slovak borders, while histories of Slovaks abroad have focused predominantly on the Slovaks' place as immigrant communities . In doing so, such histories overlook how interlinked Slovak national politics in Slovakia were to Slovak communities abroad, particularly in North America, and the critical role they played in shaping Slovak national identity formation. Addressed by only a handful of recent works, the transatlantic Slovak question requires more attention.2 1 Reference key for shortened arc hi val ci tations: IHRC : Slovak American Collection, Immi gratio n History Research Center, University of Minneso ta. fil: Slovak Institute, Cleveland, OH. DoS CS 1910-44: Records of th e U.S. Department of Stale Relating to th e Internal Affairs of Czechoslovakia 1910-1944, Microfilm (Washin gton D.C.: National Archives and Records Service, 1982). 2 For some examples of sc holarship considering the Slovak question from a transatlantic perspective, see: M. Mark Sto larik, Where is my Home? Slovak Immigration to North America ( /8 70-2010) (Bern : Peter Lang, 2012). M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak League of America and the Canadian Slovak League in the Struggle for the Self-determination of the Nation, 1907- 1992," Slovakia, 39, 72 & 73 (2007), 7-35 . Marian Mark Stolarik, "The Role of American Slovaks in the Creation of CzechoSlovakia, 1914-19 I 8," Slovak Studies, 8, Hi stori ca 5 ( 1968), 7-82. Stefan Kucik, Podiel americkych S!ovakov na aulonomistickom hnuti na Slovensku 191 8-/938 (Martin: Matica slovenska, 20 I I). Gregory Curtis Ference, Sixteen Months of Indecision : Slovak American Viewpoints Toward Compatriots and the Homeland from SLOVAKIA 2019 19 The Slovak efforts abroad during World War I remain the best told component of this story. The foundation of the transatlantic Slovak question was laid in the periods leading up to the First World War, when Slovak-American organizations began to campaign for Slovak political autonomy within the Kingdom of Hungary. The central organization for Slovak national activism became the Slovak League of America (SLA), founded in May 1907 by Slovak-American leaders to unify the disparate Slovak groups in the United States in common political action. The SLA ' s main objectives were to develop the cultural and political life of the Slovaks in America as a means of supporting the cultural and political life of the Slovaks in the homeland and to fight for Slovak national self-determination. 3 World War I and its accompanying 'Wilsonian moment' entrenched important symbols of Slovak national self-determination, as Slovak immigrant communities contributed to the establishment of the new Czechoslovak Republic. The wartime Czechoslovak National Council and its leaders, including Thomas G. Masaryk and Milan R. Stefanik, utilized Slovak-American organizations for financial , military, and diplomatic support. Consequently, Slovak-American demands led to the creation of the most important document relating to Slovak nationalism for the following twenty years: the Pittsburgh Agreement. Signed on 31 May 1918, this document declared common action between the Czechs and Slovaks in the formation of a democratic republic. Nevertheless, the agreement made a clear assertion for Slovak autonomy, under the terms that the Slovaks would I 9 I 4 to I 9 I 5 as Viewed by the Slovak Language Press in Pennsylvania (Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna Uni versity Press, 1995). Michael Cude, "The Imagined Exiles: Slovak-Americans and the Slovak Question during the First Czechoslovak Republic," in From Exsilium to Exile: Coercion in Migration, Studia Historica Gedanensia, vo l. 5, ed. Anna Mazurkiewicz (Gdansk, Poland: University of Gdansk History Institute, 20 14), 287-305 3 Konstantin Culen, History of Slovaks in America, Daniel C. Necas, trans. (St. Paul, MN : Czechoslovak Genealogical Society, 2007). Jan Pankuch, History of the Slovaks of Cleveland and Lakewood, Rasto Gallo, trans. (Cleveland: Czechoslovak Genealogical Society & Western Reserve Historical Society, 2001), 29-38. Stolarik, " Rol e," 7-82 . Stephanie 0. Husek, "Slovak American Fraternal, Cultural, and Civic Organizations to 19 I 4," in Slovaks in America: A Bicentennial Study, Joseph C. Krajsa, ed. (Middletown: Slovak League of America, 1978), 23 -38 . Joseph A. Mikus "The Slovak League of America: A Historical Survey," in Slovaks, Krajsa, ed., 3956. R. Vladimir Baumgarten & Joseph Stefka, The National Slovak Society: JOO Year History, I 890-1990 (Pittsburgh: National Slovak Society, 1990), 17-33. 20 SLOVAKIA 2019 have their "own administration, own parliament, and own courts." In the short term, the Pittsburgh Agreement appeased the Slovak-Americans, who consolidated their support around the budding state, while Masaryk used the agreement to legitimize Czech-Slovak coop4 eration in his diplomatic efforts. This campaign allowed Slovak-American leaders a sense of direct influence on the affairs of their homeland, although the Czechoslovak National Council quickly stymied this hope. While the Slovak-Americans had been able to pressure Masaryk into symbolically accepting their goals for Slovak autonomy, their influence only extended to his need to provide evidence of Slovak participation in his political program as he sought recognition from the Entente powers. As a result, the Slovak-Americans found themselves on the margins during the building of the state . Accordingly, many historians consider the Pittsburgh Agreement as a matter of domestic Slovak politics after its initial signing, with little further consideration for the Slovaks abroad. In doing so, they neglect the fact that transatlantic activities continued through the interwar period.5 With the establishment of Czechoslovakia following the war, Slovak national activists on both sides of the Atlantic, hereto identi- 4 "Pittsburgska Dohoda" in Dok:umenty slovenskej narodnej identity a statnosti, vol. I, eds. Jan Benko, et al (Narodne literame centrum: Dom slovenskej literatury, 1998), 484-7. " Masaryk to Mamatey, 22 September 1918," SLA Cabinet, F:llth Congress, Slovak Institute (S I), Cleveland, OH. Pankuch, History, 145-50. Stolarik, "Role," 32-54. Karo l Sidor, ''The Slovak League of America and the Slovak Nation 's Struggle for Autonomy," Slovakia I 7, 40 ( I 967), 39-46. Peter P. Hletko, "The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact," Slovakia l 8, 41 ( 1968), 5-54. Stanislav J. Kirschbaum , "The Cleveland and Pittsburgh Documents," in Slovakia 36, 66 & 67 ( 1998), 81-97. lmrich Mazar, A History of the Binghamton Slovaks : Over a Period of Forty Years, 1879-1919, ed. Wilhelmina Mazar Salina, trans. Thomas Janacek (Phoenix: Via Press, 2003), 203-17. Baumgarten & Stefka, National, 81-3. 5 James Ramon Felak, At the Price of the Republic: Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, 1929-1938 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, I 994). Peter A. Toma & Dusan Kovac, Slovakia: From Samo to Dzurinda (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 200 I). Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia : The Struggle for Survival, 2nd ed. (New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). Jan Rychlik, "Czech-Slovak Relations in Czechoslovakia, I 918-1939," in Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist and Fascist Europe, 1918- 1948, eds . Mark Cornwall, R.J.W . Evans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 13-26. Elisabeth Bakke, "Czechoslovakism in Slovak History," in Slovakia in History, eds. Mikulas Teich, et al (Cambridge: Cambridge Univers ity Press, 2011), 247-68. SLOVAKIA 2019 21 fied as the Slovak 'autonomists,' had full expectations of a federal relationship that would recognize Slovak cultural uniqueness and grant the Slovaks civic equality with autonomy over domestic affairs under the terms of the Pittsburgh Agreement. In contrast, most Czech leaders wanted a strongly centralized state, justified by arguments of the commonality of the Czechs and Slovaks, the threat of Hungarian and German irredentism, and the believed necessity of Czech oversight to modernize Slovakia. They relied on support from Slovak ' centralists,' who identified the Czechs and Slovaks as a common people. Slovak autonomists, who saw the Slovaks as a culturally distinct people from the Czechs, perceived this ' Prague centralism' as a form of cultural and political hegemony. In response, they replanted their fight over the Slovak question against the newly formed government in Prague. Both autonomists and centralists mobilized Slovaks at home and abroad behind their version of the state, with the transatlantic component focused on lobbying foreign governments. As with many other nationality groups, Slovak leaders saw the postwar peace process as a key moment to make their case. With the centralists represented at the Versailles Peace Conference by the formal delegation from Czechoslovakia, the autonomists attempted to present their own view, including a flurry of correspondence from Slovak-Americans to United States President Woodrow Wilson and an unofficial delegation led by Slovak nationalist leader Andrej Hlinka. The autonomists appealed for recognition of an independent Slovak identity and the establishment of a federalist system in Czechoslovakia that granted greater domestic political autonomy to Slovakia. Wilson and other western leaders, however, prioritized economic and political modernity as a necessary quality for selfgovernrnent. Czechoslovakia's centralist leaders appealed to the Wilsonian prioritization of modernism to gain American acceptance of their vision, and used a proposed uplift of the Slovaks into modernity to advance this cause. They nonetheless pursued this objective in a way that often cast the Slovaks in a disparaging light and sowed further discord. The Conference in turn legitimated this organization of the Czechoslovak state and ignored Slovak autonomist appeals. 6 6 For more, see : Michael Cude, "Wilsonian National Self-determination and the Slovak Question during th e Founding of Czechoslovakia, 1918-192 1," Diplomatic Histo,y (2016) 40, I: 155-80 22 SLOVAKIA 2019 This failure at Versailles did not dissuade transatlantic Slovak activities. From the conclusion of the Treaty of Trianon in June 1920 to the Munich Agreement in September 1938, the Slovak question persisted in the First Czechoslovak Republic. The interwar period saw the Slovak autonomist movement survive with the Czechoslovak state arrayed against them . Slovak autonomists regularly looked across the Atlantic for support in pressuring Prague to change its stance. The Slovak autonomists continued to reference the spirit and goals of Wilsonianism to justify their claims for autonomy, and the Pittsburgh Agreement became their primary symbol. SlovakAmerican autonomists accepted their leading role of defending the Slovaks internationally, and they remained hopeful of convincing world leaders, particularly those in the United States, to embrace their view. This task remained an uphill battle, given the autonomists' inability to match the resources or international connections maintained by Prague, as centralists worked to discredit the idea of domestic autonomy for Slovakia. The Czech and Slovak centralists polarized the issue as a support for state unity through centralism or support for the destruction of the state through autonomy. In international appeals, the centralists disparaged Slovak capabilities for selfgovernment, and presented the Slovak autonomists as a parochial fringe, ignorant of world affairs. Accordingly, this transatlantic debate heavily contributed to the failure of the Czechoslovak concept in the interwar period by helping sow the entrenched distrust that culminated in the splintering of the Czechoslovak Republic in March of 1939. The question of Slovak autonomy remained a principal component of Slovak politics during the First Czechoslovak Republic. The Slovaks split into three general categories on the Slovak question. The smallest of these groups were the Czechoslovakists, who wanted a close, non-differential linkage with the Czechs. Vavro Srobar, the first appointed Minister for Slovakia in 1918, exemplified this faction. Another group consisted of moderate nationalists who pursued cooperation with the Czechs, but wanted recognition of separate Slovak identity and political autonomy. Milan Hodza, Prime Minister of the republic in the late 1930s and leader of the Agrarian Party, best exemplified this faction. Hodza and others supported a federalist model to address national minority questions. Most of the former two groups came from Slovakia's Lutheran minority. The Slovak auton- SLOVAKIA 2019 23 omists, who were predominantly Catholics, were the most controversial. The Reverend Andrej Hlinka represented them as leader of the Slovak People 's Party. Hlinka and his supporters pushed for complete autonomy within Czechoslovakia, although the radical end of the party increasingly sought greater independence while a smaller minority even promoted a return to Hungary under a promise of autonomy. The Slovak People's Party (SPP) remained the most popular party in Slovakia and mixed cooperation with opposition to push for Slovak autonomy. The Agrarian Party followed in popular support, and it gradually pushed for more autonomy, albeit in a more deliberate fashion than the SPP. The Slovak National Party, the Slovak Communists, and the Hungarian Parties joined them in support of autonomy.7 Politically, some Slovaks took prominent positions in the central government, most notably Hodza. Prague allowed Slovak autonomists to organize and hold seats in Parliament, but it continued to censor nationali st viewpoints and it regularly pursued smear campaigns against Slovak autonomist leaders. The SPP joined the government in 1927, arranged by Hodza after promises of Slovak autonomy, but Hodza's plan proceeded in a watered-down fashion. The SPP participation lasted only two years before accusations of treason against radical politician Vojtech Tuka led to the SPP's withdrawal from the government. The SPP later exploited the Munich Agreement to force Prague's hand to achieve autonomy during the short-lived Second Republic, and then seceded from the state in March of 1939.8 7 Prague regularly promoted the idea that most of the Slovak people opposed autonomy, because the SPP only maintained 30-35% of the electorate in Slovakia. Although it is difficult to determine the true popular support of autonomy based strictly on the electoral support of each party, the support in Slovakia for Prague's version of centralism was probably we ll in the minority when one considers that the three largest parties-SPP, Agrarian, and Communists- all embraced some level of Slovak autonomy. 8 For more on this period in Slovak hi story, see: Yeshayahu A. Jelinek, The Lust for Power: Nationalism, Slovakia, and the Communists 1918- 1948 (New York: Columbia University, 1983). Susan Mikula, "The Politics of Frustration : The Slovak Politica l Experience, 191 8-1938," in Reflections on Slovak Histo ry, eds. Stanislav Kirschbaum & Anne C. Rom an (Toronto: Slovak World Congress, 1987), 73 -88. James Felak, "Slovak Considerations of the Slovak Question: The Ludak, Agrarian, Socialist, and Communi st views in lnterwar Czechoslovakia" in The Czech and Slovak Experience, ed . John Morison (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), 136-62. Felak, At the 24 SLOVAKIA 2019 The Slovak-A mericans also consolidated their positions on the issue in a similar fas hi on. After an early divide, the leaders of the Slovak League of America gave up on Prague and embraced the autonomist position, as did the large Catholic fraternal organization the First Catholic Slovak Union, and other, smaller organizations, such as the Friends of Slovak Freedom (FSF), an organization formed in the 1920s w ith the singul ar goal of addressing the Slovak question . The large, secular and large ly Protestant, fraternal organizations, the National Slovak Society and the Slovak Evangeli cal Un ion, at first embraced the centralist Slovaks, but nationalist pressure ultimatel y led them to try to moderate between the centrali st and autonomist positions. They ultim ate ly embraced the gradualist position of Hodza. In response, the Czechoslovaki sts established the Slovak National A lliance to serve as the arm of Prague among the SlovakAmericans, along with the Slovak Gymnastic Union Sokol. Consisting mostl y of secularists and some Lutherans, these organizations regularly attacked the SLA for its Catholic and autonomist leanings and promoted the strict uni ty of the Czechs and Slovaks. 9 As the Slovak question became entrenched in Czechoslovak politics, each competing side pursued a voluminous international lobby ing campaign to build western support for its respective position. This included a fact ion demanding a revision of the Trianon Treaty to return Slovakia to Hungary. The primary international Slovak advocate of this position was the Reverend Francis Jehlicka and hi s organization, the Slovak Council , founded in 1933 . Jehlicka had attended the Paris Peace Conference wi th Hlinka, but decided afterwards that the Slovaks could not trust the Czechs. Jehlicka remained abroad, where he lobbied fo r a Slovak reunion with Hungary based on Hun ga ri an promises of Slovak autonomy. He attempted to build Price of th e Republic. Toma & Kovac, Slovakia, 78-1 06. Kirsc hbaum, History of Slovakia , 155-84. Ryc hlik, "Czec h-Sl ovak Relations," in Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist, 13-2 6. R.J.W. Evans, " Hungarians, Czechs, and Slovaks : Some Mutual Perceptions," in Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist, I 09-22 . Mary Heimann, Czechoslovakia : The State that Failed (New Haven: Yale Uni vers ity Press, 2009), 48-86. Nata lia Kraj covicova, " Slovakia in Czechoslovakia," in Slovakia in History, 137-56. 9 Joseph Pauco, "Slovaks Abroad and Their Relati onship with Slovakia," in Slo vakia in the 19th & 20th Centuries, ed. Joseph M. Kirschbaum (Toronto: Slovak World Congress, 1973), 333-42. Josep h V. Adamec, "The Slovak Cath olic Federation," in Slovaks in America, 223-32 . Baumgarten & Stetl<a, National, 85-7. Pankuch, History, 177-86 . Stolarik, " Slovak League," 7-35 . SLOVAKIA 2019 25 support from the Slovak-Americans by appealing to Slovakia's historical and economic roots in Hungary and exposing claimed mistreatment of the Slovaks by Prague. ' 0 Jehlicka could express his voice abroad because of support from Budapest and later Nazi Germany, and he convinced a few figures in the West, most notably the British publi sher Lord Rothermere, who campaigned on behalf of Hungary internationally. Jehlicka ' s arguments nevertheless carried little weight in other circles . Scottish historian R. W. Seton-Watson, a prominent supporter of the Czechoslovak Republic , pursued a constant back and forth against Jehlicka, and, on both sides of the Atlantic, Slovaks and Czechs of different politica l views unified against Slovakia ' s return to Hungary. The Slovak autonomi sts and centralists , for example, collaborated in an open letter denouncing Jehlicka . 11 Slovak-Americans likewise continued to lobby against Hungarian claims, reminding readers about the old magyarization policy to eliminate Slovak national identity. Slovak-American publisher Jan Pankuch claimed that this was the sole occas ion when the Slovak-American autonomi sts, Czech-Americans, and Slovak10 Anthony Pessenl ehner, "Czechoslovakia' s Ri ght to Statehood Assa iled," Current History, 14, 5 (Aug. I 92 1), 845-8. Dr. F. Jehlicka: Kto on je a co chce (C leveland: 1920). Francis Jehlicka, Reply to Mr. R. W. Seton-Watson 's Book 'Slovakia Th en and Now ' (Vienn a, 1932). The Slovak Co uncil , Th e Unsolved Slovak Problem (Vienna: Slovak Council, 1933). The Slovak Co un cil , Bolsevizmus a slovenska otazka (Geneva: Slovak Council , 193 6), in : 8 : Resolutions, Memoranda, Proclamations, SI. The Slovak Council , Sh ould Great Britain go to Wa r- fo r Czechoslovakia: An Appeal to British Common Sense for th e Sake of Wo rld Peace (London: Haze l, Watson, & Viney, 1937) . Francis Jehli cka, Fa1her Hlinka 's Struggle fo r Slovak Freedom (London: Slova k Council , 1938), 34-5. "The German Minister in Czechoslovaki a (Eisenlohr) to the German Foreign Ministry (Doc 57)," Documen1s on German Foreign Policy, Seri es D, V2 (Was hington, D.C. : U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947), 132-3 . 11 R.W. Seton-Watson, Treaty Revision and the Hungarian Frontiers ( London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1934). " Seton-Watson to Alois Ka lisek" (Doc I 32) in R. W. SetonWa tson and His Relations with the Czechs and Slovaks: Documents, / 906- 195 1, vol. I, eds. Jan Ryc hlik, et al (Prague: Ustav T. G. Masaryka, I 995), 393-6. "The Situati on in Slova ki a and the Magyar Minori ty" (Doc 139) in Seton-Watson, 409-25. "Seton-Watson to Martin Razus" (Doc 155 ) in Seton- Watson, 454-5 . "Fedor Ruppeldt to Seton-Watson" (Doc I 60) in Seton-Watson, 465-9. C. L Orbach, "Czechoslovakia ' s Place in the Sun," Current Histo1y, 14, 6 (Sept I 92 1), 944-5. Anonymous, "Another Defense of Czechoslovaki a" Curren/ History, 14, 6 (Sept 192 1), 945-6. Adam Poliak, "Czechos lova ki a's Right to Statehood," Current History, I 5, 3 (Dec I 92 1), 499. " Slovaki a' s Pro test" (Doc 156) in Seton-Watson, 456-9. 26 SLOVAKIA 2019 American centralists came together in common cause, although the resolution almost failed when the two sides sparred over whether the text should declare the Slovaks and Czechs as one nation. The proHungarian autonomists, thus, remained on the periphery of the Sio• 12 va k question. The unified opposition against Hungarian irredentism otherwise did little to ease the conflict between the centralists and autonomists. The Czech and Slovak centralists made the Slovak question a primary component of their international propaganda, and they often perpetuated negative stereotypes of the Slovaks to promote the Czechoslovak vision. The official press in Prague released ample publications by Czech nationali st leaders in the English language on the topic. President Masaryk, for example, made clear his disappointment with the "po litical immaturity" of the Slovak autonomist movement. Masaryk, who continued to highlight his own partial Slovak heritage, likewise claimed to have proven his great love for Slovakia by having liberated it from Hungary and he asserted that Slovak nationalists could prove their own love by embracing Prague 's authority. 13 Edvard Benes, who served as Foreign Minister until succeeding Masaryk to the presidency in 1935, in tum argued that the Czechs and Slovaks remained unified, except for a "fringe minority," working for a return to the pre-war order, and the "dictates of local , provin12 "Rezolucie Vznesene Ustrednym Vyborom Slovenskej Ligy v Amerike na schodzi , vzdrziavanej IO novembra 1920," Person File (PF): Bielek, SI. Association of Slovak Newspapermen of America, Count Albert Apponyi or Revival of Magyar Propaganda in America (Scranton, Pa: Bosak Press, 1923), in: B: Resolutions, SI. American Citizens of Slovak Origin, The Refutation to the Arguments of the Hungarian Kossuth Delegation ( 1928), in: The Podkrivacky, Adam Papers, B: 17, Slovak American Collection, Immigration History Research Center (IHRC), Uni versity of Minnesota. "What the Magyars Forget," The National Slovak Society (NSS) of the US.A . Records, B: 168, F: Slovak League of America (SLA), lHRC. "The Cleveland District Assembly of the SLA to Hoover," 4 December 1929, F#: 860F.00/306, Records of the U.S. Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Czechoslovakia 1910-1944 (DoS CS 1910-44), Microfilm (Washington D.C .: National Archi ves and Records Service, 1982). Pankuch, History, 186-90. 13 Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, The Making of a State: Memories and Observations, 1914-1918, trans. Henry Wickham Steed (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1927), 2 1, 41 , 208-11 , 338, 361. Thomas G. Masaryk, Masa,yk on Thought and Life: Conversations with Karel Capek, reprint ed., trans. M. & R. Weatherall (New York: Arno Press, 1971 ). "T.G. Masaryk on the Pittsburgh Agreement" (Doc 30) in Slovakia : Political, 209- 10. SLOVAKIA 2019 27 cial, factional and individualist interests ." 14 Czech scholars, journalists and officials also contributed to this campaign, mostly through studies of the Czechs that glossed over the Slovaks except to praise 15 how the Czechs had liberated them. For example, Czech historian Albert Prazak praised the Czech ro le in uplifting the Slovaks, and condemned Hlinka and the SPP as tools of Hungary and as part of a Catholic conspiracy to take over Central Europe. Prazak then dismissed the Pittsburgh Agreement as "merely a flight of fancy ," rooted in "immaturity of political judgment and lack of understanding." 16 Czech journalist Ales Broz likewise condemned the Slovaks as " retarded in their development" versus the " well educated, practical, realistic" Czechs, and praised the direction of Slovakia under the Czechs for allowing the two peoples to become "one stock, one cul. ,, I 7 ture, one nat10n . Centralist Slovaks also contributed to this campaign, including articles by Interior Minister Juraj Slavik and Minister to France Stefan Osusky on the nationality questions in Czec hoslovakia, as well as one by Education Minister Anton Stefanek praising Prague ' s 14 Eduard Benes, My War Memoirs, trans. Paul Seiver (London : George Allen & Unwin, 1928), 348, 448, 469, 472-8 1. Edvard Benes, Christmas Message (Prague: Orb is, 193 7), 17. Edvard Benes, "Of Czechoslovak Unity" in We Were and We Shall Be: Th e Czechoslovak Spirit th rough th e Centuries , eds. Zdenk a & Jan Mun zer (New York : Un gar, 1941), 164-6. 15 Kami I Krofta & Jiri Hoetzel, A Short Histo,y of Czechoslovakia ( ew York: Robert McBride & Co, 1934), 137-8, 142, 149-52. Kami! Krofta, "Czechs and Slovaks (I)" The Slavonic and East European Review, 13, 38 (January 1935), 363-7 1. Kami I Kroft a, "Czechs and Slovaks ( II )" The Slavonic and East European Review, I 3, 39 (April 1935), 6 11-26. Josef Borovicka, Ten Years of Czechoslovak Politics (Prague: Orbis, 1929), 7-8, 13 , 20-1 , 44, 111-1 2, I I 9-20, I 24-6. Emanuel Capek, "The Background of Political Parti es in Czechoslovaki a" The Sla vonic and East European Review, I 0, 28 (June 193 1), 90- 104. Ales Broz, " Minori ty Ri ghts in th e Czechoslova k State," Foreign Affairs, 6, I (October 1927), 158-60. Ales Broz, " President Masaryk, Creator of the Czechos lovak Republic," Current Histo,y , 24, I (April I 926), 48-53. 16 Prague appointed Prazak, a Czech, to erve at Comenius Uni versity in Brati slava as its primary hi stori an of the Slova ks. The Slavonic Review labeled Prazak the "foremost li ving authority on Slovak History." Albert Prazak, " Review : The ew Slovaki a by R. W. Seton-W atso n" The Slavonic Review, 3, 9 (March 1925), 71 3-20. 17 Ales Broz, "Czech and Slovak at Odds: Both Sides of the Controversy - From the Czech Standpoint," Curren/ Histo,y, 22 , 5 (Aug 1925), 784-8 . 28 SLOVAKIA 2019 development of Slovak education. 18 Slovak Social Democrat, and rigid Czechoslovakist, [van Derer's short book on the Pittsburgh Agreement provided the most thorough effort in English to discredit the Slovak autonomists . Derer claimed that most Slovaks embraced the state as constructed, and that only a " pro-Magyar" minority supported autonomy. He likewise dismissed the Slovak-American signers of the Pittsburgh Agreement as not " true" Slovak nationals, because they lived in America. Derer argued that the document had meant simply local administrative autonomy, which he claimed Prague had granted. He then portrayed the Czechs as the Slovaks' saviors and condemned Slovak autonomy: In return for their having helped Slovakia when things were at th eir worst, in return for their having saved our liberty and an independent state apparatus, railway and postal communications, and a Slovak system of education at the tim e when the Slovaks th emselves were weak, unprepared, often distrustful and inclined rather to continue to live under their thousand-year yoke than to live in freedom, in return for having shed their blood for our country on the battlefronts in the Great War, and in the fights against Bolshevist Hungary in I 9 I 9 and thus saving Slovakia from a new occupation by the Magyars -in return for all this are we to remove the Czechs from Slovakia ? 19 Prague also maintained support from American and Eng lish academics and journalists in perpetuating Czechoslovakism. SetonWatson remained a staunch supporter of the idea, boasting how he regularly discredited "cantankerous Slovaks who accused Masaryk and hi s friend s of 'Czec hi sation."' He publicly condemned Hlinka and the SPP and repudiated their criticisms of Prague. Seton-Watson a lso actively denied Slovak agency in Slovak national development. 18 Juraj Slavik, "The Nationality Question in Slovakia," Central European Observer, 11 , 26 (Dec 18, 1933), 463-5 . Stefan Osusky, " Wh y Czechoslovakia?" Foreign Affairs, 15 , 3 (Apri l 1937), 455-71. Anton Stefanek, " Education in Slovakia," Th e Slavonic Review, 2, 5 (Dec 1923), 308-27. 19 Ivan Derer, The Unity of th e Czechs and Slovaks: Has th e Pittsburgh Declaration Been Carried Out? (Prague: Orbis, 193 8). SLOVAKIA 2019 29 The Slovaks should therefore be thankful that fate has made them dependent upon a race so efficient, so well-educated and well-disciplined as the Czechs ... .At the critical moment, the Slovaks made the impression of a helpless animal fascinated by the approach of the boa-constrictor, and Prague was literally the sole hope.-'0 On the Slovak question, Seton-Watson blamed the " hypersensitive" Slovaks as simply being too parochial, religiously backward and ill developed, and he dismissed autonomist arguments as the "wild talk of extremists." Even in a work of collected essays designed to "show that the Slovaks themselves have had a much greater share in the reconstruction of their country than is often supposed," Seton-Watson turned predominantly to centralist Slovaks whose contributions consisted mostly of self-promotion and praise for the merits of centralism.21 The American philanthropist and writer Kenneth D. Miller was another avid promoter of Czechoslovakism. "Everything points to the wisdom of a cultural as well as political union between the two nationalities. No matter what the cultural development may be, neither nationality can well maintain its political independence without the other." He likewise felt that the Slovak question would disappear with the development of the "slow, passive Slovak," who yet lacked initiative, and who was prone to immorality and drunkenness, and to "religious vagary or fanaticism." 22 Other presentations ranged from industrialist and diplomat John Crane, who attacked the "backward ignorance" of the Slovaks for resisting secularization, to YMCA secretary Fred Rindge who criticized a claimed lack of Slovak interest 20 R.W. Seton-Watson , Th e New Slovakia (Prague: Fr. Borovy, 1924), 3, 23-4. R.W. Seton-Watson, Masaryk in England (New York: Macmillan, 1943), 61. "Seton-Watson Open Letter to Hlinka" (Doc 108), in Seton-Watson, 343-4. "SetonWatson to Alois Kolisek" (Doc 135), in Seton-Watson, 401-2. R.W. Seton-Watson, ed. Slovakia Then and Now: A Political Survey (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1931). When planning the book, Seton-Watson expressed his desire to have an article from a SPP leader, so that Slovak autonomists could not accuse him of onesidedness. He considered an article on the issue of autonomy, but decided only to allow an article on Slovak religion by Hlinka. "Seton-Watson to Milan Hodza" (Docs 144 & 145), in Seton-Watson, 431-2 . 22 Kenneth D. Mill er, The Czecho-Slovaks in America (New York: Doran Company, 1922), 14-25, 121-122, 158-160. 21 30 SLOVAK.IA 2019 in the arts. Journalist C.J.C. Street claimed, "The Slovak dream was always to regain their lost unity with the Czechs and as a united nation to secure the tolerable conditions of existence. " 23 The Slovak autonomists in Slovakia pursued a few efforts during the interwar period to counter this campaign, although they lacked equivalent resources and connections to those held by Prague. The SPP' s most notable attempt was the Zilina Memorandum of 1922. Released to the western press and governments, the document sought to expose the Slovak question to the world, beginning with its sensationalist title, "a country doomed to death, a nation in her last agonies implores the civilized world for help." It decried the failures of Wilsonianism, which had allowed Prague to "bamboozle" the Slovaks "out of the freedom promised to them ." The text went on to explain their issues with the Czechs, discussing concerns from the treatment of religion, to economic exploitation, and the denial of autonomy. The memorandum also condemned Czechoslovakism as simply a tool for domination. The Czechs and Slovaks have been always forming two separate little worlds with a very different character due to their different geographical and economic conditions, their different way of thinking, of feeling and of mind. We have a different view of life, other morals and other traditions; we have a different social structure, different legal rules and different ideas about political economy and culture. The document ultimately claimed the world could still save the Slovaks if it acted quickly. The key of the iron cage in which the Slo vak Nation is being mercilessly incarcerated lays in the hands of the Great Powers. This memorial is our last expedient and our last weap23 John 0. Crane, "Church and State in Czechoslovakia" The Slavonic Review, 6, 17 (Dec. 1927), 364-78. Fred H. Rindge, Jr. "The Charm of Czechoslovakia" Current History, 22, 3 (June 1925), 447-50. C. J. C. Street, Slovakia Past and Present (Westm inster, UK: P.S. King & Son, 1928). For more examples, see: Robert Machray, "Czechoslova ki a a Pioneer in Central European Politics" Current Hislo ry, 25, 6 (Mar. 1927), 839-43 . J. H. Wallis, "The Upbuilding of Czechoslovakia," Curren/ Histo1y, 14, 5 (Aug. 192 1), 835-45 . SLOVAK.IA 2019 31 on ... Though only clad in the rags of our torn freedom we nevertheless appear as accusers before the world, charging the rulers of Prague who are still deluding the powers, and the powers themselves for having out of sheer ignorance become their accomplices. To ignore the Slovak case, thus, would be to support the trampling of liberty. 24 After the Zilina Memorandum bore no fruit, the Slovak autonomists pursued fewer efforts to court the west. They made a few sporadic attempts, such as a translation of the SPP •program in 1930, written by Jozef Tiso, which outlined the SPPs vision of a Slovak national Christian democracy, and appealed for autonomy as a protection of the Slovak cultural tradition. It argued that the Slovak nation's religious roots encouraged it toward a peaceful selfpreservation, unlike other nations that turned toward national chauvinism. 25 Slovak priest and publicist Anton Kompanek also produced an article that emphasized Slovak Christianity as a symbol of Slovak worthiness for self-government. Kompanek believed Slovakia served as an example of how the Church and state could find balance in the modem world. 26 These publications, however, remained exceptions, as the Slovak autonomists in Slovakia maintained little faith in western governments, recognizing Prague's stranglehold over their image internationally. They instead relied on the Slovak-Americans to lead the way in their defense internationally. Slovak nationalist politician Karol Sidor claimed that despite a continued interest in the homeland, the Slovak-Americans began to lose their "onetime vitality and ardor" during the interwar period. He linked this outcome to greater assimilation and a decreasing knowledge of the Slovak language.27 This claim is somewhat true. The energy of the war years certainly diminished, particularly in the 24 "Zilina Memorandum" (Doc I 02) & "Covering Letter for the Zilina Memorandum" (Doc I 03), in Seton-Watson, pp. 319-33 . 25 Jozef Tiso, The Ideology of th e Slovak Populist Party (Prague: 1930). 26 Anton Kompanek, "The Catholic Church in Slovakia" Th e Sla vonic and East European Review, 12, 36 (April 1934), 611-21. 27 Sidor, "Slovak League," 59-62. 32 SLOVAKIA 2019 1930s with the onset of the Great Depression.28 Sidor, however, understated how much the Slovak-Americans remained at the forefront of the international efforts to gain recognition of the Slovak question. Historian Jozef Pauco 's interpretation is much more accurate: "For twenty years the Slovak League of America defended the spirit and letter of the Pittsburgh Pact and by using the freedom of the press and the freedom of assembly on American soil, they did so more freely and energetically than the two political parties in their homeland." 29 Based on the volume of publications and direct communications with government officials on both side of the Atlantic, it is clear that the Slovak question continued to dominate the transatlantic interests of the Slovak Americans, as they bolstered their compatriots' activities within Czechoslovakia by applying external pressure on Prague. The Slovak fraternal organizations made constant efforts to keep their members linked to their Slovak cultural identity, and to aid in the fight for autonomy in the homeland. They pursued these efforts through education programs such as national lectures, art and photography tours, but also symbolic actions such as erecting a statue of General Milan R. Stefanik in Cleveland in 1924 and the planting of a Linden Tree on Capitol Hill in honor of Stefanik in 1934. 30 The Slovak question remained high on the list of Slovak-American concerns, and the various Slovak organizations produced a flurry of pamphlets and informative documents on the issue. The Pittsburgh Agreement remained at the center of this debate, with Slovak autonomists on both sides of the Atlantic continuing to affirm its legality against the centralist dismissals that it was simply a non-binding text designed to placate the Slovak-Americans during the war. Autonomist publica28 June Alexander, for example, shows how assimilation became an internal issue for Slovak-Americans, as the older generations struggled to assure that their American born children maintained links to their ethnic heritage. June Granatir Alexander, Ethnic Pride, American Patriotism: Slovaks and Other New Immigrants in the Jn terwar Era (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2004), 93-19 I. 29 Pauco, "S lovaks Abroad," 333-42. 30 "Ot. Svec to Podkrivacky," 3 Oct. 1938," PF: Adam Podkrivacky, SI. "S LA to Jakub Vitostak, 30 Nov 1923 ," The First Catholic Slovak Union of America (FCSU) Records, F: 1303, IHRC. "Jan Kocur to Michael Senko, 30 Nov 1926," FCSU, F: 1304, IHRC. 0. D. Koreff, Milan Rastisla v Stefanik: A Short Biography (Cleveland: Slovak League of America, 1924), 82-3 . "SLA to Arthur Colegrove," NSS, 8 : 168, F: SLA, IHRC. SLOVAKIA 2019 33 tions looked to inform about the Slovaks, to expose the failed promises of Prague on autonomy, and to defend against the accusations of Prague centralists. The Slovak League remained at the forefront, hoping that exposure of the situation to the American press and pub1ic would spur sympathy and support? In many cases, the Slovak-Americans directed these publications at Prague, with the hope of convincing a change in policy . They, nevertheless, would consecutively produce English versions, which they then sent to the American President, members of Congress, the Department of State, and assorted press outlets. For example, in 1921 the SLA wrote to Masaryk calling for the immediate implementation of the Pittsburgh Agreement. When Prague did not respond, the League followed up with a more detailed Memorandum on November 9, 1922. This document called on Prague to make good on the Pittsburgh Agreement in the name of natural rights and to reward the sacrifices made by Slovak-Americans during World War I. It highlighted Masaryk's role in the formation of the Agreement, and then provided a photograph of the original text as well as a series of letters between the SLA and various Czechoslovak officials that had promised its implementation to show how promises made to the Slovak-Americans never lived up to reality. The text then defended the legitimacy of Slovak autonomy. We are convinced that the honest and upright materialization of the Pittsburgh Pact in no way will harm the unity of the State; on the contrary it will mean a considerable reinforcement within and without and make possible united co-operation of all patriotic forces against the elements of disintegration, depriving them of a dangerous weapon, which they cannot effectively employ against the Republic, fanning discontent, mistrust and spreading hatred between both nations comprising the state. The League made clear, however, that this good will rested "solely upon a sincere Czecho-Slovak reciprocity." It then gave an alternative: 31 "Telegram to Ivan Bielek on 29 Nov 1934," NSS, B: 168, F: SLA , IHRC. 34 SLOVAKIA 2019 We feel it is our duty to emphasize that if our sincere and friendly attempt, which has at its heart the welfare, interest and future of the Republic, should fail to meet with success, the Slovak l eague of America would not be able to prevent the American Slovaks and their factors from turning to the Court of Public Opinion of the civilized world. While the Slovak autonomists in Slovakia acknowledged the letter, Prague neglected to respond. 32 The SLA then passed a follow-up resolution. Asserting that it "fights with fire and sword with everyone who is in favor of autonomy of the Slovak nation," it admonished Prague for manipulating the world into believing the Czechoslovakist image and for leading a smear campaign against the SLA. It then provided a list of examples of hostility, including efforts to undermine its finances , blackmail, the bullying of Slovak-American leaders and press, and attempts to send government officials to propagandize against them . It once again emphasized how the League had made every effort to resolve the Slovak question within the confines of the Czechoslovak Republic , but it would soon submit the issue "to the judgment of public opinion of the civilized world," if Prague continued to treat them with disdain.33 Many more publications followed. The Friends of Slovak Freedom , for example, released two protests in 1923. These texts defended the va lidi ty of the Slovak-Americans as representatives of the Slovak people, and condemned Prague's actions against Slovak autonomists, including such accusations as "false signatures or resolutions, false numbers of people attending their lectures, insulting the Slovak journalists, insulting the Slovak League as anti-state, and many other lies," as well as criticisms about press censorship in Slo- 32 SLA , Memorandum S/ovenskej Ligy v Amerike upra vene na vladu a Narodne Shromai denie Cesko-Slo venskej Republiky v zaujme vtelenia Pittsburgskej Dohody do ustavy C.-S. Republiky (Pittsburgh: Slovak League of America, 1922). Both the full Slovak and English versions of this Document are avai lab le at: SLA Cab, F: Memorandum /922 v Zaum e Pitts. Dohody, SI. Also avai lable in: " Memorandum Slovenskej Ligy v Arnerike" in Dokumenty, Vol 2, 138-44. 33 " An Appeal of the Slovak League of America to All Political Factors of th e Czecho-S lovak Republic," PF: Bielek, SI. SLOVAKIA 2019 35 vakia. 34 After reading Masaryk's criticism of Hlinka, the Slovak League then produced a pamphlet that challenged the idea that Masaryk personally had liberated the Slovaks. It reminded readers of the Slovak-American war contribution, and then remarked how the SLA and the Pittsburgh Agreement were certainly valid in Masaryk's eyes when he needed Slovak-American support in 1918. The document then included a text from former Czechoslovak ambassador to Japan, Karel Pergler, arguing that both the Slovaks and Czechs had unequivocally recognized the Pittsburgh Agreement upon its signing. 35 Next to these direct appeals, the Slovak-American autonomists also released many publications geared directly toward an American audience. They designed these works to inform about the Slovaks, expose their continued fight for self-determination and to link the Slovak question to American democratic values. These publications included several biographies of Milan R. Stefanik, a translated history by Slovak historian Joseph Skultety that directly challenged images of Slovak backwardness and other stereotypes, and a short pamphlet on Czechoslovakism by Slovak-American historian Ol'ga Husek warning that the concept meant for the Slovaks "the rejection of their cultural past and the stunting of their future growth." 36 They also attempted to rally America to their cause by showing their valiance in the face of domination. An SLA article distributed to the American Press praised how the Slovak-Americans continued to fight even with "the entire machinery of government set against them, calumnies upon calumnies by a government subsidized press, heaped upon the heads of those who take up their cause, and bug- 34 Friends of Slovak Freedom, " Resolution, November 28, 1923," & " Protest against Censorship and Confiscation of Slovak Publications by the Government in Slovakia" in Pankuch , Slo vaks of Cleveland, l 82-6. 35 Slovenska Liga v Amerike, V Zaujme Pra vdy! (In the Interest of Truth !) (Pittsburgh: P. Jamriska, 1930). Found in : SLA Cabinet, F: SLA Presidents, SI. Prague responded to these letters, but it simply reasserted the usual rebutta ls, claiming that 75% of the Slovaks supported centralization and that the Pittsburgh Agreement was simply an American document. "Ohlas Americkeho Memoranda u Nas," 8 : Slovak League of America (SLA) , SI. 36 0. D. Koreff, Milan Rastislav Stefanik: A Short Biography (Cleveland: Slovak League of America, 1924). Andrew Slabey, General Milan R. Stefanik (Leisenring, PA: Griglak Printery, 1937). Joseph Skultety, Sketches from Slovak History, O.D. Koreff, trans . (Middletown, PA : First Catholic Slovak Union, I 930) . Ol'ga Husek, The Czechoslovak Fallacy (Middletown, PA : Jednota, 1935). 36 SLOVAK.IA 2019 bears turned loose to scare those who are not acquainted with conditions. " 37 Religion became a major component of Slovak-American advocacy on the Slovak question in the interwar period. Slovak-American journalist Stephen J. Palickar published many articles in general Catholic publications, including a five-month tit-for-tat with Czech diplomat Josef Hane in defense of Slovak religiosity. He also provided some of the first Slovak-American attempts to link Slovak religiosity to anti-Communism. Palickar likewise defended Slovak agency, and appealed for a lifting of Prague centralism to allow the Slovaks an opportunity to prove their abi lity for self-government. 38 While most of these publications were shorter, more direct works, the Slovak-Americans released a couple of longer exposes on the Slovak question. The first, written by then SLA president Peter P. Hletko on behalf of the Slovak Catholic Federation of America, looked to inform the American people about the Pittsburgh Agreement as an American product in line with "the principles of democracy and self-determination of small nations." Hletko praised how the Slovak "has an inherent love for liberty and freedom , and enjoys fostering his national spirit," which had spurred his immigration to America in a "quest for a land of true liberty," and he argued that American democracy had allowed the Slovaks in America to assert their national identity as an independent people. He asserted how the Slovaks had only joined the Czechoslovak movement on the premise that they would be treated fairly and as equals and highlighted a reg37 "The conflict between Czechs and Slovaks," NSS Records, B: 168, F: SLA, IHRC. For many examples, see: "The Slovaks- Past and Present," in Stephen J. Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism to Atheistic Czech Communism (Cambridge, MA : Hampshire Press, 1948), 40-3 . Stephen J. Palickar, "Czech and Slovak at Odds: Both Sides of the Controversy - From the Slovak Standpoint," Current History, 22 , 5 (Aug 1925), 784-6. "A Dark Spot in Czecho-Slovakia," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism , 43-45 . "Who is Masaryk?," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 49-51 . "S lovakia-whither bound," in Palickar, Slovakia : From Hungarian Despotism, 76-83. "Slovak Catholicism vs. Czech Communism," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 84-86. "Slovak Grievance," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 70-72 . "President Masaryk and his State," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 61-62. "Scotus Viator Surveys Slovakia," in Palickar, Slo vakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 72-75. Stephen J. Palickar, Slovakia of Today (A Lecture), December 12, 1933 , Columbi a University (New York: Slovak Library Association, 1933). 38 SLOVAKIA 2019 37 ular sense of duplicity and condescension the Slovaks felt from the Czechs. Hlekto praised the Pittsburgh Agreement as having resolved these conflicts, before Masaryk ultimately betrayed his promise, and he gave a detailed defense of its validity and of the right of the Slovak-Americans to speak for their nation during the war. 39 The Slovak-American autonomists shortly thereafter produced an even longer book on the topic . Written by Peter P. Hletko under the pseudonym , "An Autonomist," it served as the most exhaustive consideration of the Slovak question in Eng lish in the early 20 th century. Hletko placed blame on Czech intransigence for fueling the issue unnecessarily. The book argued that the Czechos lovak revolution relied on American money and manpower and "should the President (Masaryk) have failed to dispel the fear and dissatisfaction of the Slovaks through the Moscow and Pittsburgh Agreements, there certainly would not be a Czecho-Slovakia today. " The book then deconstructed Prague 's policies toward the Slovaks, to show Czechoslovakism as a means of hegemony. Hletko considered every issue from the Czech obfuscation on autonomy, the complicity of the Slovak centrali sts, the language issue, schools, and the economy, and he explained the claims of Slovak neediness and incompetence, as we ll as the claimed threat of Hungary, as only a fa<;:ade to justify Czech dominance. He likewise gave examples of Slovak intellectuals to dispute the claim that the Slovaks needed the Czechs to serve that role. He then detailed the domination of Slovakia's administration, civi l service, education system, and cultura l institutions by Slovak centralists and Czechs, and the press censorship and smear campaigns. Ultimately, he concluded that Czechoslovakism was undermining the state and mu st be reversed. Hletko concluded: Th e motive that has promoted us to write this work is not one of revenge, nor a desire to arouse bad feeling, but simply to expose falsehood and reveal truth. It is our sincere hope that, the truth being known, it will enable the Czechs and Slovaks to form a more stable union which will promote justice, trust, and good 39 Slovak Catholi c Federation of America, The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact (S lovak Cath olic Federation of America, 1934). Joseph C. Krajsa, " Dr. Peter Hletko, Most Elite of American Slovaks," Slovakia, 22, 45 ( 1972), 57-9. 38 SLOVAKIA 2019 will, and thereby insure national integrity both at home and abroad. 40 A few non-Slovak publications did favor Slovak autonomy . For example, some historians of the First World War, such as Jan Opocensky and C. A. Macartney, attempted to present a balanced consideration of the Slovak question, giving voice to Slovak autonomist concerns.4 1 There were also several publications that utilized the Slovak question to criticize the broader Versailles system . Writer and journalist E. Alexander Powell , for example, highlighted the differences between the Czechs and Slovaks as an example of the precariousness of the region ' s political stability. Although not particularly admiring of the Slovaks, Powell was highly critical of the Czech treatment of them. He commented, "The Czechs, an energetic, ambitious, progressive, and aggressive people, who outnumber the Slovaks three to one, look with condescension, if not contempt, on their less literate, slower thinking, more easy-going partners, whom, if the truth be known , they regard as immensely inferior to themselves." These scholars all argued that the Czechs needed to treat their minorities with more respect and make good on promises for Slovak autonomy for the sake of the survival of the state. 42 A few works were even somewhat favorable to the Slovaks. One such example came from writer Kenneth L. Roberts , who after visiting Czechoslovakia complained, "The Czechs want to socialize everything in sight, and the Slovaks are not poignantly eager to be social- 40 An Autonomist, Slovakia 's Plea for Autonomy (Middletown, Pa: Slovak Literary Society, 1935). 41 Jan Opocensky, The Collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Mon archy and the Rise of the Czechoslovak Stale (Prague: Orbis, 1928), 153-68, I 93-214. C. A. MaCartney, National States and National Min orities (London : Oxford Uni versity Press, 1934), 117, 201 ,208. 42 E. Alexander Powell , The Danger on th e Danube (New York: Century Company, 1928), 56-8, 62-8, 72-4. M. W. Fodor, South of Hiller (Boston : Houghton Mifflin, 1939). For oth er examples, see : C. A. Macartney, Hungary and her Successors: The Treaty of Trianon and its Consequences, 1919-193 7 (London : Oxford University Press, 1937/ 1965), 73-148. Frank H. Simonds, Can Europe Keep th e Peace? (New York : Harper, I 93 I), 92-10 I. Isaiah Bowman, The New World: Problems in Political Geography, 4th ed. (Yonkers, NY : World Book, 1928). Harold Temperley, " How the Hungari an Frontiers were Drawn," Foreign Affairs, 6, 3 (April 1928), 432-47 . SLOVAKIA 2019 39 ized." Comparing the Czechs in Slovakia to U.S. Civil War carpetbaggers, he criticized the Czech administration of Slovakia, their denial of autonomy, and called out Czechoslovakism as a lie. He alternatively praised the Slovaks as "among the most attractive and lovable peasant people of the many I have seen." An article by journalist Robert Sage, after a visit to Slovakia, likewise chided the Czechs for using claims of generosi ty as a mirage for domination over Slovakia. 43 The SLA ultimately made good on its threat to take the issue to the world stage, presenting the Slovak question to the League of Nations in 1932. It produced a long legal brief, which appealed for a cessation of wrongdoing against the Slovaks and the granting of political and cultural autonomy. It then begged the League of Nations to recognize the Slovaks as an independent nation, to demand the implementation of the Pittsburgh Agreement, to investigate ill treatment, and to grant recognition of the Slovaks as a true minority in Czechoslovakia. It pointed out how the Slovak-Americans had made multiple attempts to reach out to Prague to explain their concerns and offer an olive branch towards a solution, but that Prague had ignored their appeals and through censorship had silenced their brothers in Slovakia. The document then went on to detail the history of the founding of the state and the Pittsburgh Agreement, their complaints of ill-treatment against the Slovaks, and their view as to why the 44 Slovaks were an independent people. This appeal was unsuccessful. Slovak-Americans also regularly wrote to U.S. government officials. One such example was an "Open Letter" to Masaryk in 1923 that the Slovak Catholic Federation in America also sent to President Coolidge, members of Congress, all the embassies in Prague, and to the American press. The document started with an image of Masaryk approaching the Slovak-Americans as equals during the war, to 43 Kenneth L. Roberts, Europe's Morning After (New York: Harper Brothers, 1921 ), 121-73. Kenneth L. Roberts, Why Europe l eaves Home (New York: Bobbs-Merrill , 1922), 28-31 . Robert Sage, "There's no such Nationality as Czecho-Slovak," Chicago Daily Tribune, Jan 2, 1930, 6. For other examples, see: Felix John Vondracek, The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia / 918-1935 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937), 377-9. Alexander Szana, Die Geschichte der Slowakei (Bratislava: Grenzenbote Verlag, 1930). Robert Nowak, Der Kiinstliche Staal: Ostprobleme der Tschecho-Slowakei (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling, 1938). 44 "To the Supreme Council of the League of Nations at Geneva," SlA Cabinet, F: Supreme Council of the l eague of Na tions at Geneva, 1932, SI. 40 SLOVAKIA 2019 which they responded with loyalty and support. Masaryk then betrayed them, treating the Slovaks "in step-mother fashion, nay, even like slaves," having lured them into "an invisible net of imperialistic aspirations, renounced openly that which is to every nation and to us 'ignorant' Slovaks inviolable, priceless, sacred." It bemoaned that the Slovaks again felt endangered in their national existence, and how the Czechs misled the world on the issue. It appealed for Masaryk "to acknowledge and fulfill that which you had promised us, the American Slovaks," for the sake of Czech-Slovak unity and the secu45 rity of the state. This letter elicited a response from the Slovak-American centralists. The National Slovak Society, the Slovak Sokol, and assorted editors produced a counter response to Masaryk, which they then sent to Coolidge and Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes. This document asserted open support for the idea that the Czechs and Slovaks were one nation. It criticized the SCF letter for having "a spirit of narrow sectarianism," in contrast to "the great majority of the American Slovaks," who supported Masaryk "heart and soul." The document praised Masaryk and the Czechoslovak state for bringing cultural and economic development to Slovakia and it mentioned the centralist Slovaks in the government as a sign of Czech inclusiveness. The text also apologized for the Czech administration of Slovakia, bemoaning that Slovakia lacked enough competent officials. It then claimed that Prague had carried out the Pittsburgh Agreement in full , adding that "during the war neither the Czechs nor the Slovaks demanded self-determination for each separately; they demanded self-determination for the Czechoslovaks." 46 To the frustration of the Slovak autonomists, this campaign barely registered among U.S. officials in Washington. American officials at the U.S. Embassy in Prague paid slightly more attention, although most addressed it only passively and most often from the Czechoslo45 Slovak Catholic Federation of America, Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk, President of the Czecho-S/ovak Republic (Slovak Catholic Federation of America : 1923). Found in : "Einstein to SoS, No. 611 ," 20 February 1924, F#: 860F.0l / 162, DoS CS 1910-44. The New York Times reported on the letter: " Slovak Protest to All Nations," New York Times, Mar. 12, 1924, 34. 46 National Slovak Society, et al. , An Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk, President of Czechoslovakia ( I 924), in "Joseph Jan eek to Coolidge," 3 May 1924, F# : 860F.0l / 164, Dos cs 1910-44 SLOVAKIA 2019 41 vakist perspective. The American Ambassador during the 1920s, Lewis Einstein, for example, reported on the SCF letter, misrepresenting it as "a violent indictment of Czech policy in Slovakia," and praised Prague for "accomplishing there a work of civilization. By introducing education and schools in a population where a high degree of illiteracy existed, by bringing in public hygiene, orderly justice and a better fiscal system, they are laying the foundations for the future. " Accordingly, in his view the Slovaks only needed proper education to unify with the Czechs . Ultimately, "Only one thing can be excluded, which is Slovakian autonomy." 47 In another attempt at outreach, Adam Podkrivacky as President of the FCSU wrote to John Hickerson, acting Chief of Western European Affairs at the U.S . State Department. Podkrivacky complained about the U.S. Consul General in Prague sending out correspondence to Slovakia in the Czech language instead of Slovak. He also requested that the State Department use the hyphen when writing 'Czecho-Slovakia. ' Podkrivacky then supplied Hickerson a copy of an autonomist political pamphlet, to "acquaint better with the political situation just as it exists between the Slovaks and the Czechs in Czecho-Slovakia." Hickerson forwarded the letter to the embassy in Prague and asked for a report on the Slovak question. Charge d' affaires J. Web Benton responded, declaring the letter unacceptable due to the threat posed by Czechoslovakia's neighbors. He also made the usual ethnographic arguments, adding how "Czech culture has contributed measurably to the advancement of Slovakia," and predicted the issue would dissipate. Benton dismissed the pamphlet as simply "anti-government propaganda ... the request for autonomy, in the sense of a separate parliament as mentioned in the Pittsburgh Pact, is something that no truly patriotic and far-seeing Slovak could at present afford to advocate." He added, "I assume that the Department will pay no further attention to his communications, but it seems not inopportune to observe that Czech is the official language of this country."48 While a few U.S. diplomats from the period, notably Lewis Einstein, came to develop a more nuanced view on the topic, this ended each time new embassy staff took over. 47 "Einstein to SoS , No . 611 ," DoS CS 1910-44. "Adam Podkrivac ky to John Hickerson," 29 March 1937, F#: 860F.0l / 18 1, DoS CS 1910-44. " Movement for Slovak Autonomy," 30 April 1937, F#: 860F .01 /184, DoS CS 1910-44. 48 42 SLOVAKIA 2019 The dismissal of Slovak-American pleas stood in contrast to a disproportionate concern among American officials about the proHungarian Slovaks living abroad. The Rothermere campaign spurred some interest, and while some Americans expressed some sympathy to it, including chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee William Borah and publisher William Randolph Hearst, the U.S. Embassy in Prague wrote profusely about how the Slovaks remained opposed to a return to Hungary. When the exiled nationalist communist Slovak Vince Mihalus created an exile Slovak government in 1928, the State Department gave him disproportionate consideration, even though he held little popular support in Slovakia. Jehlicka reached out to Washington, calling for support against "Czech tyranny" and requesting support for recognition of the Slovaks as a minority in the League of Nations. The Czechoslovak embassy directed the State Department in its response, simply informing U.S. officials that Jehlicka only organized a "small number of Slovak renegades, mostly of Hungarian origin." 49 This flurry of publishing was very much a product of the widespread transatlantic interaction between Slovakia and the United States, as Slovak leaders on both sides of the Atlantic travelled between Europe and North America as they attempted to coordinate common political action. In the early 1920s, Prague still had hopes of guiding the Slovak-Americans to the centralist cause, despite the sentiment building against it. One major effort was the creation of a Slovak League in Slovakia by centralist Slovaks, designed to serve 49 Czechoslovak Ambassador Vladimir Hurban exchanged several letters with Hearst on the issue, facilitated by the State Department, eventually convincing Hearst to no longer give a voice to Rothermere and his supporters. "Einstein to SoS, No. 1355," 30 July 1927, F#: 860F.4016/4, DoS CS 1910-44. "J. Butler Wright to SoS, No. 62," 15 Oct 1927, F#: 860F.4016/9, DoS CS 1910-44. "Vladimir Hurban to William Randolph Hearst," 27 May 1937, & " Hurban to Cordell Hull," 4 June 1937, F#: 860F.00/437 & 438 , DoS CS 1910-44. "Council of State of Slovakia to SoS," 6 Nov 1928, F#: 860F.01 / 171 & 172, DoS CS 1910-44. "Nelson Torsler Johnson to Einstein," 28 Jan 1929, F#: 860F.01 / 171 , DoS CS 1910-44. "Gittings to SoS, No. 1747," 28 Feb 1929, F#: 860F.0l/173, DoS CS 1910-44. "Gittings to SoS, No. 1756," 9 Mar 1929, F#: 860F.0l / 174, DoS CS 1910-44. "Washburn to SoS, No. 2153." "Einstein to SoS, No. 516," 20 Sep 1923, F#: 860F.00/2 14, DoS CS 1910-44. "SoS to Geneva and Prague," 30 July 1933, F#: 860F.00/345, DoS CS 1910-44. "Prentiss B. Gilbert to SoS, No. 650," 8 Aug 1933 , F#: 860F.00/346, DoS CS 191044. "SoS to Geneva and Prague," 29 Aug 1933, F#: 860F.00/346, DoS CS 1910-44. SLOVAKIA 2019 43 as a counterpart to the SLA and to build common action across the Atlantic. This effort failed, however, after the Slovak League of America refused to cooperate with it. 50 With autonomist sentiment among the American Slovaks sharpening, Prague sent Slovak centralist leader Vavro Srobar to the United States in 1923. While Srobar attempted to unify the Slovak-Americans behind centralism, his visit had the opposite effect of galvanizing the Slovak-American autonomists. Srobar received support from sympathetic groups such as the Slovak Sokol, but the SLA and other autonomist organizations boycotted his speeches. Prague sent other figures to agitate for centralism, including the priest Jozef Rudinsky and agrarian politician Fedor Ruppeldt. Seton-Watson also reached out to the SlovakAmericans in several letters and later in a visit in 1935 , during which he appealed to the Slovak-Americans to encourage the Slovaks in . · 51 SI ova k ia against autonomy. The efforts by centralists did not change the status quo, as the Slovak-American autonomists remained firm in their opinions and openly repudiated centralist arguments. Pankuch, for example, felt that the only result of Srobar's visit was to destroy Czech-Slovak 52 unity and the internal unity of the Slovak-Americans. Ruppelt in tum complained how even among the Slovak Lutherans he constantly had to fight against autonomist sentiment. 53 With the dividing lines firmly set, the Slovak-American centralists and autonomists quit mutual involvement in each other's organizations and the centralists began a continuous propaganda campaign against the SLA backed by Prague. For example, after Slovak-American autonomists 50 Ignac Gessay, Kratke Dejiny S/ovenskej Ligy Na S/ovensku: od Zalozenia po 1. 0kt. 1926 (Bratislava: Slovenska Liga na Slovensku, 1926). "Nova ohlavka- stary kon. Pozor na Slovensku ligu!" 27 Oct 1924, Bratislava (No 68), in Jozef Tiso, Prejavy a Clanky (1913-193 8), eds. Miroslav Fabricius & Ladislav Susko (Bratislava: Historicky 'ustav SA V, 2002),), 196-7. 51 "An Appeal ," PF: Bie/ek, SI. Pankuch, Histo ry, 177-86. "Seton-Watson to Vojtech Mastny" (Doc 124), in Seton -Watson, 375-6. "Odkaz Scotus Viatora Americkym Slovakom" (Doc 125), in Seton-Watson, 377-80. "Seton-Watson to Stefan Osusky "' (Doc 128) & "Osusky to Seton-Watson" (Doc 129), in Seton-Watson, 3857. Mikus, "Slovak League," 46-7. Karol Sidor, Andrej Hlinka, 1864-1926 (Bratislava: Knihtlaciarne Sv. Andreja, 1934), 503-5 . Palickar, "Czech and Slovak." Tomas Capek, Nase Amerika (Prague: Nakladem Narodni Rady Ceskoslovenske, 1926), 113. 52 Pankuch, History, 180. 53 " Fedor Ruppeldt to Seton-Watson" (Doc 149), in Seton-Watson, 441-2 . 44 SLOVAKIA 2019 confronted him, Srobar reportedly lashed out at them as "knownothing drunkards" and traitors against the Republic. 54 While the Slovaks in America had been legitimate Slovaks when Masaryk needed them during the war, once they became a threat, the centralists began to categorize them as United States citizens, whose influence should not extend beyond America. 55 When the Czechoslovak Government offered a special commendation to the SLA on Czechoslovakia's l 0th anniversary in 1928, for its role in the creation of the state, the Slovak League of America rejected it. 56 The Slovak autonomists in Slovakia perceived things quite differently. Many Slovak nationalist leaders believed that the nation as an ethnic and cultural foundation transcended the state, and offered regular praise of the Slovak-Americans as fighters for Slovak liberty and autonomy. Figures such as Hlinka and Lutheran autonomist leader Emil Stodola openly praised the Slovak-Americans and their role in the fight for autonomy, and argued that their past actions allowed the American Slovaks an equal right to speak about the fate of the Slovak homeland. 57 SPP leader Jozef Tiso extolled, "In this (Pittsburgh) agreement we see the heritage of our own American brothers, for which we will fight with the honor and the tenacity of the Slovak spirit, which is not intimidated by prison, the malice of the world, nor the cynicism of centralist agents." Tiso praised the "real Slovak patriots," working in the "free air of America," and he even posited that the Slovak-Americans had a better claim to speak for the Slovaks than the Slovak centralists did, because the SlovakAmericans had made the revolution successful with their blood, treasure and propaganda.58 Slovak scholars also published multiple 54 "A. S. Ambrose to Seton-Watson" (Doc 126) in Seton-Watson, 381-2. "Aby uz raz bolo jasno a aby prestaly r6zne narknutia proti Slov. Lige," PF: Bielek, SI. 55 Masaryk, for example, used such logic to dismiss the Pittsburgh Agreement, which he called a "local understanding between American Czechs and Slovaks," whose "signatories were mainly American citizens, only two of them being nonAmericans." Masaryk, Making, 208-11. 56 Stolarik, Where is my Hom e?, 98 . 57 "Hlinka on Scotus Viator" (Doc 109), in Seton-Watson, 345-53. Emil Stodola, Pre/om: Spomienky, Uvahy, Studie (Praha: L. Mazac, 1933), 193-4. 58 "Novy vykrik bratov z Ameriky," 24 Feb 1924, Bratislava (No 43), in Tiso, Prejavy, 157-9. " Pittsburghska dohoda - neplatna?!" 29 May 1924, Bratislava (no 57), in Tiso, Prejavy, 179-80. "Parliamentary Speech," 25 Nov 1931, Prague (No I 64), in Ti so, Preja vy, 347. "Speech to Public Assembly of the Slovak People 's SLOVAKIA 2019 45 studies of the Slovak-Americans and their role m Slovak national development. 59 Slovak autonomists openly expressed these sentiments through regular trips to the United States. These attempts at direct engagement were nonetheless slow to start. Prague regularly prevented such trips, including the denial of a passport to Bishop Jan Vojtassak out of concern that he would agitate for autonomy and collect money for the SPP while in the United States. The barrier broke in 1926 when Hlinka accepted an invitation to visit America from editor Jozef Husek and the Friends of Slovak Freedom, sponsored by the SLA, the FCSU, and the First Catholic Slovak Ladies Union (FCSLU). Hlinka desired to visit the United States to thank the Slovak-Americans in person for their support for Slovak self-determination, to explain firsthand the political situation in Slovakia, and to encourage them to keep fighting. After stalling on the process, Prague ultimately relented to avoid the resulting outrage had they refused. They issued Hlinka a passport to attend the Eucharistic Congress in Chicago. Hlinka's visit lasted from June 5 to October 13. Although Hlinka expressed some trepidation that Slovak-American centralists would treat him with hostility, Slovak-American autonomist leaders Josef Husek and Anton Kompanek convinced him the experience would prove the opposite. This claim proved true, as Hlinka received hundreds of invitations to speak to overflowing crowds on each occasion. Demand was so high that, then SLA president Ivan Bielek had to write an article emphasizing Hlinka's time limitations to try to tame expectations. During his visit, Hlinka travelled around the U.S. East and Midwest, visiting local Slovak communities. He regularly attended and celebrated Mass and held meetings with SlovakAmerican organizations, including the SLA from whom he received an honorary membership . Hlinka visited assorted Slovak-American institutions, surveying Slovak-American newsrooms, printeries, Party," 18 August 1937 & 25 August 1937, Bratislava (No 251 & 252), in Tiso, Prejavy, 523-4. "Nase narodnopo liticke palladium," 5 June 1938 (No 260), in Tiso, Prejavy, 543-4. Kon stantin Culen, Po Sviitop/ukovi druha nasa h/ava: Zivot Dr. Jozefa Tisu (Cleveland: First Catholic Slovak Union, 1947), 182-3. 59 Jozef Rudinsky, V Amerike a doma (Ruzomberok: Rudinsky, 1921 ). Karol Sidor, S/ovaci v zahranicnom odboji (Bratislava: Jednota, 1928). Matica Slovenska, S/ovenskej verejenosti v Amerike (Mati ca slovenska , 1937). Konstantin Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda (Bratislava: Knihtlaciarei'l Andreja, 193 7) . 46 SLOVAK.IA 2019 schools, and churches. Overall, Hlinka held rallies at 80 locations, gave 200 speeches, and visited more than 100 Slovak parishes. Hlinka's visit spurred a level of excitement and activity among the Slovak-Americans that would never recur. 60 Hlinka kept his goal of directly exposing the Slovak question during his visit. He regularly spoke on the issue, and carried a copy of a censored Slovak nationalist newspaper as evidence. During his visit, Hlinka could not help but contrast the image of America with his experience in Czechoslovakia. In one such speech, he made clear that the Slovaks .. . would prefer not to quarrel with the Bohemians, but when they preach democracy and at the same time practice deceptions and aggression, we have no choice but to oppose them ... America is a superior nation and a master democratic republic. It has a splendid constitution which not only guarantees the rights and liberties to the people, but sees that they get them as well. Hlinka likewise extolled the "firm individuality" that the SlovakAmericans had gained, and he highlighted the sense of natural connection between Slovaks and Americans. "A good Slovak who comes to America makes a good American, and all good SlovakAmericans, including the new generations born in America from Slovak extraction will appreciate what they have inherited from their Slovak ancestry. Neither will they forget Slovakia." In his farewell speech, Hlinka expressed how the Slovak-Americans had filled him with national pride. He affirmed, "I saw the large affl uence of Slovaks, these Slovaks who under the Tatras suffered from hardship and physical and spiritual want," and prai sed how they helped sustain the Slovak nation. He finally asked of them, "do not forget that under the Tatras stand your cradle and your old homeland, our hard-tested and suffering Slovakia!" 61 60 Adamec, "Slovak Catholic Federation ," 223-32. Sidor, Hlinka, 503-5, 510-1 I, 543 -52 . Sidor, "The Slovak League," 57-9. Mikus, "S lovak League," 46-7 . Jozef Pauco, "75 Years of the First Catholic Slovak Union," Furdek, 5 ( 1966), 65 -74. 61 Palickar, " Monsignor Hlinka- The Man," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism , 51-6, 55 . Palickar, " My Interview with Msgr. Hlinka," in Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 56-9. Sidor, Andrej Hlinka, 543-52. SLOVAKIA 2019 47 In the 1930s, the Slovak-Americans experienced a few more visits from notable figures. One such visit was from the Slovak cultural organization Matica slovenska, in 1935 . The Slovak-Americans had regular contact with the Matica in the 1920s and there remained regular efforts to create an American branch of the organization.62 With the outbreak of the Great Depression, however, interest and funding for Slovak cultural programs in America declined. The Matica decided a visit to America was necessary to reverse thi s process, which they interpreted as the Slovak-Americans becoming too Americanized. The organization ' s director, the writer Jozef C. Hronsky, led the delegation, but it also included historian Konstantin Culen, and the artist Jozef Cincik, among others. These individuals gave many lectures and supplied ample literature and art, including a donation of libraries of Slovak material to the cities of New York, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and Chicago.63 While they found that some second and third generation Slovak-Americans had lost touch with Slovak culture, the delegates gave high praise to the Slovak-Americans for the interest they showed in the lectures, music, art and other cultural information the Matica provided. The experience led Culen to adopt the task of writing a history of Slovak-Americans. The linguist Jozef G. Konus likewise noted how "the Slovak spirit opens up more in free America than the lush fantasie s at home could imagine." When the White House wrote a statement for a Slovak-American information brochure praising the Slovaks as a "healthy minded, freedomloving and determined people," the Matica hailed it as evidence of Slovak democratic bona tides. Ultimately, the delegation praised the trip as very much a success, and took back ample material on the Slovak-Americans for placement in the Slovak National Library. The Matica left satisfied that Slovak culture remained firm in America, although it put pressure on the Slovak-Americans to improve their direct cultural linkages with the homeland. 64 62 To see many examples of this communicati on, see: The Ma tica slovenskti, Martin, Slovakia, re: American Slovaks Papers, IHRC . 63 According to Mark Stol arik, th e Mati ca brought 84 crates of books, totaling 4 I ,000 volumes, while visiting 98 separate Slovak-American communities. Stolarik, Wh ere is my Home?, 96-100. 64 "Vianoce Maticnej delegacie," Slovensko, 2, 5 & 6 (Jan-Feb 1936), 87-8. Konstantin Culen, "Co m6ze dat' Amerika slovenskej historii ," Slovensko, 2, 7 (Mar 1936), 87-8. Jozef C. Hronsky, " Mati ca v Amerike," Slovensko, 2, 7 (March 1936), 110-13. Jozef G. Konus, " Matica v Amerike," Slovensko, 2, 7 (Mar 1936), I I6-18 . 48 SLOVAK.IA 2019 The final major figure to visit America was the Reverend Jozef Tiso in 1937, with the Catholic cultural organization Spolok Sv. Vojtecha. Much like Hlinka, Tiso celebrated mass and heard confessions during his visit, spoke at public assemblies and met with many American priests, journalists, and Slovak-American leaders. He also attended other broader Catholic events, including the National Catholic Welfare Conference, and met with the Papal delegation in Washington, D.C. Tiso made a broad effort to learn about American political life, to determine what Slovak leaders could transfer back to Slovakia. He particularly admired American technical prowess in organization and publishing, which he saw as facilitating a more efficient Catholic organization and action, and conceptualized a plan to send young Slovak leaders to America to learn American methods of organization. Tiso also praised the Slovak-American sense of independence and pride in their Slovak identity. Seeing how the Slovaks had developed on independent terms in the vast American melting pot, Tiso interpreted the Slovak-American experience as proof of Slovak capabilities and their merit for self-determination. Tiso never gave up his sense of solidarity with the Slovak-Americans, and referenced his visit to affirm his desired direction for the Slovaks. 65 The only visit to the United States by a Slovak official to gamer much attention from Washington was Srobar's in 1923. American diplomat Einstein provided notice of the visit, adding that it was "doubtless intended to counteract the seditious anti-Czech propaganda which has been going on for some time both in Slovakia, where it is fomented by Magyar intrigues, and among the Slovak clericals in the United States." Although, he noted that the Slovak autonomy movement remained "noisy and violent in its methods but unaided it can do little and it is not at present causing here any serious conJozef G. Konu s, "Matica v Amerike," Slovensko, 2, 7 (Mar 1936), 116-18. Jozef Hronsky, "Na margo americkeho zapisnika," S/o vensko, 2, IO & I I (June-July 1936), 177-80. Jozef Cincik, "Na margo americkeho zapisnaka," Slo vensko , 2, IO & 11 (June-July 1936), 181-6. " Maticna vystava v Clevelande," Slo vensko, 2, IO & 11 (June-July 1936), 181-4. " President Roosevelt pozdravuje slovensky narod," Slovensko , 2, 5 & 6 (Jan-Feb 1936), 79. "Slovenska Amerika sa hybe," S/ovensko, 4, 3 (Nov 1937), 32-3. "SLA to Sku ltety, I June 1935,".PF: Mamatey, SI. Stolarik, "Slovak League." J.A. Berta, "Slovak America and the Matica Slovenska," Furdek, 23 (1984), 163-71. 65 Culen, Po Sviiloplukovi, 182-9. "Speech about the state account balance from 1926," 23 February 1938, Prague (No 258), in Tiso, Prejavy, 533-6. SLOVAKIA 2019 49 cem." 66 Several Slovak-American autonomists wrote to the State Department to complain about Srobar's visit, including a letter from a Slovak-American World War I veteran asking the Department to halt Srobar's lectures for sowing discord among the Slovaks in the United States. The most notable letter, however, came from the Reverend John Porubsky on behalf of the Slovak Newspapermen's Association. Porubsky criticized Srobar's claimed "cultural visit" as a ruse to propagandize on behalf of Czechoslovakism. He presented it as part of an effort by Prague, "To inoculate the masses of our people in America as a contracting party with such misconception and ethnographical nonsense," and to discredit the Pittsburgh Agreement. Claiming that Srobar "forgot the scope of his mission, even forgot himself in outbursts against leading Slovak American gentlemen, calling them vile names unworthy of a man of his position," Porubsky asked Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes to have him expelled from the country.67 This effort also spurred a response by Prague and its allies in the United States. These letters, in an organized campaign, all repeated versions of the same arguments. They complained that the opposition to Srobar consisted of "Jesuits and Bolsheviks" and other "enemies of the state" that were working for Czechoslovakia's destruction. Srobar was, alternatively, a great statesman fighting against them to bring cultural development to Slovakia. They also personally targeted Porubsky and the Slovak Newspapermen's Association: "The great majority of intelligent American Slovaks are heart and soul in accord with Dr. Srobar's patriotic works; only the ignorant and reactionary masses are ignobly and ignorantly supporting the destructive work of Rev. Porubsky and his few brawling associates." 68 Likewise, the Slovak Sokol, which had arranged Srobar's visit from the American end, took credit for the visit, praising how Srobar had "proved to 66 " Einstein to SoS, No. 502 ," 29 Aug 1923, F#: 860F .0 I/ I 48, DoS CS 1910-44. "John Porubsky to Charles Evans Hughes," 31 Oct 1923 , F#: 860F.0 l/149, DoS CS 1910-44. "John J. Nedorostek to Hughes," 13 Nov 1923 , F#: 860F.01/150, DoS cs 1910-44. 68 "V. Krali cek to Hughes," 12 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0l / 151 , DoS CS 1910-44. "J. Joscak to Hughes," 14 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0l / 154, DoS CS 1910-44. "Henry Russek to Hughes," 15 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0l/156, DoS CS 1910-44. "C lement lhrisky & Joscak to Hughes," 15 Nov 1923 , F#: 860F.0 l/152, DoS CS 1910-44. " Michael Kovalovsky to Hughes," 16 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0 1/157, DoS CS 1910-44. " Michael Olsavicki to Hughes," 19 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0 1/ 155, DoS CS 1910-44. 67 50 SLOVAKIA 2019 the Slovaks of America that any fears as to the future of their former country are unfounded." 69 The State Department only sent back formulaic verification of receipts to these letters, except for one to John Zeman of the Slovak Sokol, thanking him for "setting forth the real purposes of the visit." William Phillips then requested President Coolidge to meet with Srobar, calling him "one of the five men who founded the Republic of Czechoslovakia," to which Coolidge obliged. 70 In 193 7, the Reverend Francis Dubosh of Lakewood, Ohio, attempted to arrange a meeting between officers of the SCF A, Jozef Tiso, and President Roosevelt, with the help of Monsignor Michael J. Ready at the Catholic University of America. The White House staff supported this meeting, but Roosevelt wanted to first confirm with the State Department so as not "to get mixed up in a Slovak controversy." After consulting with Czechoslovak Ambassador Vladimir Hurban, the State Department reported that the embassy made no official complaint, but that they themselves discouraged the visit with "the opinion that these persons are not of sufficient prominence for the President to receive them." After a back and forth in consideration of the issue, the White House ultimately declined, claiming 71 that the President was simply too busy. The Slovak-Americans also visited Slovakia. The most significant of these occurred in 193 8 in the tense period leading up to the Munich Agreement, when the Slovak League sent a delegation to celebrate the 20 th anniversary of the Pittsburgh Agreement. Led by its President, Peter P. Hletko, the delegation, as a deliberate gesture, made its first formal visit in Slovakia to Andrej Hlinka in Rufomberok. The delegation travelled into Slovakia through Poland, to 69 "J. Zeman to Hughes," 18 Nov 1923 , F#: 860F.01 / 153 , DoS CS 1910-44. "W. R. Castle to Association of Slovak Newspapermen of America," 6 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0l / l49, DoS CS 1910-44. "J. B. Wright to Kralicek," 20 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0l/15I, DoS CS 1910-44. "Castle to Joscak," 20 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.01/l54, DoS CS 1910-44. "Castle to Zeman," I Dec 1923, F#: 860F.0l / l53 , DoS CS 191044. "William Phillips to G. B. Slemp, 12 Nov 1923," & "Slemp to Phillips, 12 Nov 1923," Coolidge Papers, Series I, 742. 71 "Roosevelt to M. H. McIntyre, 22 Oct 1937," " McIntyre to George F. Summerlin, 23 Oct 193 7," "Spruks to Summerlin, 27 Oct 193 7," "McIntyre to Roosevelt, 29 Oct 1937," "McIntyre to Summerlin, 3 Nov 1937," President 's Personal File (PPF), F: 639, Slovak Catholic Federation of America, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (FDR), Hyde Park, New York. 70 SLOVAKIA 2019 51 avoid Prague and Bratislava, and the Polish government hosted the delegation on their way through. Both the Slovak autonomists and the Slovak centralists sent representatives to corral them before they entered Slovakia. The centralists were, however, sent back early after Warsaw and Slovak-Americans embraced the SPP delegation as the official one. After arriving in Slovakia, the delegation showed the original of the Pittsburgh Agreement to Hlinka and spent most of the trip associating with the Slovak autonomists. Its activities included several visits to the Matica slovenska in Martin, to which it gifted an authenticated copy of the Pittsburgh Agreement and made clear commitments toward transatlantic cultural programs, including joint publications and a transatlantic cultural council. Prime Minister Milan Hodza also led a continued effort to meet and work with the visiting delegation, believing he could convince them to break their close affiliation with the SPP and align with the Agrarians instead. Out of respect, the delegation did meet with centralist officials, including Hodza and President Eduard Benes, whom they encouraged the granting of autonomy to Slovakia for the sake of unity in those very tense times. In a speech in Prague, Hletko made clear their objectives stating, "Our love for Slovakia and the Czechoslovak Republic has induced us to come here. The object of the Pittsburgh Declaration, the original of which we have brought with us, is not to weaken but to strengthen the Republic ." 72 When describing his meetings, Hletko said that Hodza promised a movement towards autonomy, yet Prague still rejected them. 73 Likewise, Ivan Derer was extremely critical of the SlovakAmericans during their visit, accusing them of having been brainwashed. He also dismissed them as representing a small, vocal minority, and smeared them as deliberate Hungarian, German, or Polish agents, if not otherwise simply duped by the machinations of these neighboring rivals. Derer complained, "This delegation, composed most of autonomists, expressed its separatist convictions during every opportunity, expressed anti-Czech interests, made light of work of 72 "Visit of American Slovak Delegation to Jubilee Congress, Bratislava; Slovak Demands for Autonomy," 6 June 1938, F#: 860F.00/534, DoS CS 1910-44. 73 Hletko, "The Slovaks," 5-54. "Narodna Politika Roku 1938 : Ked Bol P. Hletko na Slovensku," B: Karol Sidor - Diplomat 1901-1958 - Vol 2, SI. Pavel KuklisKunovsky, Ako je na Slovensku ? Z vlastnych skusenosti napisa/ a vydal v mesiaci )uni /940 v Pittsburghu, Pa., U.S.A. (Pittsburgh: Narodne noviny, 1940), 4-7. 52 SLOVAK.IA 2019 the Czechoslovak government successes in Slovakia, ironized Czechoslovak oriented Slovaks." He was extremely derisive of Hletko, accusing him of not being truly Slovak, having been born in the United States, and as being "politically inexperienced, unknowledgeable about the conditions of Europe, Czechoslovakia and Slovakia." 74 The SLA visit culminated in the Jubilee Congress for the anniversary of the Pittsburgh Agreement on June 4, 1938 in Bratislava. A massive rally was organized where Hlinka, Tiso, and Hletko, among others, gave speeches. A large facsimile of the Pittsburgh Agreement surrounded on each side by the American and Slovak flags served as a backdrop. In his speech, Hletko showed the original copy of the Pittsburgh Agreement to the crowd, and praised the attention given to the Agreement. A formal proposal by the SPP in the Czechoslovak Parliament to amend the constitution to implement Slovak autonomy then followed. The centralists, led by Hodza, held a counter-rally two days later. They declared the rally more ambiguously as a celebration of the Slovak farmer, although Prague and the centralists promoted the event afterwards as a pro-state rally in opposition to autonomy. The SLA delegation also attended this celebration and Hletko gave a speech, simply affirming that the SLA continued to work for Slovak freedom . Hletko later claimed that the delegation warned the Czech and Slovak leaders they had met about the need to come to an accommodation on the Slovak question, in favor of autonomy, fearing that the issue might become larger with Adolph Hitler rattling his saber. Hletko claimed, however, that no one took this warning seriously. The delegation departed shortly before Hlinka's death in August of 1938, but the SPP sent a piece of earth from Hlinka's graveside to America. 75 74 Ivan Derer, S/ovensky vyvoj a /ud'acka zrada (Prague: K vasnicka a Hamp) , 1946), 183-9 . Derer was convinced the SLA was part of a Polish conspiracy to absorb Slovaki a, led by Karol Sidor. The SLA, however, openly rebuked Polish calls for absorption of Slovakia during its stop th ere. 75 The exact number of participants in each rally is unclear, but most accounts reflected similar participation rates (around one hundred thousand each) and photos of the Slovak Jubilee show a massive crowd. The urn containing the soil is still on display at the Slovak Institute in Cleveland. Hletko, "The Slovaks," 5-54. " Wilbur Carr to SoS, no 122," 9 June 1938, F#: 860F.00/518, DoS CS 1910-44. " Farmers' Day at Bratislava; Demonstration of Slovak Branch of Czechoslovak Agrarian Party," IO June 1938, F#: 860F.00/531 , DoS CS 1910-44. " Po odchode delegatov Slov- SLOVAKIA 2019 53 The U.S. Embassy took an interest in the SLA visit to Czechoslovakia in 1938, and U.S . Ambassador Wilbur Carr agreed to meet with the delegation. Carr reported that the visit was cordial and that the delegation affirmed to him that its visit was simply to promote good will and it did not desire to interfere in domestic issues in Czechoslovakia. Carr then stated that the SLA's visit to Czechoslovakia annoyed Prague, due to the enflamed minority issues of the time, but that Czechoslovak officials tried to maintain good will with the delegation, although this sentiment "lacked a ring of sincerity." Accordingly, Hletko admitted to Carr that the timing was not the best, but that it was not by design, since they had come simply for the anniversary celebration. Carr expected no harm from the visit. While Carr described the autonomy proposal and reported statements by Hletko and Jozef Rusek complementing the support of the Pittsburgh Agreement among the Slovaks, he countered by providing the text of an anti-autonomy speech by Derer and a section of Masaryk' s memoirs. Carr then misrepresented the Slovak-Americans as having felt embarrassed for having been "utilized by the Hlinka Party for partisan and election purposes." While Carr reported on each of the two rallies, he praised the Farmer's Day as turning into "a spontaneous demonstration of Czechoslovak unity, homage to Benes, and allegiance and confidence in its leader," hostility to autonomy, and featuring a much larger participation.76 While Czech and Slovak centralists worked to keep the SlovakAmericans at a distance after early efforts to court them failed, the Slovak autonomists on both sides of the Atlantic worked around Prague to coordinate their activities. Nevertheless, the autonomists had no means of pushing Prague towards changes on the Slovak question. The Slovak autonomists, however, continued their fight and never gave up. The transatlantic Slovak question during the interwar period established the roots for the eventual Slovak-Czech split. The failure to find a compromise between Slovak autonomists and centralists saw an entrenched distrust that contributed to the fall of the First Republic . When the Munich Agreement formally handed the enskej Ligy v Amerike," Slovensko, 5 ( I 939), 16-17. Sidor, "The Slovak League," 59-62. 76 "Carr to SoS , no 112," 31 May 1938, F#: 860F.00/5 l 0, DoS CS 1910-44. "Visit of American Slovak." "Carr to SoS, no 121 ," 8 June 1938, F#: 860F.00/517, DoS CS 1910-44. "Carr to SoS , No 122." "Farmers ' Day. " 54 SLOVAKIA 2019 Sudetenland to Germany in September of 1938, the Slovak autonomists in Slovakia demanded and received autonomy until the new SPP-led government there declared independence on March 14, 1939, following Nazi Germany's invasion of Bohemia and Moravia. Slovak-American autonomists, although distrustful of Nazi Germany, openly embraced the shift toward Slovak autonomy in the shortlived Second Republic, believing they could no longer trust the Czechs. Peter Hletko, for example, cheered how the Slovaks had "fought and won the victory." 77 Although initially hesitant to support complete independence, most Slovak-American autonomists, the moderates excepted, came to support the World War II Slovak State as a symbol of Slovak self-determination, even as they supported Allied victory in the war. While World War II and the subsequent Cold War limited direct linkages between Slovakia and North America, the same rifts on the Slovak question persisted on both sides of the Atlantic until the 1993 Velvet Divorce. 78 77 Jozef Pauco, "75 Years of the First Catholic Slovak Union," Furdek, 5 ( 1966), 6574. 78 For more on this topic during World War II and beyond, see: Michael Cude, Transatlantic Perspectives on the Slovak Question, I 9 I 4-/ 948 (PhD Diss., University of Co lorado-Boulder, 20 13 ). M. Mark Stolarik, Wh ere is my Home? Slovak Immigration to North America (/870-2010) (Bern: Peter Lang, 2012). M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak League of America and the Canadian League in the Struggle for the Self-determination of the Nation, 1907-1992," Slovakia, 39, 72 & 73 (2007), 7-35.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Transatlantic Slovak Question during the Interwar Years Description An account of the resource Michael Cude Slovakia, Vol. 44 (No. 82-83), 2019 pp. 18-54 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Cude, Michael Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 LCNAF