1 50 9 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/ec550c677d62ab56f7bdecb75deac4df.pdf 5b42a7eefdb03b512ec55b30ecbbf712 PDF Text Text 52 SLOVAKIA The Autonomy Discourse in Parliamentary Debates during the First Czechoslovak Republic and after the Velvet Revolution 1 E li sabeth Bakke " We approve the political progra m, w hi ch e ndeavors to unite the Czec hs a nd Slovaks in[to] an indepe nd e nt state of the Czech la nd s and Slovakia. Slovakia sha ll ha ve its own ad mini strati o n, its ow n parli ament and its own courts. The Slovak language shall be the officia l language in the sc hoo l[s], in office[sl and in public li fe in genera l. The Czecho-Slovak state sha ll be a republic , its constitution sha ll be democratic. [ ...] The detail ed reg ulati o ns for the estab lishment of the Czecho-Slovak state are left to the li berated Czechs and Slovaks and the ir lega l representati ves." The Pittsburgh Agreement of May 30th, 1918 2 ' An earli er version of thi s art icle was presented at the 34th National Conven ti on of the AAASS in Pittsburgh. 2 1- 24 November. 2002. 2 Thi s Agreeme nt was signed by the Slovak League of America . th e Czech National A lli ance. th e Al li ance of Czec h Ca th oli cs. representing Czech and Slovak emigrc organi zations in the USA. and T omas G. M asaryk. President of the Czechos lovak ati ona l Council in Pari s. I have quoted th e Engli sh version from The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact (Chicago: Th e Slova k Cath ol ic Federati on of America. 1934). 27. The Slovak ori gin al is reprinted in Edvard Benes. Svetov,i valka a nase revoluce. Vol. Ill (Dokumenty). (Prague: C in-Orbis . 1929) . 365. See also M. Mark Stolarik. 'The Role of Amer ican Slova ks in th e C rea tion of Czecho-S lovak ia. 19 14- 19 18"'. �SLOVAKIA 53 Slovak autonomy was on the agenda throughout Czechoslovakia 's 74 years of existence, from the beginning to the bitter end. Although it may be argued that inexperienced politicians, short deadlines , rigid constitutional amendment procedures and conflicting economic priorities also played a role in the breakup, the long-term conflict that drove Czechoslovakia apart were the closely-related matters of political autonomy and recognition of the Slovaks as a separate nation. 3 What was at stake was not only the institutional set-up and division of power; for the Slovaks, separate political institutions were also important symbols of national individuality and ownership to the shared Czecho-Slovak state. The roots of the conflict go back to the founding of Czechoslovakia in October of 19 I 8. The Czechs and Slovaks had no prior shared statehood tradition s (save perhaps Great Moravia in the ninth century), and independence was not even on the agenda before World War I. Starting in 1915, the independence movement abroad, with Tomas G. Masaryk at the helm, tried to convince the Allies that a Czechoslovak Republic should be established, invoking the principle of national self-determination on behalf of the "Czechoslovak nation. " In the First Czechoslovak Republic the idea that the Czechs and Slovaks were one nation (albeit with two tribes) became official state ideology , and it went hand-in-hand with political centralism. 4 Slovak Studies VIII (Rome, 1968) for a very interesting acco unt of the circumsta nces that led to its signin g and the subseq uent course of even ts in th e new lyfounded Repub lic. 3 For a discussion of the breakup see Eric Stein , Czecho/Slovakia. Ethnic Conflict, Constitutional Fissure. Negotiated Breakup (A nn Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997); Jirf Musil , ed., The End of Czechoslovakia (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995 ); Jan Rychlfk, Rozpad Ceskoslovenska . Cesko-slovenske vztahy 1989- 1992 (Bratis lava : AEP, 2002); Carol Skalnik Leff, The Czech and Slovak Republics. Nation Versus State (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997). 4 For details see Elisabeth Bakke, Doomed to Failure? The Czechoslovak Nation Project and the Slovak Autonomist Reaction 19/9- 1938 (Oslo: Series of Dissertations submitted to the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Un iversity of Oslo, no. 11 /1999). �SLOVAKIA 54 Howeve r, a sub sta nti al pa rt of th e Sl ova k po liti ca l e lite opposed both , de ma ndir.g recog nition of the Slovak nati on and autonomy fo r Slovaki a. The Pittsburgh Agreeme nt became important both beca use it defin ed the contents of Slovak a utonomy and because Masaryk had signed it. Afte r World War II , Czec hos lovaki sm was abandoned, but poli ti ca l centra li sm was not, and th e federali zati on of Czech os lov aki a aft er the Sov iet in vas ion in 1968 did not give Slovak po liti ca l insti tution s any rea l dec ision-m aking power. Afte r the Ve lvet Revo lution in 1989, political autonomy for Slovaki a reappeared on the agenda, and became a major iss ue in the di spute over C zechos lovaki a's new constitution . The main purpose of the present article is to co mpare the autonomy de bates durin g the First Republic and after the Ve lve t Re volu ti o n, in orde r to establi sh continuity and change. The research ques ti o ns are: I . How were the de mands fo r autonomy substa nti ated, and what were the main argume nts aga inst it? 2. Wh at role did the princ ipl e of nation al se lf-de te rmin ati on pl ay in the debates in the two peri ods? The First Re public was a unitary state , and autonom y as such was ne ver on the age nda of the Parliame nt in the interwar pe ri od. Of th e three a utonom y proposa ls th at made it to th e Parli a me nt, two were bl oc ked in committees, whil e the third was adopted without any de bate after th e fa teful Muni c h agree me nt in 1938. My analys is of the inte rwar di sco urse is th e refore based o n a se lec ti o n of govern me nt in a ugurati on de bates and budgetary debates, as we ll as c lippings from Slovak, the main autono mi st ne wspaper. 5 After 1989 seve ral de bates were re levant to the autono my di scourse: In the Federal Parliament I have analyzed the 1990 " hyphen de bate," the de bate on the compete ncy law , a nd the two de bates about the break-up of Czechos lovaki a in the fa ll of 1992. In the res- ' T he analys is of the debate in the interwar period is a condensed version of a part of Chapter 13 of my PhD di ssertat ion. For detai ls see Bakke (ibid. 1999). �SLOVAKIA 55 pec ti ve Czech and Sl ovak Nati onal Council s (Republi c Asse mblies), I have analyzed the 1992 debates on the Sl ovak D ecl aration of Sovereignty, the Slovak Con stitution, and the Czech Constituti on. I will structure the arti cle around the foll owin g three points: I . Th e in stituti onal set-up and th e contents of the autonomy demands. 2. The co mpos iti on and stability of the elite constellations on either side of the conflict. 3. The main arg uments a) in favor of autonomy and b) against autonomy. wi th spec ial emphas is on how they relate to the principle of nati onal sel f-determinati on. 1. The Institutional Set-up and the Contents of the Autonomy Demandi Czec hos lovakia was from the outset presented as the nati on-state of the Czechos lovak nation. 6 Thi s was codified in the 1920 Constituti on, which al so gave the First Czechos lovak Republic a unitary, centrali zed state form and a bi ca meral leg islature. Czec hos lovaki a was at first di vided into 22 co unties, but the county sys tem was implemented onl y in Sl ovaki a and fro m 1928 , four prov inces repl aced the counties (see tabl e I ). In the interw ar peri od, the demands for autonomy were defined in term s of separate Sl ovak instituti ons with dec ision-making powers in matters of vital importance for th e Slovaks as a nati on. The core demands were that Sl ovaki a should have " its own admini strati on, its own parli ament and its ow n co urts," cf. the Pittsburgh Ag reement. M ost of the autonomy proposa ls also included a separate Sl ovak government, but none of the three autonomy proposals that made it into the Parli ament went beyond an asymmetric federati on.7 " In reality. th e Czec hs and Slovaks togeth er comprised 65.5 percent of the populati on. Germans 23.4 percent. Magyars 5.6 percent. Ruthenians 3.5 percen t. Jews 1.4 perce nt. and Po les 0.6 percen t in the 1921 cens us. See Scftanr lidu v repub lice ceskosloven.~ke ze dne 15. unora I 921. Dfl I. (Prague: Statnf ufad statistick y. I 924 ). 7 See Bakke (ibid .. 1999). 465- 77 for a more detailed overv iew of the autonomy proposa ls. See also James Ramon Fe lak. '·A t the Price of the Republic ··. Hlinka ·s �SLOVAKIA 56 The 1938 Constitutional a me ndm ent that inaugurated the shortli ved Second Republi c was based on the third a utonomy proposal of the Slovak People 's Party, which had been submitted in August 1938. The Second Re public co mbined a federa l state form with separate Slovak institutions : a leg islat ive asse mbl y (D iet), a se parate administration and separate co urts. The Slovak gove rnme nt was acco untabl e to the Die t, and received exec uti ve power in all matters under its juri sdi ction , as we ll as many matters unde r central jurisdiction. Slovak became the officia l lang uage in S lovakia, and separate c iti zenship was introduced. After World War II , the Czechos lovak govern me nt recognized the S lovaks as a separate nati on a nd the Slovak National Co un ci l (w hi c h de fac to controlled the liberated parts of Slovakia) as its representative. An exec utive Board of Commissioners was also establi shed. However, through the three Prague agreements and the two first postwar constituti ons, Slovak institution s were gradua ll y stripped of their power and co mpete nce, and Czechoslovakia return ed to a centrali st, unitary state fo rm , with a unicamera l leg is lature. 8 Part of the reaso n for the c la mpdow n o n the Slovak organs was the victory of the De mocratic Party in the 1946 e lectio ns, w hi c h convinced the Communists th at Slovakia could not be tru sted. 9 Slovak People ·s Party. 1929-J 938 (Pi tt sburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, I 994). especially pp. 30, 80- 1, 19 1- 92. ij The 1960 Constitution aboli shed the Board of Commissioners. See Program prve dom;Jcf v/ady repub liky vlady narodnf fronty Cechu a Slovaku, (Prag ue: Mini sterstvo l nformacf. 1945). I 6-17: Jaros lav Chovanec & Peter Mozolfk, Historicke a statopravne korene sa mostatn ost i slovenskej republiky , (Yydavatel's tvo Procom , Brati slava, 1994), 38, 11 4- 122; Michal Barn ovsky. " Tri prazske dohody", in Cesko- slovenske vztahy - Slovensko-ceske vzthhy (Liberec: Technick a Un i verzi ta, 1998). 119 ff.: Elisabeth Bakke, "The Principle of National Self-de termination in Czechoslovak Consti tuti ons 1920- 1992" . CEPSR. no. I O (2002), 173- 98 . 9 The Democratic Party received 62 .0 percent of th e votes in Slovakia. See Michal Barnovsky & Edita l vanickova, eds, Prve povojnove volby v strednej a j uhovychod- nej Eur6pe (Bratislava: VEDA, 1998). 2 15- 18. �57 SLOVAKIA Table 1: State Form, Administrative Structure and Institutional Set-up in Czechoslovak Constitutions and Constitutional Amendments Year 1920 State-forming State form Administrative nation Czechoslovak Un itary 22 co unties : Centra lized, from 1928 four bicameral legislature nation Institutional set-up structure provinces 1938 Czech and Federal Slovak nations 1948 Czech and Unitary Slovak nations Four provi nces : Asymmetric: Bohem ia. M ora- bicamera l via, Slovak ia. & separate Slovak Sub-Carpathian instituti ons with Ruthenia extensi ve powers Two prov inces , Asy mmetric; The Czech lands unicamera l & separate and Slovak ia Slovak inst itutions with lim ited powers 1960 Czech and Uni ta ry Slovak nati ons Two prov inces, Asymme tric: unicame- the Czech lands ra l & separate Slovak and Slovak ia institut ions with more l imited powers 1968 Czech and Federal Slovak nations Two repub lics, Symmetric: bicameral, T he Czech Re- federa l & separate publ ic and the Czech and Slovak Slovak Republ ic institut ions Source: A ll cons titutions can be found in Sbfrka zakonii a naHzenf stalU ceskoslovenskeho. During the Prag ue Spring of 1968, the questi on of Slovak autonomy reappeared on the agenda. The initi ati ve to amend the constituti on ca me from the Slovak Nati onal Council , and thi s time a sy mmetri c so luti on was pro posed, sy mboli zing the equality of the two state-forming nati ons. 10 Accordin g to the 1968 Constitution, Czecho- ' 0 T he process towards federa li za ti on is doc umented in Jozef Za tk uli ak, Fede- ra lizacia Ceskoslovenskeho Staw 1968- 1970. Vznik Cesko-sl ovenskej fede racie �SLOVAKIA 58 slovakia became a federation of two republics, the Czech and th e Slovak Republic s, each with their ow n assemblies (National Councils), and their own govern ments. The bicameral federal legis lature consisted of the proporti onall y elected Chamber of the Peop le, and the Chamber of Nations where the two Republics were represented on equal terms. For important dec isions, a majority was req uired in the Peop le's chamber, as we ll as in the separate Czech and Slovak parts of the Chamber of Nations, in effect giving the Slovaks veto powers. The 1968 Constitution provided the in stitutional foundations for Slovak autonomy, but in practice the political system remained centralized. The original division of power in the 1968 Constitution changed in favor of the federal level during the "Normali zation " of th e early 1970s, and fo rmal decision-making rul es and divi sion of powers did not matter much during Communism . As Carol Skalnik Leff has pointed out, however, federation plu s democra ti zation was a power eq uation. 11 After the Velvet Revo lution in 1989, th e 1968 Constitution acquired new importance; first , it determined the procedures for the adoption of a new constitution (a three-fifths majority in all parts of the federal parliament), and second, it became the point of departure for the negoti ati ons about the contents of a new constitutional settl ement. Under th e new, democratic co nditi ons, the Slovak minorit y had an excell ent bargaining position , since any cons ti tutional settlement required Slovak co nsent. After 1989 the questi on was, therefore, not whether Slovakia should have autonomy, but the ex tent of that autonomy. Separate Slovak institutions were taken for roku 1968 (B rn o: Nak ladatelstvi Doplnek, 1996). See also Jaros lav Krejci & Pave l Machonin , Czechos lovakia 19/8- 92. A U1bora to1y for Social Change (London: Macmill an, I 996), 45-7: Chovanec & Mozolik, (op.cit. , I 994). 48-52: Ales Gerloch . Jiri Hrebej & Vladimir Zoubek. Us tavnf sys tem Ceske republiky ( Prague: Prospektrum, 1999). 51-4 : Carol Skalni k Leff, National Conf7ict in Czechoslo vakia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, I 988), 243 ff. 11 Leff, 132-33. �SLOVAKIA 59 granted, and autonomy now became a matter of allocating more decision-making power to the Republics. The " hyphen delJate" in the sprin g of 1990 was a foreboding of the problems that lay ahead. It was Pres ide nt Vaclav Havel who inadvertently started it. In Janu ary of 1990, without prior consultations, he submitted a constitutional amendment to the federal Parliament, proposing to drop the word "Soc iali st" from the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic . Much to hi s and many others' surpri se, thi s trigged a bitter di spute about whether the name of the Republic should be spelled with or without a hyphe n. The main alternatives were the "Czec ho-S lovak Republic ," favored by a majority of the Slovaks, and the "Czechoslovak Federal Republic ," favored by a majority of the Czechs. Stalemate in the federal Parliament at first resulted in the absurd dec ision to spe ll the word "Czechoslovak" in one word in the Czech Republic and with a hyphen in Slovakia. Thi s was presented as a concession to "S lovak grammar. " This deci sion caused demonstration s in Slovakia, after which the Parliament made a hasty retreat and settled for the "Czech and Slovak Federal Republic ." 12 Negotiations about a new Czechoslovak Constitution started after the elections in June of 1990, but soon ran into trouble. As before, the Czech political elite was generally in favor of more centralized solutions than the Slovaks. The difference was that the Czech majority , rea li zing that a unitary state was not an option , now favored a " function al federation," while the majority of the Slovak political elite increas ing ly leaned toward s confederal rather than federal so lutions. 13 A temporary settl e me nt was reached in the Competency Law 12 Milan Sutovec. Semi6za aka politikum alebo ·'pomlckova vojna." (Bra ti slava: Kalli gram , I 999). 299 ff. 13 Opinion polls cons istently showed th at th e public in the Czech Republic preferred a unitary state. with a federation as the second most popular option. while a confederation never exceeded 6 percent support. By con trast, a confedera ti on or a federation was th e preferred state form in Slovakia. See table 12.3. in Sharon L. Wolchik, ''The Politi cs of Transition and the Break-up of Czechos lovakia," in Jiff Musil. ed. , op.cit.. 235. �SLOVAKIA 60 of December 1990, whi c h more-or-less reestabli shed the co mpetency di vision of the 1968 Constitutio n. However, whil e thi s was abo ut as fa r as the Czechs we re w illing to go , the S lova ks looked at the Co mpete ncy Law merely as a po int of departure fo r further negoti ati ons. The core of the confli ct was the all ocati on of compe te nce and power in two specific areas: Eco nomi c po li cy a nd intern ati ona l re lations. The majority of the S lovak elite pressed fo r S lovak " visibility" in intern ati ona l rel ati ons, and wanted to all ocate more power in economi c matte rs to the Republics . The Czec h side wanted the federa l leve l to be stron g e nough to carry o ut the econo mi c reform s necessar y fo r th e tra ns iti o n to a market econo my, and wanted th e state internati onall y to speak with one vo ice . The negoti atio ns fa il ed to produce an acceptabl e co mpromi se befo re the 1992 elections, 14 and since the vic torious Czec h and Sl ovak parti es di sag reed fund ame nta ll y o n the iss ues of econo mic reform and state fo rm , they dec ided to di vide the state. It turn ed out th at both sides prefe rred a break-up rathe r than accepting the favo red state form of the othe r party, des pite the fac t that before the e lec ti ons, the future ex iste nce of Czec hos lovak ia was still ta ke n fo r granted . The onl y party th at advocated secess io n w as the Sl ova k Nationa l Party. 2. The Composition and Stability of the Elite Constellations In the inter- war peri od, the e lite conste ll atio ns fac in g eac h other were c lear-cut and quite stable. A clear majority of the Czec hos lovak parties was ce ntra li st a nd in fa vor of Czechoslo vaki sm. Thi s camp co mpri sed the e ntire Czech political e lite and a substanti al pa rt of the Slovak political e lite. Inte restingly, the major ce ntrali st pl ayers in the interw ar clashes about autonomy in the Parli ame nt were Slovak s, not Czec hs, a nd like th e ir adversaries, they were posin g as the c ha mpi ons of Slovak inte rests/the Slovak nati on. The two most influe nti al 14 T he negoti ators did reach a co mpromi se in the spring of 1992, but th is was turned down by th e pres idium of th e Slovak Nati onal Counci l. See Rychl fk , Roz pad. 2 18- 20. �SLOVAKIA 61 Slovak centrali sts were the Agrarian Mi Ian Hodza ( 1878- I 944) and the Social Democrat I van Derer ( 1884- 1973). They represented their parties in the Parli ament during the entire First Republi c and betwee n th em, the two men served as mini sters for 23 yea rs. Milan Hodza even became the first Slovak Prime Mini ster in 1935. Apart from these two, the A grarian Anton Stefanek ( I 877-1964) and the Czechoslovak National Socialist Igor Hrusovsky ( 1872- 1937), both seasoned parli amentari ans, played an espec iall y acti ve role in th e debates. By co ntrast, two Slovak parti es represented th e autonomist ca mp. arguing that the Slovaks were a nation of their own and, therefore, entitl ed to autonomy. 15 The larges t autonomi st party was the Slovak Peopl e's Party . Its co-founder and chairman Andrej Hlinka ( 1864- 1938), whose name was added to the party's title in 1925, was a dominatin g fi gure in the stru gg le for Slovak autonomy until hi s death in August of 1938. 16 Ferdinand (Ferdi s) Juriga ( 1878-1950) had been the onl y Slovak deputy in th e Hungari an Parli ament of 19 14 and he continued to defend Slovak autonomy in the Parliament also of the First Republi c. Jozef Ti so ( 1887- 1947) played an important role in the 1930s, as did editor-in-chief of Slovak, Karol Sidor ( 1901 - 53). The Slovak Nati onal Party never had more than one deputy - its chairman M artin Razus ( 1888- 1937) - and pl ayed a more peripheral role. After the Velvet Revolution, elite constellations were more vo latile. The Slovak political elite was from the outset divided on the quest ion of state form, the preferred so lution s ranging from mildl y federa li st to a loose confederat ion. From 1991 the Slovak National Party started to advocate independence, but already in 1990 th e chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement, Jan Carnogursky, argued th at Slovakia should enter the European Community as an in- " In addition. some of th e national minority parties and the Communists su pported autonomy. but for other reasons. '" See Felak. Ac Che Price of Che Republic. 1994: A lena Bartl ova. A ndrej Hlinka. ( Bratislava: Obzor. 1991 ). �SLOVAKIA 62 de pende nt state. Hi s party was earl y in favo r of a confederal so luti on, but o nl y as a te mporary so luti on, until both Re publi cs joined the European Community. 17 Public Aga inst Vi o le nce was be ing pulled in o ppos ite direc ti o ns, and whe n the c irc le around Vl adimfr Mec ia r broke o ut and fo rmed the Moveme nt fo r a De mocrati c Slovaki a in 1991 , the liberal , federa li st oriented w in g re ma ined , whil e the national populi sts w ith confedera l lea nings fo ll owed Mec iar. In the 1992 e lecti on Mec iar' s Move me nt fo r a De mocrati c S lovaki a appeared as the main champion of Slovak interests. The Czec h politica l e lite was fro m the o utset more indiffe rent to the nati onal questi on. Wh ile Public Aga inst Vi o le nce had the nati onal questi o n as o ne of its top pri o riti es , it was co mpl ete ly absent fro m the agenda of C ivic Forum in the first e lecti o n. In stead , " bac k to Eu ro pe" and e limination of communi sm we re the top pri oriti es. 18 Espec iall y after the " ma nagers" aro und Vac lav Kl aus won over the di ss ide nt w in g of C ivic Forum in 199 1, the leadin g Czec h po liti ca l e lite united in favo r of a stro ng fe derati o n. In th e 1992 e lec ti o n Kl aus' C ivic De mocratic Party ca me o ut as the main c hampi on of a federa l so luti on. The Move me nt fo r a De mocrati c S lovaki a and the C ivi c De mocrati c Party won the e lecti ons in th e ir respective Re publics, whil e parti es th at took a more mode rate stand on the questi on of state fo rm lost. Once the victors w ith Vac lav Kl aus and Vl adimfr Mec iar at the he lm had dec ided to di vide the state, fo rmer ene mi es beca me alli es, and the e lite conste ll ati ons changed according ly. The fo rme r oppone nts in the negoti ati o ns on state fo rm now united in favo r of a break-up , aga inst a motl ey c rew of oppos ition parti es, co mpri sing Czec h and Slovak Communi st and Soc ial De mocrati c parties, as we ll as Miros lav Slade k 's ultra- nati ona li st Republican Party of C zec hoslo vaki a. 17 Stein , Czecho/Slovakia. 67 . 93-4. '~Oskar Krejci. Kniha o volbich. (Prag ue: Victori a Pu bli sh ing. 1994). 2 10- 11. �SLOVAKIA 63 3. The Arguments in Favor of Autonomy If we turn to the actual arg ume nts, the main impress ion is that there were e lements of continuity as well as c ha nge when we go from the interwar period to the post-Communist period. On the one hand, the argume nts in favor of autonomy were located within the sa me nat io nalist di sco urse in both periods . On the other hand , the composition of the arg uments in favor of autonomy changed, and so did the contents of the autonomy demands, as we have seen. In the interwar period, the principle of national se lf-determination was used as an arg ument in favor of an asymmetric federation; after 1989 it was first used as an argument in favor of confederal so lutions, and then in favor of an independent Slovak state. Arguments in Favor of Autonomy During the First Republic In the inter-war period , the cornerstone of the a utonomists was the existence of an individual and sovereign Slovak nation , and the core message was that this Slovak nation was entitl ed to auto nomy. The premi se linkin g national identity to the matter of state form was the principle of national se lf-determination, understood as the ri ght of cu ltu ra ll y distinct nation s to se lf-governance. 19 In the a utonomist scheme, the Slovak nation had used thi s right to divorce the Magyars and join the Czec hs in a Czech and Slovak nation-state. Moreove r, as a free a nd equa l nation , the S lovaks were entit led to manage the ir own affairs and, therefore , to autonomo us political institutions. In practice, autonomy demands were always made on be half of Slovakia, yet for the a utonomists this amo unted to the same , s ince they regarded Slovakia as the homeland of the Slovaks, despite its substantial national minoriti es. 19 The principle of national self-determination can be interpreted in at least two other ways: as the right of the people to choose their government without coercion , i.e. popular sovereig nty - or as th e right of independent states to manage their affa irs without foreign intervention. See e.g. 0yvind 0sterud, Nasjonenes selvbestemmel- sesrett. (Oslo: Un iversitetsforlaget. 1984). 150 ff. �64 SLOVAKIA The Slovak a uto nomi sts argued a lon g three ma in lin es. First, they argued that Slovakia was discriminated aga in st in vario us ways, and that autono my was necessary to a ll eviate S lovakia's ill s. Second , they arg ued that Slovakia was entit led to auto no my by virtu e of various " co ntrac ts" (e.g. th e Pittsburgh Agreement). Finally, they argued that the Slovaks had the right to auto nom y s impl y because they were a natio n (the classical nation ali st arg umen t). The point of departure for the deprivation mguments was that the Slovaks were an indi vid ua l nati o n wit h separate nationa l interests, and that these national interests were not properly loo ked after under th e present centrali zed state form. Here S lovak grievances were turned into reasons for autonomy, and autonomy was the so lution to everythin g. Most of the gr ieva nce arguments for auton o my were associated with the use of Slovak as the offic ial lang uage in Slovakia and w ith (w hite-co llar) jobs fo r the Slovak inte lli gentsia. The sig na l words were " Slovak bread" . For in sta nce, before th e 1929 e lec ti on, the a utonomi st news paper Slovak argued that " a uto nomy does no t only mean political ri g hts, but a lso bread. When we get our own administration , our ow n asse mbly and our own courts, only Slovaks will be e mpl oyed there. [ ... ] The auton o mo us adm ini strati o n of the Slova k home land will compel the e mployers first a nd foremost to gran t the Slovaks work and bread." 20 Accord in g to the contract oriented lin e of arg um e nts , Slovakia had the right to autonomy by virtue of certai n (a ll eged ly) binding doc um e nts or "co ntracts". The point of departure was again that the Slovaks were an indi vidu a l and sovere ig n natio n, and th at S lovakia was the ho me la nd of the Slovaks. The argume nt was that Slovakia had been promised autono my, a nd th at thi s promise was lega ll y bindin g. However, fo r a co ntract to be va lid , it must be stipul ated th at the sig natori es had the right to s ig n agreements on behalf of those they were said to represent - in this case th e Czec h and Slovak nati o ns. 20 Slovak no. 240, 22 October I929. p. 3. �SLOVAKIA 65 Several of the many declarations and agreements that were formulated during World War I were used as arguments for (or against) autonomy . However, two documents stand out: The Pittsburgh Agreement of May 30th , 1918, and the Martin Declaration of October 30th , 1918. The former was a clear asset, while the latter soon became a liability (see next subsection). The Martin Declaration had been adopted at an as sembly of all Slovak political parties in Turciansky Svaty Martin. For the autonomists , the significance of the Martin Declaration was that through this act, the Slovaks had voluntarily joined the Czechs as equal s in one state, and they had therefore an equally large part in its founding as the Czechs. Moreover, as an equal nation which had entered the state voluntarily, the Slovaks had the right to autonomy. In effect, the autonomi sts gave the Martin declaration state-forming significance. This was also reflected in repeated attempts to turn October 30th into a national holiday. Compared to the other wartime declarations , however, the Pittsburgh Agreement had some obvious advantages. First and foremost , it had greater symbolic potential as an official agreement binding the government, because Czechoslovakia's first president and co-founder Tomas G. Masaryk had signed it, along with Czech and Slovak emigre leaders in the United States. 2 1 Second, the Agreement contained the most important autonomy demands. From the moment the Pittsburgh Agreement became known in Slovakia in the spring of 1919, it was invoked in every single debate where autonomy was " M asaryk was not Pres ident at th e tim e, of course, but on the initi ati ve of th e Slov ak L eague he signed a calliographed version of the Ag ree ment on November 14th. 19 I 8, the very same day he was elected Pres ident of the Republic. Besides. on October 3 1st. 19 18, th e Czec hoslov ak Nation al Committee had declared as bindin g all ac ti ons by members of the pro visional government abroad (including M asaryk). It may be argued that if the decl arati on of the establi shment of th e Czechos lovak state was valid. then the authori zation of Masaryk 's ac ti ons was valid as we ll. In practice, th e va lidity of th e Pittsburgh Agreement was a political , not a lega l matter. For the tex t of the statement , see Benes (op. cit. . 1929). 490. See also M. M ark Stolarik (op. cit. , 1968), 49. �SLOVAKIA 66 mentioned. At first glance, this Agreement would seem to be a stable element in the argumentation for Slovak autonomy. However, the usage varied. Early in the period, the autonomists would present the Pittsburgh Agreement as a Magna Charta granting the Slovaks the right to autonomy. Later, it became more common to present it as a binding contract. The concept of a Magna Charta brings to mind a sovereign granting hi s subjects certain rights and privileges, and it was Masaryk who (implicitly) had this role. When the Pittsburgh Agreement was presented as a contract, the contracting partners were at first the Czech and Slovak nation s. However, especially after it became public knowledge in 1922 that President Masaryk had actually drafted it, he was increasingly presented as a contracting partner. This shift can also be seen as an answer to the centralist claim that the American Czechs and Slovaks were not the leg itimate representatives of their co-nationals at home. However, the third and most common use, especially in the 1930s, was the Pittsburgh Agreement as "our program" or as an expression of the will of the Slovak nation (not just a small faction, but of all Slovaks). The point of departure was that the Slovaks were an individual nation with a natural right to self-determination, and therefore to autonomy if it so wishes. This usage was associated with the third , classical nationalist line of argument, which rested on three premises: I. that the Slovaks were an individual nation ; 2. that nation s had the right to self-determination; and 3. that the Slovak autonomists represented the true will of the Slovak nation - which was autonomy. The second premise was often implicit, while a lot of effort was put into defending Slovak individuality and the right to speak on the Slovaks ' behalf. The autonomists employed two main strategies to substantiate their claim. One strategy was to argue from the majority, which meant resorting to "advanced math". Election results here came in handy. In a parliamentary debate in 1933, Jozef Tiso argued that as a majority, the autonomists had the right to speak on behalf of the �SLOVAKIA 67 Slovak nation. Upon subtracting the stipulated Czech and Magyar votes from the votes cast for the centralist parties in Slovakia, he ended up with 402,320 votes for the centralist parties and 427,443 votes for the Slovak People ' s Party and the Slovak National Party put together. 22 A second strategy was personal attacks (argumentum ad homi- nem), which were often used to defend the existence of a Slovak nation as well as the claim for autonomy. The autonomists would then accuse Slovak deputies belonging to the Czechoslovak parties of being " renegades," " Phari sees," "sodomites" and "careerists ," and, therefore, not worthy of representing the Slovak nation. In his rather biblical language, the chairman of the Slovak People ' s Party, Andrej Hlinka, argued in 1927 that "S lovakia is ours, only we are Slovaks, you sold out the Slovak language for a bowl of Czechoslovak lentils eight years ago. " 23 Continuity and change after 1989 After 1989, the core message was still that the Slovaks were entitled to national se lf-determination "q ua nation," although the contents of this self-determination had changed from an asymmetric federation to confederate so lutions or even independence. The most important changes compared to the interwar period were, first , that there was no longer any need to defend the existence of an individual Slovak nation , since that was taken for granted, and second, a change in th e composition of the arguments. Deprivation arguments and contract oriented arguments were nearly absent, while classical nationalist arguments now dominated , and the principle of national se lf-determination was invoked more explicitly. 22 30 I. schuze poslanecke snemov ny N.S .R.C. dne 29 . li stopadu 1933. in Tesnopi- secke zpravy o scht1zfch poslanecke snemovny Narodnfho shromaidenf republiky ceskoslovenske. Ill. volebnf obdobf. (Prague. 1929- 35), 47- 50. 23 Hlinka, Slovak no. 86, 16 April , I 927 , p. I. "Sodomi tes•· referred to Social Demo- crats. as a play on wo rd s. �SLOVAKIA 68 There are, of co urse, some differe nces between the various debates, which is perha ps not surpri sin g, sin ce the topics of the debates a lso differed. The principle of nati ona l se lf-determi nati o n was most ex plicitly vo iced in the 1992 debates in the federa l parliament (th e two debates on the break- up of Czec hos lovak ia), a nd in the Slovak National Council (the de bates on the S lovak Declaration of Sovere ig nty and the Slovak Constitution ). Conve rse ly. thi s principle was more impli c it in the 1990 " hyphen debate". The " hyphe n debate" is perhaps the most atyp ica l, in terms of topic ("Czecho-Slo vak Republic" with a hyphen versus "Czechos lovak Federal Republic") as we ll as types of arg ume nt. First, thi s is rea ll y the o nl y debate where identity pl ayed any major part. Ide ntity arg uments appeared in two forms: On the one hand , it was arg ued that for the S lovaks, to spe ll the word Czecho-Slovak w ithout a hyphe n was tantamo unt to accepting the abe rrati o n of Czec hos lova ki sm. On the o ther hand , it was arg ued that th e hyphe n ex pressed Slovak nati o na l indi vidu a lity and the equa l standing of the Czech and Slovak nati o ns in the federati o n. Second, the hyphe n debate is the only debate where the Pittsburg h Agreement was me ntion ed more than o nce. However, of th e six speake rs referrin g to it, o ne appea led to the Agreement to substantiate the c laim for a hyph e n in the "Czecho-Slovak" Rep ubli c. (thi s is how the word was spelled in the orig ina l), while the rest bas ically referred to it as an express io n of the eq ual status of the two natio ns e ntering the state , or as a part of the hi storical narrative lead ing up to the federalization. Nobody referred to it as a contrac t, and the Czech National Socialist Bi anka Hykova even quoted Masaryk to the effect that it was o nl y a n agreement between American Czechs and Slovaks. 2-1 Contract oriented arguments thus disappeared a ltogeth er, and refere nces to the Pittsburg h Agreeme nt and/or the Martin Dec lara20 See Zprava o 26. spolecne sc hi'1zi snemovny lidu a snemovny narodu. 29.3. 1990. in Federalnf shromaidenf Ceskoslovenske socialisticke republiky V. vo lebnf obdobf. ( 1986-90), 25 1. 253 , 256, 270, 304. �SLOVAKIA 69 tion were rare. A utonomy was ex plicitly mentioned in the contex t of the Pittsburgh Ag reement onl y once, in the second debate abou t th e brea k-up of th e state. According to I va n Simko from the Chri stian Democratic Movement, Slovak organization s in the U nited States had made an agreement wi th Masaryk "as a leading personality of Czech po litica l li fe" to fo rm a shared state where Sl ovaki a was to have an autonomous position. Thi s agreement was unfortun ately not honored , he argued. 25 Depri vation arg uments were al so rare . The phrase " Slovak bread" occurred onl y once: In the first debate on the break -up of the state in September 1992, Michal Ko vac from the Mo ve ment for a Democratic Slovaki a ( later to beco me Slovaki a's first pres ident) argued that in a normally functioning federation , it wo uld not be possible for the standard of li ving in Slovaki a to drop as much as it had in onl y two yea rs. In another four years , he argued, " Would we not be in the hi storica l situation w here we have already been, that the Slovak nation would have to go abroad for bread, because there would not be bread for people in Slovakia? And we wou ld be as weakened as we once were under dear father Masaryk." 26 However, in the interw ar period " Slovak bread" was usuall y tantamount to w hite-collar jobs for the yo ung Slovak intelli gentsia in Slovaki a, whi le here th e lack of " bread " obvious ly refers to general unemployment. The probl em was real enough - in the earl y 1990s the unemployment ra te in Slovak ia was three or four times the Czech average. 27 25 Zprava o 5. spo lecne schu zi snemovny lidu a snemo vny narodu. 18.11 . 1992 . 25 .1 1.1 992. in Federi ln f shromiidenf Ceske a S/ovenske Federaci vnf republiky. V il. vo lebnf obdobf. ( 1992). 7 17. 2 '' Zprava o 4. spo lec ne sc huzi snemo vny lidu a snemov ny narodu 29.9. 1992. in Fe- denilni shro m;ii deni Ceske a S/ovenske Federaci vnf republiky. V II. vo lebnf obdobf, ( 1992). 60 I. 27 11. 8 percent in Slovaki a vers us 4. 1 percent in the Czec h Republic in 199 1: 10.3 percent versus 2.6 percent in 1992. Transition reporc I 996. (L ondon. The European Bank fo r Reconstructi on and Deve lopment. I 996). However. th e difference was even larger in 1993. the first yea r of independence. �SLOVAKIA 70 Finall y, compared to the interwar period , classica l nationalist ar g uments were much more co mmon , and the principle of nation al self-determination was invoked more ex plicitly. In the debate about the allocation of competence between the Republics and the Federation it was used as an argument in favor of returnin g to the original 1968 Constitution. 28 Y et, the most co mmon use of th e principle of national self-determination was as an argument in favor of establi shing an independent Slovak state or dividin g Czechoslovakia. There are, however, some interestin g nation al differences between actors in how they used it. Slovak deputies speaking in favor of Slovak independence invoked the principle of national self-determination on behalf of the Slovak nation . They regarded it as an inalienable, natural ri ght, and in one instance, even as a God-given ri ght. 29 An independent Slovak state was presented as the fulfillment of IO00 years of strugg le for Slovak individuality and sovereignty , and as the result of a natural , hi storical process of national emancipation . In the words of HZDS deputy chairman Au gustfn Marian Huska , " the Constitution is the fulfillm ent and lega l enac tment of th e ri ght to se lf-determination . ( ... )To the Slovak s, whose consciousness was molded by more than a thou sand years under foreign rule , the feeling of dependence had become second nature. Slowly, but persistently they formed an awareness of the need for self-determination , the need to search for, find , 28 Zprava o 9. spolecne schi°1zi snemovny lidu a snernovn y narodu. 11 .- 12. 12. 1990. in Federalnf shromaidenf CSFR. ( 1990-1992) . < ww,~ .p,p.c:dckni h/ I 990fs/sbn/-stcn -prot/009,c: hu t./s009077. html/ d> [2 Febru ary, 2004]. See also the debate on th e Slovak declaration of so vereignty. Stenograficka sprava o 3. sch6dzi Slovenskej narodnej rndy konanej 17. j ul a 1992. < www .nr,r.sk/i ndexarch.a,p> ]4 Febru ary. 2004 J. 29 Sedovic (S lovak National Part y), Zprava o 5. spol ec ne schu zi SL a SN , 18. 11 . 1992. in Federalnf shro,mii denf Ceske a Slovenske Federati vnf republiky. VII. volebnf obdobf. ( 1992). 788. �71 SLOVAKIA ex press. a nd at las t rea li ze sovere ig nty." 30 S lova ki a was in o th e r word s pi ctured as a nati on-state a nd the S lova ks as the state-forming nati o n. Howeve r, in the de bates in the Sl ovak Nation a l Counc il , Slovak deputi es, inc ludin g Prime Mini ster Vl adim fr Mec iar, at the same tim e pro mi sed to res pec t the eq ua l rig hts of a ll c iti ze ns, nati o na l minorities and ethni c groups. De puti es re presentin g th e Magyar mino rity in the S lovak Nationa l Counc il recog ni zed o r eve n s uppo rted the S lovak ri g ht to selfde te rmin ati o n, but argued that the princ ipl e sho uld a lso appl y to the nati o na l mino riti es. Thi s was a n arg ume nt in favo r of auto no my. At the same time, Magyar deputi es arg ued th at S lovaki a sho uld not be presented as a nati o n- state in the Co nstituti o n, bec au se it was not nation all y ho moge neous. Founding the state o n the nati o na l princ ipl e meant turnin g the minoriti es into second-c lass c iti zens, they argued . Czec h de puti es co nsiste ntly presented the break-up of Czec hoslovaki a as a matte r of se lf- determinati o n fo r the Slovak nati o n. The 1992 e lecti o n. the Slovak Dec larati o n of Sovere ig nty, and the Slovak Constituti o n were take n as proof th at the S lovak natio n did wa nt inde pende nce. In the words of Prime Mini ste r Vacl av Kl aus of the Czec h Re publi c: "The S lova k nati o n used the o ppo rtunity to co mpl e te its nati o na l e manc ipati o n by fo undin g its own state. Thi s is a rea lity we mu st res pect. " 3 1 T he arg ume nt th at the Czec hs had no ri ght to deny th e S lovak natio n its rig ht to se lf-de termin ati o n was a lso used aga in st ho ld in g a referend um in the Czech Republi c; Czec h c itizens could no t dec ide whet her the S lovaks sho uld beco me a statefo rming natio n o r no t. Interestin g ly, the princi pl e of nati o na l se lf-determin ati o n was not even o nce in voked o n be ha lf of the Czec h na- -'" For Huska ·s statement and the debate on the Const itut ion. see Stenograficka sprava o 5. sch6dzi S lovenskej mirodnej rady kona nej 31. augusta a I . septembra 1992. <www.nr,r. ., k/indexarch.a,p> 14 February . 20041. -' 1 K laus in th e debate on th e Czech Constitution . Ceskii narodnf rada I 992- 1992. Stenoprotokoly. I 0. schuze. 16.- 17. 12. 1992. <www.psp.cz/cknih/ I 992cnr/,tenprot/O I 0schuzi> 13 February. 2004J. �SLOVAKIA 72 tion .32 The reason is obvious: The Czechs did not regard the establi shme nt of the Czec h Republic as a state-formin g process, but as a restoration of Czech statehood , which expl icitly included Czechoslovak state tradition s. But the n the Czechs a lways rega rded Czechoslovakia as their state. Apart from the princ ipl e of national se lf-determination , the main lin e of argument in favor of di ssolution may be termed reali st. It was argued that the federation did not work or that it was a lread y dead, that it was too late to save the state, and now the important thing was to e nd the state in a peaceful , orderly, cultivated , adult and leg itimate fashion , and to ensure good ne ighborl y relation s be twee n the future inde pe nde nt states. 4. The Centralist Arguments Against Autonomy If we turn to the centra li st side, di sco ntinuity 1s th e word that first co mes to mind. In the inte rwar period , the centrali st arg ume nts against a utonomy were located within a nation a li st di sco urse, and mirrored the autonomist arguments to a large ex tent , the difference be ing th at the centralists based the ir arg uments on an a lte rn ative national id eo logy - Czec hos lovakism . After 1989 , the "ce ntra li st" arg um e nts changed profoundly . Czechos lov akism had been abandoned already in 1945 , and the unitary state form in 1968. The "centrali sts" afte r 1989 were , the refore, centra li sts on ly re lative to those advocating confederate so luti ons, a nd in the las t instance, inde pe ndence for Slovakia. " The principle of national se l f-de term ination was invoked on behalf of the .. Moravian nati on" ( 1.5 million . accord ing to the 199 1 census). but then as an argument in favor of Moravi an autonomy in a Czecho-Morav ian federation . See espec ially the speec hes of deputies Jan Jeg la and Jiff Bfl y (both from the Moravi an movement H SD-SMS) . Ceska narodnf rada 1992- 1992 . Stenoprotokoly. 10. sc huze , 16.17. 12. 1992. < www.psp.cz/eknih/ 1992<.:nr/~tenprot/0 I 0schuz/> 13 Febru ary , 2004J. �SLOVAKIA 73 Centralist Arguments during the First Republic ln the inter-war period, the co rnerstone of the ce ntra li st argumentati on was that the Czechs and Slovak s were one Czechoslovak nati on (a lbe it w ith two tri bes), and the core message was th at a ce ntra li zed state form was necessary to preserve nati onal unity and th e integrity of th e state. T he premi se linking nati onal identity to state fo rm was the principl e of nati onal se l f-determin ati on. According to the centrali sts, the Czechos lovak nati on had used its ri ght to self-determ ination to re uni te in a Czechos lovak nati on-state, and thi s unity had to be preserved.·13 A uto nomy for Slovak ia was seen as a th reat to Czechos lovak nationa l unity as we ll as state in tegrity , first because it wo uld dri ve th e two tribes of the Czechos lovak nati on apart, and second , beca use granting Slovaki a autonomy wo ul d be tantamoun t to recogni zing th e Slovak s as a separate nati on, w hich would j eopardi ze the state's ra ison d'etre. Th e centra lists co untered the depri vati on arguments of the autonomi sts in two ways . On the one hand, they denied that the Slovak s were d iscrimin ated agai nst, and on the other hand , they rejec ted autonomy as a suitabl e remedy to Slovaki a's alleged ill s. What was needed to help Slovak ia was not autonomy, but more unity, especiall y economica ll y, the ce ntra li sts argued. Thi s was entirely in line w ith thei r overall "strength th ro ugh unity" message. However, their main artill ery was aimed at the contract-oriented arguments, and espec iall y the Pi tts burgh Agreement. T he main ar guments were: I . T he A meri ca n Czechs and Slovaks were not leg itimate represe ntati ves of th eir co-n ati onals at home, and had no ri ght to dec ide on their behal f; 2. The Pittsburg h Agreement was one of many, and thus had a certain hi stori ca l va lue; but in order to be va lid, it wo uld need the co nse nt of Czechs and Slovak s at home; and 3. Leg itimate Slovak represe ntati ves had conse nted to Czec hos lovak ·'-' There was no big difference between the Slovak autonomists and the Czechoslovak cen tralists in terms of the co ntents of national identity. In both cases . national identi ty was defined in terms of culture. language and ancestry. See Bakke (op.c it. , 1999). especia ll y Chapter I 0. fo r documentati on. �SLOVAKIA 74 national and state unity in the Constitu ti on of 1920, as we ll as at assem bli es before and after Pittsburg h. The first arg ume nt was especia ll y damag in g, since it went to the core of a ll the auto no mi st argument s assoc iated w ith the Pittsburg h Agreement , in va lid atin g the Agreement as a Magna C harta, as a binding contract, a nd as an express io n of the will of the Slovak natio n. It was more difficult for the ce ntra li sts to de nou nce the leg iti macy of Masaryk as a represe ntati ve of the Czec hos lovak state, but the Pres ident did his best to free him se lf and the government of any obligation. Masaryk c la imed that he had sig ned the Pittsburg h Agreement in order to "appease a sma ll Slovak fact io n that dreamed of God know s what sort of independence for Slovakia ," and di smi ssed it as "a loca l pac t between American Czechs and Slovaks, signed by American citizens." 34 There is littl e doubt that Masaryk drafted the Agreement in order to ap pease a part of the Slovak League, but o ne may wo nder why this was important to him if he rega rded the m mere ly as American citizens. I think Mark Stol arik has a va lid point when he arg ues that th e American Slovaks he lped legiti mi ze th e creation of Czechoslovakia in the abse nce of a mandate from the Slovaks in Hungary (caused by war censorship).·15 Masaryk a lso tried , un successfu ll y, to di sc redit the Pittsburg h Agreement through quasi- lega li sti c arguments. In a le tte r to Andrej Hlinka on October 12th, 1929, Masaryk c laimed that the Pittsburgh Agreement was "a forge ry," because at the time, the em ig re organization of the Slovaks present in Pitts burgh , "the [Slovak l Leag ue lega ll y did no t ex ist, and it was recognized by th e Government o nl y in 191 9." Hlinka evide ntl y wrote the Slovak Leag ue , w hi ch retorted th at the re was " no doubt a bout th e a uthe nti c ity of th e Pittsburg h Agreement," and A merica n lega l experts confirmed th at there was no " Tomas G. Masaryk, Svetova revoluce. (Prague: Orbis a Ci n. 1925). 262-263. 35 M . Mark Stolarik (op.c it.. 1968). 54. �SLOVAKIA 75 difference between chartered a nd unc hartered orga ni zatio ns w ith respect to entering such ag ree me nts. 36 T o prop up the claim that leg itim ate Slovak representatives had co nsented to Czec hos lovak nat io na l and state unity after Pitts burg h, the ce ntrali sts preferred to use the Martin Dec lara ti o n of October 30th , 19 18, since thi s Dec laration had been unanimou sly accepted at a n asse mbl y of a ll Slovak po liti ca l part ies. In the beg innin g, they also used the 1920 Constitution for th e same purpose, but the trouble was th at th e Slovak Club in the Constitutional Assembly was coo pted , and arguably not representative of Slovak opinion. The ma in reason why the Martin Dec larati on was s uc h a n asset for the centrali sts, was the sente nce statin g th at the "S lovak nati o n is lingui sti ca ll y as we ll as culturally-historically pa rt of th e unitary Czec ho-Sl ovak nation ." Moreover, the asse mbl y at M artin had demanded nat io na l se lf-dete rmin ation on behalf of this "Czecho-S lovak nat io n," w hil e at the sa me time it was s il e nt on auton omy. The ce ntrali sts thu s used it as proof of Czechoslovak national and state unity, and as proof of the will of the Slovaks to e nter s uc h a unity. (Rumor in Slovakia had it th at the passage o n Czechoslovak national unity was not in the original text. This was , however, refuted in 1923 by Emil Stodola and Samue l Zoch, who had dra fted it).:17 Finally , the centrali sts counte red the c lass ic a l nati o na li st arg ume nt by rejecting the first premi se, that the Slovaks were an indi vidual nation, a nd the third premise. that the autonomi sts represented the tru e w ill of the Slovak nati o n. They presented the Slovaks as a tribe of th e Czechoslovak nati o n, and the Slovak me mbe rs o f the ce nt ral ist parties as the leg itim ate Slovak rep rese ntat ives. At the sa me time, they accepted the seco nd premi se, th at nati o ns had th e -' 6 The letter is pub lished as Document No. 30 in Joseph A. Mikus. Slova kia. A Poli- tica l and Constitutional Histo1y . (Brati slava: SAP. I 995) 209-2 10. The answer of th e Slovak League was published in Slo vak no. 194. 27 August. 1930. p. I. See also M. Mark Stolarik (op. cit.. 1968). 48-49. 52. -' 7 V ac lav Chaloupecky: Martinshi deklilrace 19- 20. II jejf politicke osudy (Prague. I 928). �SLOVAKIA 76 right to sel f-determin ati on, but as we have seen, th ey in vo ked thi s prin ciple on behalf of th e Czec hos lovak nati on. A n I va n Derer specialty was the argument th at i f the Slovak s had been an indi vidual nati on, then they w ould have th e ri ght to secess ion, not onl y to autonomy. 38 B oth sides had their share of argumentati on errors. T he ce ntrali sts argued from maj ority (a rg umentum ad populum ) in the earl y 1920s, w hen they recei ved the maj ority of the Slovak votes, and personal attacks (arg umentum ad hominem) were ac tu all y mos t co mmon on th e centrali st side. probabl y because they fi tted so we ll into their genera l strength-th ro ugh-unity argument. T he Slovak autonomi sts were accused of being " M agyarones" or " new Slovaks," thereby impl y ing th at they had other loya lties or identities,'9 and of being paid by the Hungari an government. In both cases, the M agyars had the ro le of ·'bogeyman" . T hi s M agyarone ca rd was used to expl ain w hy the Slovaks had turned away from the Czechs in the past and in the present , and to co unter th e autonomi st c laim th at they we re the so le leg itimate representati ves of the Slovak nati on. I f the ce ntra li sts believed th at Sl ovak autonomy would j eopardi ze Czechos lovak nati onal unity and th e integrit y of th e state, it w as quite log ica l to acc use th e autonomi sts of being renegades (though probabl y not very smart). Profound Changes after 1989 After 1989 there was not much left of the former ce ntra list arguments, which is not surpri sing considering that Czec hos lovaki srn had 18 • I van Derer. Ceskos/ovensk;i otizkil. (Prague : Orbis. 1935). 88- 90. 39 Both labels we re commonly used about people of Slovak origi n who had become more or less ass imil ated during Hungari an rul e. but who turned back after 19 18. There we re some known M agyarones among the autonomists (chiefl y Franti sek Jehlicka and Yoj tech/ Bela Tuka). but the lead ing figures (Hlin ka. Juri ga) had defended Slovak interests also under Hungary. T he total number of people who ac tu ally switched nati onal affi l iatio n from Magyar to Slovak i n the firs t ten years of Czec hos lovaki a cannot be ascertained prec ise ly, but an educated guess is th at it was betwee n 250.000 and half a million. See Bak ke (op.cit. . 1999). 305- 307. �SLOVAKIA 77 been abandoned and a unitary state form was no longer an option. Th e "centralists" still accepted the principle of nati onal self- determinati on; however, they now recogni zed the Czec hs and Slovaks as equal , state-forming nation s and Czechoslovakia as a Czech and Slova k nati on-state. As long as state form was sti 11 on the agenda, the players on the "centrali st" side were mostly Czechs, and the task was to defend a " function al federation ," which meant to preserve the powers of the federation v is-a-vi s the Republics. Once the break-up of the state appeared on the agenda after the 1992 electi ons, however , th e "centra li st" pl ayers were Czech and Slovak opposition parti es and the task was now to preserve a common Czechoslovak state. In the hy ph en debate, as we ll as in the co mpetenc y debate, Czech deputi es explicitly presented th e federal state form as an express ion of the equality of the Czechs and Slovaks. The main Czech arguments against th e hy phen were that it was divi sive, and that it was unacceptable to the Czech publi c. This probabl y had something to do with the fact that the Second Czecho-Slovak Republi c ( 1938-- 39) was spelled with a hyphen. It was also argued that it was grammati ca ll y probl emati c, th at the original spelling had been without a hyphen (an hi stori ca l argument), and th at the Morav ians would feel offended (an identity argument). The main arguments in favor of a strong federation were that it was necessary in order to carry out the economic reform s and to fulfill Czechos lovakia 's internati onal obligati ons. For the Czech elite, the power and competency of the Czech Republic was irrelevant. In fact, I have onl y found one example of a Czec h deputy in vok ing nat ional interests, and he arg ued th at a confederate solution would be contrary to Czech interests.-lO The Czech and Slovak opposition parties that defended Czec hoslovaki a's ex istence in the debates in the fall of 1992 were mostly Socialists and Communists, but also included the ultra-nati onali st ' 0 M andl er (Libera l Democra ti c Part y). Zprava o 9. spol ecne schuzi SL a S . 11.- 12.1 2. 1990, in Fedenilnf shromaf.difof Ceske a Slovenske Federativnf Republiky V I . vo lebnf obdobf ( 1990), <www.psp.c z/ci,.nih/ 19901\h,bnf!.,tcnprot/009,c:hud ,009()77. htrn ll d> [4 February 2004 1. �78 SLOVAKIA Republican s. Even thoug h this opposition accepted th e principle of national se lf-determination , they mostly interpreted it in the origina l meanin g - as popular sovereignty . The totally dominating line of argument was that the only leg itimate way of dividin g Czechoslovakia according to the principle of se lf-determination was to let the citizens decide by popular vote, a nd that it was unacceptable to divide the state against the will of the peopl e. In the first debate on dissolution , thi s was supported by a hi storical a nalogy. By accident, the debate was held 54 years after the fateful Munich agreement, and the opposition argued that a new Munich was about to happen: Again the fate of the Czechoslovak state wou ld be dec ided without asking the peop le. In the first debate the oppos ition parties advocated a refere ndum before the decision was made; in the second debate a ratifying pl ebisc ite. The motive was obvious ly to save the state, since all opin ion poll s showed that a clear majority was in favor. However, very few deputies ac tually defended the me rits of Czechoslovakia, although a handful of Czechs professed their love for the shared homeland , or invoked the legacy of the founding fathers , mostly T.G. Masary k and Milan Rasti slav Stefanik. Finally, a weak echo of the inte rwar debate could be heard in claims that separation would be a threat to the future existence of the Czech and Slovak nation s (reminiscent of the strength-through-unity argument), and in charges of treason (personal attac ks). Ne ither line of argument was very common. The claim that voting in favor of disso luti on was an act of treason was a preserve of the ultra-nationalist Republican Party of Czec hos lovakia. The debates a lso had their amusing sides, for in stance in the use of metaphors. The federation was alternately see n as a leaking ship, a train being pulled in opposite directions , and an old patient with a severe heart condit ion , whi le the establishment of the new states was compared to giving birth to twins! �SLOVAKIA 79 5. Summary and Conclusion [n the inter-war period, Czechoslovakia was a unitary , centralized state, and autonomy was a matter of separate Slovak institutions. After 1989, Czechoslovakia was a sy mm etric federation of two nationa l Republic s. Separate Slovak inst itutions were, therefore, no longer an iss ue, and autonomy became a matter of allocating more deci s ion-makin g power to the Republic s. However, in both cases, there was a conflict over state form, and in both cases the content of that conflict was how centralized the state should be. As for the actors , the e lite constellations were most stable in the inte rw ar pe riod . However, as lon g as the conflict was about state form, the Czech political elite was in favor of the most centralized so lution , while the Slovak elite was divided . Once the break-up of Czechoslovakia was on the agenda, the re were Czech and Slovak parties on both si des. If we focus on the main arguments on either side, we can obse rve continuity as well as change. Durin g the First Republic , the arguments of both sides were located within a nationali st discourse, but they founded their argume ntation on alternative nation al ideologies. The centralists invoked the principle of national se lf-dete rmination on behalf of the "Czechoslovak nation", the autonomists on behalf of the Slovak nation . After the Velvet Revolution , the autonomist argume nts were still located within a nationali st di scourse, and when the victorious part ies in the 1992 elections dec ided to divide the state, the Czech si de simply adopted the Slovak arg uments. By contrast, the "centrali st" arguments in the debate on state form were mainly economic, while the arguments in the debate on the break-up of Czechoslovakia were procedural. The most strik in g feature of the autonomy di sco urse after 1989 is therefore the asy mmetry of the arguments on both sides. Let us now address th e question of how the arguments related to the principle of national se lf-determination : On the autonomist side, the core message was the sa me in both periods; that the Slovaks were e ntitl ed to autonomy or se lf-determination "qu a nation ." Howeve r, �80 SLOVAKIA the principle of natio na l se lf-d etermin a ti o n was in voked more ex plicitl y after the Velvet Revo lution . On the centra li st side, the principle was used as an argument against a utono my in the interwar period , and w ith a certain twist, against the break-up of Czechos lovakia in 1992 . In the latter case, se lf-de te rmin ation was understood as popul ar sovere ignty - i.e . as a democratic principle. It is also inte res tin g that after 1989, the principl e of nation a l se lfdetermination was consistently invoked on behalf of the Slovaks, not on behalf of the Czechs, other than in the context of Czechoslovakia as the nation- state of two individual , sovere ign nations. In conclusion , the continuity was strongest on the autonomist side , alth ough th e conte nts of nation al se lf-determination c hanged from autonom y to independence. On the "centrali st" side, most of the a mmunition aga inst Slovak autonomy was gone once the concept of a Czechoslovak nation was abandoned. � 52 SLOVAKIA The Autonomy Discourse in Parliamentary Debates during the First Czechoslovak Republic and after the Velvet Revolution 1 E li sabeth Bakke " We approve the political progra m, w hi ch e ndeavors to unite the Czec hs a nd Slovaks in[to] an indepe nd e nt state of the Czech la nd s and Slovakia. Slovakia sha ll ha ve its own ad mini strati o n, its ow n parli ament and its own courts. The Slovak language shall be the officia l language in the sc hoo l[s], in office[sl and in public li fe in genera l. The Czecho-Slovak state sha ll be a republic , its constitution sha ll be democratic. [ ...] The detail ed reg ulati o ns for the estab lishment of the Czecho-Slovak state are left to the li berated Czechs and Slovaks and the ir lega l representati ves." The Pittsburgh Agreement of May 30th, 1918 2 ' An earli er version of thi s art icle was presented at the 34th National Conven ti on of the AAASS in Pittsburgh. 2 1- 24 November. 2002. 2 Thi s Agreeme nt was signed by the Slovak League of America . th e Czech National A lli ance. th e Al li ance of Czec h Ca th oli cs. representing Czech and Slovak emigrc organi zations in the USA. and T omas G. M asaryk. President of the Czechos lovak ati ona l Council in Pari s. I have quoted th e Engli sh version from The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact (Chicago: Th e Slova k Cath ol ic Federati on of America. 1934). 27. The Slovak ori gin al is reprinted in Edvard Benes. Svetov,i valka a nase revoluce. Vol. Ill (Dokumenty). (Prague: C in-Orbis . 1929) . 365. See also M. Mark Stolarik. 'The Role of Amer ican Slova ks in th e C rea tion of Czecho-S lovak ia. 19 14- 19 18"'. �SLOVAKIA 53 Slovak autonomy was on the agenda throughout Czechoslovakia 's 74 years of existence, from the beginning to the bitter end. Although it may be argued that inexperienced politicians, short deadlines , rigid constitutional amendment procedures and conflicting economic priorities also played a role in the breakup, the long-term conflict that drove Czechoslovakia apart were the closely-related matters of political autonomy and recognition of the Slovaks as a separate nation. 3 What was at stake was not only the institutional set-up and division of power; for the Slovaks, separate political institutions were also important symbols of national individuality and ownership to the shared Czecho-Slovak state. The roots of the conflict go back to the founding of Czechoslovakia in October of 19 I 8. The Czechs and Slovaks had no prior shared statehood tradition s (save perhaps Great Moravia in the ninth century), and independence was not even on the agenda before World War I. Starting in 1915, the independence movement abroad, with Tomas G. Masaryk at the helm, tried to convince the Allies that a Czechoslovak Republic should be established, invoking the principle of national self-determination on behalf of the "Czechoslovak nation. " In the First Czechoslovak Republic the idea that the Czechs and Slovaks were one nation (albeit with two tribes) became official state ideology , and it went hand-in-hand with political centralism. 4 Slovak Studies VIII (Rome, 1968) for a very interesting acco unt of the circumsta nces that led to its signin g and the subseq uent course of even ts in th e new lyfounded Repub lic. 3 For a discussion of the breakup see Eric Stein , Czecho/Slovakia. Ethnic Conflict, Constitutional Fissure. Negotiated Breakup (A nn Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997); Jirf Musil , ed., The End of Czechoslovakia (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995 ); Jan Rychlfk, Rozpad Ceskoslovenska . Cesko-slovenske vztahy 1989- 1992 (Bratis lava : AEP, 2002); Carol Skalnik Leff, The Czech and Slovak Republics. Nation Versus State (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997). 4 For details see Elisabeth Bakke, Doomed to Failure? The Czechoslovak Nation Project and the Slovak Autonomist Reaction 19/9- 1938 (Oslo: Series of Dissertations submitted to the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Un iversity of Oslo, no. 11 /1999). �SLOVAKIA 54 Howeve r, a sub sta nti al pa rt of th e Sl ova k po liti ca l e lite opposed both , de ma ndir.g recog nition of the Slovak nati on and autonomy fo r Slovaki a. The Pittsburgh Agreeme nt became important both beca use it defin ed the contents of Slovak a utonomy and because Masaryk had signed it. Afte r World War II , Czec hos lovaki sm was abandoned, but poli ti ca l centra li sm was not, and th e federali zati on of Czech os lov aki a aft er the Sov iet in vas ion in 1968 did not give Slovak po liti ca l insti tution s any rea l dec ision-m aking power. Afte r the Ve lvet Revo lution in 1989, political autonomy for Slovaki a reappeared on the agenda, and became a major iss ue in the di spute over C zechos lovaki a's new constitution . The main purpose of the present article is to co mpare the autonomy de bates durin g the First Republic and after the Ve lve t Re volu ti o n, in orde r to establi sh continuity and change. The research ques ti o ns are: I . How were the de mands fo r autonomy substa nti ated, and what were the main argume nts aga inst it? 2. Wh at role did the princ ipl e of nation al se lf-de te rmin ati on pl ay in the debates in the two peri ods? The First Re public was a unitary state , and autonom y as such was ne ver on the age nda of the Parliame nt in the interwar pe ri od. Of th e three a utonom y proposa ls th at made it to th e Parli a me nt, two were bl oc ked in committees, whil e the third was adopted without any de bate after th e fa teful Muni c h agree me nt in 1938. My analys is of the inte rwar di sco urse is th e refore based o n a se lec ti o n of govern me nt in a ugurati on de bates and budgetary debates, as we ll as c lippings from Slovak, the main autono mi st ne wspaper. 5 After 1989 seve ral de bates were re levant to the autono my di scourse: In the Federal Parliament I have analyzed the 1990 " hyphen de bate," the de bate on the compete ncy law , a nd the two de bates about the break-up of Czechos lovaki a in the fa ll of 1992. In the res- ' T he analys is of the debate in the interwar period is a condensed version of a part of Chapter 13 of my PhD di ssertat ion. For detai ls see Bakke (ibid. 1999). �SLOVAKIA 55 pec ti ve Czech and Sl ovak Nati onal Council s (Republi c Asse mblies), I have analyzed the 1992 debates on the Sl ovak D ecl aration of Sovereignty, the Slovak Con stitution, and the Czech Constituti on. I will structure the arti cle around the foll owin g three points: I . Th e in stituti onal set-up and th e contents of the autonomy demands. 2. The co mpos iti on and stability of the elite constellations on either side of the conflict. 3. The main arg uments a) in favor of autonomy and b) against autonomy. wi th spec ial emphas is on how they relate to the principle of nati onal sel f-determinati on. 1. The Institutional Set-up and the Contents of the Autonomy Demandi Czec hos lovakia was from the outset presented as the nati on-state of the Czechos lovak nation. 6 Thi s was codified in the 1920 Constituti on, which al so gave the First Czechos lovak Republic a unitary, centrali zed state form and a bi ca meral leg islature. Czec hos lovaki a was at first di vided into 22 co unties, but the county sys tem was implemented onl y in Sl ovaki a and fro m 1928 , four prov inces repl aced the counties (see tabl e I ). In the interw ar peri od, the demands for autonomy were defined in term s of separate Sl ovak instituti ons with dec ision-making powers in matters of vital importance for th e Slovaks as a nati on. The core demands were that Sl ovaki a should have " its own admini strati on, its own parli ament and its ow n co urts," cf. the Pittsburgh Ag reement. M ost of the autonomy proposa ls also included a separate Sl ovak government, but none of the three autonomy proposals that made it into the Parli ament went beyond an asymmetric federati on.7 " In reality. th e Czec hs and Slovaks togeth er comprised 65.5 percent of the populati on. Germans 23.4 percent. Magyars 5.6 percent. Ruthenians 3.5 percen t. Jews 1.4 perce nt. and Po les 0.6 percen t in the 1921 cens us. See Scftanr lidu v repub lice ceskosloven.~ke ze dne 15. unora I 921. Dfl I. (Prague: Statnf ufad statistick y. I 924 ). 7 See Bakke (ibid .. 1999). 465- 77 for a more detailed overv iew of the autonomy proposa ls. See also James Ramon Fe lak. '·A t the Price of the Republic ··. Hlinka ·s �SLOVAKIA 56 The 1938 Constitutional a me ndm ent that inaugurated the shortli ved Second Republi c was based on the third a utonomy proposal of the Slovak People 's Party, which had been submitted in August 1938. The Second Re public co mbined a federa l state form with separate Slovak institutions : a leg islat ive asse mbl y (D iet), a se parate administration and separate co urts. The Slovak gove rnme nt was acco untabl e to the Die t, and received exec uti ve power in all matters under its juri sdi ction , as we ll as many matters unde r central jurisdiction. Slovak became the officia l lang uage in S lovakia, and separate c iti zenship was introduced. After World War II , the Czechos lovak govern me nt recognized the S lovaks as a separate nati on a nd the Slovak National Co un ci l (w hi c h de fac to controlled the liberated parts of Slovakia) as its representative. An exec utive Board of Commissioners was also establi shed. However, through the three Prague agreements and the two first postwar constituti ons, Slovak institution s were gradua ll y stripped of their power and co mpete nce, and Czechoslovakia return ed to a centrali st, unitary state fo rm , with a unicamera l leg is lature. 8 Part of the reaso n for the c la mpdow n o n the Slovak organs was the victory of the De mocratic Party in the 1946 e lectio ns, w hi c h convinced the Communists th at Slovakia could not be tru sted. 9 Slovak People ·s Party. 1929-J 938 (Pi tt sburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, I 994). especially pp. 30, 80- 1, 19 1- 92. ij The 1960 Constitution aboli shed the Board of Commissioners. See Program prve dom;Jcf v/ady repub liky vlady narodnf fronty Cechu a Slovaku, (Prag ue: Mini sterstvo l nformacf. 1945). I 6-17: Jaros lav Chovanec & Peter Mozolfk, Historicke a statopravne korene sa mostatn ost i slovenskej republiky , (Yydavatel's tvo Procom , Brati slava, 1994), 38, 11 4- 122; Michal Barn ovsky. " Tri prazske dohody", in Cesko- slovenske vztahy - Slovensko-ceske vzthhy (Liberec: Technick a Un i verzi ta, 1998). 119 ff.: Elisabeth Bakke, "The Principle of National Self-de termination in Czechoslovak Consti tuti ons 1920- 1992" . CEPSR. no. I O (2002), 173- 98 . 9 The Democratic Party received 62 .0 percent of th e votes in Slovakia. See Michal Barnovsky & Edita l vanickova, eds, Prve povojnove volby v strednej a j uhovychod- nej Eur6pe (Bratislava: VEDA, 1998). 2 15- 18. �57 SLOVAKIA Table 1: State Form, Administrative Structure and Institutional Set-up in Czechoslovak Constitutions and Constitutional Amendments Year 1920 State-forming State form Administrative nation Czechoslovak Un itary 22 co unties : Centra lized, from 1928 four bicameral legislature nation Institutional set-up structure provinces 1938 Czech and Federal Slovak nations 1948 Czech and Unitary Slovak nations Four provi nces : Asymmetric: Bohem ia. M ora- bicamera l via, Slovak ia. & separate Slovak Sub-Carpathian instituti ons with Ruthenia extensi ve powers Two prov inces , Asy mmetric; The Czech lands unicamera l & separate and Slovak ia Slovak inst itutions with lim ited powers 1960 Czech and Uni ta ry Slovak nati ons Two prov inces, Asymme tric: unicame- the Czech lands ra l & separate Slovak and Slovak ia institut ions with more l imited powers 1968 Czech and Federal Slovak nations Two repub lics, Symmetric: bicameral, T he Czech Re- federa l & separate publ ic and the Czech and Slovak Slovak Republ ic institut ions Source: A ll cons titutions can be found in Sbfrka zakonii a naHzenf stalU ceskoslovenskeho. During the Prag ue Spring of 1968, the questi on of Slovak autonomy reappeared on the agenda. The initi ati ve to amend the constituti on ca me from the Slovak Nati onal Council , and thi s time a sy mmetri c so luti on was pro posed, sy mboli zing the equality of the two state-forming nati ons. 10 Accordin g to the 1968 Constitution, Czecho- ' 0 T he process towards federa li za ti on is doc umented in Jozef Za tk uli ak, Fede- ra lizacia Ceskoslovenskeho Staw 1968- 1970. Vznik Cesko-sl ovenskej fede racie �SLOVAKIA 58 slovakia became a federation of two republics, the Czech and th e Slovak Republic s, each with their ow n assemblies (National Councils), and their own govern ments. The bicameral federal legis lature consisted of the proporti onall y elected Chamber of the Peop le, and the Chamber of Nations where the two Republics were represented on equal terms. For important dec isions, a majority was req uired in the Peop le's chamber, as we ll as in the separate Czech and Slovak parts of the Chamber of Nations, in effect giving the Slovaks veto powers. The 1968 Constitution provided the in stitutional foundations for Slovak autonomy, but in practice the political system remained centralized. The original division of power in the 1968 Constitution changed in favor of the federal level during the "Normali zation " of th e early 1970s, and fo rmal decision-making rul es and divi sion of powers did not matter much during Communism . As Carol Skalnik Leff has pointed out, however, federation plu s democra ti zation was a power eq uation. 11 After the Velvet Revo lution in 1989, th e 1968 Constitution acquired new importance; first , it determined the procedures for the adoption of a new constitution (a three-fifths majority in all parts of the federal parliament), and second, it became the point of departure for the negoti ati ons about the contents of a new constitutional settl ement. Under th e new, democratic co nditi ons, the Slovak minorit y had an excell ent bargaining position , since any cons ti tutional settlement required Slovak co nsent. After 1989 the questi on was, therefore, not whether Slovakia should have autonomy, but the ex tent of that autonomy. Separate Slovak institutions were taken for roku 1968 (B rn o: Nak ladatelstvi Doplnek, 1996). See also Jaros lav Krejci & Pave l Machonin , Czechos lovakia 19/8- 92. A U1bora to1y for Social Change (London: Macmill an, I 996), 45-7: Chovanec & Mozolik, (op.cit. , I 994). 48-52: Ales Gerloch . Jiri Hrebej & Vladimir Zoubek. Us tavnf sys tem Ceske republiky ( Prague: Prospektrum, 1999). 51-4 : Carol Skalni k Leff, National Conf7ict in Czechoslo vakia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, I 988), 243 ff. 11 Leff, 132-33. �SLOVAKIA 59 granted, and autonomy now became a matter of allocating more decision-making power to the Republics. The " hyphen delJate" in the sprin g of 1990 was a foreboding of the problems that lay ahead. It was Pres ide nt Vaclav Havel who inadvertently started it. In Janu ary of 1990, without prior consultations, he submitted a constitutional amendment to the federal Parliament, proposing to drop the word "Soc iali st" from the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic . Much to hi s and many others' surpri se, thi s trigged a bitter di spute about whether the name of the Republic should be spelled with or without a hyphe n. The main alternatives were the "Czec ho-S lovak Republic ," favored by a majority of the Slovaks, and the "Czechoslovak Federal Republic ," favored by a majority of the Czechs. Stalemate in the federal Parliament at first resulted in the absurd dec ision to spe ll the word "Czechoslovak" in one word in the Czech Republic and with a hyphen in Slovakia. Thi s was presented as a concession to "S lovak grammar. " This deci sion caused demonstration s in Slovakia, after which the Parliament made a hasty retreat and settled for the "Czech and Slovak Federal Republic ." 12 Negotiations about a new Czechoslovak Constitution started after the elections in June of 1990, but soon ran into trouble. As before, the Czech political elite was generally in favor of more centralized solutions than the Slovaks. The difference was that the Czech majority , rea li zing that a unitary state was not an option , now favored a " function al federation," while the majority of the Slovak political elite increas ing ly leaned toward s confederal rather than federal so lutions. 13 A temporary settl e me nt was reached in the Competency Law 12 Milan Sutovec. Semi6za aka politikum alebo ·'pomlckova vojna." (Bra ti slava: Kalli gram , I 999). 299 ff. 13 Opinion polls cons istently showed th at th e public in the Czech Republic preferred a unitary state. with a federation as the second most popular option. while a confederation never exceeded 6 percent support. By con trast, a confedera ti on or a federation was th e preferred state form in Slovakia. See table 12.3. in Sharon L. Wolchik, ''The Politi cs of Transition and the Break-up of Czechos lovakia," in Jiff Musil. ed. , op.cit.. 235. �SLOVAKIA 60 of December 1990, whi c h more-or-less reestabli shed the co mpetency di vision of the 1968 Constitutio n. However, whil e thi s was abo ut as fa r as the Czechs we re w illing to go , the S lova ks looked at the Co mpete ncy Law merely as a po int of departure fo r further negoti ati ons. The core of the confli ct was the all ocati on of compe te nce and power in two specific areas: Eco nomi c po li cy a nd intern ati ona l re lations. The majority of the S lovak elite pressed fo r S lovak " visibility" in intern ati ona l rel ati ons, and wanted to all ocate more power in economi c matte rs to the Republics . The Czec h side wanted the federa l leve l to be stron g e nough to carry o ut the econo mi c reform s necessar y fo r th e tra ns iti o n to a market econo my, and wanted th e state internati onall y to speak with one vo ice . The negoti atio ns fa il ed to produce an acceptabl e co mpromi se befo re the 1992 elections, 14 and since the vic torious Czec h and Sl ovak parti es di sag reed fund ame nta ll y o n the iss ues of econo mic reform and state fo rm , they dec ided to di vide the state. It turn ed out th at both sides prefe rred a break-up rathe r than accepting the favo red state form of the othe r party, des pite the fac t that before the e lec ti ons, the future ex iste nce of Czec hos lovak ia was still ta ke n fo r granted . The onl y party th at advocated secess io n w as the Sl ova k Nationa l Party. 2. The Composition and Stability of the Elite Constellations In the inter- war peri od, the e lite conste ll atio ns fac in g eac h other were c lear-cut and quite stable. A clear majority of the Czec hos lovak parties was ce ntra li st a nd in fa vor of Czechoslo vaki sm. Thi s camp co mpri sed the e ntire Czech political e lite and a substanti al pa rt of the Slovak political e lite. Inte restingly, the major ce ntrali st pl ayers in the interw ar clashes about autonomy in the Parli ame nt were Slovak s, not Czec hs, a nd like th e ir adversaries, they were posin g as the c ha mpi ons of Slovak inte rests/the Slovak nati on. The two most influe nti al 14 T he negoti ators did reach a co mpromi se in the spring of 1992, but th is was turned down by th e pres idium of th e Slovak Nati onal Counci l. See Rychl fk , Roz pad. 2 18- 20. �SLOVAKIA 61 Slovak centrali sts were the Agrarian Mi Ian Hodza ( 1878- I 944) and the Social Democrat I van Derer ( 1884- 1973). They represented their parties in the Parli ament during the entire First Republi c and betwee n th em, the two men served as mini sters for 23 yea rs. Milan Hodza even became the first Slovak Prime Mini ster in 1935. Apart from these two, the A grarian Anton Stefanek ( I 877-1964) and the Czechoslovak National Socialist Igor Hrusovsky ( 1872- 1937), both seasoned parli amentari ans, played an espec iall y acti ve role in th e debates. By co ntrast, two Slovak parti es represented th e autonomist ca mp. arguing that the Slovaks were a nation of their own and, therefore, entitl ed to autonomy. 15 The larges t autonomi st party was the Slovak Peopl e's Party . Its co-founder and chairman Andrej Hlinka ( 1864- 1938), whose name was added to the party's title in 1925, was a dominatin g fi gure in the stru gg le for Slovak autonomy until hi s death in August of 1938. 16 Ferdinand (Ferdi s) Juriga ( 1878-1950) had been the onl y Slovak deputy in th e Hungari an Parli ament of 19 14 and he continued to defend Slovak autonomy in the Parliament also of the First Republi c. Jozef Ti so ( 1887- 1947) played an important role in the 1930s, as did editor-in-chief of Slovak, Karol Sidor ( 1901 - 53). The Slovak Nati onal Party never had more than one deputy - its chairman M artin Razus ( 1888- 1937) - and pl ayed a more peripheral role. After the Velvet Revolution, elite constellations were more vo latile. The Slovak political elite was from the outset divided on the quest ion of state form, the preferred so lution s ranging from mildl y federa li st to a loose confederat ion. From 1991 the Slovak National Party started to advocate independence, but already in 1990 th e chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement, Jan Carnogursky, argued th at Slovakia should enter the European Community as an in- " In addition. some of th e national minority parties and the Communists su pported autonomy. but for other reasons. '" See Felak. Ac Che Price of Che Republic. 1994: A lena Bartl ova. A ndrej Hlinka. ( Bratislava: Obzor. 1991 ). �SLOVAKIA 62 de pende nt state. Hi s party was earl y in favo r of a confederal so luti on, but o nl y as a te mporary so luti on, until both Re publi cs joined the European Community. 17 Public Aga inst Vi o le nce was be ing pulled in o ppos ite direc ti o ns, and whe n the c irc le around Vl adimfr Mec ia r broke o ut and fo rmed the Moveme nt fo r a De mocrati c Slovaki a in 1991 , the liberal , federa li st oriented w in g re ma ined , whil e the national populi sts w ith confedera l lea nings fo ll owed Mec iar. In the 1992 e lecti on Mec iar' s Move me nt fo r a De mocrati c S lovaki a appeared as the main champion of Slovak interests. The Czec h politica l e lite was fro m the o utset more indiffe rent to the nati onal questi on. Wh ile Public Aga inst Vi o le nce had the nati onal questi o n as o ne of its top pri o riti es , it was co mpl ete ly absent fro m the agenda of C ivic Forum in the first e lecti o n. In stead , " bac k to Eu ro pe" and e limination of communi sm we re the top pri oriti es. 18 Espec iall y after the " ma nagers" aro und Vac lav Kl aus won over the di ss ide nt w in g of C ivic Forum in 199 1, the leadin g Czec h po liti ca l e lite united in favo r of a stro ng fe derati o n. In th e 1992 e lec ti o n Kl aus' C ivic De mocratic Party ca me o ut as the main c hampi on of a federa l so luti on. The Move me nt fo r a De mocrati c S lovaki a and the C ivi c De mocrati c Party won the e lecti ons in th e ir respective Re publics, whil e parti es th at took a more mode rate stand on the questi on of state fo rm lost. Once the victors w ith Vac lav Kl aus and Vl adimfr Mec iar at the he lm had dec ided to di vide the state, fo rmer ene mi es beca me alli es, and the e lite conste ll ati ons changed according ly. The fo rme r oppone nts in the negoti ati o ns on state fo rm now united in favo r of a break-up , aga inst a motl ey c rew of oppos ition parti es, co mpri sing Czec h and Slovak Communi st and Soc ial De mocrati c parties, as we ll as Miros lav Slade k 's ultra- nati ona li st Republican Party of C zec hoslo vaki a. 17 Stein , Czecho/Slovakia. 67 . 93-4. '~Oskar Krejci. Kniha o volbich. (Prag ue: Victori a Pu bli sh ing. 1994). 2 10- 11. �SLOVAKIA 63 3. The Arguments in Favor of Autonomy If we turn to the actual arg ume nts, the main impress ion is that there were e lements of continuity as well as c ha nge when we go from the interwar period to the post-Communist period. On the one hand, the argume nts in favor of autonomy were located within the sa me nat io nalist di sco urse in both periods . On the other hand , the composition of the arg uments in favor of autonomy changed, and so did the contents of the autonomy demands, as we have seen. In the interwar period, the principle of national se lf-determination was used as an arg ument in favor of an asymmetric federation; after 1989 it was first used as an argument in favor of confederal so lutions, and then in favor of an independent Slovak state. Arguments in Favor of Autonomy During the First Republic In the inter-war period , the cornerstone of the a utonomists was the existence of an individual and sovereign Slovak nation , and the core message was that this Slovak nation was entitl ed to auto nomy. The premi se linkin g national identity to the matter of state form was the principle of national se lf-determination, understood as the ri ght of cu ltu ra ll y distinct nation s to se lf-governance. 19 In the a utonomist scheme, the Slovak nation had used thi s right to divorce the Magyars and join the Czec hs in a Czech and Slovak nation-state. Moreove r, as a free a nd equa l nation , the S lovaks were entit led to manage the ir own affairs and, therefore , to autonomo us political institutions. In practice, autonomy demands were always made on be half of Slovakia, yet for the a utonomists this amo unted to the same , s ince they regarded Slovakia as the homeland of the Slovaks, despite its substantial national minoriti es. 19 The principle of national self-determination can be interpreted in at least two other ways: as the right of the people to choose their government without coercion , i.e. popular sovereig nty - or as th e right of independent states to manage their affa irs without foreign intervention. See e.g. 0yvind 0sterud, Nasjonenes selvbestemmel- sesrett. (Oslo: Un iversitetsforlaget. 1984). 150 ff. �64 SLOVAKIA The Slovak a uto nomi sts argued a lon g three ma in lin es. First, they argued that Slovakia was discriminated aga in st in vario us ways, and that autono my was necessary to a ll eviate S lovakia's ill s. Second , they arg ued that Slovakia was entit led to auto no my by virtu e of various " co ntrac ts" (e.g. th e Pittsburgh Agreement). Finally, they argued that the Slovaks had the right to auto nom y s impl y because they were a natio n (the classical nation ali st arg umen t). The point of departure for the deprivation mguments was that the Slovaks were an indi vid ua l nati o n wit h separate nationa l interests, and that these national interests were not properly loo ked after under th e present centrali zed state form. Here S lovak grievances were turned into reasons for autonomy, and autonomy was the so lution to everythin g. Most of the gr ieva nce arguments for auton o my were associated with the use of Slovak as the offic ial lang uage in Slovakia and w ith (w hite-co llar) jobs fo r the Slovak inte lli gentsia. The sig na l words were " Slovak bread" . For in sta nce, before th e 1929 e lec ti on, the a utonomi st news paper Slovak argued that " a uto nomy does no t only mean political ri g hts, but a lso bread. When we get our own administration , our ow n asse mbly and our own courts, only Slovaks will be e mpl oyed there. [ ... ] The auton o mo us adm ini strati o n of the Slova k home land will compel the e mployers first a nd foremost to gran t the Slovaks work and bread." 20 Accord in g to the contract oriented lin e of arg um e nts , Slovakia had the right to autonomy by virtue of certai n (a ll eged ly) binding doc um e nts or "co ntracts". The point of departure was again that the Slovaks were an indi vidu a l and sovere ig n natio n, and th at S lovakia was the ho me la nd of the Slovaks. The argume nt was that Slovakia had been promised autono my, a nd th at thi s promise was lega ll y bindin g. However, fo r a co ntract to be va lid , it must be stipul ated th at the sig natori es had the right to s ig n agreements on behalf of those they were said to represent - in this case th e Czec h and Slovak nati o ns. 20 Slovak no. 240, 22 October I929. p. 3. �SLOVAKIA 65 Several of the many declarations and agreements that were formulated during World War I were used as arguments for (or against) autonomy . However, two documents stand out: The Pittsburgh Agreement of May 30th , 1918, and the Martin Declaration of October 30th , 1918. The former was a clear asset, while the latter soon became a liability (see next subsection). The Martin Declaration had been adopted at an as sembly of all Slovak political parties in Turciansky Svaty Martin. For the autonomists , the significance of the Martin Declaration was that through this act, the Slovaks had voluntarily joined the Czechs as equal s in one state, and they had therefore an equally large part in its founding as the Czechs. Moreover, as an equal nation which had entered the state voluntarily, the Slovaks had the right to autonomy. In effect, the autonomi sts gave the Martin declaration state-forming significance. This was also reflected in repeated attempts to turn October 30th into a national holiday. Compared to the other wartime declarations , however, the Pittsburgh Agreement had some obvious advantages. First and foremost , it had greater symbolic potential as an official agreement binding the government, because Czechoslovakia's first president and co-founder Tomas G. Masaryk had signed it, along with Czech and Slovak emigre leaders in the United States. 2 1 Second, the Agreement contained the most important autonomy demands. From the moment the Pittsburgh Agreement became known in Slovakia in the spring of 1919, it was invoked in every single debate where autonomy was " M asaryk was not Pres ident at th e tim e, of course, but on the initi ati ve of th e Slov ak L eague he signed a calliographed version of the Ag ree ment on November 14th. 19 I 8, the very same day he was elected Pres ident of the Republic. Besides. on October 3 1st. 19 18, th e Czec hoslov ak Nation al Committee had declared as bindin g all ac ti ons by members of the pro visional government abroad (including M asaryk). It may be argued that if the decl arati on of the establi shment of th e Czechos lovak state was valid. then the authori zation of Masaryk 's ac ti ons was valid as we ll. In practice, th e va lidity of th e Pittsburgh Agreement was a political , not a lega l matter. For the tex t of the statement , see Benes (op. cit. . 1929). 490. See also M. M ark Stolarik (op. cit. , 1968), 49. �SLOVAKIA 66 mentioned. At first glance, this Agreement would seem to be a stable element in the argumentation for Slovak autonomy. However, the usage varied. Early in the period, the autonomists would present the Pittsburgh Agreement as a Magna Charta granting the Slovaks the right to autonomy. Later, it became more common to present it as a binding contract. The concept of a Magna Charta brings to mind a sovereign granting hi s subjects certain rights and privileges, and it was Masaryk who (implicitly) had this role. When the Pittsburgh Agreement was presented as a contract, the contracting partners were at first the Czech and Slovak nation s. However, especially after it became public knowledge in 1922 that President Masaryk had actually drafted it, he was increasingly presented as a contracting partner. This shift can also be seen as an answer to the centralist claim that the American Czechs and Slovaks were not the leg itimate representatives of their co-nationals at home. However, the third and most common use, especially in the 1930s, was the Pittsburgh Agreement as "our program" or as an expression of the will of the Slovak nation (not just a small faction, but of all Slovaks). The point of departure was that the Slovaks were an individual nation with a natural right to self-determination, and therefore to autonomy if it so wishes. This usage was associated with the third , classical nationalist line of argument, which rested on three premises: I. that the Slovaks were an individual nation ; 2. that nation s had the right to self-determination; and 3. that the Slovak autonomists represented the true will of the Slovak nation - which was autonomy. The second premise was often implicit, while a lot of effort was put into defending Slovak individuality and the right to speak on the Slovaks ' behalf. The autonomists employed two main strategies to substantiate their claim. One strategy was to argue from the majority, which meant resorting to "advanced math". Election results here came in handy. In a parliamentary debate in 1933, Jozef Tiso argued that as a majority, the autonomists had the right to speak on behalf of the �SLOVAKIA 67 Slovak nation. Upon subtracting the stipulated Czech and Magyar votes from the votes cast for the centralist parties in Slovakia, he ended up with 402,320 votes for the centralist parties and 427,443 votes for the Slovak People ' s Party and the Slovak National Party put together. 22 A second strategy was personal attacks (argumentum ad homi- nem), which were often used to defend the existence of a Slovak nation as well as the claim for autonomy. The autonomists would then accuse Slovak deputies belonging to the Czechoslovak parties of being " renegades," " Phari sees," "sodomites" and "careerists ," and, therefore, not worthy of representing the Slovak nation. In his rather biblical language, the chairman of the Slovak People ' s Party, Andrej Hlinka, argued in 1927 that "S lovakia is ours, only we are Slovaks, you sold out the Slovak language for a bowl of Czechoslovak lentils eight years ago. " 23 Continuity and change after 1989 After 1989, the core message was still that the Slovaks were entitled to national se lf-determination "q ua nation," although the contents of this self-determination had changed from an asymmetric federation to confederate so lutions or even independence. The most important changes compared to the interwar period were, first , that there was no longer any need to defend the existence of an individual Slovak nation , since that was taken for granted, and second, a change in th e composition of the arguments. Deprivation arguments and contract oriented arguments were nearly absent, while classical nationalist arguments now dominated , and the principle of national se lf-determination was invoked more explicitly. 22 30 I. schuze poslanecke snemov ny N.S .R.C. dne 29 . li stopadu 1933. in Tesnopi- secke zpravy o scht1zfch poslanecke snemovny Narodnfho shromaidenf republiky ceskoslovenske. Ill. volebnf obdobf. (Prague. 1929- 35), 47- 50. 23 Hlinka, Slovak no. 86, 16 April , I 927 , p. I. "Sodomi tes•· referred to Social Demo- crats. as a play on wo rd s. �SLOVAKIA 68 There are, of co urse, some differe nces between the various debates, which is perha ps not surpri sin g, sin ce the topics of the debates a lso differed. The principle of nati ona l se lf-determi nati o n was most ex plicitly vo iced in the 1992 debates in the federa l parliament (th e two debates on the break- up of Czec hos lovak ia), a nd in the Slovak National Council (the de bates on the S lovak Declaration of Sovere ig nty and the Slovak Constitution ). Conve rse ly. thi s principle was more impli c it in the 1990 " hyphen debate". The " hyphe n debate" is perhaps the most atyp ica l, in terms of topic ("Czecho-Slo vak Republic" with a hyphen versus "Czechos lovak Federal Republic") as we ll as types of arg ume nt. First, thi s is rea ll y the o nl y debate where identity pl ayed any major part. Ide ntity arg uments appeared in two forms: On the one hand , it was arg ued that for the S lovaks, to spe ll the word Czecho-Slovak w ithout a hyphe n was tantamo unt to accepting the abe rrati o n of Czec hos lova ki sm. On the o ther hand , it was arg ued that th e hyphe n ex pressed Slovak nati o na l indi vidu a lity and the equa l standing of the Czech and Slovak nati o ns in the federati o n. Second, the hyphe n debate is the only debate where the Pittsburg h Agreement was me ntion ed more than o nce. However, of th e six speake rs referrin g to it, o ne appea led to the Agreement to substantiate the c laim for a hyph e n in the "Czecho-Slovak" Rep ubli c. (thi s is how the word was spelled in the orig ina l), while the rest bas ically referred to it as an express io n of the eq ual status of the two natio ns e ntering the state , or as a part of the hi storical narrative lead ing up to the federalization. Nobody referred to it as a contrac t, and the Czech National Socialist Bi anka Hykova even quoted Masaryk to the effect that it was o nl y a n agreement between American Czechs and Slovaks. 2-1 Contract oriented arguments thus disappeared a ltogeth er, and refere nces to the Pittsburg h Agreeme nt and/or the Martin Dec lara20 See Zprava o 26. spolecne sc hi'1zi snemovny lidu a snemovny narodu. 29.3. 1990. in Federalnf shromaidenf Ceskoslovenske socialisticke republiky V. vo lebnf obdobf. ( 1986-90), 25 1. 253 , 256, 270, 304. �SLOVAKIA 69 tion were rare. A utonomy was ex plicitly mentioned in the contex t of the Pittsburgh Ag reement onl y once, in the second debate abou t th e brea k-up of th e state. According to I va n Simko from the Chri stian Democratic Movement, Slovak organization s in the U nited States had made an agreement wi th Masaryk "as a leading personality of Czech po litica l li fe" to fo rm a shared state where Sl ovaki a was to have an autonomous position. Thi s agreement was unfortun ately not honored , he argued. 25 Depri vation arg uments were al so rare . The phrase " Slovak bread" occurred onl y once: In the first debate on the break -up of the state in September 1992, Michal Ko vac from the Mo ve ment for a Democratic Slovaki a ( later to beco me Slovaki a's first pres ident) argued that in a normally functioning federation , it wo uld not be possible for the standard of li ving in Slovaki a to drop as much as it had in onl y two yea rs. In another four years , he argued, " Would we not be in the hi storica l situation w here we have already been, that the Slovak nation would have to go abroad for bread, because there would not be bread for people in Slovakia? And we wou ld be as weakened as we once were under dear father Masaryk." 26 However, in the interw ar period " Slovak bread" was usuall y tantamount to w hite-collar jobs for the yo ung Slovak intelli gentsia in Slovaki a, whi le here th e lack of " bread " obvious ly refers to general unemployment. The probl em was real enough - in the earl y 1990s the unemployment ra te in Slovak ia was three or four times the Czech average. 27 25 Zprava o 5. spo lecne schu zi snemovny lidu a snemo vny narodu. 18.11 . 1992 . 25 .1 1.1 992. in Federi ln f shromiidenf Ceske a S/ovenske Federaci vnf republiky. V il. vo lebnf obdobf. ( 1992). 7 17. 2 '' Zprava o 4. spo lec ne sc huzi snemo vny lidu a snemov ny narodu 29.9. 1992. in Fe- denilni shro m;ii deni Ceske a S/ovenske Federaci vnf republiky. V II. vo lebnf obdobf, ( 1992). 60 I. 27 11. 8 percent in Slovaki a vers us 4. 1 percent in the Czec h Republic in 199 1: 10.3 percent versus 2.6 percent in 1992. Transition reporc I 996. (L ondon. The European Bank fo r Reconstructi on and Deve lopment. I 996). However. th e difference was even larger in 1993. the first yea r of independence. �SLOVAKIA 70 Finall y, compared to the interwar period , classica l nationalist ar g uments were much more co mmon , and the principle of nation al self-determination was invoked more ex plicitly. In the debate about the allocation of competence between the Republics and the Federation it was used as an argument in favor of returnin g to the original 1968 Constitution. 28 Y et, the most co mmon use of th e principle of national self-determination was as an argument in favor of establi shing an independent Slovak state or dividin g Czechoslovakia. There are, however, some interestin g nation al differences between actors in how they used it. Slovak deputies speaking in favor of Slovak independence invoked the principle of national self-determination on behalf of the Slovak nation . They regarded it as an inalienable, natural ri ght, and in one instance, even as a God-given ri ght. 29 An independent Slovak state was presented as the fulfillment of IO00 years of strugg le for Slovak individuality and sovereignty , and as the result of a natural , hi storical process of national emancipation . In the words of HZDS deputy chairman Au gustfn Marian Huska , " the Constitution is the fulfillm ent and lega l enac tment of th e ri ght to se lf-determination . ( ... )To the Slovak s, whose consciousness was molded by more than a thou sand years under foreign rule , the feeling of dependence had become second nature. Slowly, but persistently they formed an awareness of the need for self-determination , the need to search for, find , 28 Zprava o 9. spolecne schi°1zi snemovny lidu a snernovn y narodu. 11 .- 12. 12. 1990. in Federalnf shromaidenf CSFR. ( 1990-1992) . < ww,~ .p,p.c:dckni h/ I 990fs/sbn/-stcn -prot/009,c: hu t./s009077. html/ d> [2 Febru ary, 2004]. See also the debate on th e Slovak declaration of so vereignty. Stenograficka sprava o 3. sch6dzi Slovenskej narodnej rndy konanej 17. j ul a 1992. < www .nr,r.sk/i ndexarch.a,p> ]4 Febru ary. 2004 J. 29 Sedovic (S lovak National Part y), Zprava o 5. spol ec ne schu zi SL a SN , 18. 11 . 1992. in Federalnf shro,mii denf Ceske a Slovenske Federati vnf republiky. VII. volebnf obdobf. ( 1992). 788. �71 SLOVAKIA ex press. a nd at las t rea li ze sovere ig nty." 30 S lova ki a was in o th e r word s pi ctured as a nati on-state a nd the S lova ks as the state-forming nati o n. Howeve r, in the de bates in the Sl ovak Nation a l Counc il , Slovak deputi es, inc ludin g Prime Mini ster Vl adim fr Mec iar, at the same tim e pro mi sed to res pec t the eq ua l rig hts of a ll c iti ze ns, nati o na l minorities and ethni c groups. De puti es re presentin g th e Magyar mino rity in the S lovak Nationa l Counc il recog ni zed o r eve n s uppo rted the S lovak ri g ht to selfde te rmin ati o n, but argued that the princ ipl e sho uld a lso appl y to the nati o na l mino riti es. Thi s was a n arg ume nt in favo r of auto no my. At the same time, Magyar deputi es arg ued th at S lovaki a sho uld not be presented as a nati o n- state in the Co nstituti o n, bec au se it was not nation all y ho moge neous. Founding the state o n the nati o na l princ ipl e meant turnin g the minoriti es into second-c lass c iti zens, they argued . Czec h de puti es co nsiste ntly presented the break-up of Czec hoslovaki a as a matte r of se lf- determinati o n fo r the Slovak nati o n. The 1992 e lecti o n. the Slovak Dec larati o n of Sovere ig nty, and the Slovak Constituti o n were take n as proof th at the S lovak natio n did wa nt inde pende nce. In the words of Prime Mini ste r Vacl av Kl aus of the Czec h Re publi c: "The S lova k nati o n used the o ppo rtunity to co mpl e te its nati o na l e manc ipati o n by fo undin g its own state. Thi s is a rea lity we mu st res pect. " 3 1 T he arg ume nt th at the Czec hs had no ri ght to deny th e S lovak natio n its rig ht to se lf-de termin ati o n was a lso used aga in st ho ld in g a referend um in the Czech Republi c; Czec h c itizens could no t dec ide whet her the S lovaks sho uld beco me a statefo rming natio n o r no t. Interestin g ly, the princi pl e of nati o na l se lf-determin ati o n was not even o nce in voked o n be ha lf of the Czec h na- -'" For Huska ·s statement and the debate on the Const itut ion. see Stenograficka sprava o 5. sch6dzi S lovenskej mirodnej rady kona nej 31. augusta a I . septembra 1992. <www.nr,r. ., k/indexarch.a,p> 14 February . 20041. -' 1 K laus in th e debate on th e Czech Constitution . Ceskii narodnf rada I 992- 1992. Stenoprotokoly. I 0. schuze. 16.- 17. 12. 1992. <www.psp.cz/cknih/ I 992cnr/,tenprot/O I 0schuzi> 13 February. 2004J. �SLOVAKIA 72 tion .32 The reason is obvious: The Czechs did not regard the establi shme nt of the Czec h Republic as a state-formin g process, but as a restoration of Czech statehood , which expl icitly included Czechoslovak state tradition s. But the n the Czechs a lways rega rded Czechoslovakia as their state. Apart from the princ ipl e of national se lf-determination , the main lin e of argument in favor of di ssolution may be termed reali st. It was argued that the federation did not work or that it was a lread y dead, that it was too late to save the state, and now the important thing was to e nd the state in a peaceful , orderly, cultivated , adult and leg itimate fashion , and to ensure good ne ighborl y relation s be twee n the future inde pe nde nt states. 4. The Centralist Arguments Against Autonomy If we turn to the centra li st side, di sco ntinuity 1s th e word that first co mes to mind. In the inte rwar period , the centrali st arg ume nts against a utonomy were located within a nation a li st di sco urse, and mirrored the autonomist arguments to a large ex tent , the difference be ing th at the centralists based the ir arg uments on an a lte rn ative national id eo logy - Czec hos lovakism . After 1989 , the "ce ntra li st" arg um e nts changed profoundly . Czechos lov akism had been abandoned already in 1945 , and the unitary state form in 1968. The "centrali sts" afte r 1989 were , the refore, centra li sts on ly re lative to those advocating confederate so luti ons, a nd in the las t instance, inde pe ndence for Slovakia. " The principle of national se l f-de term ination was invoked on behalf of the .. Moravian nati on" ( 1.5 million . accord ing to the 199 1 census). but then as an argument in favor of Moravi an autonomy in a Czecho-Morav ian federation . See espec ially the speec hes of deputies Jan Jeg la and Jiff Bfl y (both from the Moravi an movement H SD-SMS) . Ceska narodnf rada 1992- 1992 . Stenoprotokoly. 10. sc huze , 16.17. 12. 1992. < www.psp.cz/eknih/ 1992<.:nr/~tenprot/0 I 0schuz/> 13 Febru ary , 2004J. �SLOVAKIA 73 Centralist Arguments during the First Republic ln the inter-war period, the co rnerstone of the ce ntra li st argumentati on was that the Czechs and Slovak s were one Czechoslovak nati on (a lbe it w ith two tri bes), and the core message was th at a ce ntra li zed state form was necessary to preserve nati onal unity and th e integrity of th e state. T he premi se linking nati onal identity to state fo rm was the principl e of nati onal se l f-determin ati on. According to the centrali sts, the Czechos lovak nati on had used its ri ght to self-determ ination to re uni te in a Czechos lovak nati on-state, and thi s unity had to be preserved.·13 A uto nomy for Slovak ia was seen as a th reat to Czechos lovak nationa l unity as we ll as state in tegrity , first because it wo uld dri ve th e two tribes of the Czechos lovak nati on apart, and second , beca use granting Slovaki a autonomy wo ul d be tantamoun t to recogni zing th e Slovak s as a separate nati on, w hich would j eopardi ze the state's ra ison d'etre. Th e centra lists co untered the depri vati on arguments of the autonomi sts in two ways . On the one hand, they denied that the Slovak s were d iscrimin ated agai nst, and on the other hand , they rejec ted autonomy as a suitabl e remedy to Slovaki a's alleged ill s. What was needed to help Slovak ia was not autonomy, but more unity, especiall y economica ll y, the ce ntra li sts argued. Thi s was entirely in line w ith thei r overall "strength th ro ugh unity" message. However, their main artill ery was aimed at the contract-oriented arguments, and espec iall y the Pi tts burgh Agreement. T he main ar guments were: I . T he A meri ca n Czechs and Slovaks were not leg itimate represe ntati ves of th eir co-n ati onals at home, and had no ri ght to dec ide on their behal f; 2. The Pittsburg h Agreement was one of many, and thus had a certain hi stori ca l va lue; but in order to be va lid, it wo uld need the co nse nt of Czechs and Slovak s at home; and 3. Leg itimate Slovak represe ntati ves had conse nted to Czec hos lovak ·'-' There was no big difference between the Slovak autonomists and the Czechoslovak cen tralists in terms of the co ntents of national identity. In both cases . national identi ty was defined in terms of culture. language and ancestry. See Bakke (op.c it. , 1999). especia ll y Chapter I 0. fo r documentati on. �SLOVAKIA 74 national and state unity in the Constitu ti on of 1920, as we ll as at assem bli es before and after Pittsburg h. The first arg ume nt was especia ll y damag in g, since it went to the core of a ll the auto no mi st argument s assoc iated w ith the Pittsburg h Agreement , in va lid atin g the Agreement as a Magna C harta, as a binding contract, a nd as an express io n of the will of the Slovak natio n. It was more difficult for the ce ntra li sts to de nou nce the leg iti macy of Masaryk as a represe ntati ve of the Czec hos lovak state, but the Pres ident did his best to free him se lf and the government of any obligation. Masaryk c la imed that he had sig ned the Pittsburg h Agreement in order to "appease a sma ll Slovak fact io n that dreamed of God know s what sort of independence for Slovakia ," and di smi ssed it as "a loca l pac t between American Czechs and Slovaks, signed by American citizens." 34 There is littl e doubt that Masaryk drafted the Agreement in order to ap pease a part of the Slovak League, but o ne may wo nder why this was important to him if he rega rded the m mere ly as American citizens. I think Mark Stol arik has a va lid point when he arg ues that th e American Slovaks he lped legiti mi ze th e creation of Czechoslovakia in the abse nce of a mandate from the Slovaks in Hungary (caused by war censorship).·15 Masaryk a lso tried , un successfu ll y, to di sc redit the Pittsburg h Agreement through quasi- lega li sti c arguments. In a le tte r to Andrej Hlinka on October 12th, 1929, Masaryk c laimed that the Pittsburgh Agreement was "a forge ry," because at the time, the em ig re organization of the Slovaks present in Pitts burgh , "the [Slovak l Leag ue lega ll y did no t ex ist, and it was recognized by th e Government o nl y in 191 9." Hlinka evide ntl y wrote the Slovak Leag ue , w hi ch retorted th at the re was " no doubt a bout th e a uthe nti c ity of th e Pittsburg h Agreement," and A merica n lega l experts confirmed th at there was no " Tomas G. Masaryk, Svetova revoluce. (Prague: Orbis a Ci n. 1925). 262-263. 35 M . Mark Stolarik (op.c it.. 1968). 54. �SLOVAKIA 75 difference between chartered a nd unc hartered orga ni zatio ns w ith respect to entering such ag ree me nts. 36 T o prop up the claim that leg itim ate Slovak representatives had co nsented to Czec hos lovak nat io na l and state unity after Pitts burg h, the ce ntrali sts preferred to use the Martin Dec lara ti o n of October 30th , 19 18, since thi s Dec laration had been unanimou sly accepted at a n asse mbl y of a ll Slovak po liti ca l part ies. In the beg innin g, they also used the 1920 Constitution for th e same purpose, but the trouble was th at th e Slovak Club in the Constitutional Assembly was coo pted , and arguably not representative of Slovak opinion. The ma in reason why the Martin Dec larati on was s uc h a n asset for the centrali sts, was the sente nce statin g th at the "S lovak nati o n is lingui sti ca ll y as we ll as culturally-historically pa rt of th e unitary Czec ho-Sl ovak nation ." Moreover, the asse mbl y at M artin had demanded nat io na l se lf-dete rmin ation on behalf of this "Czecho-S lovak nat io n," w hil e at the sa me time it was s il e nt on auton omy. The ce ntrali sts thu s used it as proof of Czechoslovak national and state unity, and as proof of the will of the Slovaks to e nter s uc h a unity. (Rumor in Slovakia had it th at the passage o n Czechoslovak national unity was not in the original text. This was , however, refuted in 1923 by Emil Stodola and Samue l Zoch, who had dra fted it).:17 Finally , the centrali sts counte red the c lass ic a l nati o na li st arg ume nt by rejecting the first premi se, that the Slovaks were an indi vidual nation, a nd the third premise. that the autonomi sts represented the tru e w ill of the Slovak nati o n. They presented the Slovaks as a tribe of th e Czechoslovak nati o n, and the Slovak me mbe rs o f the ce nt ral ist parties as the leg itim ate Slovak rep rese ntat ives. At the sa me time, they accepted the seco nd premi se, th at nati o ns had th e -' 6 The letter is pub lished as Document No. 30 in Joseph A. Mikus. Slova kia. A Poli- tica l and Constitutional Histo1y . (Brati slava: SAP. I 995) 209-2 10. The answer of th e Slovak League was published in Slo vak no. 194. 27 August. 1930. p. I. See also M. Mark Stolarik (op. cit.. 1968). 48-49. 52. -' 7 V ac lav Chaloupecky: Martinshi deklilrace 19- 20. II jejf politicke osudy (Prague. I 928). �SLOVAKIA 76 right to sel f-determin ati on, but as we have seen, th ey in vo ked thi s prin ciple on behalf of th e Czec hos lovak nati on. A n I va n Derer specialty was the argument th at i f the Slovak s had been an indi vidual nati on, then they w ould have th e ri ght to secess ion, not onl y to autonomy. 38 B oth sides had their share of argumentati on errors. T he ce ntrali sts argued from maj ority (a rg umentum ad populum ) in the earl y 1920s, w hen they recei ved the maj ority of the Slovak votes, and personal attacks (arg umentum ad hominem) were ac tu all y mos t co mmon on th e centrali st side. probabl y because they fi tted so we ll into their genera l strength-th ro ugh-unity argument. T he Slovak autonomi sts were accused of being " M agyarones" or " new Slovaks," thereby impl y ing th at they had other loya lties or identities,'9 and of being paid by the Hungari an government. In both cases, the M agyars had the ro le of ·'bogeyman" . T hi s M agyarone ca rd was used to expl ain w hy the Slovaks had turned away from the Czechs in the past and in the present , and to co unter th e autonomi st c laim th at they we re the so le leg itimate representati ves of the Slovak nati on. I f the ce ntra li sts believed th at Sl ovak autonomy would j eopardi ze Czechos lovak nati onal unity and th e integrit y of th e state, it w as quite log ica l to acc use th e autonomi sts of being renegades (though probabl y not very smart). Profound Changes after 1989 After 1989 there was not much left of the former ce ntra list arguments, which is not surpri sing considering that Czec hos lovaki srn had 18 • I van Derer. Ceskos/ovensk;i otizkil. (Prague : Orbis. 1935). 88- 90. 39 Both labels we re commonly used about people of Slovak origi n who had become more or less ass imil ated during Hungari an rul e. but who turned back after 19 18. There we re some known M agyarones among the autonomists (chiefl y Franti sek Jehlicka and Yoj tech/ Bela Tuka). but the lead ing figures (Hlin ka. Juri ga) had defended Slovak interests also under Hungary. T he total number of people who ac tu ally switched nati onal affi l iatio n from Magyar to Slovak i n the firs t ten years of Czec hos lovaki a cannot be ascertained prec ise ly, but an educated guess is th at it was betwee n 250.000 and half a million. See Bak ke (op.cit. . 1999). 305- 307. �SLOVAKIA 77 been abandoned and a unitary state form was no longer an option. Th e "centralists" still accepted the principle of nati onal self- determinati on; however, they now recogni zed the Czec hs and Slovaks as equal , state-forming nation s and Czechoslovakia as a Czech and Slova k nati on-state. As long as state form was sti 11 on the agenda, the players on the "centrali st" side were mostly Czechs, and the task was to defend a " function al federation ," which meant to preserve the powers of the federation v is-a-vi s the Republics. Once the break-up of the state appeared on the agenda after the 1992 electi ons, however , th e "centra li st" pl ayers were Czech and Slovak opposition parti es and the task was now to preserve a common Czechoslovak state. In the hy ph en debate, as we ll as in the co mpetenc y debate, Czech deputi es explicitly presented th e federal state form as an express ion of the equality of the Czechs and Slovaks. The main Czech arguments against th e hy phen were that it was divi sive, and that it was unacceptable to the Czech publi c. This probabl y had something to do with the fact that the Second Czecho-Slovak Republi c ( 1938-- 39) was spelled with a hyphen. It was also argued that it was grammati ca ll y probl emati c, th at the original spelling had been without a hyphen (an hi stori ca l argument), and th at the Morav ians would feel offended (an identity argument). The main arguments in favor of a strong federation were that it was necessary in order to carry out the economic reform s and to fulfill Czechos lovakia 's internati onal obligati ons. For the Czech elite, the power and competency of the Czech Republic was irrelevant. In fact, I have onl y found one example of a Czec h deputy in vok ing nat ional interests, and he arg ued th at a confederate solution would be contrary to Czech interests.-lO The Czech and Slovak opposition parties that defended Czec hoslovaki a's ex istence in the debates in the fall of 1992 were mostly Socialists and Communists, but also included the ultra-nati onali st ' 0 M andl er (Libera l Democra ti c Part y). Zprava o 9. spol ecne schuzi SL a S . 11.- 12.1 2. 1990, in Fedenilnf shromaf.difof Ceske a Slovenske Federativnf Republiky V I . vo lebnf obdobf ( 1990), <www.psp.c z/ci,.nih/ 19901\h,bnf!.,tcnprot/009,c:hud ,009()77. htrn ll d> [4 February 2004 1. �78 SLOVAKIA Republican s. Even thoug h this opposition accepted th e principle of national se lf-determination , they mostly interpreted it in the origina l meanin g - as popular sovereignty . The totally dominating line of argument was that the only leg itimate way of dividin g Czechoslovakia according to the principle of se lf-determination was to let the citizens decide by popular vote, a nd that it was unacceptable to divide the state against the will of the peopl e. In the first debate on dissolution , thi s was supported by a hi storical a nalogy. By accident, the debate was held 54 years after the fateful Munich agreement, and the opposition argued that a new Munich was about to happen: Again the fate of the Czechoslovak state wou ld be dec ided without asking the peop le. In the first debate the oppos ition parties advocated a refere ndum before the decision was made; in the second debate a ratifying pl ebisc ite. The motive was obvious ly to save the state, since all opin ion poll s showed that a clear majority was in favor. However, very few deputies ac tually defended the me rits of Czechoslovakia, although a handful of Czechs professed their love for the shared homeland , or invoked the legacy of the founding fathers , mostly T.G. Masary k and Milan Rasti slav Stefanik. Finally, a weak echo of the inte rwar debate could be heard in claims that separation would be a threat to the future existence of the Czech and Slovak nation s (reminiscent of the strength-through-unity argument), and in charges of treason (personal attac ks). Ne ither line of argument was very common. The claim that voting in favor of disso luti on was an act of treason was a preserve of the ultra-nationalist Republican Party of Czec hos lovakia. The debates a lso had their amusing sides, for in stance in the use of metaphors. The federation was alternately see n as a leaking ship, a train being pulled in opposite directions , and an old patient with a severe heart condit ion , whi le the establishment of the new states was compared to giving birth to twins! �SLOVAKIA 79 5. Summary and Conclusion [n the inter-war period, Czechoslovakia was a unitary , centralized state, and autonomy was a matter of separate Slovak institutions. After 1989, Czechoslovakia was a sy mm etric federation of two nationa l Republic s. Separate Slovak inst itutions were, therefore, no longer an iss ue, and autonomy became a matter of allocating more deci s ion-makin g power to the Republic s. However, in both cases, there was a conflict over state form, and in both cases the content of that conflict was how centralized the state should be. As for the actors , the e lite constellations were most stable in the inte rw ar pe riod . However, as lon g as the conflict was about state form, the Czech political elite was in favor of the most centralized so lution , while the Slovak elite was divided . Once the break-up of Czechoslovakia was on the agenda, the re were Czech and Slovak parties on both si des. If we focus on the main arguments on either side, we can obse rve continuity as well as change. Durin g the First Republic , the arguments of both sides were located within a nationali st discourse, but they founded their argume ntation on alternative nation al ideologies. The centralists invoked the principle of national se lf-dete rmination on behalf of the "Czechoslovak nation", the autonomists on behalf of the Slovak nation . After the Velvet Revolution , the autonomist argume nts were still located within a nationali st di scourse, and when the victorious part ies in the 1992 elections dec ided to divide the state, the Czech si de simply adopted the Slovak arg uments. By contrast, the "centrali st" arguments in the debate on state form were mainly economic, while the arguments in the debate on the break-up of Czechoslovakia were procedural. The most strik in g feature of the autonomy di sco urse after 1989 is therefore the asy mmetry of the arguments on both sides. Let us now address th e question of how the arguments related to the principle of national se lf-determination : On the autonomist side, the core message was the sa me in both periods; that the Slovaks were e ntitl ed to autonomy or se lf-determination "qu a nation ." Howeve r, �80 SLOVAKIA the principle of natio na l se lf-d etermin a ti o n was in voked more ex plicitl y after the Velvet Revo lution . On the centra li st side, the principle was used as an argument against a utono my in the interwar period , and w ith a certain twist, against the break-up of Czechos lovakia in 1992 . In the latter case, se lf-de te rmin ation was understood as popul ar sovere ignty - i.e . as a democratic principle. It is also inte res tin g that after 1989, the principl e of nation a l se lfdetermination was consistently invoked on behalf of the Slovaks, not on behalf of the Czechs, other than in the context of Czechoslovakia as the nation- state of two individual , sovere ign nations. In conclusion , the continuity was strongest on the autonomist side , alth ough th e conte nts of nation al se lf-determination c hanged from autonom y to independence. On the "centrali st" side, most of the a mmunition aga inst Slovak autonomy was gone once the concept of a Czechoslovak nation was abandoned. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2005, Vol. 38 Description An account of the resource Vol. 38 (No. 70-71), 2005. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2005 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 52 SLOVAKIA The Autonomy Discourse in Parliamentary Debates during the First Czechoslovak Republic and after the Velvet Revolution 1 E li sabeth Bakke " We approve the political progra m, w hi ch e ndeavors to unite the Czec hs a nd Slovaks in[to] an indepe nd e nt state of the Czech la nd s and Slovakia. Slovakia sha ll ha ve its own ad mini strati o n, its ow n parli ament and its own courts. The Slovak language shall be the officia l language in the sc hoo l[s], in office[sl and in public li fe in genera l. The Czecho-Slovak state sha ll be a republic , its constitution sha ll be democratic. [ ...] The detail ed reg ulati o ns for the estab lishment of the Czecho-Slovak state are left to the li berated Czechs and Slovaks and the ir lega l representati ves." The Pittsburgh Agreement of May 30th, 1918 2 ' An earli er version of thi s art icle was presented at the 34th National Conven ti on of the AAASS in Pittsburgh. 2 1- 24 November. 2002. 2 Thi s Agreeme nt was signed by the Slovak League of America . th e Czech National A lli ance. th e Al li ance of Czec h Ca th oli cs. representing Czech and Slovak emigrc organi zations in the USA. and T omas G. M asaryk. President of the Czechos lovak ati ona l Council in Pari s. I have quoted th e Engli sh version from The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact (Chicago: Th e Slova k Cath ol ic Federati on of America. 1934). 27. The Slovak ori gin al is reprinted in Edvard Benes. Svetov,i valka a nase revoluce. Vol. Ill (Dokumenty). (Prague: C in-Orbis . 1929) . 365. See also M. Mark Stolarik. 'The Role of Amer ican Slova ks in th e C rea tion of Czecho-S lovak ia. 19 14- 19 18"'. SLOVAKIA 53 Slovak autonomy was on the agenda throughout Czechoslovakia 's 74 years of existence, from the beginning to the bitter end. Although it may be argued that inexperienced politicians, short deadlines , rigid constitutional amendment procedures and conflicting economic priorities also played a role in the breakup, the long-term conflict that drove Czechoslovakia apart were the closely-related matters of political autonomy and recognition of the Slovaks as a separate nation. 3 What was at stake was not only the institutional set-up and division of power; for the Slovaks, separate political institutions were also important symbols of national individuality and ownership to the shared Czecho-Slovak state. The roots of the conflict go back to the founding of Czechoslovakia in October of 19 I 8. The Czechs and Slovaks had no prior shared statehood tradition s (save perhaps Great Moravia in the ninth century), and independence was not even on the agenda before World War I. Starting in 1915, the independence movement abroad, with Tomas G. Masaryk at the helm, tried to convince the Allies that a Czechoslovak Republic should be established, invoking the principle of national self-determination on behalf of the "Czechoslovak nation. " In the First Czechoslovak Republic the idea that the Czechs and Slovaks were one nation (albeit with two tribes) became official state ideology , and it went hand-in-hand with political centralism. 4 Slovak Studies VIII (Rome, 1968) for a very interesting acco unt of the circumsta nces that led to its signin g and the subseq uent course of even ts in th e new lyfounded Repub lic. 3 For a discussion of the breakup see Eric Stein , Czecho/Slovakia. Ethnic Conflict, Constitutional Fissure. Negotiated Breakup (A nn Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997); Jirf Musil , ed., The End of Czechoslovakia (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995 ); Jan Rychlfk, Rozpad Ceskoslovenska . Cesko-slovenske vztahy 1989- 1992 (Bratis lava : AEP, 2002); Carol Skalnik Leff, The Czech and Slovak Republics. Nation Versus State (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997). 4 For details see Elisabeth Bakke, Doomed to Failure? The Czechoslovak Nation Project and the Slovak Autonomist Reaction 19/9- 1938 (Oslo: Series of Dissertations submitted to the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Un iversity of Oslo, no. 11 /1999). SLOVAKIA 54 Howeve r, a sub sta nti al pa rt of th e Sl ova k po liti ca l e lite opposed both , de ma ndir.g recog nition of the Slovak nati on and autonomy fo r Slovaki a. The Pittsburgh Agreeme nt became important both beca use it defin ed the contents of Slovak a utonomy and because Masaryk had signed it. Afte r World War II , Czec hos lovaki sm was abandoned, but poli ti ca l centra li sm was not, and th e federali zati on of Czech os lov aki a aft er the Sov iet in vas ion in 1968 did not give Slovak po liti ca l insti tution s any rea l dec ision-m aking power. Afte r the Ve lvet Revo lution in 1989, political autonomy for Slovaki a reappeared on the agenda, and became a major iss ue in the di spute over C zechos lovaki a's new constitution . The main purpose of the present article is to co mpare the autonomy de bates durin g the First Republic and after the Ve lve t Re volu ti o n, in orde r to establi sh continuity and change. The research ques ti o ns are: I . How were the de mands fo r autonomy substa nti ated, and what were the main argume nts aga inst it? 2. Wh at role did the princ ipl e of nation al se lf-de te rmin ati on pl ay in the debates in the two peri ods? The First Re public was a unitary state , and autonom y as such was ne ver on the age nda of the Parliame nt in the interwar pe ri od. Of th e three a utonom y proposa ls th at made it to th e Parli a me nt, two were bl oc ked in committees, whil e the third was adopted without any de bate after th e fa teful Muni c h agree me nt in 1938. My analys is of the inte rwar di sco urse is th e refore based o n a se lec ti o n of govern me nt in a ugurati on de bates and budgetary debates, as we ll as c lippings from Slovak, the main autono mi st ne wspaper. 5 After 1989 seve ral de bates were re levant to the autono my di scourse: In the Federal Parliament I have analyzed the 1990 " hyphen de bate," the de bate on the compete ncy law , a nd the two de bates about the break-up of Czechos lovaki a in the fa ll of 1992. In the res- ' T he analys is of the debate in the interwar period is a condensed version of a part of Chapter 13 of my PhD di ssertat ion. For detai ls see Bakke (ibid. 1999). SLOVAKIA 55 pec ti ve Czech and Sl ovak Nati onal Council s (Republi c Asse mblies), I have analyzed the 1992 debates on the Sl ovak D ecl aration of Sovereignty, the Slovak Con stitution, and the Czech Constituti on. I will structure the arti cle around the foll owin g three points: I . Th e in stituti onal set-up and th e contents of the autonomy demands. 2. The co mpos iti on and stability of the elite constellations on either side of the conflict. 3. The main arg uments a) in favor of autonomy and b) against autonomy. wi th spec ial emphas is on how they relate to the principle of nati onal sel f-determinati on. 1. The Institutional Set-up and the Contents of the Autonomy Demandi Czec hos lovakia was from the outset presented as the nati on-state of the Czechos lovak nation. 6 Thi s was codified in the 1920 Constituti on, which al so gave the First Czechos lovak Republic a unitary, centrali zed state form and a bi ca meral leg islature. Czec hos lovaki a was at first di vided into 22 co unties, but the county sys tem was implemented onl y in Sl ovaki a and fro m 1928 , four prov inces repl aced the counties (see tabl e I ). In the interw ar peri od, the demands for autonomy were defined in term s of separate Sl ovak instituti ons with dec ision-making powers in matters of vital importance for th e Slovaks as a nati on. The core demands were that Sl ovaki a should have " its own admini strati on, its own parli ament and its ow n co urts," cf. the Pittsburgh Ag reement. M ost of the autonomy proposa ls also included a separate Sl ovak government, but none of the three autonomy proposals that made it into the Parli ament went beyond an asymmetric federati on.7 " In reality. th e Czec hs and Slovaks togeth er comprised 65.5 percent of the populati on. Germans 23.4 percent. Magyars 5.6 percent. Ruthenians 3.5 percen t. Jews 1.4 perce nt. and Po les 0.6 percen t in the 1921 cens us. See Scftanr lidu v repub lice ceskosloven.~ke ze dne 15. unora I 921. Dfl I. (Prague: Statnf ufad statistick y. I 924 ). 7 See Bakke (ibid .. 1999). 465- 77 for a more detailed overv iew of the autonomy proposa ls. See also James Ramon Fe lak. '·A t the Price of the Republic ··. Hlinka ·s SLOVAKIA 56 The 1938 Constitutional a me ndm ent that inaugurated the shortli ved Second Republi c was based on the third a utonomy proposal of the Slovak People 's Party, which had been submitted in August 1938. The Second Re public co mbined a federa l state form with separate Slovak institutions : a leg islat ive asse mbl y (D iet), a se parate administration and separate co urts. The Slovak gove rnme nt was acco untabl e to the Die t, and received exec uti ve power in all matters under its juri sdi ction , as we ll as many matters unde r central jurisdiction. Slovak became the officia l lang uage in S lovakia, and separate c iti zenship was introduced. After World War II , the Czechos lovak govern me nt recognized the S lovaks as a separate nati on a nd the Slovak National Co un ci l (w hi c h de fac to controlled the liberated parts of Slovakia) as its representative. An exec utive Board of Commissioners was also establi shed. However, through the three Prague agreements and the two first postwar constituti ons, Slovak institution s were gradua ll y stripped of their power and co mpete nce, and Czechoslovakia return ed to a centrali st, unitary state fo rm , with a unicamera l leg is lature. 8 Part of the reaso n for the c la mpdow n o n the Slovak organs was the victory of the De mocratic Party in the 1946 e lectio ns, w hi c h convinced the Communists th at Slovakia could not be tru sted. 9 Slovak People ·s Party. 1929-J 938 (Pi tt sburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, I 994). especially pp. 30, 80- 1, 19 1- 92. ij The 1960 Constitution aboli shed the Board of Commissioners. See Program prve dom;Jcf v/ady repub liky vlady narodnf fronty Cechu a Slovaku, (Prag ue: Mini sterstvo l nformacf. 1945). I 6-17: Jaros lav Chovanec & Peter Mozolfk, Historicke a statopravne korene sa mostatn ost i slovenskej republiky , (Yydavatel's tvo Procom , Brati slava, 1994), 38, 11 4- 122; Michal Barn ovsky. " Tri prazske dohody", in Cesko- slovenske vztahy - Slovensko-ceske vzthhy (Liberec: Technick a Un i verzi ta, 1998). 119 ff.: Elisabeth Bakke, "The Principle of National Self-de termination in Czechoslovak Consti tuti ons 1920- 1992" . CEPSR. no. I O (2002), 173- 98 . 9 The Democratic Party received 62 .0 percent of th e votes in Slovakia. See Michal Barnovsky & Edita l vanickova, eds, Prve povojnove volby v strednej a j uhovychod- nej Eur6pe (Bratislava: VEDA, 1998). 2 15- 18. 57 SLOVAKIA Table 1: State Form, Administrative Structure and Institutional Set-up in Czechoslovak Constitutions and Constitutional Amendments Year 1920 State-forming State form Administrative nation Czechoslovak Un itary 22 co unties : Centra lized, from 1928 four bicameral legislature nation Institutional set-up structure provinces 1938 Czech and Federal Slovak nations 1948 Czech and Unitary Slovak nations Four provi nces : Asymmetric: Bohem ia. M ora- bicamera l via, Slovak ia. & separate Slovak Sub-Carpathian instituti ons with Ruthenia extensi ve powers Two prov inces , Asy mmetric; The Czech lands unicamera l & separate and Slovak ia Slovak inst itutions with lim ited powers 1960 Czech and Uni ta ry Slovak nati ons Two prov inces, Asymme tric: unicame- the Czech lands ra l & separate Slovak and Slovak ia institut ions with more l imited powers 1968 Czech and Federal Slovak nations Two repub lics, Symmetric: bicameral, T he Czech Re- federa l & separate publ ic and the Czech and Slovak Slovak Republ ic institut ions Source: A ll cons titutions can be found in Sbfrka zakonii a naHzenf stalU ceskoslovenskeho. During the Prag ue Spring of 1968, the questi on of Slovak autonomy reappeared on the agenda. The initi ati ve to amend the constituti on ca me from the Slovak Nati onal Council , and thi s time a sy mmetri c so luti on was pro posed, sy mboli zing the equality of the two state-forming nati ons. 10 Accordin g to the 1968 Constitution, Czecho- ' 0 T he process towards federa li za ti on is doc umented in Jozef Za tk uli ak, Fede- ra lizacia Ceskoslovenskeho Staw 1968- 1970. Vznik Cesko-sl ovenskej fede racie SLOVAKIA 58 slovakia became a federation of two republics, the Czech and th e Slovak Republic s, each with their ow n assemblies (National Councils), and their own govern ments. The bicameral federal legis lature consisted of the proporti onall y elected Chamber of the Peop le, and the Chamber of Nations where the two Republics were represented on equal terms. For important dec isions, a majority was req uired in the Peop le's chamber, as we ll as in the separate Czech and Slovak parts of the Chamber of Nations, in effect giving the Slovaks veto powers. The 1968 Constitution provided the in stitutional foundations for Slovak autonomy, but in practice the political system remained centralized. The original division of power in the 1968 Constitution changed in favor of the federal level during the "Normali zation " of th e early 1970s, and fo rmal decision-making rul es and divi sion of powers did not matter much during Communism . As Carol Skalnik Leff has pointed out, however, federation plu s democra ti zation was a power eq uation. 11 After the Velvet Revo lution in 1989, th e 1968 Constitution acquired new importance; first , it determined the procedures for the adoption of a new constitution (a three-fifths majority in all parts of the federal parliament), and second, it became the point of departure for the negoti ati ons about the contents of a new constitutional settl ement. Under th e new, democratic co nditi ons, the Slovak minorit y had an excell ent bargaining position , since any cons ti tutional settlement required Slovak co nsent. After 1989 the questi on was, therefore, not whether Slovakia should have autonomy, but the ex tent of that autonomy. Separate Slovak institutions were taken for roku 1968 (B rn o: Nak ladatelstvi Doplnek, 1996). See also Jaros lav Krejci & Pave l Machonin , Czechos lovakia 19/8- 92. A U1bora to1y for Social Change (London: Macmill an, I 996), 45-7: Chovanec & Mozolik, (op.cit. , I 994). 48-52: Ales Gerloch . Jiri Hrebej & Vladimir Zoubek. Us tavnf sys tem Ceske republiky ( Prague: Prospektrum, 1999). 51-4 : Carol Skalni k Leff, National Conf7ict in Czechoslo vakia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, I 988), 243 ff. 11 Leff, 132-33. SLOVAKIA 59 granted, and autonomy now became a matter of allocating more decision-making power to the Republics. The " hyphen delJate" in the sprin g of 1990 was a foreboding of the problems that lay ahead. It was Pres ide nt Vaclav Havel who inadvertently started it. In Janu ary of 1990, without prior consultations, he submitted a constitutional amendment to the federal Parliament, proposing to drop the word "Soc iali st" from the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic . Much to hi s and many others' surpri se, thi s trigged a bitter di spute about whether the name of the Republic should be spelled with or without a hyphe n. The main alternatives were the "Czec ho-S lovak Republic ," favored by a majority of the Slovaks, and the "Czechoslovak Federal Republic ," favored by a majority of the Czechs. Stalemate in the federal Parliament at first resulted in the absurd dec ision to spe ll the word "Czechoslovak" in one word in the Czech Republic and with a hyphen in Slovakia. Thi s was presented as a concession to "S lovak grammar. " This deci sion caused demonstration s in Slovakia, after which the Parliament made a hasty retreat and settled for the "Czech and Slovak Federal Republic ." 12 Negotiations about a new Czechoslovak Constitution started after the elections in June of 1990, but soon ran into trouble. As before, the Czech political elite was generally in favor of more centralized solutions than the Slovaks. The difference was that the Czech majority , rea li zing that a unitary state was not an option , now favored a " function al federation," while the majority of the Slovak political elite increas ing ly leaned toward s confederal rather than federal so lutions. 13 A temporary settl e me nt was reached in the Competency Law 12 Milan Sutovec. Semi6za aka politikum alebo ·'pomlckova vojna." (Bra ti slava: Kalli gram , I 999). 299 ff. 13 Opinion polls cons istently showed th at th e public in the Czech Republic preferred a unitary state. with a federation as the second most popular option. while a confederation never exceeded 6 percent support. By con trast, a confedera ti on or a federation was th e preferred state form in Slovakia. See table 12.3. in Sharon L. Wolchik, ''The Politi cs of Transition and the Break-up of Czechos lovakia," in Jiff Musil. ed. , op.cit.. 235. SLOVAKIA 60 of December 1990, whi c h more-or-less reestabli shed the co mpetency di vision of the 1968 Constitutio n. However, whil e thi s was abo ut as fa r as the Czechs we re w illing to go , the S lova ks looked at the Co mpete ncy Law merely as a po int of departure fo r further negoti ati ons. The core of the confli ct was the all ocati on of compe te nce and power in two specific areas: Eco nomi c po li cy a nd intern ati ona l re lations. The majority of the S lovak elite pressed fo r S lovak " visibility" in intern ati ona l rel ati ons, and wanted to all ocate more power in economi c matte rs to the Republics . The Czec h side wanted the federa l leve l to be stron g e nough to carry o ut the econo mi c reform s necessar y fo r th e tra ns iti o n to a market econo my, and wanted th e state internati onall y to speak with one vo ice . The negoti atio ns fa il ed to produce an acceptabl e co mpromi se befo re the 1992 elections, 14 and since the vic torious Czec h and Sl ovak parti es di sag reed fund ame nta ll y o n the iss ues of econo mic reform and state fo rm , they dec ided to di vide the state. It turn ed out th at both sides prefe rred a break-up rathe r than accepting the favo red state form of the othe r party, des pite the fac t that before the e lec ti ons, the future ex iste nce of Czec hos lovak ia was still ta ke n fo r granted . The onl y party th at advocated secess io n w as the Sl ova k Nationa l Party. 2. The Composition and Stability of the Elite Constellations In the inter- war peri od, the e lite conste ll atio ns fac in g eac h other were c lear-cut and quite stable. A clear majority of the Czec hos lovak parties was ce ntra li st a nd in fa vor of Czechoslo vaki sm. Thi s camp co mpri sed the e ntire Czech political e lite and a substanti al pa rt of the Slovak political e lite. Inte restingly, the major ce ntrali st pl ayers in the interw ar clashes about autonomy in the Parli ame nt were Slovak s, not Czec hs, a nd like th e ir adversaries, they were posin g as the c ha mpi ons of Slovak inte rests/the Slovak nati on. The two most influe nti al 14 T he negoti ators did reach a co mpromi se in the spring of 1992, but th is was turned down by th e pres idium of th e Slovak Nati onal Counci l. See Rychl fk , Roz pad. 2 18- 20. SLOVAKIA 61 Slovak centrali sts were the Agrarian Mi Ian Hodza ( 1878- I 944) and the Social Democrat I van Derer ( 1884- 1973). They represented their parties in the Parli ament during the entire First Republi c and betwee n th em, the two men served as mini sters for 23 yea rs. Milan Hodza even became the first Slovak Prime Mini ster in 1935. Apart from these two, the A grarian Anton Stefanek ( I 877-1964) and the Czechoslovak National Socialist Igor Hrusovsky ( 1872- 1937), both seasoned parli amentari ans, played an espec iall y acti ve role in th e debates. By co ntrast, two Slovak parti es represented th e autonomist ca mp. arguing that the Slovaks were a nation of their own and, therefore, entitl ed to autonomy. 15 The larges t autonomi st party was the Slovak Peopl e's Party . Its co-founder and chairman Andrej Hlinka ( 1864- 1938), whose name was added to the party's title in 1925, was a dominatin g fi gure in the stru gg le for Slovak autonomy until hi s death in August of 1938. 16 Ferdinand (Ferdi s) Juriga ( 1878-1950) had been the onl y Slovak deputy in th e Hungari an Parli ament of 19 14 and he continued to defend Slovak autonomy in the Parliament also of the First Republi c. Jozef Ti so ( 1887- 1947) played an important role in the 1930s, as did editor-in-chief of Slovak, Karol Sidor ( 1901 - 53). The Slovak Nati onal Party never had more than one deputy - its chairman M artin Razus ( 1888- 1937) - and pl ayed a more peripheral role. After the Velvet Revolution, elite constellations were more vo latile. The Slovak political elite was from the outset divided on the quest ion of state form, the preferred so lution s ranging from mildl y federa li st to a loose confederat ion. From 1991 the Slovak National Party started to advocate independence, but already in 1990 th e chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement, Jan Carnogursky, argued th at Slovakia should enter the European Community as an in- " In addition. some of th e national minority parties and the Communists su pported autonomy. but for other reasons. '" See Felak. Ac Che Price of Che Republic. 1994: A lena Bartl ova. A ndrej Hlinka. ( Bratislava: Obzor. 1991 ). SLOVAKIA 62 de pende nt state. Hi s party was earl y in favo r of a confederal so luti on, but o nl y as a te mporary so luti on, until both Re publi cs joined the European Community. 17 Public Aga inst Vi o le nce was be ing pulled in o ppos ite direc ti o ns, and whe n the c irc le around Vl adimfr Mec ia r broke o ut and fo rmed the Moveme nt fo r a De mocrati c Slovaki a in 1991 , the liberal , federa li st oriented w in g re ma ined , whil e the national populi sts w ith confedera l lea nings fo ll owed Mec iar. In the 1992 e lecti on Mec iar' s Move me nt fo r a De mocrati c S lovaki a appeared as the main champion of Slovak interests. The Czec h politica l e lite was fro m the o utset more indiffe rent to the nati onal questi on. Wh ile Public Aga inst Vi o le nce had the nati onal questi o n as o ne of its top pri o riti es , it was co mpl ete ly absent fro m the agenda of C ivic Forum in the first e lecti o n. In stead , " bac k to Eu ro pe" and e limination of communi sm we re the top pri oriti es. 18 Espec iall y after the " ma nagers" aro und Vac lav Kl aus won over the di ss ide nt w in g of C ivic Forum in 199 1, the leadin g Czec h po liti ca l e lite united in favo r of a stro ng fe derati o n. In th e 1992 e lec ti o n Kl aus' C ivic De mocratic Party ca me o ut as the main c hampi on of a federa l so luti on. The Move me nt fo r a De mocrati c S lovaki a and the C ivi c De mocrati c Party won the e lecti ons in th e ir respective Re publics, whil e parti es th at took a more mode rate stand on the questi on of state fo rm lost. Once the victors w ith Vac lav Kl aus and Vl adimfr Mec iar at the he lm had dec ided to di vide the state, fo rmer ene mi es beca me alli es, and the e lite conste ll ati ons changed according ly. The fo rme r oppone nts in the negoti ati o ns on state fo rm now united in favo r of a break-up , aga inst a motl ey c rew of oppos ition parti es, co mpri sing Czec h and Slovak Communi st and Soc ial De mocrati c parties, as we ll as Miros lav Slade k 's ultra- nati ona li st Republican Party of C zec hoslo vaki a. 17 Stein , Czecho/Slovakia. 67 . 93-4. '~Oskar Krejci. Kniha o volbich. (Prag ue: Victori a Pu bli sh ing. 1994). 2 10- 11. SLOVAKIA 63 3. The Arguments in Favor of Autonomy If we turn to the actual arg ume nts, the main impress ion is that there were e lements of continuity as well as c ha nge when we go from the interwar period to the post-Communist period. On the one hand, the argume nts in favor of autonomy were located within the sa me nat io nalist di sco urse in both periods . On the other hand , the composition of the arg uments in favor of autonomy changed, and so did the contents of the autonomy demands, as we have seen. In the interwar period, the principle of national se lf-determination was used as an arg ument in favor of an asymmetric federation; after 1989 it was first used as an argument in favor of confederal so lutions, and then in favor of an independent Slovak state. Arguments in Favor of Autonomy During the First Republic In the inter-war period , the cornerstone of the a utonomists was the existence of an individual and sovereign Slovak nation , and the core message was that this Slovak nation was entitl ed to auto nomy. The premi se linkin g national identity to the matter of state form was the principle of national se lf-determination, understood as the ri ght of cu ltu ra ll y distinct nation s to se lf-governance. 19 In the a utonomist scheme, the Slovak nation had used thi s right to divorce the Magyars and join the Czec hs in a Czech and Slovak nation-state. Moreove r, as a free a nd equa l nation , the S lovaks were entit led to manage the ir own affairs and, therefore , to autonomo us political institutions. In practice, autonomy demands were always made on be half of Slovakia, yet for the a utonomists this amo unted to the same , s ince they regarded Slovakia as the homeland of the Slovaks, despite its substantial national minoriti es. 19 The principle of national self-determination can be interpreted in at least two other ways: as the right of the people to choose their government without coercion , i.e. popular sovereig nty - or as th e right of independent states to manage their affa irs without foreign intervention. See e.g. 0yvind 0sterud, Nasjonenes selvbestemmel- sesrett. (Oslo: Un iversitetsforlaget. 1984). 150 ff. 64 SLOVAKIA The Slovak a uto nomi sts argued a lon g three ma in lin es. First, they argued that Slovakia was discriminated aga in st in vario us ways, and that autono my was necessary to a ll eviate S lovakia's ill s. Second , they arg ued that Slovakia was entit led to auto no my by virtu e of various " co ntrac ts" (e.g. th e Pittsburgh Agreement). Finally, they argued that the Slovaks had the right to auto nom y s impl y because they were a natio n (the classical nation ali st arg umen t). The point of departure for the deprivation mguments was that the Slovaks were an indi vid ua l nati o n wit h separate nationa l interests, and that these national interests were not properly loo ked after under th e present centrali zed state form. Here S lovak grievances were turned into reasons for autonomy, and autonomy was the so lution to everythin g. Most of the gr ieva nce arguments for auton o my were associated with the use of Slovak as the offic ial lang uage in Slovakia and w ith (w hite-co llar) jobs fo r the Slovak inte lli gentsia. The sig na l words were " Slovak bread" . For in sta nce, before th e 1929 e lec ti on, the a utonomi st news paper Slovak argued that " a uto nomy does no t only mean political ri g hts, but a lso bread. When we get our own administration , our ow n asse mbly and our own courts, only Slovaks will be e mpl oyed there. [ ... ] The auton o mo us adm ini strati o n of the Slova k home land will compel the e mployers first a nd foremost to gran t the Slovaks work and bread." 20 Accord in g to the contract oriented lin e of arg um e nts , Slovakia had the right to autonomy by virtue of certai n (a ll eged ly) binding doc um e nts or "co ntracts". The point of departure was again that the Slovaks were an indi vidu a l and sovere ig n natio n, and th at S lovakia was the ho me la nd of the Slovaks. The argume nt was that Slovakia had been promised autono my, a nd th at thi s promise was lega ll y bindin g. However, fo r a co ntract to be va lid , it must be stipul ated th at the sig natori es had the right to s ig n agreements on behalf of those they were said to represent - in this case th e Czec h and Slovak nati o ns. 20 Slovak no. 240, 22 October I929. p. 3. SLOVAKIA 65 Several of the many declarations and agreements that were formulated during World War I were used as arguments for (or against) autonomy . However, two documents stand out: The Pittsburgh Agreement of May 30th , 1918, and the Martin Declaration of October 30th , 1918. The former was a clear asset, while the latter soon became a liability (see next subsection). The Martin Declaration had been adopted at an as sembly of all Slovak political parties in Turciansky Svaty Martin. For the autonomists , the significance of the Martin Declaration was that through this act, the Slovaks had voluntarily joined the Czechs as equal s in one state, and they had therefore an equally large part in its founding as the Czechs. Moreover, as an equal nation which had entered the state voluntarily, the Slovaks had the right to autonomy. In effect, the autonomi sts gave the Martin declaration state-forming significance. This was also reflected in repeated attempts to turn October 30th into a national holiday. Compared to the other wartime declarations , however, the Pittsburgh Agreement had some obvious advantages. First and foremost , it had greater symbolic potential as an official agreement binding the government, because Czechoslovakia's first president and co-founder Tomas G. Masaryk had signed it, along with Czech and Slovak emigre leaders in the United States. 2 1 Second, the Agreement contained the most important autonomy demands. From the moment the Pittsburgh Agreement became known in Slovakia in the spring of 1919, it was invoked in every single debate where autonomy was " M asaryk was not Pres ident at th e tim e, of course, but on the initi ati ve of th e Slov ak L eague he signed a calliographed version of the Ag ree ment on November 14th. 19 I 8, the very same day he was elected Pres ident of the Republic. Besides. on October 3 1st. 19 18, th e Czec hoslov ak Nation al Committee had declared as bindin g all ac ti ons by members of the pro visional government abroad (including M asaryk). It may be argued that if the decl arati on of the establi shment of th e Czechos lovak state was valid. then the authori zation of Masaryk 's ac ti ons was valid as we ll. In practice, th e va lidity of th e Pittsburgh Agreement was a political , not a lega l matter. For the tex t of the statement , see Benes (op. cit. . 1929). 490. See also M. M ark Stolarik (op. cit. , 1968), 49. SLOVAKIA 66 mentioned. At first glance, this Agreement would seem to be a stable element in the argumentation for Slovak autonomy. However, the usage varied. Early in the period, the autonomists would present the Pittsburgh Agreement as a Magna Charta granting the Slovaks the right to autonomy. Later, it became more common to present it as a binding contract. The concept of a Magna Charta brings to mind a sovereign granting hi s subjects certain rights and privileges, and it was Masaryk who (implicitly) had this role. When the Pittsburgh Agreement was presented as a contract, the contracting partners were at first the Czech and Slovak nation s. However, especially after it became public knowledge in 1922 that President Masaryk had actually drafted it, he was increasingly presented as a contracting partner. This shift can also be seen as an answer to the centralist claim that the American Czechs and Slovaks were not the leg itimate representatives of their co-nationals at home. However, the third and most common use, especially in the 1930s, was the Pittsburgh Agreement as "our program" or as an expression of the will of the Slovak nation (not just a small faction, but of all Slovaks). The point of departure was that the Slovaks were an individual nation with a natural right to self-determination, and therefore to autonomy if it so wishes. This usage was associated with the third , classical nationalist line of argument, which rested on three premises: I. that the Slovaks were an individual nation ; 2. that nation s had the right to self-determination; and 3. that the Slovak autonomists represented the true will of the Slovak nation - which was autonomy. The second premise was often implicit, while a lot of effort was put into defending Slovak individuality and the right to speak on the Slovaks ' behalf. The autonomists employed two main strategies to substantiate their claim. One strategy was to argue from the majority, which meant resorting to "advanced math". Election results here came in handy. In a parliamentary debate in 1933, Jozef Tiso argued that as a majority, the autonomists had the right to speak on behalf of the SLOVAKIA 67 Slovak nation. Upon subtracting the stipulated Czech and Magyar votes from the votes cast for the centralist parties in Slovakia, he ended up with 402,320 votes for the centralist parties and 427,443 votes for the Slovak People ' s Party and the Slovak National Party put together. 22 A second strategy was personal attacks (argumentum ad homi- nem), which were often used to defend the existence of a Slovak nation as well as the claim for autonomy. The autonomists would then accuse Slovak deputies belonging to the Czechoslovak parties of being " renegades," " Phari sees," "sodomites" and "careerists ," and, therefore, not worthy of representing the Slovak nation. In his rather biblical language, the chairman of the Slovak People ' s Party, Andrej Hlinka, argued in 1927 that "S lovakia is ours, only we are Slovaks, you sold out the Slovak language for a bowl of Czechoslovak lentils eight years ago. " 23 Continuity and change after 1989 After 1989, the core message was still that the Slovaks were entitled to national se lf-determination "q ua nation," although the contents of this self-determination had changed from an asymmetric federation to confederate so lutions or even independence. The most important changes compared to the interwar period were, first , that there was no longer any need to defend the existence of an individual Slovak nation , since that was taken for granted, and second, a change in th e composition of the arguments. Deprivation arguments and contract oriented arguments were nearly absent, while classical nationalist arguments now dominated , and the principle of national se lf-determination was invoked more explicitly. 22 30 I. schuze poslanecke snemov ny N.S .R.C. dne 29 . li stopadu 1933. in Tesnopi- secke zpravy o scht1zfch poslanecke snemovny Narodnfho shromaidenf republiky ceskoslovenske. Ill. volebnf obdobf. (Prague. 1929- 35), 47- 50. 23 Hlinka, Slovak no. 86, 16 April , I 927 , p. I. "Sodomi tes•· referred to Social Demo- crats. as a play on wo rd s. SLOVAKIA 68 There are, of co urse, some differe nces between the various debates, which is perha ps not surpri sin g, sin ce the topics of the debates a lso differed. The principle of nati ona l se lf-determi nati o n was most ex plicitly vo iced in the 1992 debates in the federa l parliament (th e two debates on the break- up of Czec hos lovak ia), a nd in the Slovak National Council (the de bates on the S lovak Declaration of Sovere ig nty and the Slovak Constitution ). Conve rse ly. thi s principle was more impli c it in the 1990 " hyphen debate". The " hyphe n debate" is perhaps the most atyp ica l, in terms of topic ("Czecho-Slo vak Republic" with a hyphen versus "Czechos lovak Federal Republic") as we ll as types of arg ume nt. First, thi s is rea ll y the o nl y debate where identity pl ayed any major part. Ide ntity arg uments appeared in two forms: On the one hand , it was arg ued that for the S lovaks, to spe ll the word Czecho-Slovak w ithout a hyphe n was tantamo unt to accepting the abe rrati o n of Czec hos lova ki sm. On the o ther hand , it was arg ued that th e hyphe n ex pressed Slovak nati o na l indi vidu a lity and the equa l standing of the Czech and Slovak nati o ns in the federati o n. Second, the hyphe n debate is the only debate where the Pittsburg h Agreement was me ntion ed more than o nce. However, of th e six speake rs referrin g to it, o ne appea led to the Agreement to substantiate the c laim for a hyph e n in the "Czecho-Slovak" Rep ubli c. (thi s is how the word was spelled in the orig ina l), while the rest bas ically referred to it as an express io n of the eq ual status of the two natio ns e ntering the state , or as a part of the hi storical narrative lead ing up to the federalization. Nobody referred to it as a contrac t, and the Czech National Socialist Bi anka Hykova even quoted Masaryk to the effect that it was o nl y a n agreement between American Czechs and Slovaks. 2-1 Contract oriented arguments thus disappeared a ltogeth er, and refere nces to the Pittsburg h Agreeme nt and/or the Martin Dec lara20 See Zprava o 26. spolecne sc hi'1zi snemovny lidu a snemovny narodu. 29.3. 1990. in Federalnf shromaidenf Ceskoslovenske socialisticke republiky V. vo lebnf obdobf. ( 1986-90), 25 1. 253 , 256, 270, 304. SLOVAKIA 69 tion were rare. A utonomy was ex plicitly mentioned in the contex t of the Pittsburgh Ag reement onl y once, in the second debate abou t th e brea k-up of th e state. According to I va n Simko from the Chri stian Democratic Movement, Slovak organization s in the U nited States had made an agreement wi th Masaryk "as a leading personality of Czech po litica l li fe" to fo rm a shared state where Sl ovaki a was to have an autonomous position. Thi s agreement was unfortun ately not honored , he argued. 25 Depri vation arg uments were al so rare . The phrase " Slovak bread" occurred onl y once: In the first debate on the break -up of the state in September 1992, Michal Ko vac from the Mo ve ment for a Democratic Slovaki a ( later to beco me Slovaki a's first pres ident) argued that in a normally functioning federation , it wo uld not be possible for the standard of li ving in Slovaki a to drop as much as it had in onl y two yea rs. In another four years , he argued, " Would we not be in the hi storica l situation w here we have already been, that the Slovak nation would have to go abroad for bread, because there would not be bread for people in Slovakia? And we wou ld be as weakened as we once were under dear father Masaryk." 26 However, in the interw ar period " Slovak bread" was usuall y tantamount to w hite-collar jobs for the yo ung Slovak intelli gentsia in Slovaki a, whi le here th e lack of " bread " obvious ly refers to general unemployment. The probl em was real enough - in the earl y 1990s the unemployment ra te in Slovak ia was three or four times the Czech average. 27 25 Zprava o 5. spo lecne schu zi snemovny lidu a snemo vny narodu. 18.11 . 1992 . 25 .1 1.1 992. in Federi ln f shromiidenf Ceske a S/ovenske Federaci vnf republiky. V il. vo lebnf obdobf. ( 1992). 7 17. 2 '' Zprava o 4. spo lec ne sc huzi snemo vny lidu a snemov ny narodu 29.9. 1992. in Fe- denilni shro m;ii deni Ceske a S/ovenske Federaci vnf republiky. V II. vo lebnf obdobf, ( 1992). 60 I. 27 11. 8 percent in Slovaki a vers us 4. 1 percent in the Czec h Republic in 199 1: 10.3 percent versus 2.6 percent in 1992. Transition reporc I 996. (L ondon. The European Bank fo r Reconstructi on and Deve lopment. I 996). However. th e difference was even larger in 1993. the first yea r of independence. SLOVAKIA 70 Finall y, compared to the interwar period , classica l nationalist ar g uments were much more co mmon , and the principle of nation al self-determination was invoked more ex plicitly. In the debate about the allocation of competence between the Republics and the Federation it was used as an argument in favor of returnin g to the original 1968 Constitution. 28 Y et, the most co mmon use of th e principle of national self-determination was as an argument in favor of establi shing an independent Slovak state or dividin g Czechoslovakia. There are, however, some interestin g nation al differences between actors in how they used it. Slovak deputies speaking in favor of Slovak independence invoked the principle of national self-determination on behalf of the Slovak nation . They regarded it as an inalienable, natural ri ght, and in one instance, even as a God-given ri ght. 29 An independent Slovak state was presented as the fulfillment of IO00 years of strugg le for Slovak individuality and sovereignty , and as the result of a natural , hi storical process of national emancipation . In the words of HZDS deputy chairman Au gustfn Marian Huska , " the Constitution is the fulfillm ent and lega l enac tment of th e ri ght to se lf-determination . ( ... )To the Slovak s, whose consciousness was molded by more than a thou sand years under foreign rule , the feeling of dependence had become second nature. Slowly, but persistently they formed an awareness of the need for self-determination , the need to search for, find , 28 Zprava o 9. spolecne schi°1zi snemovny lidu a snernovn y narodu. 11 .- 12. 12. 1990. in Federalnf shromaidenf CSFR. ( 1990-1992) . < ww,~ .p,p.c:dckni h/ I 990fs/sbn/-stcn -prot/009,c: hu t./s009077. html/ d> [2 Febru ary, 2004]. See also the debate on th e Slovak declaration of so vereignty. Stenograficka sprava o 3. sch6dzi Slovenskej narodnej rndy konanej 17. j ul a 1992. < www .nr,r.sk/i ndexarch.a,p> ]4 Febru ary. 2004 J. 29 Sedovic (S lovak National Part y), Zprava o 5. spol ec ne schu zi SL a SN , 18. 11 . 1992. in Federalnf shro,mii denf Ceske a Slovenske Federati vnf republiky. VII. volebnf obdobf. ( 1992). 788. 71 SLOVAKIA ex press. a nd at las t rea li ze sovere ig nty." 30 S lova ki a was in o th e r word s pi ctured as a nati on-state a nd the S lova ks as the state-forming nati o n. Howeve r, in the de bates in the Sl ovak Nation a l Counc il , Slovak deputi es, inc ludin g Prime Mini ster Vl adim fr Mec iar, at the same tim e pro mi sed to res pec t the eq ua l rig hts of a ll c iti ze ns, nati o na l minorities and ethni c groups. De puti es re presentin g th e Magyar mino rity in the S lovak Nationa l Counc il recog ni zed o r eve n s uppo rted the S lovak ri g ht to selfde te rmin ati o n, but argued that the princ ipl e sho uld a lso appl y to the nati o na l mino riti es. Thi s was a n arg ume nt in favo r of auto no my. At the same time, Magyar deputi es arg ued th at S lovaki a sho uld not be presented as a nati o n- state in the Co nstituti o n, bec au se it was not nation all y ho moge neous. Founding the state o n the nati o na l princ ipl e meant turnin g the minoriti es into second-c lass c iti zens, they argued . Czec h de puti es co nsiste ntly presented the break-up of Czec hoslovaki a as a matte r of se lf- determinati o n fo r the Slovak nati o n. The 1992 e lecti o n. the Slovak Dec larati o n of Sovere ig nty, and the Slovak Constituti o n were take n as proof th at the S lovak natio n did wa nt inde pende nce. In the words of Prime Mini ste r Vacl av Kl aus of the Czec h Re publi c: "The S lova k nati o n used the o ppo rtunity to co mpl e te its nati o na l e manc ipati o n by fo undin g its own state. Thi s is a rea lity we mu st res pect. " 3 1 T he arg ume nt th at the Czec hs had no ri ght to deny th e S lovak natio n its rig ht to se lf-de termin ati o n was a lso used aga in st ho ld in g a referend um in the Czech Republi c; Czec h c itizens could no t dec ide whet her the S lovaks sho uld beco me a statefo rming natio n o r no t. Interestin g ly, the princi pl e of nati o na l se lf-determin ati o n was not even o nce in voked o n be ha lf of the Czec h na- -'" For Huska ·s statement and the debate on the Const itut ion. see Stenograficka sprava o 5. sch6dzi S lovenskej mirodnej rady kona nej 31. augusta a I . septembra 1992. <www.nr,r. ., k/indexarch.a,p> 14 February . 20041. -' 1 K laus in th e debate on th e Czech Constitution . Ceskii narodnf rada I 992- 1992. Stenoprotokoly. I 0. schuze. 16.- 17. 12. 1992. <www.psp.cz/cknih/ I 992cnr/,tenprot/O I 0schuzi> 13 February. 2004J. SLOVAKIA 72 tion .32 The reason is obvious: The Czechs did not regard the establi shme nt of the Czec h Republic as a state-formin g process, but as a restoration of Czech statehood , which expl icitly included Czechoslovak state tradition s. But the n the Czechs a lways rega rded Czechoslovakia as their state. Apart from the princ ipl e of national se lf-determination , the main lin e of argument in favor of di ssolution may be termed reali st. It was argued that the federation did not work or that it was a lread y dead, that it was too late to save the state, and now the important thing was to e nd the state in a peaceful , orderly, cultivated , adult and leg itimate fashion , and to ensure good ne ighborl y relation s be twee n the future inde pe nde nt states. 4. The Centralist Arguments Against Autonomy If we turn to the centra li st side, di sco ntinuity 1s th e word that first co mes to mind. In the inte rwar period , the centrali st arg ume nts against a utonomy were located within a nation a li st di sco urse, and mirrored the autonomist arguments to a large ex tent , the difference be ing th at the centralists based the ir arg uments on an a lte rn ative national id eo logy - Czec hos lovakism . After 1989 , the "ce ntra li st" arg um e nts changed profoundly . Czechos lov akism had been abandoned already in 1945 , and the unitary state form in 1968. The "centrali sts" afte r 1989 were , the refore, centra li sts on ly re lative to those advocating confederate so luti ons, a nd in the las t instance, inde pe ndence for Slovakia. " The principle of national se l f-de term ination was invoked on behalf of the .. Moravian nati on" ( 1.5 million . accord ing to the 199 1 census). but then as an argument in favor of Moravi an autonomy in a Czecho-Morav ian federation . See espec ially the speec hes of deputies Jan Jeg la and Jiff Bfl y (both from the Moravi an movement H SD-SMS) . Ceska narodnf rada 1992- 1992 . Stenoprotokoly. 10. sc huze , 16.17. 12. 1992. < www.psp.cz/eknih/ 1992<.:nr/~tenprot/0 I 0schuz/> 13 Febru ary , 2004J. SLOVAKIA 73 Centralist Arguments during the First Republic ln the inter-war period, the co rnerstone of the ce ntra li st argumentati on was that the Czechs and Slovak s were one Czechoslovak nati on (a lbe it w ith two tri bes), and the core message was th at a ce ntra li zed state form was necessary to preserve nati onal unity and th e integrity of th e state. T he premi se linking nati onal identity to state fo rm was the principl e of nati onal se l f-determin ati on. According to the centrali sts, the Czechos lovak nati on had used its ri ght to self-determ ination to re uni te in a Czechos lovak nati on-state, and thi s unity had to be preserved.·13 A uto nomy for Slovak ia was seen as a th reat to Czechos lovak nationa l unity as we ll as state in tegrity , first because it wo uld dri ve th e two tribes of the Czechos lovak nati on apart, and second , beca use granting Slovaki a autonomy wo ul d be tantamoun t to recogni zing th e Slovak s as a separate nati on, w hich would j eopardi ze the state's ra ison d'etre. Th e centra lists co untered the depri vati on arguments of the autonomi sts in two ways . On the one hand, they denied that the Slovak s were d iscrimin ated agai nst, and on the other hand , they rejec ted autonomy as a suitabl e remedy to Slovaki a's alleged ill s. What was needed to help Slovak ia was not autonomy, but more unity, especiall y economica ll y, the ce ntra li sts argued. Thi s was entirely in line w ith thei r overall "strength th ro ugh unity" message. However, their main artill ery was aimed at the contract-oriented arguments, and espec iall y the Pi tts burgh Agreement. T he main ar guments were: I . T he A meri ca n Czechs and Slovaks were not leg itimate represe ntati ves of th eir co-n ati onals at home, and had no ri ght to dec ide on their behal f; 2. The Pittsburg h Agreement was one of many, and thus had a certain hi stori ca l va lue; but in order to be va lid, it wo uld need the co nse nt of Czechs and Slovak s at home; and 3. Leg itimate Slovak represe ntati ves had conse nted to Czec hos lovak ·'-' There was no big difference between the Slovak autonomists and the Czechoslovak cen tralists in terms of the co ntents of national identity. In both cases . national identi ty was defined in terms of culture. language and ancestry. See Bakke (op.c it. , 1999). especia ll y Chapter I 0. fo r documentati on. SLOVAKIA 74 national and state unity in the Constitu ti on of 1920, as we ll as at assem bli es before and after Pittsburg h. The first arg ume nt was especia ll y damag in g, since it went to the core of a ll the auto no mi st argument s assoc iated w ith the Pittsburg h Agreement , in va lid atin g the Agreement as a Magna C harta, as a binding contract, a nd as an express io n of the will of the Slovak natio n. It was more difficult for the ce ntra li sts to de nou nce the leg iti macy of Masaryk as a represe ntati ve of the Czec hos lovak state, but the Pres ident did his best to free him se lf and the government of any obligation. Masaryk c la imed that he had sig ned the Pittsburg h Agreement in order to "appease a sma ll Slovak fact io n that dreamed of God know s what sort of independence for Slovakia ," and di smi ssed it as "a loca l pac t between American Czechs and Slovaks, signed by American citizens." 34 There is littl e doubt that Masaryk drafted the Agreement in order to ap pease a part of the Slovak League, but o ne may wo nder why this was important to him if he rega rded the m mere ly as American citizens. I think Mark Stol arik has a va lid point when he arg ues that th e American Slovaks he lped legiti mi ze th e creation of Czechoslovakia in the abse nce of a mandate from the Slovaks in Hungary (caused by war censorship).·15 Masaryk a lso tried , un successfu ll y, to di sc redit the Pittsburg h Agreement through quasi- lega li sti c arguments. In a le tte r to Andrej Hlinka on October 12th, 1929, Masaryk c laimed that the Pittsburgh Agreement was "a forge ry," because at the time, the em ig re organization of the Slovaks present in Pitts burgh , "the [Slovak l Leag ue lega ll y did no t ex ist, and it was recognized by th e Government o nl y in 191 9." Hlinka evide ntl y wrote the Slovak Leag ue , w hi ch retorted th at the re was " no doubt a bout th e a uthe nti c ity of th e Pittsburg h Agreement," and A merica n lega l experts confirmed th at there was no " Tomas G. Masaryk, Svetova revoluce. (Prague: Orbis a Ci n. 1925). 262-263. 35 M . Mark Stolarik (op.c it.. 1968). 54. SLOVAKIA 75 difference between chartered a nd unc hartered orga ni zatio ns w ith respect to entering such ag ree me nts. 36 T o prop up the claim that leg itim ate Slovak representatives had co nsented to Czec hos lovak nat io na l and state unity after Pitts burg h, the ce ntrali sts preferred to use the Martin Dec lara ti o n of October 30th , 19 18, since thi s Dec laration had been unanimou sly accepted at a n asse mbl y of a ll Slovak po liti ca l part ies. In the beg innin g, they also used the 1920 Constitution for th e same purpose, but the trouble was th at th e Slovak Club in the Constitutional Assembly was coo pted , and arguably not representative of Slovak opinion. The ma in reason why the Martin Dec larati on was s uc h a n asset for the centrali sts, was the sente nce statin g th at the "S lovak nati o n is lingui sti ca ll y as we ll as culturally-historically pa rt of th e unitary Czec ho-Sl ovak nation ." Moreover, the asse mbl y at M artin had demanded nat io na l se lf-dete rmin ation on behalf of this "Czecho-S lovak nat io n," w hil e at the sa me time it was s il e nt on auton omy. The ce ntrali sts thu s used it as proof of Czechoslovak national and state unity, and as proof of the will of the Slovaks to e nter s uc h a unity. (Rumor in Slovakia had it th at the passage o n Czechoslovak national unity was not in the original text. This was , however, refuted in 1923 by Emil Stodola and Samue l Zoch, who had dra fted it).:17 Finally , the centrali sts counte red the c lass ic a l nati o na li st arg ume nt by rejecting the first premi se, that the Slovaks were an indi vidual nation, a nd the third premise. that the autonomi sts represented the tru e w ill of the Slovak nati o n. They presented the Slovaks as a tribe of th e Czechoslovak nati o n, and the Slovak me mbe rs o f the ce nt ral ist parties as the leg itim ate Slovak rep rese ntat ives. At the sa me time, they accepted the seco nd premi se, th at nati o ns had th e -' 6 The letter is pub lished as Document No. 30 in Joseph A. Mikus. Slova kia. A Poli- tica l and Constitutional Histo1y . (Brati slava: SAP. I 995) 209-2 10. The answer of th e Slovak League was published in Slo vak no. 194. 27 August. 1930. p. I. See also M. Mark Stolarik (op. cit.. 1968). 48-49. 52. -' 7 V ac lav Chaloupecky: Martinshi deklilrace 19- 20. II jejf politicke osudy (Prague. I 928). SLOVAKIA 76 right to sel f-determin ati on, but as we have seen, th ey in vo ked thi s prin ciple on behalf of th e Czec hos lovak nati on. A n I va n Derer specialty was the argument th at i f the Slovak s had been an indi vidual nati on, then they w ould have th e ri ght to secess ion, not onl y to autonomy. 38 B oth sides had their share of argumentati on errors. T he ce ntrali sts argued from maj ority (a rg umentum ad populum ) in the earl y 1920s, w hen they recei ved the maj ority of the Slovak votes, and personal attacks (arg umentum ad hominem) were ac tu all y mos t co mmon on th e centrali st side. probabl y because they fi tted so we ll into their genera l strength-th ro ugh-unity argument. T he Slovak autonomi sts were accused of being " M agyarones" or " new Slovaks," thereby impl y ing th at they had other loya lties or identities,'9 and of being paid by the Hungari an government. In both cases, the M agyars had the ro le of ·'bogeyman" . T hi s M agyarone ca rd was used to expl ain w hy the Slovaks had turned away from the Czechs in the past and in the present , and to co unter th e autonomi st c laim th at they we re the so le leg itimate representati ves of the Slovak nati on. I f the ce ntra li sts believed th at Sl ovak autonomy would j eopardi ze Czechos lovak nati onal unity and th e integrit y of th e state, it w as quite log ica l to acc use th e autonomi sts of being renegades (though probabl y not very smart). Profound Changes after 1989 After 1989 there was not much left of the former ce ntra list arguments, which is not surpri sing considering that Czec hos lovaki srn had 18 • I van Derer. Ceskos/ovensk;i otizkil. (Prague : Orbis. 1935). 88- 90. 39 Both labels we re commonly used about people of Slovak origi n who had become more or less ass imil ated during Hungari an rul e. but who turned back after 19 18. There we re some known M agyarones among the autonomists (chiefl y Franti sek Jehlicka and Yoj tech/ Bela Tuka). but the lead ing figures (Hlin ka. Juri ga) had defended Slovak interests also under Hungary. T he total number of people who ac tu ally switched nati onal affi l iatio n from Magyar to Slovak i n the firs t ten years of Czec hos lovaki a cannot be ascertained prec ise ly, but an educated guess is th at it was betwee n 250.000 and half a million. See Bak ke (op.cit. . 1999). 305- 307. SLOVAKIA 77 been abandoned and a unitary state form was no longer an option. Th e "centralists" still accepted the principle of nati onal self- determinati on; however, they now recogni zed the Czec hs and Slovaks as equal , state-forming nation s and Czechoslovakia as a Czech and Slova k nati on-state. As long as state form was sti 11 on the agenda, the players on the "centrali st" side were mostly Czechs, and the task was to defend a " function al federation ," which meant to preserve the powers of the federation v is-a-vi s the Republics. Once the break-up of the state appeared on the agenda after the 1992 electi ons, however , th e "centra li st" pl ayers were Czech and Slovak opposition parti es and the task was now to preserve a common Czechoslovak state. In the hy ph en debate, as we ll as in the co mpetenc y debate, Czech deputi es explicitly presented th e federal state form as an express ion of the equality of the Czechs and Slovaks. The main Czech arguments against th e hy phen were that it was divi sive, and that it was unacceptable to the Czech publi c. This probabl y had something to do with the fact that the Second Czecho-Slovak Republi c ( 1938-- 39) was spelled with a hyphen. It was also argued that it was grammati ca ll y probl emati c, th at the original spelling had been without a hyphen (an hi stori ca l argument), and th at the Morav ians would feel offended (an identity argument). The main arguments in favor of a strong federation were that it was necessary in order to carry out the economic reform s and to fulfill Czechos lovakia 's internati onal obligati ons. For the Czech elite, the power and competency of the Czech Republic was irrelevant. In fact, I have onl y found one example of a Czec h deputy in vok ing nat ional interests, and he arg ued th at a confederate solution would be contrary to Czech interests.-lO The Czech and Slovak opposition parties that defended Czec hoslovaki a's ex istence in the debates in the fall of 1992 were mostly Socialists and Communists, but also included the ultra-nati onali st ' 0 M andl er (Libera l Democra ti c Part y). Zprava o 9. spol ecne schuzi SL a S . 11.- 12.1 2. 1990, in Fedenilnf shromaf.difof Ceske a Slovenske Federativnf Republiky V I . vo lebnf obdobf ( 1990), <www.psp.c z/ci,.nih/ 19901\h,bnf!.,tcnprot/009,c:hud ,009()77. htrn ll d> [4 February 2004 1. 78 SLOVAKIA Republican s. Even thoug h this opposition accepted th e principle of national se lf-determination , they mostly interpreted it in the origina l meanin g - as popular sovereignty . The totally dominating line of argument was that the only leg itimate way of dividin g Czechoslovakia according to the principle of se lf-determination was to let the citizens decide by popular vote, a nd that it was unacceptable to divide the state against the will of the peopl e. In the first debate on dissolution , thi s was supported by a hi storical a nalogy. By accident, the debate was held 54 years after the fateful Munich agreement, and the opposition argued that a new Munich was about to happen: Again the fate of the Czechoslovak state wou ld be dec ided without asking the peop le. In the first debate the oppos ition parties advocated a refere ndum before the decision was made; in the second debate a ratifying pl ebisc ite. The motive was obvious ly to save the state, since all opin ion poll s showed that a clear majority was in favor. However, very few deputies ac tually defended the me rits of Czechoslovakia, although a handful of Czechs professed their love for the shared homeland , or invoked the legacy of the founding fathers , mostly T.G. Masary k and Milan Rasti slav Stefanik. Finally, a weak echo of the inte rwar debate could be heard in claims that separation would be a threat to the future existence of the Czech and Slovak nation s (reminiscent of the strength-through-unity argument), and in charges of treason (personal attac ks). Ne ither line of argument was very common. The claim that voting in favor of disso luti on was an act of treason was a preserve of the ultra-nationalist Republican Party of Czec hos lovakia. The debates a lso had their amusing sides, for in stance in the use of metaphors. The federation was alternately see n as a leaking ship, a train being pulled in opposite directions , and an old patient with a severe heart condit ion , whi le the establishment of the new states was compared to giving birth to twins! SLOVAKIA 79 5. Summary and Conclusion [n the inter-war period, Czechoslovakia was a unitary , centralized state, and autonomy was a matter of separate Slovak institutions. After 1989, Czechoslovakia was a sy mm etric federation of two nationa l Republic s. Separate Slovak inst itutions were, therefore, no longer an iss ue, and autonomy became a matter of allocating more deci s ion-makin g power to the Republic s. However, in both cases, there was a conflict over state form, and in both cases the content of that conflict was how centralized the state should be. As for the actors , the e lite constellations were most stable in the inte rw ar pe riod . However, as lon g as the conflict was about state form, the Czech political elite was in favor of the most centralized so lution , while the Slovak elite was divided . Once the break-up of Czechoslovakia was on the agenda, the re were Czech and Slovak parties on both si des. If we focus on the main arguments on either side, we can obse rve continuity as well as change. Durin g the First Republic , the arguments of both sides were located within a nationali st discourse, but they founded their argume ntation on alternative nation al ideologies. The centralists invoked the principle of national se lf-dete rmination on behalf of the "Czechoslovak nation", the autonomists on behalf of the Slovak nation . After the Velvet Revolution , the autonomist argume nts were still located within a nationali st di scourse, and when the victorious part ies in the 1992 elections dec ided to divide the state, the Czech si de simply adopted the Slovak arg uments. By contrast, the "centrali st" arguments in the debate on state form were mainly economic, while the arguments in the debate on the break-up of Czechoslovakia were procedural. The most strik in g feature of the autonomy di sco urse after 1989 is therefore the asy mmetry of the arguments on both sides. Let us now address th e question of how the arguments related to the principle of national se lf-determination : On the autonomist side, the core message was the sa me in both periods; that the Slovaks were e ntitl ed to autonomy or se lf-determination "qu a nation ." Howeve r, 80 SLOVAKIA the principle of natio na l se lf-d etermin a ti o n was in voked more ex plicitl y after the Velvet Revo lution . On the centra li st side, the principle was used as an argument against a utono my in the interwar period , and w ith a certain twist, against the break-up of Czechos lovakia in 1992 . In the latter case, se lf-de te rmin ation was understood as popul ar sovere ignty - i.e . as a democratic principle. It is also inte res tin g that after 1989, the principl e of nation a l se lfdetermination was consistently invoked on behalf of the Slovaks, not on behalf of the Czechs, other than in the context of Czechoslovakia as the nation- state of two individual , sovere ign nations. In conclusion , the continuity was strongest on the autonomist side , alth ough th e conte nts of nation al se lf-determination c hanged from autonom y to independence. On the "centrali st" side, most of the a mmunition aga inst Slovak autonomy was gone once the concept of a Czechoslovak nation was abandoned.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Autonomy Discourse in Parliamentary Debates during the First Czechoslovak Republic and after the Velvet Revolution Description An account of the resource Elisabeth Bakke Slovakia, Vol. 38 (No. 70-71), 2005 pp. 52-80 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Bakke, Elisabeth Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2005 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/97f290def9af350f5ad4fc7dd03ad4de.pdf c3aa70b314f854d471adec54478ee33d PDF Text Text REVIEWS ��SLOVAKIA 149 Peter Ze nuc h, M edzi vychodom a zapadom: Byzantsko-slovan- ska tradfcia, kultura a j azyk na vychodnom Slovensku. Brati slava: Veda , 2002. 286 pp., notes, bibliograph y, summari es in German and Ru ss ian. ROB ERT A. ORR Uni versity of Ottawa Thi s book provides va luabl e in sig hts, from severa l ang les, into a co mparati ve ly neglected area of Slavic studies: the place of Eastern Slovakia as an area straddling the di v ide between Eastern and Western Slavdom , which has cha nged hands severa l times in the course of its hi story. Although, as Zenuch shows in numerous pl aces (starting from the first page of the introducti o n), Easte rn Slovakia is generall y pl aced firmly o n the W estern side of the divide from lin- •• gui stic , cultural, and hi storical points of view (often being cited as part of Slavia Latina, Slavia Romana), it also saw the development of a homegrow n Church Slavonic tradition, a sort of " Slovak Church Slavonic", w ith a ll that it e ntail s, e.g., poor know ledge of Church Slavonic itse lf ( 127); in stances of hype rcorrection ( 168); and the gradual e merge nce of errors in re nditi o ns of so ngs, mak ing the m g radually less comprehensibl e to the laity over time (237-238). Zenuch 's book beg in s with a detailed tabl e of contents, followed by an introduc tion consisting of di sc uss ion s of approaches to the iss ue from the point of view of literature and hi sto ry, re li g io n and culture, and the hi storica l and lin g ui stic conditions. He then presents hi s major arg ume nts in e ight unnumbe red chapters , dealing roughly with hi storica l and c ultural developments in Eastern Slovakia and the Union of Uzhorod ( 1646), which broug ht the area w ithin the Uni ate C hurc h, under the authority of Rome, in the same way as the Uni o n of Brest ( 1596) did for Wes tern Ukraine; the Cyrillomethodian traditi o n in Eastern Slovakia, and that of St. Demetrius of Sa lonika; �SLOVAKIA 150 the ro le of para litu rg ica l so ng in th e Byza ntin o-S lav ic ri te; the la ng uage of se lected Cy rilli c ma nu sc ript s; th e interpre tat io n of certa in lin g ui sti c phe no me na in se lec ted manu sc ripts, whi ch he treats in co nsiderabl e detail ; and C hurch S lavoni c in Eastern S lovak ia , providing a fa irl y deta il ed ling ui stic ana lys is, es pec ia ll y of the lex icon. So urces are ex te ns ive ly referenced (23 prim ary so urces and 265 bibli ographi ca l ite ms, mostl y in Slova k, Ru ss ia n, a nd Ukra ini an, wi th some ite ms in Eng li sh, Hun gari an, etc.), w hi ch at times becomes rather cumberso me , w ith the foo tn otes (666) takin g up more than ha lf a page in pl aces. S urpris in g ly. in view of its titl e, the book offers o nl y a fa irl y bri ef di sc uss io n of the period before the Uni o n of Uzhorod (the " Byzantsko" in the titl e sound s vague ly a nac hro ni stic), jumping ra pidl y to 1646 (59-60). In view of its impo rtance, perh aps the Uni o n of Uzhorod could have been incorporated into th e actu a l titl e of the boo k (... Vychodne Slovensko po prijatf Uihorodskej unie, pe rhaps?). As me nti oned above, several Sl av ic c ultures are in contact within or c lose to Eas te rn S lova kia , and Zen o uc h di sc usses the lin g ui sti c aspects of such contacts in some deta il. In ma ny instances lang uage and re li g ion were intertw ined, and much of the no menc lature refl ec ts thi s situ ati o n, w ith te rm s suc h as Rusnak . Rusyn, Slovak, Slovj ak, e tc. be in g utili sed to de no te di ffe re nces in lang uage and re li g io n ( 126; as he puts it, e .g ., "every Gree k Ca th o li c was ta ke n fo r a Ru sy n" ( I 32)) . Vag ue aware ness of thi s co mpl ex ity has spread o uts ide the immedi ate area, with the genera ll y kn ow n Latin term Rut- heni ("Ruthe ni an") hav ing both re li g io us and ling ui sti c connotati ons. Eve n the ultim ate ly ephe mera l "s in g le Czec hos lovak" peopl e fig ure in some of the treatments ( 196- 197). Zeno uch c ites exampl es of such interconnecti o ns as , e .g., Sl ovak- U kraini an ( 137) , as we ll as lex ica l ite ms fro m ne ig hbo urin g lang uages, so metimes c itin g the same ite m in severa l la ng uages, e .g ., prikaza iie, etc .. ( 179). He makes sk ilful use of the tex ts of vari o us songs, w ith di sc uss io ns of vari o us types of song, and how to di sting ui sh the m to illustrate hi s po ints (e.g., 11 0 fn . 269), o ne of which ( 0 vyhnanf A dama i Evy z raja; 172-173) is �SLOVAKIA 151 eve n desc ribed as "s love nsko-po l's ko- ru sin sko[m ]" . He provides the Ni cene C reed in both Cy rilli c and Ro man, with stresses marked , to illustrate pro nunc iati o n (223 -224). Ze i\ o uc h deserves co mme nd ati o n fo r severa l passages a nd hi s treatment of sma ll points of deta il , e.g., hi s ex pl anati o n of drevo ( 173 fn . 498). He offe rs an excell e nt o utline of the earl y hi sto ry of Eastern Sl ovaki a (27, pass im), a nd definiti o ns of term s suc h as ca th olicos (33); sluienie (79); akatist (82), etc. On a re lated leve l, he offers useful di sc uss io ns of etymologies, e.g., S lovak Tabor ( 147). The interaction of c ultures and c hang ing borde rs in Easte rn Slovaki a meant , amo ng othe r thin gs, that a large number of la ng uages and orthographi es were used . Ze i\o uc h consiste ntl y c ites a ll mate ri a l in its ori g in a l orthograph y and fo nts, even ex te ndin g to, e.g ., c iting Russ ian refere nces in pre-Revolution orthograph y (e.g ., 59-60 ; 127), and Hun gari an orthograph y ( 196). In a text of suc h compl ex ity it is pe rhaps inev itabl e th at th e re sho uld be so me mi sprints, a lth o ug h tho se have bee n ke pt to a minimum , e.g., Atrni (54); Kovard vnvourro.X1f, ( 154) liturg ig ue (71 fn . 186 ); MaTep111.nb1 (93) sho uld be MaTep111a.nb1 as it is in the bibliograph y (w hy MaTepia.nbl in the footnotes o n pp 95-98?); Ukr. Ye.noBiK ( 169); 111c.neAOBH111e (276). In additi o n to its intrin sic inte rest, the refo re, Easte rn Slovak ia presents an exce lle nt example of an area whe re lang uages, c ultures, and re li g io n show so me degree of overl ap, and as suc h deserves to be better kn own to the scho larl y world at large. It is to be ho ped that thi s book will be translated into Engli sh. The fac t th at the most substanti a l criti c ism in vo lves the ac tua l titl e of the boo k is an indi cati o n of its va lue, both fo r hi sto ri ans and ling ui sts. �152 SLOVAKIA Mari a n Hronsky, The Struggle for Slovakia and the Treaty of Trianon 1918- 1920. Martin Styan, trans lator. Brati slava: Veda, 200 1, 407 pp., illustration s, bibliography, index . GREGORY C. FERENCE Salisbury Univers ity Mari an Hron sky, an hi storian of World War I Slovakia and the early years of the Czecho-Slovak Republic , has written an excellent book . This is a tran slation of hi s 1998 work of the same title , although the Engl ish-language version is more academic. A lthough the Treaty of Trianon dea lt with the dismantlin g of large sections of greater Hungary into its surrounding neighbors after World War One, Hron sky focused on the events leadi ng up to the treaty and their effects upon Slovakia. This detailed study beg ins with an hi storiographic lesson in the Introduction where the author claims that today many people in Slovakia are unaware of the Trianon Treaty despite more attention being paid to it since the fa ll of Communism. A lthough over e ight decades have passed s ince the treaty was signed, Hron sky notes correctly that it still causes intense emotiona l feelings in Hungary and is crucial to understanding Slovak-Hungarian relation s today, especiall y since the treaty left over 700,000 Hun garian s (Magyars ) in Czecho-Slovakia and over 500,000 current ly in S lovakia. With regards to the time frame unde r investigation, the author later stated , also quite correctly, "The Hungarians had never devoted so much attention to Slovakia as in thi s period (p. 11 0)." The treaty naturall y separated Slovakia from Hungary and attached it to the Czech Lands, but for the first time , it also delineated recogni zed boundaries for Slovakia. In the process, the a uthor took notice of so me interesting twists, such as the CzechoSlovak army havin g fought its only real war during World War I, and the Hungarian s having coined the term " Little Entente" for the diplomatic cooperation of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania after �SLOVAKIA 153 the war. The Hun garian s mourned the signin g of the treaty while it was hardly noticed by the average Slovak. Hron sky divided the book into six major sections: l. The End of the Kingdom of Hungary on the Political Scene; II. Power Vacuum in Slovaki a; Ill. The Struggle for Slovakia; IV . The War Between the Czecho-Slovak Republic and the Hun garian Soviet Republic ; V. The Peace Talks; and, VI. The Peace Treaty with Hun gary . In each section , there are numerou s sub-chapters that make the reading of thi s den se, fact-driven volume eas ier to negot iate. Much to hi s credit, Hronsky co nsulted numerou s archives , secondary so urces, and new spapers to present a very complete story. As with most tran slated works, thi s book could have used better proofreadin g. There are occasional subj ect-verb di sagreements, mi sspellings, tran slations of only some titles, wrong description s such as referrin g to Jan Smuts as a Briti sh general, and using a Slovak title to a book written by the Hungarian Oskar Jasz i. One defect, typica l of books published in Central Europe, is an index of perso nal names only, thu s limitin g its usefulness . The numerous photographs (including some very interestin g ones such as the pen used in the signin g of the treaty), drawin gs, and political cartoons are unfortunate ly blurry. They , along with proclamations and other items that should be read , are difficult to view. Another problem concerns maps. Due to the deta il ed leve l of descriptions of various battles and boundary negotiations and delin eat ion s, more and better quality maps should have been included. Perhaps the most bothersome aspect of the book, starting on page 100 and continuing many times over the next thirty pages or so, is that the " Rumanian s" or so me variation of thi s word keep appearing in the middl e of sentences or take the places of other words , makin g reading at times incomprehensi ble, or even absurd. Despite these shortcoming, which are for the most part trivial and annoying , thi s book is required reading for anyone interested in the end of the First World War, the collapse of Austria-Hungary, the ri se of the Czecho-Slovak state, the early post-war period in Central Europe, and the Treaty of Trianon itself. Hronsky has done a great �SLOVAKIA 154 serv ice by all owi ng fo r the translation of hi s book, whi ch otherwi se wo uld have had a very limited readership. Jni o k apitanovi Janovi Nalepkovi. Edited by Jozef Nalepka. Spi sska Nova Yes: Po lygrafia, 2002. 172 pp. , illustrations. VLADIMIR BAUMGARTEN Tall ahassee, Florida T horo ugh the co urse of military hi story the reader peri odi ca ll y encounters individu als who see med destined to become men of the pen, but who instead became men of the sword. Such was the case of Jan Nale pka. He was a poet by vocati on and a teacher by profess ion, and yet became a co mpetent military comm ander. Called up fo r military service by the Sl ova k Re public durin g World War II, Nalepka fo ught with di stincti on on both sides. Li ke many S lovaks sent to the Eastern Front, he deserted , and then fo ught alongs ide Sov iet parti sans in the Pripet Marches of Belaru s and northern Ukraine . Thi s biographi ca l study, edi ted by hi s brother, includes sampl es of Nalepka ' s wartime correspo nde nce, and the acco unts of peopl e who remembered him - teachers, students, fe ll ow soldi ers and Soviet military comm anders. One influenti a l fig ure d uring Na le pka ' s fo rm ati ve years in primary school in Spi ss ka Nova Yes was hi s teac her Jozef Miko laj, a Czec hos lovak Legionnaire of the First World War rece ntl y returned from long years of travel. He foun d Jan to have a provocat ive sense of humor and a mi sc hiev ious di spos ition, yet he exce ll ed academi ca ll y. Miko laj was parti cul arl y impressed with Jan' s kn ow ledge of the poets of the Slovak Nati onal Rev iva l, and his being inspired by the fo lk songs of hi s mother. Youn g Nalepka re mained precoc ious after enterin g teac her's college in 193 1. A confere nce of young teachers in Ko morna Lehotka (Jul y 1933) was visited by Czec hos lovak pres ide nt T. G. M asaryk. T he pres ide nt viewed the educati o nal system as a means of moul d in g youn g Slovaks in a "Czec hos lovak" �SLOVAKIA 155 spirit. But Nalepka remarked to hi s fri e nd Vladimfr Clementis that Slovak students were capable of c ulti vating the ir ow n sp irit. Na lepka was a nation a li st, but he was a lso a lefti st. In February of 1939 he began organizing c landest ine e le me nts aga in st the governing Slovak People' s Party - one month before the latter ass umed the leadership of a separate Slovak state . Ye t the events of March 1939 included a Hungari a n invas ion in the so utheast. Called up for military serv ice, Nalepka participated willingly in th e brief borde r war. He saw no contradiction between thi s action and hi s own idea ls. Latte r th at year, Slovakia's military alliance with Nazi Germany dictated hi s parti c ipation in the Poli sh ca mpai g n. Na le pk a, by now a lie ute nant, fought with di stinction on the northern s ide of the Carpathi ans. He was decorated by General Fe rdinand Catlos, Slovakia's Mini ster of Nationa l Defence. The war against Soviet Ru ss ia proved problemati ca l. Slovakia had te ritorial g rievances with Hungary and Pol a nd , but none w ith the Ru ss ians. Moreover, Na le pka had already beco me a li e nated by the arrogance of the nati ve Carpatho-Germans in Eastern Slovakia, who had the ir own Nazi organization. Finaly, like many Slovak so ldi ers, he was horified by Na zi atroc iti es in the occupied te rritori es. He clandestinely e ntered into contact with Soviet parti sans and eventually deserted to the m, takin g hi s men with him . Soviet parti san commander (and Red Army ge nera l) A. N. Saburov found Na le pka to be a competent subordin ate, who retained command of the Slovaks. The nature of partisan warfare in the swamps dictated that Na le pka freque ntl y travelled on horseback , carry ing an a utom atic weapon. A photograph of thi s legendary pose later in spired an equestrian sc ulpture of him by Anna Ki sakova. Thi s activity also contributed to hi s demi se. Captain Jan Nalepka was killed in an encounter with a German patrol outside the village of Ovruc o n the ni g ht of Nove mber 17 , 1943. Thi s study contains a weakness commo n to publi caation s about a " hometown boy" . It prese nts certa in fac ts in pass in g, presupposing the audi e nce is already familiar w ith the m. Whil e thi s may work for �SLOV AKIA 156 know ledgeable S lovaks, it leaves fo reigners in the dar k on key parti cul ars. Indeed , its greatest weekness lies not in what is sa id but what is left un said. Na le pk a's surv ivin g co mrades na med the ir parti sa n bri gade afte r him . The Captain Jan Nalepka Bri gade was later parasc huted back into Slovaki a to parti c ipate in the autumn 1944 upri sin g. Compared to other uni ts whi ch the Sov iets ex ported , and whic h large ly e ngaged in loot in g and pill ag in g, the Na lepka Bri gade conducted itse lf in a n exe mpl ary fas hi on. Together w ith the 2 nd Czec hoslovak Paratroo pe rs, it shares c redit fo r the capture of th e strateg ic vill age of Ja ln a in the Hron Ri ver va ll ey on Oc tobe r 10- 12. This acti on was the las t vic tory of the insurge nts in S lovakia dur ing the upris ing. A wartime fe ll ow-officer, Samue l S imonov ic, states that Jan Nalepk a was not a Communi st (p. 111 ). He di ed at a conve ni e nt time , whic h e na bl ed him to beco me a lege nd in the postwar co mmuni st era. Hi s peasant pare nts were rece ived with hono ur in the Sov ie t Union at me mo rial servi ces dedic ated to the captain. Yet one may questi on what fa te would have had in store fo r him had he li ved longer. A " w ise guy" mi ght be given a wide berth by hi s teac hers on the me rit of hi s acade mi c exce ll e nce, but not by a tota litari a n reg im e. His equ all y precoc ious fr ie nd V ladimfr C le me ntis went on to become Czec hos lovak ia's fo reig n mini ste r, but ultim ate ly e nded on the gall ows. In sofa r as the c urre nt Slovak Re public has adopted the Slovak Nati onal Upri sing rathe r than Jozef Ti so ' s Slovaki a as its lodestone, Captain Jan Nalepk a re mains a worthy subject of stud y. Hi s life cuts across the ideo log ica l lines th at later di vided the East and West du ring the Co ld War. Hi s c haracter serves to de bunk a certain stereotype of S lova ks as be in g subservie nt to a uth ority. Thi s book is a positi ve contributi on to wartime Slovak hi story. �SLOVAKIA 157 Zo ltan G . Mes ko, The S ilent Conspiracy: A Communist M odel of Political Cleansing at the Slovak Uni versity in B ratislava after the Second W orld War. Boulder, CO : East Europea n Monographs, 2003, ix- l 42pp., map, illustrati ons, notes, bibliography. L.P. HINTERB UCHNER Rye, New York When I read the orig inal Slova k vers ion "Zaml cane sprisahanie" by Dr. Zo ltan G. Mes ko in 1999, I was moved by the vivid descripti on of the eve nts th at befe ll th e medi ca l co mmunity in Slovaki a during and after World W ar II , th ro ugh the " liberation" by th e Soviets and after the illega l take-over by the Communi sts of Czec hoslovaki a in 1948. I knew many of the principal actors in the ensuin g dram a but I was not full y aware of wh at tran spired at the Medi cal School in Brati slava where I graduated the same year th at D r. Mes ko started hi s studi es. M y opini o n abo ut thi s book the n was th at it represented an important hi stori ca l testimo ny about the insane and destructi ve influence of the communi st regime on the professors and students of two medi ca l sc hool s, one in Brati slava the other in Kos ice. The poorly-trained new ph ys ici ans, who se credenti als had to be primaril y political , in ev itabl y led to inadequ ate and inferi or hea lth care fo r the nation. Th e publication in 2003 of the improved and enh anced Engli sh version of thi s work , "The S il ent Conspi racy," marks a fittin g completi on of the author' s doc umentati o n of th at peri od , based on hi s personal observati ons, interviews of th e principals and of witnesses, and the detailed research of avail able records. I read th e Eng li sh and the Slovak versio ns s ide-by-s ide and reli ved the angui sh th at the parti c ipants of thi s drama must have felt in those times. I was aga in moved by th e author' s personal remini sce nces of the "good o ld days" with hi s fa mil y, before registering to stud y medi c ine. I mu st co nfess that the Eng li sh vers io n he ld my �SLOVAKIA 158 close attention more than the Slovak one. It is a page-turner; and one is reluctant to lay the book down. There is a bri ef but very informative acco unt of the hi storica l background of the Slovak nation by professor Mark Sto larik, an improvement over the Slovak vers ion. The rest of the book is more an inte rpre tation of the Slovak edition than a verbatim tran slat ion . The res ult is th at the E ng li sh is fluent , easy to read a nd de finitely much be tte r than most Slovak publications in Eng li sh, despite occas ion a l ling ui stic errors and inaccuracies, no ne of them s ubsta nti a l. Regrettably , not a ll of the illustrati o ns from the S lovak edition appear in the En g li sh o ne . Dr. Mesko recently in for med me that the first draft was written in Eng li sh. The strength of thi s work is in the detailed acco unt of the persecu ti o n, humili at io n, torture and incarceratio n of those who , because of their re li g ious back ground or personal integrity , did not join in worshiping comm uni sm, the Soviet Union a nd its murdere r-in-chi ef Stalin. Some victim s disappeared without any trace , othe rs perished in the uranium mines of the western Czec h la nd s and many spent years in prison and did hard labor. The a uthor li sts names and dates and provides documented description s of these terrible tran sgres sion s. Dr. Mesko ' s book is an importa nt co ntributi o n to the post-war hi story of the Slovak nat ion . It has the immediacy of an eyew itness report. To those w ho do not read Slovak , it pro vides a window o n events large ly unknown to Eng li sh readers. It provides a hi storic a l g limpse of how eve nts in Slovakia in the 1940 's separated the "good g uys" who would not betray their re li g iou s and mora l principl es, from vac ill ators , weak lin gs, thieve s, torturers a nd murderers, all without any moral scruples. The book a lso describes how politi ca l opportunists stabbed the ir intellectually an d professio na ll y s upe rior colleagues in the back . It demon strates how po liti ca l a nd party affiliations rep laced merit in the grad ing of stude nts and in di spe ns ing the most desired positions and jobs to " politically correct" applicants. It show s how the absence �SLOVAKIA 159 of party affili ati on re nde red outstandin g professors and teac he rs vulnerable a nd subj ec t to chic anery. lt record s the establi shm e nt of a Chair of Marxi s m-Le nini sm a t th e M ed ica l School for th e reeducation of the faculty and of the student body. Dr. Mesko also doc ume nts the large ly unknown attempt of the Communists to meddl e with the curriculum in the Medical School. They recruited a cadre of yo ungsters from workers ' bac kground s who had very littl e education , se nt them to spec ial classes in the Medical School a nd graduated them as " physicians," a di saster waiting to happen. This e ffort apparentl y failed a nd eventu all y faded away. No further information about these "graduates" is avai labl e. Finall y, the book illustrates why the re was friction between Catholics and Lutherans in th e Medical Schoo l, a nd rev is its that old probl e m between Czechs and Slova ks, name ly the di sc redited idea of a " Czechoslovak nation " propagated by Edvard Be nes a nd T .G. Masaryk and their cohorts. Researche rs and seri ous students of the hi story of Central Europe will find a rich resource for their work in this boo k. Readers who are of Slovak origin, but not proficient in that la nguage, will be nefi t from the English version which provides a g limpse of soc ietal forces that shaped the dest in y of Slovakia a nd its evo lution toward s independe nce. Mari a Dziakova- Bi:ihmova, Dusa na dlani: Spomienky od Kosfc do New Yorku. Edited by Michal Kri sko and Be rnarda Jenc fkov a- Fabrici . Presov , Mic hal Vasko, 2004, 151 pp. Illustrati ons M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa This autobiography, compl eted by ' Mari a Dziakova-Bi:imova in August of 1989, just before the collapse of Communism in Czechoslovakia, nea tl y summ arizes the tri als and tribul ation s of Slovak �160 SLOVAKIA intellectuals during and after World War II . Born in 1910 in a vill age near Kosice, she was the e ldest of three daughters of a poor peasant family. Nevertheless, her parents recogni zed her extraord in ary intelli gence and they skrimped and saved in order to send her to the " realgy mn as ium" for g irl s a nd then to the Faculty of Medicine at Comenius Uni vers ity in Bratislava. She grad uated with her degree in 1934 and began her practice in Kosice. Between 1938 and 1944 Dr. Bohmova (s he marri ed Dr. Emanuel Bohm in 194 1) li ved in Magyar occ upi ed Kosice and later Budapest, he lpin g her politically-activist hu sband defend the Slovak comm unity agai nst forced Magyarization. Meanwhile, she tried to continue her med ical practice, with vary in g success. As the Second World War drew to a c lose, she and her hu sband managed to return to S lovak ia, survived the pass ing of the Ru ss ian front, and re-established themselves in Bratislava in 1945. While she worked for the State In sti tute for Hea lth , her hu sband became Commi ss ioner of Health for Slovakia and Deputy Speaker of the Federal Assembly in Prague . After the Communist takeover of Czechoslovaki a in 1948 Emanuel Bohm fl ed to the west and she jo ined him in Lo ndo n a littl e later. They spe nt the nex t four years working as manu al laboure rs until the United States allowed them to e nter as immi grants in 195 2. Since Maria had to flee Czechoslovakia without any of her diplomas, a nd they co uld not easi ly be mailed to her during the Stalinist l 950's, she had to start over as an intern in the USA. By 1956 she had passed all of he r medical exa ms and sett led into a career in medic ine at the Kin gsbrook Jewi sh Medical Center in New York, and retired as Assistant Director of Medicine in 1975 . Maria and Emanuel active ly participated in Slovak inte ll ectu al a nd political life in New York for the second half of the twentieth century. She a nd he r hu sband took a leading role in the Slovak-American Cultural Center of New York , the Limbora dancing group , the General Mi Ian Rast is lav Stefanik Award , and the an nu al SlovakAmerican Ball at New York ' s Athletic C lub. They also participated in the founding of the Slovak World Co ngress in 1970, of which her �SLOVAKIA 161 husband became a vice-president. The book is a pleasure to read . Maria had a talent for writing and, at one point, she even recon structed a letter that she wrote on behalf of her illiterate mother in the eastern Slovak dialect to an uncle who had emigrated to the United States before World War I. She used the same di alect, and the same uncle ' s name (who had long since disappeared), when she wrote to her sister in Kosice, imploring her to try to mail the diplomas that she had to leave behind when she fled Communist Czechoslovakia. Thi s subterfuge worked because the Czech postal officials in Prague, who were in charge of censoring the mai l, were apparently confounded by thi s dialect and allowed the letter through. Maria eventually received her diplomas, but only after she had to once again prove her medical acumen by pass ing very rigorous American exams. In spite of her trial s and tribulations, Maria Dziakova-Bohmova did not become bitter. Instead , she was thankful to the United States for having given her the chance to start a new life in the New World. She returned for visits to Czechoslovakia in 1969 and 1978 and noticed how her younger sisters had prematurely aged and how so many of her colleagues from the " realgymnasium" and the university had also either aged or died in thi s "socialist paradise." She and her hu sband visited free Czechoslovakia in 1990; he died at the end of the year and was buried in the national cemetery in Martin . After Maria died in 1999, her remains were interred beside him. Thus, Slovakia recognized the achievements of these two extraordinary indi vi dual s. We should be grateful to Bernharda Jencfkova-Fabrici , executrix of her will, for having gathered together Maria's memoirs, for having persuaded Michal Krisko to edit them, and for havi ng arranged for Michal Vasko to publish them. The book is well-worth reading, both for a glimpse at the evolution of the Slovak inte lli genti a in the first Czechoslovak Republic , and for the harsh consequences that awaited those members who refused to sub mit to the Communist takeover of their homeland and who fled into exi le. �SLOVAKIA 162 Karen Henderson, Slovakia: The Escape from fnvisibihty. London and New York: Routledge, 2002, xviii-140 pp., map, notes, bibliography, index. JURAJ HOCMAN Carleton University A few years ago Slovakia suffered from a rather negative image of radical nationalism, especiall y in the West. One reason was that foreign scholars were rare in the region and Slovak history remained invisible. In 1987 a young scholar from England was given an unexpected opportunity to spend a couple of months in Bratislava, the country's capital. Attracted by both Slovakia 's past and present, Karen Henderson gradua ll y became more in volved in Slovak affairs. The author' s knowledge of the evolution of Slovak society through the centuries enabled her to reach a new perspective. Meanwhile, she also witnessed the country ' s political development after its establishment as a sovereign state on January 1st, 1993, its first appearance on the international scene and its chi ldhood illnesses as well. Henderson ' s book then documents the steps taken by the new Slovak government after the elections of September 1998 that were designed to improve the country's democratic performance, and that eventually led to its significantly changed image abroad. The author of the book , a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Leicester in the U.K. , took a balanced look at the Slovak Republic while concentrati ng on four areas of its evolution . In the first part she focused on the Slovaks in the Kingdom of Hungary and on the pre-war Czechoslovak Republic . She succes sfully demonstrated her familiarity with the main trends that formed and influenced the mentality of Slovak soc iety exposed to the processes of forced " Magyarisation" that took place after the Austro-H un garian Comprom ise of 1867. She also hi ghlighted the processes of "Czechoslovakism" that marked the relation- �SLOVAKIA 163 ship between the Slovaks and Czechs before the Second Wor ld W ar with traces of di stru st o n o ne side and suspi c ion o n the other. In co ntras t to the preva ilin g traditi o na l approaches to Slova ki a that have been influe nced by ste reotypes impl a nted into Sl ovak hi sto ry, the auth or shows a re markabl e e mpathy fo r the way the Slovaks saw the mse lves in the fo rmer states of whi ch they had been a part for ce nturi es (the Hun gari an Kin gdo m), o r fo r decades (Czec hos lo va kia) . He nde rso n attributes the fa ilures shared by Slovaks w ith the ir partners o bj ecti ve ly and fa irl y. Slovaks are seen as the vic tim s in relati o n to the two main determina nts above. O n the other hand , Henderson, who knows the terra in of Ce nt ra l a nd East Euro pe and its non-linear a nd some tim e e ni gmati c h is to ry as we ll , a lso de mo nstrates an ability to ide ntify the mo me nts and events in whi ch Slo vak fa ilures and ruptures happe ned due to the ir indec is ive ness, bi ases , ambi g uiti es, un willin g ness o r pass ivity in copin g w ith e me rg in g situation s (e.g. the Slovak Republi c 1939-1 945). In the second part o f the boo k He nde rson dea ls w ith inde pe ndent Slo vaki a after January I'', 1993 . She foc uses o n the governme nts of Prime Mini sters Vladim fr Mec iar a nd Mikul as Dzurinda, whil e notin g a sharp co ntrast betwee n the two. The parli ame ntary e lection s he ld in Septe mbe r o f 1998 made a substanti a l difference in the eyes of Western governme nts and public audi e nces . A detail ed pi cture of what had preceded the fa ll of Mec iar ' s governme nt may be of interest to those who are not fa mili ar w ith the intern a l deve lo pme nt of Slovak soc iety and who want to better know the reasons fo r the fa ilure o f Mec iar' s po lic ies. For those who know it we ll , it is a re minde r and summ ary of what was prev io usly published and broadcast in the print and e lectroni c medi a. However, the a utho r ' s a im was to foc us o n the shi ft in mode rn Slovak hi story th at a ll owed the state and soc iety to escape its in visibility, and thi s is what undo ubtedl y deserves recogniti o n. The last parts of th e book are dedi cated to Slovak ia ' s re lati o nship with the world fro m 19 18 to the present. In spite of the auth or 's overa ll pe rspec ti ve regardin g Slovaki a after th e pe ri od 1989- 1993, �SLOVAKIA 164 one could agree with her view th at " The Slovak Republic has not been particul arl y stable po liticall y, but as a state it has not been fundamentall y instable either" (p. 129). This may be also be perceived as the bottom level of Slovak statehood and the capability of the Slovak Republic to survive as a modern state that was initi all y questioned both dipl o matica ll y and publicl y at the beg innin g of its ex istence. Neve rtheless, the se nsiti ve reader may also find so me sub-themes and situation s described in the book that require furth er di scuss ion or a better nu anced approach (for example, so me aspects of the iss ues of ethnic minorities, the political culture and so on). Henderson 's footnotes and bibliography illustrate that the author used a wide variety of sources, from skeptical critics to pass ion ate apologists of Slovak hi story. She tried to steer a middle co urse between them and used books and schol arl y articles , as well as documents of Slovak academi c institution s and reports of non-governmental organi zation s as her principal sources . She also used re levant documents and reports iss ued by international or supran ational organization s regardin g Slovaki a ' s developme nt and progress (The World Bank, NATO, The European Union , etc.). O verall , Henderson did a good job. In my opinion Henderson ' s book successfull y refl ec ts a positive shi ft in the perception of Slovakia from the outside, and in bringing a pos itive picture to larger audi ences. In the last fe w decades Slovak society has been portrayed by both academi cs and public ists selecti vely and negati ve ly, large ly due to extern a l factors th at affec ted Slovak hi story. From now on , the question of whether the positi ve image of the country will be sustained will depend upon Slovaki a's willingness and capability to remain on track and avoid any detours from its democratic deve lopment. �SLOVAKIA 165 The Slovak Republic: A Decade of Independence (I 993-2002). Edited by M. Mark Stolarik. Wauconda, IL: Bolchazy -Carducci Publi shers, 2004, xiv-168 pp. tables, charts, graphs, notes, map, index. CAROL SKALNIK LEFF University of Illinois, Urbana-Champai gn Durin g the interwar Czechoslovak Re public, several volumes were published employing a format that could be described as " progress reports," in which responsible government officials of the time outlined the state of the field in key iss ue areas. This current volume, desc ribed as Slovakia's " first ' white paper, "' performs much the same function for the first decade of the independent state. In many cases, the " ten years after" vantage point is rather artificial , but in this case it is especially appropriate and the findin gs will have more than transitory value, because this is a decade framed by the successful passage from nascent state to me mbership in the European Union and NATO. Scholars interested in Slovakia' s " rehabilitation" from seco nd tier to new EU member will find thi s decade of continuin g relevance. And if there is an occasional celebratory note in the di scussion, it is understandabl e in the context of the decade ' s achievement of European integration. M . Mark Stolarik, who in his function as Chairholder in Slovak Hi story and Culture at the University of Ottawa, also co-organized the conference on which the published work is based, provides introductory thumbnail sketches of the arguments in eac h of the main contributions, and annotations of the text on politics, to clarify and update the discussion. The core articles that follow, dealing successively with politi cs, economic s, soc ial policy , culture and international relations, are the presentations of Rudolf Schuster, Slovakia' s first elected pres ident, and e ight high-rankin g and quite prominent Slovak government officials, cabinet ministers and state secretaries. Each contribution rece ives a response from the North American side, �SLOVAKIA 166 ei the r from Canadian offic ia ls who have worked o n -and who disc uss--cooperati ve projects with Slovakia, or from a scho lar specia li zi ng in Slovakia. In addition to the detailed po li cy overviews discussed below, I fo und two addit io na l pieces particularly interesting: the exc ha nge o n c ultural po li cy be twee n th e n- Culture Mini ster Mil an Kn azko and Martin Votruba, director of the Slovak Studies program at the University of Pittsburg h and the di sc uss ion of hum an ri ghts and ethni c re lation s by Pa l Csaky, an important Slovak Hun garia n po liti cian and Deputy Prime Minister, and Paul Magocs i of the University of Toronto, whose experti se o n the minoriti es of the reg ion in fo rmed hi s ge nera li zed critique of th e Jacobin-inspired view of state hi story through the prism of the dom in ant nati o na lity in many European countries . The compe ndium is sketchi est on the politics, devoting suffic ient time for orientation but no in-de pth a na lys is, which in thi s case makes sense in severa l ways, not least because the po liti cs of transiti o n has alread y been ex haustive ly ana lyzed in ex istin g sc ho larl y work. The iss ue areas covered are a no ther matter. Muc h less informati o n cover in g po lic y is readily ava il abl e in existing work , so thi s is exceedin g ly useful gro und to cover. Most chapters are e nri c hed with some unex pected inform ation a l treas ures, since the poli cy profil es are de ta il ed and spec ific rathe r th an vag ue or genera li zed , and the re are a multitude of useful tabl es and charts that e ncode co mparati ve and tim e series data on fo re ig n debt a nd in vestme nt , e mpl oy me nt , mino rity ed ucation , li fe expectancy and so o n. While not inte nded as a reference work, the anth o logy the refore atta in s so methin g of th at status; o nce read, it can be sto red to hand for speci fi c refere nce on a range of subjects. Our library doesn ' t have thi s book yet, but it soon wi ll. �SLOVAKIA 167 Thomas J. Shelley , Slovak s on the Hudson: Most Holy Trinity Church , Yonkers, & Th e Slovak Catholics of the Archdiocese of New York, 1894 -2000. Washin gton , D.C. : The Catholic University of America Press, 2002. xv-273pp., maps, illustrati o ns, bibliography , index. DANIEL F. T ANZONE Passaic, New Jersey Slovaks on the Hudson, by the noted church hi storian Thomas J. Shelley, adds an important chapter to the hi story of the American Catholic Church. While the city of Yonkers, New York, with a population of just under 200,000 cannot be compared with the metropoli ses of Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland or Pittsburgh, it is, in fact , a microcosm of bi g city Catholicism. The city's nineteen Catholic parishe s, including tho se serving the Slovak s, Italian s, Hun garia ns and most recently the Portugese, along with two of the Byza ntine rite , contributed to the gro wth of Catholic life in the community. Catholics would soo n become major players in the city 's soc ial , educational, cultural and political life. While thi s book tell s the story of Slovak settlement in the river town of Yonke rs startin g in the l 880's, it also presents a picture of the city's political establi shment and its reaction to the grow in g immigrant population. Most of these newcomers hailed from the Catholic nation s of central and southern Europe. Slovaks, along with other Slavic peoples, found work in the city's vast mill structure, and had the opportunity to make a new life for themselves and their families. While the local " Nativi sts" often resented and mi sunderstood these immigrants and their ways, the WASP establishment gradually accepted them into the fabric of c ity life. Indeed , by 1903 a Slovak immigrant was elected to Yonkers city govern ment. Like other immigrant gro ups, the Slovaks clung to their language and faith tradition s. First they esta bli shed loca l fraternal -benefit �168 SLOVAKIA societies, which became affiliated with the national bodies in the 1890's. Yonkers had the first women 's lodge in New York State ( 1892), which became branch 2 of the First Catholic Slovak Ladies ' Association. Its other Slovak fraternals gave birth to Most Holy Trinity Church, which traced its roots to 1891 when laymen petitioned the local bishop for permission to establish a pari sh. The local parish church was very important to the laity, both as a place of worship and as a social gathering place. The parishioners married and raised their children in the shadow of the church steeple in the Hollow section of Yonkers. Most Holy Trinity afforded its people the opportunity to pass on the language, culture and traditions of their ancestral homeland. The clergy and religious, especially the sisters of Cyril and Methodius , who staffed the parish school, taught the children the Slovak language and traditions . Slovaks on the Hudson never forgot the plight of their brethren along the Danube, Yah, Hron and Torysa rivers. Indeed, the clergy and leaders of the Yonkers community played an important ro le in the establishment of Czecho-Slovakia following the col lapse of the Dual Monarchy of A ustria-Hungary . One of the pastors of Most Holy Trinity was actually offered a cabinet post in the newly-established Czecho-Slovakia in 1919. Throughout the long winter of communist domination of their ancestral homeland, the Slovaks of Yonkers never gave up hope of seeing their countrymen freed from this alien ideology and they rejoiced when Slovakia achieved its independence on January I, 1993. Thomas J. Shelley has provided the reader with a wonderful opportunity to view the life of the Slovak immigrant community within the context of big city li fe. It is a fascinating story, warts and all, of the Church in America. It is al so an important contribution to American history because the Slovaks are rapidly assimilating and moving to the suburbs while Yonkers is receiving ever more and newer immigrants. It is a welcome addition to the story of so many American ethnic groups who make up o ur ever-expanding multicultural society. �SLOVAKIA 169 June Granatir Alexander, Ethnic Pride, American Patriotism: Slovaks and Other Immigrants in the lnterwar Era. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004, xiv-278 p.p., illustrations, notes, index. M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa The purpose of this book is to explore group-generated activities among Slovak-Americans in the inter-war period of American history and to see if such activities fit into recent "whiteness" studies by professional American historians. Alexander' s theme is that in the 1920's and 1930's both first and second-generation American Slovaks "were haunted by the stigma of inferiority inflicted by American society." (P.12). They sought to overcome this stigma by purchasing Liberty Bonds during the Great War and War Bonds during the Second World War. Meanwhile, they engaged in patriotic marches, carrying both the American and Slovak flags in the two wars, they staged large "S lovak Days" in the I 920's and 1930's in order to show off their ethnicity while stressing their Americanness and they openly supported FDR's New Deal legislation in order to help their pioneers and their fraternal-benefit societies to survive the ravages of the Great Depression. In order to prove her thesis Alexander dug deeply into both archival and printed sources. She studied the records of several large fraternal-benefit societies, the correspondence of their officers, and a wide range of Slovak-American newspapers. She also read widely in American history. Alexander concluded that Slovak-American identity did not arise from their growing "whiteness" in a racist American society, as some American historians had postulated of other ethnic groups, but rather from their nationality (ethnicity). Indeed, she also saw no generational or even class cleavage among American Slovaks, who perceived of themselves as overwhelmingly "working class" and united in their �170 SLOVAKIA efforts to win acceptance as one of the " newcomer" peoples to the United States. Al exander's book will , no doubt, win many acco lades from those profess ional A meri can hi stori ans who write hi story fo r themselves. She is very much a part of the so-call ed "di scourse" school whi ch uses social hi story in order to probe into questi ons of " whiteness," class, identity, celebrations, ass imilati on and so on. These hi stori ans deri ve great pleasure in proving or dispro ving eac h other 's theori es and show in g off their erudition . By so doin g, however, th ey c ut them selves off from the general public , which is hun gry for tradi tional , narrati ve, hi story . As a result, a second group of hi stori ans fill s thi s public hunger, and they are contemptu ously di smi ssed as " popul ar" hi stori ans by the academi cs mention ed above. On the other hand , the " popul ar" hi stori ans sell hundreds of thou sand s of copies of the ir books while the academic histori ans are delighted if they can sell a thou sand. While several hundred uni versity libraries will , no doubt, purchase a copy of thi s book, I have a feeling th at the Slovak-American community will hardl y notice it, whi ch is a pity. � REVIEWS ��SLOVAKIA 149 Peter Ze nuc h, M edzi vychodom a zapadom: Byzantsko-slovan- ska tradfcia, kultura a j azyk na vychodnom Slovensku. Brati slava: Veda , 2002. 286 pp., notes, bibliograph y, summari es in German and Ru ss ian. ROB ERT A. ORR Uni versity of Ottawa Thi s book provides va luabl e in sig hts, from severa l ang les, into a co mparati ve ly neglected area of Slavic studies: the place of Eastern Slovakia as an area straddling the di v ide between Eastern and Western Slavdom , which has cha nged hands severa l times in the course of its hi story. Although, as Zenuch shows in numerous pl aces (starting from the first page of the introducti o n), Easte rn Slovakia is generall y pl aced firmly o n the W estern side of the divide from lin- •• gui stic , cultural, and hi storical points of view (often being cited as part of Slavia Latina, Slavia Romana), it also saw the development of a homegrow n Church Slavonic tradition, a sort of " Slovak Church Slavonic", w ith a ll that it e ntail s, e.g., poor know ledge of Church Slavonic itse lf ( 127); in stances of hype rcorrection ( 168); and the gradual e merge nce of errors in re nditi o ns of so ngs, mak ing the m g radually less comprehensibl e to the laity over time (237-238). Zenuch 's book beg in s with a detailed tabl e of contents, followed by an introduc tion consisting of di sc uss ion s of approaches to the iss ue from the point of view of literature and hi sto ry, re li g io n and culture, and the hi storica l and lin g ui stic conditions. He then presents hi s major arg ume nts in e ight unnumbe red chapters , dealing roughly with hi storica l and c ultural developments in Eastern Slovakia and the Union of Uzhorod ( 1646), which broug ht the area w ithin the Uni ate C hurc h, under the authority of Rome, in the same way as the Uni o n of Brest ( 1596) did for Wes tern Ukraine; the Cyrillomethodian traditi o n in Eastern Slovakia, and that of St. Demetrius of Sa lonika; �SLOVAKIA 150 the ro le of para litu rg ica l so ng in th e Byza ntin o-S lav ic ri te; the la ng uage of se lected Cy rilli c ma nu sc ript s; th e interpre tat io n of certa in lin g ui sti c phe no me na in se lec ted manu sc ripts, whi ch he treats in co nsiderabl e detail ; and C hurch S lavoni c in Eastern S lovak ia , providing a fa irl y deta il ed ling ui stic ana lys is, es pec ia ll y of the lex icon. So urces are ex te ns ive ly referenced (23 prim ary so urces and 265 bibli ographi ca l ite ms, mostl y in Slova k, Ru ss ia n, a nd Ukra ini an, wi th some ite ms in Eng li sh, Hun gari an, etc.), w hi ch at times becomes rather cumberso me , w ith the foo tn otes (666) takin g up more than ha lf a page in pl aces. S urpris in g ly. in view of its titl e, the book offers o nl y a fa irl y bri ef di sc uss io n of the period before the Uni o n of Uzhorod (the " Byzantsko" in the titl e sound s vague ly a nac hro ni stic), jumping ra pidl y to 1646 (59-60). In view of its impo rtance, perh aps the Uni o n of Uzhorod could have been incorporated into th e actu a l titl e of the boo k (... Vychodne Slovensko po prijatf Uihorodskej unie, pe rhaps?). As me nti oned above, several Sl av ic c ultures are in contact within or c lose to Eas te rn S lova kia , and Zen o uc h di sc usses the lin g ui sti c aspects of such contacts in some deta il. In ma ny instances lang uage and re li g ion were intertw ined, and much of the no menc lature refl ec ts thi s situ ati o n, w ith te rm s suc h as Rusnak . Rusyn, Slovak, Slovj ak, e tc. be in g utili sed to de no te di ffe re nces in lang uage and re li g io n ( 126; as he puts it, e .g ., "every Gree k Ca th o li c was ta ke n fo r a Ru sy n" ( I 32)) . Vag ue aware ness of thi s co mpl ex ity has spread o uts ide the immedi ate area, with the genera ll y kn ow n Latin term Rut- heni ("Ruthe ni an") hav ing both re li g io us and ling ui sti c connotati ons. Eve n the ultim ate ly ephe mera l "s in g le Czec hos lovak" peopl e fig ure in some of the treatments ( 196- 197). Zeno uch c ites exampl es of such interconnecti o ns as , e .g., Sl ovak- U kraini an ( 137) , as we ll as lex ica l ite ms fro m ne ig hbo urin g lang uages, so metimes c itin g the same ite m in severa l la ng uages, e .g ., prikaza iie, etc .. ( 179). He makes sk ilful use of the tex ts of vari o us songs, w ith di sc uss io ns of vari o us types of song, and how to di sting ui sh the m to illustrate hi s po ints (e.g., 11 0 fn . 269), o ne of which ( 0 vyhnanf A dama i Evy z raja; 172-173) is �SLOVAKIA 151 eve n desc ribed as "s love nsko-po l's ko- ru sin sko[m ]" . He provides the Ni cene C reed in both Cy rilli c and Ro man, with stresses marked , to illustrate pro nunc iati o n (223 -224). Ze i\ o uc h deserves co mme nd ati o n fo r severa l passages a nd hi s treatment of sma ll points of deta il , e.g., hi s ex pl anati o n of drevo ( 173 fn . 498). He offe rs an excell e nt o utline of the earl y hi sto ry of Eastern Sl ovaki a (27, pass im), a nd definiti o ns of term s suc h as ca th olicos (33); sluienie (79); akatist (82), etc. On a re lated leve l, he offers useful di sc uss io ns of etymologies, e.g., S lovak Tabor ( 147). The interaction of c ultures and c hang ing borde rs in Easte rn Slovaki a meant , amo ng othe r thin gs, that a large number of la ng uages and orthographi es were used . Ze i\o uc h consiste ntl y c ites a ll mate ri a l in its ori g in a l orthograph y and fo nts, even ex te ndin g to, e.g ., c iting Russ ian refere nces in pre-Revolution orthograph y (e.g ., 59-60 ; 127), and Hun gari an orthograph y ( 196). In a text of suc h compl ex ity it is pe rhaps inev itabl e th at th e re sho uld be so me mi sprints, a lth o ug h tho se have bee n ke pt to a minimum , e.g., Atrni (54); Kovard vnvourro.X1f, ( 154) liturg ig ue (71 fn . 186 ); MaTep111.nb1 (93) sho uld be MaTep111a.nb1 as it is in the bibliograph y (w hy MaTepia.nbl in the footnotes o n pp 95-98?); Ukr. Ye.noBiK ( 169); 111c.neAOBH111e (276). In additi o n to its intrin sic inte rest, the refo re, Easte rn Slovak ia presents an exce lle nt example of an area whe re lang uages, c ultures, and re li g io n show so me degree of overl ap, and as suc h deserves to be better kn own to the scho larl y world at large. It is to be ho ped that thi s book will be translated into Engli sh. The fac t th at the most substanti a l criti c ism in vo lves the ac tua l titl e of the boo k is an indi cati o n of its va lue, both fo r hi sto ri ans and ling ui sts. �152 SLOVAKIA Mari a n Hronsky, The Struggle for Slovakia and the Treaty of Trianon 1918- 1920. Martin Styan, trans lator. Brati slava: Veda, 200 1, 407 pp., illustration s, bibliography, index . GREGORY C. FERENCE Salisbury Univers ity Mari an Hron sky, an hi storian of World War I Slovakia and the early years of the Czecho-Slovak Republic , has written an excellent book . This is a tran slation of hi s 1998 work of the same title , although the Engl ish-language version is more academic. A lthough the Treaty of Trianon dea lt with the dismantlin g of large sections of greater Hungary into its surrounding neighbors after World War One, Hron sky focused on the events leadi ng up to the treaty and their effects upon Slovakia. This detailed study beg ins with an hi storiographic lesson in the Introduction where the author claims that today many people in Slovakia are unaware of the Trianon Treaty despite more attention being paid to it since the fa ll of Communism. A lthough over e ight decades have passed s ince the treaty was signed, Hron sky notes correctly that it still causes intense emotiona l feelings in Hungary and is crucial to understanding Slovak-Hungarian relation s today, especiall y since the treaty left over 700,000 Hun garian s (Magyars ) in Czecho-Slovakia and over 500,000 current ly in S lovakia. With regards to the time frame unde r investigation, the author later stated , also quite correctly, "The Hungarians had never devoted so much attention to Slovakia as in thi s period (p. 11 0)." The treaty naturall y separated Slovakia from Hungary and attached it to the Czech Lands, but for the first time , it also delineated recogni zed boundaries for Slovakia. In the process, the a uthor took notice of so me interesting twists, such as the CzechoSlovak army havin g fought its only real war during World War I, and the Hungarian s having coined the term " Little Entente" for the diplomatic cooperation of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania after �SLOVAKIA 153 the war. The Hun garian s mourned the signin g of the treaty while it was hardly noticed by the average Slovak. Hron sky divided the book into six major sections: l. The End of the Kingdom of Hungary on the Political Scene; II. Power Vacuum in Slovaki a; Ill. The Struggle for Slovakia; IV . The War Between the Czecho-Slovak Republic and the Hun garian Soviet Republic ; V. The Peace Talks; and, VI. The Peace Treaty with Hun gary . In each section , there are numerou s sub-chapters that make the reading of thi s den se, fact-driven volume eas ier to negot iate. Much to hi s credit, Hronsky co nsulted numerou s archives , secondary so urces, and new spapers to present a very complete story. As with most tran slated works, thi s book could have used better proofreadin g. There are occasional subj ect-verb di sagreements, mi sspellings, tran slations of only some titles, wrong description s such as referrin g to Jan Smuts as a Briti sh general, and using a Slovak title to a book written by the Hungarian Oskar Jasz i. One defect, typica l of books published in Central Europe, is an index of perso nal names only, thu s limitin g its usefulness . The numerous photographs (including some very interestin g ones such as the pen used in the signin g of the treaty), drawin gs, and political cartoons are unfortunate ly blurry. They , along with proclamations and other items that should be read , are difficult to view. Another problem concerns maps. Due to the deta il ed leve l of descriptions of various battles and boundary negotiations and delin eat ion s, more and better quality maps should have been included. Perhaps the most bothersome aspect of the book, starting on page 100 and continuing many times over the next thirty pages or so, is that the " Rumanian s" or so me variation of thi s word keep appearing in the middl e of sentences or take the places of other words , makin g reading at times incomprehensi ble, or even absurd. Despite these shortcoming, which are for the most part trivial and annoying , thi s book is required reading for anyone interested in the end of the First World War, the collapse of Austria-Hungary, the ri se of the Czecho-Slovak state, the early post-war period in Central Europe, and the Treaty of Trianon itself. Hronsky has done a great �SLOVAKIA 154 serv ice by all owi ng fo r the translation of hi s book, whi ch otherwi se wo uld have had a very limited readership. Jni o k apitanovi Janovi Nalepkovi. Edited by Jozef Nalepka. Spi sska Nova Yes: Po lygrafia, 2002. 172 pp. , illustrations. VLADIMIR BAUMGARTEN Tall ahassee, Florida T horo ugh the co urse of military hi story the reader peri odi ca ll y encounters individu als who see med destined to become men of the pen, but who instead became men of the sword. Such was the case of Jan Nale pka. He was a poet by vocati on and a teacher by profess ion, and yet became a co mpetent military comm ander. Called up fo r military service by the Sl ova k Re public durin g World War II, Nalepka fo ught with di stincti on on both sides. Li ke many S lovaks sent to the Eastern Front, he deserted , and then fo ught alongs ide Sov iet parti sans in the Pripet Marches of Belaru s and northern Ukraine . Thi s biographi ca l study, edi ted by hi s brother, includes sampl es of Nalepka ' s wartime correspo nde nce, and the acco unts of peopl e who remembered him - teachers, students, fe ll ow soldi ers and Soviet military comm anders. One influenti a l fig ure d uring Na le pka ' s fo rm ati ve years in primary school in Spi ss ka Nova Yes was hi s teac her Jozef Miko laj, a Czec hos lovak Legionnaire of the First World War rece ntl y returned from long years of travel. He foun d Jan to have a provocat ive sense of humor and a mi sc hiev ious di spos ition, yet he exce ll ed academi ca ll y. Miko laj was parti cul arl y impressed with Jan' s kn ow ledge of the poets of the Slovak Nati onal Rev iva l, and his being inspired by the fo lk songs of hi s mother. Youn g Nalepka re mained precoc ious after enterin g teac her's college in 193 1. A confere nce of young teachers in Ko morna Lehotka (Jul y 1933) was visited by Czec hos lovak pres ide nt T. G. M asaryk. T he pres ide nt viewed the educati o nal system as a means of moul d in g youn g Slovaks in a "Czec hos lovak" �SLOVAKIA 155 spirit. But Nalepka remarked to hi s fri e nd Vladimfr Clementis that Slovak students were capable of c ulti vating the ir ow n sp irit. Na lepka was a nation a li st, but he was a lso a lefti st. In February of 1939 he began organizing c landest ine e le me nts aga in st the governing Slovak People' s Party - one month before the latter ass umed the leadership of a separate Slovak state . Ye t the events of March 1939 included a Hungari a n invas ion in the so utheast. Called up for military serv ice, Nalepka participated willingly in th e brief borde r war. He saw no contradiction between thi s action and hi s own idea ls. Latte r th at year, Slovakia's military alliance with Nazi Germany dictated hi s parti c ipation in the Poli sh ca mpai g n. Na le pk a, by now a lie ute nant, fought with di stinction on the northern s ide of the Carpathi ans. He was decorated by General Fe rdinand Catlos, Slovakia's Mini ster of Nationa l Defence. The war against Soviet Ru ss ia proved problemati ca l. Slovakia had te ritorial g rievances with Hungary and Pol a nd , but none w ith the Ru ss ians. Moreover, Na le pka had already beco me a li e nated by the arrogance of the nati ve Carpatho-Germans in Eastern Slovakia, who had the ir own Nazi organization. Finaly, like many Slovak so ldi ers, he was horified by Na zi atroc iti es in the occupied te rritori es. He clandestinely e ntered into contact with Soviet parti sans and eventually deserted to the m, takin g hi s men with him . Soviet parti san commander (and Red Army ge nera l) A. N. Saburov found Na le pka to be a competent subordin ate, who retained command of the Slovaks. The nature of partisan warfare in the swamps dictated that Na le pka freque ntl y travelled on horseback , carry ing an a utom atic weapon. A photograph of thi s legendary pose later in spired an equestrian sc ulpture of him by Anna Ki sakova. Thi s activity also contributed to hi s demi se. Captain Jan Nalepka was killed in an encounter with a German patrol outside the village of Ovruc o n the ni g ht of Nove mber 17 , 1943. Thi s study contains a weakness commo n to publi caation s about a " hometown boy" . It prese nts certa in fac ts in pass in g, presupposing the audi e nce is already familiar w ith the m. Whil e thi s may work for �SLOV AKIA 156 know ledgeable S lovaks, it leaves fo reigners in the dar k on key parti cul ars. Indeed , its greatest weekness lies not in what is sa id but what is left un said. Na le pk a's surv ivin g co mrades na med the ir parti sa n bri gade afte r him . The Captain Jan Nalepka Bri gade was later parasc huted back into Slovaki a to parti c ipate in the autumn 1944 upri sin g. Compared to other uni ts whi ch the Sov iets ex ported , and whic h large ly e ngaged in loot in g and pill ag in g, the Na lepka Bri gade conducted itse lf in a n exe mpl ary fas hi on. Together w ith the 2 nd Czec hoslovak Paratroo pe rs, it shares c redit fo r the capture of th e strateg ic vill age of Ja ln a in the Hron Ri ver va ll ey on Oc tobe r 10- 12. This acti on was the las t vic tory of the insurge nts in S lovakia dur ing the upris ing. A wartime fe ll ow-officer, Samue l S imonov ic, states that Jan Nalepk a was not a Communi st (p. 111 ). He di ed at a conve ni e nt time , whic h e na bl ed him to beco me a lege nd in the postwar co mmuni st era. Hi s peasant pare nts were rece ived with hono ur in the Sov ie t Union at me mo rial servi ces dedic ated to the captain. Yet one may questi on what fa te would have had in store fo r him had he li ved longer. A " w ise guy" mi ght be given a wide berth by hi s teac hers on the me rit of hi s acade mi c exce ll e nce, but not by a tota litari a n reg im e. His equ all y precoc ious fr ie nd V ladimfr C le me ntis went on to become Czec hos lovak ia's fo reig n mini ste r, but ultim ate ly e nded on the gall ows. In sofa r as the c urre nt Slovak Re public has adopted the Slovak Nati onal Upri sing rathe r than Jozef Ti so ' s Slovaki a as its lodestone, Captain Jan Nalepk a re mains a worthy subject of stud y. Hi s life cuts across the ideo log ica l lines th at later di vided the East and West du ring the Co ld War. Hi s c haracter serves to de bunk a certain stereotype of S lova ks as be in g subservie nt to a uth ority. Thi s book is a positi ve contributi on to wartime Slovak hi story. �SLOVAKIA 157 Zo ltan G . Mes ko, The S ilent Conspiracy: A Communist M odel of Political Cleansing at the Slovak Uni versity in B ratislava after the Second W orld War. Boulder, CO : East Europea n Monographs, 2003, ix- l 42pp., map, illustrati ons, notes, bibliography. L.P. HINTERB UCHNER Rye, New York When I read the orig inal Slova k vers ion "Zaml cane sprisahanie" by Dr. Zo ltan G. Mes ko in 1999, I was moved by the vivid descripti on of the eve nts th at befe ll th e medi ca l co mmunity in Slovaki a during and after World W ar II , th ro ugh the " liberation" by th e Soviets and after the illega l take-over by the Communi sts of Czec hoslovaki a in 1948. I knew many of the principal actors in the ensuin g dram a but I was not full y aware of wh at tran spired at the Medi cal School in Brati slava where I graduated the same year th at D r. Mes ko started hi s studi es. M y opini o n abo ut thi s book the n was th at it represented an important hi stori ca l testimo ny about the insane and destructi ve influence of the communi st regime on the professors and students of two medi ca l sc hool s, one in Brati slava the other in Kos ice. The poorly-trained new ph ys ici ans, who se credenti als had to be primaril y political , in ev itabl y led to inadequ ate and inferi or hea lth care fo r the nation. Th e publication in 2003 of the improved and enh anced Engli sh version of thi s work , "The S il ent Conspi racy," marks a fittin g completi on of the author' s doc umentati o n of th at peri od , based on hi s personal observati ons, interviews of th e principals and of witnesses, and the detailed research of avail able records. I read th e Eng li sh and the Slovak versio ns s ide-by-s ide and reli ved the angui sh th at the parti c ipants of thi s drama must have felt in those times. I was aga in moved by th e author' s personal remini sce nces of the "good o ld days" with hi s fa mil y, before registering to stud y medi c ine. I mu st co nfess that the Eng li sh vers io n he ld my �SLOVAKIA 158 close attention more than the Slovak one. It is a page-turner; and one is reluctant to lay the book down. There is a bri ef but very informative acco unt of the hi storica l background of the Slovak nation by professor Mark Sto larik, an improvement over the Slovak vers ion. The rest of the book is more an inte rpre tation of the Slovak edition than a verbatim tran slat ion . The res ult is th at the E ng li sh is fluent , easy to read a nd de finitely much be tte r than most Slovak publications in Eng li sh, despite occas ion a l ling ui stic errors and inaccuracies, no ne of them s ubsta nti a l. Regrettably , not a ll of the illustrati o ns from the S lovak edition appear in the En g li sh o ne . Dr. Mesko recently in for med me that the first draft was written in Eng li sh. The strength of thi s work is in the detailed acco unt of the persecu ti o n, humili at io n, torture and incarceratio n of those who , because of their re li g ious back ground or personal integrity , did not join in worshiping comm uni sm, the Soviet Union a nd its murdere r-in-chi ef Stalin. Some victim s disappeared without any trace , othe rs perished in the uranium mines of the western Czec h la nd s and many spent years in prison and did hard labor. The a uthor li sts names and dates and provides documented description s of these terrible tran sgres sion s. Dr. Mesko ' s book is an importa nt co ntributi o n to the post-war hi story of the Slovak nat ion . It has the immediacy of an eyew itness report. To those w ho do not read Slovak , it pro vides a window o n events large ly unknown to Eng li sh readers. It provides a hi storic a l g limpse of how eve nts in Slovakia in the 1940 's separated the "good g uys" who would not betray their re li g iou s and mora l principl es, from vac ill ators , weak lin gs, thieve s, torturers a nd murderers, all without any moral scruples. The book a lso describes how politi ca l opportunists stabbed the ir intellectually an d professio na ll y s upe rior colleagues in the back . It demon strates how po liti ca l a nd party affiliations rep laced merit in the grad ing of stude nts and in di spe ns ing the most desired positions and jobs to " politically correct" applicants. It show s how the absence �SLOVAKIA 159 of party affili ati on re nde red outstandin g professors and teac he rs vulnerable a nd subj ec t to chic anery. lt record s the establi shm e nt of a Chair of Marxi s m-Le nini sm a t th e M ed ica l School for th e reeducation of the faculty and of the student body. Dr. Mesko also doc ume nts the large ly unknown attempt of the Communists to meddl e with the curriculum in the Medical School. They recruited a cadre of yo ungsters from workers ' bac kground s who had very littl e education , se nt them to spec ial classes in the Medical School a nd graduated them as " physicians," a di saster waiting to happen. This e ffort apparentl y failed a nd eventu all y faded away. No further information about these "graduates" is avai labl e. Finall y, the book illustrates why the re was friction between Catholics and Lutherans in th e Medical Schoo l, a nd rev is its that old probl e m between Czechs and Slova ks, name ly the di sc redited idea of a " Czechoslovak nation " propagated by Edvard Be nes a nd T .G. Masaryk and their cohorts. Researche rs and seri ous students of the hi story of Central Europe will find a rich resource for their work in this boo k. Readers who are of Slovak origin, but not proficient in that la nguage, will be nefi t from the English version which provides a g limpse of soc ietal forces that shaped the dest in y of Slovakia a nd its evo lution toward s independe nce. Mari a Dziakova- Bi:ihmova, Dusa na dlani: Spomienky od Kosfc do New Yorku. Edited by Michal Kri sko and Be rnarda Jenc fkov a- Fabrici . Presov , Mic hal Vasko, 2004, 151 pp. Illustrati ons M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa This autobiography, compl eted by ' Mari a Dziakova-Bi:imova in August of 1989, just before the collapse of Communism in Czechoslovakia, nea tl y summ arizes the tri als and tribul ation s of Slovak �160 SLOVAKIA intellectuals during and after World War II . Born in 1910 in a vill age near Kosice, she was the e ldest of three daughters of a poor peasant family. Nevertheless, her parents recogni zed her extraord in ary intelli gence and they skrimped and saved in order to send her to the " realgy mn as ium" for g irl s a nd then to the Faculty of Medicine at Comenius Uni vers ity in Bratislava. She grad uated with her degree in 1934 and began her practice in Kosice. Between 1938 and 1944 Dr. Bohmova (s he marri ed Dr. Emanuel Bohm in 194 1) li ved in Magyar occ upi ed Kosice and later Budapest, he lpin g her politically-activist hu sband defend the Slovak comm unity agai nst forced Magyarization. Meanwhile, she tried to continue her med ical practice, with vary in g success. As the Second World War drew to a c lose, she and her hu sband managed to return to S lovak ia, survived the pass ing of the Ru ss ian front, and re-established themselves in Bratislava in 1945. While she worked for the State In sti tute for Hea lth , her hu sband became Commi ss ioner of Health for Slovakia and Deputy Speaker of the Federal Assembly in Prague . After the Communist takeover of Czechoslovaki a in 1948 Emanuel Bohm fl ed to the west and she jo ined him in Lo ndo n a littl e later. They spe nt the nex t four years working as manu al laboure rs until the United States allowed them to e nter as immi grants in 195 2. Since Maria had to flee Czechoslovakia without any of her diplomas, a nd they co uld not easi ly be mailed to her during the Stalinist l 950's, she had to start over as an intern in the USA. By 1956 she had passed all of he r medical exa ms and sett led into a career in medic ine at the Kin gsbrook Jewi sh Medical Center in New York, and retired as Assistant Director of Medicine in 1975 . Maria and Emanuel active ly participated in Slovak inte ll ectu al a nd political life in New York for the second half of the twentieth century. She a nd he r hu sband took a leading role in the Slovak-American Cultural Center of New York , the Limbora dancing group , the General Mi Ian Rast is lav Stefanik Award , and the an nu al SlovakAmerican Ball at New York ' s Athletic C lub. They also participated in the founding of the Slovak World Co ngress in 1970, of which her �SLOVAKIA 161 husband became a vice-president. The book is a pleasure to read . Maria had a talent for writing and, at one point, she even recon structed a letter that she wrote on behalf of her illiterate mother in the eastern Slovak dialect to an uncle who had emigrated to the United States before World War I. She used the same di alect, and the same uncle ' s name (who had long since disappeared), when she wrote to her sister in Kosice, imploring her to try to mail the diplomas that she had to leave behind when she fled Communist Czechoslovakia. Thi s subterfuge worked because the Czech postal officials in Prague, who were in charge of censoring the mai l, were apparently confounded by thi s dialect and allowed the letter through. Maria eventually received her diplomas, but only after she had to once again prove her medical acumen by pass ing very rigorous American exams. In spite of her trial s and tribulations, Maria Dziakova-Bohmova did not become bitter. Instead , she was thankful to the United States for having given her the chance to start a new life in the New World. She returned for visits to Czechoslovakia in 1969 and 1978 and noticed how her younger sisters had prematurely aged and how so many of her colleagues from the " realgymnasium" and the university had also either aged or died in thi s "socialist paradise." She and her hu sband visited free Czechoslovakia in 1990; he died at the end of the year and was buried in the national cemetery in Martin . After Maria died in 1999, her remains were interred beside him. Thus, Slovakia recognized the achievements of these two extraordinary indi vi dual s. We should be grateful to Bernharda Jencfkova-Fabrici , executrix of her will, for having gathered together Maria's memoirs, for having persuaded Michal Krisko to edit them, and for havi ng arranged for Michal Vasko to publish them. The book is well-worth reading, both for a glimpse at the evolution of the Slovak inte lli genti a in the first Czechoslovak Republic , and for the harsh consequences that awaited those members who refused to sub mit to the Communist takeover of their homeland and who fled into exi le. �SLOVAKIA 162 Karen Henderson, Slovakia: The Escape from fnvisibihty. London and New York: Routledge, 2002, xviii-140 pp., map, notes, bibliography, index. JURAJ HOCMAN Carleton University A few years ago Slovakia suffered from a rather negative image of radical nationalism, especiall y in the West. One reason was that foreign scholars were rare in the region and Slovak history remained invisible. In 1987 a young scholar from England was given an unexpected opportunity to spend a couple of months in Bratislava, the country's capital. Attracted by both Slovakia 's past and present, Karen Henderson gradua ll y became more in volved in Slovak affairs. The author' s knowledge of the evolution of Slovak society through the centuries enabled her to reach a new perspective. Meanwhile, she also witnessed the country ' s political development after its establishment as a sovereign state on January 1st, 1993, its first appearance on the international scene and its chi ldhood illnesses as well. Henderson ' s book then documents the steps taken by the new Slovak government after the elections of September 1998 that were designed to improve the country's democratic performance, and that eventually led to its significantly changed image abroad. The author of the book , a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Leicester in the U.K. , took a balanced look at the Slovak Republic while concentrati ng on four areas of its evolution . In the first part she focused on the Slovaks in the Kingdom of Hungary and on the pre-war Czechoslovak Republic . She succes sfully demonstrated her familiarity with the main trends that formed and influenced the mentality of Slovak soc iety exposed to the processes of forced " Magyarisation" that took place after the Austro-H un garian Comprom ise of 1867. She also hi ghlighted the processes of "Czechoslovakism" that marked the relation- �SLOVAKIA 163 ship between the Slovaks and Czechs before the Second Wor ld W ar with traces of di stru st o n o ne side and suspi c ion o n the other. In co ntras t to the preva ilin g traditi o na l approaches to Slova ki a that have been influe nced by ste reotypes impl a nted into Sl ovak hi sto ry, the auth or shows a re markabl e e mpathy fo r the way the Slovaks saw the mse lves in the fo rmer states of whi ch they had been a part for ce nturi es (the Hun gari an Kin gdo m), o r fo r decades (Czec hos lo va kia) . He nde rso n attributes the fa ilures shared by Slovaks w ith the ir partners o bj ecti ve ly and fa irl y. Slovaks are seen as the vic tim s in relati o n to the two main determina nts above. O n the other hand , Henderson, who knows the terra in of Ce nt ra l a nd East Euro pe and its non-linear a nd some tim e e ni gmati c h is to ry as we ll , a lso de mo nstrates an ability to ide ntify the mo me nts and events in whi ch Slo vak fa ilures and ruptures happe ned due to the ir indec is ive ness, bi ases , ambi g uiti es, un willin g ness o r pass ivity in copin g w ith e me rg in g situation s (e.g. the Slovak Republi c 1939-1 945). In the second part o f the boo k He nde rson dea ls w ith inde pe ndent Slo vaki a after January I'', 1993 . She foc uses o n the governme nts of Prime Mini sters Vladim fr Mec iar a nd Mikul as Dzurinda, whil e notin g a sharp co ntrast betwee n the two. The parli ame ntary e lection s he ld in Septe mbe r o f 1998 made a substanti a l difference in the eyes of Western governme nts and public audi e nces . A detail ed pi cture of what had preceded the fa ll of Mec iar ' s governme nt may be of interest to those who are not fa mili ar w ith the intern a l deve lo pme nt of Slovak soc iety and who want to better know the reasons fo r the fa ilure o f Mec iar' s po lic ies. For those who know it we ll , it is a re minde r and summ ary of what was prev io usly published and broadcast in the print and e lectroni c medi a. However, the a utho r ' s a im was to foc us o n the shi ft in mode rn Slovak hi story th at a ll owed the state and soc iety to escape its in visibility, and thi s is what undo ubtedl y deserves recogniti o n. The last parts of th e book are dedi cated to Slovak ia ' s re lati o nship with the world fro m 19 18 to the present. In spite of the auth or 's overa ll pe rspec ti ve regardin g Slovaki a after th e pe ri od 1989- 1993, �SLOVAKIA 164 one could agree with her view th at " The Slovak Republic has not been particul arl y stable po liticall y, but as a state it has not been fundamentall y instable either" (p. 129). This may be also be perceived as the bottom level of Slovak statehood and the capability of the Slovak Republic to survive as a modern state that was initi all y questioned both dipl o matica ll y and publicl y at the beg innin g of its ex istence. Neve rtheless, the se nsiti ve reader may also find so me sub-themes and situation s described in the book that require furth er di scuss ion or a better nu anced approach (for example, so me aspects of the iss ues of ethnic minorities, the political culture and so on). Henderson 's footnotes and bibliography illustrate that the author used a wide variety of sources, from skeptical critics to pass ion ate apologists of Slovak hi story. She tried to steer a middle co urse between them and used books and schol arl y articles , as well as documents of Slovak academi c institution s and reports of non-governmental organi zation s as her principal sources . She also used re levant documents and reports iss ued by international or supran ational organization s regardin g Slovaki a ' s developme nt and progress (The World Bank, NATO, The European Union , etc.). O verall , Henderson did a good job. In my opinion Henderson ' s book successfull y refl ec ts a positive shi ft in the perception of Slovakia from the outside, and in bringing a pos itive picture to larger audi ences. In the last fe w decades Slovak society has been portrayed by both academi cs and public ists selecti vely and negati ve ly, large ly due to extern a l factors th at affec ted Slovak hi story. From now on , the question of whether the positi ve image of the country will be sustained will depend upon Slovaki a's willingness and capability to remain on track and avoid any detours from its democratic deve lopment. �SLOVAKIA 165 The Slovak Republic: A Decade of Independence (I 993-2002). Edited by M. Mark Stolarik. Wauconda, IL: Bolchazy -Carducci Publi shers, 2004, xiv-168 pp. tables, charts, graphs, notes, map, index. CAROL SKALNIK LEFF University of Illinois, Urbana-Champai gn Durin g the interwar Czechoslovak Re public, several volumes were published employing a format that could be described as " progress reports," in which responsible government officials of the time outlined the state of the field in key iss ue areas. This current volume, desc ribed as Slovakia's " first ' white paper, "' performs much the same function for the first decade of the independent state. In many cases, the " ten years after" vantage point is rather artificial , but in this case it is especially appropriate and the findin gs will have more than transitory value, because this is a decade framed by the successful passage from nascent state to me mbership in the European Union and NATO. Scholars interested in Slovakia' s " rehabilitation" from seco nd tier to new EU member will find thi s decade of continuin g relevance. And if there is an occasional celebratory note in the di scussion, it is understandabl e in the context of the decade ' s achievement of European integration. M . Mark Stolarik, who in his function as Chairholder in Slovak Hi story and Culture at the University of Ottawa, also co-organized the conference on which the published work is based, provides introductory thumbnail sketches of the arguments in eac h of the main contributions, and annotations of the text on politics, to clarify and update the discussion. The core articles that follow, dealing successively with politi cs, economic s, soc ial policy , culture and international relations, are the presentations of Rudolf Schuster, Slovakia' s first elected pres ident, and e ight high-rankin g and quite prominent Slovak government officials, cabinet ministers and state secretaries. Each contribution rece ives a response from the North American side, �SLOVAKIA 166 ei the r from Canadian offic ia ls who have worked o n -and who disc uss--cooperati ve projects with Slovakia, or from a scho lar specia li zi ng in Slovakia. In addition to the detailed po li cy overviews discussed below, I fo und two addit io na l pieces particularly interesting: the exc ha nge o n c ultural po li cy be twee n th e n- Culture Mini ster Mil an Kn azko and Martin Votruba, director of the Slovak Studies program at the University of Pittsburg h and the di sc uss ion of hum an ri ghts and ethni c re lation s by Pa l Csaky, an important Slovak Hun garia n po liti cian and Deputy Prime Minister, and Paul Magocs i of the University of Toronto, whose experti se o n the minoriti es of the reg ion in fo rmed hi s ge nera li zed critique of th e Jacobin-inspired view of state hi story through the prism of the dom in ant nati o na lity in many European countries . The compe ndium is sketchi est on the politics, devoting suffic ient time for orientation but no in-de pth a na lys is, which in thi s case makes sense in severa l ways, not least because the po liti cs of transiti o n has alread y been ex haustive ly ana lyzed in ex istin g sc ho larl y work. The iss ue areas covered are a no ther matter. Muc h less informati o n cover in g po lic y is readily ava il abl e in existing work , so thi s is exceedin g ly useful gro und to cover. Most chapters are e nri c hed with some unex pected inform ation a l treas ures, since the poli cy profil es are de ta il ed and spec ific rathe r th an vag ue or genera li zed , and the re are a multitude of useful tabl es and charts that e ncode co mparati ve and tim e series data on fo re ig n debt a nd in vestme nt , e mpl oy me nt , mino rity ed ucation , li fe expectancy and so o n. While not inte nded as a reference work, the anth o logy the refore atta in s so methin g of th at status; o nce read, it can be sto red to hand for speci fi c refere nce on a range of subjects. Our library doesn ' t have thi s book yet, but it soon wi ll. �SLOVAKIA 167 Thomas J. Shelley , Slovak s on the Hudson: Most Holy Trinity Church , Yonkers, & Th e Slovak Catholics of the Archdiocese of New York, 1894 -2000. Washin gton , D.C. : The Catholic University of America Press, 2002. xv-273pp., maps, illustrati o ns, bibliography , index. DANIEL F. T ANZONE Passaic, New Jersey Slovaks on the Hudson, by the noted church hi storian Thomas J. Shelley, adds an important chapter to the hi story of the American Catholic Church. While the city of Yonkers, New York, with a population of just under 200,000 cannot be compared with the metropoli ses of Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland or Pittsburgh, it is, in fact , a microcosm of bi g city Catholicism. The city's nineteen Catholic parishe s, including tho se serving the Slovak s, Italian s, Hun garia ns and most recently the Portugese, along with two of the Byza ntine rite , contributed to the gro wth of Catholic life in the community. Catholics would soo n become major players in the city 's soc ial , educational, cultural and political life. While thi s book tell s the story of Slovak settlement in the river town of Yonke rs startin g in the l 880's, it also presents a picture of the city's political establi shment and its reaction to the grow in g immigrant population. Most of these newcomers hailed from the Catholic nation s of central and southern Europe. Slovaks, along with other Slavic peoples, found work in the city's vast mill structure, and had the opportunity to make a new life for themselves and their families. While the local " Nativi sts" often resented and mi sunderstood these immigrants and their ways, the WASP establishment gradually accepted them into the fabric of c ity life. Indeed , by 1903 a Slovak immigrant was elected to Yonkers city govern ment. Like other immigrant gro ups, the Slovaks clung to their language and faith tradition s. First they esta bli shed loca l fraternal -benefit �168 SLOVAKIA societies, which became affiliated with the national bodies in the 1890's. Yonkers had the first women 's lodge in New York State ( 1892), which became branch 2 of the First Catholic Slovak Ladies ' Association. Its other Slovak fraternals gave birth to Most Holy Trinity Church, which traced its roots to 1891 when laymen petitioned the local bishop for permission to establish a pari sh. The local parish church was very important to the laity, both as a place of worship and as a social gathering place. The parishioners married and raised their children in the shadow of the church steeple in the Hollow section of Yonkers. Most Holy Trinity afforded its people the opportunity to pass on the language, culture and traditions of their ancestral homeland. The clergy and religious, especially the sisters of Cyril and Methodius , who staffed the parish school, taught the children the Slovak language and traditions . Slovaks on the Hudson never forgot the plight of their brethren along the Danube, Yah, Hron and Torysa rivers. Indeed, the clergy and leaders of the Yonkers community played an important ro le in the establishment of Czecho-Slovakia following the col lapse of the Dual Monarchy of A ustria-Hungary . One of the pastors of Most Holy Trinity was actually offered a cabinet post in the newly-established Czecho-Slovakia in 1919. Throughout the long winter of communist domination of their ancestral homeland, the Slovaks of Yonkers never gave up hope of seeing their countrymen freed from this alien ideology and they rejoiced when Slovakia achieved its independence on January I, 1993. Thomas J. Shelley has provided the reader with a wonderful opportunity to view the life of the Slovak immigrant community within the context of big city li fe. It is a fascinating story, warts and all, of the Church in America. It is al so an important contribution to American history because the Slovaks are rapidly assimilating and moving to the suburbs while Yonkers is receiving ever more and newer immigrants. It is a welcome addition to the story of so many American ethnic groups who make up o ur ever-expanding multicultural society. �SLOVAKIA 169 June Granatir Alexander, Ethnic Pride, American Patriotism: Slovaks and Other Immigrants in the lnterwar Era. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004, xiv-278 p.p., illustrations, notes, index. M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa The purpose of this book is to explore group-generated activities among Slovak-Americans in the inter-war period of American history and to see if such activities fit into recent "whiteness" studies by professional American historians. Alexander' s theme is that in the 1920's and 1930's both first and second-generation American Slovaks "were haunted by the stigma of inferiority inflicted by American society." (P.12). They sought to overcome this stigma by purchasing Liberty Bonds during the Great War and War Bonds during the Second World War. Meanwhile, they engaged in patriotic marches, carrying both the American and Slovak flags in the two wars, they staged large "S lovak Days" in the I 920's and 1930's in order to show off their ethnicity while stressing their Americanness and they openly supported FDR's New Deal legislation in order to help their pioneers and their fraternal-benefit societies to survive the ravages of the Great Depression. In order to prove her thesis Alexander dug deeply into both archival and printed sources. She studied the records of several large fraternal-benefit societies, the correspondence of their officers, and a wide range of Slovak-American newspapers. She also read widely in American history. Alexander concluded that Slovak-American identity did not arise from their growing "whiteness" in a racist American society, as some American historians had postulated of other ethnic groups, but rather from their nationality (ethnicity). Indeed, she also saw no generational or even class cleavage among American Slovaks, who perceived of themselves as overwhelmingly "working class" and united in their �170 SLOVAKIA efforts to win acceptance as one of the " newcomer" peoples to the United States. Al exander's book will , no doubt, win many acco lades from those profess ional A meri can hi stori ans who write hi story fo r themselves. She is very much a part of the so-call ed "di scourse" school whi ch uses social hi story in order to probe into questi ons of " whiteness," class, identity, celebrations, ass imilati on and so on. These hi stori ans deri ve great pleasure in proving or dispro ving eac h other 's theori es and show in g off their erudition . By so doin g, however, th ey c ut them selves off from the general public , which is hun gry for tradi tional , narrati ve, hi story . As a result, a second group of hi stori ans fill s thi s public hunger, and they are contemptu ously di smi ssed as " popul ar" hi stori ans by the academi cs mention ed above. On the other hand , the " popul ar" hi stori ans sell hundreds of thou sand s of copies of the ir books while the academic histori ans are delighted if they can sell a thou sand. While several hundred uni versity libraries will , no doubt, purchase a copy of thi s book, I have a feeling th at the Slovak-American community will hardl y notice it, whi ch is a pity. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2005, Vol. 38 Description An account of the resource Vol. 38 (No. 70-71), 2005. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2005 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document REVIEWS SLOVAKIA 149 Peter Ze nuc h, M edzi vychodom a zapadom: Byzantsko-slovan- ska tradfcia, kultura a j azyk na vychodnom Slovensku. Brati slava: Veda , 2002. 286 pp., notes, bibliograph y, summari es in German and Ru ss ian. ROB ERT A. ORR Uni versity of Ottawa Thi s book provides va luabl e in sig hts, from severa l ang les, into a co mparati ve ly neglected area of Slavic studies: the place of Eastern Slovakia as an area straddling the di v ide between Eastern and Western Slavdom , which has cha nged hands severa l times in the course of its hi story. Although, as Zenuch shows in numerous pl aces (starting from the first page of the introducti o n), Easte rn Slovakia is generall y pl aced firmly o n the W estern side of the divide from lin- •• gui stic , cultural, and hi storical points of view (often being cited as part of Slavia Latina, Slavia Romana), it also saw the development of a homegrow n Church Slavonic tradition, a sort of " Slovak Church Slavonic", w ith a ll that it e ntail s, e.g., poor know ledge of Church Slavonic itse lf ( 127); in stances of hype rcorrection ( 168); and the gradual e merge nce of errors in re nditi o ns of so ngs, mak ing the m g radually less comprehensibl e to the laity over time (237-238). Zenuch 's book beg in s with a detailed tabl e of contents, followed by an introduc tion consisting of di sc uss ion s of approaches to the iss ue from the point of view of literature and hi sto ry, re li g io n and culture, and the hi storica l and lin g ui stic conditions. He then presents hi s major arg ume nts in e ight unnumbe red chapters , dealing roughly with hi storica l and c ultural developments in Eastern Slovakia and the Union of Uzhorod ( 1646), which broug ht the area w ithin the Uni ate C hurc h, under the authority of Rome, in the same way as the Uni o n of Brest ( 1596) did for Wes tern Ukraine; the Cyrillomethodian traditi o n in Eastern Slovakia, and that of St. Demetrius of Sa lonika; SLOVAKIA 150 the ro le of para litu rg ica l so ng in th e Byza ntin o-S lav ic ri te; the la ng uage of se lected Cy rilli c ma nu sc ript s; th e interpre tat io n of certa in lin g ui sti c phe no me na in se lec ted manu sc ripts, whi ch he treats in co nsiderabl e detail ; and C hurch S lavoni c in Eastern S lovak ia , providing a fa irl y deta il ed ling ui stic ana lys is, es pec ia ll y of the lex icon. So urces are ex te ns ive ly referenced (23 prim ary so urces and 265 bibli ographi ca l ite ms, mostl y in Slova k, Ru ss ia n, a nd Ukra ini an, wi th some ite ms in Eng li sh, Hun gari an, etc.), w hi ch at times becomes rather cumberso me , w ith the foo tn otes (666) takin g up more than ha lf a page in pl aces. S urpris in g ly. in view of its titl e, the book offers o nl y a fa irl y bri ef di sc uss io n of the period before the Uni o n of Uzhorod (the " Byzantsko" in the titl e sound s vague ly a nac hro ni stic), jumping ra pidl y to 1646 (59-60). In view of its impo rtance, perh aps the Uni o n of Uzhorod could have been incorporated into th e actu a l titl e of the boo k (... Vychodne Slovensko po prijatf Uihorodskej unie, pe rhaps?). As me nti oned above, several Sl av ic c ultures are in contact within or c lose to Eas te rn S lova kia , and Zen o uc h di sc usses the lin g ui sti c aspects of such contacts in some deta il. In ma ny instances lang uage and re li g ion were intertw ined, and much of the no menc lature refl ec ts thi s situ ati o n, w ith te rm s suc h as Rusnak . Rusyn, Slovak, Slovj ak, e tc. be in g utili sed to de no te di ffe re nces in lang uage and re li g io n ( 126; as he puts it, e .g ., "every Gree k Ca th o li c was ta ke n fo r a Ru sy n" ( I 32)) . Vag ue aware ness of thi s co mpl ex ity has spread o uts ide the immedi ate area, with the genera ll y kn ow n Latin term Rut- heni ("Ruthe ni an") hav ing both re li g io us and ling ui sti c connotati ons. Eve n the ultim ate ly ephe mera l "s in g le Czec hos lovak" peopl e fig ure in some of the treatments ( 196- 197). Zeno uch c ites exampl es of such interconnecti o ns as , e .g., Sl ovak- U kraini an ( 137) , as we ll as lex ica l ite ms fro m ne ig hbo urin g lang uages, so metimes c itin g the same ite m in severa l la ng uages, e .g ., prikaza iie, etc .. ( 179). He makes sk ilful use of the tex ts of vari o us songs, w ith di sc uss io ns of vari o us types of song, and how to di sting ui sh the m to illustrate hi s po ints (e.g., 11 0 fn . 269), o ne of which ( 0 vyhnanf A dama i Evy z raja; 172-173) is SLOVAKIA 151 eve n desc ribed as "s love nsko-po l's ko- ru sin sko[m ]" . He provides the Ni cene C reed in both Cy rilli c and Ro man, with stresses marked , to illustrate pro nunc iati o n (223 -224). Ze i\ o uc h deserves co mme nd ati o n fo r severa l passages a nd hi s treatment of sma ll points of deta il , e.g., hi s ex pl anati o n of drevo ( 173 fn . 498). He offe rs an excell e nt o utline of the earl y hi sto ry of Eastern Sl ovaki a (27, pass im), a nd definiti o ns of term s suc h as ca th olicos (33); sluienie (79); akatist (82), etc. On a re lated leve l, he offers useful di sc uss io ns of etymologies, e.g., S lovak Tabor ( 147). The interaction of c ultures and c hang ing borde rs in Easte rn Slovaki a meant , amo ng othe r thin gs, that a large number of la ng uages and orthographi es were used . Ze i\o uc h consiste ntl y c ites a ll mate ri a l in its ori g in a l orthograph y and fo nts, even ex te ndin g to, e.g ., c iting Russ ian refere nces in pre-Revolution orthograph y (e.g ., 59-60 ; 127), and Hun gari an orthograph y ( 196). In a text of suc h compl ex ity it is pe rhaps inev itabl e th at th e re sho uld be so me mi sprints, a lth o ug h tho se have bee n ke pt to a minimum , e.g., Atrni (54); Kovard vnvourro.X1f, ( 154) liturg ig ue (71 fn . 186 ); MaTep111.nb1 (93) sho uld be MaTep111a.nb1 as it is in the bibliograph y (w hy MaTepia.nbl in the footnotes o n pp 95-98?); Ukr. Ye.noBiK ( 169); 111c.neAOBH111e (276). In additi o n to its intrin sic inte rest, the refo re, Easte rn Slovak ia presents an exce lle nt example of an area whe re lang uages, c ultures, and re li g io n show so me degree of overl ap, and as suc h deserves to be better kn own to the scho larl y world at large. It is to be ho ped that thi s book will be translated into Engli sh. The fac t th at the most substanti a l criti c ism in vo lves the ac tua l titl e of the boo k is an indi cati o n of its va lue, both fo r hi sto ri ans and ling ui sts. 152 SLOVAKIA Mari a n Hronsky, The Struggle for Slovakia and the Treaty of Trianon 1918- 1920. Martin Styan, trans lator. Brati slava: Veda, 200 1, 407 pp., illustration s, bibliography, index . GREGORY C. FERENCE Salisbury Univers ity Mari an Hron sky, an hi storian of World War I Slovakia and the early years of the Czecho-Slovak Republic , has written an excellent book . This is a tran slation of hi s 1998 work of the same title , although the Engl ish-language version is more academic. A lthough the Treaty of Trianon dea lt with the dismantlin g of large sections of greater Hungary into its surrounding neighbors after World War One, Hron sky focused on the events leadi ng up to the treaty and their effects upon Slovakia. This detailed study beg ins with an hi storiographic lesson in the Introduction where the author claims that today many people in Slovakia are unaware of the Trianon Treaty despite more attention being paid to it since the fa ll of Communism. A lthough over e ight decades have passed s ince the treaty was signed, Hron sky notes correctly that it still causes intense emotiona l feelings in Hungary and is crucial to understanding Slovak-Hungarian relation s today, especiall y since the treaty left over 700,000 Hun garian s (Magyars ) in Czecho-Slovakia and over 500,000 current ly in S lovakia. With regards to the time frame unde r investigation, the author later stated , also quite correctly, "The Hungarians had never devoted so much attention to Slovakia as in thi s period (p. 11 0)." The treaty naturall y separated Slovakia from Hungary and attached it to the Czech Lands, but for the first time , it also delineated recogni zed boundaries for Slovakia. In the process, the a uthor took notice of so me interesting twists, such as the CzechoSlovak army havin g fought its only real war during World War I, and the Hungarian s having coined the term " Little Entente" for the diplomatic cooperation of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania after SLOVAKIA 153 the war. The Hun garian s mourned the signin g of the treaty while it was hardly noticed by the average Slovak. Hron sky divided the book into six major sections: l. The End of the Kingdom of Hungary on the Political Scene; II. Power Vacuum in Slovaki a; Ill. The Struggle for Slovakia; IV . The War Between the Czecho-Slovak Republic and the Hun garian Soviet Republic ; V. The Peace Talks; and, VI. The Peace Treaty with Hun gary . In each section , there are numerou s sub-chapters that make the reading of thi s den se, fact-driven volume eas ier to negot iate. Much to hi s credit, Hronsky co nsulted numerou s archives , secondary so urces, and new spapers to present a very complete story. As with most tran slated works, thi s book could have used better proofreadin g. There are occasional subj ect-verb di sagreements, mi sspellings, tran slations of only some titles, wrong description s such as referrin g to Jan Smuts as a Briti sh general, and using a Slovak title to a book written by the Hungarian Oskar Jasz i. One defect, typica l of books published in Central Europe, is an index of perso nal names only, thu s limitin g its usefulness . The numerous photographs (including some very interestin g ones such as the pen used in the signin g of the treaty), drawin gs, and political cartoons are unfortunate ly blurry. They , along with proclamations and other items that should be read , are difficult to view. Another problem concerns maps. Due to the deta il ed leve l of descriptions of various battles and boundary negotiations and delin eat ion s, more and better quality maps should have been included. Perhaps the most bothersome aspect of the book, starting on page 100 and continuing many times over the next thirty pages or so, is that the " Rumanian s" or so me variation of thi s word keep appearing in the middl e of sentences or take the places of other words , makin g reading at times incomprehensi ble, or even absurd. Despite these shortcoming, which are for the most part trivial and annoying , thi s book is required reading for anyone interested in the end of the First World War, the collapse of Austria-Hungary, the ri se of the Czecho-Slovak state, the early post-war period in Central Europe, and the Treaty of Trianon itself. Hronsky has done a great SLOVAKIA 154 serv ice by all owi ng fo r the translation of hi s book, whi ch otherwi se wo uld have had a very limited readership. Jni o k apitanovi Janovi Nalepkovi. Edited by Jozef Nalepka. Spi sska Nova Yes: Po lygrafia, 2002. 172 pp. , illustrations. VLADIMIR BAUMGARTEN Tall ahassee, Florida T horo ugh the co urse of military hi story the reader peri odi ca ll y encounters individu als who see med destined to become men of the pen, but who instead became men of the sword. Such was the case of Jan Nale pka. He was a poet by vocati on and a teacher by profess ion, and yet became a co mpetent military comm ander. Called up fo r military service by the Sl ova k Re public durin g World War II, Nalepka fo ught with di stincti on on both sides. Li ke many S lovaks sent to the Eastern Front, he deserted , and then fo ught alongs ide Sov iet parti sans in the Pripet Marches of Belaru s and northern Ukraine . Thi s biographi ca l study, edi ted by hi s brother, includes sampl es of Nalepka ' s wartime correspo nde nce, and the acco unts of peopl e who remembered him - teachers, students, fe ll ow soldi ers and Soviet military comm anders. One influenti a l fig ure d uring Na le pka ' s fo rm ati ve years in primary school in Spi ss ka Nova Yes was hi s teac her Jozef Miko laj, a Czec hos lovak Legionnaire of the First World War rece ntl y returned from long years of travel. He foun d Jan to have a provocat ive sense of humor and a mi sc hiev ious di spos ition, yet he exce ll ed academi ca ll y. Miko laj was parti cul arl y impressed with Jan' s kn ow ledge of the poets of the Slovak Nati onal Rev iva l, and his being inspired by the fo lk songs of hi s mother. Youn g Nalepka re mained precoc ious after enterin g teac her's college in 193 1. A confere nce of young teachers in Ko morna Lehotka (Jul y 1933) was visited by Czec hos lovak pres ide nt T. G. M asaryk. T he pres ide nt viewed the educati o nal system as a means of moul d in g youn g Slovaks in a "Czec hos lovak" SLOVAKIA 155 spirit. But Nalepka remarked to hi s fri e nd Vladimfr Clementis that Slovak students were capable of c ulti vating the ir ow n sp irit. Na lepka was a nation a li st, but he was a lso a lefti st. In February of 1939 he began organizing c landest ine e le me nts aga in st the governing Slovak People' s Party - one month before the latter ass umed the leadership of a separate Slovak state . Ye t the events of March 1939 included a Hungari a n invas ion in the so utheast. Called up for military serv ice, Nalepka participated willingly in th e brief borde r war. He saw no contradiction between thi s action and hi s own idea ls. Latte r th at year, Slovakia's military alliance with Nazi Germany dictated hi s parti c ipation in the Poli sh ca mpai g n. Na le pk a, by now a lie ute nant, fought with di stinction on the northern s ide of the Carpathi ans. He was decorated by General Fe rdinand Catlos, Slovakia's Mini ster of Nationa l Defence. The war against Soviet Ru ss ia proved problemati ca l. Slovakia had te ritorial g rievances with Hungary and Pol a nd , but none w ith the Ru ss ians. Moreover, Na le pka had already beco me a li e nated by the arrogance of the nati ve Carpatho-Germans in Eastern Slovakia, who had the ir own Nazi organization. Finaly, like many Slovak so ldi ers, he was horified by Na zi atroc iti es in the occupied te rritori es. He clandestinely e ntered into contact with Soviet parti sans and eventually deserted to the m, takin g hi s men with him . Soviet parti san commander (and Red Army ge nera l) A. N. Saburov found Na le pka to be a competent subordin ate, who retained command of the Slovaks. The nature of partisan warfare in the swamps dictated that Na le pka freque ntl y travelled on horseback , carry ing an a utom atic weapon. A photograph of thi s legendary pose later in spired an equestrian sc ulpture of him by Anna Ki sakova. Thi s activity also contributed to hi s demi se. Captain Jan Nalepka was killed in an encounter with a German patrol outside the village of Ovruc o n the ni g ht of Nove mber 17 , 1943. Thi s study contains a weakness commo n to publi caation s about a " hometown boy" . It prese nts certa in fac ts in pass in g, presupposing the audi e nce is already familiar w ith the m. Whil e thi s may work for SLOV AKIA 156 know ledgeable S lovaks, it leaves fo reigners in the dar k on key parti cul ars. Indeed , its greatest weekness lies not in what is sa id but what is left un said. Na le pk a's surv ivin g co mrades na med the ir parti sa n bri gade afte r him . The Captain Jan Nalepka Bri gade was later parasc huted back into Slovaki a to parti c ipate in the autumn 1944 upri sin g. Compared to other uni ts whi ch the Sov iets ex ported , and whic h large ly e ngaged in loot in g and pill ag in g, the Na lepka Bri gade conducted itse lf in a n exe mpl ary fas hi on. Together w ith the 2 nd Czec hoslovak Paratroo pe rs, it shares c redit fo r the capture of th e strateg ic vill age of Ja ln a in the Hron Ri ver va ll ey on Oc tobe r 10- 12. This acti on was the las t vic tory of the insurge nts in S lovakia dur ing the upris ing. A wartime fe ll ow-officer, Samue l S imonov ic, states that Jan Nalepk a was not a Communi st (p. 111 ). He di ed at a conve ni e nt time , whic h e na bl ed him to beco me a lege nd in the postwar co mmuni st era. Hi s peasant pare nts were rece ived with hono ur in the Sov ie t Union at me mo rial servi ces dedic ated to the captain. Yet one may questi on what fa te would have had in store fo r him had he li ved longer. A " w ise guy" mi ght be given a wide berth by hi s teac hers on the me rit of hi s acade mi c exce ll e nce, but not by a tota litari a n reg im e. His equ all y precoc ious fr ie nd V ladimfr C le me ntis went on to become Czec hos lovak ia's fo reig n mini ste r, but ultim ate ly e nded on the gall ows. In sofa r as the c urre nt Slovak Re public has adopted the Slovak Nati onal Upri sing rathe r than Jozef Ti so ' s Slovaki a as its lodestone, Captain Jan Nalepk a re mains a worthy subject of stud y. Hi s life cuts across the ideo log ica l lines th at later di vided the East and West du ring the Co ld War. Hi s c haracter serves to de bunk a certain stereotype of S lova ks as be in g subservie nt to a uth ority. Thi s book is a positi ve contributi on to wartime Slovak hi story. SLOVAKIA 157 Zo ltan G . Mes ko, The S ilent Conspiracy: A Communist M odel of Political Cleansing at the Slovak Uni versity in B ratislava after the Second W orld War. Boulder, CO : East Europea n Monographs, 2003, ix- l 42pp., map, illustrati ons, notes, bibliography. L.P. HINTERB UCHNER Rye, New York When I read the orig inal Slova k vers ion "Zaml cane sprisahanie" by Dr. Zo ltan G. Mes ko in 1999, I was moved by the vivid descripti on of the eve nts th at befe ll th e medi ca l co mmunity in Slovaki a during and after World W ar II , th ro ugh the " liberation" by th e Soviets and after the illega l take-over by the Communi sts of Czec hoslovaki a in 1948. I knew many of the principal actors in the ensuin g dram a but I was not full y aware of wh at tran spired at the Medi cal School in Brati slava where I graduated the same year th at D r. Mes ko started hi s studi es. M y opini o n abo ut thi s book the n was th at it represented an important hi stori ca l testimo ny about the insane and destructi ve influence of the communi st regime on the professors and students of two medi ca l sc hool s, one in Brati slava the other in Kos ice. The poorly-trained new ph ys ici ans, who se credenti als had to be primaril y political , in ev itabl y led to inadequ ate and inferi or hea lth care fo r the nation. Th e publication in 2003 of the improved and enh anced Engli sh version of thi s work , "The S il ent Conspi racy," marks a fittin g completi on of the author' s doc umentati o n of th at peri od , based on hi s personal observati ons, interviews of th e principals and of witnesses, and the detailed research of avail able records. I read th e Eng li sh and the Slovak versio ns s ide-by-s ide and reli ved the angui sh th at the parti c ipants of thi s drama must have felt in those times. I was aga in moved by th e author' s personal remini sce nces of the "good o ld days" with hi s fa mil y, before registering to stud y medi c ine. I mu st co nfess that the Eng li sh vers io n he ld my SLOVAKIA 158 close attention more than the Slovak one. It is a page-turner; and one is reluctant to lay the book down. There is a bri ef but very informative acco unt of the hi storica l background of the Slovak nation by professor Mark Sto larik, an improvement over the Slovak vers ion. The rest of the book is more an inte rpre tation of the Slovak edition than a verbatim tran slat ion . The res ult is th at the E ng li sh is fluent , easy to read a nd de finitely much be tte r than most Slovak publications in Eng li sh, despite occas ion a l ling ui stic errors and inaccuracies, no ne of them s ubsta nti a l. Regrettably , not a ll of the illustrati o ns from the S lovak edition appear in the En g li sh o ne . Dr. Mesko recently in for med me that the first draft was written in Eng li sh. The strength of thi s work is in the detailed acco unt of the persecu ti o n, humili at io n, torture and incarceratio n of those who , because of their re li g ious back ground or personal integrity , did not join in worshiping comm uni sm, the Soviet Union a nd its murdere r-in-chi ef Stalin. Some victim s disappeared without any trace , othe rs perished in the uranium mines of the western Czec h la nd s and many spent years in prison and did hard labor. The a uthor li sts names and dates and provides documented description s of these terrible tran sgres sion s. Dr. Mesko ' s book is an importa nt co ntributi o n to the post-war hi story of the Slovak nat ion . It has the immediacy of an eyew itness report. To those w ho do not read Slovak , it pro vides a window o n events large ly unknown to Eng li sh readers. It provides a hi storic a l g limpse of how eve nts in Slovakia in the 1940 's separated the "good g uys" who would not betray their re li g iou s and mora l principl es, from vac ill ators , weak lin gs, thieve s, torturers a nd murderers, all without any moral scruples. The book a lso describes how politi ca l opportunists stabbed the ir intellectually an d professio na ll y s upe rior colleagues in the back . It demon strates how po liti ca l a nd party affiliations rep laced merit in the grad ing of stude nts and in di spe ns ing the most desired positions and jobs to " politically correct" applicants. It show s how the absence SLOVAKIA 159 of party affili ati on re nde red outstandin g professors and teac he rs vulnerable a nd subj ec t to chic anery. lt record s the establi shm e nt of a Chair of Marxi s m-Le nini sm a t th e M ed ica l School for th e reeducation of the faculty and of the student body. Dr. Mesko also doc ume nts the large ly unknown attempt of the Communists to meddl e with the curriculum in the Medical School. They recruited a cadre of yo ungsters from workers ' bac kground s who had very littl e education , se nt them to spec ial classes in the Medical School a nd graduated them as " physicians," a di saster waiting to happen. This e ffort apparentl y failed a nd eventu all y faded away. No further information about these "graduates" is avai labl e. Finall y, the book illustrates why the re was friction between Catholics and Lutherans in th e Medical Schoo l, a nd rev is its that old probl e m between Czechs and Slova ks, name ly the di sc redited idea of a " Czechoslovak nation " propagated by Edvard Be nes a nd T .G. Masaryk and their cohorts. Researche rs and seri ous students of the hi story of Central Europe will find a rich resource for their work in this boo k. Readers who are of Slovak origin, but not proficient in that la nguage, will be nefi t from the English version which provides a g limpse of soc ietal forces that shaped the dest in y of Slovakia a nd its evo lution toward s independe nce. Mari a Dziakova- Bi:ihmova, Dusa na dlani: Spomienky od Kosfc do New Yorku. Edited by Michal Kri sko and Be rnarda Jenc fkov a- Fabrici . Presov , Mic hal Vasko, 2004, 151 pp. Illustrati ons M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa This autobiography, compl eted by ' Mari a Dziakova-Bi:imova in August of 1989, just before the collapse of Communism in Czechoslovakia, nea tl y summ arizes the tri als and tribul ation s of Slovak 160 SLOVAKIA intellectuals during and after World War II . Born in 1910 in a vill age near Kosice, she was the e ldest of three daughters of a poor peasant family. Nevertheless, her parents recogni zed her extraord in ary intelli gence and they skrimped and saved in order to send her to the " realgy mn as ium" for g irl s a nd then to the Faculty of Medicine at Comenius Uni vers ity in Bratislava. She grad uated with her degree in 1934 and began her practice in Kosice. Between 1938 and 1944 Dr. Bohmova (s he marri ed Dr. Emanuel Bohm in 194 1) li ved in Magyar occ upi ed Kosice and later Budapest, he lpin g her politically-activist hu sband defend the Slovak comm unity agai nst forced Magyarization. Meanwhile, she tried to continue her med ical practice, with vary in g success. As the Second World War drew to a c lose, she and her hu sband managed to return to S lovak ia, survived the pass ing of the Ru ss ian front, and re-established themselves in Bratislava in 1945. While she worked for the State In sti tute for Hea lth , her hu sband became Commi ss ioner of Health for Slovakia and Deputy Speaker of the Federal Assembly in Prague . After the Communist takeover of Czechoslovaki a in 1948 Emanuel Bohm fl ed to the west and she jo ined him in Lo ndo n a littl e later. They spe nt the nex t four years working as manu al laboure rs until the United States allowed them to e nter as immi grants in 195 2. Since Maria had to flee Czechoslovakia without any of her diplomas, a nd they co uld not easi ly be mailed to her during the Stalinist l 950's, she had to start over as an intern in the USA. By 1956 she had passed all of he r medical exa ms and sett led into a career in medic ine at the Kin gsbrook Jewi sh Medical Center in New York, and retired as Assistant Director of Medicine in 1975 . Maria and Emanuel active ly participated in Slovak inte ll ectu al a nd political life in New York for the second half of the twentieth century. She a nd he r hu sband took a leading role in the Slovak-American Cultural Center of New York , the Limbora dancing group , the General Mi Ian Rast is lav Stefanik Award , and the an nu al SlovakAmerican Ball at New York ' s Athletic C lub. They also participated in the founding of the Slovak World Co ngress in 1970, of which her SLOVAKIA 161 husband became a vice-president. The book is a pleasure to read . Maria had a talent for writing and, at one point, she even recon structed a letter that she wrote on behalf of her illiterate mother in the eastern Slovak dialect to an uncle who had emigrated to the United States before World War I. She used the same di alect, and the same uncle ' s name (who had long since disappeared), when she wrote to her sister in Kosice, imploring her to try to mail the diplomas that she had to leave behind when she fled Communist Czechoslovakia. Thi s subterfuge worked because the Czech postal officials in Prague, who were in charge of censoring the mai l, were apparently confounded by thi s dialect and allowed the letter through. Maria eventually received her diplomas, but only after she had to once again prove her medical acumen by pass ing very rigorous American exams. In spite of her trial s and tribulations, Maria Dziakova-Bohmova did not become bitter. Instead , she was thankful to the United States for having given her the chance to start a new life in the New World. She returned for visits to Czechoslovakia in 1969 and 1978 and noticed how her younger sisters had prematurely aged and how so many of her colleagues from the " realgymnasium" and the university had also either aged or died in thi s "socialist paradise." She and her hu sband visited free Czechoslovakia in 1990; he died at the end of the year and was buried in the national cemetery in Martin . After Maria died in 1999, her remains were interred beside him. Thus, Slovakia recognized the achievements of these two extraordinary indi vi dual s. We should be grateful to Bernharda Jencfkova-Fabrici , executrix of her will, for having gathered together Maria's memoirs, for having persuaded Michal Krisko to edit them, and for havi ng arranged for Michal Vasko to publish them. The book is well-worth reading, both for a glimpse at the evolution of the Slovak inte lli genti a in the first Czechoslovak Republic , and for the harsh consequences that awaited those members who refused to sub mit to the Communist takeover of their homeland and who fled into exi le. SLOVAKIA 162 Karen Henderson, Slovakia: The Escape from fnvisibihty. London and New York: Routledge, 2002, xviii-140 pp., map, notes, bibliography, index. JURAJ HOCMAN Carleton University A few years ago Slovakia suffered from a rather negative image of radical nationalism, especiall y in the West. One reason was that foreign scholars were rare in the region and Slovak history remained invisible. In 1987 a young scholar from England was given an unexpected opportunity to spend a couple of months in Bratislava, the country's capital. Attracted by both Slovakia 's past and present, Karen Henderson gradua ll y became more in volved in Slovak affairs. The author' s knowledge of the evolution of Slovak society through the centuries enabled her to reach a new perspective. Meanwhile, she also witnessed the country ' s political development after its establishment as a sovereign state on January 1st, 1993, its first appearance on the international scene and its chi ldhood illnesses as well. Henderson ' s book then documents the steps taken by the new Slovak government after the elections of September 1998 that were designed to improve the country's democratic performance, and that eventually led to its significantly changed image abroad. The author of the book , a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Leicester in the U.K. , took a balanced look at the Slovak Republic while concentrati ng on four areas of its evolution . In the first part she focused on the Slovaks in the Kingdom of Hungary and on the pre-war Czechoslovak Republic . She succes sfully demonstrated her familiarity with the main trends that formed and influenced the mentality of Slovak soc iety exposed to the processes of forced " Magyarisation" that took place after the Austro-H un garian Comprom ise of 1867. She also hi ghlighted the processes of "Czechoslovakism" that marked the relation- SLOVAKIA 163 ship between the Slovaks and Czechs before the Second Wor ld W ar with traces of di stru st o n o ne side and suspi c ion o n the other. In co ntras t to the preva ilin g traditi o na l approaches to Slova ki a that have been influe nced by ste reotypes impl a nted into Sl ovak hi sto ry, the auth or shows a re markabl e e mpathy fo r the way the Slovaks saw the mse lves in the fo rmer states of whi ch they had been a part for ce nturi es (the Hun gari an Kin gdo m), o r fo r decades (Czec hos lo va kia) . He nde rso n attributes the fa ilures shared by Slovaks w ith the ir partners o bj ecti ve ly and fa irl y. Slovaks are seen as the vic tim s in relati o n to the two main determina nts above. O n the other hand , Henderson, who knows the terra in of Ce nt ra l a nd East Euro pe and its non-linear a nd some tim e e ni gmati c h is to ry as we ll , a lso de mo nstrates an ability to ide ntify the mo me nts and events in whi ch Slo vak fa ilures and ruptures happe ned due to the ir indec is ive ness, bi ases , ambi g uiti es, un willin g ness o r pass ivity in copin g w ith e me rg in g situation s (e.g. the Slovak Republi c 1939-1 945). In the second part o f the boo k He nde rson dea ls w ith inde pe ndent Slo vaki a after January I'', 1993 . She foc uses o n the governme nts of Prime Mini sters Vladim fr Mec iar a nd Mikul as Dzurinda, whil e notin g a sharp co ntrast betwee n the two. The parli ame ntary e lection s he ld in Septe mbe r o f 1998 made a substanti a l difference in the eyes of Western governme nts and public audi e nces . A detail ed pi cture of what had preceded the fa ll of Mec iar ' s governme nt may be of interest to those who are not fa mili ar w ith the intern a l deve lo pme nt of Slovak soc iety and who want to better know the reasons fo r the fa ilure o f Mec iar' s po lic ies. For those who know it we ll , it is a re minde r and summ ary of what was prev io usly published and broadcast in the print and e lectroni c medi a. However, the a utho r ' s a im was to foc us o n the shi ft in mode rn Slovak hi story th at a ll owed the state and soc iety to escape its in visibility, and thi s is what undo ubtedl y deserves recogniti o n. The last parts of th e book are dedi cated to Slovak ia ' s re lati o nship with the world fro m 19 18 to the present. In spite of the auth or 's overa ll pe rspec ti ve regardin g Slovaki a after th e pe ri od 1989- 1993, SLOVAKIA 164 one could agree with her view th at " The Slovak Republic has not been particul arl y stable po liticall y, but as a state it has not been fundamentall y instable either" (p. 129). This may be also be perceived as the bottom level of Slovak statehood and the capability of the Slovak Republic to survive as a modern state that was initi all y questioned both dipl o matica ll y and publicl y at the beg innin g of its ex istence. Neve rtheless, the se nsiti ve reader may also find so me sub-themes and situation s described in the book that require furth er di scuss ion or a better nu anced approach (for example, so me aspects of the iss ues of ethnic minorities, the political culture and so on). Henderson 's footnotes and bibliography illustrate that the author used a wide variety of sources, from skeptical critics to pass ion ate apologists of Slovak hi story. She tried to steer a middle co urse between them and used books and schol arl y articles , as well as documents of Slovak academi c institution s and reports of non-governmental organi zation s as her principal sources . She also used re levant documents and reports iss ued by international or supran ational organization s regardin g Slovaki a ' s developme nt and progress (The World Bank, NATO, The European Union , etc.). O verall , Henderson did a good job. In my opinion Henderson ' s book successfull y refl ec ts a positive shi ft in the perception of Slovakia from the outside, and in bringing a pos itive picture to larger audi ences. In the last fe w decades Slovak society has been portrayed by both academi cs and public ists selecti vely and negati ve ly, large ly due to extern a l factors th at affec ted Slovak hi story. From now on , the question of whether the positi ve image of the country will be sustained will depend upon Slovaki a's willingness and capability to remain on track and avoid any detours from its democratic deve lopment. SLOVAKIA 165 The Slovak Republic: A Decade of Independence (I 993-2002). Edited by M. Mark Stolarik. Wauconda, IL: Bolchazy -Carducci Publi shers, 2004, xiv-168 pp. tables, charts, graphs, notes, map, index. CAROL SKALNIK LEFF University of Illinois, Urbana-Champai gn Durin g the interwar Czechoslovak Re public, several volumes were published employing a format that could be described as " progress reports," in which responsible government officials of the time outlined the state of the field in key iss ue areas. This current volume, desc ribed as Slovakia's " first ' white paper, "' performs much the same function for the first decade of the independent state. In many cases, the " ten years after" vantage point is rather artificial , but in this case it is especially appropriate and the findin gs will have more than transitory value, because this is a decade framed by the successful passage from nascent state to me mbership in the European Union and NATO. Scholars interested in Slovakia' s " rehabilitation" from seco nd tier to new EU member will find thi s decade of continuin g relevance. And if there is an occasional celebratory note in the di scussion, it is understandabl e in the context of the decade ' s achievement of European integration. M . Mark Stolarik, who in his function as Chairholder in Slovak Hi story and Culture at the University of Ottawa, also co-organized the conference on which the published work is based, provides introductory thumbnail sketches of the arguments in eac h of the main contributions, and annotations of the text on politics, to clarify and update the discussion. The core articles that follow, dealing successively with politi cs, economic s, soc ial policy , culture and international relations, are the presentations of Rudolf Schuster, Slovakia' s first elected pres ident, and e ight high-rankin g and quite prominent Slovak government officials, cabinet ministers and state secretaries. Each contribution rece ives a response from the North American side, SLOVAKIA 166 ei the r from Canadian offic ia ls who have worked o n -and who disc uss--cooperati ve projects with Slovakia, or from a scho lar specia li zi ng in Slovakia. In addition to the detailed po li cy overviews discussed below, I fo und two addit io na l pieces particularly interesting: the exc ha nge o n c ultural po li cy be twee n th e n- Culture Mini ster Mil an Kn azko and Martin Votruba, director of the Slovak Studies program at the University of Pittsburg h and the di sc uss ion of hum an ri ghts and ethni c re lation s by Pa l Csaky, an important Slovak Hun garia n po liti cian and Deputy Prime Minister, and Paul Magocs i of the University of Toronto, whose experti se o n the minoriti es of the reg ion in fo rmed hi s ge nera li zed critique of th e Jacobin-inspired view of state hi story through the prism of the dom in ant nati o na lity in many European countries . The compe ndium is sketchi est on the politics, devoting suffic ient time for orientation but no in-de pth a na lys is, which in thi s case makes sense in severa l ways, not least because the po liti cs of transiti o n has alread y been ex haustive ly ana lyzed in ex istin g sc ho larl y work. The iss ue areas covered are a no ther matter. Muc h less informati o n cover in g po lic y is readily ava il abl e in existing work , so thi s is exceedin g ly useful gro und to cover. Most chapters are e nri c hed with some unex pected inform ation a l treas ures, since the poli cy profil es are de ta il ed and spec ific rathe r th an vag ue or genera li zed , and the re are a multitude of useful tabl es and charts that e ncode co mparati ve and tim e series data on fo re ig n debt a nd in vestme nt , e mpl oy me nt , mino rity ed ucation , li fe expectancy and so o n. While not inte nded as a reference work, the anth o logy the refore atta in s so methin g of th at status; o nce read, it can be sto red to hand for speci fi c refere nce on a range of subjects. Our library doesn ' t have thi s book yet, but it soon wi ll. SLOVAKIA 167 Thomas J. Shelley , Slovak s on the Hudson: Most Holy Trinity Church , Yonkers, & Th e Slovak Catholics of the Archdiocese of New York, 1894 -2000. Washin gton , D.C. : The Catholic University of America Press, 2002. xv-273pp., maps, illustrati o ns, bibliography , index. DANIEL F. T ANZONE Passaic, New Jersey Slovaks on the Hudson, by the noted church hi storian Thomas J. Shelley, adds an important chapter to the hi story of the American Catholic Church. While the city of Yonkers, New York, with a population of just under 200,000 cannot be compared with the metropoli ses of Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland or Pittsburgh, it is, in fact , a microcosm of bi g city Catholicism. The city's nineteen Catholic parishe s, including tho se serving the Slovak s, Italian s, Hun garia ns and most recently the Portugese, along with two of the Byza ntine rite , contributed to the gro wth of Catholic life in the community. Catholics would soo n become major players in the city 's soc ial , educational, cultural and political life. While thi s book tell s the story of Slovak settlement in the river town of Yonke rs startin g in the l 880's, it also presents a picture of the city's political establi shment and its reaction to the grow in g immigrant population. Most of these newcomers hailed from the Catholic nation s of central and southern Europe. Slovaks, along with other Slavic peoples, found work in the city's vast mill structure, and had the opportunity to make a new life for themselves and their families. While the local " Nativi sts" often resented and mi sunderstood these immigrants and their ways, the WASP establishment gradually accepted them into the fabric of c ity life. Indeed , by 1903 a Slovak immigrant was elected to Yonkers city govern ment. Like other immigrant gro ups, the Slovaks clung to their language and faith tradition s. First they esta bli shed loca l fraternal -benefit 168 SLOVAKIA societies, which became affiliated with the national bodies in the 1890's. Yonkers had the first women 's lodge in New York State ( 1892), which became branch 2 of the First Catholic Slovak Ladies ' Association. Its other Slovak fraternals gave birth to Most Holy Trinity Church, which traced its roots to 1891 when laymen petitioned the local bishop for permission to establish a pari sh. The local parish church was very important to the laity, both as a place of worship and as a social gathering place. The parishioners married and raised their children in the shadow of the church steeple in the Hollow section of Yonkers. Most Holy Trinity afforded its people the opportunity to pass on the language, culture and traditions of their ancestral homeland. The clergy and religious, especially the sisters of Cyril and Methodius , who staffed the parish school, taught the children the Slovak language and traditions . Slovaks on the Hudson never forgot the plight of their brethren along the Danube, Yah, Hron and Torysa rivers. Indeed, the clergy and leaders of the Yonkers community played an important ro le in the establishment of Czecho-Slovakia following the col lapse of the Dual Monarchy of A ustria-Hungary . One of the pastors of Most Holy Trinity was actually offered a cabinet post in the newly-established Czecho-Slovakia in 1919. Throughout the long winter of communist domination of their ancestral homeland, the Slovaks of Yonkers never gave up hope of seeing their countrymen freed from this alien ideology and they rejoiced when Slovakia achieved its independence on January I, 1993. Thomas J. Shelley has provided the reader with a wonderful opportunity to view the life of the Slovak immigrant community within the context of big city li fe. It is a fascinating story, warts and all, of the Church in America. It is al so an important contribution to American history because the Slovaks are rapidly assimilating and moving to the suburbs while Yonkers is receiving ever more and newer immigrants. It is a welcome addition to the story of so many American ethnic groups who make up o ur ever-expanding multicultural society. SLOVAKIA 169 June Granatir Alexander, Ethnic Pride, American Patriotism: Slovaks and Other Immigrants in the lnterwar Era. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004, xiv-278 p.p., illustrations, notes, index. M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa The purpose of this book is to explore group-generated activities among Slovak-Americans in the inter-war period of American history and to see if such activities fit into recent "whiteness" studies by professional American historians. Alexander' s theme is that in the 1920's and 1930's both first and second-generation American Slovaks "were haunted by the stigma of inferiority inflicted by American society." (P.12). They sought to overcome this stigma by purchasing Liberty Bonds during the Great War and War Bonds during the Second World War. Meanwhile, they engaged in patriotic marches, carrying both the American and Slovak flags in the two wars, they staged large "S lovak Days" in the I 920's and 1930's in order to show off their ethnicity while stressing their Americanness and they openly supported FDR's New Deal legislation in order to help their pioneers and their fraternal-benefit societies to survive the ravages of the Great Depression. In order to prove her thesis Alexander dug deeply into both archival and printed sources. She studied the records of several large fraternal-benefit societies, the correspondence of their officers, and a wide range of Slovak-American newspapers. She also read widely in American history. Alexander concluded that Slovak-American identity did not arise from their growing "whiteness" in a racist American society, as some American historians had postulated of other ethnic groups, but rather from their nationality (ethnicity). Indeed, she also saw no generational or even class cleavage among American Slovaks, who perceived of themselves as overwhelmingly "working class" and united in their 170 SLOVAKIA efforts to win acceptance as one of the " newcomer" peoples to the United States. Al exander's book will , no doubt, win many acco lades from those profess ional A meri can hi stori ans who write hi story fo r themselves. She is very much a part of the so-call ed "di scourse" school whi ch uses social hi story in order to probe into questi ons of " whiteness," class, identity, celebrations, ass imilati on and so on. These hi stori ans deri ve great pleasure in proving or dispro ving eac h other 's theori es and show in g off their erudition . By so doin g, however, th ey c ut them selves off from the general public , which is hun gry for tradi tional , narrati ve, hi story . As a result, a second group of hi stori ans fill s thi s public hunger, and they are contemptu ously di smi ssed as " popul ar" hi stori ans by the academi cs mention ed above. On the other hand , the " popul ar" hi stori ans sell hundreds of thou sand s of copies of the ir books while the academic histori ans are delighted if they can sell a thou sand. While several hundred uni versity libraries will , no doubt, purchase a copy of thi s book, I have a feeling th at the Slovak-American community will hardl y notice it, whi ch is a pity.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Book Reviews, Slovakia, Vol. 38 (No. 70-71) Description An account of the resource includes:<br /><ul><li>Peter Žeňuch, Medzi východom a západom: Byzantsko-slovanská tradícia, kultúra a jazyk na východnom Slovensku (Robert A. Orr), p. 149</li> <li>Marián Kronský, The Struggle for Slovakia and the Treaty of Trianon 1918-1920 (Gregory C. Ference), p. 152</li> <li>Jozef Nálepka, ed., Ini o kapitánovi Jánovi Nálepkovi (Vladimír Baumgarten), p. 154</li> <li>Zoltan G. Meško, The Silent Conspiracy: A Communist Model of Political Cleansing at the Slovak University in Bratislava after the Second World War (L.P. Hinterbuchner), p. 157</li> <li>Mária Dziaková-Böhmová, Michal Kriško and Bernarda Jenčíková-Fabrici, eds., Duša na dlani: Spomienky od Košíc do New Yorku (M. Mark Stolarik), p. 159</li> <li>Karen Hendrson, Slovakia: The Escape from Invisibility (Juraj Hocman), p. 162</li> <li>M. Mark Stolarik, ed., The Slovak Republic: A Decade of Independence (1993-2002) (Carol Skalnik Leff), p. 165</li> <li>Thomas J. Shelley, Slovaks on the Hudson: Most Holy Trinity Church, Yonkers, &amp; The Slovak Catholics of the Archdiocese of New York, 1894-2000 (Daniel F. Tanzone), p. 167</li> <li>June Granatir Alexander, Ethnic Pride, American Patriotism: Slovaks and Other Immigrants in the Interwar Era (M. Mark Stolarik), p. 169</li> </ul> Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Baumgarten, R. Vladimir Ference, Gregory Curtis, 1957- Hinterbuchner, L. P., 1922-2009 Hocman, Juraj Leff, Carol Skalnik, 1947- Orr, Robert, 1957- Stolarik, M. Mark, 1943- Tanzone, Daniel F. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2005 LCNAF name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/5ba51466eb2c6a48d6534028ecbcea2d.pdf c28a1530c11c2ff3197ecce61b791010 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 33 The Democratic Party and the Execution of Jozef Tiso James Ramon Felak On April 15 , 1947, Igor Daxne r, Chairman of the National Court in Brati s lava, pronounced the verd ict agai nst Father Jozef Ti so, the head of Slovakia's wartime state that was closely alli ed with Naz i Germany. The Co urt found Ti so guilty of 95 of 11 3 charges aga inst him, in c ludin g treason, betraya l of the Slovak National Uprising , co ll aborati on with the Naz is, and de portation of Slovak Jews to Naz i death ca mps. Hi s sente nce was death by han g in g, to be carried out within 48 hours. At once, Tiso, along w ith hi s two defense attorneys , submitted a requ est for c le me ncy. 1 Thi s pape r w ill in vesti gate the fate of thi s request, the last official chance to spare Ti so from death. Though the final deci sion on clemency rested with Czechoslovakia ' s Pres ide nt Edvard Be nes, the request passed like a hot potato over the next dozen ho urs, from Daxner to Slovakia's Commissioner of th e Interior Iva n Stefanik, to Slovakia ' s c hi ef organ of se lf-governme nt , the Slovak Nation al Council (SNC) , to the Czechoslovak gove rnme nt in Prague , and ultimatel y to Be nes. De mocra tic Party (DP) leaders had lobbi ed for c lemency during the tri al, voted for it at the gove rnme nt 's mee tin g on the eve nin g of April 16, a nd frantically appea led on its behalf to Be nes in the hours before Tiso ' s exec uti on. However, they c uri ously refused to take a stand for clemency at the meeting of the SNC's Pres idium on the afternoon of April 16, where they had a 3-to-2 majority and where a stand on Ti so 's behalf would have g ive n offic ial sanction to the view , w idely shared by many and 1 ' One of the three prosecutors. l.'.udovft Ri gan. also made a request for clemency to the Court; K arel K aplan, Dva retribucnf procesy . Komentovane dokumenty, (Prague. I 992), p. 221 (Document 37). �SLOVAKIA 34 probably most Slovaks, that Tiso should not be executed. The Democrats' refusal to take a stand in the SNC meant that Tiso's opponents could point to the failure of any official Slovak organs to recommend clemency as proof that his execution reflected the will of the Slovak people. The fate of Jozef Tiso was very much connected with the DP's fortunes in Czechoslovak and Slovak politics . Shortly after her liberation from Nazi rule and reattachment to Czechoslovakia, Slovakia had only two significant political parties-the Communist Party of Slovakia (CPS) and the Democratic Party (DP). The latter, in many ways a legacy of the interwar Agrarian party, emerged out of the Lutheran-dominated wing of the resistance to the Tiso regime. When the Catholic and nationalist Slovak People's Party (SPP) was outlawed at war ' s end , many Slovak Catholics became political orphans.2 In the spring of 1946, however, the DP adopted them through the so-called April Agreement, a pact between the party's leaders and important Catholic political activi sts whereby Catholics were promised a large share of influence in the DP and a Democratic commitment to promote the Catholic Church ' s position on issues such as education in exchange for Catholic electoral support. The fruit of the April Agreement was a landslide victory for the DP over the Communists in the May 1946 parliamentary elections, with Democrats winning 63 % of the vote to the Communists' 30%. From that point on , the CPS focused its energies on undoing the electoral results by seeking to paralyze, fracture , or dis solve the DP. Among other things, the Tiso trial figured in Communist calculations of how to cripple their rival. The Communist plan was to force the DP to navigate between the Scylla of angering its Catholic members and voters , who had hopes that the Democrats would rescue Tiso from a death sentence, and the Charybdis of being sucked into a police investigation for 2 Catholics comprised nearly 80% of the Slovak population. The majority of Slovak Catholics voted for the SPP during the interwar period. �SLOVAKIA 35 allegations of pandering to the reactionaries and war criminals it was all egedl y harboring th anks to the April Agreeme nt. Idea ll y, the DP wo uld be di scredited in the eyes of Catholics as an ineffectua l and lukewarm defe nder of Ti so, while concurrently di sc redited in the eyes of everyone else as a haven for reactionaries. With little room for mane uver, and in the face of enormo us press ure, the DP had to face thi s chall enge. What fo ll ows is how the Com muni sts were able to acco mpli sh these end s, partl y due to the ir own tactics, partl y due to the dynami c of the situ ati on, and part ly due to the cho ices made by the Democrats. Ri ght after the anno unceme nt of the verd ict, Ti so's lawyers, Ernest Zabkay and Martin Greco, submitted an official requ est for c lemency, as king for a more "appropriate" sentence for the ir c lient. 3 They particularly stressed lega l tec hni ca lities. Tiso's lawyers argued th at the defense was not all owed to speak with the acc used without the sec urity organs present-a violati on of a fund amental principle of criminal tri al procedure-and that the defense did not have certain archiv al materials at its disposal , while the prosec uti on did. Furthermore, records of testimony were not made avail able within the requisite three days, but lagged by nearly two month s, thereby mak in g it impossible for the defense to c ite testimon y made after January 15 in its concluding statements. In addition to these and a number of other technicalities, Tiso ' s lawyers arg ued th at the trial was po litica ll y biased, both because Daxner himse lf was bi ased, as the SNC itself had recognized in the past, and because, despite a leg islati ve order ca llin g for political pari ty in the Senate, no me mbers of the DP took part in the judg ment. Tiso's attorn eys a lso arg ued that Tiso was being puni shed for eve nts beyond his co ntro l. They claimed th at he did not prepare for Slovakia's independence in 1939, or he lp cause it, and that he showed no initiative and intention ality in hi s cooperation wi th Nazi Germany. Rather, he simpl y tri ed to make the best of a bad situ ation that was thru st upo n him . Finally, Ti so's atto rneys, in the .1 Kaplan, Ova retribucnf procesy. pp. 2 15-2 19 (Document 35) . �SLOVAKIA 36 onl y argument that the DP would make its ow n, argued th at clemency would strengthen Czech-Slovak relations, e liminate the threat of ill will between Slovakia ' s Catholics and Protestants, and strengthen ti es between Slovak emigrants and their motherl and. The National Court quick ly decided agai nst recommending c lemency for Ti so, and passed Tiso ' s request on to Slovak Commissioner of Ju stice Ivan Stefanik , a Democrat. Stefa nik in turn supported Tiso's request, and submitted a proposal to the Presidium of the SNC, which read , " I propose that the death se ntence of Dr. Jozef Ti so be commuted to life impri sonment. " 4 The proposal was to the point, absent the argumentation included in Ti so ' s request, and un like Ti so ' s request, allowed for no sentence less than life impri sonment. On April 16, the SNC ' s Presidium met to consider Stefa nik ' s proposal, along with some other matters connected with Ti so ' s tri al. When the Pres idium convened, it was already under enormous pressure. By law , Tiso ' s exec ution was to be carried out within 48 hours of the announcement of the verdict, so matters had to be considered quickly. Moreover, the gove rnm ent in Prag ue was meet in g later that day to discuss c lemency , and was eagerly awaiting the views of Slovakia 's leadin g organs on the matter. Adding to the pressure was the fact that the Presidium received the 214 page judgment aga inst Tiso only shortl y before its meeti ng.5 Moreover, te legrams, letters, and petitions (for and against c leme ncy) were pourin g in to the President 's office, the government, and the SNC, while Parti san and labor organizations staged anti-Ti so rallies across Slovakia and de legation s from trade union s, hou sing estates, and espec ially resistance organizations arrived in Brati slava to add their presence to the de liberations. 6 Though there were no reported cases of violence, it is not difficult to imagine the presence of these groups, enco uraged if not orchestrated by the Communists, adding a menac in g character to 4 K aplan , Dva relribucnf procesy. p. 220 (Document 36). ' Th e DP claimed the Presidium had onl y ten minutes to look over the length y judgmen t; see Cas. April 23 , 1947 , no. 93, p. I. 6 Cas, Apri l 23, 1947, no. 93 , p. I. �SLOVAKIA 37 the already inte nse pressure on the Presidium , or more prec ise ly, its Democratic me mbers. For example, a consortium of major res istance organi zati o ns iss ued a decl aration on April 16 th at conde mned c lemency as a "s hameful defilement (popl'u vanie) of all the sac rifi ces of o ur nation al stru gg le" th at co uld e mbolde n Ti so's supporte rs into provokin g unrest in S lovakia aimed at undermining the Re public.7 If cle mency was gra nted to Tiso, these organizations promi sed to assess the situation and cons ide r what mean s to emp loy in de fe nse of the Republic and the ga ins of the Slovak National Upri sin g. The DP had a majority on the Presi dium , which conta ined three Democrats (Jozef Lettrich, who was chairman of both the DP and the SNC, Andrej Cvincek, Milan Po la k) a nd two Communi sts (Karol Smidke, Ivan Horvath ). Nevertheless, the Pres idium did not e ndorse Stefanik's proposa l for c le me nc y; rather, it reso lved to submit the proposa l to the governme nt without co mme nt. In hi s me moirs, Jan Ursfny, a top DP leader and its Deputy Chairman, argued that Lettric h went into the meetin g with the intention of avo idin g debate over clemency, a position Ursfny strongly advised against. 8 Lettrich 's behav ior at the meeting does betray the actions of a man inte nt on avoi ding debate. 9 First of all , most of the meetin g 's di scuss ion dea lt with De mocratic di ssati sfaction with Daxner's ha ndling of the tri al. Whe n the Presidium did get around to the Ti so verdict, Le ttri c h made it clear th at he fe lt th at the press ure of time mad e it imposs ible to acq uire sufficie nt knowledge to take a pos ition on c le mency, and that any recommendation would thu s have to be " politica l." The Communi st Horvath the n proposed that the Presidium take no stand , but simpl y pass on Stefa nik 's proposa l to the government without co mment. He argued that a recomme nd ation from the SNC was ne ithe r requi- 1 Pravda. Apri l 18, 1947 . no. 90, p. I: th e Slovak term pop!ii vct nie could be rendered as .. spitting on". • Jan Ursfny. Z m6jho i i votct. (M artin . 2000), pp. 123- 124. " See Sl ovensky narod ny archfv (hereafter referred to as SNA). Fond Urad predsednfctva Slovenskej narodnej rady , Carton 139, Folder 134. Folios 49-58 , S R Presidiu m meetin g of A pril 16. 1947. �SLOVAKIA 38 red nor necessary, for it was the government and Benes whose views would be decisive. According to Horvath, since the Communists were opposed to clemency, they would be unable to support Stefanik ' s proposa l, and hence any vote in the SNC would be on a parti san basis, setting a bad precedent for future Communist-Democratic cooperation. When it came time to vote on Horvath ' s proposal , the Presidium accepted it unanimously. Before examining why the SNC , or more specifically its Democratic members, opted not to recommend c lemency for Tiso, let us track the proposal ' s course to Prague and ultimately to Benes. The Communists and Social Democrats were openly hostile to Tiso, and the non-parti san mini sters, Ludvfk Svoboda (Defense) and Jan Masaryk (Foreign Affairs), could be expected to be so as well. Together, these constituted 13 of the 23 members of the government, enough to tip any vote to Ti so's detriment. On top of that, the Czech National Soc ialists were at best ambivalent. A number of leading National Socialists opposed clemency and wanted their party to vote against it or at least to abstain. 10 However, Minister of Justice Prokop Drtina, one of the party's top leaders, had earlier assured Lettrich that he would support clemency provided the SNC did. 11 In the last of a series of meetings on the issue , held right before the government session began , Drtina managed to convince his colleagues to agree to the following position : to oppose clemency, but only after first proposing that the request for clemency be returned to the Presid ium of the SNC for that organ's recommendation. In thi s way, Drtina could present himself as makin g a good faith effort to honor hi s promise to Lettrich , while entertaining hopes that a vote to return the request to the SNC would fail, thu s getting himself off the hook. 12 The government meeting opened at approximately 5: 15 p.m ., after a delay of over an hour as its members waited for reports from ° Kaplan. Dva retribucnf procesy. p. 25 . 1 " Prokop Drtina. Ceskos lovensko muj osud, II. 2, (Toronto, I 982). pp. 297-298. 302. 12 Drtina, Ceskoslovensko muj osud. II , 2, p. 302. �SLOVAKIA 39 Slovakia. 13 Within ten minutes, a delegation of representatives from the Union of Czechoslovak Partisans and so me similar organizations asked to be admitted. Since the National Socialists had yet to arrive, mak ing their last minute plans in a nearby room , the meetin g was adjourned for 45 minutes while the parti san organizations were given the opportunity to press ure the mini sters to vote against clemency. 14 Once the de legation s had their say and engaged some of the mini sters over the iss ue , and the National Sociali st mini sters had arrived, the meeting was reconvened. Prime Mini ster Kl ement Gottwald began by sharin g two pieces of information he had just rece ived from Slovaki a- the memorandum from the SNC' s Pres idium pass in g on Stefanik's proposal for clemency without comment, and a telegram from Gu stav Husak, Chairman of Slovakia 's Board of Commissioners (Cabinet). Husak noted that Stefanik 's proposal did not reflect the views of the Board of Commissioners nor its Presidium, whose standpoint Stefanik did not seek, and should therefore be regarded as hi s own personal proposal. Husak added that he did not agree with the proposa l. Thus, the meeting opened with reports from Slovakia 's two chief political organs, neither of which endorsed clemency. Gottwald, leader of the Czechoslovak Communist Party , then proposed that the government reso lve aga inst clemency, since the National Court in Brati slava recommended against it, and the Pres idium of the SNC did not recommend for it. In a long and sometimes pass ionate debate, mini sters from both sides weighed in on the que stion, with positions breaking down along party lines. The Communists led the charge against clemency. Vladimfr Clementi s, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and a Slovak, read a CPS 13 For the minutes of the meeting. see K apl an, Dva retribucnf procesy. pp. 225-254. 14 Ursfny . in his memoirs, recou nts be ing asked by one member of the parti san dele- gati on: "M r. Deput y Chairman, tell me, w ith whom do you wan t to go. w ith th e Ludak underground. or with us?" A nother partisan representati ve. however, spoke up for Ursfny as ··one of the greates t partisans. " (see Ursfny, Z m6jho i ivota, p. 125): see footnote 17 for an ex planation of the term " Ludak. " �40 SLOVAKIA decl aration that la id o ut the Co mmuni st pos iti on. The dec larati o n stressed the did acti c function of the tri al, that is, its purpose in di sco urag ing enemies of the Republic. A death sentence co uld do that far better than a life sentence in thi s res pect. C lemency, on the co ntrary, would onl y encou rage enemi es of the state and sympathizers of Ti so and hi s reg ime . Reactionari es, as before, were tryin g to take over Slovaki a "even at the price of the Re public." 15 The dec laration arg ued that c leme ncy would evoke di stru st in the judic ial sys tem. Veterans of the Sl ovak Nati onal Upri sin g would be upset with the de parture from the idea ls of the res istance; peo ple wo uld note the inj ustice of lesser crimin als hav ing been more harshl y puni shed than Ti so; and politics would be seen once more as " panske huncutst vo", that is "gentl emen's mi sc hi ef." 16 The declarati o n noted in parti cul ar that Ti so showed no remorse for hi s crimes, and in fac t gave succor to th e Re public 's ene mi es in hi s co ncludin g statement at hi s tri al. Much of what Cleme nti s read was identica l to a dec larati on made a day earli er by Slovaki a's res istance organi zati o ns, testifyin g to the leadin g ro le the Co mmuni sts pl ayed in those orga ni zati o ns and the success the party had in coordin atin g various soc ial orga ni zati ons on behalf of its objecti ves . Indeed , both dec laration s co nc luded with the sa me threat to assess the s ituation and consider what mea ns to employ in defense of the Republic and its character. Czech Communi sts also spoke out again st clemency, asserting th at Ti so was a traitor and a war crimina l, and that fa ilin g to exec ute him would be a blow to Czec hos lovakia 's unity and inde pendence. Communi st speakers also arg ued th at it was the will of th e Slovak people that Ti so be exec u- 15 The express ion ··ani za ce nu republiky", th at is, •·even at the price of the rep ublic" . was a reference to a statement made by HSL:S leader A ndrej Hlin ka at a rall y in Trencfn in 1932, where he asse rted th e degree to whi ch his party wo uld pu rsue Slovak interests; see James Ramon Felak, •A l the Price of the Republic·_. Hlinka 's Slovak People 's Party. 1929- 1938. (Pittsburg h, 1994 ), p. 96. 16 " Poli tika je panske huncutstvo" was an expression curre nt among Slovaks , rooted in Slovakia ' s feudal pas t. It was the recog nition by peasan ts th at pol itics was the domain where the lords made mi sch ief. �SLOVAKIA 41 ted , as ev ide nced by the pos iti ons of the Nati ona l Co urt, the SNC, and the Board of Co mmi ss ione rs, all organs composed e ntire ly of Slova ks and re prese nting S lovakia. Thi s was why, the Czec h Co mmuni st Vac lav Kopecky noted , the DP would not speak up fo r c leme ncy on the SNC's Pres idium. Th e Soc ia l De mocrati c mini sters we re just as o pposed to c lemency as the Communi sts, and no less assertive about the ir pos iti on. Zdene k Fierlin ger, the leader of the SOP and a Deputy Prime Minister, argued th at a vote fo r c le me ncy wo uld upset Czec hoslovaki a's alli es in the Slav ic world , in part because it would fu e l Slova k independe nce, whi c h itse lf th reate ned Czec hos lovaki a 's border w ith the Sov iet Uni o n. Fie rlinger even re marked th at how o ne voted o n the cleme ncy questi on was a test of one's patri oti sm. With respect to the reli g io us dim e ns ion of the ques ti o n, the Soc ial De mocrati c leade r asserted th at the fac t of Tiso's be ing a priest was not a miti gating c irc um stance, but rathe r one th at made matters worse. He noted th at it was not good for the Catho lic Churc h to e ncumbe r itse lf with Ti so . Whil e Fie rlinger re prese nted the pro-C ommuni st left-win g of the SOP, that party's ri ght-wing was no less vehe me nt about Ti so. Vaclav Maj er, the leader of the ri ght-wing Soc ial De mocrats, referred to the Sl ovak pri est as one of the chi e f war crimin als, guilty of mass murder. The most ex te ns ive attac k on Ti so a nd argume nt against cle me ncy, however, came not fro m the mini ste rs o f the le fti st parties, but from the oste nsibl y ne utra l (a lbeit c loset Communi st) Ludvfk Svoboda, the Mini ster o f Defe nse. As a Czec hoslovak hero of both the First and Second World Wars, Svoboda's word s carri ed a certain cac het. Svoboda spoke at le ngth about why T iso mu st die . He came o ut strong ly aga inst so-ca ll ed ha lf-so luti o ns; at ha nd was a definiti ve hi stori ca l qu esti o n w ith long- te rm impli cati o ns th at sho uld not be judged accordin g to the needs a nd mood of the mo me nt. Ti so was �42 SLOVAKIA not just a war criminal ; he was the sy mbol of " Ludakism," 17 fasci sm, treason , and collaboration . To grant clemency to Tiso, according to Svoboda, would render hi s trial vain and superfluous. If alive, Ti so would remain to poison cooperation and unity between Czechs and Slovaks; clemency would encourage hi s supporters, while disappointing others. Like many speakers and writers of the time, Svoboda noted that Tiso showed no remorse. He ca lled for a firm and resolute action agai nst him as a means of strengthening Czechoslovakia's international position and prestige. To those w ho argued th at Ti so should be spared because he was a priest, Svoboda dec lared that "we are not judging a priest, but a traitor, a destroyer of the Czechoslovak state, and a criminal. That Tiso is a priest only makes matters worse; he profaned the priestly office and Church at a time when thou sands of other priests fought bravely again st Nazi sm and perished in concentration camps and prisons." On the other s ide of the equation were those mini sters who championed c lemency-on ly the Democrats and Czech Populi sts. Here the most prominent speaker was Ursfny . The Democratic Deputy Chairman argued that clemency would improve relations between Czechs and Slovaks, Lutherans and Catholics, and aid in the overall consolidation of the post-war Republic. Such a goodwi ll gesture might also win over some of Czechoslovakia' s enemi es. Ursfny noted that religiou s fee lings ran strong in Slovakia, where the exec ution of a priest was a serious , and potentiall y upsetting matter. He pointed out that many good people were for clemency, includin g so me bishops and hi gh functionari es in the Lutheran church , a church that itself had suffered under Ti so's regi me. The Democratic Minister of Transportation Ivan Pietor also spelled out a number of reasons for clemency. He argued that Ti so was popular among the majority of Slovaks, and that the preva ilin g majority of Slovaks would vote for 17 Lud aki sm, or "l'udactvo" was the term employed to refer to fo ll owers of th e Slovak People 's Party, whose members were know n as '• Ludaks" or " l'udaci ." It best approximates the Engli sh word " Populi sm. " Communi sts applied the term to any Slovak Catholics they did not like. �SLOVAKIA 43 clemency if given the chance, thou gh thi s did not mean they agreed with Ti so ' s politics. He too noted that important Lutheran leaders sent ardent appeals on Tiso's behalf in the interest of the peaceful deve lopment of Slovaki a and Czechoslovakia. The g iven politica l s ituation , accordin g to Pietor, demanded statesmanlike thinkin g, wi sdom , and sensiti vity to the prevailing political condition s and mood. In such a co ntext, clemency would be a gesture to win over hearts in Slovakia and bring the Czech and Slovak nation s together. While the Court may have unanimou sly estab lished Tiso 's guilt and ca ll ed for hi s exec ution , that was a judicial decision , not a political one. What the Republic now faced was a manifestly political deci sion , and that was the task of the government to settl e, in accordance with political considerations. The Czec h Populi sts, as members of a Catholic party with moderate inclinations, also supported clemency. Minister Franti se k Ha.la (Post Office), him se lf a Catholic priest, presented c le mency as the most suitable solution for Czechoslovak and Slovak interests. The Populi st Adolf Prochazka (Health ) remarked that c lemency was the des ire of most Slovaks, and of the Lutheran church leadership . Jan Kopecky (Mini ster without Portfolio) supported clemency as a way to consolidate the Repub li c, and reminded hi s mini sterial colleagues that life impri sonment was not tantamount to acq uittal. In makin g hi s case, Ursfny co ntended that the SNC did not recommend aga inst c lemency ; rather it was not the Pres idium 's function to ex press a position on the proposa l, but only to pass it on to the government. Technically , he was correct because the Second Prague Agreement of April I I , 1946, the statute under which such matters were regulated , stated that the commissioner's proposal be submitted to the go vernment "v ia the Pres idium of the Slovak National Counci l. " 18 However, this strict construction is not the way the SNC had hitherto been dealing with proposa ls. Gottwald snide ly noted that the '" Jan Mechyr. Slo vensko v Ceskoslovensku : Slovensko-ceske vztahy I 9 I 8- 199 I . (Prague. 1991 ). �44 SLOVAKIA Pres idium had sudde nl y dec ided in thi s case to limit itse lf to the ro le of a post office, and al ong with Fie rlinger, he regarded Ursfny 's expl a nati on as sophi stry. They were not bu ying th e De moc rats ' claim that the Pres idium ' s position was not a fa ilure to endorse c le mency. It was the centri st parties, however, that ex pressed the most anger over the SNC 's sile nce regardin g c leme ncy - a sil e nce th at, because the DP had a majority in the Pres idium, was c learl y bl a med on the De mocrats. A number of Nati ona l Soc iali st and Populi st mini ste rs vo iced their indi gnati on at the SNC's atte mpt to pass th e buck. Jaroslav Stra nsky (Edu cati on) said th at he wa nted Ursfny and hi s frie nds to recogni ze the situ ation into whi ch they had gotte n the governme nt , whi c h thanks to the m now had to dec ide on a matter about whi c h it did not have s uffic ie nt kn ow ledge. In thi s s itu ati on, th e gove rnm e nt co uld be bl a med if Ti so did not get cle me ncy, thereby bein g burde ned with what is primaril y a Sl ovak pro bl e m. Drtina, s imil arly, sa id he was perpl exed by the Pres idium ' s unex pected course of acti on, one whi ch now put the go vernme nt in a diffi c ult situati on. He pro posed se ndin g th e pro posal bac k to th e Pres idium fo r its opini o n, in acco rdance with the Second Prague Agree me nt, whi c h stipul ated that the governme nt return proposa ls to the SNC's Pres idium if it had objecti ons to them from the point of view of statew ide inte res ts. Foll o win g suit , Nation a l Soc ia li st Mini ste r o f Fore ig n Trade Hube rt Ripka noted hi s party ' s astoni shme nt at th e SNC's acti on - how it limited its ro le to th at of a mailbox in the way it interpre ted the Seco nd Prag ue Agree me nt. He noted th at Sl ovaki a ' s se lf-proc laimed leadin g orga n did not have the courage to ex press itse lf on a questi on of suc h importance fo r the future and fa te of the Slovak people . Accordin g to Ripka, it was c lear that the SNC Pres idium wa nted to shi ft the res po nsibility for Ti so's fate o nto the governme nt. He in sisted that the Pres idum ex press itse lf on the iss ue, and as qui ckl y as poss ibl e. Hala, spea kin g for th e Czech Populi sts, echoed the sentiments o f the Nation al Soc ia li sts, notin g th at the Presidium ' s action greatl y surpri sed him and that it see med to want to pass responsibility onto the governme nt. �SLOVAKIA 45 While the National Sociali sts and Populi sts expressed agreement with Drtina 's motion to return the proposa l to the SNC, the leftist parties adamantly opposed it. Gottwald, Fierlinger, and others noted that the SNC had already taken a position by failing to endorse clemency. They argued that further delay of Ti so's execution would only drag thin gs out, sustain a state of tension and provoke and evoke supporters of Ti so, as well as open the floodgates for clemency for others sentenced to death. When Drtina 's motion to return the proposal to the Presidium of the SNC came to a vote, it was defeated 13 to I0 . The voting broke down according to party lines: the National Socialists, Populists, and Democrats supported the proposal; the leftist parties and non-parti san ministers opposed it. While the Populists may well have sincerely believed that the best remedy for the crisis would have been for the SNC to voice its opinion on the matter, the National Socialists made and supported the motion simply for cosmetic purposes, hoping that it would fail. 19 The Democrats, of course, were in a quite unenviable position. The motion' s failure meant that they would not be g iven a second chance to make a stand for clemency in the Presidium. At the same time, it is not certain that they would have known what to do with a second chance; the factors that kept them from endorsing clemency the first time around were still operative. As the debate over Stefanik 's proposal resumed , the National Socialists came out against clemency, and sought to present the anticlemency position as the one identified with Slovakia. Drtina, noting th at the government was not fully informed of the detail s of the case, thought the matter should be best settled by Slovakia, as it indeed was - a Slovak Court had establi shed Tiso's guilt and had unanimously rejected clemency, which the SNC had also failed to recommend. Ripka , de mon stratin g the sort of Czech ignorance of Slovakia that ran kles Slovaks, claimed that Ti so, long before 1938 , was as bad or worse than Vojtech Tuka, Ti so 's main political rival during the war 19 Drtina adm its thi s in hi s me moirs: see Ceskoslovensko mu) osud, II , 2, p. 302. �46 SLOVAKIA and the leader of the radically pro-Nazi faction ple 's Party. 20 in the Slovak Peo- Because the consequences of Ludakism had not yet di- sappeared from Slovakia, clemency should be rejected. Ripka not only came out again st it, but also appealed to the DP and Czech Populists to abstain on the vote, so the government could present a united front. He addressed the Democrats with the rebuke that, if they did not vote for clemency in Slovakia, they should not now at the governmental level, where the domestic and international ramifications of such a vote were great. After more di sc uss ion, the government ultimately passed a resolution voicing its opposition to c lemency, on the grounds th at the National Court in Brati slava had recommended against it, and that the Pres idium of the SNC did not endorse it when pass ing Stefanik's proposal on to Prague. The vote was 17 in favor , 6 against. All mini sters rejected c lemency except those from the DP and Czech People 's Party. The meeting was adjourned at 8:50 p.m. Shortly thereafter, Gottwald took the government 's recommendation to Benes, who accepted it and informed Slovakia's Commissioner of Ju stice that hi s request for clemency had been officially denied. 2 1 Upon learn in g of the dec ision , Lettrich made a last-ditch intervention , telephoning Benes ' s chancellery. He conveyed the message that the government's standpoint was in conflict with Article I.b. of the Second Prague Agreement, which instructed the government, if it had objections aga inst a proposal from Slovaki a, to return that proposal to the SNC' s Presidium, not pass it on to Benes with a 20 Tuka was a notoriou s ri ghti st rad ica l who made a political career out of intriguing with foreign enemi es of the Czec hos lovak Republi c almost right from th e Republi c ' s founding. He spent most of th e 1930s in pri son for treason, and was executed for war crimes in the summer of 1946. we ll before the tri al of Tiso. 21 K apl an, D va retribucnf procesy, p. 27: Benes had informed Gottwald the day before th at he planned to ac t in accordance wi th whatever th e governm ent recommended regardin g clemency fo r Tiso, K apl an, D va retribucnf procesy, pp. 222-224 (Document 38). �SLOVAKIA 47 recommendation. 22 Lettrich warned Benes of possible " immense political consequences" that could resu lt from a rejection of clemency, and fo r which the DP could not accept responsibility . Lettrich conc luded by notin g th at the DP had an absolute majority in the SNC and its Pres idium and fully agreed with Stefanik ' s proposal, considering clemency as a paramount state and nation al interest. Benes received the message early the next morning, instructing hi s chancellery to tell Lettrich that he had gone to the countryside, and would discuss the matter with Gottw ald if Lettrich so desired. 23 Ursfny too attempted an appeal on behalf of clemency, and also found out that the rej ection of clemency was an accomplished fact and that Benes was incommunicado. 24 Stefanik him self made a final attempt on Tiso ' s behalf, asking the National Court that Tiso be tran sferred to the jail of the Office of the Public Prosec utor, so he could be questioned regarding some other cases. Thi s the National Court rejected on the ground s that Ti so could be just as eas ily be questioned at its own jail. 25 With all avenues for clemency now ex hausted , Ti so was hanged early on the morning of April 18, officiall y pronounced dead at 5:30 a.m. It was no surpri se that Ti so was found guilty, nor th at he was sentenced to die. Nor was it astoni shing that the majority of government mini sters in Prague rejected the reco mmendation for clemency, and that Benes acted in accordance with their position. But what was puzzling was the behavior of the DP -supporting clemency in Prague , but not in Bratislava; desperately appealin g for clemency on the 22 Mi chal Barn ovsky , Na ceste k monopolu moci, ( Bratislava , 1993) , p. 145 n; K apl an, Dva retribucnf procesy, p. 28. 23 Kaplan , D va retribucnf procesy, p. 28 ; Robert Letz, S/ovensko v rokoch I 945- 1948, (Bratislava, 1994 ), p. 48 . 24 Ursfny, Z m6jho t i vota, p. 127 . 25 K aplan, Dva retribucnf procesy, p. 29; the motive behind this attempt was to delay Ti so ' s exec uti on and thu s increase the chances that he would ultimately receive clemency . �48 SLOVAKIA eve of Tiso 's exec uti on, while letting the issue pass right throu gh the hands of the SNC Presidium that they had dominated the day before. Did the DP want the appeal for c lemency to fail? Such a view ca n be found in the po lice record , where a report me nti ons that Lettrich was opposed to cle me ncy for Tiso. 26 Like many scenarios sketched out by police inform ants, however, this one seems to be w ithout merit. Lettrich had earli er lobbi ed Tiso ' s three prosecutors for c lemency, and had persuaded Minister of Ju sti ce Drtina to promi se hi s support as well. These are hardl y the acti ons of a man desiring Tiso 's execution . Other ex planat io ns must li e behind the timidity of Lettrich and the DP at the notoriou s SNC Pres idium meeting of April 16. Hi storian s who have exa mined the meetin g, a nd the issue of clemency overall, ha ve co me up with a numbe r of ex pl anation s, which will be di sc ussed here in ascend in g order of pl a usibility and influence. 27 Most dubi o us is the view th at the De mocrats trusted that Benes would grant clemency regardless of the recommendations he rece ived. Whil e the re appare ntly was public spec ulation that Be nes mi ght spare Tiso, the DP leadership had littl e reason to put their tru st in such suppos ition s. Benes had already g ive n Lettrich and Ursfny quite c lear indication s of hi s oppositi on to cle mency. 28 Another of the weaker arguments for why the SNC did not take a stand on c le me ncy was the one the DP used to ex pl ai n itse lf at the 26 Barno vsky, Na ceste. p. 130. 27 For exp lanati ons of why the OS acted the way it did at th e SNR Pres idiu m mee- ting of Apri l 16, see Barnovsky , Na ceste, p. 130: Letz, Slovensko. pp. 47-48: Kaplan . Ova relribucnf procesy, pp. 24-26 : Ursfny, Z m6jho i i vota. pp. 123- 124 : for the DP ' s attempt to j ustify its ac ti ons at the time, see Cas. April 23, 1947. no. 93 . p. I. 28 Lettrich , in a meeting with the three state prosecutors of the Tiso trial on March 12. I 94 7, mentioned that he had discussed the matter of clemency for Tiso w ith Benes on two occasions, and th at Benes's positi on was th at he would not take a stand but rather all ow th e governmen t' s decis ion on th e matter to guide him : (see SNA. Demokraticka strana, Carton 2, Bundle 99 , Folios 1-2): moreover. Ursfny claims in hi s memoirs that in fall of 1946. Daxner asked Benes how he shou ld handle the Tiso case, to which Benes replied, " I th in k that he deserves death, but thi s is an affair for an independent court. "; (see Ursfny, Z m6jho i ivota. p. 11 3). �SLOVAKIA 49 government meetin g of April 16 and thereafter, i.e. that accordin g to the 2 nd Prague Agreement , the S C's role in the process was simpl y to pass proposals on to the Government and not to co mment on them, and that i f the government had obj ection s to Stefanik's proposa l, it wo uld soli cit the SNC Presidium 's views on it. Upon refl ec ti on, thi s ex plan ati on holds no more water th an it did at the tim e. A party that believed Slovak organs should speak for Slovakia, and a good bit of whose appeal was based on its advocacy of autonomy fo r Slovakia, is behav ing out of character w hen it surrenders to Prague the prerogati ve to decide on a matter so c lose to th e hearts of so many Slovaks. Another ex pl anation put forth by the DP was that it lacked sufficient time to stud y the doc umentation pertinent to th e Tiso tri al. Whil e on the surface thi s is true , still , the SNC was not being asked to render a lega l or judicial judgment, but a politi ca l one. In the latter case, the party could have made up its mind on a pos ition long before the verdi ct, as the Communists had. M ore convincing are the views th at th e DP was simpl y afra id th at a vote for clemency wo uld prompt the Communi sts to provoke a politica l crisis in Slovakia, halting cooperation w ithin the SNC, mobili zing Parti san and trade union groups against the Democrats, and forcing Prague to step in . Indeed, such threats and pressures were already ev ident on the Slovak political stage for over a yea r, and were com mon everywhere else in East Central Europe w here Communi st parti es were acti ve. In thi s view , the DP simpl y lost its nerve and opted to pass the matter on to Prague ra ther than deal w ith it in Bra ti slava. Thi s explanati on seems va lid enough because Communi st pres sure was al ways an influence. However, i f fear of reperc uss ions was the main reason for keeping the DP quiet, w hy did Democrats vote for clemency at the government sess ions in Prag ue? Wa s it to gi ve public assura nce to th eir co nstitu ents th at th ey opposed clemency , but at a ven ue w here they did not have to worry about their vote carry ing any influence and thereby provoking a clemency- induced �SLOVAKIA 50 cris is back home? This question is moot , give n the influence of the most significant factor of all. A final ex pl anati on is most like ly the crucial o ne - that the DP could not co unt on one of its own representatives on the Presidi um , Milan Po lak , to vote for c le mency. Po lak ' s record, both before and after 1947, place him on the left wing of the DP. A former Parti san, and leader in the Parti sa n vetera ns' movement, Po lak collaborated with the Communists durin g and after the February co up of 1948 . 29 Unable to co unt on hi s vote, Lettrich preferred no vote on c lemency to one in which Polak would abstain or vote no. Thus he chose the leas t pa inful but st ill damaging option. While many of Slovakia ' s Catholics would be upset if the DP-controll ed Presidium failed to take a vote on clemency, they wo uld be even more outraged if a DPcontrolled Pres idium rejected clemency, or could not mu ste r th e three votes needed to pass it. Ursfny 's memo irs prov ide further ev idence for thi s ex planation. Ursfny reported that, when on a vis it to the United States in the fa ll of 1967 , he spoke by telephone with Lettrich , who told him that he wanted the SNC to avoid the iss ue of clemency because Pol ak wo uld not have voted for it. 30 Thus, while the DP owed its success to a large ly Catholic e lectorate, it contained a core of resistance veterans who simpl y could not countenance anything short of Ti so's exec ution. Since the leader of those veterans he ld the deciding vote on the SNC Presidium , the DP 's efforts to support c le mency were futile. Tho ugh the DP had good reason to suspect that Polak would not vote for c lemency, the Communists had their own fears that he mi ght not vote aga inst it. This ex plains why the Communists on the SNC were as eager as the Democrats to pass the matter on to Prague. A number of factors contributed to the exec ution of Jozef Tiso-a Pres ident who disliked him and welcomed hi s exec ution ; a gove rn ment where the cards were stacked agai nst him from the start , with 19 See Barnovsky , Na ceste, pp. 240, 245 , for Pol ak ' s acti vity during the .. February Crisis" of 1948. )o Ursfny, Z mojho i ivoui, p. 124. �SLOVAKIA 51 the Soc ial Democrats, Nati onal Soc iali sts, and non-parti san mini sters un sy mpatheti c to hi s cause; a Co mmuni st Party and the labor and res istance orga ni zati ons it mo bili zed workin g agg ressive ly aga in st him ; a staunchl y anti -Ti so j udge; and Ti so 's own wartime acti vities, whi ch made a death se nte nce pl ausi bl e. Nothin g th at th e DP did could have spared Ti so from exec utio n in thi s contex t. Neverthe less, th e way the Democrats mane uvered th ro ugh the cri s is had several consequ ences. The DP did eno ugh for T iso to buttress Communi st arguments that the Democrats catered to the Ludaks they were all eged ly harboring, arg uments th at in the ensuing months would mu shroom into the arrest of several leading De mocrats for ant i-state co nspiracy. At the same time, the DP 's fa ilure to sec ure an SNC vote on T iso's beha lf made it eas ier for the government 's Co mmuni st and non-Cath o li c Czec h parti es to argue th at Slo vaki a was opposed to c lemency fo r Tiso, thu s he lpin g abso lve Czechs of any charges that T iso's exec uti on was a Czech operati on done against the w ill of the Slovak people . Fin all y, the DP's impotence in defending T iso led to increased di si llusionment amo ng S lovak ia's Catho lic voters. For the DP, the who le undertaking was a lose-lose situ ati on, an indi cati on of just how d ifficult th at party's road was in spite of, or better said , on acco unt of, its bi g e lec tora l victo ry in May of 1946. To a great ex tent, the events surroundin g the iss ue of c lemency fo r Jozef Tiso were a mi crocos m of th e proble mati c pos itio n of the De mocrati c Party in postwar Czechos lovak ia. � SLOVAKIA 33 The Democratic Party and the Execution of Jozef Tiso James Ramon Felak On April 15 , 1947, Igor Daxne r, Chairman of the National Court in Brati s lava, pronounced the verd ict agai nst Father Jozef Ti so, the head of Slovakia's wartime state that was closely alli ed with Naz i Germany. The Co urt found Ti so guilty of 95 of 11 3 charges aga inst him, in c ludin g treason, betraya l of the Slovak National Uprising , co ll aborati on with the Naz is, and de portation of Slovak Jews to Naz i death ca mps. Hi s sente nce was death by han g in g, to be carried out within 48 hours. At once, Tiso, along w ith hi s two defense attorneys , submitted a requ est for c le me ncy. 1 Thi s pape r w ill in vesti gate the fate of thi s request, the last official chance to spare Ti so from death. Though the final deci sion on clemency rested with Czechoslovakia ' s Pres ide nt Edvard Be nes, the request passed like a hot potato over the next dozen ho urs, from Daxner to Slovakia's Commissioner of th e Interior Iva n Stefanik, to Slovakia ' s c hi ef organ of se lf-governme nt , the Slovak Nation al Council (SNC) , to the Czechoslovak gove rnme nt in Prague , and ultimatel y to Be nes. De mocra tic Party (DP) leaders had lobbi ed for c lemency during the tri al, voted for it at the gove rnme nt 's mee tin g on the eve nin g of April 16, a nd frantically appea led on its behalf to Be nes in the hours before Tiso ' s exec uti on. However, they c uri ously refused to take a stand for clemency at the meeting of the SNC's Pres idium on the afternoon of April 16, where they had a 3-to-2 majority and where a stand on Ti so 's behalf would have g ive n offic ial sanction to the view , w idely shared by many and 1 ' One of the three prosecutors. l.'.udovft Ri gan. also made a request for clemency to the Court; K arel K aplan, Dva retribucnf procesy . Komentovane dokumenty, (Prague. I 992), p. 221 (Document 37). �SLOVAKIA 34 probably most Slovaks, that Tiso should not be executed. The Democrats' refusal to take a stand in the SNC meant that Tiso's opponents could point to the failure of any official Slovak organs to recommend clemency as proof that his execution reflected the will of the Slovak people. The fate of Jozef Tiso was very much connected with the DP's fortunes in Czechoslovak and Slovak politics . Shortly after her liberation from Nazi rule and reattachment to Czechoslovakia, Slovakia had only two significant political parties-the Communist Party of Slovakia (CPS) and the Democratic Party (DP). The latter, in many ways a legacy of the interwar Agrarian party, emerged out of the Lutheran-dominated wing of the resistance to the Tiso regime. When the Catholic and nationalist Slovak People's Party (SPP) was outlawed at war ' s end , many Slovak Catholics became political orphans.2 In the spring of 1946, however, the DP adopted them through the so-called April Agreement, a pact between the party's leaders and important Catholic political activi sts whereby Catholics were promised a large share of influence in the DP and a Democratic commitment to promote the Catholic Church ' s position on issues such as education in exchange for Catholic electoral support. The fruit of the April Agreement was a landslide victory for the DP over the Communists in the May 1946 parliamentary elections, with Democrats winning 63 % of the vote to the Communists' 30%. From that point on , the CPS focused its energies on undoing the electoral results by seeking to paralyze, fracture , or dis solve the DP. Among other things, the Tiso trial figured in Communist calculations of how to cripple their rival. The Communist plan was to force the DP to navigate between the Scylla of angering its Catholic members and voters , who had hopes that the Democrats would rescue Tiso from a death sentence, and the Charybdis of being sucked into a police investigation for 2 Catholics comprised nearly 80% of the Slovak population. The majority of Slovak Catholics voted for the SPP during the interwar period. �SLOVAKIA 35 allegations of pandering to the reactionaries and war criminals it was all egedl y harboring th anks to the April Agreeme nt. Idea ll y, the DP wo uld be di scredited in the eyes of Catholics as an ineffectua l and lukewarm defe nder of Ti so, while concurrently di sc redited in the eyes of everyone else as a haven for reactionaries. With little room for mane uver, and in the face of enormo us press ure, the DP had to face thi s chall enge. What fo ll ows is how the Com muni sts were able to acco mpli sh these end s, partl y due to the ir own tactics, partl y due to the dynami c of the situ ati on, and part ly due to the cho ices made by the Democrats. Ri ght after the anno unceme nt of the verd ict, Ti so's lawyers, Ernest Zabkay and Martin Greco, submitted an official requ est for c lemency, as king for a more "appropriate" sentence for the ir c lient. 3 They particularly stressed lega l tec hni ca lities. Tiso's lawyers argued th at the defense was not all owed to speak with the acc used without the sec urity organs present-a violati on of a fund amental principle of criminal tri al procedure-and that the defense did not have certain archiv al materials at its disposal , while the prosec uti on did. Furthermore, records of testimony were not made avail able within the requisite three days, but lagged by nearly two month s, thereby mak in g it impossible for the defense to c ite testimon y made after January 15 in its concluding statements. In addition to these and a number of other technicalities, Tiso ' s lawyers arg ued th at the trial was po litica ll y biased, both because Daxner himse lf was bi ased, as the SNC itself had recognized in the past, and because, despite a leg islati ve order ca llin g for political pari ty in the Senate, no me mbers of the DP took part in the judg ment. Tiso's attorn eys a lso arg ued that Tiso was being puni shed for eve nts beyond his co ntro l. They claimed th at he did not prepare for Slovakia's independence in 1939, or he lp cause it, and that he showed no initiative and intention ality in hi s cooperation wi th Nazi Germany. Rather, he simpl y tri ed to make the best of a bad situ ation that was thru st upo n him . Finally, Ti so's atto rneys, in the .1 Kaplan, Ova retribucnf procesy. pp. 2 15-2 19 (Document 35) . �SLOVAKIA 36 onl y argument that the DP would make its ow n, argued th at clemency would strengthen Czech-Slovak relations, e liminate the threat of ill will between Slovakia ' s Catholics and Protestants, and strengthen ti es between Slovak emigrants and their motherl and. The National Court quick ly decided agai nst recommending c lemency for Ti so, and passed Tiso ' s request on to Slovak Commissioner of Ju stice Ivan Stefanik , a Democrat. Stefa nik in turn supported Tiso's request, and submitted a proposal to the Presidium of the SNC, which read , " I propose that the death se ntence of Dr. Jozef Ti so be commuted to life impri sonment. " 4 The proposal was to the point, absent the argumentation included in Ti so ' s request, and un like Ti so ' s request, allowed for no sentence less than life impri sonment. On April 16, the SNC ' s Presidium met to consider Stefa nik ' s proposal, along with some other matters connected with Ti so ' s tri al. When the Pres idium convened, it was already under enormous pressure. By law , Tiso ' s exec ution was to be carried out within 48 hours of the announcement of the verdict, so matters had to be considered quickly. Moreover, the gove rnm ent in Prag ue was meet in g later that day to discuss c lemency , and was eagerly awaiting the views of Slovakia 's leadin g organs on the matter. Adding to the pressure was the fact that the Presidium received the 214 page judgment aga inst Tiso only shortl y before its meeti ng.5 Moreover, te legrams, letters, and petitions (for and against c leme ncy) were pourin g in to the President 's office, the government, and the SNC, while Parti san and labor organizations staged anti-Ti so rallies across Slovakia and de legation s from trade union s, hou sing estates, and espec ially resistance organizations arrived in Brati slava to add their presence to the de liberations. 6 Though there were no reported cases of violence, it is not difficult to imagine the presence of these groups, enco uraged if not orchestrated by the Communists, adding a menac in g character to 4 K aplan , Dva relribucnf procesy. p. 220 (Document 36). ' Th e DP claimed the Presidium had onl y ten minutes to look over the length y judgmen t; see Cas. April 23 , 1947 , no. 93, p. I. 6 Cas, Apri l 23, 1947, no. 93 , p. I. �SLOVAKIA 37 the already inte nse pressure on the Presidium , or more prec ise ly, its Democratic me mbers. For example, a consortium of major res istance organi zati o ns iss ued a decl aration on April 16 th at conde mned c lemency as a "s hameful defilement (popl'u vanie) of all the sac rifi ces of o ur nation al stru gg le" th at co uld e mbolde n Ti so's supporte rs into provokin g unrest in S lovakia aimed at undermining the Re public.7 If cle mency was gra nted to Tiso, these organizations promi sed to assess the situation and cons ide r what mean s to emp loy in de fe nse of the Republic and the ga ins of the Slovak National Upri sin g. The DP had a majority on the Presi dium , which conta ined three Democrats (Jozef Lettrich, who was chairman of both the DP and the SNC, Andrej Cvincek, Milan Po la k) a nd two Communi sts (Karol Smidke, Ivan Horvath ). Nevertheless, the Pres idium did not e ndorse Stefanik's proposa l for c le me nc y; rather, it reso lved to submit the proposa l to the governme nt without co mme nt. In hi s me moirs, Jan Ursfny, a top DP leader and its Deputy Chairman, argued that Lettric h went into the meetin g with the intention of avo idin g debate over clemency, a position Ursfny strongly advised against. 8 Lettrich 's behav ior at the meeting does betray the actions of a man inte nt on avoi ding debate. 9 First of all , most of the meetin g 's di scuss ion dea lt with De mocratic di ssati sfaction with Daxner's ha ndling of the tri al. Whe n the Presidium did get around to the Ti so verdict, Le ttri c h made it clear th at he fe lt th at the press ure of time mad e it imposs ible to acq uire sufficie nt knowledge to take a pos ition on c le mency, and that any recommendation would thu s have to be " politica l." The Communi st Horvath the n proposed that the Presidium take no stand , but simpl y pass on Stefa nik 's proposa l to the government without co mment. He argued that a recomme nd ation from the SNC was ne ithe r requi- 1 Pravda. Apri l 18, 1947 . no. 90, p. I: th e Slovak term pop!ii vct nie could be rendered as .. spitting on". • Jan Ursfny. Z m6jho i i votct. (M artin . 2000), pp. 123- 124. " See Sl ovensky narod ny archfv (hereafter referred to as SNA). Fond Urad predsednfctva Slovenskej narodnej rady , Carton 139, Folder 134. Folios 49-58 , S R Presidiu m meetin g of A pril 16. 1947. �SLOVAKIA 38 red nor necessary, for it was the government and Benes whose views would be decisive. According to Horvath, since the Communists were opposed to clemency, they would be unable to support Stefanik ' s proposa l, and hence any vote in the SNC would be on a parti san basis, setting a bad precedent for future Communist-Democratic cooperation. When it came time to vote on Horvath ' s proposal , the Presidium accepted it unanimously. Before examining why the SNC , or more specifically its Democratic members, opted not to recommend c lemency for Tiso, let us track the proposal ' s course to Prague and ultimately to Benes. The Communists and Social Democrats were openly hostile to Tiso, and the non-parti san mini sters, Ludvfk Svoboda (Defense) and Jan Masaryk (Foreign Affairs), could be expected to be so as well. Together, these constituted 13 of the 23 members of the government, enough to tip any vote to Ti so's detriment. On top of that, the Czech National Soc ialists were at best ambivalent. A number of leading National Socialists opposed clemency and wanted their party to vote against it or at least to abstain. 10 However, Minister of Justice Prokop Drtina, one of the party's top leaders, had earlier assured Lettrich that he would support clemency provided the SNC did. 11 In the last of a series of meetings on the issue , held right before the government session began , Drtina managed to convince his colleagues to agree to the following position : to oppose clemency, but only after first proposing that the request for clemency be returned to the Presid ium of the SNC for that organ's recommendation. In thi s way, Drtina could present himself as makin g a good faith effort to honor hi s promise to Lettrich , while entertaining hopes that a vote to return the request to the SNC would fail, thu s getting himself off the hook. 12 The government meeting opened at approximately 5: 15 p.m ., after a delay of over an hour as its members waited for reports from ° Kaplan. Dva retribucnf procesy. p. 25 . 1 " Prokop Drtina. Ceskos lovensko muj osud, II. 2, (Toronto, I 982). pp. 297-298. 302. 12 Drtina, Ceskoslovensko muj osud. II , 2, p. 302. �SLOVAKIA 39 Slovakia. 13 Within ten minutes, a delegation of representatives from the Union of Czechoslovak Partisans and so me similar organizations asked to be admitted. Since the National Socialists had yet to arrive, mak ing their last minute plans in a nearby room , the meetin g was adjourned for 45 minutes while the parti san organizations were given the opportunity to press ure the mini sters to vote against clemency. 14 Once the de legation s had their say and engaged some of the mini sters over the iss ue , and the National Sociali st mini sters had arrived, the meeting was reconvened. Prime Mini ster Kl ement Gottwald began by sharin g two pieces of information he had just rece ived from Slovaki a- the memorandum from the SNC' s Pres idium pass in g on Stefanik's proposal for clemency without comment, and a telegram from Gu stav Husak, Chairman of Slovakia 's Board of Commissioners (Cabinet). Husak noted that Stefanik 's proposal did not reflect the views of the Board of Commissioners nor its Presidium, whose standpoint Stefanik did not seek, and should therefore be regarded as hi s own personal proposal. Husak added that he did not agree with the proposa l. Thus, the meeting opened with reports from Slovakia 's two chief political organs, neither of which endorsed clemency. Gottwald, leader of the Czechoslovak Communist Party , then proposed that the government reso lve aga inst clemency, since the National Court in Brati slava recommended against it, and the Pres idium of the SNC did not recommend for it. In a long and sometimes pass ionate debate, mini sters from both sides weighed in on the que stion, with positions breaking down along party lines. The Communists led the charge against clemency. Vladimfr Clementi s, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and a Slovak, read a CPS 13 For the minutes of the meeting. see K apl an, Dva retribucnf procesy. pp. 225-254. 14 Ursfny . in his memoirs, recou nts be ing asked by one member of the parti san dele- gati on: "M r. Deput y Chairman, tell me, w ith whom do you wan t to go. w ith th e Ludak underground. or with us?" A nother partisan representati ve. however, spoke up for Ursfny as ··one of the greates t partisans. " (see Ursfny, Z m6jho i ivota, p. 125): see footnote 17 for an ex planation of the term " Ludak. " �40 SLOVAKIA decl aration that la id o ut the Co mmuni st pos iti on. The dec larati o n stressed the did acti c function of the tri al, that is, its purpose in di sco urag ing enemies of the Republic. A death sentence co uld do that far better than a life sentence in thi s res pect. C lemency, on the co ntrary, would onl y encou rage enemi es of the state and sympathizers of Ti so and hi s reg ime . Reactionari es, as before, were tryin g to take over Slovaki a "even at the price of the Re public." 15 The dec laration arg ued that c leme ncy would evoke di stru st in the judic ial sys tem. Veterans of the Sl ovak Nati onal Upri sin g would be upset with the de parture from the idea ls of the res istance; peo ple wo uld note the inj ustice of lesser crimin als hav ing been more harshl y puni shed than Ti so; and politics would be seen once more as " panske huncutst vo", that is "gentl emen's mi sc hi ef." 16 The declarati o n noted in parti cul ar that Ti so showed no remorse for hi s crimes, and in fac t gave succor to th e Re public 's ene mi es in hi s co ncludin g statement at hi s tri al. Much of what Cleme nti s read was identica l to a dec larati on made a day earli er by Slovaki a's res istance organi zati o ns, testifyin g to the leadin g ro le the Co mmuni sts pl ayed in those orga ni zati o ns and the success the party had in coordin atin g various soc ial orga ni zati ons on behalf of its objecti ves . Indeed , both dec laration s co nc luded with the sa me threat to assess the s ituation and consider what mea ns to employ in defense of the Republic and its character. Czech Communi sts also spoke out again st clemency, asserting th at Ti so was a traitor and a war crimina l, and that fa ilin g to exec ute him would be a blow to Czec hos lovakia 's unity and inde pendence. Communi st speakers also arg ued th at it was the will of th e Slovak people that Ti so be exec u- 15 The express ion ··ani za ce nu republiky", th at is, •·even at the price of the rep ublic" . was a reference to a statement made by HSL:S leader A ndrej Hlin ka at a rall y in Trencfn in 1932, where he asse rted th e degree to whi ch his party wo uld pu rsue Slovak interests; see James Ramon Felak, •A l the Price of the Republic·_. Hlinka 's Slovak People 's Party. 1929- 1938. (Pittsburg h, 1994 ), p. 96. 16 " Poli tika je panske huncutstvo" was an expression curre nt among Slovaks , rooted in Slovakia ' s feudal pas t. It was the recog nition by peasan ts th at pol itics was the domain where the lords made mi sch ief. �SLOVAKIA 41 ted , as ev ide nced by the pos iti ons of the Nati ona l Co urt, the SNC, and the Board of Co mmi ss ione rs, all organs composed e ntire ly of Slova ks and re prese nting S lovakia. Thi s was why, the Czec h Co mmuni st Vac lav Kopecky noted , the DP would not speak up fo r c leme ncy on the SNC's Pres idium. Th e Soc ia l De mocrati c mini sters we re just as o pposed to c lemency as the Communi sts, and no less assertive about the ir pos iti on. Zdene k Fierlin ger, the leader of the SOP and a Deputy Prime Minister, argued th at a vote fo r c le me ncy wo uld upset Czec hoslovaki a's alli es in the Slav ic world , in part because it would fu e l Slova k independe nce, whi c h itse lf th reate ned Czec hos lovaki a 's border w ith the Sov iet Uni o n. Fie rlinger even re marked th at how o ne voted o n the cleme ncy questi on was a test of one's patri oti sm. With respect to the reli g io us dim e ns ion of the ques ti o n, the Soc ial De mocrati c leade r asserted th at the fac t of Tiso's be ing a priest was not a miti gating c irc um stance, but rathe r one th at made matters worse. He noted th at it was not good for the Catho lic Churc h to e ncumbe r itse lf with Ti so . Whil e Fie rlinger re prese nted the pro-C ommuni st left-win g of the SOP, that party's ri ght-wing was no less vehe me nt about Ti so. Vaclav Maj er, the leader of the ri ght-wing Soc ial De mocrats, referred to the Sl ovak pri est as one of the chi e f war crimin als, guilty of mass murder. The most ex te ns ive attac k on Ti so a nd argume nt against cle me ncy, however, came not fro m the mini ste rs o f the le fti st parties, but from the oste nsibl y ne utra l (a lbeit c loset Communi st) Ludvfk Svoboda, the Mini ster o f Defe nse. As a Czec hoslovak hero of both the First and Second World Wars, Svoboda's word s carri ed a certain cac het. Svoboda spoke at le ngth about why T iso mu st die . He came o ut strong ly aga inst so-ca ll ed ha lf-so luti o ns; at ha nd was a definiti ve hi stori ca l qu esti o n w ith long- te rm impli cati o ns th at sho uld not be judged accordin g to the needs a nd mood of the mo me nt. Ti so was �42 SLOVAKIA not just a war criminal ; he was the sy mbol of " Ludakism," 17 fasci sm, treason , and collaboration . To grant clemency to Tiso, according to Svoboda, would render hi s trial vain and superfluous. If alive, Ti so would remain to poison cooperation and unity between Czechs and Slovaks; clemency would encourage hi s supporters, while disappointing others. Like many speakers and writers of the time, Svoboda noted that Tiso showed no remorse. He ca lled for a firm and resolute action agai nst him as a means of strengthening Czechoslovakia's international position and prestige. To those w ho argued th at Ti so should be spared because he was a priest, Svoboda dec lared that "we are not judging a priest, but a traitor, a destroyer of the Czechoslovak state, and a criminal. That Tiso is a priest only makes matters worse; he profaned the priestly office and Church at a time when thou sands of other priests fought bravely again st Nazi sm and perished in concentration camps and prisons." On the other s ide of the equation were those mini sters who championed c lemency-on ly the Democrats and Czech Populi sts. Here the most prominent speaker was Ursfny . The Democratic Deputy Chairman argued that clemency would improve relations between Czechs and Slovaks, Lutherans and Catholics, and aid in the overall consolidation of the post-war Republic. Such a goodwi ll gesture might also win over some of Czechoslovakia' s enemi es. Ursfny noted that religiou s fee lings ran strong in Slovakia, where the exec ution of a priest was a serious , and potentiall y upsetting matter. He pointed out that many good people were for clemency, includin g so me bishops and hi gh functionari es in the Lutheran church , a church that itself had suffered under Ti so's regi me. The Democratic Minister of Transportation Ivan Pietor also spelled out a number of reasons for clemency. He argued that Ti so was popular among the majority of Slovaks, and that the preva ilin g majority of Slovaks would vote for 17 Lud aki sm, or "l'udactvo" was the term employed to refer to fo ll owers of th e Slovak People 's Party, whose members were know n as '• Ludaks" or " l'udaci ." It best approximates the Engli sh word " Populi sm. " Communi sts applied the term to any Slovak Catholics they did not like. �SLOVAKIA 43 clemency if given the chance, thou gh thi s did not mean they agreed with Ti so ' s politics. He too noted that important Lutheran leaders sent ardent appeals on Tiso's behalf in the interest of the peaceful deve lopment of Slovaki a and Czechoslovakia. The g iven politica l s ituation , accordin g to Pietor, demanded statesmanlike thinkin g, wi sdom , and sensiti vity to the prevailing political condition s and mood. In such a co ntext, clemency would be a gesture to win over hearts in Slovakia and bring the Czech and Slovak nation s together. While the Court may have unanimou sly estab lished Tiso 's guilt and ca ll ed for hi s exec ution , that was a judicial decision , not a political one. What the Republic now faced was a manifestly political deci sion , and that was the task of the government to settl e, in accordance with political considerations. The Czec h Populi sts, as members of a Catholic party with moderate inclinations, also supported clemency. Minister Franti se k Ha.la (Post Office), him se lf a Catholic priest, presented c le mency as the most suitable solution for Czechoslovak and Slovak interests. The Populi st Adolf Prochazka (Health ) remarked that c lemency was the des ire of most Slovaks, and of the Lutheran church leadership . Jan Kopecky (Mini ster without Portfolio) supported clemency as a way to consolidate the Repub li c, and reminded hi s mini sterial colleagues that life impri sonment was not tantamount to acq uittal. In makin g hi s case, Ursfny co ntended that the SNC did not recommend aga inst c lemency ; rather it was not the Pres idium 's function to ex press a position on the proposa l, but only to pass it on to the government. Technically , he was correct because the Second Prague Agreement of April I I , 1946, the statute under which such matters were regulated , stated that the commissioner's proposal be submitted to the go vernment "v ia the Pres idium of the Slovak National Counci l. " 18 However, this strict construction is not the way the SNC had hitherto been dealing with proposa ls. Gottwald snide ly noted that the '" Jan Mechyr. Slo vensko v Ceskoslovensku : Slovensko-ceske vztahy I 9 I 8- 199 I . (Prague. 1991 ). �44 SLOVAKIA Pres idium had sudde nl y dec ided in thi s case to limit itse lf to the ro le of a post office, and al ong with Fie rlinger, he regarded Ursfny 's expl a nati on as sophi stry. They were not bu ying th e De moc rats ' claim that the Pres idium ' s position was not a fa ilure to endorse c le mency. It was the centri st parties, however, that ex pressed the most anger over the SNC 's sile nce regardin g c leme ncy - a sil e nce th at, because the DP had a majority in the Pres idium, was c learl y bl a med on the De mocrats. A number of Nati ona l Soc iali st and Populi st mini ste rs vo iced their indi gnati on at the SNC's atte mpt to pass th e buck. Jaroslav Stra nsky (Edu cati on) said th at he wa nted Ursfny and hi s frie nds to recogni ze the situ ation into whi ch they had gotte n the governme nt , whi c h thanks to the m now had to dec ide on a matter about whi c h it did not have s uffic ie nt kn ow ledge. In thi s s itu ati on, th e gove rnm e nt co uld be bl a med if Ti so did not get cle me ncy, thereby bein g burde ned with what is primaril y a Sl ovak pro bl e m. Drtina, s imil arly, sa id he was perpl exed by the Pres idium ' s unex pected course of acti on, one whi ch now put the go vernme nt in a diffi c ult situati on. He pro posed se ndin g th e pro posal bac k to th e Pres idium fo r its opini o n, in acco rdance with the Second Prague Agree me nt, whi c h stipul ated that the governme nt return proposa ls to the SNC's Pres idium if it had objecti ons to them from the point of view of statew ide inte res ts. Foll o win g suit , Nation a l Soc ia li st Mini ste r o f Fore ig n Trade Hube rt Ripka noted hi s party ' s astoni shme nt at th e SNC's acti on - how it limited its ro le to th at of a mailbox in the way it interpre ted the Seco nd Prag ue Agree me nt. He noted th at Sl ovaki a ' s se lf-proc laimed leadin g orga n did not have the courage to ex press itse lf on a questi on of suc h importance fo r the future and fa te of the Slovak people . Accordin g to Ripka, it was c lear that the SNC Pres idium wa nted to shi ft the res po nsibility for Ti so's fate o nto the governme nt. He in sisted that the Pres idum ex press itse lf on the iss ue, and as qui ckl y as poss ibl e. Hala, spea kin g for th e Czech Populi sts, echoed the sentiments o f the Nation al Soc ia li sts, notin g th at the Presidium ' s action greatl y surpri sed him and that it see med to want to pass responsibility onto the governme nt. �SLOVAKIA 45 While the National Sociali sts and Populi sts expressed agreement with Drtina 's motion to return the proposa l to the SNC, the leftist parties adamantly opposed it. Gottwald, Fierlinger, and others noted that the SNC had already taken a position by failing to endorse clemency. They argued that further delay of Ti so's execution would only drag thin gs out, sustain a state of tension and provoke and evoke supporters of Ti so, as well as open the floodgates for clemency for others sentenced to death. When Drtina 's motion to return the proposal to the Presidium of the SNC came to a vote, it was defeated 13 to I0 . The voting broke down according to party lines: the National Socialists, Populists, and Democrats supported the proposal; the leftist parties and non-parti san ministers opposed it. While the Populists may well have sincerely believed that the best remedy for the crisis would have been for the SNC to voice its opinion on the matter, the National Socialists made and supported the motion simply for cosmetic purposes, hoping that it would fail. 19 The Democrats, of course, were in a quite unenviable position. The motion' s failure meant that they would not be g iven a second chance to make a stand for clemency in the Presidium. At the same time, it is not certain that they would have known what to do with a second chance; the factors that kept them from endorsing clemency the first time around were still operative. As the debate over Stefanik 's proposal resumed , the National Socialists came out against clemency, and sought to present the anticlemency position as the one identified with Slovakia. Drtina, noting th at the government was not fully informed of the detail s of the case, thought the matter should be best settled by Slovakia, as it indeed was - a Slovak Court had establi shed Tiso's guilt and had unanimously rejected clemency, which the SNC had also failed to recommend. Ripka , de mon stratin g the sort of Czech ignorance of Slovakia that ran kles Slovaks, claimed that Ti so, long before 1938 , was as bad or worse than Vojtech Tuka, Ti so 's main political rival during the war 19 Drtina adm its thi s in hi s me moirs: see Ceskoslovensko mu) osud, II , 2, p. 302. �46 SLOVAKIA and the leader of the radically pro-Nazi faction ple 's Party. 20 in the Slovak Peo- Because the consequences of Ludakism had not yet di- sappeared from Slovakia, clemency should be rejected. Ripka not only came out again st it, but also appealed to the DP and Czech Populists to abstain on the vote, so the government could present a united front. He addressed the Democrats with the rebuke that, if they did not vote for clemency in Slovakia, they should not now at the governmental level, where the domestic and international ramifications of such a vote were great. After more di sc uss ion, the government ultimately passed a resolution voicing its opposition to c lemency, on the grounds th at the National Court in Brati slava had recommended against it, and that the Pres idium of the SNC did not endorse it when pass ing Stefanik's proposal on to Prague. The vote was 17 in favor , 6 against. All mini sters rejected c lemency except those from the DP and Czech People 's Party. The meeting was adjourned at 8:50 p.m. Shortly thereafter, Gottwald took the government 's recommendation to Benes, who accepted it and informed Slovakia's Commissioner of Ju stice that hi s request for clemency had been officially denied. 2 1 Upon learn in g of the dec ision , Lettrich made a last-ditch intervention , telephoning Benes ' s chancellery. He conveyed the message that the government's standpoint was in conflict with Article I.b. of the Second Prague Agreement, which instructed the government, if it had objections aga inst a proposal from Slovaki a, to return that proposal to the SNC' s Presidium, not pass it on to Benes with a 20 Tuka was a notoriou s ri ghti st rad ica l who made a political career out of intriguing with foreign enemi es of the Czec hos lovak Republi c almost right from th e Republi c ' s founding. He spent most of th e 1930s in pri son for treason, and was executed for war crimes in the summer of 1946. we ll before the tri al of Tiso. 21 K apl an, D va retribucnf procesy, p. 27: Benes had informed Gottwald the day before th at he planned to ac t in accordance wi th whatever th e governm ent recommended regardin g clemency fo r Tiso, K apl an, D va retribucnf procesy, pp. 222-224 (Document 38). �SLOVAKIA 47 recommendation. 22 Lettrich warned Benes of possible " immense political consequences" that could resu lt from a rejection of clemency, and fo r which the DP could not accept responsibility . Lettrich conc luded by notin g th at the DP had an absolute majority in the SNC and its Pres idium and fully agreed with Stefanik ' s proposal, considering clemency as a paramount state and nation al interest. Benes received the message early the next morning, instructing hi s chancellery to tell Lettrich that he had gone to the countryside, and would discuss the matter with Gottw ald if Lettrich so desired. 23 Ursfny too attempted an appeal on behalf of clemency, and also found out that the rej ection of clemency was an accomplished fact and that Benes was incommunicado. 24 Stefanik him self made a final attempt on Tiso ' s behalf, asking the National Court that Tiso be tran sferred to the jail of the Office of the Public Prosec utor, so he could be questioned regarding some other cases. Thi s the National Court rejected on the ground s that Ti so could be just as eas ily be questioned at its own jail. 25 With all avenues for clemency now ex hausted , Ti so was hanged early on the morning of April 18, officiall y pronounced dead at 5:30 a.m. It was no surpri se that Ti so was found guilty, nor th at he was sentenced to die. Nor was it astoni shing that the majority of government mini sters in Prague rejected the reco mmendation for clemency, and that Benes acted in accordance with their position. But what was puzzling was the behavior of the DP -supporting clemency in Prague , but not in Bratislava; desperately appealin g for clemency on the 22 Mi chal Barn ovsky , Na ceste k monopolu moci, ( Bratislava , 1993) , p. 145 n; K apl an, Dva retribucnf procesy, p. 28. 23 Kaplan , D va retribucnf procesy, p. 28 ; Robert Letz, S/ovensko v rokoch I 945- 1948, (Bratislava, 1994 ), p. 48 . 24 Ursfny, Z m6jho t i vota, p. 127 . 25 K aplan, Dva retribucnf procesy, p. 29; the motive behind this attempt was to delay Ti so ' s exec uti on and thu s increase the chances that he would ultimately receive clemency . �48 SLOVAKIA eve of Tiso 's exec uti on, while letting the issue pass right throu gh the hands of the SNC Presidium that they had dominated the day before. Did the DP want the appeal for c lemency to fail? Such a view ca n be found in the po lice record , where a report me nti ons that Lettrich was opposed to cle me ncy for Tiso. 26 Like many scenarios sketched out by police inform ants, however, this one seems to be w ithout merit. Lettrich had earli er lobbi ed Tiso ' s three prosecutors for c lemency, and had persuaded Minister of Ju sti ce Drtina to promi se hi s support as well. These are hardl y the acti ons of a man desiring Tiso 's execution . Other ex planat io ns must li e behind the timidity of Lettrich and the DP at the notoriou s SNC Pres idium meeting of April 16. Hi storian s who have exa mined the meetin g, a nd the issue of clemency overall, ha ve co me up with a numbe r of ex pl anation s, which will be di sc ussed here in ascend in g order of pl a usibility and influence. 27 Most dubi o us is the view th at the De mocrats trusted that Benes would grant clemency regardless of the recommendations he rece ived. Whil e the re appare ntly was public spec ulation that Be nes mi ght spare Tiso, the DP leadership had littl e reason to put their tru st in such suppos ition s. Benes had already g ive n Lettrich and Ursfny quite c lear indication s of hi s oppositi on to cle mency. 28 Another of the weaker arguments for why the SNC did not take a stand on c le me ncy was the one the DP used to ex pl ai n itse lf at the 26 Barno vsky, Na ceste. p. 130. 27 For exp lanati ons of why the OS acted the way it did at th e SNR Pres idiu m mee- ting of Apri l 16, see Barnovsky , Na ceste, p. 130: Letz, Slovensko. pp. 47-48: Kaplan . Ova relribucnf procesy, pp. 24-26 : Ursfny, Z m6jho i i vota. pp. 123- 124 : for the DP ' s attempt to j ustify its ac ti ons at the time, see Cas. April 23, 1947. no. 93 . p. I. 28 Lettrich , in a meeting with the three state prosecutors of the Tiso trial on March 12. I 94 7, mentioned that he had discussed the matter of clemency for Tiso w ith Benes on two occasions, and th at Benes's positi on was th at he would not take a stand but rather all ow th e governmen t' s decis ion on th e matter to guide him : (see SNA. Demokraticka strana, Carton 2, Bundle 99 , Folios 1-2): moreover. Ursfny claims in hi s memoirs that in fall of 1946. Daxner asked Benes how he shou ld handle the Tiso case, to which Benes replied, " I th in k that he deserves death, but thi s is an affair for an independent court. "; (see Ursfny, Z m6jho i ivota. p. 11 3). �SLOVAKIA 49 government meetin g of April 16 and thereafter, i.e. that accordin g to the 2 nd Prague Agreement , the S C's role in the process was simpl y to pass proposals on to the Government and not to co mment on them, and that i f the government had obj ection s to Stefanik's proposa l, it wo uld soli cit the SNC Presidium 's views on it. Upon refl ec ti on, thi s ex plan ati on holds no more water th an it did at the tim e. A party that believed Slovak organs should speak for Slovakia, and a good bit of whose appeal was based on its advocacy of autonomy fo r Slovakia, is behav ing out of character w hen it surrenders to Prague the prerogati ve to decide on a matter so c lose to th e hearts of so many Slovaks. Another ex pl anation put forth by the DP was that it lacked sufficient time to stud y the doc umentation pertinent to th e Tiso tri al. Whil e on the surface thi s is true , still , the SNC was not being asked to render a lega l or judicial judgment, but a politi ca l one. In the latter case, the party could have made up its mind on a pos ition long before the verdi ct, as the Communists had. M ore convincing are the views th at th e DP was simpl y afra id th at a vote for clemency wo uld prompt the Communi sts to provoke a politica l crisis in Slovakia, halting cooperation w ithin the SNC, mobili zing Parti san and trade union groups against the Democrats, and forcing Prague to step in . Indeed, such threats and pressures were already ev ident on the Slovak political stage for over a yea r, and were com mon everywhere else in East Central Europe w here Communi st parti es were acti ve. In thi s view , the DP simpl y lost its nerve and opted to pass the matter on to Prague ra ther than deal w ith it in Bra ti slava. Thi s explanati on seems va lid enough because Communi st pres sure was al ways an influence. However, i f fear of reperc uss ions was the main reason for keeping the DP quiet, w hy did Democrats vote for clemency at the government sess ions in Prag ue? Wa s it to gi ve public assura nce to th eir co nstitu ents th at th ey opposed clemency , but at a ven ue w here they did not have to worry about their vote carry ing any influence and thereby provoking a clemency- induced �SLOVAKIA 50 cris is back home? This question is moot , give n the influence of the most significant factor of all. A final ex pl anati on is most like ly the crucial o ne - that the DP could not co unt on one of its own representatives on the Presidi um , Milan Po lak , to vote for c le mency. Po lak ' s record, both before and after 1947, place him on the left wing of the DP. A former Parti san, and leader in the Parti sa n vetera ns' movement, Po lak collaborated with the Communists durin g and after the February co up of 1948 . 29 Unable to co unt on hi s vote, Lettrich preferred no vote on c lemency to one in which Polak would abstain or vote no. Thus he chose the leas t pa inful but st ill damaging option. While many of Slovakia ' s Catholics would be upset if the DP-controll ed Presidium failed to take a vote on clemency, they wo uld be even more outraged if a DPcontrolled Pres idium rejected clemency, or could not mu ste r th e three votes needed to pass it. Ursfny 's memo irs prov ide further ev idence for thi s ex planation. Ursfny reported that, when on a vis it to the United States in the fa ll of 1967 , he spoke by telephone with Lettrich , who told him that he wanted the SNC to avoid the iss ue of clemency because Pol ak wo uld not have voted for it. 30 Thus, while the DP owed its success to a large ly Catholic e lectorate, it contained a core of resistance veterans who simpl y could not countenance anything short of Ti so's exec ution. Since the leader of those veterans he ld the deciding vote on the SNC Presidium , the DP 's efforts to support c le mency were futile. Tho ugh the DP had good reason to suspect that Polak would not vote for c lemency, the Communists had their own fears that he mi ght not vote aga inst it. This ex plains why the Communists on the SNC were as eager as the Democrats to pass the matter on to Prague. A number of factors contributed to the exec ution of Jozef Tiso-a Pres ident who disliked him and welcomed hi s exec ution ; a gove rn ment where the cards were stacked agai nst him from the start , with 19 See Barnovsky , Na ceste, pp. 240, 245 , for Pol ak ' s acti vity during the .. February Crisis" of 1948. )o Ursfny, Z mojho i ivoui, p. 124. �SLOVAKIA 51 the Soc ial Democrats, Nati onal Soc iali sts, and non-parti san mini sters un sy mpatheti c to hi s cause; a Co mmuni st Party and the labor and res istance orga ni zati ons it mo bili zed workin g agg ressive ly aga in st him ; a staunchl y anti -Ti so j udge; and Ti so 's own wartime acti vities, whi ch made a death se nte nce pl ausi bl e. Nothin g th at th e DP did could have spared Ti so from exec utio n in thi s contex t. Neverthe less, th e way the Democrats mane uvered th ro ugh the cri s is had several consequ ences. The DP did eno ugh for T iso to buttress Communi st arguments that the Democrats catered to the Ludaks they were all eged ly harboring, arg uments th at in the ensuing months would mu shroom into the arrest of several leading De mocrats for ant i-state co nspiracy. At the same time, the DP 's fa ilure to sec ure an SNC vote on T iso's beha lf made it eas ier for the government 's Co mmuni st and non-Cath o li c Czec h parti es to argue th at Slo vaki a was opposed to c lemency fo r Tiso, thu s he lpin g abso lve Czechs of any charges that T iso's exec uti on was a Czech operati on done against the w ill of the Slovak people . Fin all y, the DP's impotence in defending T iso led to increased di si llusionment amo ng S lovak ia's Catho lic voters. For the DP, the who le undertaking was a lose-lose situ ati on, an indi cati on of just how d ifficult th at party's road was in spite of, or better said , on acco unt of, its bi g e lec tora l victo ry in May of 1946. To a great ex tent, the events surroundin g the iss ue of c lemency fo r Jozef Tiso were a mi crocos m of th e proble mati c pos itio n of the De mocrati c Party in postwar Czechos lovak ia. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2005, Vol. 38 Description An account of the resource Vol. 38 (No. 70-71), 2005. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2005 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 33 The Democratic Party and the Execution of Jozef Tiso James Ramon Felak On April 15 , 1947, Igor Daxne r, Chairman of the National Court in Brati s lava, pronounced the verd ict agai nst Father Jozef Ti so, the head of Slovakia's wartime state that was closely alli ed with Naz i Germany. The Co urt found Ti so guilty of 95 of 11 3 charges aga inst him, in c ludin g treason, betraya l of the Slovak National Uprising , co ll aborati on with the Naz is, and de portation of Slovak Jews to Naz i death ca mps. Hi s sente nce was death by han g in g, to be carried out within 48 hours. At once, Tiso, along w ith hi s two defense attorneys , submitted a requ est for c le me ncy. 1 Thi s pape r w ill in vesti gate the fate of thi s request, the last official chance to spare Ti so from death. Though the final deci sion on clemency rested with Czechoslovakia ' s Pres ide nt Edvard Be nes, the request passed like a hot potato over the next dozen ho urs, from Daxner to Slovakia's Commissioner of th e Interior Iva n Stefanik, to Slovakia ' s c hi ef organ of se lf-governme nt , the Slovak Nation al Council (SNC) , to the Czechoslovak gove rnme nt in Prague , and ultimatel y to Be nes. De mocra tic Party (DP) leaders had lobbi ed for c lemency during the tri al, voted for it at the gove rnme nt 's mee tin g on the eve nin g of April 16, a nd frantically appea led on its behalf to Be nes in the hours before Tiso ' s exec uti on. However, they c uri ously refused to take a stand for clemency at the meeting of the SNC's Pres idium on the afternoon of April 16, where they had a 3-to-2 majority and where a stand on Ti so 's behalf would have g ive n offic ial sanction to the view , w idely shared by many and 1 ' One of the three prosecutors. l.'.udovft Ri gan. also made a request for clemency to the Court; K arel K aplan, Dva retribucnf procesy . Komentovane dokumenty, (Prague. I 992), p. 221 (Document 37). SLOVAKIA 34 probably most Slovaks, that Tiso should not be executed. The Democrats' refusal to take a stand in the SNC meant that Tiso's opponents could point to the failure of any official Slovak organs to recommend clemency as proof that his execution reflected the will of the Slovak people. The fate of Jozef Tiso was very much connected with the DP's fortunes in Czechoslovak and Slovak politics . Shortly after her liberation from Nazi rule and reattachment to Czechoslovakia, Slovakia had only two significant political parties-the Communist Party of Slovakia (CPS) and the Democratic Party (DP). The latter, in many ways a legacy of the interwar Agrarian party, emerged out of the Lutheran-dominated wing of the resistance to the Tiso regime. When the Catholic and nationalist Slovak People's Party (SPP) was outlawed at war ' s end , many Slovak Catholics became political orphans.2 In the spring of 1946, however, the DP adopted them through the so-called April Agreement, a pact between the party's leaders and important Catholic political activi sts whereby Catholics were promised a large share of influence in the DP and a Democratic commitment to promote the Catholic Church ' s position on issues such as education in exchange for Catholic electoral support. The fruit of the April Agreement was a landslide victory for the DP over the Communists in the May 1946 parliamentary elections, with Democrats winning 63 % of the vote to the Communists' 30%. From that point on , the CPS focused its energies on undoing the electoral results by seeking to paralyze, fracture , or dis solve the DP. Among other things, the Tiso trial figured in Communist calculations of how to cripple their rival. The Communist plan was to force the DP to navigate between the Scylla of angering its Catholic members and voters , who had hopes that the Democrats would rescue Tiso from a death sentence, and the Charybdis of being sucked into a police investigation for 2 Catholics comprised nearly 80% of the Slovak population. The majority of Slovak Catholics voted for the SPP during the interwar period. SLOVAKIA 35 allegations of pandering to the reactionaries and war criminals it was all egedl y harboring th anks to the April Agreeme nt. Idea ll y, the DP wo uld be di scredited in the eyes of Catholics as an ineffectua l and lukewarm defe nder of Ti so, while concurrently di sc redited in the eyes of everyone else as a haven for reactionaries. With little room for mane uver, and in the face of enormo us press ure, the DP had to face thi s chall enge. What fo ll ows is how the Com muni sts were able to acco mpli sh these end s, partl y due to the ir own tactics, partl y due to the dynami c of the situ ati on, and part ly due to the cho ices made by the Democrats. Ri ght after the anno unceme nt of the verd ict, Ti so's lawyers, Ernest Zabkay and Martin Greco, submitted an official requ est for c lemency, as king for a more "appropriate" sentence for the ir c lient. 3 They particularly stressed lega l tec hni ca lities. Tiso's lawyers argued th at the defense was not all owed to speak with the acc used without the sec urity organs present-a violati on of a fund amental principle of criminal tri al procedure-and that the defense did not have certain archiv al materials at its disposal , while the prosec uti on did. Furthermore, records of testimony were not made avail able within the requisite three days, but lagged by nearly two month s, thereby mak in g it impossible for the defense to c ite testimon y made after January 15 in its concluding statements. In addition to these and a number of other technicalities, Tiso ' s lawyers arg ued th at the trial was po litica ll y biased, both because Daxner himse lf was bi ased, as the SNC itself had recognized in the past, and because, despite a leg islati ve order ca llin g for political pari ty in the Senate, no me mbers of the DP took part in the judg ment. Tiso's attorn eys a lso arg ued that Tiso was being puni shed for eve nts beyond his co ntro l. They claimed th at he did not prepare for Slovakia's independence in 1939, or he lp cause it, and that he showed no initiative and intention ality in hi s cooperation wi th Nazi Germany. Rather, he simpl y tri ed to make the best of a bad situ ation that was thru st upo n him . Finally, Ti so's atto rneys, in the .1 Kaplan, Ova retribucnf procesy. pp. 2 15-2 19 (Document 35) . SLOVAKIA 36 onl y argument that the DP would make its ow n, argued th at clemency would strengthen Czech-Slovak relations, e liminate the threat of ill will between Slovakia ' s Catholics and Protestants, and strengthen ti es between Slovak emigrants and their motherl and. The National Court quick ly decided agai nst recommending c lemency for Ti so, and passed Tiso ' s request on to Slovak Commissioner of Ju stice Ivan Stefanik , a Democrat. Stefa nik in turn supported Tiso's request, and submitted a proposal to the Presidium of the SNC, which read , " I propose that the death se ntence of Dr. Jozef Ti so be commuted to life impri sonment. " 4 The proposal was to the point, absent the argumentation included in Ti so ' s request, and un like Ti so ' s request, allowed for no sentence less than life impri sonment. On April 16, the SNC ' s Presidium met to consider Stefa nik ' s proposal, along with some other matters connected with Ti so ' s tri al. When the Pres idium convened, it was already under enormous pressure. By law , Tiso ' s exec ution was to be carried out within 48 hours of the announcement of the verdict, so matters had to be considered quickly. Moreover, the gove rnm ent in Prag ue was meet in g later that day to discuss c lemency , and was eagerly awaiting the views of Slovakia 's leadin g organs on the matter. Adding to the pressure was the fact that the Presidium received the 214 page judgment aga inst Tiso only shortl y before its meeti ng.5 Moreover, te legrams, letters, and petitions (for and against c leme ncy) were pourin g in to the President 's office, the government, and the SNC, while Parti san and labor organizations staged anti-Ti so rallies across Slovakia and de legation s from trade union s, hou sing estates, and espec ially resistance organizations arrived in Brati slava to add their presence to the de liberations. 6 Though there were no reported cases of violence, it is not difficult to imagine the presence of these groups, enco uraged if not orchestrated by the Communists, adding a menac in g character to 4 K aplan , Dva relribucnf procesy. p. 220 (Document 36). ' Th e DP claimed the Presidium had onl y ten minutes to look over the length y judgmen t; see Cas. April 23 , 1947 , no. 93, p. I. 6 Cas, Apri l 23, 1947, no. 93 , p. I. SLOVAKIA 37 the already inte nse pressure on the Presidium , or more prec ise ly, its Democratic me mbers. For example, a consortium of major res istance organi zati o ns iss ued a decl aration on April 16 th at conde mned c lemency as a "s hameful defilement (popl'u vanie) of all the sac rifi ces of o ur nation al stru gg le" th at co uld e mbolde n Ti so's supporte rs into provokin g unrest in S lovakia aimed at undermining the Re public.7 If cle mency was gra nted to Tiso, these organizations promi sed to assess the situation and cons ide r what mean s to emp loy in de fe nse of the Republic and the ga ins of the Slovak National Upri sin g. The DP had a majority on the Presi dium , which conta ined three Democrats (Jozef Lettrich, who was chairman of both the DP and the SNC, Andrej Cvincek, Milan Po la k) a nd two Communi sts (Karol Smidke, Ivan Horvath ). Nevertheless, the Pres idium did not e ndorse Stefanik's proposa l for c le me nc y; rather, it reso lved to submit the proposa l to the governme nt without co mme nt. In hi s me moirs, Jan Ursfny, a top DP leader and its Deputy Chairman, argued that Lettric h went into the meetin g with the intention of avo idin g debate over clemency, a position Ursfny strongly advised against. 8 Lettrich 's behav ior at the meeting does betray the actions of a man inte nt on avoi ding debate. 9 First of all , most of the meetin g 's di scuss ion dea lt with De mocratic di ssati sfaction with Daxner's ha ndling of the tri al. Whe n the Presidium did get around to the Ti so verdict, Le ttri c h made it clear th at he fe lt th at the press ure of time mad e it imposs ible to acq uire sufficie nt knowledge to take a pos ition on c le mency, and that any recommendation would thu s have to be " politica l." The Communi st Horvath the n proposed that the Presidium take no stand , but simpl y pass on Stefa nik 's proposa l to the government without co mment. He argued that a recomme nd ation from the SNC was ne ithe r requi- 1 Pravda. Apri l 18, 1947 . no. 90, p. I: th e Slovak term pop!ii vct nie could be rendered as .. spitting on". • Jan Ursfny. Z m6jho i i votct. (M artin . 2000), pp. 123- 124. " See Sl ovensky narod ny archfv (hereafter referred to as SNA). Fond Urad predsednfctva Slovenskej narodnej rady , Carton 139, Folder 134. Folios 49-58 , S R Presidiu m meetin g of A pril 16. 1947. SLOVAKIA 38 red nor necessary, for it was the government and Benes whose views would be decisive. According to Horvath, since the Communists were opposed to clemency, they would be unable to support Stefanik ' s proposa l, and hence any vote in the SNC would be on a parti san basis, setting a bad precedent for future Communist-Democratic cooperation. When it came time to vote on Horvath ' s proposal , the Presidium accepted it unanimously. Before examining why the SNC , or more specifically its Democratic members, opted not to recommend c lemency for Tiso, let us track the proposal ' s course to Prague and ultimately to Benes. The Communists and Social Democrats were openly hostile to Tiso, and the non-parti san mini sters, Ludvfk Svoboda (Defense) and Jan Masaryk (Foreign Affairs), could be expected to be so as well. Together, these constituted 13 of the 23 members of the government, enough to tip any vote to Ti so's detriment. On top of that, the Czech National Soc ialists were at best ambivalent. A number of leading National Socialists opposed clemency and wanted their party to vote against it or at least to abstain. 10 However, Minister of Justice Prokop Drtina, one of the party's top leaders, had earlier assured Lettrich that he would support clemency provided the SNC did. 11 In the last of a series of meetings on the issue , held right before the government session began , Drtina managed to convince his colleagues to agree to the following position : to oppose clemency, but only after first proposing that the request for clemency be returned to the Presid ium of the SNC for that organ's recommendation. In thi s way, Drtina could present himself as makin g a good faith effort to honor hi s promise to Lettrich , while entertaining hopes that a vote to return the request to the SNC would fail, thu s getting himself off the hook. 12 The government meeting opened at approximately 5: 15 p.m ., after a delay of over an hour as its members waited for reports from ° Kaplan. Dva retribucnf procesy. p. 25 . 1 " Prokop Drtina. Ceskos lovensko muj osud, II. 2, (Toronto, I 982). pp. 297-298. 302. 12 Drtina, Ceskoslovensko muj osud. II , 2, p. 302. SLOVAKIA 39 Slovakia. 13 Within ten minutes, a delegation of representatives from the Union of Czechoslovak Partisans and so me similar organizations asked to be admitted. Since the National Socialists had yet to arrive, mak ing their last minute plans in a nearby room , the meetin g was adjourned for 45 minutes while the parti san organizations were given the opportunity to press ure the mini sters to vote against clemency. 14 Once the de legation s had their say and engaged some of the mini sters over the iss ue , and the National Sociali st mini sters had arrived, the meeting was reconvened. Prime Mini ster Kl ement Gottwald began by sharin g two pieces of information he had just rece ived from Slovaki a- the memorandum from the SNC' s Pres idium pass in g on Stefanik's proposal for clemency without comment, and a telegram from Gu stav Husak, Chairman of Slovakia 's Board of Commissioners (Cabinet). Husak noted that Stefanik 's proposal did not reflect the views of the Board of Commissioners nor its Presidium, whose standpoint Stefanik did not seek, and should therefore be regarded as hi s own personal proposal. Husak added that he did not agree with the proposa l. Thus, the meeting opened with reports from Slovakia 's two chief political organs, neither of which endorsed clemency. Gottwald, leader of the Czechoslovak Communist Party , then proposed that the government reso lve aga inst clemency, since the National Court in Brati slava recommended against it, and the Pres idium of the SNC did not recommend for it. In a long and sometimes pass ionate debate, mini sters from both sides weighed in on the que stion, with positions breaking down along party lines. The Communists led the charge against clemency. Vladimfr Clementi s, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and a Slovak, read a CPS 13 For the minutes of the meeting. see K apl an, Dva retribucnf procesy. pp. 225-254. 14 Ursfny . in his memoirs, recou nts be ing asked by one member of the parti san dele- gati on: "M r. Deput y Chairman, tell me, w ith whom do you wan t to go. w ith th e Ludak underground. or with us?" A nother partisan representati ve. however, spoke up for Ursfny as ··one of the greates t partisans. " (see Ursfny, Z m6jho i ivota, p. 125): see footnote 17 for an ex planation of the term " Ludak. " 40 SLOVAKIA decl aration that la id o ut the Co mmuni st pos iti on. The dec larati o n stressed the did acti c function of the tri al, that is, its purpose in di sco urag ing enemies of the Republic. A death sentence co uld do that far better than a life sentence in thi s res pect. C lemency, on the co ntrary, would onl y encou rage enemi es of the state and sympathizers of Ti so and hi s reg ime . Reactionari es, as before, were tryin g to take over Slovaki a "even at the price of the Re public." 15 The dec laration arg ued that c leme ncy would evoke di stru st in the judic ial sys tem. Veterans of the Sl ovak Nati onal Upri sin g would be upset with the de parture from the idea ls of the res istance; peo ple wo uld note the inj ustice of lesser crimin als hav ing been more harshl y puni shed than Ti so; and politics would be seen once more as " panske huncutst vo", that is "gentl emen's mi sc hi ef." 16 The declarati o n noted in parti cul ar that Ti so showed no remorse for hi s crimes, and in fac t gave succor to th e Re public 's ene mi es in hi s co ncludin g statement at hi s tri al. Much of what Cleme nti s read was identica l to a dec larati on made a day earli er by Slovaki a's res istance organi zati o ns, testifyin g to the leadin g ro le the Co mmuni sts pl ayed in those orga ni zati o ns and the success the party had in coordin atin g various soc ial orga ni zati ons on behalf of its objecti ves . Indeed , both dec laration s co nc luded with the sa me threat to assess the s ituation and consider what mea ns to employ in defense of the Republic and its character. Czech Communi sts also spoke out again st clemency, asserting th at Ti so was a traitor and a war crimina l, and that fa ilin g to exec ute him would be a blow to Czec hos lovakia 's unity and inde pendence. Communi st speakers also arg ued th at it was the will of th e Slovak people that Ti so be exec u- 15 The express ion ··ani za ce nu republiky", th at is, •·even at the price of the rep ublic" . was a reference to a statement made by HSL:S leader A ndrej Hlin ka at a rall y in Trencfn in 1932, where he asse rted th e degree to whi ch his party wo uld pu rsue Slovak interests; see James Ramon Felak, •A l the Price of the Republic·_. Hlinka 's Slovak People 's Party. 1929- 1938. (Pittsburg h, 1994 ), p. 96. 16 " Poli tika je panske huncutstvo" was an expression curre nt among Slovaks , rooted in Slovakia ' s feudal pas t. It was the recog nition by peasan ts th at pol itics was the domain where the lords made mi sch ief. SLOVAKIA 41 ted , as ev ide nced by the pos iti ons of the Nati ona l Co urt, the SNC, and the Board of Co mmi ss ione rs, all organs composed e ntire ly of Slova ks and re prese nting S lovakia. Thi s was why, the Czec h Co mmuni st Vac lav Kopecky noted , the DP would not speak up fo r c leme ncy on the SNC's Pres idium. Th e Soc ia l De mocrati c mini sters we re just as o pposed to c lemency as the Communi sts, and no less assertive about the ir pos iti on. Zdene k Fierlin ger, the leader of the SOP and a Deputy Prime Minister, argued th at a vote fo r c le me ncy wo uld upset Czec hoslovaki a's alli es in the Slav ic world , in part because it would fu e l Slova k independe nce, whi c h itse lf th reate ned Czec hos lovaki a 's border w ith the Sov iet Uni o n. Fie rlinger even re marked th at how o ne voted o n the cleme ncy questi on was a test of one's patri oti sm. With respect to the reli g io us dim e ns ion of the ques ti o n, the Soc ial De mocrati c leade r asserted th at the fac t of Tiso's be ing a priest was not a miti gating c irc um stance, but rathe r one th at made matters worse. He noted th at it was not good for the Catho lic Churc h to e ncumbe r itse lf with Ti so . Whil e Fie rlinger re prese nted the pro-C ommuni st left-win g of the SOP, that party's ri ght-wing was no less vehe me nt about Ti so. Vaclav Maj er, the leader of the ri ght-wing Soc ial De mocrats, referred to the Sl ovak pri est as one of the chi e f war crimin als, guilty of mass murder. The most ex te ns ive attac k on Ti so a nd argume nt against cle me ncy, however, came not fro m the mini ste rs o f the le fti st parties, but from the oste nsibl y ne utra l (a lbeit c loset Communi st) Ludvfk Svoboda, the Mini ster o f Defe nse. As a Czec hoslovak hero of both the First and Second World Wars, Svoboda's word s carri ed a certain cac het. Svoboda spoke at le ngth about why T iso mu st die . He came o ut strong ly aga inst so-ca ll ed ha lf-so luti o ns; at ha nd was a definiti ve hi stori ca l qu esti o n w ith long- te rm impli cati o ns th at sho uld not be judged accordin g to the needs a nd mood of the mo me nt. Ti so was 42 SLOVAKIA not just a war criminal ; he was the sy mbol of " Ludakism," 17 fasci sm, treason , and collaboration . To grant clemency to Tiso, according to Svoboda, would render hi s trial vain and superfluous. If alive, Ti so would remain to poison cooperation and unity between Czechs and Slovaks; clemency would encourage hi s supporters, while disappointing others. Like many speakers and writers of the time, Svoboda noted that Tiso showed no remorse. He ca lled for a firm and resolute action agai nst him as a means of strengthening Czechoslovakia's international position and prestige. To those w ho argued th at Ti so should be spared because he was a priest, Svoboda dec lared that "we are not judging a priest, but a traitor, a destroyer of the Czechoslovak state, and a criminal. That Tiso is a priest only makes matters worse; he profaned the priestly office and Church at a time when thou sands of other priests fought bravely again st Nazi sm and perished in concentration camps and prisons." On the other s ide of the equation were those mini sters who championed c lemency-on ly the Democrats and Czech Populi sts. Here the most prominent speaker was Ursfny . The Democratic Deputy Chairman argued that clemency would improve relations between Czechs and Slovaks, Lutherans and Catholics, and aid in the overall consolidation of the post-war Republic. Such a goodwi ll gesture might also win over some of Czechoslovakia' s enemi es. Ursfny noted that religiou s fee lings ran strong in Slovakia, where the exec ution of a priest was a serious , and potentiall y upsetting matter. He pointed out that many good people were for clemency, includin g so me bishops and hi gh functionari es in the Lutheran church , a church that itself had suffered under Ti so's regi me. The Democratic Minister of Transportation Ivan Pietor also spelled out a number of reasons for clemency. He argued that Ti so was popular among the majority of Slovaks, and that the preva ilin g majority of Slovaks would vote for 17 Lud aki sm, or "l'udactvo" was the term employed to refer to fo ll owers of th e Slovak People 's Party, whose members were know n as '• Ludaks" or " l'udaci ." It best approximates the Engli sh word " Populi sm. " Communi sts applied the term to any Slovak Catholics they did not like. SLOVAKIA 43 clemency if given the chance, thou gh thi s did not mean they agreed with Ti so ' s politics. He too noted that important Lutheran leaders sent ardent appeals on Tiso's behalf in the interest of the peaceful deve lopment of Slovaki a and Czechoslovakia. The g iven politica l s ituation , accordin g to Pietor, demanded statesmanlike thinkin g, wi sdom , and sensiti vity to the prevailing political condition s and mood. In such a co ntext, clemency would be a gesture to win over hearts in Slovakia and bring the Czech and Slovak nation s together. While the Court may have unanimou sly estab lished Tiso 's guilt and ca ll ed for hi s exec ution , that was a judicial decision , not a political one. What the Republic now faced was a manifestly political deci sion , and that was the task of the government to settl e, in accordance with political considerations. The Czec h Populi sts, as members of a Catholic party with moderate inclinations, also supported clemency. Minister Franti se k Ha.la (Post Office), him se lf a Catholic priest, presented c le mency as the most suitable solution for Czechoslovak and Slovak interests. The Populi st Adolf Prochazka (Health ) remarked that c lemency was the des ire of most Slovaks, and of the Lutheran church leadership . Jan Kopecky (Mini ster without Portfolio) supported clemency as a way to consolidate the Repub li c, and reminded hi s mini sterial colleagues that life impri sonment was not tantamount to acq uittal. In makin g hi s case, Ursfny co ntended that the SNC did not recommend aga inst c lemency ; rather it was not the Pres idium 's function to ex press a position on the proposa l, but only to pass it on to the government. Technically , he was correct because the Second Prague Agreement of April I I , 1946, the statute under which such matters were regulated , stated that the commissioner's proposal be submitted to the go vernment "v ia the Pres idium of the Slovak National Counci l. " 18 However, this strict construction is not the way the SNC had hitherto been dealing with proposa ls. Gottwald snide ly noted that the '" Jan Mechyr. Slo vensko v Ceskoslovensku : Slovensko-ceske vztahy I 9 I 8- 199 I . (Prague. 1991 ). 44 SLOVAKIA Pres idium had sudde nl y dec ided in thi s case to limit itse lf to the ro le of a post office, and al ong with Fie rlinger, he regarded Ursfny 's expl a nati on as sophi stry. They were not bu ying th e De moc rats ' claim that the Pres idium ' s position was not a fa ilure to endorse c le mency. It was the centri st parties, however, that ex pressed the most anger over the SNC 's sile nce regardin g c leme ncy - a sil e nce th at, because the DP had a majority in the Pres idium, was c learl y bl a med on the De mocrats. A number of Nati ona l Soc iali st and Populi st mini ste rs vo iced their indi gnati on at the SNC's atte mpt to pass th e buck. Jaroslav Stra nsky (Edu cati on) said th at he wa nted Ursfny and hi s frie nds to recogni ze the situ ation into whi ch they had gotte n the governme nt , whi c h thanks to the m now had to dec ide on a matter about whi c h it did not have s uffic ie nt kn ow ledge. In thi s s itu ati on, th e gove rnm e nt co uld be bl a med if Ti so did not get cle me ncy, thereby bein g burde ned with what is primaril y a Sl ovak pro bl e m. Drtina, s imil arly, sa id he was perpl exed by the Pres idium ' s unex pected course of acti on, one whi ch now put the go vernme nt in a diffi c ult situati on. He pro posed se ndin g th e pro posal bac k to th e Pres idium fo r its opini o n, in acco rdance with the Second Prague Agree me nt, whi c h stipul ated that the governme nt return proposa ls to the SNC's Pres idium if it had objecti ons to them from the point of view of statew ide inte res ts. Foll o win g suit , Nation a l Soc ia li st Mini ste r o f Fore ig n Trade Hube rt Ripka noted hi s party ' s astoni shme nt at th e SNC's acti on - how it limited its ro le to th at of a mailbox in the way it interpre ted the Seco nd Prag ue Agree me nt. He noted th at Sl ovaki a ' s se lf-proc laimed leadin g orga n did not have the courage to ex press itse lf on a questi on of suc h importance fo r the future and fa te of the Slovak people . Accordin g to Ripka, it was c lear that the SNC Pres idium wa nted to shi ft the res po nsibility for Ti so's fate o nto the governme nt. He in sisted that the Pres idum ex press itse lf on the iss ue, and as qui ckl y as poss ibl e. Hala, spea kin g for th e Czech Populi sts, echoed the sentiments o f the Nation al Soc ia li sts, notin g th at the Presidium ' s action greatl y surpri sed him and that it see med to want to pass responsibility onto the governme nt. SLOVAKIA 45 While the National Sociali sts and Populi sts expressed agreement with Drtina 's motion to return the proposa l to the SNC, the leftist parties adamantly opposed it. Gottwald, Fierlinger, and others noted that the SNC had already taken a position by failing to endorse clemency. They argued that further delay of Ti so's execution would only drag thin gs out, sustain a state of tension and provoke and evoke supporters of Ti so, as well as open the floodgates for clemency for others sentenced to death. When Drtina 's motion to return the proposal to the Presidium of the SNC came to a vote, it was defeated 13 to I0 . The voting broke down according to party lines: the National Socialists, Populists, and Democrats supported the proposal; the leftist parties and non-parti san ministers opposed it. While the Populists may well have sincerely believed that the best remedy for the crisis would have been for the SNC to voice its opinion on the matter, the National Socialists made and supported the motion simply for cosmetic purposes, hoping that it would fail. 19 The Democrats, of course, were in a quite unenviable position. The motion' s failure meant that they would not be g iven a second chance to make a stand for clemency in the Presidium. At the same time, it is not certain that they would have known what to do with a second chance; the factors that kept them from endorsing clemency the first time around were still operative. As the debate over Stefanik 's proposal resumed , the National Socialists came out against clemency, and sought to present the anticlemency position as the one identified with Slovakia. Drtina, noting th at the government was not fully informed of the detail s of the case, thought the matter should be best settled by Slovakia, as it indeed was - a Slovak Court had establi shed Tiso's guilt and had unanimously rejected clemency, which the SNC had also failed to recommend. Ripka , de mon stratin g the sort of Czech ignorance of Slovakia that ran kles Slovaks, claimed that Ti so, long before 1938 , was as bad or worse than Vojtech Tuka, Ti so 's main political rival during the war 19 Drtina adm its thi s in hi s me moirs: see Ceskoslovensko mu) osud, II , 2, p. 302. 46 SLOVAKIA and the leader of the radically pro-Nazi faction ple 's Party. 20 in the Slovak Peo- Because the consequences of Ludakism had not yet di- sappeared from Slovakia, clemency should be rejected. Ripka not only came out again st it, but also appealed to the DP and Czech Populists to abstain on the vote, so the government could present a united front. He addressed the Democrats with the rebuke that, if they did not vote for clemency in Slovakia, they should not now at the governmental level, where the domestic and international ramifications of such a vote were great. After more di sc uss ion, the government ultimately passed a resolution voicing its opposition to c lemency, on the grounds th at the National Court in Brati slava had recommended against it, and that the Pres idium of the SNC did not endorse it when pass ing Stefanik's proposal on to Prague. The vote was 17 in favor , 6 against. All mini sters rejected c lemency except those from the DP and Czech People 's Party. The meeting was adjourned at 8:50 p.m. Shortly thereafter, Gottwald took the government 's recommendation to Benes, who accepted it and informed Slovakia's Commissioner of Ju stice that hi s request for clemency had been officially denied. 2 1 Upon learn in g of the dec ision , Lettrich made a last-ditch intervention , telephoning Benes ' s chancellery. He conveyed the message that the government's standpoint was in conflict with Article I.b. of the Second Prague Agreement, which instructed the government, if it had objections aga inst a proposal from Slovaki a, to return that proposal to the SNC' s Presidium, not pass it on to Benes with a 20 Tuka was a notoriou s ri ghti st rad ica l who made a political career out of intriguing with foreign enemi es of the Czec hos lovak Republi c almost right from th e Republi c ' s founding. He spent most of th e 1930s in pri son for treason, and was executed for war crimes in the summer of 1946. we ll before the tri al of Tiso. 21 K apl an, D va retribucnf procesy, p. 27: Benes had informed Gottwald the day before th at he planned to ac t in accordance wi th whatever th e governm ent recommended regardin g clemency fo r Tiso, K apl an, D va retribucnf procesy, pp. 222-224 (Document 38). SLOVAKIA 47 recommendation. 22 Lettrich warned Benes of possible " immense political consequences" that could resu lt from a rejection of clemency, and fo r which the DP could not accept responsibility . Lettrich conc luded by notin g th at the DP had an absolute majority in the SNC and its Pres idium and fully agreed with Stefanik ' s proposal, considering clemency as a paramount state and nation al interest. Benes received the message early the next morning, instructing hi s chancellery to tell Lettrich that he had gone to the countryside, and would discuss the matter with Gottw ald if Lettrich so desired. 23 Ursfny too attempted an appeal on behalf of clemency, and also found out that the rej ection of clemency was an accomplished fact and that Benes was incommunicado. 24 Stefanik him self made a final attempt on Tiso ' s behalf, asking the National Court that Tiso be tran sferred to the jail of the Office of the Public Prosec utor, so he could be questioned regarding some other cases. Thi s the National Court rejected on the ground s that Ti so could be just as eas ily be questioned at its own jail. 25 With all avenues for clemency now ex hausted , Ti so was hanged early on the morning of April 18, officiall y pronounced dead at 5:30 a.m. It was no surpri se that Ti so was found guilty, nor th at he was sentenced to die. Nor was it astoni shing that the majority of government mini sters in Prague rejected the reco mmendation for clemency, and that Benes acted in accordance with their position. But what was puzzling was the behavior of the DP -supporting clemency in Prague , but not in Bratislava; desperately appealin g for clemency on the 22 Mi chal Barn ovsky , Na ceste k monopolu moci, ( Bratislava , 1993) , p. 145 n; K apl an, Dva retribucnf procesy, p. 28. 23 Kaplan , D va retribucnf procesy, p. 28 ; Robert Letz, S/ovensko v rokoch I 945- 1948, (Bratislava, 1994 ), p. 48 . 24 Ursfny, Z m6jho t i vota, p. 127 . 25 K aplan, Dva retribucnf procesy, p. 29; the motive behind this attempt was to delay Ti so ' s exec uti on and thu s increase the chances that he would ultimately receive clemency . 48 SLOVAKIA eve of Tiso 's exec uti on, while letting the issue pass right throu gh the hands of the SNC Presidium that they had dominated the day before. Did the DP want the appeal for c lemency to fail? Such a view ca n be found in the po lice record , where a report me nti ons that Lettrich was opposed to cle me ncy for Tiso. 26 Like many scenarios sketched out by police inform ants, however, this one seems to be w ithout merit. Lettrich had earli er lobbi ed Tiso ' s three prosecutors for c lemency, and had persuaded Minister of Ju sti ce Drtina to promi se hi s support as well. These are hardl y the acti ons of a man desiring Tiso 's execution . Other ex planat io ns must li e behind the timidity of Lettrich and the DP at the notoriou s SNC Pres idium meeting of April 16. Hi storian s who have exa mined the meetin g, a nd the issue of clemency overall, ha ve co me up with a numbe r of ex pl anation s, which will be di sc ussed here in ascend in g order of pl a usibility and influence. 27 Most dubi o us is the view th at the De mocrats trusted that Benes would grant clemency regardless of the recommendations he rece ived. Whil e the re appare ntly was public spec ulation that Be nes mi ght spare Tiso, the DP leadership had littl e reason to put their tru st in such suppos ition s. Benes had already g ive n Lettrich and Ursfny quite c lear indication s of hi s oppositi on to cle mency. 28 Another of the weaker arguments for why the SNC did not take a stand on c le me ncy was the one the DP used to ex pl ai n itse lf at the 26 Barno vsky, Na ceste. p. 130. 27 For exp lanati ons of why the OS acted the way it did at th e SNR Pres idiu m mee- ting of Apri l 16, see Barnovsky , Na ceste, p. 130: Letz, Slovensko. pp. 47-48: Kaplan . Ova relribucnf procesy, pp. 24-26 : Ursfny, Z m6jho i i vota. pp. 123- 124 : for the DP ' s attempt to j ustify its ac ti ons at the time, see Cas. April 23, 1947. no. 93 . p. I. 28 Lettrich , in a meeting with the three state prosecutors of the Tiso trial on March 12. I 94 7, mentioned that he had discussed the matter of clemency for Tiso w ith Benes on two occasions, and th at Benes's positi on was th at he would not take a stand but rather all ow th e governmen t' s decis ion on th e matter to guide him : (see SNA. Demokraticka strana, Carton 2, Bundle 99 , Folios 1-2): moreover. Ursfny claims in hi s memoirs that in fall of 1946. Daxner asked Benes how he shou ld handle the Tiso case, to which Benes replied, " I th in k that he deserves death, but thi s is an affair for an independent court. "; (see Ursfny, Z m6jho i ivota. p. 11 3). SLOVAKIA 49 government meetin g of April 16 and thereafter, i.e. that accordin g to the 2 nd Prague Agreement , the S C's role in the process was simpl y to pass proposals on to the Government and not to co mment on them, and that i f the government had obj ection s to Stefanik's proposa l, it wo uld soli cit the SNC Presidium 's views on it. Upon refl ec ti on, thi s ex plan ati on holds no more water th an it did at the tim e. A party that believed Slovak organs should speak for Slovakia, and a good bit of whose appeal was based on its advocacy of autonomy fo r Slovakia, is behav ing out of character w hen it surrenders to Prague the prerogati ve to decide on a matter so c lose to th e hearts of so many Slovaks. Another ex pl anation put forth by the DP was that it lacked sufficient time to stud y the doc umentation pertinent to th e Tiso tri al. Whil e on the surface thi s is true , still , the SNC was not being asked to render a lega l or judicial judgment, but a politi ca l one. In the latter case, the party could have made up its mind on a pos ition long before the verdi ct, as the Communists had. M ore convincing are the views th at th e DP was simpl y afra id th at a vote for clemency wo uld prompt the Communi sts to provoke a politica l crisis in Slovakia, halting cooperation w ithin the SNC, mobili zing Parti san and trade union groups against the Democrats, and forcing Prague to step in . Indeed, such threats and pressures were already ev ident on the Slovak political stage for over a yea r, and were com mon everywhere else in East Central Europe w here Communi st parti es were acti ve. In thi s view , the DP simpl y lost its nerve and opted to pass the matter on to Prague ra ther than deal w ith it in Bra ti slava. Thi s explanati on seems va lid enough because Communi st pres sure was al ways an influence. However, i f fear of reperc uss ions was the main reason for keeping the DP quiet, w hy did Democrats vote for clemency at the government sess ions in Prag ue? Wa s it to gi ve public assura nce to th eir co nstitu ents th at th ey opposed clemency , but at a ven ue w here they did not have to worry about their vote carry ing any influence and thereby provoking a clemency- induced SLOVAKIA 50 cris is back home? This question is moot , give n the influence of the most significant factor of all. A final ex pl anati on is most like ly the crucial o ne - that the DP could not co unt on one of its own representatives on the Presidi um , Milan Po lak , to vote for c le mency. Po lak ' s record, both before and after 1947, place him on the left wing of the DP. A former Parti san, and leader in the Parti sa n vetera ns' movement, Po lak collaborated with the Communists durin g and after the February co up of 1948 . 29 Unable to co unt on hi s vote, Lettrich preferred no vote on c lemency to one in which Polak would abstain or vote no. Thus he chose the leas t pa inful but st ill damaging option. While many of Slovakia ' s Catholics would be upset if the DP-controll ed Presidium failed to take a vote on clemency, they wo uld be even more outraged if a DPcontrolled Pres idium rejected clemency, or could not mu ste r th e three votes needed to pass it. Ursfny 's memo irs prov ide further ev idence for thi s ex planation. Ursfny reported that, when on a vis it to the United States in the fa ll of 1967 , he spoke by telephone with Lettrich , who told him that he wanted the SNC to avoid the iss ue of clemency because Pol ak wo uld not have voted for it. 30 Thus, while the DP owed its success to a large ly Catholic e lectorate, it contained a core of resistance veterans who simpl y could not countenance anything short of Ti so's exec ution. Since the leader of those veterans he ld the deciding vote on the SNC Presidium , the DP 's efforts to support c le mency were futile. Tho ugh the DP had good reason to suspect that Polak would not vote for c lemency, the Communists had their own fears that he mi ght not vote aga inst it. This ex plains why the Communists on the SNC were as eager as the Democrats to pass the matter on to Prague. A number of factors contributed to the exec ution of Jozef Tiso-a Pres ident who disliked him and welcomed hi s exec ution ; a gove rn ment where the cards were stacked agai nst him from the start , with 19 See Barnovsky , Na ceste, pp. 240, 245 , for Pol ak ' s acti vity during the .. February Crisis" of 1948. )o Ursfny, Z mojho i ivoui, p. 124. SLOVAKIA 51 the Soc ial Democrats, Nati onal Soc iali sts, and non-parti san mini sters un sy mpatheti c to hi s cause; a Co mmuni st Party and the labor and res istance orga ni zati ons it mo bili zed workin g agg ressive ly aga in st him ; a staunchl y anti -Ti so j udge; and Ti so 's own wartime acti vities, whi ch made a death se nte nce pl ausi bl e. Nothin g th at th e DP did could have spared Ti so from exec utio n in thi s contex t. Neverthe less, th e way the Democrats mane uvered th ro ugh the cri s is had several consequ ences. The DP did eno ugh for T iso to buttress Communi st arguments that the Democrats catered to the Ludaks they were all eged ly harboring, arg uments th at in the ensuing months would mu shroom into the arrest of several leading De mocrats for ant i-state co nspiracy. At the same time, the DP 's fa ilure to sec ure an SNC vote on T iso's beha lf made it eas ier for the government 's Co mmuni st and non-Cath o li c Czec h parti es to argue th at Slo vaki a was opposed to c lemency fo r Tiso, thu s he lpin g abso lve Czechs of any charges that T iso's exec uti on was a Czech operati on done against the w ill of the Slovak people . Fin all y, the DP's impotence in defending T iso led to increased di si llusionment amo ng S lovak ia's Catho lic voters. For the DP, the who le undertaking was a lose-lose situ ati on, an indi cati on of just how d ifficult th at party's road was in spite of, or better said , on acco unt of, its bi g e lec tora l victo ry in May of 1946. To a great ex tent, the events surroundin g the iss ue of c lemency fo r Jozef Tiso were a mi crocos m of th e proble mati c pos itio n of the De mocrati c Party in postwar Czechos lovak ia.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Democratic Party and the Execution of Jozef Tiso Description An account of the resource James Ramon Felak Slovakia, Vol. 38 (No. 70-71), 2005 pp. 33-51 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Felak, James Ramon, 1957- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2005 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/fb2ab3a578d038d57e9b181c3c6076c1.pdf 32d484c7344930be58908110a965a896 PDF Text Text 81 SLOVAKIA From Bratr nas to At'jdou Slovakia, the Slovaks and Slovak Nationalism seen from Prague 1 Paa! Sigurd Hilde The Velvet Divorce between the Czech and Slovak parts of the Czech and Slovak Federal Repub lic (CSFR) was a political undertaking. All public opinion polls taken in the period 1990-1992 showed a clear majority in favour of a common state among both Slovaks and Czechs.2 The decision to divide the country came as a result of a compromise between two political parties - or more specifically, between two politicians: Vaclav Klaus of the (Czech) Civic Democratic Party and Vladimfr Meciar of the (Slovak) Movement for a Democratic Slovakia. While both Klaus and Meciar argued that they wanted to preserve the common state, their visions of such a Czech and Slovak state were so disparate that an agreement to differ was the only possibility. Most detailed studies of the break-up agree that if either of them , Meciar or Klaus, were to be identified as 'more guilty' in promoting the break-up, it would not be the Slovak nationali st Meci ar, but the Czech ' Thatcherite ' Klaus. 3 Ultimately, what sank the good ship Czechoslovakia was that the Czech captain, the ' A sli ghtly different version of thi s arti cle was originall y published in Norwegian in Nordisk @stforum, Yol . 15/2. 200 I , pp.5-16. 2 See. for example, Sharon Wolchik: 'The Pol itics of Ethnicity in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia', fast European Politics and Society, Vol. 8/ 1994. I , pp.153-188. 3 See, for example, Abby Innes: Czechoslovakia: The Short Goodbye. London. 200 I , particularly pp. 176-2 19. �SLOVAKIA 82 o ne that had a lw ays fo ught the hardest to keep it a fl oat, gave the order to sc uttle. The a im of thi s paper is to prov ide a n in sig ht into the deve lopme nt of the vi e ws on Slovaki a, Slovaks and Slova k nati o na li sm in th e Czec h Land s: fro m the ideas unde rl y in g the creati o n of Czech oslova ki a in 19 18 to those leading to the di sso luti o n of th at country in 1992. Natu ra ll y, the re is no c lear 'Czec h view ' of matters re lating to Sl ova ki a. Even if one di srega rds indi vidu a l o pini o ns and con ce ntrates o n what mi g ht be ca ll ed c ultura l ' heteroste reotypes' (v ie ws of the othe r), o ne w ill still find , fo r in stance, strong reg io na l differe nces w ithin the Czech La nd s. Any ana lys is of the ' Czec h view ' will thu s, eve n in the best case, be a probl e mati c prese ntati o n o f e lu sive collecti ve attitudes. Furthe rm ore, give n the absence of publi c opinio n surveys fo r most of the peri od studi ed , it is imposs ibl e to asce rta in ho w representati ve suc h attitudes were. The pi cture of Sl o va ki a presented here will be based to a large deg ree o n the attitudes ex pressed by leadin g po liti c ia ns, jo urn a li sts a nd o th er ' opini o n-fo rmers' in the Czec h Lands. For thi s reaso n the arti c le will present o pini o ns mo re typi ca l of Prague tha n. fo r in stance, Mo ra via, whe re co ntacts w ith Slovaks a nd Sl ovaki a we re more direct. Ho we ve r, as an earli er study , simil ar to thi s, argued , ' in Prag ue and in the C zec h Land s in genera l there are few opportunities to ga in a broad , direct impress ion of Slovaks, and the Czec h view of the Slovak is the refore the res ult of tra nsmitted , dedu ced impress io ns. ' 4 Whe n attitudes are acqui red ma inl y indirec tl y, opini o n-formers pl ay an important rol e. Gi ve n the limited scope of thi s arti c le, th e many theoreti cal and methodo log ica l pro bl e ms of suc h a stud y ca nno t be e xamined. Interestin g a nd impo rtant aspec ts, suc h as the inte raction between th e C zech and Slo va k he teroste reotypes o f eac h othe r, will al so have to be ig no red . Gi ven these limitati o ns, thi s articl e beco mes a mere in - 0 Petr Pi'fh oda : ' Slovac i ces kyma ocima'. Svedect vf, Vol. I 3/52. 1976, p.637. T he arti cle was publi shed under the pseudonym Jan Prfbram. �SLOVAKIA 83 troducti o n to the issue - an introducti o n th at mi g ht mo ti vate othe rs to make a c loser and broader examin atio n. Three aspects - three stages In her exce ll e nt stud y of the co nfli c t betwee n S lova ks a nd Czec hs, Caro l Ska lnik Leff a na lysed the develo pme nt of a se nse of mutu a l resentment betwee n the two gro ups. 5 A lmost througho ut Czechos lovak hi sto ry, there was persiste nt o ppos it ion fro m the Czec hdo min ated politi ca l leade rship , bo th de mocrati c a nd Co m m uni st, aga in st ful fi llin g pro mi ses of a uto no my for the Slova k part of the co untry. On the one hand , thi s fa ilure to live up to the pro m ises of 19 18, 1945 and , some argue, 1968, led to the deve lo pme nt of a sense of betraya l in Slovak ia. On the ot her ha nd, in creas ing numbers of Czec hs ex pressed a nger over what they perce ived as S lovak in gratitude - Slovak ungratefuln ess fo r a ll the ass istance Czec hs affo rded Slovaki a. Moreove r, the way Slovak po liti c ians, in the Czec h perception, ex pl o ited tim es of crisis in Czec hos lovaki a to pro mo te the ir narrow nati o na li st ai ms ca used pa rti c ul ar rese ntm ent. T h is deeprooted mutu al resentme nt was, Leff arg ued in 1987 , o ne of th e ma in reasons why the co nfl ic t betwee n the Czec hs a nd S lovaks wo ul d rema in an unresolved pro bl e m.6 She was soon to be proven right. If o ne examines the Czec h view of S lovaki a, Slovaks and S lovak natio na li sm mo re broad ly than Leff, it is poss ible to ide nti fy two furth er impo rta nt aspec ts of the Czec h view. The firs t mi g ht be des cribed as big-brothe rl y co nce rn . Ma ny Czec h inte ll ect ua ls, po li tic ians and other Slova ko ph iles we re ge nuine ly interes ted in and conce rned abo ut th e we lfare and fate of the S lova ks. T he ir e ngagement was we ll in tended and , espec ia ll y before 19 18 but a lso later, of g reat he lp to Slova k inte ll ec tu a l a nd c ultu ra l li fe. However, no t in fre qu e ntl y d id thi s bi g brothe rl y co nce rn deve lop into a peda nt ic a nd 5 Carol Skalni k Leff: Na tional Conf7ict in Czechoslovakia. Princeton . 1987 , particu larly pp. 148-177. 6 Ibid .. p. 282 . �84 SLOVAKI A arroga nt pate rn a li sm . Not surpri s in g ly, thi s was not favo urabl y received in Slovak ia. T he seco nd aspec t of the Czec h view of S lova ki a a nd the S lovaks is best described as a lac k of aware ness. Average know ledge of po liti ca l a nd eco no mi c conditi o ns in S lova ki a a nd S lova k c ul ture was never ex tensive in the Czech Lands. Partic ul arl y impo rtant was th e w id espread ig norance of the c ultu ra l, soc ia l and es pec iall y re li g iou s diffe re nces betwee n th e average Czec h and Slovak. Hi sto ri ca ll y, thi s un aware ness was to a large degree a res ult of th e qui ck and re lati ve ly pa inl ess acce ptance by the Czec hs of a Czechos lovak ide ntity and the offic ia l ideo logy of the ex iste nce of a Czec hos lovak nati o n. Thi s lack of kn o wl edge often led to in sensiti vity to wards Slovak di stin cti ve ness. Czech po liti c ia ns thu s occas io na ll y made po litica l dec isio ns that suited co nditio ns in the Czec h La nds w itho ut proper concern fo r the di ffe rent impac t the ir po lic ies mi g ht have on Slovaki a. C learl y, th ere is no c lear-c ut di stinc ti o n betwee n the three analytica l aspects of the Czec h view of Slovaks and Slovak nationa li sm. A ll three were present to a greate r o r lesser ex tent th rougho ut the hi story of co ntacts between the two gro ups, and they overl ap. To a certa in degree, however, th ey re prese nt stages throu g h whi c h ma in strea m o pini o n in th e Czec h La nd s went as time progressed . Bi gbrothe rl y co ncern was c learly the most important facet in th e pre19 18 pe ri od and in the ear ly years of the First Repu bli c. The inte rwar pe ri od is most stro ng ly marked by the Prague leadership ' s ig norance of the parti c ul ar soc ia l, econo mi c and re li g io us conditi o ns in Slovak ia. After the dra mati c eve nts in 1938 and 1939, wi th the Mu ni c h Acco rd, S lova k a uto no my a nd la te r ' ind e pe nde nce ' durin g Wo rl d W ar II , Czec h rese ntme nt towards the Slovaks, a nd espec iall y S lovak nat io na li sm, beco mes in creas in g ly impo rta nt. Fi fty years later, thi s animos ity was to dec ide the fa te of the co mm on Czec h and Sl ovak state. �SLOVAKIA 85 Big Brother In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the overarching aim of Czech political parties was to force Vienna to acce pt increased autonomy for ' the hi storic lands ' (basically today 's Czech Republic) within the Habsburg Monarchy. The idea of a wider Slav cooperation within the Empire, particularly with th e Slovaks, had ga in ed stre ngth among Czech intell ec tual s from about the 1830s. However, after the success of Hung aria n nat ion ali sm in th e 1867 Ausgleich, Czech leaders became concerned not to a ntagoni se their potential allies in Budapest. The result was that 'Czec h politicians, thou gh sy mpathetic toward [the Slovaks], were re luctant to inte rfere on the ir behalf in Hungary, for this would constitute a violation of Hungary 's state rights and mi ght jeo pardize the Czech program that was based on Bohemia's hi storic state ri ghts. ' 7 The lack of broader politica l cooperation did not preve nt an increasing activism in favour of the c ulturall y oppressed Slovaks, especially among Czech intellectua ls. Whil e Czech culture and society , and Czech nationalism, deve loped rapidly in line with the rapid social and economic deve lopm e nts in the re lativel y liberal Austrian part of the Monarch y, the s itu ation for Slovak culture a nd nationali sm was much more difficult. Particularly after 1867, the Hun garian authoriti es led a heavy-handed assimilation policy (Magyarisation) towards the minorities in Hungary . Many Czech intellectuals expressed a deep sy mpathy for the fate of what they saw as their Slovak brethren in Hun gary and the Slovak national dema nd s. 8 Especially 7 Victor S. Mamatey: 'The Estab li shment of the Republic'. in Victor S. Mamatey and Radomfr Luza (eds.): A History or the Czechosl ovak Republic: 19 18- 1948. Princeton . 1973 , pp. 3-38 (9). 8 Under th e leadership of L'.udovit Stur. Jozef Miloslav Hurban and Michal Miloslav Hodza, a Slovak National Council , formed in Vienna on 16 September I 848 , gave Slovak nationalism its first clear political expression in form of the declaration De mands or the Slovak Nation. Thirteen years later, this time inspired mainly by Stefan Marko Daxner and Jan Francisci, an even clearer national programme was formulated in the 186 1 Memorandum or the Slovak Nation. See Dusan Kovac: Dejiny Slovenska. Prague. 1998. pp. I 19- 13 1. �SLOVAKIA 86 from th e 1880s , ac ti ve support fo r Slovak nati onali st intell ec tu als increased. As H. Gordon Sk ill ing wrote: 'from the leighteen] eighties on, there graduall y deve loped, among Czech cultu ra l and pro fes sional persons, a substanti al concern for the Slovaks and a desire to promote Czech and Slovak cooperati on. ' 9 M ost importantl y, the Czech interest in Sl ovaki a took an organised fo rm w ith th e creati on of Ceskoslovanska j edn ota (Czec hos lav Unity), in 1895 . Thi s organi sati on offered fin ancial support to Slovak publi cati ons, grants for Slovak students in the Czech L ands and promoted Czech in vestments in Slovaki a. 1° Furthermore, Ceskoslovan- ska jedn ota sought to spread in form ati on about Sl ovaki a and the Slovaks among Czechs. Thi s w illingness to help the Sl ovaks did not di sappear with the es tabli shment of th e Czec hoslovak state in 19 18. With the gradu al ' liberation ' of what the new Czechos lovak authoriti es considered to be 'S lovaki a' (no admini strati ve boundari es ex isted), a new admini strati on had to be establi shed. The old admini strati ve apparatu s in Hungary consisted almost exc lusive ly of M agyars (ethni c Hungari ans) or ass imil ated intelligenti fro m other cultures. M ost of these refu sed to work for the new Czechos lovak state. As there were far from sufficient educated, patri oti c Sl ovaks to take over the admini strati on, officials had to be imported from the Czech L ands. The first major immi grati on ca me in the spring of 19 19, when ra il way and postal workers in Sl ovaki a stopped work ing to protest again st the new regime. A t th e urgent request of K ornel Stodola, the official res ponsibl e for ra il ways, ' several th ousand patri oti c Czech 9 H . Gordon Ski lling: T. G. Ma.r nryk : Against the Current. 1882- 19 14. London . 1994. p.68 (hereafter Ski ll ing: Mw;ary k). JU Mi ros lav Pek nfk: ·K profi lu slovensko-ceskych vztahov pred prvou sve tovou voj - nou'. in Mi lan Podrimavsky and Dusan Kovac (eds.) : Slovensko ,w zaciatku 20. storocia (Spo /ocnost: stat a narod v siiradniciach doby). Brati slava. 1999. pp.9 1-9 3: Mari e L. Neudorn: ' Slovakia in the Czech Press at the Turn of the ineteen th and Twe nti eth Ce ntu ries' . in John Morison (ed. ): The Czech and Slovak Experience: Selected Papers fro m the Fourth World Cong ress for So viet and East European Studies. Harrogille. I 990. London . 1992. pp. 38-6 I. �SLOVAKIA 87 vo lunteers hurri ed fro m Bohe mi a a nd Mo ra via and at a mo me nt 's notice.' 11 Late r, me mbe rs of othe r profess ion a l groups ca me to take up vacant pos iti o ns in S lovaki a: sc hoo lteac hers, uni versity lec ture rs, gend armes, tax collectors a nd bureaucrats of a ll so rts. It has bee n estimated th at 50-60 000 Czec hs went to Sl ovaki a in 19 19-20 and about as many aga in in the years up to 1930. 12 Whil e undo ubtedl y moti vated partl y by the ava il ability of jobs, the w illin g ness to uproot and move to still un safe S lova ki a o n sho rt no ti ce does suggest at least some idea li sm amo ng the vo lunteers. In 19 19-20 there was still armed confli ct betwee n Hun gari an and Czechoslo va k fo rces fo r control o ve r Slovaki a. Even fo r an un e mpl oyed bu reaucrat it could no t have been an easy dec isio n to move there. Few Czec hs can be seen to have do ne mo re to ra ise sy mpathy fo r the Sl o vaks a nd the ir fa te th an To mas Garri g ue Masaryk. Bo rn in Hodonfn , in the Slov acko reg io n of Morav ia, Masaryk ca me fro m a reg ion o n the bo rde r betwee n Czec h and Sl ova k lang uage and c ul ture. Hi s fa ther was Sl ova k and hi s moth er a Germ ani sed C zec h. 13 Gi ven thi s bac kg round , the idea of Czec h and Slovak politica l cooperation mu st have co me easil y to M asaryk. In hi s po litica l li fe , he became one of the ma in propo ne nts of suc h cooperati o n among Czec h politi c ians. As a pro fessor at the C harl es Uni ve rs ity in Prag ue, he was the ma in so urce of in spirati o n fo r a g roup of Slovak stu dents who wo uld later make up an impo rta nt part of the po liti ca l e lite in Czechoslova ki a. Th ese stude nts , best know n as hlasisti, afte r th e name of the ir j o urn a l Hlas (Vo ice), beca me the ma in supporte rs of the C zechos lovak idea in Slovaki a. 14 Yet, despite hi s ge nuin e co nce rn for the S lovaks, M asary k 's speec hes and arti c les at times ex pressed a pa te rn a li st and arroga nt 11 R. W. Seton-Watson : A History of the Czechs and Slovaks. London. 1943. p.323. 12 Jan M ec hyr: Slovensko v Ceskoslovensku : Slovensko-ceske vztahy I 9 I 8- 199 I. Prague. 199 1. p.27. 1 '- K arel Capek: Hovory s T. G. M asa1y kem. Prag ue. 1947. pp.8-9, I I 8. 14 Vl ad im ir Bakos: Questions of the Nation in Slo va k Thoug ht. Brati slava. 1999. pp.1 3-57 . �88 SLOVAKIA attitude toward s Slovak culture and hi story . For instance, Masaryk rej ected calls for a plebisc ite in Slovakia after World War l, arg uin g that 'one cannot allow such a vote there, since the Slovaks have bee n so oppressed that they have never had the opportunity to think politically and they would not know in whose hand s to put th eir fate. ' 15 Even c learer was hi s comment on rece nt negotiation s with Slovak leaders in a letter to hi s dau ghter Alice, in 1924: 'It is necessary to be patient with the Slovaks - they are children, or rather spoilt brats.' 16 Given the relatively low educational level and minimal political experience of most Slovaks in 1918 , claims about their immaturity clearly had some justification in the first years after the establi shme nt of Czechoslovakia. However, Czech politicians continued throu ghout the ex istence of the Czechoslovak state to explain the lack of understanding for their policies in Slovakia as a sign of the politica l immaturity of Slovaks. Commenting on relations between Czech and Slovak exiles during World War II, for instance, Edvard Be nes informed the British Foreign Mini stry , that ' the re existed unity among the Czechs while the Slovaks, he conceded, because of their political immaturity, reflected the divided opinions at home.' 17 Also in the post-Communist period , Slovak nationalism , and especially its more radical expressions, were presented as clear signs of the political immaturity of the Slovaks. 'Everyone has the right to live his nineteenth century,' became a common remark in sarcastic comments. 18 " Quoted in Robert 8. Pynsent: ' Masaryk 's ·' Path of Democracy". Or: The Democrati c National Socialist Ideal'. in K atarina A. M . K ocourek (ed.): T. G. Masaiyk 1850- /937. A Collection of Essays to Commemora te the 150th Anniversary of the Birth of Thomas G. Masaryk . London, 2000, p. 35 -57 (41 ) (a specia l issue of Masa1yk Journal). 16 Quoted in Zbynek Zeman and Antonin Klimek: The Life of Eduard Benes: Cze- choslovakia in Peace and War. Oxford , 1997, p.5 I (herea fter Zeman and Klimek: Eduard Benes) . 17 Quoted ibid. pp.168-69. 18 Otto U lc: 'Czechoslovakia ' s Velvet Divorce ' , East European Quarterly, Vol.30/3, 1996, pp. 33 1-352 (340). �SLOVAKIA 89 From a Czech po int of view, the re lati o nship between the C zechs and Sl ovaks was c learl y a bi g broth er - littl e brother re lati o nship. The Czech partner in the Czec h-S lovak unio n was c learl y superior in po pulati o n (abo ut 2: I), and fo r most of the hi sto ry of the common state a lso in soc io-econo mic deve lo pment (for example, in education , car-ow nership , numbe r of te le pho nes , etc .). Czech nationa li sts could be proud of a ri c h nati o na l hi story a nd a hi g hl y deve lo ped Czec h c ulture, whil e Slovak nati o na li sts, for hi stori ca l reasons, had less to brag abo ut. The pi cture of Slovaki a as a less deve lo ped, less c ultured ' hinte rl and ' re ma in ed in Czec h po pul ar c ulture, parti c ul arl y in Prague, eve n after Slovak ia reac hed a basica ll y equ al leve l of soc io-econo mi c developme nt (abo ut I 980) . 19 As Petr Prfh oda, the pse udo nymo us Jan Prfbram, observed in the ex ile jo urna l Svedect vfin 1976: T he charac te ri sti c tra its of [the Czec h view of Slovaks a nd S lovaki a] have o ne co mmo n de no m inato r: an a lbe it unc lear, th o ug h multi face ted inferiority. Slovaks see m primiti ve, imm ature, emo ti o na ll y unrestra ined and uneducated [ ... ] The na ivety and lack of ex pe ri e nce amo ng those who come to the unknow n Czec h e nvironme nt is qui c kl y mi sunde rstood as stupidity. A Slovak is qu ite simpl y asc ribed a child 's menta li ty .20 Ignorance On the first page of its 27 Nove mber 1935 iss ue, in an artic le by the fa mo us Czec h jo urn a li st Ferdin and Pe routka, the influenti al journal Pl ftomnost (Presence) asked its readers: ' Do you know of anyone who unde rstand s Slova ki a?' 2 1 F ifty-fi ve years late r, Vac lav Have l' s ad visor Pe te r Hun c ik to ld the Ch a irm a n of th e Sl ova k N ati o na l 19 M il an K ucera and Zdenek Pavlfk: ·Czech and Slovak Demograph y ·, in Jiff M usil (ed.): The End or Czechoslovak ia. Budapest, 1995 , pp. 15-39. 20 Prfhoda: ·s Jovaci ceskyma oc ima' , p.643. 21 Ferd inand Peroutka: ·Nevfte o nekom , kdo rozu mf Slovensku?' , Prfto mnos t, Vo l. 12/47. 1935 , p. I . as reprod uced in Anton Ras la: Zastupova l som ceskoslovensky stat - vyznanie. Presov, 1999, p.268. �90 SLOVAKIA Co un c il , Fra nti se k Mi k losko, th at the Pres ide nt a lways had mi graines whe n he trave ll ed in Slovaki a. 22 Thi s was no t due to the c lim ate, but beca use Have l fe lt great unease abo ut not know ing Slovaki a. Such ac know ledge me nts refl ect the limited kno wl edge of Slovaki a and the Slovaks in the C zech Land s. As Prfhoda o bserved : ' Of all the ne ig hbo urin g nati o ns we know the S lovaks the leas t and ex press the least interest in the m and the ir nat io n. Admittedl y, we have been introdu ced th e best to th e Sl ova ks, but we kn ow th e leas t abo ut the m. ' 23 It is poss ible to ide nti fy severa l reasons fo r thi s lac k of know ledge and understanding. Partl y, it was a res ult of the somew hat confusin g nature of Slovak po liti cs . A lmost thro ugho ut the histo ry of Czechoslovaki a, the politica l e lite in Slova ki a was di vided o n the iss ue of inc reased se lf-governm e nt. Pe ri odi ca ll y, thi s inte rn a l stru gg le amon g S lovak po liti c ians over whethe r S lovaks did or did not want a uto no my mu st have been confu s in g eve n for th e most interested C zech o bserver. Gu stav Hu sak, fo r exampl e, contributed to muddlin g the picture of S lovak nati o na li sm : fro m be ing the prime propo ne nt o f th e federa li sati o n of Czec hos lova ki a befo re a nd durin g the 1968 ' Prag ue S prin g', Hu sak sudde nl y changed into a pro po ne nt of ce ntrali sati o n o nce he was in po wer in Prag ue. Thi s s ituation was exacerbated by the lac k of opportunity pro po nents of inc reased Sl ovak se lf- rul e had to prese nt thei r views to the Czech publi c. Genera ll y, the Slovak po liti c ians who most eas il y ga ined access to the pages of the Prag ue press were those in favo ur of centra li sed rul e. Furth e rmo re, the lac k of know ledge a nd unde rstand in g of S lovaki a a mo ng Czec hs was a res ult of a lac k of in terest in S lova k affa irs. Slovaki a was, at least in the in ter- war peri od, a po liti ca ll y less impo rta nt part of the country. Even if sy mpathy fo r the S lovaks had pl ayed a ro le in the suppo rt C zec h po li tic ians gave the pl ans fo r an inde pe nde nt Czec hos lova ki a, th e re we re o ther impo rt a nt reaso ns 22 Frantsiek M iklosko: Cas stretnutf. Brati slava, 1996, p.44. 23 Pffhoda: ·s tovaci ceskyma oci ma', p.643. �91 SLOVAKIA why they wanted a union . The main ' problem ' in Czech hi story has been the question of the Czechs ' position as a small nation surrounded by Germans. In Slovakia and the Slovaks, Czech leaders found a doub le solution to their problem. As a people, the Slovaks represented a biological reinforcement to the Czech , renamed the Czechoslovak, nation , making it the majority nation in the new state. They thus helped legitimate Czech(oslovak) domination of Czechoslovakia. (One should not forget that there were about 50 per cent more German than Slovak speakin g citizens (3 versus 2 million ) in interwar Czechoslovakia.) As a territory . Slovakia formed a bridge out of the German encirclement towards Ru ssia, which before 1917 was perceived as a rival of Germany and protector of the Slavs, and towards Czechoslovakia ·s all y Romania. For those perceivin g the state from such a ' Great-Czech ' point of view, Czechos lovakia was merely 'a reestabli shment of th e Czech state, reinforced by the Slovak territorie s, which were so weak and neglected that it was simply not necessary to see them as a separate entity. ' 24 The most important reason for the lack of knowl edge and understandin g of Slovakia among Czechs was , however. the uncritical acceptance of the Czechoslovak idea by most Czechs. In th e interwar yea rs, the Czechoslovak ideo logy was a pillar ce ntral to the very existence of the state. Even Masaryk argued th at ' there is no such thing as a Slovak nation 25 paganda ' . l- .. I; that is an invention of Hungarian pro- In Slovakia, on the other hand, the idea of one Czecho- slovak nation met res istance, [i]n the minds of th e Czechs, the notions of 'Czec h' and ' Czechoslovak' had blended into one by th e end of the Second World War at the latest. A significa nt conseq uence of thi s psycho- soci al operation was the removal of the Slovaks as a distinct ethni c entity from the Czech field of vis ion . The Slovaks eventuall y began to be perceived as H L.:.ubomfr Liptak: Slovensko v 20. storocf. Bratisl ava. 1998. 2nd edition. p. 128 . 15 Pynse nt : ' Masaryk ·s "Pa th of Democracy''". p.41. �92 SLOVAKIA part of the same nat iona l organi sm - almost as the advocates of the Czechoslovak concept would like to have it only thi s organi sm was not Czechoslovak but Czech.26 The net result of thi s process was that the social, c ultura l and reli g ious differences betwee n the Czechs and Slovaks became invisible to the majority of Czechs who never learned to kn ow the Slovaks and Slovakia directly. Thi s aga in led to the anticipatio n that Slovaks would have a s imil ar world view and would react in the sa me way as Czechs to events and po li c ies. The co nsequences of such anticipation varied over time. In the inter-war period , it was the insensitive attitude of the new regime towards the Catholic Church that was most important. Czech nation alism had the Hu ss ite peri od as its Golden Age; a Golden Age that was termin ated by the Battle of the White Mountain in 1620 and the following violent co unterReform ation in Bohemia and , to a somew hat lesser degree, Morav ia. With the sec ulari sing impact of the industriali sation and urbani sati on of the Czech Lands in the nineteenth century, thi s gave Czech nationalism a not only sec ul ar, but often an openly anti-Catho lic edge. 27 Although the Protestant minority was proportionately bi gger in Slovakia than in the Czech Land s, there was no clear connection between anti-Catholici sm and nation ali sm even amon g Protestant Slovak nat ionali sts. On the contrary, one direction within the Slovak nati ona l move ment was closely co nnec ted to the Catholic fa ith . The Catholic national ists, led from the early twentieth century by Andrej Hlinka, were more skeptica l of cooperation with the Czec hs than were the hlasi sti. Man y Czech politicians and intellec tu a ls were, from the point of view of Slovak Catholics, dangerously radical liberals, if not atheist anti-Catholics. 28 When the declaration of Czechoslovak independence on 28 October 1918 was followed by a wave of 26 Zdenek Suda: ' Slovakia in Czech Nati onal Consciousness ' , in Musil (ed.): The End of Czechoslovakia, p.1 39- 155 ( 11 8) (hereafter Suda: ' Slovakia ' ). 27 R. W. Seton-Watson: A History of the Czechs and Slovaks. London, 1943, p.33 1. 28 Jan Rychl fk : Cesi a Slovaci ve 20. stoletf: Cesko-sl ovenske vztahy , 19 14- 1945. Bratislava, 1997, p.38 (hereafter Rychlfk: Cesi a Slo vac1). �SLOVAKIA 93 anti-Catholic gestures in the Czech Lands, the worst fears of the Slovak Catholics were reali sed . As lsmo Nurmi wrote: ' if the anti-Catholic mood was fashionable in the Czech lands, it was not so in Slovak ia and even less so when a numbe r of desecration s of reli g iou s c ult objects, churches, statues, crosses etc. were committed [ ... ] also in Slovakia [by] civil servants and particularly the Czechoslovak Army.' 29 The attempt to create a Czechoslovak national hi story and tradition with the Hussite era as pivotal was a clear sign of the lac k of understanding among Czech (and some Slovak) leade rs for the position of the Catholic Church in Slovakia. Masaryk 's official ' inclusion ' of Slovakia in the Hu ss ite tradition on the basis of Jan Ji skra 's ' crusade ' into Slovakia was not only hi storically dubiou s, but also, and not surpri sin gly, rejected by the Slovak Catholic clergy. As Suda wrote: ' To the Catholic majority of the Slovaks, among whom Catholicism had a very pronounced conservative tin ge typical of a pre-modern society , a common programme with the Czechs based on the traditions of the Protestant Reformation must have been almost an anathema. ' 30 After 1948, with the industriali sation of Slo vaki a unde r Communi st rul e, the religious differen ces be tween the Czech a nd Slovak parts of the common state were so mew hat diffused. Albeit a clear scepticism towards 'Czech liberali sm ' was visible in Christian democratic circles in Slovakia also after the collapse of Communism, another as pec t of the Czech ignorance of Slovak affairs beca me more important. As noted above , very many Czechs saw Czechoslovakia and the ' Czechoslovak nation ' as their state and nation , quite often interpreted as a Czech state a nd nation that included the Slovaks. After World War II , the rec reation of Czechoslovakia was acco mpanied by an official recog niti on by all political leaders, albeit some Czec h politicians were reluctant to do so, of the ex iste nce of two 29 lsmo Nurmi: Slo vakia - A Playground for Na tionalism and National Identity. 191 8- /920 : M anifestations of the Na tional Identity of Slovaks. Hel sinki. 1999. pp. 92-93. 30 Suda : ·Slovakia ' . p.11 5. �SLOVAKIA 94 fo un d in g nati ons in the co untry . Thi s princ ipl e was reaffirmed with the federa li sati on of 1968. Despite thi s offic ial recogniti on, there was ve ry littl e understanding a mong Czec hs of S lovak atte mpts to promote the ir separate ide ntity. Proba bl y the best kn ow n exa mpl e of S lova k po li tic ians ' dema nd s fo r 'v isibility and equ a lity ' fo r S lovaki a w ithin Czec hos lovaki a was the stru gg le fo r the name of the federati on in the sprin g of 1990 . Th e so-ca ll ed ' hy phe n-wa r ' sta rted w he n new ly e lec ted Pres ide nt Vac lav Have l suggested c ha ng in g the offic ial name of the Republic, the Czechoslovak Soc iali st Republic, by mere de leti on of the word ' Sociali st' . Whil e fo r mos t Czec hs thi s so luti on mu st have see med natural , it ran into oppos iti on in S lovaki a? A Sl ovak co unter-proposa l, the Czec ho-Slovak Re public, or just Czec ho-Slovaki a, a name that made Slovaki a more vi s ibl e to the world , was, however, not acceptabl e to most Czec h po liti c ians. The reasons given fo r thi s were that th e hyphe n had been used in the name of the Second Republi c (1938 -39, th at is, afte r the Muni c h Accord), a nd beca use ' C zec ho' (Ces k o) was not consi de red a pro pe r word in the Czech language. As one leading comme ntator compl ained in Lidove noviny: ' We in the Czec h Land s perce ive the insiste nt de mand of Sl ovaki a fo r a di vidin g line in the na me of the Re public as tac tl ess and coarse. " 2 Onl y afte r two mo nth s o f de bate in the three nati onal asse mbli es (the Czec h, Slova k and Federa l) and the mass medi a was a compromi se fo und : The Czec h and Slovak Federa l Republic. Have l quic kl y rea li sed th at he had made a mi stake by not consul ting politic ians fro m both the Czec h a nd Sl ova k Re pu b li cs before making hi s suggestion public. In a n atte mpt to rec ti fy the s itu ati on the hospitali sed Have l sent a le tter to the Federal Asse mbl y in February, where he stated : -' ' M il an Su tovec: Semi6za aka pol i tik um a/ebo "Pom lckov;-i vojna ". Brati slava, 1999, pp. 174- 196 (hereafter Sutovec: Pomlckova vojna). -' 2 Ji ff Hanak: 'Nespraved li ve a tedy neprijatelne' . Lidove Noviny. 28 M arch 1990. p.l. �SLOVAKIA 95 We a ll kn o w th at thi s hyphe n, whi ch fo r a ll Czechs seems ridi c ul o us, unnecessary and ugly, is mo re tha n just a hyphe n. In thi s hyphe n o ne ca n find severa l decades, if not ce ntu ries of th e hi sto ry of the S lo va k nati o n [ ... ] The Sl o vak nation is ri g htfull y tryin g to fin d its ide ntity, fo r reason s Czec hs probabl y do n ' t understa nd , eve n if they o ught to understand them.33 Resentment Exampl es of Czec h skepti c ism a nd resentment to ward s Slo vak nati o na li sm ca n be fo und as earl y as the middl e of th e nine teenth century. From the late 1840s, a majo rity of Slovak inte ll ectua ls ado pted the new codifi cati o n of th e S lovak lang uage , as publi shed in 1846 by Cudovft Stur, as a pl atfo rm fo r the Sl ovak national programme. This met w ith strong res istance fro m Czech and Slovak inte llectua ls promotin g Czec h-Sl ovak unity: they saw the Slovaki zed versio n of Hu ss ite Bible Czec h used by ma ny Slovak inte llec tua ls until then, as the clearest bo nd between Czechs and Slovaks.34 If in the inte rwar years Czec hos lovak leade rs cons idered Slovak nati o na li sm a pro bl e m, it was ma inl y after 1938 th at o pe nl y hostil e attitudes toward s it e merged. The ex pl oi tatio n by Slovak nati o na li sts of the weakness of the Czec hos lovak reg ime after the Munich cri sis to push trou gh thei r de mands fo r a uto no my, c ulmin atin g in the ac ceptance by the Slovak leade rs of German de mand s fo r Slovak indepe ndence in M arc h 1939, was conside red a stab in the back by most Czechs. 35 Durin g the Second World W ar, Ed vard Be nes, the C zechoslovak Pres ide nt-in -ex il e, was o ne of the sharpest cri tics of what he considered the Slovak be traya l. He was ' o bstin ate in defending the Czec hos lovak ca use: its betraya l by the Slovaks mattered more to him than the grow ing press ure from Moscow. He be li e ved th at the " As quoted in Sutovec: Pomlckova vojna, pp.269-27 1. 34 Sk illing: Masary k, p. 69. 35 Petr Pffhoda: ' M utual Perceptions in Czech-S lovak Relationshi ps ', in M usil (ed .): The End of Czechoslovakia. pp. 128- 138 ( 134 ). �96 SLOVAKIA Slovak heresy undermined the ve ry fo undations of the state, and Czechoslovaki sm was for him a part of the foundations. ' 36 Throu ghout the war, Benes and other Czech politi cians fought for the reestabli shment of the First (th at is, pre-Muni ch) Republi c. Most Slovak politici ans, howe ver, including former Czechos lovak Prime Minster Milan Hodza, con sidered thi s a less th an optim um solution. 37 Only reluctantly , given th e situation in Slovakia after the Slovak National Upri sing in the autum n of 1944, was Benes forced to accept a de facto asymmetric federalisation of post-war Czechoslo va ki a. However, despite previou s agreements, most importantl y the Kosice Government Programme, drafted by the first pro visional government after the country was partly -liberated from the East, the question of Slovaki a's position within the country cont inued to divide the Czec h and Slovak non-Comm uni st parties after the war. The willin gness of the Czec h democratic parti es to coo perate with the Communi sts in reducin g the powers of the Slovak nation al organs , cruci all y after the 1946 elections, contrib uted to undermining the position of the Democratic Party in Slo va ki a. The Czechos lovak Communi st Party was thu s abl e to exploit ' the anti -Sl ovak nati onali sm among Czech political parties and [ ... ] the isolated position of the Slovak democrats. ' 38 Thi s clearly weakened the democrats' ability to oppose the Communi sts' increasing political power in the country. During and after 1968 , the negati ve view of Slo vak nationali sm and Slovakia in the Czech L ands was reinforced. After the Soviet-led in vas ion on 2 1 Au gust 1968, 'sociali sm with a human face ' was gradually di smantled and replaced by ' norm ali sation '. Th e only maj or reform of the Prague Spring to survive was the dec ision to federalize Czechoslovakia. In Sl ovaki a thi s decision w as generall y interpreted 36 37 Zeman and Klimek : Eduard Bene{ p.203. Milan Hodza : Federarion in Cenrra l Europe: Renections and Reminiscences. London. 1942, pp.93-94. 38 Ji rf K ocian: ·Narodnf soc ialis te a slovenska otazka 1945- I 948 ". in Michal Bar- novsky (ed.) : Od dikratury k diktature. Brati slava. 1995 . pp.57-65 (6 I ). (hereafter K oc ian: ' Narodnf socialiste') �SLOVAKIA 97 as a more just organi sation of the common state. In the Czech Lands, however, many saw federalisation as a further example of the Slovak nationali sts' skill in drawing advantages from Czechoslovakia's mi sfortune. The fact th at the new party leade r and late r Pres ident of Czechoslovakia, Gu stav Hu sak, was Slovak, also contributed to the negative picture of Slovakia and Slovaks. As Petr Pithart wrote: the Czech public was di sappointed, even di sg usted, by the Slovaks ' ex peri e nce of havin g ga ined sati sfac tion with federalization; at best, it was seen as foolishness a nd at worst, as blind se lfi shness and eve n betrayal. ( ... ) in the Czec h Lands there was an increasing ly obvious di sg ust for the regime and for the Slovaks, as the ones through whom normali zation was allegedly introduced and carried out. 39 A s ign of the growing irritation with and resentment toward s Slovak nationa li sm and Slovaks in ge ne ral in the Czech Lands, was the increas in g ly popul a r de mand that Czech taxpayers should not have to subsidi se the ungrateful Slovaks. Already in 1933 Czechoslovak Prime Min ster Ja n Malypete r had rejected the demand for Slovak autonomy on the grounds that Slovakia would not be able to pay its way . In the Czech press, headlines read along the lines: ' We are paying for Slovakia ' .40 Thi s be lief that the Czechs were subsidis in g th e Slovaks was observed also by Prfhoda forty-three years late r: ' In the Czech Lands the view of Slovak parasiti sm [parazitismu s] is common and it is formulated more or less like thi s: we Czechs are payin g for the Slovaks. ' 41 The Czechoslovak Communist Party was committed to so lvin g the probl e m of Slovak nation alism, which it interpreted as a mainly eco nomic iss ue , through equ ali zat ion of the standard of li ving bet- 39 Petr Pithart: ' Towards a Shared Freedom ' , in Mu sil (ed.): Th e End of Czechoslovakia.pp.20 1-222 (206). 40 Vi ctor S. Mamatey: ' The Development of Czechoslovak Democ racy ', in Mamatey and Luza (eds.) : A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, pp.99-166 ( 15 1). 41 Prfhoda: "S lovac i ces kyma ocima', p.647. �SLOVAKIA 98 wee n the Czech and Slovak parts of the co unty. Economic transfers, parti cul arly through a higher level of in vestment in Sl ovaki a were, therefore, considered important. They continued even during the di ffic ult years in the 1970s and 1980s, but were kept secret, probabl y to avoid un favo urable reactions in the Czech L ands. After the co llapse of Communi sm, opposition to w hat was popularl y referred to as the Czech ' money pipeline' (p enezovod) to Slovak ia was quickl y made into a politi cal demand. In the first formal ro und of negoti ation s on th e future of the fe derati on after the co ll apse of Communi sm, in Lnare in April 1990, the Czech delegati on demanded a halt to Czec h subsidies to Slovaki a.42 From Czech to Czechoslovak nationalism and back As noted earlier, the Czechos lov ak directi on within Czech poli ti cs was by no means dominant pri or to W orld W ar I. Czec h nationali sts concentrated mainl y on defending and enhancing Czech autonomy w ithin th e Habsburg M onarchy. With the success of the Czec hoslovak idea in the Entente capitals in 19 17-1 8, however, most Czec h nati onali sts quite quickl y became convinced Czec hos lovak nati onali sts; Czech nati onali sm was ex panded to include th e Sl ovaks, the Czec hs' ' little bro ther ' in Hungary. Cultura ll y and economi ca ll y wea k, the Slovaks posed no threat to either Czech culture or politica l and economic dominati on of the new state. A nd after all , as M asaryk himse lf pointed out, the Slovaks were merely Czec hs w ith a slightly di fferent hi story. Th e attachment o f Czech politi cians to the Czech os lovak idea ca n be clearl y see n after W orld W ar II. In 1968 , a document supposedly written by members of th e (Czec h) Nation al Soc iali st Party 4 in I 946 was pub I ished in the Slova k press . ' Its authors argued th at the bes t way to so lve the problem of Slovak nati onalism was fo rced ass imil ati on of the Sl ovaks into good Czec hoslovaks. Whil e seri ous • • 2 BBC Summa1y of World Broadcast. EE/0738 B/2. 13 Apri I 1990. 3 T he document was first publi shed in Vac lav Kral: Cestou k tinoru, Prague, I 956, but attrac ted relati ve ly little attention until reproduced in the mass medi a in 1968. �99 SLOVAKIA doubts exist as to th e authenticity of thi s ' Memorandum on Slovakia' , most hi storian s seem to agree that the idea of turnin g the Slovaks into good Czechoslovaks was not alien to certain leading Czech politicians at the time. 44 The reaction to what was perceived as the Slovak betraya l of 1938-39 was increased Czechoslovak nationali sm. However, during the Communist period , a nd particul ar ly after 1968 , Czech nationalism gradually gained supporters in the Czech Lands . As Prfhoda wrote in 1976: 'I am not sure how thin gs are in Slovakia, but among Czechs the concept of a com mon state is being re-eva luated these days . I have eve n heard : let the Ru ss ia ns make Slovakia into a union republic or something and leave us in peace!' 45 Obviou sly , ne ither Czech nor Slovak separat ism was politically acceptable durin g Communist rul e. After th e 'Velvet Revo lution' , however, influe ntial vo ices soo n e merged in the Czech Land s questioning the union with the Slovaks. As earl y as the beginning of May 1990, in the aftermath of the hyphe n war, the Czech writer Ludvfk Vaculfk, the author of the 'Two thousand words' manifesto in 1968, wrote a sharpl y worded articl e in Litenimf noviny. 46 ' W e Czechs have a great debt to the Slovaks,' Yaculfk argued. This debt was due to the fact that the Czechs had happily made Slovakia ' theirs' without takin g into account what it meant to be Slovak. Through their behaviour, however, the Slovaks had made it difficult for the Czechs to appreciate thi s debt. Th e Czechs had g ive n the Slovaks the ir industry and inte lli gentsia, so mething that had only caused the Slovaks to ' until thi s day complain about the qua lity of these supplies'. The Czechs had give n the Slovaks a way out of defeat as a separate state during World War II. Even Communism , brou g ht to Slovakia by Czechs afte r the war, had g ive n the Slovaks more in material terms than it had to the Czechs. When the Czechs then tri ed to ease th e die- 44 See Koc ian: ' Narodnf soc iali ste' . passim: Rychlfk: Ce.si II Slo vaci. pp. 54-55: ·Na okraj diskusie: 0 tzv. Slovenskom memoranda Cs. narodne sociali stickej strany ', Nase snahy . Vol. I 9/2. 1983. p. 9. 45 Prfhoda: ' Slovaci ceskyma ocima ' . p.653. 41 ' Ludvik Vaculfk: ' Nase slovenska otazk a', Litenimf noviny. Vol.1 /5, 1990. p.2. �SLOVAK IA 100 tatorship during 1968, the Slovaks saw thi s as a Czech matter and instead forced through 'autonomy '. For this they escaped with lighter puni shment during the era of ' normali sation .' Now aga in , after the col lapse of Communism, when Czechs were trying th eir utmost finally to defeat the dictatorial regime , the Slovaks were 'coming with their prestige demands'. ' Do we need thi s?' he asks rhetorically and then concludes : We have found ourse lves with a thankless task in th e fate of the Slo vaks, and I think th at we should end it without se lf-pity - more with a smil e into th e mirror. [ ... l Why should the Slovaks ha ve to force out of us, centimetre by ce ntimetre, somethin g that they can have in one go? By separating from the Slovaks , purely of our ow n volition , we " lose" - judging from experience to date - economic losses. Politicall y we lose th e Hungarian and Ruth ene problem s. We put another border between us and th e Soviet Union. 47 At th e time of hi s writ ing, Yaculfk ' s recommendation th at th e Czec hs should dispense with the Slovaks accorded with neither public nor political opinion in the Czech Republic. At that stage not even the most radical Czech politician s were promoting divi sion of the state. Gradually , however, the need to resolve the probl em of th e common state w ith the Slovaks once and for all became pressing. As Yaculfk observed in December of 1990: 'Public opinion poll s show that 75 percent of Czechs are said to favour a common state with the Slovaks. Had one, on the other hand , asked if we should let the Slovaks go, just as many would probabl y have answered " yes" to thi s as we ll. ' 48 In Slovakia, the question of the statu s of the Slovak Republic within the Czech and Slovak state became a centra l political topic . 47 Ibid. The double quotation marks arou nd -- Jose" were added to make th e irony more vi sible. The original tex t is : ' Od loucenfm od Slovaku. jez j e vyhradne v nasf vu li. ztratfme - souzeno dosavadnf zkusenostf - ekonomicke ztraty. • 48 Ludvik Yaculfk: ' M ec iar mozna odejde' . Litenimf noviny . Vol. I /39. I 990. p.2. �SLOVAKIA 101 Sl ovak politicians began to co mpete over w ho co uld present a programme th at would benefit and pro mote Slovaki a the most. Thi s led to a gradual radi ca li sati on of Slovak demands in the negoti ation s on the future of the federati on. Such radica li sati on in turn provoked a voc iferou s reaction in the Czech L ands. Th e influenti al Czec h j ournal R esp ekt refl ec ted th e growin g antagoni sm toward s Sl ovaki a in th e Czec h L ands. Headlines from the Spring of 1992 such as ' The supreme Slovak irrespon sibility' ( 17 Febru ary, p.2), ' B alkan model on the hori zo n: how long w ill the Czech-Slovak statu s quo las t?" (24 Febru ary, p.2) and 'A bsurd parliamentary drama: who saves Slovak ia from sovereignty?' (6 A pril , p.2) ev ince an increas ingly criti ca l view o f Sl ovak politi cs . In the issue th at co incided with the electi ons of 8 June, the criticism ca me to its logica l co nclu sion . Peter Schutz, Respekt 's (Sl ovak-Hungari an) correspondent in Slovak ia, wrote in the arti cle ' Slovaki a adheres to nati onal soc iali sm': ' The shameful result of thi s electi on formul ated onl y one alternati ve - either lMec iar 's party] HZDS disintegrates, or the CSFR. ' 49 Vl adimfr Ml ynar ex pressed the same message in the subtitle o f hi s arti cle in the same issue: 'A lone into Euro pe or together into the Balkans'. 50 Parti cul arl y the politi ca l ri ght in th e Czec h Lands increasingly saw Slovaki a as an obstac le on the road ' back ' to Europe. After the 1990 elec ti ons, th e ri ght had graduall y strengthened its pos ition among the Czech elec torate. In Slovaki a, on the other hand , it was the more reform- scepti ca l and patri oti c parti es on the politica l left that had enjoyed greater success. Gi ven th e spec ial minority veto of both the Czec h and Slovak groups of deputies in th e House of Nati ons of the Federal Assembl y, a left-patri otic maj ority in Slovaki a was a worry ing prospec t for the Czech proponents of radi ca l reform s. A month before th e parliam entary election s in June 1992, V aclav 09 Peter Sch utz: ·s tovensko sa prihlasilo k narodnemu socializmu - Pos lcdne zvone- nie pre federaciu ·, Respekt. 8- 14 June 1992, p.2. ~ V lad imir Ml ynar: ·v Cechac h tes ne vftezstvf prav ice - lecne na Balka n·. Respekt, 8- 14 June 1992. p.3. Sarni do Evropy nebo spo- �102 SLOVA KI A Kl aus made it c lear that if a fu ncti o na l federa ti o n was not poss ible after the e lect io ns, he and his partners were ' ready to create a mec hani sm for a q uick, c ivili sed and prob le m-free div isio n of the state. ' 51 Conclusion By the late summ er of 1992, th e do min ant view of Slovak ia in C zec h po liti cs had, in a se nse, co me full c irc le to co inc ide with the views th at preva il ed pri o r to W o rl d W ar I. Fro m hav ing bee n a strateg ica ll y less attrac ti ve partne r in the seco nd ha lf of the nineteenth ce ntury, Sl ovaki a beca me a strateg ic asset in the firs t ha lf of th e twenti eth . Afte r W o rld W ar II , however, S lovak ia a nd th e S lovaks gradu a ll y lost the ir strateg ic impo rt a nce for the Czec hs. The large Ge rm an mino rity in the Czec h Lands was ex pe ll ed in the firs t years after the war, taking the edge off the Ge rman threat. Furthermore, fo r C zec h democ rats, the Communi st co up of Febru ary 194 8 put an e nd to a ll ideas of seekin g sec urity a nd integrati o n in the East, th ro ugh Slova ki a. In stead , they now turn ed exc lu sive ly to the West: to th e US , NATO . the E uro pean Co mmunity and eve n the o ld ri va l, Ge rmany. At the th resho ld of the twenty- first ce ntury, Slova ki a, w ith its c umbe rso me soc ia li st eco no my, its po puli st nati o na li sm , and its pro bl e ms with Hun ga ry over the Hungari an mino rity in Slovaki a and the G abc fk ovo- Nagy maros da m projec t o n the Da nube, aga in became a strateg ic burden. The Czec hos lovak traditi o n and adhe re nce to the Czec hos lovak idea were still strong in the Czec h Lands. Tho ugh the Czec h politica l ri ght had the suppo rt of gro ups suc h as The Czec h Initi ati ve, whic h gathered aro und 50,000 sig natures in favo ur of Czec h independe nce in fo ur days in June 1992 in Prague, most Czec hs were still in favo ur of a co mm o n state w ith the Slova ks. 52 Thu s Kl aus and hi s partners co uld not push throug h a break-up w itho ut so me effort. Co nsequ ent ly, as Abby Innes wrote: ' Kl a us preferred a strategy o f shi ftin g res- 51 As cited in Marian Lesko: Meciar a meciarizm us: polit ik bez .~kruptif" politika bez zabran. Bratis lava. 1997, p.78. 52 BBC Summary of World Broadcast. EE/ 14 12 B/5. 20 June I 992. �SLOVAKIA 103 po ns ibility fo r the confli c t e ntire ly onto the Slovak side and c la imed th at it was now "ev ide nt th at votes fo r the HZ DS are votes fo r th e di visio n o f the state". ' 53 Give n th at th e do min a nt Czec h im age of S lovak nati o na li sm, a nd of Vl adim ir Mec iar, was negative, Kl aus was lucky in hav in g hi s tas k made eas ier. Hi s ca mpa ig n was furth er ass isted by th e oppos iti o n of the leading S lova k parti es to th e ree lection of Pres ide nt Vac lav Have l in Jul y. Hav ing fa il ed to be ree lec te d , Have l res ig ned pre m ature ly whe n th e Slo va k Nation a l Co unc il passed a large ly sy mbo li c dec larati o n of sovere ig nty o n 17 Jul y. Have l, prev io us ly o ne of the leading pro po ne nts of the co mmo n state, now le nt hi s support to a di visio n of the state. 54 The first day of Janu ary 1993 saw the creati o n of two new states: the C zec h Re publi c and the Sl ovak Re publi c. Of the two, the Czec h Republi c c learl y adopted the mantl e of successor to Czec hos lovaki a. T he new Czec h state had the sa me capita l, the same fl ag (in breac h o f an earli e r agree me nt) and the sa me pres ide nt. C zec h co mpani es and even po liti ca l parties fo r a lo ng time ke pt the word 'Czechos lovak ' in the ir na me (for exampl e, the S in CSA, Czec h[os lovak] A irlin es). Mos t things re ma ined as they had bee n, exce pt w ith o ut the Slovaks. As Vaculfk had po inted o ut so po ig nantl y in 1990: ' Whe n th e "Federati o n" started crac king in its fo undatio n, I got the idea fo r a new , in spi rin g ly o ptimi sti c so luti o n: whe n S lov aki a breaks away there w ill be no o ne to preve nt us fro m ca lling o ur state Czec hos lovak ia ... ' 55 " A bby Innes: ' T he Breakup of Czechos lovak ia: T he Impact of Part y Deve lopment on the Separation of the State· . Eust European Politics and Society. Vol. I I /3. 1997. pp. 393-435 (424). '" I va n L amper and V ladimir Ml ynar: ·skoncila ceskoslovenska statnost: Rozhovor s pos lednfm prezi dentem CSFR Vac lave m Havlem ' . Respekt. 20-27 July 1992. p.4. " Vac ulfk: ' Meciar mofoa odejde'. p.2 . � 81 SLOVAKIA From Bratr nas to At'jdou Slovakia, the Slovaks and Slovak Nationalism seen from Prague 1 Paa! Sigurd Hilde The Velvet Divorce between the Czech and Slovak parts of the Czech and Slovak Federal Repub lic (CSFR) was a political undertaking. All public opinion polls taken in the period 1990-1992 showed a clear majority in favour of a common state among both Slovaks and Czechs.2 The decision to divide the country came as a result of a compromise between two political parties - or more specifically, between two politicians: Vaclav Klaus of the (Czech) Civic Democratic Party and Vladimfr Meciar of the (Slovak) Movement for a Democratic Slovakia. While both Klaus and Meciar argued that they wanted to preserve the common state, their visions of such a Czech and Slovak state were so disparate that an agreement to differ was the only possibility. Most detailed studies of the break-up agree that if either of them , Meciar or Klaus, were to be identified as 'more guilty' in promoting the break-up, it would not be the Slovak nationali st Meci ar, but the Czech ' Thatcherite ' Klaus. 3 Ultimately, what sank the good ship Czechoslovakia was that the Czech captain, the ' A sli ghtly different version of thi s arti cle was originall y published in Norwegian in Nordisk @stforum, Yol . 15/2. 200 I , pp.5-16. 2 See. for example, Sharon Wolchik: 'The Pol itics of Ethnicity in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia', fast European Politics and Society, Vol. 8/ 1994. I , pp.153-188. 3 See, for example, Abby Innes: Czechoslovakia: The Short Goodbye. London. 200 I , particularly pp. 176-2 19. �SLOVAKIA 82 o ne that had a lw ays fo ught the hardest to keep it a fl oat, gave the order to sc uttle. The a im of thi s paper is to prov ide a n in sig ht into the deve lopme nt of the vi e ws on Slovaki a, Slovaks and Slova k nati o na li sm in th e Czec h Land s: fro m the ideas unde rl y in g the creati o n of Czech oslova ki a in 19 18 to those leading to the di sso luti o n of th at country in 1992. Natu ra ll y, the re is no c lear 'Czec h view ' of matters re lating to Sl ova ki a. Even if one di srega rds indi vidu a l o pini o ns and con ce ntrates o n what mi g ht be ca ll ed c ultura l ' heteroste reotypes' (v ie ws of the othe r), o ne w ill still find , fo r in stance, strong reg io na l differe nces w ithin the Czech La nd s. Any ana lys is of the ' Czec h view ' will thu s, eve n in the best case, be a probl e mati c prese ntati o n o f e lu sive collecti ve attitudes. Furthe rm ore, give n the absence of publi c opinio n surveys fo r most of the peri od studi ed , it is imposs ibl e to asce rta in ho w representati ve suc h attitudes were. The pi cture of Sl o va ki a presented here will be based to a large deg ree o n the attitudes ex pressed by leadin g po liti c ia ns, jo urn a li sts a nd o th er ' opini o n-fo rmers' in the Czec h Lands. For thi s reaso n the arti c le will present o pini o ns mo re typi ca l of Prague tha n. fo r in stance, Mo ra via, whe re co ntacts w ith Slovaks a nd Sl ovaki a we re more direct. Ho we ve r, as an earli er study , simil ar to thi s, argued , ' in Prag ue and in the C zec h Land s in genera l there are few opportunities to ga in a broad , direct impress ion of Slovaks, and the Czec h view of the Slovak is the refore the res ult of tra nsmitted , dedu ced impress io ns. ' 4 Whe n attitudes are acqui red ma inl y indirec tl y, opini o n-formers pl ay an important rol e. Gi ve n the limited scope of thi s arti c le, th e many theoreti cal and methodo log ica l pro bl e ms of suc h a stud y ca nno t be e xamined. Interestin g a nd impo rtant aspec ts, suc h as the inte raction between th e C zech and Slo va k he teroste reotypes o f eac h othe r, will al so have to be ig no red . Gi ven these limitati o ns, thi s articl e beco mes a mere in - 0 Petr Pi'fh oda : ' Slovac i ces kyma ocima'. Svedect vf, Vol. I 3/52. 1976, p.637. T he arti cle was publi shed under the pseudonym Jan Prfbram. �SLOVAKIA 83 troducti o n to the issue - an introducti o n th at mi g ht mo ti vate othe rs to make a c loser and broader examin atio n. Three aspects - three stages In her exce ll e nt stud y of the co nfli c t betwee n S lova ks a nd Czec hs, Caro l Ska lnik Leff a na lysed the develo pme nt of a se nse of mutu a l resentment betwee n the two gro ups. 5 A lmost througho ut Czechos lovak hi sto ry, there was persiste nt o ppos it ion fro m the Czec hdo min ated politi ca l leade rship , bo th de mocrati c a nd Co m m uni st, aga in st ful fi llin g pro mi ses of a uto no my for the Slova k part of the co untry. On the one hand , thi s fa ilure to live up to the pro m ises of 19 18, 1945 and , some argue, 1968, led to the deve lo pme nt of a sense of betraya l in Slovak ia. On the ot her ha nd, in creas ing numbers of Czec hs ex pressed a nger over what they perce ived as S lovak in gratitude - Slovak ungratefuln ess fo r a ll the ass istance Czec hs affo rded Slovaki a. Moreove r, the way Slovak po liti c ians, in the Czec h perception, ex pl o ited tim es of crisis in Czec hos lovaki a to pro mo te the ir narrow nati o na li st ai ms ca used pa rti c ul ar rese ntm ent. T h is deeprooted mutu al resentme nt was, Leff arg ued in 1987 , o ne of th e ma in reasons why the co nfl ic t betwee n the Czec hs a nd S lovaks wo ul d rema in an unresolved pro bl e m.6 She was soon to be proven right. If o ne examines the Czec h view of S lovaki a, Slovaks and S lovak natio na li sm mo re broad ly than Leff, it is poss ible to ide nti fy two furth er impo rta nt aspec ts of the Czec h view. The firs t mi g ht be des cribed as big-brothe rl y co nce rn . Ma ny Czec h inte ll ect ua ls, po li tic ians and other Slova ko ph iles we re ge nuine ly interes ted in and conce rned abo ut th e we lfare and fate of the S lova ks. T he ir e ngagement was we ll in tended and , espec ia ll y before 19 18 but a lso later, of g reat he lp to Slova k inte ll ec tu a l a nd c ultu ra l li fe. However, no t in fre qu e ntl y d id thi s bi g brothe rl y co nce rn deve lop into a peda nt ic a nd 5 Carol Skalni k Leff: Na tional Conf7ict in Czechoslovakia. Princeton . 1987 , particu larly pp. 148-177. 6 Ibid .. p. 282 . �84 SLOVAKI A arroga nt pate rn a li sm . Not surpri s in g ly, thi s was not favo urabl y received in Slovak ia. T he seco nd aspec t of the Czec h view of S lova ki a a nd the S lovaks is best described as a lac k of aware ness. Average know ledge of po liti ca l a nd eco no mi c conditi o ns in S lova ki a a nd S lova k c ul ture was never ex tensive in the Czech Lands. Partic ul arl y impo rtant was th e w id espread ig norance of the c ultu ra l, soc ia l and es pec iall y re li g iou s diffe re nces betwee n th e average Czec h and Slovak. Hi sto ri ca ll y, thi s un aware ness was to a large degree a res ult of th e qui ck and re lati ve ly pa inl ess acce ptance by the Czec hs of a Czechos lovak ide ntity and the offic ia l ideo logy of the ex iste nce of a Czec hos lovak nati o n. Thi s lack of kn o wl edge often led to in sensiti vity to wards Slovak di stin cti ve ness. Czech po liti c ia ns thu s occas io na ll y made po litica l dec isio ns that suited co nditio ns in the Czec h La nds w itho ut proper concern fo r the di ffe rent impac t the ir po lic ies mi g ht have on Slovaki a. C learl y, th ere is no c lear-c ut di stinc ti o n betwee n the three analytica l aspects of the Czec h view of Slovaks and Slovak nationa li sm. A ll three were present to a greate r o r lesser ex tent th rougho ut the hi story of co ntacts between the two gro ups, and they overl ap. To a certa in degree, however, th ey re prese nt stages throu g h whi c h ma in strea m o pini o n in th e Czec h La nd s went as time progressed . Bi gbrothe rl y co ncern was c learly the most important facet in th e pre19 18 pe ri od and in the ear ly years of the First Repu bli c. The inte rwar pe ri od is most stro ng ly marked by the Prague leadership ' s ig norance of the parti c ul ar soc ia l, econo mi c and re li g io us conditi o ns in Slovak ia. After the dra mati c eve nts in 1938 and 1939, wi th the Mu ni c h Acco rd, S lova k a uto no my a nd la te r ' ind e pe nde nce ' durin g Wo rl d W ar II , Czec h rese ntme nt towards the Slovaks, a nd espec iall y S lovak nat io na li sm, beco mes in creas in g ly impo rta nt. Fi fty years later, thi s animos ity was to dec ide the fa te of the co mm on Czec h and Sl ovak state. �SLOVAKIA 85 Big Brother In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the overarching aim of Czech political parties was to force Vienna to acce pt increased autonomy for ' the hi storic lands ' (basically today 's Czech Republic) within the Habsburg Monarchy. The idea of a wider Slav cooperation within the Empire, particularly with th e Slovaks, had ga in ed stre ngth among Czech intell ec tual s from about the 1830s. However, after the success of Hung aria n nat ion ali sm in th e 1867 Ausgleich, Czech leaders became concerned not to a ntagoni se their potential allies in Budapest. The result was that 'Czec h politicians, thou gh sy mpathetic toward [the Slovaks], were re luctant to inte rfere on the ir behalf in Hungary, for this would constitute a violation of Hungary 's state rights and mi ght jeo pardize the Czech program that was based on Bohemia's hi storic state ri ghts. ' 7 The lack of broader politica l cooperation did not preve nt an increasing activism in favour of the c ulturall y oppressed Slovaks, especially among Czech intellectua ls. Whil e Czech culture and society , and Czech nationalism, deve loped rapidly in line with the rapid social and economic deve lopm e nts in the re lativel y liberal Austrian part of the Monarch y, the s itu ation for Slovak culture a nd nationali sm was much more difficult. Particularly after 1867, the Hun garian authoriti es led a heavy-handed assimilation policy (Magyarisation) towards the minorities in Hungary . Many Czech intellectuals expressed a deep sy mpathy for the fate of what they saw as their Slovak brethren in Hun gary and the Slovak national dema nd s. 8 Especially 7 Victor S. Mamatey: 'The Estab li shment of the Republic'. in Victor S. Mamatey and Radomfr Luza (eds.): A History or the Czechosl ovak Republic: 19 18- 1948. Princeton . 1973 , pp. 3-38 (9). 8 Under th e leadership of L'.udovit Stur. Jozef Miloslav Hurban and Michal Miloslav Hodza, a Slovak National Council , formed in Vienna on 16 September I 848 , gave Slovak nationalism its first clear political expression in form of the declaration De mands or the Slovak Nation. Thirteen years later, this time inspired mainly by Stefan Marko Daxner and Jan Francisci, an even clearer national programme was formulated in the 186 1 Memorandum or the Slovak Nation. See Dusan Kovac: Dejiny Slovenska. Prague. 1998. pp. I 19- 13 1. �SLOVAKIA 86 from th e 1880s , ac ti ve support fo r Slovak nati onali st intell ec tu als increased. As H. Gordon Sk ill ing wrote: 'from the leighteen] eighties on, there graduall y deve loped, among Czech cultu ra l and pro fes sional persons, a substanti al concern for the Slovaks and a desire to promote Czech and Slovak cooperati on. ' 9 M ost importantl y, the Czech interest in Sl ovaki a took an organised fo rm w ith th e creati on of Ceskoslovanska j edn ota (Czec hos lav Unity), in 1895 . Thi s organi sati on offered fin ancial support to Slovak publi cati ons, grants for Slovak students in the Czech L ands and promoted Czech in vestments in Slovaki a. 1° Furthermore, Ceskoslovan- ska jedn ota sought to spread in form ati on about Sl ovaki a and the Slovaks among Czechs. Thi s w illingness to help the Sl ovaks did not di sappear with the es tabli shment of th e Czec hoslovak state in 19 18. With the gradu al ' liberation ' of what the new Czechos lovak authoriti es considered to be 'S lovaki a' (no admini strati ve boundari es ex isted), a new admini strati on had to be establi shed. The old admini strati ve apparatu s in Hungary consisted almost exc lusive ly of M agyars (ethni c Hungari ans) or ass imil ated intelligenti fro m other cultures. M ost of these refu sed to work for the new Czechos lovak state. As there were far from sufficient educated, patri oti c Sl ovaks to take over the admini strati on, officials had to be imported from the Czech L ands. The first major immi grati on ca me in the spring of 19 19, when ra il way and postal workers in Sl ovaki a stopped work ing to protest again st the new regime. A t th e urgent request of K ornel Stodola, the official res ponsibl e for ra il ways, ' several th ousand patri oti c Czech 9 H . Gordon Ski lling: T. G. Ma.r nryk : Against the Current. 1882- 19 14. London . 1994. p.68 (hereafter Ski ll ing: Mw;ary k). JU Mi ros lav Pek nfk: ·K profi lu slovensko-ceskych vztahov pred prvou sve tovou voj - nou'. in Mi lan Podrimavsky and Dusan Kovac (eds.) : Slovensko ,w zaciatku 20. storocia (Spo /ocnost: stat a narod v siiradniciach doby). Brati slava. 1999. pp.9 1-9 3: Mari e L. Neudorn: ' Slovakia in the Czech Press at the Turn of the ineteen th and Twe nti eth Ce ntu ries' . in John Morison (ed. ): The Czech and Slovak Experience: Selected Papers fro m the Fourth World Cong ress for So viet and East European Studies. Harrogille. I 990. London . 1992. pp. 38-6 I. �SLOVAKIA 87 vo lunteers hurri ed fro m Bohe mi a a nd Mo ra via and at a mo me nt 's notice.' 11 Late r, me mbe rs of othe r profess ion a l groups ca me to take up vacant pos iti o ns in S lovaki a: sc hoo lteac hers, uni versity lec ture rs, gend armes, tax collectors a nd bureaucrats of a ll so rts. It has bee n estimated th at 50-60 000 Czec hs went to Sl ovaki a in 19 19-20 and about as many aga in in the years up to 1930. 12 Whil e undo ubtedl y moti vated partl y by the ava il ability of jobs, the w illin g ness to uproot and move to still un safe S lova ki a o n sho rt no ti ce does suggest at least some idea li sm amo ng the vo lunteers. In 19 19-20 there was still armed confli ct betwee n Hun gari an and Czechoslo va k fo rces fo r control o ve r Slovaki a. Even fo r an un e mpl oyed bu reaucrat it could no t have been an easy dec isio n to move there. Few Czec hs can be seen to have do ne mo re to ra ise sy mpathy fo r the Sl o vaks a nd the ir fa te th an To mas Garri g ue Masaryk. Bo rn in Hodonfn , in the Slov acko reg io n of Morav ia, Masaryk ca me fro m a reg ion o n the bo rde r betwee n Czec h and Sl ova k lang uage and c ul ture. Hi s fa ther was Sl ova k and hi s moth er a Germ ani sed C zec h. 13 Gi ven thi s bac kg round , the idea of Czec h and Slovak politica l cooperation mu st have co me easil y to M asaryk. In hi s po litica l li fe , he became one of the ma in propo ne nts of suc h cooperati o n among Czec h politi c ians. As a pro fessor at the C harl es Uni ve rs ity in Prag ue, he was the ma in so urce of in spirati o n fo r a g roup of Slovak stu dents who wo uld later make up an impo rta nt part of the po liti ca l e lite in Czechoslova ki a. Th ese stude nts , best know n as hlasisti, afte r th e name of the ir j o urn a l Hlas (Vo ice), beca me the ma in supporte rs of the C zechos lovak idea in Slovaki a. 14 Yet, despite hi s ge nuin e co nce rn for the S lovaks, M asary k 's speec hes and arti c les at times ex pressed a pa te rn a li st and arroga nt 11 R. W. Seton-Watson : A History of the Czechs and Slovaks. London. 1943. p.323. 12 Jan M ec hyr: Slovensko v Ceskoslovensku : Slovensko-ceske vztahy I 9 I 8- 199 I. Prague. 199 1. p.27. 1 '- K arel Capek: Hovory s T. G. M asa1y kem. Prag ue. 1947. pp.8-9, I I 8. 14 Vl ad im ir Bakos: Questions of the Nation in Slo va k Thoug ht. Brati slava. 1999. pp.1 3-57 . �88 SLOVAKIA attitude toward s Slovak culture and hi story . For instance, Masaryk rej ected calls for a plebisc ite in Slovakia after World War l, arg uin g that 'one cannot allow such a vote there, since the Slovaks have bee n so oppressed that they have never had the opportunity to think politically and they would not know in whose hand s to put th eir fate. ' 15 Even c learer was hi s comment on rece nt negotiation s with Slovak leaders in a letter to hi s dau ghter Alice, in 1924: 'It is necessary to be patient with the Slovaks - they are children, or rather spoilt brats.' 16 Given the relatively low educational level and minimal political experience of most Slovaks in 1918 , claims about their immaturity clearly had some justification in the first years after the establi shme nt of Czechoslovakia. However, Czech politicians continued throu ghout the ex istence of the Czechoslovak state to explain the lack of understanding for their policies in Slovakia as a sign of the politica l immaturity of Slovaks. Commenting on relations between Czech and Slovak exiles during World War II, for instance, Edvard Be nes informed the British Foreign Mini stry , that ' the re existed unity among the Czechs while the Slovaks, he conceded, because of their political immaturity, reflected the divided opinions at home.' 17 Also in the post-Communist period , Slovak nationalism , and especially its more radical expressions, were presented as clear signs of the political immaturity of the Slovaks. 'Everyone has the right to live his nineteenth century,' became a common remark in sarcastic comments. 18 " Quoted in Robert 8. Pynsent: ' Masaryk 's ·' Path of Democracy". Or: The Democrati c National Socialist Ideal'. in K atarina A. M . K ocourek (ed.): T. G. Masaiyk 1850- /937. A Collection of Essays to Commemora te the 150th Anniversary of the Birth of Thomas G. Masaryk . London, 2000, p. 35 -57 (41 ) (a specia l issue of Masa1yk Journal). 16 Quoted in Zbynek Zeman and Antonin Klimek: The Life of Eduard Benes: Cze- choslovakia in Peace and War. Oxford , 1997, p.5 I (herea fter Zeman and Klimek: Eduard Benes) . 17 Quoted ibid. pp.168-69. 18 Otto U lc: 'Czechoslovakia ' s Velvet Divorce ' , East European Quarterly, Vol.30/3, 1996, pp. 33 1-352 (340). �SLOVAKIA 89 From a Czech po int of view, the re lati o nship between the C zechs and Sl ovaks was c learl y a bi g broth er - littl e brother re lati o nship. The Czech partner in the Czec h-S lovak unio n was c learl y superior in po pulati o n (abo ut 2: I), and fo r most of the hi sto ry of the common state a lso in soc io-econo mic deve lo pment (for example, in education , car-ow nership , numbe r of te le pho nes , etc .). Czech nationa li sts could be proud of a ri c h nati o na l hi story a nd a hi g hl y deve lo ped Czec h c ulture, whil e Slovak nati o na li sts, for hi stori ca l reasons, had less to brag abo ut. The pi cture of Slovaki a as a less deve lo ped, less c ultured ' hinte rl and ' re ma in ed in Czec h po pul ar c ulture, parti c ul arl y in Prague, eve n after Slovak ia reac hed a basica ll y equ al leve l of soc io-econo mi c developme nt (abo ut I 980) . 19 As Petr Prfh oda, the pse udo nymo us Jan Prfbram, observed in the ex ile jo urna l Svedect vfin 1976: T he charac te ri sti c tra its of [the Czec h view of Slovaks a nd S lovaki a] have o ne co mmo n de no m inato r: an a lbe it unc lear, th o ug h multi face ted inferiority. Slovaks see m primiti ve, imm ature, emo ti o na ll y unrestra ined and uneducated [ ... ] The na ivety and lack of ex pe ri e nce amo ng those who come to the unknow n Czec h e nvironme nt is qui c kl y mi sunde rstood as stupidity. A Slovak is qu ite simpl y asc ribed a child 's menta li ty .20 Ignorance On the first page of its 27 Nove mber 1935 iss ue, in an artic le by the fa mo us Czec h jo urn a li st Ferdin and Pe routka, the influenti al journal Pl ftomnost (Presence) asked its readers: ' Do you know of anyone who unde rstand s Slova ki a?' 2 1 F ifty-fi ve years late r, Vac lav Have l' s ad visor Pe te r Hun c ik to ld the Ch a irm a n of th e Sl ova k N ati o na l 19 M il an K ucera and Zdenek Pavlfk: ·Czech and Slovak Demograph y ·, in Jiff M usil (ed.): The End or Czechoslovak ia. Budapest, 1995 , pp. 15-39. 20 Prfhoda: ·s Jovaci ceskyma oc ima' , p.643. 21 Ferd inand Peroutka: ·Nevfte o nekom , kdo rozu mf Slovensku?' , Prfto mnos t, Vo l. 12/47. 1935 , p. I . as reprod uced in Anton Ras la: Zastupova l som ceskoslovensky stat - vyznanie. Presov, 1999, p.268. �90 SLOVAKIA Co un c il , Fra nti se k Mi k losko, th at the Pres ide nt a lways had mi graines whe n he trave ll ed in Slovaki a. 22 Thi s was no t due to the c lim ate, but beca use Have l fe lt great unease abo ut not know ing Slovaki a. Such ac know ledge me nts refl ect the limited kno wl edge of Slovaki a and the Slovaks in the C zech Land s. As Prfhoda o bserved : ' Of all the ne ig hbo urin g nati o ns we know the S lovaks the leas t and ex press the least interest in the m and the ir nat io n. Admittedl y, we have been introdu ced th e best to th e Sl ova ks, but we kn ow th e leas t abo ut the m. ' 23 It is poss ible to ide nti fy severa l reasons fo r thi s lac k of know ledge and understanding. Partl y, it was a res ult of the somew hat confusin g nature of Slovak po liti cs . A lmost thro ugho ut the histo ry of Czechoslovaki a, the politica l e lite in Slova ki a was di vided o n the iss ue of inc reased se lf-governm e nt. Pe ri odi ca ll y, thi s inte rn a l stru gg le amon g S lovak po liti c ians over whethe r S lovaks did or did not want a uto no my mu st have been confu s in g eve n for th e most interested C zech o bserver. Gu stav Hu sak, fo r exampl e, contributed to muddlin g the picture of S lovak nati o na li sm : fro m be ing the prime propo ne nt o f th e federa li sati o n of Czec hos lova ki a befo re a nd durin g the 1968 ' Prag ue S prin g', Hu sak sudde nl y changed into a pro po ne nt of ce ntrali sati o n o nce he was in po wer in Prag ue. Thi s s ituation was exacerbated by the lac k of opportunity pro po nents of inc reased Sl ovak se lf- rul e had to prese nt thei r views to the Czech publi c. Genera ll y, the Slovak po liti c ians who most eas il y ga ined access to the pages of the Prag ue press were those in favo ur of centra li sed rul e. Furth e rmo re, the lac k of know ledge a nd unde rstand in g of S lovaki a a mo ng Czec hs was a res ult of a lac k of in terest in S lova k affa irs. Slovaki a was, at least in the in ter- war peri od, a po liti ca ll y less impo rta nt part of the country. Even if sy mpathy fo r the S lovaks had pl ayed a ro le in the suppo rt C zec h po li tic ians gave the pl ans fo r an inde pe nde nt Czec hos lova ki a, th e re we re o ther impo rt a nt reaso ns 22 Frantsiek M iklosko: Cas stretnutf. Brati slava, 1996, p.44. 23 Pffhoda: ·s tovaci ceskyma oci ma', p.643. �91 SLOVAKIA why they wanted a union . The main ' problem ' in Czech hi story has been the question of the Czechs ' position as a small nation surrounded by Germans. In Slovakia and the Slovaks, Czech leaders found a doub le solution to their problem. As a people, the Slovaks represented a biological reinforcement to the Czech , renamed the Czechoslovak, nation , making it the majority nation in the new state. They thus helped legitimate Czech(oslovak) domination of Czechoslovakia. (One should not forget that there were about 50 per cent more German than Slovak speakin g citizens (3 versus 2 million ) in interwar Czechoslovakia.) As a territory . Slovakia formed a bridge out of the German encirclement towards Ru ssia, which before 1917 was perceived as a rival of Germany and protector of the Slavs, and towards Czechoslovakia ·s all y Romania. For those perceivin g the state from such a ' Great-Czech ' point of view, Czechos lovakia was merely 'a reestabli shment of th e Czech state, reinforced by the Slovak territorie s, which were so weak and neglected that it was simply not necessary to see them as a separate entity. ' 24 The most important reason for the lack of knowl edge and understandin g of Slovakia among Czechs was , however. the uncritical acceptance of the Czechoslovak idea by most Czechs. In th e interwar yea rs, the Czechoslovak ideo logy was a pillar ce ntral to the very existence of the state. Even Masaryk argued th at ' there is no such thing as a Slovak nation 25 paganda ' . l- .. I; that is an invention of Hungarian pro- In Slovakia, on the other hand, the idea of one Czecho- slovak nation met res istance, [i]n the minds of th e Czechs, the notions of 'Czec h' and ' Czechoslovak' had blended into one by th e end of the Second World War at the latest. A significa nt conseq uence of thi s psycho- soci al operation was the removal of the Slovaks as a distinct ethni c entity from the Czech field of vis ion . The Slovaks eventuall y began to be perceived as H L.:.ubomfr Liptak: Slovensko v 20. storocf. Bratisl ava. 1998. 2nd edition. p. 128 . 15 Pynse nt : ' Masaryk ·s "Pa th of Democracy''". p.41. �92 SLOVAKIA part of the same nat iona l organi sm - almost as the advocates of the Czechoslovak concept would like to have it only thi s organi sm was not Czechoslovak but Czech.26 The net result of thi s process was that the social, c ultura l and reli g ious differences betwee n the Czechs and Slovaks became invisible to the majority of Czechs who never learned to kn ow the Slovaks and Slovakia directly. Thi s aga in led to the anticipatio n that Slovaks would have a s imil ar world view and would react in the sa me way as Czechs to events and po li c ies. The co nsequences of such anticipation varied over time. In the inter-war period , it was the insensitive attitude of the new regime towards the Catholic Church that was most important. Czech nation alism had the Hu ss ite peri od as its Golden Age; a Golden Age that was termin ated by the Battle of the White Mountain in 1620 and the following violent co unterReform ation in Bohemia and , to a somew hat lesser degree, Morav ia. With the sec ulari sing impact of the industriali sation and urbani sati on of the Czech Lands in the nineteenth century, thi s gave Czech nationalism a not only sec ul ar, but often an openly anti-Catho lic edge. 27 Although the Protestant minority was proportionately bi gger in Slovakia than in the Czech Land s, there was no clear connection between anti-Catholici sm and nation ali sm even amon g Protestant Slovak nat ionali sts. On the contrary, one direction within the Slovak nati ona l move ment was closely co nnec ted to the Catholic fa ith . The Catholic national ists, led from the early twentieth century by Andrej Hlinka, were more skeptica l of cooperation with the Czec hs than were the hlasi sti. Man y Czech politicians and intellec tu a ls were, from the point of view of Slovak Catholics, dangerously radical liberals, if not atheist anti-Catholics. 28 When the declaration of Czechoslovak independence on 28 October 1918 was followed by a wave of 26 Zdenek Suda: ' Slovakia in Czech Nati onal Consciousness ' , in Musil (ed.): The End of Czechoslovakia, p.1 39- 155 ( 11 8) (hereafter Suda: ' Slovakia ' ). 27 R. W. Seton-Watson: A History of the Czechs and Slovaks. London, 1943, p.33 1. 28 Jan Rychl fk : Cesi a Slovaci ve 20. stoletf: Cesko-sl ovenske vztahy , 19 14- 1945. Bratislava, 1997, p.38 (hereafter Rychlfk: Cesi a Slo vac1). �SLOVAKIA 93 anti-Catholic gestures in the Czech Lands, the worst fears of the Slovak Catholics were reali sed . As lsmo Nurmi wrote: ' if the anti-Catholic mood was fashionable in the Czech lands, it was not so in Slovak ia and even less so when a numbe r of desecration s of reli g iou s c ult objects, churches, statues, crosses etc. were committed [ ... ] also in Slovakia [by] civil servants and particularly the Czechoslovak Army.' 29 The attempt to create a Czechoslovak national hi story and tradition with the Hussite era as pivotal was a clear sign of the lac k of understanding among Czech (and some Slovak) leade rs for the position of the Catholic Church in Slovakia. Masaryk 's official ' inclusion ' of Slovakia in the Hu ss ite tradition on the basis of Jan Ji skra 's ' crusade ' into Slovakia was not only hi storically dubiou s, but also, and not surpri sin gly, rejected by the Slovak Catholic clergy. As Suda wrote: ' To the Catholic majority of the Slovaks, among whom Catholicism had a very pronounced conservative tin ge typical of a pre-modern society , a common programme with the Czechs based on the traditions of the Protestant Reformation must have been almost an anathema. ' 30 After 1948, with the industriali sation of Slo vaki a unde r Communi st rul e, the religious differen ces be tween the Czech a nd Slovak parts of the common state were so mew hat diffused. Albeit a clear scepticism towards 'Czech liberali sm ' was visible in Christian democratic circles in Slovakia also after the collapse of Communism, another as pec t of the Czech ignorance of Slovak affairs beca me more important. As noted above , very many Czechs saw Czechoslovakia and the ' Czechoslovak nation ' as their state and nation , quite often interpreted as a Czech state a nd nation that included the Slovaks. After World War II , the rec reation of Czechoslovakia was acco mpanied by an official recog niti on by all political leaders, albeit some Czec h politicians were reluctant to do so, of the ex iste nce of two 29 lsmo Nurmi: Slo vakia - A Playground for Na tionalism and National Identity. 191 8- /920 : M anifestations of the Na tional Identity of Slovaks. Hel sinki. 1999. pp. 92-93. 30 Suda : ·Slovakia ' . p.11 5. �SLOVAKIA 94 fo un d in g nati ons in the co untry . Thi s princ ipl e was reaffirmed with the federa li sati on of 1968. Despite thi s offic ial recogniti on, there was ve ry littl e understanding a mong Czec hs of S lovak atte mpts to promote the ir separate ide ntity. Proba bl y the best kn ow n exa mpl e of S lova k po li tic ians ' dema nd s fo r 'v isibility and equ a lity ' fo r S lovaki a w ithin Czec hos lovaki a was the stru gg le fo r the name of the federati on in the sprin g of 1990 . Th e so-ca ll ed ' hy phe n-wa r ' sta rted w he n new ly e lec ted Pres ide nt Vac lav Have l suggested c ha ng in g the offic ial name of the Republic, the Czechoslovak Soc iali st Republic, by mere de leti on of the word ' Sociali st' . Whil e fo r mos t Czec hs thi s so luti on mu st have see med natural , it ran into oppos iti on in S lovaki a? A Sl ovak co unter-proposa l, the Czec ho-Slovak Re public, or just Czec ho-Slovaki a, a name that made Slovaki a more vi s ibl e to the world , was, however, not acceptabl e to most Czec h po liti c ians. The reasons given fo r thi s were that th e hyphe n had been used in the name of the Second Republi c (1938 -39, th at is, afte r the Muni c h Accord), a nd beca use ' C zec ho' (Ces k o) was not consi de red a pro pe r word in the Czech language. As one leading comme ntator compl ained in Lidove noviny: ' We in the Czec h Land s perce ive the insiste nt de mand of Sl ovaki a fo r a di vidin g line in the na me of the Re public as tac tl ess and coarse. " 2 Onl y afte r two mo nth s o f de bate in the three nati onal asse mbli es (the Czec h, Slova k and Federa l) and the mass medi a was a compromi se fo und : The Czec h and Slovak Federa l Republic. Have l quic kl y rea li sed th at he had made a mi stake by not consul ting politic ians fro m both the Czec h a nd Sl ova k Re pu b li cs before making hi s suggestion public. In a n atte mpt to rec ti fy the s itu ati on the hospitali sed Have l sent a le tter to the Federal Asse mbl y in February, where he stated : -' ' M il an Su tovec: Semi6za aka pol i tik um a/ebo "Pom lckov;-i vojna ". Brati slava, 1999, pp. 174- 196 (hereafter Sutovec: Pomlckova vojna). -' 2 Ji ff Hanak: 'Nespraved li ve a tedy neprijatelne' . Lidove Noviny. 28 M arch 1990. p.l. �SLOVAKIA 95 We a ll kn o w th at thi s hyphe n, whi ch fo r a ll Czechs seems ridi c ul o us, unnecessary and ugly, is mo re tha n just a hyphe n. In thi s hyphe n o ne ca n find severa l decades, if not ce ntu ries of th e hi sto ry of the S lo va k nati o n [ ... ] The Sl o vak nation is ri g htfull y tryin g to fin d its ide ntity, fo r reason s Czec hs probabl y do n ' t understa nd , eve n if they o ught to understand them.33 Resentment Exampl es of Czec h skepti c ism a nd resentment to ward s Slo vak nati o na li sm ca n be fo und as earl y as the middl e of th e nine teenth century. From the late 1840s, a majo rity of Slovak inte ll ectua ls ado pted the new codifi cati o n of th e S lovak lang uage , as publi shed in 1846 by Cudovft Stur, as a pl atfo rm fo r the Sl ovak national programme. This met w ith strong res istance fro m Czech and Slovak inte llectua ls promotin g Czec h-Sl ovak unity: they saw the Slovaki zed versio n of Hu ss ite Bible Czec h used by ma ny Slovak inte llec tua ls until then, as the clearest bo nd between Czechs and Slovaks.34 If in the inte rwar years Czec hos lovak leade rs cons idered Slovak nati o na li sm a pro bl e m, it was ma inl y after 1938 th at o pe nl y hostil e attitudes toward s it e merged. The ex pl oi tatio n by Slovak nati o na li sts of the weakness of the Czec hos lovak reg ime after the Munich cri sis to push trou gh thei r de mands fo r a uto no my, c ulmin atin g in the ac ceptance by the Slovak leade rs of German de mand s fo r Slovak indepe ndence in M arc h 1939, was conside red a stab in the back by most Czechs. 35 Durin g the Second World W ar, Ed vard Be nes, the C zechoslovak Pres ide nt-in -ex il e, was o ne of the sharpest cri tics of what he considered the Slovak be traya l. He was ' o bstin ate in defending the Czec hos lovak ca use: its betraya l by the Slovaks mattered more to him than the grow ing press ure from Moscow. He be li e ved th at the " As quoted in Sutovec: Pomlckova vojna, pp.269-27 1. 34 Sk illing: Masary k, p. 69. 35 Petr Pffhoda: ' M utual Perceptions in Czech-S lovak Relationshi ps ', in M usil (ed .): The End of Czechoslovakia. pp. 128- 138 ( 134 ). �96 SLOVAKIA Slovak heresy undermined the ve ry fo undations of the state, and Czechoslovaki sm was for him a part of the foundations. ' 36 Throu ghout the war, Benes and other Czech politi cians fought for the reestabli shment of the First (th at is, pre-Muni ch) Republi c. Most Slovak politici ans, howe ver, including former Czechos lovak Prime Minster Milan Hodza, con sidered thi s a less th an optim um solution. 37 Only reluctantly , given th e situation in Slovakia after the Slovak National Upri sing in the autum n of 1944, was Benes forced to accept a de facto asymmetric federalisation of post-war Czechoslo va ki a. However, despite previou s agreements, most importantl y the Kosice Government Programme, drafted by the first pro visional government after the country was partly -liberated from the East, the question of Slovaki a's position within the country cont inued to divide the Czec h and Slovak non-Comm uni st parties after the war. The willin gness of the Czec h democratic parti es to coo perate with the Communi sts in reducin g the powers of the Slovak nation al organs , cruci all y after the 1946 elections, contrib uted to undermining the position of the Democratic Party in Slo va ki a. The Czechos lovak Communi st Party was thu s abl e to exploit ' the anti -Sl ovak nati onali sm among Czech political parties and [ ... ] the isolated position of the Slovak democrats. ' 38 Thi s clearly weakened the democrats' ability to oppose the Communi sts' increasing political power in the country. During and after 1968 , the negati ve view of Slo vak nationali sm and Slovakia in the Czech L ands was reinforced. After the Soviet-led in vas ion on 2 1 Au gust 1968, 'sociali sm with a human face ' was gradually di smantled and replaced by ' norm ali sation '. Th e only maj or reform of the Prague Spring to survive was the dec ision to federalize Czechoslovakia. In Sl ovaki a thi s decision w as generall y interpreted 36 37 Zeman and Klimek : Eduard Bene{ p.203. Milan Hodza : Federarion in Cenrra l Europe: Renections and Reminiscences. London. 1942, pp.93-94. 38 Ji rf K ocian: ·Narodnf soc ialis te a slovenska otazka 1945- I 948 ". in Michal Bar- novsky (ed.) : Od dikratury k diktature. Brati slava. 1995 . pp.57-65 (6 I ). (hereafter K oc ian: ' Narodnf socialiste') �SLOVAKIA 97 as a more just organi sation of the common state. In the Czech Lands, however, many saw federalisation as a further example of the Slovak nationali sts' skill in drawing advantages from Czechoslovakia's mi sfortune. The fact th at the new party leade r and late r Pres ident of Czechoslovakia, Gu stav Hu sak, was Slovak, also contributed to the negative picture of Slovakia and Slovaks. As Petr Pithart wrote: the Czech public was di sappointed, even di sg usted, by the Slovaks ' ex peri e nce of havin g ga ined sati sfac tion with federalization; at best, it was seen as foolishness a nd at worst, as blind se lfi shness and eve n betrayal. ( ... ) in the Czec h Lands there was an increasing ly obvious di sg ust for the regime and for the Slovaks, as the ones through whom normali zation was allegedly introduced and carried out. 39 A s ign of the growing irritation with and resentment toward s Slovak nationa li sm and Slovaks in ge ne ral in the Czech Lands, was the increas in g ly popul a r de mand that Czech taxpayers should not have to subsidi se the ungrateful Slovaks. Already in 1933 Czechoslovak Prime Min ster Ja n Malypete r had rejected the demand for Slovak autonomy on the grounds that Slovakia would not be able to pay its way . In the Czech press, headlines read along the lines: ' We are paying for Slovakia ' .40 Thi s be lief that the Czechs were subsidis in g th e Slovaks was observed also by Prfhoda forty-three years late r: ' In the Czech Lands the view of Slovak parasiti sm [parazitismu s] is common and it is formulated more or less like thi s: we Czechs are payin g for the Slovaks. ' 41 The Czechoslovak Communist Party was committed to so lvin g the probl e m of Slovak nation alism, which it interpreted as a mainly eco nomic iss ue , through equ ali zat ion of the standard of li ving bet- 39 Petr Pithart: ' Towards a Shared Freedom ' , in Mu sil (ed.): Th e End of Czechoslovakia.pp.20 1-222 (206). 40 Vi ctor S. Mamatey: ' The Development of Czechoslovak Democ racy ', in Mamatey and Luza (eds.) : A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, pp.99-166 ( 15 1). 41 Prfhoda: "S lovac i ces kyma ocima', p.647. �SLOVAKIA 98 wee n the Czech and Slovak parts of the co unty. Economic transfers, parti cul arly through a higher level of in vestment in Sl ovaki a were, therefore, considered important. They continued even during the di ffic ult years in the 1970s and 1980s, but were kept secret, probabl y to avoid un favo urable reactions in the Czech L ands. After the co llapse of Communi sm, opposition to w hat was popularl y referred to as the Czech ' money pipeline' (p enezovod) to Slovak ia was quickl y made into a politi cal demand. In the first formal ro und of negoti ation s on th e future of the fe derati on after the co ll apse of Communi sm, in Lnare in April 1990, the Czech delegati on demanded a halt to Czec h subsidies to Slovaki a.42 From Czech to Czechoslovak nationalism and back As noted earlier, the Czechos lov ak directi on within Czech poli ti cs was by no means dominant pri or to W orld W ar I. Czec h nationali sts concentrated mainl y on defending and enhancing Czech autonomy w ithin th e Habsburg M onarchy. With the success of the Czec hoslovak idea in the Entente capitals in 19 17-1 8, however, most Czec h nati onali sts quite quickl y became convinced Czec hos lovak nati onali sts; Czech nati onali sm was ex panded to include th e Sl ovaks, the Czec hs' ' little bro ther ' in Hungary. Cultura ll y and economi ca ll y wea k, the Slovaks posed no threat to either Czech culture or politica l and economic dominati on of the new state. A nd after all , as M asaryk himse lf pointed out, the Slovaks were merely Czec hs w ith a slightly di fferent hi story. Th e attachment o f Czech politi cians to the Czech os lovak idea ca n be clearl y see n after W orld W ar II. In 1968 , a document supposedly written by members of th e (Czec h) Nation al Soc iali st Party 4 in I 946 was pub I ished in the Slova k press . ' Its authors argued th at the bes t way to so lve the problem of Slovak nati onalism was fo rced ass imil ati on of the Sl ovaks into good Czec hoslovaks. Whil e seri ous • • 2 BBC Summa1y of World Broadcast. EE/0738 B/2. 13 Apri I 1990. 3 T he document was first publi shed in Vac lav Kral: Cestou k tinoru, Prague, I 956, but attrac ted relati ve ly little attention until reproduced in the mass medi a in 1968. �99 SLOVAKIA doubts exist as to th e authenticity of thi s ' Memorandum on Slovakia' , most hi storian s seem to agree that the idea of turnin g the Slovaks into good Czechoslovaks was not alien to certain leading Czech politicians at the time. 44 The reaction to what was perceived as the Slovak betraya l of 1938-39 was increased Czechoslovak nationali sm. However, during the Communist period , a nd particul ar ly after 1968 , Czech nationalism gradually gained supporters in the Czech Lands . As Prfhoda wrote in 1976: 'I am not sure how thin gs are in Slovakia, but among Czechs the concept of a com mon state is being re-eva luated these days . I have eve n heard : let the Ru ss ia ns make Slovakia into a union republic or something and leave us in peace!' 45 Obviou sly , ne ither Czech nor Slovak separat ism was politically acceptable durin g Communist rul e. After th e 'Velvet Revo lution' , however, influe ntial vo ices soo n e merged in the Czech Land s questioning the union with the Slovaks. As earl y as the beginning of May 1990, in the aftermath of the hyphe n war, the Czech writer Ludvfk Vaculfk, the author of the 'Two thousand words' manifesto in 1968, wrote a sharpl y worded articl e in Litenimf noviny. 46 ' W e Czechs have a great debt to the Slovaks,' Yaculfk argued. This debt was due to the fact that the Czechs had happily made Slovakia ' theirs' without takin g into account what it meant to be Slovak. Through their behaviour, however, the Slovaks had made it difficult for the Czechs to appreciate thi s debt. Th e Czechs had g ive n the Slovaks the ir industry and inte lli gentsia, so mething that had only caused the Slovaks to ' until thi s day complain about the qua lity of these supplies'. The Czechs had give n the Slovaks a way out of defeat as a separate state during World War II. Even Communism , brou g ht to Slovakia by Czechs afte r the war, had g ive n the Slovaks more in material terms than it had to the Czechs. When the Czechs then tri ed to ease th e die- 44 See Koc ian: ' Narodnf soc iali ste' . passim: Rychlfk: Ce.si II Slo vaci. pp. 54-55: ·Na okraj diskusie: 0 tzv. Slovenskom memoranda Cs. narodne sociali stickej strany ', Nase snahy . Vol. I 9/2. 1983. p. 9. 45 Prfhoda: ' Slovaci ceskyma ocima ' . p.653. 41 ' Ludvik Vaculfk: ' Nase slovenska otazk a', Litenimf noviny. Vol.1 /5, 1990. p.2. �SLOVAK IA 100 tatorship during 1968, the Slovaks saw thi s as a Czech matter and instead forced through 'autonomy '. For this they escaped with lighter puni shment during the era of ' normali sation .' Now aga in , after the col lapse of Communism, when Czechs were trying th eir utmost finally to defeat the dictatorial regime , the Slovaks were 'coming with their prestige demands'. ' Do we need thi s?' he asks rhetorically and then concludes : We have found ourse lves with a thankless task in th e fate of the Slo vaks, and I think th at we should end it without se lf-pity - more with a smil e into th e mirror. [ ... l Why should the Slovaks ha ve to force out of us, centimetre by ce ntimetre, somethin g that they can have in one go? By separating from the Slovaks , purely of our ow n volition , we " lose" - judging from experience to date - economic losses. Politicall y we lose th e Hungarian and Ruth ene problem s. We put another border between us and th e Soviet Union. 47 At th e time of hi s writ ing, Yaculfk ' s recommendation th at th e Czec hs should dispense with the Slovaks accorded with neither public nor political opinion in the Czech Republic. At that stage not even the most radical Czech politician s were promoting divi sion of the state. Gradually , however, the need to resolve the probl em of th e common state w ith the Slovaks once and for all became pressing. As Yaculfk observed in December of 1990: 'Public opinion poll s show that 75 percent of Czechs are said to favour a common state with the Slovaks. Had one, on the other hand , asked if we should let the Slovaks go, just as many would probabl y have answered " yes" to thi s as we ll. ' 48 In Slovakia, the question of the statu s of the Slovak Republic within the Czech and Slovak state became a centra l political topic . 47 Ibid. The double quotation marks arou nd -- Jose" were added to make th e irony more vi sible. The original tex t is : ' Od loucenfm od Slovaku. jez j e vyhradne v nasf vu li. ztratfme - souzeno dosavadnf zkusenostf - ekonomicke ztraty. • 48 Ludvik Yaculfk: ' M ec iar mozna odejde' . Litenimf noviny . Vol. I /39. I 990. p.2. �SLOVAKIA 101 Sl ovak politicians began to co mpete over w ho co uld present a programme th at would benefit and pro mote Slovaki a the most. Thi s led to a gradual radi ca li sati on of Slovak demands in the negoti ation s on the future of the federati on. Such radica li sati on in turn provoked a voc iferou s reaction in the Czech L ands. Th e influenti al Czec h j ournal R esp ekt refl ec ted th e growin g antagoni sm toward s Sl ovaki a in th e Czec h L ands. Headlines from the Spring of 1992 such as ' The supreme Slovak irrespon sibility' ( 17 Febru ary, p.2), ' B alkan model on the hori zo n: how long w ill the Czech-Slovak statu s quo las t?" (24 Febru ary, p.2) and 'A bsurd parliamentary drama: who saves Slovak ia from sovereignty?' (6 A pril , p.2) ev ince an increas ingly criti ca l view o f Sl ovak politi cs . In the issue th at co incided with the electi ons of 8 June, the criticism ca me to its logica l co nclu sion . Peter Schutz, Respekt 's (Sl ovak-Hungari an) correspondent in Slovak ia, wrote in the arti cle ' Slovaki a adheres to nati onal soc iali sm': ' The shameful result of thi s electi on formul ated onl y one alternati ve - either lMec iar 's party] HZDS disintegrates, or the CSFR. ' 49 Vl adimfr Ml ynar ex pressed the same message in the subtitle o f hi s arti cle in the same issue: 'A lone into Euro pe or together into the Balkans'. 50 Parti cul arl y the politi ca l ri ght in th e Czec h Lands increasingly saw Slovaki a as an obstac le on the road ' back ' to Europe. After the 1990 elec ti ons, th e ri ght had graduall y strengthened its pos ition among the Czech elec torate. In Slovaki a, on the other hand , it was the more reform- scepti ca l and patri oti c parti es on the politica l left that had enjoyed greater success. Gi ven th e spec ial minority veto of both the Czec h and Slovak groups of deputies in th e House of Nati ons of the Federal Assembl y, a left-patri otic maj ority in Slovaki a was a worry ing prospec t for the Czech proponents of radi ca l reform s. A month before th e parliam entary election s in June 1992, V aclav 09 Peter Sch utz: ·s tovensko sa prihlasilo k narodnemu socializmu - Pos lcdne zvone- nie pre federaciu ·, Respekt. 8- 14 June 1992, p.2. ~ V lad imir Ml ynar: ·v Cechac h tes ne vftezstvf prav ice - lecne na Balka n·. Respekt, 8- 14 June 1992. p.3. Sarni do Evropy nebo spo- �102 SLOVA KI A Kl aus made it c lear that if a fu ncti o na l federa ti o n was not poss ible after the e lect io ns, he and his partners were ' ready to create a mec hani sm for a q uick, c ivili sed and prob le m-free div isio n of the state. ' 51 Conclusion By the late summ er of 1992, th e do min ant view of Slovak ia in C zec h po liti cs had, in a se nse, co me full c irc le to co inc ide with the views th at preva il ed pri o r to W o rl d W ar I. Fro m hav ing bee n a strateg ica ll y less attrac ti ve partne r in the seco nd ha lf of the nineteenth ce ntury, Sl ovaki a beca me a strateg ic asset in the firs t ha lf of th e twenti eth . Afte r W o rld W ar II , however, S lovak ia a nd th e S lovaks gradu a ll y lost the ir strateg ic impo rt a nce for the Czec hs. The large Ge rm an mino rity in the Czec h Lands was ex pe ll ed in the firs t years after the war, taking the edge off the Ge rman threat. Furthermore, fo r C zec h democ rats, the Communi st co up of Febru ary 194 8 put an e nd to a ll ideas of seekin g sec urity a nd integrati o n in the East, th ro ugh Slova ki a. In stead , they now turn ed exc lu sive ly to the West: to th e US , NATO . the E uro pean Co mmunity and eve n the o ld ri va l, Ge rmany. At the th resho ld of the twenty- first ce ntury, Slova ki a, w ith its c umbe rso me soc ia li st eco no my, its po puli st nati o na li sm , and its pro bl e ms with Hun ga ry over the Hungari an mino rity in Slovaki a and the G abc fk ovo- Nagy maros da m projec t o n the Da nube, aga in became a strateg ic burden. The Czec hos lovak traditi o n and adhe re nce to the Czec hos lovak idea were still strong in the Czec h Lands. Tho ugh the Czec h politica l ri ght had the suppo rt of gro ups suc h as The Czec h Initi ati ve, whic h gathered aro und 50,000 sig natures in favo ur of Czec h independe nce in fo ur days in June 1992 in Prague, most Czec hs were still in favo ur of a co mm o n state w ith the Slova ks. 52 Thu s Kl aus and hi s partners co uld not push throug h a break-up w itho ut so me effort. Co nsequ ent ly, as Abby Innes wrote: ' Kl a us preferred a strategy o f shi ftin g res- 51 As cited in Marian Lesko: Meciar a meciarizm us: polit ik bez .~kruptif" politika bez zabran. Bratis lava. 1997, p.78. 52 BBC Summary of World Broadcast. EE/ 14 12 B/5. 20 June I 992. �SLOVAKIA 103 po ns ibility fo r the confli c t e ntire ly onto the Slovak side and c la imed th at it was now "ev ide nt th at votes fo r the HZ DS are votes fo r th e di visio n o f the state". ' 53 Give n th at th e do min a nt Czec h im age of S lovak nati o na li sm, a nd of Vl adim ir Mec iar, was negative, Kl aus was lucky in hav in g hi s tas k made eas ier. Hi s ca mpa ig n was furth er ass isted by th e oppos iti o n of the leading S lova k parti es to th e ree lection of Pres ide nt Vac lav Have l in Jul y. Hav ing fa il ed to be ree lec te d , Have l res ig ned pre m ature ly whe n th e Slo va k Nation a l Co unc il passed a large ly sy mbo li c dec larati o n of sovere ig nty o n 17 Jul y. Have l, prev io us ly o ne of the leading pro po ne nts of the co mmo n state, now le nt hi s support to a di visio n of the state. 54 The first day of Janu ary 1993 saw the creati o n of two new states: the C zec h Re publi c and the Sl ovak Re publi c. Of the two, the Czec h Republi c c learl y adopted the mantl e of successor to Czec hos lovaki a. T he new Czec h state had the sa me capita l, the same fl ag (in breac h o f an earli e r agree me nt) and the sa me pres ide nt. C zec h co mpani es and even po liti ca l parties fo r a lo ng time ke pt the word 'Czechos lovak ' in the ir na me (for exampl e, the S in CSA, Czec h[os lovak] A irlin es). Mos t things re ma ined as they had bee n, exce pt w ith o ut the Slovaks. As Vaculfk had po inted o ut so po ig nantl y in 1990: ' Whe n th e "Federati o n" started crac king in its fo undatio n, I got the idea fo r a new , in spi rin g ly o ptimi sti c so luti o n: whe n S lov aki a breaks away there w ill be no o ne to preve nt us fro m ca lling o ur state Czec hos lovak ia ... ' 55 " A bby Innes: ' T he Breakup of Czechos lovak ia: T he Impact of Part y Deve lopment on the Separation of the State· . Eust European Politics and Society. Vol. I I /3. 1997. pp. 393-435 (424). '" I va n L amper and V ladimir Ml ynar: ·skoncila ceskoslovenska statnost: Rozhovor s pos lednfm prezi dentem CSFR Vac lave m Havlem ' . Respekt. 20-27 July 1992. p.4. " Vac ulfk: ' Meciar mofoa odejde'. p.2 . � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2005, Vol. 38 Description An account of the resource Vol. 38 (No. 70-71), 2005. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2005 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 81 SLOVAKIA From Bratr nas to At'jdou Slovakia, the Slovaks and Slovak Nationalism seen from Prague 1 Paa! Sigurd Hilde The Velvet Divorce between the Czech and Slovak parts of the Czech and Slovak Federal Repub lic (CSFR) was a political undertaking. All public opinion polls taken in the period 1990-1992 showed a clear majority in favour of a common state among both Slovaks and Czechs.2 The decision to divide the country came as a result of a compromise between two political parties - or more specifically, between two politicians: Vaclav Klaus of the (Czech) Civic Democratic Party and Vladimfr Meciar of the (Slovak) Movement for a Democratic Slovakia. While both Klaus and Meciar argued that they wanted to preserve the common state, their visions of such a Czech and Slovak state were so disparate that an agreement to differ was the only possibility. Most detailed studies of the break-up agree that if either of them , Meciar or Klaus, were to be identified as 'more guilty' in promoting the break-up, it would not be the Slovak nationali st Meci ar, but the Czech ' Thatcherite ' Klaus. 3 Ultimately, what sank the good ship Czechoslovakia was that the Czech captain, the ' A sli ghtly different version of thi s arti cle was originall y published in Norwegian in Nordisk @stforum, Yol . 15/2. 200 I , pp.5-16. 2 See. for example, Sharon Wolchik: 'The Pol itics of Ethnicity in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia', fast European Politics and Society, Vol. 8/ 1994. I , pp.153-188. 3 See, for example, Abby Innes: Czechoslovakia: The Short Goodbye. London. 200 I , particularly pp. 176-2 19. SLOVAKIA 82 o ne that had a lw ays fo ught the hardest to keep it a fl oat, gave the order to sc uttle. The a im of thi s paper is to prov ide a n in sig ht into the deve lopme nt of the vi e ws on Slovaki a, Slovaks and Slova k nati o na li sm in th e Czec h Land s: fro m the ideas unde rl y in g the creati o n of Czech oslova ki a in 19 18 to those leading to the di sso luti o n of th at country in 1992. Natu ra ll y, the re is no c lear 'Czec h view ' of matters re lating to Sl ova ki a. Even if one di srega rds indi vidu a l o pini o ns and con ce ntrates o n what mi g ht be ca ll ed c ultura l ' heteroste reotypes' (v ie ws of the othe r), o ne w ill still find , fo r in stance, strong reg io na l differe nces w ithin the Czech La nd s. Any ana lys is of the ' Czec h view ' will thu s, eve n in the best case, be a probl e mati c prese ntati o n o f e lu sive collecti ve attitudes. Furthe rm ore, give n the absence of publi c opinio n surveys fo r most of the peri od studi ed , it is imposs ibl e to asce rta in ho w representati ve suc h attitudes were. The pi cture of Sl o va ki a presented here will be based to a large deg ree o n the attitudes ex pressed by leadin g po liti c ia ns, jo urn a li sts a nd o th er ' opini o n-fo rmers' in the Czec h Lands. For thi s reaso n the arti c le will present o pini o ns mo re typi ca l of Prague tha n. fo r in stance, Mo ra via, whe re co ntacts w ith Slovaks a nd Sl ovaki a we re more direct. Ho we ve r, as an earli er study , simil ar to thi s, argued , ' in Prag ue and in the C zec h Land s in genera l there are few opportunities to ga in a broad , direct impress ion of Slovaks, and the Czec h view of the Slovak is the refore the res ult of tra nsmitted , dedu ced impress io ns. ' 4 Whe n attitudes are acqui red ma inl y indirec tl y, opini o n-formers pl ay an important rol e. Gi ve n the limited scope of thi s arti c le, th e many theoreti cal and methodo log ica l pro bl e ms of suc h a stud y ca nno t be e xamined. Interestin g a nd impo rtant aspec ts, suc h as the inte raction between th e C zech and Slo va k he teroste reotypes o f eac h othe r, will al so have to be ig no red . Gi ven these limitati o ns, thi s articl e beco mes a mere in - 0 Petr Pi'fh oda : ' Slovac i ces kyma ocima'. Svedect vf, Vol. I 3/52. 1976, p.637. T he arti cle was publi shed under the pseudonym Jan Prfbram. SLOVAKIA 83 troducti o n to the issue - an introducti o n th at mi g ht mo ti vate othe rs to make a c loser and broader examin atio n. Three aspects - three stages In her exce ll e nt stud y of the co nfli c t betwee n S lova ks a nd Czec hs, Caro l Ska lnik Leff a na lysed the develo pme nt of a se nse of mutu a l resentment betwee n the two gro ups. 5 A lmost througho ut Czechos lovak hi sto ry, there was persiste nt o ppos it ion fro m the Czec hdo min ated politi ca l leade rship , bo th de mocrati c a nd Co m m uni st, aga in st ful fi llin g pro mi ses of a uto no my for the Slova k part of the co untry. On the one hand , thi s fa ilure to live up to the pro m ises of 19 18, 1945 and , some argue, 1968, led to the deve lo pme nt of a sense of betraya l in Slovak ia. On the ot her ha nd, in creas ing numbers of Czec hs ex pressed a nger over what they perce ived as S lovak in gratitude - Slovak ungratefuln ess fo r a ll the ass istance Czec hs affo rded Slovaki a. Moreove r, the way Slovak po liti c ians, in the Czec h perception, ex pl o ited tim es of crisis in Czec hos lovaki a to pro mo te the ir narrow nati o na li st ai ms ca used pa rti c ul ar rese ntm ent. T h is deeprooted mutu al resentme nt was, Leff arg ued in 1987 , o ne of th e ma in reasons why the co nfl ic t betwee n the Czec hs a nd S lovaks wo ul d rema in an unresolved pro bl e m.6 She was soon to be proven right. If o ne examines the Czec h view of S lovaki a, Slovaks and S lovak natio na li sm mo re broad ly than Leff, it is poss ible to ide nti fy two furth er impo rta nt aspec ts of the Czec h view. The firs t mi g ht be des cribed as big-brothe rl y co nce rn . Ma ny Czec h inte ll ect ua ls, po li tic ians and other Slova ko ph iles we re ge nuine ly interes ted in and conce rned abo ut th e we lfare and fate of the S lova ks. T he ir e ngagement was we ll in tended and , espec ia ll y before 19 18 but a lso later, of g reat he lp to Slova k inte ll ec tu a l a nd c ultu ra l li fe. However, no t in fre qu e ntl y d id thi s bi g brothe rl y co nce rn deve lop into a peda nt ic a nd 5 Carol Skalni k Leff: Na tional Conf7ict in Czechoslovakia. Princeton . 1987 , particu larly pp. 148-177. 6 Ibid .. p. 282 . 84 SLOVAKI A arroga nt pate rn a li sm . Not surpri s in g ly, thi s was not favo urabl y received in Slovak ia. T he seco nd aspec t of the Czec h view of S lova ki a a nd the S lovaks is best described as a lac k of aware ness. Average know ledge of po liti ca l a nd eco no mi c conditi o ns in S lova ki a a nd S lova k c ul ture was never ex tensive in the Czech Lands. Partic ul arl y impo rtant was th e w id espread ig norance of the c ultu ra l, soc ia l and es pec iall y re li g iou s diffe re nces betwee n th e average Czec h and Slovak. Hi sto ri ca ll y, thi s un aware ness was to a large degree a res ult of th e qui ck and re lati ve ly pa inl ess acce ptance by the Czec hs of a Czechos lovak ide ntity and the offic ia l ideo logy of the ex iste nce of a Czec hos lovak nati o n. Thi s lack of kn o wl edge often led to in sensiti vity to wards Slovak di stin cti ve ness. Czech po liti c ia ns thu s occas io na ll y made po litica l dec isio ns that suited co nditio ns in the Czec h La nds w itho ut proper concern fo r the di ffe rent impac t the ir po lic ies mi g ht have on Slovaki a. C learl y, th ere is no c lear-c ut di stinc ti o n betwee n the three analytica l aspects of the Czec h view of Slovaks and Slovak nationa li sm. A ll three were present to a greate r o r lesser ex tent th rougho ut the hi story of co ntacts between the two gro ups, and they overl ap. To a certa in degree, however, th ey re prese nt stages throu g h whi c h ma in strea m o pini o n in th e Czec h La nd s went as time progressed . Bi gbrothe rl y co ncern was c learly the most important facet in th e pre19 18 pe ri od and in the ear ly years of the First Repu bli c. The inte rwar pe ri od is most stro ng ly marked by the Prague leadership ' s ig norance of the parti c ul ar soc ia l, econo mi c and re li g io us conditi o ns in Slovak ia. After the dra mati c eve nts in 1938 and 1939, wi th the Mu ni c h Acco rd, S lova k a uto no my a nd la te r ' ind e pe nde nce ' durin g Wo rl d W ar II , Czec h rese ntme nt towards the Slovaks, a nd espec iall y S lovak nat io na li sm, beco mes in creas in g ly impo rta nt. Fi fty years later, thi s animos ity was to dec ide the fa te of the co mm on Czec h and Sl ovak state. SLOVAKIA 85 Big Brother In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the overarching aim of Czech political parties was to force Vienna to acce pt increased autonomy for ' the hi storic lands ' (basically today 's Czech Republic) within the Habsburg Monarchy. The idea of a wider Slav cooperation within the Empire, particularly with th e Slovaks, had ga in ed stre ngth among Czech intell ec tual s from about the 1830s. However, after the success of Hung aria n nat ion ali sm in th e 1867 Ausgleich, Czech leaders became concerned not to a ntagoni se their potential allies in Budapest. The result was that 'Czec h politicians, thou gh sy mpathetic toward [the Slovaks], were re luctant to inte rfere on the ir behalf in Hungary, for this would constitute a violation of Hungary 's state rights and mi ght jeo pardize the Czech program that was based on Bohemia's hi storic state ri ghts. ' 7 The lack of broader politica l cooperation did not preve nt an increasing activism in favour of the c ulturall y oppressed Slovaks, especially among Czech intellectua ls. Whil e Czech culture and society , and Czech nationalism, deve loped rapidly in line with the rapid social and economic deve lopm e nts in the re lativel y liberal Austrian part of the Monarch y, the s itu ation for Slovak culture a nd nationali sm was much more difficult. Particularly after 1867, the Hun garian authoriti es led a heavy-handed assimilation policy (Magyarisation) towards the minorities in Hungary . Many Czech intellectuals expressed a deep sy mpathy for the fate of what they saw as their Slovak brethren in Hun gary and the Slovak national dema nd s. 8 Especially 7 Victor S. Mamatey: 'The Estab li shment of the Republic'. in Victor S. Mamatey and Radomfr Luza (eds.): A History or the Czechosl ovak Republic: 19 18- 1948. Princeton . 1973 , pp. 3-38 (9). 8 Under th e leadership of L'.udovit Stur. Jozef Miloslav Hurban and Michal Miloslav Hodza, a Slovak National Council , formed in Vienna on 16 September I 848 , gave Slovak nationalism its first clear political expression in form of the declaration De mands or the Slovak Nation. Thirteen years later, this time inspired mainly by Stefan Marko Daxner and Jan Francisci, an even clearer national programme was formulated in the 186 1 Memorandum or the Slovak Nation. See Dusan Kovac: Dejiny Slovenska. Prague. 1998. pp. I 19- 13 1. SLOVAKIA 86 from th e 1880s , ac ti ve support fo r Slovak nati onali st intell ec tu als increased. As H. Gordon Sk ill ing wrote: 'from the leighteen] eighties on, there graduall y deve loped, among Czech cultu ra l and pro fes sional persons, a substanti al concern for the Slovaks and a desire to promote Czech and Slovak cooperati on. ' 9 M ost importantl y, the Czech interest in Sl ovaki a took an organised fo rm w ith th e creati on of Ceskoslovanska j edn ota (Czec hos lav Unity), in 1895 . Thi s organi sati on offered fin ancial support to Slovak publi cati ons, grants for Slovak students in the Czech L ands and promoted Czech in vestments in Slovaki a. 1° Furthermore, Ceskoslovan- ska jedn ota sought to spread in form ati on about Sl ovaki a and the Slovaks among Czechs. Thi s w illingness to help the Sl ovaks did not di sappear with the es tabli shment of th e Czec hoslovak state in 19 18. With the gradu al ' liberation ' of what the new Czechos lovak authoriti es considered to be 'S lovaki a' (no admini strati ve boundari es ex isted), a new admini strati on had to be establi shed. The old admini strati ve apparatu s in Hungary consisted almost exc lusive ly of M agyars (ethni c Hungari ans) or ass imil ated intelligenti fro m other cultures. M ost of these refu sed to work for the new Czechos lovak state. As there were far from sufficient educated, patri oti c Sl ovaks to take over the admini strati on, officials had to be imported from the Czech L ands. The first major immi grati on ca me in the spring of 19 19, when ra il way and postal workers in Sl ovaki a stopped work ing to protest again st the new regime. A t th e urgent request of K ornel Stodola, the official res ponsibl e for ra il ways, ' several th ousand patri oti c Czech 9 H . Gordon Ski lling: T. G. Ma.r nryk : Against the Current. 1882- 19 14. London . 1994. p.68 (hereafter Ski ll ing: Mw;ary k). JU Mi ros lav Pek nfk: ·K profi lu slovensko-ceskych vztahov pred prvou sve tovou voj - nou'. in Mi lan Podrimavsky and Dusan Kovac (eds.) : Slovensko ,w zaciatku 20. storocia (Spo /ocnost: stat a narod v siiradniciach doby). Brati slava. 1999. pp.9 1-9 3: Mari e L. Neudorn: ' Slovakia in the Czech Press at the Turn of the ineteen th and Twe nti eth Ce ntu ries' . in John Morison (ed. ): The Czech and Slovak Experience: Selected Papers fro m the Fourth World Cong ress for So viet and East European Studies. Harrogille. I 990. London . 1992. pp. 38-6 I. SLOVAKIA 87 vo lunteers hurri ed fro m Bohe mi a a nd Mo ra via and at a mo me nt 's notice.' 11 Late r, me mbe rs of othe r profess ion a l groups ca me to take up vacant pos iti o ns in S lovaki a: sc hoo lteac hers, uni versity lec ture rs, gend armes, tax collectors a nd bureaucrats of a ll so rts. It has bee n estimated th at 50-60 000 Czec hs went to Sl ovaki a in 19 19-20 and about as many aga in in the years up to 1930. 12 Whil e undo ubtedl y moti vated partl y by the ava il ability of jobs, the w illin g ness to uproot and move to still un safe S lova ki a o n sho rt no ti ce does suggest at least some idea li sm amo ng the vo lunteers. In 19 19-20 there was still armed confli ct betwee n Hun gari an and Czechoslo va k fo rces fo r control o ve r Slovaki a. Even fo r an un e mpl oyed bu reaucrat it could no t have been an easy dec isio n to move there. Few Czec hs can be seen to have do ne mo re to ra ise sy mpathy fo r the Sl o vaks a nd the ir fa te th an To mas Garri g ue Masaryk. Bo rn in Hodonfn , in the Slov acko reg io n of Morav ia, Masaryk ca me fro m a reg ion o n the bo rde r betwee n Czec h and Sl ova k lang uage and c ul ture. Hi s fa ther was Sl ova k and hi s moth er a Germ ani sed C zec h. 13 Gi ven thi s bac kg round , the idea of Czec h and Slovak politica l cooperation mu st have co me easil y to M asaryk. In hi s po litica l li fe , he became one of the ma in propo ne nts of suc h cooperati o n among Czec h politi c ians. As a pro fessor at the C harl es Uni ve rs ity in Prag ue, he was the ma in so urce of in spirati o n fo r a g roup of Slovak stu dents who wo uld later make up an impo rta nt part of the po liti ca l e lite in Czechoslova ki a. Th ese stude nts , best know n as hlasisti, afte r th e name of the ir j o urn a l Hlas (Vo ice), beca me the ma in supporte rs of the C zechos lovak idea in Slovaki a. 14 Yet, despite hi s ge nuin e co nce rn for the S lovaks, M asary k 's speec hes and arti c les at times ex pressed a pa te rn a li st and arroga nt 11 R. W. Seton-Watson : A History of the Czechs and Slovaks. London. 1943. p.323. 12 Jan M ec hyr: Slovensko v Ceskoslovensku : Slovensko-ceske vztahy I 9 I 8- 199 I. Prague. 199 1. p.27. 1 '- K arel Capek: Hovory s T. G. M asa1y kem. Prag ue. 1947. pp.8-9, I I 8. 14 Vl ad im ir Bakos: Questions of the Nation in Slo va k Thoug ht. Brati slava. 1999. pp.1 3-57 . 88 SLOVAKIA attitude toward s Slovak culture and hi story . For instance, Masaryk rej ected calls for a plebisc ite in Slovakia after World War l, arg uin g that 'one cannot allow such a vote there, since the Slovaks have bee n so oppressed that they have never had the opportunity to think politically and they would not know in whose hand s to put th eir fate. ' 15 Even c learer was hi s comment on rece nt negotiation s with Slovak leaders in a letter to hi s dau ghter Alice, in 1924: 'It is necessary to be patient with the Slovaks - they are children, or rather spoilt brats.' 16 Given the relatively low educational level and minimal political experience of most Slovaks in 1918 , claims about their immaturity clearly had some justification in the first years after the establi shme nt of Czechoslovakia. However, Czech politicians continued throu ghout the ex istence of the Czechoslovak state to explain the lack of understanding for their policies in Slovakia as a sign of the politica l immaturity of Slovaks. Commenting on relations between Czech and Slovak exiles during World War II, for instance, Edvard Be nes informed the British Foreign Mini stry , that ' the re existed unity among the Czechs while the Slovaks, he conceded, because of their political immaturity, reflected the divided opinions at home.' 17 Also in the post-Communist period , Slovak nationalism , and especially its more radical expressions, were presented as clear signs of the political immaturity of the Slovaks. 'Everyone has the right to live his nineteenth century,' became a common remark in sarcastic comments. 18 " Quoted in Robert 8. Pynsent: ' Masaryk 's ·' Path of Democracy". Or: The Democrati c National Socialist Ideal'. in K atarina A. M . K ocourek (ed.): T. G. Masaiyk 1850- /937. A Collection of Essays to Commemora te the 150th Anniversary of the Birth of Thomas G. Masaryk . London, 2000, p. 35 -57 (41 ) (a specia l issue of Masa1yk Journal). 16 Quoted in Zbynek Zeman and Antonin Klimek: The Life of Eduard Benes: Cze- choslovakia in Peace and War. Oxford , 1997, p.5 I (herea fter Zeman and Klimek: Eduard Benes) . 17 Quoted ibid. pp.168-69. 18 Otto U lc: 'Czechoslovakia ' s Velvet Divorce ' , East European Quarterly, Vol.30/3, 1996, pp. 33 1-352 (340). SLOVAKIA 89 From a Czech po int of view, the re lati o nship between the C zechs and Sl ovaks was c learl y a bi g broth er - littl e brother re lati o nship. The Czech partner in the Czec h-S lovak unio n was c learl y superior in po pulati o n (abo ut 2: I), and fo r most of the hi sto ry of the common state a lso in soc io-econo mic deve lo pment (for example, in education , car-ow nership , numbe r of te le pho nes , etc .). Czech nationa li sts could be proud of a ri c h nati o na l hi story a nd a hi g hl y deve lo ped Czec h c ulture, whil e Slovak nati o na li sts, for hi stori ca l reasons, had less to brag abo ut. The pi cture of Slovaki a as a less deve lo ped, less c ultured ' hinte rl and ' re ma in ed in Czec h po pul ar c ulture, parti c ul arl y in Prague, eve n after Slovak ia reac hed a basica ll y equ al leve l of soc io-econo mi c developme nt (abo ut I 980) . 19 As Petr Prfh oda, the pse udo nymo us Jan Prfbram, observed in the ex ile jo urna l Svedect vfin 1976: T he charac te ri sti c tra its of [the Czec h view of Slovaks a nd S lovaki a] have o ne co mmo n de no m inato r: an a lbe it unc lear, th o ug h multi face ted inferiority. Slovaks see m primiti ve, imm ature, emo ti o na ll y unrestra ined and uneducated [ ... ] The na ivety and lack of ex pe ri e nce amo ng those who come to the unknow n Czec h e nvironme nt is qui c kl y mi sunde rstood as stupidity. A Slovak is qu ite simpl y asc ribed a child 's menta li ty .20 Ignorance On the first page of its 27 Nove mber 1935 iss ue, in an artic le by the fa mo us Czec h jo urn a li st Ferdin and Pe routka, the influenti al journal Pl ftomnost (Presence) asked its readers: ' Do you know of anyone who unde rstand s Slova ki a?' 2 1 F ifty-fi ve years late r, Vac lav Have l' s ad visor Pe te r Hun c ik to ld the Ch a irm a n of th e Sl ova k N ati o na l 19 M il an K ucera and Zdenek Pavlfk: ·Czech and Slovak Demograph y ·, in Jiff M usil (ed.): The End or Czechoslovak ia. Budapest, 1995 , pp. 15-39. 20 Prfhoda: ·s Jovaci ceskyma oc ima' , p.643. 21 Ferd inand Peroutka: ·Nevfte o nekom , kdo rozu mf Slovensku?' , Prfto mnos t, Vo l. 12/47. 1935 , p. I . as reprod uced in Anton Ras la: Zastupova l som ceskoslovensky stat - vyznanie. Presov, 1999, p.268. 90 SLOVAKIA Co un c il , Fra nti se k Mi k losko, th at the Pres ide nt a lways had mi graines whe n he trave ll ed in Slovaki a. 22 Thi s was no t due to the c lim ate, but beca use Have l fe lt great unease abo ut not know ing Slovaki a. Such ac know ledge me nts refl ect the limited kno wl edge of Slovaki a and the Slovaks in the C zech Land s. As Prfhoda o bserved : ' Of all the ne ig hbo urin g nati o ns we know the S lovaks the leas t and ex press the least interest in the m and the ir nat io n. Admittedl y, we have been introdu ced th e best to th e Sl ova ks, but we kn ow th e leas t abo ut the m. ' 23 It is poss ible to ide nti fy severa l reasons fo r thi s lac k of know ledge and understanding. Partl y, it was a res ult of the somew hat confusin g nature of Slovak po liti cs . A lmost thro ugho ut the histo ry of Czechoslovaki a, the politica l e lite in Slova ki a was di vided o n the iss ue of inc reased se lf-governm e nt. Pe ri odi ca ll y, thi s inte rn a l stru gg le amon g S lovak po liti c ians over whethe r S lovaks did or did not want a uto no my mu st have been confu s in g eve n for th e most interested C zech o bserver. Gu stav Hu sak, fo r exampl e, contributed to muddlin g the picture of S lovak nati o na li sm : fro m be ing the prime propo ne nt o f th e federa li sati o n of Czec hos lova ki a befo re a nd durin g the 1968 ' Prag ue S prin g', Hu sak sudde nl y changed into a pro po ne nt of ce ntrali sati o n o nce he was in po wer in Prag ue. Thi s s ituation was exacerbated by the lac k of opportunity pro po nents of inc reased Sl ovak se lf- rul e had to prese nt thei r views to the Czech publi c. Genera ll y, the Slovak po liti c ians who most eas il y ga ined access to the pages of the Prag ue press were those in favo ur of centra li sed rul e. Furth e rmo re, the lac k of know ledge a nd unde rstand in g of S lovaki a a mo ng Czec hs was a res ult of a lac k of in terest in S lova k affa irs. Slovaki a was, at least in the in ter- war peri od, a po liti ca ll y less impo rta nt part of the country. Even if sy mpathy fo r the S lovaks had pl ayed a ro le in the suppo rt C zec h po li tic ians gave the pl ans fo r an inde pe nde nt Czec hos lova ki a, th e re we re o ther impo rt a nt reaso ns 22 Frantsiek M iklosko: Cas stretnutf. Brati slava, 1996, p.44. 23 Pffhoda: ·s tovaci ceskyma oci ma', p.643. 91 SLOVAKIA why they wanted a union . The main ' problem ' in Czech hi story has been the question of the Czechs ' position as a small nation surrounded by Germans. In Slovakia and the Slovaks, Czech leaders found a doub le solution to their problem. As a people, the Slovaks represented a biological reinforcement to the Czech , renamed the Czechoslovak, nation , making it the majority nation in the new state. They thus helped legitimate Czech(oslovak) domination of Czechoslovakia. (One should not forget that there were about 50 per cent more German than Slovak speakin g citizens (3 versus 2 million ) in interwar Czechoslovakia.) As a territory . Slovakia formed a bridge out of the German encirclement towards Ru ssia, which before 1917 was perceived as a rival of Germany and protector of the Slavs, and towards Czechoslovakia ·s all y Romania. For those perceivin g the state from such a ' Great-Czech ' point of view, Czechos lovakia was merely 'a reestabli shment of th e Czech state, reinforced by the Slovak territorie s, which were so weak and neglected that it was simply not necessary to see them as a separate entity. ' 24 The most important reason for the lack of knowl edge and understandin g of Slovakia among Czechs was , however. the uncritical acceptance of the Czechoslovak idea by most Czechs. In th e interwar yea rs, the Czechoslovak ideo logy was a pillar ce ntral to the very existence of the state. Even Masaryk argued th at ' there is no such thing as a Slovak nation 25 paganda ' . l- .. I; that is an invention of Hungarian pro- In Slovakia, on the other hand, the idea of one Czecho- slovak nation met res istance, [i]n the minds of th e Czechs, the notions of 'Czec h' and ' Czechoslovak' had blended into one by th e end of the Second World War at the latest. A significa nt conseq uence of thi s psycho- soci al operation was the removal of the Slovaks as a distinct ethni c entity from the Czech field of vis ion . The Slovaks eventuall y began to be perceived as H L.:.ubomfr Liptak: Slovensko v 20. storocf. Bratisl ava. 1998. 2nd edition. p. 128 . 15 Pynse nt : ' Masaryk ·s "Pa th of Democracy''". p.41. 92 SLOVAKIA part of the same nat iona l organi sm - almost as the advocates of the Czechoslovak concept would like to have it only thi s organi sm was not Czechoslovak but Czech.26 The net result of thi s process was that the social, c ultura l and reli g ious differences betwee n the Czechs and Slovaks became invisible to the majority of Czechs who never learned to kn ow the Slovaks and Slovakia directly. Thi s aga in led to the anticipatio n that Slovaks would have a s imil ar world view and would react in the sa me way as Czechs to events and po li c ies. The co nsequences of such anticipation varied over time. In the inter-war period , it was the insensitive attitude of the new regime towards the Catholic Church that was most important. Czech nation alism had the Hu ss ite peri od as its Golden Age; a Golden Age that was termin ated by the Battle of the White Mountain in 1620 and the following violent co unterReform ation in Bohemia and , to a somew hat lesser degree, Morav ia. With the sec ulari sing impact of the industriali sation and urbani sati on of the Czech Lands in the nineteenth century, thi s gave Czech nationalism a not only sec ul ar, but often an openly anti-Catho lic edge. 27 Although the Protestant minority was proportionately bi gger in Slovakia than in the Czech Land s, there was no clear connection between anti-Catholici sm and nation ali sm even amon g Protestant Slovak nat ionali sts. On the contrary, one direction within the Slovak nati ona l move ment was closely co nnec ted to the Catholic fa ith . The Catholic national ists, led from the early twentieth century by Andrej Hlinka, were more skeptica l of cooperation with the Czec hs than were the hlasi sti. Man y Czech politicians and intellec tu a ls were, from the point of view of Slovak Catholics, dangerously radical liberals, if not atheist anti-Catholics. 28 When the declaration of Czechoslovak independence on 28 October 1918 was followed by a wave of 26 Zdenek Suda: ' Slovakia in Czech Nati onal Consciousness ' , in Musil (ed.): The End of Czechoslovakia, p.1 39- 155 ( 11 8) (hereafter Suda: ' Slovakia ' ). 27 R. W. Seton-Watson: A History of the Czechs and Slovaks. London, 1943, p.33 1. 28 Jan Rychl fk : Cesi a Slovaci ve 20. stoletf: Cesko-sl ovenske vztahy , 19 14- 1945. Bratislava, 1997, p.38 (hereafter Rychlfk: Cesi a Slo vac1). SLOVAKIA 93 anti-Catholic gestures in the Czech Lands, the worst fears of the Slovak Catholics were reali sed . As lsmo Nurmi wrote: ' if the anti-Catholic mood was fashionable in the Czech lands, it was not so in Slovak ia and even less so when a numbe r of desecration s of reli g iou s c ult objects, churches, statues, crosses etc. were committed [ ... ] also in Slovakia [by] civil servants and particularly the Czechoslovak Army.' 29 The attempt to create a Czechoslovak national hi story and tradition with the Hussite era as pivotal was a clear sign of the lac k of understanding among Czech (and some Slovak) leade rs for the position of the Catholic Church in Slovakia. Masaryk 's official ' inclusion ' of Slovakia in the Hu ss ite tradition on the basis of Jan Ji skra 's ' crusade ' into Slovakia was not only hi storically dubiou s, but also, and not surpri sin gly, rejected by the Slovak Catholic clergy. As Suda wrote: ' To the Catholic majority of the Slovaks, among whom Catholicism had a very pronounced conservative tin ge typical of a pre-modern society , a common programme with the Czechs based on the traditions of the Protestant Reformation must have been almost an anathema. ' 30 After 1948, with the industriali sation of Slo vaki a unde r Communi st rul e, the religious differen ces be tween the Czech a nd Slovak parts of the common state were so mew hat diffused. Albeit a clear scepticism towards 'Czech liberali sm ' was visible in Christian democratic circles in Slovakia also after the collapse of Communism, another as pec t of the Czech ignorance of Slovak affairs beca me more important. As noted above , very many Czechs saw Czechoslovakia and the ' Czechoslovak nation ' as their state and nation , quite often interpreted as a Czech state a nd nation that included the Slovaks. After World War II , the rec reation of Czechoslovakia was acco mpanied by an official recog niti on by all political leaders, albeit some Czec h politicians were reluctant to do so, of the ex iste nce of two 29 lsmo Nurmi: Slo vakia - A Playground for Na tionalism and National Identity. 191 8- /920 : M anifestations of the Na tional Identity of Slovaks. Hel sinki. 1999. pp. 92-93. 30 Suda : ·Slovakia ' . p.11 5. SLOVAKIA 94 fo un d in g nati ons in the co untry . Thi s princ ipl e was reaffirmed with the federa li sati on of 1968. Despite thi s offic ial recogniti on, there was ve ry littl e understanding a mong Czec hs of S lovak atte mpts to promote the ir separate ide ntity. Proba bl y the best kn ow n exa mpl e of S lova k po li tic ians ' dema nd s fo r 'v isibility and equ a lity ' fo r S lovaki a w ithin Czec hos lovaki a was the stru gg le fo r the name of the federati on in the sprin g of 1990 . Th e so-ca ll ed ' hy phe n-wa r ' sta rted w he n new ly e lec ted Pres ide nt Vac lav Have l suggested c ha ng in g the offic ial name of the Republic, the Czechoslovak Soc iali st Republic, by mere de leti on of the word ' Sociali st' . Whil e fo r mos t Czec hs thi s so luti on mu st have see med natural , it ran into oppos iti on in S lovaki a? A Sl ovak co unter-proposa l, the Czec ho-Slovak Re public, or just Czec ho-Slovaki a, a name that made Slovaki a more vi s ibl e to the world , was, however, not acceptabl e to most Czec h po liti c ians. The reasons given fo r thi s were that th e hyphe n had been used in the name of the Second Republi c (1938 -39, th at is, afte r the Muni c h Accord), a nd beca use ' C zec ho' (Ces k o) was not consi de red a pro pe r word in the Czech language. As one leading comme ntator compl ained in Lidove noviny: ' We in the Czec h Land s perce ive the insiste nt de mand of Sl ovaki a fo r a di vidin g line in the na me of the Re public as tac tl ess and coarse. " 2 Onl y afte r two mo nth s o f de bate in the three nati onal asse mbli es (the Czec h, Slova k and Federa l) and the mass medi a was a compromi se fo und : The Czec h and Slovak Federa l Republic. Have l quic kl y rea li sed th at he had made a mi stake by not consul ting politic ians fro m both the Czec h a nd Sl ova k Re pu b li cs before making hi s suggestion public. In a n atte mpt to rec ti fy the s itu ati on the hospitali sed Have l sent a le tter to the Federal Asse mbl y in February, where he stated : -' ' M il an Su tovec: Semi6za aka pol i tik um a/ebo "Pom lckov;-i vojna ". Brati slava, 1999, pp. 174- 196 (hereafter Sutovec: Pomlckova vojna). -' 2 Ji ff Hanak: 'Nespraved li ve a tedy neprijatelne' . Lidove Noviny. 28 M arch 1990. p.l. SLOVAKIA 95 We a ll kn o w th at thi s hyphe n, whi ch fo r a ll Czechs seems ridi c ul o us, unnecessary and ugly, is mo re tha n just a hyphe n. In thi s hyphe n o ne ca n find severa l decades, if not ce ntu ries of th e hi sto ry of the S lo va k nati o n [ ... ] The Sl o vak nation is ri g htfull y tryin g to fin d its ide ntity, fo r reason s Czec hs probabl y do n ' t understa nd , eve n if they o ught to understand them.33 Resentment Exampl es of Czec h skepti c ism a nd resentment to ward s Slo vak nati o na li sm ca n be fo und as earl y as the middl e of th e nine teenth century. From the late 1840s, a majo rity of Slovak inte ll ectua ls ado pted the new codifi cati o n of th e S lovak lang uage , as publi shed in 1846 by Cudovft Stur, as a pl atfo rm fo r the Sl ovak national programme. This met w ith strong res istance fro m Czech and Slovak inte llectua ls promotin g Czec h-Sl ovak unity: they saw the Slovaki zed versio n of Hu ss ite Bible Czec h used by ma ny Slovak inte llec tua ls until then, as the clearest bo nd between Czechs and Slovaks.34 If in the inte rwar years Czec hos lovak leade rs cons idered Slovak nati o na li sm a pro bl e m, it was ma inl y after 1938 th at o pe nl y hostil e attitudes toward s it e merged. The ex pl oi tatio n by Slovak nati o na li sts of the weakness of the Czec hos lovak reg ime after the Munich cri sis to push trou gh thei r de mands fo r a uto no my, c ulmin atin g in the ac ceptance by the Slovak leade rs of German de mand s fo r Slovak indepe ndence in M arc h 1939, was conside red a stab in the back by most Czechs. 35 Durin g the Second World W ar, Ed vard Be nes, the C zechoslovak Pres ide nt-in -ex il e, was o ne of the sharpest cri tics of what he considered the Slovak be traya l. He was ' o bstin ate in defending the Czec hos lovak ca use: its betraya l by the Slovaks mattered more to him than the grow ing press ure from Moscow. He be li e ved th at the " As quoted in Sutovec: Pomlckova vojna, pp.269-27 1. 34 Sk illing: Masary k, p. 69. 35 Petr Pffhoda: ' M utual Perceptions in Czech-S lovak Relationshi ps ', in M usil (ed .): The End of Czechoslovakia. pp. 128- 138 ( 134 ). 96 SLOVAKIA Slovak heresy undermined the ve ry fo undations of the state, and Czechoslovaki sm was for him a part of the foundations. ' 36 Throu ghout the war, Benes and other Czech politi cians fought for the reestabli shment of the First (th at is, pre-Muni ch) Republi c. Most Slovak politici ans, howe ver, including former Czechos lovak Prime Minster Milan Hodza, con sidered thi s a less th an optim um solution. 37 Only reluctantly , given th e situation in Slovakia after the Slovak National Upri sing in the autum n of 1944, was Benes forced to accept a de facto asymmetric federalisation of post-war Czechoslo va ki a. However, despite previou s agreements, most importantl y the Kosice Government Programme, drafted by the first pro visional government after the country was partly -liberated from the East, the question of Slovaki a's position within the country cont inued to divide the Czec h and Slovak non-Comm uni st parties after the war. The willin gness of the Czec h democratic parti es to coo perate with the Communi sts in reducin g the powers of the Slovak nation al organs , cruci all y after the 1946 elections, contrib uted to undermining the position of the Democratic Party in Slo va ki a. The Czechos lovak Communi st Party was thu s abl e to exploit ' the anti -Sl ovak nati onali sm among Czech political parties and [ ... ] the isolated position of the Slovak democrats. ' 38 Thi s clearly weakened the democrats' ability to oppose the Communi sts' increasing political power in the country. During and after 1968 , the negati ve view of Slo vak nationali sm and Slovakia in the Czech L ands was reinforced. After the Soviet-led in vas ion on 2 1 Au gust 1968, 'sociali sm with a human face ' was gradually di smantled and replaced by ' norm ali sation '. Th e only maj or reform of the Prague Spring to survive was the dec ision to federalize Czechoslovakia. In Sl ovaki a thi s decision w as generall y interpreted 36 37 Zeman and Klimek : Eduard Bene{ p.203. Milan Hodza : Federarion in Cenrra l Europe: Renections and Reminiscences. London. 1942, pp.93-94. 38 Ji rf K ocian: ·Narodnf soc ialis te a slovenska otazka 1945- I 948 ". in Michal Bar- novsky (ed.) : Od dikratury k diktature. Brati slava. 1995 . pp.57-65 (6 I ). (hereafter K oc ian: ' Narodnf socialiste') SLOVAKIA 97 as a more just organi sation of the common state. In the Czech Lands, however, many saw federalisation as a further example of the Slovak nationali sts' skill in drawing advantages from Czechoslovakia's mi sfortune. The fact th at the new party leade r and late r Pres ident of Czechoslovakia, Gu stav Hu sak, was Slovak, also contributed to the negative picture of Slovakia and Slovaks. As Petr Pithart wrote: the Czech public was di sappointed, even di sg usted, by the Slovaks ' ex peri e nce of havin g ga ined sati sfac tion with federalization; at best, it was seen as foolishness a nd at worst, as blind se lfi shness and eve n betrayal. ( ... ) in the Czec h Lands there was an increasing ly obvious di sg ust for the regime and for the Slovaks, as the ones through whom normali zation was allegedly introduced and carried out. 39 A s ign of the growing irritation with and resentment toward s Slovak nationa li sm and Slovaks in ge ne ral in the Czech Lands, was the increas in g ly popul a r de mand that Czech taxpayers should not have to subsidi se the ungrateful Slovaks. Already in 1933 Czechoslovak Prime Min ster Ja n Malypete r had rejected the demand for Slovak autonomy on the grounds that Slovakia would not be able to pay its way . In the Czech press, headlines read along the lines: ' We are paying for Slovakia ' .40 Thi s be lief that the Czechs were subsidis in g th e Slovaks was observed also by Prfhoda forty-three years late r: ' In the Czech Lands the view of Slovak parasiti sm [parazitismu s] is common and it is formulated more or less like thi s: we Czechs are payin g for the Slovaks. ' 41 The Czechoslovak Communist Party was committed to so lvin g the probl e m of Slovak nation alism, which it interpreted as a mainly eco nomic iss ue , through equ ali zat ion of the standard of li ving bet- 39 Petr Pithart: ' Towards a Shared Freedom ' , in Mu sil (ed.): Th e End of Czechoslovakia.pp.20 1-222 (206). 40 Vi ctor S. Mamatey: ' The Development of Czechoslovak Democ racy ', in Mamatey and Luza (eds.) : A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, pp.99-166 ( 15 1). 41 Prfhoda: "S lovac i ces kyma ocima', p.647. SLOVAKIA 98 wee n the Czech and Slovak parts of the co unty. Economic transfers, parti cul arly through a higher level of in vestment in Sl ovaki a were, therefore, considered important. They continued even during the di ffic ult years in the 1970s and 1980s, but were kept secret, probabl y to avoid un favo urable reactions in the Czech L ands. After the co llapse of Communi sm, opposition to w hat was popularl y referred to as the Czech ' money pipeline' (p enezovod) to Slovak ia was quickl y made into a politi cal demand. In the first formal ro und of negoti ation s on th e future of the fe derati on after the co ll apse of Communi sm, in Lnare in April 1990, the Czech delegati on demanded a halt to Czec h subsidies to Slovaki a.42 From Czech to Czechoslovak nationalism and back As noted earlier, the Czechos lov ak directi on within Czech poli ti cs was by no means dominant pri or to W orld W ar I. Czec h nationali sts concentrated mainl y on defending and enhancing Czech autonomy w ithin th e Habsburg M onarchy. With the success of the Czec hoslovak idea in the Entente capitals in 19 17-1 8, however, most Czec h nati onali sts quite quickl y became convinced Czec hos lovak nati onali sts; Czech nati onali sm was ex panded to include th e Sl ovaks, the Czec hs' ' little bro ther ' in Hungary. Cultura ll y and economi ca ll y wea k, the Slovaks posed no threat to either Czech culture or politica l and economic dominati on of the new state. A nd after all , as M asaryk himse lf pointed out, the Slovaks were merely Czec hs w ith a slightly di fferent hi story. Th e attachment o f Czech politi cians to the Czech os lovak idea ca n be clearl y see n after W orld W ar II. In 1968 , a document supposedly written by members of th e (Czec h) Nation al Soc iali st Party 4 in I 946 was pub I ished in the Slova k press . ' Its authors argued th at the bes t way to so lve the problem of Slovak nati onalism was fo rced ass imil ati on of the Sl ovaks into good Czec hoslovaks. Whil e seri ous • • 2 BBC Summa1y of World Broadcast. EE/0738 B/2. 13 Apri I 1990. 3 T he document was first publi shed in Vac lav Kral: Cestou k tinoru, Prague, I 956, but attrac ted relati ve ly little attention until reproduced in the mass medi a in 1968. 99 SLOVAKIA doubts exist as to th e authenticity of thi s ' Memorandum on Slovakia' , most hi storian s seem to agree that the idea of turnin g the Slovaks into good Czechoslovaks was not alien to certain leading Czech politicians at the time. 44 The reaction to what was perceived as the Slovak betraya l of 1938-39 was increased Czechoslovak nationali sm. However, during the Communist period , a nd particul ar ly after 1968 , Czech nationalism gradually gained supporters in the Czech Lands . As Prfhoda wrote in 1976: 'I am not sure how thin gs are in Slovakia, but among Czechs the concept of a com mon state is being re-eva luated these days . I have eve n heard : let the Ru ss ia ns make Slovakia into a union republic or something and leave us in peace!' 45 Obviou sly , ne ither Czech nor Slovak separat ism was politically acceptable durin g Communist rul e. After th e 'Velvet Revo lution' , however, influe ntial vo ices soo n e merged in the Czech Land s questioning the union with the Slovaks. As earl y as the beginning of May 1990, in the aftermath of the hyphe n war, the Czech writer Ludvfk Vaculfk, the author of the 'Two thousand words' manifesto in 1968, wrote a sharpl y worded articl e in Litenimf noviny. 46 ' W e Czechs have a great debt to the Slovaks,' Yaculfk argued. This debt was due to the fact that the Czechs had happily made Slovakia ' theirs' without takin g into account what it meant to be Slovak. Through their behaviour, however, the Slovaks had made it difficult for the Czechs to appreciate thi s debt. Th e Czechs had g ive n the Slovaks the ir industry and inte lli gentsia, so mething that had only caused the Slovaks to ' until thi s day complain about the qua lity of these supplies'. The Czechs had give n the Slovaks a way out of defeat as a separate state during World War II. Even Communism , brou g ht to Slovakia by Czechs afte r the war, had g ive n the Slovaks more in material terms than it had to the Czechs. When the Czechs then tri ed to ease th e die- 44 See Koc ian: ' Narodnf soc iali ste' . passim: Rychlfk: Ce.si II Slo vaci. pp. 54-55: ·Na okraj diskusie: 0 tzv. Slovenskom memoranda Cs. narodne sociali stickej strany ', Nase snahy . Vol. I 9/2. 1983. p. 9. 45 Prfhoda: ' Slovaci ceskyma ocima ' . p.653. 41 ' Ludvik Vaculfk: ' Nase slovenska otazk a', Litenimf noviny. Vol.1 /5, 1990. p.2. SLOVAK IA 100 tatorship during 1968, the Slovaks saw thi s as a Czech matter and instead forced through 'autonomy '. For this they escaped with lighter puni shment during the era of ' normali sation .' Now aga in , after the col lapse of Communism, when Czechs were trying th eir utmost finally to defeat the dictatorial regime , the Slovaks were 'coming with their prestige demands'. ' Do we need thi s?' he asks rhetorically and then concludes : We have found ourse lves with a thankless task in th e fate of the Slo vaks, and I think th at we should end it without se lf-pity - more with a smil e into th e mirror. [ ... l Why should the Slovaks ha ve to force out of us, centimetre by ce ntimetre, somethin g that they can have in one go? By separating from the Slovaks , purely of our ow n volition , we " lose" - judging from experience to date - economic losses. Politicall y we lose th e Hungarian and Ruth ene problem s. We put another border between us and th e Soviet Union. 47 At th e time of hi s writ ing, Yaculfk ' s recommendation th at th e Czec hs should dispense with the Slovaks accorded with neither public nor political opinion in the Czech Republic. At that stage not even the most radical Czech politician s were promoting divi sion of the state. Gradually , however, the need to resolve the probl em of th e common state w ith the Slovaks once and for all became pressing. As Yaculfk observed in December of 1990: 'Public opinion poll s show that 75 percent of Czechs are said to favour a common state with the Slovaks. Had one, on the other hand , asked if we should let the Slovaks go, just as many would probabl y have answered " yes" to thi s as we ll. ' 48 In Slovakia, the question of the statu s of the Slovak Republic within the Czech and Slovak state became a centra l political topic . 47 Ibid. The double quotation marks arou nd -- Jose" were added to make th e irony more vi sible. The original tex t is : ' Od loucenfm od Slovaku. jez j e vyhradne v nasf vu li. ztratfme - souzeno dosavadnf zkusenostf - ekonomicke ztraty. • 48 Ludvik Yaculfk: ' M ec iar mozna odejde' . Litenimf noviny . Vol. I /39. I 990. p.2. SLOVAKIA 101 Sl ovak politicians began to co mpete over w ho co uld present a programme th at would benefit and pro mote Slovaki a the most. Thi s led to a gradual radi ca li sati on of Slovak demands in the negoti ation s on the future of the federati on. Such radica li sati on in turn provoked a voc iferou s reaction in the Czech L ands. Th e influenti al Czec h j ournal R esp ekt refl ec ted th e growin g antagoni sm toward s Sl ovaki a in th e Czec h L ands. Headlines from the Spring of 1992 such as ' The supreme Slovak irrespon sibility' ( 17 Febru ary, p.2), ' B alkan model on the hori zo n: how long w ill the Czech-Slovak statu s quo las t?" (24 Febru ary, p.2) and 'A bsurd parliamentary drama: who saves Slovak ia from sovereignty?' (6 A pril , p.2) ev ince an increas ingly criti ca l view o f Sl ovak politi cs . In the issue th at co incided with the electi ons of 8 June, the criticism ca me to its logica l co nclu sion . Peter Schutz, Respekt 's (Sl ovak-Hungari an) correspondent in Slovak ia, wrote in the arti cle ' Slovaki a adheres to nati onal soc iali sm': ' The shameful result of thi s electi on formul ated onl y one alternati ve - either lMec iar 's party] HZDS disintegrates, or the CSFR. ' 49 Vl adimfr Ml ynar ex pressed the same message in the subtitle o f hi s arti cle in the same issue: 'A lone into Euro pe or together into the Balkans'. 50 Parti cul arl y the politi ca l ri ght in th e Czec h Lands increasingly saw Slovaki a as an obstac le on the road ' back ' to Europe. After the 1990 elec ti ons, th e ri ght had graduall y strengthened its pos ition among the Czech elec torate. In Slovaki a, on the other hand , it was the more reform- scepti ca l and patri oti c parti es on the politica l left that had enjoyed greater success. Gi ven th e spec ial minority veto of both the Czec h and Slovak groups of deputies in th e House of Nati ons of the Federal Assembl y, a left-patri otic maj ority in Slovaki a was a worry ing prospec t for the Czech proponents of radi ca l reform s. A month before th e parliam entary election s in June 1992, V aclav 09 Peter Sch utz: ·s tovensko sa prihlasilo k narodnemu socializmu - Pos lcdne zvone- nie pre federaciu ·, Respekt. 8- 14 June 1992, p.2. ~ V lad imir Ml ynar: ·v Cechac h tes ne vftezstvf prav ice - lecne na Balka n·. Respekt, 8- 14 June 1992. p.3. Sarni do Evropy nebo spo- 102 SLOVA KI A Kl aus made it c lear that if a fu ncti o na l federa ti o n was not poss ible after the e lect io ns, he and his partners were ' ready to create a mec hani sm for a q uick, c ivili sed and prob le m-free div isio n of the state. ' 51 Conclusion By the late summ er of 1992, th e do min ant view of Slovak ia in C zec h po liti cs had, in a se nse, co me full c irc le to co inc ide with the views th at preva il ed pri o r to W o rl d W ar I. Fro m hav ing bee n a strateg ica ll y less attrac ti ve partne r in the seco nd ha lf of the nineteenth ce ntury, Sl ovaki a beca me a strateg ic asset in the firs t ha lf of th e twenti eth . Afte r W o rld W ar II , however, S lovak ia a nd th e S lovaks gradu a ll y lost the ir strateg ic impo rt a nce for the Czec hs. The large Ge rm an mino rity in the Czec h Lands was ex pe ll ed in the firs t years after the war, taking the edge off the Ge rman threat. Furthermore, fo r C zec h democ rats, the Communi st co up of Febru ary 194 8 put an e nd to a ll ideas of seekin g sec urity a nd integrati o n in the East, th ro ugh Slova ki a. In stead , they now turn ed exc lu sive ly to the West: to th e US , NATO . the E uro pean Co mmunity and eve n the o ld ri va l, Ge rmany. At the th resho ld of the twenty- first ce ntury, Slova ki a, w ith its c umbe rso me soc ia li st eco no my, its po puli st nati o na li sm , and its pro bl e ms with Hun ga ry over the Hungari an mino rity in Slovaki a and the G abc fk ovo- Nagy maros da m projec t o n the Da nube, aga in became a strateg ic burden. The Czec hos lovak traditi o n and adhe re nce to the Czec hos lovak idea were still strong in the Czec h Lands. Tho ugh the Czec h politica l ri ght had the suppo rt of gro ups suc h as The Czec h Initi ati ve, whic h gathered aro und 50,000 sig natures in favo ur of Czec h independe nce in fo ur days in June 1992 in Prague, most Czec hs were still in favo ur of a co mm o n state w ith the Slova ks. 52 Thu s Kl aus and hi s partners co uld not push throug h a break-up w itho ut so me effort. Co nsequ ent ly, as Abby Innes wrote: ' Kl a us preferred a strategy o f shi ftin g res- 51 As cited in Marian Lesko: Meciar a meciarizm us: polit ik bez .~kruptif" politika bez zabran. Bratis lava. 1997, p.78. 52 BBC Summary of World Broadcast. EE/ 14 12 B/5. 20 June I 992. SLOVAKIA 103 po ns ibility fo r the confli c t e ntire ly onto the Slovak side and c la imed th at it was now "ev ide nt th at votes fo r the HZ DS are votes fo r th e di visio n o f the state". ' 53 Give n th at th e do min a nt Czec h im age of S lovak nati o na li sm, a nd of Vl adim ir Mec iar, was negative, Kl aus was lucky in hav in g hi s tas k made eas ier. Hi s ca mpa ig n was furth er ass isted by th e oppos iti o n of the leading S lova k parti es to th e ree lection of Pres ide nt Vac lav Have l in Jul y. Hav ing fa il ed to be ree lec te d , Have l res ig ned pre m ature ly whe n th e Slo va k Nation a l Co unc il passed a large ly sy mbo li c dec larati o n of sovere ig nty o n 17 Jul y. Have l, prev io us ly o ne of the leading pro po ne nts of the co mmo n state, now le nt hi s support to a di visio n of the state. 54 The first day of Janu ary 1993 saw the creati o n of two new states: the C zec h Re publi c and the Sl ovak Re publi c. Of the two, the Czec h Republi c c learl y adopted the mantl e of successor to Czec hos lovaki a. T he new Czec h state had the sa me capita l, the same fl ag (in breac h o f an earli e r agree me nt) and the sa me pres ide nt. C zec h co mpani es and even po liti ca l parties fo r a lo ng time ke pt the word 'Czechos lovak ' in the ir na me (for exampl e, the S in CSA, Czec h[os lovak] A irlin es). Mos t things re ma ined as they had bee n, exce pt w ith o ut the Slovaks. As Vaculfk had po inted o ut so po ig nantl y in 1990: ' Whe n th e "Federati o n" started crac king in its fo undatio n, I got the idea fo r a new , in spi rin g ly o ptimi sti c so luti o n: whe n S lov aki a breaks away there w ill be no o ne to preve nt us fro m ca lling o ur state Czec hos lovak ia ... ' 55 " A bby Innes: ' T he Breakup of Czechos lovak ia: T he Impact of Part y Deve lopment on the Separation of the State· . Eust European Politics and Society. Vol. I I /3. 1997. pp. 393-435 (424). '" I va n L amper and V ladimir Ml ynar: ·skoncila ceskoslovenska statnost: Rozhovor s pos lednfm prezi dentem CSFR Vac lave m Havlem ' . Respekt. 20-27 July 1992. p.4. " Vac ulfk: ' Meciar mofoa odejde'. p.2 .  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource From Bratr náš to Aťjdou - Slovakia, the Slovaks and Slovak Nationalism seen from Prague Description An account of the resource Paal Sigurd Hilde Slovakia, Vol. 38 (No. 70-71), 2005 pp. 81-103 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Hilde, Paal Sigurd, 1970- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2005 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/225c67a1f19614b755cfcea0f49a34ca.pdf 4d472700766a1ce54206fca5d53c2688 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 7 The Origin and Development of the Slovak Literary Language 1 Konstantin V. Lifanov The history of the Slavic literary languages has developed rapidly over the last few decades as an independent linguistic discipline. Scholars have reviewed the objects of their study and defined them more precisely , and even attempted to develop optimal methods of research, all of which has made it possible for them to make adequate assessments of actual linguistic data, and to avoid imposing their contemporary perceptions on the past. For example, the use of socio1inguistic concepts has been very fruitful in the study of certain Sla- vic literary languages. However, many problems have so far remained uninvestigated. Thus Kretschmer, surveying the overall level of research into Slavic literary languages, declares that in spite of the amount of material that has already appeared, the processes whereby the Slavic literary languages emerged still remain to be worked out, as well as their regularities and specific features. 2 This conclusion also applies to the history of the Slovak literary language. Many texts written in Slovakia before the language was codified remain uninvestigated from the lingui stic point of view. There are hardly any comparative studies of texts of different ge nres or from different eras. Nevertheless , comparative study is the only 1 I deeply thank Professor Robert Orr and Professor M. Mark Stolarik for English corrections of this paper. 2 Anna Krechmer (Anna Kretschmer), " Sravnitel'naja istorija slavjanskich literatur- nych jazykov: Yoprosy metodologiji " , Vjestnik Moskovskogo uni vers iteta. Seria 9. Filologia. 3, I 998, p 48. �8 SLOVAKIA method that makes it poss ible to define the real status of co nc rete for ms a nd to determine, e.g., whether a give n for m is mere ly the result of a language error, because, e.g., a give n wri te r did not know the coeva l language norm , or of sty li stic variat ion arisin g from a g ive n genre of wri tin g, or a typical lin gui st ic feat ure characteristic of the Slovak written tradition as a whole. But if we cannot determine the status of concrete forms , we ca nnot qualify the essence of differe nt lang uage for mati o ns in the hi story of Slovak , a nd therefore we cannot compre he nd the process of the emergence and subseque nt deve lopme nt of the Slovak literary language eithe r. In its turn, this situation in the hi story of the Slovak literary language ope ns up the poss ibility of arbitrary interpretations, ofte n aris ing from extra lin gui st ic factors. Thus it is wide ly believed, mainly outside Slovakia, that the Slovak literary language emerged in the late 18 th century by differe ntiating itse lf from Czech , and that previous ly Slovaks had used Czech as their literary language. We may trace the sources of thi s beli ef to the concepts of some Czech lingui sts3, who did not recognize the di stinctiveness of Slovak and considered it merely a variant of a unitary Czechoslovak language. According to a seco nd view of thi s problem, which has been "official" in Slovak lingui stics since the mid- I 950 's, distinct languages - cultural West Slovak, Central Slovak, and perhaps East Slovak had emerged in Slovakia before the codificatio n of the Slovak literary language. Subsequently Bernolak 's 1787 codification was based o n c ultu ra l W est Slovak a nd Stur's ( I 840 's) on cultural Central Slovak. There is also a third view, accord in g to which the Slovak literary lang uage arose as a res ult of interact ion between the Czech literary language and Slovak (mainl y West Slovak) dialects. It was shared by ' See Albert Prazak , Dejiny spisovne slovenstiny po dobu Sturovu (Brati slava, 1922), A lbert Prazak , Cesi a Slovaci (Praha 1929) and Vaclav Yazny "Spisovny jazyk slove nsky", Ceskos lovenska vlasti veda , Rada 11, Sp isovny jazyk Cesky a s/ovensky (Praha 1936) pp. 145-2 15. �SLOVAKIA 9 many Slovak linguists from I 900-1950.4 We embarked upon the study of thi s problem without preconceptions, and intended to base all conc lusions so lely on the analysis of concrete lin gui stic material and modern literary language theory. We cannot outline our theoretical fram ework in thi s paper, and therefore we can only refer to the first chapter of our book.5 Research into the problem of the Slovak literary language should take as its starting point the 14 th century, when Old Czech began to develop into an interethnic literary lan guage in Central Europe. At the same time it also penetrated into Slovakia. Stani slav, Kiraly , & Pauliny 6 show that in Slovakia copiers of Czec h texts tried to adhere to Czech norms. Infrin gements of these norm s tended to be iso lated and accidental , and may be described as simple errors. But as early as CC 14 - 15 fo ur changes - three phonolog ical and one morpholog ical - are attested in texts quite regul arly: the loss of the phoneme Iii, the loss of jotation in labials before lel < *e, *r, the affrication oft; d ' > c, dz, and the repl ace ment of vocati ves by nominatives. These processes constitute the initial stage of development of Old Czec h in Slovaki a, and its iso lation from the language functionin g in the Czech heartland. In the first place, we studied the further deve lopme nts of th ese phenom e na in th e spiritu a l literature of Slovak Catholics. • See , for exa mple, J. Y lkolinsky (Czambel 's pseudon ym) "O '·prvej " knihe slovenskej ", Z i ve na, 2, 1885, pp 230-240 . Henri ch Bartek, "S pi sov ny j azyk slovensky", Slovenska rec. 6, 1937- 1938, pp 50-57 and l.'.udovft Novak. "Cestina na Slove nsk u a vzn ik spisovnej slovenciny ", Slovenske pohl'ady . 54, 1938, pp 105-111. 159- 173, 2 17-222, 28 1-287. 5 Konstantin V. Lifanov, Genezis slovackogo literaturnogo jazyka . LINCOM Stu - dies in Slavic Linguistics, 21 (Munich 200 I ), pp. 18-4 1. 6 Jan Stani slav . " Zur Frage der Slowazismen in den alttschechi schen Denkmalern ", Zeitschrift fiir Slawistik. Bd. I, Heft 4. 1956. pp. 58-70, Bd. II . Heft I , 1957, pp. 3751 , Peter Kiraly. Zur Frage der altesten slowak ischen Sprachdenkmdlern" , Studia Slavica Academiae Scientiaru m Hungaricae. 4, 1958, pp. I 13- 158 , Eugen Pauliny, "Zac iatky kulturneho jazyka slovenskej narod nos ti ", Jazykovedne stridie. 6, 196 1. pp. 28-39. �SLOVAKIA The re pl ace me nt of /f/ by Ir/ spread ra pidl y, alm ost over a ll S lovak wri tings , inc ludin g sp iritua l literature . By the time " Ol a.h 's Ritu a l" was tra ns lated (ca. I 550 - 1600) Iii was an obvio us, very irreg ul ar arc ha ism (proti nassy m mrskym hfJc hum ). In the re li gious treati ses of B. Smrtnik and A. Macsay , publi shed in 1697 and 171 8 res pecti ve ly, it is attes ted ma inl y in fo rm s of the ve rb ffc i , mos t probabl y as a pure ly orthographi ca l conve nti o n (Prosil ne kdy gedon Prite le sweho rikuce), but it is co mpletely absent in the manuscripts in vesti gated (the Ca ma ldul Bible ( 1756- 1759), and th e se rm ons of Mokos ( 1752- 1774), Vrabel ( I 766), and Bajan ( 1760- 177 1)). The deve lopme nt of /JI after labi a l co nso nants and before l e/ < *e, *~ was sli ghtl y di ffe re nt. The primary stages of thi s process were ide nti ca l to those in vo lved in the repl aceme nt of If/. Thus, according to Paulin /, exa mpl es of th at deve lopme nt still c lea rl y predominated in the I 5th century " Muni ch Confess ion al Formula" ( 16 fo rms with /j/ and three without), but they were refl ected incons iste ntl y as earl y as " Ol a.h 's Ritu al," as a rul e in the idi omati c fo rmul as at the end of verses (s stebau Bohe m Otcem y Duc he m Swatym bud ' cest y c hwa la na wieky wiekow. Amen). The di ffere nti ati o n betwee n genres based on the presence or absence of fo rms w ith or w itho ut /jl is characte ri sti c of later texts. Onl y fo rm s without /JI occ urred in the language of sermons, inc luding Baj an 's (tuto bude lakomec w Negwecsy potrebe), in spite of the situ ati on in hi s nati ve di a lect (Zahorsky), whe re fo rm s w ith /JI are still c urrent. However, fo rms w ith /JI re mained in the " hi ghe r" genres (in the " Bible" a nd re lig io us treati ses) and in Macsay 's la nguage they are used quite freque ntl y (T yto Pobudky ma clowek ws rdcy swem pilne vwafowati ; kri wdy net1pet1). Spec ial vocati ve for ms, and nom inati ves used as vocati ves, were lost in the maj ority of Sl ovak di alects. They were restri cted to animates in spiritual Catho li c literature (radu g se tec hd y Narod Uhersky 7 Eugen Paul iny, ·'Mnfchovska spovedna formu la" , Jazykovedny casopis. 10. no. I , 1959, p. 30. �SLOVAKIA 11 /Vrabel/ - A braham e, A braham e ne wsta hug ruky tweg na djte /Macsay/). In contrast to Literary Old Czech, anim ate noun s w ith palatal ste ms had the same endin gs as nouns with no n-palatal ste ms (chce m rect du sso kresta nska bludica /M okos/ ; Czec h du se!. It is inte resting that these were the very forms that Berno lak codi fied. The hi story of the affricates c and dz(< t'and d ') shows that new fo rm s did not always oust co mpe tin g o lde r fo rms as a res ult of the loss of the oppos ition " literary - non-literary." In thi s case the te ndency was c hanged and the literary language lost the affri cates. They were w ides pread in I 4'h - I S'h century writin gs, but o nl y iso lated examples appeared in I 8'h century Catho li c literature (strhel se weter, zrucil dom /Vrabel/) . Th ese fo ur phe no me na are c uri o us ly s imil ar: they occ urred in literary Old Czech, but onl y sporadi ca ll y, occ urring in tex ts as errors by Czec h copy ists. These fo rm s deve loped into competin g doubl ets in the Slovak writte n language. However, the affri cati on of t'and d' differed from the other phenome na, in th at it made the phonol og ica l syste m more compl ex (the phone mes ga ined an additi onal artic ul atory feature) , while the othe r phe nome na, on the contrary , s implified the system , because they in vol ved the loss of a ph one me, or a pos iti onal vari ant of a phoneme, or a gra mm ati ca l fo rm . He nce we mi ght sugges t th at ph e nome na simpli fy in g a syste m preva il in co mpetiti o n in th e earl y stage of deve lopme nt of a literary la nguage outs ide its core ethni c te rritory, but phe no me na complicatin g it do not. Thi s is also suggested by the fact that it was not until the mid- I 8'h century th at the ph one me dz < *dj pe netrated the la nguage of spiritua l li teratu re; prev io us ly it had been co nsiste ntl y repl aced by /z/, or rare ly by Id '/ (zretedlne p ot wrz uje [pa n- S lovak po twrdzuj e] to wssec ko Job; skrze pokanj z te ho sna se probud'uje [pan-Sl ovak prebudz uje] /Macsay/) . The re was an esse ntial di ffe re nce between sporadi c pheno me na and doubl ets in wri tten Old Czec h. T he latte r survived as vari ants fo r almost the who le hi story of the language of Slovak Cath o li c literature, e .g., the refl exes of so-ca ll ed regress ive uml aut, i.e., the deve- �SLOVAKIA 12 lopment of tautosyllabic -aj- to -ej- in Old Czec h, and the emerge nce of the co nso nant clu ster sr:. c haracterist ic of Old Czech and Central Slovak, from sc- (< *stj-, *skj- , a nd *sk- before fro nt vowe ls). The first phenomenon was subject to a degree of gra mmaticali zation , as may be deduced from the fac t that no n-uml au ted seq ue nces obviously predomin ated in imperati ve fo rm s (ne mess kag obratjtj se ku Pa.nu Bohu /Macsay/) , but variation in the superlati ve forms of adjectives and adverbs was maintain ed as late as the mid- 18 th century, and usage mai nl y depended on the indi vidu al taste of the respecti ve author (pod'te a pod mym stjnem odpocjwagte - eopustili nalezk i swe a cestu nagtwrdssu /the " Bible"/; krize a proti wenstwy trpezliwe znassagme - sa m Tyran ze swym negmlacssym sine m /Vrabel/). Forms w ith sc- a nd st: were used in re li g ious texts throu ghout the pe ri od covered by the research , regardl ess of the orig ins of their authors (gegjho pak narozenj cas gesste oppodal byl - Pridrzme se th gessce S. Paw la /Macsay/). It was onl y in mid- I 8 century sermon s that th e tendency towards regional differentiation of th ese forms e merged: Makos used on ly fo rms with st:, following hi s nati ve Cen- tral Slovak dial ect (kazani takow i mestiane bi zas lu zili ), while Bajan, from Western Slovakia, mostly used forms w ith sc- (kde tenkrat bude Utociisscie hri ssniku). The process of for mati on of lin gui stic norms, which mu st have ex isted , may be observed from the lin gui st ic mate ri al th at ca n be g leaned from the written records. The occ urre nce of nati ve Czech and nati ve Slovak for ms in texts was not random, but governed by certain rules: firstl y the primary literary and non-literary fo rms arose, the n the primary non-literary form usuall y ousted the primary literary one. These processes, however, were subject to the princ ipl e of flexibl e stability8, whereby they were impl e me nted sy nchroni ca ll y, and thu s co ntinuity was ma intain ed be tween th e written languages of diffe re nt epoc hs. Thus, the fo ll ow in g new phe nomena, untypi ca l of " Yi lem Matezius ( Yi lem Matesius), ·'O neobchodimosti stab il'nost i litera turnogo jazyka" . Praiskij lingvisticeskij krniok (Moskva. 1967). p. 38 1 �13 SLOVAKIA earlie r writings, are attested in the tran slation of the "Ol ah Ritual ": □ unco ntracted forms of the gen., dat. and loc. sg. of femi nine adjecti ves e ndin g in fun ctional non -pa lata l conso na nts o usted the corresponding co ntracted forms (podl e tagneg radd y otcowskeg a dobrotiweg wu le twey); □ there was vari ation betwee n the nati ve Czech in str. forms of the pronouns ty and seba with the root vowe l o, a nd the nat ive Slovak ones with the root vowe l e, but the native Slovak forms prevailed (s steba u Bohe m otcem y s Duchem Swatym - s tobou bohem Ot- cem s Duchem Swatym); □ both the short and lon g forms of participl es were used as predi cati ves (za hrj c hy nasse vcinen gest - kterjmz to byl zapaleny proti nassy m mrskym hrjchum), etc. Some phe nome na are first attested in the lang uage of Smrtnik's re li gious treati se: □ the an im ate ge n.-acc. plural (Wide l pyssycych se A nge luw; cf. "Olah Ritua l": ze sy pro nas lidj hrjssne vkri fo wany) ; □ a n epenthetic vowel in masc uline forms of the /-participl e of consonant ste ms (polozil ho na Oltari na hranjcy drew a wstahe / ru ku ; cf. a n examp le fro m " Olah 's Ritu a l": z nes / zuriwy hnew otce tweho wecneho) ; □ the gramm ati ca li zation of piehlask a9 , prese rved in so me form s and lost in others, e.g., it is preserved in participial and verba l adverbia l endings, but beginning to be lost in present verb forms (gako Rewy we wykwjtagicy Winnicy; smegjce se pobij za k bytwe; pred Ssediwinamj wassymj Ml ads sy hore powstawagj - Dijtky zros- 9 Pieh/iska denotes the series of comprehensive progressi ve vowe l changes, unique to earl y Czech within Slavic. which was ori ginall y manifested co nsisten tl y in the morphology. but later reduced due to analogical pre ssures. Basically, it involved the frontin g and raising of vowels after origin ally soft consona nts. e. g .. u/ice < * ulica. biicho < * br ·ucho. see. e. g .. Miroslav Komarek. Historicka mluvnica ceski. 1: Hlis k os l ovf (Praha. 1962). pp. 62-66, I 15-118 , 153; 1964: 17, 18. 54; Charl es Townsend & Laura Janda. Common and Comparati ve Slavic (Indi ana 1996), pp. 9 192. I 6 I. I 63 , 272. �SLOVAKIA 14 tie wchazagu do sklepu); □ the spread of the genitive of the pronoun onilony to the acc., with both forms used as variants (pi su ge y pro tebe - prikazal aby se zem otewrela a za ziwa gych pozrela), etc. The majority of the features peculiar to the language of spiritual literature spread in the first half of the 18 th century. These trends are shown in the lan guage of Macs ay's religious treatises, which a lso contains the following further innovation s: □ masculine loc. pl. forms in -och (zalezelo to znamenj na skut- koch geho zazracnych; cf. nenj wskutcych miloserdenstwj (Smrtnik)); □ the dat. , loc. and instr. pl. of noun s such as kost' fo ll ow the pattern of ulice/iena (pri ledagakyc h wecech se zabaw ugu - a w smetach hrjchuw lezite); □ the spread of the loss of sy llabic sonants in abso lute word- final position , apart from /-participles, where this process took place earlier (Ale o Swaty Otce wyswet li vmysl twug - gakz ty s wilozjl smyse/ geho), etc. However, some Czech elements were very stable and were used almost universally: □ the sequence ji- in word-initial position , in contrast to Slovak i- (gako by mluwil a prisahal gim ("The Bible"); □ velar/alternations in the dat/loc. sg. of feminine nouns (Zadag- jcymu wodi mleka dala a na ssalce knj zatskeg podala ("The Bible") and in the nom pl. of adjectives agreeing with animates (A le zase pocali synowe Yzrahelsty ciniti zle weci ("The Bible"), etc. These processes obviously demon strate the modification of Old Czech as it was transformed into a standardised written language. Its structure consisted of native Czech and native S lovak elements used according to fairly strict rules. Such phenomena, maintained in Slovak, but lost in contemporary Literary Czech, are direct evidence of its clear connection to Old Czech. Apart from analogical doublets in literary Old Czech and in the language of Slovak Catholics, these are as follows: �SLOVAKIA □ 15 the preservati o n of the auxili ary in 3rd person verb fo rm s of the /- parti c ipl e un til the mi d- I 8 th century (a kralostwy sweho nekoncene ho pocatek gest ucinil (Mokos); ze ges t guz pri dwerac h wibehei protj ne mu / Baja n/); suc h fo rm s were co mpl ete ly lost in S lovak di alec ts by abo ut the I 5th ce ntury1°, and they were very ra re in Czec h writings by the 16 th century; 11 □ the e ndin g -u/-ti in the inst. sg. of fe minine noun s and adjec- ti ves, and also so me personal pronouns, in all works of Catho lic literature, inc ludin g authors of Central Sl ovak o ri g in , altho ugh they do not ac tu all y occ ur in Central Slovak (S krotite le Sweta A lexand ra M ladeho kw itnu cj ho strilku swu ra nil a; Pod se mnu odegdi (S mrtni k)); □ no d iphthongs apart from uo in the "Ol ah Ritu al", partic ul arly in Smrtni k 's re li g io us treati se, whi c h co ntinu es th e s itu ati o n in Literary Old Czec h (Oleg obmekssuge kuoie (S mrtni k)); □ gemin ates in the same words as in Literary O ld Czech (podle tagneg raddy Otcows keg /Olah/), etc. The language of S lovak Catho li c literature, howeve r, was indepe nde nt. It deve loped accordin g to its ow n rul es, in co ntrast to those of Old Czec h and Slova k di alec ts. Spec ific processes e merged rapidly, e.g., th e above- me nti o ned grammati ca li zati on of piehlask a, plus the follow ing: □ most masc uline no un s have gen. pl. fo rm s in -u w, whi ch is absent fro m Slova k di alects, and was lost in literary Czech (odwede l od rodiczuw, od prateluw /Vrabel/); □ an oppos iti o n between fe minin e adj ectives with ste m-fin al no n-palata l a nd ste m-fi na l palatal co nso na nts, beca use th e latte r fo rm s also had contracted gen. , dat. a nd loc. fo rm s (V < *Vj V; Mlc zim , abi ch w dnessny (< *-j-) Reczy meg d luhy ne bil /Bajan/), whil e the fo rmer had uncontracted fo rms; □ Ill 11 the de limi tati on of gen. and acc. pl. fo rms of animate nouns as Rudolf K rajcov ic, Nacrt dejfn slovenskeho jazyka (Bratislava, 197 1) p. 143 A rn ost L amprec ht, Dusan Slosar & Jaros lav Bauer, Historicka mlu vnice cestiny (Praha, 1986), p. 244 �SLOVAKIA 16 observed in Macsay ' s lan guage, and in the language of the " Bible" (ge n.: okolo deset ti syc uw wseckych sy lnych a udatnych Muiuw; acc.: kdiz zachwatili dwoch mu iti s knjzat Madyanskych /th e " Bible"/); □ the appearance of spec ial gen. sg. forms of the pronouns ty and seba, with -o- in the root (a le podobne wecy pro sobe od druheho slissetj pohrdagj (S mrtnik)), etc. Many native Slovak elements in the language of Slovak Catholic literature were pan-Slovak, but some of them directly indicate the region of Slovakia which played the main role in the formation of the Slovak written tradition : West Slovak. This is espec iall y true of features that do not occur in other Slovak dialects, primarily Central Slovak, such as , e.g.: □ diphthongs tended to be lost; □ -e in the endings of adjectives with a ste m-fi nal pal atal (ni c nad neho neni twrdsseho /Mokos/; Czech t vrdsfho; North Central Slovak tvrdsieho, South tvrdsiho/tvrdsiho) ; □ non-contracted gen. , dat. , and acc . forms (in the latter case if agreeing with animate noun s) of masc uline and neuter possessive adjectives (abich guss kpredsewzeti mogemu mluwil /Mokos/; Czech memu; Central Slovak m 6jmu); □ epenthetic -e- in masculine /-part iciples (Ce ntral Slovak -o-; a do stawu sweg Boskeg milosti pren esel /Mokos/; Czech pienes /; Central Slovak preniesol) , etc. D moreover, many native Czech e lements remained unchan ged, because they also occur in West Slovak as a whole, or in its SouthWestern subdial ects, e.g.: D the sequence rot- as a reflex of Common Slavic c ircumflex *6rt- (aby rostlo nany Hlozj a Trnj (S mrtnik ); Czech and Wes t Slovak rostlo; Central Slovak nistlo); □ the vowel e as a refl ex of Common Slavic strong *b (a gedna zadruhu wen zkostola wichazali /Mo kos/ ; Czech and West Slovak ven; Central Slovak von ); D the ending -em in the loc. sg. of masc uline and neuter adjec- �17 SLOVAKIA ti ves (aby na hrobowem kamenj tyto slowa wy kresatj dali /M acsay/ ; Czech and West Slovak hrobovem ; Centra l S lovak hrobovom ); □ the endin gs -e and -owe in the no m. pl. of anim ate no un s (nadto y pry tele daleko od stupili od ne ho /the " Bible"/ ; mn ozy p atriarcho we, mnozy kni zata a w udcowe /V rabel/; Czech p hite le , patriarchove, vudcove; West S lovak prate/e, patriarchove, vodcove; Central Slovak priatelia, patriarchovia, vodcovia) , etc. The typical West Slovak elements occ urring in Catho li c literary texts were as fo ll ows: □ the lack o f sy ll abic sonants from ori gin al sequences of conso- nants plus b i b + I (iluc Draku w gest wino geg ich (Smrtnik); Czech i luc; Central Sl ovak i lc; the isogloss was located on the territory o f South-Western (Trnava) di alects); □ the instr. sg. e ndin g -e m in masc uline and ne uter no un s (A sed'e la pod strom em palmowym, ktery m enem gey m sa menowal /the " Bible"/ ; Czec h, Zahorak, and some adj acent Trn ava di alec ts stromem, jmeneml m enem ; Central Slova k and other Wes t S lovak di alects have -om : stromom , menom), etc. Althou gh thi s lin g ui stic form ati on does di splay territori a ll ybased di alect di vergences, mai nl y in sermons, di alectal fea tures have not totall y submerged its characteri sti c pan-di alectal elements. If we compare the lin gui stic structures of Slovak Catholic literature and Berno lak 's codifi cation, we may conc lude that the codi ficati on was not somethin g new in princ iple. Nati ve Czec h fea tures occurring in , e.g., both the language of Slovak Catho li c literature and Berno lak's codifi cati on, clearl y de mo nstrate the c lose co nnec ti on between the two. These features are as fo llows: □ contracted fo rm s of possess ive adjecti ves (m eho, etc.) ; □ dat. sg. fo rms of ori g in all y soft-stem neuter noun s, whi ch d is- pl ay the refl exes of the ceska p fehlask a, i.e., u>i (srdci); □ □ neuter noun s endin g in -nf (stawaiif); parti c ipl es and verba l ad verb s w ith pieh/aska in suffixes ( wolag icf, wolagic); □ the I" person subjuncti ve of by t' in -ch, incl ud in g co mpoun d �SLOVAKIA 18 conjunctions (e.g., abich); □ the sequence ji- in word-initial position (gim), etc. The material being analyzed shows that the language of Catholic literature had many features characteristic of a literary language. It was cultivated, selective, functionally homoge neous, and essentially supra-dialectal. For its definitive identification as such , it needs to be ascertained whether it was only a religious style or multifunctional , and whether it was widespread over the whole of Slovakia. In order to answer the first question we compared the language of Catholic literature to the language of secular baroque poetry , based on the following texts: P. Benickfs [original] "Slovak Verses" ( 1652), S.F. Selecky ' s " Pen Portrait of a Beautiful Lady" ( 170 I), and H. Gavlovic's "The Pastoral School " ( 1775). The language of secular baroque poetry generally coincides with the lan guage of Catholic literature. The linguistic differences in each genre are mainly based on the respective periods of composition ; and not the origins of the authors . In other words, secular baroque poetry may be grouped along with Catholic literature in accordance with its period of composition. The vowel system s of both genres may be characterised by their clear tendency to use long monophthongs instead of native Czech and Central Slovak diphthongs. The native Czech diphthong ou (orthographic au) , also attested in earlier spiritual literature, occurs only in Benicky (Spravedlivim gsaudem I Osemetnim !idem / Pracuje gich chitrost (Benicky); moudrost y cest geho /Olah/ ; Strach Saudu a Ostrost Sudce (Smrtnik)). It is absent from 18 th century works , however, regardless of genre. In contrast to Catholic literature, other diphthongs occur sporadically in the language of Benicky and Gavlovic : the former has two examples of -ia- , and the latter nearly ten of -ie-, and perhaps one example of -iu- (Neb size Rodiczke / Kliatby Materynske / Prinasegj pokuty (Benicky) ; Spiwala sy gedna baba : mam penazy dgessku, I su do zeme zakopane, / newim w kterem br- geiku /Gavlovic/; A gak pangu penezitu, / musiss geg sluziti , / Gak chudobnu budess w dome / dwe chudoby miti (Gavlovic). These phe- �SLOVAKIA 19 nomena may be described as deliberate violations of norm. 12 The wholesale remodelling of the front/back contrast in the vowel system due to the gradual reduction of pieh/aska provides another substantial feature common to secular baroque poetry and Catholic literature. The grammaticalization of piehJaska may also be observed in the language of secular baroque poetry, generally identical to similar processes in the language of Catholic literature. This convergence is manifest in the stability of some grammatical forms , variation in others, and even in the total loss of some forms with piehlaska Thus, participial and verbal adverb endings are the most stable (Had kuzy svu zvleka, / Orlyce z daleka / Letagicz pera pusty (Benicky); czistotu woniczy proto smim potwrdit (Selecky); Ktery mlcy , ku mluweni , / pricynu magice, I Wiceg cyni, nezli zwitas / zamky walagice (Gavlovic). In contrast, at an early stage 3 rd person forms without piehlas- ka began to be replaced by forms with piehlaska and a stage where forms both with and without coexist occurs in the language of Ben icky, which chronologically corresponds to the language of Smrtnik (Nebo u susedu / Pekagj chleb z medu, / Take pryslovy byva - Saty ozdobene, I Czinicz telo pisne / Molove prei iraju (Benicky)). As in the language of Catholic literature, forms with pieh/aska are absent from the language of F. Selecky and H. Gavlovic (Mnozy tez zadagu wzacznost smichu widjet (Selecky); Ne ze zeme, ale z Judi / wiros- tagu zlosti , / Puwod magu w marnych Srdcach I z nedobreg wlchkosti (Gavlovic). The convergence of the main linguistic features of Catholic literature and sec ular baroque poetry also affected the morphological system. The features which have changed are as follows: □ In the language of Benicky the development of animate gen.lace. forms in the plural of nouns is fixed at a stage where both nom./acc. and gen.lace. forms occur. The translation of "Olah ' s Ritual," in which the original nom ./acc. forms are still consistent, repre- 12 See Ian Muk arfovsk ii (Jan Mukai'ovsky), ·"Literaturn yj jazyk i poeticeskij jazy k", Praiskij lingvisticeskij kruiok (Moskva, 1967), pp. 407-408. �SLOVAKIA 20 sents an intermediate stage and the treati se of B. Smrtnik refl ects the e ndpoint of thi s process: the re are no nom ./acc. forms in Selecky and Gavlovic at all (Mas lj se so uditj , / Mu sis svedky mitj , / Tak bude vec vihrana - Yzlast gestlis na vogne / Drz vogak u v s ilne / Czastim napominanim (Benicky); Ked bi g ih ranjenych ona htje la hog it (Se lecky) ; A Kato mu odpowedel : / Nemluw mi nic wice, / bil by zazrak, kdyby zhryzly / Sswabuw nohaw ice (Gavlovi c); □ the loss of the spec ial acc. forms of the pe rso nal pronoun oni/ony (here both Benicky and Smrtnik have doubl ets, and they may be contrasted on the one ha nd with "Ola.h 's Ritual ," the point of departure, and on the other hand , to a ll other writin gs attesting to the e nd of the process (Magj peczet daty , / 0 to se staraty , / Aby ge ginsy stihat - Darmo konom hv yzdat / Kdyz g ich mas napagat / gestlj ze sam nepi ge (Benicky); Prirownam g ich k oczam soko la draheho (Selec ky); Proto wzacny karbunkulu s / y drahe kameni , / ze g ich zridka uhlidame, / w hognosti g ich ne ni (Gav lovic); □ the replace ment of primary forms of /-participles with ste m- fin a l sy ll a bic sonants by forms with epenthetic -e- (Benicky and " Ol a.h 's Ritual " have only forms with sy llabic sonants, they still predomin ate in Smrtnik , whi le 18 th century writings, including the works of Selec ky and Gavlovi c (Zes ze statku panskeho / Zbohatl, v kratky cas / vezme ti to Pan zas (Be nicky); jakbi u kralowneg lasku bil dosahel (Se lec ky ); A Pan os la se u/eke/, / osla dal zabiti, / Tak osel, chtic las ku ziskat, / strati I ziwobiti (Gav lovi c)) have only innovatio ns, etc . The following phenome na may be termed stabl e : □ The consiste nt preservation of alternations in nom . pl. adj ec- tives agree in g with animate noun s (Tak pansty dvorane I Yak nahl e pan vstane / Nec h zanim postupu g u (Benicky); ked by ta czi czerti pgek ni bil y w pe kl e (Se lecky); Nazy na Swet prich adzame / ze ziwota Matk i, / Neprinassame ze sebu / penize a statki (Gavlovic); □ masc uline a nd ne ute r in str. sg. forms in -em (Ne b czasta pri saha / Ciasem dopomaha / ze zustava lhar vetsy (Be ni c ky); nebo s ak samitem okrasle na bi wa (Se lec ky) ; Zena mu fov i ukl ady / z placem spu sob uge, / Geho mi se l vsse li ga kim / s pu s obe m probu ge �SLOVAKIA 21 (Gavl ov ic); bych (Chtje l bih mnihe m zostat, rad bih giste wgedj e l (Selecky); Y kosselu bych predala, / vssak se mu za bo□ th e subjun cti ve in gim, I Kdyz se trochu podnapi gem, / ce la neobstog im (Gav lov ic), etc. Sporadic phe nome na simil ar to those in the language of Catho li c literature may also be fo und in the language of sec ul ar baroque poetry: ge min ate consona nts (Trucow ity y neg le pss u / c udzu Raddu ha ni , I A teprw a gu c hce plnit, / kdyz se guss porani (Gav lov ic); 3d pe rson /-parti cipl es w ith overt a uxili aries (Z iwot ta k cz istotneg c hwa li ges t zas lu zil (Se lecky)), co ntrac ted fe minine loc. sg. Adj ecti ves w ith stem-fi nal palatals (Napomaha k pravde, / V negchitregsi zrade / Sv u ukazuge moc nost (Benicky)), etc. T he lingui sti c di ffe rences arising fro m c hrono log ica l d ive rgences betwee n sec ul ar baroque poetry and Catho li c li teratu re onl y in vo lve detail s, mainl y in stances whe re poets use such language e le me nt s as had already bee n lost or had not yet e merged in Catho li c literature. Thus, fo r instance, H. Gav lov ic used both -om and -um as masc uline nomin al dat. pl. endings, although the latte r fo rm s had already been lost in Cath olic literature by around the l 750's (De n Sed/akom a Noc ia kom I negw ic pos luhu ge, / to Sowa w cy me ry zac ke m / slu ssne oznamuge - Prez ce ly de n Walac h chodi , / a malo spi w nocy, / By mohe l bit proti wlkum I owcam na pomocy) . The masc uline loc. pl. ending -och had already appea red by Beni cky's tim e, sli ghtl y ea rli er than in Catho li c literatu re (Kupcove, fl agnarkj , I V hostincoch krczmarky / Nemagf dluho spavat). Sometimes fo rm s were se lected based on the need fo r a rhy me. Thu s, in G av lov ic we do find 3rd person present forms with piehlaska, but onl y in cases where they are part of a rhyming sche me (Wssec ke wecy cas sw ug magu, / cas gest k fartovani , / Kdyz se zme ni ss c hwa litebne, / zaden te nezhani - Coko li w ge kre m potre by, / to guss stog i w zbytku , / Z bytek w sto loc h we Ike statki / vihana z pribitku). A lingui sti c analys is of sec ul ar baroque poetry and Catho li c literature shows th at th e la nguage fo rmati on in these genres was ide nti ca l. In othe r words, the language of Catho lic lite rature was not onl y �22 SLOVAKIA religiou s. It has already been shown that the language of sec ular baroque poetry, specifically Gavlovic ' s " Pastoral School ", mostly coincides with the language of administrative-legal texts of South-Western origin. Hence it follows that comparing them with administrative- lega l texts from other regions involves in principle the comparison of different genres. And thi s in its turn makes it possible to determine whether thi s language formation was widespread in all region s of Slovakia, which is very important for its definitive identification. We studied thi s problem by comparing the concrete lin guistic features occurring in administrative- lega l texts. Then we also compared different sy nchronic stages of the "Jel sava Town Chronicle" of 15661710 (South Central Slovakia) and the 16 th - 19 th century "Levoca Formu las of Oaths" (East Slovakia) , in order to determine trends in the ir lingui stic development. A comparison of spec ific lin gui stic features from diverse admini strative-legal texts reveals interestin g features in the manifestation of linguistic processes and the di stribution of phenomena in texts of different origins. Thus, all phenomena involving the modification of the Old Czech base are manifested in different texts in the same positions, and therefore many of them were not due to the lingui stic factors contrasting all Slovak dialects with Czech. An examp le of loss is furnished by the history of the phoneme Ii i, which was re placed in all positions by the phoneme Ir/ in regional variants of admini strative-legal writings. An example of maintenance is furni shed by the old instr. sg. feminine ending -11 (- u), which began to be used in Slovak written texts as a component of Old Czech morphological structure , not only in West and East Slovak admin istrative-lega l documents, where it is supported by local dialect usage, but also in Central Slovak. This shows that processes manifested in the written language spread into other reg ions from an epicentre. This examp le is especially interesting, as the Central Slovak ending -ou is formally identical to the new Czech ending -ou from the diphthong ization of - 11 (mezi Mikulasem Kowacze[m] a druhu osobu Matronu Elzbetu �SLOVAKIA 23 Haylowich /1658, Dojc, W es t Slo vakia/; Roli czku ... zo psseniczu posal ( 1728, Spi s, East Slovaki a); vsak z mu matku na vinicu ko mne chodivala zvadzat ( 1728, Krupina, Central Slovakia) 13. Some instances of doublets occur in South-West Slovak admini strati ve -lega l tex ts. As a rule , one member of such pair occurs more frequently , and may be considered the unmarked form. All the invariant feature s of these texts occur in non-South-Western administrative-legal documents Features with doubl et forms show both variants in non-SouthWestern texts, or, less frequ e ntly , only the unmarked variant. " Reg ional variants" had the function of doublets, which differentiated indivisible lan guage formations , but did not separate them into inde pe ndent lingui stic units. Thus, for example, the masc uline and ne ute r oblique adjective case form s with -e- in the endings, the only poss ible variant in South-West Slovak administrative-legal texts (ze Sa czcinskeho trhu spolem issly ( 1725 , Skalica)), also occurred in NorthWest Slovak (ta cesta od kamenneho Snehu na Polianku ( 1633, Pruske)) , North Central Slovak (za Radu Slowutneho a Oppatrneho muze Pana Tomassa Sk/adaneho 11649, Rufomberok/) , South-Central Slovak (pana knam milostiweho a /askaweho ( 1570, Banska Stiavnica)) and East Slovak (stegto strany Yarku mlinskeho /1658 , Sari s - Zemplfn/) texts. Side by side with these form s, their regional variants are also used in non-South-Western texts, e.g., the diphthongs -ie- (pre sirotky zu stale nebohyeho Samuela /166 I , Rufomberok/), -f- (-i-; (Pozdraweni y g iniho mnoho dobriho /1622 , Ban ska Stiavnica/), -o(Agnieha Istvana Radomskoho sestra /1608, Sari s - Zemplfn/). These features, mainl y typical of South-Weste rn written texts, may be seen as invariants, based on their genera l di stribution . Invariants on the level of concrete linguistic elements are always attested in South-Western texts, and therefore the lan guage of South-West administrative- '-' A lthough the M odern Czech and Slovak - ou endings are forma ll y identica l , they constitute the endpoints of two different hi storica l processes : Czech -ou is the reflex of th e diphthongisation of *- u resulting from th e denazali za ti on. fo ll owed by contraction. of * -ojQ ( * -11 < * -oju < * -ojQ). whereas Slovak -ou is simply the refl ex of contracti on. wi th subsequent denazali zati on. of * -ojQ (-ou < * -OQ < * -ojQ). �SLOVAKIA 24 lega l tex ts is genera ll y in varia nt by com pari so n to texts from other reg ion s of Slovakia. The o bvious fact th at Catholic literature and sec ul ar baroque poetry were based o n South-West Slovak dialects shows th at the sa me lin g ui st ic fo rmat io n functioned in a ll kinds of writte n texts, and was widespread in a ll region s of Slovakia. Thu s, the so-ca ll ed c ultural la ng uages were not indepe nde nt lingui stic formations. Firstly , no compl ete li st of distinct features can be revealed for any of the m, because every indi vidu a l isog loss used to c lass ify tex ts of different ori g in s yie ld s different res ults, even of " regiona ll y- based variants" recorded in written tex ts. In other word s, the lang uage of ad mini strative-lega l texts amounts to th e sum of minor loca l var ia nts united into a who le, w itho ut any tran s iti o na l fo rm ation s (so-ca ll ed c ultu ra l lang uages). 14 An ana lys is of the deve lopment of the lang uage of the " Je lsava Town Chronicle" revea ls a number of facts, whi c h are extre me ly important fo r the e luc idati o n of the dynamics of the developme nt of thi s ling ui stic fo rmati o n. There were man y phe nomena in the ear li e r records, as earl y as the I 560's and I 570's , deviating from Czech norms. Firstly, we found pan-Sl ova k features , w hi c h mi g ht have penetra ted writte n tex ts in different reg ions of Slovak ia independently of o ne anothe r (the absence of the phone me Iii and the nati ve Czech diphthong ou, the jotation of lab ia l consona nts before e < *e, *~, etc.). Phe nome na on the th whole untypica l of writte n 16 century texts a lso occ urred (the consiste nt occ urre nce of th e phoneme dz < *dj, for ms bo th with and without j before i in word-initial position, etc .). A few features, howeve r, we re o bviously Centra l Slovak (the diphtho ngs -uo- and -ie-, o < stron g * b , masculine and neuter nomina l in str. sg . forms in -om, masc uline and ne uter possess ive adjecti ve gen. sg. fo rms in -ho, etc .). Adj ecti ves w ith -ie- in the ir endin gs are th e most important, because they simulta neo us ly de mo nstrate th e break w ith the Old Czech writ14 K.McCone and D. Mathews describe similar se ts of probl ems in defining Middle Iri sh and Middle Engli sh respec tively. See Kim McCone. The Early Irish Verb (M aynooth , 1987) , pp. 18 1- 183 and Dav id M atth ews , (U ni versity Park , PA , 2000), pp. 1- 14. �SLOVAKIA 25 ten tradition and show th at some standardi sation processes were carried through in the la nguage of written Central Slovak texts, because these forms have the monophthong iii in South Centra l Slovak dia lects, including Je lsava. At the same time, whi le generall y ac knowl edg ing the impl e mentation of standardi sation processes in the Central Slovak dialects, it should be stated that they were rather weak, due to the occ urre nce of a numbe r of loca l features in the written tex ts. These inc luded, e.g., the almost total loss of the sy llabi c so nant r, the c han ge of ou into 6, primarily attested in the instr. sg . forms of feminine noun s and adjectives, the c hange of c into s, and the appearance of a afte r ve lars, etc. Some features may be found in late 16 th a nd early I 7'h ce ntury texts, which may be described as the rea li sation of two contradictory te ndencies: the wea kness of the loca l c harac te r of record s, because dialectal ele me nt s were lost in the respec tive la nguages (the restoration of sy llabic r, the loss of Gerner features ia < ie and s < c, etc.), and the increas ing occurre nce of features from the Trnava written tradition (the losses of the phoneme /dz/, masc uline and neuter adjectival form s with e in the e ndin gs, a nd di alecta l forms of I-participle bel/biel, etc.). In the I 630 's - I 650's the popul ation of Je lsava accepted th e Counter-Refo rmation , whic h was reflected in the language of the town chronicle. The first te nde ncy we named was modified , because the occ urrence of most of the already exist in g Ce ntral Slovak features in creased , but no new feat ures of Central Slovak orig in appeared in the texts. The second te ndency - followin g the Trnava written tradition - was maintained. The second tendency predominated until the earl y I 8 th ce ntury. W e may therefore conclude that over the whole hi story of th e "Je lsava Town Chronicle", its lang uage gradually adapted to Be rnol ak 's codification of Slovak literary la nguage, and not to Stur' s, as we mi ght ex pect based on the Central Slovak origin �26 SLOVAKIA of th ese texts. 15 The development of the language of the " Levoca Formulas of Oaths" was essentiall y similar: there is an early stratum of Polish di alectal feature s in the texts (e.g., plosive g and the Poli sh reflexes of the *tort formula) , with a layer of East Slovak ones (e.g., the vowe l e < * and reflexes of assibilated t' and d) superimposed. Over time, however, they were lost, because they could not res ist competition from pan-Slovak and West Slovak feature s, which beca me obvious in the early 18 th century, not long after the Counter-Reformation . 16 It is very important to note th at the lan guage of administrativelega l texts was common for both Catholics and Lutherans, in contrast to Catholic literature and secular baroque poetry. The language of popular poetry was also common to both Catholics and Lutherans, and it was on the whole also based on the SouthWestern written tradition. Specifically, however, it was characterised by a very fluid structure, because thi s lin guistic formation in such writings was contrasted to Literary Czech or some Slovak dialect, depending on the genre or contents of the respective verses. Consequently , Czech feature s, atypica l of the Slovak written tradition , penetrated the language of hi storical verse (for instance , the " Book of Verses" (East Slovaki a, 1751 ), or J . Bruk ' s manuscript co ll ectio n (Orava, North Central Slovaki a, 1794) or occasional poetry (for in stance , congratulation from the J. Lany manu script co ll ec tion , late 18th century). And conversely, a number of dialectal features are found in styli sed folksongs (e.g., the D. Kubik collection (Priev idza, Central Slovakia, 1791 )). From the early l 800's a number of Central Slovak feat ures occur in a variety of verses (for examp le, in J. Koll ar 's " Folksongs", the M. M. Krizan collection (Trencfn County, North-West Slovakia, 1839, etc.), which we consider a s ign of the 15 See in detail K[ o nstantin] V. Li fa nov, "Evoljucia j azyka " Je lsavskoj gorodskoj kni g i" 1566- 17 10 gg. i t. naz. Kul\urnyj sred nes lov ac kij j azyk", Zeitschrift filr Sla- wische Philologie. Bd. 58 , Heft I, 1999, pp. 151 - 170. See Ko nsta ntin V Lifanov , Genezis slovatskogo literaturnogo iazyka. LIN CO M 16 St udi es in Slavic Lingui sti cs, 2 1 (Muenchen , 200 I). pp. 163- 170. �SLOVAKIA 27 emergence of a spec ific language , the Centra l Slovak folklore koine, based on North Centra l Slovak di alects. Another sign of thi s phenomenon is the nature of the lingui sti c changes whi ch we find in manuscript copies of the folk songs (for instance, in J. Boczko 's collections fro m Banska Sti av ni ca ( 1830-1 83 1) and J. Jamri ch Junior 's from Gerner ( 1832-1 833)). These copyists were South Central Slovaks by birth , but when they copied songs from the second part of Koll ar 's "Slovak Secul ar Fo lksongs fro m Hun gary" , they gave preference to North Central Sl ovak features. 17 The purest vari ety of the Central Slovak fo lkl ore koine fun ctioned in North Central Slovaki a, and a written form is fi xed in the S.B. Hrobo n manu sc ript collecti on (S ielni ca, Liptov County, No rth Central Slovaki a, 1841 ). Its penetrati on into South Central and West Slovaki a (it did not influence the language of East Slovak folk songs, or minimall y so) took the form of infiltration of some its features. Later the Central Slovak folklore koine turned into a poetic koine, when it began to used in popular poetry as we ll , over the who le territory of Slovaki a (e.g., the verses of J. Szent-Kereszty ( I 822, of So uth Central Slovak ori gin ), the "Samlungen" manu script collection (Trnava, West Slovaki a, 18 17), the Eastern Slovak lawye r F. Balogh's translation of Hungari an poet Y.M. Csokonai' s verse (earl y 1800 's), and not just in the styli zations of folksongs. The Central Slovak fo lkl ore ko ine also penetrated the " hi gh" poetry of Luthera n poets, who had prev iously written in Czec h. The fi rst such works - three verses by S. Chalupka - were published in G . Fejerpataky' s Alm anac in 1834. At first thi s process was also mani fested in the sty li zati ons of folk songs, but in contrast to the popular poetry, it totall y o usted the prev io us lin gui stic system (the Czec h language). Later on it spread into other genres of hi gh poetry (the hymnal song "Nitra, Dear Nitra" was publi shed in the first volume of 17 Konstantin Lifa nov . " Stredos love nske basni cke ko ine pred l.'.. Stu rom", Slovenska rec. 60. 11 0. 5-6. 1995. pp. 264-28 1. �28 SLOVAKIA " Nitra" Almanacs in 1842). 18 Some previously known facts, also ascertained in the process of our study and analyzed by using sociolingui stic concepts, have made it poss ible to offer a ne w view of the origin and the sub seq uent development of the Slovak literary language. Thus, the lingui stic formation functionin g in Catholic literature, sec ul ar baroque poetry, admini strati ve-l ega l tex ts, popular poetry , etc. had all the propert ies of a literary lang uage, and may be called the "Old Slovak Literary language." As the lin gui stic material shows, it had started to take shape from the 1630 's on as a result of its developing di vergence from Literary Old Czech. Its epicentre was West Slovaki a. After the Battl e of Mohacs ( 1526), the capital of Hun gary and the archbishop's res idence were tran sferred to West Slovaki a, to Brati slava and Trnava respectively. Later on, South-West Slovakia 's role in cultural life became even more important, because a university with its ow n printing- house was opened there. At first, lingui stic development among Catholics and Luthera ns was identical. Texts were created by adherents of both confessions according to the " review mechani sm." 19 The common deve lopment of the Old Slovak literary language, however, was ruptured in the early l 600's, when ling ui stic diverge nces among Catholics and Lutheran s arose as a result of an aggressive Counter-Reformation. 18 K[onstantin] V. Li fanov, "Formy proniknovenija sredneslovackogo folk lornogo ko ine v ste ru avtorskoj poezii (konec XVIII v. - pervaja polovi na XIX v.)" , Wiener Slawistiches Jahrbuch, Bd. 44, 1998, pp. 99- 113. 19 It is a free tran slation of the Russ ian term " mechanizm peresceta" used by V. M. Zivov. Its essence concludes in the fact th at rather strong associated bonds between elements gi ven (l iterary) bookish character to a text and corres ponding elementts of people (d ialec tal ) speec h ex isted in th e minds of creators of tex ts. In th e case of adopti on of •'foreign " literary language, its elements contrasted to elemen ts of people speech and were initiall y bookish. Thu s, the opposition between adopted literary language and nati ve dialects was only in the fu nctional sphere. See, for examp le, V . M. Zivov, " Roi] russkogo ce rkov noslavianskogo v istoriji slavjanski ch literaturn yc h jazykov" , Aktual'nyje problemy sla vjansk ogo jazykoznanija (Moskva, 1988), pp. 4998. �SLOVAKIA 29 The Old Slovak literary language continued to develop in a Catho lic environment. It went throu gh all the important stages, including a translation of the whole of the " Bible" ( 1750), th e first Slovak novel : the "Adventures and the Experiences of Young Rene" (1783) , by J.L. Bajza, and its codification by A. Bernolak. The Old Slovak literary language was studied at elementary and secondary school s in different parts of S lovakia, and even at two universities - in Trnava and Kosice.20 Slovak Catholics numbered 75 % of population when emperor Joseph II iss ued the Patent of Toleration ( 1781 ), and perceived Czech as a heretical language. In thi s connection there is no reason to assert that the literary language of S lovaks was Czech prior to Bernol ak 's codification. Slovak Lutherans yielded their positions and had to seek external support , and they found it in Czech reli gious books. As a result, they reverted to the norms of Literary Czech (more exactly, to norms of the " Kralice Bible"), but not in all genres, and di gloss ia 2 1 arose in their environment. In thi s situation Czech was perceived as the high , cultivated form of the native language , whereas Old Slovak literary lan g uage was perceived as " ordinary," and to be used only in administrative-legal texts and popular poetry . Literary Czech and Old Slovak functioned in parallel in the Lutheran and Catholic environments respectively , and Catholi cs contrasted both literary languages, and gradually perceived that some features belonged not just to different functional spheres, but to different languages. As a result a new mechanism - conversion - arose in their environment. In practice it resembled the " review mechani sm", but differed substantially, because so me features were contrasted on the nati ve rather than on the functional level. Thus, Slovak Catholics began to perce ive spec ific features of their language on the leve l of 20 See Izidor Kotulic. " Bernolakovcina a predbernolakovska kulturna slovenc in a··, Pamatnica A ntona Berno/aka (Martin 1992), pp. 81, 88. 21 See Charles A. Ferguson, "Diglossia", Word, 15, 1959, no. 2, pp. 325-340 and Boris A. Uspenskij , Jazykovaia situacija Kijevskoj Rusi I jejo znacenije d!Ja istoriji russkogo literaturnogo jazyka (Moscow , 1983) , pp. 4-5. �SLOVAKIA 30 concrete phoneti c and morphological units, and so me fea tures as belonging to diffe rent periods. Th e situati on amon g Cath o li cs and Lutherans re ma in ed stable until the l 830 's, when the Centra l Slovak folkl ore ko ine penetrated into the sphere of hi gh poetry of Lutheran authors, and made it possible to codify a new literary language. r.. Stur made a major specific contribution by essenti all y changing the phoneti c and morpho logical syste ms of the literary language , but the lex icon fro m th e period of the Old Slovak literary language was maintained. Some features had reached the stage of con versati on (Catho lics perceived them as S lovak as opposed to Czech), and some were at the stage of rev iew (they were regarded as "booki sh/literary" (nati ve Czec h) or as ordin ary (native Slovak). The "ordinary" features codified by Stur were not accepted by Catholi cs, and they de manded that they be replaced by "booki sh" features, as was implemented in the codification of Hattala and Hodza ( 1852). SOURCES Catholic Literature P. Bajan, Sermones, 1760- 1771 (manuscript). Kamaldulska biblia, 1756-1759 (manu script). A. Macsay, Panes primatiarum aneb Chleby prwotjn (Trn ava , 171 8). D . Ma kos, Sermones, 1752- 1774 (manuscript). N. Ol ah, Ordo et ritus sanctae metropolitane ecc/esic Strigonien- sis, quibus parochi et a/ii animarum pastores in ecc/esiis suis uti debent. Viennae Austriae in aedibus Collegii caesarei, Societatis Jezu. Anno M.D.L.X. (manuscript). B. Smrtnik, Kunsst dobre umriti (Trnava, 1697). G. Vrabel, Sermones, 1766 (manuscript). �SLOVAKIA 31 Secular Baroque Poetry " Basne Petra Benickeho", Archiv starych cesko-s/oven skych /istfn , pfsomnostf a dejepisnych povodfn pre dejepis a literattiru Slovakov, Diel II. - Svazok I. (Tun::. sv . Martin, 1873), pp. 5-47. H. Gavlo vic, Wala sk a sskola mrawuw stodola (manuscript); Gerald J. Sabo, ed., Hugo/in 's Gavlo vic's Valaska skola (Co lumbus, Ohio, 1988). Stefan F Selecky, Obraz panye krasneg perem malowany, ktera maw Trnawe swoge prebiwany (manu script); Stefan F Selecky, "Obraz pani krasnej , perem malovany, ktera ma v Trnave svoje prebyvanf", Anto/6gia starsej slovenskej literattiry (Brati slava, 1981 ), pp. 522-530. Administrative-Legal Texts Inquisitiones, Skalica, 1616-1730 (manuscript). Darina Lehotska & Jozef Orlovsky , Najstarsia jelsavska mestska kniha 1566- 1710 (Martin , 1976). Listy Sta/ice IO kopijnfkov, Spis, XVII-XVIII storocie (manu- script). Mar ia Majtanova & Mil an Majtan, Krupin ski prfsne pravc (Bratislava, 1979). Missiles, Banska Stiavnica, XYI.-XYII. storocie (manu script). Obecna kniha obce Dojc, 1622-1836 (manu script). Panstvo Pruske, XVII.-XYIII. storocie (manuscript). Pfsomnosti Sarisskej a Zemplfnskej iupy, XYII.-XYIII. storocie (manuscript). Protocol/um mais mesta Ruiomberka, XYI.-XYII. storoc ie (ma- nuscript). Jozef Stoic, "Jazyk levocskych slovenskyc h prfsah zo XYI.-XIX. storocia", Jazyko vedny sbornfk, 5, l 951, pp. 197-247. Popular Poetry and Folksongs J. Csaplovics, Slowenske Wersse, (Pest, l 822). J. Jamrich ml. , Wselygake Rozlycne Rozprawky k zabawenf �32 SLOVAKIA zepsane, 1832- 1833 (manu script) Jan Koll ar, Narodnie spievanky, zvazok I, (Bratislava, 1953). Jan Misianik , Knii ka ry tmovni (Bratislava, 1952) . Samlungen, 18 17 (manu script). Spevnfk D. Boczka, 1830-183 1 (manu script). Lasz lo Sziklay, " Poznamky k Csokonaiho popularite v slove nskej literature," Sbornfk Filozofickej fak ulty Uni verzity Komen skeho. Philologica, 16, 1964, pp. 12 1-1 3 1. Pave l Josef Safarfk, Jan Kollar, Pjsne swetske lidu slawenskeho w Uhrach, swazek 2 (Pest, 1827). Jozef Skultety, " Literarno-hi storicke drobnost i", Slovenske pohl'ady, 17, 1897, pp. 125- 128. Zbornfk J. Bruka, 1794 (manuscript). Z bornfk M. M. Kriia na, 1839 (manuscript). Zbornfk D . Kubfka, 179 1 (manu sc ript). Zbornfk J. L any, koni ec XVIII . storocia (manu script). � SLOVAKIA 7 The Origin and Development of the Slovak Literary Language 1 Konstantin V. Lifanov The history of the Slavic literary languages has developed rapidly over the last few decades as an independent linguistic discipline. Scholars have reviewed the objects of their study and defined them more precisely , and even attempted to develop optimal methods of research, all of which has made it possible for them to make adequate assessments of actual linguistic data, and to avoid imposing their contemporary perceptions on the past. For example, the use of socio1inguistic concepts has been very fruitful in the study of certain Sla- vic literary languages. However, many problems have so far remained uninvestigated. Thus Kretschmer, surveying the overall level of research into Slavic literary languages, declares that in spite of the amount of material that has already appeared, the processes whereby the Slavic literary languages emerged still remain to be worked out, as well as their regularities and specific features. 2 This conclusion also applies to the history of the Slovak literary language. Many texts written in Slovakia before the language was codified remain uninvestigated from the lingui stic point of view. There are hardly any comparative studies of texts of different ge nres or from different eras. Nevertheless , comparative study is the only 1 I deeply thank Professor Robert Orr and Professor M. Mark Stolarik for English corrections of this paper. 2 Anna Krechmer (Anna Kretschmer), " Sravnitel'naja istorija slavjanskich literatur- nych jazykov: Yoprosy metodologiji " , Vjestnik Moskovskogo uni vers iteta. Seria 9. Filologia. 3, I 998, p 48. �8 SLOVAKIA method that makes it poss ible to define the real status of co nc rete for ms a nd to determine, e.g., whether a give n for m is mere ly the result of a language error, because, e.g., a give n wri te r did not know the coeva l language norm , or of sty li stic variat ion arisin g from a g ive n genre of wri tin g, or a typical lin gui st ic feat ure characteristic of the Slovak written tradition as a whole. But if we cannot determine the status of concrete forms , we ca nnot qualify the essence of differe nt lang uage for mati o ns in the hi story of Slovak , a nd therefore we cannot compre he nd the process of the emergence and subseque nt deve lopme nt of the Slovak literary language eithe r. In its turn, this situation in the hi story of the Slovak literary language ope ns up the poss ibility of arbitrary interpretations, ofte n aris ing from extra lin gui st ic factors. Thus it is wide ly believed, mainly outside Slovakia, that the Slovak literary language emerged in the late 18 th century by differe ntiating itse lf from Czech , and that previous ly Slovaks had used Czech as their literary language. We may trace the sources of thi s beli ef to the concepts of some Czech lingui sts3, who did not recognize the di stinctiveness of Slovak and considered it merely a variant of a unitary Czechoslovak language. According to a seco nd view of thi s problem, which has been "official" in Slovak lingui stics since the mid- I 950 's, distinct languages - cultural West Slovak, Central Slovak, and perhaps East Slovak had emerged in Slovakia before the codificatio n of the Slovak literary language. Subsequently Bernolak 's 1787 codification was based o n c ultu ra l W est Slovak a nd Stur's ( I 840 's) on cultural Central Slovak. There is also a third view, accord in g to which the Slovak literary lang uage arose as a res ult of interact ion between the Czech literary language and Slovak (mainl y West Slovak) dialects. It was shared by ' See Albert Prazak , Dejiny spisovne slovenstiny po dobu Sturovu (Brati slava, 1922), A lbert Prazak , Cesi a Slovaci (Praha 1929) and Vaclav Yazny "Spisovny jazyk slove nsky", Ceskos lovenska vlasti veda , Rada 11, Sp isovny jazyk Cesky a s/ovensky (Praha 1936) pp. 145-2 15. �SLOVAKIA 9 many Slovak linguists from I 900-1950.4 We embarked upon the study of thi s problem without preconceptions, and intended to base all conc lusions so lely on the analysis of concrete lin gui stic material and modern literary language theory. We cannot outline our theoretical fram ework in thi s paper, and therefore we can only refer to the first chapter of our book.5 Research into the problem of the Slovak literary language should take as its starting point the 14 th century, when Old Czech began to develop into an interethnic literary lan guage in Central Europe. At the same time it also penetrated into Slovakia. Stani slav, Kiraly , & Pauliny 6 show that in Slovakia copiers of Czec h texts tried to adhere to Czech norms. Infrin gements of these norm s tended to be iso lated and accidental , and may be described as simple errors. But as early as CC 14 - 15 fo ur changes - three phonolog ical and one morpholog ical - are attested in texts quite regul arly: the loss of the phoneme Iii, the loss of jotation in labials before lel < *e, *r, the affrication oft; d ' > c, dz, and the repl ace ment of vocati ves by nominatives. These processes constitute the initial stage of development of Old Czec h in Slovaki a, and its iso lation from the language functionin g in the Czech heartland. In the first place, we studied the further deve lopme nts of th ese phenom e na in th e spiritu a l literature of Slovak Catholics. • See , for exa mple, J. Y lkolinsky (Czambel 's pseudon ym) "O '·prvej " knihe slovenskej ", Z i ve na, 2, 1885, pp 230-240 . Henri ch Bartek, "S pi sov ny j azyk slovensky", Slovenska rec. 6, 1937- 1938, pp 50-57 and l.'.udovft Novak. "Cestina na Slove nsk u a vzn ik spisovnej slovenciny ", Slovenske pohl'ady . 54, 1938, pp 105-111. 159- 173, 2 17-222, 28 1-287. 5 Konstantin V. Lifanov, Genezis slovackogo literaturnogo jazyka . LINCOM Stu - dies in Slavic Linguistics, 21 (Munich 200 I ), pp. 18-4 1. 6 Jan Stani slav . " Zur Frage der Slowazismen in den alttschechi schen Denkmalern ", Zeitschrift fiir Slawistik. Bd. I, Heft 4. 1956. pp. 58-70, Bd. II . Heft I , 1957, pp. 3751 , Peter Kiraly. Zur Frage der altesten slowak ischen Sprachdenkmdlern" , Studia Slavica Academiae Scientiaru m Hungaricae. 4, 1958, pp. I 13- 158 , Eugen Pauliny, "Zac iatky kulturneho jazyka slovenskej narod nos ti ", Jazykovedne stridie. 6, 196 1. pp. 28-39. �SLOVAKIA The re pl ace me nt of /f/ by Ir/ spread ra pidl y, alm ost over a ll S lovak wri tings , inc ludin g sp iritua l literature . By the time " Ol a.h 's Ritu a l" was tra ns lated (ca. I 550 - 1600) Iii was an obvio us, very irreg ul ar arc ha ism (proti nassy m mrskym hfJc hum ). In the re li gious treati ses of B. Smrtnik and A. Macsay , publi shed in 1697 and 171 8 res pecti ve ly, it is attes ted ma inl y in fo rm s of the ve rb ffc i , mos t probabl y as a pure ly orthographi ca l conve nti o n (Prosil ne kdy gedon Prite le sweho rikuce), but it is co mpletely absent in the manuscripts in vesti gated (the Ca ma ldul Bible ( 1756- 1759), and th e se rm ons of Mokos ( 1752- 1774), Vrabel ( I 766), and Bajan ( 1760- 177 1)). The deve lopme nt of /JI after labi a l co nso nants and before l e/ < *e, *~ was sli ghtl y di ffe re nt. The primary stages of thi s process were ide nti ca l to those in vo lved in the repl aceme nt of If/. Thus, according to Paulin /, exa mpl es of th at deve lopme nt still c lea rl y predominated in the I 5th century " Muni ch Confess ion al Formula" ( 16 fo rms with /j/ and three without), but they were refl ected incons iste ntl y as earl y as " Ol a.h 's Ritu al," as a rul e in the idi omati c fo rmul as at the end of verses (s stebau Bohe m Otcem y Duc he m Swatym bud ' cest y c hwa la na wieky wiekow. Amen). The di ffere nti ati o n betwee n genres based on the presence or absence of fo rms w ith or w itho ut /jl is characte ri sti c of later texts. Onl y fo rm s without /JI occ urred in the language of sermons, inc luding Baj an 's (tuto bude lakomec w Negwecsy potrebe), in spite of the situ ati on in hi s nati ve di a lect (Zahorsky), whe re fo rm s w ith /JI are still c urrent. However, fo rms w ith /JI re mained in the " hi ghe r" genres (in the " Bible" a nd re lig io us treati ses) and in Macsay 's la nguage they are used quite freque ntl y (T yto Pobudky ma clowek ws rdcy swem pilne vwafowati ; kri wdy net1pet1). Spec ial vocati ve for ms, and nom inati ves used as vocati ves, were lost in the maj ority of Sl ovak di alects. They were restri cted to animates in spiritual Catho li c literature (radu g se tec hd y Narod Uhersky 7 Eugen Paul iny, ·'Mnfchovska spovedna formu la" , Jazykovedny casopis. 10. no. I , 1959, p. 30. �SLOVAKIA 11 /Vrabel/ - A braham e, A braham e ne wsta hug ruky tweg na djte /Macsay/). In contrast to Literary Old Czech, anim ate noun s w ith palatal ste ms had the same endin gs as nouns with no n-palatal ste ms (chce m rect du sso kresta nska bludica /M okos/ ; Czec h du se!. It is inte resting that these were the very forms that Berno lak codi fied. The hi story of the affricates c and dz(< t'and d ') shows that new fo rm s did not always oust co mpe tin g o lde r fo rms as a res ult of the loss of the oppos ition " literary - non-literary." In thi s case the te ndency was c hanged and the literary language lost the affri cates. They were w ides pread in I 4'h - I S'h century writin gs, but o nl y iso lated examples appeared in I 8'h century Catho li c literature (strhel se weter, zrucil dom /Vrabel/) . Th ese fo ur phe no me na are c uri o us ly s imil ar: they occ urred in literary Old Czech, but onl y sporadi ca ll y, occ urring in tex ts as errors by Czec h copy ists. These fo rm s deve loped into competin g doubl ets in the Slovak writte n language. However, the affri cati on of t'and d' differed from the other phenome na, in th at it made the phonol og ica l syste m more compl ex (the phone mes ga ined an additi onal artic ul atory feature) , while the othe r phe nome na, on the contrary , s implified the system , because they in vol ved the loss of a ph one me, or a pos iti onal vari ant of a phoneme, or a gra mm ati ca l fo rm . He nce we mi ght sugges t th at ph e nome na simpli fy in g a syste m preva il in co mpetiti o n in th e earl y stage of deve lopme nt of a literary la nguage outs ide its core ethni c te rritory, but phe no me na complicatin g it do not. Thi s is also suggested by the fact that it was not until the mid- I 8'h century th at the ph one me dz < *dj pe netrated the la nguage of spiritua l li teratu re; prev io us ly it had been co nsiste ntl y repl aced by /z/, or rare ly by Id '/ (zretedlne p ot wrz uje [pa n- S lovak po twrdzuj e] to wssec ko Job; skrze pokanj z te ho sna se probud'uje [pan-Sl ovak prebudz uje] /Macsay/) . The re was an esse ntial di ffe re nce between sporadi c pheno me na and doubl ets in wri tten Old Czec h. T he latte r survived as vari ants fo r almost the who le hi story of the language of Slovak Cath o li c literature, e .g., the refl exes of so-ca ll ed regress ive uml aut, i.e., the deve- �SLOVAKIA 12 lopment of tautosyllabic -aj- to -ej- in Old Czec h, and the emerge nce of the co nso nant clu ster sr:. c haracterist ic of Old Czech and Central Slovak, from sc- (< *stj-, *skj- , a nd *sk- before fro nt vowe ls). The first phenomenon was subject to a degree of gra mmaticali zation , as may be deduced from the fac t that no n-uml au ted seq ue nces obviously predomin ated in imperati ve fo rm s (ne mess kag obratjtj se ku Pa.nu Bohu /Macsay/) , but variation in the superlati ve forms of adjectives and adverbs was maintain ed as late as the mid- 18 th century, and usage mai nl y depended on the indi vidu al taste of the respecti ve author (pod'te a pod mym stjnem odpocjwagte - eopustili nalezk i swe a cestu nagtwrdssu /the " Bible"/; krize a proti wenstwy trpezliwe znassagme - sa m Tyran ze swym negmlacssym sine m /Vrabel/). Forms w ith sc- a nd st: were used in re li g ious texts throu ghout the pe ri od covered by the research , regardl ess of the orig ins of their authors (gegjho pak narozenj cas gesste oppodal byl - Pridrzme se th gessce S. Paw la /Macsay/). It was onl y in mid- I 8 century sermon s that th e tendency towards regional differentiation of th ese forms e merged: Makos used on ly fo rms with st:, following hi s nati ve Cen- tral Slovak dial ect (kazani takow i mestiane bi zas lu zili ), while Bajan, from Western Slovakia, mostly used forms w ith sc- (kde tenkrat bude Utociisscie hri ssniku). The process of for mati on of lin gui stic norms, which mu st have ex isted , may be observed from the lin gui st ic mate ri al th at ca n be g leaned from the written records. The occ urre nce of nati ve Czech and nati ve Slovak for ms in texts was not random, but governed by certain rules: firstl y the primary literary and non-literary fo rms arose, the n the primary non-literary form usuall y ousted the primary literary one. These processes, however, were subject to the princ ipl e of flexibl e stability8, whereby they were impl e me nted sy nchroni ca ll y, and thu s co ntinuity was ma intain ed be tween th e written languages of diffe re nt epoc hs. Thus, the fo ll ow in g new phe nomena, untypi ca l of " Yi lem Matezius ( Yi lem Matesius), ·'O neobchodimosti stab il'nost i litera turnogo jazyka" . Praiskij lingvisticeskij krniok (Moskva. 1967). p. 38 1 �13 SLOVAKIA earlie r writings, are attested in the tran slation of the "Ol ah Ritual ": □ unco ntracted forms of the gen., dat. and loc. sg. of femi nine adjecti ves e ndin g in fun ctional non -pa lata l conso na nts o usted the corresponding co ntracted forms (podl e tagneg radd y otcowskeg a dobrotiweg wu le twey); □ there was vari ation betwee n the nati ve Czech in str. forms of the pronouns ty and seba with the root vowe l o, a nd the nat ive Slovak ones with the root vowe l e, but the native Slovak forms prevailed (s steba u Bohe m otcem y s Duchem Swatym - s tobou bohem Ot- cem s Duchem Swatym); □ both the short and lon g forms of participl es were used as predi cati ves (za hrj c hy nasse vcinen gest - kterjmz to byl zapaleny proti nassy m mrskym hrjchum), etc. Some phe nome na are first attested in the lang uage of Smrtnik's re li gious treati se: □ the an im ate ge n.-acc. plural (Wide l pyssycych se A nge luw; cf. "Olah Ritua l": ze sy pro nas lidj hrjssne vkri fo wany) ; □ a n epenthetic vowel in masc uline forms of the /-participl e of consonant ste ms (polozil ho na Oltari na hranjcy drew a wstahe / ru ku ; cf. a n examp le fro m " Olah 's Ritu a l": z nes / zuriwy hnew otce tweho wecneho) ; □ the gramm ati ca li zation of piehlask a9 , prese rved in so me form s and lost in others, e.g., it is preserved in participial and verba l adverbia l endings, but beginning to be lost in present verb forms (gako Rewy we wykwjtagicy Winnicy; smegjce se pobij za k bytwe; pred Ssediwinamj wassymj Ml ads sy hore powstawagj - Dijtky zros- 9 Pieh/iska denotes the series of comprehensive progressi ve vowe l changes, unique to earl y Czech within Slavic. which was ori ginall y manifested co nsisten tl y in the morphology. but later reduced due to analogical pre ssures. Basically, it involved the frontin g and raising of vowels after origin ally soft consona nts. e. g .. u/ice < * ulica. biicho < * br ·ucho. see. e. g .. Miroslav Komarek. Historicka mluvnica ceski. 1: Hlis k os l ovf (Praha. 1962). pp. 62-66, I 15-118 , 153; 1964: 17, 18. 54; Charl es Townsend & Laura Janda. Common and Comparati ve Slavic (Indi ana 1996), pp. 9 192. I 6 I. I 63 , 272. �SLOVAKIA 14 tie wchazagu do sklepu); □ the spread of the genitive of the pronoun onilony to the acc., with both forms used as variants (pi su ge y pro tebe - prikazal aby se zem otewrela a za ziwa gych pozrela), etc. The majority of the features peculiar to the language of spiritual literature spread in the first half of the 18 th century. These trends are shown in the lan guage of Macs ay's religious treatises, which a lso contains the following further innovation s: □ masculine loc. pl. forms in -och (zalezelo to znamenj na skut- koch geho zazracnych; cf. nenj wskutcych miloserdenstwj (Smrtnik)); □ the dat. , loc. and instr. pl. of noun s such as kost' fo ll ow the pattern of ulice/iena (pri ledagakyc h wecech se zabaw ugu - a w smetach hrjchuw lezite); □ the spread of the loss of sy llabic sonants in abso lute word- final position , apart from /-participles, where this process took place earlier (Ale o Swaty Otce wyswet li vmysl twug - gakz ty s wilozjl smyse/ geho), etc. However, some Czech elements were very stable and were used almost universally: □ the sequence ji- in word-initial position , in contrast to Slovak i- (gako by mluwil a prisahal gim ("The Bible"); □ velar/alternations in the dat/loc. sg. of feminine nouns (Zadag- jcymu wodi mleka dala a na ssalce knj zatskeg podala ("The Bible") and in the nom pl. of adjectives agreeing with animates (A le zase pocali synowe Yzrahelsty ciniti zle weci ("The Bible"), etc. These processes obviously demon strate the modification of Old Czech as it was transformed into a standardised written language. Its structure consisted of native Czech and native S lovak elements used according to fairly strict rules. Such phenomena, maintained in Slovak, but lost in contemporary Literary Czech, are direct evidence of its clear connection to Old Czech. Apart from analogical doublets in literary Old Czech and in the language of Slovak Catholics, these are as follows: �SLOVAKIA □ 15 the preservati o n of the auxili ary in 3rd person verb fo rm s of the /- parti c ipl e un til the mi d- I 8 th century (a kralostwy sweho nekoncene ho pocatek gest ucinil (Mokos); ze ges t guz pri dwerac h wibehei protj ne mu / Baja n/); suc h fo rm s were co mpl ete ly lost in S lovak di alec ts by abo ut the I 5th ce ntury1°, and they were very ra re in Czec h writings by the 16 th century; 11 □ the e ndin g -u/-ti in the inst. sg. of fe minine noun s and adjec- ti ves, and also so me personal pronouns, in all works of Catho lic literature, inc ludin g authors of Central Sl ovak o ri g in , altho ugh they do not ac tu all y occ ur in Central Slovak (S krotite le Sweta A lexand ra M ladeho kw itnu cj ho strilku swu ra nil a; Pod se mnu odegdi (S mrtni k)); □ no d iphthongs apart from uo in the "Ol ah Ritu al", partic ul arly in Smrtni k 's re li g io us treati se, whi c h co ntinu es th e s itu ati o n in Literary Old Czec h (Oleg obmekssuge kuoie (S mrtni k)); □ gemin ates in the same words as in Literary O ld Czech (podle tagneg raddy Otcows keg /Olah/), etc. The language of S lovak Catho li c literature, howeve r, was indepe nde nt. It deve loped accordin g to its ow n rul es, in co ntrast to those of Old Czec h and Slova k di alec ts. Spec ific processes e merged rapidly, e.g., th e above- me nti o ned grammati ca li zati on of piehlask a, plus the follow ing: □ most masc uline no un s have gen. pl. fo rm s in -u w, whi ch is absent fro m Slova k di alects, and was lost in literary Czech (odwede l od rodiczuw, od prateluw /Vrabel/); □ an oppos iti o n between fe minin e adj ectives with ste m-fin al no n-palata l a nd ste m-fi na l palatal co nso na nts, beca use th e latte r fo rm s also had contracted gen. , dat. a nd loc. fo rm s (V < *Vj V; Mlc zim , abi ch w dnessny (< *-j-) Reczy meg d luhy ne bil /Bajan/), whil e the fo rmer had uncontracted fo rms; □ Ill 11 the de limi tati on of gen. and acc. pl. fo rms of animate nouns as Rudolf K rajcov ic, Nacrt dejfn slovenskeho jazyka (Bratislava, 197 1) p. 143 A rn ost L amprec ht, Dusan Slosar & Jaros lav Bauer, Historicka mlu vnice cestiny (Praha, 1986), p. 244 �SLOVAKIA 16 observed in Macsay ' s lan guage, and in the language of the " Bible" (ge n.: okolo deset ti syc uw wseckych sy lnych a udatnych Muiuw; acc.: kdiz zachwatili dwoch mu iti s knjzat Madyanskych /th e " Bible"/); □ the appearance of spec ial gen. sg. forms of the pronouns ty and seba, with -o- in the root (a le podobne wecy pro sobe od druheho slissetj pohrdagj (S mrtnik)), etc. Many native Slovak elements in the language of Slovak Catholic literature were pan-Slovak, but some of them directly indicate the region of Slovakia which played the main role in the formation of the Slovak written tradition : West Slovak. This is espec iall y true of features that do not occur in other Slovak dialects, primarily Central Slovak, such as , e.g.: □ diphthongs tended to be lost; □ -e in the endings of adjectives with a ste m-fi nal pal atal (ni c nad neho neni twrdsseho /Mokos/; Czech t vrdsfho; North Central Slovak tvrdsieho, South tvrdsiho/tvrdsiho) ; □ non-contracted gen. , dat. , and acc . forms (in the latter case if agreeing with animate noun s) of masc uline and neuter possessive adjectives (abich guss kpredsewzeti mogemu mluwil /Mokos/; Czech memu; Central Slovak m 6jmu); □ epenthetic -e- in masculine /-part iciples (Ce ntral Slovak -o-; a do stawu sweg Boskeg milosti pren esel /Mokos/; Czech pienes /; Central Slovak preniesol) , etc. D moreover, many native Czech e lements remained unchan ged, because they also occur in West Slovak as a whole, or in its SouthWestern subdial ects, e.g.: D the sequence rot- as a reflex of Common Slavic c ircumflex *6rt- (aby rostlo nany Hlozj a Trnj (S mrtnik ); Czech and Wes t Slovak rostlo; Central Slovak nistlo); □ the vowel e as a refl ex of Common Slavic strong *b (a gedna zadruhu wen zkostola wichazali /Mo kos/ ; Czech and West Slovak ven; Central Slovak von ); D the ending -em in the loc. sg. of masc uline and neuter adjec- �17 SLOVAKIA ti ves (aby na hrobowem kamenj tyto slowa wy kresatj dali /M acsay/ ; Czech and West Slovak hrobovem ; Centra l S lovak hrobovom ); □ the endin gs -e and -owe in the no m. pl. of anim ate no un s (nadto y pry tele daleko od stupili od ne ho /the " Bible"/ ; mn ozy p atriarcho we, mnozy kni zata a w udcowe /V rabel/; Czech p hite le , patriarchove, vudcove; West S lovak prate/e, patriarchove, vodcove; Central Slovak priatelia, patriarchovia, vodcovia) , etc. The typical West Slovak elements occ urring in Catho li c literary texts were as fo ll ows: □ the lack o f sy ll abic sonants from ori gin al sequences of conso- nants plus b i b + I (iluc Draku w gest wino geg ich (Smrtnik); Czech i luc; Central Sl ovak i lc; the isogloss was located on the territory o f South-Western (Trnava) di alects); □ the instr. sg. e ndin g -e m in masc uline and ne uter no un s (A sed'e la pod strom em palmowym, ktery m enem gey m sa menowal /the " Bible"/ ; Czec h, Zahorak, and some adj acent Trn ava di alec ts stromem, jmeneml m enem ; Central Slova k and other Wes t S lovak di alects have -om : stromom , menom), etc. Althou gh thi s lin g ui stic form ati on does di splay territori a ll ybased di alect di vergences, mai nl y in sermons, di alectal fea tures have not totall y submerged its characteri sti c pan-di alectal elements. If we compare the lin gui stic structures of Slovak Catholic literature and Berno lak 's codifi cation, we may conc lude that the codi ficati on was not somethin g new in princ iple. Nati ve Czec h fea tures occurring in , e.g., both the language of Slovak Catho li c literature and Berno lak's codifi cati on, clearl y de mo nstrate the c lose co nnec ti on between the two. These features are as fo llows: □ contracted fo rm s of possess ive adjecti ves (m eho, etc.) ; □ dat. sg. fo rms of ori g in all y soft-stem neuter noun s, whi ch d is- pl ay the refl exes of the ceska p fehlask a, i.e., u>i (srdci); □ □ neuter noun s endin g in -nf (stawaiif); parti c ipl es and verba l ad verb s w ith pieh/aska in suffixes ( wolag icf, wolagic); □ the I" person subjuncti ve of by t' in -ch, incl ud in g co mpoun d �SLOVAKIA 18 conjunctions (e.g., abich); □ the sequence ji- in word-initial position (gim), etc. The material being analyzed shows that the language of Catholic literature had many features characteristic of a literary language. It was cultivated, selective, functionally homoge neous, and essentially supra-dialectal. For its definitive identification as such , it needs to be ascertained whether it was only a religious style or multifunctional , and whether it was widespread over the whole of Slovakia. In order to answer the first question we compared the language of Catholic literature to the language of secular baroque poetry , based on the following texts: P. Benickfs [original] "Slovak Verses" ( 1652), S.F. Selecky ' s " Pen Portrait of a Beautiful Lady" ( 170 I), and H. Gavlovic's "The Pastoral School " ( 1775). The language of secular baroque poetry generally coincides with the lan guage of Catholic literature. The linguistic differences in each genre are mainly based on the respective periods of composition ; and not the origins of the authors . In other words, secular baroque poetry may be grouped along with Catholic literature in accordance with its period of composition. The vowel system s of both genres may be characterised by their clear tendency to use long monophthongs instead of native Czech and Central Slovak diphthongs. The native Czech diphthong ou (orthographic au) , also attested in earlier spiritual literature, occurs only in Benicky (Spravedlivim gsaudem I Osemetnim !idem / Pracuje gich chitrost (Benicky); moudrost y cest geho /Olah/ ; Strach Saudu a Ostrost Sudce (Smrtnik)). It is absent from 18 th century works , however, regardless of genre. In contrast to Catholic literature, other diphthongs occur sporadically in the language of Benicky and Gavlovic : the former has two examples of -ia- , and the latter nearly ten of -ie-, and perhaps one example of -iu- (Neb size Rodiczke / Kliatby Materynske / Prinasegj pokuty (Benicky) ; Spiwala sy gedna baba : mam penazy dgessku, I su do zeme zakopane, / newim w kterem br- geiku /Gavlovic/; A gak pangu penezitu, / musiss geg sluziti , / Gak chudobnu budess w dome / dwe chudoby miti (Gavlovic). These phe- �SLOVAKIA 19 nomena may be described as deliberate violations of norm. 12 The wholesale remodelling of the front/back contrast in the vowel system due to the gradual reduction of pieh/aska provides another substantial feature common to secular baroque poetry and Catholic literature. The grammaticalization of piehJaska may also be observed in the language of secular baroque poetry, generally identical to similar processes in the language of Catholic literature. This convergence is manifest in the stability of some grammatical forms , variation in others, and even in the total loss of some forms with piehlaska Thus, participial and verbal adverb endings are the most stable (Had kuzy svu zvleka, / Orlyce z daleka / Letagicz pera pusty (Benicky); czistotu woniczy proto smim potwrdit (Selecky); Ktery mlcy , ku mluweni , / pricynu magice, I Wiceg cyni, nezli zwitas / zamky walagice (Gavlovic). In contrast, at an early stage 3 rd person forms without piehlas- ka began to be replaced by forms with piehlaska and a stage where forms both with and without coexist occurs in the language of Ben icky, which chronologically corresponds to the language of Smrtnik (Nebo u susedu / Pekagj chleb z medu, / Take pryslovy byva - Saty ozdobene, I Czinicz telo pisne / Molove prei iraju (Benicky)). As in the language of Catholic literature, forms with pieh/aska are absent from the language of F. Selecky and H. Gavlovic (Mnozy tez zadagu wzacznost smichu widjet (Selecky); Ne ze zeme, ale z Judi / wiros- tagu zlosti , / Puwod magu w marnych Srdcach I z nedobreg wlchkosti (Gavlovic). The convergence of the main linguistic features of Catholic literature and sec ular baroque poetry also affected the morphological system. The features which have changed are as follows: □ In the language of Benicky the development of animate gen.lace. forms in the plural of nouns is fixed at a stage where both nom./acc. and gen.lace. forms occur. The translation of "Olah ' s Ritual," in which the original nom ./acc. forms are still consistent, repre- 12 See Ian Muk arfovsk ii (Jan Mukai'ovsky), ·"Literaturn yj jazyk i poeticeskij jazy k", Praiskij lingvisticeskij kruiok (Moskva, 1967), pp. 407-408. �SLOVAKIA 20 sents an intermediate stage and the treati se of B. Smrtnik refl ects the e ndpoint of thi s process: the re are no nom ./acc. forms in Selecky and Gavlovic at all (Mas lj se so uditj , / Mu sis svedky mitj , / Tak bude vec vihrana - Yzlast gestlis na vogne / Drz vogak u v s ilne / Czastim napominanim (Benicky); Ked bi g ih ranjenych ona htje la hog it (Se lecky) ; A Kato mu odpowedel : / Nemluw mi nic wice, / bil by zazrak, kdyby zhryzly / Sswabuw nohaw ice (Gavlovi c); □ the loss of the spec ial acc. forms of the pe rso nal pronoun oni/ony (here both Benicky and Smrtnik have doubl ets, and they may be contrasted on the one ha nd with "Ola.h 's Ritual ," the point of departure, and on the other hand , to a ll other writin gs attesting to the e nd of the process (Magj peczet daty , / 0 to se staraty , / Aby ge ginsy stihat - Darmo konom hv yzdat / Kdyz g ich mas napagat / gestlj ze sam nepi ge (Benicky); Prirownam g ich k oczam soko la draheho (Selec ky); Proto wzacny karbunkulu s / y drahe kameni , / ze g ich zridka uhlidame, / w hognosti g ich ne ni (Gav lovic); □ the replace ment of primary forms of /-participles with ste m- fin a l sy ll a bic sonants by forms with epenthetic -e- (Benicky and " Ol a.h 's Ritual " have only forms with sy llabic sonants, they still predomin ate in Smrtnik , whi le 18 th century writings, including the works of Selec ky and Gavlovi c (Zes ze statku panskeho / Zbohatl, v kratky cas / vezme ti to Pan zas (Be nicky); jakbi u kralowneg lasku bil dosahel (Se lec ky ); A Pan os la se u/eke/, / osla dal zabiti, / Tak osel, chtic las ku ziskat, / strati I ziwobiti (Gav lovi c)) have only innovatio ns, etc . The following phenome na may be termed stabl e : □ The consiste nt preservation of alternations in nom . pl. adj ec- tives agree in g with animate noun s (Tak pansty dvorane I Yak nahl e pan vstane / Nec h zanim postupu g u (Benicky); ked by ta czi czerti pgek ni bil y w pe kl e (Se lecky); Nazy na Swet prich adzame / ze ziwota Matk i, / Neprinassame ze sebu / penize a statki (Gavlovic); □ masc uline a nd ne ute r in str. sg. forms in -em (Ne b czasta pri saha / Ciasem dopomaha / ze zustava lhar vetsy (Be ni c ky); nebo s ak samitem okrasle na bi wa (Se lec ky) ; Zena mu fov i ukl ady / z placem spu sob uge, / Geho mi se l vsse li ga kim / s pu s obe m probu ge �SLOVAKIA 21 (Gavl ov ic); bych (Chtje l bih mnihe m zostat, rad bih giste wgedj e l (Selecky); Y kosselu bych predala, / vssak se mu za bo□ th e subjun cti ve in gim, I Kdyz se trochu podnapi gem, / ce la neobstog im (Gav lov ic), etc. Sporadic phe nome na simil ar to those in the language of Catho li c literature may also be fo und in the language of sec ul ar baroque poetry: ge min ate consona nts (Trucow ity y neg le pss u / c udzu Raddu ha ni , I A teprw a gu c hce plnit, / kdyz se guss porani (Gav lov ic); 3d pe rson /-parti cipl es w ith overt a uxili aries (Z iwot ta k cz istotneg c hwa li ges t zas lu zil (Se lecky)), co ntrac ted fe minine loc. sg. Adj ecti ves w ith stem-fi nal palatals (Napomaha k pravde, / V negchitregsi zrade / Sv u ukazuge moc nost (Benicky)), etc. T he lingui sti c di ffe rences arising fro m c hrono log ica l d ive rgences betwee n sec ul ar baroque poetry and Catho li c li teratu re onl y in vo lve detail s, mainl y in stances whe re poets use such language e le me nt s as had already bee n lost or had not yet e merged in Catho li c literature. Thus, fo r instance, H. Gav lov ic used both -om and -um as masc uline nomin al dat. pl. endings, although the latte r fo rm s had already been lost in Cath olic literature by around the l 750's (De n Sed/akom a Noc ia kom I negw ic pos luhu ge, / to Sowa w cy me ry zac ke m / slu ssne oznamuge - Prez ce ly de n Walac h chodi , / a malo spi w nocy, / By mohe l bit proti wlkum I owcam na pomocy) . The masc uline loc. pl. ending -och had already appea red by Beni cky's tim e, sli ghtl y ea rli er than in Catho li c literatu re (Kupcove, fl agnarkj , I V hostincoch krczmarky / Nemagf dluho spavat). Sometimes fo rm s were se lected based on the need fo r a rhy me. Thu s, in G av lov ic we do find 3rd person present forms with piehlaska, but onl y in cases where they are part of a rhyming sche me (Wssec ke wecy cas sw ug magu, / cas gest k fartovani , / Kdyz se zme ni ss c hwa litebne, / zaden te nezhani - Coko li w ge kre m potre by, / to guss stog i w zbytku , / Z bytek w sto loc h we Ike statki / vihana z pribitku). A lingui sti c analys is of sec ul ar baroque poetry and Catho li c literature shows th at th e la nguage fo rmati on in these genres was ide nti ca l. In othe r words, the language of Catho lic lite rature was not onl y �22 SLOVAKIA religiou s. It has already been shown that the language of sec ular baroque poetry, specifically Gavlovic ' s " Pastoral School ", mostly coincides with the language of administrative-legal texts of South-Western origin. Hence it follows that comparing them with administrative- lega l texts from other regions involves in principle the comparison of different genres. And thi s in its turn makes it possible to determine whether thi s language formation was widespread in all region s of Slovakia, which is very important for its definitive identification. We studied thi s problem by comparing the concrete lin guistic features occurring in administrative- lega l texts. Then we also compared different sy nchronic stages of the "Jel sava Town Chronicle" of 15661710 (South Central Slovakia) and the 16 th - 19 th century "Levoca Formu las of Oaths" (East Slovakia) , in order to determine trends in the ir lingui stic development. A comparison of spec ific lin gui stic features from diverse admini strative-legal texts reveals interestin g features in the manifestation of linguistic processes and the di stribution of phenomena in texts of different origins. Thus, all phenomena involving the modification of the Old Czech base are manifested in different texts in the same positions, and therefore many of them were not due to the lingui stic factors contrasting all Slovak dialects with Czech. An examp le of loss is furnished by the history of the phoneme Ii i, which was re placed in all positions by the phoneme Ir/ in regional variants of admini strative-legal writings. An example of maintenance is furni shed by the old instr. sg. feminine ending -11 (- u), which began to be used in Slovak written texts as a component of Old Czech morphological structure , not only in West and East Slovak admin istrative-lega l documents, where it is supported by local dialect usage, but also in Central Slovak. This shows that processes manifested in the written language spread into other reg ions from an epicentre. This examp le is especially interesting, as the Central Slovak ending -ou is formally identical to the new Czech ending -ou from the diphthong ization of - 11 (mezi Mikulasem Kowacze[m] a druhu osobu Matronu Elzbetu �SLOVAKIA 23 Haylowich /1658, Dojc, W es t Slo vakia/; Roli czku ... zo psseniczu posal ( 1728, Spi s, East Slovaki a); vsak z mu matku na vinicu ko mne chodivala zvadzat ( 1728, Krupina, Central Slovakia) 13. Some instances of doublets occur in South-West Slovak admini strati ve -lega l tex ts. As a rule , one member of such pair occurs more frequently , and may be considered the unmarked form. All the invariant feature s of these texts occur in non-South-Western administrative-legal documents Features with doubl et forms show both variants in non-SouthWestern texts, or, less frequ e ntly , only the unmarked variant. " Reg ional variants" had the function of doublets, which differentiated indivisible lan guage formations , but did not separate them into inde pe ndent lingui stic units. Thus, for example, the masc uline and ne ute r oblique adjective case form s with -e- in the endings, the only poss ible variant in South-West Slovak administrative-legal texts (ze Sa czcinskeho trhu spolem issly ( 1725 , Skalica)), also occurred in NorthWest Slovak (ta cesta od kamenneho Snehu na Polianku ( 1633, Pruske)) , North Central Slovak (za Radu Slowutneho a Oppatrneho muze Pana Tomassa Sk/adaneho 11649, Rufomberok/) , South-Central Slovak (pana knam milostiweho a /askaweho ( 1570, Banska Stiavnica)) and East Slovak (stegto strany Yarku mlinskeho /1658 , Sari s - Zemplfn/) texts. Side by side with these form s, their regional variants are also used in non-South-Western texts, e.g., the diphthongs -ie- (pre sirotky zu stale nebohyeho Samuela /166 I , Rufomberok/), -f- (-i-; (Pozdraweni y g iniho mnoho dobriho /1622 , Ban ska Stiavnica/), -o(Agnieha Istvana Radomskoho sestra /1608, Sari s - Zemplfn/). These features, mainl y typical of South-Weste rn written texts, may be seen as invariants, based on their genera l di stribution . Invariants on the level of concrete linguistic elements are always attested in South-Western texts, and therefore the lan guage of South-West administrative- '-' A lthough the M odern Czech and Slovak - ou endings are forma ll y identica l , they constitute the endpoints of two different hi storica l processes : Czech -ou is the reflex of th e diphthongisation of *- u resulting from th e denazali za ti on. fo ll owed by contraction. of * -ojQ ( * -11 < * -oju < * -ojQ). whereas Slovak -ou is simply the refl ex of contracti on. wi th subsequent denazali zati on. of * -ojQ (-ou < * -OQ < * -ojQ). �SLOVAKIA 24 lega l tex ts is genera ll y in varia nt by com pari so n to texts from other reg ion s of Slovakia. The o bvious fact th at Catholic literature and sec ul ar baroque poetry were based o n South-West Slovak dialects shows th at the sa me lin g ui st ic fo rmat io n functioned in a ll kinds of writte n texts, and was widespread in a ll region s of Slovakia. Thu s, the so-ca ll ed c ultural la ng uages were not indepe nde nt lingui stic formations. Firstly , no compl ete li st of distinct features can be revealed for any of the m, because every indi vidu a l isog loss used to c lass ify tex ts of different ori g in s yie ld s different res ults, even of " regiona ll y- based variants" recorded in written tex ts. In other word s, the lang uage of ad mini strative-lega l texts amounts to th e sum of minor loca l var ia nts united into a who le, w itho ut any tran s iti o na l fo rm ation s (so-ca ll ed c ultu ra l lang uages). 14 An ana lys is of the deve lopment of the lang uage of the " Je lsava Town Chronicle" revea ls a number of facts, whi c h are extre me ly important fo r the e luc idati o n of the dynamics of the developme nt of thi s ling ui stic fo rmati o n. There were man y phe nomena in the ear li e r records, as earl y as the I 560's and I 570's , deviating from Czech norms. Firstly, we found pan-Sl ova k features , w hi c h mi g ht have penetra ted writte n tex ts in different reg ions of Slovak ia independently of o ne anothe r (the absence of the phone me Iii and the nati ve Czech diphthong ou, the jotation of lab ia l consona nts before e < *e, *~, etc.). Phe nome na on the th whole untypica l of writte n 16 century texts a lso occ urred (the consiste nt occ urre nce of th e phoneme dz < *dj, for ms bo th with and without j before i in word-initial position, etc .). A few features, howeve r, we re o bviously Centra l Slovak (the diphtho ngs -uo- and -ie-, o < stron g * b , masculine and neuter nomina l in str. sg . forms in -om, masc uline and ne uter possess ive adjecti ve gen. sg. fo rms in -ho, etc .). Adj ecti ves w ith -ie- in the ir endin gs are th e most important, because they simulta neo us ly de mo nstrate th e break w ith the Old Czech writ14 K.McCone and D. Mathews describe similar se ts of probl ems in defining Middle Iri sh and Middle Engli sh respec tively. See Kim McCone. The Early Irish Verb (M aynooth , 1987) , pp. 18 1- 183 and Dav id M atth ews , (U ni versity Park , PA , 2000), pp. 1- 14. �SLOVAKIA 25 ten tradition and show th at some standardi sation processes were carried through in the la nguage of written Central Slovak texts, because these forms have the monophthong iii in South Centra l Slovak dia lects, including Je lsava. At the same time, whi le generall y ac knowl edg ing the impl e mentation of standardi sation processes in the Central Slovak dialects, it should be stated that they were rather weak, due to the occ urre nce of a numbe r of loca l features in the written tex ts. These inc luded, e.g., the almost total loss of the sy llabi c so nant r, the c han ge of ou into 6, primarily attested in the instr. sg . forms of feminine noun s and adjectives, the c hange of c into s, and the appearance of a afte r ve lars, etc. Some features may be found in late 16 th a nd early I 7'h ce ntury texts, which may be described as the rea li sation of two contradictory te ndencies: the wea kness of the loca l c harac te r of record s, because dialectal ele me nt s were lost in the respec tive la nguages (the restoration of sy llabic r, the loss of Gerner features ia < ie and s < c, etc.), and the increas ing occurre nce of features from the Trnava written tradition (the losses of the phoneme /dz/, masc uline and neuter adjectival form s with e in the e ndin gs, a nd di alecta l forms of I-participle bel/biel, etc.). In the I 630 's - I 650's the popul ation of Je lsava accepted th e Counter-Refo rmation , whic h was reflected in the language of the town chronicle. The first te nde ncy we named was modified , because the occ urrence of most of the already exist in g Ce ntral Slovak features in creased , but no new feat ures of Central Slovak orig in appeared in the texts. The second te ndency - followin g the Trnava written tradition - was maintained. The second tendency predominated until the earl y I 8 th ce ntury. W e may therefore conclude that over the whole hi story of th e "Je lsava Town Chronicle", its lang uage gradually adapted to Be rnol ak 's codification of Slovak literary la nguage, and not to Stur' s, as we mi ght ex pect based on the Central Slovak origin �26 SLOVAKIA of th ese texts. 15 The development of the language of the " Levoca Formulas of Oaths" was essentiall y similar: there is an early stratum of Polish di alectal feature s in the texts (e.g., plosive g and the Poli sh reflexes of the *tort formula) , with a layer of East Slovak ones (e.g., the vowe l e < * and reflexes of assibilated t' and d) superimposed. Over time, however, they were lost, because they could not res ist competition from pan-Slovak and West Slovak feature s, which beca me obvious in the early 18 th century, not long after the Counter-Reformation . 16 It is very important to note th at the lan guage of administrativelega l texts was common for both Catholics and Lutherans, in contrast to Catholic literature and secular baroque poetry. The language of popular poetry was also common to both Catholics and Lutherans, and it was on the whole also based on the SouthWestern written tradition. Specifically, however, it was characterised by a very fluid structure, because thi s lin guistic formation in such writings was contrasted to Literary Czech or some Slovak dialect, depending on the genre or contents of the respective verses. Consequently , Czech feature s, atypica l of the Slovak written tradition , penetrated the language of hi storical verse (for instance , the " Book of Verses" (East Slovaki a, 1751 ), or J . Bruk ' s manuscript co ll ectio n (Orava, North Central Slovaki a, 1794) or occasional poetry (for in stance , congratulation from the J. Lany manu script co ll ec tion , late 18th century). And conversely, a number of dialectal features are found in styli sed folksongs (e.g., the D. Kubik collection (Priev idza, Central Slovakia, 1791 )). From the early l 800's a number of Central Slovak feat ures occur in a variety of verses (for examp le, in J. Koll ar 's " Folksongs", the M. M. Krizan collection (Trencfn County, North-West Slovakia, 1839, etc.), which we consider a s ign of the 15 See in detail K[ o nstantin] V. Li fa nov, "Evoljucia j azyka " Je lsavskoj gorodskoj kni g i" 1566- 17 10 gg. i t. naz. Kul\urnyj sred nes lov ac kij j azyk", Zeitschrift filr Sla- wische Philologie. Bd. 58 , Heft I, 1999, pp. 151 - 170. See Ko nsta ntin V Lifanov , Genezis slovatskogo literaturnogo iazyka. LIN CO M 16 St udi es in Slavic Lingui sti cs, 2 1 (Muenchen , 200 I). pp. 163- 170. �SLOVAKIA 27 emergence of a spec ific language , the Centra l Slovak folklore koine, based on North Centra l Slovak di alects. Another sign of thi s phenomenon is the nature of the lingui sti c changes whi ch we find in manuscript copies of the folk songs (for instance, in J. Boczko 's collections fro m Banska Sti av ni ca ( 1830-1 83 1) and J. Jamri ch Junior 's from Gerner ( 1832-1 833)). These copyists were South Central Slovaks by birth , but when they copied songs from the second part of Koll ar 's "Slovak Secul ar Fo lksongs fro m Hun gary" , they gave preference to North Central Sl ovak features. 17 The purest vari ety of the Central Slovak fo lkl ore koine fun ctioned in North Central Slovaki a, and a written form is fi xed in the S.B. Hrobo n manu sc ript collecti on (S ielni ca, Liptov County, No rth Central Slovaki a, 1841 ). Its penetrati on into South Central and West Slovaki a (it did not influence the language of East Slovak folk songs, or minimall y so) took the form of infiltration of some its features. Later the Central Slovak folklore koine turned into a poetic koine, when it began to used in popular poetry as we ll , over the who le territory of Slovaki a (e.g., the verses of J. Szent-Kereszty ( I 822, of So uth Central Slovak ori gin ), the "Samlungen" manu script collection (Trnava, West Slovaki a, 18 17), the Eastern Slovak lawye r F. Balogh's translation of Hungari an poet Y.M. Csokonai' s verse (earl y 1800 's), and not just in the styli zations of folksongs. The Central Slovak fo lkl ore ko ine also penetrated the " hi gh" poetry of Luthera n poets, who had prev iously written in Czec h. The fi rst such works - three verses by S. Chalupka - were published in G . Fejerpataky' s Alm anac in 1834. At first thi s process was also mani fested in the sty li zati ons of folk songs, but in contrast to the popular poetry, it totall y o usted the prev io us lin gui stic system (the Czec h language). Later on it spread into other genres of hi gh poetry (the hymnal song "Nitra, Dear Nitra" was publi shed in the first volume of 17 Konstantin Lifa nov . " Stredos love nske basni cke ko ine pred l.'.. Stu rom", Slovenska rec. 60. 11 0. 5-6. 1995. pp. 264-28 1. �28 SLOVAKIA " Nitra" Almanacs in 1842). 18 Some previously known facts, also ascertained in the process of our study and analyzed by using sociolingui stic concepts, have made it poss ible to offer a ne w view of the origin and the sub seq uent development of the Slovak literary language. Thus, the lingui stic formation functionin g in Catholic literature, sec ul ar baroque poetry, admini strati ve-l ega l tex ts, popular poetry , etc. had all the propert ies of a literary lang uage, and may be called the "Old Slovak Literary language." As the lin gui stic material shows, it had started to take shape from the 1630 's on as a result of its developing di vergence from Literary Old Czech. Its epicentre was West Slovaki a. After the Battl e of Mohacs ( 1526), the capital of Hun gary and the archbishop's res idence were tran sferred to West Slovaki a, to Brati slava and Trnava respectively. Later on, South-West Slovakia 's role in cultural life became even more important, because a university with its ow n printing- house was opened there. At first, lingui stic development among Catholics and Luthera ns was identical. Texts were created by adherents of both confessions according to the " review mechani sm." 19 The common deve lopment of the Old Slovak literary language, however, was ruptured in the early l 600's, when ling ui stic diverge nces among Catholics and Lutheran s arose as a result of an aggressive Counter-Reformation. 18 K[onstantin] V. Li fanov, "Formy proniknovenija sredneslovackogo folk lornogo ko ine v ste ru avtorskoj poezii (konec XVIII v. - pervaja polovi na XIX v.)" , Wiener Slawistiches Jahrbuch, Bd. 44, 1998, pp. 99- 113. 19 It is a free tran slation of the Russ ian term " mechanizm peresceta" used by V. M. Zivov. Its essence concludes in the fact th at rather strong associated bonds between elements gi ven (l iterary) bookish character to a text and corres ponding elementts of people (d ialec tal ) speec h ex isted in th e minds of creators of tex ts. In th e case of adopti on of •'foreign " literary language, its elements contrasted to elemen ts of people speech and were initiall y bookish. Thu s, the opposition between adopted literary language and nati ve dialects was only in the fu nctional sphere. See, for examp le, V . M. Zivov, " Roi] russkogo ce rkov noslavianskogo v istoriji slavjanski ch literaturn yc h jazykov" , Aktual'nyje problemy sla vjansk ogo jazykoznanija (Moskva, 1988), pp. 4998. �SLOVAKIA 29 The Old Slovak literary language continued to develop in a Catho lic environment. It went throu gh all the important stages, including a translation of the whole of the " Bible" ( 1750), th e first Slovak novel : the "Adventures and the Experiences of Young Rene" (1783) , by J.L. Bajza, and its codification by A. Bernolak. The Old Slovak literary language was studied at elementary and secondary school s in different parts of S lovakia, and even at two universities - in Trnava and Kosice.20 Slovak Catholics numbered 75 % of population when emperor Joseph II iss ued the Patent of Toleration ( 1781 ), and perceived Czech as a heretical language. In thi s connection there is no reason to assert that the literary language of S lovaks was Czech prior to Bernol ak 's codification. Slovak Lutherans yielded their positions and had to seek external support , and they found it in Czech reli gious books. As a result, they reverted to the norms of Literary Czech (more exactly, to norms of the " Kralice Bible"), but not in all genres, and di gloss ia 2 1 arose in their environment. In thi s situation Czech was perceived as the high , cultivated form of the native language , whereas Old Slovak literary lan g uage was perceived as " ordinary," and to be used only in administrative-legal texts and popular poetry . Literary Czech and Old Slovak functioned in parallel in the Lutheran and Catholic environments respectively , and Catholi cs contrasted both literary languages, and gradually perceived that some features belonged not just to different functional spheres, but to different languages. As a result a new mechanism - conversion - arose in their environment. In practice it resembled the " review mechani sm", but differed substantially, because so me features were contrasted on the nati ve rather than on the functional level. Thus, Slovak Catholics began to perce ive spec ific features of their language on the leve l of 20 See Izidor Kotulic. " Bernolakovcina a predbernolakovska kulturna slovenc in a··, Pamatnica A ntona Berno/aka (Martin 1992), pp. 81, 88. 21 See Charles A. Ferguson, "Diglossia", Word, 15, 1959, no. 2, pp. 325-340 and Boris A. Uspenskij , Jazykovaia situacija Kijevskoj Rusi I jejo znacenije d!Ja istoriji russkogo literaturnogo jazyka (Moscow , 1983) , pp. 4-5. �SLOVAKIA 30 concrete phoneti c and morphological units, and so me fea tures as belonging to diffe rent periods. Th e situati on amon g Cath o li cs and Lutherans re ma in ed stable until the l 830 's, when the Centra l Slovak folkl ore ko ine penetrated into the sphere of hi gh poetry of Lutheran authors, and made it possible to codify a new literary language. r.. Stur made a major specific contribution by essenti all y changing the phoneti c and morpho logical syste ms of the literary language , but the lex icon fro m th e period of the Old Slovak literary language was maintained. Some features had reached the stage of con versati on (Catho lics perceived them as S lovak as opposed to Czech), and some were at the stage of rev iew (they were regarded as "booki sh/literary" (nati ve Czec h) or as ordin ary (native Slovak). The "ordinary" features codified by Stur were not accepted by Catholi cs, and they de manded that they be replaced by "booki sh" features, as was implemented in the codification of Hattala and Hodza ( 1852). SOURCES Catholic Literature P. Bajan, Sermones, 1760- 1771 (manuscript). Kamaldulska biblia, 1756-1759 (manu script). A. Macsay, Panes primatiarum aneb Chleby prwotjn (Trn ava , 171 8). D . Ma kos, Sermones, 1752- 1774 (manuscript). N. Ol ah, Ordo et ritus sanctae metropolitane ecc/esic Strigonien- sis, quibus parochi et a/ii animarum pastores in ecc/esiis suis uti debent. Viennae Austriae in aedibus Collegii caesarei, Societatis Jezu. Anno M.D.L.X. (manuscript). B. Smrtnik, Kunsst dobre umriti (Trnava, 1697). G. Vrabel, Sermones, 1766 (manuscript). �SLOVAKIA 31 Secular Baroque Poetry " Basne Petra Benickeho", Archiv starych cesko-s/oven skych /istfn , pfsomnostf a dejepisnych povodfn pre dejepis a literattiru Slovakov, Diel II. - Svazok I. (Tun::. sv . Martin, 1873), pp. 5-47. H. Gavlo vic, Wala sk a sskola mrawuw stodola (manuscript); Gerald J. Sabo, ed., Hugo/in 's Gavlo vic's Valaska skola (Co lumbus, Ohio, 1988). Stefan F Selecky, Obraz panye krasneg perem malowany, ktera maw Trnawe swoge prebiwany (manu script); Stefan F Selecky, "Obraz pani krasnej , perem malovany, ktera ma v Trnave svoje prebyvanf", Anto/6gia starsej slovenskej literattiry (Brati slava, 1981 ), pp. 522-530. Administrative-Legal Texts Inquisitiones, Skalica, 1616-1730 (manuscript). Darina Lehotska & Jozef Orlovsky , Najstarsia jelsavska mestska kniha 1566- 1710 (Martin , 1976). Listy Sta/ice IO kopijnfkov, Spis, XVII-XVIII storocie (manu- script). Mar ia Majtanova & Mil an Majtan, Krupin ski prfsne pravc (Bratislava, 1979). Missiles, Banska Stiavnica, XYI.-XYII. storocie (manu script). Obecna kniha obce Dojc, 1622-1836 (manu script). Panstvo Pruske, XVII.-XYIII. storocie (manuscript). Pfsomnosti Sarisskej a Zemplfnskej iupy, XYII.-XYIII. storocie (manuscript). Protocol/um mais mesta Ruiomberka, XYI.-XYII. storoc ie (ma- nuscript). Jozef Stoic, "Jazyk levocskych slovenskyc h prfsah zo XYI.-XIX. storocia", Jazyko vedny sbornfk, 5, l 951, pp. 197-247. Popular Poetry and Folksongs J. Csaplovics, Slowenske Wersse, (Pest, l 822). J. Jamrich ml. , Wselygake Rozlycne Rozprawky k zabawenf �32 SLOVAKIA zepsane, 1832- 1833 (manu script) Jan Koll ar, Narodnie spievanky, zvazok I, (Bratislava, 1953). Jan Misianik , Knii ka ry tmovni (Bratislava, 1952) . Samlungen, 18 17 (manu script). Spevnfk D. Boczka, 1830-183 1 (manu script). Lasz lo Sziklay, " Poznamky k Csokonaiho popularite v slove nskej literature," Sbornfk Filozofickej fak ulty Uni verzity Komen skeho. Philologica, 16, 1964, pp. 12 1-1 3 1. Pave l Josef Safarfk, Jan Kollar, Pjsne swetske lidu slawenskeho w Uhrach, swazek 2 (Pest, 1827). Jozef Skultety, " Literarno-hi storicke drobnost i", Slovenske pohl'ady, 17, 1897, pp. 125- 128. Zbornfk J. Bruka, 1794 (manuscript). Z bornfk M. M. Kriia na, 1839 (manuscript). Zbornfk D . Kubfka, 179 1 (manu sc ript). Zbornfk J. L any, koni ec XVIII . storocia (manu script). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2005, Vol. 38 Description An account of the resource Vol. 38 (No. 70-71), 2005. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2005 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 7 The Origin and Development of the Slovak Literary Language 1 Konstantin V. Lifanov The history of the Slavic literary languages has developed rapidly over the last few decades as an independent linguistic discipline. Scholars have reviewed the objects of their study and defined them more precisely , and even attempted to develop optimal methods of research, all of which has made it possible for them to make adequate assessments of actual linguistic data, and to avoid imposing their contemporary perceptions on the past. For example, the use of socio1inguistic concepts has been very fruitful in the study of certain Sla- vic literary languages. However, many problems have so far remained uninvestigated. Thus Kretschmer, surveying the overall level of research into Slavic literary languages, declares that in spite of the amount of material that has already appeared, the processes whereby the Slavic literary languages emerged still remain to be worked out, as well as their regularities and specific features. 2 This conclusion also applies to the history of the Slovak literary language. Many texts written in Slovakia before the language was codified remain uninvestigated from the lingui stic point of view. There are hardly any comparative studies of texts of different ge nres or from different eras. Nevertheless , comparative study is the only 1 I deeply thank Professor Robert Orr and Professor M. Mark Stolarik for English corrections of this paper. 2 Anna Krechmer (Anna Kretschmer), " Sravnitel'naja istorija slavjanskich literatur- nych jazykov: Yoprosy metodologiji " , Vjestnik Moskovskogo uni vers iteta. Seria 9. Filologia. 3, I 998, p 48. 8 SLOVAKIA method that makes it poss ible to define the real status of co nc rete for ms a nd to determine, e.g., whether a give n for m is mere ly the result of a language error, because, e.g., a give n wri te r did not know the coeva l language norm , or of sty li stic variat ion arisin g from a g ive n genre of wri tin g, or a typical lin gui st ic feat ure characteristic of the Slovak written tradition as a whole. But if we cannot determine the status of concrete forms , we ca nnot qualify the essence of differe nt lang uage for mati o ns in the hi story of Slovak , a nd therefore we cannot compre he nd the process of the emergence and subseque nt deve lopme nt of the Slovak literary language eithe r. In its turn, this situation in the hi story of the Slovak literary language ope ns up the poss ibility of arbitrary interpretations, ofte n aris ing from extra lin gui st ic factors. Thus it is wide ly believed, mainly outside Slovakia, that the Slovak literary language emerged in the late 18 th century by differe ntiating itse lf from Czech , and that previous ly Slovaks had used Czech as their literary language. We may trace the sources of thi s beli ef to the concepts of some Czech lingui sts3, who did not recognize the di stinctiveness of Slovak and considered it merely a variant of a unitary Czechoslovak language. According to a seco nd view of thi s problem, which has been "official" in Slovak lingui stics since the mid- I 950 's, distinct languages - cultural West Slovak, Central Slovak, and perhaps East Slovak had emerged in Slovakia before the codificatio n of the Slovak literary language. Subsequently Bernolak 's 1787 codification was based o n c ultu ra l W est Slovak a nd Stur's ( I 840 's) on cultural Central Slovak. There is also a third view, accord in g to which the Slovak literary lang uage arose as a res ult of interact ion between the Czech literary language and Slovak (mainl y West Slovak) dialects. It was shared by ' See Albert Prazak , Dejiny spisovne slovenstiny po dobu Sturovu (Brati slava, 1922), A lbert Prazak , Cesi a Slovaci (Praha 1929) and Vaclav Yazny "Spisovny jazyk slove nsky", Ceskos lovenska vlasti veda , Rada 11, Sp isovny jazyk Cesky a s/ovensky (Praha 1936) pp. 145-2 15. SLOVAKIA 9 many Slovak linguists from I 900-1950.4 We embarked upon the study of thi s problem without preconceptions, and intended to base all conc lusions so lely on the analysis of concrete lin gui stic material and modern literary language theory. We cannot outline our theoretical fram ework in thi s paper, and therefore we can only refer to the first chapter of our book.5 Research into the problem of the Slovak literary language should take as its starting point the 14 th century, when Old Czech began to develop into an interethnic literary lan guage in Central Europe. At the same time it also penetrated into Slovakia. Stani slav, Kiraly , & Pauliny 6 show that in Slovakia copiers of Czec h texts tried to adhere to Czech norms. Infrin gements of these norm s tended to be iso lated and accidental , and may be described as simple errors. But as early as CC 14 - 15 fo ur changes - three phonolog ical and one morpholog ical - are attested in texts quite regul arly: the loss of the phoneme Iii, the loss of jotation in labials before lel < *e, *r, the affrication oft; d ' > c, dz, and the repl ace ment of vocati ves by nominatives. These processes constitute the initial stage of development of Old Czec h in Slovaki a, and its iso lation from the language functionin g in the Czech heartland. In the first place, we studied the further deve lopme nts of th ese phenom e na in th e spiritu a l literature of Slovak Catholics. • See , for exa mple, J. Y lkolinsky (Czambel 's pseudon ym) "O '·prvej " knihe slovenskej ", Z i ve na, 2, 1885, pp 230-240 . Henri ch Bartek, "S pi sov ny j azyk slovensky", Slovenska rec. 6, 1937- 1938, pp 50-57 and l.'.udovft Novak. "Cestina na Slove nsk u a vzn ik spisovnej slovenciny ", Slovenske pohl'ady . 54, 1938, pp 105-111. 159- 173, 2 17-222, 28 1-287. 5 Konstantin V. Lifanov, Genezis slovackogo literaturnogo jazyka . LINCOM Stu - dies in Slavic Linguistics, 21 (Munich 200 I ), pp. 18-4 1. 6 Jan Stani slav . " Zur Frage der Slowazismen in den alttschechi schen Denkmalern ", Zeitschrift fiir Slawistik. Bd. I, Heft 4. 1956. pp. 58-70, Bd. II . Heft I , 1957, pp. 3751 , Peter Kiraly. Zur Frage der altesten slowak ischen Sprachdenkmdlern" , Studia Slavica Academiae Scientiaru m Hungaricae. 4, 1958, pp. I 13- 158 , Eugen Pauliny, "Zac iatky kulturneho jazyka slovenskej narod nos ti ", Jazykovedne stridie. 6, 196 1. pp. 28-39. SLOVAKIA The re pl ace me nt of /f/ by Ir/ spread ra pidl y, alm ost over a ll S lovak wri tings , inc ludin g sp iritua l literature . By the time " Ol a.h 's Ritu a l" was tra ns lated (ca. I 550 - 1600) Iii was an obvio us, very irreg ul ar arc ha ism (proti nassy m mrskym hfJc hum ). In the re li gious treati ses of B. Smrtnik and A. Macsay , publi shed in 1697 and 171 8 res pecti ve ly, it is attes ted ma inl y in fo rm s of the ve rb ffc i , mos t probabl y as a pure ly orthographi ca l conve nti o n (Prosil ne kdy gedon Prite le sweho rikuce), but it is co mpletely absent in the manuscripts in vesti gated (the Ca ma ldul Bible ( 1756- 1759), and th e se rm ons of Mokos ( 1752- 1774), Vrabel ( I 766), and Bajan ( 1760- 177 1)). The deve lopme nt of /JI after labi a l co nso nants and before l e/ < *e, *~ was sli ghtl y di ffe re nt. The primary stages of thi s process were ide nti ca l to those in vo lved in the repl aceme nt of If/. Thus, according to Paulin /, exa mpl es of th at deve lopme nt still c lea rl y predominated in the I 5th century " Muni ch Confess ion al Formula" ( 16 fo rms with /j/ and three without), but they were refl ected incons iste ntl y as earl y as " Ol a.h 's Ritu al," as a rul e in the idi omati c fo rmul as at the end of verses (s stebau Bohe m Otcem y Duc he m Swatym bud ' cest y c hwa la na wieky wiekow. Amen). The di ffere nti ati o n betwee n genres based on the presence or absence of fo rms w ith or w itho ut /jl is characte ri sti c of later texts. Onl y fo rm s without /JI occ urred in the language of sermons, inc luding Baj an 's (tuto bude lakomec w Negwecsy potrebe), in spite of the situ ati on in hi s nati ve di a lect (Zahorsky), whe re fo rm s w ith /JI are still c urrent. However, fo rms w ith /JI re mained in the " hi ghe r" genres (in the " Bible" a nd re lig io us treati ses) and in Macsay 's la nguage they are used quite freque ntl y (T yto Pobudky ma clowek ws rdcy swem pilne vwafowati ; kri wdy net1pet1). Spec ial vocati ve for ms, and nom inati ves used as vocati ves, were lost in the maj ority of Sl ovak di alects. They were restri cted to animates in spiritual Catho li c literature (radu g se tec hd y Narod Uhersky 7 Eugen Paul iny, ·'Mnfchovska spovedna formu la" , Jazykovedny casopis. 10. no. I , 1959, p. 30. SLOVAKIA 11 /Vrabel/ - A braham e, A braham e ne wsta hug ruky tweg na djte /Macsay/). In contrast to Literary Old Czech, anim ate noun s w ith palatal ste ms had the same endin gs as nouns with no n-palatal ste ms (chce m rect du sso kresta nska bludica /M okos/ ; Czec h du se!. It is inte resting that these were the very forms that Berno lak codi fied. The hi story of the affricates c and dz(< t'and d ') shows that new fo rm s did not always oust co mpe tin g o lde r fo rms as a res ult of the loss of the oppos ition " literary - non-literary." In thi s case the te ndency was c hanged and the literary language lost the affri cates. They were w ides pread in I 4'h - I S'h century writin gs, but o nl y iso lated examples appeared in I 8'h century Catho li c literature (strhel se weter, zrucil dom /Vrabel/) . Th ese fo ur phe no me na are c uri o us ly s imil ar: they occ urred in literary Old Czech, but onl y sporadi ca ll y, occ urring in tex ts as errors by Czec h copy ists. These fo rm s deve loped into competin g doubl ets in the Slovak writte n language. However, the affri cati on of t'and d' differed from the other phenome na, in th at it made the phonol og ica l syste m more compl ex (the phone mes ga ined an additi onal artic ul atory feature) , while the othe r phe nome na, on the contrary , s implified the system , because they in vol ved the loss of a ph one me, or a pos iti onal vari ant of a phoneme, or a gra mm ati ca l fo rm . He nce we mi ght sugges t th at ph e nome na simpli fy in g a syste m preva il in co mpetiti o n in th e earl y stage of deve lopme nt of a literary la nguage outs ide its core ethni c te rritory, but phe no me na complicatin g it do not. Thi s is also suggested by the fact that it was not until the mid- I 8'h century th at the ph one me dz < *dj pe netrated the la nguage of spiritua l li teratu re; prev io us ly it had been co nsiste ntl y repl aced by /z/, or rare ly by Id '/ (zretedlne p ot wrz uje [pa n- S lovak po twrdzuj e] to wssec ko Job; skrze pokanj z te ho sna se probud'uje [pan-Sl ovak prebudz uje] /Macsay/) . The re was an esse ntial di ffe re nce between sporadi c pheno me na and doubl ets in wri tten Old Czec h. T he latte r survived as vari ants fo r almost the who le hi story of the language of Slovak Cath o li c literature, e .g., the refl exes of so-ca ll ed regress ive uml aut, i.e., the deve- SLOVAKIA 12 lopment of tautosyllabic -aj- to -ej- in Old Czec h, and the emerge nce of the co nso nant clu ster sr:. c haracterist ic of Old Czech and Central Slovak, from sc- (< *stj-, *skj- , a nd *sk- before fro nt vowe ls). The first phenomenon was subject to a degree of gra mmaticali zation , as may be deduced from the fac t that no n-uml au ted seq ue nces obviously predomin ated in imperati ve fo rm s (ne mess kag obratjtj se ku Pa.nu Bohu /Macsay/) , but variation in the superlati ve forms of adjectives and adverbs was maintain ed as late as the mid- 18 th century, and usage mai nl y depended on the indi vidu al taste of the respecti ve author (pod'te a pod mym stjnem odpocjwagte - eopustili nalezk i swe a cestu nagtwrdssu /the " Bible"/; krize a proti wenstwy trpezliwe znassagme - sa m Tyran ze swym negmlacssym sine m /Vrabel/). Forms w ith sc- a nd st: were used in re li g ious texts throu ghout the pe ri od covered by the research , regardl ess of the orig ins of their authors (gegjho pak narozenj cas gesste oppodal byl - Pridrzme se th gessce S. Paw la /Macsay/). It was onl y in mid- I 8 century sermon s that th e tendency towards regional differentiation of th ese forms e merged: Makos used on ly fo rms with st:, following hi s nati ve Cen- tral Slovak dial ect (kazani takow i mestiane bi zas lu zili ), while Bajan, from Western Slovakia, mostly used forms w ith sc- (kde tenkrat bude Utociisscie hri ssniku). The process of for mati on of lin gui stic norms, which mu st have ex isted , may be observed from the lin gui st ic mate ri al th at ca n be g leaned from the written records. The occ urre nce of nati ve Czech and nati ve Slovak for ms in texts was not random, but governed by certain rules: firstl y the primary literary and non-literary fo rms arose, the n the primary non-literary form usuall y ousted the primary literary one. These processes, however, were subject to the princ ipl e of flexibl e stability8, whereby they were impl e me nted sy nchroni ca ll y, and thu s co ntinuity was ma intain ed be tween th e written languages of diffe re nt epoc hs. Thus, the fo ll ow in g new phe nomena, untypi ca l of " Yi lem Matezius ( Yi lem Matesius), ·'O neobchodimosti stab il'nost i litera turnogo jazyka" . Praiskij lingvisticeskij krniok (Moskva. 1967). p. 38 1 13 SLOVAKIA earlie r writings, are attested in the tran slation of the "Ol ah Ritual ": □ unco ntracted forms of the gen., dat. and loc. sg. of femi nine adjecti ves e ndin g in fun ctional non -pa lata l conso na nts o usted the corresponding co ntracted forms (podl e tagneg radd y otcowskeg a dobrotiweg wu le twey); □ there was vari ation betwee n the nati ve Czech in str. forms of the pronouns ty and seba with the root vowe l o, a nd the nat ive Slovak ones with the root vowe l e, but the native Slovak forms prevailed (s steba u Bohe m otcem y s Duchem Swatym - s tobou bohem Ot- cem s Duchem Swatym); □ both the short and lon g forms of participl es were used as predi cati ves (za hrj c hy nasse vcinen gest - kterjmz to byl zapaleny proti nassy m mrskym hrjchum), etc. Some phe nome na are first attested in the lang uage of Smrtnik's re li gious treati se: □ the an im ate ge n.-acc. plural (Wide l pyssycych se A nge luw; cf. "Olah Ritua l": ze sy pro nas lidj hrjssne vkri fo wany) ; □ a n epenthetic vowel in masc uline forms of the /-participl e of consonant ste ms (polozil ho na Oltari na hranjcy drew a wstahe / ru ku ; cf. a n examp le fro m " Olah 's Ritu a l": z nes / zuriwy hnew otce tweho wecneho) ; □ the gramm ati ca li zation of piehlask a9 , prese rved in so me form s and lost in others, e.g., it is preserved in participial and verba l adverbia l endings, but beginning to be lost in present verb forms (gako Rewy we wykwjtagicy Winnicy; smegjce se pobij za k bytwe; pred Ssediwinamj wassymj Ml ads sy hore powstawagj - Dijtky zros- 9 Pieh/iska denotes the series of comprehensive progressi ve vowe l changes, unique to earl y Czech within Slavic. which was ori ginall y manifested co nsisten tl y in the morphology. but later reduced due to analogical pre ssures. Basically, it involved the frontin g and raising of vowels after origin ally soft consona nts. e. g .. u/ice < * ulica. biicho < * br ·ucho. see. e. g .. Miroslav Komarek. Historicka mluvnica ceski. 1: Hlis k os l ovf (Praha. 1962). pp. 62-66, I 15-118 , 153; 1964: 17, 18. 54; Charl es Townsend & Laura Janda. Common and Comparati ve Slavic (Indi ana 1996), pp. 9 192. I 6 I. I 63 , 272. SLOVAKIA 14 tie wchazagu do sklepu); □ the spread of the genitive of the pronoun onilony to the acc., with both forms used as variants (pi su ge y pro tebe - prikazal aby se zem otewrela a za ziwa gych pozrela), etc. The majority of the features peculiar to the language of spiritual literature spread in the first half of the 18 th century. These trends are shown in the lan guage of Macs ay's religious treatises, which a lso contains the following further innovation s: □ masculine loc. pl. forms in -och (zalezelo to znamenj na skut- koch geho zazracnych; cf. nenj wskutcych miloserdenstwj (Smrtnik)); □ the dat. , loc. and instr. pl. of noun s such as kost' fo ll ow the pattern of ulice/iena (pri ledagakyc h wecech se zabaw ugu - a w smetach hrjchuw lezite); □ the spread of the loss of sy llabic sonants in abso lute word- final position , apart from /-participles, where this process took place earlier (Ale o Swaty Otce wyswet li vmysl twug - gakz ty s wilozjl smyse/ geho), etc. However, some Czech elements were very stable and were used almost universally: □ the sequence ji- in word-initial position , in contrast to Slovak i- (gako by mluwil a prisahal gim ("The Bible"); □ velar/alternations in the dat/loc. sg. of feminine nouns (Zadag- jcymu wodi mleka dala a na ssalce knj zatskeg podala ("The Bible") and in the nom pl. of adjectives agreeing with animates (A le zase pocali synowe Yzrahelsty ciniti zle weci ("The Bible"), etc. These processes obviously demon strate the modification of Old Czech as it was transformed into a standardised written language. Its structure consisted of native Czech and native S lovak elements used according to fairly strict rules. Such phenomena, maintained in Slovak, but lost in contemporary Literary Czech, are direct evidence of its clear connection to Old Czech. Apart from analogical doublets in literary Old Czech and in the language of Slovak Catholics, these are as follows: SLOVAKIA □ 15 the preservati o n of the auxili ary in 3rd person verb fo rm s of the /- parti c ipl e un til the mi d- I 8 th century (a kralostwy sweho nekoncene ho pocatek gest ucinil (Mokos); ze ges t guz pri dwerac h wibehei protj ne mu / Baja n/); suc h fo rm s were co mpl ete ly lost in S lovak di alec ts by abo ut the I 5th ce ntury1°, and they were very ra re in Czec h writings by the 16 th century; 11 □ the e ndin g -u/-ti in the inst. sg. of fe minine noun s and adjec- ti ves, and also so me personal pronouns, in all works of Catho lic literature, inc ludin g authors of Central Sl ovak o ri g in , altho ugh they do not ac tu all y occ ur in Central Slovak (S krotite le Sweta A lexand ra M ladeho kw itnu cj ho strilku swu ra nil a; Pod se mnu odegdi (S mrtni k)); □ no d iphthongs apart from uo in the "Ol ah Ritu al", partic ul arly in Smrtni k 's re li g io us treati se, whi c h co ntinu es th e s itu ati o n in Literary Old Czec h (Oleg obmekssuge kuoie (S mrtni k)); □ gemin ates in the same words as in Literary O ld Czech (podle tagneg raddy Otcows keg /Olah/), etc. The language of S lovak Catho li c literature, howeve r, was indepe nde nt. It deve loped accordin g to its ow n rul es, in co ntrast to those of Old Czec h and Slova k di alec ts. Spec ific processes e merged rapidly, e.g., th e above- me nti o ned grammati ca li zati on of piehlask a, plus the follow ing: □ most masc uline no un s have gen. pl. fo rm s in -u w, whi ch is absent fro m Slova k di alects, and was lost in literary Czech (odwede l od rodiczuw, od prateluw /Vrabel/); □ an oppos iti o n between fe minin e adj ectives with ste m-fin al no n-palata l a nd ste m-fi na l palatal co nso na nts, beca use th e latte r fo rm s also had contracted gen. , dat. a nd loc. fo rm s (V < *Vj V; Mlc zim , abi ch w dnessny (< *-j-) Reczy meg d luhy ne bil /Bajan/), whil e the fo rmer had uncontracted fo rms; □ Ill 11 the de limi tati on of gen. and acc. pl. fo rms of animate nouns as Rudolf K rajcov ic, Nacrt dejfn slovenskeho jazyka (Bratislava, 197 1) p. 143 A rn ost L amprec ht, Dusan Slosar & Jaros lav Bauer, Historicka mlu vnice cestiny (Praha, 1986), p. 244 SLOVAKIA 16 observed in Macsay ' s lan guage, and in the language of the " Bible" (ge n.: okolo deset ti syc uw wseckych sy lnych a udatnych Muiuw; acc.: kdiz zachwatili dwoch mu iti s knjzat Madyanskych /th e " Bible"/); □ the appearance of spec ial gen. sg. forms of the pronouns ty and seba, with -o- in the root (a le podobne wecy pro sobe od druheho slissetj pohrdagj (S mrtnik)), etc. Many native Slovak elements in the language of Slovak Catholic literature were pan-Slovak, but some of them directly indicate the region of Slovakia which played the main role in the formation of the Slovak written tradition : West Slovak. This is espec iall y true of features that do not occur in other Slovak dialects, primarily Central Slovak, such as , e.g.: □ diphthongs tended to be lost; □ -e in the endings of adjectives with a ste m-fi nal pal atal (ni c nad neho neni twrdsseho /Mokos/; Czech t vrdsfho; North Central Slovak tvrdsieho, South tvrdsiho/tvrdsiho) ; □ non-contracted gen. , dat. , and acc . forms (in the latter case if agreeing with animate noun s) of masc uline and neuter possessive adjectives (abich guss kpredsewzeti mogemu mluwil /Mokos/; Czech memu; Central Slovak m 6jmu); □ epenthetic -e- in masculine /-part iciples (Ce ntral Slovak -o-; a do stawu sweg Boskeg milosti pren esel /Mokos/; Czech pienes /; Central Slovak preniesol) , etc. D moreover, many native Czech e lements remained unchan ged, because they also occur in West Slovak as a whole, or in its SouthWestern subdial ects, e.g.: D the sequence rot- as a reflex of Common Slavic c ircumflex *6rt- (aby rostlo nany Hlozj a Trnj (S mrtnik ); Czech and Wes t Slovak rostlo; Central Slovak nistlo); □ the vowel e as a refl ex of Common Slavic strong *b (a gedna zadruhu wen zkostola wichazali /Mo kos/ ; Czech and West Slovak ven; Central Slovak von ); D the ending -em in the loc. sg. of masc uline and neuter adjec- 17 SLOVAKIA ti ves (aby na hrobowem kamenj tyto slowa wy kresatj dali /M acsay/ ; Czech and West Slovak hrobovem ; Centra l S lovak hrobovom ); □ the endin gs -e and -owe in the no m. pl. of anim ate no un s (nadto y pry tele daleko od stupili od ne ho /the " Bible"/ ; mn ozy p atriarcho we, mnozy kni zata a w udcowe /V rabel/; Czech p hite le , patriarchove, vudcove; West S lovak prate/e, patriarchove, vodcove; Central Slovak priatelia, patriarchovia, vodcovia) , etc. The typical West Slovak elements occ urring in Catho li c literary texts were as fo ll ows: □ the lack o f sy ll abic sonants from ori gin al sequences of conso- nants plus b i b + I (iluc Draku w gest wino geg ich (Smrtnik); Czech i luc; Central Sl ovak i lc; the isogloss was located on the territory o f South-Western (Trnava) di alects); □ the instr. sg. e ndin g -e m in masc uline and ne uter no un s (A sed'e la pod strom em palmowym, ktery m enem gey m sa menowal /the " Bible"/ ; Czec h, Zahorak, and some adj acent Trn ava di alec ts stromem, jmeneml m enem ; Central Slova k and other Wes t S lovak di alects have -om : stromom , menom), etc. Althou gh thi s lin g ui stic form ati on does di splay territori a ll ybased di alect di vergences, mai nl y in sermons, di alectal fea tures have not totall y submerged its characteri sti c pan-di alectal elements. If we compare the lin gui stic structures of Slovak Catholic literature and Berno lak 's codifi cation, we may conc lude that the codi ficati on was not somethin g new in princ iple. Nati ve Czec h fea tures occurring in , e.g., both the language of Slovak Catho li c literature and Berno lak's codifi cati on, clearl y de mo nstrate the c lose co nnec ti on between the two. These features are as fo llows: □ contracted fo rm s of possess ive adjecti ves (m eho, etc.) ; □ dat. sg. fo rms of ori g in all y soft-stem neuter noun s, whi ch d is- pl ay the refl exes of the ceska p fehlask a, i.e., u>i (srdci); □ □ neuter noun s endin g in -nf (stawaiif); parti c ipl es and verba l ad verb s w ith pieh/aska in suffixes ( wolag icf, wolagic); □ the I" person subjuncti ve of by t' in -ch, incl ud in g co mpoun d SLOVAKIA 18 conjunctions (e.g., abich); □ the sequence ji- in word-initial position (gim), etc. The material being analyzed shows that the language of Catholic literature had many features characteristic of a literary language. It was cultivated, selective, functionally homoge neous, and essentially supra-dialectal. For its definitive identification as such , it needs to be ascertained whether it was only a religious style or multifunctional , and whether it was widespread over the whole of Slovakia. In order to answer the first question we compared the language of Catholic literature to the language of secular baroque poetry , based on the following texts: P. Benickfs [original] "Slovak Verses" ( 1652), S.F. Selecky ' s " Pen Portrait of a Beautiful Lady" ( 170 I), and H. Gavlovic's "The Pastoral School " ( 1775). The language of secular baroque poetry generally coincides with the lan guage of Catholic literature. The linguistic differences in each genre are mainly based on the respective periods of composition ; and not the origins of the authors . In other words, secular baroque poetry may be grouped along with Catholic literature in accordance with its period of composition. The vowel system s of both genres may be characterised by their clear tendency to use long monophthongs instead of native Czech and Central Slovak diphthongs. The native Czech diphthong ou (orthographic au) , also attested in earlier spiritual literature, occurs only in Benicky (Spravedlivim gsaudem I Osemetnim !idem / Pracuje gich chitrost (Benicky); moudrost y cest geho /Olah/ ; Strach Saudu a Ostrost Sudce (Smrtnik)). It is absent from 18 th century works , however, regardless of genre. In contrast to Catholic literature, other diphthongs occur sporadically in the language of Benicky and Gavlovic : the former has two examples of -ia- , and the latter nearly ten of -ie-, and perhaps one example of -iu- (Neb size Rodiczke / Kliatby Materynske / Prinasegj pokuty (Benicky) ; Spiwala sy gedna baba : mam penazy dgessku, I su do zeme zakopane, / newim w kterem br- geiku /Gavlovic/; A gak pangu penezitu, / musiss geg sluziti , / Gak chudobnu budess w dome / dwe chudoby miti (Gavlovic). These phe- SLOVAKIA 19 nomena may be described as deliberate violations of norm. 12 The wholesale remodelling of the front/back contrast in the vowel system due to the gradual reduction of pieh/aska provides another substantial feature common to secular baroque poetry and Catholic literature. The grammaticalization of piehJaska may also be observed in the language of secular baroque poetry, generally identical to similar processes in the language of Catholic literature. This convergence is manifest in the stability of some grammatical forms , variation in others, and even in the total loss of some forms with piehlaska Thus, participial and verbal adverb endings are the most stable (Had kuzy svu zvleka, / Orlyce z daleka / Letagicz pera pusty (Benicky); czistotu woniczy proto smim potwrdit (Selecky); Ktery mlcy , ku mluweni , / pricynu magice, I Wiceg cyni, nezli zwitas / zamky walagice (Gavlovic). In contrast, at an early stage 3 rd person forms without piehlas- ka began to be replaced by forms with piehlaska and a stage where forms both with and without coexist occurs in the language of Ben icky, which chronologically corresponds to the language of Smrtnik (Nebo u susedu / Pekagj chleb z medu, / Take pryslovy byva - Saty ozdobene, I Czinicz telo pisne / Molove prei iraju (Benicky)). As in the language of Catholic literature, forms with pieh/aska are absent from the language of F. Selecky and H. Gavlovic (Mnozy tez zadagu wzacznost smichu widjet (Selecky); Ne ze zeme, ale z Judi / wiros- tagu zlosti , / Puwod magu w marnych Srdcach I z nedobreg wlchkosti (Gavlovic). The convergence of the main linguistic features of Catholic literature and sec ular baroque poetry also affected the morphological system. The features which have changed are as follows: □ In the language of Benicky the development of animate gen.lace. forms in the plural of nouns is fixed at a stage where both nom./acc. and gen.lace. forms occur. The translation of "Olah ' s Ritual," in which the original nom ./acc. forms are still consistent, repre- 12 See Ian Muk arfovsk ii (Jan Mukai'ovsky), ·"Literaturn yj jazyk i poeticeskij jazy k", Praiskij lingvisticeskij kruiok (Moskva, 1967), pp. 407-408. SLOVAKIA 20 sents an intermediate stage and the treati se of B. Smrtnik refl ects the e ndpoint of thi s process: the re are no nom ./acc. forms in Selecky and Gavlovic at all (Mas lj se so uditj , / Mu sis svedky mitj , / Tak bude vec vihrana - Yzlast gestlis na vogne / Drz vogak u v s ilne / Czastim napominanim (Benicky); Ked bi g ih ranjenych ona htje la hog it (Se lecky) ; A Kato mu odpowedel : / Nemluw mi nic wice, / bil by zazrak, kdyby zhryzly / Sswabuw nohaw ice (Gavlovi c); □ the loss of the spec ial acc. forms of the pe rso nal pronoun oni/ony (here both Benicky and Smrtnik have doubl ets, and they may be contrasted on the one ha nd with "Ola.h 's Ritual ," the point of departure, and on the other hand , to a ll other writin gs attesting to the e nd of the process (Magj peczet daty , / 0 to se staraty , / Aby ge ginsy stihat - Darmo konom hv yzdat / Kdyz g ich mas napagat / gestlj ze sam nepi ge (Benicky); Prirownam g ich k oczam soko la draheho (Selec ky); Proto wzacny karbunkulu s / y drahe kameni , / ze g ich zridka uhlidame, / w hognosti g ich ne ni (Gav lovic); □ the replace ment of primary forms of /-participles with ste m- fin a l sy ll a bic sonants by forms with epenthetic -e- (Benicky and " Ol a.h 's Ritual " have only forms with sy llabic sonants, they still predomin ate in Smrtnik , whi le 18 th century writings, including the works of Selec ky and Gavlovi c (Zes ze statku panskeho / Zbohatl, v kratky cas / vezme ti to Pan zas (Be nicky); jakbi u kralowneg lasku bil dosahel (Se lec ky ); A Pan os la se u/eke/, / osla dal zabiti, / Tak osel, chtic las ku ziskat, / strati I ziwobiti (Gav lovi c)) have only innovatio ns, etc . The following phenome na may be termed stabl e : □ The consiste nt preservation of alternations in nom . pl. adj ec- tives agree in g with animate noun s (Tak pansty dvorane I Yak nahl e pan vstane / Nec h zanim postupu g u (Benicky); ked by ta czi czerti pgek ni bil y w pe kl e (Se lecky); Nazy na Swet prich adzame / ze ziwota Matk i, / Neprinassame ze sebu / penize a statki (Gavlovic); □ masc uline a nd ne ute r in str. sg. forms in -em (Ne b czasta pri saha / Ciasem dopomaha / ze zustava lhar vetsy (Be ni c ky); nebo s ak samitem okrasle na bi wa (Se lec ky) ; Zena mu fov i ukl ady / z placem spu sob uge, / Geho mi se l vsse li ga kim / s pu s obe m probu ge SLOVAKIA 21 (Gavl ov ic); bych (Chtje l bih mnihe m zostat, rad bih giste wgedj e l (Selecky); Y kosselu bych predala, / vssak se mu za bo□ th e subjun cti ve in gim, I Kdyz se trochu podnapi gem, / ce la neobstog im (Gav lov ic), etc. Sporadic phe nome na simil ar to those in the language of Catho li c literature may also be fo und in the language of sec ul ar baroque poetry: ge min ate consona nts (Trucow ity y neg le pss u / c udzu Raddu ha ni , I A teprw a gu c hce plnit, / kdyz se guss porani (Gav lov ic); 3d pe rson /-parti cipl es w ith overt a uxili aries (Z iwot ta k cz istotneg c hwa li ges t zas lu zil (Se lecky)), co ntrac ted fe minine loc. sg. Adj ecti ves w ith stem-fi nal palatals (Napomaha k pravde, / V negchitregsi zrade / Sv u ukazuge moc nost (Benicky)), etc. T he lingui sti c di ffe rences arising fro m c hrono log ica l d ive rgences betwee n sec ul ar baroque poetry and Catho li c li teratu re onl y in vo lve detail s, mainl y in stances whe re poets use such language e le me nt s as had already bee n lost or had not yet e merged in Catho li c literature. Thus, fo r instance, H. Gav lov ic used both -om and -um as masc uline nomin al dat. pl. endings, although the latte r fo rm s had already been lost in Cath olic literature by around the l 750's (De n Sed/akom a Noc ia kom I negw ic pos luhu ge, / to Sowa w cy me ry zac ke m / slu ssne oznamuge - Prez ce ly de n Walac h chodi , / a malo spi w nocy, / By mohe l bit proti wlkum I owcam na pomocy) . The masc uline loc. pl. ending -och had already appea red by Beni cky's tim e, sli ghtl y ea rli er than in Catho li c literatu re (Kupcove, fl agnarkj , I V hostincoch krczmarky / Nemagf dluho spavat). Sometimes fo rm s were se lected based on the need fo r a rhy me. Thu s, in G av lov ic we do find 3rd person present forms with piehlaska, but onl y in cases where they are part of a rhyming sche me (Wssec ke wecy cas sw ug magu, / cas gest k fartovani , / Kdyz se zme ni ss c hwa litebne, / zaden te nezhani - Coko li w ge kre m potre by, / to guss stog i w zbytku , / Z bytek w sto loc h we Ike statki / vihana z pribitku). A lingui sti c analys is of sec ul ar baroque poetry and Catho li c literature shows th at th e la nguage fo rmati on in these genres was ide nti ca l. In othe r words, the language of Catho lic lite rature was not onl y 22 SLOVAKIA religiou s. It has already been shown that the language of sec ular baroque poetry, specifically Gavlovic ' s " Pastoral School ", mostly coincides with the language of administrative-legal texts of South-Western origin. Hence it follows that comparing them with administrative- lega l texts from other regions involves in principle the comparison of different genres. And thi s in its turn makes it possible to determine whether thi s language formation was widespread in all region s of Slovakia, which is very important for its definitive identification. We studied thi s problem by comparing the concrete lin guistic features occurring in administrative- lega l texts. Then we also compared different sy nchronic stages of the "Jel sava Town Chronicle" of 15661710 (South Central Slovakia) and the 16 th - 19 th century "Levoca Formu las of Oaths" (East Slovakia) , in order to determine trends in the ir lingui stic development. A comparison of spec ific lin gui stic features from diverse admini strative-legal texts reveals interestin g features in the manifestation of linguistic processes and the di stribution of phenomena in texts of different origins. Thus, all phenomena involving the modification of the Old Czech base are manifested in different texts in the same positions, and therefore many of them were not due to the lingui stic factors contrasting all Slovak dialects with Czech. An examp le of loss is furnished by the history of the phoneme Ii i, which was re placed in all positions by the phoneme Ir/ in regional variants of admini strative-legal writings. An example of maintenance is furni shed by the old instr. sg. feminine ending -11 (- u), which began to be used in Slovak written texts as a component of Old Czech morphological structure , not only in West and East Slovak admin istrative-lega l documents, where it is supported by local dialect usage, but also in Central Slovak. This shows that processes manifested in the written language spread into other reg ions from an epicentre. This examp le is especially interesting, as the Central Slovak ending -ou is formally identical to the new Czech ending -ou from the diphthong ization of - 11 (mezi Mikulasem Kowacze[m] a druhu osobu Matronu Elzbetu SLOVAKIA 23 Haylowich /1658, Dojc, W es t Slo vakia/; Roli czku ... zo psseniczu posal ( 1728, Spi s, East Slovaki a); vsak z mu matku na vinicu ko mne chodivala zvadzat ( 1728, Krupina, Central Slovakia) 13. Some instances of doublets occur in South-West Slovak admini strati ve -lega l tex ts. As a rule , one member of such pair occurs more frequently , and may be considered the unmarked form. All the invariant feature s of these texts occur in non-South-Western administrative-legal documents Features with doubl et forms show both variants in non-SouthWestern texts, or, less frequ e ntly , only the unmarked variant. " Reg ional variants" had the function of doublets, which differentiated indivisible lan guage formations , but did not separate them into inde pe ndent lingui stic units. Thus, for example, the masc uline and ne ute r oblique adjective case form s with -e- in the endings, the only poss ible variant in South-West Slovak administrative-legal texts (ze Sa czcinskeho trhu spolem issly ( 1725 , Skalica)), also occurred in NorthWest Slovak (ta cesta od kamenneho Snehu na Polianku ( 1633, Pruske)) , North Central Slovak (za Radu Slowutneho a Oppatrneho muze Pana Tomassa Sk/adaneho 11649, Rufomberok/) , South-Central Slovak (pana knam milostiweho a /askaweho ( 1570, Banska Stiavnica)) and East Slovak (stegto strany Yarku mlinskeho /1658 , Sari s - Zemplfn/) texts. Side by side with these form s, their regional variants are also used in non-South-Western texts, e.g., the diphthongs -ie- (pre sirotky zu stale nebohyeho Samuela /166 I , Rufomberok/), -f- (-i-; (Pozdraweni y g iniho mnoho dobriho /1622 , Ban ska Stiavnica/), -o(Agnieha Istvana Radomskoho sestra /1608, Sari s - Zemplfn/). These features, mainl y typical of South-Weste rn written texts, may be seen as invariants, based on their genera l di stribution . Invariants on the level of concrete linguistic elements are always attested in South-Western texts, and therefore the lan guage of South-West administrative- '-' A lthough the M odern Czech and Slovak - ou endings are forma ll y identica l , they constitute the endpoints of two different hi storica l processes : Czech -ou is the reflex of th e diphthongisation of *- u resulting from th e denazali za ti on. fo ll owed by contraction. of * -ojQ ( * -11 < * -oju < * -ojQ). whereas Slovak -ou is simply the refl ex of contracti on. wi th subsequent denazali zati on. of * -ojQ (-ou < * -OQ < * -ojQ). SLOVAKIA 24 lega l tex ts is genera ll y in varia nt by com pari so n to texts from other reg ion s of Slovakia. The o bvious fact th at Catholic literature and sec ul ar baroque poetry were based o n South-West Slovak dialects shows th at the sa me lin g ui st ic fo rmat io n functioned in a ll kinds of writte n texts, and was widespread in a ll region s of Slovakia. Thu s, the so-ca ll ed c ultural la ng uages were not indepe nde nt lingui stic formations. Firstly , no compl ete li st of distinct features can be revealed for any of the m, because every indi vidu a l isog loss used to c lass ify tex ts of different ori g in s yie ld s different res ults, even of " regiona ll y- based variants" recorded in written tex ts. In other word s, the lang uage of ad mini strative-lega l texts amounts to th e sum of minor loca l var ia nts united into a who le, w itho ut any tran s iti o na l fo rm ation s (so-ca ll ed c ultu ra l lang uages). 14 An ana lys is of the deve lopment of the lang uage of the " Je lsava Town Chronicle" revea ls a number of facts, whi c h are extre me ly important fo r the e luc idati o n of the dynamics of the developme nt of thi s ling ui stic fo rmati o n. There were man y phe nomena in the ear li e r records, as earl y as the I 560's and I 570's , deviating from Czech norms. Firstly, we found pan-Sl ova k features , w hi c h mi g ht have penetra ted writte n tex ts in different reg ions of Slovak ia independently of o ne anothe r (the absence of the phone me Iii and the nati ve Czech diphthong ou, the jotation of lab ia l consona nts before e < *e, *~, etc.). Phe nome na on the th whole untypica l of writte n 16 century texts a lso occ urred (the consiste nt occ urre nce of th e phoneme dz < *dj, for ms bo th with and without j before i in word-initial position, etc .). A few features, howeve r, we re o bviously Centra l Slovak (the diphtho ngs -uo- and -ie-, o < stron g * b , masculine and neuter nomina l in str. sg . forms in -om, masc uline and ne uter possess ive adjecti ve gen. sg. fo rms in -ho, etc .). Adj ecti ves w ith -ie- in the ir endin gs are th e most important, because they simulta neo us ly de mo nstrate th e break w ith the Old Czech writ14 K.McCone and D. Mathews describe similar se ts of probl ems in defining Middle Iri sh and Middle Engli sh respec tively. See Kim McCone. The Early Irish Verb (M aynooth , 1987) , pp. 18 1- 183 and Dav id M atth ews , (U ni versity Park , PA , 2000), pp. 1- 14. SLOVAKIA 25 ten tradition and show th at some standardi sation processes were carried through in the la nguage of written Central Slovak texts, because these forms have the monophthong iii in South Centra l Slovak dia lects, including Je lsava. At the same time, whi le generall y ac knowl edg ing the impl e mentation of standardi sation processes in the Central Slovak dialects, it should be stated that they were rather weak, due to the occ urre nce of a numbe r of loca l features in the written tex ts. These inc luded, e.g., the almost total loss of the sy llabi c so nant r, the c han ge of ou into 6, primarily attested in the instr. sg . forms of feminine noun s and adjectives, the c hange of c into s, and the appearance of a afte r ve lars, etc. Some features may be found in late 16 th a nd early I 7'h ce ntury texts, which may be described as the rea li sation of two contradictory te ndencies: the wea kness of the loca l c harac te r of record s, because dialectal ele me nt s were lost in the respec tive la nguages (the restoration of sy llabic r, the loss of Gerner features ia < ie and s < c, etc.), and the increas ing occurre nce of features from the Trnava written tradition (the losses of the phoneme /dz/, masc uline and neuter adjectival form s with e in the e ndin gs, a nd di alecta l forms of I-participle bel/biel, etc.). In the I 630 's - I 650's the popul ation of Je lsava accepted th e Counter-Refo rmation , whic h was reflected in the language of the town chronicle. The first te nde ncy we named was modified , because the occ urrence of most of the already exist in g Ce ntral Slovak features in creased , but no new feat ures of Central Slovak orig in appeared in the texts. The second te ndency - followin g the Trnava written tradition - was maintained. The second tendency predominated until the earl y I 8 th ce ntury. W e may therefore conclude that over the whole hi story of th e "Je lsava Town Chronicle", its lang uage gradually adapted to Be rnol ak 's codification of Slovak literary la nguage, and not to Stur' s, as we mi ght ex pect based on the Central Slovak origin 26 SLOVAKIA of th ese texts. 15 The development of the language of the " Levoca Formulas of Oaths" was essentiall y similar: there is an early stratum of Polish di alectal feature s in the texts (e.g., plosive g and the Poli sh reflexes of the *tort formula) , with a layer of East Slovak ones (e.g., the vowe l e < * and reflexes of assibilated t' and d) superimposed. Over time, however, they were lost, because they could not res ist competition from pan-Slovak and West Slovak feature s, which beca me obvious in the early 18 th century, not long after the Counter-Reformation . 16 It is very important to note th at the lan guage of administrativelega l texts was common for both Catholics and Lutherans, in contrast to Catholic literature and secular baroque poetry. The language of popular poetry was also common to both Catholics and Lutherans, and it was on the whole also based on the SouthWestern written tradition. Specifically, however, it was characterised by a very fluid structure, because thi s lin guistic formation in such writings was contrasted to Literary Czech or some Slovak dialect, depending on the genre or contents of the respective verses. Consequently , Czech feature s, atypica l of the Slovak written tradition , penetrated the language of hi storical verse (for instance , the " Book of Verses" (East Slovaki a, 1751 ), or J . Bruk ' s manuscript co ll ectio n (Orava, North Central Slovaki a, 1794) or occasional poetry (for in stance , congratulation from the J. Lany manu script co ll ec tion , late 18th century). And conversely, a number of dialectal features are found in styli sed folksongs (e.g., the D. Kubik collection (Priev idza, Central Slovakia, 1791 )). From the early l 800's a number of Central Slovak feat ures occur in a variety of verses (for examp le, in J. Koll ar 's " Folksongs", the M. M. Krizan collection (Trencfn County, North-West Slovakia, 1839, etc.), which we consider a s ign of the 15 See in detail K[ o nstantin] V. Li fa nov, "Evoljucia j azyka " Je lsavskoj gorodskoj kni g i" 1566- 17 10 gg. i t. naz. Kul\urnyj sred nes lov ac kij j azyk", Zeitschrift filr Sla- wische Philologie. Bd. 58 , Heft I, 1999, pp. 151 - 170. See Ko nsta ntin V Lifanov , Genezis slovatskogo literaturnogo iazyka. LIN CO M 16 St udi es in Slavic Lingui sti cs, 2 1 (Muenchen , 200 I). pp. 163- 170. SLOVAKIA 27 emergence of a spec ific language , the Centra l Slovak folklore koine, based on North Centra l Slovak di alects. Another sign of thi s phenomenon is the nature of the lingui sti c changes whi ch we find in manuscript copies of the folk songs (for instance, in J. Boczko 's collections fro m Banska Sti av ni ca ( 1830-1 83 1) and J. Jamri ch Junior 's from Gerner ( 1832-1 833)). These copyists were South Central Slovaks by birth , but when they copied songs from the second part of Koll ar 's "Slovak Secul ar Fo lksongs fro m Hun gary" , they gave preference to North Central Sl ovak features. 17 The purest vari ety of the Central Slovak fo lkl ore koine fun ctioned in North Central Slovaki a, and a written form is fi xed in the S.B. Hrobo n manu sc ript collecti on (S ielni ca, Liptov County, No rth Central Slovaki a, 1841 ). Its penetrati on into South Central and West Slovaki a (it did not influence the language of East Slovak folk songs, or minimall y so) took the form of infiltration of some its features. Later the Central Slovak folklore koine turned into a poetic koine, when it began to used in popular poetry as we ll , over the who le territory of Slovaki a (e.g., the verses of J. Szent-Kereszty ( I 822, of So uth Central Slovak ori gin ), the "Samlungen" manu script collection (Trnava, West Slovaki a, 18 17), the Eastern Slovak lawye r F. Balogh's translation of Hungari an poet Y.M. Csokonai' s verse (earl y 1800 's), and not just in the styli zations of folksongs. The Central Slovak fo lkl ore ko ine also penetrated the " hi gh" poetry of Luthera n poets, who had prev iously written in Czec h. The fi rst such works - three verses by S. Chalupka - were published in G . Fejerpataky' s Alm anac in 1834. At first thi s process was also mani fested in the sty li zati ons of folk songs, but in contrast to the popular poetry, it totall y o usted the prev io us lin gui stic system (the Czec h language). Later on it spread into other genres of hi gh poetry (the hymnal song "Nitra, Dear Nitra" was publi shed in the first volume of 17 Konstantin Lifa nov . " Stredos love nske basni cke ko ine pred l.'.. Stu rom", Slovenska rec. 60. 11 0. 5-6. 1995. pp. 264-28 1. 28 SLOVAKIA " Nitra" Almanacs in 1842). 18 Some previously known facts, also ascertained in the process of our study and analyzed by using sociolingui stic concepts, have made it poss ible to offer a ne w view of the origin and the sub seq uent development of the Slovak literary language. Thus, the lingui stic formation functionin g in Catholic literature, sec ul ar baroque poetry, admini strati ve-l ega l tex ts, popular poetry , etc. had all the propert ies of a literary lang uage, and may be called the "Old Slovak Literary language." As the lin gui stic material shows, it had started to take shape from the 1630 's on as a result of its developing di vergence from Literary Old Czech. Its epicentre was West Slovaki a. After the Battl e of Mohacs ( 1526), the capital of Hun gary and the archbishop's res idence were tran sferred to West Slovaki a, to Brati slava and Trnava respectively. Later on, South-West Slovakia 's role in cultural life became even more important, because a university with its ow n printing- house was opened there. At first, lingui stic development among Catholics and Luthera ns was identical. Texts were created by adherents of both confessions according to the " review mechani sm." 19 The common deve lopment of the Old Slovak literary language, however, was ruptured in the early l 600's, when ling ui stic diverge nces among Catholics and Lutheran s arose as a result of an aggressive Counter-Reformation. 18 K[onstantin] V. Li fanov, "Formy proniknovenija sredneslovackogo folk lornogo ko ine v ste ru avtorskoj poezii (konec XVIII v. - pervaja polovi na XIX v.)" , Wiener Slawistiches Jahrbuch, Bd. 44, 1998, pp. 99- 113. 19 It is a free tran slation of the Russ ian term " mechanizm peresceta" used by V. M. Zivov. Its essence concludes in the fact th at rather strong associated bonds between elements gi ven (l iterary) bookish character to a text and corres ponding elementts of people (d ialec tal ) speec h ex isted in th e minds of creators of tex ts. In th e case of adopti on of •'foreign " literary language, its elements contrasted to elemen ts of people speech and were initiall y bookish. Thu s, the opposition between adopted literary language and nati ve dialects was only in the fu nctional sphere. See, for examp le, V . M. Zivov, " Roi] russkogo ce rkov noslavianskogo v istoriji slavjanski ch literaturn yc h jazykov" , Aktual'nyje problemy sla vjansk ogo jazykoznanija (Moskva, 1988), pp. 4998. SLOVAKIA 29 The Old Slovak literary language continued to develop in a Catho lic environment. It went throu gh all the important stages, including a translation of the whole of the " Bible" ( 1750), th e first Slovak novel : the "Adventures and the Experiences of Young Rene" (1783) , by J.L. Bajza, and its codification by A. Bernolak. The Old Slovak literary language was studied at elementary and secondary school s in different parts of S lovakia, and even at two universities - in Trnava and Kosice.20 Slovak Catholics numbered 75 % of population when emperor Joseph II iss ued the Patent of Toleration ( 1781 ), and perceived Czech as a heretical language. In thi s connection there is no reason to assert that the literary language of S lovaks was Czech prior to Bernol ak 's codification. Slovak Lutherans yielded their positions and had to seek external support , and they found it in Czech reli gious books. As a result, they reverted to the norms of Literary Czech (more exactly, to norms of the " Kralice Bible"), but not in all genres, and di gloss ia 2 1 arose in their environment. In thi s situation Czech was perceived as the high , cultivated form of the native language , whereas Old Slovak literary lan g uage was perceived as " ordinary," and to be used only in administrative-legal texts and popular poetry . Literary Czech and Old Slovak functioned in parallel in the Lutheran and Catholic environments respectively , and Catholi cs contrasted both literary languages, and gradually perceived that some features belonged not just to different functional spheres, but to different languages. As a result a new mechanism - conversion - arose in their environment. In practice it resembled the " review mechani sm", but differed substantially, because so me features were contrasted on the nati ve rather than on the functional level. Thus, Slovak Catholics began to perce ive spec ific features of their language on the leve l of 20 See Izidor Kotulic. " Bernolakovcina a predbernolakovska kulturna slovenc in a··, Pamatnica A ntona Berno/aka (Martin 1992), pp. 81, 88. 21 See Charles A. Ferguson, "Diglossia", Word, 15, 1959, no. 2, pp. 325-340 and Boris A. Uspenskij , Jazykovaia situacija Kijevskoj Rusi I jejo znacenije d!Ja istoriji russkogo literaturnogo jazyka (Moscow , 1983) , pp. 4-5. SLOVAKIA 30 concrete phoneti c and morphological units, and so me fea tures as belonging to diffe rent periods. Th e situati on amon g Cath o li cs and Lutherans re ma in ed stable until the l 830 's, when the Centra l Slovak folkl ore ko ine penetrated into the sphere of hi gh poetry of Lutheran authors, and made it possible to codify a new literary language. r.. Stur made a major specific contribution by essenti all y changing the phoneti c and morpho logical syste ms of the literary language , but the lex icon fro m th e period of the Old Slovak literary language was maintained. Some features had reached the stage of con versati on (Catho lics perceived them as S lovak as opposed to Czech), and some were at the stage of rev iew (they were regarded as "booki sh/literary" (nati ve Czec h) or as ordin ary (native Slovak). The "ordinary" features codified by Stur were not accepted by Catholi cs, and they de manded that they be replaced by "booki sh" features, as was implemented in the codification of Hattala and Hodza ( 1852). SOURCES Catholic Literature P. Bajan, Sermones, 1760- 1771 (manuscript). Kamaldulska biblia, 1756-1759 (manu script). A. Macsay, Panes primatiarum aneb Chleby prwotjn (Trn ava , 171 8). D . Ma kos, Sermones, 1752- 1774 (manuscript). N. Ol ah, Ordo et ritus sanctae metropolitane ecc/esic Strigonien- sis, quibus parochi et a/ii animarum pastores in ecc/esiis suis uti debent. Viennae Austriae in aedibus Collegii caesarei, Societatis Jezu. Anno M.D.L.X. (manuscript). B. Smrtnik, Kunsst dobre umriti (Trnava, 1697). G. Vrabel, Sermones, 1766 (manuscript). SLOVAKIA 31 Secular Baroque Poetry " Basne Petra Benickeho", Archiv starych cesko-s/oven skych /istfn , pfsomnostf a dejepisnych povodfn pre dejepis a literattiru Slovakov, Diel II. - Svazok I. (Tun::. sv . Martin, 1873), pp. 5-47. H. Gavlo vic, Wala sk a sskola mrawuw stodola (manuscript); Gerald J. Sabo, ed., Hugo/in 's Gavlo vic's Valaska skola (Co lumbus, Ohio, 1988). Stefan F Selecky, Obraz panye krasneg perem malowany, ktera maw Trnawe swoge prebiwany (manu script); Stefan F Selecky, "Obraz pani krasnej , perem malovany, ktera ma v Trnave svoje prebyvanf", Anto/6gia starsej slovenskej literattiry (Brati slava, 1981 ), pp. 522-530. Administrative-Legal Texts Inquisitiones, Skalica, 1616-1730 (manuscript). Darina Lehotska & Jozef Orlovsky , Najstarsia jelsavska mestska kniha 1566- 1710 (Martin , 1976). Listy Sta/ice IO kopijnfkov, Spis, XVII-XVIII storocie (manu- script). Mar ia Majtanova & Mil an Majtan, Krupin ski prfsne pravc (Bratislava, 1979). Missiles, Banska Stiavnica, XYI.-XYII. storocie (manu script). Obecna kniha obce Dojc, 1622-1836 (manu script). Panstvo Pruske, XVII.-XYIII. storocie (manuscript). Pfsomnosti Sarisskej a Zemplfnskej iupy, XYII.-XYIII. storocie (manuscript). Protocol/um mais mesta Ruiomberka, XYI.-XYII. storoc ie (ma- nuscript). Jozef Stoic, "Jazyk levocskych slovenskyc h prfsah zo XYI.-XIX. storocia", Jazyko vedny sbornfk, 5, l 951, pp. 197-247. Popular Poetry and Folksongs J. Csaplovics, Slowenske Wersse, (Pest, l 822). J. Jamrich ml. , Wselygake Rozlycne Rozprawky k zabawenf 32 SLOVAKIA zepsane, 1832- 1833 (manu script) Jan Koll ar, Narodnie spievanky, zvazok I, (Bratislava, 1953). Jan Misianik , Knii ka ry tmovni (Bratislava, 1952) . Samlungen, 18 17 (manu script). Spevnfk D. Boczka, 1830-183 1 (manu script). Lasz lo Sziklay, " Poznamky k Csokonaiho popularite v slove nskej literature," Sbornfk Filozofickej fak ulty Uni verzity Komen skeho. Philologica, 16, 1964, pp. 12 1-1 3 1. Pave l Josef Safarfk, Jan Kollar, Pjsne swetske lidu slawenskeho w Uhrach, swazek 2 (Pest, 1827). Jozef Skultety, " Literarno-hi storicke drobnost i", Slovenske pohl'ady, 17, 1897, pp. 125- 128. Zbornfk J. Bruka, 1794 (manuscript). Z bornfk M. M. Kriia na, 1839 (manuscript). Zbornfk D . Kubfka, 179 1 (manu sc ript). Zbornfk J. L any, koni ec XVIII . storocia (manu script).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Origin and Development of the Slovak Literary Language Description An account of the resource Konstantin V. Lifanov Slovakia, Vol. 38 (No. 70-71), 2005 pp. 7-32 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Lifanov, Konstantin Vasilʹevich Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2005 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/4420b4453e192d09d2d212a901402912.pdf afcd80dcea279c3e678c67cd55f6063e PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 121 Separate Paths: Czech and Slovak Foreign Policies Since 1993 James W. Peterson Introduction Foll owing the 1993 break-up of Czechos lovaki a into the Czech Re public and Slovak ia, the two states needed to attend to chall enging fo re ign po li cy iss ues. Wh ile there were important d iffe rences in the situations of the two states, the broad chall enges th at awaited them were s imil ar. In ge nera l, th eir res ponses to those chall enges put the two co untri es on se parate path s th roug ho ut much of the 1990s. It may be th at the iss ues th at led to the brea k-up o f C zechos lo vakia proved too much to overco me in the earl y years after the split. However, by th e earl y twenty-fi rst ce ntury, the ir separate path s moved closer together and stra ightened out in such a way th at they become parallel. The initi al di ffe rences in the new geopo litica l positi ons of the two states were pro nounced. Whil e th e o ld Czechos lovak state had often served as a long, bridge- like link betwee n East and West, the two new co untri es leaned in di ffe rent direction s. Slovak leaders initi all y and instincti ve ly thought about ties to eastern countri es, as well as to th e Yisegrad organizati o n, in whi ch its future pros pec ts were linked to those o f the Czec h Re public, Po land, and Hun gary. By contra st, the Czec h Re public leadership looked westward s to th e o utstretched, embrac ing arms of we ll -es tabli shed European stru ctures . Th e S lova k path was more uncertain and waverin g th an was th e Czech, for Co ld War organi zati onal structures in the east had broken down. �122 SLOVAKIA In light of their contrasting geopolitical orientations, the two states responded differently to common challenges. First, they confronted common political challenges in different ways. While many of these political pressures were primarily domestic , they all had an impact on future foreign policy choices and potentialities. For examp le, both states sought to establish functioning political party systems that would be capab le of proposing consistent foreign policies. Both were under scrutiny from the outside wor ld on the issue of treatment of important minority groups within the country. Further, in each country cultivation of non-governmental organizations that cou ld extend the roots of foreign policy debates further into the civil society was an important goa l. Different strategies on democratization led the two nations on different political paths regarding foreign policy questions. A second common challenge for the Czechs and Slovaks emerged from the economic sector. Newly elected leaders immediately wrestled with the que stion of converting centrally-planned economies into the principles of the free market. Again , this issue was not exclusively domestic . Success in competing for outside loans was contingent on progress made in privatization of enterprises, in release from fixed price controls, and in the estab li shment of principles of competitiveness . By the middl e of the 1990s, prospects for admission to the European Union (EU) were good. Leadership in the Czech Republic initially put a higher priority both on rapid conversion to capita li sm and on links to the EU than did the Slovaks. Thirdly, location of a dependable national security structure was a common problem in the two nations. The Warsaw Pact, a structure that had ostensibly ass ured the protection of the Czechoslovak state did not long survive the end of the Cold War. Give n Slovakia 's more eastern location , there was a long debate on the question of whe ther it was more desirabl e to preserve what was left of ties to its eastern neighbors or to res pond to overtures from the West. For the Czech Republic it was more obvious that participation in western institution s would be th e next step. The West European Union (WEU), �SLOVAKIA 123 North Atl anti c Treaty Orga ni zati on (NATO), and the EU's Common Fo re ig n a nd Sec urit y Po li cy (C FSP) we re co nte nd e rs fo r th a t linkage. It sho uld be no surpri se that the fo re ig n po li c ies of S lovaki a and the Czec h Re publi c di verged in the earl y years afte r separation but the n reco nnec ted. The ir commo n ex peri e nce in the Czec hos lovak state th ro ug h e ig ht decades bo re th e sa me contras tin g fea tures. C ultural simil ariti es drew the m together, but at times bitter po litica l and eco no mi c ex pe ri e nces pu shed the m apart. Once freed fro m the larger state. th ey made quite di ffe re nt cho ices fo r a number of years. However, reg io na l and s itu a ti o na l fo rces eventu a ll y pu shed th e ir path s in the world together aga in . Political Factors and Foreign Policy of the Two Nation-States The Czech Republic C reati o n of an effec ti ve, po li cy-ori e nted po litica l syste m was a chall enge in the earl y 1990 s. In the C zec h Republic there was initi a lly considera bl e co ntinuity in po liti ca l leadership afte r Janu ary 1993 . Vac lav Have l re ma in ed as Pres id e nt of the small e r state, whil e Vac lav Kl a us co ntinu ed o n as Prim e Mini ster. The do min ant po litica l party of Kl aus was still the C ivic Democratic Party (ODS), an organi zati o n th at had bee n bo rn o ut of the C ivic Forum so ac ti ve durin g the eve nts of 1989. In genera l, the Kl aus governm ent ( 1993-97 ) e nd o rsed a ll the steps co nn ec ted w ith th e re turn to E uro pe. Th e brea k-up of th e Czechos lovak state put th e Ukra ine and Ru ss ia furthe r away geographi ca ll y fro m the C zec h Republic . Thu s, the Czechs as earl y as 1994 jo ined the Partn ership fo r Peace (P4 P) and stressed c loser link s to Po land . 105 A n a na lys is of po liti ca l party pos iti o ns durin g e lec ti o ns in the 1990 s is very revea lin g in te rm s o f the iss ues and de bates that 0 ' ' See Thomas S. Szayna. ··The Czech Republic: A Small Contributor or a ' Free Rider·'l_-· in Andrew A . M ichta. ed .. A merica·s New A llies: Poland. Hungary. and the Czech Republic in NA TO (Sea tt le: Un i versity of Washingto n Press. 1999). pp. 11 2- 148 . �124 SLOVAKIA circulated throughout the Czech Republic. Political party leaders debated the merits of the move to the West but finally endorsed it. The 1998 elections are a useful example . The Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD) ended up technically in power, with Milos Zeman as Prime Minister, but the party needed to establish a "Gentlemen ' s Agreement" with the ODS in order to function as a government. For the CSSD there was less emphasis in the e lection campaign on hardheaded defen se of national interests and more of a focus on livin g standards and the rights of citizens within the country . This priority on domestic issues led the CSSD to endorse the idea of a referendum prior to entry into either the EU or NATO. There a lso was a humanitarian component to its view of Czech relations with the outside world. Such a focus led the CSSD to upgrade the importance of North-South relations and the related role of the UN. It concluded that Czechs should have a say whenever human ri ghts were jeopardized in any part of the world . While it endorsed EU membership, it thought of it in terms of stimulating the Czech economy. While it favored NATO entry , it expressed grave concerns about the future location of nuclear weapon s on Czech territory. During the I 998 election the ODS continued to give a " realpolitik" cast to its statements on foreign policy. National interests rather than humanitarian concerns were its top priority. NATO membership cou ld bring increased security for the nation as well as trade and technological benefits. The latter would promote development of the free market, a priority for Klaus since the early 1990s. National economic interests were of paramount importance, whi le crusades connected with globalization and human rights were to be carefu ll y examined. Increased Czech exports through membership in international organizations were the desired outcome. Thus, the party said less than did the CSSD about broader, western-based international organizations that could pull the Czech nation beyond the orbit of its national interests. 106 106 See Jakub Durr, Vo/by '98 (Brno: Pavel Saradin , 2000), pp. 84-97. �SLOVAKIA 125 Attention to th e views of the main political parties enriches understa ndin gs of the Czech point of view on the major foreign and security policy question s of the day. Czech voters in the 2002 elections confirmed the steady march toward s inclu sion in western institution s. Rejection of the ODS was based in part on the negative reaction to the "euroskeptic" views of Klau s on the matter of integration into the EU . Public support for EU membership was confirmed in the results of the June 2003 Referendum. EU support for Czech membership had been offered at the end of 2002. One of the continuing political challenges for the Czech Republic during the 1990s was the iss ue of minority rights, a matter that affected the country's relation ship with the outside world. The criteria for entering both NATO and the EU required a record of fairness toward key groups within the population . One major conflict was the relationship between Czechs and the Roma. A number of well-publicized incidents have raised questions about Czech attitudes and policies. For example, the erection of a wall by Czechs in Ustf nad Labem in 1999 became a foreign policy incident as well as a temporary setback to pursuit of EU membership. It was clear that the wall was intended to prevent Czechs from having to view the Rom a population as well as their Iife-sty le. Attention to such iss ues was necessary in li ght of integration into western institutions. Development of a robust political culture on foreign policy questions remained another challenge to the new state. One s ignificant new factor was the emerge nce of a visible public opinion on foreign policy questions. In genera l, the public was supportive of the new linkages with western institutions. However, there were some differences that were sign ifi ca nt. Public opinion polls over time demonstrated a stabl e level of support for EU entry . However, before 1999 support for entry into NATO was less impressive. 107 Events of 1999 made some difference. In that year the Czech Republic actually en- ' 07 See Caro l Skalnik Leff, The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State (Bou lder. Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), p 263. �SLOVAKIA 126 te red NATO , a nd th e Kosovo bo mbin g ca mpa ig n imm edi a te ly occurred . Suc h proximity to th e wars in the Ba lkan s made Czec hs somewhat more like ly to think pos iti ve ly abo ut NATO entry. Th ere were a lso uniqu e e ffo rts to build suppo rt within the po litical culture for certain fore ig n poli cy instituti o ns. One abiding problem was the negative set of Czec h attitudes abo ut the ro le of the military. C zec h resentme nt of the military is unde rstand abl e in li g ht o f the long years of the Sov ie t military prese nce afte r 1968 . Al so , after 1989 th e So vie t military left a catastro phe in many Czec h co mmu niti es. The barracks a nd o the r fac iliti es were in te rribl e co nditi o n, and individu a l Sovi et units had ta ke n anythin g of va lue fro m those locati o ns. One effort to build mo re pos iti ve Czec h attitudes abo ut the military too k pl ace in So uth Bo he mi a. A c iti ze n group ca ll ed S AS was fo rmed in 1997. The a im of the group was to de mon strate th at the Czec h military was a contributin g in strume nt in a de mocra ti c state rather than mere ly an in strume nt o f power. The SAS established link s to sc hoo ls and uni versities with the obj ec tive of c ultiv atin g a mo re pos iti ve attitude abo ut the C zech military. It set up co nfere nces and a lso co nsulted spec ia li sts from o the r nati o ns. In fac t, o ne res ult o f thi s acti vity was the creation of spec ial ti es betwee n the c ity o f Ces ky Kruml o v in the Czec h Republi c and Mi a mi Beac h in the State of Fl o rida, USA . A public e xcha nge of ideas abo ut the rol e of th e military could gene rate more in fo rmed C zech perspec ti ves about the va lue of a strong defense capability to cope w ith new threats. 108 Mo re positive attitudes about th e military wo uld fac ilitate integ rati o n into western o rgani zati o ns such as NATO. Slovakia The creati o n of po liti ca l stability was a greater c ha lle nge for Sl ovaki a than it was fo r the Czec h Republi c . In the C zec h case continuity of leadership from the 1989-93 period to th e post-1989 pe riod ' 08 J. Yondro us. .. Regionaln f dimenze ceskeho atl anti smu.'· M inisterst vo zahranicnfch vecf(2002). h ttp: //wwW .lllZ V.C/. March 2002 . �SLOVAKIA 127 contributed to stability. In the Slovak case continuity of leadership undermined rather than supported stability. Vladimfr Meciar had been the chosen Slovak leader in the two years immediately after the 1989 revolution. His new party, Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), did very well in the 1992 elections, and this enabled him again to become Prime Minister once Slovakia became an independent state in 1993 . He was reluctant to reform in any comprehensive way the centrally planned economy, and thus privatization was very slow. In addition, his government included " many of the old regime ' s cadres, resources, and xenophobic ideologies intact. " 109 Meciar fell from power in the spring of 1994, and a caretaker government under Jozef Moravcfk managed public affairs until the fall elections. Again, the voters returned a coalition government headed by Meciar and the HZDS to power, and this government lasted through the next elections in 1998. In this period Meciar basically put the brakes both on democratization and on the movement of the economic system towards free market principles. The political experiences of the first half decade of independence had major consequences for foreign policy, as Slovakia made very slow progress on the criteria that both NATO and the EU presented to it. During the I 998-2002 period , a coalition led by the Social Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU) took the leading role in government, after the public rebuffed Meciar for a third time. Mikulas Dzurinda as Prime Minister gradually moved Slovakia back onto the path towards western institutions. He emerged again as Prime Minister after the fall 2002 elections , and so the steady movement toward NATO and the EU remained unchanged. Meciar and the HZDS were still prominent and in fact received in 2002 both the largest share of the popular vote ( 19.5 %) and the highest number of seats in the I 50 seat legislature (36). His rhetoric on foreign policy was more muted in this campaign , but numerous warnings emanated from NATO and ,m Rudolf L. Tokes. " From Visegrad to Krakow: Cooperation, Competition , and Coexi stence in Central Europe," Problems of Communism 40( 1991 ), pp. 100-114. �SLOVAKIA 128 the EU leade rship a bo ut the imp licati o ns of a new governme nt in whic h the HZ DS pl ayed a ny rol e at a ll. In late Septe mber work began o n a coa liti o n th at would in c lude Dzu rinda's S DK U, the C hristi a n De mocrati c Uni o n (KDH), A lli a nce fo r ew C itize ns (A 0), and the Hungari an Coa liti o n (SMK). In earl y October thi s fo ur-party coa litio n fo rged an ag reeme nt abo ut executi ve pos iti o ns, and the new governme nt was in pl ace. A ll of these arra nge me nts were a imed to keep Sl ova ki a o n a stead y trac k in es tabli shin g its new, wes te rn o rgani zatio na l connectio ns in fore ig n poli cy. 11 0 Whil e the Czechs had been press ured by the o utside world o n the matte r of the Ro ma, Slovaks were c riti c ized fo r the ir treatment of the Hun garian mi no rity. Aga in , the Mec iar periods were suspec t in th is regard . Otto Ulc1 11 ex pl a in s thi s situ ati o n by notin g th at afte r 1968 Slova ks were not pro min e nt in the di ss ide nt moveme nt th at e mphasized hum a n ri ghts. Part of the pro bl e m was a lso the lack of ex perie nce of S lova ks in the Czechoslovak dipl o mati c corps. The leaders may have not understood full y the way in whi ch Slova ki a's domesti c record o n mino rity re lati o ns, the e nviro nme nt , a nd autho ritari ani sm in ge ne ra l influe nced fo re ign percepti o ns as we ll as fo re ig n po li cy objecti ve . 11 2 In another respect, the Slovak governme nt d urin g th at peri od was quite ce ntra li st o n the matter o f th e ri g hts of reg io ns within the country. The re is so me iro ny in thi s, fo r th e HZDS had been very ant i-federa li st (a nti -ce ntra list) after its e merge nce in April 199 1. 11 3 In that ea rli er time, the ta rget had bee n the a ll eged centrali st reg ime in Prag ue, s ince the Czec hos lovak state was still intact. Ev ide nce of Mec iar 's centra li st po li c ies li es primaril y in hi s po licy towards the 110 RFE/RL ewsline. Part II. September 24. 2002; October 8, 2002. Archived at http://\\\\w.11°erl.org September. October. 2002. 111 Otto Ulc. " The Bumpy Road ofCzechoslovaki a·s Velvet Revolution ," Problems of Communism 41 ( 1992). pp. 19-3 3 111 See Adrian Hyde Price. The International Politics of East Central Europe (New York: M anchester Uni versity Press, 1996), p. 28. 11 3 Ulc,"The Bumpy Road of Czechoslovakia ' s Ve l vet Revoluti on ." p. 29. �SLOVAKIA 129 eastern part of Slovakia. In the mid- I 990s that region became interested in participating in a large Carpathian Euroregion. Other players in the Euroregion wo uld include Romania , Hungary , Poland , and Ukraine. However, the Slovak Ministry of the Interior was quite critical of that orientation. In 1995 that Ministry abo li shed the Slovak Carpathian Regional Association that had co nsisted of a number of regional and local governments in eastern Slovakia. As a result, in 1996 the Slovak representatives in the Euroregion resigned and Slovakia cancel led its participation. Meciar took these actions because of a double suspicion. First, he was suspic ious that the eastern Slovak metropolis of Kosice would lead eastern Slovakia to develop its own independent foreign policy . Second, he feared that Hungary would use the Euroregion to exp loit the anger of the Slovak Hungarian minority . 114 Such att itudes and policies of the top leadership would not mesh well with the EU and its priority on the rights of regions within countries. However, after the 1998 elections the Slovak leadership reflected more sensitivity toward the political culture. For exam ple, Slovaks were aware after 1998 of the need to incorporate domestic non-governmenta l gro ups (NGO 's) into the increasingly public discussion of foreign policy . Thi s was particularly the case in the efforts to ga in admiss ion to NATO. Younger persons were a special target of efforts at political soc ialization . Teachers in middle schools organized essay contests about the sig nific ance of NATO . Organized debates about NATO themes took pl ace in both middle and upper schools. Further, the government set up twe lve information centers that were aimed at youn ger persons. According to one observer, regional projects abo ut NATO by 2002 had reached 120,000 students. Similar discuss ions were aimed at women's groups . For example, profess ional women in Bratislava as we ll as the Union of Women of S lovakia engaged in discussions on the mea nin g and significance of NATO . The mass "" See A lexander Duleba, 'The Slovak-Ukraini an-Russian Security Tri angle." in M argarita M. Balmaceda, ed ., On the Edge: Ukrainian-Central European-Russian Security Triangle (Budapest: Central European Univers ity, 2000), pp. I 06- I 09. �SLOVAKIA 130 medi a also pl ayed a ro le in thi s process. T wo major national telev ision projects were aimed at promoting di sc uss ion of NATO the mes. Furthe r, additi o na l in fo rm ati on proj ec ts we re bea med at the populati on through thi rty loca l te lev ision stati ons. The re was even an effort to pull ex pe rts and speciali sts into the di scuss ion. 115 The hope was th at these gro up s wo uld communicate pos iti ve attitudes abo ut NATO to the ir peers a nd e ve n in the ir publicat ions. S imil arl y, after the Nice EU Summit at the e nd of 2000 , Slo vaki a establi shed the Nation al Conve nti on. Its mi ssion e ntail ed stimul ati on of a nati o nal di scuss ion on the E U and Slovak nati o nal inte rests. The di scuss ion was to be in c lu s ive in which po liti ca l party me mbe rs, acade mi cs, c hurc hes , interest gro ups, non- governme nta l orga ni zati o ns, trade union s, muni cipalities, and reg ions all pl ayed a ro le. 11 6 Comparison Both co untries confronted major po litica l chall e nges th at affected fore ign po licy prospects. In both cases there was outside scrutin y and suspi c io n througho ut the first decade abo ut the way in whi c h their governme nts treated key minority gro ups. C riteri a fo r admi ssion to wes te rn orga ni zati ons required prog ress in thi s area. Both countri es a lso ex pe ri e nced maj or c ha nges in governme nt. In the Czech case such cha nges d id not affect very much the steady process of integration w ith the West. Slovak governme ntal changes had more of an impact. In addition , the continuin g presence of Vl adimfr Meciar and the HZDS had the net effect of postponin g Slovaki a's integrati on with western institution s until the late 1990s. Finally , cultivation of positive attitudes within the po liti ca l c ulture became a priority once the leadership made the dec ision to look in a westward direction . In th e Czec h case thi s spotli ght on po liti ca l culture was a 115 • Organ izacie a instituc ie, ktorym bola udelena Strieborn a plaketa M inisterstva zahranicnych vecf Slovenskej republ iky di\a 20. juna 2002," M inisterst vo zah ranicnych vecf(2002). http://www.mzv .sk Oc tober 2002. 116 " Narodny ko nvent o Evropskej buducnosti Slovenska," Ministerst vo zahranicnych vecf (2002). http://www.mzv.sk October 2002. �SLOVAKIA 131 constant theme throughout the decade, but in the Slovak case it was only characteristic of the second half of the decade. Economic Factors and Foreign Policy of the Two Nation-States The Czech Republic In the years following th e 1989 revo lution , the Klau s government made eco nomi c restructurin g in Czechoslovakia a major priority. Privati zation and the use of vouchers placed formerly state-controlled industries in private hand s. Job sec urity yie lded to the greater uncertainty connected with the free market. It became more like ly that industries would ri se and fa ll on the ir own merits, while artifi cial control of prices was no longer the norm. 11 7 Thus, major economic changes had deve loped their own momentum at the time the Czechs separated from Slovakia, and they bore the potenti al to have a major impact on foreign policy. For exampl e, ga inin g admission to the EU became a top priority as a result of the new geographic and eco nomi c developments. Very soon Brusse ls presented to the eastern countries its Iist of thirty-one chapters in the "acqui s communautaire" process. Czech leaders began to meet regularl y with EU bureaucrats in order to demonstrate progress toward s meeting the criteria of eac h of the chapters. Usually twice a year the EU represe ntatives came to the Czech Republic to inspect progress made and to iss ue judgments about the relative rank of the nation on the li st of EU prospects from that region. By the end of the 1990s, the Czech Republic ranked near the top of the prospec ti ve li st of new members, and membership appeared like ly by 2004. In fac t, in October of 2002 the EU Commission announced that the Czech Republic would be one of the ten nation s admitted in 2004. 11 8 Czech involvement in the EU 's PHARE and ERBD investment projects was of particular significance. Invo lve ment in the wider EU market would 117 See Bernard Wheaton and Zdenek Ka van , The Velvet Revolution: Czechoslo- vakia 1988- /99 1 (Boulder. Colorado: Westvi ew Press, 1992) , pp. 139-143. 118 Sueddeutsche Zeitung, October 9, 2002. Arch i ved at: http://sueddeutsche .de October 2002. �132 SLOVAKIA multipl y the steps taken by the Czech governme nt in co nvers ion to capitali sm and th ereby open up additional new in vestment opportunities in othe r nations. At the same time , eve ntua l EU membership woul d lead to add ition al western investments, and important ones had come about already in the 1990s. For example , in 1994 th e German automobil e company Volkswagen bought majo rity co ntrol of the o ld Czech mega-compan y Skoda . Whil e the agree ment did guarantee the Germans majority control , it also provided the Czechs with a veto over future policy dec ision s. 11 9 Similarly, Air France took over the Prague Airport Ruzyne and made it into a modern facility. Early in the twenty-first century the A merica n company Motorola began construction of a fac tory in Moravia in the area of the Beskydy Mountains. Much news accompanied the buy -out of severa l well known breweries, including Pil sner Urque ll , by South Africa n enterprises. Certainly , one by- product of this western indu stri a l and financial in vo lvement would be the rapid infusion of western tec hniques and know-how in manag ing an economy on capitali st princi pl es. A ll of thi s would acce lerate the type of domestic economic restructuring that would more qui ck ly meet EU criteria. The outreach of the changing Czech economy was not confined exclusively to its European nei ghborhood. For instance, in the mid l 990s the Czech Re publi c became a member of UNESCO. In th at capac ity it took a particular interest in the plight of the ravaged nations that had e merged from the old Yugoslavia. This ac ti vity led to membership as well in the Organi zat ion for Economic Cooperati on and Developme nt (OECD ). In fact , the Czechs were the first from the Central E uropean region to ga in membership in th at organi zation. Linkages between the Czech Republic and the Internati onal Monetary Fund (IMF) e nh anced their reputation for reliabi lity. In A ugus t 1994, the natio n was the first post-communist state to pay off its 11 9 Leff. The Czech and Slo vak Republics: Nation Vers us State. p. 263. �SLOVAKIA 133 initial IMF loan . 120 Again, involvement with the larger universe of western capitalist economies outside the immediate geographic region paid dividends in terms of domestic economic change. In sum, the revolution of 1989, combined with the loss of Slovakia in 1993, generated a rapid rate of economic change in the Czech Republic. Conversion to capitalist economic principles was inevitable after the 1989 events, but the process received a number of important stimuli. Interest in joining NATO and the drive for EU membership mandated that the nation meet specific criteria in terms of capitalist development. Investments by western firms outside the nation led to collaborative efforts in which Czech managers could more fully see the capitalist system in action. Involvement in the economic projects of a number of global organizations, primarily located in the West, expanded Czech horizon s in a positive way. All of thi s offered a powerful economic antidote to the much more restricted COMECON framework that was characteristic of the Cold War. Slovakia For a number of reasons , Slovakia looked east for economic links rather than west after the 1993 split. This had also been true after the 1989 revolution. Slovak leaders noted that their country was the only Yisegrad member that bordered all of the other three. Such a perception encouraged them to think about a potential Slovak role as the ideal country to be a bridge between East and West. The collapse of COMECON led the Slovaks to hope for a replacement in the form of special ties with Russia and Ukraine. The look eastward made Slovakia "more sensitive to developments in the CIS." 12 1 At the same time, EU import quotas were having a negative impact on certain Slovak industries such as a steel mill in Kosice, and that created some suspicion about the West. 122 120 Leff, The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State, p. 258. 12 1 Price, The International Politics of East Central Europe, p. 170. 122 Leff, The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State, p. 261. �134 SLOVAKIA One concrete manifestation of thi s economic orie ntatio n to the East was cultivation of a spec ial link to Ru ss ia. A key motive for this outreach was the pli g ht of the Slovak arms industry . At the time of the 1989 revolution , o ne hundred e leven of Czec hoslo va ki a ' s weapon s manufacturing pl a nts were in the Slovak region . As early as 1990, weapo ns sa les from those pl ants had declined from 1988 leve ls from eight billio n dollars to one billion . This situ ation prompted Meciar to trave l to Moscow in 1991 in order to get defe nse co ntracts to make up some of thi s loss. 123 In fact , the sub sequent recess io n became part of the reason that Slovak leaders sought separation from the Czechs. Further, the Slovak military hoped that Ru ss ia might give Slovakia li ce nses to se ll military ha rdw are to third world countries. 12~ Eventu a ll y, Pres ident Bo ri s Yeltsin of Ru ss ia visited Slovaki a in Aug ust 1993, and one res ult was the sig nin g of a bilatera l state treaty. In add iti o n, the two states s ig ned a fi ve-yea r military cooperation agree me nt. The latter would po te nti a ll y assist Slovakia economically, for it would he lp rev ive its arm s industry . One fea ture of the agree me nt was the provis io n that Ru ss ia would suppl y spare parts for th e Slovak milita ry. 125 Other Slovak goa ls in c lud ed development of a Slovak role in tran sporting Ru ss ian natural gas to Western Europe. In part, Mec iar hoped that the flirtation with Ru ss ia mi g ht increase Slovakia ' s econo mi c importance to th e West a nd attract in vestme nts from that direction as well. 126 Cultivation of ties to Ukrai ne a lso became part of thi s new economi c strategy. Early afte r th e revolution Meciar soug ht to build a new railway from Brati slava to Ukraine by utili zing the for mer Soviet ra il network. 127 By the middl e 1990s Slovak leaders began to think in broader terms. Perh aps Ukra ine could act as well as the gate- 12 .1 See Andrew A. Michta. East Central Europe after the Warsaw Pact: Security Dilemmas in the 1990s (New York: Greenwood Press. 1992 ). p. 107. 12 "' Duleba, ·'The Slovak-Ukrainian-Ru ssian Security Tri angle: · p. 20. 125 Price, The International Politics o f East Central Europe. p. 170. 126 Duleba, ''The Slovak-Ukrainian-Ru ssian Security Triangle." pp. 85-8 6. 127 Price. The International Politics of East Central Europe. p. 170. �SLOVAKIA 135 way to the Ru ss ian market. 128 For many Slovaks, Ukraine was in a sense still Ru ss ia, and thu s economic policies toward s the two we re intertw ined. In spite of the eastward look in economic policy, western organi zation s were not totall y ignored. For example, in June 1993 Sl ovaki a was accepted into the Council of Europe. Then in June 1995 , th e M ec iar government submitted a membership appli cati on to the EU . Reliance on in ves tments from western countries rein forced thi s economic policy dimension. K ey economic in vestors in the 1990s included, in rank order , Germ any, A ustri a, and th e Czech Repu bli c. 129 Despite Slovaki a's approach to the East, the W est was in many ways more helpful. Seri ous di sc uss ions w ith the EU rea ll y began in 1997 w ith th e Lu xembourg Summit. A t th at meeting the EU placed Slovaki a in a second ti er of si x nati ons, and so it looked as if Sl ovaki a wo uld have to wa it longer then its Czech co unterpart, w ho ended up in the first ti er of si x. Contacts w ith the EU acce lerated after the defea t of the M ec iar government in 1998. A multilateral screening process by the EU took pl ace between April 1998 and February 1999, and thi s gave way to more signifi ca nt bil ateral screenin g procedu res between M arch of 1999 and Febru ary of 2000. 130 In the 2000-2002 period Slovaki a worked its way th rough most of the thirty-one chapters of th e EU 's aqui s co mmunautaire. For exa mpl e, di sc uss ions about Chapter Four ce ntered on future poss ibilities that fore igners could control Sl ovak land and corresponding poss ibilities fo r Slovak s to purchase land w ithin th e EU. Fo ll ow in g the 1998 elec ti ons th e chances of mee tin g the goa ls of Ch apter Si x we re enhanced, as Slovaki a moved more firml y in the direc ti on of erec tin g a market economy. Chapter Seven on agri cultu re was a criti ca l one for Slovak ia as it was for most of the other nati ons in the region. Sl ovak s 12 " 129 1.'<, Du leba. ··The Slovak-Ukrainian-Russian Security Triangle." p. 97 . Leff. The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State. p. 262. '·Fazy proces u rozs irova ni a EU ," M inisterstvo za hra11ic11yc h vecf (2002) . hllp ://www. 1111. v.,k Oc tober 2002. �SLOVAKIA 136 soug ht promises of an ad mini stra ti ve structure that wou ld e nsure protect ion of the ir agric ultural sys tem . The politica l tran s iti on from the Mec iar governm e nt to th at of Dzurinda made sa ti sfac tion of Chapte r Thirteen more poss ibl e. Th at c hapter in vo lved worker 's ri g hts, ge nde r equ a lity, racia l justi ce, a nd other vita l categori es. Sl ovak ia rece ived spec ia l in stru c tion s within th e framework of Chapter Fifteen. Th e EU requ es ted th a t Slo va ki a acce lera te pri vati za ti o n of ba nk s as we ll as na tural reso urce mo nopoli es. Further, it was ex pected th at Slovakia wo uld build up small and medium s ized firm s w hil e e nco urag in g add iti o na l fo re ig n in vestme nt. 13 1 Comparison The Czec h Republic and Slo vaki a did move on separate paths in terms of the economi c dime nsion of fo re ign policy for a large part of the first decade after separation . In fac t, so me of their sharpe r differences e merged in the fo ur years after the 1989 revo luti on prior to the 1993 breakup. In the post- 1993 atmosphere the Czechs quickl y latched on to western organi zati ons in order to map out their future. S lovaki a, with its differe nt geographi c position and greater nostalgia for the lost economic links to the form er Soviet Union , c ultivated the Ukra ine and Russ ia as part of a ge nera l orientation to the east. Both di sappointme nt with the East and th e ex pe rien ce of th e 1998 elections brought the Slovak path much c loser to that of the Czechs . One sy mbo l of thi s shift was the progress made by both states in th e 1998-2002 pe riod towa rd me mbership in the EU . By September of 2002 the Czech Re public had c losed twe nty-fi ve of the thirty most s ignifi cant c hapters th at led to EU me mbership. Surprising ly, Slovaki a had closed twe nty-seven. Slo vakia 's progress had bee n very rapid, for the Czechs had ac tu all y closed eightee n of the chapters before Slovakia had . An important resu lt was th at Sl ova kia moved 131 " Ka ndid atske krajiny a ic h ak tu alny stav negoc iac if," Ministe,:~tvo w hranicnj ch vecf (2002). http ://www.111zv.~k Jul y 30. 2002. �SLOVAKIA 137 from the second ti er of six pote nti al EU members to the first ti er of ten between 1997 and the autumn of 2002. T he re port of the EU Commiss ion on October 9, 2002, bas ica ll y treated both countri es as if they were at simil ar leve ls of pre paredness for EU entry in earl y 2004. 132 Both co untries ge nera ll y rece ived pos iti ve reports and were firml y in the group o f ten nati ons to be admitted at the sa me time in 2004. National Security Factors and the Foreign Policy of the Two States The Czech Republic Separati on fro m S lovak ia led to an immed iate series of ste ps aimed at underpinnin g the natio nal sec urity of the new, smaller Czech state. T hroughout th e first decade after the separati on, the sec urity spotli ght shi fted from an emph as is on the Wes tern European Unio n (W EU), to the ca mpaign fo r NATO me mbership , and later to cons iderat ion of th e ro le of th e Co mmon Fore ign and Sec urity Po li cy (CFS P) of th e EU. 133 ln additi o n, Czec hs bega n to in vo lve themse lves more full y in international organi zati ons such as the UN, OSCE , and Y isegrad . T hu s th e nati o na l sec urity age nd a was crowded. Czech disc uss ions abo ut defense po licy in the earl y 1990s centered in part on the W EU , an organi zati on that had e merged in 1948 with the Brusse ls Treaty. On the o ne hand , EU pl anners at the begi nning of the 1990s envisioned the WEU in a ce ntra l ro le in ass istin g Europe to take responsibility fo r its ow n sec urity. On the other hand , others hoped that the WEU could he lp create mo re conse nsus with NATO as well as support for NATO mi ss ions. 134 rn RFE/RL News line. Part II. October 10. 2002. Archived at: h1tp ://www.rferl.org October 2002. rn See Dav id S. Mason , Revolution and Transition in East Central Europe. Second Edi tion (Bou lder, Colorado : Westview Press, 1996), pp. 95-98. " 4 K arel Pezl, " Ceska repub li ka a zapadoevropske unie: bezpecnostnf aspek ty, " Mezinarodnf Politika 18( 1994). pp. 25-26. �138 SLOVAKIA By the late 1990s discu ss ions within the Czech Re public about admission to NATO overshadowed conversations about the fading WEU. Admission to NATO in 1999 brought with it a whole set of new obligations. There was a need to prepare defense legislation that would move the Czech defense structure toward the level of NATO standard s. New military pe rso nnel requirements mandated that the Czech defense sector prepare courses for a ll ranks about the changing role of the military. Training in the use of radar was also upgraded. Further, the Czech Republic would need to build a crisis command center that would facilitate the rapid sharing of information between NATO and the Czech Republic. It would also be necessary for the Czechs to build a sys tem of command and control that paralleled the organizations in other NATO countries. 135 Immediately after expansion to include three new members in 1999, NATO had an opportunity to utilize these new national resources during the Kosovo bombing campaign . One lesson of that campaign was increased awareness of th e asymmetry of capabilities within the alliance. 136 America provided eighty per cent of the bombs dropped on Kosovo in the spring of 1999 as well as ninety per cent of the weapons. U. S. airplanes were the only ones that could operate in all weather. Lowered European defen se budgets in the 1990s resulted in a situation in which all European NATO members contributed only two-thirds of the fundin g that the United States did to defen se. The Czech Republic responded to this imbalance by developing a blueprint for change in 2001. That plan called for a rapid upgrade in mane uverability of units, logistical strength, placement of weaponry and pe rsonnel , ability to resist over a lon g period, and information command and control. Further, the Ministry of Defense drew up a li st of four principles that would guide Czech participation rn Antonin Sverak . ··vnej sf a vnitfnf aspekty zac lenovanf resortu obrany CR do NATO," Mezimfrodnf Vztahy 2( 1999). pp. 13-3 1. 136 See Otto Pick, ·· NATO, evropska obrana a poucenf K osova." CR po vstupu do NATO. Uvahy a problemy (Praha: Ceska Atlanticka Komise UMY. 2000), pp. 2532. �SLOVAKIA In 139 NATO. Th ey inc luded co ntinu ed in vo lvement of the two North American powers in the defe nse of Europe, reliance on NATO as the main guarantor of European security , subordination of the CFSP of the EU within the framework of NATO , a nd guara nteed access to NATO capabi lities for all EU defense and sec urity mi ss ion s. 137 Recog nition of the important Czech role in NATO was evident in the dec ision to hold the conference of Nove mber 2002 in Prague. At that meeting seve n additional nati ons joined the military alliance. Finally, durin g th e war in Iraq in 2003, th e Czechs sent an anti-biolog ical , chemical , and nuclear weapon s unit as well as a fi eld hospital. By the early 1990s, the EU began to outline plans for its own defe nse structure, one that would be independent of the North Atlantic nation s th at had for so lon g domin ated NATO. These plans centered on the creation in 1990 of th e Common Forei gn and Security (CFS P) of the EU . In 1993 the Treaty of Europe called for the addition to the CFSP of pe rm ane nt officials from the EU Council Secretariat as well as of fiftee n diplomats from each Fore ign Ministry. 138 In early 2001 the Czech Foreign Mini ster made a persuasive case for the natural harmony between the broad-rang ing objectives of the CFSP and the specific, national inte rests of the Czec h Republic. 139 For him the current spirit of cooperation in Europe was a needed antidote to the suffer in g of the Czechoslovak people during the twe nti e th century. Throu gh the CFSP, the Czech Re public would ga in both assistance in its multi-pronged process of development and also the opportunity to co ntribute to regional probl e m so lvin g. He did not e nvision participation in European and Atlantic structures as a threat to Czech national inte rests. In particul ar, the Dece mber 2000 Nic e Summit ge nerated orga ni zati o na l c han ges in EU institution s 117 Jaromfr Novotny, "' DCI (Defense Capabiliti es Initiative) a Cesk,\ Republika." Mini sterstvo zahranicnfch vecf (2002). http://www.1111v.u March 2002 . 1" See Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler. The European Un ion as a Global Actor (L ondon: Routledge. 1999). pp. 169- 196. iw -''Jan K avan. ·'Ceska zahrani cnf politika na prahu 2 1. stoletf."' Mez inarodnf Politikil 25(200 I ). pp. 4-5. �140 SLOVAKIA that would continue to break down the artificial barriers that divided Europe during the Cold War. Growin g European military stren gth would s imultaneou sly contribute to an increase in Czech capabi lities. 140 Slovakia In spite of the fact that so much of the defense industry had been located in the Slovak areas during the Co ld War and into the immediate post-1989 revolution period, the leadership ex peri ence of Slovaks on defen se matters had been re lative ly slim . For instance, in I 99 1 Slovak so ldiers constituted 34.7 % of the federa l Czechoslovak army. However, the representation of Slovak manage rs within the Ministry of Defense over several years ranged from on ly 5 to 23 %. 141 In the early years after separation , Slovaks were primarily focused on reestabli shing or maintaining ties with the East. Previously mentioned political ties to Ru ss ia, Ukraine, and Yi segrad see med to offer them a non-western prescription for protecting national sec urity. The Slovaks rea ll y only went through the motion s of taking part in so me western sec urity structures. For example, like th e Czech Republic , Slovakia became an Assoc iate Partner in the WEU and reg ul arl y attended its meetings. Although Associate Members he ld no voting power within the organization , they did have the ri ght to plan and execute military operations. 142 Contac ts between Slovakia and NATO were minimal and bas ically centered on only a few reciprocal visits by key personnel during the three years before Meciar fel l from grace. The most impor- 140 Pavel Teli cka, " Aktualni stav jednani o pristoupeni CR k EU ," M ezimirodnf Politika 25(200 I ). 14 1 Michta, East Central Europe after the Warsaw Pact: Security Dilemmas in the 1990s, p. I 10. 142 See Philip H. Gordon, ·The Western European Union and NATO 's ' Europeanisation ," in Philip H. Gordon, ed., NATO 's Transformation : The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance (L ondon : Row man & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. , I 997), p. 26 1. �SLOVAKIA 141 tant visit by a top NATO figure to Slovakia was the 1996 trip of Secretary-General Javier Solana . The most important Slovak trip was that by President Kovac to Brussels in 1996 to meet with top NATO personnel. After the 1998 elections and the establishment of a new government under Mikulas Dzurinda, the pace of contacts picked up. In early 2002, Slovakia hosted visits by the unified NATO European commander General Dieter Stockman ; by General Joseph Ralston, the commander of NATO forces in Europe; and by Deputy NATO Minister Nicholas Burns. In turn, Slovak leaders who made their way to NATO Headquarters included incoming Prime Minister Dzurinda in 1998 and President Schuster in 1999 and again in 2002. 143 Another key component of the post- I 998 , systematic Slovak move toward s NATO involved the Membership Action Plan (MAP) Process. In early 1999 Slovakia presented a five-point plan that included a strategy for political/economic issues, defense/military question s, resources/capabilities, security challenges, and legal matters. In April of 1999, NATO accepted that MAP and the Slovak government followed suit in June of the same year. The National Program for the process of NATO entry was finalized in April of 2000. 144 Finalization of the MAP process led to many meetings over the next few years. Additional activity after 1998 centered on galvanizing public support for entry into the military alliance. Slovakia held a grants competition to enable NGO' s to raise public awareness of the significance of NATO entry. Support for entry came officially from a total of seventy-five Roma organizations. One result of all thi s activity was a rel atively high level of public support for joining the organization . Between the fall of 200 I and the spring of 2002 , support reflected in public opinion poll s rose from 52.2 % to 60.7 %, although it 143 " M edznfky spoluprace SR a NATO," Ministerstvo zahranicnych vec f (2002). http ://www.rnzv.sk October 2002. 144 " Chrono logicky prehl'ad PREN AME," Ministerstvo zahranicnych vecf(2002). http ://www.mzv.,k October 2002. �142 SLOVAKIA declined a bit a few month s later. 145 All of this attention to visits, organizational matters, and public opinion enabled Slovakia to make up for its lack of attention an d interest in NATO during the midI 990s. In addition , during the latter part of the 1990s, Slovakia took part in severa l important peacekeeping missions under NATO leadership. This involvement demonstrated that the nation would possess the level of commitment required of new NATO members. After completion of the Dayton Accord on Bosnia in 1995, Slovakia se nt some military personnel and equipment as part of SFOR to the area of operations. At the end of 1997, it sent three Army engineers and five army specialists in the field of civil-military cooperation. In the fall of 2002 Slovakia made its first Air Force contribution to a NATO mis sion. The capabilities it sent included a helicopte r unit with two helicopte rs and twenty-one assoc iated personnel. Slovakia promised to keep that contingent in Bosnia for the next six months. Involveme nt in KFOR after the Kosovo bombin g campaign in late 1999 was even more extensive. The initial commitment included forty Army engineers , a nd di spatch of an additional four persons at the command level one year later. A major upgrade occurred in early 2002 with the creation of a five hundred person Czech-Slovak rapid reaction battalion . The Slovak role in that force included twenty per cent of the overall membership, and the vast majority of those were doctors, conductors, mechanics, and logi stics specialists. The vital mi ss ions of that battalion centered on sec uring the Serb-Kosovo border, monitoring a range of activities, assuring stable conditions for the return of refugees, policing the civil serv ice, and protecting the Serb minority. 146 Thi s particular operation would provide man y lessons that would assist Slovakia in making important contributions as a full NATO member. Finally , in the sprin g of 2003 , Slovakia dispat145 " Chronologicky prehl'ad PREN AME," Ministerstvo zahranicnych veer (2002). http ://www.mzY.sk October 2002 . 146 " Ucast' SR v operaciach na podporu mieru pod vedenfm NATO," Ministerstvo zahranicnych vecf(2002). h11p ://www.111zv.sk October 2002. �SLOVAKIA 143 ched military personnel to the Pers ian Gulf durin g the co ntro versial war in Iraq. Comparisons Czech pursuit of national sec urity followed a unidirect io nal path during the first decade a fte r se parati o n from Slovakia. Its leade rs thou ght proacti ve ly in eac h part of the decade about a co ntributin g role in the maj or defe nse opti ons ava il ab le at the time. This mea nt that much of the di sc uss ion foc used on activity within the framework of W EU in the first years after the breakup . Once NATO ad mi ss ion became a real possibility , the Czec hs set the ir eyes on th at orga ni zation . F in all y, as EU membership approac hed early in the new century, more of th e di sc uss ion centered o n the CFSP, a progra m that offered a European sec urity cho ice th at was inde pe nde nt of Ameri can leade rship. In the Slovak case the emp hasis on re-stoking ti es with Ukraine and Ru ss ia at first prec luded seri ous discussion about western sec urity o rga ni zati o nal structures . Once the 1998 e lect ions offered the chance for a new policy, Slovak ia ' s outreach to the West in the defe nse area mainl y took the for m of a se ri ous effort to jo in NA TO. Achi eve me nt of that goa l at the e nd of 2002 e nab led Slovakia to adopt the multi -pron ged , western-oriented strategy utili zed by the Czechs fo r an e ntire decade. Conclusion The re is remark ab le cons iste ncy across the ra nge of va ri abl es that, for a time , divided the two nations. Those vari ables inc lude politi cs, economi cs, and nati o nal sec urity. It is clear th at the political va ri abl es were the driving force be hind the othe r two. Elec ti o n outcomes in the Czech Re public a nd Slovakia were quite different between 1992 and 1998. Those results acco unt primaril y for the very diffe rent foreign polic y path s a lon g which the two sets of fore ign policy elites traveled prior to 1998. Throu ghout the e ntire decade Czech po liti ca l leaders looked to the West fo r th eir future organi zati onal home. Politica l parti es debated the pace and nature of the march to the West but not its in ev i- �SLOVAKIA 144 tability. As a result Czech economic connections with the West were forged throughout the entire period , and the Czec hs ke pt their sights set on EU membership consistently after 1993. The des ire to enter western sec urity structures entailed consideration of the WEU at first, then anticipation as well as achievement of NATO membership, and finall y thorough attention to the CFSP of the EU. S lovak leaders were at first ambiva lent and at times negati ve about connections to the West. In the 1992-98 period they attempted to resusc itate the old eco nomic ties with Ukraine and Ru ss ia. At the same time , they maintained a di stance from the states that were pursuing NATO membership at the earliest poss ible moment. Early hopes that the Visegrad alliance cou ld provide a measure of security for Slovakia di sappeared in 1999 when the other three members of that alli ance joined NATO. The election of 1998 changed Slovakia's forei gn policy path in very defi nite ways. It engaged in much more serious di sc ussions with the EU about progress on the thirty-one chapters of the acquis communautaire. A MAP leadin g to NA TO membership was approved by both that organization and the Slovak government. Although the Slovaks wou ld end up joining NATO three and one half years after the Czechs, both nation s would likely enter the EU at the same time. By the fall of 2002, both countries were not walking exactly on the sa me path , but the ir paths were c learly in view of one another. In conclusion, it is important, while acknowledg in g these differences prior to I 998, not to overstate them. For example, Timothy Frye 147 examined political polarization within all of the post-communi st co untri es. Hi s stud y covered the 1989-98 period , and thu s it included the time frame in which these two countries were moving in differe nt direction s. The political polari zation rating for the Czech Republic was 4.4, and for Slovakia it was 4 .9. Despite the sli ghtly higher rate for Slovaki a, he c lassified both countries as non-pol ari - 14 7 Timothy Frye, " The Price of Polarizati on: Economic Performance in the Post- Communist World," World Politics 54(2002). pp. 308-337 . �SLOVAKIA 145 zed. The po lari zed co untri es inc luded Albania, Be laru s, Bul gari a, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Romani a, Ru ss ia, and Ukraine. Thi s is a signifi cant conclusion, for it he lps ex pl ain how two nati ons that seemed to be mov ing in such di ffe rent directi o ns after 1993 were able to adopt parall el paths by the end of the century. Perh aps the findin gs also revea l the wi sdom of those observers who chose to characteri ze the di vorce in 1993 as a "velvet" one. �� SLOVAKIA 121 Separate Paths: Czech and Slovak Foreign Policies Since 1993 James W. Peterson Introduction Foll owing the 1993 break-up of Czechos lovaki a into the Czech Re public and Slovak ia, the two states needed to attend to chall enging fo re ign po li cy iss ues. Wh ile there were important d iffe rences in the situations of the two states, the broad chall enges th at awaited them were s imil ar. In ge nera l, th eir res ponses to those chall enges put the two co untri es on se parate path s th roug ho ut much of the 1990s. It may be th at the iss ues th at led to the brea k-up o f C zechos lo vakia proved too much to overco me in the earl y years after the split. However, by th e earl y twenty-fi rst ce ntury, the ir separate path s moved closer together and stra ightened out in such a way th at they become parallel. The initi al di ffe rences in the new geopo litica l positi ons of the two states were pro nounced. Whil e th e o ld Czechos lovak state had often served as a long, bridge- like link betwee n East and West, the two new co untri es leaned in di ffe rent direction s. Slovak leaders initi all y and instincti ve ly thought about ties to eastern countri es, as well as to th e Yisegrad organizati o n, in whi ch its future pros pec ts were linked to those o f the Czec h Re public, Po land, and Hun gary. By contra st, the Czec h Re public leadership looked westward s to th e o utstretched, embrac ing arms of we ll -es tabli shed European stru ctures . Th e S lova k path was more uncertain and waverin g th an was th e Czech, for Co ld War organi zati onal structures in the east had broken down. �122 SLOVAKIA In light of their contrasting geopolitical orientations, the two states responded differently to common challenges. First, they confronted common political challenges in different ways. While many of these political pressures were primarily domestic , they all had an impact on future foreign policy choices and potentialities. For examp le, both states sought to establish functioning political party systems that would be capab le of proposing consistent foreign policies. Both were under scrutiny from the outside wor ld on the issue of treatment of important minority groups within the country. Further, in each country cultivation of non-governmental organizations that cou ld extend the roots of foreign policy debates further into the civil society was an important goa l. Different strategies on democratization led the two nations on different political paths regarding foreign policy questions. A second common challenge for the Czechs and Slovaks emerged from the economic sector. Newly elected leaders immediately wrestled with the que stion of converting centrally-planned economies into the principles of the free market. Again , this issue was not exclusively domestic . Success in competing for outside loans was contingent on progress made in privatization of enterprises, in release from fixed price controls, and in the estab li shment of principles of competitiveness . By the middl e of the 1990s, prospects for admission to the European Union (EU) were good. Leadership in the Czech Republic initially put a higher priority both on rapid conversion to capita li sm and on links to the EU than did the Slovaks. Thirdly, location of a dependable national security structure was a common problem in the two nations. The Warsaw Pact, a structure that had ostensibly ass ured the protection of the Czechoslovak state did not long survive the end of the Cold War. Give n Slovakia 's more eastern location , there was a long debate on the question of whe ther it was more desirabl e to preserve what was left of ties to its eastern neighbors or to res pond to overtures from the West. For the Czech Republic it was more obvious that participation in western institution s would be th e next step. The West European Union (WEU), �SLOVAKIA 123 North Atl anti c Treaty Orga ni zati on (NATO), and the EU's Common Fo re ig n a nd Sec urit y Po li cy (C FSP) we re co nte nd e rs fo r th a t linkage. It sho uld be no surpri se that the fo re ig n po li c ies of S lovaki a and the Czec h Re publi c di verged in the earl y years afte r separation but the n reco nnec ted. The ir commo n ex peri e nce in the Czec hos lovak state th ro ug h e ig ht decades bo re th e sa me contras tin g fea tures. C ultural simil ariti es drew the m together, but at times bitter po litica l and eco no mi c ex pe ri e nces pu shed the m apart. Once freed fro m the larger state. th ey made quite di ffe re nt cho ices fo r a number of years. However, reg io na l and s itu a ti o na l fo rces eventu a ll y pu shed th e ir path s in the world together aga in . Political Factors and Foreign Policy of the Two Nation-States The Czech Republic C reati o n of an effec ti ve, po li cy-ori e nted po litica l syste m was a chall enge in the earl y 1990 s. In the C zec h Republic there was initi a lly considera bl e co ntinuity in po liti ca l leadership afte r Janu ary 1993 . Vac lav Have l re ma in ed as Pres id e nt of the small e r state, whil e Vac lav Kl a us co ntinu ed o n as Prim e Mini ster. The do min ant po litica l party of Kl aus was still the C ivic Democratic Party (ODS), an organi zati o n th at had bee n bo rn o ut of the C ivic Forum so ac ti ve durin g the eve nts of 1989. In genera l, the Kl aus governm ent ( 1993-97 ) e nd o rsed a ll the steps co nn ec ted w ith th e re turn to E uro pe. Th e brea k-up of th e Czechos lovak state put th e Ukra ine and Ru ss ia furthe r away geographi ca ll y fro m the C zec h Republic . Thu s, the Czechs as earl y as 1994 jo ined the Partn ership fo r Peace (P4 P) and stressed c loser link s to Po land . 105 A n a na lys is of po liti ca l party pos iti o ns durin g e lec ti o ns in the 1990 s is very revea lin g in te rm s o f the iss ues and de bates that 0 ' ' See Thomas S. Szayna. ··The Czech Republic: A Small Contributor or a ' Free Rider·'l_-· in Andrew A . M ichta. ed .. A merica·s New A llies: Poland. Hungary. and the Czech Republic in NA TO (Sea tt le: Un i versity of Washingto n Press. 1999). pp. 11 2- 148 . �124 SLOVAKIA circulated throughout the Czech Republic. Political party leaders debated the merits of the move to the West but finally endorsed it. The 1998 elections are a useful example . The Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD) ended up technically in power, with Milos Zeman as Prime Minister, but the party needed to establish a "Gentlemen ' s Agreement" with the ODS in order to function as a government. For the CSSD there was less emphasis in the e lection campaign on hardheaded defen se of national interests and more of a focus on livin g standards and the rights of citizens within the country . This priority on domestic issues led the CSSD to endorse the idea of a referendum prior to entry into either the EU or NATO. There a lso was a humanitarian component to its view of Czech relations with the outside world. Such a focus led the CSSD to upgrade the importance of North-South relations and the related role of the UN. It concluded that Czechs should have a say whenever human ri ghts were jeopardized in any part of the world . While it endorsed EU membership, it thought of it in terms of stimulating the Czech economy. While it favored NATO entry , it expressed grave concerns about the future location of nuclear weapon s on Czech territory. During the I 998 election the ODS continued to give a " realpolitik" cast to its statements on foreign policy. National interests rather than humanitarian concerns were its top priority. NATO membership cou ld bring increased security for the nation as well as trade and technological benefits. The latter would promote development of the free market, a priority for Klaus since the early 1990s. National economic interests were of paramount importance, whi le crusades connected with globalization and human rights were to be carefu ll y examined. Increased Czech exports through membership in international organizations were the desired outcome. Thus, the party said less than did the CSSD about broader, western-based international organizations that could pull the Czech nation beyond the orbit of its national interests. 106 106 See Jakub Durr, Vo/by '98 (Brno: Pavel Saradin , 2000), pp. 84-97. �SLOVAKIA 125 Attention to th e views of the main political parties enriches understa ndin gs of the Czech point of view on the major foreign and security policy question s of the day. Czech voters in the 2002 elections confirmed the steady march toward s inclu sion in western institution s. Rejection of the ODS was based in part on the negative reaction to the "euroskeptic" views of Klau s on the matter of integration into the EU . Public support for EU membership was confirmed in the results of the June 2003 Referendum. EU support for Czech membership had been offered at the end of 2002. One of the continuing political challenges for the Czech Republic during the 1990s was the iss ue of minority rights, a matter that affected the country's relation ship with the outside world. The criteria for entering both NATO and the EU required a record of fairness toward key groups within the population . One major conflict was the relationship between Czechs and the Roma. A number of well-publicized incidents have raised questions about Czech attitudes and policies. For example, the erection of a wall by Czechs in Ustf nad Labem in 1999 became a foreign policy incident as well as a temporary setback to pursuit of EU membership. It was clear that the wall was intended to prevent Czechs from having to view the Rom a population as well as their Iife-sty le. Attention to such iss ues was necessary in li ght of integration into western institutions. Development of a robust political culture on foreign policy questions remained another challenge to the new state. One s ignificant new factor was the emerge nce of a visible public opinion on foreign policy questions. In genera l, the public was supportive of the new linkages with western institutions. However, there were some differences that were sign ifi ca nt. Public opinion polls over time demonstrated a stabl e level of support for EU entry . However, before 1999 support for entry into NATO was less impressive. 107 Events of 1999 made some difference. In that year the Czech Republic actually en- ' 07 See Caro l Skalnik Leff, The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State (Bou lder. Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), p 263. �SLOVAKIA 126 te red NATO , a nd th e Kosovo bo mbin g ca mpa ig n imm edi a te ly occurred . Suc h proximity to th e wars in the Ba lkan s made Czec hs somewhat more like ly to think pos iti ve ly abo ut NATO entry. Th ere were a lso uniqu e e ffo rts to build suppo rt within the po litical culture for certain fore ig n poli cy instituti o ns. One abiding problem was the negative set of Czec h attitudes abo ut the ro le of the military. C zec h resentme nt of the military is unde rstand abl e in li g ht o f the long years of the Sov ie t military prese nce afte r 1968 . Al so , after 1989 th e So vie t military left a catastro phe in many Czec h co mmu niti es. The barracks a nd o the r fac iliti es were in te rribl e co nditi o n, and individu a l Sovi et units had ta ke n anythin g of va lue fro m those locati o ns. One effort to build mo re pos iti ve Czec h attitudes abo ut the military too k pl ace in So uth Bo he mi a. A c iti ze n group ca ll ed S AS was fo rmed in 1997. The a im of the group was to de mon strate th at the Czec h military was a contributin g in strume nt in a de mocra ti c state rather than mere ly an in strume nt o f power. The SAS established link s to sc hoo ls and uni versities with the obj ec tive of c ultiv atin g a mo re pos iti ve attitude abo ut the C zech military. It set up co nfere nces and a lso co nsulted spec ia li sts from o the r nati o ns. In fac t, o ne res ult o f thi s acti vity was the creation of spec ial ti es betwee n the c ity o f Ces ky Kruml o v in the Czec h Republi c and Mi a mi Beac h in the State of Fl o rida, USA . A public e xcha nge of ideas abo ut the rol e of th e military could gene rate more in fo rmed C zech perspec ti ves about the va lue of a strong defense capability to cope w ith new threats. 108 Mo re positive attitudes about th e military wo uld fac ilitate integ rati o n into western o rgani zati o ns such as NATO. Slovakia The creati o n of po liti ca l stability was a greater c ha lle nge for Sl ovaki a than it was fo r the Czec h Republi c . In the C zec h case continuity of leadership from the 1989-93 period to th e post-1989 pe riod ' 08 J. Yondro us. .. Regionaln f dimenze ceskeho atl anti smu.'· M inisterst vo zahranicnfch vecf(2002). h ttp: //wwW .lllZ V.C/. March 2002 . �SLOVAKIA 127 contributed to stability. In the Slovak case continuity of leadership undermined rather than supported stability. Vladimfr Meciar had been the chosen Slovak leader in the two years immediately after the 1989 revolution. His new party, Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), did very well in the 1992 elections, and this enabled him again to become Prime Minister once Slovakia became an independent state in 1993 . He was reluctant to reform in any comprehensive way the centrally planned economy, and thus privatization was very slow. In addition, his government included " many of the old regime ' s cadres, resources, and xenophobic ideologies intact. " 109 Meciar fell from power in the spring of 1994, and a caretaker government under Jozef Moravcfk managed public affairs until the fall elections. Again, the voters returned a coalition government headed by Meciar and the HZDS to power, and this government lasted through the next elections in 1998. In this period Meciar basically put the brakes both on democratization and on the movement of the economic system towards free market principles. The political experiences of the first half decade of independence had major consequences for foreign policy, as Slovakia made very slow progress on the criteria that both NATO and the EU presented to it. During the I 998-2002 period , a coalition led by the Social Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU) took the leading role in government, after the public rebuffed Meciar for a third time. Mikulas Dzurinda as Prime Minister gradually moved Slovakia back onto the path towards western institutions. He emerged again as Prime Minister after the fall 2002 elections , and so the steady movement toward NATO and the EU remained unchanged. Meciar and the HZDS were still prominent and in fact received in 2002 both the largest share of the popular vote ( 19.5 %) and the highest number of seats in the I 50 seat legislature (36). His rhetoric on foreign policy was more muted in this campaign , but numerous warnings emanated from NATO and ,m Rudolf L. Tokes. " From Visegrad to Krakow: Cooperation, Competition , and Coexi stence in Central Europe," Problems of Communism 40( 1991 ), pp. 100-114. �SLOVAKIA 128 the EU leade rship a bo ut the imp licati o ns of a new governme nt in whic h the HZ DS pl ayed a ny rol e at a ll. In late Septe mber work began o n a coa liti o n th at would in c lude Dzu rinda's S DK U, the C hristi a n De mocrati c Uni o n (KDH), A lli a nce fo r ew C itize ns (A 0), and the Hungari an Coa liti o n (SMK). In earl y October thi s fo ur-party coa litio n fo rged an ag reeme nt abo ut executi ve pos iti o ns, and the new governme nt was in pl ace. A ll of these arra nge me nts were a imed to keep Sl ova ki a o n a stead y trac k in es tabli shin g its new, wes te rn o rgani zatio na l connectio ns in fore ig n poli cy. 11 0 Whil e the Czechs had been press ured by the o utside world o n the matte r of the Ro ma, Slovaks were c riti c ized fo r the ir treatment of the Hun garian mi no rity. Aga in , the Mec iar periods were suspec t in th is regard . Otto Ulc1 11 ex pl a in s thi s situ ati o n by notin g th at afte r 1968 Slova ks were not pro min e nt in the di ss ide nt moveme nt th at e mphasized hum a n ri ghts. Part of the pro bl e m was a lso the lack of ex perie nce of S lova ks in the Czechoslovak dipl o mati c corps. The leaders may have not understood full y the way in whi ch Slova ki a's domesti c record o n mino rity re lati o ns, the e nviro nme nt , a nd autho ritari ani sm in ge ne ra l influe nced fo re ign percepti o ns as we ll as fo re ig n po li cy objecti ve . 11 2 In another respect, the Slovak governme nt d urin g th at peri od was quite ce ntra li st o n the matter o f th e ri g hts of reg io ns within the country. The re is so me iro ny in thi s, fo r th e HZDS had been very ant i-federa li st (a nti -ce ntra list) after its e merge nce in April 199 1. 11 3 In that ea rli er time, the ta rget had bee n the a ll eged centrali st reg ime in Prag ue, s ince the Czec hos lovak state was still intact. Ev ide nce of Mec iar 's centra li st po li c ies li es primaril y in hi s po licy towards the 110 RFE/RL ewsline. Part II. September 24. 2002; October 8, 2002. Archived at http://\\\\w.11°erl.org September. October. 2002. 111 Otto Ulc. " The Bumpy Road ofCzechoslovaki a·s Velvet Revolution ," Problems of Communism 41 ( 1992). pp. 19-3 3 111 See Adrian Hyde Price. The International Politics of East Central Europe (New York: M anchester Uni versity Press, 1996), p. 28. 11 3 Ulc,"The Bumpy Road of Czechoslovakia ' s Ve l vet Revoluti on ." p. 29. �SLOVAKIA 129 eastern part of Slovakia. In the mid- I 990s that region became interested in participating in a large Carpathian Euroregion. Other players in the Euroregion wo uld include Romania , Hungary , Poland , and Ukraine. However, the Slovak Ministry of the Interior was quite critical of that orientation. In 1995 that Ministry abo li shed the Slovak Carpathian Regional Association that had co nsisted of a number of regional and local governments in eastern Slovakia. As a result, in 1996 the Slovak representatives in the Euroregion resigned and Slovakia cancel led its participation. Meciar took these actions because of a double suspicion. First, he was suspic ious that the eastern Slovak metropolis of Kosice would lead eastern Slovakia to develop its own independent foreign policy . Second, he feared that Hungary would use the Euroregion to exp loit the anger of the Slovak Hungarian minority . 114 Such att itudes and policies of the top leadership would not mesh well with the EU and its priority on the rights of regions within countries. However, after the 1998 elections the Slovak leadership reflected more sensitivity toward the political culture. For exam ple, Slovaks were aware after 1998 of the need to incorporate domestic non-governmenta l gro ups (NGO 's) into the increasingly public discussion of foreign policy . Thi s was particularly the case in the efforts to ga in admiss ion to NATO. Younger persons were a special target of efforts at political soc ialization . Teachers in middle schools organized essay contests about the sig nific ance of NATO . Organized debates about NATO themes took pl ace in both middle and upper schools. Further, the government set up twe lve information centers that were aimed at youn ger persons. According to one observer, regional projects abo ut NATO by 2002 had reached 120,000 students. Similar discuss ions were aimed at women's groups . For example, profess ional women in Bratislava as we ll as the Union of Women of S lovakia engaged in discussions on the mea nin g and significance of NATO . The mass "" See A lexander Duleba, 'The Slovak-Ukraini an-Russian Security Tri angle." in M argarita M. Balmaceda, ed ., On the Edge: Ukrainian-Central European-Russian Security Triangle (Budapest: Central European Univers ity, 2000), pp. I 06- I 09. �SLOVAKIA 130 medi a also pl ayed a ro le in thi s process. T wo major national telev ision projects were aimed at promoting di sc uss ion of NATO the mes. Furthe r, additi o na l in fo rm ati on proj ec ts we re bea med at the populati on through thi rty loca l te lev ision stati ons. The re was even an effort to pull ex pe rts and speciali sts into the di scuss ion. 115 The hope was th at these gro up s wo uld communicate pos iti ve attitudes abo ut NATO to the ir peers a nd e ve n in the ir publicat ions. S imil arl y, after the Nice EU Summit at the e nd of 2000 , Slo vaki a establi shed the Nation al Conve nti on. Its mi ssion e ntail ed stimul ati on of a nati o nal di scuss ion on the E U and Slovak nati o nal inte rests. The di scuss ion was to be in c lu s ive in which po liti ca l party me mbe rs, acade mi cs, c hurc hes , interest gro ups, non- governme nta l orga ni zati o ns, trade union s, muni cipalities, and reg ions all pl ayed a ro le. 11 6 Comparison Both co untries confronted major po litica l chall e nges th at affected fore ign po licy prospects. In both cases there was outside scrutin y and suspi c io n througho ut the first decade abo ut the way in whi c h their governme nts treated key minority gro ups. C riteri a fo r admi ssion to wes te rn orga ni zati ons required prog ress in thi s area. Both countri es a lso ex pe ri e nced maj or c ha nges in governme nt. In the Czech case such cha nges d id not affect very much the steady process of integration w ith the West. Slovak governme ntal changes had more of an impact. In addition , the continuin g presence of Vl adimfr Meciar and the HZDS had the net effect of postponin g Slovaki a's integrati on with western institution s until the late 1990s. Finally , cultivation of positive attitudes within the po liti ca l c ulture became a priority once the leadership made the dec ision to look in a westward direction . In th e Czec h case thi s spotli ght on po liti ca l culture was a 115 • Organ izacie a instituc ie, ktorym bola udelena Strieborn a plaketa M inisterstva zahranicnych vecf Slovenskej republ iky di\a 20. juna 2002," M inisterst vo zah ranicnych vecf(2002). http://www.mzv .sk Oc tober 2002. 116 " Narodny ko nvent o Evropskej buducnosti Slovenska," Ministerst vo zahranicnych vecf (2002). http://www.mzv.sk October 2002. �SLOVAKIA 131 constant theme throughout the decade, but in the Slovak case it was only characteristic of the second half of the decade. Economic Factors and Foreign Policy of the Two Nation-States The Czech Republic In the years following th e 1989 revo lution , the Klau s government made eco nomi c restructurin g in Czechoslovakia a major priority. Privati zation and the use of vouchers placed formerly state-controlled industries in private hand s. Job sec urity yie lded to the greater uncertainty connected with the free market. It became more like ly that industries would ri se and fa ll on the ir own merits, while artifi cial control of prices was no longer the norm. 11 7 Thus, major economic changes had deve loped their own momentum at the time the Czechs separated from Slovakia, and they bore the potenti al to have a major impact on foreign policy. For exampl e, ga inin g admission to the EU became a top priority as a result of the new geographic and eco nomi c developments. Very soon Brusse ls presented to the eastern countries its Iist of thirty-one chapters in the "acqui s communautaire" process. Czech leaders began to meet regularl y with EU bureaucrats in order to demonstrate progress toward s meeting the criteria of eac h of the chapters. Usually twice a year the EU represe ntatives came to the Czech Republic to inspect progress made and to iss ue judgments about the relative rank of the nation on the li st of EU prospects from that region. By the end of the 1990s, the Czech Republic ranked near the top of the prospec ti ve li st of new members, and membership appeared like ly by 2004. In fac t, in October of 2002 the EU Commission announced that the Czech Republic would be one of the ten nation s admitted in 2004. 11 8 Czech involvement in the EU 's PHARE and ERBD investment projects was of particular significance. Invo lve ment in the wider EU market would 117 See Bernard Wheaton and Zdenek Ka van , The Velvet Revolution: Czechoslo- vakia 1988- /99 1 (Boulder. Colorado: Westvi ew Press, 1992) , pp. 139-143. 118 Sueddeutsche Zeitung, October 9, 2002. Arch i ved at: http://sueddeutsche .de October 2002. �132 SLOVAKIA multipl y the steps taken by the Czech governme nt in co nvers ion to capitali sm and th ereby open up additional new in vestment opportunities in othe r nations. At the same time , eve ntua l EU membership woul d lead to add ition al western investments, and important ones had come about already in the 1990s. For example , in 1994 th e German automobil e company Volkswagen bought majo rity co ntrol of the o ld Czech mega-compan y Skoda . Whil e the agree ment did guarantee the Germans majority control , it also provided the Czechs with a veto over future policy dec ision s. 11 9 Similarly, Air France took over the Prague Airport Ruzyne and made it into a modern facility. Early in the twenty-first century the A merica n company Motorola began construction of a fac tory in Moravia in the area of the Beskydy Mountains. Much news accompanied the buy -out of severa l well known breweries, including Pil sner Urque ll , by South Africa n enterprises. Certainly , one by- product of this western indu stri a l and financial in vo lvement would be the rapid infusion of western tec hniques and know-how in manag ing an economy on capitali st princi pl es. A ll of thi s would acce lerate the type of domestic economic restructuring that would more qui ck ly meet EU criteria. The outreach of the changing Czech economy was not confined exclusively to its European nei ghborhood. For instance, in the mid l 990s the Czech Re publi c became a member of UNESCO. In th at capac ity it took a particular interest in the plight of the ravaged nations that had e merged from the old Yugoslavia. This ac ti vity led to membership as well in the Organi zat ion for Economic Cooperati on and Developme nt (OECD ). In fact , the Czechs were the first from the Central E uropean region to ga in membership in th at organi zation. Linkages between the Czech Republic and the Internati onal Monetary Fund (IMF) e nh anced their reputation for reliabi lity. In A ugus t 1994, the natio n was the first post-communist state to pay off its 11 9 Leff. The Czech and Slo vak Republics: Nation Vers us State. p. 263. �SLOVAKIA 133 initial IMF loan . 120 Again, involvement with the larger universe of western capitalist economies outside the immediate geographic region paid dividends in terms of domestic economic change. In sum, the revolution of 1989, combined with the loss of Slovakia in 1993, generated a rapid rate of economic change in the Czech Republic. Conversion to capitalist economic principles was inevitable after the 1989 events, but the process received a number of important stimuli. Interest in joining NATO and the drive for EU membership mandated that the nation meet specific criteria in terms of capitalist development. Investments by western firms outside the nation led to collaborative efforts in which Czech managers could more fully see the capitalist system in action. Involvement in the economic projects of a number of global organizations, primarily located in the West, expanded Czech horizon s in a positive way. All of thi s offered a powerful economic antidote to the much more restricted COMECON framework that was characteristic of the Cold War. Slovakia For a number of reasons , Slovakia looked east for economic links rather than west after the 1993 split. This had also been true after the 1989 revolution. Slovak leaders noted that their country was the only Yisegrad member that bordered all of the other three. Such a perception encouraged them to think about a potential Slovak role as the ideal country to be a bridge between East and West. The collapse of COMECON led the Slovaks to hope for a replacement in the form of special ties with Russia and Ukraine. The look eastward made Slovakia "more sensitive to developments in the CIS." 12 1 At the same time, EU import quotas were having a negative impact on certain Slovak industries such as a steel mill in Kosice, and that created some suspicion about the West. 122 120 Leff, The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State, p. 258. 12 1 Price, The International Politics of East Central Europe, p. 170. 122 Leff, The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State, p. 261. �134 SLOVAKIA One concrete manifestation of thi s economic orie ntatio n to the East was cultivation of a spec ial link to Ru ss ia. A key motive for this outreach was the pli g ht of the Slovak arms industry . At the time of the 1989 revolution , o ne hundred e leven of Czec hoslo va ki a ' s weapon s manufacturing pl a nts were in the Slovak region . As early as 1990, weapo ns sa les from those pl ants had declined from 1988 leve ls from eight billio n dollars to one billion . This situ ation prompted Meciar to trave l to Moscow in 1991 in order to get defe nse co ntracts to make up some of thi s loss. 123 In fact , the sub sequent recess io n became part of the reason that Slovak leaders sought separation from the Czechs. Further, the Slovak military hoped that Ru ss ia might give Slovakia li ce nses to se ll military ha rdw are to third world countries. 12~ Eventu a ll y, Pres ident Bo ri s Yeltsin of Ru ss ia visited Slovaki a in Aug ust 1993, and one res ult was the sig nin g of a bilatera l state treaty. In add iti o n, the two states s ig ned a fi ve-yea r military cooperation agree me nt. The latter would po te nti a ll y assist Slovakia economically, for it would he lp rev ive its arm s industry . One fea ture of the agree me nt was the provis io n that Ru ss ia would suppl y spare parts for th e Slovak milita ry. 125 Other Slovak goa ls in c lud ed development of a Slovak role in tran sporting Ru ss ian natural gas to Western Europe. In part, Mec iar hoped that the flirtation with Ru ss ia mi g ht increase Slovakia ' s econo mi c importance to th e West a nd attract in vestme nts from that direction as well. 126 Cultivation of ties to Ukrai ne a lso became part of thi s new economi c strategy. Early afte r th e revolution Meciar soug ht to build a new railway from Brati slava to Ukraine by utili zing the for mer Soviet ra il network. 127 By the middl e 1990s Slovak leaders began to think in broader terms. Perh aps Ukra ine could act as well as the gate- 12 .1 See Andrew A. Michta. East Central Europe after the Warsaw Pact: Security Dilemmas in the 1990s (New York: Greenwood Press. 1992 ). p. 107. 12 "' Duleba, ·'The Slovak-Ukrainian-Ru ssian Security Tri angle: · p. 20. 125 Price, The International Politics o f East Central Europe. p. 170. 126 Duleba, ''The Slovak-Ukrainian-Ru ssian Security Triangle." pp. 85-8 6. 127 Price. The International Politics of East Central Europe. p. 170. �SLOVAKIA 135 way to the Ru ss ian market. 128 For many Slovaks, Ukraine was in a sense still Ru ss ia, and thu s economic policies toward s the two we re intertw ined. In spite of the eastward look in economic policy, western organi zation s were not totall y ignored. For example, in June 1993 Sl ovaki a was accepted into the Council of Europe. Then in June 1995 , th e M ec iar government submitted a membership appli cati on to the EU . Reliance on in ves tments from western countries rein forced thi s economic policy dimension. K ey economic in vestors in the 1990s included, in rank order , Germ any, A ustri a, and th e Czech Repu bli c. 129 Despite Slovaki a's approach to the East, the W est was in many ways more helpful. Seri ous di sc uss ions w ith the EU rea ll y began in 1997 w ith th e Lu xembourg Summit. A t th at meeting the EU placed Slovaki a in a second ti er of si x nati ons, and so it looked as if Sl ovaki a wo uld have to wa it longer then its Czech co unterpart, w ho ended up in the first ti er of si x. Contacts w ith the EU acce lerated after the defea t of the M ec iar government in 1998. A multilateral screening process by the EU took pl ace between April 1998 and February 1999, and thi s gave way to more signifi ca nt bil ateral screenin g procedu res between M arch of 1999 and Febru ary of 2000. 130 In the 2000-2002 period Slovaki a worked its way th rough most of the thirty-one chapters of th e EU 's aqui s co mmunautaire. For exa mpl e, di sc uss ions about Chapter Four ce ntered on future poss ibilities that fore igners could control Sl ovak land and corresponding poss ibilities fo r Slovak s to purchase land w ithin th e EU. Fo ll ow in g the 1998 elec ti ons th e chances of mee tin g the goa ls of Ch apter Si x we re enhanced, as Slovaki a moved more firml y in the direc ti on of erec tin g a market economy. Chapter Seven on agri cultu re was a criti ca l one for Slovak ia as it was for most of the other nati ons in the region. Sl ovak s 12 " 129 1.'<, Du leba. ··The Slovak-Ukrainian-Russian Security Triangle." p. 97 . Leff. The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State. p. 262. '·Fazy proces u rozs irova ni a EU ," M inisterstvo za hra11ic11yc h vecf (2002) . hllp ://www. 1111. v.,k Oc tober 2002. �SLOVAKIA 136 soug ht promises of an ad mini stra ti ve structure that wou ld e nsure protect ion of the ir agric ultural sys tem . The politica l tran s iti on from the Mec iar governm e nt to th at of Dzurinda made sa ti sfac tion of Chapte r Thirteen more poss ibl e. Th at c hapter in vo lved worker 's ri g hts, ge nde r equ a lity, racia l justi ce, a nd other vita l categori es. Sl ovak ia rece ived spec ia l in stru c tion s within th e framework of Chapter Fifteen. Th e EU requ es ted th a t Slo va ki a acce lera te pri vati za ti o n of ba nk s as we ll as na tural reso urce mo nopoli es. Further, it was ex pected th at Slovakia wo uld build up small and medium s ized firm s w hil e e nco urag in g add iti o na l fo re ig n in vestme nt. 13 1 Comparison The Czec h Republic and Slo vaki a did move on separate paths in terms of the economi c dime nsion of fo re ign policy for a large part of the first decade after separation . In fac t, so me of their sharpe r differences e merged in the fo ur years after the 1989 revo luti on prior to the 1993 breakup. In the post- 1993 atmosphere the Czechs quickl y latched on to western organi zati ons in order to map out their future. S lovaki a, with its differe nt geographi c position and greater nostalgia for the lost economic links to the form er Soviet Union , c ultivated the Ukra ine and Russ ia as part of a ge nera l orientation to the east. Both di sappointme nt with the East and th e ex pe rien ce of th e 1998 elections brought the Slovak path much c loser to that of the Czechs . One sy mbo l of thi s shift was the progress made by both states in th e 1998-2002 pe riod towa rd me mbership in the EU . By September of 2002 the Czech Re public had c losed twe nty-fi ve of the thirty most s ignifi cant c hapters th at led to EU me mbership. Surprising ly, Slovaki a had closed twe nty-seven. Slo vakia 's progress had bee n very rapid, for the Czechs had ac tu all y closed eightee n of the chapters before Slovakia had . An important resu lt was th at Sl ova kia moved 131 " Ka ndid atske krajiny a ic h ak tu alny stav negoc iac if," Ministe,:~tvo w hranicnj ch vecf (2002). http ://www.111zv.~k Jul y 30. 2002. �SLOVAKIA 137 from the second ti er of six pote nti al EU members to the first ti er of ten between 1997 and the autumn of 2002. T he re port of the EU Commiss ion on October 9, 2002, bas ica ll y treated both countri es as if they were at simil ar leve ls of pre paredness for EU entry in earl y 2004. 132 Both co untries ge nera ll y rece ived pos iti ve reports and were firml y in the group o f ten nati ons to be admitted at the sa me time in 2004. National Security Factors and the Foreign Policy of the Two States The Czech Republic Separati on fro m S lovak ia led to an immed iate series of ste ps aimed at underpinnin g the natio nal sec urity of the new, smaller Czech state. T hroughout th e first decade after the separati on, the sec urity spotli ght shi fted from an emph as is on the Wes tern European Unio n (W EU), to the ca mpaign fo r NATO me mbership , and later to cons iderat ion of th e ro le of th e Co mmon Fore ign and Sec urity Po li cy (CFS P) of th e EU. 133 ln additi o n, Czec hs bega n to in vo lve themse lves more full y in international organi zati ons such as the UN, OSCE , and Y isegrad . T hu s th e nati o na l sec urity age nd a was crowded. Czech disc uss ions abo ut defense po licy in the earl y 1990s centered in part on the W EU , an organi zati on that had e merged in 1948 with the Brusse ls Treaty. On the o ne hand , EU pl anners at the begi nning of the 1990s envisioned the WEU in a ce ntra l ro le in ass istin g Europe to take responsibility fo r its ow n sec urity. On the other hand , others hoped that the WEU could he lp create mo re conse nsus with NATO as well as support for NATO mi ss ions. 134 rn RFE/RL News line. Part II. October 10. 2002. Archived at: h1tp ://www.rferl.org October 2002. rn See Dav id S. Mason , Revolution and Transition in East Central Europe. Second Edi tion (Bou lder, Colorado : Westview Press, 1996), pp. 95-98. " 4 K arel Pezl, " Ceska repub li ka a zapadoevropske unie: bezpecnostnf aspek ty, " Mezinarodnf Politika 18( 1994). pp. 25-26. �138 SLOVAKIA By the late 1990s discu ss ions within the Czech Re public about admission to NATO overshadowed conversations about the fading WEU. Admission to NATO in 1999 brought with it a whole set of new obligations. There was a need to prepare defense legislation that would move the Czech defense structure toward the level of NATO standard s. New military pe rso nnel requirements mandated that the Czech defense sector prepare courses for a ll ranks about the changing role of the military. Training in the use of radar was also upgraded. Further, the Czech Republic would need to build a crisis command center that would facilitate the rapid sharing of information between NATO and the Czech Republic. It would also be necessary for the Czechs to build a sys tem of command and control that paralleled the organizations in other NATO countries. 135 Immediately after expansion to include three new members in 1999, NATO had an opportunity to utilize these new national resources during the Kosovo bombing campaign . One lesson of that campaign was increased awareness of th e asymmetry of capabilities within the alliance. 136 America provided eighty per cent of the bombs dropped on Kosovo in the spring of 1999 as well as ninety per cent of the weapons. U. S. airplanes were the only ones that could operate in all weather. Lowered European defen se budgets in the 1990s resulted in a situation in which all European NATO members contributed only two-thirds of the fundin g that the United States did to defen se. The Czech Republic responded to this imbalance by developing a blueprint for change in 2001. That plan called for a rapid upgrade in mane uverability of units, logistical strength, placement of weaponry and pe rsonnel , ability to resist over a lon g period, and information command and control. Further, the Ministry of Defense drew up a li st of four principles that would guide Czech participation rn Antonin Sverak . ··vnej sf a vnitfnf aspekty zac lenovanf resortu obrany CR do NATO," Mezimfrodnf Vztahy 2( 1999). pp. 13-3 1. 136 See Otto Pick, ·· NATO, evropska obrana a poucenf K osova." CR po vstupu do NATO. Uvahy a problemy (Praha: Ceska Atlanticka Komise UMY. 2000), pp. 2532. �SLOVAKIA In 139 NATO. Th ey inc luded co ntinu ed in vo lvement of the two North American powers in the defe nse of Europe, reliance on NATO as the main guarantor of European security , subordination of the CFSP of the EU within the framework of NATO , a nd guara nteed access to NATO capabi lities for all EU defense and sec urity mi ss ion s. 137 Recog nition of the important Czech role in NATO was evident in the dec ision to hold the conference of Nove mber 2002 in Prague. At that meeting seve n additional nati ons joined the military alliance. Finally, durin g th e war in Iraq in 2003, th e Czechs sent an anti-biolog ical , chemical , and nuclear weapon s unit as well as a fi eld hospital. By the early 1990s, the EU began to outline plans for its own defe nse structure, one that would be independent of the North Atlantic nation s th at had for so lon g domin ated NATO. These plans centered on the creation in 1990 of th e Common Forei gn and Security (CFS P) of the EU . In 1993 the Treaty of Europe called for the addition to the CFSP of pe rm ane nt officials from the EU Council Secretariat as well as of fiftee n diplomats from each Fore ign Ministry. 138 In early 2001 the Czech Foreign Mini ster made a persuasive case for the natural harmony between the broad-rang ing objectives of the CFSP and the specific, national inte rests of the Czec h Republic. 139 For him the current spirit of cooperation in Europe was a needed antidote to the suffer in g of the Czechoslovak people during the twe nti e th century. Throu gh the CFSP, the Czech Re public would ga in both assistance in its multi-pronged process of development and also the opportunity to co ntribute to regional probl e m so lvin g. He did not e nvision participation in European and Atlantic structures as a threat to Czech national inte rests. In particul ar, the Dece mber 2000 Nic e Summit ge nerated orga ni zati o na l c han ges in EU institution s 117 Jaromfr Novotny, "' DCI (Defense Capabiliti es Initiative) a Cesk,\ Republika." Mini sterstvo zahranicnfch vecf (2002). http://www.1111v.u March 2002 . 1" See Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler. The European Un ion as a Global Actor (L ondon: Routledge. 1999). pp. 169- 196. iw -''Jan K avan. ·'Ceska zahrani cnf politika na prahu 2 1. stoletf."' Mez inarodnf Politikil 25(200 I ). pp. 4-5. �140 SLOVAKIA that would continue to break down the artificial barriers that divided Europe during the Cold War. Growin g European military stren gth would s imultaneou sly contribute to an increase in Czech capabi lities. 140 Slovakia In spite of the fact that so much of the defense industry had been located in the Slovak areas during the Co ld War and into the immediate post-1989 revolution period, the leadership ex peri ence of Slovaks on defen se matters had been re lative ly slim . For instance, in I 99 1 Slovak so ldiers constituted 34.7 % of the federa l Czechoslovak army. However, the representation of Slovak manage rs within the Ministry of Defense over several years ranged from on ly 5 to 23 %. 141 In the early years after separation , Slovaks were primarily focused on reestabli shing or maintaining ties with the East. Previously mentioned political ties to Ru ss ia, Ukraine, and Yi segrad see med to offer them a non-western prescription for protecting national sec urity. The Slovaks rea ll y only went through the motion s of taking part in so me western sec urity structures. For example, like th e Czech Republic , Slovakia became an Assoc iate Partner in the WEU and reg ul arl y attended its meetings. Although Associate Members he ld no voting power within the organization , they did have the ri ght to plan and execute military operations. 142 Contac ts between Slovakia and NATO were minimal and bas ically centered on only a few reciprocal visits by key personnel during the three years before Meciar fel l from grace. The most impor- 140 Pavel Teli cka, " Aktualni stav jednani o pristoupeni CR k EU ," M ezimirodnf Politika 25(200 I ). 14 1 Michta, East Central Europe after the Warsaw Pact: Security Dilemmas in the 1990s, p. I 10. 142 See Philip H. Gordon, ·The Western European Union and NATO 's ' Europeanisation ," in Philip H. Gordon, ed., NATO 's Transformation : The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance (L ondon : Row man & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. , I 997), p. 26 1. �SLOVAKIA 141 tant visit by a top NATO figure to Slovakia was the 1996 trip of Secretary-General Javier Solana . The most important Slovak trip was that by President Kovac to Brussels in 1996 to meet with top NATO personnel. After the 1998 elections and the establishment of a new government under Mikulas Dzurinda, the pace of contacts picked up. In early 2002, Slovakia hosted visits by the unified NATO European commander General Dieter Stockman ; by General Joseph Ralston, the commander of NATO forces in Europe; and by Deputy NATO Minister Nicholas Burns. In turn, Slovak leaders who made their way to NATO Headquarters included incoming Prime Minister Dzurinda in 1998 and President Schuster in 1999 and again in 2002. 143 Another key component of the post- I 998 , systematic Slovak move toward s NATO involved the Membership Action Plan (MAP) Process. In early 1999 Slovakia presented a five-point plan that included a strategy for political/economic issues, defense/military question s, resources/capabilities, security challenges, and legal matters. In April of 1999, NATO accepted that MAP and the Slovak government followed suit in June of the same year. The National Program for the process of NATO entry was finalized in April of 2000. 144 Finalization of the MAP process led to many meetings over the next few years. Additional activity after 1998 centered on galvanizing public support for entry into the military alliance. Slovakia held a grants competition to enable NGO' s to raise public awareness of the significance of NATO entry. Support for entry came officially from a total of seventy-five Roma organizations. One result of all thi s activity was a rel atively high level of public support for joining the organization . Between the fall of 200 I and the spring of 2002 , support reflected in public opinion poll s rose from 52.2 % to 60.7 %, although it 143 " M edznfky spoluprace SR a NATO," Ministerstvo zahranicnych vec f (2002). http ://www.rnzv.sk October 2002. 144 " Chrono logicky prehl'ad PREN AME," Ministerstvo zahranicnych vecf(2002). http ://www.mzv.,k October 2002. �142 SLOVAKIA declined a bit a few month s later. 145 All of this attention to visits, organizational matters, and public opinion enabled Slovakia to make up for its lack of attention an d interest in NATO during the midI 990s. In addition , during the latter part of the 1990s, Slovakia took part in severa l important peacekeeping missions under NATO leadership. This involvement demonstrated that the nation would possess the level of commitment required of new NATO members. After completion of the Dayton Accord on Bosnia in 1995, Slovakia se nt some military personnel and equipment as part of SFOR to the area of operations. At the end of 1997, it sent three Army engineers and five army specialists in the field of civil-military cooperation. In the fall of 2002 Slovakia made its first Air Force contribution to a NATO mis sion. The capabilities it sent included a helicopte r unit with two helicopte rs and twenty-one assoc iated personnel. Slovakia promised to keep that contingent in Bosnia for the next six months. Involveme nt in KFOR after the Kosovo bombin g campaign in late 1999 was even more extensive. The initial commitment included forty Army engineers , a nd di spatch of an additional four persons at the command level one year later. A major upgrade occurred in early 2002 with the creation of a five hundred person Czech-Slovak rapid reaction battalion . The Slovak role in that force included twenty per cent of the overall membership, and the vast majority of those were doctors, conductors, mechanics, and logi stics specialists. The vital mi ss ions of that battalion centered on sec uring the Serb-Kosovo border, monitoring a range of activities, assuring stable conditions for the return of refugees, policing the civil serv ice, and protecting the Serb minority. 146 Thi s particular operation would provide man y lessons that would assist Slovakia in making important contributions as a full NATO member. Finally , in the sprin g of 2003 , Slovakia dispat145 " Chronologicky prehl'ad PREN AME," Ministerstvo zahranicnych veer (2002). http ://www.mzY.sk October 2002 . 146 " Ucast' SR v operaciach na podporu mieru pod vedenfm NATO," Ministerstvo zahranicnych vecf(2002). h11p ://www.111zv.sk October 2002. �SLOVAKIA 143 ched military personnel to the Pers ian Gulf durin g the co ntro versial war in Iraq. Comparisons Czech pursuit of national sec urity followed a unidirect io nal path during the first decade a fte r se parati o n from Slovakia. Its leade rs thou ght proacti ve ly in eac h part of the decade about a co ntributin g role in the maj or defe nse opti ons ava il ab le at the time. This mea nt that much of the di sc uss ion foc used on activity within the framework of W EU in the first years after the breakup . Once NATO ad mi ss ion became a real possibility , the Czec hs set the ir eyes on th at orga ni zation . F in all y, as EU membership approac hed early in the new century, more of th e di sc uss ion centered o n the CFSP, a progra m that offered a European sec urity cho ice th at was inde pe nde nt of Ameri can leade rship. In the Slovak case the emp hasis on re-stoking ti es with Ukraine and Ru ss ia at first prec luded seri ous discussion about western sec urity o rga ni zati o nal structures . Once the 1998 e lect ions offered the chance for a new policy, Slovak ia ' s outreach to the West in the defe nse area mainl y took the for m of a se ri ous effort to jo in NA TO. Achi eve me nt of that goa l at the e nd of 2002 e nab led Slovakia to adopt the multi -pron ged , western-oriented strategy utili zed by the Czechs fo r an e ntire decade. Conclusion The re is remark ab le cons iste ncy across the ra nge of va ri abl es that, for a time , divided the two nations. Those vari ables inc lude politi cs, economi cs, and nati o nal sec urity. It is clear th at the political va ri abl es were the driving force be hind the othe r two. Elec ti o n outcomes in the Czech Re public a nd Slovakia were quite different between 1992 and 1998. Those results acco unt primaril y for the very diffe rent foreign polic y path s a lon g which the two sets of fore ign policy elites traveled prior to 1998. Throu ghout the e ntire decade Czech po liti ca l leaders looked to the West fo r th eir future organi zati onal home. Politica l parti es debated the pace and nature of the march to the West but not its in ev i- �SLOVAKIA 144 tability. As a result Czech economic connections with the West were forged throughout the entire period , and the Czec hs ke pt their sights set on EU membership consistently after 1993. The des ire to enter western sec urity structures entailed consideration of the WEU at first, then anticipation as well as achievement of NATO membership, and finall y thorough attention to the CFSP of the EU. S lovak leaders were at first ambiva lent and at times negati ve about connections to the West. In the 1992-98 period they attempted to resusc itate the old eco nomic ties with Ukraine and Ru ss ia. At the same time , they maintained a di stance from the states that were pursuing NATO membership at the earliest poss ible moment. Early hopes that the Visegrad alliance cou ld provide a measure of security for Slovakia di sappeared in 1999 when the other three members of that alli ance joined NATO. The election of 1998 changed Slovakia's forei gn policy path in very defi nite ways. It engaged in much more serious di sc ussions with the EU about progress on the thirty-one chapters of the acquis communautaire. A MAP leadin g to NA TO membership was approved by both that organization and the Slovak government. Although the Slovaks wou ld end up joining NATO three and one half years after the Czechs, both nation s would likely enter the EU at the same time. By the fall of 2002, both countries were not walking exactly on the sa me path , but the ir paths were c learly in view of one another. In conclusion, it is important, while acknowledg in g these differences prior to I 998, not to overstate them. For example, Timothy Frye 147 examined political polarization within all of the post-communi st co untri es. Hi s stud y covered the 1989-98 period , and thu s it included the time frame in which these two countries were moving in differe nt direction s. The political polari zation rating for the Czech Republic was 4.4, and for Slovakia it was 4 .9. Despite the sli ghtly higher rate for Slovaki a, he c lassified both countries as non-pol ari - 14 7 Timothy Frye, " The Price of Polarizati on: Economic Performance in the Post- Communist World," World Politics 54(2002). pp. 308-337 . �SLOVAKIA 145 zed. The po lari zed co untri es inc luded Albania, Be laru s, Bul gari a, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Romani a, Ru ss ia, and Ukraine. Thi s is a signifi cant conclusion, for it he lps ex pl ain how two nati ons that seemed to be mov ing in such di ffe rent directi o ns after 1993 were able to adopt parall el paths by the end of the century. Perh aps the findin gs also revea l the wi sdom of those observers who chose to characteri ze the di vorce in 1993 as a "velvet" one. �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2005, Vol. 38 Description An account of the resource Vol. 38 (No. 70-71), 2005. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2005 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 121 Separate Paths: Czech and Slovak Foreign Policies Since 1993 James W. Peterson Introduction Foll owing the 1993 break-up of Czechos lovaki a into the Czech Re public and Slovak ia, the two states needed to attend to chall enging fo re ign po li cy iss ues. Wh ile there were important d iffe rences in the situations of the two states, the broad chall enges th at awaited them were s imil ar. In ge nera l, th eir res ponses to those chall enges put the two co untri es on se parate path s th roug ho ut much of the 1990s. It may be th at the iss ues th at led to the brea k-up o f C zechos lo vakia proved too much to overco me in the earl y years after the split. However, by th e earl y twenty-fi rst ce ntury, the ir separate path s moved closer together and stra ightened out in such a way th at they become parallel. The initi al di ffe rences in the new geopo litica l positi ons of the two states were pro nounced. Whil e th e o ld Czechos lovak state had often served as a long, bridge- like link betwee n East and West, the two new co untri es leaned in di ffe rent direction s. Slovak leaders initi all y and instincti ve ly thought about ties to eastern countri es, as well as to th e Yisegrad organizati o n, in whi ch its future pros pec ts were linked to those o f the Czec h Re public, Po land, and Hun gary. By contra st, the Czec h Re public leadership looked westward s to th e o utstretched, embrac ing arms of we ll -es tabli shed European stru ctures . Th e S lova k path was more uncertain and waverin g th an was th e Czech, for Co ld War organi zati onal structures in the east had broken down. 122 SLOVAKIA In light of their contrasting geopolitical orientations, the two states responded differently to common challenges. First, they confronted common political challenges in different ways. While many of these political pressures were primarily domestic , they all had an impact on future foreign policy choices and potentialities. For examp le, both states sought to establish functioning political party systems that would be capab le of proposing consistent foreign policies. Both were under scrutiny from the outside wor ld on the issue of treatment of important minority groups within the country. Further, in each country cultivation of non-governmental organizations that cou ld extend the roots of foreign policy debates further into the civil society was an important goa l. Different strategies on democratization led the two nations on different political paths regarding foreign policy questions. A second common challenge for the Czechs and Slovaks emerged from the economic sector. Newly elected leaders immediately wrestled with the que stion of converting centrally-planned economies into the principles of the free market. Again , this issue was not exclusively domestic . Success in competing for outside loans was contingent on progress made in privatization of enterprises, in release from fixed price controls, and in the estab li shment of principles of competitiveness . By the middl e of the 1990s, prospects for admission to the European Union (EU) were good. Leadership in the Czech Republic initially put a higher priority both on rapid conversion to capita li sm and on links to the EU than did the Slovaks. Thirdly, location of a dependable national security structure was a common problem in the two nations. The Warsaw Pact, a structure that had ostensibly ass ured the protection of the Czechoslovak state did not long survive the end of the Cold War. Give n Slovakia 's more eastern location , there was a long debate on the question of whe ther it was more desirabl e to preserve what was left of ties to its eastern neighbors or to res pond to overtures from the West. For the Czech Republic it was more obvious that participation in western institution s would be th e next step. The West European Union (WEU), SLOVAKIA 123 North Atl anti c Treaty Orga ni zati on (NATO), and the EU's Common Fo re ig n a nd Sec urit y Po li cy (C FSP) we re co nte nd e rs fo r th a t linkage. It sho uld be no surpri se that the fo re ig n po li c ies of S lovaki a and the Czec h Re publi c di verged in the earl y years afte r separation but the n reco nnec ted. The ir commo n ex peri e nce in the Czec hos lovak state th ro ug h e ig ht decades bo re th e sa me contras tin g fea tures. C ultural simil ariti es drew the m together, but at times bitter po litica l and eco no mi c ex pe ri e nces pu shed the m apart. Once freed fro m the larger state. th ey made quite di ffe re nt cho ices fo r a number of years. However, reg io na l and s itu a ti o na l fo rces eventu a ll y pu shed th e ir path s in the world together aga in . Political Factors and Foreign Policy of the Two Nation-States The Czech Republic C reati o n of an effec ti ve, po li cy-ori e nted po litica l syste m was a chall enge in the earl y 1990 s. In the C zec h Republic there was initi a lly considera bl e co ntinuity in po liti ca l leadership afte r Janu ary 1993 . Vac lav Have l re ma in ed as Pres id e nt of the small e r state, whil e Vac lav Kl a us co ntinu ed o n as Prim e Mini ster. The do min ant po litica l party of Kl aus was still the C ivic Democratic Party (ODS), an organi zati o n th at had bee n bo rn o ut of the C ivic Forum so ac ti ve durin g the eve nts of 1989. In genera l, the Kl aus governm ent ( 1993-97 ) e nd o rsed a ll the steps co nn ec ted w ith th e re turn to E uro pe. Th e brea k-up of th e Czechos lovak state put th e Ukra ine and Ru ss ia furthe r away geographi ca ll y fro m the C zec h Republic . Thu s, the Czechs as earl y as 1994 jo ined the Partn ership fo r Peace (P4 P) and stressed c loser link s to Po land . 105 A n a na lys is of po liti ca l party pos iti o ns durin g e lec ti o ns in the 1990 s is very revea lin g in te rm s o f the iss ues and de bates that 0 ' ' See Thomas S. Szayna. ··The Czech Republic: A Small Contributor or a ' Free Rider·'l_-· in Andrew A . M ichta. ed .. A merica·s New A llies: Poland. Hungary. and the Czech Republic in NA TO (Sea tt le: Un i versity of Washingto n Press. 1999). pp. 11 2- 148 . 124 SLOVAKIA circulated throughout the Czech Republic. Political party leaders debated the merits of the move to the West but finally endorsed it. The 1998 elections are a useful example . The Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD) ended up technically in power, with Milos Zeman as Prime Minister, but the party needed to establish a "Gentlemen ' s Agreement" with the ODS in order to function as a government. For the CSSD there was less emphasis in the e lection campaign on hardheaded defen se of national interests and more of a focus on livin g standards and the rights of citizens within the country . This priority on domestic issues led the CSSD to endorse the idea of a referendum prior to entry into either the EU or NATO. There a lso was a humanitarian component to its view of Czech relations with the outside world. Such a focus led the CSSD to upgrade the importance of North-South relations and the related role of the UN. It concluded that Czechs should have a say whenever human ri ghts were jeopardized in any part of the world . While it endorsed EU membership, it thought of it in terms of stimulating the Czech economy. While it favored NATO entry , it expressed grave concerns about the future location of nuclear weapon s on Czech territory. During the I 998 election the ODS continued to give a " realpolitik" cast to its statements on foreign policy. National interests rather than humanitarian concerns were its top priority. NATO membership cou ld bring increased security for the nation as well as trade and technological benefits. The latter would promote development of the free market, a priority for Klaus since the early 1990s. National economic interests were of paramount importance, whi le crusades connected with globalization and human rights were to be carefu ll y examined. Increased Czech exports through membership in international organizations were the desired outcome. Thus, the party said less than did the CSSD about broader, western-based international organizations that could pull the Czech nation beyond the orbit of its national interests. 106 106 See Jakub Durr, Vo/by '98 (Brno: Pavel Saradin , 2000), pp. 84-97. SLOVAKIA 125 Attention to th e views of the main political parties enriches understa ndin gs of the Czech point of view on the major foreign and security policy question s of the day. Czech voters in the 2002 elections confirmed the steady march toward s inclu sion in western institution s. Rejection of the ODS was based in part on the negative reaction to the "euroskeptic" views of Klau s on the matter of integration into the EU . Public support for EU membership was confirmed in the results of the June 2003 Referendum. EU support for Czech membership had been offered at the end of 2002. One of the continuing political challenges for the Czech Republic during the 1990s was the iss ue of minority rights, a matter that affected the country's relation ship with the outside world. The criteria for entering both NATO and the EU required a record of fairness toward key groups within the population . One major conflict was the relationship between Czechs and the Roma. A number of well-publicized incidents have raised questions about Czech attitudes and policies. For example, the erection of a wall by Czechs in Ustf nad Labem in 1999 became a foreign policy incident as well as a temporary setback to pursuit of EU membership. It was clear that the wall was intended to prevent Czechs from having to view the Rom a population as well as their Iife-sty le. Attention to such iss ues was necessary in li ght of integration into western institutions. Development of a robust political culture on foreign policy questions remained another challenge to the new state. One s ignificant new factor was the emerge nce of a visible public opinion on foreign policy questions. In genera l, the public was supportive of the new linkages with western institutions. However, there were some differences that were sign ifi ca nt. Public opinion polls over time demonstrated a stabl e level of support for EU entry . However, before 1999 support for entry into NATO was less impressive. 107 Events of 1999 made some difference. In that year the Czech Republic actually en- ' 07 See Caro l Skalnik Leff, The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State (Bou lder. Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), p 263. SLOVAKIA 126 te red NATO , a nd th e Kosovo bo mbin g ca mpa ig n imm edi a te ly occurred . Suc h proximity to th e wars in the Ba lkan s made Czec hs somewhat more like ly to think pos iti ve ly abo ut NATO entry. Th ere were a lso uniqu e e ffo rts to build suppo rt within the po litical culture for certain fore ig n poli cy instituti o ns. One abiding problem was the negative set of Czec h attitudes abo ut the ro le of the military. C zec h resentme nt of the military is unde rstand abl e in li g ht o f the long years of the Sov ie t military prese nce afte r 1968 . Al so , after 1989 th e So vie t military left a catastro phe in many Czec h co mmu niti es. The barracks a nd o the r fac iliti es were in te rribl e co nditi o n, and individu a l Sovi et units had ta ke n anythin g of va lue fro m those locati o ns. One effort to build mo re pos iti ve Czec h attitudes abo ut the military too k pl ace in So uth Bo he mi a. A c iti ze n group ca ll ed S AS was fo rmed in 1997. The a im of the group was to de mon strate th at the Czec h military was a contributin g in strume nt in a de mocra ti c state rather than mere ly an in strume nt o f power. The SAS established link s to sc hoo ls and uni versities with the obj ec tive of c ultiv atin g a mo re pos iti ve attitude abo ut the C zech military. It set up co nfere nces and a lso co nsulted spec ia li sts from o the r nati o ns. In fac t, o ne res ult o f thi s acti vity was the creation of spec ial ti es betwee n the c ity o f Ces ky Kruml o v in the Czec h Republi c and Mi a mi Beac h in the State of Fl o rida, USA . A public e xcha nge of ideas abo ut the rol e of th e military could gene rate more in fo rmed C zech perspec ti ves about the va lue of a strong defense capability to cope w ith new threats. 108 Mo re positive attitudes about th e military wo uld fac ilitate integ rati o n into western o rgani zati o ns such as NATO. Slovakia The creati o n of po liti ca l stability was a greater c ha lle nge for Sl ovaki a than it was fo r the Czec h Republi c . In the C zec h case continuity of leadership from the 1989-93 period to th e post-1989 pe riod ' 08 J. Yondro us. .. Regionaln f dimenze ceskeho atl anti smu.'· M inisterst vo zahranicnfch vecf(2002). h ttp: //wwW .lllZ V.C/. March 2002 . SLOVAKIA 127 contributed to stability. In the Slovak case continuity of leadership undermined rather than supported stability. Vladimfr Meciar had been the chosen Slovak leader in the two years immediately after the 1989 revolution. His new party, Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), did very well in the 1992 elections, and this enabled him again to become Prime Minister once Slovakia became an independent state in 1993 . He was reluctant to reform in any comprehensive way the centrally planned economy, and thus privatization was very slow. In addition, his government included " many of the old regime ' s cadres, resources, and xenophobic ideologies intact. " 109 Meciar fell from power in the spring of 1994, and a caretaker government under Jozef Moravcfk managed public affairs until the fall elections. Again, the voters returned a coalition government headed by Meciar and the HZDS to power, and this government lasted through the next elections in 1998. In this period Meciar basically put the brakes both on democratization and on the movement of the economic system towards free market principles. The political experiences of the first half decade of independence had major consequences for foreign policy, as Slovakia made very slow progress on the criteria that both NATO and the EU presented to it. During the I 998-2002 period , a coalition led by the Social Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU) took the leading role in government, after the public rebuffed Meciar for a third time. Mikulas Dzurinda as Prime Minister gradually moved Slovakia back onto the path towards western institutions. He emerged again as Prime Minister after the fall 2002 elections , and so the steady movement toward NATO and the EU remained unchanged. Meciar and the HZDS were still prominent and in fact received in 2002 both the largest share of the popular vote ( 19.5 %) and the highest number of seats in the I 50 seat legislature (36). His rhetoric on foreign policy was more muted in this campaign , but numerous warnings emanated from NATO and ,m Rudolf L. Tokes. " From Visegrad to Krakow: Cooperation, Competition , and Coexi stence in Central Europe," Problems of Communism 40( 1991 ), pp. 100-114. SLOVAKIA 128 the EU leade rship a bo ut the imp licati o ns of a new governme nt in whic h the HZ DS pl ayed a ny rol e at a ll. In late Septe mber work began o n a coa liti o n th at would in c lude Dzu rinda's S DK U, the C hristi a n De mocrati c Uni o n (KDH), A lli a nce fo r ew C itize ns (A 0), and the Hungari an Coa liti o n (SMK). In earl y October thi s fo ur-party coa litio n fo rged an ag reeme nt abo ut executi ve pos iti o ns, and the new governme nt was in pl ace. A ll of these arra nge me nts were a imed to keep Sl ova ki a o n a stead y trac k in es tabli shin g its new, wes te rn o rgani zatio na l connectio ns in fore ig n poli cy. 11 0 Whil e the Czechs had been press ured by the o utside world o n the matte r of the Ro ma, Slovaks were c riti c ized fo r the ir treatment of the Hun garian mi no rity. Aga in , the Mec iar periods were suspec t in th is regard . Otto Ulc1 11 ex pl a in s thi s situ ati o n by notin g th at afte r 1968 Slova ks were not pro min e nt in the di ss ide nt moveme nt th at e mphasized hum a n ri ghts. Part of the pro bl e m was a lso the lack of ex perie nce of S lova ks in the Czechoslovak dipl o mati c corps. The leaders may have not understood full y the way in whi ch Slova ki a's domesti c record o n mino rity re lati o ns, the e nviro nme nt , a nd autho ritari ani sm in ge ne ra l influe nced fo re ign percepti o ns as we ll as fo re ig n po li cy objecti ve . 11 2 In another respect, the Slovak governme nt d urin g th at peri od was quite ce ntra li st o n the matter o f th e ri g hts of reg io ns within the country. The re is so me iro ny in thi s, fo r th e HZDS had been very ant i-federa li st (a nti -ce ntra list) after its e merge nce in April 199 1. 11 3 In that ea rli er time, the ta rget had bee n the a ll eged centrali st reg ime in Prag ue, s ince the Czec hos lovak state was still intact. Ev ide nce of Mec iar 's centra li st po li c ies li es primaril y in hi s po licy towards the 110 RFE/RL ewsline. Part II. September 24. 2002; October 8, 2002. Archived at http://\\\\w.11°erl.org September. October. 2002. 111 Otto Ulc. " The Bumpy Road ofCzechoslovaki a·s Velvet Revolution ," Problems of Communism 41 ( 1992). pp. 19-3 3 111 See Adrian Hyde Price. The International Politics of East Central Europe (New York: M anchester Uni versity Press, 1996), p. 28. 11 3 Ulc,"The Bumpy Road of Czechoslovakia ' s Ve l vet Revoluti on ." p. 29. SLOVAKIA 129 eastern part of Slovakia. In the mid- I 990s that region became interested in participating in a large Carpathian Euroregion. Other players in the Euroregion wo uld include Romania , Hungary , Poland , and Ukraine. However, the Slovak Ministry of the Interior was quite critical of that orientation. In 1995 that Ministry abo li shed the Slovak Carpathian Regional Association that had co nsisted of a number of regional and local governments in eastern Slovakia. As a result, in 1996 the Slovak representatives in the Euroregion resigned and Slovakia cancel led its participation. Meciar took these actions because of a double suspicion. First, he was suspic ious that the eastern Slovak metropolis of Kosice would lead eastern Slovakia to develop its own independent foreign policy . Second, he feared that Hungary would use the Euroregion to exp loit the anger of the Slovak Hungarian minority . 114 Such att itudes and policies of the top leadership would not mesh well with the EU and its priority on the rights of regions within countries. However, after the 1998 elections the Slovak leadership reflected more sensitivity toward the political culture. For exam ple, Slovaks were aware after 1998 of the need to incorporate domestic non-governmenta l gro ups (NGO 's) into the increasingly public discussion of foreign policy . Thi s was particularly the case in the efforts to ga in admiss ion to NATO. Younger persons were a special target of efforts at political soc ialization . Teachers in middle schools organized essay contests about the sig nific ance of NATO . Organized debates about NATO themes took pl ace in both middle and upper schools. Further, the government set up twe lve information centers that were aimed at youn ger persons. According to one observer, regional projects abo ut NATO by 2002 had reached 120,000 students. Similar discuss ions were aimed at women's groups . For example, profess ional women in Bratislava as we ll as the Union of Women of S lovakia engaged in discussions on the mea nin g and significance of NATO . The mass "" See A lexander Duleba, 'The Slovak-Ukraini an-Russian Security Tri angle." in M argarita M. Balmaceda, ed ., On the Edge: Ukrainian-Central European-Russian Security Triangle (Budapest: Central European Univers ity, 2000), pp. I 06- I 09. SLOVAKIA 130 medi a also pl ayed a ro le in thi s process. T wo major national telev ision projects were aimed at promoting di sc uss ion of NATO the mes. Furthe r, additi o na l in fo rm ati on proj ec ts we re bea med at the populati on through thi rty loca l te lev ision stati ons. The re was even an effort to pull ex pe rts and speciali sts into the di scuss ion. 115 The hope was th at these gro up s wo uld communicate pos iti ve attitudes abo ut NATO to the ir peers a nd e ve n in the ir publicat ions. S imil arl y, after the Nice EU Summit at the e nd of 2000 , Slo vaki a establi shed the Nation al Conve nti on. Its mi ssion e ntail ed stimul ati on of a nati o nal di scuss ion on the E U and Slovak nati o nal inte rests. The di scuss ion was to be in c lu s ive in which po liti ca l party me mbe rs, acade mi cs, c hurc hes , interest gro ups, non- governme nta l orga ni zati o ns, trade union s, muni cipalities, and reg ions all pl ayed a ro le. 11 6 Comparison Both co untries confronted major po litica l chall e nges th at affected fore ign po licy prospects. In both cases there was outside scrutin y and suspi c io n througho ut the first decade abo ut the way in whi c h their governme nts treated key minority gro ups. C riteri a fo r admi ssion to wes te rn orga ni zati ons required prog ress in thi s area. Both countri es a lso ex pe ri e nced maj or c ha nges in governme nt. In the Czech case such cha nges d id not affect very much the steady process of integration w ith the West. Slovak governme ntal changes had more of an impact. In addition , the continuin g presence of Vl adimfr Meciar and the HZDS had the net effect of postponin g Slovaki a's integrati on with western institution s until the late 1990s. Finally , cultivation of positive attitudes within the po liti ca l c ulture became a priority once the leadership made the dec ision to look in a westward direction . In th e Czec h case thi s spotli ght on po liti ca l culture was a 115 • Organ izacie a instituc ie, ktorym bola udelena Strieborn a plaketa M inisterstva zahranicnych vecf Slovenskej republ iky di\a 20. juna 2002," M inisterst vo zah ranicnych vecf(2002). http://www.mzv .sk Oc tober 2002. 116 " Narodny ko nvent o Evropskej buducnosti Slovenska," Ministerst vo zahranicnych vecf (2002). http://www.mzv.sk October 2002. SLOVAKIA 131 constant theme throughout the decade, but in the Slovak case it was only characteristic of the second half of the decade. Economic Factors and Foreign Policy of the Two Nation-States The Czech Republic In the years following th e 1989 revo lution , the Klau s government made eco nomi c restructurin g in Czechoslovakia a major priority. Privati zation and the use of vouchers placed formerly state-controlled industries in private hand s. Job sec urity yie lded to the greater uncertainty connected with the free market. It became more like ly that industries would ri se and fa ll on the ir own merits, while artifi cial control of prices was no longer the norm. 11 7 Thus, major economic changes had deve loped their own momentum at the time the Czechs separated from Slovakia, and they bore the potenti al to have a major impact on foreign policy. For exampl e, ga inin g admission to the EU became a top priority as a result of the new geographic and eco nomi c developments. Very soon Brusse ls presented to the eastern countries its Iist of thirty-one chapters in the "acqui s communautaire" process. Czech leaders began to meet regularl y with EU bureaucrats in order to demonstrate progress toward s meeting the criteria of eac h of the chapters. Usually twice a year the EU represe ntatives came to the Czech Republic to inspect progress made and to iss ue judgments about the relative rank of the nation on the li st of EU prospects from that region. By the end of the 1990s, the Czech Republic ranked near the top of the prospec ti ve li st of new members, and membership appeared like ly by 2004. In fac t, in October of 2002 the EU Commission announced that the Czech Republic would be one of the ten nation s admitted in 2004. 11 8 Czech involvement in the EU 's PHARE and ERBD investment projects was of particular significance. Invo lve ment in the wider EU market would 117 See Bernard Wheaton and Zdenek Ka van , The Velvet Revolution: Czechoslo- vakia 1988- /99 1 (Boulder. Colorado: Westvi ew Press, 1992) , pp. 139-143. 118 Sueddeutsche Zeitung, October 9, 2002. Arch i ved at: http://sueddeutsche .de October 2002. 132 SLOVAKIA multipl y the steps taken by the Czech governme nt in co nvers ion to capitali sm and th ereby open up additional new in vestment opportunities in othe r nations. At the same time , eve ntua l EU membership woul d lead to add ition al western investments, and important ones had come about already in the 1990s. For example , in 1994 th e German automobil e company Volkswagen bought majo rity co ntrol of the o ld Czech mega-compan y Skoda . Whil e the agree ment did guarantee the Germans majority control , it also provided the Czechs with a veto over future policy dec ision s. 11 9 Similarly, Air France took over the Prague Airport Ruzyne and made it into a modern facility. Early in the twenty-first century the A merica n company Motorola began construction of a fac tory in Moravia in the area of the Beskydy Mountains. Much news accompanied the buy -out of severa l well known breweries, including Pil sner Urque ll , by South Africa n enterprises. Certainly , one by- product of this western indu stri a l and financial in vo lvement would be the rapid infusion of western tec hniques and know-how in manag ing an economy on capitali st princi pl es. A ll of thi s would acce lerate the type of domestic economic restructuring that would more qui ck ly meet EU criteria. The outreach of the changing Czech economy was not confined exclusively to its European nei ghborhood. For instance, in the mid l 990s the Czech Re publi c became a member of UNESCO. In th at capac ity it took a particular interest in the plight of the ravaged nations that had e merged from the old Yugoslavia. This ac ti vity led to membership as well in the Organi zat ion for Economic Cooperati on and Developme nt (OECD ). In fact , the Czechs were the first from the Central E uropean region to ga in membership in th at organi zation. Linkages between the Czech Republic and the Internati onal Monetary Fund (IMF) e nh anced their reputation for reliabi lity. In A ugus t 1994, the natio n was the first post-communist state to pay off its 11 9 Leff. The Czech and Slo vak Republics: Nation Vers us State. p. 263. SLOVAKIA 133 initial IMF loan . 120 Again, involvement with the larger universe of western capitalist economies outside the immediate geographic region paid dividends in terms of domestic economic change. In sum, the revolution of 1989, combined with the loss of Slovakia in 1993, generated a rapid rate of economic change in the Czech Republic. Conversion to capitalist economic principles was inevitable after the 1989 events, but the process received a number of important stimuli. Interest in joining NATO and the drive for EU membership mandated that the nation meet specific criteria in terms of capitalist development. Investments by western firms outside the nation led to collaborative efforts in which Czech managers could more fully see the capitalist system in action. Involvement in the economic projects of a number of global organizations, primarily located in the West, expanded Czech horizon s in a positive way. All of thi s offered a powerful economic antidote to the much more restricted COMECON framework that was characteristic of the Cold War. Slovakia For a number of reasons , Slovakia looked east for economic links rather than west after the 1993 split. This had also been true after the 1989 revolution. Slovak leaders noted that their country was the only Yisegrad member that bordered all of the other three. Such a perception encouraged them to think about a potential Slovak role as the ideal country to be a bridge between East and West. The collapse of COMECON led the Slovaks to hope for a replacement in the form of special ties with Russia and Ukraine. The look eastward made Slovakia "more sensitive to developments in the CIS." 12 1 At the same time, EU import quotas were having a negative impact on certain Slovak industries such as a steel mill in Kosice, and that created some suspicion about the West. 122 120 Leff, The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State, p. 258. 12 1 Price, The International Politics of East Central Europe, p. 170. 122 Leff, The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State, p. 261. 134 SLOVAKIA One concrete manifestation of thi s economic orie ntatio n to the East was cultivation of a spec ial link to Ru ss ia. A key motive for this outreach was the pli g ht of the Slovak arms industry . At the time of the 1989 revolution , o ne hundred e leven of Czec hoslo va ki a ' s weapon s manufacturing pl a nts were in the Slovak region . As early as 1990, weapo ns sa les from those pl ants had declined from 1988 leve ls from eight billio n dollars to one billion . This situ ation prompted Meciar to trave l to Moscow in 1991 in order to get defe nse co ntracts to make up some of thi s loss. 123 In fact , the sub sequent recess io n became part of the reason that Slovak leaders sought separation from the Czechs. Further, the Slovak military hoped that Ru ss ia might give Slovakia li ce nses to se ll military ha rdw are to third world countries. 12~ Eventu a ll y, Pres ident Bo ri s Yeltsin of Ru ss ia visited Slovaki a in Aug ust 1993, and one res ult was the sig nin g of a bilatera l state treaty. In add iti o n, the two states s ig ned a fi ve-yea r military cooperation agree me nt. The latter would po te nti a ll y assist Slovakia economically, for it would he lp rev ive its arm s industry . One fea ture of the agree me nt was the provis io n that Ru ss ia would suppl y spare parts for th e Slovak milita ry. 125 Other Slovak goa ls in c lud ed development of a Slovak role in tran sporting Ru ss ian natural gas to Western Europe. In part, Mec iar hoped that the flirtation with Ru ss ia mi g ht increase Slovakia ' s econo mi c importance to th e West a nd attract in vestme nts from that direction as well. 126 Cultivation of ties to Ukrai ne a lso became part of thi s new economi c strategy. Early afte r th e revolution Meciar soug ht to build a new railway from Brati slava to Ukraine by utili zing the for mer Soviet ra il network. 127 By the middl e 1990s Slovak leaders began to think in broader terms. Perh aps Ukra ine could act as well as the gate- 12 .1 See Andrew A. Michta. East Central Europe after the Warsaw Pact: Security Dilemmas in the 1990s (New York: Greenwood Press. 1992 ). p. 107. 12 "' Duleba, ·'The Slovak-Ukrainian-Ru ssian Security Tri angle: · p. 20. 125 Price, The International Politics o f East Central Europe. p. 170. 126 Duleba, ''The Slovak-Ukrainian-Ru ssian Security Triangle." pp. 85-8 6. 127 Price. The International Politics of East Central Europe. p. 170. SLOVAKIA 135 way to the Ru ss ian market. 128 For many Slovaks, Ukraine was in a sense still Ru ss ia, and thu s economic policies toward s the two we re intertw ined. In spite of the eastward look in economic policy, western organi zation s were not totall y ignored. For example, in June 1993 Sl ovaki a was accepted into the Council of Europe. Then in June 1995 , th e M ec iar government submitted a membership appli cati on to the EU . Reliance on in ves tments from western countries rein forced thi s economic policy dimension. K ey economic in vestors in the 1990s included, in rank order , Germ any, A ustri a, and th e Czech Repu bli c. 129 Despite Slovaki a's approach to the East, the W est was in many ways more helpful. Seri ous di sc uss ions w ith the EU rea ll y began in 1997 w ith th e Lu xembourg Summit. A t th at meeting the EU placed Slovaki a in a second ti er of si x nati ons, and so it looked as if Sl ovaki a wo uld have to wa it longer then its Czech co unterpart, w ho ended up in the first ti er of si x. Contacts w ith the EU acce lerated after the defea t of the M ec iar government in 1998. A multilateral screening process by the EU took pl ace between April 1998 and February 1999, and thi s gave way to more signifi ca nt bil ateral screenin g procedu res between M arch of 1999 and Febru ary of 2000. 130 In the 2000-2002 period Slovaki a worked its way th rough most of the thirty-one chapters of th e EU 's aqui s co mmunautaire. For exa mpl e, di sc uss ions about Chapter Four ce ntered on future poss ibilities that fore igners could control Sl ovak land and corresponding poss ibilities fo r Slovak s to purchase land w ithin th e EU. Fo ll ow in g the 1998 elec ti ons th e chances of mee tin g the goa ls of Ch apter Si x we re enhanced, as Slovaki a moved more firml y in the direc ti on of erec tin g a market economy. Chapter Seven on agri cultu re was a criti ca l one for Slovak ia as it was for most of the other nati ons in the region. Sl ovak s 12 " 129 1.'<, Du leba. ··The Slovak-Ukrainian-Russian Security Triangle." p. 97 . Leff. The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State. p. 262. '·Fazy proces u rozs irova ni a EU ," M inisterstvo za hra11ic11yc h vecf (2002) . hllp ://www. 1111. v.,k Oc tober 2002. SLOVAKIA 136 soug ht promises of an ad mini stra ti ve structure that wou ld e nsure protect ion of the ir agric ultural sys tem . The politica l tran s iti on from the Mec iar governm e nt to th at of Dzurinda made sa ti sfac tion of Chapte r Thirteen more poss ibl e. Th at c hapter in vo lved worker 's ri g hts, ge nde r equ a lity, racia l justi ce, a nd other vita l categori es. Sl ovak ia rece ived spec ia l in stru c tion s within th e framework of Chapter Fifteen. Th e EU requ es ted th a t Slo va ki a acce lera te pri vati za ti o n of ba nk s as we ll as na tural reso urce mo nopoli es. Further, it was ex pected th at Slovakia wo uld build up small and medium s ized firm s w hil e e nco urag in g add iti o na l fo re ig n in vestme nt. 13 1 Comparison The Czec h Republic and Slo vaki a did move on separate paths in terms of the economi c dime nsion of fo re ign policy for a large part of the first decade after separation . In fac t, so me of their sharpe r differences e merged in the fo ur years after the 1989 revo luti on prior to the 1993 breakup. In the post- 1993 atmosphere the Czechs quickl y latched on to western organi zati ons in order to map out their future. S lovaki a, with its differe nt geographi c position and greater nostalgia for the lost economic links to the form er Soviet Union , c ultivated the Ukra ine and Russ ia as part of a ge nera l orientation to the east. Both di sappointme nt with the East and th e ex pe rien ce of th e 1998 elections brought the Slovak path much c loser to that of the Czechs . One sy mbo l of thi s shift was the progress made by both states in th e 1998-2002 pe riod towa rd me mbership in the EU . By September of 2002 the Czech Re public had c losed twe nty-fi ve of the thirty most s ignifi cant c hapters th at led to EU me mbership. Surprising ly, Slovaki a had closed twe nty-seven. Slo vakia 's progress had bee n very rapid, for the Czechs had ac tu all y closed eightee n of the chapters before Slovakia had . An important resu lt was th at Sl ova kia moved 131 " Ka ndid atske krajiny a ic h ak tu alny stav negoc iac if," Ministe,:~tvo w hranicnj ch vecf (2002). http ://www.111zv.~k Jul y 30. 2002. SLOVAKIA 137 from the second ti er of six pote nti al EU members to the first ti er of ten between 1997 and the autumn of 2002. T he re port of the EU Commiss ion on October 9, 2002, bas ica ll y treated both countri es as if they were at simil ar leve ls of pre paredness for EU entry in earl y 2004. 132 Both co untries ge nera ll y rece ived pos iti ve reports and were firml y in the group o f ten nati ons to be admitted at the sa me time in 2004. National Security Factors and the Foreign Policy of the Two States The Czech Republic Separati on fro m S lovak ia led to an immed iate series of ste ps aimed at underpinnin g the natio nal sec urity of the new, smaller Czech state. T hroughout th e first decade after the separati on, the sec urity spotli ght shi fted from an emph as is on the Wes tern European Unio n (W EU), to the ca mpaign fo r NATO me mbership , and later to cons iderat ion of th e ro le of th e Co mmon Fore ign and Sec urity Po li cy (CFS P) of th e EU. 133 ln additi o n, Czec hs bega n to in vo lve themse lves more full y in international organi zati ons such as the UN, OSCE , and Y isegrad . T hu s th e nati o na l sec urity age nd a was crowded. Czech disc uss ions abo ut defense po licy in the earl y 1990s centered in part on the W EU , an organi zati on that had e merged in 1948 with the Brusse ls Treaty. On the o ne hand , EU pl anners at the begi nning of the 1990s envisioned the WEU in a ce ntra l ro le in ass istin g Europe to take responsibility fo r its ow n sec urity. On the other hand , others hoped that the WEU could he lp create mo re conse nsus with NATO as well as support for NATO mi ss ions. 134 rn RFE/RL News line. Part II. October 10. 2002. Archived at: h1tp ://www.rferl.org October 2002. rn See Dav id S. Mason , Revolution and Transition in East Central Europe. Second Edi tion (Bou lder, Colorado : Westview Press, 1996), pp. 95-98. " 4 K arel Pezl, " Ceska repub li ka a zapadoevropske unie: bezpecnostnf aspek ty, " Mezinarodnf Politika 18( 1994). pp. 25-26. 138 SLOVAKIA By the late 1990s discu ss ions within the Czech Re public about admission to NATO overshadowed conversations about the fading WEU. Admission to NATO in 1999 brought with it a whole set of new obligations. There was a need to prepare defense legislation that would move the Czech defense structure toward the level of NATO standard s. New military pe rso nnel requirements mandated that the Czech defense sector prepare courses for a ll ranks about the changing role of the military. Training in the use of radar was also upgraded. Further, the Czech Republic would need to build a crisis command center that would facilitate the rapid sharing of information between NATO and the Czech Republic. It would also be necessary for the Czechs to build a sys tem of command and control that paralleled the organizations in other NATO countries. 135 Immediately after expansion to include three new members in 1999, NATO had an opportunity to utilize these new national resources during the Kosovo bombing campaign . One lesson of that campaign was increased awareness of th e asymmetry of capabilities within the alliance. 136 America provided eighty per cent of the bombs dropped on Kosovo in the spring of 1999 as well as ninety per cent of the weapons. U. S. airplanes were the only ones that could operate in all weather. Lowered European defen se budgets in the 1990s resulted in a situation in which all European NATO members contributed only two-thirds of the fundin g that the United States did to defen se. The Czech Republic responded to this imbalance by developing a blueprint for change in 2001. That plan called for a rapid upgrade in mane uverability of units, logistical strength, placement of weaponry and pe rsonnel , ability to resist over a lon g period, and information command and control. Further, the Ministry of Defense drew up a li st of four principles that would guide Czech participation rn Antonin Sverak . ··vnej sf a vnitfnf aspekty zac lenovanf resortu obrany CR do NATO," Mezimfrodnf Vztahy 2( 1999). pp. 13-3 1. 136 See Otto Pick, ·· NATO, evropska obrana a poucenf K osova." CR po vstupu do NATO. Uvahy a problemy (Praha: Ceska Atlanticka Komise UMY. 2000), pp. 2532. SLOVAKIA In 139 NATO. Th ey inc luded co ntinu ed in vo lvement of the two North American powers in the defe nse of Europe, reliance on NATO as the main guarantor of European security , subordination of the CFSP of the EU within the framework of NATO , a nd guara nteed access to NATO capabi lities for all EU defense and sec urity mi ss ion s. 137 Recog nition of the important Czech role in NATO was evident in the dec ision to hold the conference of Nove mber 2002 in Prague. At that meeting seve n additional nati ons joined the military alliance. Finally, durin g th e war in Iraq in 2003, th e Czechs sent an anti-biolog ical , chemical , and nuclear weapon s unit as well as a fi eld hospital. By the early 1990s, the EU began to outline plans for its own defe nse structure, one that would be independent of the North Atlantic nation s th at had for so lon g domin ated NATO. These plans centered on the creation in 1990 of th e Common Forei gn and Security (CFS P) of the EU . In 1993 the Treaty of Europe called for the addition to the CFSP of pe rm ane nt officials from the EU Council Secretariat as well as of fiftee n diplomats from each Fore ign Ministry. 138 In early 2001 the Czech Foreign Mini ster made a persuasive case for the natural harmony between the broad-rang ing objectives of the CFSP and the specific, national inte rests of the Czec h Republic. 139 For him the current spirit of cooperation in Europe was a needed antidote to the suffer in g of the Czechoslovak people during the twe nti e th century. Throu gh the CFSP, the Czech Re public would ga in both assistance in its multi-pronged process of development and also the opportunity to co ntribute to regional probl e m so lvin g. He did not e nvision participation in European and Atlantic structures as a threat to Czech national inte rests. In particul ar, the Dece mber 2000 Nic e Summit ge nerated orga ni zati o na l c han ges in EU institution s 117 Jaromfr Novotny, "' DCI (Defense Capabiliti es Initiative) a Cesk,\ Republika." Mini sterstvo zahranicnfch vecf (2002). http://www.1111v.u March 2002 . 1" See Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler. The European Un ion as a Global Actor (L ondon: Routledge. 1999). pp. 169- 196. iw -''Jan K avan. ·'Ceska zahrani cnf politika na prahu 2 1. stoletf."' Mez inarodnf Politikil 25(200 I ). pp. 4-5. 140 SLOVAKIA that would continue to break down the artificial barriers that divided Europe during the Cold War. Growin g European military stren gth would s imultaneou sly contribute to an increase in Czech capabi lities. 140 Slovakia In spite of the fact that so much of the defense industry had been located in the Slovak areas during the Co ld War and into the immediate post-1989 revolution period, the leadership ex peri ence of Slovaks on defen se matters had been re lative ly slim . For instance, in I 99 1 Slovak so ldiers constituted 34.7 % of the federa l Czechoslovak army. However, the representation of Slovak manage rs within the Ministry of Defense over several years ranged from on ly 5 to 23 %. 141 In the early years after separation , Slovaks were primarily focused on reestabli shing or maintaining ties with the East. Previously mentioned political ties to Ru ss ia, Ukraine, and Yi segrad see med to offer them a non-western prescription for protecting national sec urity. The Slovaks rea ll y only went through the motion s of taking part in so me western sec urity structures. For example, like th e Czech Republic , Slovakia became an Assoc iate Partner in the WEU and reg ul arl y attended its meetings. Although Associate Members he ld no voting power within the organization , they did have the ri ght to plan and execute military operations. 142 Contac ts between Slovakia and NATO were minimal and bas ically centered on only a few reciprocal visits by key personnel during the three years before Meciar fel l from grace. The most impor- 140 Pavel Teli cka, " Aktualni stav jednani o pristoupeni CR k EU ," M ezimirodnf Politika 25(200 I ). 14 1 Michta, East Central Europe after the Warsaw Pact: Security Dilemmas in the 1990s, p. I 10. 142 See Philip H. Gordon, ·The Western European Union and NATO 's ' Europeanisation ," in Philip H. Gordon, ed., NATO 's Transformation : The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance (L ondon : Row man & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. , I 997), p. 26 1. SLOVAKIA 141 tant visit by a top NATO figure to Slovakia was the 1996 trip of Secretary-General Javier Solana . The most important Slovak trip was that by President Kovac to Brussels in 1996 to meet with top NATO personnel. After the 1998 elections and the establishment of a new government under Mikulas Dzurinda, the pace of contacts picked up. In early 2002, Slovakia hosted visits by the unified NATO European commander General Dieter Stockman ; by General Joseph Ralston, the commander of NATO forces in Europe; and by Deputy NATO Minister Nicholas Burns. In turn, Slovak leaders who made their way to NATO Headquarters included incoming Prime Minister Dzurinda in 1998 and President Schuster in 1999 and again in 2002. 143 Another key component of the post- I 998 , systematic Slovak move toward s NATO involved the Membership Action Plan (MAP) Process. In early 1999 Slovakia presented a five-point plan that included a strategy for political/economic issues, defense/military question s, resources/capabilities, security challenges, and legal matters. In April of 1999, NATO accepted that MAP and the Slovak government followed suit in June of the same year. The National Program for the process of NATO entry was finalized in April of 2000. 144 Finalization of the MAP process led to many meetings over the next few years. Additional activity after 1998 centered on galvanizing public support for entry into the military alliance. Slovakia held a grants competition to enable NGO' s to raise public awareness of the significance of NATO entry. Support for entry came officially from a total of seventy-five Roma organizations. One result of all thi s activity was a rel atively high level of public support for joining the organization . Between the fall of 200 I and the spring of 2002 , support reflected in public opinion poll s rose from 52.2 % to 60.7 %, although it 143 " M edznfky spoluprace SR a NATO," Ministerstvo zahranicnych vec f (2002). http ://www.rnzv.sk October 2002. 144 " Chrono logicky prehl'ad PREN AME," Ministerstvo zahranicnych vecf(2002). http ://www.mzv.,k October 2002. 142 SLOVAKIA declined a bit a few month s later. 145 All of this attention to visits, organizational matters, and public opinion enabled Slovakia to make up for its lack of attention an d interest in NATO during the midI 990s. In addition , during the latter part of the 1990s, Slovakia took part in severa l important peacekeeping missions under NATO leadership. This involvement demonstrated that the nation would possess the level of commitment required of new NATO members. After completion of the Dayton Accord on Bosnia in 1995, Slovakia se nt some military personnel and equipment as part of SFOR to the area of operations. At the end of 1997, it sent three Army engineers and five army specialists in the field of civil-military cooperation. In the fall of 2002 Slovakia made its first Air Force contribution to a NATO mis sion. The capabilities it sent included a helicopte r unit with two helicopte rs and twenty-one assoc iated personnel. Slovakia promised to keep that contingent in Bosnia for the next six months. Involveme nt in KFOR after the Kosovo bombin g campaign in late 1999 was even more extensive. The initial commitment included forty Army engineers , a nd di spatch of an additional four persons at the command level one year later. A major upgrade occurred in early 2002 with the creation of a five hundred person Czech-Slovak rapid reaction battalion . The Slovak role in that force included twenty per cent of the overall membership, and the vast majority of those were doctors, conductors, mechanics, and logi stics specialists. The vital mi ss ions of that battalion centered on sec uring the Serb-Kosovo border, monitoring a range of activities, assuring stable conditions for the return of refugees, policing the civil serv ice, and protecting the Serb minority. 146 Thi s particular operation would provide man y lessons that would assist Slovakia in making important contributions as a full NATO member. Finally , in the sprin g of 2003 , Slovakia dispat145 " Chronologicky prehl'ad PREN AME," Ministerstvo zahranicnych veer (2002). http ://www.mzY.sk October 2002 . 146 " Ucast' SR v operaciach na podporu mieru pod vedenfm NATO," Ministerstvo zahranicnych vecf(2002). h11p ://www.111zv.sk October 2002. SLOVAKIA 143 ched military personnel to the Pers ian Gulf durin g the co ntro versial war in Iraq. Comparisons Czech pursuit of national sec urity followed a unidirect io nal path during the first decade a fte r se parati o n from Slovakia. Its leade rs thou ght proacti ve ly in eac h part of the decade about a co ntributin g role in the maj or defe nse opti ons ava il ab le at the time. This mea nt that much of the di sc uss ion foc used on activity within the framework of W EU in the first years after the breakup . Once NATO ad mi ss ion became a real possibility , the Czec hs set the ir eyes on th at orga ni zation . F in all y, as EU membership approac hed early in the new century, more of th e di sc uss ion centered o n the CFSP, a progra m that offered a European sec urity cho ice th at was inde pe nde nt of Ameri can leade rship. In the Slovak case the emp hasis on re-stoking ti es with Ukraine and Ru ss ia at first prec luded seri ous discussion about western sec urity o rga ni zati o nal structures . Once the 1998 e lect ions offered the chance for a new policy, Slovak ia ' s outreach to the West in the defe nse area mainl y took the for m of a se ri ous effort to jo in NA TO. Achi eve me nt of that goa l at the e nd of 2002 e nab led Slovakia to adopt the multi -pron ged , western-oriented strategy utili zed by the Czechs fo r an e ntire decade. Conclusion The re is remark ab le cons iste ncy across the ra nge of va ri abl es that, for a time , divided the two nations. Those vari ables inc lude politi cs, economi cs, and nati o nal sec urity. It is clear th at the political va ri abl es were the driving force be hind the othe r two. Elec ti o n outcomes in the Czech Re public a nd Slovakia were quite different between 1992 and 1998. Those results acco unt primaril y for the very diffe rent foreign polic y path s a lon g which the two sets of fore ign policy elites traveled prior to 1998. Throu ghout the e ntire decade Czech po liti ca l leaders looked to the West fo r th eir future organi zati onal home. Politica l parti es debated the pace and nature of the march to the West but not its in ev i- SLOVAKIA 144 tability. As a result Czech economic connections with the West were forged throughout the entire period , and the Czec hs ke pt their sights set on EU membership consistently after 1993. The des ire to enter western sec urity structures entailed consideration of the WEU at first, then anticipation as well as achievement of NATO membership, and finall y thorough attention to the CFSP of the EU. S lovak leaders were at first ambiva lent and at times negati ve about connections to the West. In the 1992-98 period they attempted to resusc itate the old eco nomic ties with Ukraine and Ru ss ia. At the same time , they maintained a di stance from the states that were pursuing NATO membership at the earliest poss ible moment. Early hopes that the Visegrad alliance cou ld provide a measure of security for Slovakia di sappeared in 1999 when the other three members of that alli ance joined NATO. The election of 1998 changed Slovakia's forei gn policy path in very defi nite ways. It engaged in much more serious di sc ussions with the EU about progress on the thirty-one chapters of the acquis communautaire. A MAP leadin g to NA TO membership was approved by both that organization and the Slovak government. Although the Slovaks wou ld end up joining NATO three and one half years after the Czechs, both nation s would likely enter the EU at the same time. By the fall of 2002, both countries were not walking exactly on the sa me path , but the ir paths were c learly in view of one another. In conclusion, it is important, while acknowledg in g these differences prior to I 998, not to overstate them. For example, Timothy Frye 147 examined political polarization within all of the post-communi st co untri es. Hi s stud y covered the 1989-98 period , and thu s it included the time frame in which these two countries were moving in differe nt direction s. The political polari zation rating for the Czech Republic was 4.4, and for Slovakia it was 4 .9. Despite the sli ghtly higher rate for Slovaki a, he c lassified both countries as non-pol ari - 14 7 Timothy Frye, " The Price of Polarizati on: Economic Performance in the Post- Communist World," World Politics 54(2002). pp. 308-337 . SLOVAKIA 145 zed. The po lari zed co untri es inc luded Albania, Be laru s, Bul gari a, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Romani a, Ru ss ia, and Ukraine. Thi s is a signifi cant conclusion, for it he lps ex pl ain how two nati ons that seemed to be mov ing in such di ffe rent directi o ns after 1993 were able to adopt parall el paths by the end of the century. Perh aps the findin gs also revea l the wi sdom of those observers who chose to characteri ze the di vorce in 1993 as a "velvet" one.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Separate Paths: Czech and Slovak Foreign Policies Since 1993 Description An account of the resource James W. Peterson Slovakia, Vol. 38 (No. 70-71), 2005 pp. 121-145 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Peterson, James W. (James Walter), 1945- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2005 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/d921c2674cb9cdd8b5f466434569a89d.pdf dbff8b3493ac8960d46e827c9a213670 PDF Text Text 104 SLOVAKIA "Ungrateful Younger Brothers" versus "Arrogant Atheists." Czech-Slovak Stereotypes in a Collective Memory Perspective. Lone Sarauw On January I , 1993 , Czechoslovakia was divided in a process that has been characterized as a "vel vet divorce. " 56 Compared to the ways in which other post-communi st states were fa lling apart at the time, thi s seems a va lid description . However , the split was ca used by severe confli cts betwee n the two parts of the state. Scholars have given a number of reasons for the di vo rce : I ) The Czech desire for democracy and a market economy clashed with Slovak insistence upon nati onal eq uality. 57 2) Despite grow ing macro-structu ra l simil ariti es, one Czechoslovak soc iety never managed to replace the Czech and Slovak soc ieti es that had been brought together in a com mon state. 58 3) Th e w inners of the parli amentary elec tion s in 1992, th e Sl ovak Vl adimfr Meciar and the Czech V aclav Kl aus, were unabl e to 56 See Otto U lc: "C zechos lovak ia' s ve l vet divorce. " East European Quarterly 30. September ( 1996). pp. 33 1-352. 57 5 " Ibid. Ji ff Mu sil : '"C zec h and Slovak Soc iety." in Jiff Mu sil (ed.): Th e End or Czechoslova kia (Budapest. L ondon, New York: Central European University Press 1995). 77-94. �SLOVAKIA 105 come to te rm s w ith the constitutional arrangement of Czechoslovakia, beca use they were unwillin g to put the interests of the common state before their own power ambi tions. 59 And more co uld be found. As a contrib uti on to the debate over the break-up, thi s artic le inte nd s to look at th e role of stereotypes and collective memory in it, the argument being that hi story was mobili zed in the media de bates prior to the partition , and that it happe ned in a way that en hanced the di ffere nces rather than the likenesses of the two peopl es.60 As a result of thi s th e population graduall y came to accept the partition of the common state, even if the majority of the population never supported it. 6 1 The concept "collective me mory" has been defi ned as "a soc iety 's co ll ected production of me mory," 62 whi ch suppli es the soc iety with a fee ling of belong ing together by sharing the same past. One of the probl e ms in Czec hoslovakia seems to have bee n the lack of such a feelin g of sharing the same past in both halves of the state. Despite the fact that, apart from World W ar II , Czechs and Slovaks lived together in one state between 19 18 and I 993 , their co ll ective me mories of this li fe together differ to a considerab le ex tent. 59 Abby Innes: ·'T he Breakup of Czechos lovakia: The Impac t of Party Development on the Separa ti on of the State," East European Politics and Societies (EEPS) , Vol. I I , No. 3, Fall ( 1997), 393-435 . 60 Si l via Mihali kova: •• arod ne symbo ly slovenskej statnosti", Politologicka revue 2, prosinec, ( 1996), 56. 61 An opi ni on poll from Jul y 1992 shows th at 53 % of the Czechs and 42 % of the Slovaks w ished lo maintain th e co mmon state. whi le respecti ve ly 24 % and 32 % w ished the slate to be divided (Sharon W olchi k : ·The Politics of Transition and th e Break-U p of Czec hos lova ki a," in Ji ff Musi l (ed .): Th e End of' Czechos lova kia. (Budapest : Centra l European Universi ty Press 1995 , 233). 62 Claus Bry ld and Anette Warrin g: Besaette/sestiden som kollektiv erindring. Histo- rie- og traditionsfor va llning at' krig og besaettelse 1945- 1997. (Rosk ilde: Rosk ilde Uni versitetsforlag 1998), 19-20. �106 SLOVAKIA In the medi a debates in the peri od leading up to the break-up of C zec hos lovakia hi story , or rather memory ,63 was mobi Ii zed as proof of the inevitability and desirability of the divorce. Because thi s was the aim of the partic ipants of the debate, chrono logy was irre levant and hi story became ' hori zontali zed ' so to speak. As Silvia Mi halikova has formulated it, "osten sible or rea l sins committed centuries ago merge with wrongs done in th e last decades and are at the same time th e reaso n for today 's mi sunderstandin gs and hatred."64 Thus, the mobilization of past conflicts e nabl ed the two nation s to blame eac h other for their current probl ems, which is wh at thi s article intend s to show using examples from the literary newspapers of th e Czech Land s and Slovakia, Literarnf noviny and Literarny tyi- dennik,65 prior to the break-up. Wh en looking for archetypical examp les of the Czech and S lovak stereotypes or images of each other, the "arroga nt atheists" and " ungrateful younger brothers" of the headlines were the first ideas about the Czech and S lovak images of each other that came to mind . Therefore, it came as a surprise that it was rather imposs ibl e to find any examples of the stereotype of the Czechs as dangerous atheists they are presented as being arrogant, though. The lack of proof of the idea that the Slovak image of the Czec hs would see them as atheists 0 -' Pierre Nora has formu lated thi s di st incti on be tween history and memory in terms of a fund amen tal opposi ti on . .. Memory is life [ ... ] a bond tying us to the etern al presen t[ ... ] it is affec ti ve and mag ica l l and] onl y accom modates th ose facts that suit it .'' whereas hi story is .. the reconstru cti on , al ways problematic and incomplete j ... I a representati on of the past I th at I ca ll s fo r analys is and criti cism' ' (Pierre Nora: "Between Memory and H istory: Les Lieux de M emoire" . Representations Vol 0, No. 26 Special Issue: M emory and Cou nter-M emory. Spring ( I 989) , 8-9). A less ri gid di stincti on has been pro posed by A nne Erikse n. who sees hi story and memory as being equally important aspec ts of the co llecti ve memory th at combine to create the entire co llec ti ve memory (A nne Eriksen: Del var nae annet under krigen. 2. verdenskrig i norsk kollektivtradisjon. (Oslo: Pax 1995). r,., Mihalikova: ·'Narodne symboly," 55. 65 In the literary newspapers the past was mobili zed more obviously and cru dely but not in a different way th an in mos t other newspapers. Thus, they serve well as illustrations of a process that was happening in the press in general. �SLOVAKIA 107 was fru strating , and it raised the question where thi s idea came from. It stemmed from the Christian Democratic Movement (Kresfansko De mokraticke Hnutie, KOH) , which, according to Miroslav Kusy , wanted to protect Slovakia from " des tructive liberal and freethinking influences from the Czech Lands." Besides, the stereotype had been used frequently in the interwar period , but the industrialization and urbanization of Slovakia since then had turned the mostly rural soc iety into one where Catholics did not necessarily consider their interests as Catholics to be more important than their economic and cultural conditions. 66 Also, as Petr Prfhod a has stated , the image of the Czechs as atheists was a well-known Czech stereotype of the Slovak view of them ,67 indirectly testifyin g to a Czech stereotype of the Slovaks as ' religiou s. ' 68 The image that eventually turned out to be the most pervasive was one of the Czechs as Czechoslovakist69 colonialists exploiting Slovakia. And as colonialists, they were described as arrogant in wanting to rule over Slovakia, even though they did not know it properly. It should be pointed out that the difficulty in having the stereo- '"' Miroslav Ku sy: ··S lovak Exceptionalism". in Musil (ed.): The End. 147- 149 . See also Martin Butora and Zora Butorova: " Slovakia: The Iden tit y Chal lenges of the Newly Born State". Socia l Research. Vol. 60. No. 4, Winter ( 1993). 7 13-7 14. and Sona Szomol anyi: UParadox kon zervativi zmu na Slovensku .'· Domino Efekt. Vol. 2. No. 15. ( 1993). 4. 67 Petr Prfhoda: '·Mutual Perceptions in Czech -Slovak Relationships•·, in: Musil (ed.) : The End. 134. "" Al so th e nationali sti c Slovak news paper ··s Jovak Nation·• (Slovensky mirod) was checked for the atheist image. but it could not be found even here . This probably reflects the fact that the image was propagated by the KDH . which was a quite unpopu lar part y those days among its non -ad herents. and whic h was often reproached in Slovensky mirod. 69 As a way of legitimising th e new Czechos lovak Republic in 19 18, the doctrine of one Czechoslovak nati on w ith two branche s. a Czech and a Slovak one. was propa gated to comp ly wi th the intention of president Woodrow Wilson to gi ve national self-determinat ion to the nations of Cen tral and Eastern Europe . The doctrine was officia ll y abandoned onl y afler World War II. �108 SLOVAKIA types co nfirmed did not co ncern the Czech newspaper, the se l fimage of the Czechs as 'rational' notwithstanding. 70 The most co mmonl y cited example of the Czech perception of the Slovaks as ungra tefu l yo unger brothers was an article by the writer Lud vfk Vaculfk in Literarnf noviny from 1990 entitled: " Our Slova k Questi on. " 7 1 The first thin g to be noticed about Vaculfk 's article is the co ndescending tone of the titl e: The Slovak questi on is ' our ' ques ti on, that is ' us' meaning the Czechs , not the Slovak s. 72 Vaculfk beg ins his arti cle by definin g himself as being Czech by nation ality, but Czechoslovak as a citi ze n, but he nevertheless repeatedl y speaks in the name of ' us, th e Czec hs,' whi ch substanti all y weakens hi s claim to being a truly Czechoslovak citizen. Throu ghout hi s tex t, Vaculfk uses exampl es from hi story to argue for a separati on from the Slo vaks. First, he bl ames the Slovaks for never having dealt with the fasc ism of their wartime state ( 19391945). They escaped thi s obligation by rejoining the Czechs in Czechos lovakia, and wh en, after a few yea rs, they were forced into a communi st regime, they did not reall y mind , si nce they ga ined a lot more economicall y from co mmuni sm than did the Czechs. There is no inner log ic between these two situati ons other th an th e fac t th at Vaculfk 's description of them makes the Slovaks look as if they have no principl es, going more or less direc tl y from accepting fascism to accepting co mmuni sm. He co ntinues by bl ami ng the Slovaks fo r prey ing on the Czech s' struggle for democracy in 1968, since th e only reform that survived the W arsaw Pac t in vas ion was the federali zation of the state, " When we in I 968 tri ed to free ourse lves from 70 L adis lav Holy : The Lillie Czech and the Gre<I/ Czech Na tion. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996), 104. 71 72 " Nase slovenska otazka". Litenimf noviny (M ay 3, 1990). I +3 . Yacu l fk's titl e was in spired by the titl e of T.G. Masaryk ·s book ··The Czech Question" (C:eska otazka) from 1895 on the Czech rebirth in the 19th century and it outlined hi s po litica l progra mme for the Czech nati on. But where Masaryk treated his own nation. Yacu lfk by the use of the word ··our" implies th at the Czechs have a ri ght to objectify and defi ne the Slovaks. �SLOVAKIA 109 the dictatorship, the Slovaks regarded it as our business and went for autonomy. When we were then puni shed for the rebellion , they , because they had not compromised th emse lves very much with us, received a more gentle puni shment; and that their autonomy, which they gained from our rebellion , for us meant a sharpenin g of the punishment, does not cross their mind s." 73 When Vaculfk describes the Slovak ga in of autonomy as a sharpenin g of the puni shment for the Czechs , this testifies to hi s belief, not only in centralism , but also that the Czechs have the right to control Slovaki a. When employing these im ages he attempts to mobilize the Czech memory of the Slovaks as traitors both in 1938-39, when they ga ined their own state whereas the Czech lands were turned into the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and in the Prague Spring of 1968. Later on Vaculfk contradicts his argument of th e Slovak sati sfaction with the communist regime by claiming that they left it to the Czechs to defeat the communists and then again brought up their claims for autonomy: "as if they thought: you brou ght us your communism, now you take it away again, Czechs! " 74 According to Vaculfk, the Slovaks, being objects rather than subjects of hi story, unlike the Czechs have always managed to escape the existential question: Who are we and what do we want? Thi s even counts for the Slovak National Uprising during World War II, which in Vaculfk 's view was too brief and too limited territoriall y to count as proof of Slovak pro-C zec hos lov ak ism. Vaculfk only mention s the anti-fascist element of the upri si ng and neg lects the fact that the leaders of the resistance movement clearly stated a wish to reunite with the Czechs after 73 " Kdyz jsme se v roce 1968 poku sili uvolnit se z diktatury , povazovali to Slovaci za nasi staro st a sli si za autonomif. K dyz my pak byli za vzpouru ztrestan i, oni , j elikoz se s nami moc nezkompromitovali, dostali mfrnejsf trest; a ze jejich autono- mie, kterou z nasf vzpoury vyzfska li , znamenala pro nas zostfenf trestu, to jim nenapada." 74 "jako by si mysleli: Privezli j ste nam sem v,is komuni smus, odvezte si ho zas, Cesi 1" - Many Slovaks after 1989 have pointed ou t that in 1946 40 % of th e Czechs voted com muni st, and only 30 % of the Slovaks, suggesting that comm uni sm was a predomi nantly Czech idea. �SLOVAKIA 110 th e wa r,75 whi c h was inco ns iste nt w ith hi s prev io us acc usati o ns aga inst the Slovak s fo r not hav ing co me to te rm s w ith the fasc ism of the ir wartime state . The first time Vaculfk mobili zes the " littl e brothe r" im age he c laims that the Slovak s, s ince they do not have a nybody else against whom to prove the ir adulthood , mi stake nl y tried it o ut on the Czechs. Later on he continues th at, afte r the fa ll of co mmuni sm, th e Sl ovak nation fin a ll y had the cha nce to start looking fo r its ow n happiness, by whi ch it would grow one more leve l. The most c rude exa mple of the im age comes w he n Vac ulfk re plies to Mil an Si mec ka, a Czec h write r li vin g in Slovaki a, who had w ritte n to the Czec hs th at the ir yo un ger brothe r had grow n up a nd now should ha ve hi s ow n bed. Vac ul fk 's repl y was as fo ll ows: "As we know our youn ger brothe r, he w ill want to have hi s bed by the window in the summer and by the ove n in the w inte r. No bed , littl e broth e r, ha ve yo ur o wn littl e ho use!" 76 And finall y, he li sts reaso ns why just now is the ri ght time to get rid of the Slovaks, one of whi c h is th at 70 years ago it wo uld have bee n interpreted as de ny ing he lp to the younger brother. Thus, Vac ulfk mobili zes the Czec h image of the ungrateful younger brother and the coll ective me mory of Slovak betrayal s to make hi s po int th at the Czec hs would be better off without the Slovaks. It is hard not to find Vac ulfk a bit patronizing, but hi s views we re not e xce pti onal a mong the Czec hs. In the articl e " Re lie f with a dec ision," 77 fo urteen intellectu als 78 agreed th at it was bette r to let the Slovaks go, if th at was what they wanted , so th at the Czec hs co uld stand as the true he irs of Czec hos lovaki a and thereby keep the name of the 75 See I.:.ubomir Liptak : S/ovensko v 20. storocf. (Brat islava : K all igram 2000), 25 1- 252. 76 ·'A le j ak mladsfho brat ffc ka zname, bude v lete chtft tu pos tylku u ok na a v zime u pece. Zadnou postylku, bra tfe. domecek mej si 1" 77 " Uleva z rozhodnutf" . L itenim f noviny June 18, 1992, I. 78 The article was signed by Ji ff K olar, K arel Siktanc, K arel Pecka, Lud vfk Yacul fk , V lad im ir K ar ffk , I van Werni sc h, Jan Lopatka, Sergej Mac honi n, Pfemys l Rut. Dusan K arpatsky, Yrati slav Farber, Ji ff Cies lar, Mi ros lav Kl omfnek, M ilan Jungmann, all men of literature. �SLOVAKIA 111 state. Se manti ca ll y, Czechoslovaki a w itho ut Slova ki a does not make muc h sense, but to the authors of the arti cle there was c learly anothe r aspect to Czechos lova ki a th an the territori al one. T he ir be li ef that Czechos lovak ia w ithout Slovaki a made sense indi cated that they pe rce ived th e Czech s as be in g in some undefin ed ma nner more trul y Czec hos lova k th an the Slovaks and that they reserved the ri ght to defin e the character of the co mmon state fo r the Czechs. Bes ides, they saw the diffe re nt res ults of the e lection s in June 1992 in the two parts of the country as an exampl e of the Czech desire fo r a free economy and po liti ca l de moc rac y on the o ne hand , and on the oth er of the Slovak longin g fo r a soc iety directed by the state a nd with e le me nts of nati onal soci ali sm. And they furth e rmore inte rpre ted the S lovak res ult as an ex press ion of a Slovak long ing fo r their own indepe nde nt state, in spite of the fac t th at th e onl y Slovak party with inde pe nde nce as part of its e lec ti on prog ramme was the Slova k Nati onal Party (Sl ovenska narodna strana, SNS), whi ch ga ined onl y 9.4 % of the votes in Slovakia.79 The arti cle was writte n in a tone th at sugges ted ne utrality and objecti vity, whil e the co nte nt was in fac t stron gly po le mi ca l. " If it is so that onl y e rectin g one's ow n state is the sign o f adulth ood and se lf-justifi cati on of a nation , we do not have reasons fo r counting it as a fa ilure a nd loss, what we since 19 18 have contributed to Slovaki a in that respect materi all y and mora ll y. The found ation of Czechos lova ki a co mpl eted the Czech nati o nal reawake nin g, and if the Slovaks today c ut the mse lves loose fro m us, it means th at they are still lac kin g somethin g to reac h the same pos iti on and consc iousness, and we do not have the ri ght to keep the m fro m that. " 80 In thi s argu- 79 K aren Henderson: T he Slovak Republic, in : Bogdan Szajkowsk i (ed.): Po litica l Parties of Eastern Europe. Russia & the Successor S tates. (Harlow: Longman In for- mati on and Reference 1994 ). 529. ' 0 ·'Je- li tom u tak, ze teprve ustave nf vlas tn fho statu je znamenfm dospe losti a sveprav nosti naroda, nemame duvod pocftat si za pro hru a ztratu , cfm jsme k tomu Slovensku od rok u 19 18 hmotne i moraine prispeli . Zalozenfm Ceskos lovenske republik y se dov rsilo ceske narodn f obroze nf, a j estli ze se Slovaci dnes od nas odpo- �SLOVAKIA 112 ment th e Slovaks are the ones cutting themselves loose because they want to 'g row up ' and become indepe ndent of the Czechs who have helped the m " materially and morally" ever s ince the foundation of the common state. "Let it be obvious that it is the Slovaks who step out of the federation, and that we the n are the successor state , which keeps its ob li gations, treaties and relation s to th e world around us. The Czech kingdom united hi storicall y with Moravia does not need to be confirmed once again by any Rome, Frankfurt or Vienna." 8 1 So, the Czech Lands are a hi storically natural unity , wh ich does not in any way need Slovakia. They cont inue: " Without artificia l nationalizing, all questions can be named and also so lved in a more rational way" 82 - again, they are suggesting that the Slovaks are irrational and nationalistic as opposed to the rational Czechs. The Slovak image of the Czechs was propagated no less directly . In a series of articles in Literarny tyidennfk entitled " If Slovakia wants to be Slovakia ... ,"83 the writer Mi lan Ferko treated severa l subjects concern ing Slovak autonomy or independence. He held that after th e parliamentary e lectio ns in June 1992 when Vl adimfr Meciar 's Movement for a Democratic S lovakia (Hnutie za demokraticke Slovensko, HZDS ) won in Slovakia, the Czechs finally began to understand that the Slovaks really wanted to be inde pendent, and stated, " Some Czech politicians are beg inning to abandon [ ... ] the pos ition of historical arrogance and eco nomic super iorit y." 84 He thereby confirmed the image of the arroga nt Czechs who wanted to jujf. znamena to, ze jim k tem uz stavu a vedomf jeste neco chybf. a my nemame pravo je od toho zdrfovat." 81 "At' se stane zrejmym, ze jsou to Slovaci. kdo vystupujf z federace. a my pak jsme nastupni cky stat. jen z zus tane ve svych zavazcfch , sm lou vach a vztazfch k okolnfmu svetu. Ceske kralovstvf spoj ene hi storick y s Moravou se nepotre buje davat zadnym Rfmem. Frankfurtem ci Vfdnf znovu potvrzovat. " 82 .. Bez 83 " Ak Slovensko chce byt'Slovenskom .. ... 84 " Niektorf cesk f politici zacfnaju opu stat' [ .. . J pozfcie historickej arogancie a ekono- umeleho nacionalizovanf dajf se vsechny otazky pojmenovat i resi t vecneji ." mickej nadradenost i." " Ak Slovensko chce byt' Slovenskom ..." Vil. Literarny dennik June 27. 1992, 12. tyz- �SLOVAKIA 113 keep the Slovaks in an inferior position and he continued, " With the help of international financial superpowers , Prague decided about the fate of Slovakia, which has to remain in a vassal relationship to the Czech Lands." 85 According to Ferko, the Slovak government had also become arrogant, and the politicians of Public Again st Violence (Verejnost' proti nasiliu , VPN) had become " slaves of Prague' s neocolonial relationship to Slovakia" 86 and sought " to continue to infiltrate into the Slovak political life ideas of Masaryki sm and cosmopolitani sm in the fra mework of which there is no place for the Slovak nation. " 87 T.G. Masaryk was the first president of Czechos lovakia , and Czech s and Slovaks have very di ss imilar view s of him . To the Czechs he epitomizes democracy , whereas many Slovaks see him as the representative of the state ideology of the First Republic ( 19181938), the Czechoslovakism, according to which Czec hs and Slovaks were two branches of the same Czechoslovak nation . Many Slovaks belie ve that Czechoslovaki sm suppressed their national identity, and their view of the First Republic and of Masaryk is influenced by thi s negative vie w of the state ideology. The Slovak view of Masaryk is also tainted by the fact that in 1918 he signed an agreement with a group of Czech and Slovak emigres in Pittsburgh , according to which Slovakia was promi sed some form of autonomy in the new Czechoslovak state. For variou s reason s thi s promise was never fulfill ed,88 and thi s has left an impression among some Slovaks that Masaryk and the Czechs delibe ratel y broke their promi ses becau se xs -- Pra ha pros tred nfctvom medzin arod nyc h fin ancnych ve l'mocf rozhod la o osude Sl ovenska, ktore ma zostat' vo vaza lskom pomere k Cecham." Ak Slovensko chce byt' Slovenskom ... VI. Literam y tyidennik M ay 23, 1992, 3. 86 " ''otrokmi prazs keho neokolonialisti ckeho vztahu k Slovensku. " Ibid. 7 " d'alej in f iltrovat' do slovenskeho politickeho zivota myslienk y masaryki zmu a kozmopoliti zmu , v ramci ktoryc h niet miesta pre slovensky narod."' Ibid. 88 Part of the reason why Sl ovaki a was not granted autonomy was th at in the new Czechos lovak state there was a Germ an mi nority of the same size as th e Slovak popul ati on. and if the Sl ovaks had gained autonomy it wo uld have been very di fficult to find a va lid argument why the Germ ans should not have autonomy, too. �SLOVAKJA 114 th ey wished to maintain the ir control ove r Slovakia. Furthermore, whe n Ferko attacked Masaryk it wen t to the very heart of the Czech se lf-understandin g and co uld serve as proof to the Czec hs that the Slovaks did not rea ll y understand what democracy was a ll about. Anoth er im age from hi story that Ferko mobilizes is the Slovak wartime state , whi c h he presents as hav in g raised ge nera l Slovak se lf-co nsc iou sness, the spirit of e nterpri se, a nd the will to be equa l with the rest of the world . 89 Thi s is a totally different im age of the Slovak State than the one propagated by Vac ul fk who saw it only as a sy mbol of fascism , with which the Slo va ks had still not dealt. To Ferko the fa sc ism of the state was less sig nificant than the fac t th at it was Slovak. According to him , the e lect io ns in Jun e 1992 showed that neo-fasc ist te nde nci es were growing in oth er parts of Czec hoslovak ia, but not in Slovakia - leavi ng o nl y the Czec h land s infected wi th it. 911 He re, Ferko turn s Vaculfk 's accusation of the Slovaks' lac k of se ttleme nt w ith the wart ime fascism aga in st the Czechs - poss ibl y beca use he was aware that hi s arg ume nt was not very solid. In the very last issue of Literarny tyidennfk before the partiti o n, Vladimfr Min ac (one of Slovakia 's lead in g writers) propagated hi s less than pos iti ve im age of the Czec hs: "God save us from learning from the Czec hs the e mpty ideo log ica l rhetoric , the spl e ndid mora1ity, whi ch is limited to word s, the Have l-like e mptiness, which hides in itse lf o nl y a mad dwarf. " 9 1 In ridi c ulin g Vaclav Have l, Min ac insulted anothe r icon of the Czec h se lf-unders tandin g: Have l as the successor to Masaryk as the good philosopher-pres ide nt. And he was co mpl ete ly aware of thi s w he n he mentioned the myth of Masaryk 's '" Ferko: "'Ak Slovensko .. . VII ". ° Ferko 9 wi th out doubt hints at th e amazing elec ti on results or the Czec h Miroslav Sl,1dek ' s neo-fasc ist Republi ca n Party, which gained over 6 % of the votes in the Czech lands (Peter Bugge : The Czech Republi c, in: Szajkowsk i (ed.): Politica l Parties. 158- 159). "' " Bozec hrai\ , aby sme sa naucil i od Cechov prazdnej idologickej retorike. onej skvelej moralke, ktora sa obm edzuje na slova. onej hav lovskej prazdnote. ktora utaj uje v sebe iba zuriveho trpas lfka."' " Odkiar a kam , Slovaci 'I" ("Wherefrom and whereto, Slovaks?") Literamy tyi dennfk Dec. 19, 1992 , 11 . �SLOVAKIA 115 model democracy and deemed it " shrieking Bohemian glass in the necklace of the legend" 92 - instead of being real jewels, that is. When dismi ss ing the first Czechoslovak Republic like this, Mimic reflected the views of one-third of the Slovak populace, which did not consider it democratic, but in opposition to the majority of the Czech population, 93 and so he , like Yaculfk, invoked the collective memory in order to create an impression of Czech-Slovak incompatibility. Furthermore, Mimic painted a picture of the First Republic as a time when many Czechs came to Slovakia allegedly to help build it, but when they taught in school s at all level s, they taught Czechos lovak instead of Slovak, and when they founded the Slovak National Theatre , it was in reality one more Czech National Theatre. So the Czechs did not help out of pure brotherly sacrifice, but out of a desire to turn the Slovaks into Czechs. Later, Mimic reproduced the stereotype of the Czechs as being arrogant enough to want to decide over Slovakia without the appropriate understanding: " Again and again they go into political battle with the Slovaks with the same reproaches and with the sa me lack of knowledge of the Slovak world. They still tutor, still look after and protect in the way that every coloniali st has protected hi s colony. " 94 He re , the image of the Czechs as malevolent colonialists was used to create the impress ion that a veritable war was being waged between the evil Czech politicians and the Slovak people-and not onl y this: 9 ' 93 skrfpajuce ces ke skl o v mi hrdelnfku legendy. 37 % of th e Slovaks and 70 % of the Czechs sa w th e First Republi c as a model democracy. whereas anoth er 33 % of th e Slovaks did not think it was democrati c at all. (Marian Timorack y : Yerejna mienka o ce sko-slovenskych vztahoch. in: Fedor Gal (ed. ): One.for krize cesko-slovenskych vztaht1. (Praha: SLON 1992), 8 1-82 . Thi s probabl y refl ec ts th e Sl ovak res istance aga inst M asaryk ·s Czechos lovaki sm. which Ferko attacked, too. "" ·· v zdy znovu a znov u tiahnu do politickeho zapasu so Slo vakmi s tymi istyrni vycitkami a s tou istou neznalostbu slovenskeho sveta. Stale tutorcia, stale opatruju a ochrai\uju tak, ako kazdy kol oni ali sta ochrai\ova l svoju kol 6niu. " '·Odki al' a karn , Slovac i?" Litenirny tyidennlk Dec. 19, 1992, 11. �116 SLOVAKIA betwee n the Czech and Slovak worlds. 95 By portraying Czechs and Slovaks as living in different worlds , Minac made the partition of the common state look natural and desirab le as it enabled the small Slovak nation to fulfil its destiny as an authentic small nation facing the threatening international consumer society. And he concluded, " Behind us stay the o ld enmities and mi sunderstandin gs, a serva nt 's conflicts and rebellion s. Before us is our new di gnity." 96 As thi s ana lysis has shown , the Czech and Slovak collective memories were used to explain the differences between Czechs and Slovaks and to legitimize the break-up. Thi s way of usin g the past was made poss ible by the hu ge soc ietal changes since the Ve lvet Revolution in 1989. When communism fe ll , there was a broadly felt need to rewrite history in order to get rid of the ideolog ica ll y deformed historical interpretation s of the communists and thi s led to two different phenomena. On the one hand , the new situ at ion led to an uncovering of 'wh ite spots ' in the hi story of the Czechs and Slovaks. On the other, thi s rewriting made room for new deformations of history. Silvia Mihalikova has described this phenome non , which was common for the entire post-communi st world, as a use of arguments from the past according to a principle of se lf-service: people simply chose the historical facts, persons, and conceptions that suited their momentary purposes. 97 95 Thi s image of the Czechs and Slovaks li ving in different worlds was shared by at least the Czech political weekly, Respekt, whose front page of the elect ion issue in 1992 read in large red letters 'Two civi li za ti ons" and conti nued in the main comment: "A lone into Europe or toge ther to the Balkans" ( Respekt June 8-14, I 992, I ). See Peter Bugge : The Use of the Middle: Mitteleuropa vs. Strednf Evropa. In : European Review of History , Vol. 6. No. I . 1999, 30-3 1 and Vladimir Macura: Masarykovy boty a jine semi(o) fejetony. (Praha: Prazska imagin ace 1993). 48-49 for a further elaborat ion of the Czech imaging of the Slovaks as belonging to the Balkans . % " Za nami ostavaju stare nepriatel'stva a nedorozumenia, sluhovs ke spory a vzbury . Pred nami je nasa nova d6stojnost'. " " Odkial' a kam . Slovaci ?" Literarny tj idennfk Dec. 19. 1992. 11. 97 Mihalikova: Narodne symboly, 54-56. �SLOVAKIA 117 The se lf-serv ice aspec t of the use of hi story was supported by the communist ideo logization of the culture, includin g the schools. The hi story that had been to ld by the regime and taught in sc hool s was perce ived as inh erentl y wrong , and therefore , as Tony Judt has argued, a plurality of memories was created when parents told their children what hi story was ' reall y' like. Every hi story that was told by the reg ime was by implication fa lse, which meant th at every hi story not to ld by the regime mu st by implication be true. 98 This was the reason, not onl y for the very different Czec h and Slovak collective memories, but also for the overa ll low level of knowl edge about and reflection on the nation al hi story. Key period s in Czechoslovak hi story co ncernin g the mutual Czech-Slovak relation ship can be li sted as follows : I) the First Republic 19 I 8- 1938, 2) the destruction of Czechoslovakia and th e creati on of the Slovak State durin g World War II, 3) the Slovak National Uprising against the fascists in 1944, 4) the Prague Spring in 1968, 5) the Normalization 1969-1 989. When lookin g at the articles that we have analysed here, it is c lear that Vaculfk employed al l of them. In hi s interpretation : the First Rep ublic was a time when the Czechs he lped the ir un grateful younger brothers; the Slovak State came into bein g when the Slovaks betrayed the Czechs; the Slovak National Upri sin g was not necessaril y for a renewal of Czechoslovakia; in the Prague Spring the Slovaks preyed on the Czech strugg le for democracy; and durin g Norma li zati on the Slovaks suffered less than the Czec hs. In the same vei n, Mil an Ferko and Vladimfr Mimic invoked the Slovak collective memory of the First Republic as a period of Czechoslovakism th at did not properly ack now ledge the character and needs of the Slovaks, and the Czechs did what they could to turn the Slovaks into Czec hs. The reason why Ferko and Mimic both used thi s period probabl y lay in the fact th at Czechoslovakism was the 'state ideo logy' of the First Rep ublic , which made it easy to attack 9 ' Tony Judt: The Past is Another Cou ntry : Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe , in: Dcedalus. Vol. 21. No. 4, 1992, I OI. �SLOVAK IA 118 Czech arrogance towards the Slovaks. As opposed to this , the legacy of all the other significant periods seemed in some way or another too ambiguous to be exp loited from Minac ' s and Ferko ' s points of view. 99 This reflects the fact that Czechs and Slovaks not on ly experienced the events differently at the time, but also that their memories of them today are very different. And this then shows us that the socia li zation of the population ' s memories since 1918 was not successful in providing the two nations with a common co ll ective memory of the past that they shared as parts of the same state. In stead, those who after 1989 wished to do otherwise were ab le, like Vaculfk, Minac , Ferko, and others, to mobilize conflicts from the past and link them together regardless of any inner logic and chrono logy. They painted a picture of a basic Czech-Slovak incompatibility and a common history consisting of conflicts, betrayals, and wrongdoings that made a divorce look c learly preferable to a continued malfunctionin g marriage. 100 In Slovakia, the discu ss ions about the common history of the Czechs and the Slovaks became polarized to the degree that two directly opposite interpretations were propagated. The relevant criterion for arguments became the question whether the common state had been favourable or disadvantageous to the Slovaks. 101 Slovak so99 The Slovak State was fascist: the National Uprising was directed aga in st the inde- pendent Slovak State; resu lting from th e Prague Spring was th e federalism that Ferko and Minac fo ught aga inst but which neverth eless meant progress in th e Czech-Slovak relationship; and Normalization was not see n as too bad a period for th e Slovaks . ' 00 The metaphor of the marriage was also frequently used in the debate, see e.g. Miroslav Ku sy : '·Konfederacnf k lam·• (""Confederation delusion'"). Literarnf no viny Aug. 6. 1992. 1+3. 0 ' ' Mihalikova: Narodne symboly, 58. An ex traordinary feature of th e Slovak contex t was the fact that very ac tive participants in the debate were exi les like Stefan Polakovic or Milan S. Durica. who either had been in ex ile ever since World War II beca use of their ro le in the Slovak State or they came from thi s environment. They saw as their greatest task res torin g Slovak independence from th e Czechs and seemed not to reali ze that Slovak society had changed since their heyday during the �SLOVAKIA 119 ciety was to a very large ex tent di vided over interpretations of hi story , the nature of Slovak nation al identity, and wishes for the future, and in fact the Slovaks who engaged in the de bates on the CzechSlovak past spent as much or even more energy blaming eac h other, rather than blaming the Czechs. 102 In contrast to thi s deep divi sion , the Czechs may have disagreed on many thing s, but by and large there was unanimity concerning subjects such as these. In the Czech debate, the efforts to create a separate Czech state grad uall y came to be seen as a way of guardin g Kl aus' rapid economic reform s from the " irrati o nal" Slovaks a nd Czech democracy from the alleged Slovak inclin ation to national soc iali sm and a stron g state, images which were mobili zed by the frequent use of exa mples from the Czech collective me mory. It is furthermore interesting that an opinion poll in October of 1990 showed that more than 50 % of the Czechs believed in the idea of one Czechoslovak nation . 1w While most Czechs and Slovaks perce ived of them se lves as be in g simultaneously Czechoslovaks and e ithe r Czechs or Slovaks, most Czechs, who unconsciously conceived of the two layers of the ir identification as being identical , had never paid much attention to the conce pt of a Czech identification as be in g different from their ide ntific ation as Czechoslovaks. Most Slovaks , on the other hand , were very much aware that there was a difference between their Slovak and their Czechoslovak identification . 104 Whe n the newspaper debates invoked the war. In co ntrast to the hi stori ans who had li ved throu gh the communi st period at home and those who had been in exile becau se of their di sagreements with the co mmuni st regime. thi s group of hi storians saw nothing but disadvantages for the Slovaks in the com mon Czechos lovak Republic. 102 According to Soiia Szomolanyi. different perceptions of key fi gures and events in Slovak history not onl y divided . but outri ght polari zed th e population (Szomo lany i 1994 : 76). '"' Timoracky : Yerejna mienka. 7 1-72. ' 04 Thi s was strengthened by th e asy mmetri ca l conditi ons after 19 I 8. e.g. when in school tex tbooks Czech hi story was made Czechos lovak simply by adding " slovak" to th e adjec ti ve (E li sabeth Bakke: Cechoslovak izmu s v skol skych uceb ni ciach ( 19 18- 1938). Historicky casopis. Vo l. 47. o 2. 1999: 242-243) or when on ly the �120 SLOVAKIA past, it happened in a way that mobili zed images that em phasized the differences rather than the s imil ariti es between th e tw o nation a l groups. In thi s way the Czech and Slovak layers of the Czec hoslovak population 's identifi cat ion were stre ngthened to the detriment of the Czechoslovak layer. And the di scre pancy that was mob ili zed between the Czech and Slovak images of themselves, the other, and the future of the common state is undoubted ly part of the answer to the question why the common Czechoslovak state eventually broke up. Slovaks had their own Communist Party (KSS) whereas the Czechos lovak Communist Party (KSC) served both as the Czech and the all-state party. � 104 SLOVAKIA "Ungrateful Younger Brothers" versus "Arrogant Atheists." Czech-Slovak Stereotypes in a Collective Memory Perspective. Lone Sarauw On January I , 1993 , Czechoslovakia was divided in a process that has been characterized as a "vel vet divorce. " 56 Compared to the ways in which other post-communi st states were fa lling apart at the time, thi s seems a va lid description . However , the split was ca used by severe confli cts betwee n the two parts of the state. Scholars have given a number of reasons for the di vo rce : I ) The Czech desire for democracy and a market economy clashed with Slovak insistence upon nati onal eq uality. 57 2) Despite grow ing macro-structu ra l simil ariti es, one Czechoslovak soc iety never managed to replace the Czech and Slovak soc ieti es that had been brought together in a com mon state. 58 3) Th e w inners of the parli amentary elec tion s in 1992, th e Sl ovak Vl adimfr Meciar and the Czech V aclav Kl aus, were unabl e to 56 See Otto U lc: "C zechos lovak ia' s ve l vet divorce. " East European Quarterly 30. September ( 1996). pp. 33 1-352. 57 5 " Ibid. Ji ff Mu sil : '"C zec h and Slovak Soc iety." in Jiff Mu sil (ed.): Th e End or Czechoslova kia (Budapest. L ondon, New York: Central European University Press 1995). 77-94. �SLOVAKIA 105 come to te rm s w ith the constitutional arrangement of Czechoslovakia, beca use they were unwillin g to put the interests of the common state before their own power ambi tions. 59 And more co uld be found. As a contrib uti on to the debate over the break-up, thi s artic le inte nd s to look at th e role of stereotypes and collective memory in it, the argument being that hi story was mobili zed in the media de bates prior to the partition , and that it happe ned in a way that en hanced the di ffere nces rather than the likenesses of the two peopl es.60 As a result of thi s th e population graduall y came to accept the partition of the common state, even if the majority of the population never supported it. 6 1 The concept "collective me mory" has been defi ned as "a soc iety 's co ll ected production of me mory," 62 whi ch suppli es the soc iety with a fee ling of belong ing together by sharing the same past. One of the probl e ms in Czec hoslovakia seems to have bee n the lack of such a feelin g of sharing the same past in both halves of the state. Despite the fact that, apart from World W ar II , Czechs and Slovaks lived together in one state between 19 18 and I 993 , their co ll ective me mories of this li fe together differ to a considerab le ex tent. 59 Abby Innes: ·'T he Breakup of Czechos lovakia: The Impac t of Party Development on the Separa ti on of the State," East European Politics and Societies (EEPS) , Vol. I I , No. 3, Fall ( 1997), 393-435 . 60 Si l via Mihali kova: •• arod ne symbo ly slovenskej statnosti", Politologicka revue 2, prosinec, ( 1996), 56. 61 An opi ni on poll from Jul y 1992 shows th at 53 % of the Czechs and 42 % of the Slovaks w ished lo maintain th e co mmon state. whi le respecti ve ly 24 % and 32 % w ished the slate to be divided (Sharon W olchi k : ·The Politics of Transition and th e Break-U p of Czec hos lova ki a," in Ji ff Musi l (ed .): Th e End of' Czechos lova kia. (Budapest : Centra l European Universi ty Press 1995 , 233). 62 Claus Bry ld and Anette Warrin g: Besaette/sestiden som kollektiv erindring. Histo- rie- og traditionsfor va llning at' krig og besaettelse 1945- 1997. (Rosk ilde: Rosk ilde Uni versitetsforlag 1998), 19-20. �106 SLOVAKIA In the medi a debates in the peri od leading up to the break-up of C zec hos lovakia hi story , or rather memory ,63 was mobi Ii zed as proof of the inevitability and desirability of the divorce. Because thi s was the aim of the partic ipants of the debate, chrono logy was irre levant and hi story became ' hori zontali zed ' so to speak. As Silvia Mi halikova has formulated it, "osten sible or rea l sins committed centuries ago merge with wrongs done in th e last decades and are at the same time th e reaso n for today 's mi sunderstandin gs and hatred."64 Thus, the mobilization of past conflicts e nabl ed the two nation s to blame eac h other for their current probl ems, which is wh at thi s article intend s to show using examples from the literary newspapers of th e Czech Land s and Slovakia, Literarnf noviny and Literarny tyi- dennik,65 prior to the break-up. Wh en looking for archetypical examp les of the Czech and S lovak stereotypes or images of each other, the "arroga nt atheists" and " ungrateful younger brothers" of the headlines were the first ideas about the Czech and S lovak images of each other that came to mind . Therefore, it came as a surprise that it was rather imposs ibl e to find any examples of the stereotype of the Czechs as dangerous atheists they are presented as being arrogant, though. The lack of proof of the idea that the Slovak image of the Czec hs would see them as atheists 0 -' Pierre Nora has formu lated thi s di st incti on be tween history and memory in terms of a fund amen tal opposi ti on . .. Memory is life [ ... ] a bond tying us to the etern al presen t[ ... ] it is affec ti ve and mag ica l l and] onl y accom modates th ose facts that suit it .'' whereas hi story is .. the reconstru cti on , al ways problematic and incomplete j ... I a representati on of the past I th at I ca ll s fo r analys is and criti cism' ' (Pierre Nora: "Between Memory and H istory: Les Lieux de M emoire" . Representations Vol 0, No. 26 Special Issue: M emory and Cou nter-M emory. Spring ( I 989) , 8-9). A less ri gid di stincti on has been pro posed by A nne Erikse n. who sees hi story and memory as being equally important aspec ts of the co llecti ve memory th at combine to create the entire co llec ti ve memory (A nne Eriksen: Del var nae annet under krigen. 2. verdenskrig i norsk kollektivtradisjon. (Oslo: Pax 1995). r,., Mihalikova: ·'Narodne symboly," 55. 65 In the literary newspapers the past was mobili zed more obviously and cru dely but not in a different way th an in mos t other newspapers. Thus, they serve well as illustrations of a process that was happening in the press in general. �SLOVAKIA 107 was fru strating , and it raised the question where thi s idea came from. It stemmed from the Christian Democratic Movement (Kresfansko De mokraticke Hnutie, KOH) , which, according to Miroslav Kusy , wanted to protect Slovakia from " des tructive liberal and freethinking influences from the Czech Lands." Besides, the stereotype had been used frequently in the interwar period , but the industrialization and urbanization of Slovakia since then had turned the mostly rural soc iety into one where Catholics did not necessarily consider their interests as Catholics to be more important than their economic and cultural conditions. 66 Also, as Petr Prfhod a has stated , the image of the Czechs as atheists was a well-known Czech stereotype of the Slovak view of them ,67 indirectly testifyin g to a Czech stereotype of the Slovaks as ' religiou s. ' 68 The image that eventually turned out to be the most pervasive was one of the Czechs as Czechoslovakist69 colonialists exploiting Slovakia. And as colonialists, they were described as arrogant in wanting to rule over Slovakia, even though they did not know it properly. It should be pointed out that the difficulty in having the stereo- '"' Miroslav Ku sy: ··S lovak Exceptionalism". in Musil (ed.): The End. 147- 149 . See also Martin Butora and Zora Butorova: " Slovakia: The Iden tit y Chal lenges of the Newly Born State". Socia l Research. Vol. 60. No. 4, Winter ( 1993). 7 13-7 14. and Sona Szomol anyi: UParadox kon zervativi zmu na Slovensku .'· Domino Efekt. Vol. 2. No. 15. ( 1993). 4. 67 Petr Prfhoda: '·Mutual Perceptions in Czech -Slovak Relationships•·, in: Musil (ed.) : The End. 134. "" Al so th e nationali sti c Slovak news paper ··s Jovak Nation·• (Slovensky mirod) was checked for the atheist image. but it could not be found even here . This probably reflects the fact that the image was propagated by the KDH . which was a quite unpopu lar part y those days among its non -ad herents. and whic h was often reproached in Slovensky mirod. 69 As a way of legitimising th e new Czechos lovak Republic in 19 18, the doctrine of one Czechoslovak nati on w ith two branche s. a Czech and a Slovak one. was propa gated to comp ly wi th the intention of president Woodrow Wilson to gi ve national self-determinat ion to the nations of Cen tral and Eastern Europe . The doctrine was officia ll y abandoned onl y afler World War II. �108 SLOVAKIA types co nfirmed did not co ncern the Czech newspaper, the se l fimage of the Czechs as 'rational' notwithstanding. 70 The most co mmonl y cited example of the Czech perception of the Slovaks as ungra tefu l yo unger brothers was an article by the writer Lud vfk Vaculfk in Literarnf noviny from 1990 entitled: " Our Slova k Questi on. " 7 1 The first thin g to be noticed about Vaculfk 's article is the co ndescending tone of the titl e: The Slovak questi on is ' our ' ques ti on, that is ' us' meaning the Czechs , not the Slovak s. 72 Vaculfk beg ins his arti cle by definin g himself as being Czech by nation ality, but Czechoslovak as a citi ze n, but he nevertheless repeatedl y speaks in the name of ' us, th e Czec hs,' whi ch substanti all y weakens hi s claim to being a truly Czechoslovak citizen. Throu ghout hi s tex t, Vaculfk uses exampl es from hi story to argue for a separati on from the Slo vaks. First, he bl ames the Slovaks for never having dealt with the fasc ism of their wartime state ( 19391945). They escaped thi s obligation by rejoining the Czechs in Czechos lovakia, and wh en, after a few yea rs, they were forced into a communi st regime, they did not reall y mind , si nce they ga ined a lot more economicall y from co mmuni sm than did the Czechs. There is no inner log ic between these two situati ons other th an th e fac t th at Vaculfk 's description of them makes the Slovaks look as if they have no principl es, going more or less direc tl y from accepting fascism to accepting co mmuni sm. He co ntinues by bl ami ng the Slovaks fo r prey ing on the Czech s' struggle for democracy in 1968, since th e only reform that survived the W arsaw Pac t in vas ion was the federali zation of the state, " When we in I 968 tri ed to free ourse lves from 70 L adis lav Holy : The Lillie Czech and the Gre<I/ Czech Na tion. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996), 104. 71 72 " Nase slovenska otazka". Litenimf noviny (M ay 3, 1990). I +3 . Yacu l fk's titl e was in spired by the titl e of T.G. Masaryk ·s book ··The Czech Question" (C:eska otazka) from 1895 on the Czech rebirth in the 19th century and it outlined hi s po litica l progra mme for the Czech nati on. But where Masaryk treated his own nation. Yacu lfk by the use of the word ··our" implies th at the Czechs have a ri ght to objectify and defi ne the Slovaks. �SLOVAKIA 109 the dictatorship, the Slovaks regarded it as our business and went for autonomy. When we were then puni shed for the rebellion , they , because they had not compromised th emse lves very much with us, received a more gentle puni shment; and that their autonomy, which they gained from our rebellion , for us meant a sharpenin g of the punishment, does not cross their mind s." 73 When Vaculfk describes the Slovak ga in of autonomy as a sharpenin g of the puni shment for the Czechs , this testifies to hi s belief, not only in centralism , but also that the Czechs have the right to control Slovaki a. When employing these im ages he attempts to mobilize the Czech memory of the Slovaks as traitors both in 1938-39, when they ga ined their own state whereas the Czech lands were turned into the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and in the Prague Spring of 1968. Later on Vaculfk contradicts his argument of th e Slovak sati sfaction with the communist regime by claiming that they left it to the Czechs to defeat the communists and then again brought up their claims for autonomy: "as if they thought: you brou ght us your communism, now you take it away again, Czechs! " 74 According to Vaculfk, the Slovaks, being objects rather than subjects of hi story, unlike the Czechs have always managed to escape the existential question: Who are we and what do we want? Thi s even counts for the Slovak National Uprising during World War II, which in Vaculfk 's view was too brief and too limited territoriall y to count as proof of Slovak pro-C zec hos lov ak ism. Vaculfk only mention s the anti-fascist element of the upri si ng and neg lects the fact that the leaders of the resistance movement clearly stated a wish to reunite with the Czechs after 73 " Kdyz jsme se v roce 1968 poku sili uvolnit se z diktatury , povazovali to Slovaci za nasi staro st a sli si za autonomif. K dyz my pak byli za vzpouru ztrestan i, oni , j elikoz se s nami moc nezkompromitovali, dostali mfrnejsf trest; a ze jejich autono- mie, kterou z nasf vzpoury vyzfska li , znamenala pro nas zostfenf trestu, to jim nenapada." 74 "jako by si mysleli: Privezli j ste nam sem v,is komuni smus, odvezte si ho zas, Cesi 1" - Many Slovaks after 1989 have pointed ou t that in 1946 40 % of th e Czechs voted com muni st, and only 30 % of the Slovaks, suggesting that comm uni sm was a predomi nantly Czech idea. �SLOVAKIA 110 th e wa r,75 whi c h was inco ns iste nt w ith hi s prev io us acc usati o ns aga inst the Slovak s fo r not hav ing co me to te rm s w ith the fasc ism of the ir wartime state . The first time Vaculfk mobili zes the " littl e brothe r" im age he c laims that the Slovak s, s ince they do not have a nybody else against whom to prove the ir adulthood , mi stake nl y tried it o ut on the Czechs. Later on he continues th at, afte r the fa ll of co mmuni sm, th e Sl ovak nation fin a ll y had the cha nce to start looking fo r its ow n happiness, by whi ch it would grow one more leve l. The most c rude exa mple of the im age comes w he n Vac ulfk re plies to Mil an Si mec ka, a Czec h write r li vin g in Slovaki a, who had w ritte n to the Czec hs th at the ir yo un ger brothe r had grow n up a nd now should ha ve hi s ow n bed. Vac ul fk 's repl y was as fo ll ows: "As we know our youn ger brothe r, he w ill want to have hi s bed by the window in the summer and by the ove n in the w inte r. No bed , littl e broth e r, ha ve yo ur o wn littl e ho use!" 76 And finall y, he li sts reaso ns why just now is the ri ght time to get rid of the Slovaks, one of whi c h is th at 70 years ago it wo uld have bee n interpreted as de ny ing he lp to the younger brother. Thus, Vac ulfk mobili zes the Czec h image of the ungrateful younger brother and the coll ective me mory of Slovak betrayal s to make hi s po int th at the Czec hs would be better off without the Slovaks. It is hard not to find Vac ulfk a bit patronizing, but hi s views we re not e xce pti onal a mong the Czec hs. In the articl e " Re lie f with a dec ision," 77 fo urteen intellectu als 78 agreed th at it was bette r to let the Slovaks go, if th at was what they wanted , so th at the Czec hs co uld stand as the true he irs of Czec hos lovaki a and thereby keep the name of the 75 See I.:.ubomir Liptak : S/ovensko v 20. storocf. (Brat islava : K all igram 2000), 25 1- 252. 76 ·'A le j ak mladsfho brat ffc ka zname, bude v lete chtft tu pos tylku u ok na a v zime u pece. Zadnou postylku, bra tfe. domecek mej si 1" 77 " Uleva z rozhodnutf" . L itenim f noviny June 18, 1992, I. 78 The article was signed by Ji ff K olar, K arel Siktanc, K arel Pecka, Lud vfk Yacul fk , V lad im ir K ar ffk , I van Werni sc h, Jan Lopatka, Sergej Mac honi n, Pfemys l Rut. Dusan K arpatsky, Yrati slav Farber, Ji ff Cies lar, Mi ros lav Kl omfnek, M ilan Jungmann, all men of literature. �SLOVAKIA 111 state. Se manti ca ll y, Czechoslovaki a w itho ut Slova ki a does not make muc h sense, but to the authors of the arti cle there was c learly anothe r aspect to Czechos lova ki a th an the territori al one. T he ir be li ef that Czechos lovak ia w ithout Slovaki a made sense indi cated that they pe rce ived th e Czech s as be in g in some undefin ed ma nner more trul y Czec hos lova k th an the Slovaks and that they reserved the ri ght to defin e the character of the co mmon state fo r the Czechs. Bes ides, they saw the diffe re nt res ults of the e lection s in June 1992 in the two parts of the country as an exampl e of the Czech desire fo r a free economy and po liti ca l de moc rac y on the o ne hand , and on the oth er of the Slovak longin g fo r a soc iety directed by the state a nd with e le me nts of nati onal soci ali sm. And they furth e rmore inte rpre ted the S lovak res ult as an ex press ion of a Slovak long ing fo r their own indepe nde nt state, in spite of the fac t th at th e onl y Slovak party with inde pe nde nce as part of its e lec ti on prog ramme was the Slova k Nati onal Party (Sl ovenska narodna strana, SNS), whi ch ga ined onl y 9.4 % of the votes in Slovakia.79 The arti cle was writte n in a tone th at sugges ted ne utrality and objecti vity, whil e the co nte nt was in fac t stron gly po le mi ca l. " If it is so that onl y e rectin g one's ow n state is the sign o f adulth ood and se lf-justifi cati on of a nation , we do not have reasons fo r counting it as a fa ilure a nd loss, what we since 19 18 have contributed to Slovaki a in that respect materi all y and mora ll y. The found ation of Czechos lova ki a co mpl eted the Czech nati o nal reawake nin g, and if the Slovaks today c ut the mse lves loose fro m us, it means th at they are still lac kin g somethin g to reac h the same pos iti on and consc iousness, and we do not have the ri ght to keep the m fro m that. " 80 In thi s argu- 79 K aren Henderson: T he Slovak Republic, in : Bogdan Szajkowsk i (ed.): Po litica l Parties of Eastern Europe. Russia & the Successor S tates. (Harlow: Longman In for- mati on and Reference 1994 ). 529. ' 0 ·'Je- li tom u tak, ze teprve ustave nf vlas tn fho statu je znamenfm dospe losti a sveprav nosti naroda, nemame duvod pocftat si za pro hru a ztratu , cfm jsme k tomu Slovensku od rok u 19 18 hmotne i moraine prispeli . Zalozenfm Ceskos lovenske republik y se dov rsilo ceske narodn f obroze nf, a j estli ze se Slovaci dnes od nas odpo- �SLOVAKIA 112 ment th e Slovaks are the ones cutting themselves loose because they want to 'g row up ' and become indepe ndent of the Czechs who have helped the m " materially and morally" ever s ince the foundation of the common state. "Let it be obvious that it is the Slovaks who step out of the federation, and that we the n are the successor state , which keeps its ob li gations, treaties and relation s to th e world around us. The Czech kingdom united hi storicall y with Moravia does not need to be confirmed once again by any Rome, Frankfurt or Vienna." 8 1 So, the Czech Lands are a hi storically natural unity , wh ich does not in any way need Slovakia. They cont inue: " Without artificia l nationalizing, all questions can be named and also so lved in a more rational way" 82 - again, they are suggesting that the Slovaks are irrational and nationalistic as opposed to the rational Czechs. The Slovak image of the Czechs was propagated no less directly . In a series of articles in Literarny tyidennfk entitled " If Slovakia wants to be Slovakia ... ,"83 the writer Mi lan Ferko treated severa l subjects concern ing Slovak autonomy or independence. He held that after th e parliamentary e lectio ns in June 1992 when Vl adimfr Meciar 's Movement for a Democratic S lovakia (Hnutie za demokraticke Slovensko, HZDS ) won in Slovakia, the Czechs finally began to understand that the Slovaks really wanted to be inde pendent, and stated, " Some Czech politicians are beg inning to abandon [ ... ] the pos ition of historical arrogance and eco nomic super iorit y." 84 He thereby confirmed the image of the arroga nt Czechs who wanted to jujf. znamena to, ze jim k tem uz stavu a vedomf jeste neco chybf. a my nemame pravo je od toho zdrfovat." 81 "At' se stane zrejmym, ze jsou to Slovaci. kdo vystupujf z federace. a my pak jsme nastupni cky stat. jen z zus tane ve svych zavazcfch , sm lou vach a vztazfch k okolnfmu svetu. Ceske kralovstvf spoj ene hi storick y s Moravou se nepotre buje davat zadnym Rfmem. Frankfurtem ci Vfdnf znovu potvrzovat. " 82 .. Bez 83 " Ak Slovensko chce byt'Slovenskom .. ... 84 " Niektorf cesk f politici zacfnaju opu stat' [ .. . J pozfcie historickej arogancie a ekono- umeleho nacionalizovanf dajf se vsechny otazky pojmenovat i resi t vecneji ." mickej nadradenost i." " Ak Slovensko chce byt' Slovenskom ..." Vil. Literarny dennik June 27. 1992, 12. tyz- �SLOVAKIA 113 keep the Slovaks in an inferior position and he continued, " With the help of international financial superpowers , Prague decided about the fate of Slovakia, which has to remain in a vassal relationship to the Czech Lands." 85 According to Ferko, the Slovak government had also become arrogant, and the politicians of Public Again st Violence (Verejnost' proti nasiliu , VPN) had become " slaves of Prague' s neocolonial relationship to Slovakia" 86 and sought " to continue to infiltrate into the Slovak political life ideas of Masaryki sm and cosmopolitani sm in the fra mework of which there is no place for the Slovak nation. " 87 T.G. Masaryk was the first president of Czechos lovakia , and Czech s and Slovaks have very di ss imilar view s of him . To the Czechs he epitomizes democracy , whereas many Slovaks see him as the representative of the state ideology of the First Republic ( 19181938), the Czechoslovakism, according to which Czec hs and Slovaks were two branches of the same Czechoslovak nation . Many Slovaks belie ve that Czechoslovaki sm suppressed their national identity, and their view of the First Republic and of Masaryk is influenced by thi s negative vie w of the state ideology. The Slovak view of Masaryk is also tainted by the fact that in 1918 he signed an agreement with a group of Czech and Slovak emigres in Pittsburgh , according to which Slovakia was promi sed some form of autonomy in the new Czechoslovak state. For variou s reason s thi s promise was never fulfill ed,88 and thi s has left an impression among some Slovaks that Masaryk and the Czechs delibe ratel y broke their promi ses becau se xs -- Pra ha pros tred nfctvom medzin arod nyc h fin ancnych ve l'mocf rozhod la o osude Sl ovenska, ktore ma zostat' vo vaza lskom pomere k Cecham." Ak Slovensko chce byt' Slovenskom ... VI. Literam y tyidennik M ay 23, 1992, 3. 86 " ''otrokmi prazs keho neokolonialisti ckeho vztahu k Slovensku. " Ibid. 7 " d'alej in f iltrovat' do slovenskeho politickeho zivota myslienk y masaryki zmu a kozmopoliti zmu , v ramci ktoryc h niet miesta pre slovensky narod."' Ibid. 88 Part of the reason why Sl ovaki a was not granted autonomy was th at in the new Czechos lovak state there was a Germ an mi nority of the same size as th e Slovak popul ati on. and if the Sl ovaks had gained autonomy it wo uld have been very di fficult to find a va lid argument why the Germ ans should not have autonomy, too. �SLOVAKJA 114 th ey wished to maintain the ir control ove r Slovakia. Furthermore, whe n Ferko attacked Masaryk it wen t to the very heart of the Czech se lf-understandin g and co uld serve as proof to the Czec hs that the Slovaks did not rea ll y understand what democracy was a ll about. Anoth er im age from hi story that Ferko mobilizes is the Slovak wartime state , whi c h he presents as hav in g raised ge nera l Slovak se lf-co nsc iou sness, the spirit of e nterpri se, a nd the will to be equa l with the rest of the world . 89 Thi s is a totally different im age of the Slovak State than the one propagated by Vac ul fk who saw it only as a sy mbol of fascism , with which the Slo va ks had still not dealt. To Ferko the fa sc ism of the state was less sig nificant than the fac t th at it was Slovak. According to him , the e lect io ns in Jun e 1992 showed that neo-fasc ist te nde nci es were growing in oth er parts of Czec hoslovak ia, but not in Slovakia - leavi ng o nl y the Czec h land s infected wi th it. 911 He re, Ferko turn s Vaculfk 's accusation of the Slovaks' lac k of se ttleme nt w ith the wart ime fascism aga in st the Czechs - poss ibl y beca use he was aware that hi s arg ume nt was not very solid. In the very last issue of Literarny tyidennfk before the partiti o n, Vladimfr Min ac (one of Slovakia 's lead in g writers) propagated hi s less than pos iti ve im age of the Czec hs: "God save us from learning from the Czec hs the e mpty ideo log ica l rhetoric , the spl e ndid mora1ity, whi ch is limited to word s, the Have l-like e mptiness, which hides in itse lf o nl y a mad dwarf. " 9 1 In ridi c ulin g Vaclav Have l, Min ac insulted anothe r icon of the Czec h se lf-unders tandin g: Have l as the successor to Masaryk as the good philosopher-pres ide nt. And he was co mpl ete ly aware of thi s w he n he mentioned the myth of Masaryk 's '" Ferko: "'Ak Slovensko .. . VII ". ° Ferko 9 wi th out doubt hints at th e amazing elec ti on results or the Czec h Miroslav Sl,1dek ' s neo-fasc ist Republi ca n Party, which gained over 6 % of the votes in the Czech lands (Peter Bugge : The Czech Republi c, in: Szajkowsk i (ed.): Politica l Parties. 158- 159). "' " Bozec hrai\ , aby sme sa naucil i od Cechov prazdnej idologickej retorike. onej skvelej moralke, ktora sa obm edzuje na slova. onej hav lovskej prazdnote. ktora utaj uje v sebe iba zuriveho trpas lfka."' " Odkiar a kam , Slovaci 'I" ("Wherefrom and whereto, Slovaks?") Literamy tyi dennfk Dec. 19, 1992 , 11 . �SLOVAKIA 115 model democracy and deemed it " shrieking Bohemian glass in the necklace of the legend" 92 - instead of being real jewels, that is. When dismi ss ing the first Czechoslovak Republic like this, Mimic reflected the views of one-third of the Slovak populace, which did not consider it democratic, but in opposition to the majority of the Czech population, 93 and so he , like Yaculfk, invoked the collective memory in order to create an impression of Czech-Slovak incompatibility. Furthermore, Mimic painted a picture of the First Republic as a time when many Czechs came to Slovakia allegedly to help build it, but when they taught in school s at all level s, they taught Czechos lovak instead of Slovak, and when they founded the Slovak National Theatre , it was in reality one more Czech National Theatre. So the Czechs did not help out of pure brotherly sacrifice, but out of a desire to turn the Slovaks into Czechs. Later, Mimic reproduced the stereotype of the Czechs as being arrogant enough to want to decide over Slovakia without the appropriate understanding: " Again and again they go into political battle with the Slovaks with the same reproaches and with the sa me lack of knowledge of the Slovak world. They still tutor, still look after and protect in the way that every coloniali st has protected hi s colony. " 94 He re , the image of the Czechs as malevolent colonialists was used to create the impress ion that a veritable war was being waged between the evil Czech politicians and the Slovak people-and not onl y this: 9 ' 93 skrfpajuce ces ke skl o v mi hrdelnfku legendy. 37 % of th e Slovaks and 70 % of the Czechs sa w th e First Republi c as a model democracy. whereas anoth er 33 % of th e Slovaks did not think it was democrati c at all. (Marian Timorack y : Yerejna mienka o ce sko-slovenskych vztahoch. in: Fedor Gal (ed. ): One.for krize cesko-slovenskych vztaht1. (Praha: SLON 1992), 8 1-82 . Thi s probabl y refl ec ts th e Sl ovak res istance aga inst M asaryk ·s Czechos lovaki sm. which Ferko attacked, too. "" ·· v zdy znovu a znov u tiahnu do politickeho zapasu so Slo vakmi s tymi istyrni vycitkami a s tou istou neznalostbu slovenskeho sveta. Stale tutorcia, stale opatruju a ochrai\uju tak, ako kazdy kol oni ali sta ochrai\ova l svoju kol 6niu. " '·Odki al' a karn , Slovac i?" Litenirny tyidennlk Dec. 19, 1992, 11. �116 SLOVAKIA betwee n the Czech and Slovak worlds. 95 By portraying Czechs and Slovaks as living in different worlds , Minac made the partition of the common state look natural and desirab le as it enabled the small Slovak nation to fulfil its destiny as an authentic small nation facing the threatening international consumer society. And he concluded, " Behind us stay the o ld enmities and mi sunderstandin gs, a serva nt 's conflicts and rebellion s. Before us is our new di gnity." 96 As thi s ana lysis has shown , the Czech and Slovak collective memories were used to explain the differences between Czechs and Slovaks and to legitimize the break-up. Thi s way of usin g the past was made poss ible by the hu ge soc ietal changes since the Ve lvet Revolution in 1989. When communism fe ll , there was a broadly felt need to rewrite history in order to get rid of the ideolog ica ll y deformed historical interpretation s of the communists and thi s led to two different phenomena. On the one hand , the new situ at ion led to an uncovering of 'wh ite spots ' in the hi story of the Czechs and Slovaks. On the other, thi s rewriting made room for new deformations of history. Silvia Mihalikova has described this phenome non , which was common for the entire post-communi st world, as a use of arguments from the past according to a principle of se lf-service: people simply chose the historical facts, persons, and conceptions that suited their momentary purposes. 97 95 Thi s image of the Czechs and Slovaks li ving in different worlds was shared by at least the Czech political weekly, Respekt, whose front page of the elect ion issue in 1992 read in large red letters 'Two civi li za ti ons" and conti nued in the main comment: "A lone into Europe or toge ther to the Balkans" ( Respekt June 8-14, I 992, I ). See Peter Bugge : The Use of the Middle: Mitteleuropa vs. Strednf Evropa. In : European Review of History , Vol. 6. No. I . 1999, 30-3 1 and Vladimir Macura: Masarykovy boty a jine semi(o) fejetony. (Praha: Prazska imagin ace 1993). 48-49 for a further elaborat ion of the Czech imaging of the Slovaks as belonging to the Balkans . % " Za nami ostavaju stare nepriatel'stva a nedorozumenia, sluhovs ke spory a vzbury . Pred nami je nasa nova d6stojnost'. " " Odkial' a kam . Slovaci ?" Literarny tj idennfk Dec. 19. 1992. 11. 97 Mihalikova: Narodne symboly, 54-56. �SLOVAKIA 117 The se lf-serv ice aspec t of the use of hi story was supported by the communist ideo logization of the culture, includin g the schools. The hi story that had been to ld by the regime and taught in sc hool s was perce ived as inh erentl y wrong , and therefore , as Tony Judt has argued, a plurality of memories was created when parents told their children what hi story was ' reall y' like. Every hi story that was told by the reg ime was by implication fa lse, which meant th at every hi story not to ld by the regime mu st by implication be true. 98 This was the reason, not onl y for the very different Czec h and Slovak collective memories, but also for the overa ll low level of knowl edge about and reflection on the nation al hi story. Key period s in Czechoslovak hi story co ncernin g the mutual Czech-Slovak relation ship can be li sted as follows : I) the First Republic 19 I 8- 1938, 2) the destruction of Czechoslovakia and th e creati on of the Slovak State durin g World War II, 3) the Slovak National Uprising against the fascists in 1944, 4) the Prague Spring in 1968, 5) the Normalization 1969-1 989. When lookin g at the articles that we have analysed here, it is c lear that Vaculfk employed al l of them. In hi s interpretation : the First Rep ublic was a time when the Czechs he lped the ir un grateful younger brothers; the Slovak State came into bein g when the Slovaks betrayed the Czechs; the Slovak National Upri sin g was not necessaril y for a renewal of Czechoslovakia; in the Prague Spring the Slovaks preyed on the Czech strugg le for democracy; and durin g Norma li zati on the Slovaks suffered less than the Czec hs. In the same vei n, Mil an Ferko and Vladimfr Mimic invoked the Slovak collective memory of the First Republic as a period of Czechoslovakism th at did not properly ack now ledge the character and needs of the Slovaks, and the Czechs did what they could to turn the Slovaks into Czec hs. The reason why Ferko and Mimic both used thi s period probabl y lay in the fact th at Czechoslovakism was the 'state ideo logy' of the First Rep ublic , which made it easy to attack 9 ' Tony Judt: The Past is Another Cou ntry : Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe , in: Dcedalus. Vol. 21. No. 4, 1992, I OI. �SLOVAK IA 118 Czech arrogance towards the Slovaks. As opposed to this , the legacy of all the other significant periods seemed in some way or another too ambiguous to be exp loited from Minac ' s and Ferko ' s points of view. 99 This reflects the fact that Czechs and Slovaks not on ly experienced the events differently at the time, but also that their memories of them today are very different. And this then shows us that the socia li zation of the population ' s memories since 1918 was not successful in providing the two nations with a common co ll ective memory of the past that they shared as parts of the same state. In stead, those who after 1989 wished to do otherwise were ab le, like Vaculfk, Minac , Ferko, and others, to mobilize conflicts from the past and link them together regardless of any inner logic and chrono logy. They painted a picture of a basic Czech-Slovak incompatibility and a common history consisting of conflicts, betrayals, and wrongdoings that made a divorce look c learly preferable to a continued malfunctionin g marriage. 100 In Slovakia, the discu ss ions about the common history of the Czechs and the Slovaks became polarized to the degree that two directly opposite interpretations were propagated. The relevant criterion for arguments became the question whether the common state had been favourable or disadvantageous to the Slovaks. 101 Slovak so99 The Slovak State was fascist: the National Uprising was directed aga in st the inde- pendent Slovak State; resu lting from th e Prague Spring was th e federalism that Ferko and Minac fo ught aga inst but which neverth eless meant progress in th e Czech-Slovak relationship; and Normalization was not see n as too bad a period for th e Slovaks . ' 00 The metaphor of the marriage was also frequently used in the debate, see e.g. Miroslav Ku sy : '·Konfederacnf k lam·• (""Confederation delusion'"). Literarnf no viny Aug. 6. 1992. 1+3. 0 ' ' Mihalikova: Narodne symboly, 58. An ex traordinary feature of th e Slovak contex t was the fact that very ac tive participants in the debate were exi les like Stefan Polakovic or Milan S. Durica. who either had been in ex ile ever since World War II beca use of their ro le in the Slovak State or they came from thi s environment. They saw as their greatest task res torin g Slovak independence from th e Czechs and seemed not to reali ze that Slovak society had changed since their heyday during the �SLOVAKIA 119 ciety was to a very large ex tent di vided over interpretations of hi story , the nature of Slovak nation al identity, and wishes for the future, and in fact the Slovaks who engaged in the de bates on the CzechSlovak past spent as much or even more energy blaming eac h other, rather than blaming the Czechs. 102 In contrast to thi s deep divi sion , the Czechs may have disagreed on many thing s, but by and large there was unanimity concerning subjects such as these. In the Czech debate, the efforts to create a separate Czech state grad uall y came to be seen as a way of guardin g Kl aus' rapid economic reform s from the " irrati o nal" Slovaks a nd Czech democracy from the alleged Slovak inclin ation to national soc iali sm and a stron g state, images which were mobili zed by the frequent use of exa mples from the Czech collective me mory. It is furthermore interesting that an opinion poll in October of 1990 showed that more than 50 % of the Czechs believed in the idea of one Czechoslovak nation . 1w While most Czechs and Slovaks perce ived of them se lves as be in g simultaneously Czechoslovaks and e ithe r Czechs or Slovaks, most Czechs, who unconsciously conceived of the two layers of the ir identification as being identical , had never paid much attention to the conce pt of a Czech identification as be in g different from their ide ntific ation as Czechoslovaks. Most Slovaks , on the other hand , were very much aware that there was a difference between their Slovak and their Czechoslovak identification . 104 Whe n the newspaper debates invoked the war. In co ntrast to the hi stori ans who had li ved throu gh the communi st period at home and those who had been in exile becau se of their di sagreements with the co mmuni st regime. thi s group of hi storians saw nothing but disadvantages for the Slovaks in the com mon Czechos lovak Republic. 102 According to Soiia Szomolanyi. different perceptions of key fi gures and events in Slovak history not onl y divided . but outri ght polari zed th e population (Szomo lany i 1994 : 76). '"' Timoracky : Yerejna mienka. 7 1-72. ' 04 Thi s was strengthened by th e asy mmetri ca l conditi ons after 19 I 8. e.g. when in school tex tbooks Czech hi story was made Czechos lovak simply by adding " slovak" to th e adjec ti ve (E li sabeth Bakke: Cechoslovak izmu s v skol skych uceb ni ciach ( 19 18- 1938). Historicky casopis. Vo l. 47. o 2. 1999: 242-243) or when on ly the �120 SLOVAKIA past, it happened in a way that mobili zed images that em phasized the differences rather than the s imil ariti es between th e tw o nation a l groups. In thi s way the Czech and Slovak layers of the Czec hoslovak population 's identifi cat ion were stre ngthened to the detriment of the Czechoslovak layer. And the di scre pancy that was mob ili zed between the Czech and Slovak images of themselves, the other, and the future of the common state is undoubted ly part of the answer to the question why the common Czechoslovak state eventually broke up. Slovaks had their own Communist Party (KSS) whereas the Czechos lovak Communist Party (KSC) served both as the Czech and the all-state party. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2005, Vol. 38 Description An account of the resource Vol. 38 (No. 70-71), 2005. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2005 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 104 SLOVAKIA "Ungrateful Younger Brothers" versus "Arrogant Atheists." Czech-Slovak Stereotypes in a Collective Memory Perspective. Lone Sarauw On January I , 1993 , Czechoslovakia was divided in a process that has been characterized as a "vel vet divorce. " 56 Compared to the ways in which other post-communi st states were fa lling apart at the time, thi s seems a va lid description . However , the split was ca used by severe confli cts betwee n the two parts of the state. Scholars have given a number of reasons for the di vo rce : I ) The Czech desire for democracy and a market economy clashed with Slovak insistence upon nati onal eq uality. 57 2) Despite grow ing macro-structu ra l simil ariti es, one Czechoslovak soc iety never managed to replace the Czech and Slovak soc ieti es that had been brought together in a com mon state. 58 3) Th e w inners of the parli amentary elec tion s in 1992, th e Sl ovak Vl adimfr Meciar and the Czech V aclav Kl aus, were unabl e to 56 See Otto U lc: "C zechos lovak ia' s ve l vet divorce. " East European Quarterly 30. September ( 1996). pp. 33 1-352. 57 5 " Ibid. Ji ff Mu sil : '"C zec h and Slovak Soc iety." in Jiff Mu sil (ed.): Th e End or Czechoslova kia (Budapest. L ondon, New York: Central European University Press 1995). 77-94. SLOVAKIA 105 come to te rm s w ith the constitutional arrangement of Czechoslovakia, beca use they were unwillin g to put the interests of the common state before their own power ambi tions. 59 And more co uld be found. As a contrib uti on to the debate over the break-up, thi s artic le inte nd s to look at th e role of stereotypes and collective memory in it, the argument being that hi story was mobili zed in the media de bates prior to the partition , and that it happe ned in a way that en hanced the di ffere nces rather than the likenesses of the two peopl es.60 As a result of thi s th e population graduall y came to accept the partition of the common state, even if the majority of the population never supported it. 6 1 The concept "collective me mory" has been defi ned as "a soc iety 's co ll ected production of me mory," 62 whi ch suppli es the soc iety with a fee ling of belong ing together by sharing the same past. One of the probl e ms in Czec hoslovakia seems to have bee n the lack of such a feelin g of sharing the same past in both halves of the state. Despite the fact that, apart from World W ar II , Czechs and Slovaks lived together in one state between 19 18 and I 993 , their co ll ective me mories of this li fe together differ to a considerab le ex tent. 59 Abby Innes: ·'T he Breakup of Czechos lovakia: The Impac t of Party Development on the Separa ti on of the State," East European Politics and Societies (EEPS) , Vol. I I , No. 3, Fall ( 1997), 393-435 . 60 Si l via Mihali kova: •• arod ne symbo ly slovenskej statnosti", Politologicka revue 2, prosinec, ( 1996), 56. 61 An opi ni on poll from Jul y 1992 shows th at 53 % of the Czechs and 42 % of the Slovaks w ished lo maintain th e co mmon state. whi le respecti ve ly 24 % and 32 % w ished the slate to be divided (Sharon W olchi k : ·The Politics of Transition and th e Break-U p of Czec hos lova ki a," in Ji ff Musi l (ed .): Th e End of' Czechos lova kia. (Budapest : Centra l European Universi ty Press 1995 , 233). 62 Claus Bry ld and Anette Warrin g: Besaette/sestiden som kollektiv erindring. Histo- rie- og traditionsfor va llning at' krig og besaettelse 1945- 1997. (Rosk ilde: Rosk ilde Uni versitetsforlag 1998), 19-20. 106 SLOVAKIA In the medi a debates in the peri od leading up to the break-up of C zec hos lovakia hi story , or rather memory ,63 was mobi Ii zed as proof of the inevitability and desirability of the divorce. Because thi s was the aim of the partic ipants of the debate, chrono logy was irre levant and hi story became ' hori zontali zed ' so to speak. As Silvia Mi halikova has formulated it, "osten sible or rea l sins committed centuries ago merge with wrongs done in th e last decades and are at the same time th e reaso n for today 's mi sunderstandin gs and hatred."64 Thus, the mobilization of past conflicts e nabl ed the two nation s to blame eac h other for their current probl ems, which is wh at thi s article intend s to show using examples from the literary newspapers of th e Czech Land s and Slovakia, Literarnf noviny and Literarny tyi- dennik,65 prior to the break-up. Wh en looking for archetypical examp les of the Czech and S lovak stereotypes or images of each other, the "arroga nt atheists" and " ungrateful younger brothers" of the headlines were the first ideas about the Czech and S lovak images of each other that came to mind . Therefore, it came as a surprise that it was rather imposs ibl e to find any examples of the stereotype of the Czechs as dangerous atheists they are presented as being arrogant, though. The lack of proof of the idea that the Slovak image of the Czec hs would see them as atheists 0 -' Pierre Nora has formu lated thi s di st incti on be tween history and memory in terms of a fund amen tal opposi ti on . .. Memory is life [ ... ] a bond tying us to the etern al presen t[ ... ] it is affec ti ve and mag ica l l and] onl y accom modates th ose facts that suit it .'' whereas hi story is .. the reconstru cti on , al ways problematic and incomplete j ... I a representati on of the past I th at I ca ll s fo r analys is and criti cism' ' (Pierre Nora: "Between Memory and H istory: Les Lieux de M emoire" . Representations Vol 0, No. 26 Special Issue: M emory and Cou nter-M emory. Spring ( I 989) , 8-9). A less ri gid di stincti on has been pro posed by A nne Erikse n. who sees hi story and memory as being equally important aspec ts of the co llecti ve memory th at combine to create the entire co llec ti ve memory (A nne Eriksen: Del var nae annet under krigen. 2. verdenskrig i norsk kollektivtradisjon. (Oslo: Pax 1995). r,., Mihalikova: ·'Narodne symboly," 55. 65 In the literary newspapers the past was mobili zed more obviously and cru dely but not in a different way th an in mos t other newspapers. Thus, they serve well as illustrations of a process that was happening in the press in general. SLOVAKIA 107 was fru strating , and it raised the question where thi s idea came from. It stemmed from the Christian Democratic Movement (Kresfansko De mokraticke Hnutie, KOH) , which, according to Miroslav Kusy , wanted to protect Slovakia from " des tructive liberal and freethinking influences from the Czech Lands." Besides, the stereotype had been used frequently in the interwar period , but the industrialization and urbanization of Slovakia since then had turned the mostly rural soc iety into one where Catholics did not necessarily consider their interests as Catholics to be more important than their economic and cultural conditions. 66 Also, as Petr Prfhod a has stated , the image of the Czechs as atheists was a well-known Czech stereotype of the Slovak view of them ,67 indirectly testifyin g to a Czech stereotype of the Slovaks as ' religiou s. ' 68 The image that eventually turned out to be the most pervasive was one of the Czechs as Czechoslovakist69 colonialists exploiting Slovakia. And as colonialists, they were described as arrogant in wanting to rule over Slovakia, even though they did not know it properly. It should be pointed out that the difficulty in having the stereo- '"' Miroslav Ku sy: ··S lovak Exceptionalism". in Musil (ed.): The End. 147- 149 . See also Martin Butora and Zora Butorova: " Slovakia: The Iden tit y Chal lenges of the Newly Born State". Socia l Research. Vol. 60. No. 4, Winter ( 1993). 7 13-7 14. and Sona Szomol anyi: UParadox kon zervativi zmu na Slovensku .'· Domino Efekt. Vol. 2. No. 15. ( 1993). 4. 67 Petr Prfhoda: '·Mutual Perceptions in Czech -Slovak Relationships•·, in: Musil (ed.) : The End. 134. "" Al so th e nationali sti c Slovak news paper ··s Jovak Nation·• (Slovensky mirod) was checked for the atheist image. but it could not be found even here . This probably reflects the fact that the image was propagated by the KDH . which was a quite unpopu lar part y those days among its non -ad herents. and whic h was often reproached in Slovensky mirod. 69 As a way of legitimising th e new Czechos lovak Republic in 19 18, the doctrine of one Czechoslovak nati on w ith two branche s. a Czech and a Slovak one. was propa gated to comp ly wi th the intention of president Woodrow Wilson to gi ve national self-determinat ion to the nations of Cen tral and Eastern Europe . The doctrine was officia ll y abandoned onl y afler World War II. 108 SLOVAKIA types co nfirmed did not co ncern the Czech newspaper, the se l fimage of the Czechs as 'rational' notwithstanding. 70 The most co mmonl y cited example of the Czech perception of the Slovaks as ungra tefu l yo unger brothers was an article by the writer Lud vfk Vaculfk in Literarnf noviny from 1990 entitled: " Our Slova k Questi on. " 7 1 The first thin g to be noticed about Vaculfk 's article is the co ndescending tone of the titl e: The Slovak questi on is ' our ' ques ti on, that is ' us' meaning the Czechs , not the Slovak s. 72 Vaculfk beg ins his arti cle by definin g himself as being Czech by nation ality, but Czechoslovak as a citi ze n, but he nevertheless repeatedl y speaks in the name of ' us, th e Czec hs,' whi ch substanti all y weakens hi s claim to being a truly Czechoslovak citizen. Throu ghout hi s tex t, Vaculfk uses exampl es from hi story to argue for a separati on from the Slo vaks. First, he bl ames the Slovaks for never having dealt with the fasc ism of their wartime state ( 19391945). They escaped thi s obligation by rejoining the Czechs in Czechos lovakia, and wh en, after a few yea rs, they were forced into a communi st regime, they did not reall y mind , si nce they ga ined a lot more economicall y from co mmuni sm than did the Czechs. There is no inner log ic between these two situati ons other th an th e fac t th at Vaculfk 's description of them makes the Slovaks look as if they have no principl es, going more or less direc tl y from accepting fascism to accepting co mmuni sm. He co ntinues by bl ami ng the Slovaks fo r prey ing on the Czech s' struggle for democracy in 1968, since th e only reform that survived the W arsaw Pac t in vas ion was the federali zation of the state, " When we in I 968 tri ed to free ourse lves from 70 L adis lav Holy : The Lillie Czech and the Gre<I/ Czech Na tion. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996), 104. 71 72 " Nase slovenska otazka". Litenimf noviny (M ay 3, 1990). I +3 . Yacu l fk's titl e was in spired by the titl e of T.G. Masaryk ·s book ··The Czech Question" (C:eska otazka) from 1895 on the Czech rebirth in the 19th century and it outlined hi s po litica l progra mme for the Czech nati on. But where Masaryk treated his own nation. Yacu lfk by the use of the word ··our" implies th at the Czechs have a ri ght to objectify and defi ne the Slovaks. SLOVAKIA 109 the dictatorship, the Slovaks regarded it as our business and went for autonomy. When we were then puni shed for the rebellion , they , because they had not compromised th emse lves very much with us, received a more gentle puni shment; and that their autonomy, which they gained from our rebellion , for us meant a sharpenin g of the punishment, does not cross their mind s." 73 When Vaculfk describes the Slovak ga in of autonomy as a sharpenin g of the puni shment for the Czechs , this testifies to hi s belief, not only in centralism , but also that the Czechs have the right to control Slovaki a. When employing these im ages he attempts to mobilize the Czech memory of the Slovaks as traitors both in 1938-39, when they ga ined their own state whereas the Czech lands were turned into the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and in the Prague Spring of 1968. Later on Vaculfk contradicts his argument of th e Slovak sati sfaction with the communist regime by claiming that they left it to the Czechs to defeat the communists and then again brought up their claims for autonomy: "as if they thought: you brou ght us your communism, now you take it away again, Czechs! " 74 According to Vaculfk, the Slovaks, being objects rather than subjects of hi story, unlike the Czechs have always managed to escape the existential question: Who are we and what do we want? Thi s even counts for the Slovak National Uprising during World War II, which in Vaculfk 's view was too brief and too limited territoriall y to count as proof of Slovak pro-C zec hos lov ak ism. Vaculfk only mention s the anti-fascist element of the upri si ng and neg lects the fact that the leaders of the resistance movement clearly stated a wish to reunite with the Czechs after 73 " Kdyz jsme se v roce 1968 poku sili uvolnit se z diktatury , povazovali to Slovaci za nasi staro st a sli si za autonomif. K dyz my pak byli za vzpouru ztrestan i, oni , j elikoz se s nami moc nezkompromitovali, dostali mfrnejsf trest; a ze jejich autono- mie, kterou z nasf vzpoury vyzfska li , znamenala pro nas zostfenf trestu, to jim nenapada." 74 "jako by si mysleli: Privezli j ste nam sem v,is komuni smus, odvezte si ho zas, Cesi 1" - Many Slovaks after 1989 have pointed ou t that in 1946 40 % of th e Czechs voted com muni st, and only 30 % of the Slovaks, suggesting that comm uni sm was a predomi nantly Czech idea. SLOVAKIA 110 th e wa r,75 whi c h was inco ns iste nt w ith hi s prev io us acc usati o ns aga inst the Slovak s fo r not hav ing co me to te rm s w ith the fasc ism of the ir wartime state . The first time Vaculfk mobili zes the " littl e brothe r" im age he c laims that the Slovak s, s ince they do not have a nybody else against whom to prove the ir adulthood , mi stake nl y tried it o ut on the Czechs. Later on he continues th at, afte r the fa ll of co mmuni sm, th e Sl ovak nation fin a ll y had the cha nce to start looking fo r its ow n happiness, by whi ch it would grow one more leve l. The most c rude exa mple of the im age comes w he n Vac ulfk re plies to Mil an Si mec ka, a Czec h write r li vin g in Slovaki a, who had w ritte n to the Czec hs th at the ir yo un ger brothe r had grow n up a nd now should ha ve hi s ow n bed. Vac ul fk 's repl y was as fo ll ows: "As we know our youn ger brothe r, he w ill want to have hi s bed by the window in the summer and by the ove n in the w inte r. No bed , littl e broth e r, ha ve yo ur o wn littl e ho use!" 76 And finall y, he li sts reaso ns why just now is the ri ght time to get rid of the Slovaks, one of whi c h is th at 70 years ago it wo uld have bee n interpreted as de ny ing he lp to the younger brother. Thus, Vac ulfk mobili zes the Czec h image of the ungrateful younger brother and the coll ective me mory of Slovak betrayal s to make hi s po int th at the Czec hs would be better off without the Slovaks. It is hard not to find Vac ulfk a bit patronizing, but hi s views we re not e xce pti onal a mong the Czec hs. In the articl e " Re lie f with a dec ision," 77 fo urteen intellectu als 78 agreed th at it was bette r to let the Slovaks go, if th at was what they wanted , so th at the Czec hs co uld stand as the true he irs of Czec hos lovaki a and thereby keep the name of the 75 See I.:.ubomir Liptak : S/ovensko v 20. storocf. (Brat islava : K all igram 2000), 25 1- 252. 76 ·'A le j ak mladsfho brat ffc ka zname, bude v lete chtft tu pos tylku u ok na a v zime u pece. Zadnou postylku, bra tfe. domecek mej si 1" 77 " Uleva z rozhodnutf" . L itenim f noviny June 18, 1992, I. 78 The article was signed by Ji ff K olar, K arel Siktanc, K arel Pecka, Lud vfk Yacul fk , V lad im ir K ar ffk , I van Werni sc h, Jan Lopatka, Sergej Mac honi n, Pfemys l Rut. Dusan K arpatsky, Yrati slav Farber, Ji ff Cies lar, Mi ros lav Kl omfnek, M ilan Jungmann, all men of literature. SLOVAKIA 111 state. Se manti ca ll y, Czechoslovaki a w itho ut Slova ki a does not make muc h sense, but to the authors of the arti cle there was c learly anothe r aspect to Czechos lova ki a th an the territori al one. T he ir be li ef that Czechos lovak ia w ithout Slovaki a made sense indi cated that they pe rce ived th e Czech s as be in g in some undefin ed ma nner more trul y Czec hos lova k th an the Slovaks and that they reserved the ri ght to defin e the character of the co mmon state fo r the Czechs. Bes ides, they saw the diffe re nt res ults of the e lection s in June 1992 in the two parts of the country as an exampl e of the Czech desire fo r a free economy and po liti ca l de moc rac y on the o ne hand , and on the oth er of the Slovak longin g fo r a soc iety directed by the state a nd with e le me nts of nati onal soci ali sm. And they furth e rmore inte rpre ted the S lovak res ult as an ex press ion of a Slovak long ing fo r their own indepe nde nt state, in spite of the fac t th at th e onl y Slovak party with inde pe nde nce as part of its e lec ti on prog ramme was the Slova k Nati onal Party (Sl ovenska narodna strana, SNS), whi ch ga ined onl y 9.4 % of the votes in Slovakia.79 The arti cle was writte n in a tone th at sugges ted ne utrality and objecti vity, whil e the co nte nt was in fac t stron gly po le mi ca l. " If it is so that onl y e rectin g one's ow n state is the sign o f adulth ood and se lf-justifi cati on of a nation , we do not have reasons fo r counting it as a fa ilure a nd loss, what we since 19 18 have contributed to Slovaki a in that respect materi all y and mora ll y. The found ation of Czechos lova ki a co mpl eted the Czech nati o nal reawake nin g, and if the Slovaks today c ut the mse lves loose fro m us, it means th at they are still lac kin g somethin g to reac h the same pos iti on and consc iousness, and we do not have the ri ght to keep the m fro m that. " 80 In thi s argu- 79 K aren Henderson: T he Slovak Republic, in : Bogdan Szajkowsk i (ed.): Po litica l Parties of Eastern Europe. Russia & the Successor S tates. (Harlow: Longman In for- mati on and Reference 1994 ). 529. ' 0 ·'Je- li tom u tak, ze teprve ustave nf vlas tn fho statu je znamenfm dospe losti a sveprav nosti naroda, nemame duvod pocftat si za pro hru a ztratu , cfm jsme k tomu Slovensku od rok u 19 18 hmotne i moraine prispeli . Zalozenfm Ceskos lovenske republik y se dov rsilo ceske narodn f obroze nf, a j estli ze se Slovaci dnes od nas odpo- SLOVAKIA 112 ment th e Slovaks are the ones cutting themselves loose because they want to 'g row up ' and become indepe ndent of the Czechs who have helped the m " materially and morally" ever s ince the foundation of the common state. "Let it be obvious that it is the Slovaks who step out of the federation, and that we the n are the successor state , which keeps its ob li gations, treaties and relation s to th e world around us. The Czech kingdom united hi storicall y with Moravia does not need to be confirmed once again by any Rome, Frankfurt or Vienna." 8 1 So, the Czech Lands are a hi storically natural unity , wh ich does not in any way need Slovakia. They cont inue: " Without artificia l nationalizing, all questions can be named and also so lved in a more rational way" 82 - again, they are suggesting that the Slovaks are irrational and nationalistic as opposed to the rational Czechs. The Slovak image of the Czechs was propagated no less directly . In a series of articles in Literarny tyidennfk entitled " If Slovakia wants to be Slovakia ... ,"83 the writer Mi lan Ferko treated severa l subjects concern ing Slovak autonomy or independence. He held that after th e parliamentary e lectio ns in June 1992 when Vl adimfr Meciar 's Movement for a Democratic S lovakia (Hnutie za demokraticke Slovensko, HZDS ) won in Slovakia, the Czechs finally began to understand that the Slovaks really wanted to be inde pendent, and stated, " Some Czech politicians are beg inning to abandon [ ... ] the pos ition of historical arrogance and eco nomic super iorit y." 84 He thereby confirmed the image of the arroga nt Czechs who wanted to jujf. znamena to, ze jim k tem uz stavu a vedomf jeste neco chybf. a my nemame pravo je od toho zdrfovat." 81 "At' se stane zrejmym, ze jsou to Slovaci. kdo vystupujf z federace. a my pak jsme nastupni cky stat. jen z zus tane ve svych zavazcfch , sm lou vach a vztazfch k okolnfmu svetu. Ceske kralovstvf spoj ene hi storick y s Moravou se nepotre buje davat zadnym Rfmem. Frankfurtem ci Vfdnf znovu potvrzovat. " 82 .. Bez 83 " Ak Slovensko chce byt'Slovenskom .. ... 84 " Niektorf cesk f politici zacfnaju opu stat' [ .. . J pozfcie historickej arogancie a ekono- umeleho nacionalizovanf dajf se vsechny otazky pojmenovat i resi t vecneji ." mickej nadradenost i." " Ak Slovensko chce byt' Slovenskom ..." Vil. Literarny dennik June 27. 1992, 12. tyz- SLOVAKIA 113 keep the Slovaks in an inferior position and he continued, " With the help of international financial superpowers , Prague decided about the fate of Slovakia, which has to remain in a vassal relationship to the Czech Lands." 85 According to Ferko, the Slovak government had also become arrogant, and the politicians of Public Again st Violence (Verejnost' proti nasiliu , VPN) had become " slaves of Prague' s neocolonial relationship to Slovakia" 86 and sought " to continue to infiltrate into the Slovak political life ideas of Masaryki sm and cosmopolitani sm in the fra mework of which there is no place for the Slovak nation. " 87 T.G. Masaryk was the first president of Czechos lovakia , and Czech s and Slovaks have very di ss imilar view s of him . To the Czechs he epitomizes democracy , whereas many Slovaks see him as the representative of the state ideology of the First Republic ( 19181938), the Czechoslovakism, according to which Czec hs and Slovaks were two branches of the same Czechoslovak nation . Many Slovaks belie ve that Czechoslovaki sm suppressed their national identity, and their view of the First Republic and of Masaryk is influenced by thi s negative vie w of the state ideology. The Slovak view of Masaryk is also tainted by the fact that in 1918 he signed an agreement with a group of Czech and Slovak emigres in Pittsburgh , according to which Slovakia was promi sed some form of autonomy in the new Czechoslovak state. For variou s reason s thi s promise was never fulfill ed,88 and thi s has left an impression among some Slovaks that Masaryk and the Czechs delibe ratel y broke their promi ses becau se xs -- Pra ha pros tred nfctvom medzin arod nyc h fin ancnych ve l'mocf rozhod la o osude Sl ovenska, ktore ma zostat' vo vaza lskom pomere k Cecham." Ak Slovensko chce byt' Slovenskom ... VI. Literam y tyidennik M ay 23, 1992, 3. 86 " ''otrokmi prazs keho neokolonialisti ckeho vztahu k Slovensku. " Ibid. 7 " d'alej in f iltrovat' do slovenskeho politickeho zivota myslienk y masaryki zmu a kozmopoliti zmu , v ramci ktoryc h niet miesta pre slovensky narod."' Ibid. 88 Part of the reason why Sl ovaki a was not granted autonomy was th at in the new Czechos lovak state there was a Germ an mi nority of the same size as th e Slovak popul ati on. and if the Sl ovaks had gained autonomy it wo uld have been very di fficult to find a va lid argument why the Germ ans should not have autonomy, too. SLOVAKJA 114 th ey wished to maintain the ir control ove r Slovakia. Furthermore, whe n Ferko attacked Masaryk it wen t to the very heart of the Czech se lf-understandin g and co uld serve as proof to the Czec hs that the Slovaks did not rea ll y understand what democracy was a ll about. Anoth er im age from hi story that Ferko mobilizes is the Slovak wartime state , whi c h he presents as hav in g raised ge nera l Slovak se lf-co nsc iou sness, the spirit of e nterpri se, a nd the will to be equa l with the rest of the world . 89 Thi s is a totally different im age of the Slovak State than the one propagated by Vac ul fk who saw it only as a sy mbol of fascism , with which the Slo va ks had still not dealt. To Ferko the fa sc ism of the state was less sig nificant than the fac t th at it was Slovak. According to him , the e lect io ns in Jun e 1992 showed that neo-fasc ist te nde nci es were growing in oth er parts of Czec hoslovak ia, but not in Slovakia - leavi ng o nl y the Czec h land s infected wi th it. 911 He re, Ferko turn s Vaculfk 's accusation of the Slovaks' lac k of se ttleme nt w ith the wart ime fascism aga in st the Czechs - poss ibl y beca use he was aware that hi s arg ume nt was not very solid. In the very last issue of Literarny tyidennfk before the partiti o n, Vladimfr Min ac (one of Slovakia 's lead in g writers) propagated hi s less than pos iti ve im age of the Czec hs: "God save us from learning from the Czec hs the e mpty ideo log ica l rhetoric , the spl e ndid mora1ity, whi ch is limited to word s, the Have l-like e mptiness, which hides in itse lf o nl y a mad dwarf. " 9 1 In ridi c ulin g Vaclav Have l, Min ac insulted anothe r icon of the Czec h se lf-unders tandin g: Have l as the successor to Masaryk as the good philosopher-pres ide nt. And he was co mpl ete ly aware of thi s w he n he mentioned the myth of Masaryk 's '" Ferko: "'Ak Slovensko .. . VII ". ° Ferko 9 wi th out doubt hints at th e amazing elec ti on results or the Czec h Miroslav Sl,1dek ' s neo-fasc ist Republi ca n Party, which gained over 6 % of the votes in the Czech lands (Peter Bugge : The Czech Republi c, in: Szajkowsk i (ed.): Politica l Parties. 158- 159). "' " Bozec hrai\ , aby sme sa naucil i od Cechov prazdnej idologickej retorike. onej skvelej moralke, ktora sa obm edzuje na slova. onej hav lovskej prazdnote. ktora utaj uje v sebe iba zuriveho trpas lfka."' " Odkiar a kam , Slovaci 'I" ("Wherefrom and whereto, Slovaks?") Literamy tyi dennfk Dec. 19, 1992 , 11 . SLOVAKIA 115 model democracy and deemed it " shrieking Bohemian glass in the necklace of the legend" 92 - instead of being real jewels, that is. When dismi ss ing the first Czechoslovak Republic like this, Mimic reflected the views of one-third of the Slovak populace, which did not consider it democratic, but in opposition to the majority of the Czech population, 93 and so he , like Yaculfk, invoked the collective memory in order to create an impression of Czech-Slovak incompatibility. Furthermore, Mimic painted a picture of the First Republic as a time when many Czechs came to Slovakia allegedly to help build it, but when they taught in school s at all level s, they taught Czechos lovak instead of Slovak, and when they founded the Slovak National Theatre , it was in reality one more Czech National Theatre. So the Czechs did not help out of pure brotherly sacrifice, but out of a desire to turn the Slovaks into Czechs. Later, Mimic reproduced the stereotype of the Czechs as being arrogant enough to want to decide over Slovakia without the appropriate understanding: " Again and again they go into political battle with the Slovaks with the same reproaches and with the sa me lack of knowledge of the Slovak world. They still tutor, still look after and protect in the way that every coloniali st has protected hi s colony. " 94 He re , the image of the Czechs as malevolent colonialists was used to create the impress ion that a veritable war was being waged between the evil Czech politicians and the Slovak people-and not onl y this: 9 ' 93 skrfpajuce ces ke skl o v mi hrdelnfku legendy. 37 % of th e Slovaks and 70 % of the Czechs sa w th e First Republi c as a model democracy. whereas anoth er 33 % of th e Slovaks did not think it was democrati c at all. (Marian Timorack y : Yerejna mienka o ce sko-slovenskych vztahoch. in: Fedor Gal (ed. ): One.for krize cesko-slovenskych vztaht1. (Praha: SLON 1992), 8 1-82 . Thi s probabl y refl ec ts th e Sl ovak res istance aga inst M asaryk ·s Czechos lovaki sm. which Ferko attacked, too. "" ·· v zdy znovu a znov u tiahnu do politickeho zapasu so Slo vakmi s tymi istyrni vycitkami a s tou istou neznalostbu slovenskeho sveta. Stale tutorcia, stale opatruju a ochrai\uju tak, ako kazdy kol oni ali sta ochrai\ova l svoju kol 6niu. " '·Odki al' a karn , Slovac i?" Litenirny tyidennlk Dec. 19, 1992, 11. 116 SLOVAKIA betwee n the Czech and Slovak worlds. 95 By portraying Czechs and Slovaks as living in different worlds , Minac made the partition of the common state look natural and desirab le as it enabled the small Slovak nation to fulfil its destiny as an authentic small nation facing the threatening international consumer society. And he concluded, " Behind us stay the o ld enmities and mi sunderstandin gs, a serva nt 's conflicts and rebellion s. Before us is our new di gnity." 96 As thi s ana lysis has shown , the Czech and Slovak collective memories were used to explain the differences between Czechs and Slovaks and to legitimize the break-up. Thi s way of usin g the past was made poss ible by the hu ge soc ietal changes since the Ve lvet Revolution in 1989. When communism fe ll , there was a broadly felt need to rewrite history in order to get rid of the ideolog ica ll y deformed historical interpretation s of the communists and thi s led to two different phenomena. On the one hand , the new situ at ion led to an uncovering of 'wh ite spots ' in the hi story of the Czechs and Slovaks. On the other, thi s rewriting made room for new deformations of history. Silvia Mihalikova has described this phenome non , which was common for the entire post-communi st world, as a use of arguments from the past according to a principle of se lf-service: people simply chose the historical facts, persons, and conceptions that suited their momentary purposes. 97 95 Thi s image of the Czechs and Slovaks li ving in different worlds was shared by at least the Czech political weekly, Respekt, whose front page of the elect ion issue in 1992 read in large red letters 'Two civi li za ti ons" and conti nued in the main comment: "A lone into Europe or toge ther to the Balkans" ( Respekt June 8-14, I 992, I ). See Peter Bugge : The Use of the Middle: Mitteleuropa vs. Strednf Evropa. In : European Review of History , Vol. 6. No. I . 1999, 30-3 1 and Vladimir Macura: Masarykovy boty a jine semi(o) fejetony. (Praha: Prazska imagin ace 1993). 48-49 for a further elaborat ion of the Czech imaging of the Slovaks as belonging to the Balkans . % " Za nami ostavaju stare nepriatel'stva a nedorozumenia, sluhovs ke spory a vzbury . Pred nami je nasa nova d6stojnost'. " " Odkial' a kam . Slovaci ?" Literarny tj idennfk Dec. 19. 1992. 11. 97 Mihalikova: Narodne symboly, 54-56. SLOVAKIA 117 The se lf-serv ice aspec t of the use of hi story was supported by the communist ideo logization of the culture, includin g the schools. The hi story that had been to ld by the regime and taught in sc hool s was perce ived as inh erentl y wrong , and therefore , as Tony Judt has argued, a plurality of memories was created when parents told their children what hi story was ' reall y' like. Every hi story that was told by the reg ime was by implication fa lse, which meant th at every hi story not to ld by the regime mu st by implication be true. 98 This was the reason, not onl y for the very different Czec h and Slovak collective memories, but also for the overa ll low level of knowl edge about and reflection on the nation al hi story. Key period s in Czechoslovak hi story co ncernin g the mutual Czech-Slovak relation ship can be li sted as follows : I) the First Republic 19 I 8- 1938, 2) the destruction of Czechoslovakia and th e creati on of the Slovak State durin g World War II, 3) the Slovak National Uprising against the fascists in 1944, 4) the Prague Spring in 1968, 5) the Normalization 1969-1 989. When lookin g at the articles that we have analysed here, it is c lear that Vaculfk employed al l of them. In hi s interpretation : the First Rep ublic was a time when the Czechs he lped the ir un grateful younger brothers; the Slovak State came into bein g when the Slovaks betrayed the Czechs; the Slovak National Upri sin g was not necessaril y for a renewal of Czechoslovakia; in the Prague Spring the Slovaks preyed on the Czech strugg le for democracy; and durin g Norma li zati on the Slovaks suffered less than the Czec hs. In the same vei n, Mil an Ferko and Vladimfr Mimic invoked the Slovak collective memory of the First Republic as a period of Czechoslovakism th at did not properly ack now ledge the character and needs of the Slovaks, and the Czechs did what they could to turn the Slovaks into Czec hs. The reason why Ferko and Mimic both used thi s period probabl y lay in the fact th at Czechoslovakism was the 'state ideo logy' of the First Rep ublic , which made it easy to attack 9 ' Tony Judt: The Past is Another Cou ntry : Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe , in: Dcedalus. Vol. 21. No. 4, 1992, I OI. SLOVAK IA 118 Czech arrogance towards the Slovaks. As opposed to this , the legacy of all the other significant periods seemed in some way or another too ambiguous to be exp loited from Minac ' s and Ferko ' s points of view. 99 This reflects the fact that Czechs and Slovaks not on ly experienced the events differently at the time, but also that their memories of them today are very different. And this then shows us that the socia li zation of the population ' s memories since 1918 was not successful in providing the two nations with a common co ll ective memory of the past that they shared as parts of the same state. In stead, those who after 1989 wished to do otherwise were ab le, like Vaculfk, Minac , Ferko, and others, to mobilize conflicts from the past and link them together regardless of any inner logic and chrono logy. They painted a picture of a basic Czech-Slovak incompatibility and a common history consisting of conflicts, betrayals, and wrongdoings that made a divorce look c learly preferable to a continued malfunctionin g marriage. 100 In Slovakia, the discu ss ions about the common history of the Czechs and the Slovaks became polarized to the degree that two directly opposite interpretations were propagated. The relevant criterion for arguments became the question whether the common state had been favourable or disadvantageous to the Slovaks. 101 Slovak so99 The Slovak State was fascist: the National Uprising was directed aga in st the inde- pendent Slovak State; resu lting from th e Prague Spring was th e federalism that Ferko and Minac fo ught aga inst but which neverth eless meant progress in th e Czech-Slovak relationship; and Normalization was not see n as too bad a period for th e Slovaks . ' 00 The metaphor of the marriage was also frequently used in the debate, see e.g. Miroslav Ku sy : '·Konfederacnf k lam·• (""Confederation delusion'"). Literarnf no viny Aug. 6. 1992. 1+3. 0 ' ' Mihalikova: Narodne symboly, 58. An ex traordinary feature of th e Slovak contex t was the fact that very ac tive participants in the debate were exi les like Stefan Polakovic or Milan S. Durica. who either had been in ex ile ever since World War II beca use of their ro le in the Slovak State or they came from thi s environment. They saw as their greatest task res torin g Slovak independence from th e Czechs and seemed not to reali ze that Slovak society had changed since their heyday during the SLOVAKIA 119 ciety was to a very large ex tent di vided over interpretations of hi story , the nature of Slovak nation al identity, and wishes for the future, and in fact the Slovaks who engaged in the de bates on the CzechSlovak past spent as much or even more energy blaming eac h other, rather than blaming the Czechs. 102 In contrast to thi s deep divi sion , the Czechs may have disagreed on many thing s, but by and large there was unanimity concerning subjects such as these. In the Czech debate, the efforts to create a separate Czech state grad uall y came to be seen as a way of guardin g Kl aus' rapid economic reform s from the " irrati o nal" Slovaks a nd Czech democracy from the alleged Slovak inclin ation to national soc iali sm and a stron g state, images which were mobili zed by the frequent use of exa mples from the Czech collective me mory. It is furthermore interesting that an opinion poll in October of 1990 showed that more than 50 % of the Czechs believed in the idea of one Czechoslovak nation . 1w While most Czechs and Slovaks perce ived of them se lves as be in g simultaneously Czechoslovaks and e ithe r Czechs or Slovaks, most Czechs, who unconsciously conceived of the two layers of the ir identification as being identical , had never paid much attention to the conce pt of a Czech identification as be in g different from their ide ntific ation as Czechoslovaks. Most Slovaks , on the other hand , were very much aware that there was a difference between their Slovak and their Czechoslovak identification . 104 Whe n the newspaper debates invoked the war. In co ntrast to the hi stori ans who had li ved throu gh the communi st period at home and those who had been in exile becau se of their di sagreements with the co mmuni st regime. thi s group of hi storians saw nothing but disadvantages for the Slovaks in the com mon Czechos lovak Republic. 102 According to Soiia Szomolanyi. different perceptions of key fi gures and events in Slovak history not onl y divided . but outri ght polari zed th e population (Szomo lany i 1994 : 76). '"' Timoracky : Yerejna mienka. 7 1-72. ' 04 Thi s was strengthened by th e asy mmetri ca l conditi ons after 19 I 8. e.g. when in school tex tbooks Czech hi story was made Czechos lovak simply by adding " slovak" to th e adjec ti ve (E li sabeth Bakke: Cechoslovak izmu s v skol skych uceb ni ciach ( 19 18- 1938). Historicky casopis. Vo l. 47. o 2. 1999: 242-243) or when on ly the 120 SLOVAKIA past, it happened in a way that mobili zed images that em phasized the differences rather than the s imil ariti es between th e tw o nation a l groups. In thi s way the Czech and Slovak layers of the Czec hoslovak population 's identifi cat ion were stre ngthened to the detriment of the Czechoslovak layer. And the di scre pancy that was mob ili zed between the Czech and Slovak images of themselves, the other, and the future of the common state is undoubted ly part of the answer to the question why the common Czechoslovak state eventually broke up. Slovaks had their own Communist Party (KSS) whereas the Czechos lovak Communist Party (KSC) served both as the Czech and the all-state party.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource "Ungrateful Younger Brothers" versus "Arrogant Atheists": Czech-Slovak Stereotypes in a Collective Memory Perspective Description An account of the resource Lone Sarauw Slovakia, Vol. 38 (No. 70-71), 2005 pp. 104-120 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Sarauw, Lone Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2005 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/d9eb9389ef2312723a33acdc8b4e013e.pdf 0f8601081a9f36ecd9e39e74568a7055 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 171 CONTRIBUTORS ELISABETH BAKKE is c urre ntl y e mp loyed as a Post-Doctoral Resea rch Fe ll ow in the Department of Politica l Scie nce, Univers ity of Oslo. She successfully de fe nded her thes is " Doomed To Failure? The C zec hoslovak Nation Project and the Slovak Autonom ist Reaction , 1918- 1938" in Jun e of 1999. She teac hes " Nation ali sm and Centra l European Politi cs" at the postgrad uate leve l. Bakke has publi shed severa l arti c les on Czechoslovak, Czech and Slovak question s, a nd ha s rece ntl y ed ited a book in Norwegian o n co nte mporary Central European and Ba lti c politics (2002). JAMES FELAK is Associate Professor of Hi story at th e University of Was hin gton . He is the author of ' A t the Price of the R epublic': Hlinka "s Slovak People's Party, I 929-1938, winner of the 1996 Book Pri ze of the S lovak Studies Assoc iation and the Book Prize for Czech and S lovak Studies. He has contributed artic les to Nation alities Papers. East Centra l Europe and East European Quarterly. PAAL SIGURD HILDE rece ived hi s Ph .D . from the Univers ity of O xford in 2003 . Hi s di sse rtation dea lt with the e me rge nce of nationa li sm in Slovakia betwee n 1989 a nd 1992. He has publi shed severa l arti c les o n thi s subject in leadin g sc hol arl y journa ls. He is c urrentl y e mpl oyed by the Norwegian Mini stry of Defe nse. KONSTANTIN V . LIFANOV is Professor of Slovak Linguistics at the Lo monosov Univers ity of Moscow. He specia li zes in the hi story of Slovak , in c luding the Slovak lang uage in the USA , and mode rn Slovak. He is the author of S lovak M orphology (Moscow, 1999) [in Ru ss ian l, Th e Language of Spiritual Literature of S lovak Catholics from the I 6 th to the 18th Cen twy and B ernolak 's Codification (Moscow , 2000) [in Ru ss ian], Genesis of the S lovak Litera1y L anguage �172 SLOVAKIA (Munich, 2001) [in Russian] and The Language of Eastern Slo vak Publications in the USA from the End of the I <Jh to the Beginning of the 2(/h Century (M unich, 2005) [in Russian]. JAMES W. PETERSON is Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science at Valdosta State University in Valdosta, Georgia. His publications and conference papers center on Czec h and Slovak politics, NATO, and the common foreign and security policy of the EU. He is also editor of The Czech and Slovak History Newsletter. LONE SARAUW rece ived her Ph .D from the University of Aarhus (Denmark) in 2004. Her di ssertation was entitled "Together We Part. Collective Memory , Political Culture and the Breakup of Czechoslovakia." She is now raising two daughters. �SLOVAKIA 173 GUIDELINES FOR MANUSCRIPTS Manu sc ripts for poss ible publication should be sent to the editor. Articles should not normally exceed twenty-five pages in length , should be submitted in duplicate and typed double-spaced, with generous marg ins fo r copy-editin g. Footnotes should be numbered consec uti ve ly and pl aced at the bottom of each page. A copy of the paper sho uld also be submitted on a floppy di sc, either in WordPerfect or MicrosoftWord format. Tex t and format should ad here to the "Chicago Manual of Sty le". Proper orthography and diacritical marks mu st be suppli ed for a ll foreign words. Manu scripts will not be returned unl ess spec ifically requested and postage is provided. Books fo r rev iew are to be sent to the editor. Unsolicited book rev iews are not enco uraged. Individual s who wi sh to rev iew books should request them from the editor. �����THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA Organized in 1907 Dr. LUDWIG J. PAVLO President W. NINA HOLY Secretary-Treasurer Vice-presidents: MIKULAS BENO ANNE Z. SAROSY JUSTINE WESNAK Executive Board: Dr. Ludwig J. Pavlo, W. Nina Holy, Dr. L. P. Hinterbuchner, Daniel F. Tanzone, Dr. John Karch , John A. Holy, Mary Ann S. Johanek, Esq., Thomas M. Hricik, Sue Ann M. Seich , Theresa M. Kluchinski, David G. Balzek, John Yuhas Milan Cuba, Youth Director SLOVAK FRATERNAL ORGANIZATIONS AFFILIATED WITH THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA FIRST CATHOLIC SLOVAK LADIES ASSOCIATION Beachwood, Ohio FIRST CATHOLIC SLOVAK UNION OF THE US AND CANADA Independence, Ohio SLOVAK CATHOLIC SOKOL Passaic, New Jersey NATIONAL SLOVAK SOCIETY OF THE U.S.A. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania LADIES PENNSYLVANIA SLOVAK CATHOLIC UNION Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania SLOVAK NEWSPAPERMEN'S ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA THE SLOVAK GARDEN, INC. Winter Park, Florida ©SLOVAKIA $ 10.00 per issue � SLOVAKIA 171 CONTRIBUTORS ELISABETH BAKKE is c urre ntl y e mp loyed as a Post-Doctoral Resea rch Fe ll ow in the Department of Politica l Scie nce, Univers ity of Oslo. She successfully de fe nded her thes is " Doomed To Failure? The C zec hoslovak Nation Project and the Slovak Autonom ist Reaction , 1918- 1938" in Jun e of 1999. She teac hes " Nation ali sm and Centra l European Politi cs" at the postgrad uate leve l. Bakke has publi shed severa l arti c les on Czechoslovak, Czech and Slovak question s, a nd ha s rece ntl y ed ited a book in Norwegian o n co nte mporary Central European and Ba lti c politics (2002). JAMES FELAK is Associate Professor of Hi story at th e University of Was hin gton . He is the author of ' A t the Price of the R epublic': Hlinka "s Slovak People's Party, I 929-1938, winner of the 1996 Book Pri ze of the S lovak Studies Assoc iation and the Book Prize for Czech and S lovak Studies. He has contributed artic les to Nation alities Papers. East Centra l Europe and East European Quarterly. PAAL SIGURD HILDE rece ived hi s Ph .D . from the Univers ity of O xford in 2003 . Hi s di sse rtation dea lt with the e me rge nce of nationa li sm in Slovakia betwee n 1989 a nd 1992. He has publi shed severa l arti c les o n thi s subject in leadin g sc hol arl y journa ls. He is c urrentl y e mpl oyed by the Norwegian Mini stry of Defe nse. KONSTANTIN V . LIFANOV is Professor of Slovak Linguistics at the Lo monosov Univers ity of Moscow. He specia li zes in the hi story of Slovak , in c luding the Slovak lang uage in the USA , and mode rn Slovak. He is the author of S lovak M orphology (Moscow, 1999) [in Ru ss ian l, Th e Language of Spiritual Literature of S lovak Catholics from the I 6 th to the 18th Cen twy and B ernolak 's Codification (Moscow , 2000) [in Ru ss ian], Genesis of the S lovak Litera1y L anguage �172 SLOVAKIA (Munich, 2001) [in Russian] and The Language of Eastern Slo vak Publications in the USA from the End of the I <Jh to the Beginning of the 2(/h Century (M unich, 2005) [in Russian]. JAMES W. PETERSON is Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science at Valdosta State University in Valdosta, Georgia. His publications and conference papers center on Czec h and Slovak politics, NATO, and the common foreign and security policy of the EU. He is also editor of The Czech and Slovak History Newsletter. LONE SARAUW rece ived her Ph .D from the University of Aarhus (Denmark) in 2004. Her di ssertation was entitled "Together We Part. Collective Memory , Political Culture and the Breakup of Czechoslovakia." She is now raising two daughters. �SLOVAKIA 173 GUIDELINES FOR MANUSCRIPTS Manu sc ripts for poss ible publication should be sent to the editor. Articles should not normally exceed twenty-five pages in length , should be submitted in duplicate and typed double-spaced, with generous marg ins fo r copy-editin g. Footnotes should be numbered consec uti ve ly and pl aced at the bottom of each page. A copy of the paper sho uld also be submitted on a floppy di sc, either in WordPerfect or MicrosoftWord format. Tex t and format should ad here to the "Chicago Manual of Sty le". Proper orthography and diacritical marks mu st be suppli ed for a ll foreign words. Manu scripts will not be returned unl ess spec ifically requested and postage is provided. Books fo r rev iew are to be sent to the editor. Unsolicited book rev iews are not enco uraged. Individual s who wi sh to rev iew books should request them from the editor. �����THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA Organized in 1907 Dr. LUDWIG J. PAVLO President W. NINA HOLY Secretary-Treasurer Vice-presidents: MIKULAS BENO ANNE Z. SAROSY JUSTINE WESNAK Executive Board: Dr. Ludwig J. Pavlo, W. Nina Holy, Dr. L. P. Hinterbuchner, Daniel F. Tanzone, Dr. John Karch , John A. Holy, Mary Ann S. Johanek, Esq., Thomas M. Hricik, Sue Ann M. Seich , Theresa M. Kluchinski, David G. Balzek, John Yuhas Milan Cuba, Youth Director SLOVAK FRATERNAL ORGANIZATIONS AFFILIATED WITH THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA FIRST CATHOLIC SLOVAK LADIES ASSOCIATION Beachwood, Ohio FIRST CATHOLIC SLOVAK UNION OF THE US AND CANADA Independence, Ohio SLOVAK CATHOLIC SOKOL Passaic, New Jersey NATIONAL SLOVAK SOCIETY OF THE U.S.A. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania LADIES PENNSYLVANIA SLOVAK CATHOLIC UNION Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania SLOVAK NEWSPAPERMEN'S ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA THE SLOVAK GARDEN, INC. Winter Park, Florida ©SLOVAKIA $ 10.00 per issue � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2005, Vol. 38 Description An account of the resource Vol. 38 (No. 70-71), 2005. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2005 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 171 CONTRIBUTORS ELISABETH BAKKE is c urre ntl y e mp loyed as a Post-Doctoral Resea rch Fe ll ow in the Department of Politica l Scie nce, Univers ity of Oslo. She successfully de fe nded her thes is " Doomed To Failure? The C zec hoslovak Nation Project and the Slovak Autonom ist Reaction , 1918- 1938" in Jun e of 1999. She teac hes " Nation ali sm and Centra l European Politi cs" at the postgrad uate leve l. Bakke has publi shed severa l arti c les on Czechoslovak, Czech and Slovak question s, a nd ha s rece ntl y ed ited a book in Norwegian o n co nte mporary Central European and Ba lti c politics (2002). JAMES FELAK is Associate Professor of Hi story at th e University of Was hin gton . He is the author of ' A t the Price of the R epublic': Hlinka "s Slovak People's Party, I 929-1938, winner of the 1996 Book Pri ze of the S lovak Studies Assoc iation and the Book Prize for Czech and S lovak Studies. He has contributed artic les to Nation alities Papers. East Centra l Europe and East European Quarterly. PAAL SIGURD HILDE rece ived hi s Ph .D . from the Univers ity of O xford in 2003 . Hi s di sse rtation dea lt with the e me rge nce of nationa li sm in Slovakia betwee n 1989 a nd 1992. He has publi shed severa l arti c les o n thi s subject in leadin g sc hol arl y journa ls. He is c urrentl y e mpl oyed by the Norwegian Mini stry of Defe nse. KONSTANTIN V . LIFANOV is Professor of Slovak Linguistics at the Lo monosov Univers ity of Moscow. He specia li zes in the hi story of Slovak , in c luding the Slovak lang uage in the USA , and mode rn Slovak. He is the author of S lovak M orphology (Moscow, 1999) [in Ru ss ian l, Th e Language of Spiritual Literature of S lovak Catholics from the I 6 th to the 18th Cen twy and B ernolak 's Codification (Moscow , 2000) [in Ru ss ian], Genesis of the S lovak Litera1y L anguage 172 SLOVAKIA (Munich, 2001) [in Russian] and The Language of Eastern Slo vak Publications in the USA from the End of the I <Jh to the Beginning of the 2(/h Century (M unich, 2005) [in Russian]. JAMES W. PETERSON is Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science at Valdosta State University in Valdosta, Georgia. His publications and conference papers center on Czec h and Slovak politics, NATO, and the common foreign and security policy of the EU. He is also editor of The Czech and Slovak History Newsletter. LONE SARAUW rece ived her Ph .D from the University of Aarhus (Denmark) in 2004. Her di ssertation was entitled "Together We Part. Collective Memory , Political Culture and the Breakup of Czechoslovakia." She is now raising two daughters. SLOVAKIA 173 GUIDELINES FOR MANUSCRIPTS Manu sc ripts for poss ible publication should be sent to the editor. Articles should not normally exceed twenty-five pages in length , should be submitted in duplicate and typed double-spaced, with generous marg ins fo r copy-editin g. Footnotes should be numbered consec uti ve ly and pl aced at the bottom of each page. A copy of the paper sho uld also be submitted on a floppy di sc, either in WordPerfect or MicrosoftWord format. Tex t and format should ad here to the "Chicago Manual of Sty le". Proper orthography and diacritical marks mu st be suppli ed for a ll foreign words. Manu scripts will not be returned unl ess spec ifically requested and postage is provided. Books fo r rev iew are to be sent to the editor. Unsolicited book rev iews are not enco uraged. Individual s who wi sh to rev iew books should request them from the editor. THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA Organized in 1907 Dr. LUDWIG J. PAVLO President W. NINA HOLY Secretary-Treasurer Vice-presidents: MIKULAS BENO ANNE Z. SAROSY JUSTINE WESNAK Executive Board: Dr. Ludwig J. Pavlo, W. Nina Holy, Dr. L. P. Hinterbuchner, Daniel F. Tanzone, Dr. John Karch , John A. Holy, Mary Ann S. Johanek, Esq., Thomas M. Hricik, Sue Ann M. Seich , Theresa M. Kluchinski, David G. Balzek, John Yuhas Milan Cuba, Youth Director SLOVAK FRATERNAL ORGANIZATIONS AFFILIATED WITH THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA FIRST CATHOLIC SLOVAK LADIES ASSOCIATION Beachwood, Ohio FIRST CATHOLIC SLOVAK UNION OF THE US AND CANADA Independence, Ohio SLOVAK CATHOLIC SOKOL Passaic, New Jersey NATIONAL SLOVAK SOCIETY OF THE U.S.A. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania LADIES PENNSYLVANIA SLOVAK CATHOLIC UNION Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania SLOVAK NEWSPAPERMEN'S ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA THE SLOVAK GARDEN, INC. Winter Park, Florida ©SLOVAKIA $ 10.00 per issue  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 38 (No. 70-71) Description An account of the resource includes Contributors; Guidelines for Manuscripts Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2005 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/0b2415ed1b61d4bf0561f761618c2207.pdf 3c22ea88b7ad0043e61efa6ed647ef36 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA Published By THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA ��SLOVAKIA VOLUME XXXVIII 2005 NUMBERS 70-71 A schol arl y annu al devoted to the hi story, literature and c ulture of the Slovaks the wo rld over Editor M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa Editorial Board ROBERT K. EV ANSON Univers ity of Mi ssouri PET ER PETRO University of Briti sh Columbia MICHAEL NOV AK American Enterprise In stitute CAROLS . LEFF Uni vers ity of Illino is JAMES R. FELAK Uni ve rsity of Washingto n PATRICIA KR A FCIK The Evergreen State Co llege Publisher Slovak League of America 205 Mad ison Street Passa ic, NJ 07055 Inquiries regarding subscriptio ns sho uld be sent to the above address . The cost of a sing le issue is $ 10.00 Manuscripts for possib le publication and books for review shou ld be sen t to M. Mark Sto larik , Edi tor, Slo vakia 22 Bren-Maur Road , Nepean, Ontario , Canada . K2J 327 ��Table of Contents ARTICLES The Origin and Development of the Slovak Literary Language Konstantin V. Lifanov .......................... .... .. .. ... ................. ........ ....... 7 The Democratic Party and the Execution of Jozef Tiso James R. Pelak ............ .. ... ..... .. .............. ... ..... .... ..... ............ .... ........ 33 The Autonomy Discourse in Parliamentary Debates during the First Czechoslovak Republic and after the Velvet Revolution Elisabeth Bakke .. ........ .... ............. ................................. .... ............. 52 From Brau· nas to At'jdou - Slovakia, the Slovaks and Slovak Nationali sm Seen from Prague Paa/ Sigurd Hilde... .................. .. .................................................... 81 " Ungrateful Younger Brothers" versus "Arrogant Atheists". CzechSlovak Stereotypes in a Collective Memory Perspective Lone Sarauw ............. .. .............. ........... .............. .. ...... ... .... ..... .... .. l 04 Separate Paths: Czech and Slovak Fore ign Policies Since 1993 James W. Peterson .................... ....................... ..... ... .................... 121 REVIEWS Peter Zenouch, M edzi vychodom a zapadom: Byzantsko-slovanska tradfcia, kulttira a jazyk na vychodnom Slovensku Robert A. Orr ....... ..................... ................ .... ................... .. ........ .. 149 Marian Hronsky , The Struggle for Slovakia and the Treaty of Trianon 1918-1920 Gregory C. Ference .. .. ...... ... .. ..... ......... .... ........... ... ..... .... ............. 152 �SLOVAKIA 4 Jni o kapitanovi Janovi Nalepkovi. Edited by Jozef Nalepka Vladimir Baumgarten ..... .. ... .... .... .... ......... ................................... 154 Zoltan G. Mesko, The Silent Conspiracy L. P. Hinterbuchner ...... .. .......... .................. .. ...... .......................... 157 Maria Dziakova- Bohmova, Dusa na d/ani: Spomienky od Kosfc do New Yorku M. Mark Stolarik ...... .. .. .. ... ................... .. ... ................ ........ ........... 159 Karen Henderson, Slovakia: The Escape from Invisibility Juraj Hocman ............... .................... ........ .... ..... ............. ........ ...... 162 The Slovak Republic: A Decade of Independence ( 1993-2002). Edited by M. Mark Stolarik Carol Skalnik Leff ... ...... ................. ...... ........ .... .... ... ..... .... .. .. .... ... 165 Thomas J. Shell ey, Slovaks on the Hudson Daniel F. Tanzone ............. ..... .. ..... .... .... ........ ..... ........... .... .... ....... 167 June Granatir Alexander, Ethnic Pride, American Patriotism M. Mark Stolarik ....................... ............ ........ ......... .......... ............ 169 Contributors ......... ... .. ... .................... ........ ............ .... .......... ... ... ..... ... .. . 17 I G uidelines for Manuscripts ......... ...... ... .... .. ..... .... ......................... ... .. . 173 �ARTICLES �� SLOVAKIA Published By THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA ��SLOVAKIA VOLUME XXXVIII 2005 NUMBERS 70-71 A schol arl y annu al devoted to the hi story, literature and c ulture of the Slovaks the wo rld over Editor M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa Editorial Board ROBERT K. EV ANSON Univers ity of Mi ssouri PET ER PETRO University of Briti sh Columbia MICHAEL NOV AK American Enterprise In stitute CAROLS . LEFF Uni vers ity of Illino is JAMES R. FELAK Uni ve rsity of Washingto n PATRICIA KR A FCIK The Evergreen State Co llege Publisher Slovak League of America 205 Mad ison Street Passa ic, NJ 07055 Inquiries regarding subscriptio ns sho uld be sent to the above address . The cost of a sing le issue is $ 10.00 Manuscripts for possib le publication and books for review shou ld be sen t to M. Mark Sto larik , Edi tor, Slo vakia 22 Bren-Maur Road , Nepean, Ontario , Canada . K2J 327 ��Table of Contents ARTICLES The Origin and Development of the Slovak Literary Language Konstantin V. Lifanov .......................... .... .. .. ... ................. ........ ....... 7 The Democratic Party and the Execution of Jozef Tiso James R. Pelak ............ .. ... ..... .. .............. ... ..... .... ..... ............ .... ........ 33 The Autonomy Discourse in Parliamentary Debates during the First Czechoslovak Republic and after the Velvet Revolution Elisabeth Bakke .. ........ .... ............. ................................. .... ............. 52 From Brau· nas to At'jdou - Slovakia, the Slovaks and Slovak Nationali sm Seen from Prague Paa/ Sigurd Hilde... .................. .. .................................................... 81 " Ungrateful Younger Brothers" versus "Arrogant Atheists". CzechSlovak Stereotypes in a Collective Memory Perspective Lone Sarauw ............. .. .............. ........... .............. .. ...... ... .... ..... .... .. l 04 Separate Paths: Czech and Slovak Fore ign Policies Since 1993 James W. Peterson .................... ....................... ..... ... .................... 121 REVIEWS Peter Zenouch, M edzi vychodom a zapadom: Byzantsko-slovanska tradfcia, kulttira a jazyk na vychodnom Slovensku Robert A. Orr ....... ..................... ................ .... ................... .. ........ .. 149 Marian Hronsky , The Struggle for Slovakia and the Treaty of Trianon 1918-1920 Gregory C. Ference .. .. ...... ... .. ..... ......... .... ........... ... ..... .... ............. 152 �SLOVAKIA 4 Jni o kapitanovi Janovi Nalepkovi. Edited by Jozef Nalepka Vladimir Baumgarten ..... .. ... .... .... .... ......... ................................... 154 Zoltan G. Mesko, The Silent Conspiracy L. P. Hinterbuchner ...... .. .......... .................. .. ...... .......................... 157 Maria Dziakova- Bohmova, Dusa na d/ani: Spomienky od Kosfc do New Yorku M. Mark Stolarik ...... .. .. .. ... ................... .. ... ................ ........ ........... 159 Karen Henderson, Slovakia: The Escape from Invisibility Juraj Hocman ............... .................... ........ .... ..... ............. ........ ...... 162 The Slovak Republic: A Decade of Independence ( 1993-2002). Edited by M. Mark Stolarik Carol Skalnik Leff ... ...... ................. ...... ........ .... .... ... ..... .... .. .. .... ... 165 Thomas J. Shell ey, Slovaks on the Hudson Daniel F. Tanzone ............. ..... .. ..... .... .... ........ ..... ........... .... .... ....... 167 June Granatir Alexander, Ethnic Pride, American Patriotism M. Mark Stolarik ....................... ............ ........ ......... .......... ............ 169 Contributors ......... ... .. ... .................... ........ ............ .... .......... ... ... ..... ... .. . 17 I G uidelines for Manuscripts ......... ...... ... .... .. ..... .... ......................... ... .. . 173 �ARTICLES �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2005, Vol. 38 Description An account of the resource Vol. 38 (No. 70-71), 2005. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2005 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA Published By THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA SLOVAKIA VOLUME XXXVIII 2005 NUMBERS 70-71 A schol arl y annu al devoted to the hi story, literature and c ulture of the Slovaks the wo rld over Editor M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa Editorial Board ROBERT K. EV ANSON Univers ity of Mi ssouri PET ER PETRO University of Briti sh Columbia MICHAEL NOV AK American Enterprise In stitute CAROLS . LEFF Uni vers ity of Illino is JAMES R. FELAK Uni ve rsity of Washingto n PATRICIA KR A FCIK The Evergreen State Co llege Publisher Slovak League of America 205 Mad ison Street Passa ic, NJ 07055 Inquiries regarding subscriptio ns sho uld be sent to the above address . The cost of a sing le issue is $ 10.00 Manuscripts for possib le publication and books for review shou ld be sen t to M. Mark Sto larik , Edi tor, Slo vakia 22 Bren-Maur Road , Nepean, Ontario , Canada . K2J 327 Table of Contents ARTICLES The Origin and Development of the Slovak Literary Language Konstantin V. Lifanov .......................... .... .. .. ... ................. ........ ....... 7 The Democratic Party and the Execution of Jozef Tiso James R. Pelak ............ .. ... ..... .. .............. ... ..... .... ..... ............ .... ........ 33 The Autonomy Discourse in Parliamentary Debates during the First Czechoslovak Republic and after the Velvet Revolution Elisabeth Bakke .. ........ .... ............. ................................. .... ............. 52 From Brau· nas to At'jdou - Slovakia, the Slovaks and Slovak Nationali sm Seen from Prague Paa/ Sigurd Hilde... .................. .. .................................................... 81 " Ungrateful Younger Brothers" versus "Arrogant Atheists". CzechSlovak Stereotypes in a Collective Memory Perspective Lone Sarauw ............. .. .............. ........... .............. .. ...... ... .... ..... .... .. l 04 Separate Paths: Czech and Slovak Fore ign Policies Since 1993 James W. Peterson .................... ....................... ..... ... .................... 121 REVIEWS Peter Zenouch, M edzi vychodom a zapadom: Byzantsko-slovanska tradfcia, kulttira a jazyk na vychodnom Slovensku Robert A. Orr ....... ..................... ................ .... ................... .. ........ .. 149 Marian Hronsky , The Struggle for Slovakia and the Treaty of Trianon 1918-1920 Gregory C. Ference .. .. ...... ... .. ..... ......... .... ........... ... ..... .... ............. 152 SLOVAKIA 4 Jni o kapitanovi Janovi Nalepkovi. Edited by Jozef Nalepka Vladimir Baumgarten ..... .. ... .... .... .... ......... ................................... 154 Zoltan G. Mesko, The Silent Conspiracy L. P. Hinterbuchner ...... .. .......... .................. .. ...... .......................... 157 Maria Dziakova- Bohmova, Dusa na d/ani: Spomienky od Kosfc do New Yorku M. Mark Stolarik ...... .. .. .. ... ................... .. ... ................ ........ ........... 159 Karen Henderson, Slovakia: The Escape from Invisibility Juraj Hocman ............... .................... ........ .... ..... ............. ........ ...... 162 The Slovak Republic: A Decade of Independence ( 1993-2002). Edited by M. Mark Stolarik Carol Skalnik Leff ... ...... ................. ...... ........ .... .... ... ..... .... .. .. .... ... 165 Thomas J. Shell ey, Slovaks on the Hudson Daniel F. Tanzone ............. ..... .. ..... .... .... ........ ..... ........... .... .... ....... 167 June Granatir Alexander, Ethnic Pride, American Patriotism M. Mark Stolarik ....................... ............ ........ ......... .......... ............ 169 Contributors ......... ... .. ... .................... ........ ............ .... .......... ... ... ..... ... .. . 17 I G uidelines for Manuscripts ......... ...... ... .... .. ..... .... ......................... ... .. . 173 ARTICLES  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 38 (No. 70-71) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2005