1 50 48 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/48db9010a51e0e44c7a014041b30abb2.pdf 66222c37f0096df9ae1815c9fccf02c0 PDF Text Text 31 SLOVAKIA would guarantee the existence oif a 0zeicho-Sloivakia in which they would rule. They 3Jre true foUowers oif Benes: If they are for a central Euroq>ean federation, it is only because of political exiped!iency, or, as Ripka himself so a'PtlY put it: "to gain the sympathies of the demo.craitic world for the CZECH caJuse." The Slovaks, on the other hand, are against any and all forms of Czecho-Slovakia - the federation they were forced into against their will. They are stricmgl,y for a '.Central :IDuropean federation in which Sloiva'kia would be an independent ethnic part, independent oif Bohemia and the 0zechs, and an equal among equals. 1 • • • SLOVAKIA'S RIGHT TO BE HEARD Ann Su Cardwell The Slovak nation has a fong and enrv'iaJble record in the :struggle for freedom and the rights O!f man. That struggle continiues, ,w ith the SlovaJks in this country carrying the'ir share of the rbul'den. How clifrfiicwlt they find it I know only too well it:rom actual experience. '!'here were years when getting the trutJh 1before the Amerilca,n reading 'PUIJ:>lic was next to impossi!ble, and those writers who did succeed oocasional,l y were the ,reciipients ,of letters ()If sha11p criticism and even inrveC:ti!ve. On th3Jt point, too, ·I speak out of experience. It is not necessa'I1)' for me to tell the Slova.tks that Americans in generall hawe ,known ail.I too little of SlovaJkia and its pface in Centra!l European lirfe and 'C!iviliization; and if irn Eastern European life, and dvilization, then in that of Western. Eu1:1oipe and America as well. ,F or despite geograiphical distances am.di differences in lamrgruarge and customs, the entire Western world - and hy that I mean all Europe and Amerrea - is bOIUDd together throughout histo!IY to agree that we do not st-Olp to realize. What haipnot hruppen to one ipeorple has its effect upon pens or the rest, though thait effect may be long in beoom:ing manifest. Surely that point does not need argument these days, does �32 SLOVAKIA when the world is 1ooin,g fo11dbly divided into two great camps. [ think ,ba.dk to the time when my own enlightenm ent on Eastern Europe lbegan. Of course even -as a schoolgirl I had a ,g eneral idea orf the location of Central and Eastern European ;p eoples, which naJturailly i.nc1'uded the .Slaivirc m11tions. That kr.nowledge was lburt slightly improved during my university -and ipost~wn:iversity years. Mter a:11 my <:hief impressions <:onitinued to lbe the inOOIIl/Prehensilble and unpronowncalb1e JwngUJa;ges and the extraordin ary ibeautilful peasant costumes. The faJct w~ that there was simply no ,r eason why I shouild lbe ipairtiicularly interested in those ,peoples. Then <!ame the First Wo rld War, and American readers quidkly became ea;ger students ,o f geog,r ~hy. We were soon on rvery lfarrniliar te11II1s with the iprinted names olf a lot of cities and towns aJUd loca;lities that left us icOIIlllP,letely dumb when we tried to rp:rionounice them, until we mastered the phonetic helip girven us in 'bhe daily paipers as the war progressed. But the sum of it aM wa:s that we ,b ecame vitally interested in what was hruppening in this hitherto uniknoWlll world. The vigorously conducted movement that resulted in the creation ,o f the new state of 0.zeoho,Slova!kia made us aware of the vitwty ,olf those two ,peoples. Thomas Masaryk 'beoome a name and a symbol •a round which ~tered an immense American enthusiasm . But all this was something in whd:ch I !persona:Hy had no part, and so I r~ll little else of that movement e:,oceipt the enthusiasm of icerlain groups, and the ·g reat pulblicity girven the or eation oif what ,w as ha.Ned as a new democracy. Little did I dream that l was to live neighbor to that new state for 17 years. I am more fortunate than most Ameri(!alls when it comes to getting a chance to iknoiw Europe of our time. In 1922 my husband, an eJOpert in 1persorunel training, was loaned by the Alrnerican YiMCA to helip the neiwliy organized YMCA's in Ozecho-Slova.k-ia and Poland get themsclves established . (I :s houid ~lain here that Ann Su Cardwell is my pen name. iMy rea!l name is Mrs. Paw Suiper.) My husband had /been over there but a short time when the �SLOVAKIA 33 Pales asked him to lbecome na,tioll!al director of their YMCA. He oocepted on wndition that I would -agree. I did, for a temn of two · yeara. I ha'Ve ,aJreadiy said we stayed seventeen, lea.ving at midnight of the day the Red Aranry crossed the Polish4Soiviet firontier, Septemlber 17, 1939. We were in Rumania, Hwnga,i,y, l3Jil.d France anotiher nine months before returning to Arrnerioa after the fa:U of fiance. We had lost a:11 we had 'in our Warsaw rupartment, and that was oonsideraJble. Yet we did not count the loos. We had never boon narrow in our outlook, for we had been privileged to iknow .A!meric"a ;fir.om coast to coast and had lived ten years in Honolulu. 'Burt IDurape ,was somethin,g else. It was the ;place Of Arrneri~n origins; and conscious of our ignorance we began di•ligentliy to acquaint 01.l!rselves with Em-ope. One of the !first coiuntri.es I wa:s to vis.it was OzechoSlovaJkia, as everyfbodry then said, but ,which I now refer to simply as IS'loivaikia. There was a conference in T,rencin, whieh mry hu.sband had to attend. My son and I went ,a iong. I irecaM the very attraotirve place where we stayed, the pleasant pe<>iple, the ,g ood food, the lorvely country, the lbeautid:ul things in the ,g ift shops, eSipeciaB.y the briUiant embroidery. I think eJVery woman at the colliference bought at least one blouse "to send 'home." A better introduction to a country than that ivisit afforded could 'hardly ibe asked. From Tren:cin we took the :train to Vienna, and that jowney aicross the southwest corner of iSlowrukia is memoraJble not only for its scenery but the, castle ruins. The names of the castles haive, of course, escaped me, though I was duly instnrcted as or be:fo:re we passed them, but the beaiuty of that scenery shall remain with me forever. Now after the introduction what d!id I learn aJbout Slovakia? ·F or one thing, that it is laiiger than severall well a,nd honoralbly lkm,own European states. Swi,merl,and, Belgi'llllll, Denmark, for insta.:nce. .Arul -w ho would ,propose that these ,n ations ,s houM 4ose their independence and identity? Slova,kia is not th'inl'Y :populated, either. · One cannot say precisely what the tpopulation figures are now, uncertain as we are of the extent o:f 'Moscow's deportation and exter1 �34 SLOVAKIA mination aictiivities, ,plus the importation of elements from the Soviet Union. !But we can still ,be sU1re that the Slovaik population has not 'been too seriously affected. But why was it that we on this side of the Atlantic knew so Jittle aJbout 1Slava1kia during the years preceeding World War I? That is easHy anS1Wered. It 'had been so completely incOI1J)OTated ·i nto Hungary that it did not maJke the i.!Illlpression l.J!POn us as it would have, had it beein a separate sbate. How much space did American histories giive Slovakia? A •parngraiph? But Switzerland - every American schoo~boy and schoolgiTl :knew something of that country's history, ,c,ouild call U!p clear images of pictured mountains and chalets, knew that for watches and clooks no ipeople •c ould compete with t!he. ·Swiss. Perhaips pu:bhcation'S ltke the _National Geograiphic Magruzine carried illrustrated articles on Slovakia, as it did ,and does on little known parts of the world as well. as on the known. But if so, they were for the entertainment of the curious and of arm-chair trruvellers, rather than for informative purposes, on the history and problems orf the Slova;ks. Unless Americans •c ame in ·contact with Slovaks who had emigrated lfnom their unfortunate homelaind to free Ameriica, they never heard olf how the Slova!ks had fought through the ,c enturies to 1pre·se11ve their freedoon or throw off the oppresso•r 's yolke when it had been laiid ,u pon them. We know noching otf the fier,ce Slovruk resistance to swarming Tatar hordes that came up over the "Blaelk Trail" to loot a,nd burn in Burope and ,retire with ca,p tives to be sold in the slawe mankets of tthe East. We knew little or nothing of Slovaik battles •w'ith invading Turks; nothing of the never...ceasing effort to hold their own against German domination amd ·aSiSimilation; and ivery little of the hopeless struggle to prevent .b eing swallowed up by Hungary. And how much more, may I aSik, do Ameri·cans !know of the underigrounrl struggJe itlhat is going on in SlovaJkia today against the tools orf Moscow? I know how difficult it is to. get tmstworthy news out of the lands behind the Iron Curtain, and then how difficult it is to get the press here to take it. But I hope the Slovaks �SLOVAKIA 35 never allow di,s coora:gement to get hold ol[ them. And as for Slo:va!k history, they now hruve an excellent vol,urrne in Mr. Yurehaik's "'.Dhe SlowaJks," to iput before their Americrun. friends and those who should be, their friends. I lose no chan'Ce to recommend it. Norw the magnificent thing about Slo1Vak history is that it is the story of a 1peo1p le that despite oppression, which in all. too many instances reduced the 1Sloivaks to what was little better than an runimal existence,, never lost the consciousness of tJheir nationality and the rights that nationality gave them. The Slovruk spirit !burned with a /bright unwruvering flame. How many Americans know the story of the prirvate schools that were estalblished when the SlovaJk language was not pernn1tted in the state schools? How boo1ks were written and printed, how collection;s of things ipreserving the Slo:vruk tradition, culture, and history were made; how the vairious dfa.iJ.ects were unified to become one recognized languruge? How denationaHzat ion was fought at every turn, and that the num!ber of Slovaks who ,su:ocumbed to magyarfaation for eoonomi1c or sociail reasons was very small compared with the numlber that stubbo,r nly paid the price for remaining 1Slovalks, keeping the SlovaJk farm of thei,r namee: and folllowing Slova:k c;ustoms? Resistantce to denationaliza tion woultl not a1wa,ys remain pass,iive. There were times when protest after protest was made, ruppead after ruppeal. But even when noble Hungarians valiantly espoused the Slovak Slide and sometimes won what seemed a victory, nothing ever came of it. The Slovaks were either scorned or ignored. Then sometimes conditions lbecaime intoleraJble and Slovruk leaders called for fo11ce. But what could ri-sin,gs of the oppressed do against ove:rwheJJining fo,r ee? Oppression of a people for century after century naturally leaids individuals among that people to despairing resignation. They for.get that if the blood of the martyrs is the seed Olf the churich, it is no less true that the blood of the ,p atriots is the seed of the free nation. That is as true America as it is of any other land. Lt is true of tSlovaJkia. m. �36 SLOVAKIA BecaUJSe of the martyrs and the. patriots, there never ceased to ,be a SlovaJlda ipopulated iby Slovaks. And so it came rubout as a wholly logical sequence that when World War I showed the fatal wealkness of the Austro-SiULtllg.arian ffimpire, the minorities within it, among them the SlovaJks, made their bid for freedom. But there is another higihly important factor that, while it has !been in existence for some time, now comes into the limelight. That is the Slovalk element in Ameriica. 1 mentioned earlier the .fact that Slov:alks had either to accept denationalization or leaive their homeland if they hoped fo,r advancement in. any field. There could be but one result in such a situation, namely, the potential leadership of a Slovakian movement for lilberation -was largely drained out of the country and aibso:lfued into the 'Citizenship of other countries. And leadershifp is a temi. that in this instance: alt any rate included eiconomic resources. Where and how that leadership airose I need not recite to the Slovalks who were O!f that ndble comp81Ily. Friends in Western Europe swelled the ranks. We should not forget that during all those years of oppressi,o n there had been a few voirces raised in an eiifort oo let the ,w orld know, in the hope thalt pressure oould be. brought to bear upon a professedly Om-istian. E)rrupiire to right the wrongs. That these revealers o(f the truth oo.e after another failed to stir the West does not talke fu,am theiir good will. The Slo:va/k,s were wise enough to underatand that it wais useless for a smrull Centrrul European oou,nt,r,y to attempt to maintain its independence. There was and it seemed there would always ibe a powerif1U[ amlbitious st.ate on either side. Little countries lying between them rwould always tempt them. Nothing except force sufficient . to irestmm. them would deter them from cooking Ulp one excuse oir ainother for moiving in and taikill!g ,p ossession. 'Dhe only way to get that ne:cessrury force was tJhroug,h union of smaller nations in some sort of federation. lt was but natural, therefore that when the Czechs, straining every effort through Czech leaders in America to gain Owch independence, proposed the Sl()IVaJks join them. �SLOVAKIA 37 There was agreement. A new creation, Ozecho~lovakia, a demooraoy with a;utonomy for eruch partner in the union was to be hera[ded to the world. 'l'he SlorvaJks were ,particular to require sipedfic ,provisions for Slo,vakiia's pos,ition in that union, as is penfootly clear through Ozech acceptance of the iPittsbtu,gh Aig,rooment. ,I n that the db.ligations assumed by eacll party are doowmented, as aire the prinicip'les accepted by each as the foundation upon which the new state would 1 rest. I well ,remem1ber the hig'h enthusiasm wiitll which Americans welcomed the birth of the new state. Oze.cho-Slovrulcia and demooracy see:m.ed toi be words interchangealble in meaning. Thomas Masa,'rylk was spoiken orf as one of the greatest statesmen orf the age, a "Grand Old Mam.," ea.reh of these three words oogi:rming with a caipital letter. Masary!k was a great main in those days and, I was told, that he was a SlO!Vak ,b y birth; but education lhaid -made him Czech in outlook, and that was to be most unfortunate in its eJffects. But at the time, Masaryk's star outshone a11 others in the Ozech0-1SlO!V'aJk slcy, and ilf •w e heard of the Pittsburgh Agreement it got all too little notice. 'r.he rest iis ;painful to recall. Instead orf a Ozecho..Slorvakia where Ozoohs an:d Slovaks, were "equals with equals, a state compairaJble in admirustratirve f.ree with free" oi,gain.izations to the Swiss cantons - the Ozech leaders utterlry disregarded the solemn compact with their Slovak brothers, inrvented reasons for disarvowing it, and emlbarked at the outset on a centralization !I)Ol'icy that put all authority in .Prague. And desipite vociferous and continual protests it ,was a ipolicy followed through to the end. It was a iba4d assumption of Czech suiperi-0rity. Yet we must 1be just and remember that not all Czechs approrved that poliey. There haid been Ozechs supporting, and very valiantly, the Slovruk side of the debate whille the Pittsburgh Algireement iwas under discussion. So alS-O there ,were 07.eehs who did not rupprove the Masaryfic&nes repudiation of that aigreement. But they could not inlfilruence the men launched on the ,r oad toward a Ozooh--controMed union. How easy it is for men to fall viictim to ,t he lust for power! Their judgment warped lby excessive American �SLOVAKIA 38 praise, Benes and his adherents believed that only the Ozechs had the vision and the competence to administer and guide the state fOT whose creation they toolk the credit. They flouted the ivery prindples of democracy on which the state had been estaJblished. They lbecaJme dbsessed with the idea of develo.ping a Ozecho-Sl01Vrukia in which there would ibe no hyphen ~d no crupital S, in which the Ozech would lbe dominant, and whose peqple ,woUJl.d lbe known as "CzeichosJava!ks." They were too blind to see that surc!h a project was foredoomed to faiJure; that a people who if or a thOIU'sand years had endured sub9ection and yet preserived their disitinrctirve cuiltuire, traditions, and toogue was not materirul ,f or amalgamation. But truth and justice were refused a heairing. By devious a:rigume:i:its those in the seats of ipower ,p rofessed to justify their couir~. All these years, even after his crupituil.ation ,t o the Germans, Benes was the ideal democrat in the eyes of many Americans. He waJS :referred to as "the aJblest diiplomat in Europe - the top EurOlpean statesman." The legend of his democra oy has clun,g to .h'im despite the record. But IDdwa11d Benes was not the 1p aragon he was held to 1be. He was not a great .statesman but a clever politician, with the cleverness too often in question. We in PoJ.and knew only too well that Czecho~Sloivakia was not the embodiment of democracy Americans naively swpposed it to be, amd iknew that Benes was not the democrat they ibelieved him to .be. But nothing we oouild say lhad .a ny effect. We were a,ccmsed of indulging in malice and jealousy betcause, as they in -their swperior intelligence asserted, we Hived in Poland, a co'Uiltry ruled by a dictator! Which showed how much they did NOT know. 1 Few .Americrun.s had ,been in either country; if they had, it was for a brief stay only. They made stopover !Visits in Praigiue and Warsruw fo,r a daiy or so while enroute to that most delig,hbfiul ( !) olf all taurist lands, the SoiViet Union f.rom w'hich honest ones came out somewhat less, lyrical than when they went in. In iPra·g ue they met Oze:chs, as a rule, saw the really siplendid Czech industries and arts, but saw and heard little of SlovaJks and Slcxvalkia. If they did it was �SLOVAKIA 39 as. '.'Cz~chosloivakia." The Ozechs, in American Olpinion, were E1qTope's ,p rize exh'ilbit. ls .it any wonder they got satisd'action out of the role O!I' that it infiluenced their own opinion of themselives? Wehl, "God doesn't rpay erv~ day, but He pays," a famous French woman is credited with hav:mg ,w ritten. And Benes and those with him who . framed and ex~ruted thek mistaiken policres have made the final accounting. Surrely no one can envy rthem their fasit years, when in oiverweening confiidenice in their own aibility they wallked inrt o the Soiviet traip, were deiprived of al!l ,p ower, and lingered on runtil death ifilter;vened. But the past is ,p ast. We cannot change its pattern. We review it oruy to 1earn its les,s on, that the same mistaik es may n01t lbe made again. For t!hinlking people it is farll oif guide posts to that fuitme which while we talk betomes the present. What of that future for Sloivrukia? The .~lovaJks are aH w~l a;ware of how mtroh it deipends upon them. SloivaJkia must olf course ibe free. Of that there is no question. But then what? · · You will ,prolbaJbly rugree that the position tiruken at the time the Slov,aiks thre,w in their lot with the Cze.chs was soU!Ild. Oze:chs and Slovaks are, ib1ood kin. They are neighbors, .destined to be neighlbors with nonmaJl commercial and other relations, unless another iron curtain des:coo.ds. There is good reason to hope that after these years otf serivitude to :Moscow the Czechs wil!l .better understand international and ibrotherly relationsh1ps and the spirit of cooperntion. One thing will he~p - t'hey haive not the ;remarkrub~e reputation in America that they onice had. They are less akin to the angcls and deiddedlly more mortal. A real Sio:vak state and a real Ozech state - eaJOh indiividual and independent - should ~ppear after the StaUn'ists are induced to. •r eturn to their own bor,ders. · Yet formation of these separate inmvidurul states is oruy a beginning. Thmwghout the ruges there has been a Gffl'ma,n .push to the east and a Russian to the west. In that is the care oif the prdblem the world stiN faces. It is the threat �40 SLOVAKIA that haiS ai1Jways hung lake the sword of Demooles a!bove the heads oif the peoples ibetween t!he Bail.tic, the Adriatic, and the Black seas. There is a solution to that prOlblem, but one which our Administration in Waslhington for some reason refuses to re!Cogni:ze. That is a regionrul federation in Centrrul and Eastern IDuirqpe. Iif the roughly 11'5,000,000 (POOI>le in that area were in a f~eration that gaJVe them a customs unii.on, a common currency, .s tandardized a'rnlled forces under some kind of a joint comma,nld, a common foreign policy, and whatever e:l:se in icammon or in cooperation they agreed upon while retaining cooniplete control of their initernrul aliai:rs, that federation would fu:rnn so ipowenfiul an dbsta.cile to aggression that no power would dare eJq)and in its direction. There is not spruce here to disouss the enomnous and varied adJvantages that wouil.d come to each of the countries entering into suoh a federation. Moscow has forcilb1y produced a regional union, but what a travesty it is! It is ,t o be hoped that when tJhe day of U'beration comes, the exiles from t)lese Jands WOI1king togetller ,w ith .Americans whose all!cestors came from those lands will ha;ve plains fur swch a regiomcl federation thoroughly discussed and prepared. Lt wou!ld be fol!ly to wait until after liberation to get r eady. I lknow how faithlfully and persistently the Slovaks hwve been fighting all these• re!Cent years that .Americans might iknow the trult'h rubout !Slovalkia. 1It is caJUSe for rejoici.n!g that t:Jhe representa:tiives oif the peoples behind the ITop Curtain are uniting in a common effort to fight communism. The Sllovaiks hruve good grounds for holding up their heads in this fight, for .they hruve Sloivalkia with them. They are not a front behind which stands a paltry few. From what country do we get news of more effective guerilla resastantce, o:r of a greater resistance on the part of the people to soviet~ati.Qn? The Sl01Vak:.s are making t hemselves a force to be redkoned with in mor e ways than one . I close on a note of ,confidence in the future. The struggle for the liberation and ,r ~tablishment of a free Central �SLOVAKIA 41 and East :mu.rope wi'hl .r equire all the wisdom, courage, and persist.eillCe we can commaind. Lt will mean further suffering and blood saic:riifice on the part of the peoples of that area, possilbly on OUT own part. But in the end right wm t.:r,iumiph over might. The signs ,t hat the tide is at last b,eginnin.g to turn in Riight's fawor a.re ruppearing on the horizon, and we will :liive to see the task to whlch we haive set ourselves accomplished. ,SlolV'alkia, too, shall lbe free! • • • SLOVA.KIA AND INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN 1938 Joseph Kirschbaum From the very beginning of Czecho-Slovakia, for twenty entire years, Czech policy and diplomacy succeeded in presenting the Slovak question as an internal problem, about which the outside world could say nothing without disturbing the sovereignty of the Czecho..Slovak State. Even professor Ernest Denis of the Sorbonne in Paris, who was quite partial to the Czech nation, wrote as early as 1917 that "the Slovak question is of European importance" (1), but for Czech politicians it was only an insignificant administrative problem. They refused to admit the existence of any Slovak problem. Thus it happened that Slovakia and Slovak politicians were not mentioned in international official documents until the fall of 1938. The storm, which broke loose over CzechoSlovakia, tore the cloak of Czech propaganda to shreds, and Slovakia, together with other problems of the Czecho-Slovak State, came to the forefront of European interests. This happened primarily through the neighbors of Czecho-Slovakia, each of whom wished to solve the Slovak question according to their own interests. Since these were not always in accord with the interests of the Slovaks, the representatives of the Slovak nation undertook everything possible to save Slovakia from the catastrophe into which the Czecho..Slovak Republic was led lby the policy of Prague. And so, almost simultaneously, we find documents which tell us, on the one hand, of the efforts to annex Slovakia to Hungary or � 31 SLOVAKIA would guarantee the existence oif a 0zeicho-Sloivakia in which they would rule. They 3Jre true foUowers oif Benes: If they are for a central Euroq>ean federation, it is only because of political exiped!iency, or, as Ripka himself so a'PtlY put it: "to gain the sympathies of the demo.craitic world for the CZECH caJuse." The Slovaks, on the other hand, are against any and all forms of Czecho-Slovakia - the federation they were forced into against their will. They are stricmgl,y for a '.Central :IDuropean federation in which Sloiva'kia would be an independent ethnic part, independent oif Bohemia and the 0zechs, and an equal among equals. 1 • • • SLOVAKIA'S RIGHT TO BE HEARD Ann Su Cardwell The Slovak nation has a fong and enrv'iaJble record in the :struggle for freedom and the rights O!f man. That struggle continiues, ,w ith the SlovaJks in this country carrying the'ir share of the rbul'den. How clifrfiicwlt they find it I know only too well it:rom actual experience. '!'here were years when getting the trutJh 1before the Amerilca,n reading 'PUIJ:>lic was next to impossi!ble, and those writers who did succeed oocasional,l y were the ,reciipients ,of letters ()If sha11p criticism and even inrveC:ti!ve. On th3Jt point, too, ·I speak out of experience. It is not necessa'I1)' for me to tell the Slova.tks that Americans in generall hawe ,known ail.I too little of SlovaJkia and its pface in Centra!l European lirfe and 'C!iviliization; and if irn Eastern European life, and dvilization, then in that of Western. Eu1:1oipe and America as well. ,F or despite geograiphical distances am.di differences in lamrgruarge and customs, the entire Western world - and hy that I mean all Europe and Amerrea - is bOIUDd together throughout histo!IY to agree that we do not st-Olp to realize. What haipnot hruppen to one ipeorple has its effect upon pens or the rest, though thait effect may be long in beoom:ing manifest. Surely that point does not need argument these days, does �32 SLOVAKIA when the world is 1ooin,g fo11dbly divided into two great camps. [ think ,ba.dk to the time when my own enlightenm ent on Eastern Europe lbegan. Of course even -as a schoolgirl I had a ,g eneral idea orf the location of Central and Eastern European ;p eoples, which naJturailly i.nc1'uded the .Slaivirc m11tions. That kr.nowledge was lburt slightly improved during my university -and ipost~wn:iversity years. Mter a:11 my <:hief impressions <:onitinued to lbe the inOOIIl/Prehensilble and unpronowncalb1e JwngUJa;ges and the extraordin ary ibeautilful peasant costumes. The faJct w~ that there was simply no ,r eason why I shouild lbe ipairtiicularly interested in those ,peoples. Then <!ame the First Wo rld War, and American readers quidkly became ea;ger students ,o f geog,r ~hy. We were soon on rvery lfarrniliar te11II1s with the iprinted names olf a lot of cities and towns aJUd loca;lities that left us icOIIlllP,letely dumb when we tried to rp:rionounice them, until we mastered the phonetic helip girven us in 'bhe daily paipers as the war progressed. But the sum of it aM wa:s that we ,b ecame vitally interested in what was hruppening in this hitherto uniknoWlll world. The vigorously conducted movement that resulted in the creation ,o f the new state of 0.zeoho,Slova!kia made us aware of the vitwty ,olf those two ,peoples. Thomas Masaryk 'beoome a name and a symbol •a round which ~tered an immense American enthusiasm . But all this was something in whd:ch I !persona:Hy had no part, and so I r~ll little else of that movement e:,oceipt the enthusiasm of icerlain groups, and the ·g reat pulblicity girven the or eation oif what ,w as ha.Ned as a new democracy. Little did I dream that l was to live neighbor to that new state for 17 years. I am more fortunate than most Ameri(!alls when it comes to getting a chance to iknoiw Europe of our time. In 1922 my husband, an eJOpert in 1persorunel training, was loaned by the Alrnerican YiMCA to helip the neiwliy organized YMCA's in Ozecho-Slova.k-ia and Poland get themsclves established . (I :s houid ~lain here that Ann Su Cardwell is my pen name. iMy rea!l name is Mrs. Paw Suiper.) My husband had /been over there but a short time when the �SLOVAKIA 33 Pales asked him to lbecome na,tioll!al director of their YMCA. He oocepted on wndition that I would -agree. I did, for a temn of two · yeara. I ha'Ve ,aJreadiy said we stayed seventeen, lea.ving at midnight of the day the Red Aranry crossed the Polish4Soiviet firontier, Septemlber 17, 1939. We were in Rumania, Hwnga,i,y, l3Jil.d France anotiher nine months before returning to Arrnerioa after the fa:U of fiance. We had lost a:11 we had 'in our Warsaw rupartment, and that was oonsideraJble. Yet we did not count the loos. We had never boon narrow in our outlook, for we had been privileged to iknow .A!meric"a ;fir.om coast to coast and had lived ten years in Honolulu. 'Burt IDurape ,was somethin,g else. It was the ;place Of Arrneri~n origins; and conscious of our ignorance we began di•ligentliy to acquaint 01.l!rselves with Em-ope. One of the !first coiuntri.es I wa:s to vis.it was OzechoSlovaJkia, as everyfbodry then said, but ,which I now refer to simply as IS'loivaikia. There was a conference in T,rencin, whieh mry hu.sband had to attend. My son and I went ,a iong. I irecaM the very attraotirve place where we stayed, the pleasant pe<>iple, the ,g ood food, the lorvely country, the lbeautid:ul things in the ,g ift shops, eSipeciaB.y the briUiant embroidery. I think eJVery woman at the colliference bought at least one blouse "to send 'home." A better introduction to a country than that ivisit afforded could 'hardly ibe asked. From Tren:cin we took the :train to Vienna, and that jowney aicross the southwest corner of iSlowrukia is memoraJble not only for its scenery but the, castle ruins. The names of the castles haive, of course, escaped me, though I was duly instnrcted as or be:fo:re we passed them, but the beaiuty of that scenery shall remain with me forever. Now after the introduction what d!id I learn aJbout Slovakia? ·F or one thing, that it is laiiger than severall well a,nd honoralbly lkm,own European states. Swi,merl,and, Belgi'llllll, Denmark, for insta.:nce. .Arul -w ho would ,propose that these ,n ations ,s houM 4ose their independence and identity? Slova,kia is not th'inl'Y :populated, either. · One cannot say precisely what the tpopulation figures are now, uncertain as we are of the extent o:f 'Moscow's deportation and exter1 �34 SLOVAKIA mination aictiivities, ,plus the importation of elements from the Soviet Union. !But we can still ,be sU1re that the Slovaik population has not 'been too seriously affected. But why was it that we on this side of the Atlantic knew so Jittle aJbout 1Slava1kia during the years preceeding World War I? That is easHy anS1Wered. It 'had been so completely incOI1J)OTated ·i nto Hungary that it did not maJke the i.!Illlpression l.J!POn us as it would have, had it beein a separate sbate. How much space did American histories giive Slovakia? A •parngraiph? But Switzerland - every American schoo~boy and schoolgiTl :knew something of that country's history, ,c,ouild call U!p clear images of pictured mountains and chalets, knew that for watches and clooks no ipeople •c ould compete with t!he. ·Swiss. Perhaips pu:bhcation'S ltke the _National Geograiphic Magruzine carried illrustrated articles on Slovakia, as it did ,and does on little known parts of the world as well. as on the known. But if so, they were for the entertainment of the curious and of arm-chair trruvellers, rather than for informative purposes, on the history and problems orf the Slova;ks. Unless Americans •c ame in ·contact with Slovaks who had emigrated lfnom their unfortunate homelaind to free Ameriica, they never heard olf how the Slova!ks had fought through the ,c enturies to 1pre·se11ve their freedoon or throw off the oppresso•r 's yolke when it had been laiid ,u pon them. We know noching otf the fier,ce Slovruk resistance to swarming Tatar hordes that came up over the "Blaelk Trail" to loot a,nd burn in Burope and ,retire with ca,p tives to be sold in the slawe mankets of tthe East. We knew little or nothing of Slovaik battles •w'ith invading Turks; nothing of the never...ceasing effort to hold their own against German domination amd ·aSiSimilation; and ivery little of the hopeless struggle to prevent .b eing swallowed up by Hungary. And how much more, may I aSik, do Ameri·cans !know of the underigrounrl struggJe itlhat is going on in SlovaJkia today against the tools orf Moscow? I know how difficult it is to. get tmstworthy news out of the lands behind the Iron Curtain, and then how difficult it is to get the press here to take it. But I hope the Slovaks �SLOVAKIA 35 never allow di,s coora:gement to get hold ol[ them. And as for Slo:va!k history, they now hruve an excellent vol,urrne in Mr. Yurehaik's "'.Dhe SlowaJks," to iput before their Americrun. friends and those who should be, their friends. I lose no chan'Ce to recommend it. Norw the magnificent thing about Slo1Vak history is that it is the story of a 1peo1p le that despite oppression, which in all. too many instances reduced the 1Sloivaks to what was little better than an runimal existence,, never lost the consciousness of tJheir nationality and the rights that nationality gave them. The Slovruk spirit !burned with a /bright unwruvering flame. How many Americans know the story of the prirvate schools that were estalblished when the SlovaJk language was not pernn1tted in the state schools? How boo1ks were written and printed, how collection;s of things ipreserving the Slo:vruk tradition, culture, and history were made; how the vairious dfa.iJ.ects were unified to become one recognized languruge? How denationaHzat ion was fought at every turn, and that the num!ber of Slovaks who ,su:ocumbed to magyarfaation for eoonomi1c or sociail reasons was very small compared with the numlber that stubbo,r nly paid the price for remaining 1Slovalks, keeping the SlovaJk farm of thei,r namee: and folllowing Slova:k c;ustoms? Resistantce to denationaliza tion woultl not a1wa,ys remain pass,iive. There were times when protest after protest was made, ruppead after ruppeal. But even when noble Hungarians valiantly espoused the Slovak Slide and sometimes won what seemed a victory, nothing ever came of it. The Slovaks were either scorned or ignored. Then sometimes conditions lbecaime intoleraJble and Slovruk leaders called for fo11ce. But what could ri-sin,gs of the oppressed do against ove:rwheJJining fo,r ee? Oppression of a people for century after century naturally leaids individuals among that people to despairing resignation. They for.get that if the blood of the martyrs is the seed Olf the churich, it is no less true that the blood of the ,p atriots is the seed of the free nation. That is as true America as it is of any other land. Lt is true of tSlovaJkia. m. �36 SLOVAKIA BecaUJSe of the martyrs and the. patriots, there never ceased to ,be a SlovaJlda ipopulated iby Slovaks. And so it came rubout as a wholly logical sequence that when World War I showed the fatal wealkness of the Austro-SiULtllg.arian ffimpire, the minorities within it, among them the SlovaJks, made their bid for freedom. But there is another higihly important factor that, while it has !been in existence for some time, now comes into the limelight. That is the Slovalk element in Ameriica. 1 mentioned earlier the .fact that Slov:alks had either to accept denationalization or leaive their homeland if they hoped fo,r advancement in. any field. There could be but one result in such a situation, namely, the potential leadership of a Slovakian movement for lilberation -was largely drained out of the country and aibso:lfued into the 'Citizenship of other countries. And leadershifp is a temi. that in this instance: alt any rate included eiconomic resources. Where and how that leadership airose I need not recite to the Slovalks who were O!f that ndble comp81Ily. Friends in Western Europe swelled the ranks. We should not forget that during all those years of oppressi,o n there had been a few voirces raised in an eiifort oo let the ,w orld know, in the hope thalt pressure oould be. brought to bear upon a professedly Om-istian. E)rrupiire to right the wrongs. That these revealers o(f the truth oo.e after another failed to stir the West does not talke fu,am theiir good will. The Slo:va/k,s were wise enough to underatand that it wais useless for a smrull Centrrul European oou,nt,r,y to attempt to maintain its independence. There was and it seemed there would always ibe a powerif1U[ amlbitious st.ate on either side. Little countries lying between them rwould always tempt them. Nothing except force sufficient . to irestmm. them would deter them from cooking Ulp one excuse oir ainother for moiving in and taikill!g ,p ossession. 'Dhe only way to get that ne:cessrury force was tJhroug,h union of smaller nations in some sort of federation. lt was but natural, therefore that when the Czechs, straining every effort through Czech leaders in America to gain Owch independence, proposed the Sl()IVaJks join them. �SLOVAKIA 37 There was agreement. A new creation, Ozecho~lovakia, a demooraoy with a;utonomy for eruch partner in the union was to be hera[ded to the world. 'l'he SlorvaJks were ,particular to require sipedfic ,provisions for Slo,vakiia's pos,ition in that union, as is penfootly clear through Ozech acceptance of the iPittsbtu,gh Aig,rooment. ,I n that the db.ligations assumed by eacll party are doowmented, as aire the prinicip'les accepted by each as the foundation upon which the new state would 1 rest. I well ,remem1ber the hig'h enthusiasm wiitll which Americans welcomed the birth of the new state. Oze.cho-Slovrulcia and demooracy see:m.ed toi be words interchangealble in meaning. Thomas Masa,'rylk was spoiken orf as one of the greatest statesmen orf the age, a "Grand Old Mam.," ea.reh of these three words oogi:rming with a caipital letter. Masary!k was a great main in those days and, I was told, that he was a SlO!Vak ,b y birth; but education lhaid -made him Czech in outlook, and that was to be most unfortunate in its eJffects. But at the time, Masaryk's star outshone a11 others in the Ozech0-1SlO!V'aJk slcy, and ilf •w e heard of the Pittsburgh Agreement it got all too little notice. 'r.he rest iis ;painful to recall. Instead orf a Ozecho..Slorvakia where Ozoohs an:d Slovaks, were "equals with equals, a state compairaJble in admirustratirve f.ree with free" oi,gain.izations to the Swiss cantons - the Ozech leaders utterlry disregarded the solemn compact with their Slovak brothers, inrvented reasons for disarvowing it, and emlbarked at the outset on a centralization !I)Ol'icy that put all authority in .Prague. And desipite vociferous and continual protests it ,was a ipolicy followed through to the end. It was a iba4d assumption of Czech suiperi-0rity. Yet we must 1be just and remember that not all Czechs approrved that poliey. There haid been Ozechs supporting, and very valiantly, the Slovruk side of the debate whille the Pittsburgh Algireement iwas under discussion. So alS-O there ,were 07.eehs who did not rupprove the Masaryfic&nes repudiation of that aigreement. But they could not inlfilruence the men launched on the ,r oad toward a Ozooh--controMed union. How easy it is for men to fall viictim to ,t he lust for power! Their judgment warped lby excessive American �SLOVAKIA 38 praise, Benes and his adherents believed that only the Ozechs had the vision and the competence to administer and guide the state fOT whose creation they toolk the credit. They flouted the ivery prindples of democracy on which the state had been estaJblished. They lbecaJme dbsessed with the idea of develo.ping a Ozecho-Sl01Vrukia in which there would ibe no hyphen ~d no crupital S, in which the Ozech would lbe dominant, and whose peqple ,woUJl.d lbe known as "CzeichosJava!ks." They were too blind to see that surc!h a project was foredoomed to faiJure; that a people who if or a thOIU'sand years had endured sub9ection and yet preserived their disitinrctirve cuiltuire, traditions, and toogue was not materirul ,f or amalgamation. But truth and justice were refused a heairing. By devious a:rigume:i:its those in the seats of ipower ,p rofessed to justify their couir~. All these years, even after his crupituil.ation ,t o the Germans, Benes was the ideal democrat in the eyes of many Americans. He waJS :referred to as "the aJblest diiplomat in Europe - the top EurOlpean statesman." The legend of his democra oy has clun,g to .h'im despite the record. But IDdwa11d Benes was not the 1p aragon he was held to 1be. He was not a great .statesman but a clever politician, with the cleverness too often in question. We in PoJ.and knew only too well that Czecho~Sloivakia was not the embodiment of democracy Americans naively swpposed it to be, amd iknew that Benes was not the democrat they ibelieved him to .be. But nothing we oouild say lhad .a ny effect. We were a,ccmsed of indulging in malice and jealousy betcause, as they in -their swperior intelligence asserted, we Hived in Poland, a co'Uiltry ruled by a dictator! Which showed how much they did NOT know. 1 Few .Americrun.s had ,been in either country; if they had, it was for a brief stay only. They made stopover !Visits in Praigiue and Warsruw fo,r a daiy or so while enroute to that most delig,hbfiul ( !) olf all taurist lands, the SoiViet Union f.rom w'hich honest ones came out somewhat less, lyrical than when they went in. In iPra·g ue they met Oze:chs, as a rule, saw the really siplendid Czech industries and arts, but saw and heard little of SlovaJks and Slcxvalkia. If they did it was �SLOVAKIA 39 as. '.'Cz~chosloivakia." The Ozechs, in American Olpinion, were E1qTope's ,p rize exh'ilbit. ls .it any wonder they got satisd'action out of the role O!I' that it infiluenced their own opinion of themselives? Wehl, "God doesn't rpay erv~ day, but He pays," a famous French woman is credited with hav:mg ,w ritten. And Benes and those with him who . framed and ex~ruted thek mistaiken policres have made the final accounting. Surrely no one can envy rthem their fasit years, when in oiverweening confiidenice in their own aibility they wallked inrt o the Soiviet traip, were deiprived of al!l ,p ower, and lingered on runtil death ifilter;vened. But the past is ,p ast. We cannot change its pattern. We review it oruy to 1earn its les,s on, that the same mistaik es may n01t lbe made again. For t!hinlking people it is farll oif guide posts to that fuitme which while we talk betomes the present. What of that future for Sloivrukia? The .~lovaJks are aH w~l a;ware of how mtroh it deipends upon them. SloivaJkia must olf course ibe free. Of that there is no question. But then what? · · You will ,prolbaJbly rugree that the position tiruken at the time the Slov,aiks thre,w in their lot with the Cze.chs was soU!Ild. Oze:chs and Slovaks are, ib1ood kin. They are neighbors, .destined to be neighlbors with nonmaJl commercial and other relations, unless another iron curtain des:coo.ds. There is good reason to hope that after these years otf serivitude to :Moscow the Czechs wil!l .better understand international and ibrotherly relationsh1ps and the spirit of cooperntion. One thing will he~p - t'hey haive not the ;remarkrub~e reputation in America that they onice had. They are less akin to the angcls and deiddedlly more mortal. A real Sio:vak state and a real Ozech state - eaJOh indiividual and independent - should ~ppear after the StaUn'ists are induced to. •r eturn to their own bor,ders. · Yet formation of these separate inmvidurul states is oruy a beginning. Thmwghout the ruges there has been a Gffl'ma,n .push to the east and a Russian to the west. In that is the care oif the prdblem the world stiN faces. It is the threat �40 SLOVAKIA that haiS ai1Jways hung lake the sword of Demooles a!bove the heads oif the peoples ibetween t!he Bail.tic, the Adriatic, and the Black seas. There is a solution to that prOlblem, but one which our Administration in Waslhington for some reason refuses to re!Cogni:ze. That is a regionrul federation in Centrrul and Eastern IDuirqpe. Iif the roughly 11'5,000,000 (POOI>le in that area were in a f~eration that gaJVe them a customs unii.on, a common currency, .s tandardized a'rnlled forces under some kind of a joint comma,nld, a common foreign policy, and whatever e:l:se in icammon or in cooperation they agreed upon while retaining cooniplete control of their initernrul aliai:rs, that federation would fu:rnn so ipowenfiul an dbsta.cile to aggression that no power would dare eJq)and in its direction. There is not spruce here to disouss the enomnous and varied adJvantages that wouil.d come to each of the countries entering into suoh a federation. Moscow has forcilb1y produced a regional union, but what a travesty it is! It is ,t o be hoped that when tJhe day of U'beration comes, the exiles from t)lese Jands WOI1king togetller ,w ith .Americans whose all!cestors came from those lands will ha;ve plains fur swch a regiomcl federation thoroughly discussed and prepared. Lt wou!ld be fol!ly to wait until after liberation to get r eady. I lknow how faithlfully and persistently the Slovaks hwve been fighting all these• re!Cent years that .Americans might iknow the trult'h rubout !Slovalkia. 1It is caJUSe for rejoici.n!g that t:Jhe representa:tiives oif the peoples behind the ITop Curtain are uniting in a common effort to fight communism. The Sllovaiks hruve good grounds for holding up their heads in this fight, for .they hruve Sloivalkia with them. They are not a front behind which stands a paltry few. From what country do we get news of more effective guerilla resastantce, o:r of a greater resistance on the part of the people to soviet~ati.Qn? The Sl01Vak:.s are making t hemselves a force to be redkoned with in mor e ways than one . I close on a note of ,confidence in the future. The struggle for the liberation and ,r ~tablishment of a free Central �SLOVAKIA 41 and East :mu.rope wi'hl .r equire all the wisdom, courage, and persist.eillCe we can commaind. Lt will mean further suffering and blood saic:riifice on the part of the peoples of that area, possilbly on OUT own part. But in the end right wm t.:r,iumiph over might. The signs ,t hat the tide is at last b,eginnin.g to turn in Riight's fawor a.re ruppearing on the horizon, and we will :liive to see the task to whlch we haive set ourselves accomplished. ,SlolV'alkia, too, shall lbe free! • • • SLOVA.KIA AND INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN 1938 Joseph Kirschbaum From the very beginning of Czecho-Slovakia, for twenty entire years, Czech policy and diplomacy succeeded in presenting the Slovak question as an internal problem, about which the outside world could say nothing without disturbing the sovereignty of the Czecho..Slovak State. Even professor Ernest Denis of the Sorbonne in Paris, who was quite partial to the Czech nation, wrote as early as 1917 that "the Slovak question is of European importance" (1), but for Czech politicians it was only an insignificant administrative problem. They refused to admit the existence of any Slovak problem. Thus it happened that Slovakia and Slovak politicians were not mentioned in international official documents until the fall of 1938. The storm, which broke loose over CzechoSlovakia, tore the cloak of Czech propaganda to shreds, and Slovakia, together with other problems of the Czecho-Slovak State, came to the forefront of European interests. This happened primarily through the neighbors of Czecho-Slovakia, each of whom wished to solve the Slovak question according to their own interests. Since these were not always in accord with the interests of the Slovaks, the representatives of the Slovak nation undertook everything possible to save Slovakia from the catastrophe into which the Czecho..Slovak Republic was led lby the policy of Prague. And so, almost simultaneously, we find documents which tell us, on the one hand, of the efforts to annex Slovakia to Hungary or � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 31 SLOVAKIA would guarantee the existence oif a 0zeicho-Sloivakia in which they would rule. They 3Jre true foUowers oif Benes: If they are for a central Euroq>ean federation, it is only because of political exiped!iency, or, as Ripka himself so a'PtlY put it: "to gain the sympathies of the demo.craitic world for the CZECH caJuse." The Slovaks, on the other hand, are against any and all forms of Czecho-Slovakia - the federation they were forced into against their will. They are stricmgl,y for a '.Central :IDuropean federation in which Sloiva'kia would be an independent ethnic part, independent oif Bohemia and the 0zechs, and an equal among equals. 1 • • • SLOVAKIA'S RIGHT TO BE HEARD Ann Su Cardwell The Slovak nation has a fong and enrv'iaJble record in the :struggle for freedom and the rights O!f man. That struggle continiues, ,w ith the SlovaJks in this country carrying the'ir share of the rbul'den. How clifrfiicwlt they find it I know only too well it:rom actual experience. '!'here were years when getting the trutJh 1before the Amerilca,n reading 'PUIJ:>lic was next to impossi!ble, and those writers who did succeed oocasional,l y were the ,reciipients ,of letters ()If sha11p criticism and even inrveC:ti!ve. On th3Jt point, too, ·I speak out of experience. It is not necessa'I1)' for me to tell the Slova.tks that Americans in generall hawe ,known ail.I too little of SlovaJkia and its pface in Centra!l European lirfe and 'C!iviliization; and if irn Eastern European life, and dvilization, then in that of Western. Eu1:1oipe and America as well. ,F or despite geograiphical distances am.di differences in lamrgruarge and customs, the entire Western world - and hy that I mean all Europe and Amerrea - is bOIUDd together throughout histo!IY to agree that we do not st-Olp to realize. What haipnot hruppen to one ipeorple has its effect upon pens or the rest, though thait effect may be long in beoom:ing manifest. Surely that point does not need argument these days, does 32 SLOVAKIA when the world is 1ooin,g fo11dbly divided into two great camps. [ think ,ba.dk to the time when my own enlightenm ent on Eastern Europe lbegan. Of course even -as a schoolgirl I had a ,g eneral idea orf the location of Central and Eastern European ;p eoples, which naJturailly i.nc1'uded the .Slaivirc m11tions. That kr.nowledge was lburt slightly improved during my university -and ipost~wn:iversity years. Mter a:11 my <:hief impressions <:onitinued to lbe the inOOIIl/Prehensilble and unpronowncalb1e JwngUJa;ges and the extraordin ary ibeautilful peasant costumes. The faJct w~ that there was simply no ,r eason why I shouild lbe ipairtiicularly interested in those ,peoples. Then <!ame the First Wo rld War, and American readers quidkly became ea;ger students ,o f geog,r ~hy. We were soon on rvery lfarrniliar te11II1s with the iprinted names olf a lot of cities and towns aJUd loca;lities that left us icOIIlllP,letely dumb when we tried to rp:rionounice them, until we mastered the phonetic helip girven us in 'bhe daily paipers as the war progressed. But the sum of it aM wa:s that we ,b ecame vitally interested in what was hruppening in this hitherto uniknoWlll world. The vigorously conducted movement that resulted in the creation ,o f the new state of 0.zeoho,Slova!kia made us aware of the vitwty ,olf those two ,peoples. Thomas Masaryk 'beoome a name and a symbol •a round which ~tered an immense American enthusiasm . But all this was something in whd:ch I !persona:Hy had no part, and so I r~ll little else of that movement e:,oceipt the enthusiasm of icerlain groups, and the ·g reat pulblicity girven the or eation oif what ,w as ha.Ned as a new democracy. Little did I dream that l was to live neighbor to that new state for 17 years. I am more fortunate than most Ameri(!alls when it comes to getting a chance to iknoiw Europe of our time. In 1922 my husband, an eJOpert in 1persorunel training, was loaned by the Alrnerican YiMCA to helip the neiwliy organized YMCA's in Ozecho-Slova.k-ia and Poland get themsclves established . (I :s houid ~lain here that Ann Su Cardwell is my pen name. iMy rea!l name is Mrs. Paw Suiper.) My husband had /been over there but a short time when the SLOVAKIA 33 Pales asked him to lbecome na,tioll!al director of their YMCA. He oocepted on wndition that I would -agree. I did, for a temn of two · yeara. I ha'Ve ,aJreadiy said we stayed seventeen, lea.ving at midnight of the day the Red Aranry crossed the Polish4Soiviet firontier, Septemlber 17, 1939. We were in Rumania, Hwnga,i,y, l3Jil.d France anotiher nine months before returning to Arrnerioa after the fa:U of fiance. We had lost a:11 we had 'in our Warsaw rupartment, and that was oonsideraJble. Yet we did not count the loos. We had never boon narrow in our outlook, for we had been privileged to iknow .A!meric"a ;fir.om coast to coast and had lived ten years in Honolulu. 'Burt IDurape ,was somethin,g else. It was the ;place Of Arrneri~n origins; and conscious of our ignorance we began di•ligentliy to acquaint 01.l!rselves with Em-ope. One of the !first coiuntri.es I wa:s to vis.it was OzechoSlovaJkia, as everyfbodry then said, but ,which I now refer to simply as IS'loivaikia. There was a conference in T,rencin, whieh mry hu.sband had to attend. My son and I went ,a iong. I irecaM the very attraotirve place where we stayed, the pleasant pe<>iple, the ,g ood food, the lorvely country, the lbeautid:ul things in the ,g ift shops, eSipeciaB.y the briUiant embroidery. I think eJVery woman at the colliference bought at least one blouse "to send 'home." A better introduction to a country than that ivisit afforded could 'hardly ibe asked. From Tren:cin we took the :train to Vienna, and that jowney aicross the southwest corner of iSlowrukia is memoraJble not only for its scenery but the, castle ruins. The names of the castles haive, of course, escaped me, though I was duly instnrcted as or be:fo:re we passed them, but the beaiuty of that scenery shall remain with me forever. Now after the introduction what d!id I learn aJbout Slovakia? ·F or one thing, that it is laiiger than severall well a,nd honoralbly lkm,own European states. Swi,merl,and, Belgi'llllll, Denmark, for insta.:nce. .Arul -w ho would ,propose that these ,n ations ,s houM 4ose their independence and identity? Slova,kia is not th'inl'Y :populated, either. · One cannot say precisely what the tpopulation figures are now, uncertain as we are of the extent o:f 'Moscow's deportation and exter1 34 SLOVAKIA mination aictiivities, ,plus the importation of elements from the Soviet Union. !But we can still ,be sU1re that the Slovaik population has not 'been too seriously affected. But why was it that we on this side of the Atlantic knew so Jittle aJbout 1Slava1kia during the years preceeding World War I? That is easHy anS1Wered. It 'had been so completely incOI1J)OTated ·i nto Hungary that it did not maJke the i.!Illlpression l.J!POn us as it would have, had it beein a separate sbate. How much space did American histories giive Slovakia? A •parngraiph? But Switzerland - every American schoo~boy and schoolgiTl :knew something of that country's history, ,c,ouild call U!p clear images of pictured mountains and chalets, knew that for watches and clooks no ipeople •c ould compete with t!he. ·Swiss. Perhaips pu:bhcation'S ltke the _National Geograiphic Magruzine carried illrustrated articles on Slovakia, as it did ,and does on little known parts of the world as well. as on the known. But if so, they were for the entertainment of the curious and of arm-chair trruvellers, rather than for informative purposes, on the history and problems orf the Slova;ks. Unless Americans •c ame in ·contact with Slovaks who had emigrated lfnom their unfortunate homelaind to free Ameriica, they never heard olf how the Slova!ks had fought through the ,c enturies to 1pre·se11ve their freedoon or throw off the oppresso•r 's yolke when it had been laiid ,u pon them. We know noching otf the fier,ce Slovruk resistance to swarming Tatar hordes that came up over the "Blaelk Trail" to loot a,nd burn in Burope and ,retire with ca,p tives to be sold in the slawe mankets of tthe East. We knew little or nothing of Slovaik battles •w'ith invading Turks; nothing of the never...ceasing effort to hold their own against German domination amd ·aSiSimilation; and ivery little of the hopeless struggle to prevent .b eing swallowed up by Hungary. And how much more, may I aSik, do Ameri·cans !know of the underigrounrl struggJe itlhat is going on in SlovaJkia today against the tools orf Moscow? I know how difficult it is to. get tmstworthy news out of the lands behind the Iron Curtain, and then how difficult it is to get the press here to take it. But I hope the Slovaks SLOVAKIA 35 never allow di,s coora:gement to get hold ol[ them. And as for Slo:va!k history, they now hruve an excellent vol,urrne in Mr. Yurehaik's "'.Dhe SlowaJks," to iput before their Americrun. friends and those who should be, their friends. I lose no chan'Ce to recommend it. Norw the magnificent thing about Slo1Vak history is that it is the story of a 1peo1p le that despite oppression, which in all. too many instances reduced the 1Sloivaks to what was little better than an runimal existence,, never lost the consciousness of tJheir nationality and the rights that nationality gave them. The Slovruk spirit !burned with a /bright unwruvering flame. How many Americans know the story of the prirvate schools that were estalblished when the SlovaJk language was not pernn1tted in the state schools? How boo1ks were written and printed, how collection;s of things ipreserving the Slo:vruk tradition, culture, and history were made; how the vairious dfa.iJ.ects were unified to become one recognized languruge? How denationaHzat ion was fought at every turn, and that the num!ber of Slovaks who ,su:ocumbed to magyarfaation for eoonomi1c or sociail reasons was very small compared with the numlber that stubbo,r nly paid the price for remaining 1Slovalks, keeping the SlovaJk farm of thei,r namee: and folllowing Slova:k c;ustoms? Resistantce to denationaliza tion woultl not a1wa,ys remain pass,iive. There were times when protest after protest was made, ruppead after ruppeal. But even when noble Hungarians valiantly espoused the Slovak Slide and sometimes won what seemed a victory, nothing ever came of it. The Slovaks were either scorned or ignored. Then sometimes conditions lbecaime intoleraJble and Slovruk leaders called for fo11ce. But what could ri-sin,gs of the oppressed do against ove:rwheJJining fo,r ee? Oppression of a people for century after century naturally leaids individuals among that people to despairing resignation. They for.get that if the blood of the martyrs is the seed Olf the churich, it is no less true that the blood of the ,p atriots is the seed of the free nation. That is as true America as it is of any other land. Lt is true of tSlovaJkia. m. 36 SLOVAKIA BecaUJSe of the martyrs and the. patriots, there never ceased to ,be a SlovaJlda ipopulated iby Slovaks. And so it came rubout as a wholly logical sequence that when World War I showed the fatal wealkness of the Austro-SiULtllg.arian ffimpire, the minorities within it, among them the SlovaJks, made their bid for freedom. But there is another higihly important factor that, while it has !been in existence for some time, now comes into the limelight. That is the Slovalk element in Ameriica. 1 mentioned earlier the .fact that Slov:alks had either to accept denationalization or leaive their homeland if they hoped fo,r advancement in. any field. There could be but one result in such a situation, namely, the potential leadership of a Slovakian movement for lilberation -was largely drained out of the country and aibso:lfued into the 'Citizenship of other countries. And leadershifp is a temi. that in this instance: alt any rate included eiconomic resources. Where and how that leadership airose I need not recite to the Slovalks who were O!f that ndble comp81Ily. Friends in Western Europe swelled the ranks. We should not forget that during all those years of oppressi,o n there had been a few voirces raised in an eiifort oo let the ,w orld know, in the hope thalt pressure oould be. brought to bear upon a professedly Om-istian. E)rrupiire to right the wrongs. That these revealers o(f the truth oo.e after another failed to stir the West does not talke fu,am theiir good will. The Slo:va/k,s were wise enough to underatand that it wais useless for a smrull Centrrul European oou,nt,r,y to attempt to maintain its independence. There was and it seemed there would always ibe a powerif1U[ amlbitious st.ate on either side. Little countries lying between them rwould always tempt them. Nothing except force sufficient . to irestmm. them would deter them from cooking Ulp one excuse oir ainother for moiving in and taikill!g ,p ossession. 'Dhe only way to get that ne:cessrury force was tJhroug,h union of smaller nations in some sort of federation. lt was but natural, therefore that when the Czechs, straining every effort through Czech leaders in America to gain Owch independence, proposed the Sl()IVaJks join them. SLOVAKIA 37 There was agreement. A new creation, Ozecho~lovakia, a demooraoy with a;utonomy for eruch partner in the union was to be hera[ded to the world. 'l'he SlorvaJks were ,particular to require sipedfic ,provisions for Slo,vakiia's pos,ition in that union, as is penfootly clear through Ozech acceptance of the iPittsbtu,gh Aig,rooment. ,I n that the db.ligations assumed by eacll party are doowmented, as aire the prinicip'les accepted by each as the foundation upon which the new state would 1 rest. I well ,remem1ber the hig'h enthusiasm wiitll which Americans welcomed the birth of the new state. Oze.cho-Slovrulcia and demooracy see:m.ed toi be words interchangealble in meaning. Thomas Masa,'rylk was spoiken orf as one of the greatest statesmen orf the age, a "Grand Old Mam.," ea.reh of these three words oogi:rming with a caipital letter. Masary!k was a great main in those days and, I was told, that he was a SlO!Vak ,b y birth; but education lhaid -made him Czech in outlook, and that was to be most unfortunate in its eJffects. But at the time, Masaryk's star outshone a11 others in the Ozech0-1SlO!V'aJk slcy, and ilf •w e heard of the Pittsburgh Agreement it got all too little notice. 'r.he rest iis ;painful to recall. Instead orf a Ozecho..Slorvakia where Ozoohs an:d Slovaks, were "equals with equals, a state compairaJble in admirustratirve f.ree with free" oi,gain.izations to the Swiss cantons - the Ozech leaders utterlry disregarded the solemn compact with their Slovak brothers, inrvented reasons for disarvowing it, and emlbarked at the outset on a centralization !I)Ol'icy that put all authority in .Prague. And desipite vociferous and continual protests it ,was a ipolicy followed through to the end. It was a iba4d assumption of Czech suiperi-0rity. Yet we must 1be just and remember that not all Czechs approrved that poliey. There haid been Ozechs supporting, and very valiantly, the Slovruk side of the debate whille the Pittsburgh Algireement iwas under discussion. So alS-O there ,were 07.eehs who did not rupprove the Masaryfic&nes repudiation of that aigreement. But they could not inlfilruence the men launched on the ,r oad toward a Ozooh--controMed union. How easy it is for men to fall viictim to ,t he lust for power! Their judgment warped lby excessive American SLOVAKIA 38 praise, Benes and his adherents believed that only the Ozechs had the vision and the competence to administer and guide the state fOT whose creation they toolk the credit. They flouted the ivery prindples of democracy on which the state had been estaJblished. They lbecaJme dbsessed with the idea of develo.ping a Ozecho-Sl01Vrukia in which there would ibe no hyphen ~d no crupital S, in which the Ozech would lbe dominant, and whose peqple ,woUJl.d lbe known as "CzeichosJava!ks." They were too blind to see that surc!h a project was foredoomed to faiJure; that a people who if or a thOIU'sand years had endured sub9ection and yet preserived their disitinrctirve cuiltuire, traditions, and toogue was not materirul ,f or amalgamation. But truth and justice were refused a heairing. By devious a:rigume:i:its those in the seats of ipower ,p rofessed to justify their couir~. All these years, even after his crupituil.ation ,t o the Germans, Benes was the ideal democrat in the eyes of many Americans. He waJS :referred to as "the aJblest diiplomat in Europe - the top EurOlpean statesman." The legend of his democra oy has clun,g to .h'im despite the record. But IDdwa11d Benes was not the 1p aragon he was held to 1be. He was not a great .statesman but a clever politician, with the cleverness too often in question. We in PoJ.and knew only too well that Czecho~Sloivakia was not the embodiment of democracy Americans naively swpposed it to be, amd iknew that Benes was not the democrat they ibelieved him to .be. But nothing we oouild say lhad .a ny effect. We were a,ccmsed of indulging in malice and jealousy betcause, as they in -their swperior intelligence asserted, we Hived in Poland, a co'Uiltry ruled by a dictator! Which showed how much they did NOT know. 1 Few .Americrun.s had ,been in either country; if they had, it was for a brief stay only. They made stopover !Visits in Praigiue and Warsruw fo,r a daiy or so while enroute to that most delig,hbfiul ( !) olf all taurist lands, the SoiViet Union f.rom w'hich honest ones came out somewhat less, lyrical than when they went in. In iPra·g ue they met Oze:chs, as a rule, saw the really siplendid Czech industries and arts, but saw and heard little of SlovaJks and Slcxvalkia. If they did it was SLOVAKIA 39 as. '.'Cz~chosloivakia." The Ozechs, in American Olpinion, were E1qTope's ,p rize exh'ilbit. ls .it any wonder they got satisd'action out of the role O!I' that it infiluenced their own opinion of themselives? Wehl, "God doesn't rpay erv~ day, but He pays," a famous French woman is credited with hav:mg ,w ritten. And Benes and those with him who . framed and ex~ruted thek mistaiken policres have made the final accounting. Surrely no one can envy rthem their fasit years, when in oiverweening confiidenice in their own aibility they wallked inrt o the Soiviet traip, were deiprived of al!l ,p ower, and lingered on runtil death ifilter;vened. But the past is ,p ast. We cannot change its pattern. We review it oruy to 1earn its les,s on, that the same mistaik es may n01t lbe made again. For t!hinlking people it is farll oif guide posts to that fuitme which while we talk betomes the present. What of that future for Sloivrukia? The .~lovaJks are aH w~l a;ware of how mtroh it deipends upon them. SloivaJkia must olf course ibe free. Of that there is no question. But then what? · · You will ,prolbaJbly rugree that the position tiruken at the time the Slov,aiks thre,w in their lot with the Cze.chs was soU!Ild. Oze:chs and Slovaks are, ib1ood kin. They are neighbors, .destined to be neighlbors with nonmaJl commercial and other relations, unless another iron curtain des:coo.ds. There is good reason to hope that after these years otf serivitude to :Moscow the Czechs wil!l .better understand international and ibrotherly relationsh1ps and the spirit of cooperntion. One thing will he~p - t'hey haive not the ;remarkrub~e reputation in America that they onice had. They are less akin to the angcls and deiddedlly more mortal. A real Sio:vak state and a real Ozech state - eaJOh indiividual and independent - should ~ppear after the StaUn'ists are induced to. •r eturn to their own bor,ders. · Yet formation of these separate inmvidurul states is oruy a beginning. Thmwghout the ruges there has been a Gffl'ma,n .push to the east and a Russian to the west. In that is the care oif the prdblem the world stiN faces. It is the threat 40 SLOVAKIA that haiS ai1Jways hung lake the sword of Demooles a!bove the heads oif the peoples ibetween t!he Bail.tic, the Adriatic, and the Black seas. There is a solution to that prOlblem, but one which our Administration in Waslhington for some reason refuses to re!Cogni:ze. That is a regionrul federation in Centrrul and Eastern IDuirqpe. Iif the roughly 11'5,000,000 (POOI>le in that area were in a f~eration that gaJVe them a customs unii.on, a common currency, .s tandardized a'rnlled forces under some kind of a joint comma,nld, a common foreign policy, and whatever e:l:se in icammon or in cooperation they agreed upon while retaining cooniplete control of their initernrul aliai:rs, that federation would fu:rnn so ipowenfiul an dbsta.cile to aggression that no power would dare eJq)and in its direction. There is not spruce here to disouss the enomnous and varied adJvantages that wouil.d come to each of the countries entering into suoh a federation. Moscow has forcilb1y produced a regional union, but what a travesty it is! It is ,t o be hoped that when tJhe day of U'beration comes, the exiles from t)lese Jands WOI1king togetller ,w ith .Americans whose all!cestors came from those lands will ha;ve plains fur swch a regiomcl federation thoroughly discussed and prepared. Lt wou!ld be fol!ly to wait until after liberation to get r eady. I lknow how faithlfully and persistently the Slovaks hwve been fighting all these• re!Cent years that .Americans might iknow the trult'h rubout !Slovalkia. 1It is caJUSe for rejoici.n!g that t:Jhe representa:tiives oif the peoples behind the ITop Curtain are uniting in a common effort to fight communism. The Sllovaiks hruve good grounds for holding up their heads in this fight, for .they hruve Sloivalkia with them. They are not a front behind which stands a paltry few. From what country do we get news of more effective guerilla resastantce, o:r of a greater resistance on the part of the people to soviet~ati.Qn? The Sl01Vak:.s are making t hemselves a force to be redkoned with in mor e ways than one . I close on a note of ,confidence in the future. The struggle for the liberation and ,r ~tablishment of a free Central SLOVAKIA 41 and East :mu.rope wi'hl .r equire all the wisdom, courage, and persist.eillCe we can commaind. Lt will mean further suffering and blood saic:riifice on the part of the peoples of that area, possilbly on OUT own part. But in the end right wm t.:r,iumiph over might. The signs ,t hat the tide is at last b,eginnin.g to turn in Riight's fawor a.re ruppearing on the horizon, and we will :liive to see the task to whlch we haive set ourselves accomplished. ,SlolV'alkia, too, shall lbe free! • • • SLOVA.KIA AND INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN 1938 Joseph Kirschbaum From the very beginning of Czecho-Slovakia, for twenty entire years, Czech policy and diplomacy succeeded in presenting the Slovak question as an internal problem, about which the outside world could say nothing without disturbing the sovereignty of the Czecho..Slovak State. Even professor Ernest Denis of the Sorbonne in Paris, who was quite partial to the Czech nation, wrote as early as 1917 that "the Slovak question is of European importance" (1), but for Czech politicians it was only an insignificant administrative problem. They refused to admit the existence of any Slovak problem. Thus it happened that Slovakia and Slovak politicians were not mentioned in international official documents until the fall of 1938. The storm, which broke loose over CzechoSlovakia, tore the cloak of Czech propaganda to shreds, and Slovakia, together with other problems of the Czecho-Slovak State, came to the forefront of European interests. This happened primarily through the neighbors of Czecho-Slovakia, each of whom wished to solve the Slovak question according to their own interests. Since these were not always in accord with the interests of the Slovaks, the representatives of the Slovak nation undertook everything possible to save Slovakia from the catastrophe into which the Czecho..Slovak Republic was led lby the policy of Prague. And so, almost simultaneously, we find documents which tell us, on the one hand, of the efforts to annex Slovakia to Hungary or  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovakia's Right to Be Heard Description An account of the resource Ann Su Cardwell Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953 pp. 31-41 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Cardwell, Ann Su Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1953 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/1951bd42fdbbf67544fc5306088ea250.pdf 6b22492b534f792f66247946149db4bb PDF Text Text u SLOVAKIA THE SLOVAKS AND PRESIDENT EISENHOWER Matthew Cernak What do the Slovaik s expect of President Eisenhower ? From the Government orf President Eisenhower we expect a new American politcy: basica:lly, a change of policy toward Bolshevism and, secondly, a change of policy as far as the Slova;k nation is concerned. During the past three decades the Unlted States of North America has shown very little understanding for the nwtural and self-evident right of the Slovaks to independentce. The Sllova:k nation cannot logicaHy understand why this should be so. This la:ck of understanding for the fundamental right of the Slo;va'k nation is all the more striking, ibecause the USA has always aippeared everywhere; from its very ibeginnmg, in the spirit of the beautiful tra;diibions of Wa;shinigton and Jefferson as the ipioneer of national rights and freedom. The Declaration of Lndependance, Wilson's "Fourteen Points," and the principles of the Atlantic Charter - all these in principle express the equal right of the Slovaks to freedom and independence, the ri•g ht to statehood amd the right to a government of their choke. And America,ns oif Slovak descent proba:bly have been more amazed and confused by the situation than there brethren in Slovakia, ,beca;use they had brought these "self-evident" ,t ruths to the attention of their Government many times in the past. This striking conf:liot between the princip1es of American pol11ey on the one hand, amd the practical appli~ation of them in the Slovak instance, on the other, undoubtedly is not the result of hostile intentions toward the Slovruk nation, hut rather the resu1t of incorrect information. It is certamly :p1aiimy evident ,t hat leading Amerioan statesmen olb tained their knowledge about the Slovruks and the Slovak problem mainly from the silty sources of Dr. Edward Benes and his odllalborators. Knowingly they misinformed the entire western world a}bout Slovakia and the Sloviaks to rpromote their fa;ntastic, undemocratic schemes in the intereE.t of Czech imperialism. �SLOVAKIA 23 Today the western world /better knows Benes and his colla'borators for what they really were than it did in the past deoa.des. The greaJt trust enjoyed by Benes in the West and his unreal conception had bad effects not only for the Sloivak nation, ibut even for his own Czech nation ailld for the who1le western world. It was the misfortune of aU of us that the West woike up too late to rea'1ize the fact that Benes was most instrumental in clearililg the wary for Bo1she!Vism into Central Europe. Benes is, therefore respoTI!Silble in a large measure for the terrilble siituation of the world today, which is costing all of us, and even the America.in people, plenty in material goods and blood. Benes, it seems, learned nothing from history; he knew what happened to the Russi:an nation under Communism and he witnessed what had !happened in Poland; but he still insisted on te'.l:ling the western world that this could not and would not hruppen ,t o Czecho~S!lovakia. He promoted StaHn and Moscow in Britain and the United States; they were gullible, a.ind the whole world is paying dearly for it today. Unfortunatelry, even some leading personalities of the Democratic Party of the lJIS!A became the victims of the Sovietophile, simultaneaously the a,nti-Sfovak, prop~anda of the Benesites. In poiwer, they even invited some orf them to the USA to work in va:r.i,ou:s agencies of government, even though the Truman AdministraJtion must have known that most olf them were members of the Commimljgt-tlominated National Fro:nt Government from 1'945 to 1948 and, thernfore, responsilble in a measure for the insta:Uation of the tyranny of Communism in Ozecho..:Slorvakia. Since Mr. Eisenhower has taken office, indli'catioills are that he and his party will not trust any advi1ce or information which mlight lbe offered .b y the Benesites in the so-called ''Council of Free Ozechoslovakia." They were not reliaJble in matters concerning the USSR and are no more reliaJble in oither ·matters, including even the Slovak question. They certainly do- not represent the ,w,i.Jl o,f the Slovak nation, and it ·is sedous1y doUJbted that they speak even for the Czechs ,a:t home or in exile. Positiive e~res- �SLOVAKIA sions of various memlbera of Congress of the USA aJbout the inherent rights of the Slovaks confirm our position in this rega:rd. ·' It is known that the RepUJblican Party of the USA has hitherto regarded the .American pol.icy towaTd Moscow as not suffilCiently self~conscious and out of line with .Ame11:i'can interests. lit haJS regarded rand stm rega:rds Acheson's thesis o!f contaiinmenrt ,a s not sufficient and insists on a firnner polioy of sUJppressinig Bolshevism. This is something thait the people lbehind the Iron Curtain waited a looig time to hear. And ,t he sooner the words are translated into action, the !better. General IDisenhower exipressed this clearly at the American Legion Convention in New York on Aug.ust 25, 195Q, when he said : "We must telil the Kremlin that never shall we desist i,n ouir aid to every man a'IId woman of those shackled lands who seeks refuge with us, any man who keeps burning among his own people the flame of freedom or who js ded!1ciarted to the Hbeiration of his fellows." From this staltement, a:nd others 'b y Eisenhower and other Repulblicam statements, it is evident that a systematic, energetic and firm poli:oy to surppress Bolesheviism is being planned. I beliEWe, itlherefore, that our hope is justified that American polilcy will endeavor, with the dose cooperation of aU an,ti"Bolshevik forces, to helip all the haipless nations behind the · Iron Curtain to freedom, including the Slovak nation. The Slovaks, however, welcome not only this general change in the course of American policy, but have motives to welcome even the ipoliiey' of the new Repulblicam government toward the Slovak na,,tron. A number of Repulblican members of Congress have openly stated that they aTe for the realization of the desires of SlOV!ak nation for its own staJte. Senator Robert Taift of Ohio did not hesitaite to express his views in this regard, neither did the new President of the USA, Dwiig'ht D. Eisenhower. We hope, theretfore, thait the new .Americam President, together with his oo-workers and the whole American nation will. bring aJbout a necessary a:nd invitaJble, erpochai and �26 SLOVA.KIA ipolirtioail corrootion cxf the western Christian world in regard to .t he tyranny cxf Bol,s hevism, but also a corresponding change in policy towaTd the SllQ!Vak nation. By doing so, he will render service to the truth and the ndble principles of Woodrow Wilson and the Atlantic Charter, as well a:s all idears of freedom whi~h have from the time of Geo:r,ge W a'Shington 'been the pride of the American people. In this sense we w.i-sh President Dwight D. Eisenhower a mu!ltitude of God's blessing on all his ructions . • • • WHO SAID IT7 "It can be said w ,ithout hesitation that the Czecho-Slovak Government-in-Exile has accepted the leadership of Moscow freely and voluntarily. The Czecho.,Slovak Government-in-Exile became the full ally of Moscow ·by the pact signed in Moscow last year. and when Dr. Be- nes went baclk to the part of Czecho•Slovakia li•b erated by the Russians, he went by way of •Moscow. The new provisional government he set up in Ko.sice was th1:i result of consultatioru; in Moscow conducted, it seems, very much under the pressure of the CZECH Communist ,g,roup there. For although it was ignored by the American Press, 1:iven Czecho-Slovakfa had her mvn Moscow group, a distinctly Commun'istic councB, headed by the CZECH Communist leader, Klement Gottwald, ,a nd the intellectual leader of CZECH Commundsts, Profossor Zdenek Nej,edly. Th€ difference betwe1:in the CZECH commilttee in Moscow and the Polish grouip there was that the CZECH Government-inExile was in complete agreement with the CZECH Com. munist group in Moscow with respect to the Russian orientation." E. M. Voyta, AMERICA, June 9, 1945. • • • The author of the above quote is a CZECH, formerly of Prague, now residing in the Unit1:id States, who saw and reported events objectiv1:ily. Voyta calls a CZECH a CZECH, and not a "CZECHOSLOVAK," as the propaganda of Dr. Benes did when it suited its purpose to confu:se the western world. The Slovak nation had nothing to do with the 1Moscow deal but, n1:iv1:irtheless, had to surfor the consequen,ces of it. The "Czecho,Slo,v ak Government-in-Exile" mentioned by Voyta was selected by Dr. Edward Benes ; it repres1:inted not the wiil of the Czech and Slovak nations, ,b ut only the wlll of Dr. Benes. Slovaks, es·pecially those of America, condemned Ben1:is and his proSoviet policy long before 1945, but their's was but voice in the wilderness. Today we know they wer1:i right in th1:ilr claim that Benes •s old out to Mo.scow. a • • • we "Don't believe the stupid Nazi perol"aitlons saying tha.t are in the service ot England OR THAT THE SOVIET UNION WISHES TO INCLUDE US WITHIN ITS BOUNDARIES. We are a free and independent state. We are the friends of ALL DEMOCRATIC, treedomlovlng nations, o! the SOVIETS, as well as or Brita.in and America." - (Dr. Bene§, Broadcast to Czechoslovakia, London, June 24, 1943) � u SLOVAKIA THE SLOVAKS AND PRESIDENT EISENHOWER Matthew Cernak What do the Slovaik s expect of President Eisenhower ? From the Government orf President Eisenhower we expect a new American politcy: basica:lly, a change of policy toward Bolshevism and, secondly, a change of policy as far as the Slova;k nation is concerned. During the past three decades the Unlted States of North America has shown very little understanding for the nwtural and self-evident right of the Slovaks to independentce. The Sllova:k nation cannot logicaHy understand why this should be so. This la:ck of understanding for the fundamental right of the Slo;va'k nation is all the more striking, ibecause the USA has always aippeared everywhere; from its very ibeginnmg, in the spirit of the beautiful tra;diibions of Wa;shinigton and Jefferson as the ipioneer of national rights and freedom. The Declaration of Lndependance, Wilson's "Fourteen Points," and the principles of the Atlantic Charter - all these in principle express the equal right of the Slovaks to freedom and independence, the ri•g ht to statehood amd the right to a government of their choke. And America,ns oif Slovak descent proba:bly have been more amazed and confused by the situation than there brethren in Slovakia, ,beca;use they had brought these "self-evident" ,t ruths to the attention of their Government many times in the past. This striking conf:liot between the princip1es of American pol11ey on the one hand, amd the practical appli~ation of them in the Slovak instance, on the other, undoubtedly is not the result of hostile intentions toward the Slovruk nation, hut rather the resu1t of incorrect information. It is certamly :p1aiimy evident ,t hat leading Amerioan statesmen olb tained their knowledge about the Slovruks and the Slovak problem mainly from the silty sources of Dr. Edward Benes and his odllalborators. Knowingly they misinformed the entire western world a}bout Slovakia and the Sloviaks to rpromote their fa;ntastic, undemocratic schemes in the intereE.t of Czech imperialism. �SLOVAKIA 23 Today the western world /better knows Benes and his colla'borators for what they really were than it did in the past deoa.des. The greaJt trust enjoyed by Benes in the West and his unreal conception had bad effects not only for the Sloivak nation, ibut even for his own Czech nation ailld for the who1le western world. It was the misfortune of aU of us that the West woike up too late to rea'1ize the fact that Benes was most instrumental in clearililg the wary for Bo1she!Vism into Central Europe. Benes is, therefore respoTI!Silble in a large measure for the terrilble siituation of the world today, which is costing all of us, and even the America.in people, plenty in material goods and blood. Benes, it seems, learned nothing from history; he knew what happened to the Russi:an nation under Communism and he witnessed what had !happened in Poland; but he still insisted on te'.l:ling the western world that this could not and would not hruppen ,t o Czecho~S!lovakia. He promoted StaHn and Moscow in Britain and the United States; they were gullible, a.ind the whole world is paying dearly for it today. Unfortunatelry, even some leading personalities of the Democratic Party of the lJIS!A became the victims of the Sovietophile, simultaneaously the a,nti-Sfovak, prop~anda of the Benesites. In poiwer, they even invited some orf them to the USA to work in va:r.i,ou:s agencies of government, even though the Truman AdministraJtion must have known that most olf them were members of the Commimljgt-tlominated National Fro:nt Government from 1'945 to 1948 and, thernfore, responsilble in a measure for the insta:Uation of the tyranny of Communism in Ozecho..:Slorvakia. Since Mr. Eisenhower has taken office, indli'catioills are that he and his party will not trust any advi1ce or information which mlight lbe offered .b y the Benesites in the so-called ''Council of Free Ozechoslovakia." They were not reliaJble in matters concerning the USSR and are no more reliaJble in oither ·matters, including even the Slovak question. They certainly do- not represent the ,w,i.Jl o,f the Slovak nation, and it ·is sedous1y doUJbted that they speak even for the Czechs ,a:t home or in exile. Positiive e~res- �SLOVAKIA sions of various memlbera of Congress of the USA aJbout the inherent rights of the Slovaks confirm our position in this rega:rd. ·' It is known that the RepUJblican Party of the USA has hitherto regarded the .American pol.icy towaTd Moscow as not suffilCiently self~conscious and out of line with .Ame11:i'can interests. lit haJS regarded rand stm rega:rds Acheson's thesis o!f contaiinmenrt ,a s not sufficient and insists on a firnner polioy of sUJppressinig Bolshevism. This is something thait the people lbehind the Iron Curtain waited a looig time to hear. And ,t he sooner the words are translated into action, the !better. General IDisenhower exipressed this clearly at the American Legion Convention in New York on Aug.ust 25, 195Q, when he said : "We must telil the Kremlin that never shall we desist i,n ouir aid to every man a'IId woman of those shackled lands who seeks refuge with us, any man who keeps burning among his own people the flame of freedom or who js ded!1ciarted to the Hbeiration of his fellows." From this staltement, a:nd others 'b y Eisenhower and other Repulblicam statements, it is evident that a systematic, energetic and firm poli:oy to surppress Bolesheviism is being planned. I beliEWe, itlherefore, that our hope is justified that American polilcy will endeavor, with the dose cooperation of aU an,ti"Bolshevik forces, to helip all the haipless nations behind the · Iron Curtain to freedom, including the Slovak nation. The Slovaks, however, welcome not only this general change in the course of American policy, but have motives to welcome even the ipoliiey' of the new Repulblicam government toward the Slovak na,,tron. A number of Repulblican members of Congress have openly stated that they aTe for the realization of the desires of SlOV!ak nation for its own staJte. Senator Robert Taift of Ohio did not hesitaite to express his views in this regard, neither did the new President of the USA, Dwiig'ht D. Eisenhower. We hope, theretfore, thait the new .Americam President, together with his oo-workers and the whole American nation will. bring aJbout a necessary a:nd invitaJble, erpochai and �26 SLOVA.KIA ipolirtioail corrootion cxf the western Christian world in regard to .t he tyranny cxf Bol,s hevism, but also a corresponding change in policy towaTd the SllQ!Vak nation. By doing so, he will render service to the truth and the ndble principles of Woodrow Wilson and the Atlantic Charter, as well a:s all idears of freedom whi~h have from the time of Geo:r,ge W a'Shington 'been the pride of the American people. In this sense we w.i-sh President Dwight D. Eisenhower a mu!ltitude of God's blessing on all his ructions . • • • WHO SAID IT7 "It can be said w ,ithout hesitation that the Czecho-Slovak Government-in-Exile has accepted the leadership of Moscow freely and voluntarily. The Czecho.,Slovak Government-in-Exile became the full ally of Moscow ·by the pact signed in Moscow last year. and when Dr. Be- nes went baclk to the part of Czecho•Slovakia li•b erated by the Russians, he went by way of •Moscow. The new provisional government he set up in Ko.sice was th1:i result of consultatioru; in Moscow conducted, it seems, very much under the pressure of the CZECH Communist ,g,roup there. For although it was ignored by the American Press, 1:iven Czecho-Slovakfa had her mvn Moscow group, a distinctly Commun'istic councB, headed by the CZECH Communist leader, Klement Gottwald, ,a nd the intellectual leader of CZECH Commundsts, Profossor Zdenek Nej,edly. Th€ difference betwe1:in the CZECH commilttee in Moscow and the Polish grouip there was that the CZECH Government-inExile was in complete agreement with the CZECH Com. munist group in Moscow with respect to the Russian orientation." E. M. Voyta, AMERICA, June 9, 1945. • • • The author of the above quote is a CZECH, formerly of Prague, now residing in the Unit1:id States, who saw and reported events objectiv1:ily. Voyta calls a CZECH a CZECH, and not a "CZECHOSLOVAK," as the propaganda of Dr. Benes did when it suited its purpose to confu:se the western world. The Slovak nation had nothing to do with the 1Moscow deal but, n1:iv1:irtheless, had to surfor the consequen,ces of it. The "Czecho,Slo,v ak Government-in-Exile" mentioned by Voyta was selected by Dr. Edward Benes ; it repres1:inted not the wiil of the Czech and Slovak nations, ,b ut only the wlll of Dr. Benes. Slovaks, es·pecially those of America, condemned Ben1:is and his proSoviet policy long before 1945, but their's was but voice in the wilderness. Today we know they wer1:i right in th1:ilr claim that Benes •s old out to Mo.scow. a • • • we "Don't believe the stupid Nazi perol"aitlons saying tha.t are in the service ot England OR THAT THE SOVIET UNION WISHES TO INCLUDE US WITHIN ITS BOUNDARIES. We are a free and independent state. We are the friends of ALL DEMOCRATIC, treedomlovlng nations, o! the SOVIETS, as well as or Brita.in and America." - (Dr. Bene§, Broadcast to Czechoslovakia, London, June 24, 1943) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 22 SLOVAKIA THE SLOVAKS AND PRESIDENT EISENHOWER Matthew Cernak What do the Slovaik s expect of President Eisenhower ? From the Government orf President Eisenhower we expect a new American politcy: basica:lly, a change of policy toward Bolshevism and, secondly, a change of policy as far as the Slova;k nation is concerned. During the past three decades the Unlted States of North America has shown very little understanding for the nwtural and self-evident right of the Slovaks to independentce. The Sllova:k nation cannot logicaHy understand why this should be so. This la:ck of understanding for the fundamental right of the Slo;va'k nation is all the more striking, ibecause the USA has always aippeared everywhere; from its very ibeginnmg, in the spirit of the beautiful tra;diibions of Wa;shinigton and Jefferson as the ipioneer of national rights and freedom. The Declaration of Lndependance, Wilson's "Fourteen Points," and the principles of the Atlantic Charter - all these in principle express the equal right of the Slovaks to freedom and independence, the ri•g ht to statehood amd the right to a government of their choke. And America,ns oif Slovak descent proba:bly have been more amazed and confused by the situation than there brethren in Slovakia, ,beca;use they had brought these "self-evident" ,t ruths to the attention of their Government many times in the past. This striking conf:liot between the princip1es of American pol11ey on the one hand, amd the practical appli~ation of them in the Slovak instance, on the other, undoubtedly is not the result of hostile intentions toward the Slovruk nation, hut rather the resu1t of incorrect information. It is certamly :p1aiimy evident ,t hat leading Amerioan statesmen olb tained their knowledge about the Slovruks and the Slovak problem mainly from the silty sources of Dr. Edward Benes and his odllalborators. Knowingly they misinformed the entire western world a}bout Slovakia and the Sloviaks to rpromote their fa;ntastic, undemocratic schemes in the intereE.t of Czech imperialism. SLOVAKIA 23 Today the western world /better knows Benes and his colla'borators for what they really were than it did in the past deoa.des. The greaJt trust enjoyed by Benes in the West and his unreal conception had bad effects not only for the Sloivak nation, ibut even for his own Czech nation ailld for the who1le western world. It was the misfortune of aU of us that the West woike up too late to rea'1ize the fact that Benes was most instrumental in clearililg the wary for Bo1she!Vism into Central Europe. Benes is, therefore respoTI!Silble in a large measure for the terrilble siituation of the world today, which is costing all of us, and even the America.in people, plenty in material goods and blood. Benes, it seems, learned nothing from history; he knew what happened to the Russi:an nation under Communism and he witnessed what had !happened in Poland; but he still insisted on te'.l:ling the western world that this could not and would not hruppen ,t o Czecho~S!lovakia. He promoted StaHn and Moscow in Britain and the United States; they were gullible, a.ind the whole world is paying dearly for it today. Unfortunatelry, even some leading personalities of the Democratic Party of the lJIS!A became the victims of the Sovietophile, simultaneaously the a,nti-Sfovak, prop~anda of the Benesites. In poiwer, they even invited some orf them to the USA to work in va:r.i,ou:s agencies of government, even though the Truman AdministraJtion must have known that most olf them were members of the Commimljgt-tlominated National Fro:nt Government from 1'945 to 1948 and, thernfore, responsilble in a measure for the insta:Uation of the tyranny of Communism in Ozecho..:Slorvakia. Since Mr. Eisenhower has taken office, indli'catioills are that he and his party will not trust any advi1ce or information which mlight lbe offered .b y the Benesites in the so-called ''Council of Free Ozechoslovakia." They were not reliaJble in matters concerning the USSR and are no more reliaJble in oither ·matters, including even the Slovak question. They certainly do- not represent the ,w,i.Jl o,f the Slovak nation, and it ·is sedous1y doUJbted that they speak even for the Czechs ,a:t home or in exile. Positiive e~res- SLOVAKIA sions of various memlbera of Congress of the USA aJbout the inherent rights of the Slovaks confirm our position in this rega:rd. ·' It is known that the RepUJblican Party of the USA has hitherto regarded the .American pol.icy towaTd Moscow as not suffilCiently self~conscious and out of line with .Ame11:i'can interests. lit haJS regarded rand stm rega:rds Acheson's thesis o!f contaiinmenrt ,a s not sufficient and insists on a firnner polioy of sUJppressinig Bolshevism. This is something thait the people lbehind the Iron Curtain waited a looig time to hear. And ,t he sooner the words are translated into action, the !better. General IDisenhower exipressed this clearly at the American Legion Convention in New York on Aug.ust 25, 195Q, when he said : "We must telil the Kremlin that never shall we desist i,n ouir aid to every man a'IId woman of those shackled lands who seeks refuge with us, any man who keeps burning among his own people the flame of freedom or who js ded!1ciarted to the Hbeiration of his fellows." From this staltement, a:nd others 'b y Eisenhower and other Repulblicam statements, it is evident that a systematic, energetic and firm poli:oy to surppress Bolesheviism is being planned. I beliEWe, itlherefore, that our hope is justified that American polilcy will endeavor, with the dose cooperation of aU an,ti"Bolshevik forces, to helip all the haipless nations behind the · Iron Curtain to freedom, including the Slovak nation. The Slovaks, however, welcome not only this general change in the course of American policy, but have motives to welcome even the ipoliiey' of the new Repulblicam government toward the Slovak na,,tron. A number of Repulblican members of Congress have openly stated that they aTe for the realization of the desires of SlOV!ak nation for its own staJte. Senator Robert Taift of Ohio did not hesitaite to express his views in this regard, neither did the new President of the USA, Dwiig'ht D. Eisenhower. We hope, theretfore, thait the new .Americam President, together with his oo-workers and the whole American nation will. bring aJbout a necessary a:nd invitaJble, erpochai and 26 SLOVA.KIA ipolirtioail corrootion cxf the western Christian world in regard to .t he tyranny cxf Bol,s hevism, but also a corresponding change in policy towaTd the SllQ!Vak nation. By doing so, he will render service to the truth and the ndble principles of Woodrow Wilson and the Atlantic Charter, as well a:s all idears of freedom whi~h have from the time of Geo:r,ge W a'Shington 'been the pride of the American people. In this sense we w.i-sh President Dwight D. Eisenhower a mu!ltitude of God's blessing on all his ructions . • • • WHO SAID IT7 "It can be said w ,ithout hesitation that the Czecho-Slovak Government-in-Exile has accepted the leadership of Moscow freely and voluntarily. The Czecho.,Slovak Government-in-Exile became the full ally of Moscow ·by the pact signed in Moscow last year. and when Dr. Be- nes went baclk to the part of Czecho•Slovakia li•b erated by the Russians, he went by way of •Moscow. The new provisional government he set up in Ko.sice was th1:i result of consultatioru; in Moscow conducted, it seems, very much under the pressure of the CZECH Communist ,g,roup there. For although it was ignored by the American Press, 1:iven Czecho-Slovakfa had her mvn Moscow group, a distinctly Commun'istic councB, headed by the CZECH Communist leader, Klement Gottwald, ,a nd the intellectual leader of CZECH Commundsts, Profossor Zdenek Nej,edly. Th€ difference betwe1:in the CZECH commilttee in Moscow and the Polish grouip there was that the CZECH Government-inExile was in complete agreement with the CZECH Com. munist group in Moscow with respect to the Russian orientation." E. M. Voyta, AMERICA, June 9, 1945. • • • The author of the above quote is a CZECH, formerly of Prague, now residing in the Unit1:id States, who saw and reported events objectiv1:ily. Voyta calls a CZECH a CZECH, and not a "CZECHOSLOVAK," as the propaganda of Dr. Benes did when it suited its purpose to confu:se the western world. The Slovak nation had nothing to do with the 1Moscow deal but, n1:iv1:irtheless, had to surfor the consequen,ces of it. The "Czecho,Slo,v ak Government-in-Exile" mentioned by Voyta was selected by Dr. Edward Benes ; it repres1:inted not the wiil of the Czech and Slovak nations, ,b ut only the wlll of Dr. Benes. Slovaks, es·pecially those of America, condemned Ben1:is and his proSoviet policy long before 1945, but their's was but voice in the wilderness. Today we know they wer1:i right in th1:ilr claim that Benes •s old out to Mo.scow. a • • • we "Don't believe the stupid Nazi perol"aitlons saying tha.t are in the service ot England OR THAT THE SOVIET UNION WISHES TO INCLUDE US WITHIN ITS BOUNDARIES. We are a free and independent state. We are the friends of ALL DEMOCRATIC, treedomlovlng nations, o! the SOVIETS, as well as or Brita.in and America." - (Dr. Bene§, Broadcast to Czechoslovakia, London, June 24, 1943)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Slovaks and President Eisenhower Description An account of the resource Matthew Černák Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 1 (6), April 1953 pp. 22-25 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Černák, Matthew Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource April 1953 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/cae39c6465594f6f4a0f788fb7fc510c.pdf 6fd3e7fee758d0c6d5ec88cc21a37386 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA THE TRAGIC CASE OF DUSAN SLAVIK Constantine Culen No generation of the Slovak nation sinned so grievously against its own people as did the generation of so-called "pre-revolutionary " Slovaks, who rendered service to Prague and so betrayed their Slovak birthright for a mess of Czech pottage. To this group -b elong Dr. Joseph Lettrich, former chairman of the Slovak National Front and communist collaborator, and Dr. George Slavik, former ambassador of Dr. Benes to the USA - today both are leading members of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia." They were the socalled "Czechoslovaks," the "ruling class" of Slovakia, who believed that political leaders of the overwhelming majority of the Slovak nation were not fit for any government office either in Slovakia or in the ill-fated Czecho-Slovak Republic of T. G. Masaryk and Dr. Edward Benes. This story is about the son of Dr. George Slavik, Dusan Slavik, who was executed several years ago along with an i.n dustrialist named Tvarozka for espionage and acts inimical fo the "people's democracy." The court which tried Slavik and others was the court set up by Dr. Edward Benes, for whom the elder Slavik worked - the court approved by Dr. Lettrich, who today roams freely about America telling people how great a democrat and anti-Communist he is! The irony of the whole affair is that Dr. Lettrich had decorated both of the executed men for services rendered to restore Czecho-Slovakia. The boys did everything in 1945 to annihilate the independent state of Slovakia and re-estab:. lish the Czecho-Slovak state of Benes which was unwanted by 90 per cent of the Slovak people. For that they were decorated by Lettrich and the Reds. Again they became members of the "ruling" class. Then in 1949: death by the 6rder of the "People's Court!" : ' .. It should be noted for 'h istory that the Slovak Republic thtotighout its six-year: existence had protected Dusan Slavik. And all the while his father, ambassador George Slavik, �iO SLOVAKIA villified and smeared the Slovak State and threatened Tiso and other Slovak leaders with terrible reprisals. What was young Dusan doing during that time? Attending Bratislava University and taking advantage of everything the Slova'k State had to offer to Slovak students. And the Tvarozkas waxed rich, just as had so many other "select" families of Brezova. When waves of the bolshevik armies inundated Slovakia in 1945, the unfinished lawyer Dusan Slavik became the "leader" of a group of Slovak students. At 23 he was a Deputy of parliament. Dr. Lettrich and the Reds knew whom to place in high positions. They could not trust the hated Catholic "separatists" and followers of IIlinka and Tiso. But they knew that they could depend on the Slaviks, Ursinys, Stefaniks, Boors, Cobrdas and others - who professed to be Christian followers of Martin Luther - to make it really tough for the overwhelming Catholic majority of the Slovak population. And tough they made it, too! The youngsters of this so-called "ruling" class in Slovakia followed closely in their fathers' footsteps. As their fathers had divided positions and functions in 1918, so also did their sons in 1945. They shared lucrative governmental positions in Slovakia with nobody but the Communists. The youthful leaders of Slovak students ,o utlawed all existing student organizations and established a new one: "The Club of Fighting Youth." Only a partisan and non-Catholic could be an officer of the Club. Rudas and Ba.zany represented the Communists in the office of the Club, and Slavik, Stefanik and Boor represented the families of the "pre-revolutionary" super-patriots. The very first thing that Dusan's Club did was to set up a screening commission to put the finger on all students "who had sinned against the Slovak nation." As a result thousands of students were expelled from universities. Their crime: they belonged to the Hlinka Youth Organization! Young Slavik further proposed that no diplomas or degrees given or acquired during the years of the Slovak Republic be recognized as valid. But that proposition fell through be- �SLOVAKIA 61 cause even the Communists thought it was going too far at that time. Young Slavik had begun his political career as a Deputy of Lettrich's Democratic Party. But when Benes saw that Lettrich was getting a bit coc'ky in Slovakia - claiming that his party represented at least 62 per cent of the voting population - he gave money to Dr. Srobar to start the Liberty Party. Young Slavik was in on the deal. He soon became a leading member of the new party and a private secretary to Srobar; he was told the party had the blessing of Benes and soon would be the largest ,p olitical party in Slovakia. But even then he was not satisfied. A year later Dusan Slavik became a member of the Socialist Democratic Party, which promised him more than Srobar's party. After the Stalinists were firmly entrenched in the government of Czecho-Slovakia, they staged their so-called "putsch" in February, 1948. · Everything went overboard. All Red opposition was outlawed, jailad, exiled to Siberia, put into labor camps or executed. Benes, Sramek and many other "democratic" greats who collaborated fully with the Gottwaldists were thrown out. Lettrich, Ursiny, Slavik, and all the other "select" leaders, who had set out with the Reds to smash the Catholics of Slovakia, shared a similar fate. And young Dusan Slavik, who had screened so many of his classmates and labeled them "anti-state," made out worse than most of the bigwigs who had counseled him. Lettrich and many of the leading "pre-revolutionary" Slovaks are enjoying the freedom of America and London, but Dusan was executed. Dusan Slavik was executed by order of the "people's court." His murderers were the enemies of the Slovak nation. But his father and he had thought they were friends. Dusan walked in his father's footsteps, hoping that he too, as ;a faithful follower of the anti-democratic, anti-Christian and anti-Slova.k -policies of Benes, might have an eternal claim to some ministerial job, just like his father seemed to have. Dusan, however, was just as terribly mistaken as was Benes, who had found out too late that you cannot do business with Stalin and win. �52 SLOVAKIA Dr. Benes knew how the Slovak Lutherans felt a,,bout the Slovak Catholics. So did Stalin and his man Friday in Czecho-Slovakia - the late Gottwald. Benes and Stalin used that hatred of the Lutherans against the Catholics to attain their own ends. It is high time that all Slovak Christians realize what has happened to their Slovakia, put away their hatred and work together to liberate their country from Godless, Red rule and to establish a democratic, independent Slovakia, the safe guarantee of their national existence . • • • WHO SAID IT? "lt would be a new tragedy not merely for .Elurope but for the whole world if the Soviet Union were again driven into is olation and deprived of an Influence ON THE COURSE OF EUROPEAN EVENTS. That 1s why what I hi.ve called the MIDDLE WAY has been chosen - the natural way which does not abandon the principle of federa,tlon ' or the ruture and meanwhile permits friendly agreements !or mumat assistance and post-war collaboration such as the CzechoslovakSoviet Pact. This agreement is not merely defensive, merely regional, merely based on self-Interest. It leaves room for collaboration with all the Allied nations and in essence serves WORLD PEACE and helps lay the foundations of the NEW WORLD. whicb is to be FREE from the fear of War. FREE from the curse of Naziism and Fascism IN ALL THE!h ~'ORMS, a world based on the principles of INDIVIDUAL AND NATION AL LIBERTY. It does not mean tha,t we shall be an instrument of SOVIET policy, but it CERTAINLY means that we shall not be an instrument of ANTI-SOVIET policy. Internally we shall be COMPLETELY FREE, with quite different cultural, economic and soci al conditions than exist in SOVIET RUSSIA. And 1n our external affairs we shall not abandon our efforts to reach the same relations we have established with Russia and to malnt.ain with Poland · as our traditional relations with wes tern Europe. This path FULLY accords with Czechoslovakia's national tradition of HUMANITARIAN ( Dr. Benes, Foreign Affairs, New York, October OEMOCRACY." 1944). • • • "Our relations with Germany are good and correct and they s.hall remain so In the future In every instance. Between ourselves and Germany there never were, are not, and shall not be any border d~bates and difficulties." (Dr. Ben es, Speecb to the Slovaks, 1933) . • • • "We must get rid of all those Germans in _Czechoslovakia who plunged a dagger in the back of the Czechoslovak state in 1938. Similar treatment· will be meted out to ALL collaborationists in the Czech lands and In . Slovakia and to ALL those whq _lost faith .i.n, the State, in democracy, freedom and In glorious tradition." - (Dr. Benes Brol!,d· · cast from London, October 28. 1944). � SLOVAKIA THE TRAGIC CASE OF DUSAN SLAVIK Constantine Culen No generation of the Slovak nation sinned so grievously against its own people as did the generation of so-called "pre-revolutionary " Slovaks, who rendered service to Prague and so betrayed their Slovak birthright for a mess of Czech pottage. To this group -b elong Dr. Joseph Lettrich, former chairman of the Slovak National Front and communist collaborator, and Dr. George Slavik, former ambassador of Dr. Benes to the USA - today both are leading members of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia." They were the socalled "Czechoslovaks," the "ruling class" of Slovakia, who believed that political leaders of the overwhelming majority of the Slovak nation were not fit for any government office either in Slovakia or in the ill-fated Czecho-Slovak Republic of T. G. Masaryk and Dr. Edward Benes. This story is about the son of Dr. George Slavik, Dusan Slavik, who was executed several years ago along with an i.n dustrialist named Tvarozka for espionage and acts inimical fo the "people's democracy." The court which tried Slavik and others was the court set up by Dr. Edward Benes, for whom the elder Slavik worked - the court approved by Dr. Lettrich, who today roams freely about America telling people how great a democrat and anti-Communist he is! The irony of the whole affair is that Dr. Lettrich had decorated both of the executed men for services rendered to restore Czecho-Slovakia. The boys did everything in 1945 to annihilate the independent state of Slovakia and re-estab:. lish the Czecho-Slovak state of Benes which was unwanted by 90 per cent of the Slovak people. For that they were decorated by Lettrich and the Reds. Again they became members of the "ruling" class. Then in 1949: death by the 6rder of the "People's Court!" : ' .. It should be noted for 'h istory that the Slovak Republic thtotighout its six-year: existence had protected Dusan Slavik. And all the while his father, ambassador George Slavik, �iO SLOVAKIA villified and smeared the Slovak State and threatened Tiso and other Slovak leaders with terrible reprisals. What was young Dusan doing during that time? Attending Bratislava University and taking advantage of everything the Slova'k State had to offer to Slovak students. And the Tvarozkas waxed rich, just as had so many other "select" families of Brezova. When waves of the bolshevik armies inundated Slovakia in 1945, the unfinished lawyer Dusan Slavik became the "leader" of a group of Slovak students. At 23 he was a Deputy of parliament. Dr. Lettrich and the Reds knew whom to place in high positions. They could not trust the hated Catholic "separatists" and followers of IIlinka and Tiso. But they knew that they could depend on the Slaviks, Ursinys, Stefaniks, Boors, Cobrdas and others - who professed to be Christian followers of Martin Luther - to make it really tough for the overwhelming Catholic majority of the Slovak population. And tough they made it, too! The youngsters of this so-called "ruling" class in Slovakia followed closely in their fathers' footsteps. As their fathers had divided positions and functions in 1918, so also did their sons in 1945. They shared lucrative governmental positions in Slovakia with nobody but the Communists. The youthful leaders of Slovak students ,o utlawed all existing student organizations and established a new one: "The Club of Fighting Youth." Only a partisan and non-Catholic could be an officer of the Club. Rudas and Ba.zany represented the Communists in the office of the Club, and Slavik, Stefanik and Boor represented the families of the "pre-revolutionary" super-patriots. The very first thing that Dusan's Club did was to set up a screening commission to put the finger on all students "who had sinned against the Slovak nation." As a result thousands of students were expelled from universities. Their crime: they belonged to the Hlinka Youth Organization! Young Slavik further proposed that no diplomas or degrees given or acquired during the years of the Slovak Republic be recognized as valid. But that proposition fell through be- �SLOVAKIA 61 cause even the Communists thought it was going too far at that time. Young Slavik had begun his political career as a Deputy of Lettrich's Democratic Party. But when Benes saw that Lettrich was getting a bit coc'ky in Slovakia - claiming that his party represented at least 62 per cent of the voting population - he gave money to Dr. Srobar to start the Liberty Party. Young Slavik was in on the deal. He soon became a leading member of the new party and a private secretary to Srobar; he was told the party had the blessing of Benes and soon would be the largest ,p olitical party in Slovakia. But even then he was not satisfied. A year later Dusan Slavik became a member of the Socialist Democratic Party, which promised him more than Srobar's party. After the Stalinists were firmly entrenched in the government of Czecho-Slovakia, they staged their so-called "putsch" in February, 1948. · Everything went overboard. All Red opposition was outlawed, jailad, exiled to Siberia, put into labor camps or executed. Benes, Sramek and many other "democratic" greats who collaborated fully with the Gottwaldists were thrown out. Lettrich, Ursiny, Slavik, and all the other "select" leaders, who had set out with the Reds to smash the Catholics of Slovakia, shared a similar fate. And young Dusan Slavik, who had screened so many of his classmates and labeled them "anti-state," made out worse than most of the bigwigs who had counseled him. Lettrich and many of the leading "pre-revolutionary" Slovaks are enjoying the freedom of America and London, but Dusan was executed. Dusan Slavik was executed by order of the "people's court." His murderers were the enemies of the Slovak nation. But his father and he had thought they were friends. Dusan walked in his father's footsteps, hoping that he too, as ;a faithful follower of the anti-democratic, anti-Christian and anti-Slova.k -policies of Benes, might have an eternal claim to some ministerial job, just like his father seemed to have. Dusan, however, was just as terribly mistaken as was Benes, who had found out too late that you cannot do business with Stalin and win. �52 SLOVAKIA Dr. Benes knew how the Slovak Lutherans felt a,,bout the Slovak Catholics. So did Stalin and his man Friday in Czecho-Slovakia - the late Gottwald. Benes and Stalin used that hatred of the Lutherans against the Catholics to attain their own ends. It is high time that all Slovak Christians realize what has happened to their Slovakia, put away their hatred and work together to liberate their country from Godless, Red rule and to establish a democratic, independent Slovakia, the safe guarantee of their national existence . • • • WHO SAID IT? "lt would be a new tragedy not merely for .Elurope but for the whole world if the Soviet Union were again driven into is olation and deprived of an Influence ON THE COURSE OF EUROPEAN EVENTS. That 1s why what I hi.ve called the MIDDLE WAY has been chosen - the natural way which does not abandon the principle of federa,tlon ' or the ruture and meanwhile permits friendly agreements !or mumat assistance and post-war collaboration such as the CzechoslovakSoviet Pact. This agreement is not merely defensive, merely regional, merely based on self-Interest. It leaves room for collaboration with all the Allied nations and in essence serves WORLD PEACE and helps lay the foundations of the NEW WORLD. whicb is to be FREE from the fear of War. FREE from the curse of Naziism and Fascism IN ALL THE!h ~'ORMS, a world based on the principles of INDIVIDUAL AND NATION AL LIBERTY. It does not mean tha,t we shall be an instrument of SOVIET policy, but it CERTAINLY means that we shall not be an instrument of ANTI-SOVIET policy. Internally we shall be COMPLETELY FREE, with quite different cultural, economic and soci al conditions than exist in SOVIET RUSSIA. And 1n our external affairs we shall not abandon our efforts to reach the same relations we have established with Russia and to malnt.ain with Poland · as our traditional relations with wes tern Europe. This path FULLY accords with Czechoslovakia's national tradition of HUMANITARIAN ( Dr. Benes, Foreign Affairs, New York, October OEMOCRACY." 1944). • • • "Our relations with Germany are good and correct and they s.hall remain so In the future In every instance. Between ourselves and Germany there never were, are not, and shall not be any border d~bates and difficulties." (Dr. Ben es, Speecb to the Slovaks, 1933) . • • • "We must get rid of all those Germans in _Czechoslovakia who plunged a dagger in the back of the Czechoslovak state in 1938. Similar treatment· will be meted out to ALL collaborationists in the Czech lands and In . Slovakia and to ALL those whq _lost faith .i.n, the State, in democracy, freedom and In glorious tradition." - (Dr. Benes Brol!,d· · cast from London, October 28. 1944). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA THE TRAGIC CASE OF DUSAN SLAVIK Constantine Culen No generation of the Slovak nation sinned so grievously against its own people as did the generation of so-called "pre-revolutionary " Slovaks, who rendered service to Prague and so betrayed their Slovak birthright for a mess of Czech pottage. To this group -b elong Dr. Joseph Lettrich, former chairman of the Slovak National Front and communist collaborator, and Dr. George Slavik, former ambassador of Dr. Benes to the USA - today both are leading members of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia." They were the socalled "Czechoslovaks," the "ruling class" of Slovakia, who believed that political leaders of the overwhelming majority of the Slovak nation were not fit for any government office either in Slovakia or in the ill-fated Czecho-Slovak Republic of T. G. Masaryk and Dr. Edward Benes. This story is about the son of Dr. George Slavik, Dusan Slavik, who was executed several years ago along with an i.n dustrialist named Tvarozka for espionage and acts inimical fo the "people's democracy." The court which tried Slavik and others was the court set up by Dr. Edward Benes, for whom the elder Slavik worked - the court approved by Dr. Lettrich, who today roams freely about America telling people how great a democrat and anti-Communist he is! The irony of the whole affair is that Dr. Lettrich had decorated both of the executed men for services rendered to restore Czecho-Slovakia. The boys did everything in 1945 to annihilate the independent state of Slovakia and re-estab:. lish the Czecho-Slovak state of Benes which was unwanted by 90 per cent of the Slovak people. For that they were decorated by Lettrich and the Reds. Again they became members of the "ruling" class. Then in 1949: death by the 6rder of the "People's Court!" : ' .. It should be noted for 'h istory that the Slovak Republic thtotighout its six-year: existence had protected Dusan Slavik. And all the while his father, ambassador George Slavik, iO SLOVAKIA villified and smeared the Slovak State and threatened Tiso and other Slovak leaders with terrible reprisals. What was young Dusan doing during that time? Attending Bratislava University and taking advantage of everything the Slova'k State had to offer to Slovak students. And the Tvarozkas waxed rich, just as had so many other "select" families of Brezova. When waves of the bolshevik armies inundated Slovakia in 1945, the unfinished lawyer Dusan Slavik became the "leader" of a group of Slovak students. At 23 he was a Deputy of parliament. Dr. Lettrich and the Reds knew whom to place in high positions. They could not trust the hated Catholic "separatists" and followers of IIlinka and Tiso. But they knew that they could depend on the Slaviks, Ursinys, Stefaniks, Boors, Cobrdas and others - who professed to be Christian followers of Martin Luther - to make it really tough for the overwhelming Catholic majority of the Slovak population. And tough they made it, too! The youngsters of this so-called "ruling" class in Slovakia followed closely in their fathers' footsteps. As their fathers had divided positions and functions in 1918, so also did their sons in 1945. They shared lucrative governmental positions in Slovakia with nobody but the Communists. The youthful leaders of Slovak students ,o utlawed all existing student organizations and established a new one: "The Club of Fighting Youth." Only a partisan and non-Catholic could be an officer of the Club. Rudas and Ba.zany represented the Communists in the office of the Club, and Slavik, Stefanik and Boor represented the families of the "pre-revolutionary" super-patriots. The very first thing that Dusan's Club did was to set up a screening commission to put the finger on all students "who had sinned against the Slovak nation." As a result thousands of students were expelled from universities. Their crime: they belonged to the Hlinka Youth Organization! Young Slavik further proposed that no diplomas or degrees given or acquired during the years of the Slovak Republic be recognized as valid. But that proposition fell through be- SLOVAKIA 61 cause even the Communists thought it was going too far at that time. Young Slavik had begun his political career as a Deputy of Lettrich's Democratic Party. But when Benes saw that Lettrich was getting a bit coc'ky in Slovakia - claiming that his party represented at least 62 per cent of the voting population - he gave money to Dr. Srobar to start the Liberty Party. Young Slavik was in on the deal. He soon became a leading member of the new party and a private secretary to Srobar; he was told the party had the blessing of Benes and soon would be the largest ,p olitical party in Slovakia. But even then he was not satisfied. A year later Dusan Slavik became a member of the Socialist Democratic Party, which promised him more than Srobar's party. After the Stalinists were firmly entrenched in the government of Czecho-Slovakia, they staged their so-called "putsch" in February, 1948. · Everything went overboard. All Red opposition was outlawed, jailad, exiled to Siberia, put into labor camps or executed. Benes, Sramek and many other "democratic" greats who collaborated fully with the Gottwaldists were thrown out. Lettrich, Ursiny, Slavik, and all the other "select" leaders, who had set out with the Reds to smash the Catholics of Slovakia, shared a similar fate. And young Dusan Slavik, who had screened so many of his classmates and labeled them "anti-state," made out worse than most of the bigwigs who had counseled him. Lettrich and many of the leading "pre-revolutionary" Slovaks are enjoying the freedom of America and London, but Dusan was executed. Dusan Slavik was executed by order of the "people's court." His murderers were the enemies of the Slovak nation. But his father and he had thought they were friends. Dusan walked in his father's footsteps, hoping that he too, as ;a faithful follower of the anti-democratic, anti-Christian and anti-Slova.k -policies of Benes, might have an eternal claim to some ministerial job, just like his father seemed to have. Dusan, however, was just as terribly mistaken as was Benes, who had found out too late that you cannot do business with Stalin and win. 52 SLOVAKIA Dr. Benes knew how the Slovak Lutherans felt a,,bout the Slovak Catholics. So did Stalin and his man Friday in Czecho-Slovakia - the late Gottwald. Benes and Stalin used that hatred of the Lutherans against the Catholics to attain their own ends. It is high time that all Slovak Christians realize what has happened to their Slovakia, put away their hatred and work together to liberate their country from Godless, Red rule and to establish a democratic, independent Slovakia, the safe guarantee of their national existence . • • • WHO SAID IT? "lt would be a new tragedy not merely for .Elurope but for the whole world if the Soviet Union were again driven into is olation and deprived of an Influence ON THE COURSE OF EUROPEAN EVENTS. That 1s why what I hi.ve called the MIDDLE WAY has been chosen - the natural way which does not abandon the principle of federa,tlon ' or the ruture and meanwhile permits friendly agreements !or mumat assistance and post-war collaboration such as the CzechoslovakSoviet Pact. This agreement is not merely defensive, merely regional, merely based on self-Interest. It leaves room for collaboration with all the Allied nations and in essence serves WORLD PEACE and helps lay the foundations of the NEW WORLD. whicb is to be FREE from the fear of War. FREE from the curse of Naziism and Fascism IN ALL THE!h ~'ORMS, a world based on the principles of INDIVIDUAL AND NATION AL LIBERTY. It does not mean tha,t we shall be an instrument of SOVIET policy, but it CERTAINLY means that we shall not be an instrument of ANTI-SOVIET policy. Internally we shall be COMPLETELY FREE, with quite different cultural, economic and soci al conditions than exist in SOVIET RUSSIA. And 1n our external affairs we shall not abandon our efforts to reach the same relations we have established with Russia and to malnt.ain with Poland · as our traditional relations with wes tern Europe. This path FULLY accords with Czechoslovakia's national tradition of HUMANITARIAN ( Dr. Benes, Foreign Affairs, New York, October OEMOCRACY." 1944). • • • "Our relations with Germany are good and correct and they s.hall remain so In the future In every instance. Between ourselves and Germany there never were, are not, and shall not be any border d~bates and difficulties." (Dr. Ben es, Speecb to the Slovaks, 1933) . • • • "We must get rid of all those Germans in _Czechoslovakia who plunged a dagger in the back of the Czechoslovak state in 1938. Similar treatment· will be meted out to ALL collaborationists in the Czech lands and In . Slovakia and to ALL those whq _lost faith .i.n, the State, in democracy, freedom and In glorious tradition." - (Dr. Benes Brol!,d· · cast from London, October 28. 1944).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Tragic Case of Dušan Slávik Description An account of the resource Constantine Čulen Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 1 (6), April 1953 pp. 49-52 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Čulen, Konštantín, 1904-1964 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource April 1953 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/2d909cb69a653bba71ed2694b6634a63.pdf 39bf3de4330edf0c7818a25645cd2711 PDF Text Text fi6 SLOVAKIA THE SWVAK TONGUE John Dater After the Almighty had distributed tongues of speech to all peoples even as He thought ·b est for them, there came from somewhere a little nation <o stand before Him with pleading, tear-filled eyes - but not to ask for power, lands, or a great name. It was love and understanding the Slovaks sought for their weary hearts. The Lord gave ear to their humble pleadings and said: "Where had you been when I was distributing My gifts among men?" "Alas, forgive us, Father," the little Slovak nation meekly implored, "the crowds were too great for us and made up of stronger peoples than we. Being weak, we had to stand afar, You see. Even those of our own Slav progeny, for having given us a helpful hand, wanted to steal our liberty." "Ah!" the Lord replied, "what now, then? Do you not know that I have given all I had away?" Thereupon the Slovak people cried: "Alas, is naught of creation left for us?" And the Lord said: "Stay, have hope!" And, turning, He reached to the thrones of singing choirs of angels and took of the incense that wafted around the throne. And, bending, He placed His Hand in the Heaven's crystal waters, and with noble gentleness touched the tongues of the forgotten people. "Let this 1b e your language," the Lord, said; "such that no other can equal: as melodious as the music of heaven, as beautifttl as sparkling gems in the rays of the sun, as soothing as the lulling winds of May, as loving as the voice of a mother, as sweet as the smile of an infant babe, so tender and soft and smooth and true, its sound will make hearts of the old and bent and gray young once again." �SLOVAKIA Thus, with the tones of angelic voices, God made a balm for aching Slovak hearts. "This dowry," He said, "is for Slovak maids, that when they sing, their sadness may be changed to joy, that at their sound birds may cease their song to listen, the hills rise in glory, the fields bloom anew, the valleys with music ring, the brooks flow with ripples of melody, all the vales rejoice, and the very earth be changed to a paradise." Thus gloriously did God array the Slovak people and place them a,part in a world greedy for prominence, glory and power. Endowed with a heavenly gift, they cared not what awaited them among throngs greater than they. In God's hand they rest, and under His care they will always be. Sheltered in the protecting Tatra,s for long ages, they survive cruelty, tyranny, and power; to live and stand strong forever - a people of peace, beloved of God, may the Slovak people ever be! • • • "The treaties concluded at the Peace Conference (1918) made no reference to Slovak autonomy. After this episode the rift be!Jween the Centralists and the Autonomists was very deep. . . . The Czechs appear also to have objected to the validity of the document (Pittsburgh Pact) on th e ground that the Slovak League was not officialty recognized by the American authorities until 1919, although it was good enough for the advocacy of Czechoslovak claims (prior to that time.) . . . Slovakia was ruled by the two main Centralist parties •- the Agrarians and the Social Democrats with the support of the Czechs; and this continued to be the case even after the 1925 elections had shown the (Hlinka Slovak) People's Party to be at that time, much the strongest single Slovak party." (C. A. Macartney : HUNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS - London, 1937). WHO SAi D IT? - • • • "Great Moravia, after many centuries of peaceful burial, was dug up for the benefit of the Peace Conference in 1918, to be paraded as the earliest Czecho-Slovak State. . . The case for including Northern Hungary in Czecho-Slovakia does not rest on historical .rights, although the ghost of Svatopluk, ruler of Great Moravia, was made to serve its turn. But Svatopluk's historic claims were obviously less valid than those of Hungary, with her thousand-odd yeai;i;;.- of .u .ninterrupted possession . He was more important as supporting, by the evidence whi ch he gave of an early connection between the Czechs and Slovaks, the rea,I claim, which was that of self-determination." (C. A. Macartney: HUNGARY AND HER -~ljfiC~C~SSOR~ - London, 1937). WHO SAID IT? - � fi6 SLOVAKIA THE SWVAK TONGUE John Dater After the Almighty had distributed tongues of speech to all peoples even as He thought ·b est for them, there came from somewhere a little nation <o stand before Him with pleading, tear-filled eyes - but not to ask for power, lands, or a great name. It was love and understanding the Slovaks sought for their weary hearts. The Lord gave ear to their humble pleadings and said: "Where had you been when I was distributing My gifts among men?" "Alas, forgive us, Father," the little Slovak nation meekly implored, "the crowds were too great for us and made up of stronger peoples than we. Being weak, we had to stand afar, You see. Even those of our own Slav progeny, for having given us a helpful hand, wanted to steal our liberty." "Ah!" the Lord replied, "what now, then? Do you not know that I have given all I had away?" Thereupon the Slovak people cried: "Alas, is naught of creation left for us?" And the Lord said: "Stay, have hope!" And, turning, He reached to the thrones of singing choirs of angels and took of the incense that wafted around the throne. And, bending, He placed His Hand in the Heaven's crystal waters, and with noble gentleness touched the tongues of the forgotten people. "Let this 1b e your language," the Lord, said; "such that no other can equal: as melodious as the music of heaven, as beautifttl as sparkling gems in the rays of the sun, as soothing as the lulling winds of May, as loving as the voice of a mother, as sweet as the smile of an infant babe, so tender and soft and smooth and true, its sound will make hearts of the old and bent and gray young once again." �SLOVAKIA Thus, with the tones of angelic voices, God made a balm for aching Slovak hearts. "This dowry," He said, "is for Slovak maids, that when they sing, their sadness may be changed to joy, that at their sound birds may cease their song to listen, the hills rise in glory, the fields bloom anew, the valleys with music ring, the brooks flow with ripples of melody, all the vales rejoice, and the very earth be changed to a paradise." Thus gloriously did God array the Slovak people and place them a,part in a world greedy for prominence, glory and power. Endowed with a heavenly gift, they cared not what awaited them among throngs greater than they. In God's hand they rest, and under His care they will always be. Sheltered in the protecting Tatra,s for long ages, they survive cruelty, tyranny, and power; to live and stand strong forever - a people of peace, beloved of God, may the Slovak people ever be! • • • "The treaties concluded at the Peace Conference (1918) made no reference to Slovak autonomy. After this episode the rift be!Jween the Centralists and the Autonomists was very deep. . . . The Czechs appear also to have objected to the validity of the document (Pittsburgh Pact) on th e ground that the Slovak League was not officialty recognized by the American authorities until 1919, although it was good enough for the advocacy of Czechoslovak claims (prior to that time.) . . . Slovakia was ruled by the two main Centralist parties •- the Agrarians and the Social Democrats with the support of the Czechs; and this continued to be the case even after the 1925 elections had shown the (Hlinka Slovak) People's Party to be at that time, much the strongest single Slovak party." (C. A. Macartney : HUNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS - London, 1937). WHO SAi D IT? - • • • "Great Moravia, after many centuries of peaceful burial, was dug up for the benefit of the Peace Conference in 1918, to be paraded as the earliest Czecho-Slovak State. . . The case for including Northern Hungary in Czecho-Slovakia does not rest on historical .rights, although the ghost of Svatopluk, ruler of Great Moravia, was made to serve its turn. But Svatopluk's historic claims were obviously less valid than those of Hungary, with her thousand-odd yeai;i;;.- of .u .ninterrupted possession . He was more important as supporting, by the evidence whi ch he gave of an early connection between the Czechs and Slovaks, the rea,I claim, which was that of self-determination." (C. A. Macartney: HUNGARY AND HER -~ljfiC~C~SSOR~ - London, 1937). WHO SAID IT? - � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 56 SLOVAKIA THE SWVAK TONGUE John Dater After the Almighty had distributed tongues of speech to all peoples even as He thought ·b est for them, there came from somewhere a little nation <o stand before Him with pleading, tear-filled eyes - but not to ask for power, lands, or a great name. It was love and understanding the Slovaks sought for their weary hearts. The Lord gave ear to their humble pleadings and said: "Where had you been when I was distributing My gifts among men?" "Alas, forgive us, Father," the little Slovak nation meekly implored, "the crowds were too great for us and made up of stronger peoples than we. Being weak, we had to stand afar, You see. Even those of our own Slav progeny, for having given us a helpful hand, wanted to steal our liberty." "Ah!" the Lord replied, "what now, then? Do you not know that I have given all I had away?" Thereupon the Slovak people cried: "Alas, is naught of creation left for us?" And the Lord said: "Stay, have hope!" And, turning, He reached to the thrones of singing choirs of angels and took of the incense that wafted around the throne. And, bending, He placed His Hand in the Heaven's crystal waters, and with noble gentleness touched the tongues of the forgotten people. "Let this 1b e your language," the Lord, said; "such that no other can equal: as melodious as the music of heaven, as beautifttl as sparkling gems in the rays of the sun, as soothing as the lulling winds of May, as loving as the voice of a mother, as sweet as the smile of an infant babe, so tender and soft and smooth and true, its sound will make hearts of the old and bent and gray young once again." SLOVAKIA Thus, with the tones of angelic voices, God made a balm for aching Slovak hearts. "This dowry," He said, "is for Slovak maids, that when they sing, their sadness may be changed to joy, that at their sound birds may cease their song to listen, the hills rise in glory, the fields bloom anew, the valleys with music ring, the brooks flow with ripples of melody, all the vales rejoice, and the very earth be changed to a paradise." Thus gloriously did God array the Slovak people and place them a,part in a world greedy for prominence, glory and power. Endowed with a heavenly gift, they cared not what awaited them among throngs greater than they. In God's hand they rest, and under His care they will always be. Sheltered in the protecting Tatra,s for long ages, they survive cruelty, tyranny, and power; to live and stand strong forever - a people of peace, beloved of God, may the Slovak people ever be! • • • "The treaties concluded at the Peace Conference (1918) made no reference to Slovak autonomy. After this episode the rift be!Jween the Centralists and the Autonomists was very deep. . . . The Czechs appear also to have objected to the validity of the document (Pittsburgh Pact) on th e ground that the Slovak League was not officialty recognized by the American authorities until 1919, although it was good enough for the advocacy of Czechoslovak claims (prior to that time.) . . . Slovakia was ruled by the two main Centralist parties •- the Agrarians and the Social Democrats with the support of the Czechs; and this continued to be the case even after the 1925 elections had shown the (Hlinka Slovak) People's Party to be at that time, much the strongest single Slovak party." (C. A. Macartney : HUNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS - London, 1937). WHO SAi D IT? - • • • "Great Moravia, after many centuries of peaceful burial, was dug up for the benefit of the Peace Conference in 1918, to be paraded as the earliest Czecho-Slovak State. . . The case for including Northern Hungary in Czecho-Slovakia does not rest on historical .rights, although the ghost of Svatopluk, ruler of Great Moravia, was made to serve its turn. But Svatopluk's historic claims were obviously less valid than those of Hungary, with her thousand-odd yeai;i;;.- of .u .ninterrupted possession . He was more important as supporting, by the evidence whi ch he gave of an early connection between the Czechs and Slovaks, the rea,I claim, which was that of self-determination." (C. A. Macartney: HUNGARY AND HER -~ljfiC~C~SSOR~ - London, 1937). WHO SAID IT? -  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Slovak Tongue Description An account of the resource John Ďateľ Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 1 (6), April 1953 pp. 56-57 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Ďateľ, John Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource April 1953 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/8affe32b1d99e5b7198ea2d629fcb183.pdf c05f2805e3ec532338bc99ce54df9bc0 PDF Text Text 62 SLOVAKIA LE'.ITRICH'S REGIME IN .THE LIGHT OF TRUTH Dr. Andrew Dubina In the fall of 1948, the International Peasant Union presented a memorandum concerning the political situation in central and south-eastern Europe to the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is a very interesting document; it has the ,b acking of such personalities as Dr. Macek, Dr. Dimitrov, Mikolejczyk, Ferenc Nagy, Dr. Joseph Cerny and other representatives of the central European nations. The memorandum is replete with figures and statistics that condemn the regimes of so-called "people's" democracies and their representatives. The memorandum also says something about the conditions in 1S lovakia and the Czech lands since the re-establishment of Czecho-Slovakia. There are indications that his part of the memorandum was prepared by the Czech Agrarians: Cerny, Veverka and Klimes. Ironically enough, the memorandum Is a'l:so signed by a smaH so111 of a great father, Fedor Hod.fa, a Czech Slovak ("Czechoslovak"!) Since Czech politicians had a hand in the memorandum, it follows naturally that not everything is mentioned in the memorandum that happened since 1945 in :Slovakia against democracy and human rights. But even what the memorandum does mention about the conditions in :Slovakia since 1945 is a terrible condemnation of the regime in power at that time and its leaders: Lettrich, Hodfa, Ferjencik and their helpers, who today pose as democrats and defenders of democracy in western Europe and America. Behold the kind of democracy that prevailed in Slovakia at a time when Lettrich's regime boasted of representing over 62 per cent of the electorate (J quote from the memorandum): "All human rights were trampled upon since 1945. Nobody was certain of his fundamental right to life and freedom. People were-murdered arbitrarily and prisons were filled with the victims of class justice. "Already in the spring of 1945 the Soviet army of 'libera- �SLOVAKIA 63 tio}l' occµpied the eastern _part of _S lovakia. On the basis of the denunciations of local Communists more than 2Q,OOO innocent citizens were arrested and deported to the coal pits in the Donbasse region of the USSR." That is how the memorandum begins and then continues to ~ay that Czecho-Slovakia became "a model police state. Those who refused to become ~bedient tools of the regime were deprived of all functions, if a worse fate did n~t befall them. Every personal opinion, every resistance was brutally suppressed." "The universally recognized differentiation between legislative, executive and judicial powers was done away with. The administrati,ve machine rendered verdicts and confiscated properties. "The parliament - that was never the result of free elections, but was composed on the basis of delegated power of the privileged parties, allowed by the grace of the Communist party - approved all decrees and changes. "The decisions of the courts were influenced by the press and the demands, manifestations and rallies of the masses. "Violence and lawlessness acquired a form of apparent legality. Morale was destroyed; base denunciation was .raised to a civic virtue." Certainly we need not quote further from the memorandum to illustrate the kind of "democracy" introduced into Slovakia and Bohemia by the collaborators with Bolshevisni when they came into power in 1945 :b y the grace of Moscow and the Communist Parties of Czecho-Slovakia. A queer democracy indeed: arbitrary murders, deportations, confiscations, concentration ·camps, gallows and jails for thousands of the best :Slovak people just because they did not agree with the regime and did not want their Slovakia subordinated to ruthless Czecho-bolshevik sovereignty! But the representatives of Lettrich's regime still have the gall to talk about damocracy, pose as defenders of the democratic way of life! What is more, even in emigration they dare denounce the victims of their political revenge and brutality as enemies of democracy! How much spiritual base- �64 SLOVAKIA ness and heartlessness must be necessary to do a thing like that?! We .Slovaks say that a pitcher goes for water only until it is broken. All these "democrats'' - as they did in the past - even now hide themselves ·b ehind the false reputation of Edward Benes. For them he was a model; they wanted to imitate him at home and they want to emulate him even in emigration - though some of them with their intelligence would not stand a chance of becoming squires in the lowliest Slovak village. We know that Dr. Benes talked a lot about democracy and at the same time ordered the deportation of 3,500,000 Germans, the enslavement of 3,000,000 Slovaks, and the hanging of his political opponents. And Benes got away with this kind ,o f "democracy" for a while. Finally, however, his own brand of democracy caught up with him and he himself became a victim of his lies and frauds. He perished miserably, hated by millions of people - the victims of his anti-democratic and anti-Christian policies. And such an end awaits all the Czech and Slovak followers of Dr. Benes. ~or a time they still shall be able to hide behind the mask of defenders of democracy and pose as victims of Bolshevism. However, the time shall come when they shall be unmasked before the whole world. There is a lot of innocent blood on their hands - more than they can hope to wash off in a lifetime. They have overcompromised themselves with Bolshevism and have no right to speak in the name of the nations they have cast into misery and misfortune. Slowly but surely the light of truth is piercing its way through the fog of "Czecho-Slovak" democracy - the handmaid of the "people's" democracy of Moscow. RECOMMENDED BOOKS: THE SLOVAKS - their history and traditions - by Peter P. Yurchak; 312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $3.00; paper cover - $2.00. by Joseph Skultety; 229 SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK HISTORY pages, well documented; hard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover - $1.00. � 62 SLOVAKIA LE'.ITRICH'S REGIME IN .THE LIGHT OF TRUTH Dr. Andrew Dubina In the fall of 1948, the International Peasant Union presented a memorandum concerning the political situation in central and south-eastern Europe to the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is a very interesting document; it has the ,b acking of such personalities as Dr. Macek, Dr. Dimitrov, Mikolejczyk, Ferenc Nagy, Dr. Joseph Cerny and other representatives of the central European nations. The memorandum is replete with figures and statistics that condemn the regimes of so-called "people's" democracies and their representatives. The memorandum also says something about the conditions in 1S lovakia and the Czech lands since the re-establishment of Czecho-Slovakia. There are indications that his part of the memorandum was prepared by the Czech Agrarians: Cerny, Veverka and Klimes. Ironically enough, the memorandum Is a'l:so signed by a smaH so111 of a great father, Fedor Hod.fa, a Czech Slovak ("Czechoslovak"!) Since Czech politicians had a hand in the memorandum, it follows naturally that not everything is mentioned in the memorandum that happened since 1945 in :Slovakia against democracy and human rights. But even what the memorandum does mention about the conditions in :Slovakia since 1945 is a terrible condemnation of the regime in power at that time and its leaders: Lettrich, Hodfa, Ferjencik and their helpers, who today pose as democrats and defenders of democracy in western Europe and America. Behold the kind of democracy that prevailed in Slovakia at a time when Lettrich's regime boasted of representing over 62 per cent of the electorate (J quote from the memorandum): "All human rights were trampled upon since 1945. Nobody was certain of his fundamental right to life and freedom. People were-murdered arbitrarily and prisons were filled with the victims of class justice. "Already in the spring of 1945 the Soviet army of 'libera- �SLOVAKIA 63 tio}l' occµpied the eastern _part of _S lovakia. On the basis of the denunciations of local Communists more than 2Q,OOO innocent citizens were arrested and deported to the coal pits in the Donbasse region of the USSR." That is how the memorandum begins and then continues to ~ay that Czecho-Slovakia became "a model police state. Those who refused to become ~bedient tools of the regime were deprived of all functions, if a worse fate did n~t befall them. Every personal opinion, every resistance was brutally suppressed." "The universally recognized differentiation between legislative, executive and judicial powers was done away with. The administrati,ve machine rendered verdicts and confiscated properties. "The parliament - that was never the result of free elections, but was composed on the basis of delegated power of the privileged parties, allowed by the grace of the Communist party - approved all decrees and changes. "The decisions of the courts were influenced by the press and the demands, manifestations and rallies of the masses. "Violence and lawlessness acquired a form of apparent legality. Morale was destroyed; base denunciation was .raised to a civic virtue." Certainly we need not quote further from the memorandum to illustrate the kind of "democracy" introduced into Slovakia and Bohemia by the collaborators with Bolshevisni when they came into power in 1945 :b y the grace of Moscow and the Communist Parties of Czecho-Slovakia. A queer democracy indeed: arbitrary murders, deportations, confiscations, concentration ·camps, gallows and jails for thousands of the best :Slovak people just because they did not agree with the regime and did not want their Slovakia subordinated to ruthless Czecho-bolshevik sovereignty! But the representatives of Lettrich's regime still have the gall to talk about damocracy, pose as defenders of the democratic way of life! What is more, even in emigration they dare denounce the victims of their political revenge and brutality as enemies of democracy! How much spiritual base- �64 SLOVAKIA ness and heartlessness must be necessary to do a thing like that?! We .Slovaks say that a pitcher goes for water only until it is broken. All these "democrats'' - as they did in the past - even now hide themselves ·b ehind the false reputation of Edward Benes. For them he was a model; they wanted to imitate him at home and they want to emulate him even in emigration - though some of them with their intelligence would not stand a chance of becoming squires in the lowliest Slovak village. We know that Dr. Benes talked a lot about democracy and at the same time ordered the deportation of 3,500,000 Germans, the enslavement of 3,000,000 Slovaks, and the hanging of his political opponents. And Benes got away with this kind ,o f "democracy" for a while. Finally, however, his own brand of democracy caught up with him and he himself became a victim of his lies and frauds. He perished miserably, hated by millions of people - the victims of his anti-democratic and anti-Christian policies. And such an end awaits all the Czech and Slovak followers of Dr. Benes. ~or a time they still shall be able to hide behind the mask of defenders of democracy and pose as victims of Bolshevism. However, the time shall come when they shall be unmasked before the whole world. There is a lot of innocent blood on their hands - more than they can hope to wash off in a lifetime. They have overcompromised themselves with Bolshevism and have no right to speak in the name of the nations they have cast into misery and misfortune. Slowly but surely the light of truth is piercing its way through the fog of "Czecho-Slovak" democracy - the handmaid of the "people's" democracy of Moscow. RECOMMENDED BOOKS: THE SLOVAKS - their history and traditions - by Peter P. Yurchak; 312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $3.00; paper cover - $2.00. by Joseph Skultety; 229 SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK HISTORY pages, well documented; hard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover - $1.00. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 62 SLOVAKIA LE'.ITRICH'S REGIME IN .THE LIGHT OF TRUTH Dr. Andrew Dubina In the fall of 1948, the International Peasant Union presented a memorandum concerning the political situation in central and south-eastern Europe to the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is a very interesting document; it has the ,b acking of such personalities as Dr. Macek, Dr. Dimitrov, Mikolejczyk, Ferenc Nagy, Dr. Joseph Cerny and other representatives of the central European nations. The memorandum is replete with figures and statistics that condemn the regimes of so-called "people's" democracies and their representatives. The memorandum also says something about the conditions in 1S lovakia and the Czech lands since the re-establishment of Czecho-Slovakia. There are indications that his part of the memorandum was prepared by the Czech Agrarians: Cerny, Veverka and Klimes. Ironically enough, the memorandum Is a'l:so signed by a smaH so111 of a great father, Fedor Hod.fa, a Czech Slovak ("Czechoslovak"!) Since Czech politicians had a hand in the memorandum, it follows naturally that not everything is mentioned in the memorandum that happened since 1945 in :Slovakia against democracy and human rights. But even what the memorandum does mention about the conditions in :Slovakia since 1945 is a terrible condemnation of the regime in power at that time and its leaders: Lettrich, Hodfa, Ferjencik and their helpers, who today pose as democrats and defenders of democracy in western Europe and America. Behold the kind of democracy that prevailed in Slovakia at a time when Lettrich's regime boasted of representing over 62 per cent of the electorate (J quote from the memorandum): "All human rights were trampled upon since 1945. Nobody was certain of his fundamental right to life and freedom. People were-murdered arbitrarily and prisons were filled with the victims of class justice. "Already in the spring of 1945 the Soviet army of 'libera- SLOVAKIA 63 tio}l' occµpied the eastern _part of _S lovakia. On the basis of the denunciations of local Communists more than 2Q,OOO innocent citizens were arrested and deported to the coal pits in the Donbasse region of the USSR." That is how the memorandum begins and then continues to ~ay that Czecho-Slovakia became "a model police state. Those who refused to become ~bedient tools of the regime were deprived of all functions, if a worse fate did n~t befall them. Every personal opinion, every resistance was brutally suppressed." "The universally recognized differentiation between legislative, executive and judicial powers was done away with. The administrati,ve machine rendered verdicts and confiscated properties. "The parliament - that was never the result of free elections, but was composed on the basis of delegated power of the privileged parties, allowed by the grace of the Communist party - approved all decrees and changes. "The decisions of the courts were influenced by the press and the demands, manifestations and rallies of the masses. "Violence and lawlessness acquired a form of apparent legality. Morale was destroyed; base denunciation was .raised to a civic virtue." Certainly we need not quote further from the memorandum to illustrate the kind of "democracy" introduced into Slovakia and Bohemia by the collaborators with Bolshevisni when they came into power in 1945 :b y the grace of Moscow and the Communist Parties of Czecho-Slovakia. A queer democracy indeed: arbitrary murders, deportations, confiscations, concentration ·camps, gallows and jails for thousands of the best :Slovak people just because they did not agree with the regime and did not want their Slovakia subordinated to ruthless Czecho-bolshevik sovereignty! But the representatives of Lettrich's regime still have the gall to talk about damocracy, pose as defenders of the democratic way of life! What is more, even in emigration they dare denounce the victims of their political revenge and brutality as enemies of democracy! How much spiritual base- 64 SLOVAKIA ness and heartlessness must be necessary to do a thing like that?! We .Slovaks say that a pitcher goes for water only until it is broken. All these "democrats'' - as they did in the past - even now hide themselves ·b ehind the false reputation of Edward Benes. For them he was a model; they wanted to imitate him at home and they want to emulate him even in emigration - though some of them with their intelligence would not stand a chance of becoming squires in the lowliest Slovak village. We know that Dr. Benes talked a lot about democracy and at the same time ordered the deportation of 3,500,000 Germans, the enslavement of 3,000,000 Slovaks, and the hanging of his political opponents. And Benes got away with this kind ,o f "democracy" for a while. Finally, however, his own brand of democracy caught up with him and he himself became a victim of his lies and frauds. He perished miserably, hated by millions of people - the victims of his anti-democratic and anti-Christian policies. And such an end awaits all the Czech and Slovak followers of Dr. Benes. ~or a time they still shall be able to hide behind the mask of defenders of democracy and pose as victims of Bolshevism. However, the time shall come when they shall be unmasked before the whole world. There is a lot of innocent blood on their hands - more than they can hope to wash off in a lifetime. They have overcompromised themselves with Bolshevism and have no right to speak in the name of the nations they have cast into misery and misfortune. Slowly but surely the light of truth is piercing its way through the fog of "Czecho-Slovak" democracy - the handmaid of the "people's" democracy of Moscow. RECOMMENDED BOOKS: THE SLOVAKS - their history and traditions - by Peter P. Yurchak; 312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $3.00; paper cover - $2.00. by Joseph Skultety; 229 SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK HISTORY pages, well documented; hard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover - $1.00.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Lettrich's Regime in the Light of Truth Description An account of the resource Dr. Andrew Dubina Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953 pp. 62-64 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Dubina, Andrew Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1953 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/5871d8288f1bb90993b597c326068fc3.pdf 05e693849668c0259d8504f0a255f049 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 55 SWVAKIA IN THE LIGHT OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS Dr. Andrej Dubina In the documents, read during the Nurem~I'g trials 3lgainst the main ouliprits of Hitl.e r's regime, Slovakia was mentioned several times. The events concerning t!he ;proclamation of SlovaJk indeipendence and the political existence of the Slorvak Reipulblic were s'Ulbjected to the examination olf the representatives of the victorious powers. HO!W did Slorvrukia and her leading po[itical factors fare before the Nuremibe1,g tribunal? mto what kind of a light was the proclamation od: Slcwa.k indeipendence pla:ced, which the regime of the late Dr. Benes regarded as treason, as the cause of the breaJk-'Ulp of Czecho-Slovaikia and punished with the gaHows? In the interesting book that was pUiblished in London in 1946 .b y Peter de Meindelssohn, under the title "The Nuremberg Documents - Some Aspects of German War Policy 1939-1945," we can find a meritorious answer to these questions. That answer completely contraverts the ~ech accusations aJCCording to which leading Sloiva:k factors are Quislings and that the ,p olitics of the Illinlka Slovak People's Party caused the disi:ntegration of Ozechoc-Siorvaikia. On the •b asis of the Documents read before the Nurembe:r,g tribunal, it is crystal clear that Gemnany a:lready in 1936---1937 had wcmked out its "Directive for Unified Pre:paration for War of the Aimed Forces" by the Minister of War Blomiber,g, and that in Seiptemlber 1938 the iillVasion o;f Ozecho-Slovrukia begam to be enacted according to the plan "Case Green." In .t his plan Slovakia and her leading political fig1ures were not even cOilS!idered by the leading German circles, and the Germans did not figure on any heJip from Slovakia, nor did they need it. The ,planned invasion and occupation of Ozecho~ovaikia came to naught with the Munich Pact of the four Great Powers, by which a part of CzechoSiovakia was handed o.v er to the Germans with the consent of the Prague Gorvemment headed by Dr. Benes, and the �56 SLOVAKIA rest of Ozecho-Slovakia came under the direct economical and politi ca1 . deipeindence od: Ge·rmam.y. When Dr. Benes himself w,rote about this pact and its consequences m 1943, he said that it was for Czeicho-lSl:ovaJkia "a frutad blow." We do not meet with Sloivakia and her fa;ctors, especially with Dr . . Tiso, Sidor and Dr. :Durcansky, in the Nuremlberg Do·currnents until March 1939. What was left of Ozecho-iSlOiVaJkia at that time? 'Indeed, qze:cho~Sl()IV'akia was beset UJPOn not only by Germany but -also" the resit of her neighbors and had sucoum'bed to her "fatad_blow," that is, had died, factuany hrud ceased to exist as a state. Peter de Mendelssohn q,uotes the record orf Hitler's office alboot the visit of the president of the autonomous Government of Slovakia to Berlin; Tiso was caliled by Hitler after the Czech a:rmy putsch in Slovaikia (March 10). Aoco.rding to the Nuremberg Documents, quoted by Mendelssohn: "The Czechs" - Hitle1r told Dr. Tiso - "•w ere vioJaiting the Munich a1greement and were . behaving in a proivocath7P manner into:lerruble to Gernnan,y. At Munich, Germany had solved the .C zech question a:ccording to her Weiltanschauung but if "this solution leads to no results., we have decided albsoJutely to ,p ursue it to its conclusion, without consideratipn for his ideological principle." Hitler, however, was not a!Ltogether satisfied even with Silo!Valda. Mendelssohn says: "The attitude orf Slorvakia was also a disappointment to him. In the past year - the record states, - the Ftihrer had to face the difficult deicision whether or not to permit Hungary to occupy Sloivakia. He .had been under a wrong imipre,s sion as he had od' course beilieved that Slovakia wished to be annexed to Hungary. This errorr- was caused by the fact that Slorvaikia was fanther away f11om Germany and by the importance, of the more serious problems which then overshrudorwed this question. It was oinly in the crisis that the Fuhrer was dissuaded from this opinion. It was then that he fir.st heaird and noted that Slovakia wished to co:ndwct her own a;:flfai:rs. "Norw he had pemnitted Minister Tiso to come here in 1 �57 SLOVAKIA order to mruke his position clear in a very short time. Germany had no interests to the east of the Carpathian mountains. It was indifferent to hi:m what ha'Ppened there. The question was whether Slovakia wished to conduct her own affairs or not. He did not wish for anything f.rom Sloiv,a lda. But he wanted to secure final confirmation as to What Slovrukia really wanted. He d,i d not wish that reproaches should come from Hungary that he was preseT1Vinig something which did not wish to be preserved at all. He took a lilbera:l view of unrest and demonstrations in general, but in this connection, unrest was only an outward indication oif internal instability. He would not tolerate it and he had for that reason pernnitted Tiso to come in order to hear his dedsion. It was not a quesrtion of days but of hours. He had stated at the time that if Slovakia wished to rmruke herself independent, he would support this endeavor and even guarantee it. He wouild state by his own iword as lOil!g as Slovakia made it clear that she desired independence. If she hesitated or did not wish to dissolve her con,nection with Prague, he would leave the destiny of S l01vaJkia to the mercy of events for which he was no longer res,p onsible." Hitler then asked Ribbentrop - writes Mendelssohn whether he had anything to add to what he had said. Rib.bentrop repeated that the decision n:ust be made in a few hours and not in seiveral days. "He (Ri'bbentrorp) showed the Fuhrer a message he had just receirved which reported Hungarian troop m01vements on the Slovak frontieirs. The Flihrer read this report, mentioned it to Tiso and exipressed the horpe that Slavwkia wou!id sewn make her decision." 1 That is the end of t:he record concerning Tiso's visit to Beirlin. To properly appreciate the position that Slovakia and her leading political figures faced at the time, it is necessary to quote an additional document. It is the telegram of the Magywr Regent, Nicho[as Hort'hy, sent to Hitler March 3, 1939, which reads as fQ11lows: "Your EXJcellency - my sincere thanks. I can hardly tell you how happy I am because this Head Water Region - I dislike using big words - is of vital importance to the �58 SLOVAKIA life of Hungary. In spite oif the fact that our recnmts have OD!ly been serwing for five wooks, we are going into this affair with eager enthusiasrm. The dispositions ha,ve aJTeady been made. On Thursday, the 16th of this month, a frontier incident will talke pla;ce which win .b e followed by the big !blow on Saturday. I shall never fo11get this proof af friendship, and Your Excellency may rely on my unshak~ able g,r atitude at all times. Your devoted friend - Horthy. " Under the circumstances Slovakia had to choose whether she wanted to be occupied by Germany and Hungary, or whet'herr she wanted to proclaim her independence. Tertium non datur. Independence , after ailil, is the supreme goal oif every nation, and every nation oif the wcrld made, use of the first opportunity that presented itse:lrf to gain independence. Slovakia did not want to be occupied by Hungary or by Germany. What couJd Dr. Tiso and his, colleagues do under the circumstance s? Well, they did not act on their orvvn. They returned to Bratislava and informed the members of the autonomous government of Sl01Vakia rubout what had transpired. Hacha orderred the Slovalk Assembly to convene, and the duly elected representativ es of the SloiVa;k people decided the fate of Sl01Vaikia: they unanimouSily proclaimed the independence of Slovakia. Did the Slovaks do wrong accorrding to the Nuremberg Documents? Oe.rtamly not! In the light of these documents the leaders o,f Slovalk politi:caJ life were justified in doing just what they did. The DocUJmelllts di$prove completely the contentions of Czech propaganda and the so...called "People's Courts" of Dr. Ben€S's State. The Documents further state the stand of Karol Sidor against the methods used .b y the Ger,mans in those hect ic days. Nevertheless, the judiciary of Dr. Ben€S condemned and sentenced to death the main c,reators of the Sl-oivak RepuJblic. Dr. Joseph Tiso died on the gallows, Dr. :Duroansky was sentenced. to die on the gallows in aJbsentia, and Kar01l Sidor was senten~ed to 20 years at harrd lrubor in a!bsentia. Thousands iwon thousands oif othe,r s were jailed and exiled and their properties confiscatec. Slova:k political factors did not betray their nation, but �SLOVAKIA 59 protected it aigainst invasion, occupation and annexation, gas chambers and concentration camps. But for that Benes and his poli1Jcal regime denounced them as traitors. The Sl,ovaks were held responsible foT a situation which they thema situation into which they wetre sellVes had not created thrust alOIIlg with the Czech nation by the aniti-diemocratic, anit-Chri<Sltian, anti-Slovalk and imperialistic policies of the late but not lamented Dr. Edward Benes, the man who sold out the Slovaik and Ozech nations twice within a decade to tota'1itarian powers. • • • CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA BUDATIN The ruins of the Budatin Castle stand opposite 2ilina, just about where the Kysuca pours into the Vah. In its time it stood guard over the J ablunkov Pass and the old commercial highways. Slovak history tells us that the Slovaks, led by Joseph Hurban, fought two battles here during the rebellion of the 1848-1849: the first one September 11, 1848, and the second January 2, 1849. During the latter fight the archives of Budatin, which today undoubtedly could have shed some light on the foggy history of ancient Slovakia, were destroyed by fire. In 1922-23, the lower part of the castle was restored which was adorned with a typical Budatin tower. In the castle there are two spacious rooms, one on the ground floor and the other on the upper floor, which are adorned with numerous pictures, most of them portraits of former owners of the castle. In one of the side rooms is a portrait of Ludmila Lazansky, to whom the Slovaks even today refer to as "our good Ludmila." The people still recall that the mistresses of Budatin Castle treated the Slovaks rather decently and that one of them even had a bridge built across the Vah river at a time when there was no work and people were starving. The rooms of the castle tower are especially interesting, containing as they do many precious antiquities. The view of the river and the vicinity � SLOVAKIA 55 SWVAKIA IN THE LIGHT OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS Dr. Andrej Dubina In the documents, read during the Nurem~I'g trials 3lgainst the main ouliprits of Hitl.e r's regime, Slovakia was mentioned several times. The events concerning t!he ;proclamation of SlovaJk indeipendence and the political existence of the Slorvak Reipulblic were s'Ulbjected to the examination olf the representatives of the victorious powers. HO!W did Slorvrukia and her leading po[itical factors fare before the Nuremibe1,g tribunal? mto what kind of a light was the proclamation od: Slcwa.k indeipendence pla:ced, which the regime of the late Dr. Benes regarded as treason, as the cause of the breaJk-'Ulp of Czecho-Slovaikia and punished with the gaHows? In the interesting book that was pUiblished in London in 1946 .b y Peter de Meindelssohn, under the title "The Nuremberg Documents - Some Aspects of German War Policy 1939-1945," we can find a meritorious answer to these questions. That answer completely contraverts the ~ech accusations aJCCording to which leading Sloiva:k factors are Quislings and that the ,p olitics of the Illinlka Slovak People's Party caused the disi:ntegration of Ozechoc-Siorvaikia. On the •b asis of the Documents read before the Nurembe:r,g tribunal, it is crystal clear that Gemnany a:lready in 1936---1937 had wcmked out its "Directive for Unified Pre:paration for War of the Aimed Forces" by the Minister of War Blomiber,g, and that in Seiptemlber 1938 the iillVasion o;f Ozecho-Slovrukia begam to be enacted according to the plan "Case Green." In .t his plan Slovakia and her leading political fig1ures were not even cOilS!idered by the leading German circles, and the Germans did not figure on any heJip from Slovakia, nor did they need it. The ,planned invasion and occupation of Ozecho~ovaikia came to naught with the Munich Pact of the four Great Powers, by which a part of CzechoSiovakia was handed o.v er to the Germans with the consent of the Prague Gorvemment headed by Dr. Benes, and the �56 SLOVAKIA rest of Ozecho-Slovakia came under the direct economical and politi ca1 . deipeindence od: Ge·rmam.y. When Dr. Benes himself w,rote about this pact and its consequences m 1943, he said that it was for Czeicho-lSl:ovaJkia "a frutad blow." We do not meet with Sloivakia and her fa;ctors, especially with Dr . . Tiso, Sidor and Dr. :Durcansky, in the Nuremlberg Do·currnents until March 1939. What was left of Ozecho-iSlOiVaJkia at that time? 'Indeed, qze:cho~Sl()IV'akia was beset UJPOn not only by Germany but -also" the resit of her neighbors and had sucoum'bed to her "fatad_blow," that is, had died, factuany hrud ceased to exist as a state. Peter de Mendelssohn q,uotes the record orf Hitler's office alboot the visit of the president of the autonomous Government of Slovakia to Berlin; Tiso was caliled by Hitler after the Czech a:rmy putsch in Slovaikia (March 10). Aoco.rding to the Nuremberg Documents, quoted by Mendelssohn: "The Czechs" - Hitle1r told Dr. Tiso - "•w ere vioJaiting the Munich a1greement and were . behaving in a proivocath7P manner into:lerruble to Gernnan,y. At Munich, Germany had solved the .C zech question a:ccording to her Weiltanschauung but if "this solution leads to no results., we have decided albsoJutely to ,p ursue it to its conclusion, without consideratipn for his ideological principle." Hitler, however, was not a!Ltogether satisfied even with Silo!Valda. Mendelssohn says: "The attitude orf Slorvakia was also a disappointment to him. In the past year - the record states, - the Ftihrer had to face the difficult deicision whether or not to permit Hungary to occupy Sloivakia. He .had been under a wrong imipre,s sion as he had od' course beilieved that Slovakia wished to be annexed to Hungary. This errorr- was caused by the fact that Slorvaikia was fanther away f11om Germany and by the importance, of the more serious problems which then overshrudorwed this question. It was oinly in the crisis that the Fuhrer was dissuaded from this opinion. It was then that he fir.st heaird and noted that Slovakia wished to co:ndwct her own a;:flfai:rs. "Norw he had pemnitted Minister Tiso to come here in 1 �57 SLOVAKIA order to mruke his position clear in a very short time. Germany had no interests to the east of the Carpathian mountains. It was indifferent to hi:m what ha'Ppened there. The question was whether Slovakia wished to conduct her own affairs or not. He did not wish for anything f.rom Sloiv,a lda. But he wanted to secure final confirmation as to What Slovrukia really wanted. He d,i d not wish that reproaches should come from Hungary that he was preseT1Vinig something which did not wish to be preserved at all. He took a lilbera:l view of unrest and demonstrations in general, but in this connection, unrest was only an outward indication oif internal instability. He would not tolerate it and he had for that reason pernnitted Tiso to come in order to hear his dedsion. It was not a quesrtion of days but of hours. He had stated at the time that if Slovakia wished to rmruke herself independent, he would support this endeavor and even guarantee it. He wouild state by his own iword as lOil!g as Slovakia made it clear that she desired independence. If she hesitated or did not wish to dissolve her con,nection with Prague, he would leave the destiny of S l01vaJkia to the mercy of events for which he was no longer res,p onsible." Hitler then asked Ribbentrop - writes Mendelssohn whether he had anything to add to what he had said. Rib.bentrop repeated that the decision n:ust be made in a few hours and not in seiveral days. "He (Ri'bbentrorp) showed the Fuhrer a message he had just receirved which reported Hungarian troop m01vements on the Slovak frontieirs. The Flihrer read this report, mentioned it to Tiso and exipressed the horpe that Slavwkia wou!id sewn make her decision." 1 That is the end of t:he record concerning Tiso's visit to Beirlin. To properly appreciate the position that Slovakia and her leading political figures faced at the time, it is necessary to quote an additional document. It is the telegram of the Magywr Regent, Nicho[as Hort'hy, sent to Hitler March 3, 1939, which reads as fQ11lows: "Your EXJcellency - my sincere thanks. I can hardly tell you how happy I am because this Head Water Region - I dislike using big words - is of vital importance to the �58 SLOVAKIA life of Hungary. In spite oif the fact that our recnmts have OD!ly been serwing for five wooks, we are going into this affair with eager enthusiasrm. The dispositions ha,ve aJTeady been made. On Thursday, the 16th of this month, a frontier incident will talke pla;ce which win .b e followed by the big !blow on Saturday. I shall never fo11get this proof af friendship, and Your Excellency may rely on my unshak~ able g,r atitude at all times. Your devoted friend - Horthy. " Under the circumstances Slovakia had to choose whether she wanted to be occupied by Germany and Hungary, or whet'herr she wanted to proclaim her independence. Tertium non datur. Independence , after ailil, is the supreme goal oif every nation, and every nation oif the wcrld made, use of the first opportunity that presented itse:lrf to gain independence. Slovakia did not want to be occupied by Hungary or by Germany. What couJd Dr. Tiso and his, colleagues do under the circumstance s? Well, they did not act on their orvvn. They returned to Bratislava and informed the members of the autonomous government of Sl01Vakia rubout what had transpired. Hacha orderred the Slovalk Assembly to convene, and the duly elected representativ es of the SloiVa;k people decided the fate of Sl01Vaikia: they unanimouSily proclaimed the independence of Slovakia. Did the Slovaks do wrong accorrding to the Nuremberg Documents? Oe.rtamly not! In the light of these documents the leaders o,f Slovalk politi:caJ life were justified in doing just what they did. The DocUJmelllts di$prove completely the contentions of Czech propaganda and the so...called "People's Courts" of Dr. Ben€S's State. The Documents further state the stand of Karol Sidor against the methods used .b y the Ger,mans in those hect ic days. Nevertheless, the judiciary of Dr. Ben€S condemned and sentenced to death the main c,reators of the Sl-oivak RepuJblic. Dr. Joseph Tiso died on the gallows, Dr. :Duroansky was sentenced. to die on the gallows in aJbsentia, and Kar01l Sidor was senten~ed to 20 years at harrd lrubor in a!bsentia. Thousands iwon thousands oif othe,r s were jailed and exiled and their properties confiscatec. Slova:k political factors did not betray their nation, but �SLOVAKIA 59 protected it aigainst invasion, occupation and annexation, gas chambers and concentration camps. But for that Benes and his poli1Jcal regime denounced them as traitors. The Sl,ovaks were held responsible foT a situation which they thema situation into which they wetre sellVes had not created thrust alOIIlg with the Czech nation by the aniti-diemocratic, anit-Chri<Sltian, anti-Slovalk and imperialistic policies of the late but not lamented Dr. Edward Benes, the man who sold out the Slovaik and Ozech nations twice within a decade to tota'1itarian powers. • • • CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA BUDATIN The ruins of the Budatin Castle stand opposite 2ilina, just about where the Kysuca pours into the Vah. In its time it stood guard over the J ablunkov Pass and the old commercial highways. Slovak history tells us that the Slovaks, led by Joseph Hurban, fought two battles here during the rebellion of the 1848-1849: the first one September 11, 1848, and the second January 2, 1849. During the latter fight the archives of Budatin, which today undoubtedly could have shed some light on the foggy history of ancient Slovakia, were destroyed by fire. In 1922-23, the lower part of the castle was restored which was adorned with a typical Budatin tower. In the castle there are two spacious rooms, one on the ground floor and the other on the upper floor, which are adorned with numerous pictures, most of them portraits of former owners of the castle. In one of the side rooms is a portrait of Ludmila Lazansky, to whom the Slovaks even today refer to as "our good Ludmila." The people still recall that the mistresses of Budatin Castle treated the Slovaks rather decently and that one of them even had a bridge built across the Vah river at a time when there was no work and people were starving. The rooms of the castle tower are especially interesting, containing as they do many precious antiquities. The view of the river and the vicinity � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 55 SWVAKIA IN THE LIGHT OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS Dr. Andrej Dubina In the documents, read during the Nurem~I'g trials 3lgainst the main ouliprits of Hitl.e r's regime, Slovakia was mentioned several times. The events concerning t!he ;proclamation of SlovaJk indeipendence and the political existence of the Slorvak Reipulblic were s'Ulbjected to the examination olf the representatives of the victorious powers. HO!W did Slorvrukia and her leading po[itical factors fare before the Nuremibe1,g tribunal? mto what kind of a light was the proclamation od: Slcwa.k indeipendence pla:ced, which the regime of the late Dr. Benes regarded as treason, as the cause of the breaJk-'Ulp of Czecho-Slovaikia and punished with the gaHows? In the interesting book that was pUiblished in London in 1946 .b y Peter de Meindelssohn, under the title "The Nuremberg Documents - Some Aspects of German War Policy 1939-1945," we can find a meritorious answer to these questions. That answer completely contraverts the ~ech accusations aJCCording to which leading Sloiva:k factors are Quislings and that the ,p olitics of the Illinlka Slovak People's Party caused the disi:ntegration of Ozechoc-Siorvaikia. On the •b asis of the Documents read before the Nurembe:r,g tribunal, it is crystal clear that Gemnany a:lready in 1936---1937 had wcmked out its "Directive for Unified Pre:paration for War of the Aimed Forces" by the Minister of War Blomiber,g, and that in Seiptemlber 1938 the iillVasion o;f Ozecho-Slovrukia begam to be enacted according to the plan "Case Green." In .t his plan Slovakia and her leading political fig1ures were not even cOilS!idered by the leading German circles, and the Germans did not figure on any heJip from Slovakia, nor did they need it. The ,planned invasion and occupation of Ozecho~ovaikia came to naught with the Munich Pact of the four Great Powers, by which a part of CzechoSiovakia was handed o.v er to the Germans with the consent of the Prague Gorvemment headed by Dr. Benes, and the 56 SLOVAKIA rest of Ozecho-Slovakia came under the direct economical and politi ca1 . deipeindence od: Ge·rmam.y. When Dr. Benes himself w,rote about this pact and its consequences m 1943, he said that it was for Czeicho-lSl:ovaJkia "a frutad blow." We do not meet with Sloivakia and her fa;ctors, especially with Dr . . Tiso, Sidor and Dr. :Durcansky, in the Nuremlberg Do·currnents until March 1939. What was left of Ozecho-iSlOiVaJkia at that time? 'Indeed, qze:cho~Sl()IV'akia was beset UJPOn not only by Germany but -also" the resit of her neighbors and had sucoum'bed to her "fatad_blow," that is, had died, factuany hrud ceased to exist as a state. Peter de Mendelssohn q,uotes the record orf Hitler's office alboot the visit of the president of the autonomous Government of Slovakia to Berlin; Tiso was caliled by Hitler after the Czech a:rmy putsch in Slovaikia (March 10). Aoco.rding to the Nuremberg Documents, quoted by Mendelssohn: "The Czechs" - Hitle1r told Dr. Tiso - "•w ere vioJaiting the Munich a1greement and were . behaving in a proivocath7P manner into:lerruble to Gernnan,y. At Munich, Germany had solved the .C zech question a:ccording to her Weiltanschauung but if "this solution leads to no results., we have decided albsoJutely to ,p ursue it to its conclusion, without consideratipn for his ideological principle." Hitler, however, was not a!Ltogether satisfied even with Silo!Valda. Mendelssohn says: "The attitude orf Slorvakia was also a disappointment to him. In the past year - the record states, - the Ftihrer had to face the difficult deicision whether or not to permit Hungary to occupy Sloivakia. He .had been under a wrong imipre,s sion as he had od' course beilieved that Slovakia wished to be annexed to Hungary. This errorr- was caused by the fact that Slorvaikia was fanther away f11om Germany and by the importance, of the more serious problems which then overshrudorwed this question. It was oinly in the crisis that the Fuhrer was dissuaded from this opinion. It was then that he fir.st heaird and noted that Slovakia wished to co:ndwct her own a;:flfai:rs. "Norw he had pemnitted Minister Tiso to come here in 1 57 SLOVAKIA order to mruke his position clear in a very short time. Germany had no interests to the east of the Carpathian mountains. It was indifferent to hi:m what ha'Ppened there. The question was whether Slovakia wished to conduct her own affairs or not. He did not wish for anything f.rom Sloiv,a lda. But he wanted to secure final confirmation as to What Slovrukia really wanted. He d,i d not wish that reproaches should come from Hungary that he was preseT1Vinig something which did not wish to be preserved at all. He took a lilbera:l view of unrest and demonstrations in general, but in this connection, unrest was only an outward indication oif internal instability. He would not tolerate it and he had for that reason pernnitted Tiso to come in order to hear his dedsion. It was not a quesrtion of days but of hours. He had stated at the time that if Slovakia wished to rmruke herself independent, he would support this endeavor and even guarantee it. He wouild state by his own iword as lOil!g as Slovakia made it clear that she desired independence. If she hesitated or did not wish to dissolve her con,nection with Prague, he would leave the destiny of S l01vaJkia to the mercy of events for which he was no longer res,p onsible." Hitler then asked Ribbentrop - writes Mendelssohn whether he had anything to add to what he had said. Rib.bentrop repeated that the decision n:ust be made in a few hours and not in seiveral days. "He (Ri'bbentrorp) showed the Fuhrer a message he had just receirved which reported Hungarian troop m01vements on the Slovak frontieirs. The Flihrer read this report, mentioned it to Tiso and exipressed the horpe that Slavwkia wou!id sewn make her decision." 1 That is the end of t:he record concerning Tiso's visit to Beirlin. To properly appreciate the position that Slovakia and her leading political figures faced at the time, it is necessary to quote an additional document. It is the telegram of the Magywr Regent, Nicho[as Hort'hy, sent to Hitler March 3, 1939, which reads as fQ11lows: "Your EXJcellency - my sincere thanks. I can hardly tell you how happy I am because this Head Water Region - I dislike using big words - is of vital importance to the 58 SLOVAKIA life of Hungary. In spite oif the fact that our recnmts have OD!ly been serwing for five wooks, we are going into this affair with eager enthusiasrm. The dispositions ha,ve aJTeady been made. On Thursday, the 16th of this month, a frontier incident will talke pla;ce which win .b e followed by the big !blow on Saturday. I shall never fo11get this proof af friendship, and Your Excellency may rely on my unshak~ able g,r atitude at all times. Your devoted friend - Horthy. " Under the circumstances Slovakia had to choose whether she wanted to be occupied by Germany and Hungary, or whet'herr she wanted to proclaim her independence. Tertium non datur. Independence , after ailil, is the supreme goal oif every nation, and every nation oif the wcrld made, use of the first opportunity that presented itse:lrf to gain independence. Slovakia did not want to be occupied by Hungary or by Germany. What couJd Dr. Tiso and his, colleagues do under the circumstance s? Well, they did not act on their orvvn. They returned to Bratislava and informed the members of the autonomous government of Sl01Vakia rubout what had transpired. Hacha orderred the Slovalk Assembly to convene, and the duly elected representativ es of the SloiVa;k people decided the fate of Sl01Vaikia: they unanimouSily proclaimed the independence of Slovakia. Did the Slovaks do wrong accorrding to the Nuremberg Documents? Oe.rtamly not! In the light of these documents the leaders o,f Slovalk politi:caJ life were justified in doing just what they did. The DocUJmelllts di$prove completely the contentions of Czech propaganda and the so...called "People's Courts" of Dr. Ben€S's State. The Documents further state the stand of Karol Sidor against the methods used .b y the Ger,mans in those hect ic days. Nevertheless, the judiciary of Dr. Ben€S condemned and sentenced to death the main c,reators of the Sl-oivak RepuJblic. Dr. Joseph Tiso died on the gallows, Dr. :Duroansky was sentenced. to die on the gallows in aJbsentia, and Kar01l Sidor was senten~ed to 20 years at harrd lrubor in a!bsentia. Thousands iwon thousands oif othe,r s were jailed and exiled and their properties confiscatec. Slova:k political factors did not betray their nation, but SLOVAKIA 59 protected it aigainst invasion, occupation and annexation, gas chambers and concentration camps. But for that Benes and his poli1Jcal regime denounced them as traitors. The Sl,ovaks were held responsible foT a situation which they thema situation into which they wetre sellVes had not created thrust alOIIlg with the Czech nation by the aniti-diemocratic, anit-Chri<Sltian, anti-Slovalk and imperialistic policies of the late but not lamented Dr. Edward Benes, the man who sold out the Slovaik and Ozech nations twice within a decade to tota'1itarian powers. • • • CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA BUDATIN The ruins of the Budatin Castle stand opposite 2ilina, just about where the Kysuca pours into the Vah. In its time it stood guard over the J ablunkov Pass and the old commercial highways. Slovak history tells us that the Slovaks, led by Joseph Hurban, fought two battles here during the rebellion of the 1848-1849: the first one September 11, 1848, and the second January 2, 1849. During the latter fight the archives of Budatin, which today undoubtedly could have shed some light on the foggy history of ancient Slovakia, were destroyed by fire. In 1922-23, the lower part of the castle was restored which was adorned with a typical Budatin tower. In the castle there are two spacious rooms, one on the ground floor and the other on the upper floor, which are adorned with numerous pictures, most of them portraits of former owners of the castle. In one of the side rooms is a portrait of Ludmila Lazansky, to whom the Slovaks even today refer to as "our good Ludmila." The people still recall that the mistresses of Budatin Castle treated the Slovaks rather decently and that one of them even had a bridge built across the Vah river at a time when there was no work and people were starving. The rooms of the castle tower are especially interesting, containing as they do many precious antiquities. The view of the river and the vicinity  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovakia in the Light of the Nuremberg Trials Description An account of the resource Dr. Andrej Dubina Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953 pp. 55-59 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Dubina, Andrew Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1953 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/761361c5f6afeaf3ae1ee90f14ad507b.pdf 7512a9c9e50f4c3d9f0f6d1232487783 PDF Text Text 22 SLOVAK.IA SWVA'KIA AND THE WEST Dr. Andrew Dubina The western world k1I1Jorw,s Ia.,tt1e rubout Slo;Viakia. What has been puljjlislied has been ,preipa;red; by :f:hreig;n~rs or the propaganda rupparatu:s, of Pra gue, whic'h for olbwou!s reas,ons could not .present the tr.uth a/bout Slo;va1ki:a an:d the Slovaks. 'I1he strug,gle Olf the SiklfVak,s fo,r their national rights in Hungary wa;s ,p resented to the world by the Ma;gy,ars as a Panslavistic corrspiirrucy with Tsarist Russia. Since the Slovruks continued to. fight for national rights eiven in icentralistic O,zeclho~rnovrukiia, the Ozeclhs in the pay of Benes a;nd Prague exiplained that this fight wa.rs simply the :;i.ictirvity oif a few un:riuly, i!Iltolerant auttonomists and sepruratists, \VhO were saturnted with. Hungiairiianism and, the:rm._9r~, had to b,e sile1n:ced in the interest of "Czechoslovak" democracy. Finally, becruuse of the relationship of the Slovak Reipulblic wl1:h Germany durfog the Second World War, the same Benes Ozeclhs today smear all Slovak ,patriots, even those .who held insigni.!ficant State jolbs, as fascists. Now, the avera;ge Ameriican citizen, who has practicaMy no knowledge of the real 1problems. oif the central European nations, what does he think ~bout the Slorvruks. a;fte:r being exposed to suclh a flood of misinformation about them? What, can he .possilbly thinik aJbout a nation that is once '.lrubcled "pa.nsbavh;itilc," tlhen "a!Ilti-™'.a;g;yair" and · "anti.Czech," and fi'll!ahly a:s "Ge:rimanoplhi[e" and "against the al1.ies"? Surely, he wiH thinlk tha;t the :Slo;vaks as a friivolous and :iirrespons~ble nation in central :IDuro:pe. He is not awaire of th~ fact that these ~ithets aire used pur,posely to sy,m,plify the whole prolblem and, therefore, they must be taken in a manner warranted by the situation, that is as pro:paganda slogans .o f a certain phase o.f the struggle whiclh was gradua;lly wruged between the Czechs and the Magyars, or the Ge,:rimans and the Russia,n s, for domination 01Ver the Sfo;vaks during the past fifty years It wa:s oruy natural that in the second half of the nineteen th century, when Euroipe was uruconcerned about the SlovaJk prolblem, the Slo1Vaks looked towwd Russia, to the 1 �23 SLOVAKIA famous Russian writers, expooting at least inSlpiration, if not material help. But so did the Cze:chs and othex Slo.V'anic nations at that time. This, of course, fr:ritaJteld the Magyacrs. Not that they were really ' afraid of "Pans,lavti.~," but because.they feared the Slovak national idea, Sl01vak nationahsm, whiicih hindered them from suicces,sfU!lly cOIIIl.pleting the chanige-0iver of a nationailistic Hungary into a Magyar national state. Panskwism, t!herefore, was the bogey with whiclh the Magyars endeavored to justify themselves in the eyes of Eurorpe for their unjust treatment of Slovruk. patriots. When the Magyars "lost" the Silorvaks in 1918 with the creation of Oze:cho-Slorvakia, and the Czechs be,g an to rule over Slovakia, it did not truke the Pr,a gue gorve:rnment lotfg to lab.el the Slovruk s "Magyarones," because the Slovaks made claim to tlhe right of se[f-determiOOJtion and insisted that T. G. Masaryk's gorvernment validate the PittsblllI"gh Pact of May 30, 1918, which guaranteed the la.ind of the Slo¥a!ks · autonomy. In SloJVlalkia at that time, outside of a few i.n:diyidua:is, thexe were no pofitical forces tending toward Budapest. But that did not matter to the Czech poHtidans in .pe>vver, Tihey had to have some excuse for insitalling Benes's· "po:lirce" deimoomcy in SlovaJkia by :pas.s.ir11g a la;w f~r ~he ",prote:ction" of the Republic. As studenits we lea-med that tlhe city of -Sparta was not enclosed by wahls, but that it was, nevertheil ess, well protected by the harmony of its citizens. Well, what Sparta did could not be a;ccomrpiished by Benes's ~ooho~Slorvwkia, because it la·clked harmony among its citizens. The Gzech MaLffit wa;s not concerned aJbo.ut the weilfare of the Reipuiblic, but o,nly aJbout the realization of the aims of political Pancze'ehism. Czech politics, just lilke the "iBlac:k Hand" of greater Se11bia before Wo!I'ld WaT I, was. guided by the slogan: "Unity OT death!" Of course, tJhis policy only divided the .newly created state• into Czechs and non.Czechs; - into the governing and the gorverned. So that the state cquld be kept together fhmJy, Benes needed eX!C'~tionaI laws and vadous swbtle, outside "walls" to. support his i;tate. And these were his allianices, pacts, and agireements; they' weire 1 1 �24 SLOVAKIA SlJ!PPOsed to "guarantee" the Hite of the state from stem to stem., f:rom the East to. the West. While study;i,ng physics•, we learned of the existence of a laiw which states that to every- ruction there is an equal a:nd oppoo.ite rea;otion. lit seems that Benes forgot about this laiw, orr prolbably newer studied physd.lCS. The more pressure Prague exeit.ed on the Sloiva.k,s to make them forrget they were .Sl01V1aks, the more the Siova:~s became a.ware Olf the fa.ct that they were Slovaks, an individual ethnic entity, and the more tlhey resisted the attempt orf Czech Prague to make them one with the Oze.ch nation. Naitionai so.Iidariitly bloomed among the SlOIVaks. This did not eSIC3JPe the a;ttention of the outside world. When Slovruks voiced themsewes aJbout the matter in the foreirg n press (England, tJhe Unirted States allld Can.a da), Benes oonnilngly ~lained that such expressi'Ons were made, 'iby the "local opposition" of the People's Pa;rty. "Why opposition belongs to tlhe suJbstance of demooracy," Benes explained cynkaUy. FOil" him Slava!kia always wais only "an internal problem of the RepuJblic," that is a prO!bJem whilch the Czechs were detemnined to resolve at ·some time in the name of power preponderrance. The meaniD!g of true democracy was pei,verted by Beto fit his braJnd, that is "Ozechoslovaik" demooracy, which meant the complete sulbjugation a.ind, finali)I', the utter extinction of the Slov:ruk nation. Natura1ly it was opposed by aM trrue .Slovruks. If democracy is a "daily pletbi.Sictte" within the framework of a state, then the right of self-determination of .nations meruns a permanent and Ult1Silenooalble plebiscite of the nations on the, rood to world democracy. One can see the meaning of political development in the world not in the pr®ltection od: definite historical state :fornls or certain nulmg oligarehies, but only in tJhe endreaivor for a greater rreedom af nations and individuals. nes Today the Slov,aJks in the free world are working for the international :recognition of their right to self-determination. The nUJcleus, which can be ;pludkeld from thi,s genera:l prin'c iple by logical reas001iing, is tJhe cl-airm to one's olWJl. national government, to one's own state. That is the aim whilc h is the motive of activity of the Slovaks in exile in the free world. �SLOVAKIA 25 While Louis Stur and Stephen Marko DaXiner limited their demands for national rights to the most fundraimentall ones - the rj,gbJt to lirve, the right to one's oiwn territory, to their own national tongue, tlheir own naitionail culture, their own government o.ver theiir o·wn destiny, etc. - the present Slovruk generation, which is no longer burdened spi<ritually with any sort of '"Hungariianisan" or "Miagyaronism" or even by that complex oif political inferiority knorwn as "Czechosloivaiki;s m," deri<ves its ooncl'l.l!sions froon a:ll premises which weire foI1IX1ulated by previous generations and demands foothe Slova!k IIJaJbion, in the name of order and democracy in central ffiuroipe, the right to its own gowemment, to 1ts own state. But it does not do so in the name oif oveI'lly erudite and more or less polemical theories - sucih as is, for example, the legal conrtiniuity of the Slovak RepuJblic - but in the name of the princi1)les oif equality orf al•l natio!IlS, that is, in the name of the principle whicll not onil y UIIliversity professora, but every person in the wo:rild can :rea.di1y understamd, and the ,p rinciple whlch is so clearly exipressed in the American DeclaratiOIIl of Independence,. to wit : "We hold tlhese truths to be selrf-evident, that all men are created equa;l, that they are endowed ·b y their Creatoc with certain unalienruble Rj,g,hts, that among these are Life, Lilberty and the ipl.ll'suit of Happiness. That t.o secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People t.o alt.er or to abolish it, and institute new Government, laying its foundations on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness." Jn this paraigrrup'h is exipresserl the uruversal principle of world dem.01Cracy. These words are the goopel of the oppressed naJtions. They condemn whatever fonn oif interna.tionail feud:a1ism and stress the rigiht of oppressed nations t o fight foT theiir life and freedmn. The Slovaks, too, see in t his paragraph of the Ameri10an Declaration oif Independence t heir strongest argument for a place on the map oif Europe, �26 SLOVAKIA for the recognition of their right to national existence. The Slova!k nation demrunds nothing more: Of course, it may ibe said thaJt no western democracies deny that right to the Slowik people. They recogru:ze it and ,r espect it, we are told, 'but validating it is another question. The Slo:vruks, it seems, are not strOillg enough physically to force their just demands, so the western world pa:ys no heed to them. On the other hand, however, the greatest statesmen oif the West haJVe told us r eipeatedly that there r eally was no argument that could not be settled without the use of ·p hysical or amned force. The United Nations Organization aaso sulbscri!bes to this. So, might does not necessarily mean right, we are led to ·believe. But, then, what stands in the way of Slovruk freedom and i:ndependen:ce, the aipplication m the right of self-deter:mination in the caise of the Slov,aJk nation? Why then does the West recognize the . proponents of the old "Czechoslova:k" school, the followers of Benes, who still claim tfue rrght to determine the destiny of the Slovruk nation? It is high time that the democratic West relegated the "Czechoslo:va!k" pseudodemoc rats to the poHtical rubish hoop. The damage they have done in thirty years will not be repaired in the next hundred years, if the West persists in taking adJv,k e from them . • • • WHO SAID IT? "President Benes was always of the opinion, and in his latest statements ailwa;ys stressed, 1:lhrut OUT pam of alliance with So:viet Russia and our friendshiip with other S~av nations must not encrooch on OUT friendly and cordiail relations with other democratic states. This is the natuiral deske, shared iby an enormous majority of ()IUr people, and nothing .p revents UIS from keeping the comidence of the democratic states and strerugthening and deepening our friendship with our great western Allies. Moscow, · too, wan/ts tio ful[o;w this line of polircy. rt willl, h01Wever, be necessary for certain prej'l.l(Eces of the West with regard to the Soviet Union, which are stiU existing, to be swept away." - Premier Fierlinger o:f Czercho-,Slovakia, OW1I Bulletin, June 1, 1945. � 22 SLOVAK.IA SWVA'KIA AND THE WEST Dr. Andrew Dubina The western world k1I1Jorw,s Ia.,tt1e rubout Slo;Viakia. What has been puljjlislied has been ,preipa;red; by :f:hreig;n~rs or the propaganda rupparatu:s, of Pra gue, whic'h for olbwou!s reas,ons could not .present the tr.uth a/bout Slo;va1ki:a an:d the Slovaks. 'I1he strug,gle Olf the SiklfVak,s fo,r their national rights in Hungary wa;s ,p resented to the world by the Ma;gy,ars as a Panslavistic corrspiirrucy with Tsarist Russia. Since the Slovruks continued to. fight for national rights eiven in icentralistic O,zeclho~rnovrukiia, the Ozeclhs in the pay of Benes a;nd Prague exiplained that this fight wa.rs simply the :;i.ictirvity oif a few un:riuly, i!Iltolerant auttonomists and sepruratists, \VhO were saturnted with. Hungiairiianism and, the:rm._9r~, had to b,e sile1n:ced in the interest of "Czechoslovak" democracy. Finally, becruuse of the relationship of the Slovak Reipulblic wl1:h Germany durfog the Second World War, the same Benes Ozeclhs today smear all Slovak ,patriots, even those .who held insigni.!ficant State jolbs, as fascists. Now, the avera;ge Ameriican citizen, who has practicaMy no knowledge of the real 1problems. oif the central European nations, what does he think ~bout the Slorvruks. a;fte:r being exposed to suclh a flood of misinformation about them? What, can he .possilbly thinik aJbout a nation that is once '.lrubcled "pa.nsbavh;itilc," tlhen "a!Ilti-™'.a;g;yair" and · "anti.Czech," and fi'll!ahly a:s "Ge:rimanoplhi[e" and "against the al1.ies"? Surely, he wiH thinlk tha;t the :Slo;vaks as a friivolous and :iirrespons~ble nation in central :IDuro:pe. He is not awaire of th~ fact that these ~ithets aire used pur,posely to sy,m,plify the whole prolblem and, therefore, they must be taken in a manner warranted by the situation, that is as pro:paganda slogans .o f a certain phase o.f the struggle whiclh was gradua;lly wruged between the Czechs and the Magyars, or the Ge,:rimans and the Russia,n s, for domination 01Ver the Sfo;vaks during the past fifty years It wa:s oruy natural that in the second half of the nineteen th century, when Euroipe was uruconcerned about the SlovaJk prolblem, the Slo1Vaks looked towwd Russia, to the 1 �23 SLOVAKIA famous Russian writers, expooting at least inSlpiration, if not material help. But so did the Cze:chs and othex Slo.V'anic nations at that time. This, of course, fr:ritaJteld the Magyacrs. Not that they were really ' afraid of "Pans,lavti.~," but because.they feared the Slovak national idea, Sl01vak nationahsm, whiicih hindered them from suicces,sfU!lly cOIIIl.pleting the chanige-0iver of a nationailistic Hungary into a Magyar national state. Panskwism, t!herefore, was the bogey with whiclh the Magyars endeavored to justify themselves in the eyes of Eurorpe for their unjust treatment of Slovruk. patriots. When the Magyars "lost" the Silorvaks in 1918 with the creation of Oze:cho-Slorvakia, and the Czechs be,g an to rule over Slovakia, it did not truke the Pr,a gue gorve:rnment lotfg to lab.el the Slovruk s "Magyarones," because the Slovaks made claim to tlhe right of se[f-determiOOJtion and insisted that T. G. Masaryk's gorvernment validate the PittsblllI"gh Pact of May 30, 1918, which guaranteed the la.ind of the Slo¥a!ks · autonomy. In SloJVlalkia at that time, outside of a few i.n:diyidua:is, thexe were no pofitical forces tending toward Budapest. But that did not matter to the Czech poHtidans in .pe>vver, Tihey had to have some excuse for insitalling Benes's· "po:lirce" deimoomcy in SlovaJkia by :pas.s.ir11g a la;w f~r ~he ",prote:ction" of the Republic. As studenits we lea-med that tlhe city of -Sparta was not enclosed by wahls, but that it was, nevertheil ess, well protected by the harmony of its citizens. Well, what Sparta did could not be a;ccomrpiished by Benes's ~ooho~Slorvwkia, because it la·clked harmony among its citizens. The Gzech MaLffit wa;s not concerned aJbo.ut the weilfare of the Reipuiblic, but o,nly aJbout the realization of the aims of political Pancze'ehism. Czech politics, just lilke the "iBlac:k Hand" of greater Se11bia before Wo!I'ld WaT I, was. guided by the slogan: "Unity OT death!" Of course, tJhis policy only divided the .newly created state• into Czechs and non.Czechs; - into the governing and the gorverned. So that the state cquld be kept together fhmJy, Benes needed eX!C'~tionaI laws and vadous swbtle, outside "walls" to. support his i;tate. And these were his allianices, pacts, and agireements; they' weire 1 1 �24 SLOVAKIA SlJ!PPOsed to "guarantee" the Hite of the state from stem to stem., f:rom the East to. the West. While study;i,ng physics•, we learned of the existence of a laiw which states that to every- ruction there is an equal a:nd oppoo.ite rea;otion. lit seems that Benes forgot about this laiw, orr prolbably newer studied physd.lCS. The more pressure Prague exeit.ed on the Sloiva.k,s to make them forrget they were .Sl01V1aks, the more the Siova:~s became a.ware Olf the fa.ct that they were Slovaks, an individual ethnic entity, and the more tlhey resisted the attempt orf Czech Prague to make them one with the Oze.ch nation. Naitionai so.Iidariitly bloomed among the SlOIVaks. This did not eSIC3JPe the a;ttention of the outside world. When Slovruks voiced themsewes aJbout the matter in the foreirg n press (England, tJhe Unirted States allld Can.a da), Benes oonnilngly ~lained that such expressi'Ons were made, 'iby the "local opposition" of the People's Pa;rty. "Why opposition belongs to tlhe suJbstance of demooracy," Benes explained cynkaUy. FOil" him Slava!kia always wais only "an internal problem of the RepuJblic," that is a prO!bJem whilch the Czechs were detemnined to resolve at ·some time in the name of power preponderrance. The meaniD!g of true democracy was pei,verted by Beto fit his braJnd, that is "Ozechoslovaik" demooracy, which meant the complete sulbjugation a.ind, finali)I', the utter extinction of the Slov:ruk nation. Natura1ly it was opposed by aM trrue .Slovruks. If democracy is a "daily pletbi.Sictte" within the framework of a state, then the right of self-determination of .nations meruns a permanent and Ult1Silenooalble plebiscite of the nations on the, rood to world democracy. One can see the meaning of political development in the world not in the pr®ltection od: definite historical state :fornls or certain nulmg oligarehies, but only in tJhe endreaivor for a greater rreedom af nations and individuals. nes Today the Slov,aJks in the free world are working for the international :recognition of their right to self-determination. The nUJcleus, which can be ;pludkeld from thi,s genera:l prin'c iple by logical reas001iing, is tJhe cl-airm to one's olWJl. national government, to one's own state. That is the aim whilc h is the motive of activity of the Slovaks in exile in the free world. �SLOVAKIA 25 While Louis Stur and Stephen Marko DaXiner limited their demands for national rights to the most fundraimentall ones - the rj,gbJt to lirve, the right to one's oiwn territory, to their own national tongue, tlheir own naitionail culture, their own government o.ver theiir o·wn destiny, etc. - the present Slovruk generation, which is no longer burdened spi<ritually with any sort of '"Hungariianisan" or "Miagyaronism" or even by that complex oif political inferiority knorwn as "Czechosloivaiki;s m," deri<ves its ooncl'l.l!sions froon a:ll premises which weire foI1IX1ulated by previous generations and demands foothe Slova!k IIJaJbion, in the name of order and democracy in central ffiuroipe, the right to its own gowemment, to 1ts own state. But it does not do so in the name oif oveI'lly erudite and more or less polemical theories - sucih as is, for example, the legal conrtiniuity of the Slovak RepuJblic - but in the name of the princi1)les oif equality orf al•l natio!IlS, that is, in the name of the principle whicll not onil y UIIliversity professora, but every person in the wo:rild can :rea.di1y understamd, and the ,p rinciple whlch is so clearly exipressed in the American DeclaratiOIIl of Independence,. to wit : "We hold tlhese truths to be selrf-evident, that all men are created equa;l, that they are endowed ·b y their Creatoc with certain unalienruble Rj,g,hts, that among these are Life, Lilberty and the ipl.ll'suit of Happiness. That t.o secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People t.o alt.er or to abolish it, and institute new Government, laying its foundations on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness." Jn this paraigrrup'h is exipresserl the uruversal principle of world dem.01Cracy. These words are the goopel of the oppressed naJtions. They condemn whatever fonn oif interna.tionail feud:a1ism and stress the rigiht of oppressed nations t o fight foT theiir life and freedmn. The Slovaks, too, see in t his paragraph of the Ameri10an Declaration oif Independence t heir strongest argument for a place on the map oif Europe, �26 SLOVAKIA for the recognition of their right to national existence. The Slova!k nation demrunds nothing more: Of course, it may ibe said thaJt no western democracies deny that right to the Slowik people. They recogru:ze it and ,r espect it, we are told, 'but validating it is another question. The Slo:vruks, it seems, are not strOillg enough physically to force their just demands, so the western world pa:ys no heed to them. On the other hand, however, the greatest statesmen oif the West haJVe told us r eipeatedly that there r eally was no argument that could not be settled without the use of ·p hysical or amned force. The United Nations Organization aaso sulbscri!bes to this. So, might does not necessarily mean right, we are led to ·believe. But, then, what stands in the way of Slovruk freedom and i:ndependen:ce, the aipplication m the right of self-deter:mination in the caise of the Slov,aJk nation? Why then does the West recognize the . proponents of the old "Czechoslova:k" school, the followers of Benes, who still claim tfue rrght to determine the destiny of the Slovruk nation? It is high time that the democratic West relegated the "Czechoslo:va!k" pseudodemoc rats to the poHtical rubish hoop. The damage they have done in thirty years will not be repaired in the next hundred years, if the West persists in taking adJv,k e from them . • • • WHO SAID IT? "President Benes was always of the opinion, and in his latest statements ailwa;ys stressed, 1:lhrut OUT pam of alliance with So:viet Russia and our friendshiip with other S~av nations must not encrooch on OUT friendly and cordiail relations with other democratic states. This is the natuiral deske, shared iby an enormous majority of ()IUr people, and nothing .p revents UIS from keeping the comidence of the democratic states and strerugthening and deepening our friendship with our great western Allies. Moscow, · too, wan/ts tio ful[o;w this line of polircy. rt willl, h01Wever, be necessary for certain prej'l.l(Eces of the West with regard to the Soviet Union, which are stiU existing, to be swept away." - Premier Fierlinger o:f Czercho-,Slovakia, OW1I Bulletin, June 1, 1945. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 22 SLOVAK.IA SWVA'KIA AND THE WEST Dr. Andrew Dubina The western world k1I1Jorw,s Ia.,tt1e rubout Slo;Viakia. What has been puljjlislied has been ,preipa;red; by :f:hreig;n~rs or the propaganda rupparatu:s, of Pra gue, whic'h for olbwou!s reas,ons could not .present the tr.uth a/bout Slo;va1ki:a an:d the Slovaks. 'I1he strug,gle Olf the SiklfVak,s fo,r their national rights in Hungary wa;s ,p resented to the world by the Ma;gy,ars as a Panslavistic corrspiirrucy with Tsarist Russia. Since the Slovruks continued to. fight for national rights eiven in icentralistic O,zeclho~rnovrukiia, the Ozeclhs in the pay of Benes a;nd Prague exiplained that this fight wa.rs simply the :;i.ictirvity oif a few un:riuly, i!Iltolerant auttonomists and sepruratists, \VhO were saturnted with. Hungiairiianism and, the:rm._9r~, had to b,e sile1n:ced in the interest of "Czechoslovak" democracy. Finally, becruuse of the relationship of the Slovak Reipulblic wl1:h Germany durfog the Second World War, the same Benes Ozeclhs today smear all Slovak ,patriots, even those .who held insigni.!ficant State jolbs, as fascists. Now, the avera;ge Ameriican citizen, who has practicaMy no knowledge of the real 1problems. oif the central European nations, what does he think ~bout the Slorvruks. a;fte:r being exposed to suclh a flood of misinformation about them? What, can he .possilbly thinik aJbout a nation that is once '.lrubcled "pa.nsbavh;itilc," tlhen "a!Ilti-™'.a;g;yair" and · "anti.Czech," and fi'll!ahly a:s "Ge:rimanoplhi[e" and "against the al1.ies"? Surely, he wiH thinlk tha;t the :Slo;vaks as a friivolous and :iirrespons~ble nation in central :IDuro:pe. He is not awaire of th~ fact that these ~ithets aire used pur,posely to sy,m,plify the whole prolblem and, therefore, they must be taken in a manner warranted by the situation, that is as pro:paganda slogans .o f a certain phase o.f the struggle whiclh was gradua;lly wruged between the Czechs and the Magyars, or the Ge,:rimans and the Russia,n s, for domination 01Ver the Sfo;vaks during the past fifty years It wa:s oruy natural that in the second half of the nineteen th century, when Euroipe was uruconcerned about the SlovaJk prolblem, the Slo1Vaks looked towwd Russia, to the 1 23 SLOVAKIA famous Russian writers, expooting at least inSlpiration, if not material help. But so did the Cze:chs and othex Slo.V'anic nations at that time. This, of course, fr:ritaJteld the Magyacrs. Not that they were really ' afraid of "Pans,lavti.~," but because.they feared the Slovak national idea, Sl01vak nationahsm, whiicih hindered them from suicces,sfU!lly cOIIIl.pleting the chanige-0iver of a nationailistic Hungary into a Magyar national state. Panskwism, t!herefore, was the bogey with whiclh the Magyars endeavored to justify themselves in the eyes of Eurorpe for their unjust treatment of Slovruk. patriots. When the Magyars "lost" the Silorvaks in 1918 with the creation of Oze:cho-Slorvakia, and the Czechs be,g an to rule over Slovakia, it did not truke the Pr,a gue gorve:rnment lotfg to lab.el the Slovruk s "Magyarones," because the Slovaks made claim to tlhe right of se[f-determiOOJtion and insisted that T. G. Masaryk's gorvernment validate the PittsblllI"gh Pact of May 30, 1918, which guaranteed the la.ind of the Slo¥a!ks · autonomy. In SloJVlalkia at that time, outside of a few i.n:diyidua:is, thexe were no pofitical forces tending toward Budapest. But that did not matter to the Czech poHtidans in .pe>vver, Tihey had to have some excuse for insitalling Benes's· "po:lirce" deimoomcy in SlovaJkia by :pas.s.ir11g a la;w f~r ~he ",prote:ction" of the Republic. As studenits we lea-med that tlhe city of -Sparta was not enclosed by wahls, but that it was, nevertheil ess, well protected by the harmony of its citizens. Well, what Sparta did could not be a;ccomrpiished by Benes's ~ooho~Slorvwkia, because it la·clked harmony among its citizens. The Gzech MaLffit wa;s not concerned aJbo.ut the weilfare of the Reipuiblic, but o,nly aJbout the realization of the aims of political Pancze'ehism. Czech politics, just lilke the "iBlac:k Hand" of greater Se11bia before Wo!I'ld WaT I, was. guided by the slogan: "Unity OT death!" Of course, tJhis policy only divided the .newly created state• into Czechs and non.Czechs; - into the governing and the gorverned. So that the state cquld be kept together fhmJy, Benes needed eX!C'~tionaI laws and vadous swbtle, outside "walls" to. support his i;tate. And these were his allianices, pacts, and agireements; they' weire 1 1 24 SLOVAKIA SlJ!PPOsed to "guarantee" the Hite of the state from stem to stem., f:rom the East to. the West. While study;i,ng physics•, we learned of the existence of a laiw which states that to every- ruction there is an equal a:nd oppoo.ite rea;otion. lit seems that Benes forgot about this laiw, orr prolbably newer studied physd.lCS. The more pressure Prague exeit.ed on the Sloiva.k,s to make them forrget they were .Sl01V1aks, the more the Siova:~s became a.ware Olf the fa.ct that they were Slovaks, an individual ethnic entity, and the more tlhey resisted the attempt orf Czech Prague to make them one with the Oze.ch nation. Naitionai so.Iidariitly bloomed among the SlOIVaks. This did not eSIC3JPe the a;ttention of the outside world. When Slovruks voiced themsewes aJbout the matter in the foreirg n press (England, tJhe Unirted States allld Can.a da), Benes oonnilngly ~lained that such expressi'Ons were made, 'iby the "local opposition" of the People's Pa;rty. "Why opposition belongs to tlhe suJbstance of demooracy," Benes explained cynkaUy. FOil" him Slava!kia always wais only "an internal problem of the RepuJblic," that is a prO!bJem whilch the Czechs were detemnined to resolve at ·some time in the name of power preponderrance. The meaniD!g of true democracy was pei,verted by Beto fit his braJnd, that is "Ozechoslovaik" demooracy, which meant the complete sulbjugation a.ind, finali)I', the utter extinction of the Slov:ruk nation. Natura1ly it was opposed by aM trrue .Slovruks. If democracy is a "daily pletbi.Sictte" within the framework of a state, then the right of self-determination of .nations meruns a permanent and Ult1Silenooalble plebiscite of the nations on the, rood to world democracy. One can see the meaning of political development in the world not in the pr®ltection od: definite historical state :fornls or certain nulmg oligarehies, but only in tJhe endreaivor for a greater rreedom af nations and individuals. nes Today the Slov,aJks in the free world are working for the international :recognition of their right to self-determination. The nUJcleus, which can be ;pludkeld from thi,s genera:l prin'c iple by logical reas001iing, is tJhe cl-airm to one's olWJl. national government, to one's own state. That is the aim whilc h is the motive of activity of the Slovaks in exile in the free world. SLOVAKIA 25 While Louis Stur and Stephen Marko DaXiner limited their demands for national rights to the most fundraimentall ones - the rj,gbJt to lirve, the right to one's oiwn territory, to their own national tongue, tlheir own naitionail culture, their own government o.ver theiir o·wn destiny, etc. - the present Slovruk generation, which is no longer burdened spi<ritually with any sort of '"Hungariianisan" or "Miagyaronism" or even by that complex oif political inferiority knorwn as "Czechosloivaiki;s m," deri<ves its ooncl'l.l!sions froon a:ll premises which weire foI1IX1ulated by previous generations and demands foothe Slova!k IIJaJbion, in the name of order and democracy in central ffiuroipe, the right to its own gowemment, to 1ts own state. But it does not do so in the name oif oveI'lly erudite and more or less polemical theories - sucih as is, for example, the legal conrtiniuity of the Slovak RepuJblic - but in the name of the princi1)les oif equality orf al•l natio!IlS, that is, in the name of the principle whicll not onil y UIIliversity professora, but every person in the wo:rild can :rea.di1y understamd, and the ,p rinciple whlch is so clearly exipressed in the American DeclaratiOIIl of Independence,. to wit : "We hold tlhese truths to be selrf-evident, that all men are created equa;l, that they are endowed ·b y their Creatoc with certain unalienruble Rj,g,hts, that among these are Life, Lilberty and the ipl.ll'suit of Happiness. That t.o secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People t.o alt.er or to abolish it, and institute new Government, laying its foundations on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness." Jn this paraigrrup'h is exipresserl the uruversal principle of world dem.01Cracy. These words are the goopel of the oppressed naJtions. They condemn whatever fonn oif interna.tionail feud:a1ism and stress the rigiht of oppressed nations t o fight foT theiir life and freedmn. The Slovaks, too, see in t his paragraph of the Ameri10an Declaration oif Independence t heir strongest argument for a place on the map oif Europe, 26 SLOVAKIA for the recognition of their right to national existence. The Slova!k nation demrunds nothing more: Of course, it may ibe said thaJt no western democracies deny that right to the Slowik people. They recogru:ze it and ,r espect it, we are told, 'but validating it is another question. The Slo:vruks, it seems, are not strOillg enough physically to force their just demands, so the western world pa:ys no heed to them. On the other hand, however, the greatest statesmen oif the West haJVe told us r eipeatedly that there r eally was no argument that could not be settled without the use of ·p hysical or amned force. The United Nations Organization aaso sulbscri!bes to this. So, might does not necessarily mean right, we are led to ·believe. But, then, what stands in the way of Slovruk freedom and i:ndependen:ce, the aipplication m the right of self-deter:mination in the caise of the Slov,aJk nation? Why then does the West recognize the . proponents of the old "Czechoslova:k" school, the followers of Benes, who still claim tfue rrght to determine the destiny of the Slovruk nation? It is high time that the democratic West relegated the "Czechoslo:va!k" pseudodemoc rats to the poHtical rubish hoop. The damage they have done in thirty years will not be repaired in the next hundred years, if the West persists in taking adJv,k e from them . • • • WHO SAID IT? "President Benes was always of the opinion, and in his latest statements ailwa;ys stressed, 1:lhrut OUT pam of alliance with So:viet Russia and our friendshiip with other S~av nations must not encrooch on OUT friendly and cordiail relations with other democratic states. This is the natuiral deske, shared iby an enormous majority of ()IUr people, and nothing .p revents UIS from keeping the comidence of the democratic states and strerugthening and deepening our friendship with our great western Allies. Moscow, · too, wan/ts tio ful[o;w this line of polircy. rt willl, h01Wever, be necessary for certain prej'l.l(Eces of the West with regard to the Soviet Union, which are stiU existing, to be swept away." - Premier Fierlinger o:f Czercho-,Slovakia, OW1I Bulletin, June 1, 1945.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovakia and the West Description An account of the resource Dr. Andrew Dubina Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953 pp. 22-26 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Dubina, Andrew Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1953 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/076c0becfb8ddb04f20fab1757680249.pdf 40dfe516a506f1adc73d3519afc189e2 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 17 OUR BLUNDERING CZECHO-SLOVAH.IA POLICY By Kurt Gl.a ser " Dea·1 ing w.iith his Mos'Cow journey, Dr. Benes said it could be regarded in the future as t·h e logi cal culmination of an ancient policy." News Flashes from Czechoslovakia, Chicago, F e,b ruary 21, 1944. "He who rules Bohemia rules Europe" is an old saying. In this vital area, American policy has been built around a myth, spread by a public-relations program for which the Czecho-Slovak Government spent millions of dollars from 1918 to 1938. To understand what this myth has done to American interests, we must study the true story of Czecho-Slovakia, the story which the Administration has never told us. When founded in 1918 by Masaryk and Benes, who gained support for the idea at home only after they had sold it to the Allies, Czecho-Slovakia had six different nationalities. As of the end of World War II, there were six and one-half million Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia, and three and one-half million Sudeten Germans, mostly in a crescent north, west and southwest of the Czech core, but with large German colonies in Prague, Bruenn and other centers. The Teschen district, predominantly Polish, had been ceded to Poland in 1938. Slovakia, to the east, had more than three million Slovaks, 700,000 Hungarians and some Germans. The extreme eastern province was Ruthenia, with a population of about 700,000, ceded to the U.S.S.R. in 1945. The Slovaks were induced to join with the Czechs by the so-called "Pittsburgh Agreement" which promised them absolute equality: Czecho-Slovakia would be "like Switzerland," as Benes put it. The Sudetens wanted to stay with Austria, but they were not asked, and Czech troops overthrew their elected provincial government in March 1919. Masaryk and Benes did not keep their promise of equal rights. Instead, they set up a centralized government in Prague, gave preference to Czechs in the civil service, in business and in finance, undertook to "Czechify" the edu- �18 SLOVAKIA cational system and refused to allow Slovak autonomy. Although the Sudeten region furnished the bulk of CzechoSlovak exports, Prague economic policies kept the area in a state of perpetual depression. It was inevitable that Slovaks, Sudetens and Hungarians should become increasingly anxious to "get out from under". All this time Czech professors and journalists in America, and Americans paid by them (Hitler had a list compiled from Czechs archives) were telling the wonders of "Czechoslovak" democracy. The original aim of Henlein's Sudeten-German Party was simply to gain equal rights for the Sudetens within Czecho-Slovakia. Only after 1935, when the Party won a majority in the German-speaking area, offered to cooperate with Benes and was rebuffed, did pro-Nazi elements become dominant. When the Czech-Sudeten crisis became acute in 1938, the British Government sent Lord Runciman to mediate. The refusal of Benes to make timely concessions led Lord Runciman to recommend cession of the Sudeten areas to Germany. Slovak pressure during and after the Munich crisis forced the Prague Government to grant autonomy to Slovakia on October 6, 1938. In March 1939, however, the Czech President Hacha deposed Slovak Prime Minister Tiso, occupied Bratislava with Czech troops and installed a new Slovak Government. This intervention was used by Hitler as an excuse for marching into Prague, an action which the Slovaks neither requested or suggested. It is true that Hitler seizure of Bohemia made possible the establishment of the Slovak Republic. But this did not make it a Nazi sta.te any more than German aid to Finland nazified that country. The Slovak Republic was what the Slovak people wanted, and it was recognized by 27 countries, including Great Britain, France and even the Soviet Union. In spite of intense Nazi pressure, President Tiso and the Slovak Government did their best to protect the Jews of Slovakia until 1944, when a "rebellion" organized by Communist parachutists led Hitler to install a reign of terror. Slovakia declared war on the Soviet Union in 1941, but it was never at war with the United States. Slovaks �SLOVAKIA 19 repeatedly protected American airmen forced down over their country. Although President Benes, who had resigned after the Munich Agreement in 1938, had recognized his successor Hacha, he decided after the dismemberment of Czecho-Slovakia in 1939 to work toward a political come-back. He and his followers formed the Czechoslovakian Liberation Movement in Paris in 1939, and moved it to London in 1940, later securing Allied recognition as the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government." It was necessary to face the fact that the Czech population at home was not particularly anti-German. Of all the territories under Nazi control, the Czech Protectorate had the highest standard of living. Official rations were the same as in Germany, and since they were actually distributed (which was not always the case in the Reich) the Czechs actually had more to eat than the Germans. Czech industry gave adive support to the German war effort, and large numbers of Czechs volunteered for the German Army. As Kenneth de Courcey (Review of World Affairs, April 28, 1944) pointed out, there was "almost no resistance movement at all" so that it was necessary to parachute in territories to assasinate the Nazi Commissioner Heydrich and provoke the Lidice atrocity with which Hitler was stupid enough to oblige. Since Benes and his followers were determined to pursue their policy of Czech ultra-nationalism, it was evident that they could not count on Czech support at home, let alone the allegiance of the Slovaks. The anti-Nazi Sudeten Germans were willing to reach a settlement, but Benes decided instead to expel them from Czecho-Slovakia. This policy could only be executed with outside assistance, and the only government which could give effective support was that of the Soviet Union. The "Czechoslovakist" policy of Benes and his followers was, therefore, bound to make their government permanently dependent on Russia. The blunder of American policy is that we supported Soviet policy, recognized the Benes "Government" and even now (December 1952) accept those of Benes' followers who broke with Gottwald in 1948 as "democratic exiles" even though they have not changed their policies in the slightest. �20 SLOVAKIA The policy of the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government," which supplied the "non-Commun ist" politicians in the "National Front" which governed Czecho-Slovakia from 1945 to 1948 and whose members are now mostly in the United States under State Department protection, was that of absolute adherence to the Soviet Union. As Dr. Peter Zenkl, today President of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" with headquarters in Washington, explained to the temporary parliament in November 1945: "The nationally conscious Czechs and Slovaks have no doubt that in their own interest, as well as in international interests, permanent collaboration with the USSR is necessary. Never without the USSR, never against the USSR, always at its side!" Hubert Ripka, who in 1939 hid the Soviet agent SimonKatz from the French police, later became Minister of Information in the London "Government " and who is now a professor at the New School for Social Research in New York, summarizes the policy in more details in his book East and West (London, 1944): "Since, in the new situation, it was impo,s sible to collaborate officially with the Sovielt Union, we ... did nothing which might prejudice or preven1t the renewal of co-operation at the earliest possible moment; I need only recall how strong ly OUT aJttitude contrasted with that of many others during the Soviet-Finnish War. Moreover, even in that period, there was no inilerruption of the personal contacts and exchange of informrution between ourselves and important Soviet representatives in London, Paris, Washington and elsewhere." Apparently both the British and United States Governments were willing to accept as a "Czechoslovak democratic exile" anyone with a passport from the Czech "Governmentin-exile." The London "Czechoslovak s" took advantage of this fact to infiltrate a large number of Soviet agents, who were in the direct service of the Kremlin, into both the United Kingdom and the United States. The "Czech-Slovak " service of the British Broadcasting Company was taken over by Communists; others worked for the Communist party paper Daily Worker, the two staffs being for operating purposes interchangeab le. Douglas Hyde, a former Communist, relates in his book I Believe (London, 1951) a typical example of infiltration �SLOVAKIA 21 involving one Ludwig Freund•, a German Communist masquerading as a Czech. Freund was assigned to the Daily Worker but his salary was paid by the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government" with British funds. Hyde tells us: "Freund a.c hieved considera,ble standing with member.s of the Benes Government and was ruble to put us (the Communist Party) in touch with them at any time. He was able, also, of course, to keep us mfo.rmed of most of whwt was going on in Czech Government circles. "Freund in co-operation with members of our Editorial Foreign Departmerut would write articles Ito which -non-Communist members of his Government would willing put their names." • The Ludwig Freund mentioned here is not the s·aime person as the Chicago professor of rthat name. The effectiveness of this arrangement is suggested by Minister Ripka's speech of November 7, 1942, over the British Broadcasting Company, in which he said: " ... the Russian November Revolurtion not only increased the strength of the Russian Soviet State, it a,lso raised to greater heighrts than ever ,before the standard of -civilizalt.ion, culture and living of the wide masses of the Soviet peoples ... "Bolshevism is a supe,r -national ideal, an eternal ideal, a human ideal, an ideal which has kindled the mind·s of the noblest of men from the time of Plato and through the Christian era, through the French Revolution and until today ... Just as the French Revolution strove to realize the ideal of freedOllll, so did the Russian Revolution try 1to reali'ze :the ideal of equality." The "non-Communist" politicians in London, whom the State Department has since 1948 undertaken to palm off on the American public as anti-Communists, planned with Stalin during the war to destroy the Slovak Republic and to expel the German-speaking minority. The price exacted by the Kremlin was the complete Sovietization of CzechoSlovakia, which became a Communist satellite in 1945, not in 1948. To assure that the sell-out would work, the "nonCommunists" agreed with the Kremlin to allow only those political parties which would join a United Front under Communist domination, a procedure which General Eisenhower rejected for the U. S. Zone of Germany as undemocratic (New York Times, October 17, 1945). Other parties were prohibited and their leaders thrown into concentration camps. The true policies of the "non-Communist" CzechoSlovak politicians can best be shown by their public statements made between 1945 and 1948. �22 SLOVAKJA "Our alliance with the Soviet Union is the main pillar of our foreign policy (applau se) . . . Our alliance with the Sovie;t Union gu arantees u s immediate he1p of Soviet armies in case of emergency." Dr. Ivo Duchacek, President of the Foreign Com:milbtee of the National Assembly, speech oif March 8, 1946. "Let us declare war against fear of bolshevi•sm and forbid , at the same time, the t'onm,a,tliolJ'l of an,y an1ti,Oommuntst front whaltever." Pravo lidu, organ of Social Democratic Party. "Centrifugal forces shall be jailed ... Centrifugal force,s are ,today eradicated and liquidaited." - Dr. Jozef Le ttri ch , writing in Cas, B rati slava, o. 130, 194G. Question: "Why does no opposition party ex,ist in Czecho-Slovakia ?" Answer: "The need for an opposition party in reality has not yet arisen in our coun1try." - Pavel Viboch at press conference in England, May 1947. "Never in hi sto ry was Russia so mighty, never were the forces of socialism so colossally forged together. This is a new historical epoch. Neve11theless some people think in a stick-in-the-mud fashion. It has not yet •been possible to convince everyone of the necessity of the oventhrow of capitalism ... " Ferdinand Peroutka, Tak nebo tak ("So or so"), Prague, 1947, p. 8. "In Ozech politics, in Czech .national life, it is urgent that we come to an understanding with the Commun ist Party. .. The Communist Party shall remain the greatest force in our p olitical scheme even a!ter the elections are over; and socialism shall remain t he foundation of our national life ... Coming to terms with the Oommunists is t h e golden theme of our political philosophy." - Ferdinand Peroutka, writing In Dnesek, Prague, February 9, rn48. Together with Communist "partisans," the "non-Communist" politicians of the National Front supervised the wholesale murder of more than 300,000 innocent people. They voted unanimously the Communist-drafted Kosice Program which wiped out private business, they set up a system of "People's Courts" on the Soviet model and in Slovakia they established forced labor camps, to which confinement could be imposed without trial for persons "who profess an ideology inimical to the State". And then one day Stalin and Gottwald decided they needed their "liberal allies no longer - because the Sovietization of Czecho-Slovakia had been completed. After the so-called "Gottwald Putsch" of 1948, the leading Communist collaborators and fellow-travellers - including all those quoted above - came to the United States. �SLOVAKIA 23 The State Department received them as "democratic exiles" and set them up in the research business, partly with taxpayers' money. Mr. Duchacek, who once claimed credit for helping to negotiate the Czech-Soviet Treaty of 1943, was employed by the Voice of America. Ferdinand Peroutka, who had written as late as December 1947 that it would be "unthinkable" to take the side of the United States in a war with the Soviet Union, was placed in charge of the "Czechoslovak" operations of Radio Free Europe, financed by the Crusade for Freedom. Two of his principal assistants were Pavel Tigrid and Joseph Kodicek, both forme:· members of the BBC's Communist-dominated "Czech-Slovak" staff. Tigrid was a member of the Communist Party until 1945, when he joined the "Catholic" Party headed by the "Red Monsignor" Sramek under circumstances which are to say the least equivocal. All the other Czecho-Slovak politicians favored by the State Department (up to December 1952) meet the same standard of (,pro-Soviet) loyalty. The "Council for Free Czechoslovakia," headed by Peter Zenkl, boasted in a pamphlet (In Search of Havens, Washington, 1950) that the State Department takes its advice on which Czech and Slovak refugees to admit to the United States and which to exclude. It is well known in Europe even though American newspapers maintaining correspondents in Germany have for some reason never seen fit to publish the facts - that pro-Communists and left-wing socialists get preference for immigration, whereas known anti-Communists are put on a blacklist. The attitude of those favored by the Council is illustrated by the f.arewell speech of one Rostislav Foukal, who before leaving for America told his comrades in Germany: "Every democraticthinking person must recognize that the present economic system in America is rotten to the core, the workers are exploited by their employers and stifled by Taft and Company ... We Czechoslovakian socialists ... will help America to escape from the claws of the capitalists ... We will help the Americans to reshape their history!" As for Slovakia, the overwhelming majority of the nation was and remains today firmly anti-Communist. The �24 SLOVAKIA Slovaks hoped fervently that the end of World War II would not destroy their Republic, but would bring them liberation so that they could govern themselves without German, Russian or Czech interference. But the "Czechoslovak" Government in London had already made its deal with the Kremlin, a deal explicitly sanctioned by an American Administration. The Slovak Republic was liquidated. In spite of asylum granted to the Slovak Cabinet by General Walton H. Walker at Kremsmuenster, Austria, the State Department ordered the surrender of Father Tiso and his government to the "Czechoslovak War Crimes Commission" without even the formality of an extradiction hearing. The kangaroo trial of Father Tiso - conducted before a judge who had sworn in advance "I will hang Tiso!" - is a classic case of judicial murder. After the Slovak Republic had been wantonly destroyed by the Red Armies by pre-arrangement between the Kremlin and the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government," the Communist-dominated government of Dr. Benes mobilized '. 'people's courts" on the Soviet model for a drive against patriotic Slovaks. The Catholic Bishops John Vojtassak and Michael Buzalka were incarcerated, church institutions were nationalized and private and corporate property was confiscated arbitrarily. Up to 1948, during a period when Ambassador Steinhardt assured the American public that "there is definitely no iron curtain in Czechoslovakia" (New York Times, Febrµary 1, 1947), over 100,000 Slovaks were jailed, about 30,000 deported to Russia and over a hundred executed. Slovakia was placed under the joint rule of the Communist Party and the so-called "Slovak Democratic Party" headed by Dr. Joseph Lettrich, now a member of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia." The "Democratic Party" was created arbitrarily to provide an ostensibly "non-Communist" partner for the Bolshevists, since the Slovak parties with popular support refused to cooperate with the Communists and were therefore liquidated. Government positions were divided by the two parties on a 50-50 basis. In the May 1946 elections the Democratic Party (for which �SLOVAKIA 25 non-Communists felt constrained to vote, fault de mieux) received 62 per cent of the votes, two minor parties 8 per cent and the Communist Party 30 per cent. The Communists continued, however, to enjoy key positions in the provincial government of Slovakia out of all proportion to their actual strength. Their collaborators and supporters, such as Messrs. Lettrich, Kvetko, Viboch, Slavik, Kocvara and Ferjencik, are all in the United States, where they pose as "anti-Communist democratic exiles" from Czecho-Slovakia. The tensions created by the brutal expropriation of the Sudeten Germans and by the rape of Slovakia are factors which perpetuate the Soviet Russian stranglehold on Czecho-Slovakia. It is the aim of the "Czechoslovak" politicians in the United States to re.turn to power with American assistance. But if they succeed, they will again be dependent on Russian support, since the majority of citizens of Czecho-Slovakia (including vast numbers of Czechs who object to socialism and were revolted by the atrocities and the police terror) are strongly opposed to them. As long as the United States Government maintains its unholy alliance with this group, it will never be able to pursue a firm or consistent anti-Communist policy in Central Europe. (Reprinted by permission from the author's "The Iron Curtain and American Policy," Public Affairs Press, 2153 Florida Avenue, Washington 8, D. C.) • • • WHO SAID IT? "THE SLOVAK PEOPLE is one of the great Christian nations of central Europe. History tells us that the forefathers of the Slovaks inhabited their present territory s ince about the fifth century. The Slo· vaks are a plain, humorous, intelligent, song-loving, industrious and religious peo,ple, devoted to the peaceful development of their national life and their national culture. They did not seek domination over other peoples, but only sought to safeguard their own national existence. No other nation of Europe suffered longer under alien domination than the Slovaks. The recognition and respect of their Inherent right to free development and political independence will be a corner stone of peace and coo peration among nations. It is necessary and right for Americans, including Americans of Slovak descent who wish all nationa of the earth as mu ch freedom and independence as they themselves enjoy in our blesesd Country, to show at least an equal amount of love and sympathy for the Slovak people in its long struggle for freedom and independence." (P. A. Hrobak, M!lwaukee, Wis., 10-28-51) � SLOVAKIA 17 OUR BLUNDERING CZECHO-SLOVAH.IA POLICY By Kurt Gl.a ser " Dea·1 ing w.iith his Mos'Cow journey, Dr. Benes said it could be regarded in the future as t·h e logi cal culmination of an ancient policy." News Flashes from Czechoslovakia, Chicago, F e,b ruary 21, 1944. "He who rules Bohemia rules Europe" is an old saying. In this vital area, American policy has been built around a myth, spread by a public-relations program for which the Czecho-Slovak Government spent millions of dollars from 1918 to 1938. To understand what this myth has done to American interests, we must study the true story of Czecho-Slovakia, the story which the Administration has never told us. When founded in 1918 by Masaryk and Benes, who gained support for the idea at home only after they had sold it to the Allies, Czecho-Slovakia had six different nationalities. As of the end of World War II, there were six and one-half million Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia, and three and one-half million Sudeten Germans, mostly in a crescent north, west and southwest of the Czech core, but with large German colonies in Prague, Bruenn and other centers. The Teschen district, predominantly Polish, had been ceded to Poland in 1938. Slovakia, to the east, had more than three million Slovaks, 700,000 Hungarians and some Germans. The extreme eastern province was Ruthenia, with a population of about 700,000, ceded to the U.S.S.R. in 1945. The Slovaks were induced to join with the Czechs by the so-called "Pittsburgh Agreement" which promised them absolute equality: Czecho-Slovakia would be "like Switzerland," as Benes put it. The Sudetens wanted to stay with Austria, but they were not asked, and Czech troops overthrew their elected provincial government in March 1919. Masaryk and Benes did not keep their promise of equal rights. Instead, they set up a centralized government in Prague, gave preference to Czechs in the civil service, in business and in finance, undertook to "Czechify" the edu- �18 SLOVAKIA cational system and refused to allow Slovak autonomy. Although the Sudeten region furnished the bulk of CzechoSlovak exports, Prague economic policies kept the area in a state of perpetual depression. It was inevitable that Slovaks, Sudetens and Hungarians should become increasingly anxious to "get out from under". All this time Czech professors and journalists in America, and Americans paid by them (Hitler had a list compiled from Czechs archives) were telling the wonders of "Czechoslovak" democracy. The original aim of Henlein's Sudeten-German Party was simply to gain equal rights for the Sudetens within Czecho-Slovakia. Only after 1935, when the Party won a majority in the German-speaking area, offered to cooperate with Benes and was rebuffed, did pro-Nazi elements become dominant. When the Czech-Sudeten crisis became acute in 1938, the British Government sent Lord Runciman to mediate. The refusal of Benes to make timely concessions led Lord Runciman to recommend cession of the Sudeten areas to Germany. Slovak pressure during and after the Munich crisis forced the Prague Government to grant autonomy to Slovakia on October 6, 1938. In March 1939, however, the Czech President Hacha deposed Slovak Prime Minister Tiso, occupied Bratislava with Czech troops and installed a new Slovak Government. This intervention was used by Hitler as an excuse for marching into Prague, an action which the Slovaks neither requested or suggested. It is true that Hitler seizure of Bohemia made possible the establishment of the Slovak Republic. But this did not make it a Nazi sta.te any more than German aid to Finland nazified that country. The Slovak Republic was what the Slovak people wanted, and it was recognized by 27 countries, including Great Britain, France and even the Soviet Union. In spite of intense Nazi pressure, President Tiso and the Slovak Government did their best to protect the Jews of Slovakia until 1944, when a "rebellion" organized by Communist parachutists led Hitler to install a reign of terror. Slovakia declared war on the Soviet Union in 1941, but it was never at war with the United States. Slovaks �SLOVAKIA 19 repeatedly protected American airmen forced down over their country. Although President Benes, who had resigned after the Munich Agreement in 1938, had recognized his successor Hacha, he decided after the dismemberment of Czecho-Slovakia in 1939 to work toward a political come-back. He and his followers formed the Czechoslovakian Liberation Movement in Paris in 1939, and moved it to London in 1940, later securing Allied recognition as the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government." It was necessary to face the fact that the Czech population at home was not particularly anti-German. Of all the territories under Nazi control, the Czech Protectorate had the highest standard of living. Official rations were the same as in Germany, and since they were actually distributed (which was not always the case in the Reich) the Czechs actually had more to eat than the Germans. Czech industry gave adive support to the German war effort, and large numbers of Czechs volunteered for the German Army. As Kenneth de Courcey (Review of World Affairs, April 28, 1944) pointed out, there was "almost no resistance movement at all" so that it was necessary to parachute in territories to assasinate the Nazi Commissioner Heydrich and provoke the Lidice atrocity with which Hitler was stupid enough to oblige. Since Benes and his followers were determined to pursue their policy of Czech ultra-nationalism, it was evident that they could not count on Czech support at home, let alone the allegiance of the Slovaks. The anti-Nazi Sudeten Germans were willing to reach a settlement, but Benes decided instead to expel them from Czecho-Slovakia. This policy could only be executed with outside assistance, and the only government which could give effective support was that of the Soviet Union. The "Czechoslovakist" policy of Benes and his followers was, therefore, bound to make their government permanently dependent on Russia. The blunder of American policy is that we supported Soviet policy, recognized the Benes "Government" and even now (December 1952) accept those of Benes' followers who broke with Gottwald in 1948 as "democratic exiles" even though they have not changed their policies in the slightest. �20 SLOVAKIA The policy of the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government," which supplied the "non-Commun ist" politicians in the "National Front" which governed Czecho-Slovakia from 1945 to 1948 and whose members are now mostly in the United States under State Department protection, was that of absolute adherence to the Soviet Union. As Dr. Peter Zenkl, today President of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" with headquarters in Washington, explained to the temporary parliament in November 1945: "The nationally conscious Czechs and Slovaks have no doubt that in their own interest, as well as in international interests, permanent collaboration with the USSR is necessary. Never without the USSR, never against the USSR, always at its side!" Hubert Ripka, who in 1939 hid the Soviet agent SimonKatz from the French police, later became Minister of Information in the London "Government " and who is now a professor at the New School for Social Research in New York, summarizes the policy in more details in his book East and West (London, 1944): "Since, in the new situation, it was impo,s sible to collaborate officially with the Sovielt Union, we ... did nothing which might prejudice or preven1t the renewal of co-operation at the earliest possible moment; I need only recall how strong ly OUT aJttitude contrasted with that of many others during the Soviet-Finnish War. Moreover, even in that period, there was no inilerruption of the personal contacts and exchange of informrution between ourselves and important Soviet representatives in London, Paris, Washington and elsewhere." Apparently both the British and United States Governments were willing to accept as a "Czechoslovak democratic exile" anyone with a passport from the Czech "Governmentin-exile." The London "Czechoslovak s" took advantage of this fact to infiltrate a large number of Soviet agents, who were in the direct service of the Kremlin, into both the United Kingdom and the United States. The "Czech-Slovak " service of the British Broadcasting Company was taken over by Communists; others worked for the Communist party paper Daily Worker, the two staffs being for operating purposes interchangeab le. Douglas Hyde, a former Communist, relates in his book I Believe (London, 1951) a typical example of infiltration �SLOVAKIA 21 involving one Ludwig Freund•, a German Communist masquerading as a Czech. Freund was assigned to the Daily Worker but his salary was paid by the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government" with British funds. Hyde tells us: "Freund a.c hieved considera,ble standing with member.s of the Benes Government and was ruble to put us (the Communist Party) in touch with them at any time. He was able, also, of course, to keep us mfo.rmed of most of whwt was going on in Czech Government circles. "Freund in co-operation with members of our Editorial Foreign Departmerut would write articles Ito which -non-Communist members of his Government would willing put their names." • The Ludwig Freund mentioned here is not the s·aime person as the Chicago professor of rthat name. The effectiveness of this arrangement is suggested by Minister Ripka's speech of November 7, 1942, over the British Broadcasting Company, in which he said: " ... the Russian November Revolurtion not only increased the strength of the Russian Soviet State, it a,lso raised to greater heighrts than ever ,before the standard of -civilizalt.ion, culture and living of the wide masses of the Soviet peoples ... "Bolshevism is a supe,r -national ideal, an eternal ideal, a human ideal, an ideal which has kindled the mind·s of the noblest of men from the time of Plato and through the Christian era, through the French Revolution and until today ... Just as the French Revolution strove to realize the ideal of freedOllll, so did the Russian Revolution try 1to reali'ze :the ideal of equality." The "non-Communist" politicians in London, whom the State Department has since 1948 undertaken to palm off on the American public as anti-Communists, planned with Stalin during the war to destroy the Slovak Republic and to expel the German-speaking minority. The price exacted by the Kremlin was the complete Sovietization of CzechoSlovakia, which became a Communist satellite in 1945, not in 1948. To assure that the sell-out would work, the "nonCommunists" agreed with the Kremlin to allow only those political parties which would join a United Front under Communist domination, a procedure which General Eisenhower rejected for the U. S. Zone of Germany as undemocratic (New York Times, October 17, 1945). Other parties were prohibited and their leaders thrown into concentration camps. The true policies of the "non-Communist" CzechoSlovak politicians can best be shown by their public statements made between 1945 and 1948. �22 SLOVAKJA "Our alliance with the Soviet Union is the main pillar of our foreign policy (applau se) . . . Our alliance with the Sovie;t Union gu arantees u s immediate he1p of Soviet armies in case of emergency." Dr. Ivo Duchacek, President of the Foreign Com:milbtee of the National Assembly, speech oif March 8, 1946. "Let us declare war against fear of bolshevi•sm and forbid , at the same time, the t'onm,a,tliolJ'l of an,y an1ti,Oommuntst front whaltever." Pravo lidu, organ of Social Democratic Party. "Centrifugal forces shall be jailed ... Centrifugal force,s are ,today eradicated and liquidaited." - Dr. Jozef Le ttri ch , writing in Cas, B rati slava, o. 130, 194G. Question: "Why does no opposition party ex,ist in Czecho-Slovakia ?" Answer: "The need for an opposition party in reality has not yet arisen in our coun1try." - Pavel Viboch at press conference in England, May 1947. "Never in hi sto ry was Russia so mighty, never were the forces of socialism so colossally forged together. This is a new historical epoch. Neve11theless some people think in a stick-in-the-mud fashion. It has not yet •been possible to convince everyone of the necessity of the oventhrow of capitalism ... " Ferdinand Peroutka, Tak nebo tak ("So or so"), Prague, 1947, p. 8. "In Ozech politics, in Czech .national life, it is urgent that we come to an understanding with the Commun ist Party. .. The Communist Party shall remain the greatest force in our p olitical scheme even a!ter the elections are over; and socialism shall remain t he foundation of our national life ... Coming to terms with the Oommunists is t h e golden theme of our political philosophy." - Ferdinand Peroutka, writing In Dnesek, Prague, February 9, rn48. Together with Communist "partisans," the "non-Communist" politicians of the National Front supervised the wholesale murder of more than 300,000 innocent people. They voted unanimously the Communist-drafted Kosice Program which wiped out private business, they set up a system of "People's Courts" on the Soviet model and in Slovakia they established forced labor camps, to which confinement could be imposed without trial for persons "who profess an ideology inimical to the State". And then one day Stalin and Gottwald decided they needed their "liberal allies no longer - because the Sovietization of Czecho-Slovakia had been completed. After the so-called "Gottwald Putsch" of 1948, the leading Communist collaborators and fellow-travellers - including all those quoted above - came to the United States. �SLOVAKIA 23 The State Department received them as "democratic exiles" and set them up in the research business, partly with taxpayers' money. Mr. Duchacek, who once claimed credit for helping to negotiate the Czech-Soviet Treaty of 1943, was employed by the Voice of America. Ferdinand Peroutka, who had written as late as December 1947 that it would be "unthinkable" to take the side of the United States in a war with the Soviet Union, was placed in charge of the "Czechoslovak" operations of Radio Free Europe, financed by the Crusade for Freedom. Two of his principal assistants were Pavel Tigrid and Joseph Kodicek, both forme:· members of the BBC's Communist-dominated "Czech-Slovak" staff. Tigrid was a member of the Communist Party until 1945, when he joined the "Catholic" Party headed by the "Red Monsignor" Sramek under circumstances which are to say the least equivocal. All the other Czecho-Slovak politicians favored by the State Department (up to December 1952) meet the same standard of (,pro-Soviet) loyalty. The "Council for Free Czechoslovakia," headed by Peter Zenkl, boasted in a pamphlet (In Search of Havens, Washington, 1950) that the State Department takes its advice on which Czech and Slovak refugees to admit to the United States and which to exclude. It is well known in Europe even though American newspapers maintaining correspondents in Germany have for some reason never seen fit to publish the facts - that pro-Communists and left-wing socialists get preference for immigration, whereas known anti-Communists are put on a blacklist. The attitude of those favored by the Council is illustrated by the f.arewell speech of one Rostislav Foukal, who before leaving for America told his comrades in Germany: "Every democraticthinking person must recognize that the present economic system in America is rotten to the core, the workers are exploited by their employers and stifled by Taft and Company ... We Czechoslovakian socialists ... will help America to escape from the claws of the capitalists ... We will help the Americans to reshape their history!" As for Slovakia, the overwhelming majority of the nation was and remains today firmly anti-Communist. The �24 SLOVAKIA Slovaks hoped fervently that the end of World War II would not destroy their Republic, but would bring them liberation so that they could govern themselves without German, Russian or Czech interference. But the "Czechoslovak" Government in London had already made its deal with the Kremlin, a deal explicitly sanctioned by an American Administration. The Slovak Republic was liquidated. In spite of asylum granted to the Slovak Cabinet by General Walton H. Walker at Kremsmuenster, Austria, the State Department ordered the surrender of Father Tiso and his government to the "Czechoslovak War Crimes Commission" without even the formality of an extradiction hearing. The kangaroo trial of Father Tiso - conducted before a judge who had sworn in advance "I will hang Tiso!" - is a classic case of judicial murder. After the Slovak Republic had been wantonly destroyed by the Red Armies by pre-arrangement between the Kremlin and the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government," the Communist-dominated government of Dr. Benes mobilized '. 'people's courts" on the Soviet model for a drive against patriotic Slovaks. The Catholic Bishops John Vojtassak and Michael Buzalka were incarcerated, church institutions were nationalized and private and corporate property was confiscated arbitrarily. Up to 1948, during a period when Ambassador Steinhardt assured the American public that "there is definitely no iron curtain in Czechoslovakia" (New York Times, Febrµary 1, 1947), over 100,000 Slovaks were jailed, about 30,000 deported to Russia and over a hundred executed. Slovakia was placed under the joint rule of the Communist Party and the so-called "Slovak Democratic Party" headed by Dr. Joseph Lettrich, now a member of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia." The "Democratic Party" was created arbitrarily to provide an ostensibly "non-Communist" partner for the Bolshevists, since the Slovak parties with popular support refused to cooperate with the Communists and were therefore liquidated. Government positions were divided by the two parties on a 50-50 basis. In the May 1946 elections the Democratic Party (for which �SLOVAKIA 25 non-Communists felt constrained to vote, fault de mieux) received 62 per cent of the votes, two minor parties 8 per cent and the Communist Party 30 per cent. The Communists continued, however, to enjoy key positions in the provincial government of Slovakia out of all proportion to their actual strength. Their collaborators and supporters, such as Messrs. Lettrich, Kvetko, Viboch, Slavik, Kocvara and Ferjencik, are all in the United States, where they pose as "anti-Communist democratic exiles" from Czecho-Slovakia. The tensions created by the brutal expropriation of the Sudeten Germans and by the rape of Slovakia are factors which perpetuate the Soviet Russian stranglehold on Czecho-Slovakia. It is the aim of the "Czechoslovak" politicians in the United States to re.turn to power with American assistance. But if they succeed, they will again be dependent on Russian support, since the majority of citizens of Czecho-Slovakia (including vast numbers of Czechs who object to socialism and were revolted by the atrocities and the police terror) are strongly opposed to them. As long as the United States Government maintains its unholy alliance with this group, it will never be able to pursue a firm or consistent anti-Communist policy in Central Europe. (Reprinted by permission from the author's "The Iron Curtain and American Policy," Public Affairs Press, 2153 Florida Avenue, Washington 8, D. C.) • • • WHO SAID IT? "THE SLOVAK PEOPLE is one of the great Christian nations of central Europe. History tells us that the forefathers of the Slovaks inhabited their present territory s ince about the fifth century. The Slo· vaks are a plain, humorous, intelligent, song-loving, industrious and religious peo,ple, devoted to the peaceful development of their national life and their national culture. They did not seek domination over other peoples, but only sought to safeguard their own national existence. No other nation of Europe suffered longer under alien domination than the Slovaks. The recognition and respect of their Inherent right to free development and political independence will be a corner stone of peace and coo peration among nations. It is necessary and right for Americans, including Americans of Slovak descent who wish all nationa of the earth as mu ch freedom and independence as they themselves enjoy in our blesesd Country, to show at least an equal amount of love and sympathy for the Slovak people in its long struggle for freedom and independence." (P. A. Hrobak, M!lwaukee, Wis., 10-28-51) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 17 OUR BLUNDERING CZECHO-SLOVAH.IA POLICY By Kurt Gl.a ser " Dea·1 ing w.iith his Mos'Cow journey, Dr. Benes said it could be regarded in the future as t·h e logi cal culmination of an ancient policy." News Flashes from Czechoslovakia, Chicago, F e,b ruary 21, 1944. "He who rules Bohemia rules Europe" is an old saying. In this vital area, American policy has been built around a myth, spread by a public-relations program for which the Czecho-Slovak Government spent millions of dollars from 1918 to 1938. To understand what this myth has done to American interests, we must study the true story of Czecho-Slovakia, the story which the Administration has never told us. When founded in 1918 by Masaryk and Benes, who gained support for the idea at home only after they had sold it to the Allies, Czecho-Slovakia had six different nationalities. As of the end of World War II, there were six and one-half million Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia, and three and one-half million Sudeten Germans, mostly in a crescent north, west and southwest of the Czech core, but with large German colonies in Prague, Bruenn and other centers. The Teschen district, predominantly Polish, had been ceded to Poland in 1938. Slovakia, to the east, had more than three million Slovaks, 700,000 Hungarians and some Germans. The extreme eastern province was Ruthenia, with a population of about 700,000, ceded to the U.S.S.R. in 1945. The Slovaks were induced to join with the Czechs by the so-called "Pittsburgh Agreement" which promised them absolute equality: Czecho-Slovakia would be "like Switzerland," as Benes put it. The Sudetens wanted to stay with Austria, but they were not asked, and Czech troops overthrew their elected provincial government in March 1919. Masaryk and Benes did not keep their promise of equal rights. Instead, they set up a centralized government in Prague, gave preference to Czechs in the civil service, in business and in finance, undertook to "Czechify" the edu- 18 SLOVAKIA cational system and refused to allow Slovak autonomy. Although the Sudeten region furnished the bulk of CzechoSlovak exports, Prague economic policies kept the area in a state of perpetual depression. It was inevitable that Slovaks, Sudetens and Hungarians should become increasingly anxious to "get out from under". All this time Czech professors and journalists in America, and Americans paid by them (Hitler had a list compiled from Czechs archives) were telling the wonders of "Czechoslovak" democracy. The original aim of Henlein's Sudeten-German Party was simply to gain equal rights for the Sudetens within Czecho-Slovakia. Only after 1935, when the Party won a majority in the German-speaking area, offered to cooperate with Benes and was rebuffed, did pro-Nazi elements become dominant. When the Czech-Sudeten crisis became acute in 1938, the British Government sent Lord Runciman to mediate. The refusal of Benes to make timely concessions led Lord Runciman to recommend cession of the Sudeten areas to Germany. Slovak pressure during and after the Munich crisis forced the Prague Government to grant autonomy to Slovakia on October 6, 1938. In March 1939, however, the Czech President Hacha deposed Slovak Prime Minister Tiso, occupied Bratislava with Czech troops and installed a new Slovak Government. This intervention was used by Hitler as an excuse for marching into Prague, an action which the Slovaks neither requested or suggested. It is true that Hitler seizure of Bohemia made possible the establishment of the Slovak Republic. But this did not make it a Nazi sta.te any more than German aid to Finland nazified that country. The Slovak Republic was what the Slovak people wanted, and it was recognized by 27 countries, including Great Britain, France and even the Soviet Union. In spite of intense Nazi pressure, President Tiso and the Slovak Government did their best to protect the Jews of Slovakia until 1944, when a "rebellion" organized by Communist parachutists led Hitler to install a reign of terror. Slovakia declared war on the Soviet Union in 1941, but it was never at war with the United States. Slovaks SLOVAKIA 19 repeatedly protected American airmen forced down over their country. Although President Benes, who had resigned after the Munich Agreement in 1938, had recognized his successor Hacha, he decided after the dismemberment of Czecho-Slovakia in 1939 to work toward a political come-back. He and his followers formed the Czechoslovakian Liberation Movement in Paris in 1939, and moved it to London in 1940, later securing Allied recognition as the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government." It was necessary to face the fact that the Czech population at home was not particularly anti-German. Of all the territories under Nazi control, the Czech Protectorate had the highest standard of living. Official rations were the same as in Germany, and since they were actually distributed (which was not always the case in the Reich) the Czechs actually had more to eat than the Germans. Czech industry gave adive support to the German war effort, and large numbers of Czechs volunteered for the German Army. As Kenneth de Courcey (Review of World Affairs, April 28, 1944) pointed out, there was "almost no resistance movement at all" so that it was necessary to parachute in territories to assasinate the Nazi Commissioner Heydrich and provoke the Lidice atrocity with which Hitler was stupid enough to oblige. Since Benes and his followers were determined to pursue their policy of Czech ultra-nationalism, it was evident that they could not count on Czech support at home, let alone the allegiance of the Slovaks. The anti-Nazi Sudeten Germans were willing to reach a settlement, but Benes decided instead to expel them from Czecho-Slovakia. This policy could only be executed with outside assistance, and the only government which could give effective support was that of the Soviet Union. The "Czechoslovakist" policy of Benes and his followers was, therefore, bound to make their government permanently dependent on Russia. The blunder of American policy is that we supported Soviet policy, recognized the Benes "Government" and even now (December 1952) accept those of Benes' followers who broke with Gottwald in 1948 as "democratic exiles" even though they have not changed their policies in the slightest. 20 SLOVAKIA The policy of the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government," which supplied the "non-Commun ist" politicians in the "National Front" which governed Czecho-Slovakia from 1945 to 1948 and whose members are now mostly in the United States under State Department protection, was that of absolute adherence to the Soviet Union. As Dr. Peter Zenkl, today President of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" with headquarters in Washington, explained to the temporary parliament in November 1945: "The nationally conscious Czechs and Slovaks have no doubt that in their own interest, as well as in international interests, permanent collaboration with the USSR is necessary. Never without the USSR, never against the USSR, always at its side!" Hubert Ripka, who in 1939 hid the Soviet agent SimonKatz from the French police, later became Minister of Information in the London "Government " and who is now a professor at the New School for Social Research in New York, summarizes the policy in more details in his book East and West (London, 1944): "Since, in the new situation, it was impo,s sible to collaborate officially with the Sovielt Union, we ... did nothing which might prejudice or preven1t the renewal of co-operation at the earliest possible moment; I need only recall how strong ly OUT aJttitude contrasted with that of many others during the Soviet-Finnish War. Moreover, even in that period, there was no inilerruption of the personal contacts and exchange of informrution between ourselves and important Soviet representatives in London, Paris, Washington and elsewhere." Apparently both the British and United States Governments were willing to accept as a "Czechoslovak democratic exile" anyone with a passport from the Czech "Governmentin-exile." The London "Czechoslovak s" took advantage of this fact to infiltrate a large number of Soviet agents, who were in the direct service of the Kremlin, into both the United Kingdom and the United States. The "Czech-Slovak " service of the British Broadcasting Company was taken over by Communists; others worked for the Communist party paper Daily Worker, the two staffs being for operating purposes interchangeab le. Douglas Hyde, a former Communist, relates in his book I Believe (London, 1951) a typical example of infiltration SLOVAKIA 21 involving one Ludwig Freund•, a German Communist masquerading as a Czech. Freund was assigned to the Daily Worker but his salary was paid by the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government" with British funds. Hyde tells us: "Freund a.c hieved considera,ble standing with member.s of the Benes Government and was ruble to put us (the Communist Party) in touch with them at any time. He was able, also, of course, to keep us mfo.rmed of most of whwt was going on in Czech Government circles. "Freund in co-operation with members of our Editorial Foreign Departmerut would write articles Ito which -non-Communist members of his Government would willing put their names." • The Ludwig Freund mentioned here is not the s·aime person as the Chicago professor of rthat name. The effectiveness of this arrangement is suggested by Minister Ripka's speech of November 7, 1942, over the British Broadcasting Company, in which he said: " ... the Russian November Revolurtion not only increased the strength of the Russian Soviet State, it a,lso raised to greater heighrts than ever ,before the standard of -civilizalt.ion, culture and living of the wide masses of the Soviet peoples ... "Bolshevism is a supe,r -national ideal, an eternal ideal, a human ideal, an ideal which has kindled the mind·s of the noblest of men from the time of Plato and through the Christian era, through the French Revolution and until today ... Just as the French Revolution strove to realize the ideal of freedOllll, so did the Russian Revolution try 1to reali'ze :the ideal of equality." The "non-Communist" politicians in London, whom the State Department has since 1948 undertaken to palm off on the American public as anti-Communists, planned with Stalin during the war to destroy the Slovak Republic and to expel the German-speaking minority. The price exacted by the Kremlin was the complete Sovietization of CzechoSlovakia, which became a Communist satellite in 1945, not in 1948. To assure that the sell-out would work, the "nonCommunists" agreed with the Kremlin to allow only those political parties which would join a United Front under Communist domination, a procedure which General Eisenhower rejected for the U. S. Zone of Germany as undemocratic (New York Times, October 17, 1945). Other parties were prohibited and their leaders thrown into concentration camps. The true policies of the "non-Communist" CzechoSlovak politicians can best be shown by their public statements made between 1945 and 1948. 22 SLOVAKJA "Our alliance with the Soviet Union is the main pillar of our foreign policy (applau se) . . . Our alliance with the Sovie;t Union gu arantees u s immediate he1p of Soviet armies in case of emergency." Dr. Ivo Duchacek, President of the Foreign Com:milbtee of the National Assembly, speech oif March 8, 1946. "Let us declare war against fear of bolshevi•sm and forbid , at the same time, the t'onm,a,tliolJ'l of an,y an1ti,Oommuntst front whaltever." Pravo lidu, organ of Social Democratic Party. "Centrifugal forces shall be jailed ... Centrifugal force,s are ,today eradicated and liquidaited." - Dr. Jozef Le ttri ch , writing in Cas, B rati slava, o. 130, 194G. Question: "Why does no opposition party ex,ist in Czecho-Slovakia ?" Answer: "The need for an opposition party in reality has not yet arisen in our coun1try." - Pavel Viboch at press conference in England, May 1947. "Never in hi sto ry was Russia so mighty, never were the forces of socialism so colossally forged together. This is a new historical epoch. Neve11theless some people think in a stick-in-the-mud fashion. It has not yet •been possible to convince everyone of the necessity of the oventhrow of capitalism ... " Ferdinand Peroutka, Tak nebo tak ("So or so"), Prague, 1947, p. 8. "In Ozech politics, in Czech .national life, it is urgent that we come to an understanding with the Commun ist Party. .. The Communist Party shall remain the greatest force in our p olitical scheme even a!ter the elections are over; and socialism shall remain t he foundation of our national life ... Coming to terms with the Oommunists is t h e golden theme of our political philosophy." - Ferdinand Peroutka, writing In Dnesek, Prague, February 9, rn48. Together with Communist "partisans," the "non-Communist" politicians of the National Front supervised the wholesale murder of more than 300,000 innocent people. They voted unanimously the Communist-drafted Kosice Program which wiped out private business, they set up a system of "People's Courts" on the Soviet model and in Slovakia they established forced labor camps, to which confinement could be imposed without trial for persons "who profess an ideology inimical to the State". And then one day Stalin and Gottwald decided they needed their "liberal allies no longer - because the Sovietization of Czecho-Slovakia had been completed. After the so-called "Gottwald Putsch" of 1948, the leading Communist collaborators and fellow-travellers - including all those quoted above - came to the United States. SLOVAKIA 23 The State Department received them as "democratic exiles" and set them up in the research business, partly with taxpayers' money. Mr. Duchacek, who once claimed credit for helping to negotiate the Czech-Soviet Treaty of 1943, was employed by the Voice of America. Ferdinand Peroutka, who had written as late as December 1947 that it would be "unthinkable" to take the side of the United States in a war with the Soviet Union, was placed in charge of the "Czechoslovak" operations of Radio Free Europe, financed by the Crusade for Freedom. Two of his principal assistants were Pavel Tigrid and Joseph Kodicek, both forme:· members of the BBC's Communist-dominated "Czech-Slovak" staff. Tigrid was a member of the Communist Party until 1945, when he joined the "Catholic" Party headed by the "Red Monsignor" Sramek under circumstances which are to say the least equivocal. All the other Czecho-Slovak politicians favored by the State Department (up to December 1952) meet the same standard of (,pro-Soviet) loyalty. The "Council for Free Czechoslovakia," headed by Peter Zenkl, boasted in a pamphlet (In Search of Havens, Washington, 1950) that the State Department takes its advice on which Czech and Slovak refugees to admit to the United States and which to exclude. It is well known in Europe even though American newspapers maintaining correspondents in Germany have for some reason never seen fit to publish the facts - that pro-Communists and left-wing socialists get preference for immigration, whereas known anti-Communists are put on a blacklist. The attitude of those favored by the Council is illustrated by the f.arewell speech of one Rostislav Foukal, who before leaving for America told his comrades in Germany: "Every democraticthinking person must recognize that the present economic system in America is rotten to the core, the workers are exploited by their employers and stifled by Taft and Company ... We Czechoslovakian socialists ... will help America to escape from the claws of the capitalists ... We will help the Americans to reshape their history!" As for Slovakia, the overwhelming majority of the nation was and remains today firmly anti-Communist. The 24 SLOVAKIA Slovaks hoped fervently that the end of World War II would not destroy their Republic, but would bring them liberation so that they could govern themselves without German, Russian or Czech interference. But the "Czechoslovak" Government in London had already made its deal with the Kremlin, a deal explicitly sanctioned by an American Administration. The Slovak Republic was liquidated. In spite of asylum granted to the Slovak Cabinet by General Walton H. Walker at Kremsmuenster, Austria, the State Department ordered the surrender of Father Tiso and his government to the "Czechoslovak War Crimes Commission" without even the formality of an extradiction hearing. The kangaroo trial of Father Tiso - conducted before a judge who had sworn in advance "I will hang Tiso!" - is a classic case of judicial murder. After the Slovak Republic had been wantonly destroyed by the Red Armies by pre-arrangement between the Kremlin and the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government," the Communist-dominated government of Dr. Benes mobilized '. 'people's courts" on the Soviet model for a drive against patriotic Slovaks. The Catholic Bishops John Vojtassak and Michael Buzalka were incarcerated, church institutions were nationalized and private and corporate property was confiscated arbitrarily. Up to 1948, during a period when Ambassador Steinhardt assured the American public that "there is definitely no iron curtain in Czechoslovakia" (New York Times, Febrµary 1, 1947), over 100,000 Slovaks were jailed, about 30,000 deported to Russia and over a hundred executed. Slovakia was placed under the joint rule of the Communist Party and the so-called "Slovak Democratic Party" headed by Dr. Joseph Lettrich, now a member of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia." The "Democratic Party" was created arbitrarily to provide an ostensibly "non-Communist" partner for the Bolshevists, since the Slovak parties with popular support refused to cooperate with the Communists and were therefore liquidated. Government positions were divided by the two parties on a 50-50 basis. In the May 1946 elections the Democratic Party (for which SLOVAKIA 25 non-Communists felt constrained to vote, fault de mieux) received 62 per cent of the votes, two minor parties 8 per cent and the Communist Party 30 per cent. The Communists continued, however, to enjoy key positions in the provincial government of Slovakia out of all proportion to their actual strength. Their collaborators and supporters, such as Messrs. Lettrich, Kvetko, Viboch, Slavik, Kocvara and Ferjencik, are all in the United States, where they pose as "anti-Communist democratic exiles" from Czecho-Slovakia. The tensions created by the brutal expropriation of the Sudeten Germans and by the rape of Slovakia are factors which perpetuate the Soviet Russian stranglehold on Czecho-Slovakia. It is the aim of the "Czechoslovak" politicians in the United States to re.turn to power with American assistance. But if they succeed, they will again be dependent on Russian support, since the majority of citizens of Czecho-Slovakia (including vast numbers of Czechs who object to socialism and were revolted by the atrocities and the police terror) are strongly opposed to them. As long as the United States Government maintains its unholy alliance with this group, it will never be able to pursue a firm or consistent anti-Communist policy in Central Europe. (Reprinted by permission from the author's "The Iron Curtain and American Policy," Public Affairs Press, 2153 Florida Avenue, Washington 8, D. C.) • • • WHO SAID IT? "THE SLOVAK PEOPLE is one of the great Christian nations of central Europe. History tells us that the forefathers of the Slovaks inhabited their present territory s ince about the fifth century. The Slo· vaks are a plain, humorous, intelligent, song-loving, industrious and religious peo,ple, devoted to the peaceful development of their national life and their national culture. They did not seek domination over other peoples, but only sought to safeguard their own national existence. No other nation of Europe suffered longer under alien domination than the Slovaks. The recognition and respect of their Inherent right to free development and political independence will be a corner stone of peace and coo peration among nations. It is necessary and right for Americans, including Americans of Slovak descent who wish all nationa of the earth as mu ch freedom and independence as they themselves enjoy in our blesesd Country, to show at least an equal amount of love and sympathy for the Slovak people in its long struggle for freedom and independence." (P. A. Hrobak, M!lwaukee, Wis., 10-28-51)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Our Blundering Czecho-Slovakia Policy Description An account of the resource Kurt Glaser Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 2 (7), July 1953 pp. 17-25 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Glaser, Kurt, 1914-1993 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource July 1953 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/a4e4be273902bd0b9c3f5c3e5061d44f.pdf 05780bcaf6956f5072fb1f0dd69a84c6 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 11 THE "RUSSIA FIRST" BOYS IN RADIO FREE EUROPE By Kurt Glaser (Reprinted from the February, 1953, issue of the NATIONAL REPUBLIC by permission) If you are one of sixteen million Americans who have given to the "Crusade for Freedom" to "help lift the iron curtain," you are naturally interested in what's being done with your money. Even if you're just a taxpayer, you may be interested in an operation which is costing you and me plenty and possibly doing the United States more harm than good. The money collected by the "Crusade for Freedom" goes to the "National Committee for a Free Europe" in New York. With these funds plus a seven-figure subsidy from the Government, the Committee finances Radio Free Europe which broadcasts from Germany to countries behind the Iron Curtain. RFE is supposed to fight Communism and according to its own public relations department it does. Obviously an American propoganda agency should employ only proven antiCommunists who can speak from conviction. To do otherwise would endanger directly the security of the United States. Here are some facts about the principal Czechs and Slovaks who write, edit, produce and broadcast RFE's Czechoslovakian program: 1 They are no more anti-Communists than Mrs. O'Leary's cow was a giraffe: they themselves sold C?.echoslovakia down the river to the Communists. 2. The "intelligence" agency operated in Germany by the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, to which the more important of these individuals belong, is infested with Communist agents and tips off anti-Communists in Czechoslovakia to Dictator Gottwald's secret police. 3. Their political line promotes hatred and rivalry between European peoples, thereby helping Stalin. �32 SLOVAKIA 4. With the help of State Department friends they have stacked immigration procedures to help left-wingers get to the United States and to keep out real anti-Communists. To get down to cases, the Czechs and Slovaks running the "Czechoslovak " section of RFE are all members of the "National Front" parties which governed Czechoslovakia, together with the Communists, from 1945 to 1948. The most important persons associated with this group are Jan Stransky (a leader in the Czech National Socialist Party) , Martin Kvetko and Pavel Viboch (members of parliament) and Ferdinand Peroutka and Pavel Tigrid (editors) , all of whom are or were until recently employed by RFE. Peroutka is the chief of the "Czechoslovak" section of RFE in New York; Tigrid was until October 1, 1952, chief of the broadcasting station in Munich. Not directly associated with RFE, but playing important background roles, are Peter Zenkl and Hubert Ripka (cabinet ministers), Jan Papanek (former Czechoslovak delegate to the U. N.), Josef Lettrich (National Councillor in Slovakia) and Andrew Valushek (editor of the New Yorksky Dennik). All these individuals (except Papanek and Valushek, who were already in the United States) left Czechoslovakia during or after the reorganization of February, 1948, sometimes reforred to incorrectly as the "Gottwald Putsch." The "National Front" politicians were accepted immediately by the State Department as "democratic exiles" and their organization in America, the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," was recognized as a quasi-official spokesman representing democratic Czechs and Slovaks. American officials were either unaware of or closed their eyes to the fact that the "non-Communist' parties of the "National Front" had begun to collaborate with the Communists as early as 1935, and had continued to do so until 1948. The National Front's "line" was expounded by Minister Zenkl in a speech to the Temporary National Assembly in November. 1945, in which he said: "The nationally conscious CzE;ehs and Slovaks have no doubt that ... permanent collaboration with the USSR is �SLOVAKIA 33 necessary. Never without the USSR, never against the USSR, always at its side!" During World War II the National Front's forerunner, the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government" in London, planned its post-war policies in such a way that they could only be carried out with Soviet support. It would take too long to explain these policies here, but we may take the word of Dr. Ivo Duchacek (now working for the Voice of America) who said in 1946 that: "Our alliance with the Soviet Union is the main pillar of our foreign policy ... (It) guarantees us the immediate help of the Soviet armies in case of emergency." To compensate for Soviet support, the Czechoslovak Government in London issued passports to a number of Communist agents, and got them jobs on either the British Broadcasting Company's Czechoslovak section or the Communist Party's Daily Worker, the. two staffs being interchangeable for operating purposes. Other agents were infiltrated into . the United States, such as the Communists Bension Batt and Karel Leitner of the New Yorkske Listy (Czech-language paper), and Desider Benau, a subordinate of Valushek on the (Slovak-language) New Yorksky Dennik, now merged with the Listy. Batt, Leitner and Benau are now back in Communist Czechoslovakia, where they occupy important positions. After the liberation of Czechoslovakia in 1945 the National Front politicians continued to collaborate with the Communists. "Let us declare war on fear of bolshevism and forbid, at the same time. the formation of any anti-Communist front whatever!" declared the Social Democratic newspaper Pravo Lidu. On February 9, 1948, only a few weeks before the State Department took him over as a "democratic exile," RFE's Ferdinand Peroutka restated the "line" as follows: "In Czech politics, in Czech national life, it i,s urgent that we come to an understanding with the Communist Party.... The Communist Party shall remain the greatest force in our political scheme even after the elections are over, and socialism shall remain the foundation of our na- �SLOVAKIA . tional life.... Coming to terms with the Communists is the golden theme of our political philosophy." ("What Do We Want of Them?" Dnesek, February 9, 1948.) Since arriving in the United States, the National Fronters have sold their wealthy backers and apparently the Government the myth that the Communists "took over" Czechoslovakia in 1948 despite their efforts to prevent it. The fact is: they themselves had sold Czechoslovakia down the river to the Communists long before 1948, and did nothing to prevent the "Gottwald Putsch." The first step was a secret treaty with the Soviets in 1941, followed by an open treaty in 1943, and a number of supplemental agreements which set up a Moscow-planned program for sovietizing Czechoslovakia. The main elements of this program were (1) the prohibition of political parties which would not go along with the Communists; (2) the "Kosice Program" of socialization which liquidated the anti-Communist middle class; and (3) the expulsion of the anti-Communist German-speaking minority, most of whom had had nothing to do with Nazi atrocities. To carry out this program there was established in 1945 (not 1948) a police state with socalled "People's Courts" on the Soviet model (Ripka and Stransky . signed the decree setting them up) and a Czech secret police under a Communist minister. In Slovakia it was not necessary to have a communist minister for police. The Slovak Democratic Party's Mikulas Ferjencik, an associate of Lettrich, jailed 130,000 Slovaks in 1945-47, and did such a good job of liquidating anti-Communists that the Communists thanked him for it. Lettrich applauded this action, writing: "Centrifugal forces shall be jailed. . . . Centrifugal forces are today eradicated and liquidated." RFE's Martin Kvetko backed up the action by issuing an "Executive Decree on Labor Camps" providing for confinement without trial, which Communist Gottwald liked so well he extended it later to the whole of Czechoslovakia. Lettrich's and Kvetko's Slovak "Democratic" Party passed a resolution in 1948 stating that: "The leaders of the Democratic Party .. . will give full �SLOVAKIA 36 support to the Commissioner of the [nterior in all matters pertaining to obstructing any anti-State activity whatsoever . . . . We are in accord with a thorough purge of antiState elements." .. . . As for Commissioner Ferjencik, he later tried to enter the United States and was held on Ellis Island on complaints of Americans of Slovak descent. But Jan Papanek evidently pulled some wires in Washington and the decision of the Immigration Service was reversed by "higher authority." · The National Fronters supported unanimously all measures to carry out the Sovietization plan. It was useful for the Communists to have a majority of "non-Communists" in the Government, since this allayed the suspicions of the West. By February, 1948, the process of Sovietization was substantially completed, and Gottwald did not need the "non-Communists" any more. Whether the National Fronters made a secret deal with the Communists, as suggested by Robert Ingrim and other writers, is a moot point, but it is a fact that they could be much more useful to Gottwald in the United States (or in RFE Munich) than in Czechoslovakia. It is also a fact that most of them got out of Czechoslovakia without the least interference by the Communists, some even driving their own cars. Having arrived in the United States, the National Front politicians organized the "Council for Free Czechoslovakia" and its sister organization, the "American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees." The Fund has big names such as Professor Shotwell of Columbia, Drew Pearson and Mrs. Roosevelt, but is actually run by Papanek and Valushek, who have also been active in the "American Slav Congress," cited by the Attorney General as "subversive and Communist" and by the House Committee on Un-American Activities as "a Moscow-inspired and directed federation of Communist-dominated organizations." The "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" boasts in one of its own leaflets that it convinced the State Department to let its agents in Germany pre-screen Czech and Slovak refugees who wanted to come to the United States. Among the screeners have been such individuals as Dr. Schenk, Dr. �36 SLOVAKIA Rebhahn and Dr. Jerabek, who are notorious in Germany for their open left-wing sympathies and associations. It is obvious that these gentlemen did their best to blackball any genuine anti-Communists who wanted a United States visa. Typical of those who did get in is one Rostislav Foukal, who shortly before his departure for America delivered himself of the following: Every democratic thinking person must recognize that the present economic system in America is rotten to the core, the workers are exploited by their employers and stifled by Taft and Company . . . . We Czechoslovakian socialists . . . . will help America to escape from the claws of the capitalists ... We will help the Americans to re-shape their history." As a communications channel between the "Council of Free Cze<!hoslovakia" and the "underground" remaining in that country, a message center was set up in Frankfurt, Germany, under the management of General Moravec, formerly head of the "Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service" in London This organization was heavily infiltrated with Communist agents, a numb.er of whom have been arrested as Gottwald spies by U. S. intelligence agencies. It is quite obvious that the "Moravec" organization contains other spies who have not yet been discovered. It managed to leak enough information to the Czech State Prosecutor to convict the most prominent members of the "underground" and it is considered by West German officials to be dangerously. subversive. Yet RFE, evidently with State Department approval, uses the "Moravec" outfit to gather some of the "intelligence" which it broadcasts. American agencies sometimes use it too; a recent case involved a "Moravec" reporl; on Czech fortifications, complete with diagrams, for which American officers paid a goodly sum. It was a fine report except for one thing - a further examination showed that the fortifications did not exist. The National Fronters have not, to my knowledge, recanted their pre-1948 policies. Peroutka, who late in 1947 wrote that it would be "unthinkable" to take the side of the United States in conflict with the Soviet Union, stated in 1949 that he would endeavor to remove from the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" all member opposed to socialism �SLOVAKIA 17 (Navrat, Paris, July 15, 1949). The Tribuna, intellectual magazine of the National Front, declared ·in 1950 that "private illlitiative is a thing of the past," and in 1951 that "private possession of the means of . production ... is immoral, anti-social, unjust, inefficient and disadvantageous." By turning over an American-financed propaganda operation to the National Front, we are sabotaging our own "fight for freedom" in Europe. This is all the more so since RFE, although theo:r:etically private, is considered by most Europeans to be associated with the United States Government, which in fact it is. It is apparent that RFE tends to .undermine American popularity in Europe. To begin with,· .its policies and personnel are anathema to the Slovaks, of whom at least 80 per cent (as estimated by Dr. Kvetko, a N~tional Fronter) want an independent Slovak state. Among the Czechs, the strictly non-Communist organizations, such as General Prchala's Czech National Committee';. appear to be more popular than the left-wing National ·Front. Those Czechs who like the National Front's policy ·of advanced socialism bordering on Communism won't find· too much wrong with the Gottwald regime anyway. Finally, the rabid anti-German attitude taken by many of the National Front's politicians and writers - not so much over the air, where they have been subject to some censorship, but in their outside writings ~nd . speeches - has infuriated large sectors of the German public. The · net result is that RFE antagonizes exactly those people, on both sides of the iron curtain, whom it is vital to have on our side for our own security. Nor has it helped that the Chief and Personnel Director of the proposed American-financed Russian.. broadcasting station to parallel RFID, Yakovlev alias Nareikis, and Vasiliev alias Gottlieb alias Bogolyubov, are both long-time members of Stalin's MVD (secret police, formerly NKVD) who continued to work for that agency after they had left the Soviet Union and had theoretically joined Stalin's enemies. The American people have elected a new administration which has promised to proceed vigor.011s.ly against Communist dangers which threaten j,he _United States. It is Glear that in the sector just described there. is plenty to do. � SLOVAKIA 11 THE "RUSSIA FIRST" BOYS IN RADIO FREE EUROPE By Kurt Glaser (Reprinted from the February, 1953, issue of the NATIONAL REPUBLIC by permission) If you are one of sixteen million Americans who have given to the "Crusade for Freedom" to "help lift the iron curtain," you are naturally interested in what's being done with your money. Even if you're just a taxpayer, you may be interested in an operation which is costing you and me plenty and possibly doing the United States more harm than good. The money collected by the "Crusade for Freedom" goes to the "National Committee for a Free Europe" in New York. With these funds plus a seven-figure subsidy from the Government, the Committee finances Radio Free Europe which broadcasts from Germany to countries behind the Iron Curtain. RFE is supposed to fight Communism and according to its own public relations department it does. Obviously an American propoganda agency should employ only proven antiCommunists who can speak from conviction. To do otherwise would endanger directly the security of the United States. Here are some facts about the principal Czechs and Slovaks who write, edit, produce and broadcast RFE's Czechoslovakian program: 1 They are no more anti-Communists than Mrs. O'Leary's cow was a giraffe: they themselves sold C?.echoslovakia down the river to the Communists. 2. The "intelligence" agency operated in Germany by the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, to which the more important of these individuals belong, is infested with Communist agents and tips off anti-Communists in Czechoslovakia to Dictator Gottwald's secret police. 3. Their political line promotes hatred and rivalry between European peoples, thereby helping Stalin. �32 SLOVAKIA 4. With the help of State Department friends they have stacked immigration procedures to help left-wingers get to the United States and to keep out real anti-Communists. To get down to cases, the Czechs and Slovaks running the "Czechoslovak " section of RFE are all members of the "National Front" parties which governed Czechoslovakia, together with the Communists, from 1945 to 1948. The most important persons associated with this group are Jan Stransky (a leader in the Czech National Socialist Party) , Martin Kvetko and Pavel Viboch (members of parliament) and Ferdinand Peroutka and Pavel Tigrid (editors) , all of whom are or were until recently employed by RFE. Peroutka is the chief of the "Czechoslovak" section of RFE in New York; Tigrid was until October 1, 1952, chief of the broadcasting station in Munich. Not directly associated with RFE, but playing important background roles, are Peter Zenkl and Hubert Ripka (cabinet ministers), Jan Papanek (former Czechoslovak delegate to the U. N.), Josef Lettrich (National Councillor in Slovakia) and Andrew Valushek (editor of the New Yorksky Dennik). All these individuals (except Papanek and Valushek, who were already in the United States) left Czechoslovakia during or after the reorganization of February, 1948, sometimes reforred to incorrectly as the "Gottwald Putsch." The "National Front" politicians were accepted immediately by the State Department as "democratic exiles" and their organization in America, the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," was recognized as a quasi-official spokesman representing democratic Czechs and Slovaks. American officials were either unaware of or closed their eyes to the fact that the "non-Communist' parties of the "National Front" had begun to collaborate with the Communists as early as 1935, and had continued to do so until 1948. The National Front's "line" was expounded by Minister Zenkl in a speech to the Temporary National Assembly in November. 1945, in which he said: "The nationally conscious CzE;ehs and Slovaks have no doubt that ... permanent collaboration with the USSR is �SLOVAKIA 33 necessary. Never without the USSR, never against the USSR, always at its side!" During World War II the National Front's forerunner, the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government" in London, planned its post-war policies in such a way that they could only be carried out with Soviet support. It would take too long to explain these policies here, but we may take the word of Dr. Ivo Duchacek (now working for the Voice of America) who said in 1946 that: "Our alliance with the Soviet Union is the main pillar of our foreign policy ... (It) guarantees us the immediate help of the Soviet armies in case of emergency." To compensate for Soviet support, the Czechoslovak Government in London issued passports to a number of Communist agents, and got them jobs on either the British Broadcasting Company's Czechoslovak section or the Communist Party's Daily Worker, the. two staffs being interchangeable for operating purposes. Other agents were infiltrated into . the United States, such as the Communists Bension Batt and Karel Leitner of the New Yorkske Listy (Czech-language paper), and Desider Benau, a subordinate of Valushek on the (Slovak-language) New Yorksky Dennik, now merged with the Listy. Batt, Leitner and Benau are now back in Communist Czechoslovakia, where they occupy important positions. After the liberation of Czechoslovakia in 1945 the National Front politicians continued to collaborate with the Communists. "Let us declare war on fear of bolshevism and forbid, at the same time. the formation of any anti-Communist front whatever!" declared the Social Democratic newspaper Pravo Lidu. On February 9, 1948, only a few weeks before the State Department took him over as a "democratic exile," RFE's Ferdinand Peroutka restated the "line" as follows: "In Czech politics, in Czech national life, it i,s urgent that we come to an understanding with the Communist Party.... The Communist Party shall remain the greatest force in our political scheme even after the elections are over, and socialism shall remain the foundation of our na- �SLOVAKIA . tional life.... Coming to terms with the Communists is the golden theme of our political philosophy." ("What Do We Want of Them?" Dnesek, February 9, 1948.) Since arriving in the United States, the National Fronters have sold their wealthy backers and apparently the Government the myth that the Communists "took over" Czechoslovakia in 1948 despite their efforts to prevent it. The fact is: they themselves had sold Czechoslovakia down the river to the Communists long before 1948, and did nothing to prevent the "Gottwald Putsch." The first step was a secret treaty with the Soviets in 1941, followed by an open treaty in 1943, and a number of supplemental agreements which set up a Moscow-planned program for sovietizing Czechoslovakia. The main elements of this program were (1) the prohibition of political parties which would not go along with the Communists; (2) the "Kosice Program" of socialization which liquidated the anti-Communist middle class; and (3) the expulsion of the anti-Communist German-speaking minority, most of whom had had nothing to do with Nazi atrocities. To carry out this program there was established in 1945 (not 1948) a police state with socalled "People's Courts" on the Soviet model (Ripka and Stransky . signed the decree setting them up) and a Czech secret police under a Communist minister. In Slovakia it was not necessary to have a communist minister for police. The Slovak Democratic Party's Mikulas Ferjencik, an associate of Lettrich, jailed 130,000 Slovaks in 1945-47, and did such a good job of liquidating anti-Communists that the Communists thanked him for it. Lettrich applauded this action, writing: "Centrifugal forces shall be jailed. . . . Centrifugal forces are today eradicated and liquidated." RFE's Martin Kvetko backed up the action by issuing an "Executive Decree on Labor Camps" providing for confinement without trial, which Communist Gottwald liked so well he extended it later to the whole of Czechoslovakia. Lettrich's and Kvetko's Slovak "Democratic" Party passed a resolution in 1948 stating that: "The leaders of the Democratic Party .. . will give full �SLOVAKIA 36 support to the Commissioner of the [nterior in all matters pertaining to obstructing any anti-State activity whatsoever . . . . We are in accord with a thorough purge of antiState elements." .. . . As for Commissioner Ferjencik, he later tried to enter the United States and was held on Ellis Island on complaints of Americans of Slovak descent. But Jan Papanek evidently pulled some wires in Washington and the decision of the Immigration Service was reversed by "higher authority." · The National Fronters supported unanimously all measures to carry out the Sovietization plan. It was useful for the Communists to have a majority of "non-Communists" in the Government, since this allayed the suspicions of the West. By February, 1948, the process of Sovietization was substantially completed, and Gottwald did not need the "non-Communists" any more. Whether the National Fronters made a secret deal with the Communists, as suggested by Robert Ingrim and other writers, is a moot point, but it is a fact that they could be much more useful to Gottwald in the United States (or in RFE Munich) than in Czechoslovakia. It is also a fact that most of them got out of Czechoslovakia without the least interference by the Communists, some even driving their own cars. Having arrived in the United States, the National Front politicians organized the "Council for Free Czechoslovakia" and its sister organization, the "American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees." The Fund has big names such as Professor Shotwell of Columbia, Drew Pearson and Mrs. Roosevelt, but is actually run by Papanek and Valushek, who have also been active in the "American Slav Congress," cited by the Attorney General as "subversive and Communist" and by the House Committee on Un-American Activities as "a Moscow-inspired and directed federation of Communist-dominated organizations." The "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" boasts in one of its own leaflets that it convinced the State Department to let its agents in Germany pre-screen Czech and Slovak refugees who wanted to come to the United States. Among the screeners have been such individuals as Dr. Schenk, Dr. �36 SLOVAKIA Rebhahn and Dr. Jerabek, who are notorious in Germany for their open left-wing sympathies and associations. It is obvious that these gentlemen did their best to blackball any genuine anti-Communists who wanted a United States visa. Typical of those who did get in is one Rostislav Foukal, who shortly before his departure for America delivered himself of the following: Every democratic thinking person must recognize that the present economic system in America is rotten to the core, the workers are exploited by their employers and stifled by Taft and Company . . . . We Czechoslovakian socialists . . . . will help America to escape from the claws of the capitalists ... We will help the Americans to re-shape their history." As a communications channel between the "Council of Free Cze<!hoslovakia" and the "underground" remaining in that country, a message center was set up in Frankfurt, Germany, under the management of General Moravec, formerly head of the "Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service" in London This organization was heavily infiltrated with Communist agents, a numb.er of whom have been arrested as Gottwald spies by U. S. intelligence agencies. It is quite obvious that the "Moravec" organization contains other spies who have not yet been discovered. It managed to leak enough information to the Czech State Prosecutor to convict the most prominent members of the "underground" and it is considered by West German officials to be dangerously. subversive. Yet RFE, evidently with State Department approval, uses the "Moravec" outfit to gather some of the "intelligence" which it broadcasts. American agencies sometimes use it too; a recent case involved a "Moravec" reporl; on Czech fortifications, complete with diagrams, for which American officers paid a goodly sum. It was a fine report except for one thing - a further examination showed that the fortifications did not exist. The National Fronters have not, to my knowledge, recanted their pre-1948 policies. Peroutka, who late in 1947 wrote that it would be "unthinkable" to take the side of the United States in conflict with the Soviet Union, stated in 1949 that he would endeavor to remove from the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" all member opposed to socialism �SLOVAKIA 17 (Navrat, Paris, July 15, 1949). The Tribuna, intellectual magazine of the National Front, declared ·in 1950 that "private illlitiative is a thing of the past," and in 1951 that "private possession of the means of . production ... is immoral, anti-social, unjust, inefficient and disadvantageous." By turning over an American-financed propaganda operation to the National Front, we are sabotaging our own "fight for freedom" in Europe. This is all the more so since RFE, although theo:r:etically private, is considered by most Europeans to be associated with the United States Government, which in fact it is. It is apparent that RFE tends to .undermine American popularity in Europe. To begin with,· .its policies and personnel are anathema to the Slovaks, of whom at least 80 per cent (as estimated by Dr. Kvetko, a N~tional Fronter) want an independent Slovak state. Among the Czechs, the strictly non-Communist organizations, such as General Prchala's Czech National Committee';. appear to be more popular than the left-wing National ·Front. Those Czechs who like the National Front's policy ·of advanced socialism bordering on Communism won't find· too much wrong with the Gottwald regime anyway. Finally, the rabid anti-German attitude taken by many of the National Front's politicians and writers - not so much over the air, where they have been subject to some censorship, but in their outside writings ~nd . speeches - has infuriated large sectors of the German public. The · net result is that RFE antagonizes exactly those people, on both sides of the iron curtain, whom it is vital to have on our side for our own security. Nor has it helped that the Chief and Personnel Director of the proposed American-financed Russian.. broadcasting station to parallel RFID, Yakovlev alias Nareikis, and Vasiliev alias Gottlieb alias Bogolyubov, are both long-time members of Stalin's MVD (secret police, formerly NKVD) who continued to work for that agency after they had left the Soviet Union and had theoretically joined Stalin's enemies. The American people have elected a new administration which has promised to proceed vigor.011s.ly against Communist dangers which threaten j,he _United States. It is Glear that in the sector just described there. is plenty to do. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 31 THE "RUSSIA FIRST" BOYS IN RADIO FREE EUROPE By Kurt Glaser (Reprinted from the February, 1953, issue of the NATIONAL REPUBLIC by permission) If you are one of sixteen million Americans who have given to the "Crusade for Freedom" to "help lift the iron curtain," you are naturally interested in what's being done with your money. Even if you're just a taxpayer, you may be interested in an operation which is costing you and me plenty and possibly doing the United States more harm than good. The money collected by the "Crusade for Freedom" goes to the "National Committee for a Free Europe" in New York. With these funds plus a seven-figure subsidy from the Government, the Committee finances Radio Free Europe which broadcasts from Germany to countries behind the Iron Curtain. RFE is supposed to fight Communism and according to its own public relations department it does. Obviously an American propoganda agency should employ only proven antiCommunists who can speak from conviction. To do otherwise would endanger directly the security of the United States. Here are some facts about the principal Czechs and Slovaks who write, edit, produce and broadcast RFE's Czechoslovakian program: 1 They are no more anti-Communists than Mrs. O'Leary's cow was a giraffe: they themselves sold C?.echoslovakia down the river to the Communists. 2. The "intelligence" agency operated in Germany by the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, to which the more important of these individuals belong, is infested with Communist agents and tips off anti-Communists in Czechoslovakia to Dictator Gottwald's secret police. 3. Their political line promotes hatred and rivalry between European peoples, thereby helping Stalin. 32 SLOVAKIA 4. With the help of State Department friends they have stacked immigration procedures to help left-wingers get to the United States and to keep out real anti-Communists. To get down to cases, the Czechs and Slovaks running the "Czechoslovak " section of RFE are all members of the "National Front" parties which governed Czechoslovakia, together with the Communists, from 1945 to 1948. The most important persons associated with this group are Jan Stransky (a leader in the Czech National Socialist Party) , Martin Kvetko and Pavel Viboch (members of parliament) and Ferdinand Peroutka and Pavel Tigrid (editors) , all of whom are or were until recently employed by RFE. Peroutka is the chief of the "Czechoslovak" section of RFE in New York; Tigrid was until October 1, 1952, chief of the broadcasting station in Munich. Not directly associated with RFE, but playing important background roles, are Peter Zenkl and Hubert Ripka (cabinet ministers), Jan Papanek (former Czechoslovak delegate to the U. N.), Josef Lettrich (National Councillor in Slovakia) and Andrew Valushek (editor of the New Yorksky Dennik). All these individuals (except Papanek and Valushek, who were already in the United States) left Czechoslovakia during or after the reorganization of February, 1948, sometimes reforred to incorrectly as the "Gottwald Putsch." The "National Front" politicians were accepted immediately by the State Department as "democratic exiles" and their organization in America, the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," was recognized as a quasi-official spokesman representing democratic Czechs and Slovaks. American officials were either unaware of or closed their eyes to the fact that the "non-Communist' parties of the "National Front" had begun to collaborate with the Communists as early as 1935, and had continued to do so until 1948. The National Front's "line" was expounded by Minister Zenkl in a speech to the Temporary National Assembly in November. 1945, in which he said: "The nationally conscious CzE;ehs and Slovaks have no doubt that ... permanent collaboration with the USSR is SLOVAKIA 33 necessary. Never without the USSR, never against the USSR, always at its side!" During World War II the National Front's forerunner, the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government" in London, planned its post-war policies in such a way that they could only be carried out with Soviet support. It would take too long to explain these policies here, but we may take the word of Dr. Ivo Duchacek (now working for the Voice of America) who said in 1946 that: "Our alliance with the Soviet Union is the main pillar of our foreign policy ... (It) guarantees us the immediate help of the Soviet armies in case of emergency." To compensate for Soviet support, the Czechoslovak Government in London issued passports to a number of Communist agents, and got them jobs on either the British Broadcasting Company's Czechoslovak section or the Communist Party's Daily Worker, the. two staffs being interchangeable for operating purposes. Other agents were infiltrated into . the United States, such as the Communists Bension Batt and Karel Leitner of the New Yorkske Listy (Czech-language paper), and Desider Benau, a subordinate of Valushek on the (Slovak-language) New Yorksky Dennik, now merged with the Listy. Batt, Leitner and Benau are now back in Communist Czechoslovakia, where they occupy important positions. After the liberation of Czechoslovakia in 1945 the National Front politicians continued to collaborate with the Communists. "Let us declare war on fear of bolshevism and forbid, at the same time. the formation of any anti-Communist front whatever!" declared the Social Democratic newspaper Pravo Lidu. On February 9, 1948, only a few weeks before the State Department took him over as a "democratic exile," RFE's Ferdinand Peroutka restated the "line" as follows: "In Czech politics, in Czech national life, it i,s urgent that we come to an understanding with the Communist Party.... The Communist Party shall remain the greatest force in our political scheme even after the elections are over, and socialism shall remain the foundation of our na- SLOVAKIA . tional life.... Coming to terms with the Communists is the golden theme of our political philosophy." ("What Do We Want of Them?" Dnesek, February 9, 1948.) Since arriving in the United States, the National Fronters have sold their wealthy backers and apparently the Government the myth that the Communists "took over" Czechoslovakia in 1948 despite their efforts to prevent it. The fact is: they themselves had sold Czechoslovakia down the river to the Communists long before 1948, and did nothing to prevent the "Gottwald Putsch." The first step was a secret treaty with the Soviets in 1941, followed by an open treaty in 1943, and a number of supplemental agreements which set up a Moscow-planned program for sovietizing Czechoslovakia. The main elements of this program were (1) the prohibition of political parties which would not go along with the Communists; (2) the "Kosice Program" of socialization which liquidated the anti-Communist middle class; and (3) the expulsion of the anti-Communist German-speaking minority, most of whom had had nothing to do with Nazi atrocities. To carry out this program there was established in 1945 (not 1948) a police state with socalled "People's Courts" on the Soviet model (Ripka and Stransky . signed the decree setting them up) and a Czech secret police under a Communist minister. In Slovakia it was not necessary to have a communist minister for police. The Slovak Democratic Party's Mikulas Ferjencik, an associate of Lettrich, jailed 130,000 Slovaks in 1945-47, and did such a good job of liquidating anti-Communists that the Communists thanked him for it. Lettrich applauded this action, writing: "Centrifugal forces shall be jailed. . . . Centrifugal forces are today eradicated and liquidated." RFE's Martin Kvetko backed up the action by issuing an "Executive Decree on Labor Camps" providing for confinement without trial, which Communist Gottwald liked so well he extended it later to the whole of Czechoslovakia. Lettrich's and Kvetko's Slovak "Democratic" Party passed a resolution in 1948 stating that: "The leaders of the Democratic Party .. . will give full SLOVAKIA 36 support to the Commissioner of the [nterior in all matters pertaining to obstructing any anti-State activity whatsoever . . . . We are in accord with a thorough purge of antiState elements." .. . . As for Commissioner Ferjencik, he later tried to enter the United States and was held on Ellis Island on complaints of Americans of Slovak descent. But Jan Papanek evidently pulled some wires in Washington and the decision of the Immigration Service was reversed by "higher authority." · The National Fronters supported unanimously all measures to carry out the Sovietization plan. It was useful for the Communists to have a majority of "non-Communists" in the Government, since this allayed the suspicions of the West. By February, 1948, the process of Sovietization was substantially completed, and Gottwald did not need the "non-Communists" any more. Whether the National Fronters made a secret deal with the Communists, as suggested by Robert Ingrim and other writers, is a moot point, but it is a fact that they could be much more useful to Gottwald in the United States (or in RFE Munich) than in Czechoslovakia. It is also a fact that most of them got out of Czechoslovakia without the least interference by the Communists, some even driving their own cars. Having arrived in the United States, the National Front politicians organized the "Council for Free Czechoslovakia" and its sister organization, the "American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees." The Fund has big names such as Professor Shotwell of Columbia, Drew Pearson and Mrs. Roosevelt, but is actually run by Papanek and Valushek, who have also been active in the "American Slav Congress," cited by the Attorney General as "subversive and Communist" and by the House Committee on Un-American Activities as "a Moscow-inspired and directed federation of Communist-dominated organizations." The "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" boasts in one of its own leaflets that it convinced the State Department to let its agents in Germany pre-screen Czech and Slovak refugees who wanted to come to the United States. Among the screeners have been such individuals as Dr. Schenk, Dr. 36 SLOVAKIA Rebhahn and Dr. Jerabek, who are notorious in Germany for their open left-wing sympathies and associations. It is obvious that these gentlemen did their best to blackball any genuine anti-Communists who wanted a United States visa. Typical of those who did get in is one Rostislav Foukal, who shortly before his departure for America delivered himself of the following: Every democratic thinking person must recognize that the present economic system in America is rotten to the core, the workers are exploited by their employers and stifled by Taft and Company . . . . We Czechoslovakian socialists . . . . will help America to escape from the claws of the capitalists ... We will help the Americans to re-shape their history." As a communications channel between the "Council of Free Cze<!hoslovakia" and the "underground" remaining in that country, a message center was set up in Frankfurt, Germany, under the management of General Moravec, formerly head of the "Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service" in London This organization was heavily infiltrated with Communist agents, a numb.er of whom have been arrested as Gottwald spies by U. S. intelligence agencies. It is quite obvious that the "Moravec" organization contains other spies who have not yet been discovered. It managed to leak enough information to the Czech State Prosecutor to convict the most prominent members of the "underground" and it is considered by West German officials to be dangerously. subversive. Yet RFE, evidently with State Department approval, uses the "Moravec" outfit to gather some of the "intelligence" which it broadcasts. American agencies sometimes use it too; a recent case involved a "Moravec" reporl; on Czech fortifications, complete with diagrams, for which American officers paid a goodly sum. It was a fine report except for one thing - a further examination showed that the fortifications did not exist. The National Fronters have not, to my knowledge, recanted their pre-1948 policies. Peroutka, who late in 1947 wrote that it would be "unthinkable" to take the side of the United States in conflict with the Soviet Union, stated in 1949 that he would endeavor to remove from the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" all member opposed to socialism SLOVAKIA 17 (Navrat, Paris, July 15, 1949). The Tribuna, intellectual magazine of the National Front, declared ·in 1950 that "private illlitiative is a thing of the past," and in 1951 that "private possession of the means of . production ... is immoral, anti-social, unjust, inefficient and disadvantageous." By turning over an American-financed propaganda operation to the National Front, we are sabotaging our own "fight for freedom" in Europe. This is all the more so since RFE, although theo:r:etically private, is considered by most Europeans to be associated with the United States Government, which in fact it is. It is apparent that RFE tends to .undermine American popularity in Europe. To begin with,· .its policies and personnel are anathema to the Slovaks, of whom at least 80 per cent (as estimated by Dr. Kvetko, a N~tional Fronter) want an independent Slovak state. Among the Czechs, the strictly non-Communist organizations, such as General Prchala's Czech National Committee';. appear to be more popular than the left-wing National ·Front. Those Czechs who like the National Front's policy ·of advanced socialism bordering on Communism won't find· too much wrong with the Gottwald regime anyway. Finally, the rabid anti-German attitude taken by many of the National Front's politicians and writers - not so much over the air, where they have been subject to some censorship, but in their outside writings ~nd . speeches - has infuriated large sectors of the German public. The · net result is that RFE antagonizes exactly those people, on both sides of the iron curtain, whom it is vital to have on our side for our own security. Nor has it helped that the Chief and Personnel Director of the proposed American-financed Russian.. broadcasting station to parallel RFID, Yakovlev alias Nareikis, and Vasiliev alias Gottlieb alias Bogolyubov, are both long-time members of Stalin's MVD (secret police, formerly NKVD) who continued to work for that agency after they had left the Soviet Union and had theoretically joined Stalin's enemies. The American people have elected a new administration which has promised to proceed vigor.011s.ly against Communist dangers which threaten j,he _United States. It is Glear that in the sector just described there. is plenty to do.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The "Russia First" Boys in Radio Free Europe Description An account of the resource Kurt Glaser Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 1 (6), April 1953 pp. 31-37 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Glaser, Kurt, 1914-1993 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource April 1953 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/4bf24b14b55c8c7c700a20bc2f0f46d7.pdf 9916fb9c6316cbdb4d95d65106f1cd09 PDF Text Text 48 SLOVAKIA WHY THE SLOVAKS WERE NOT CONTENT IN CZECHO-SWVAKIA Dr. Arved Grebert The Slovaks entered into a common state with the Czechs, into Ozecho-Slovrukia, on the condition that SlovaJkia would have its own self-government, its sta:tes' rights, that it would be governed by the people of Slorva,kia, have its own state courts, its own SlOIVaJk schools - in a ward, that the people of Slova,kia would be ruble to exercise their funda~ mental democraUc rights and, thus, be the masters of their own destiny. Czech Promises and Fulfillment I suppose it is quite logical to assume that Czecho-0-lovakia would not harve come into being withoot Slovakia. During World War I, the Czechs and Slov8lks concluded several agreements of which the best known are the Cleveland and Pittsburgh agreements. An examination orf the Cleveland Agreement t ells us that "Slovaikia would have complete national autonomy, its own legislature, its own state administration, and complete ctrltura!l and political autonomy." The Pittsburr,gh Agreement, dTafted and signed by T. G. Masaryk himself, guaranteed that "Slo.vaJkia sha.11 have its own administration, its own legislature and its own courts" and tha,t the SlorvaJk language "shall be the ofificial language in the scho.ols, aH state orffices and in pwb.Uc life in generad." In Chicago, T. G. Masaryk told the Slorvruks on May 6. 1918: "I aJm for the propositon that Slo!V'akia, joined with the Czech lands, should have complete sellf--administration; I am for the pr01p0siton that the S10,va,k language rule in the scihools, in the churches and in government offices everywhere." fa Pititsiburgh, Pa., on May 30, 1918, Masaryk told the Slovalks whom he desperately needed to re-a4ize his Ozecih0Slova.kia: "Thus it wihl be that half of the state shall be Czech and half SlorvaJk; t'he Slorvaik lan•g uage shadl rule in Slo- �SLOVAKIA 49 va;lcia in the schools and in pwbi-ic office. We understand each other. 'Dherefo.re, there are no words, nor shaJl there be any about any kind of majorizing of the Slova,ks by the Czechs. Yoo shall be the masters of your household and we shaH be masters of ours." Tha,t sa,me evening, while meeting with the representatives of Slovaik life, Masaryk said: ''You slhall hruve the entire adnninistTation in your hands, because Slovakia shall not be governed from Prague, but shall govern itself." But even if such agreements and promises were not made, the Slo;vruks, just as every nation, stihl had a natocal and unalienaJble right to freedom, self-determination and independence . .Surely, no adherent of the democratic way of life will deny that the Slcwa,ks definitel,y should have administered the .territory whkh they irrhrubited since aJbout the sixth century. Slovakia Flooded By Czechs But what haippened in 191'8, when the Czecho-Slova,k RepuibHc was estaJblisthed? Just as soon as Sl01VaJkia was annexed to the Ozech lands, thousands of Czechs poured into Slovakia to help arl!minister the state. It is true, of course, that Slovakia did need some exiperls to take over the state administration from the Magyar buTeauc,ra,cy. But she certainly did not need the multitude .o f woI1kers thait Prague had sent. Slovakia did not need the thousands of S1Ina:H Czech officials, teachers, clerks, policemen, soldiers, detectives, ralilroadimen, businessmen, farmers, laJborers, postmasters, mailmen, janitors, etc., who flooded Slova!kia and deipr1ved the Slovruks of wor.k in the1r OIWiil homeland. In 1910, theTe were 7,556 Czechs in Slorvaikia. Whein the first census in Czecho-1Slovakia was talken February 15, 1921, twenty-eight months after the Reipulblic was estaJblished, Czech statistics showed that there were 71,733 Cze:chs in Slovakia. Did their nwmibers decreruse af.ter ,t hat? From 19·21 hundreds of youn:g Slovaks gTaduated from the new schools ervecy year, ,but were not erven considered for state positions ; many took UJP technicrul training to fit them for particular joibs, b,uit that did not help to any noticea1ble extent. ln 1930, twel,ve years aifter the found4ng oif the Republic, Czechs were �SLOVAKIA 50 still coming into SloviaJkia "to help the Slorvalkis mn their State" ; Grech statistics put the nmnlber of Ozechs in Slova:k:ia at 1'30,926 - a;n increase oif 87.89 per cent ()!Ver 1921! Eight yea.TS later, in 1938, their ruumlber inoreased. to aJbout 200,000. 1n the meantime, rubout that mruny Slova!ks had to seek a lirvelihood in neighiborinig countries and in more distant lands. The Ozechs were doing the same tlhing the Magya,r s had dome prior to 1918. After Munich, when Creoh officials had to leruve the Sudeten1land, the NA.RJ()[)NE NOVINY (Nrutionai News) of Bratislruva remariked (Oct01ber 13, 1938): "from the lands ocicupied by Germany they will now be send.mg ahl, OT a:t least the majority of State employees to Slovakia. We see hundreds oif these people cominig in daHy." Cze<!'.h offidails and people took over not omy the lead.ring and ,key positions in Sl01VaJkia, 'but also positions that were completely sulbocdinate OT unimpo:rtant, li'ke janitors, offi'cial ser:vants, doonmen, ek., whrc:h the Sl01Vaks unquestionaJbly coUJld hawe fillled very easily - e:ven those who had little or no schodling. From 1921 to 1930, the numlber of State employees in the rugri'culltmral division increas~ by 57.93 per cent; in industry and the trades by 50.16 per cent ; in business and 'ba:nikilllg by 67. 93 per cent. While 203 independent Ozech farmers settled. in Slova!kia ,Uip to 1921, their nrnn.lber inm-eased to 1,031 by 1930 - this :being due "mainly to the co~oni:21ation of OzelC'h legionaires on some of the estates whilch were parcelil ed up" in ffiovakia. During the srume period, the number of Czechs in public adiministration iI11CTea,s ed by 14.10 per c·e nt; in the schools, in the category of o£ficials, by 70.41 per cent; in the free v01cations and the heailth serwke by 89.96 per cent; in the post-olfifice department by 10 ..74 per cent. And dwring that same time (19211930), the nlllmber of ind~ndent Oze.ch enteripri:ses in industTy and the trades increased. by 112.56 per cent; in business and banildn1g by 184.65 per cent. A. Bohaic, Ozec'h sfatistician, whose statistics we have used a'bove, rema11ked in 1935 that "even Ozech 18Jbor increased in industry" and that "in the practical professions in Slovakia, the Czechs will be validating themselves sig1 �SLOVAKIA 51 niffoantly in the future and instead od: the Czech official, as ll!p ,t o now, Sl'O!Vakia in the furture will see more Czech tradesmen, businessmen, trained war.kers and enteI'lprisers" (CIDS[ NA SLOVE~U, "Staitisticky 0/beior, XVI, c. 4-5, Prague, 1935). Slovakia - A Czech Colony SlovaJkia roolily became a Czech colony. Thousands od: Czechs, whom the Slo!VaJks did not need, came into Slovakia. Eiven Dr. VaJVTo Srobar, notorious Czechofile and Minister oif the Prague gcwerrum.ent, publidy remariked in 1.919: "In recent runes, the official forces arriving here from Bohemia, are mediocre and are committing various transgressions. Many Czechs are coming into SloiV'8Jkia as if it were an occupied territory and think that they may exploit it." Kornei Stodbta, another notorious ''Oze:chosloivaJk" (a Ozeoh SllorvaJk, i.e. a SlolV'ak in the pay of the Czechs), who held the pos,i tion of referent of the PostaQ Serrvice and Rail.roads in Slovakia, complained as ea:I111y as Deornlbier 17, 1918: "From the ministries of Prague they are send.ring us peo;ple we did not order and this is ca:wsinig us great difficulties" (S'I'olbar: 0SDOBODENE SLOVENSK0, p. 437). Michael Slaivik, another great "Czechoslo.rvak," also found something to complain about. As the adlrninistr8Jto,r (l~ll!pan) of the Zemplin region, he SOOJt a conifid!ential memorandum to T. G. Mas,ruryk on June 1, 1922, in which he complained: "Czechs haive been aJppointed as senvants in Slovakia, despite the fact that local good SllovaJks sought tho,se positions. IDven though we do not have a g.reat intelligentsia, nevertheless you wiU have to admit that there are plenity oif UIS who could be serrvants, b~ause we know how to serve after 1beinig serrvants for a thousand years!" But the people quoted eividently forgot that Slo:vakia really was a colony for the 0zec'hs. "If we succeed in saving the SlorvaJc1s, " we find in NASE SlJOVENSK0 (Our S'lovakia, in 1907, No. 1, rp. 4), in Czech, "our bro!ther Czechs will ther~by be 1presented with a wide field of operation, beca;use those, for whom there is no place· in Bohemia, ,wH1 come to Slova,kia and undoubte<Ny find here a wealithy source of �f>2 SLOVAKIA livelihood." And Otto's Commercial Dictionary (Ottuv olbohodni s.Iovnilk ), puil:Ylished in 0zech in 1919, states quite plainly (Vol 2, p. 1217) in 1919 that "SIJ.ovakia shall be our colonial land; it is incorrect to ho'ld to the view that, perhaips, a colonial territwy must not border on the motherfand. An exaimple is Russia with Siberia." Conscious of his own power, Dr. Edlwaird Benes threatened in his notorious "Speeoh to the Slovaiks" in 1933: ''I whll always stand out Oif principle against the political fantasy - I cannot ca[[ it by any other name - which, speruking aJbout a Slovak administration, SlovaJk bureaus and Slovaik eoonomicaJl management and enterprising, mints the one-sided Sllogan ":Slovakia for the Sl01Valks"." And Klima wrote in the ,p ublication "S'LOVENSKO" (ISlovaikia): "We have gained Slo1Vakia not only for 0zech cu1ture, but also for 0zech biusiness." Furthermore, in his book "Vychova a voiJ~sko" (Training and the Army) , Dr. F. Oberpfalcer wi,ote that the Ozechs must not lose their interest in Sl.ovaJkia, because if the Ozechs did not have SlolV,a kia "there would rerturn therefrom to us a multi-tude of our employees, for whom there would be no worl< in our country, misery and dissatisfaction with all their consequences would be increased." The Outflow of Slovak Blood While Sl01Va!kia was being fJooded wirt:h 0zechs, the natiiVe Slovaks, lacking workinig facilities, had to emigrate to France, Belgium, Germany, Canada, Brazi:l, Arge:nitina and the United States. Whi'l.e thousands of Czechs got soft jobs in Slovaikia, nati<ve Sl01VaJks had to struggle beyond the ocean in a foreign, unfriendly environment for bread. Beneath the Tatras the 0zechs lived in comfort and fared well, whereas natirve sons of Slovakia had to go ,t o the forests and jUil!gJes of BraizH and Argentina and the mines of France and BclgiUlffi. In the "Hberaited fatherJand," after large Magya;r estates weTe parcel1ed, Czech legionnaires were able to get land, but the sons of SlovaJk farmers, becaiuse of a laCik of swfificient land, had to, clear jungles and forests in Argentina, or sJave on the plantations of Brazil. �SLOVAKIA 53 So that we might have an idea of the magnitude of Slova:k em~gration, let us turn to statistics: in the period from 1924-1928, out of ever,y 10,000 pQpU!lation, 7.7 per cent emigrarted to :Eiuropea,n countries from Czech lands an!d 14.3 peT cent from Slova!kia; from 1929 to 1'933 only 3.6 per cent emigratoo from Czech lands, while 14.8 per cent emigrated from Slova>kia to IDuropean countries. And what do statistiics teJ[ us aJbout emigration overseas? ~giuring on the same basis,, we find that 1.9 per cent entig;rated from Coooh lands, while 38.1 per cent went out of Sl01Va!kiia; and from 1929-1933, 0.6 per cent fr,oim the Czech lands, but 12.6 per cent from Slovakia (see: Annuaire statistique de la Repulblique tchecosfovaque, 1938, p. 33). We must bear in mind, too,, that it was mainly the Sudeften Gerimans who emigrated from the Ozech lands and not Czechs. In 1930, out olf every 100,000 peo,p le in SL01Va1kia, 503.15 had etmiligra:tion visas, whereas only 54.72 had them in Bohemia and 68.70 in Moravia.JSiiesia (vd. ChuTa, Slovensko bez dorastu? p. 187). In 1922, out of the, total n;umber of emigrants in the United States £rom Ozecho~Slovaikria, 42 Sl01Vaks. A year later the figure rose to 5:l1924 pyrMll!i.ded to 62.6 per cent. In the Slova;ks made up 78.1 per cent of the total Cze~ho.JSlova!kia. per cent were per cent, and in latter year, the emi·g ration from This, then, is what the Czechs called the "liberation" of Slovrukia from the Magyars! This f,loodiing of S1ova!kia with Czechs, ho,w ever, diid not serve to benefit only the indi-vidrual Czeoh emigrants themselves. There was more than that to it. The 200,000 Czechs in S'lova:kia represented the actual support of Czech hegemony over SlQ/Vakia. The 200,000 Czech officials, policemen, soldiers, cl0r1ks, bankers, tea;chers, etc., signified a complete occupation oif Sloiva>kia, which at tha.Jt time had a population of ruboru,t 2.8 miHion. The Czechs were everyiwhere in Slovakia; there was not a single burnau, institution, community, city and villruge, enterprise, oir cultur-a;l institution, without a. Czech, the representat1ve, sruppo-r t and coruf.idtante of the Czech hegemony o,v er S'lova>kia. �54 SLOVAKIA It was pib,vious thrut Slovaikia could not liberate herself from this situation without a politicail up.hea;val firom the outside. We must remettnlber, too, that in 192'1, there were 18,364 Ozec'h so[diers and of!ffoers in S1lovakia, but in 1930 thei.r numlber rose to 20,652 - as admitted by Czech staitistics. 'l'he Slovialks, for ''security" reason s were for the most part forced to serwe their term in the aTIIny in Ozech lands. In Slova.k ia there were 2,891 Czech and on[y 1,543 Slova;k gendarmes; olf this num1ber, 104 Czechs and only 21 Slovaks were officers. Of coiurae, even here the Czechs were in key posiition.s and a great part orf the Slovaks was very carefuUy "seledted," so that a "O.ooc:h Slovak" (1Sfov,a,k renegade in the pay orf the Czechs) practically aaways was preferred to a patriotic, nrutionaa[iy consciOIUS Slovak. The world was told b,y official Orech proipaganda and representatilves of the Prague regimes th.rut the Slovruks joined with the Czechs, as equal partners, to form the Ozecho-Slwak R~ublitc. We were told that the Slovalks and the Czechs ruled equal1y in the S'trute and thait the Slovaks determined their own state affairs in Slovakia. The Magyrurs had do,ne the srume thing before the C:zJechs. 'Dhe trurbh, however, was something else. The Sl01Vaiks pleaid:ed', begged and entreated the Benes Czechs for twenty yea,i,s to come to their senses and recognize in a pra'Ctical way the inherent rights of the Slovak nation, the right of the Slovaiks to govern their own sta;te within the frrumeworik of Ctzooho..,Slov~a, bu.rt to no aivail. The inevita!ble happened in 1939. Czecho-SlOIVaJkia had to cohlapse like a horuse of cards, beca'USe it treated the majority of its inhabitants as secondrat·e citizens. "Czechosilo;valk" democira;cy failed utterly, becaru.se in rea[,i ty it made a mO'Cikery of the greait £undamental _principles that make up for a democracy . 1 • • • WHO SAID IT? "None of us has the right to obligate definitely for the future our people and state in fundamental matters, internal or international, to anything . . . . That holds for all of us and, above all, even for me personally. I think that it is necessary that this be altogether clear. That is why from the beginnnlng I have refused to make any funda(Dr. Edward Benes, to mental, internal or international, ties ...... " - th e Czechoslovak State Council, Nov. 21i, 1941) . � 48 SLOVAKIA WHY THE SLOVAKS WERE NOT CONTENT IN CZECHO-SWVAKIA Dr. Arved Grebert The Slovaks entered into a common state with the Czechs, into Ozecho-Slovrukia, on the condition that SlovaJkia would have its own self-government, its sta:tes' rights, that it would be governed by the people of Slorva,kia, have its own state courts, its own SlOIVaJk schools - in a ward, that the people of Slova,kia would be ruble to exercise their funda~ mental democraUc rights and, thus, be the masters of their own destiny. Czech Promises and Fulfillment I suppose it is quite logical to assume that Czecho-0-lovakia would not harve come into being withoot Slovakia. During World War I, the Czechs and Slov8lks concluded several agreements of which the best known are the Cleveland and Pittsburgh agreements. An examination orf the Cleveland Agreement t ells us that "Slovaikia would have complete national autonomy, its own legislature, its own state administration, and complete ctrltura!l and political autonomy." The Pittsburr,gh Agreement, dTafted and signed by T. G. Masaryk himself, guaranteed that "Slo.vaJkia sha.11 have its own administration, its own legislature and its own courts" and tha,t the SlorvaJk language "shall be the ofificial language in the scho.ols, aH state orffices and in pwb.Uc life in generad." In Chicago, T. G. Masaryk told the Slorvruks on May 6. 1918: "I aJm for the propositon that Slo!V'akia, joined with the Czech lands, should have complete sellf--administration; I am for the pr01p0siton that the S10,va,k language rule in the scihools, in the churches and in government offices everywhere." fa Pititsiburgh, Pa., on May 30, 1918, Masaryk told the Slovalks whom he desperately needed to re-a4ize his Ozecih0Slova.kia: "Thus it wihl be that half of the state shall be Czech and half SlorvaJk; t'he Slorvaik lan•g uage shadl rule in Slo- �SLOVAKIA 49 va;lcia in the schools and in pwbi-ic office. We understand each other. 'Dherefo.re, there are no words, nor shaJl there be any about any kind of majorizing of the Slova,ks by the Czechs. Yoo shall be the masters of your household and we shaH be masters of ours." Tha,t sa,me evening, while meeting with the representatives of Slovaik life, Masaryk said: ''You slhall hruve the entire adnninistTation in your hands, because Slovakia shall not be governed from Prague, but shall govern itself." But even if such agreements and promises were not made, the Slo;vruks, just as every nation, stihl had a natocal and unalienaJble right to freedom, self-determination and independence . .Surely, no adherent of the democratic way of life will deny that the Slcwa,ks definitel,y should have administered the .territory whkh they irrhrubited since aJbout the sixth century. Slovakia Flooded By Czechs But what haippened in 191'8, when the Czecho-Slova,k RepuibHc was estaJblisthed? Just as soon as Sl01VaJkia was annexed to the Ozech lands, thousands of Czechs poured into Slovakia to help arl!minister the state. It is true, of course, that Slovakia did need some exiperls to take over the state administration from the Magyar buTeauc,ra,cy. But she certainly did not need the multitude .o f woI1kers thait Prague had sent. Slovakia did not need the thousands of S1Ina:H Czech officials, teachers, clerks, policemen, soldiers, detectives, ralilroadimen, businessmen, farmers, laJborers, postmasters, mailmen, janitors, etc., who flooded Slova!kia and deipr1ved the Slovruks of wor.k in the1r OIWiil homeland. In 1910, theTe were 7,556 Czechs in Slorvaikia. Whein the first census in Czecho-1Slovakia was talken February 15, 1921, twenty-eight months after the Reipulblic was estaJblished, Czech statistics showed that there were 71,733 Cze:chs in Slovakia. Did their nwmibers decreruse af.ter ,t hat? From 19·21 hundreds of youn:g Slovaks gTaduated from the new schools ervecy year, ,but were not erven considered for state positions ; many took UJP technicrul training to fit them for particular joibs, b,uit that did not help to any noticea1ble extent. ln 1930, twel,ve years aifter the found4ng oif the Republic, Czechs were �SLOVAKIA 50 still coming into SloviaJkia "to help the Slorvalkis mn their State" ; Grech statistics put the nmnlber of Ozechs in Slova:k:ia at 1'30,926 - a;n increase oif 87.89 per cent ()!Ver 1921! Eight yea.TS later, in 1938, their ruumlber inoreased. to aJbout 200,000. 1n the meantime, rubout that mruny Slova!ks had to seek a lirvelihood in neighiborinig countries and in more distant lands. The Ozechs were doing the same tlhing the Magya,r s had dome prior to 1918. After Munich, when Creoh officials had to leruve the Sudeten1land, the NA.RJ()[)NE NOVINY (Nrutionai News) of Bratislruva remariked (Oct01ber 13, 1938): "from the lands ocicupied by Germany they will now be send.mg ahl, OT a:t least the majority of State employees to Slovakia. We see hundreds oif these people cominig in daHy." Cze<!'.h offidails and people took over not omy the lead.ring and ,key positions in Sl01VaJkia, 'but also positions that were completely sulbocdinate OT unimpo:rtant, li'ke janitors, offi'cial ser:vants, doonmen, ek., whrc:h the Sl01Vaks unquestionaJbly coUJld hawe fillled very easily - e:ven those who had little or no schodling. From 1921 to 1930, the numlber of State employees in the rugri'culltmral division increas~ by 57.93 per cent; in industry and the trades by 50.16 per cent ; in business and 'ba:nikilllg by 67. 93 per cent. While 203 independent Ozech farmers settled. in Slova!kia ,Uip to 1921, their nrnn.lber inm-eased to 1,031 by 1930 - this :being due "mainly to the co~oni:21ation of OzelC'h legionaires on some of the estates whilch were parcelil ed up" in ffiovakia. During the srume period, the number of Czechs in public adiministration iI11CTea,s ed by 14.10 per c·e nt; in the schools, in the category of o£ficials, by 70.41 per cent; in the free v01cations and the heailth serwke by 89.96 per cent; in the post-olfifice department by 10 ..74 per cent. And dwring that same time (19211930), the nlllmber of ind~ndent Oze.ch enteripri:ses in industTy and the trades increased. by 112.56 per cent; in business and banildn1g by 184.65 per cent. A. Bohaic, Ozec'h sfatistician, whose statistics we have used a'bove, rema11ked in 1935 that "even Ozech 18Jbor increased in industry" and that "in the practical professions in Slovakia, the Czechs will be validating themselves sig1 �SLOVAKIA 51 niffoantly in the future and instead od: the Czech official, as ll!p ,t o now, Sl'O!Vakia in the furture will see more Czech tradesmen, businessmen, trained war.kers and enteI'lprisers" (CIDS[ NA SLOVE~U, "Staitisticky 0/beior, XVI, c. 4-5, Prague, 1935). Slovakia - A Czech Colony SlovaJkia roolily became a Czech colony. Thousands od: Czechs, whom the Slo!VaJks did not need, came into Slovakia. Eiven Dr. VaJVTo Srobar, notorious Czechofile and Minister oif the Prague gcwerrum.ent, publidy remariked in 1.919: "In recent runes, the official forces arriving here from Bohemia, are mediocre and are committing various transgressions. Many Czechs are coming into SloiV'8Jkia as if it were an occupied territory and think that they may exploit it." Kornei Stodbta, another notorious ''Oze:chosloivaJk" (a Ozeoh SllorvaJk, i.e. a SlolV'ak in the pay of the Czechs), who held the pos,i tion of referent of the PostaQ Serrvice and Rail.roads in Slovakia, complained as ea:I111y as Deornlbier 17, 1918: "From the ministries of Prague they are send.ring us peo;ple we did not order and this is ca:wsinig us great difficulties" (S'I'olbar: 0SDOBODENE SLOVENSK0, p. 437). Michael Slaivik, another great "Czechoslo.rvak," also found something to complain about. As the adlrninistr8Jto,r (l~ll!pan) of the Zemplin region, he SOOJt a conifid!ential memorandum to T. G. Mas,ruryk on June 1, 1922, in which he complained: "Czechs haive been aJppointed as senvants in Slovakia, despite the fact that local good SllovaJks sought tho,se positions. IDven though we do not have a g.reat intelligentsia, nevertheless you wiU have to admit that there are plenity oif UIS who could be serrvants, b~ause we know how to serve after 1beinig serrvants for a thousand years!" But the people quoted eividently forgot that Slo:vakia really was a colony for the 0zec'hs. "If we succeed in saving the SlorvaJc1s, " we find in NASE SlJOVENSK0 (Our S'lovakia, in 1907, No. 1, rp. 4), in Czech, "our bro!ther Czechs will ther~by be 1presented with a wide field of operation, beca;use those, for whom there is no place· in Bohemia, ,wH1 come to Slova,kia and undoubte<Ny find here a wealithy source of �f>2 SLOVAKIA livelihood." And Otto's Commercial Dictionary (Ottuv olbohodni s.Iovnilk ), puil:Ylished in 0zech in 1919, states quite plainly (Vol 2, p. 1217) in 1919 that "SIJ.ovakia shall be our colonial land; it is incorrect to ho'ld to the view that, perhaips, a colonial territwy must not border on the motherfand. An exaimple is Russia with Siberia." Conscious of his own power, Dr. Edlwaird Benes threatened in his notorious "Speeoh to the Slovaiks" in 1933: ''I whll always stand out Oif principle against the political fantasy - I cannot ca[[ it by any other name - which, speruking aJbout a Slovak administration, SlovaJk bureaus and Slovaik eoonomicaJl management and enterprising, mints the one-sided Sllogan ":Slovakia for the Sl01Valks"." And Klima wrote in the ,p ublication "S'LOVENSKO" (ISlovaikia): "We have gained Slo1Vakia not only for 0zech cu1ture, but also for 0zech biusiness." Furthermore, in his book "Vychova a voiJ~sko" (Training and the Army) , Dr. F. Oberpfalcer wi,ote that the Ozechs must not lose their interest in Sl.ovaJkia, because if the Ozechs did not have SlolV,a kia "there would rerturn therefrom to us a multi-tude of our employees, for whom there would be no worl< in our country, misery and dissatisfaction with all their consequences would be increased." The Outflow of Slovak Blood While Sl01Va!kia was being fJooded wirt:h 0zechs, the natiiVe Slovaks, lacking workinig facilities, had to emigrate to France, Belgium, Germany, Canada, Brazi:l, Arge:nitina and the United States. Whi'l.e thousands of Czechs got soft jobs in Slovaikia, nati<ve Sl01VaJks had to struggle beyond the ocean in a foreign, unfriendly environment for bread. Beneath the Tatras the 0zechs lived in comfort and fared well, whereas natirve sons of Slovakia had to go ,t o the forests and jUil!gJes of BraizH and Argentina and the mines of France and BclgiUlffi. In the "Hberaited fatherJand," after large Magya;r estates weTe parcel1ed, Czech legionnaires were able to get land, but the sons of SlovaJk farmers, becaiuse of a laCik of swfificient land, had to, clear jungles and forests in Argentina, or sJave on the plantations of Brazil. �SLOVAKIA 53 So that we might have an idea of the magnitude of Slova:k em~gration, let us turn to statistics: in the period from 1924-1928, out of ever,y 10,000 pQpU!lation, 7.7 per cent emigrarted to :Eiuropea,n countries from Czech lands an!d 14.3 peT cent from Slova!kia; from 1929 to 1'933 only 3.6 per cent emigratoo from Czech lands, while 14.8 per cent emigrated from Slova>kia to IDuropean countries. And what do statistiics teJ[ us aJbout emigration overseas? ~giuring on the same basis,, we find that 1.9 per cent entig;rated from Coooh lands, while 38.1 per cent went out of Sl01Va!kiia; and from 1929-1933, 0.6 per cent fr,oim the Czech lands, but 12.6 per cent from Slovakia (see: Annuaire statistique de la Repulblique tchecosfovaque, 1938, p. 33). We must bear in mind, too,, that it was mainly the Sudeften Gerimans who emigrated from the Ozech lands and not Czechs. In 1930, out olf every 100,000 peo,p le in SL01Va1kia, 503.15 had etmiligra:tion visas, whereas only 54.72 had them in Bohemia and 68.70 in Moravia.JSiiesia (vd. ChuTa, Slovensko bez dorastu? p. 187). In 1922, out of the, total n;umber of emigrants in the United States £rom Ozecho~Slovaikria, 42 Sl01Vaks. A year later the figure rose to 5:l1924 pyrMll!i.ded to 62.6 per cent. In the Slova;ks made up 78.1 per cent of the total Cze~ho.JSlova!kia. per cent were per cent, and in latter year, the emi·g ration from This, then, is what the Czechs called the "liberation" of Slovrukia from the Magyars! This f,loodiing of S1ova!kia with Czechs, ho,w ever, diid not serve to benefit only the indi-vidrual Czeoh emigrants themselves. There was more than that to it. The 200,000 Czechs in S'lova:kia represented the actual support of Czech hegemony over SlQ/Vakia. The 200,000 Czech officials, policemen, soldiers, cl0r1ks, bankers, tea;chers, etc., signified a complete occupation oif Sloiva>kia, which at tha.Jt time had a population of ruboru,t 2.8 miHion. The Czechs were everyiwhere in Slovakia; there was not a single burnau, institution, community, city and villruge, enterprise, oir cultur-a;l institution, without a. Czech, the representat1ve, sruppo-r t and coruf.idtante of the Czech hegemony o,v er S'lova>kia. �54 SLOVAKIA It was pib,vious thrut Slovaikia could not liberate herself from this situation without a politicail up.hea;val firom the outside. We must remettnlber, too, that in 192'1, there were 18,364 Ozec'h so[diers and of!ffoers in S1lovakia, but in 1930 thei.r numlber rose to 20,652 - as admitted by Czech staitistics. 'l'he Slovialks, for ''security" reason s were for the most part forced to serwe their term in the aTIIny in Ozech lands. In Slova.k ia there were 2,891 Czech and on[y 1,543 Slova;k gendarmes; olf this num1ber, 104 Czechs and only 21 Slovaks were officers. Of coiurae, even here the Czechs were in key posiition.s and a great part orf the Slovaks was very carefuUy "seledted," so that a "O.ooc:h Slovak" (1Sfov,a,k renegade in the pay orf the Czechs) practically aaways was preferred to a patriotic, nrutionaa[iy consciOIUS Slovak. The world was told b,y official Orech proipaganda and representatilves of the Prague regimes th.rut the Slovruks joined with the Czechs, as equal partners, to form the Ozecho-Slwak R~ublitc. We were told that the Slovalks and the Czechs ruled equal1y in the S'trute and thait the Slovaks determined their own state affairs in Slovakia. The Magyrurs had do,ne the srume thing before the C:zJechs. 'Dhe trurbh, however, was something else. The Sl01Vaiks pleaid:ed', begged and entreated the Benes Czechs for twenty yea,i,s to come to their senses and recognize in a pra'Ctical way the inherent rights of the Slovak nation, the right of the Slovaiks to govern their own sta;te within the frrumeworik of Ctzooho..,Slov~a, bu.rt to no aivail. The inevita!ble happened in 1939. Czecho-SlOIVaJkia had to cohlapse like a horuse of cards, beca'USe it treated the majority of its inhabitants as secondrat·e citizens. "Czechosilo;valk" democira;cy failed utterly, becaru.se in rea[,i ty it made a mO'Cikery of the greait £undamental _principles that make up for a democracy . 1 • • • WHO SAID IT? "None of us has the right to obligate definitely for the future our people and state in fundamental matters, internal or international, to anything . . . . That holds for all of us and, above all, even for me personally. I think that it is necessary that this be altogether clear. That is why from the beginnnlng I have refused to make any funda(Dr. Edward Benes, to mental, internal or international, ties ...... " - th e Czechoslovak State Council, Nov. 21i, 1941) . � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 48 SLOVAKIA WHY THE SLOVAKS WERE NOT CONTENT IN CZECHO-SWVAKIA Dr. Arved Grebert The Slovaks entered into a common state with the Czechs, into Ozecho-Slovrukia, on the condition that SlovaJkia would have its own self-government, its sta:tes' rights, that it would be governed by the people of Slorva,kia, have its own state courts, its own SlOIVaJk schools - in a ward, that the people of Slova,kia would be ruble to exercise their funda~ mental democraUc rights and, thus, be the masters of their own destiny. Czech Promises and Fulfillment I suppose it is quite logical to assume that Czecho-0-lovakia would not harve come into being withoot Slovakia. During World War I, the Czechs and Slov8lks concluded several agreements of which the best known are the Cleveland and Pittsburgh agreements. An examination orf the Cleveland Agreement t ells us that "Slovaikia would have complete national autonomy, its own legislature, its own state administration, and complete ctrltura!l and political autonomy." The Pittsburr,gh Agreement, dTafted and signed by T. G. Masaryk himself, guaranteed that "Slo.vaJkia sha.11 have its own administration, its own legislature and its own courts" and tha,t the SlorvaJk language "shall be the ofificial language in the scho.ols, aH state orffices and in pwb.Uc life in generad." In Chicago, T. G. Masaryk told the Slorvruks on May 6. 1918: "I aJm for the propositon that Slo!V'akia, joined with the Czech lands, should have complete sellf--administration; I am for the pr01p0siton that the S10,va,k language rule in the scihools, in the churches and in government offices everywhere." fa Pititsiburgh, Pa., on May 30, 1918, Masaryk told the Slovalks whom he desperately needed to re-a4ize his Ozecih0Slova.kia: "Thus it wihl be that half of the state shall be Czech and half SlorvaJk; t'he Slorvaik lan•g uage shadl rule in Slo- SLOVAKIA 49 va;lcia in the schools and in pwbi-ic office. We understand each other. 'Dherefo.re, there are no words, nor shaJl there be any about any kind of majorizing of the Slova,ks by the Czechs. Yoo shall be the masters of your household and we shaH be masters of ours." Tha,t sa,me evening, while meeting with the representatives of Slovaik life, Masaryk said: ''You slhall hruve the entire adnninistTation in your hands, because Slovakia shall not be governed from Prague, but shall govern itself." But even if such agreements and promises were not made, the Slo;vruks, just as every nation, stihl had a natocal and unalienaJble right to freedom, self-determination and independence . .Surely, no adherent of the democratic way of life will deny that the Slcwa,ks definitel,y should have administered the .territory whkh they irrhrubited since aJbout the sixth century. Slovakia Flooded By Czechs But what haippened in 191'8, when the Czecho-Slova,k RepuibHc was estaJblisthed? Just as soon as Sl01VaJkia was annexed to the Ozech lands, thousands of Czechs poured into Slovakia to help arl!minister the state. It is true, of course, that Slovakia did need some exiperls to take over the state administration from the Magyar buTeauc,ra,cy. But she certainly did not need the multitude .o f woI1kers thait Prague had sent. Slovakia did not need the thousands of S1Ina:H Czech officials, teachers, clerks, policemen, soldiers, detectives, ralilroadimen, businessmen, farmers, laJborers, postmasters, mailmen, janitors, etc., who flooded Slova!kia and deipr1ved the Slovruks of wor.k in the1r OIWiil homeland. In 1910, theTe were 7,556 Czechs in Slorvaikia. Whein the first census in Czecho-1Slovakia was talken February 15, 1921, twenty-eight months after the Reipulblic was estaJblished, Czech statistics showed that there were 71,733 Cze:chs in Slovakia. Did their nwmibers decreruse af.ter ,t hat? From 19·21 hundreds of youn:g Slovaks gTaduated from the new schools ervecy year, ,but were not erven considered for state positions ; many took UJP technicrul training to fit them for particular joibs, b,uit that did not help to any noticea1ble extent. ln 1930, twel,ve years aifter the found4ng oif the Republic, Czechs were SLOVAKIA 50 still coming into SloviaJkia "to help the Slorvalkis mn their State" ; Grech statistics put the nmnlber of Ozechs in Slova:k:ia at 1'30,926 - a;n increase oif 87.89 per cent ()!Ver 1921! Eight yea.TS later, in 1938, their ruumlber inoreased. to aJbout 200,000. 1n the meantime, rubout that mruny Slova!ks had to seek a lirvelihood in neighiborinig countries and in more distant lands. The Ozechs were doing the same tlhing the Magya,r s had dome prior to 1918. After Munich, when Creoh officials had to leruve the Sudeten1land, the NA.RJ()[)NE NOVINY (Nrutionai News) of Bratislruva remariked (Oct01ber 13, 1938): "from the lands ocicupied by Germany they will now be send.mg ahl, OT a:t least the majority of State employees to Slovakia. We see hundreds oif these people cominig in daHy." Cze<!'.h offidails and people took over not omy the lead.ring and ,key positions in Sl01VaJkia, 'but also positions that were completely sulbocdinate OT unimpo:rtant, li'ke janitors, offi'cial ser:vants, doonmen, ek., whrc:h the Sl01Vaks unquestionaJbly coUJld hawe fillled very easily - e:ven those who had little or no schodling. From 1921 to 1930, the numlber of State employees in the rugri'culltmral division increas~ by 57.93 per cent; in industry and the trades by 50.16 per cent ; in business and 'ba:nikilllg by 67. 93 per cent. While 203 independent Ozech farmers settled. in Slova!kia ,Uip to 1921, their nrnn.lber inm-eased to 1,031 by 1930 - this :being due "mainly to the co~oni:21ation of OzelC'h legionaires on some of the estates whilch were parcelil ed up" in ffiovakia. During the srume period, the number of Czechs in public adiministration iI11CTea,s ed by 14.10 per c·e nt; in the schools, in the category of o£ficials, by 70.41 per cent; in the free v01cations and the heailth serwke by 89.96 per cent; in the post-olfifice department by 10 ..74 per cent. And dwring that same time (19211930), the nlllmber of ind~ndent Oze.ch enteripri:ses in industTy and the trades increased. by 112.56 per cent; in business and banildn1g by 184.65 per cent. A. Bohaic, Ozec'h sfatistician, whose statistics we have used a'bove, rema11ked in 1935 that "even Ozech 18Jbor increased in industry" and that "in the practical professions in Slovakia, the Czechs will be validating themselves sig1 SLOVAKIA 51 niffoantly in the future and instead od: the Czech official, as ll!p ,t o now, Sl'O!Vakia in the furture will see more Czech tradesmen, businessmen, trained war.kers and enteI'lprisers" (CIDS[ NA SLOVE~U, "Staitisticky 0/beior, XVI, c. 4-5, Prague, 1935). Slovakia - A Czech Colony SlovaJkia roolily became a Czech colony. Thousands od: Czechs, whom the Slo!VaJks did not need, came into Slovakia. Eiven Dr. VaJVTo Srobar, notorious Czechofile and Minister oif the Prague gcwerrum.ent, publidy remariked in 1.919: "In recent runes, the official forces arriving here from Bohemia, are mediocre and are committing various transgressions. Many Czechs are coming into SloiV'8Jkia as if it were an occupied territory and think that they may exploit it." Kornei Stodbta, another notorious ''Oze:chosloivaJk" (a Ozeoh SllorvaJk, i.e. a SlolV'ak in the pay of the Czechs), who held the pos,i tion of referent of the PostaQ Serrvice and Rail.roads in Slovakia, complained as ea:I111y as Deornlbier 17, 1918: "From the ministries of Prague they are send.ring us peo;ple we did not order and this is ca:wsinig us great difficulties" (S'I'olbar: 0SDOBODENE SLOVENSK0, p. 437). Michael Slaivik, another great "Czechoslo.rvak," also found something to complain about. As the adlrninistr8Jto,r (l~ll!pan) of the Zemplin region, he SOOJt a conifid!ential memorandum to T. G. Mas,ruryk on June 1, 1922, in which he complained: "Czechs haive been aJppointed as senvants in Slovakia, despite the fact that local good SllovaJks sought tho,se positions. IDven though we do not have a g.reat intelligentsia, nevertheless you wiU have to admit that there are plenity oif UIS who could be serrvants, b~ause we know how to serve after 1beinig serrvants for a thousand years!" But the people quoted eividently forgot that Slo:vakia really was a colony for the 0zec'hs. "If we succeed in saving the SlorvaJc1s, " we find in NASE SlJOVENSK0 (Our S'lovakia, in 1907, No. 1, rp. 4), in Czech, "our bro!ther Czechs will ther~by be 1presented with a wide field of operation, beca;use those, for whom there is no place· in Bohemia, ,wH1 come to Slova,kia and undoubte<Ny find here a wealithy source of f>2 SLOVAKIA livelihood." And Otto's Commercial Dictionary (Ottuv olbohodni s.Iovnilk ), puil:Ylished in 0zech in 1919, states quite plainly (Vol 2, p. 1217) in 1919 that "SIJ.ovakia shall be our colonial land; it is incorrect to ho'ld to the view that, perhaips, a colonial territwy must not border on the motherfand. An exaimple is Russia with Siberia." Conscious of his own power, Dr. Edlwaird Benes threatened in his notorious "Speeoh to the Slovaiks" in 1933: ''I whll always stand out Oif principle against the political fantasy - I cannot ca[[ it by any other name - which, speruking aJbout a Slovak administration, SlovaJk bureaus and Slovaik eoonomicaJl management and enterprising, mints the one-sided Sllogan ":Slovakia for the Sl01Valks"." And Klima wrote in the ,p ublication "S'LOVENSKO" (ISlovaikia): "We have gained Slo1Vakia not only for 0zech cu1ture, but also for 0zech biusiness." Furthermore, in his book "Vychova a voiJ~sko" (Training and the Army) , Dr. F. Oberpfalcer wi,ote that the Ozechs must not lose their interest in Sl.ovaJkia, because if the Ozechs did not have SlolV,a kia "there would rerturn therefrom to us a multi-tude of our employees, for whom there would be no worl< in our country, misery and dissatisfaction with all their consequences would be increased." The Outflow of Slovak Blood While Sl01Va!kia was being fJooded wirt:h 0zechs, the natiiVe Slovaks, lacking workinig facilities, had to emigrate to France, Belgium, Germany, Canada, Brazi:l, Arge:nitina and the United States. Whi'l.e thousands of Czechs got soft jobs in Slovaikia, nati<ve Sl01VaJks had to struggle beyond the ocean in a foreign, unfriendly environment for bread. Beneath the Tatras the 0zechs lived in comfort and fared well, whereas natirve sons of Slovakia had to go ,t o the forests and jUil!gJes of BraizH and Argentina and the mines of France and BclgiUlffi. In the "Hberaited fatherJand," after large Magya;r estates weTe parcel1ed, Czech legionnaires were able to get land, but the sons of SlovaJk farmers, becaiuse of a laCik of swfificient land, had to, clear jungles and forests in Argentina, or sJave on the plantations of Brazil. SLOVAKIA 53 So that we might have an idea of the magnitude of Slova:k em~gration, let us turn to statistics: in the period from 1924-1928, out of ever,y 10,000 pQpU!lation, 7.7 per cent emigrarted to :Eiuropea,n countries from Czech lands an!d 14.3 peT cent from Slova!kia; from 1929 to 1'933 only 3.6 per cent emigratoo from Czech lands, while 14.8 per cent emigrated from Slova>kia to IDuropean countries. And what do statistiics teJ[ us aJbout emigration overseas? ~giuring on the same basis,, we find that 1.9 per cent entig;rated from Coooh lands, while 38.1 per cent went out of Sl01Va!kiia; and from 1929-1933, 0.6 per cent fr,oim the Czech lands, but 12.6 per cent from Slovakia (see: Annuaire statistique de la Repulblique tchecosfovaque, 1938, p. 33). We must bear in mind, too,, that it was mainly the Sudeften Gerimans who emigrated from the Ozech lands and not Czechs. In 1930, out olf every 100,000 peo,p le in SL01Va1kia, 503.15 had etmiligra:tion visas, whereas only 54.72 had them in Bohemia and 68.70 in Moravia.JSiiesia (vd. ChuTa, Slovensko bez dorastu? p. 187). In 1922, out of the, total n;umber of emigrants in the United States £rom Ozecho~Slovaikria, 42 Sl01Vaks. A year later the figure rose to 5:l1924 pyrMll!i.ded to 62.6 per cent. In the Slova;ks made up 78.1 per cent of the total Cze~ho.JSlova!kia. per cent were per cent, and in latter year, the emi·g ration from This, then, is what the Czechs called the "liberation" of Slovrukia from the Magyars! This f,loodiing of S1ova!kia with Czechs, ho,w ever, diid not serve to benefit only the indi-vidrual Czeoh emigrants themselves. There was more than that to it. The 200,000 Czechs in S'lova:kia represented the actual support of Czech hegemony over SlQ/Vakia. The 200,000 Czech officials, policemen, soldiers, cl0r1ks, bankers, tea;chers, etc., signified a complete occupation oif Sloiva>kia, which at tha.Jt time had a population of ruboru,t 2.8 miHion. The Czechs were everyiwhere in Slovakia; there was not a single burnau, institution, community, city and villruge, enterprise, oir cultur-a;l institution, without a. Czech, the representat1ve, sruppo-r t and coruf.idtante of the Czech hegemony o,v er S'lova>kia. 54 SLOVAKIA It was pib,vious thrut Slovaikia could not liberate herself from this situation without a politicail up.hea;val firom the outside. We must remettnlber, too, that in 192'1, there were 18,364 Ozec'h so[diers and of!ffoers in S1lovakia, but in 1930 thei.r numlber rose to 20,652 - as admitted by Czech staitistics. 'l'he Slovialks, for ''security" reason s were for the most part forced to serwe their term in the aTIIny in Ozech lands. In Slova.k ia there were 2,891 Czech and on[y 1,543 Slova;k gendarmes; olf this num1ber, 104 Czechs and only 21 Slovaks were officers. Of coiurae, even here the Czechs were in key posiition.s and a great part orf the Slovaks was very carefuUy "seledted," so that a "O.ooc:h Slovak" (1Sfov,a,k renegade in the pay orf the Czechs) practically aaways was preferred to a patriotic, nrutionaa[iy consciOIUS Slovak. The world was told b,y official Orech proipaganda and representatilves of the Prague regimes th.rut the Slovruks joined with the Czechs, as equal partners, to form the Ozecho-Slwak R~ublitc. We were told that the Slovalks and the Czechs ruled equal1y in the S'trute and thait the Slovaks determined their own state affairs in Slovakia. The Magyrurs had do,ne the srume thing before the C:zJechs. 'Dhe trurbh, however, was something else. The Sl01Vaiks pleaid:ed', begged and entreated the Benes Czechs for twenty yea,i,s to come to their senses and recognize in a pra'Ctical way the inherent rights of the Slovak nation, the right of the Slovaiks to govern their own sta;te within the frrumeworik of Ctzooho..,Slov~a, bu.rt to no aivail. The inevita!ble happened in 1939. Czecho-SlOIVaJkia had to cohlapse like a horuse of cards, beca'USe it treated the majority of its inhabitants as secondrat·e citizens. "Czechosilo;valk" democira;cy failed utterly, becaru.se in rea[,i ty it made a mO'Cikery of the greait £undamental _principles that make up for a democracy . 1 • • • WHO SAID IT? "None of us has the right to obligate definitely for the future our people and state in fundamental matters, internal or international, to anything . . . . That holds for all of us and, above all, even for me personally. I think that it is necessary that this be altogether clear. That is why from the beginnnlng I have refused to make any funda(Dr. Edward Benes, to mental, internal or international, ties ...... " - th e Czechoslovak State Council, Nov. 21i, 1941) .  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Why the Slovaks Were Not Content in Czecho-Slovakia Description An account of the resource Dr. Arved Grébert Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953 pp. 48-54 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Grébert, Arvéd, 1915-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1953 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/49499471653b0ae34bb29ad85de401a0.pdf 0b7385f1831145e9c99e09d87a7bbd09 PDF Text Text SEPT~MBER, 1953 SLOVAKIA 1 WAS CZEOHO-SWVAK IA A DEMOCRACY? Dr. Arved Grebert The wo.r ld at large has become aiccustomed to regarding the first Ozecho..Slovruk Republic as an exemplary democratk state, a real "isle of democracy" in Central Europe. From the beginnmg o,f this state in 1918, official Czech propaganda exipended large SJUms of money to convince the world pulblic that such actually was the case. On the other hand, however, aibout a haiif of the total rpotpulation of Czecho~lovakia (The Slo1Vaiks, Germans, Po-les, Magyars, Ruthenians) continually protested this erroneous view and judgement oif conditions in the RepUlblic, ibut little came of it. In view Olf what has ha:pperned in Ozecho-iSlo,va)kia sinc 2 1938 - the ease with which it colla:psed in 1939 and laiter, in 1945, accepted the hegemony of communistic Moscow, it may be interesting to loo!k a .bit closer at the kind o.f democracy the: first Ozecho-'Sloivak Re.public actuaHy was. The Right of Self-Determinatlon and Czecho-Slovakia T. G. Masaryk and Edward Benes set aJbout to break up the Austro-Hungarian Monarichy during World War I in the nrume od: and with the aid of the right of self-determination of nations. They evoiked this basic principle con~ sistenUy and consitantliy. This is attested to .by the literature they pro,pagated, as well as the "Memoirs" they placed before the Peace Conference, wherein they -c laimed the right of self-detemnination of nations in the interests of Czech independence. As soon as the war ended, however, and AUJstria-Hungary lay in ashes, Masaryk and Benes very quickly and conveniently forgot 8J'bout the democratilc princilple oif the right of selif--detemnination of nations and labored to create a state which in suibstance became only a small and bad copy of the old monarehy they had helped to destroy. This newly created and artificial state, which never existed before that time, was first called ib;y the Czechs under Masaryk a.ind Benes "Ozeoho.;Slovrukia" - a synthetic n ame 1 �2 SLOV.AKil u111kn0,wn in the history of either the Czech nation or the Slovak nation before World War . At the ,v ery outset, this synthetic State rol)bed approximately 4,500,000 (3,700,000 Germans, 800,000 Magyars and aJbout 100,000 Poles) of their basic democratic right, the right of self-determination. The Germans, Magyars and Poles were forced within the framework of this artificial State against their eX!pressed will. And three million S1ova:ks and aJbout a ha1f million SUJb-CaI"pathian Ukrainians (the Ruthenians) favored the State only conditionally, that is, on1y if they enjoyed full autonomy within the Repulblk ; when this condition remained unfulfilled they found themselves in opposition to the existence of this :State. A political state is supposed to be the exipression oif the free will of the peoiple the existence of a state is SUIPposed to be in accoro with the will of its inhaJbitants. But Ozecho-lSlova!kia was not such a state; the Prague government, once it was set Uip in ,power, repudiated the basic democratic ,principle of the right of self-deter- . mination of nations - the very principle which brought it into being. We must not forget that the occupation of non-Czech lands took place with wea:pons in hand against the will of the native ,p opulation. Manifestations for the realization of the right of self-determination were bloodily suppressed by the Ozech army. For examiple, in a. single day, on March 4, 1919, the Czech arm,y killed 57 Gemnans and wounded over 100 more, when they demonstrated in German towns for their right to self-determination. Uip to 1921 there were 130 GeI"mans killed during street demonstrations iby the Ozech occupation for,ces. The same situation prevailed in territories inhaJbited iby the Magyars and Poles. Aocording to 1923 statistics, the newly created Czech~lovaJkia was inhabited by some 6,400,000 Czechs and a!bout 7,000,000 non-Czechs. The latter felt that they we,r e roM>ed of their democratirc right to self-determination, when Masaryk and Benes repudiated the promises and agreements made 1b y them when the ReipUJblic was in a state of formation. This was all the more grave and momentous, since the principle of the right of self-determination was a,pplied �SLOVAKIA 3 practkally in the case of Estonia (1,200,000 pop.), Lithuania (2,500,000), Latvia (2,000,000) Finland (3,800,000), M))ania (1,000,000), Nonway (3,000,000), Iceland (110,000), Denmark (3,800,000), etc. - states of wthich the entire popufation numbered less or 8Jpproximately the S3Jllle as, for example, there were Slovaks or Germans in the OzechoSlovaik Repulblfo. So that we might have some idea of the extent oif these realities, we must recall that at that very same time when Ozecho-iSlo1Vakia originated, there originated three small independent states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) in a far more threatened territory, on the !b orders of the UISISR (160,000,000), without the protection of natural borders or synthetic fortiifreations; eaoh one of these states h!!Jd less inhaibitants than Ozecho-;Slo.vaJkia had Slovaiks or Germans who weTe .r obbed ()If their right to selif-.deternnination. And on the borders od' the Soviet colossus there originated Finland, which at that time had only alb out 4,000,000 inhabitants and, therefore, much less than the non-Ozech na tionalities of Ozecho.Slorvalkia who were deprived of their right to se.J.lf-deter.min•a tion. In the case of the A]banians, who inhabit the dangerous Balkan crossroads orf the interests of Italy, Greece and Yugoslaivia, their right to state independence was recognized an,d respected. But the Sudeten Germans were not permitted to join either Austria or Ge:rttnany in 11919, as they h!!Jd desired to, do. And the will of the Slovak nation (3,000,000) was not respected when it decided to join the Ozechs in a common state only on condition that it would enjoy full autonomy within the framework of the Republic. Once in ,p ower, the government of Masaryik and Benes also refosed -to respect the rights of the Ruthenians and the Polish and Magyar minorities. From this standpoint, "Czecho-Slovak" democraicy for the 7,000,000 inhaJbitants of that State was only an empty phrase, a propaganda tenn devoid of content and foundation. A Dict.at.ed Constitution The foundations oif the political structure of every state are represented iby its constitution. The basic prin- �SLOVAKIA ci:ple of every genuine democratic state is that its constitution is the exipression oif the will o!f its inhaJbJ.tants. It is quite ohvious to asslli!lle, where a multinational state is concerned, that all strata of the population, all regions of the state, and all nationalities are properly and duly rep resented when the constitution is created. In Ozecho-.SlO!Vakia, however, the Constitution of Febmary 29, 1920, was exclusively a Czech product, and the Czechs under Masaryk and Benes simply dktated it and forced it upon the majority of the non-Czech population of the State In the so-called Constitutional National Assemibly there was not a single representative of the 3,700,000 Germans, not a single representative of the 800,000 Magyars, and not a single representative of the 100,000 Poles. And the representatives of the Slo,vak nation were not ele ~ted by the people, but simply ~pointed by Prague, and this was done in such a way that ,w ould ibest satisfy Prague: the overwhelming majority of them were proponents of "Czeohoslovalk ism" - the opponents of Slovak autonomy - even though the vast majority of Slo,vaiks were proiponents oif SloiVak autonomy within the framework of the OzechoS1ovak Repulblic. The representatives o.f Czech imperialism and "progressiveness" went so far as to name Czechs as re,presentatiives of Sl01VaJkia , as, for example, Dr. Edward Benes, Dr. Alice .Masaryk, Ing. Joseph Rotnagl, Dr. Aloysius Kolisek, and Ing. Joseph Zaruiba-,P:fofifermann. When Ozecho'-lSlo:vakia was ,b orn not more than 5000 Czechs lived in Slovakia, hence these, Ozechs could hardly be considered as repres enta.tilves of their pec;ple in Slc,v akia. In the twentieth century, when the solution or the granting od' sel!f..,manageiment or independence to some colonial nation of Africa or Asia is debated and negotiated, it is cus tomary that representatives oif the native population spealk in their name. Hut the Czech imperialists under Masaryk and Benes thought otherwise. They prolbaJbly regarded the Slo,vaJks as a nation beneath the level of colonial nations, because they named also five Czechs to, represent it on the Constitutional National Assembly Czechs who were practically ,unknown to the vast majority of the Slovak 1 �SLOVAKIA 5 peoiple. For example, up to that time, Dr. Edward Benes had never been in Slovakia. In this ha:ndpi'oked "parliament" there were 204 Czech, but only 56 Sl()!Valk deputies, and this number included five :C zechs mentioned albo1Ve. Furthermore, there weTe only eight Slovak deputies from the autonomdst bloc in that ruppointed Constitutional National Assem1bly. And it was significant, indeed, that on the very day that the Prague parliament voted for this Constitution, the leader of the Slovak nation and undoubtedly the most eminent polit1cal figure o.f the Slov8!k struggle against Magyarism, Andrew Hlinlka, was beihind bars in a Ozech prison. 1 The Slo;vaik r€ipresentation in that assembly was so unjust that eiven such a notorious adherent of "Ozechoslovaikism" as Dr. Juraj Slavik - now a member of the socalloo "Council cd' Free Ozechoslovakia" which operates out of New Yo,I'lk and Washi.Il!gton - protested at that time that the Slovaks did not hav e sufficient and ,proper representation. The Ozechs reiplie-0. that an adjustment would be made, but nothing hrupipene<l. Because Mr . .SlaiVik did not continue protesting against the injustice, Prague rewarded him for it. In a very short time he ibe1came a minister in the Czech goivernment in Prague. Even Seton-Watson, a close a:nd loyal .friend of T. G. Mas,a,ryk, noted that Sl0vak seats in the legislative assembly were to a certain extent filled by arnitrary a,ppointments (Sloivakia Then And Now" - ipg. 12). Under sU!ch undemocratic conditions the Constitution that emerged enthroned: a regime of Oz~h hegemony in the Czecho-iSloivaJk State. The entire Ozecho-Slova>k politi,cal system rested on this Constitution which is dictated iby the Czechs . And since the Constituiton was diotated, therefore dicfated was also the entire system in its relationshi1p to the 7,000,000 non-CzeiCh citizens. Where a state is foriced on a half of its, ,poipulation, where a Constitution is dictated to half the ;poipulation and against its most elementary political, economic and ooltUTal interests, where 7,000,000 'people are overruled and made a minority od', there can be no serious talk aibout a democratic state. In Czecho-rS'lovakia the �G SLOVAKIA Czechs sought to realize the very thing they had fought against so furiously in Austria. And realize it they did, even if eventually it did mean the utter ruin of the, State they had created under Masa.ryik and Benes. Centralism vs. Federalism The dictated Ozech Constitution installed a rugged centralistic sy,stem in Ozecho-Sloivakia; ,p ractically all key political positions and all power rested in Czech hands. Among the fundamental :principles of democratic states belongs tihe principle that multinational or multilingual states should .be origaruzed on a federalistic basis, that is, with the aid of aiutonomy of the indirvidrual minorities, since it is only in this manner that the ,p rinciples of . justice in a mutual relationshtp of the individual nationalities of the state can be realized in pra,,ctiice. But the great "Czech,oslovaJk Democrats" rapudiated this prin'Ciiple and instituted a strong centralistic regime. By so doing they not only failed to keep the -promises made and given the Slovaks and, Ruthenians and the minorities, but also instituted a regime which was in sulbstance a profanation and mookery of democracy. Behind the mask of democratic phrases they installed a regime of Ozech national imperialism. To safeguard their hegemony, the Czechs dictated into the Constitution paragrruphs which in practice prevented a change of the Constitution (the enactments about the- necessity of a 3/ 5 and 2/ 3 ,majority). Ozech hegemony was thus secured, because representatives of the non-Czech p01pulation could never attain this required majority in the Prag;ue Parliament without the Ozechs and, hence, could never uipset Czech hegemony in the State in constitutional or parliamentary manner. The dictated constitution and the Ozech hegemony emanating therefrom were then safeguarded by the notorious "law for the protection of the Republic" (No. 50) of March 23, 1923, which made the 7,000,000 non-Czech citizens of the various nationalities liaible to rprosecution on the grounds of anti...state a;ctivities, if they rpersisted in their rightful demands for the recognition of and respect for their �SLOVAKIA 7 right to sehf-detemrination , the 1principle upon which the Republic was sU1pposed to ha,ve 'b een founded. The Czech Communists ,wsed this law to advantage when they got hold af the key .p ositions in the State in 1945 and, later, in 1948, had practically no trouible at all in seizing a1l power in the Reipulblitc in a "legal and constitutional" way. Another laJW, the law regarding political parties (No. 201 of Octolber 25, 1953) , provided for the outlawing and dissolution of any political ,p arty if its arctivity seriously endangered the "constitutional unity" - and "constitutional unity'' in practice simply :meant Ozech rule oiver the nonCzech citizens. On the basis of this law, the ,political demand for the territorial legislatiive autonomy of SlovaJkia the -c ondition under which the .Slovak,s decided to form a joint state with the Czechs - was cause for prooecution by the State. Dr. Ivan Derer, who sold his Slovak birthright for a mess Olf Ozech pottage, as Minister of Justice demanded on various occasions to use this law against the Hlin!ka Sloivak Poople's Party, because it persistently demanded the f.uilifillment olf the Pittsburgh ·P act of May 30, 1918 - that is, states, rights or foll aiutonoony for Slovakia. Prague, however, ordered Derer to withhold action; the centralists were not entirely ,bl.ind to the development olf the internationaJl situation, and the consequencoo of such action: the RepuibUc would have undoUibtedly collapsed 10\Il!g before 1939 if Derer was not overruled. Ozech centralism. pulled in its horns a little _and attempted to show the Slovaks that it favored them by not aipplying the law. Of course, the Slova;ks, by that time, .were wise to the Czech centn1.lists. The Anti-Democratic Regrme of Czech Hegemony . Czech hegemony was also protected b~ a whole series of la.ws and regulations which emanated from the undemocratic' Constitution which was forced on the non-Ozech popuiation. The Constitution, for example, "legalized" the notorious fiction - better said the international fraud oif the i•Ozechoslovak nation" in the political · and ethnic sense·, a nation which had never existed and, in the end, from the ·existence of which even its creators and propaga~ �SLOVAKIA tors fled with their notorious Kosice .Agreement with the Communists in 1'946. With the he1p of this fraud, the fiction of a national state was ipromo.ted against the reality of a nationa,listic state. On this dictated Constituti:on rested also the language, law with its notorious monstrosity - the "CzechoslovaJk languruge" - which was legali1zed and given a special status even though no such tongue ever existed. In prad1ce this ructualliy meant the hegemony o;f the Ozech languruge on the territo,r.y oif the entire state, including the lands inhabited tby the 7,000,000 non-Ozech inhrubitants, a part o;f whom, for example the Sudeten Germans, had a higher level o;f culture and ciivili,z ation than the "ruling" Czech nation. While the o,ld Austrian Constitution issued from the prin:ciiple of language equality, the CZeiCiho~lovak language law introduced the iprindple oif the .p rivileged position od' the non-existent "Ozechoslovaik" language in the Reiplllblic. Regional, county and loca1 se1f-ad!Ininistration was maimed lby legal regulations, which gaive the Prague government the dght to ruppoint one~third of the members of these "se1f-administering" organs.. SinJCe the government nrumed 33 per cent of the officials, it only needed to gain 18 ver cent o;f the electorate so that it could continue to rule "democratically'' with the hel•p of such an artificial majority against the actual majority oif inhaibitants olf Slovakia, Ruthenia and the territories inhalbited by the Gemnans. In Slovakia this 18 .p er cent was not too difficult to attain, with the aid {)If Czech oifficia:ls under Prague, who :placed thousands of Ozechs in Slovakia in various capacities, and the help oif the entire iprnpaganda aipparatus of the state, and ·political corruption, as well as 1police pressure. With the helip of a bit o.f "political geometry" in the Czech lands, for example, in the Prague voting district, only about 22,000 voters were needed to elect one deputy to pM'liament, whereas in many SlovaJk, Magyar, Ruthenian and German districts almost 30,000 votes were needed for one minister. This evidently helped the Czech minority to attain a ma;jority in the Prag,ue parliament. Here we had an actual case where the "largest minority ruled as a state �SLOVAKIA 9 nation over the other :minorities, which together numbered more adherents than the ruling nation" - as Dr. Hassinger of the university o;f Basel claimed. Czech bureaucratic officials censored the non-Czech press ruthlessly; .protests against the existing order were squashed. For examrple, in 1922 alone 1498 editions of newspapers were confiscated by the Ozech censor; instances of deletions of words, sentences, whole para,graphs and entire arUcles were more Il/UmerOUS. In harmony with the stmcture and the sipirit of this regime in so-called "Czechoslovak" governments, the Czechs as a rule held 7'5-------80 1per cent of the ministershirps and the maijority in parliament, so that the Ozech minority in the State, contrary to the most fundamental princiJples of democracy, US1Urt1ped ipractically al,l power of government and absolute control in the issuance of iaws. How the Slovaks, for example, regarded the "Slo1Va;k" ministers in the Prague Government, iwas prOibalbly best described. by d~uty Martin Ra:zus, a Protestant minister and the president of the Slovalk National Party, when on November 4, 1932, in the Prague ,p arliament, he said: "Yes, by obligation we do have two Slo1Vak ministers. But the sad .part aibout it is the fact we do have ministers; but these ministers, however, are not the ministers of the Slovak nation; they are the ministers of the present Herrenvolk, but not the ministers of the SlovaJk nation." OriginaHy, by the peace ~greements, the name of the country created lb y the Czechs and the Slovaks 1w,as spelled with a h~hen: Czecho-Slovakia. Therelby the federaUve character of that State was supposed to be stressed; also that the Ozechs and and the Slo,vaiks were regarded as equal partners in the administration of the joint Republic; f,urtheI1II1ore., it was SUIPP<>sed to indicate that the Czechs would rule in Czech lands and the Slovaks would rule in Slovakia, that is, states riights, of each would be fully enjoyed and respected by ·both nations. AU the ;peace agreements where:by this State was created designated the State in such a manner as a matter of principle; the hyphen prevailed. But as soon as the Czechs gained and consolidated �10 SLOVAKIA their hegemOilJY, the tetirn "Czecho,SlO!Vakia" was, changed to "Czechosl()IV'ahla." From 1923 the law declared thi.$ rup-pelation leg,a lly proper and correct, and any one using the hyiphen was lialble to ,p rosecution by the State. Thereby in a symbolic manner was SIUlppOsed to ,b e demonstrated the thesis rega'I'd:ing the fusion, or better said, the ~bsorption of the SlovaJks by the C?,eehs, so that Czech supremacy in the State could ibe guaranteed even numerically. Official statistics told the world how many Germans, Magyars, Poles, Ruthenians and Jews there were in Ozecho.SlovaJda, but not the nurmlber of Sloivaiks; how many seats were held _in parliament biy the Gernnans, Poles, Magyars and Ruthe~ µians, but not how many were h~d lby the SlOIVaJks. And it was with alil statistics. The Slovaks,. however,. stubborn.ly resisted the spelling of the name of the R~1mlbli:c without the hyphen. · so Rights of Minorities Repudiated The regime of Czech ,hegemony in the Repulblic had ruinous conseque~es not only for the ,Slo;vruks, .but the other nationalities as welt The Germans, Magyars, Poles and Ruthenians complained albout injustices as mlllch as the Slovaiks did. It was not on:ly Slo,vakia that was flooded .with ~ h officials and workers, but also the lands inhabited' by the Ruthenians, Poles, Mrugyars and Germans. ·F or example1 between 191·8 and 1938 there emigrated into Slova,kia more than 200,000 ~ h officials, businessmen and entrepreneurs: During that same time more than 200,000 Slovalks, lacking woy,king opportunities in their homeland, had to emigrate to. Australia, Argentina, Uruguay, Canada, the United States, Bra:zil, Franice and Belgium. In that same ,p eriod rupproximately 150,000 Czechs moved into the territoriy inhabited by the Germans. Simi~ larly, the territories of the Magyars, Po.les and ·Ruthenians were also flooded with Ozechs,. The Ge'.Mlails, for example, who represented 22.3 iper cent of the- population .o f the Republic, held on1y 12.2 per cent official posts on the railmads, 14.4 ,p er cent in the Post Office, in _the state :ii.<}; ministration only 13.1 per cent, and in the · Officers Coi,p·s· only 5.1 per cent were in ructive service. �SLOVAKIA 11 In the central offices, ministries, the highest control offices, etc., the Slovaks represented only 1.3 rper cent of the o!fficials, ibut even these were subordinate and insignificant positions. All the citizens of the Repulblirc, regardless of their nationality, were bound by the same obligations, but the Czechs alone enjoyed special prirvileges and better opportunities. The centralisti'c Prague government was in the hands of Czeichs who regarded their nation as the ruling nation, their people as first-r.a te citizens, while the other nationalities were regarded. as ~ond..,rate. The Ozech government cried that Sl01Valkia ,w as just so. much economic ballast, but fought tooth and nail to keep it in hand at all costs. "Ozechosl01Va!k" democracy as propagandized by the Oooohs and ,p aid iProlfessional non..,Ozerch ipro.paga:.ndists was one thing, while the •b rand actually prevailing in Czecho-'Slovalkia something entirely different. A repetition of history: the Magyars, too, used to ,p roclaim iblatantl;y that the democratic system prevailed in Hungary, while at the same time they were ibr.uWly s,uppre.ssing and exploiting all non-Magyar elements in the country. In the light of these facts, any reference to "Ozechoslovak " democracy evoked a strong revulsion in the hearts of the millions of non-OLech inhabitants who were .burdened with it. They knew in their hearts that it was fraud, even though the Cz~hs presented it to. the world- as the ultimate in democratk systems. The non..,Czerch nationalities were burdened with the same civic obligations as the Czechs were, ibut they did not enjoy equal rights and ;privileges and, therei:fore, it is quite understandruble that at the first opportune moment - and that came in 1938-1939 - they did everything rpossi.lble to escape from the emlbrace of this "isle of, demorcracy." .. "Czechoslovak'! Democracy W.a s a Fraud In this !brief review o!f the "dettnocracy" that was Czecho-Slovakia, the reader will not find details of all the aspects oif the politics oif Czech hegemony in the Republic. That would require a voluminous wo:nk. And practical~ nothing was said regarding the conditions after 1945, inasmuch the trampling upon the most :fundamental rights of �12 SLOVAKIA man, carried out by the Benes-Communist coalition, was so general that many pruges would be needed to delineate only the most important of its aspocts. The mass deportation of millions Olf ,p eople from their homeland, the outlawing and prevention of politica,l ,parties, the limitation of the freedom of the 1press and assemlbly, tens of thousands of political ,p risoners, hundreds of the executed, the many unconstitutional decrees af Benes, etc. - all this had happened with the cooperation of the Czech 1p oliticians, who to<lay pose as champions of democracy. It is regrettable that some .p eople in the West even today do not IOOJke any noticeable effort to imonn themselves of the true nature otf so~called "Czechoslovalk dem<X:ra<cy" and its representatives. It is regrettruble, indeed, that responsible people otf western democracies stiU continue to recognize and favor the ipr~agators of "Czechoslovaikism" former members of the Communist-dominated "National Front" government oif Bene-s and Gottwald, who Slllpiported the proJSoviet poli:cy oif Benes and, hence, ·a re in a great measure responsible for the present terrible plight of the Czech and Slovaik nations. Ozecho-Slo:vakia was not a true democracy, but a fraud and a mockery orf democracy. That was proved by the inhaJbitants Olf the State when the first grea;t crisis struclc and Czecho-Slovakia colla_psed completely. No one, not even the Czechs themsel,ves, fired a single shot to preserve it. Why should any western democratic gcwernment endeawor to preseI1Ve it a;gainst the will of the Sl01Va;ks and others of ~ho-SlovaJkia who are kept in that .State only by force? There must be an answer S01Ineiwhere! • • • WHO SAID IT? The Czechs and .Slovaks had their .State but not for longer than .twenty years. What now remains is infinite!~ worse .than what existed before. . . The politic,a[ theories of (T. G.) Masaryk and Benes collapsed because they could not beair the pra<dtioal test of the times." (·S KUTECNOST, review of the Ozach refugees, London, Vot III, No. 2, p. 33, Feib. 1951). � SEPT~MBER, 1953 SLOVAKIA 1 WAS CZEOHO-SWVAK IA A DEMOCRACY? Dr. Arved Grebert The wo.r ld at large has become aiccustomed to regarding the first Ozecho..Slovruk Republic as an exemplary democratk state, a real "isle of democracy" in Central Europe. From the beginnmg o,f this state in 1918, official Czech propaganda exipended large SJUms of money to convince the world pulblic that such actually was the case. On the other hand, however, aibout a haiif of the total rpotpulation of Czecho~lovakia (The Slo1Vaiks, Germans, Po-les, Magyars, Ruthenians) continually protested this erroneous view and judgement oif conditions in the RepUlblic, ibut little came of it. In view Olf what has ha:pperned in Ozecho-iSlo,va)kia sinc 2 1938 - the ease with which it colla:psed in 1939 and laiter, in 1945, accepted the hegemony of communistic Moscow, it may be interesting to loo!k a .bit closer at the kind o.f democracy the: first Ozecho-'Sloivak Re.public actuaHy was. The Right of Self-Determinatlon and Czecho-Slovakia T. G. Masaryk and Edward Benes set aJbout to break up the Austro-Hungarian Monarichy during World War I in the nrume od: and with the aid of the right of self-determination of nations. They evoiked this basic principle con~ sistenUy and consitantliy. This is attested to .by the literature they pro,pagated, as well as the "Memoirs" they placed before the Peace Conference, wherein they -c laimed the right of self-detemnination of nations in the interests of Czech independence. As soon as the war ended, however, and AUJstria-Hungary lay in ashes, Masaryk and Benes very quickly and conveniently forgot 8J'bout the democratilc princilple oif the right of selif--detemnination of nations and labored to create a state which in suibstance became only a small and bad copy of the old monarehy they had helped to destroy. This newly created and artificial state, which never existed before that time, was first called ib;y the Czechs under Masaryk a.ind Benes "Ozeoho.;Slovrukia" - a synthetic n ame 1 �2 SLOV.AKil u111kn0,wn in the history of either the Czech nation or the Slovak nation before World War . At the ,v ery outset, this synthetic State rol)bed approximately 4,500,000 (3,700,000 Germans, 800,000 Magyars and aJbout 100,000 Poles) of their basic democratic right, the right of self-determination. The Germans, Magyars and Poles were forced within the framework of this artificial State against their eX!pressed will. And three million S1ova:ks and aJbout a ha1f million SUJb-CaI"pathian Ukrainians (the Ruthenians) favored the State only conditionally, that is, on1y if they enjoyed full autonomy within the Repulblk ; when this condition remained unfulfilled they found themselves in opposition to the existence of this :State. A political state is supposed to be the exipression oif the free will of the peoiple the existence of a state is SUIPposed to be in accoro with the will of its inhaJbitants. But Ozecho-lSlova!kia was not such a state; the Prague government, once it was set Uip in ,power, repudiated the basic democratic ,principle of the right of self-deter- . mination of nations - the very principle which brought it into being. We must not forget that the occupation of non-Czech lands took place with wea:pons in hand against the will of the native ,p opulation. Manifestations for the realization of the right of self-determination were bloodily suppressed by the Ozech army. For examiple, in a. single day, on March 4, 1919, the Czech arm,y killed 57 Gemnans and wounded over 100 more, when they demonstrated in German towns for their right to self-determination. Uip to 1921 there were 130 GeI"mans killed during street demonstrations iby the Ozech occupation for,ces. The same situation prevailed in territories inhaJbited iby the Magyars and Poles. Aocording to 1923 statistics, the newly created Czech~lovaJkia was inhabited by some 6,400,000 Czechs and a!bout 7,000,000 non-Czechs. The latter felt that they we,r e roM>ed of their democratirc right to self-determination, when Masaryk and Benes repudiated the promises and agreements made 1b y them when the ReipUJblic was in a state of formation. This was all the more grave and momentous, since the principle of the right of self-determination was a,pplied �SLOVAKIA 3 practkally in the case of Estonia (1,200,000 pop.), Lithuania (2,500,000), Latvia (2,000,000) Finland (3,800,000), M))ania (1,000,000), Nonway (3,000,000), Iceland (110,000), Denmark (3,800,000), etc. - states of wthich the entire popufation numbered less or 8Jpproximately the S3Jllle as, for example, there were Slovaks or Germans in the OzechoSlovaik Repulblfo. So that we might have some idea of the extent oif these realities, we must recall that at that very same time when Ozecho-iSlo1Vakia originated, there originated three small independent states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) in a far more threatened territory, on the !b orders of the UISISR (160,000,000), without the protection of natural borders or synthetic fortiifreations; eaoh one of these states h!!Jd less inhaibitants than Ozecho-;Slo.vaJkia had Slovaiks or Germans who weTe .r obbed ()If their right to selif-.deternnination. And on the borders od' the Soviet colossus there originated Finland, which at that time had only alb out 4,000,000 inhabitants and, therefore, much less than the non-Ozech na tionalities of Ozecho.Slorvalkia who were deprived of their right to se.J.lf-deter.min•a tion. In the case of the A]banians, who inhabit the dangerous Balkan crossroads orf the interests of Italy, Greece and Yugoslaivia, their right to state independence was recognized an,d respected. But the Sudeten Germans were not permitted to join either Austria or Ge:rttnany in 11919, as they h!!Jd desired to, do. And the will of the Slovak nation (3,000,000) was not respected when it decided to join the Ozechs in a common state only on condition that it would enjoy full autonomy within the framework of the Republic. Once in ,p ower, the government of Masaryik and Benes also refosed -to respect the rights of the Ruthenians and the Polish and Magyar minorities. From this standpoint, "Czecho-Slovak" democraicy for the 7,000,000 inhaJbitants of that State was only an empty phrase, a propaganda tenn devoid of content and foundation. A Dict.at.ed Constitution The foundations oif the political structure of every state are represented iby its constitution. The basic prin- �SLOVAKIA ci:ple of every genuine democratic state is that its constitution is the exipression oif the will o!f its inhaJbJ.tants. It is quite ohvious to asslli!lle, where a multinational state is concerned, that all strata of the population, all regions of the state, and all nationalities are properly and duly rep resented when the constitution is created. In Ozecho-.SlO!Vakia, however, the Constitution of Febmary 29, 1920, was exclusively a Czech product, and the Czechs under Masaryk and Benes simply dktated it and forced it upon the majority of the non-Czech population of the State In the so-called Constitutional National Assemibly there was not a single representative of the 3,700,000 Germans, not a single representative of the 800,000 Magyars, and not a single representative of the 100,000 Poles. And the representatives of the Slo,vak nation were not ele ~ted by the people, but simply ~pointed by Prague, and this was done in such a way that ,w ould ibest satisfy Prague: the overwhelming majority of them were proponents of "Czeohoslovalk ism" - the opponents of Slovak autonomy - even though the vast majority of Slo,vaiks were proiponents oif SloiVak autonomy within the framework of the OzechoS1ovak Repulblic. The representatives o.f Czech imperialism and "progressiveness" went so far as to name Czechs as re,presentatiives of Sl01VaJkia , as, for example, Dr. Edward Benes, Dr. Alice .Masaryk, Ing. Joseph Rotnagl, Dr. Aloysius Kolisek, and Ing. Joseph Zaruiba-,P:fofifermann. When Ozecho'-lSlo:vakia was ,b orn not more than 5000 Czechs lived in Slovakia, hence these, Ozechs could hardly be considered as repres enta.tilves of their pec;ple in Slc,v akia. In the twentieth century, when the solution or the granting od' sel!f..,manageiment or independence to some colonial nation of Africa or Asia is debated and negotiated, it is cus tomary that representatives oif the native population spealk in their name. Hut the Czech imperialists under Masaryk and Benes thought otherwise. They prolbaJbly regarded the Slo,vaJks as a nation beneath the level of colonial nations, because they named also five Czechs to, represent it on the Constitutional National Assembly Czechs who were practically ,unknown to the vast majority of the Slovak 1 �SLOVAKIA 5 peoiple. For example, up to that time, Dr. Edward Benes had never been in Slovakia. In this ha:ndpi'oked "parliament" there were 204 Czech, but only 56 Sl()!Valk deputies, and this number included five :C zechs mentioned albo1Ve. Furthermore, there weTe only eight Slovak deputies from the autonomdst bloc in that ruppointed Constitutional National Assem1bly. And it was significant, indeed, that on the very day that the Prague parliament voted for this Constitution, the leader of the Slovak nation and undoubtedly the most eminent polit1cal figure o.f the Slov8!k struggle against Magyarism, Andrew Hlinlka, was beihind bars in a Ozech prison. 1 The Slo;vaik r€ipresentation in that assembly was so unjust that eiven such a notorious adherent of "Ozechoslovaikism" as Dr. Juraj Slavik - now a member of the socalloo "Council cd' Free Ozechoslovakia" which operates out of New Yo,I'lk and Washi.Il!gton - protested at that time that the Slovaks did not hav e sufficient and ,proper representation. The Ozechs reiplie-0. that an adjustment would be made, but nothing hrupipene<l. Because Mr . .SlaiVik did not continue protesting against the injustice, Prague rewarded him for it. In a very short time he ibe1came a minister in the Czech goivernment in Prague. Even Seton-Watson, a close a:nd loyal .friend of T. G. Mas,a,ryk, noted that Sl0vak seats in the legislative assembly were to a certain extent filled by arnitrary a,ppointments (Sloivakia Then And Now" - ipg. 12). Under sU!ch undemocratic conditions the Constitution that emerged enthroned: a regime of Oz~h hegemony in the Czecho-iSloivaJk State. The entire Ozecho-Slova>k politi,cal system rested on this Constitution which is dictated iby the Czechs . And since the Constituiton was diotated, therefore dicfated was also the entire system in its relationshi1p to the 7,000,000 non-CzeiCh citizens. Where a state is foriced on a half of its, ,poipulation, where a Constitution is dictated to half the ;poipulation and against its most elementary political, economic and ooltUTal interests, where 7,000,000 'people are overruled and made a minority od', there can be no serious talk aibout a democratic state. In Czecho-rS'lovakia the �G SLOVAKIA Czechs sought to realize the very thing they had fought against so furiously in Austria. And realize it they did, even if eventually it did mean the utter ruin of the, State they had created under Masa.ryik and Benes. Centralism vs. Federalism The dictated Ozech Constitution installed a rugged centralistic sy,stem in Ozecho-Sloivakia; ,p ractically all key political positions and all power rested in Czech hands. Among the fundamental :principles of democratic states belongs tihe principle that multinational or multilingual states should .be origaruzed on a federalistic basis, that is, with the aid of aiutonomy of the indirvidrual minorities, since it is only in this manner that the ,p rinciples of . justice in a mutual relationshtp of the individual nationalities of the state can be realized in pra,,ctiice. But the great "Czech,oslovaJk Democrats" rapudiated this prin'Ciiple and instituted a strong centralistic regime. By so doing they not only failed to keep the -promises made and given the Slovaks and, Ruthenians and the minorities, but also instituted a regime which was in sulbstance a profanation and mookery of democracy. Behind the mask of democratic phrases they installed a regime of Ozech national imperialism. To safeguard their hegemony, the Czechs dictated into the Constitution paragrruphs which in practice prevented a change of the Constitution (the enactments about the- necessity of a 3/ 5 and 2/ 3 ,majority). Ozech hegemony was thus secured, because representatives of the non-Czech p01pulation could never attain this required majority in the Prag;ue Parliament without the Ozechs and, hence, could never uipset Czech hegemony in the State in constitutional or parliamentary manner. The dictated constitution and the Ozech hegemony emanating therefrom were then safeguarded by the notorious "law for the protection of the Republic" (No. 50) of March 23, 1923, which made the 7,000,000 non-Czech citizens of the various nationalities liaible to rprosecution on the grounds of anti...state a;ctivities, if they rpersisted in their rightful demands for the recognition of and respect for their �SLOVAKIA 7 right to sehf-detemrination , the 1principle upon which the Republic was sU1pposed to ha,ve 'b een founded. The Czech Communists ,wsed this law to advantage when they got hold af the key .p ositions in the State in 1945 and, later, in 1948, had practically no trouible at all in seizing a1l power in the Reipulblitc in a "legal and constitutional" way. Another laJW, the law regarding political parties (No. 201 of Octolber 25, 1953) , provided for the outlawing and dissolution of any political ,p arty if its arctivity seriously endangered the "constitutional unity" - and "constitutional unity'' in practice simply :meant Ozech rule oiver the nonCzech citizens. On the basis of this law, the ,political demand for the territorial legislatiive autonomy of SlovaJkia the -c ondition under which the .Slovak,s decided to form a joint state with the Czechs - was cause for prooecution by the State. Dr. Ivan Derer, who sold his Slovak birthright for a mess Olf Ozech pottage, as Minister of Justice demanded on various occasions to use this law against the Hlin!ka Sloivak Poople's Party, because it persistently demanded the f.uilifillment olf the Pittsburgh ·P act of May 30, 1918 - that is, states, rights or foll aiutonoony for Slovakia. Prague, however, ordered Derer to withhold action; the centralists were not entirely ,bl.ind to the development olf the internationaJl situation, and the consequencoo of such action: the RepuibUc would have undoUibtedly collapsed 10\Il!g before 1939 if Derer was not overruled. Ozech centralism. pulled in its horns a little _and attempted to show the Slovaks that it favored them by not aipplying the law. Of course, the Slova;ks, by that time, .were wise to the Czech centn1.lists. The Anti-Democratic Regrme of Czech Hegemony . Czech hegemony was also protected b~ a whole series of la.ws and regulations which emanated from the undemocratic' Constitution which was forced on the non-Ozech popuiation. The Constitution, for example, "legalized" the notorious fiction - better said the international fraud oif the i•Ozechoslovak nation" in the political · and ethnic sense·, a nation which had never existed and, in the end, from the ·existence of which even its creators and propaga~ �SLOVAKIA tors fled with their notorious Kosice .Agreement with the Communists in 1'946. With the he1p of this fraud, the fiction of a national state was ipromo.ted against the reality of a nationa,listic state. On this dictated Constituti:on rested also the language, law with its notorious monstrosity - the "CzechoslovaJk languruge" - which was legali1zed and given a special status even though no such tongue ever existed. In prad1ce this ructualliy meant the hegemony o;f the Ozech languruge on the territo,r.y oif the entire state, including the lands inhabited tby the 7,000,000 non-Ozech inhrubitants, a part o;f whom, for example the Sudeten Germans, had a higher level o;f culture and ciivili,z ation than the "ruling" Czech nation. While the o,ld Austrian Constitution issued from the prin:ciiple of language equality, the CZeiCiho~lovak language law introduced the iprindple oif the .p rivileged position od' the non-existent "Ozechoslovaik" language in the Reiplllblic. Regional, county and loca1 se1f-ad!Ininistration was maimed lby legal regulations, which gaive the Prague government the dght to ruppoint one~third of the members of these "se1f-administering" organs.. SinJCe the government nrumed 33 per cent of the officials, it only needed to gain 18 ver cent o;f the electorate so that it could continue to rule "democratically'' with the hel•p of such an artificial majority against the actual majority oif inhaibitants olf Slovakia, Ruthenia and the territories inhalbited by the Gemnans. In Slovakia this 18 .p er cent was not too difficult to attain, with the aid {)If Czech oifficia:ls under Prague, who :placed thousands of Ozechs in Slovakia in various capacities, and the help oif the entire iprnpaganda aipparatus of the state, and ·political corruption, as well as 1police pressure. With the helip of a bit o.f "political geometry" in the Czech lands, for example, in the Prague voting district, only about 22,000 voters were needed to elect one deputy to pM'liament, whereas in many SlovaJk, Magyar, Ruthenian and German districts almost 30,000 votes were needed for one minister. This evidently helped the Czech minority to attain a ma;jority in the Prag,ue parliament. Here we had an actual case where the "largest minority ruled as a state �SLOVAKIA 9 nation over the other :minorities, which together numbered more adherents than the ruling nation" - as Dr. Hassinger of the university o;f Basel claimed. Czech bureaucratic officials censored the non-Czech press ruthlessly; .protests against the existing order were squashed. For examrple, in 1922 alone 1498 editions of newspapers were confiscated by the Ozech censor; instances of deletions of words, sentences, whole para,graphs and entire arUcles were more Il/UmerOUS. In harmony with the stmcture and the sipirit of this regime in so-called "Czechoslovak" governments, the Czechs as a rule held 7'5-------80 1per cent of the ministershirps and the maijority in parliament, so that the Ozech minority in the State, contrary to the most fundamental princiJples of democracy, US1Urt1ped ipractically al,l power of government and absolute control in the issuance of iaws. How the Slovaks, for example, regarded the "Slo1Va;k" ministers in the Prague Government, iwas prOibalbly best described. by d~uty Martin Ra:zus, a Protestant minister and the president of the Slovalk National Party, when on November 4, 1932, in the Prague ,p arliament, he said: "Yes, by obligation we do have two Slo1Vak ministers. But the sad .part aibout it is the fact we do have ministers; but these ministers, however, are not the ministers of the Slovak nation; they are the ministers of the present Herrenvolk, but not the ministers of the SlovaJk nation." OriginaHy, by the peace ~greements, the name of the country created lb y the Czechs and the Slovaks 1w,as spelled with a h~hen: Czecho-Slovakia. Therelby the federaUve character of that State was supposed to be stressed; also that the Ozechs and and the Slo,vaiks were regarded as equal partners in the administration of the joint Republic; f,urtheI1II1ore., it was SUIPP<>sed to indicate that the Czechs would rule in Czech lands and the Slovaks would rule in Slovakia, that is, states riights, of each would be fully enjoyed and respected by ·both nations. AU the ;peace agreements where:by this State was created designated the State in such a manner as a matter of principle; the hyphen prevailed. But as soon as the Czechs gained and consolidated �10 SLOVAKIA their hegemOilJY, the tetirn "Czecho,SlO!Vakia" was, changed to "Czechosl()IV'ahla." From 1923 the law declared thi.$ rup-pelation leg,a lly proper and correct, and any one using the hyiphen was lialble to ,p rosecution by the State. Thereby in a symbolic manner was SIUlppOsed to ,b e demonstrated the thesis rega'I'd:ing the fusion, or better said, the ~bsorption of the SlovaJks by the C?,eehs, so that Czech supremacy in the State could ibe guaranteed even numerically. Official statistics told the world how many Germans, Magyars, Poles, Ruthenians and Jews there were in Ozecho.SlovaJda, but not the nurmlber of Sloivaiks; how many seats were held _in parliament biy the Gernnans, Poles, Magyars and Ruthe~ µians, but not how many were h~d lby the SlOIVaJks. And it was with alil statistics. The Slovaks,. however,. stubborn.ly resisted the spelling of the name of the R~1mlbli:c without the hyphen. · so Rights of Minorities Repudiated The regime of Czech ,hegemony in the Repulblic had ruinous conseque~es not only for the ,Slo;vruks, .but the other nationalities as welt The Germans, Magyars, Poles and Ruthenians complained albout injustices as mlllch as the Slovaiks did. It was not on:ly Slo,vakia that was flooded .with ~ h officials and workers, but also the lands inhabited' by the Ruthenians, Poles, Mrugyars and Germans. ·F or example1 between 191·8 and 1938 there emigrated into Slova,kia more than 200,000 ~ h officials, businessmen and entrepreneurs: During that same time more than 200,000 Slovalks, lacking woy,king opportunities in their homeland, had to emigrate to. Australia, Argentina, Uruguay, Canada, the United States, Bra:zil, Franice and Belgium. In that same ,p eriod rupproximately 150,000 Czechs moved into the territoriy inhabited by the Germans. Simi~ larly, the territories of the Magyars, Po.les and ·Ruthenians were also flooded with Ozechs,. The Ge'.Mlails, for example, who represented 22.3 iper cent of the- population .o f the Republic, held on1y 12.2 per cent official posts on the railmads, 14.4 ,p er cent in the Post Office, in _the state :ii.<}; ministration only 13.1 per cent, and in the · Officers Coi,p·s· only 5.1 per cent were in ructive service. �SLOVAKIA 11 In the central offices, ministries, the highest control offices, etc., the Slovaks represented only 1.3 rper cent of the o!fficials, ibut even these were subordinate and insignificant positions. All the citizens of the Repulblirc, regardless of their nationality, were bound by the same obligations, but the Czechs alone enjoyed special prirvileges and better opportunities. The centralisti'c Prague government was in the hands of Czeichs who regarded their nation as the ruling nation, their people as first-r.a te citizens, while the other nationalities were regarded. as ~ond..,rate. The Ozech government cried that Sl01Valkia ,w as just so. much economic ballast, but fought tooth and nail to keep it in hand at all costs. "Ozechosl01Va!k" democracy as propagandized by the Oooohs and ,p aid iProlfessional non..,Ozerch ipro.paga:.ndists was one thing, while the •b rand actually prevailing in Czecho-'Slovalkia something entirely different. A repetition of history: the Magyars, too, used to ,p roclaim iblatantl;y that the democratic system prevailed in Hungary, while at the same time they were ibr.uWly s,uppre.ssing and exploiting all non-Magyar elements in the country. In the light of these facts, any reference to "Ozechoslovak " democracy evoked a strong revulsion in the hearts of the millions of non-OLech inhabitants who were .burdened with it. They knew in their hearts that it was fraud, even though the Cz~hs presented it to. the world- as the ultimate in democratk systems. The non..,Czerch nationalities were burdened with the same civic obligations as the Czechs were, ibut they did not enjoy equal rights and ;privileges and, therei:fore, it is quite understandruble that at the first opportune moment - and that came in 1938-1939 - they did everything rpossi.lble to escape from the emlbrace of this "isle of, demorcracy." .. "Czechoslovak'! Democracy W.a s a Fraud In this !brief review o!f the "dettnocracy" that was Czecho-Slovakia, the reader will not find details of all the aspects oif the politics oif Czech hegemony in the Republic. That would require a voluminous wo:nk. And practical~ nothing was said regarding the conditions after 1945, inasmuch the trampling upon the most :fundamental rights of �12 SLOVAKIA man, carried out by the Benes-Communist coalition, was so general that many pruges would be needed to delineate only the most important of its aspocts. The mass deportation of millions Olf ,p eople from their homeland, the outlawing and prevention of politica,l ,parties, the limitation of the freedom of the 1press and assemlbly, tens of thousands of political ,p risoners, hundreds of the executed, the many unconstitutional decrees af Benes, etc. - all this had happened with the cooperation of the Czech 1p oliticians, who to<lay pose as champions of democracy. It is regrettable that some .p eople in the West even today do not IOOJke any noticeable effort to imonn themselves of the true nature otf so~called "Czechoslovalk dem<X:ra<cy" and its representatives. It is regrettruble, indeed, that responsible people otf western democracies stiU continue to recognize and favor the ipr~agators of "Czechoslovaikism" former members of the Communist-dominated "National Front" government oif Bene-s and Gottwald, who Slllpiported the proJSoviet poli:cy oif Benes and, hence, ·a re in a great measure responsible for the present terrible plight of the Czech and Slovaik nations. Ozecho-Slo:vakia was not a true democracy, but a fraud and a mockery orf democracy. That was proved by the inhaJbitants Olf the State when the first grea;t crisis struclc and Czecho-Slovakia colla_psed completely. No one, not even the Czechs themsel,ves, fired a single shot to preserve it. Why should any western democratic gcwernment endeawor to preseI1Ve it a;gainst the will of the Sl01Va;ks and others of ~ho-SlovaJkia who are kept in that .State only by force? There must be an answer S01Ineiwhere! • • • WHO SAID IT? The Czechs and .Slovaks had their .State but not for longer than .twenty years. What now remains is infinite!~ worse .than what existed before. . . The politic,a[ theories of (T. G.) Masaryk and Benes collapsed because they could not beair the pra<dtioal test of the times." (·S KUTECNOST, review of the Ozach refugees, London, Vot III, No. 2, p. 33, Feib. 1951). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SEPT~MBER, 1953 SLOVAKIA 1 WAS CZEOHO-SWVAK IA A DEMOCRACY? Dr. Arved Grebert The wo.r ld at large has become aiccustomed to regarding the first Ozecho..Slovruk Republic as an exemplary democratk state, a real "isle of democracy" in Central Europe. From the beginnmg o,f this state in 1918, official Czech propaganda exipended large SJUms of money to convince the world pulblic that such actually was the case. On the other hand, however, aibout a haiif of the total rpotpulation of Czecho~lovakia (The Slo1Vaiks, Germans, Po-les, Magyars, Ruthenians) continually protested this erroneous view and judgement oif conditions in the RepUlblic, ibut little came of it. In view Olf what has ha:pperned in Ozecho-iSlo,va)kia sinc 2 1938 - the ease with which it colla:psed in 1939 and laiter, in 1945, accepted the hegemony of communistic Moscow, it may be interesting to loo!k a .bit closer at the kind o.f democracy the: first Ozecho-'Sloivak Re.public actuaHy was. The Right of Self-Determinatlon and Czecho-Slovakia T. G. Masaryk and Edward Benes set aJbout to break up the Austro-Hungarian Monarichy during World War I in the nrume od: and with the aid of the right of self-determination of nations. They evoiked this basic principle con~ sistenUy and consitantliy. This is attested to .by the literature they pro,pagated, as well as the "Memoirs" they placed before the Peace Conference, wherein they -c laimed the right of self-detemnination of nations in the interests of Czech independence. As soon as the war ended, however, and AUJstria-Hungary lay in ashes, Masaryk and Benes very quickly and conveniently forgot 8J'bout the democratilc princilple oif the right of selif--detemnination of nations and labored to create a state which in suibstance became only a small and bad copy of the old monarehy they had helped to destroy. This newly created and artificial state, which never existed before that time, was first called ib;y the Czechs under Masaryk a.ind Benes "Ozeoho.;Slovrukia" - a synthetic n ame 1 2 SLOV.AKil u111kn0,wn in the history of either the Czech nation or the Slovak nation before World War . At the ,v ery outset, this synthetic State rol)bed approximately 4,500,000 (3,700,000 Germans, 800,000 Magyars and aJbout 100,000 Poles) of their basic democratic right, the right of self-determination. The Germans, Magyars and Poles were forced within the framework of this artificial State against their eX!pressed will. And three million S1ova:ks and aJbout a ha1f million SUJb-CaI"pathian Ukrainians (the Ruthenians) favored the State only conditionally, that is, on1y if they enjoyed full autonomy within the Repulblk ; when this condition remained unfulfilled they found themselves in opposition to the existence of this :State. A political state is supposed to be the exipression oif the free will of the peoiple the existence of a state is SUIPposed to be in accoro with the will of its inhaJbitants. But Ozecho-lSlova!kia was not such a state; the Prague government, once it was set Uip in ,power, repudiated the basic democratic ,principle of the right of self-deter- . mination of nations - the very principle which brought it into being. We must not forget that the occupation of non-Czech lands took place with wea:pons in hand against the will of the native ,p opulation. Manifestations for the realization of the right of self-determination were bloodily suppressed by the Ozech army. For examiple, in a. single day, on March 4, 1919, the Czech arm,y killed 57 Gemnans and wounded over 100 more, when they demonstrated in German towns for their right to self-determination. Uip to 1921 there were 130 GeI"mans killed during street demonstrations iby the Ozech occupation for,ces. The same situation prevailed in territories inhaJbited iby the Magyars and Poles. Aocording to 1923 statistics, the newly created Czech~lovaJkia was inhabited by some 6,400,000 Czechs and a!bout 7,000,000 non-Czechs. The latter felt that they we,r e roM>ed of their democratirc right to self-determination, when Masaryk and Benes repudiated the promises and agreements made 1b y them when the ReipUJblic was in a state of formation. This was all the more grave and momentous, since the principle of the right of self-determination was a,pplied SLOVAKIA 3 practkally in the case of Estonia (1,200,000 pop.), Lithuania (2,500,000), Latvia (2,000,000) Finland (3,800,000), M))ania (1,000,000), Nonway (3,000,000), Iceland (110,000), Denmark (3,800,000), etc. - states of wthich the entire popufation numbered less or 8Jpproximately the S3Jllle as, for example, there were Slovaks or Germans in the OzechoSlovaik Repulblfo. So that we might have some idea of the extent oif these realities, we must recall that at that very same time when Ozecho-iSlo1Vakia originated, there originated three small independent states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) in a far more threatened territory, on the !b orders of the UISISR (160,000,000), without the protection of natural borders or synthetic fortiifreations; eaoh one of these states h!!Jd less inhaibitants than Ozecho-;Slo.vaJkia had Slovaiks or Germans who weTe .r obbed ()If their right to selif-.deternnination. And on the borders od' the Soviet colossus there originated Finland, which at that time had only alb out 4,000,000 inhabitants and, therefore, much less than the non-Ozech na tionalities of Ozecho.Slorvalkia who were deprived of their right to se.J.lf-deter.min•a tion. In the case of the A]banians, who inhabit the dangerous Balkan crossroads orf the interests of Italy, Greece and Yugoslaivia, their right to state independence was recognized an,d respected. But the Sudeten Germans were not permitted to join either Austria or Ge:rttnany in 11919, as they h!!Jd desired to, do. And the will of the Slovak nation (3,000,000) was not respected when it decided to join the Ozechs in a common state only on condition that it would enjoy full autonomy within the framework of the Republic. Once in ,p ower, the government of Masaryik and Benes also refosed -to respect the rights of the Ruthenians and the Polish and Magyar minorities. From this standpoint, "Czecho-Slovak" democraicy for the 7,000,000 inhaJbitants of that State was only an empty phrase, a propaganda tenn devoid of content and foundation. A Dict.at.ed Constitution The foundations oif the political structure of every state are represented iby its constitution. The basic prin- SLOVAKIA ci:ple of every genuine democratic state is that its constitution is the exipression oif the will o!f its inhaJbJ.tants. It is quite ohvious to asslli!lle, where a multinational state is concerned, that all strata of the population, all regions of the state, and all nationalities are properly and duly rep resented when the constitution is created. In Ozecho-.SlO!Vakia, however, the Constitution of Febmary 29, 1920, was exclusively a Czech product, and the Czechs under Masaryk and Benes simply dktated it and forced it upon the majority of the non-Czech population of the State In the so-called Constitutional National Assemibly there was not a single representative of the 3,700,000 Germans, not a single representative of the 800,000 Magyars, and not a single representative of the 100,000 Poles. And the representatives of the Slo,vak nation were not ele ~ted by the people, but simply ~pointed by Prague, and this was done in such a way that ,w ould ibest satisfy Prague: the overwhelming majority of them were proponents of "Czeohoslovalk ism" - the opponents of Slovak autonomy - even though the vast majority of Slo,vaiks were proiponents oif SloiVak autonomy within the framework of the OzechoS1ovak Repulblic. The representatives o.f Czech imperialism and "progressiveness" went so far as to name Czechs as re,presentatiives of Sl01VaJkia , as, for example, Dr. Edward Benes, Dr. Alice .Masaryk, Ing. Joseph Rotnagl, Dr. Aloysius Kolisek, and Ing. Joseph Zaruiba-,P:fofifermann. When Ozecho'-lSlo:vakia was ,b orn not more than 5000 Czechs lived in Slovakia, hence these, Ozechs could hardly be considered as repres enta.tilves of their pec;ple in Slc,v akia. In the twentieth century, when the solution or the granting od' sel!f..,manageiment or independence to some colonial nation of Africa or Asia is debated and negotiated, it is cus tomary that representatives oif the native population spealk in their name. Hut the Czech imperialists under Masaryk and Benes thought otherwise. They prolbaJbly regarded the Slo,vaJks as a nation beneath the level of colonial nations, because they named also five Czechs to, represent it on the Constitutional National Assembly Czechs who were practically ,unknown to the vast majority of the Slovak 1 SLOVAKIA 5 peoiple. For example, up to that time, Dr. Edward Benes had never been in Slovakia. In this ha:ndpi'oked "parliament" there were 204 Czech, but only 56 Sl()!Valk deputies, and this number included five :C zechs mentioned albo1Ve. Furthermore, there weTe only eight Slovak deputies from the autonomdst bloc in that ruppointed Constitutional National Assem1bly. And it was significant, indeed, that on the very day that the Prague parliament voted for this Constitution, the leader of the Slovak nation and undoubtedly the most eminent polit1cal figure o.f the Slov8!k struggle against Magyarism, Andrew Hlinlka, was beihind bars in a Ozech prison. 1 The Slo;vaik r€ipresentation in that assembly was so unjust that eiven such a notorious adherent of "Ozechoslovaikism" as Dr. Juraj Slavik - now a member of the socalloo "Council cd' Free Ozechoslovakia" which operates out of New Yo,I'lk and Washi.Il!gton - protested at that time that the Slovaks did not hav e sufficient and ,proper representation. The Ozechs reiplie-0. that an adjustment would be made, but nothing hrupipene<l. Because Mr . .SlaiVik did not continue protesting against the injustice, Prague rewarded him for it. In a very short time he ibe1came a minister in the Czech goivernment in Prague. Even Seton-Watson, a close a:nd loyal .friend of T. G. Mas,a,ryk, noted that Sl0vak seats in the legislative assembly were to a certain extent filled by arnitrary a,ppointments (Sloivakia Then And Now" - ipg. 12). Under sU!ch undemocratic conditions the Constitution that emerged enthroned: a regime of Oz~h hegemony in the Czecho-iSloivaJk State. The entire Ozecho-Slova>k politi,cal system rested on this Constitution which is dictated iby the Czechs . And since the Constituiton was diotated, therefore dicfated was also the entire system in its relationshi1p to the 7,000,000 non-CzeiCh citizens. Where a state is foriced on a half of its, ,poipulation, where a Constitution is dictated to half the ;poipulation and against its most elementary political, economic and ooltUTal interests, where 7,000,000 'people are overruled and made a minority od', there can be no serious talk aibout a democratic state. In Czecho-rS'lovakia the G SLOVAKIA Czechs sought to realize the very thing they had fought against so furiously in Austria. And realize it they did, even if eventually it did mean the utter ruin of the, State they had created under Masa.ryik and Benes. Centralism vs. Federalism The dictated Ozech Constitution installed a rugged centralistic sy,stem in Ozecho-Sloivakia; ,p ractically all key political positions and all power rested in Czech hands. Among the fundamental :principles of democratic states belongs tihe principle that multinational or multilingual states should .be origaruzed on a federalistic basis, that is, with the aid of aiutonomy of the indirvidrual minorities, since it is only in this manner that the ,p rinciples of . justice in a mutual relationshtp of the individual nationalities of the state can be realized in pra,,ctiice. But the great "Czech,oslovaJk Democrats" rapudiated this prin'Ciiple and instituted a strong centralistic regime. By so doing they not only failed to keep the -promises made and given the Slovaks and, Ruthenians and the minorities, but also instituted a regime which was in sulbstance a profanation and mookery of democracy. Behind the mask of democratic phrases they installed a regime of Ozech national imperialism. To safeguard their hegemony, the Czechs dictated into the Constitution paragrruphs which in practice prevented a change of the Constitution (the enactments about the- necessity of a 3/ 5 and 2/ 3 ,majority). Ozech hegemony was thus secured, because representatives of the non-Czech p01pulation could never attain this required majority in the Prag;ue Parliament without the Ozechs and, hence, could never uipset Czech hegemony in the State in constitutional or parliamentary manner. The dictated constitution and the Ozech hegemony emanating therefrom were then safeguarded by the notorious "law for the protection of the Republic" (No. 50) of March 23, 1923, which made the 7,000,000 non-Czech citizens of the various nationalities liaible to rprosecution on the grounds of anti...state a;ctivities, if they rpersisted in their rightful demands for the recognition of and respect for their SLOVAKIA 7 right to sehf-detemrination , the 1principle upon which the Republic was sU1pposed to ha,ve 'b een founded. The Czech Communists ,wsed this law to advantage when they got hold af the key .p ositions in the State in 1945 and, later, in 1948, had practically no trouible at all in seizing a1l power in the Reipulblitc in a "legal and constitutional" way. Another laJW, the law regarding political parties (No. 201 of Octolber 25, 1953) , provided for the outlawing and dissolution of any political ,p arty if its arctivity seriously endangered the "constitutional unity" - and "constitutional unity'' in practice simply :meant Ozech rule oiver the nonCzech citizens. On the basis of this law, the ,political demand for the territorial legislatiive autonomy of SlovaJkia the -c ondition under which the .Slovak,s decided to form a joint state with the Czechs - was cause for prooecution by the State. Dr. Ivan Derer, who sold his Slovak birthright for a mess Olf Ozech pottage, as Minister of Justice demanded on various occasions to use this law against the Hlin!ka Sloivak Poople's Party, because it persistently demanded the f.uilifillment olf the Pittsburgh ·P act of May 30, 1918 - that is, states, rights or foll aiutonoony for Slovakia. Prague, however, ordered Derer to withhold action; the centralists were not entirely ,bl.ind to the development olf the internationaJl situation, and the consequencoo of such action: the RepuibUc would have undoUibtedly collapsed 10\Il!g before 1939 if Derer was not overruled. Ozech centralism. pulled in its horns a little _and attempted to show the Slovaks that it favored them by not aipplying the law. Of course, the Slova;ks, by that time, .were wise to the Czech centn1.lists. The Anti-Democratic Regrme of Czech Hegemony . Czech hegemony was also protected b~ a whole series of la.ws and regulations which emanated from the undemocratic' Constitution which was forced on the non-Ozech popuiation. The Constitution, for example, "legalized" the notorious fiction - better said the international fraud oif the i•Ozechoslovak nation" in the political · and ethnic sense·, a nation which had never existed and, in the end, from the ·existence of which even its creators and propaga~ SLOVAKIA tors fled with their notorious Kosice .Agreement with the Communists in 1'946. With the he1p of this fraud, the fiction of a national state was ipromo.ted against the reality of a nationa,listic state. On this dictated Constituti:on rested also the language, law with its notorious monstrosity - the "CzechoslovaJk languruge" - which was legali1zed and given a special status even though no such tongue ever existed. In prad1ce this ructualliy meant the hegemony o;f the Ozech languruge on the territo,r.y oif the entire state, including the lands inhabited tby the 7,000,000 non-Ozech inhrubitants, a part o;f whom, for example the Sudeten Germans, had a higher level o;f culture and ciivili,z ation than the "ruling" Czech nation. While the o,ld Austrian Constitution issued from the prin:ciiple of language equality, the CZeiCiho~lovak language law introduced the iprindple oif the .p rivileged position od' the non-existent "Ozechoslovaik" language in the Reiplllblic. Regional, county and loca1 se1f-ad!Ininistration was maimed lby legal regulations, which gaive the Prague government the dght to ruppoint one~third of the members of these "se1f-administering" organs.. SinJCe the government nrumed 33 per cent of the officials, it only needed to gain 18 ver cent o;f the electorate so that it could continue to rule "democratically'' with the hel•p of such an artificial majority against the actual majority oif inhaibitants olf Slovakia, Ruthenia and the territories inhalbited by the Gemnans. In Slovakia this 18 .p er cent was not too difficult to attain, with the aid {)If Czech oifficia:ls under Prague, who :placed thousands of Ozechs in Slovakia in various capacities, and the help oif the entire iprnpaganda aipparatus of the state, and ·political corruption, as well as 1police pressure. With the helip of a bit o.f "political geometry" in the Czech lands, for example, in the Prague voting district, only about 22,000 voters were needed to elect one deputy to pM'liament, whereas in many SlovaJk, Magyar, Ruthenian and German districts almost 30,000 votes were needed for one minister. This evidently helped the Czech minority to attain a ma;jority in the Prag,ue parliament. Here we had an actual case where the "largest minority ruled as a state SLOVAKIA 9 nation over the other :minorities, which together numbered more adherents than the ruling nation" - as Dr. Hassinger of the university o;f Basel claimed. Czech bureaucratic officials censored the non-Czech press ruthlessly; .protests against the existing order were squashed. For examrple, in 1922 alone 1498 editions of newspapers were confiscated by the Ozech censor; instances of deletions of words, sentences, whole para,graphs and entire arUcles were more Il/UmerOUS. In harmony with the stmcture and the sipirit of this regime in so-called "Czechoslovak" governments, the Czechs as a rule held 7'5-------80 1per cent of the ministershirps and the maijority in parliament, so that the Ozech minority in the State, contrary to the most fundamental princiJples of democracy, US1Urt1ped ipractically al,l power of government and absolute control in the issuance of iaws. How the Slovaks, for example, regarded the "Slo1Va;k" ministers in the Prague Government, iwas prOibalbly best described. by d~uty Martin Ra:zus, a Protestant minister and the president of the Slovalk National Party, when on November 4, 1932, in the Prague ,p arliament, he said: "Yes, by obligation we do have two Slo1Vak ministers. But the sad .part aibout it is the fact we do have ministers; but these ministers, however, are not the ministers of the Slovak nation; they are the ministers of the present Herrenvolk, but not the ministers of the SlovaJk nation." OriginaHy, by the peace ~greements, the name of the country created lb y the Czechs and the Slovaks 1w,as spelled with a h~hen: Czecho-Slovakia. Therelby the federaUve character of that State was supposed to be stressed; also that the Ozechs and and the Slo,vaiks were regarded as equal partners in the administration of the joint Republic; f,urtheI1II1ore., it was SUIPP<>sed to indicate that the Czechs would rule in Czech lands and the Slovaks would rule in Slovakia, that is, states riights, of each would be fully enjoyed and respected by ·both nations. AU the ;peace agreements where:by this State was created designated the State in such a manner as a matter of principle; the hyphen prevailed. But as soon as the Czechs gained and consolidated 10 SLOVAKIA their hegemOilJY, the tetirn "Czecho,SlO!Vakia" was, changed to "Czechosl()IV'ahla." From 1923 the law declared thi.$ rup-pelation leg,a lly proper and correct, and any one using the hyiphen was lialble to ,p rosecution by the State. Thereby in a symbolic manner was SIUlppOsed to ,b e demonstrated the thesis rega'I'd:ing the fusion, or better said, the ~bsorption of the SlovaJks by the C?,eehs, so that Czech supremacy in the State could ibe guaranteed even numerically. Official statistics told the world how many Germans, Magyars, Poles, Ruthenians and Jews there were in Ozecho.SlovaJda, but not the nurmlber of Sloivaiks; how many seats were held _in parliament biy the Gernnans, Poles, Magyars and Ruthe~ µians, but not how many were h~d lby the SlOIVaJks. And it was with alil statistics. The Slovaks,. however,. stubborn.ly resisted the spelling of the name of the R~1mlbli:c without the hyphen. · so Rights of Minorities Repudiated The regime of Czech ,hegemony in the Repulblic had ruinous conseque~es not only for the ,Slo;vruks, .but the other nationalities as welt The Germans, Magyars, Poles and Ruthenians complained albout injustices as mlllch as the Slovaiks did. It was not on:ly Slo,vakia that was flooded .with ~ h officials and workers, but also the lands inhabited' by the Ruthenians, Poles, Mrugyars and Germans. ·F or example1 between 191·8 and 1938 there emigrated into Slova,kia more than 200,000 ~ h officials, businessmen and entrepreneurs: During that same time more than 200,000 Slovalks, lacking woy,king opportunities in their homeland, had to emigrate to. Australia, Argentina, Uruguay, Canada, the United States, Bra:zil, Franice and Belgium. In that same ,p eriod rupproximately 150,000 Czechs moved into the territoriy inhabited by the Germans. Simi~ larly, the territories of the Magyars, Po.les and ·Ruthenians were also flooded with Ozechs,. The Ge'.Mlails, for example, who represented 22.3 iper cent of the- population .o f the Republic, held on1y 12.2 per cent official posts on the railmads, 14.4 ,p er cent in the Post Office, in _the state :ii.<}; ministration only 13.1 per cent, and in the · Officers Coi,p·s· only 5.1 per cent were in ructive service. SLOVAKIA 11 In the central offices, ministries, the highest control offices, etc., the Slovaks represented only 1.3 rper cent of the o!fficials, ibut even these were subordinate and insignificant positions. All the citizens of the Repulblirc, regardless of their nationality, were bound by the same obligations, but the Czechs alone enjoyed special prirvileges and better opportunities. The centralisti'c Prague government was in the hands of Czeichs who regarded their nation as the ruling nation, their people as first-r.a te citizens, while the other nationalities were regarded. as ~ond..,rate. The Ozech government cried that Sl01Valkia ,w as just so. much economic ballast, but fought tooth and nail to keep it in hand at all costs. "Ozechosl01Va!k" democracy as propagandized by the Oooohs and ,p aid iProlfessional non..,Ozerch ipro.paga:.ndists was one thing, while the •b rand actually prevailing in Czecho-'Slovalkia something entirely different. A repetition of history: the Magyars, too, used to ,p roclaim iblatantl;y that the democratic system prevailed in Hungary, while at the same time they were ibr.uWly s,uppre.ssing and exploiting all non-Magyar elements in the country. In the light of these facts, any reference to "Ozechoslovak " democracy evoked a strong revulsion in the hearts of the millions of non-OLech inhabitants who were .burdened with it. They knew in their hearts that it was fraud, even though the Cz~hs presented it to. the world- as the ultimate in democratk systems. The non..,Czerch nationalities were burdened with the same civic obligations as the Czechs were, ibut they did not enjoy equal rights and ;privileges and, therei:fore, it is quite understandruble that at the first opportune moment - and that came in 1938-1939 - they did everything rpossi.lble to escape from the emlbrace of this "isle of, demorcracy." .. "Czechoslovak'! Democracy W.a s a Fraud In this !brief review o!f the "dettnocracy" that was Czecho-Slovakia, the reader will not find details of all the aspects oif the politics oif Czech hegemony in the Republic. That would require a voluminous wo:nk. And practical~ nothing was said regarding the conditions after 1945, inasmuch the trampling upon the most :fundamental rights of 12 SLOVAKIA man, carried out by the Benes-Communist coalition, was so general that many pruges would be needed to delineate only the most important of its aspocts. The mass deportation of millions Olf ,p eople from their homeland, the outlawing and prevention of politica,l ,parties, the limitation of the freedom of the 1press and assemlbly, tens of thousands of political ,p risoners, hundreds of the executed, the many unconstitutional decrees af Benes, etc. - all this had happened with the cooperation of the Czech 1p oliticians, who to<lay pose as champions of democracy. It is regrettable that some .p eople in the West even today do not IOOJke any noticeable effort to imonn themselves of the true nature otf so~called "Czechoslovalk dem<X:ra<cy" and its representatives. It is regrettruble, indeed, that responsible people otf western democracies stiU continue to recognize and favor the ipr~agators of "Czechoslovaikism" former members of the Communist-dominated "National Front" government oif Bene-s and Gottwald, who Slllpiported the proJSoviet poli:cy oif Benes and, hence, ·a re in a great measure responsible for the present terrible plight of the Czech and Slovaik nations. Ozecho-Slo:vakia was not a true democracy, but a fraud and a mockery orf democracy. That was proved by the inhaJbitants Olf the State when the first grea;t crisis struclc and Czecho-Slovakia colla_psed completely. No one, not even the Czechs themsel,ves, fired a single shot to preserve it. Why should any western democratic gcwernment endeawor to preseI1Ve it a;gainst the will of the Sl01Va;ks and others of ~ho-SlovaJkia who are kept in that .State only by force? There must be an answer S01Ineiwhere! • • • WHO SAID IT? The Czechs and .Slovaks had their .State but not for longer than .twenty years. What now remains is infinite!~ worse .than what existed before. . . The politic,a[ theories of (T. G.) Masaryk and Benes collapsed because they could not beair the pra<dtioal test of the times." (·S KUTECNOST, review of the Ozach refugees, London, Vot III, No. 2, p. 33, Feib. 1951).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Was Czecho-Slovakia a Democracy? Description An account of the resource Dr. Arvéd Grébert Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 3 (8), September 1953 pp. 1-12 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Grébert, Arvéd, 1915-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September 1953 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/a01fa46f3883973925608e41e6246ea6.pdf 9f80c494a979434be4c2efa3cf00fa40 PDF Text Text 16 SLOVAKIA CHRISTMAS IN THE WW TATRA REGION By Robert A. Heckert A fow yeairs ago it was .my good fortune to. spend the Christmas hol'idays in the Low Tatra region orf Slovakia. A'bourt two days :b efore ChTistmas I haJppened. to be in Prague, feeling rather disconsolate a;bout the prospect of spending this Christmas alone in a foreign city, when suddenly and quite unexpected.iy I r~eived an iruvitation to come to Slovakia. WitJh eager anticipation I accepted. That very night I lef.t Prague ,b y train, for my destination was 400 miles to the east, and it was most important that I slhOIU!ld ,b e in the town of Banska Bystrica on Christmas Eve. 'Dhe train was crowded with all s.o.rts orf people, all joyously looiking forwaird, de~ite clouds on t!he .p olitical horizon to sipendinig the holidays at home or in the mountains. Scores of young soldiers there were, and like boys in any country in the world, they we-re proud oif their uniforms and indescrilbably hasppy in the knowledge that they wen:e going hOime to sweetheart., to Mother and Father, and the family hearth. It was stil.l daJI'.k when we reaidhed BratislaJva on the Dant11be. Most of the town was still asloop, 1b ut quite a large delegation of holiday seekers got on our train tJhere. Many orf them were Hungarians, some were Austria.ins, but most were Slovaks, and I was the only .Ame:rican. Almost everybody was carryilllg a pair of skis, for rpe,oiple in this part orf the WOI'ld feel like a holiday is not complete without skis. As we left BratiStlava behind we were oive•r taiken by the ever...recurri:ng miracle orf d8Jwn. Slowly 1!hrough the early morning hou~s our train wound its way up the mountain vaHey, now white with fresh fallen snow. At each village station a proud peasant father and mother were there to welcome a son who was coming from the big city fa,r away. Pride, humility and deep affection mingled to produce a scene, ciharacteri:Sltically SlovaJk, which has left a permanent maTk on this olbserver. �SLOVAKIA 17 It was albout noon when our train reached the. town of Banska Bystrilca. Uipon emerging from the train I felt at on'Ce that I was in a spot in whidh charm and grandeur were mi·n gled in.a wondrous way. In the distance on alil sides were snow--covered mountadns, damzling in the sun. At a lower altitude was a ,b elt oif forests, and in tihe center of this magnificent panorama was the old town of Banska Bystrica, a peil'lfect gem in a perfect setting. Then it was that I U!Ilderstood why it was called "The Pea.I'll of 'Sl01va!kia." The spiTes in its old medieval church, the ancient ruined castle aloog the rirver, the color a1I1d quaintness of the old houses, all com!bined to giive me the feeling that I was in a dream world. /My hosts were at the station to meet me. They put me to 'b ed at once, for I had had no sl~ on the train the nig,ht before . .A!bout six o'clock in the eveniillg I was awa!kened by the pealing of clhiurch bells. I arose at once, and quickly made myself ready for the evening's fesitirvities, for in Slova'ki.a. tihe grea;t moment oif the year comes on Ohristmas Eve. As if 'b y magic a doorr wa.c;. opened,. and I was ushered into a. new and gforio:us kimgdb!In. The room was lighted with candles, 8Jlld the people in the, room seemed to be transfigured by some mir.aJcUlous power into wonderf.u!l beiillgs. It was Christmas filve. There in a corner of the room was a Christmas tree, and rut the taible in the center of the room stood the grrundmother, the father and mother, and the children. They seemed to ibe hruppy to haJVe a guest from faroff Ameri'Ca on this unique occasion. We sat do1W1I1 to a simple meal of which the princ:iipal dish was fresh caz,p. The fish , as we iknow, was the firrstknown Christian symb.ol, going back to tihe time of the Apostles in the first centuriy A.D. After this simiple sUipper the famH.y ,g rowp gathered around the Christmas tree 3.IIld exchanged gifts. This was followed by the singing of carols and 0th.err ChTistian hymns, and also· folik-<Songs, with the father aJccompa,nying on a gwtarr. There was singing until albout .ten o'dodk, wlhen a1l retired for the night. Next morning, when I loo\ked out the window, I saw that a fresh mantle of snow had fal.len that night. This �18 SLOVAKIA made all tlhe skiers hruppy, for it meant that there would be good skimg through the holidays. Skiing is especia:Hy fine when fresh light snow has fa:Hen on an old layeT of snow thart has pa,oked. The under layer of paJcked snow serves as a solid cushion, while the top layer of fresh snow is li:ke the wax that is added to a hardwood dancing floOT. •' ·. Following church in the ea•rly morning we htked··buf to . a hili whiclh was good for skiing aJbout three mHes from the center of the town. Soores. of people we,r e a'lready there when we came. SmaH chHdren as, young as six yearrs were on skis, some .of them showing remrurlkarble ~ill and courage. In many cases tlhere were whole frumiiies on skis, father . and motheT, and the chilidren. L '.. -· • -l,. You can ima:gine what healthy appetites we had 'Yhen we got ba;clk after this exer.cise in the healthy mount?,in air. Often a;fter Slllpper and a rest, we would talc~ , a little strroH throUJgh the main street of the town. Pewsamts in_their gor.geous costUJffies rud:ded a riot of color to this most colorful of seasons. It was a ravishing sight to see a red-<cheeked peasant .g irl with a hrund-iworiked, vari-icolored kerchief round her darik hair, and wearing a go·r geous hand-worked dress that must have taJken a year to make. The lo,w er part of her dress was pr~domina:ntly red, in contrast to her black leather boots, whi~h crume up almost to her knees. She was rivalled by several dozen girls in costume, rolliclding in the sno..w, with a trooip olf men, also in peasa:nt costume, at their heels. We could hear beaiuti!ful Christmas mus~c floating in the air, coming fu-om somewheTe in the nearest mountain above the town. 'I1he whoJe scene, with sound effects, seemed to be too bea:urtiiful to be true. One day we .decided to visit a village a;bout six miles away. We ,p ut on good heaivy warm boots, and lots of sweaters, and carried some lunch with us, for we kne,w that we would .be gone most of the day. It was a delightful hike through forest land in la<rge part, and over the country roa,ds. Several times we passed gypsies, w!ho are ,quite numerous in this part olf the wodd. Not infrequently they would be carrying a stringed musical instTUJffient, by which many of them earned their living in the towns. On and �SLOVAKIA 19 on we walked. Often, as we were approaching the toip of a hill, or a cross..road, there loomed beforre us a carved, wooden c:rulcifix, liifo-si•ze, silhouetted against t!he clea·r blue sky, a centuiries-oM feature off the SlO!Vak landscaipe, aind sym'bol of a reliigioin deep}y :iimbedded in the Sloivak heart, the heaJrts of the over.whelming majority. 'Dhis fact came home to me arud left its indelilble ma;:r,k rus we hilked through the snow. Finally we reruched the village. As we came lllp the main street of the viHruge all the boys and girls, arrd all the dogs came rushing orut to greet us with wild-eyed curiosity. The dogs barlked as they had never barlked before, and they and the children suirrounded .us as we .progressed to:ward the centerr of tJhe vinage. The news of our coming sipread like wildfire, and when the v:iillage may,or heard it he quickly prepared to greet us. He was a fine Slovak type, gentle, as most of them are, with small eyes, deHcate chin, and a Roman nose. The SloivaJks have been caJled the "doveJJ.ike" people. When the village mayor heard that I was froim Amer. ica, . .he said that one of his villagers had lived in America a long time, but had come bacik to his native viJlage to fore the rest of his days. We werut to, see him. He was quite an old man now and had already been baok in his homeland for some years. He had for.gotten much aJbout America, but he recalled that his life had been one of hard work, of su:f.fering, and of saving. He had wonked in the steel mill at Johnstown, PennsyJ.vania. When he told us tJhat, I saluted him as a fellow-worker, for in my own youth I had to.i'led i'n the grim and gri:my steel miills o.f Pennsylrvania some 35 years ago, side by side with many a sorn of Slovakia, and in the glare of the furnaices dUJring loo.g nights, I had listened to some of them pourin1g tales of Slovakia into my ears. The old man looked out the window of his cottage with contentment. He was content to die here in his natiive villruge on his native soiJ. We went into se;veral homes in the village. In one of the peasant huts a little girl of a!bout ten years was sitri,pping and deaning goosefeathers to be used for featherbeds �20 SLOVAKIA -and pill.lows. The :tlloor o.f the hwt was earthen, and in one corner was a huge stove made of bricik. Porcelainware hung on the walls, anrli on a talble was a huge Bible. The father was there, 1but the motlher had gone to mariket in town that morning to sehl her eggs, and butter and cheese. The father had felt honored that we had come to his home. He gave us fresh mHk to drink with the Lunch that we had br011i:,c0iht along, and he told us stories rubout 1id'e in the village. He asked me whether I lklllew certain individuals wiho had gone to America f11om this villruge. They had never been heard from again aifter they went ruwaiy. He mentioned names and places in different parts of the United States, but, a:las, he fai-led to realize the enornnous distances jn Arrnerica, and my extremely limited acqu1ai,n tanceshi1p with tihe Slo.valk immigrrution in America . Like all SloviaJk peasants, the :poople in this village wore .picturesque costumes. Americans of Slovak birth am.d upbringing do not need to 1be told that costumes from one village to another in .Slova1cia may vary only in some sliglht debaN, but the variation in d~il is unique to each particular villruge, and mariks the inhaJbit,a nt of a particular village. The practiced dbsez,ver, upon seeing a peasant in a market town among crowds of pea,srunts on market day, oan name the villaige from which the peasant comes lby noting the disti.n:otirve detail in :hiiis or her costume. Toward lrute afternoon o<f this day in tlhe vi!hlage we started baclk to BaJilSka Bystrica. On the road we ·met the peasant mother returning from maliket, trrud!gi:ng along through the snow with a heruvy pruClk on her 1b aak. She had walked six miles to the mairiket tfurough the snow very early that morning wi1Jh her healVY pruck, and now she was wallking back with another heavy load of t'hirnigs she had bought for the family . But she was all smiles when she crume abreast of us, and she stopped to ta:llk. S!he was full of all that happened that day in tlhe toiwn, rund she had to teH us aJbout it. After a whHe she put her b~g bag on her baidk again, showered us with compliments rund good wishes, waved a smiling farewell, and went off down the road toward the village. She had left a wonderi,f.ul wa.T!IIJ.,tJh in our hearts, this little Slovruk woman, whose name I could not �SLOVAKIA 21 say, but who-se simple, rug,ged, yet sweet .personality will remain with me fur a, long while. The .s un was setting as we came to the toip of the last hill overlooiking the town oif Banska By:strioa. 'Dhe North Star was already out, and in the east a full ...rounded moon cast a sHrveey beam Oiver the crest of tlh.e mountain and in a few miootes shown in her fu11 splendor. Soon a light aJPpea;red in the tOWill, and then anOither, and still anotiheT; and then we could hear the farofd' sound of clh.urch bells with tbek ethereal purity of tone, wih ich can be heard only in Eu~pe. And then silence reigned again. For a whiile we.stood there in that sacred silence, beholding the glory of God in the heawens and illlVokiillg His bleSS1I11g upon the people of Ba.nska Bystriica and 1..11pon the children Olf men everywhere. A few minutes later we reentered tlh.e town and thus ended our druy's pilgrimage. Next diary I journeyed iba:ck to Prague. Miy ho.liday wa'S ov~. But a:s long as I li:ve I shaH remember that season spent in the Low 'Datras with peculiar vividness and satisfaction. I hope sincere:ly thait many of you, my readers, m!i,y some day have the pri;vilege oif sojourning in. that picturesque and memomlble lamrl - Slovakia, wh:i.ch I lo,ve. • • • WHO SAID IT? "We can ottl:y repeat ,t hat neither Austria nor Hungary, and prolbaJbly not even Gerunany, nor even the Slovaks, woun.d a:cceipt in the iong I'lliil. tlle existence of Czoohoslovakia. Therefore -t he graftmg olf OzoohoslovaJkia on to a Danubian federation is hair&y possilble. In such a framewo.nk she would simiplry continue to lbe what she was in her prevfous existence: an international oalamity. The position would !be d.iifferent in .the case of Bohemfa and Moravia being separated from Slovakia. The od'ten repeated argument that Czeohoslova:kia's brea;king l.llp into her naJtural components wO'U!ld cause an even gireaiter disfoca:tion in the DanrUl'be Basin, fails to convince, if one rea!li.zes that such a part.iition. is the essentia1l iprerequisite oif the oreation o'f a greater State entity." - F. 0. Miik.sche - a Czech - in UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER, pp. 215-21'6 ; FaJber and Faiber, Ltd., London). � 16 SLOVAKIA CHRISTMAS IN THE WW TATRA REGION By Robert A. Heckert A fow yeairs ago it was .my good fortune to. spend the Christmas hol'idays in the Low Tatra region orf Slovakia. A'bourt two days :b efore ChTistmas I haJppened. to be in Prague, feeling rather disconsolate a;bout the prospect of spending this Christmas alone in a foreign city, when suddenly and quite unexpected.iy I r~eived an iruvitation to come to Slovakia. WitJh eager anticipation I accepted. That very night I lef.t Prague ,b y train, for my destination was 400 miles to the east, and it was most important that I slhOIU!ld ,b e in the town of Banska Bystrica on Christmas Eve. 'Dhe train was crowded with all s.o.rts orf people, all joyously looiking forwaird, de~ite clouds on t!he .p olitical horizon to sipendinig the holidays at home or in the mountains. Scores of young soldiers there were, and like boys in any country in the world, they we-re proud oif their uniforms and indescrilbably hasppy in the knowledge that they wen:e going hOime to sweetheart., to Mother and Father, and the family hearth. It was stil.l daJI'.k when we reaidhed BratislaJva on the Dant11be. Most of the town was still asloop, 1b ut quite a large delegation of holiday seekers got on our train tJhere. Many orf them were Hungarians, some were Austria.ins, but most were Slovaks, and I was the only .Ame:rican. Almost everybody was carryilllg a pair of skis, for rpe,oiple in this part orf the WOI'ld feel like a holiday is not complete without skis. As we left BratiStlava behind we were oive•r taiken by the ever...recurri:ng miracle orf d8Jwn. Slowly 1!hrough the early morning hou~s our train wound its way up the mountain vaHey, now white with fresh fallen snow. At each village station a proud peasant father and mother were there to welcome a son who was coming from the big city fa,r away. Pride, humility and deep affection mingled to produce a scene, ciharacteri:Sltically SlovaJk, which has left a permanent maTk on this olbserver. �SLOVAKIA 17 It was albout noon when our train reached the. town of Banska Bystrilca. Uipon emerging from the train I felt at on'Ce that I was in a spot in whidh charm and grandeur were mi·n gled in.a wondrous way. In the distance on alil sides were snow--covered mountadns, damzling in the sun. At a lower altitude was a ,b elt oif forests, and in tihe center of this magnificent panorama was the old town of Banska Bystrica, a peil'lfect gem in a perfect setting. Then it was that I U!Ilderstood why it was called "The Pea.I'll of 'Sl01va!kia." The spiTes in its old medieval church, the ancient ruined castle aloog the rirver, the color a1I1d quaintness of the old houses, all com!bined to giive me the feeling that I was in a dream world. /My hosts were at the station to meet me. They put me to 'b ed at once, for I had had no sl~ on the train the nig,ht before . .A!bout six o'clock in the eveniillg I was awa!kened by the pealing of clhiurch bells. I arose at once, and quickly made myself ready for the evening's fesitirvities, for in Slova'ki.a. tihe grea;t moment oif the year comes on Ohristmas Eve. As if 'b y magic a doorr wa.c;. opened,. and I was ushered into a. new and gforio:us kimgdb!In. The room was lighted with candles, 8Jlld the people in the, room seemed to be transfigured by some mir.aJcUlous power into wonderf.u!l beiillgs. It was Christmas filve. There in a corner of the room was a Christmas tree, and rut the taible in the center of the room stood the grrundmother, the father and mother, and the children. They seemed to ibe hruppy to haJVe a guest from faroff Ameri'Ca on this unique occasion. We sat do1W1I1 to a simple meal of which the princ:iipal dish was fresh caz,p. The fish , as we iknow, was the firrstknown Christian symb.ol, going back to tihe time of the Apostles in the first centuriy A.D. After this simiple sUipper the famH.y ,g rowp gathered around the Christmas tree 3.IIld exchanged gifts. This was followed by the singing of carols and 0th.err ChTistian hymns, and also· folik-<Songs, with the father aJccompa,nying on a gwtarr. There was singing until albout .ten o'dodk, wlhen a1l retired for the night. Next morning, when I loo\ked out the window, I saw that a fresh mantle of snow had fal.len that night. This �18 SLOVAKIA made all tlhe skiers hruppy, for it meant that there would be good skimg through the holidays. Skiing is especia:Hy fine when fresh light snow has fa:Hen on an old layeT of snow thart has pa,oked. The under layer of paJcked snow serves as a solid cushion, while the top layer of fresh snow is li:ke the wax that is added to a hardwood dancing floOT. •' ·. Following church in the ea•rly morning we htked··buf to . a hili whiclh was good for skiing aJbout three mHes from the center of the town. Soores. of people we,r e a'lready there when we came. SmaH chHdren as, young as six yearrs were on skis, some .of them showing remrurlkarble ~ill and courage. In many cases tlhere were whole frumiiies on skis, father . and motheT, and the chilidren. L '.. -· • -l,. You can ima:gine what healthy appetites we had 'Yhen we got ba;clk after this exer.cise in the healthy mount?,in air. Often a;fter Slllpper and a rest, we would talc~ , a little strroH throUJgh the main street of the town. Pewsamts in_their gor.geous costUJffies rud:ded a riot of color to this most colorful of seasons. It was a ravishing sight to see a red-<cheeked peasant .g irl with a hrund-iworiked, vari-icolored kerchief round her darik hair, and wearing a go·r geous hand-worked dress that must have taJken a year to make. The lo,w er part of her dress was pr~domina:ntly red, in contrast to her black leather boots, whi~h crume up almost to her knees. She was rivalled by several dozen girls in costume, rolliclding in the sno..w, with a trooip olf men, also in peasa:nt costume, at their heels. We could hear beaiuti!ful Christmas mus~c floating in the air, coming fu-om somewheTe in the nearest mountain above the town. 'I1he whoJe scene, with sound effects, seemed to be too bea:urtiiful to be true. One day we .decided to visit a village a;bout six miles away. We ,p ut on good heaivy warm boots, and lots of sweaters, and carried some lunch with us, for we kne,w that we would .be gone most of the day. It was a delightful hike through forest land in la<rge part, and over the country roa,ds. Several times we passed gypsies, w!ho are ,quite numerous in this part olf the wodd. Not infrequently they would be carrying a stringed musical instTUJffient, by which many of them earned their living in the towns. On and �SLOVAKIA 19 on we walked. Often, as we were approaching the toip of a hill, or a cross..road, there loomed beforre us a carved, wooden c:rulcifix, liifo-si•ze, silhouetted against t!he clea·r blue sky, a centuiries-oM feature off the SlO!Vak landscaipe, aind sym'bol of a reliigioin deep}y :iimbedded in the Sloivak heart, the heaJrts of the over.whelming majority. 'Dhis fact came home to me arud left its indelilble ma;:r,k rus we hilked through the snow. Finally we reruched the village. As we came lllp the main street of the viHruge all the boys and girls, arrd all the dogs came rushing orut to greet us with wild-eyed curiosity. The dogs barlked as they had never barlked before, and they and the children suirrounded .us as we .progressed to:ward the centerr of tJhe vinage. The news of our coming sipread like wildfire, and when the v:iillage may,or heard it he quickly prepared to greet us. He was a fine Slovak type, gentle, as most of them are, with small eyes, deHcate chin, and a Roman nose. The SloivaJks have been caJled the "doveJJ.ike" people. When the village mayor heard that I was froim Amer. ica, . .he said that one of his villagers had lived in America a long time, but had come bacik to his native viJlage to fore the rest of his days. We werut to, see him. He was quite an old man now and had already been baok in his homeland for some years. He had for.gotten much aJbout America, but he recalled that his life had been one of hard work, of su:f.fering, and of saving. He had wonked in the steel mill at Johnstown, PennsyJ.vania. When he told us tJhat, I saluted him as a fellow-worker, for in my own youth I had to.i'led i'n the grim and gri:my steel miills o.f Pennsylrvania some 35 years ago, side by side with many a sorn of Slovakia, and in the glare of the furnaices dUJring loo.g nights, I had listened to some of them pourin1g tales of Slovakia into my ears. The old man looked out the window of his cottage with contentment. He was content to die here in his natiive villruge on his native soiJ. We went into se;veral homes in the village. In one of the peasant huts a little girl of a!bout ten years was sitri,pping and deaning goosefeathers to be used for featherbeds �20 SLOVAKIA -and pill.lows. The :tlloor o.f the hwt was earthen, and in one corner was a huge stove made of bricik. Porcelainware hung on the walls, anrli on a talble was a huge Bible. The father was there, 1but the motlher had gone to mariket in town that morning to sehl her eggs, and butter and cheese. The father had felt honored that we had come to his home. He gave us fresh mHk to drink with the Lunch that we had br011i:,c0iht along, and he told us stories rubout 1id'e in the village. He asked me whether I lklllew certain individuals wiho had gone to America f11om this villruge. They had never been heard from again aifter they went ruwaiy. He mentioned names and places in different parts of the United States, but, a:las, he fai-led to realize the enornnous distances jn Arrnerica, and my extremely limited acqu1ai,n tanceshi1p with tihe Slo.valk immigrrution in America . Like all SloviaJk peasants, the :poople in this village wore .picturesque costumes. Americans of Slovak birth am.d upbringing do not need to 1be told that costumes from one village to another in .Slova1cia may vary only in some sliglht debaN, but the variation in d~il is unique to each particular villruge, and mariks the inhaJbit,a nt of a particular village. The practiced dbsez,ver, upon seeing a peasant in a market town among crowds of pea,srunts on market day, oan name the villaige from which the peasant comes lby noting the disti.n:otirve detail in :hiiis or her costume. Toward lrute afternoon o<f this day in tlhe vi!hlage we started baclk to BaJilSka Bystrica. On the road we ·met the peasant mother returning from maliket, trrud!gi:ng along through the snow with a heruvy pruClk on her 1b aak. She had walked six miles to the mairiket tfurough the snow very early that morning wi1Jh her healVY pruck, and now she was wallking back with another heavy load of t'hirnigs she had bought for the family . But she was all smiles when she crume abreast of us, and she stopped to ta:llk. S!he was full of all that happened that day in tlhe toiwn, rund she had to teH us aJbout it. After a whHe she put her b~g bag on her baidk again, showered us with compliments rund good wishes, waved a smiling farewell, and went off down the road toward the village. She had left a wonderi,f.ul wa.T!IIJ.,tJh in our hearts, this little Slovruk woman, whose name I could not �SLOVAKIA 21 say, but who-se simple, rug,ged, yet sweet .personality will remain with me fur a, long while. The .s un was setting as we came to the toip of the last hill overlooiking the town oif Banska By:strioa. 'Dhe North Star was already out, and in the east a full ...rounded moon cast a sHrveey beam Oiver the crest of tlh.e mountain and in a few miootes shown in her fu11 splendor. Soon a light aJPpea;red in the tOWill, and then anOither, and still anotiheT; and then we could hear the farofd' sound of clh.urch bells with tbek ethereal purity of tone, wih ich can be heard only in Eu~pe. And then silence reigned again. For a whiile we.stood there in that sacred silence, beholding the glory of God in the heawens and illlVokiillg His bleSS1I11g upon the people of Ba.nska Bystriica and 1..11pon the children Olf men everywhere. A few minutes later we reentered tlh.e town and thus ended our druy's pilgrimage. Next diary I journeyed iba:ck to Prague. Miy ho.liday wa'S ov~. But a:s long as I li:ve I shaH remember that season spent in the Low 'Datras with peculiar vividness and satisfaction. I hope sincere:ly thait many of you, my readers, m!i,y some day have the pri;vilege oif sojourning in. that picturesque and memomlble lamrl - Slovakia, wh:i.ch I lo,ve. • • • WHO SAID IT? "We can ottl:y repeat ,t hat neither Austria nor Hungary, and prolbaJbly not even Gerunany, nor even the Slovaks, woun.d a:cceipt in the iong I'lliil. tlle existence of Czoohoslovakia. Therefore -t he graftmg olf OzoohoslovaJkia on to a Danubian federation is hair&y possilble. In such a framewo.nk she would simiplry continue to lbe what she was in her prevfous existence: an international oalamity. The position would !be d.iifferent in .the case of Bohemfa and Moravia being separated from Slovakia. The od'ten repeated argument that Czeohoslova:kia's brea;king l.llp into her naJtural components wO'U!ld cause an even gireaiter disfoca:tion in the DanrUl'be Basin, fails to convince, if one rea!li.zes that such a part.iition. is the essentia1l iprerequisite oif the oreation o'f a greater State entity." - F. 0. Miik.sche - a Czech - in UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER, pp. 215-21'6 ; FaJber and Faiber, Ltd., London). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 16 SLOVAKIA CHRISTMAS IN THE WW TATRA REGION By Robert A. Heckert A fow yeairs ago it was .my good fortune to. spend the Christmas hol'idays in the Low Tatra region orf Slovakia. A'bourt two days :b efore ChTistmas I haJppened. to be in Prague, feeling rather disconsolate a;bout the prospect of spending this Christmas alone in a foreign city, when suddenly and quite unexpected.iy I r~eived an iruvitation to come to Slovakia. WitJh eager anticipation I accepted. That very night I lef.t Prague ,b y train, for my destination was 400 miles to the east, and it was most important that I slhOIU!ld ,b e in the town of Banska Bystrica on Christmas Eve. 'Dhe train was crowded with all s.o.rts orf people, all joyously looiking forwaird, de~ite clouds on t!he .p olitical horizon to sipendinig the holidays at home or in the mountains. Scores of young soldiers there were, and like boys in any country in the world, they we-re proud oif their uniforms and indescrilbably hasppy in the knowledge that they wen:e going hOime to sweetheart., to Mother and Father, and the family hearth. It was stil.l daJI'.k when we reaidhed BratislaJva on the Dant11be. Most of the town was still asloop, 1b ut quite a large delegation of holiday seekers got on our train tJhere. Many orf them were Hungarians, some were Austria.ins, but most were Slovaks, and I was the only .Ame:rican. Almost everybody was carryilllg a pair of skis, for rpe,oiple in this part orf the WOI'ld feel like a holiday is not complete without skis. As we left BratiStlava behind we were oive•r taiken by the ever...recurri:ng miracle orf d8Jwn. Slowly 1!hrough the early morning hou~s our train wound its way up the mountain vaHey, now white with fresh fallen snow. At each village station a proud peasant father and mother were there to welcome a son who was coming from the big city fa,r away. Pride, humility and deep affection mingled to produce a scene, ciharacteri:Sltically SlovaJk, which has left a permanent maTk on this olbserver. SLOVAKIA 17 It was albout noon when our train reached the. town of Banska Bystrilca. Uipon emerging from the train I felt at on'Ce that I was in a spot in whidh charm and grandeur were mi·n gled in.a wondrous way. In the distance on alil sides were snow--covered mountadns, damzling in the sun. At a lower altitude was a ,b elt oif forests, and in tihe center of this magnificent panorama was the old town of Banska Bystrica, a peil'lfect gem in a perfect setting. Then it was that I U!Ilderstood why it was called "The Pea.I'll of 'Sl01va!kia." The spiTes in its old medieval church, the ancient ruined castle aloog the rirver, the color a1I1d quaintness of the old houses, all com!bined to giive me the feeling that I was in a dream world. /My hosts were at the station to meet me. They put me to 'b ed at once, for I had had no sl~ on the train the nig,ht before . .A!bout six o'clock in the eveniillg I was awa!kened by the pealing of clhiurch bells. I arose at once, and quickly made myself ready for the evening's fesitirvities, for in Slova'ki.a. tihe grea;t moment oif the year comes on Ohristmas Eve. As if 'b y magic a doorr wa.c;. opened,. and I was ushered into a. new and gforio:us kimgdb!In. The room was lighted with candles, 8Jlld the people in the, room seemed to be transfigured by some mir.aJcUlous power into wonderf.u!l beiillgs. It was Christmas filve. There in a corner of the room was a Christmas tree, and rut the taible in the center of the room stood the grrundmother, the father and mother, and the children. They seemed to ibe hruppy to haJVe a guest from faroff Ameri'Ca on this unique occasion. We sat do1W1I1 to a simple meal of which the princ:iipal dish was fresh caz,p. The fish , as we iknow, was the firrstknown Christian symb.ol, going back to tihe time of the Apostles in the first centuriy A.D. After this simiple sUipper the famH.y ,g rowp gathered around the Christmas tree 3.IIld exchanged gifts. This was followed by the singing of carols and 0th.err ChTistian hymns, and also· folik-<Songs, with the father aJccompa,nying on a gwtarr. There was singing until albout .ten o'dodk, wlhen a1l retired for the night. Next morning, when I loo\ked out the window, I saw that a fresh mantle of snow had fal.len that night. This 18 SLOVAKIA made all tlhe skiers hruppy, for it meant that there would be good skimg through the holidays. Skiing is especia:Hy fine when fresh light snow has fa:Hen on an old layeT of snow thart has pa,oked. The under layer of paJcked snow serves as a solid cushion, while the top layer of fresh snow is li:ke the wax that is added to a hardwood dancing floOT. •' ·. Following church in the ea•rly morning we htked··buf to . a hili whiclh was good for skiing aJbout three mHes from the center of the town. Soores. of people we,r e a'lready there when we came. SmaH chHdren as, young as six yearrs were on skis, some .of them showing remrurlkarble ~ill and courage. In many cases tlhere were whole frumiiies on skis, father . and motheT, and the chilidren. L '.. -· • -l,. You can ima:gine what healthy appetites we had 'Yhen we got ba;clk after this exer.cise in the healthy mount?,in air. Often a;fter Slllpper and a rest, we would talc~ , a little strroH throUJgh the main street of the town. Pewsamts in_their gor.geous costUJffies rud:ded a riot of color to this most colorful of seasons. It was a ravishing sight to see a red-<cheeked peasant .g irl with a hrund-iworiked, vari-icolored kerchief round her darik hair, and wearing a go·r geous hand-worked dress that must have taJken a year to make. The lo,w er part of her dress was pr~domina:ntly red, in contrast to her black leather boots, whi~h crume up almost to her knees. She was rivalled by several dozen girls in costume, rolliclding in the sno..w, with a trooip olf men, also in peasa:nt costume, at their heels. We could hear beaiuti!ful Christmas mus~c floating in the air, coming fu-om somewheTe in the nearest mountain above the town. 'I1he whoJe scene, with sound effects, seemed to be too bea:urtiiful to be true. One day we .decided to visit a village a;bout six miles away. We ,p ut on good heaivy warm boots, and lots of sweaters, and carried some lunch with us, for we kne,w that we would .be gone most of the day. It was a delightful hike through forest land in la<rge part, and over the country roa,ds. Several times we passed gypsies, w!ho are ,quite numerous in this part olf the wodd. Not infrequently they would be carrying a stringed musical instTUJffient, by which many of them earned their living in the towns. On and SLOVAKIA 19 on we walked. Often, as we were approaching the toip of a hill, or a cross..road, there loomed beforre us a carved, wooden c:rulcifix, liifo-si•ze, silhouetted against t!he clea·r blue sky, a centuiries-oM feature off the SlO!Vak landscaipe, aind sym'bol of a reliigioin deep}y :iimbedded in the Sloivak heart, the heaJrts of the over.whelming majority. 'Dhis fact came home to me arud left its indelilble ma;:r,k rus we hilked through the snow. Finally we reruched the village. As we came lllp the main street of the viHruge all the boys and girls, arrd all the dogs came rushing orut to greet us with wild-eyed curiosity. The dogs barlked as they had never barlked before, and they and the children suirrounded .us as we .progressed to:ward the centerr of tJhe vinage. The news of our coming sipread like wildfire, and when the v:iillage may,or heard it he quickly prepared to greet us. He was a fine Slovak type, gentle, as most of them are, with small eyes, deHcate chin, and a Roman nose. The SloivaJks have been caJled the "doveJJ.ike" people. When the village mayor heard that I was froim Amer. ica, . .he said that one of his villagers had lived in America a long time, but had come bacik to his native viJlage to fore the rest of his days. We werut to, see him. He was quite an old man now and had already been baok in his homeland for some years. He had for.gotten much aJbout America, but he recalled that his life had been one of hard work, of su:f.fering, and of saving. He had wonked in the steel mill at Johnstown, PennsyJ.vania. When he told us tJhat, I saluted him as a fellow-worker, for in my own youth I had to.i'led i'n the grim and gri:my steel miills o.f Pennsylrvania some 35 years ago, side by side with many a sorn of Slovakia, and in the glare of the furnaices dUJring loo.g nights, I had listened to some of them pourin1g tales of Slovakia into my ears. The old man looked out the window of his cottage with contentment. He was content to die here in his natiive villruge on his native soiJ. We went into se;veral homes in the village. In one of the peasant huts a little girl of a!bout ten years was sitri,pping and deaning goosefeathers to be used for featherbeds 20 SLOVAKIA -and pill.lows. The :tlloor o.f the hwt was earthen, and in one corner was a huge stove made of bricik. Porcelainware hung on the walls, anrli on a talble was a huge Bible. The father was there, 1but the motlher had gone to mariket in town that morning to sehl her eggs, and butter and cheese. The father had felt honored that we had come to his home. He gave us fresh mHk to drink with the Lunch that we had br011i:,c0iht along, and he told us stories rubout 1id'e in the village. He asked me whether I lklllew certain individuals wiho had gone to America f11om this villruge. They had never been heard from again aifter they went ruwaiy. He mentioned names and places in different parts of the United States, but, a:las, he fai-led to realize the enornnous distances jn Arrnerica, and my extremely limited acqu1ai,n tanceshi1p with tihe Slo.valk immigrrution in America . Like all SloviaJk peasants, the :poople in this village wore .picturesque costumes. Americans of Slovak birth am.d upbringing do not need to 1be told that costumes from one village to another in .Slova1cia may vary only in some sliglht debaN, but the variation in d~il is unique to each particular villruge, and mariks the inhaJbit,a nt of a particular village. The practiced dbsez,ver, upon seeing a peasant in a market town among crowds of pea,srunts on market day, oan name the villaige from which the peasant comes lby noting the disti.n:otirve detail in :hiiis or her costume. Toward lrute afternoon o<f this day in tlhe vi!hlage we started baclk to BaJilSka Bystrica. On the road we ·met the peasant mother returning from maliket, trrud!gi:ng along through the snow with a heruvy pruClk on her 1b aak. She had walked six miles to the mairiket tfurough the snow very early that morning wi1Jh her healVY pruck, and now she was wallking back with another heavy load of t'hirnigs she had bought for the family . But she was all smiles when she crume abreast of us, and she stopped to ta:llk. S!he was full of all that happened that day in tlhe toiwn, rund she had to teH us aJbout it. After a whHe she put her b~g bag on her baidk again, showered us with compliments rund good wishes, waved a smiling farewell, and went off down the road toward the village. She had left a wonderi,f.ul wa.T!IIJ.,tJh in our hearts, this little Slovruk woman, whose name I could not SLOVAKIA 21 say, but who-se simple, rug,ged, yet sweet .personality will remain with me fur a, long while. The .s un was setting as we came to the toip of the last hill overlooiking the town oif Banska By:strioa. 'Dhe North Star was already out, and in the east a full ...rounded moon cast a sHrveey beam Oiver the crest of tlh.e mountain and in a few miootes shown in her fu11 splendor. Soon a light aJPpea;red in the tOWill, and then anOither, and still anotiheT; and then we could hear the farofd' sound of clh.urch bells with tbek ethereal purity of tone, wih ich can be heard only in Eu~pe. And then silence reigned again. For a whiile we.stood there in that sacred silence, beholding the glory of God in the heawens and illlVokiillg His bleSS1I11g upon the people of Ba.nska Bystriica and 1..11pon the children Olf men everywhere. A few minutes later we reentered tlh.e town and thus ended our druy's pilgrimage. Next diary I journeyed iba:ck to Prague. Miy ho.liday wa'S ov~. But a:s long as I li:ve I shaH remember that season spent in the Low 'Datras with peculiar vividness and satisfaction. I hope sincere:ly thait many of you, my readers, m!i,y some day have the pri;vilege oif sojourning in. that picturesque and memomlble lamrl - Slovakia, wh:i.ch I lo,ve. • • • WHO SAID IT? "We can ottl:y repeat ,t hat neither Austria nor Hungary, and prolbaJbly not even Gerunany, nor even the Slovaks, woun.d a:cceipt in the iong I'lliil. tlle existence of Czoohoslovakia. Therefore -t he graftmg olf OzoohoslovaJkia on to a Danubian federation is hair&y possilble. In such a framewo.nk she would simiplry continue to lbe what she was in her prevfous existence: an international oalamity. The position would !be d.iifferent in .the case of Bohemfa and Moravia being separated from Slovakia. The od'ten repeated argument that Czeohoslova:kia's brea;king l.llp into her naJtural components wO'U!ld cause an even gireaiter disfoca:tion in the DanrUl'be Basin, fails to convince, if one rea!li.zes that such a part.iition. is the essentia1l iprerequisite oif the oreation o'f a greater State entity." - F. 0. Miik.sche - a Czech - in UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER, pp. 215-21'6 ; FaJber and Faiber, Ltd., London).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Christmas in the Low Tatra Region Description An account of the resource Robert A. Heckert Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953 pp. 16-21 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Heckert, Robert A. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1953 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/6394be7187e3ab8f7c136ae6bea94f28.pdf 9ba5b71db2ea2fc1783abb5eab2fc013 PDF Text Text DECEMBER, 1953 SLOVAKIA 1 INFLUENCE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY ON SWVAK LIFE Dr. Francis Hrusovsky Actual living conditions of the Slovak immigrants in the new warild, especially in the United States oif America, were very much different from those in hi1s homeland which was under the domination of Hungary until the end of the first world war. The natural temperament of the average Slovak was determined, to some degree, by the circumstances of his life in a land that had been under foreign nrle for centuries. Economically, the native of Slovakia found life hard and difficult; socially, his lot was unprogressive; politically, freedom and equality had no practical meaning for him. His energies were drained by the relentless struggle for survival. Not infrequently, he suffered from want; his entire life was spent in misery and poverty. The downtrodden Slovak peasant, though inwardly protesting against social inequality and injustice, had not suffi. cient strength and vitality to break the chains of his servitude. He resigned hims~lf to his misfortune, concluding that unkind fate decreed that misery was to be his n a tural lot on earth. Under such adverse circumstances, it was extremely difficult to arouse and maintain a feeling of Slovak national patriotism ; and it was doubly difficult to organize a Slovak society that would espouse the idea of Slovak nationalism, because the average Slovak was hampered at every step by his enemies who tenaciously held to the age-old concept of Magyar feudalism, a way of life that was contrary to the idea of Slovak nationalism. Every Slovak knew that he was not a Magyar but a Slovak; yet, this consciousness of nationalism was never allowed to develop freely. Patriotism and loyalty in the Hugarian State was only one: all had to acknowledge their adherence to the Crown of St. Stephen and Magyar hegemony. It is not surprising, therefore, that the peasant in Slovaikia had no clearcut understanding of the meaning of nationalism ; that he failed to aspire to national emancipation is manifestly an indication that he �2 SLOVA-IHA failed to grasp the glorious meaning of having one's own government in power and one's own native language as the official tongue of the land. And, hence, at first, the aver age Slovak was not inclined to partici,pate in political gatherings that were designe'd· to bring his own country ultimate freedom and democra;cy. Weighed . down ,b y the burdens of life as an oppressed human being, the Slovak's paJtience and endurance were truly remarkable. In the long succession of centuries of political servitude and 'tymnny, he had become resigned to his unchanging misery, injustice, humiliation and serfdom, for to him it seemed that this was decreed by fate, or a higher power. This was, then, the average Slova,k immigrant who came to America. Imagine how great was his amazement upon discovering that living an:d social conditions in the New World were so diametrically different from his life in the land of his birth, his Slova:kia beneath the Tatras. He was amazed by the vast difference between life at home in Slovakia and here in America and the unlimited opportunities offered the immigrant, provided he was willing to work. And since hard work was practica,lly s~cond nature to the Slovak immigra,nrt, he found his new home to his liking. At home, his sphere of activity ha,d been limited, while here, in his new home land, unlimited opportunities presented themselves on all sides, so that a man of inte1ligence, ingenuity and industry just could not fail to become a success in America. At hame, the Slovak could only hope to eke out a bare existence with hardly a chance for improvement; here in America he could look forward to a steady improvement of his social conditions. Here, in the new world, his .progress was not impeded by circumstances, on the contrary, the conditions for his advancement exceeded his fondest dreams. No doubt the primary motive for Slovak emigration was to seek a solution for financial difficulties; the Slovak went abroad chiefly to secure economic advantages which were lacking at home. He envisioned the day when he would rise above his lowly station in life with the help of his incr:eased earning power. Hence, there was no job, no matter �SLOVAKIA 3 how strenuorus or dangerous, that he shirked S'O long as ft promised him immediate returns. There is little doubt that tlhe Slovak immigrant in America worked harder than he had ever worked at home, •b ut t:Jhis was a sacrifice well worthwhile, in his estimation, if it helped his loved one$ in the old country and improved his own condition. America attracted the simple peaJsant from the hills and villages throughout Slovakfa. He was uneducated, though generally not illiterate, but equirpped with the natural gifts of remarkahle stamina, courage, ingenuity, industry and native intelligence. Possessing unusual powers of observation, sound judgment and ability to assimilate new ways of life, as well as being blessed witJh a good moral training, the Slov,a k found America a fertile field for his endeavors. He learned much in the new land of freedom and opportunity; and though he received much from it, he ailso gave much in return. He put his heart and will in his work, employed his mind in developing new tech:. niques, spared no effort, time and energy to produce an unending stream of goods for human consumption and welfare. Thus, the Slovak, who had been held in political bondage and who had lapsed into a state of social and economic retrogression, suddenly found a dynamic release for his pent-up energies in a land that was forever dedicated to freedom and equality, a land which offered him constant inspiration for his enterprising spirit and proved to be a never-ending source of visions of a great destiny. The de_~ mocratic atmosphere of America was to him a tonic, an elixir of magical powers that turned him into a veritable giant who feared no undertaking, avoided no difficulty. Consequently, many of his kind, working doggedly and persistently with indomitable energy, achieved comparative success in America. The typical American immigr ant from Slovakia was confronted with the difficulties of language, strange cus~ toms and new surroundings, and the immedi•a te necessity of employment. After securing a job, he quickly adjusted · himself to his new emrironment, acquired vaJ1uaJble expe~ riences over a period of years, steadHy increased his earnings and saved his money. He soon perceived that he, too, �4 SLOVAKIA ·was a human being with natural aspirations, desires and ideals which he knew could be realized if he worked for their attainment. It wa;s in America that he found himself as an ind!iividual, no:t only with civic responstbilites, but with personal rights as weH. As a full-fledged naturalized citizen of hi:s adopted country, he became acutely aware of his added dignity as a free man. This both satisfied him and aLso aroused in him the determination to emulate his fellow-citizens in the fullest a;ppreciation of his precious inheritance. Of course, there were some unfortunate exceptions to the general respon:se of the typical Slovak to his Ameriican surroundings; but on the whole, the great majority reacted favorably to the stimulating influences of a democratic way of life in the United States. Life's vicissitudes make human existence a constant struggle with obstacles strewn on the path that ,l eads to the ultimaJte goal. The SlovaJk lras never been without hardships and, therefore, he has never been afraid of the future. At home, all his efforts to overcome the handicaps of his lowly station in life were to no avail. He was doomed to remain in the same social caiste into which he was born. If he was born in poverty, he was destined to a lifelong struggle for a mere livelhood. There was no opportunity for him to rise above his station, being inextricably bound by ties of an outmoded feudal ,s ystem which kept him hopelessly mired in a bog of caste-privileged society. But his patient endurance and peritina;city, his indefatigable industry, which had helped him to survive under the most adverse conditions, served him well in the new land; and his ingrained habits of determination, dependability and native ingenuity were qualities which gave him the impetus to succeed when he was suddenly thrust into the fresh atmosphere of American free enterpr1se and democracy. The a;ma:zing discovery that he was on a plane of political and social equality with men of more than a score of nationa-lities, enjoy}ng freedom under one flag, the Stars and Stripes, made him feel that he had accomplished something worthwhile; and the consciousness of his abilities and achievements inspired him to work even harder to advance further on the road to Americanization, a process that �SLOVAKIA 5 brought out the native powers of the Slovak to adopt himself to new surroundings and to assimilate without losing his identity as a new American of Slovak ancestry. The immigrant Slovak's contacts with men of various races made him conscious of his own distinctness as a national figure, for he was unable to converse with them and he did not understand their ways. This factor affected him in two ways: 1) he was inclined to keep aloof from "strangers" and, 2) he was instinctively drawn to follow Slovaks who spoke his language and who knew his ways. Thus, it was but natural for him to draw closer to men of his own kind for companionship and understanding. All Slovak immigrants came together wherever they went, being drawn to each other by their common longing for the homes they had but recently left behind across the sea. Following the example of other nationalities, they organized societies and founded churches thaJt soon became the centers of their activities. This association kept them closely united and helped them to protect and enhance their common interests. Moreover, the feeling of national consciousness grew stronger among them as they sought refuge and comfort in these islands of Slovak memories and realities in the midst of a sea of representatives of every nation on earth. Slovaks in their homeland could not publicly express their national aspirations without reprisals, but here in America they were free to profess their patriotism and write about their ideals of nationhood. Every American of Slovak parentage could acknowledge his Slovak heritage publicly, and no one took it amiss, nobody was suspicious of his motives, no one insulted him for it. Moreover, his fellow-citizens of other national origins, in business and politics, accepted the new Americans as equals without regard to national origins. A Slovak immigrant who became a naturalized American citizen soon realized that he not only had civic responsibilities but personal rights, too, and the fact that 'he did · not have to renounce his Slovak heritage as such, while pledging loyalty to his new homeland, became the source �SLOVAKIA of his national pride of being a descendant of Slovak an~estors who had not been able to call their ancient hearths their own for many centuries. They cherished the national traditions of their forefathers and soon gave voice to them in this new land of freedom. In a comparatively short time, the Slovak in America · teaHzed that he, too, could voice his opinions freely, that he could have convictions wiithout fear of repression. Slovak organizations gave him ample opportunities to express himself; and hls newspapers were for him mediums of information, instruction and inspiration. These <:!orrstituted the keystone of Slovak unity for all fellow Americans of Slovak ancestry. From the stand,point of individual advancement, any Slovak, no matter how humble his origin, could ·air his views in his own newspapers. This was a veritable school for many simple, uneducated Slovaks who became well-informed and law-abiding citizens of their •a dopted -country, but who, nevertheless, spoke proudly of their native Slovakia, the land in which they had been born, the ·land of their forefathers. The Slovak immigrant found it impossible to forget the land of his birth; he fondly recalled the scenes of Ms childhood, and often spolke of the relatives and friends beyond the sea. This was perfectly natural, for despite 1:!he hard lot and misery •o f his oTiginal home, yet he longed to be with his parents and friends, if only for a little whHe. He could see the village church wit'h its cross uplifted to the sky, as an eternal sign of salvation, a symbol of the deep faith in God that was in his soul, a symbol at once of his own pain and suffering, of his strength and hope. The church, located in the center of Slovak village life, with spires rising high above the simple peasant huts in whose shadow they reclined, stood out in sharp relief in his memory, for religion was the keystone of his existence. The church was his fortress in time of danger, his solace in time of grief, his hope in time of despair. Without his qhurch, his village priest, without prayer, his life would, indeed, be empty and forelorn. The Slovak has been able to bear life's burdens because he staunchly believes in Di- �SLOVAKIA 7 vine Providence and because he seeks resources in prayer at all times. Abroad, in foreign lands, the church with its Slovak prayers and hymns, has been the bulwaTk of the Slovak immigrant. It has been his ,anchor on a foreign shore, a compass in an uncharted sea. Because the church is all hnportant in his life, the Slovak has invariably built a church, then school. With a ,s trong religious and social foundation, the Slovak in America maintained his national character and expanded his cultural endeavors as the years went by. It was his faith that kept him loyal to his sacred traditions, preserved his language, and made him cherish his nationality. On Sundays, he joined his fellow countrymen in Slovak prayers and hymns; this, perhaps, more than any ot'her single factor, perpetuated the most sacred and treasured memories of Slovakia. Imposing Slovak churches, modern parish and school buildings, and office building,s· of the Slovak societies are. concrete expressions of the deep religious convictions a:nd· cultural aspirations of the Slovak immigrant. They are monuments of self-sacrifice and devotion to time-honored institutions, permeated with the same fervent spirit of his forefathers who cherished their Christian traditions be·neath the Tatras since time immemorial. At home, unfortunately, genuine Slovaik societies and organizations did not exist, and the few that functioned were -p rimarily designed to serve elements and interests that were alien to the Slovak cause. Even ibhe churcih, in some instances, became an agency for these forces. But · in America, Slovak churches, organizations and schools became the centers of Slovak national culture. Moreover, the .spark of nationalism which was barely kept alight ait home, burst into a bright flame in the new Land of freedom. The Slovak immigrant caught t:Jhe spirit of American democracy whose blessings he had personally experienced in his daily life. He accepted these with a deep sense of gratitude. He was proud of his new status of citizenship, an'd now · tlia.t he was content, he yearned to have his folks back home· enjoy these self-same rights and advantages of the democratic way of life. �8 SLOVAKIA Slovak poets and writers, keenly aware of this stifling atmosphere in which their people were slowly expiring, made every effort to arouse the masses out of their lethargy. Although their voices were unheeded in their native land, where the people were submissive and demoralized, nevertheless, a small but determined minority of patriaticminded Slovaks organized political clubs to fight for their nation's inherent rights and to formulate a program for an active political movement. The Slovaks had leadership, but failed to support their leaders efficiently, and on various occasions some of their leaders joined the opposition to work against the best interests and welfare of their nat,ion. Before the first World War Slovakia's national life was caught in a nut-cracker net-wor'k of political and social intrigue and seemed doomed. National extinction was. indeed, a grave danger which had to be averted. The Slovaks were helpless in the fa:ce of the opposition whi•c h prevented them from developing their native culture and realizing their right to self-government and independence. Internally, the Slovak nation was vitally sound-physically, biologically and morally it was sound - and it possessed untapped natural resources, but needed an external force to set it free. And this dynamic force came from America. Actual statistics are not available to indicate to what extent the American Slovaks influenced various developments in their ancient homeland, but, perhaps, in the future this vital information will be gathered and compiled in order to determine approximately, if nat precisely, to what measure they affected the social and political progress of their native country. Even without this material, however, w~ are able to mention the beginnings of the movements that were inspired and inaugurated by the Slorvaks in America. Naturally, a considerable number of Slovak emigrants returned home after spending several years abroad. These had. fulfilled. their goal to attain sufficient funds for their particular needs; but a large number, the majority as a matter of fact, remained in America and made their permanent home in the land of their adoption. These had overcome the almost irresistable desire to return to their native land �SLOVAKIA 9 and, though they never returned, during their entire life-time they nevertheless maintained close contaet with their relatives and friends in Slovakia. Even those, who brdke their ties with Europe irrevoc~bly, sti'll remained in touch w.iith their fellow-countrymen and, consequently, ma.de some contribution to the S'lovak cause indirectly. Actual instances of individua1s who broke completely wi1:Jh their past and lost contact wii!h their fellow Slovaks in Amerka were so rare that they can be d1scounted in our attempts to evaluate the destiny of the Slovaks in America and to arrive at a realistic analysis of the influence of American Slovaks on Slovia'k life in the country of their birtJh. The American phase of Slovak life, with its democratic texture and blend, effected several significant changes on home life in their native land. S,i nce the impeUing force of ~heir emigration in many cases was economic, there is no doubt whatsoever that corresponding returns from their labors abroad became the direct and immediate source of a relatiivelly large national income in Slovakia. The amount of new capital that was brought in by returning , Slovak emigrants is, perhaps, impossible to determine even approximately, but the fact remains that it was a windfall which gave Slovakia a new lease on its economic life. Foremost among the effec,ts of this influx of new capital to Slova'kia, was the ability of the average Slovak to own his own land by redeeming it if he hia,d lost it, and to purchase the necessary equiipment and livestock to insure his future economically. This gave him a chance to live as a free man to a large degree, for he was no longer subject completely to the whims and caprice's of his overlords in a smaill country, where the steadily increasing population made it imperative for the native Slovak to have .his plot of land, if he hoped to survive. The emergence of a growing number of debt-free, well-equipped arrd wellstocked small landowners marked the estalblishment, imperceptrbly but none-the-less surely, of a sound well-balanced economic unit in Slovakia's clhanging social order, Sma!ll landowners formed the nucleus of Slovakia's national life, for now they not only inha;bited the land of their forefathers, but they aetually owned it. Economic power, though �10 SLOVAKIA lllodest, indeed, had nevertheless enabled them to effect their social emancipation. Their improved status i'S readily ~derstood and appreciaited if we realize to what extent it freed them from the dead-weight of an oppressive feudal system stHl in vogue throughout Hungary and its domination - a feudal inheritance that had put most of Slovakia's ;forests and ara!ble soil, its rivers and la:kes, a'S weH as its ,l)O\litica1 control, into the ha,nds of an exclusively foreigz:i aristocracy. Under this system the Slovaks were nothing more than servants in their own homes and the fruits of their labors were plucked by usur,peTS who had seized control of tlheiir household. Originally, Slovakia's nobility was largely Slovak by birth, but in the course of time it degenerated by wholesale pesertion to a foreign cause. In this · way, large tracts of Jand passed into the hand'S of those who no longer were Slovak by temperament or nature and, hence, their policies were not designed to benefit the Slovaks. Moreover, in modern times, many large estates came into the hands of fore1gners whose policies were injurious to Slovak interests and whose political al'ignment with ,parties hostile to the Slovaks constituted· a positive menace to the national ex,i stence of the Slovaks in their own country. There is no doubt that the loss of ownership by the majority of the Slovak gentry, which was the backbone of the nation, put the national destiny of Slovakia into a most precarious posit!i:on. Moreover, the necessity of brea:king up their smal>l estates, because of the increasing population, :I'65ttlted in reducing the land to such small units as to make them unprofitable. 'J.ihis inevitably forced the s·m all land-holders to go into debt whenever there was the least mi:sca}Jeulation in their p1ans, or when there was a crop fai-lure. Improvements, or an expansion of one's holdings, were out of the question, for there was seldom a:ny surplus which the Slovalk could use · as an investment in a new enterprise. As a matter of fact, iit often ha:rppened thiat a landpwner was unable to meet his interest, not to speak of reducing the principal on his loan. Eventually, therefore, mahy estates fell into the hands of receivers, arid ·1ater were �SLOVAKIA 11 1bought up by non-Slovaks. As a result, the Slovaks suffered. in a twofold manner: 1) native land-owners dmlinished greatly in numbers, and 2) many diispossessed Slovaks emigrated to o1!her lands where, having settled chiefly in industrial areas, they no longer cared to return to the land and, consequently, they and their children were lost to their country forever. The continual drain of human resources from the n_a ti.onal reservoi'I' of Slovakia weakened the country economica'1ly, morrully and poliitically, because non-Slovaks replaced. the original Slovaks in their native homeland. Under such conditions, Slovak life, as su~h, suffered a sharp decline. Without a doubt, the most essential unit of the Slovalk nation, w'hich gave it permanent character, solidarity and stability, was its independent gentry which had been close .to the sdil for centuries. It was imperative that this group be ,p reserved in its pristine strength and vigor if Slova'kia was to survive as a distinct race in its original niationrul domain. The land-holdings, instead of being sub_ject to di,visions, must be held intact - otherwise, a complete economic breakdown would result and national dissolution would inevitably follow. This was their fear, a well-founded one, of which the Slovaks were acutely aware. 1 America -came to the rescue in this national crisis. The many opportunities for work and good pay in the new world offered a solution to the problems of economic reihabili~ tion at home. Accordingly, t:Jhousands of debt-r:idden and almost destitute Slovaks departed. for American shores with high hopes for the future. And that they were not disillusioned is attested to by the fact that, in a few years, many returned home again with savings which reestablishe d their fortunes in thcir homeland. New homes a.ppeared, old ones were repaired, new equipment and livestock were purchased, old debts were liquidated and Slova'kia's national economy was once more in the hands of iits own native population. ParadoxicaUy enough, the emigration on a large scale from Slovakia which threatened to destroy the nation irre- �12 SLOVAKIA :voca;bly beyond revival, actually restored it to its rightful ownership and renewed vigor. The returning emigrants manifested remarkable energy and enthusiasm in this national restoration. Moreover, many former workers and tenants upon their return were a)ble to buy sufficient parcels pf land to insure a preponderantly Slovak ownership. Others, profiting from their varied experiences abroad, established some sort of business by buying a sawmill, a flour mill, a tavern, etc., and thereby reenforced Slovakia's eco-, nomy by their initiative in founding diversified enterprises. These manifold activities by a thoroughly-awakened Slovak populace were greeted with keen competition by alien interlopers who had established a monopoly in many fields, but the returning Slovaks, having had the advantages of rich experience in the new world, proved to be a match for them. Of tantamount importance was the need for wider education, so that their children might have the opportunity to acquire a high school and college training. The need was both soci'a.'l and political, for they needed Slovak leaders in public Hfe and industry. It was a serious menace, indeed, to have a large percentage of their sons desert to an alien camp and serve a foreign cause stmply because of their training in the anti-Slovak schools sponsored by chauvinistic Magyar regimes which produced countless renegades. Fortunately, not all the Slovak graduates of these schools turned against their Slovak nation. The blessings of American capital became aga,in apparent in the struggle of the Slovak nationalists to maintain the Slovak spirit of loyalty in their ~hildren by providing speciali>zed training for them. Thus, Slovak fathers in America secured the funds necessary for the task of educating their sons in Slovakia for the common welfare of their own countrymen. In homes that had an Ameri'c an background, the spirit of democracy and patriotism kept alive the national life of Slovakia. This is to be .attribulted to Amerka as her gift of freedom to a small nation which was struggling to emancipate itself from foreign domination. An essentia~ element in directing the destiny of a nation is undoubtedly the press, for newspapers, magazines �SLOVAKIA 13 and books provide an index for the spiritual condition of a people. In this respect, the situation in Slovakia was really ~ploralble, because. only a fow Slovak neiwspaipers were published, and these did not enjoy wide circulation. The masses, as yet, had:·not acquired the habit of reading, because they did not feel the need of it. Moreover, they were impoverished and, hence, bought few boolks. For a long time, the only reading they had at hand was limited to their praye:tibodks, religious .bulletins and an occasional publication of the Spalok sv. Vojtecha (St. Adalbert's Society). The average Slovak showed l.ittle or no interest in politics, for he had become accustomed to the view that this was a game, or hobby, exclusively reserved for the nobility. The Americanized Slovaik, however, adopted a different view, and even native-born Slovaks, who had never been outside the confines of their country, gradually cihanged their attitude by reading Slovak newspapers which were sent to them from across the sea. From their pages they learned for the first time how grave the situation was in reality in their own b'ac'k yards. It was truly paradoxical that they were informed of things that happened right at home by receiving newspapers, published in their own language and spirit, more than three thousand miles away. They learned to defend their rights by a unified public opinion which was being crysta1Uzed largely through the influence of publications from foreign lands. And returning emigi.·ants strengthened this movement by keeping up their subscriptions to American newspapers. Many of them kept in close touch with their brother Slovaks abroad by retaining their membership in American Slovak societies for several years after coming back to Slovakia. Perhaps the most precious gift that America presented to Slovakia were the Slovaks who returned to their na.tive country, not only because they brought their savings, but also because these men had learned much by their new experiences whirch had matured them in many ways and which were to help Slovakia on the way towards winning her national freedom. Men who had left their country, dejected and despirrited, now returned refreshed and revivified by the atmosphere of American democracy. �14 SLOVAKIA In America, the Slovak who became a naturalized citizen lost his inferiority complex and acquired a healthy selfconfidence. He felt important once more as an individual, for he was proud of his new staJtus as a full-fledged citi'zeri of a great, democratic country. He respected the rights of others, While his own rights were a'liso respected. Moreover, as a member of free Slovak organizations, he learned to work not only in his own, but also in other's !interests. In fulfilling his responsibilities, as well as in insisting on his own rights, he was doing his work well in the spirit of true democracy. Although he became a vital part of American democratic life, the new citizen of S'lovak ancestry did not forget his native counrtrymen who lived in the land of his fathers in the Slovaik hills and woodlands and fields that stretched from the Low Carpathians in the West to the High Carpathians in the East. The Slovak language became a golden bond by whkh he was united to his fellow-countrymen beyond the seas ; and the concept ·of a wider extention of these rights to his people back home inspired him to work for the realrization of that idea!. Thus America became the fertile soil for the growth of Siovak national consciousness and freedom. Every Slovak town and village felt the impact of American democracy. The returning emigrant did not remain aloof from affairs of public welfare, but plunged 'into the thick of thfogs. Polirt:fos was no longer the here noire of the common man, for, after learning the democratic technique of American life, the Slovak entered into the arena of political struggles for his rights. He had both the courage and confidence to carry on the fight for his country's freedom as well as for his rights as a free man. While tracing 1:he direct influence of American democratic elements on Slovakia, we ought to reca:11 tha,t there was a strong cross-current that was felt in Slovak circles in America. This mutual assistance was ruppreciaited by leading Slovaks on both sides of the Atlantic, and they tried to establish closer ties of rela1Jionshilp with ea:ch other in order to achieve their goal of freedom. Communications �SLOVAKIA 15 betw~n leading Slovak thinkers in Slovakia and America were mruintained through · personal messages, · writings in the mag~ines a,nd,_ newsipapers, annuals and almanacs in which the freedom-lov,ing Slovaks at home kept in touch with their brothers across the sea. Americans of Slovak descent, former immigrants from Slovakia, learned the iJ.esson of democracy and freedom well in Ameri'Ca. Freedom, they learned, is the natural birthright of all mankind. If and when the Slovak nation wins its fight for fireedom and complete pwitical independenrce, the Slovak people will have America to tJhank for it. Am~ rica was, and still is, a constant source of insipiration and hope for the Slovaks in their hom~land, despite what has happened in 1945. 'I1he Slovaks shall remain eternally grateful to Ameri'ca and Americans of Slo,va'k ancestry for the priceless contributions to their struggle for freedom and independence, for the many sacrifices made so that true democracy once may rule not only in Slovakia, butt in an countries of the world. The roots of democracy and freedom in .Slovalk,i a had their beginnings in America, and Slovaks everywhere, at home and aJbroad in foreign lands, firmly believe that America will not abandon Slovakia in her darkest hour. The Slovaks look longingly to America for liberat ion from the scourge of manlkind, the greatest enemy of the democratic way of life - Communism . 1 • • • WHO SAID IT? "We lay pa;roiooJar stress on ithe fadt that the few Slovaik rei:f.ugees wandering about in the we:sit, adwooating the idea of a Ozooh.os!lova!k State, do not r~resent the Slovalk people, who are today fanat~ca'lly anti-Czeoh. Ozeohoslovakia can only be restored against the wi:H of the S-loivaks. Concerning the Czeicihs, they s'hould wnderstand that onJy the federation suggested aJbQlVe (!the Da.nulbian federation) can protect theisr nation from new adventures." - (F. 0. Miksche - a Czech - in UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER, p. 216 ; Faber and Faber Ltd .. London). � DECEMBER, 1953 SLOVAKIA 1 INFLUENCE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY ON SWVAK LIFE Dr. Francis Hrusovsky Actual living conditions of the Slovak immigrants in the new warild, especially in the United States oif America, were very much different from those in hi1s homeland which was under the domination of Hungary until the end of the first world war. The natural temperament of the average Slovak was determined, to some degree, by the circumstances of his life in a land that had been under foreign nrle for centuries. Economically, the native of Slovakia found life hard and difficult; socially, his lot was unprogressive; politically, freedom and equality had no practical meaning for him. His energies were drained by the relentless struggle for survival. Not infrequently, he suffered from want; his entire life was spent in misery and poverty. The downtrodden Slovak peasant, though inwardly protesting against social inequality and injustice, had not suffi. cient strength and vitality to break the chains of his servitude. He resigned hims~lf to his misfortune, concluding that unkind fate decreed that misery was to be his n a tural lot on earth. Under such adverse circumstances, it was extremely difficult to arouse and maintain a feeling of Slovak national patriotism ; and it was doubly difficult to organize a Slovak society that would espouse the idea of Slovak nationalism, because the average Slovak was hampered at every step by his enemies who tenaciously held to the age-old concept of Magyar feudalism, a way of life that was contrary to the idea of Slovak nationalism. Every Slovak knew that he was not a Magyar but a Slovak; yet, this consciousness of nationalism was never allowed to develop freely. Patriotism and loyalty in the Hugarian State was only one: all had to acknowledge their adherence to the Crown of St. Stephen and Magyar hegemony. It is not surprising, therefore, that the peasant in Slovaikia had no clearcut understanding of the meaning of nationalism ; that he failed to aspire to national emancipation is manifestly an indication that he �2 SLOVA-IHA failed to grasp the glorious meaning of having one's own government in power and one's own native language as the official tongue of the land. And, hence, at first, the aver age Slovak was not inclined to partici,pate in political gatherings that were designe'd· to bring his own country ultimate freedom and democra;cy. Weighed . down ,b y the burdens of life as an oppressed human being, the Slovak's paJtience and endurance were truly remarkable. In the long succession of centuries of political servitude and 'tymnny, he had become resigned to his unchanging misery, injustice, humiliation and serfdom, for to him it seemed that this was decreed by fate, or a higher power. This was, then, the average Slova,k immigrant who came to America. Imagine how great was his amazement upon discovering that living an:d social conditions in the New World were so diametrically different from his life in the land of his birth, his Slova:kia beneath the Tatras. He was amazed by the vast difference between life at home in Slovakia and here in America and the unlimited opportunities offered the immigrant, provided he was willing to work. And since hard work was practica,lly s~cond nature to the Slovak immigra,nrt, he found his new home to his liking. At home, his sphere of activity ha,d been limited, while here, in his new home land, unlimited opportunities presented themselves on all sides, so that a man of inte1ligence, ingenuity and industry just could not fail to become a success in America. At hame, the Slovak could only hope to eke out a bare existence with hardly a chance for improvement; here in America he could look forward to a steady improvement of his social conditions. Here, in the new world, his .progress was not impeded by circumstances, on the contrary, the conditions for his advancement exceeded his fondest dreams. No doubt the primary motive for Slovak emigration was to seek a solution for financial difficulties; the Slovak went abroad chiefly to secure economic advantages which were lacking at home. He envisioned the day when he would rise above his lowly station in life with the help of his incr:eased earning power. Hence, there was no job, no matter �SLOVAKIA 3 how strenuorus or dangerous, that he shirked S'O long as ft promised him immediate returns. There is little doubt that tlhe Slovak immigrant in America worked harder than he had ever worked at home, •b ut t:Jhis was a sacrifice well worthwhile, in his estimation, if it helped his loved one$ in the old country and improved his own condition. America attracted the simple peaJsant from the hills and villages throughout Slovakfa. He was uneducated, though generally not illiterate, but equirpped with the natural gifts of remarkahle stamina, courage, ingenuity, industry and native intelligence. Possessing unusual powers of observation, sound judgment and ability to assimilate new ways of life, as well as being blessed witJh a good moral training, the Slov,a k found America a fertile field for his endeavors. He learned much in the new land of freedom and opportunity; and though he received much from it, he ailso gave much in return. He put his heart and will in his work, employed his mind in developing new tech:. niques, spared no effort, time and energy to produce an unending stream of goods for human consumption and welfare. Thus, the Slovak, who had been held in political bondage and who had lapsed into a state of social and economic retrogression, suddenly found a dynamic release for his pent-up energies in a land that was forever dedicated to freedom and equality, a land which offered him constant inspiration for his enterprising spirit and proved to be a never-ending source of visions of a great destiny. The de_~ mocratic atmosphere of America was to him a tonic, an elixir of magical powers that turned him into a veritable giant who feared no undertaking, avoided no difficulty. Consequently, many of his kind, working doggedly and persistently with indomitable energy, achieved comparative success in America. The typical American immigr ant from Slovakia was confronted with the difficulties of language, strange cus~ toms and new surroundings, and the immedi•a te necessity of employment. After securing a job, he quickly adjusted · himself to his new emrironment, acquired vaJ1uaJble expe~ riences over a period of years, steadHy increased his earnings and saved his money. He soon perceived that he, too, �4 SLOVAKIA ·was a human being with natural aspirations, desires and ideals which he knew could be realized if he worked for their attainment. It wa;s in America that he found himself as an ind!iividual, no:t only with civic responstbilites, but with personal rights as weH. As a full-fledged naturalized citizen of hi:s adopted country, he became acutely aware of his added dignity as a free man. This both satisfied him and aLso aroused in him the determination to emulate his fellow-citizens in the fullest a;ppreciation of his precious inheritance. Of course, there were some unfortunate exceptions to the general respon:se of the typical Slovak to his Ameriican surroundings; but on the whole, the great majority reacted favorably to the stimulating influences of a democratic way of life in the United States. Life's vicissitudes make human existence a constant struggle with obstacles strewn on the path that ,l eads to the ultimaJte goal. The SlovaJk lras never been without hardships and, therefore, he has never been afraid of the future. At home, all his efforts to overcome the handicaps of his lowly station in life were to no avail. He was doomed to remain in the same social caiste into which he was born. If he was born in poverty, he was destined to a lifelong struggle for a mere livelhood. There was no opportunity for him to rise above his station, being inextricably bound by ties of an outmoded feudal ,s ystem which kept him hopelessly mired in a bog of caste-privileged society. But his patient endurance and peritina;city, his indefatigable industry, which had helped him to survive under the most adverse conditions, served him well in the new land; and his ingrained habits of determination, dependability and native ingenuity were qualities which gave him the impetus to succeed when he was suddenly thrust into the fresh atmosphere of American free enterpr1se and democracy. The a;ma:zing discovery that he was on a plane of political and social equality with men of more than a score of nationa-lities, enjoy}ng freedom under one flag, the Stars and Stripes, made him feel that he had accomplished something worthwhile; and the consciousness of his abilities and achievements inspired him to work even harder to advance further on the road to Americanization, a process that �SLOVAKIA 5 brought out the native powers of the Slovak to adopt himself to new surroundings and to assimilate without losing his identity as a new American of Slovak ancestry. The immigrant Slovak's contacts with men of various races made him conscious of his own distinctness as a national figure, for he was unable to converse with them and he did not understand their ways. This factor affected him in two ways: 1) he was inclined to keep aloof from "strangers" and, 2) he was instinctively drawn to follow Slovaks who spoke his language and who knew his ways. Thus, it was but natural for him to draw closer to men of his own kind for companionship and understanding. All Slovak immigrants came together wherever they went, being drawn to each other by their common longing for the homes they had but recently left behind across the sea. Following the example of other nationalities, they organized societies and founded churches thaJt soon became the centers of their activities. This association kept them closely united and helped them to protect and enhance their common interests. Moreover, the feeling of national consciousness grew stronger among them as they sought refuge and comfort in these islands of Slovak memories and realities in the midst of a sea of representatives of every nation on earth. Slovaks in their homeland could not publicly express their national aspirations without reprisals, but here in America they were free to profess their patriotism and write about their ideals of nationhood. Every American of Slovak parentage could acknowledge his Slovak heritage publicly, and no one took it amiss, nobody was suspicious of his motives, no one insulted him for it. Moreover, his fellow-citizens of other national origins, in business and politics, accepted the new Americans as equals without regard to national origins. A Slovak immigrant who became a naturalized American citizen soon realized that he not only had civic responsibilities but personal rights, too, and the fact that 'he did · not have to renounce his Slovak heritage as such, while pledging loyalty to his new homeland, became the source �SLOVAKIA of his national pride of being a descendant of Slovak an~estors who had not been able to call their ancient hearths their own for many centuries. They cherished the national traditions of their forefathers and soon gave voice to them in this new land of freedom. In a comparatively short time, the Slovak in America · teaHzed that he, too, could voice his opinions freely, that he could have convictions wiithout fear of repression. Slovak organizations gave him ample opportunities to express himself; and hls newspapers were for him mediums of information, instruction and inspiration. These <:!orrstituted the keystone of Slovak unity for all fellow Americans of Slovak ancestry. From the stand,point of individual advancement, any Slovak, no matter how humble his origin, could ·air his views in his own newspapers. This was a veritable school for many simple, uneducated Slovaks who became well-informed and law-abiding citizens of their •a dopted -country, but who, nevertheless, spoke proudly of their native Slovakia, the land in which they had been born, the ·land of their forefathers. The Slovak immigrant found it impossible to forget the land of his birth; he fondly recalled the scenes of Ms childhood, and often spolke of the relatives and friends beyond the sea. This was perfectly natural, for despite 1:!he hard lot and misery •o f his oTiginal home, yet he longed to be with his parents and friends, if only for a little whHe. He could see the village church wit'h its cross uplifted to the sky, as an eternal sign of salvation, a symbol of the deep faith in God that was in his soul, a symbol at once of his own pain and suffering, of his strength and hope. The church, located in the center of Slovak village life, with spires rising high above the simple peasant huts in whose shadow they reclined, stood out in sharp relief in his memory, for religion was the keystone of his existence. The church was his fortress in time of danger, his solace in time of grief, his hope in time of despair. Without his qhurch, his village priest, without prayer, his life would, indeed, be empty and forelorn. The Slovak has been able to bear life's burdens because he staunchly believes in Di- �SLOVAKIA 7 vine Providence and because he seeks resources in prayer at all times. Abroad, in foreign lands, the church with its Slovak prayers and hymns, has been the bulwaTk of the Slovak immigrant. It has been his ,anchor on a foreign shore, a compass in an uncharted sea. Because the church is all hnportant in his life, the Slovak has invariably built a church, then school. With a ,s trong religious and social foundation, the Slovak in America maintained his national character and expanded his cultural endeavors as the years went by. It was his faith that kept him loyal to his sacred traditions, preserved his language, and made him cherish his nationality. On Sundays, he joined his fellow countrymen in Slovak prayers and hymns; this, perhaps, more than any ot'her single factor, perpetuated the most sacred and treasured memories of Slovakia. Imposing Slovak churches, modern parish and school buildings, and office building,s· of the Slovak societies are. concrete expressions of the deep religious convictions a:nd· cultural aspirations of the Slovak immigrant. They are monuments of self-sacrifice and devotion to time-honored institutions, permeated with the same fervent spirit of his forefathers who cherished their Christian traditions be·neath the Tatras since time immemorial. At home, unfortunately, genuine Slovaik societies and organizations did not exist, and the few that functioned were -p rimarily designed to serve elements and interests that were alien to the Slovak cause. Even ibhe churcih, in some instances, became an agency for these forces. But · in America, Slovak churches, organizations and schools became the centers of Slovak national culture. Moreover, the .spark of nationalism which was barely kept alight ait home, burst into a bright flame in the new Land of freedom. The Slovak immigrant caught t:Jhe spirit of American democracy whose blessings he had personally experienced in his daily life. He accepted these with a deep sense of gratitude. He was proud of his new status of citizenship, an'd now · tlia.t he was content, he yearned to have his folks back home· enjoy these self-same rights and advantages of the democratic way of life. �8 SLOVAKIA Slovak poets and writers, keenly aware of this stifling atmosphere in which their people were slowly expiring, made every effort to arouse the masses out of their lethargy. Although their voices were unheeded in their native land, where the people were submissive and demoralized, nevertheless, a small but determined minority of patriaticminded Slovaks organized political clubs to fight for their nation's inherent rights and to formulate a program for an active political movement. The Slovaks had leadership, but failed to support their leaders efficiently, and on various occasions some of their leaders joined the opposition to work against the best interests and welfare of their nat,ion. Before the first World War Slovakia's national life was caught in a nut-cracker net-wor'k of political and social intrigue and seemed doomed. National extinction was. indeed, a grave danger which had to be averted. The Slovaks were helpless in the fa:ce of the opposition whi•c h prevented them from developing their native culture and realizing their right to self-government and independence. Internally, the Slovak nation was vitally sound-physically, biologically and morally it was sound - and it possessed untapped natural resources, but needed an external force to set it free. And this dynamic force came from America. Actual statistics are not available to indicate to what extent the American Slovaks influenced various developments in their ancient homeland, but, perhaps, in the future this vital information will be gathered and compiled in order to determine approximately, if nat precisely, to what measure they affected the social and political progress of their native country. Even without this material, however, w~ are able to mention the beginnings of the movements that were inspired and inaugurated by the Slorvaks in America. Naturally, a considerable number of Slovak emigrants returned home after spending several years abroad. These had. fulfilled. their goal to attain sufficient funds for their particular needs; but a large number, the majority as a matter of fact, remained in America and made their permanent home in the land of their adoption. These had overcome the almost irresistable desire to return to their native land �SLOVAKIA 9 and, though they never returned, during their entire life-time they nevertheless maintained close contaet with their relatives and friends in Slovakia. Even those, who brdke their ties with Europe irrevoc~bly, sti'll remained in touch w.iith their fellow-countrymen and, consequently, ma.de some contribution to the S'lovak cause indirectly. Actual instances of individua1s who broke completely wi1:Jh their past and lost contact wii!h their fellow Slovaks in Amerka were so rare that they can be d1scounted in our attempts to evaluate the destiny of the Slovaks in America and to arrive at a realistic analysis of the influence of American Slovaks on Slovia'k life in the country of their birtJh. The American phase of Slovak life, with its democratic texture and blend, effected several significant changes on home life in their native land. S,i nce the impeUing force of ~heir emigration in many cases was economic, there is no doubt whatsoever that corresponding returns from their labors abroad became the direct and immediate source of a relatiivelly large national income in Slovakia. The amount of new capital that was brought in by returning , Slovak emigrants is, perhaps, impossible to determine even approximately, but the fact remains that it was a windfall which gave Slovakia a new lease on its economic life. Foremost among the effec,ts of this influx of new capital to Slova'kia, was the ability of the average Slovak to own his own land by redeeming it if he hia,d lost it, and to purchase the necessary equiipment and livestock to insure his future economically. This gave him a chance to live as a free man to a large degree, for he was no longer subject completely to the whims and caprice's of his overlords in a smaill country, where the steadily increasing population made it imperative for the native Slovak to have .his plot of land, if he hoped to survive. The emergence of a growing number of debt-free, well-equipped arrd wellstocked small landowners marked the estalblishment, imperceptrbly but none-the-less surely, of a sound well-balanced economic unit in Slovakia's clhanging social order, Sma!ll landowners formed the nucleus of Slovakia's national life, for now they not only inha;bited the land of their forefathers, but they aetually owned it. Economic power, though �10 SLOVAKIA lllodest, indeed, had nevertheless enabled them to effect their social emancipation. Their improved status i'S readily ~derstood and appreciaited if we realize to what extent it freed them from the dead-weight of an oppressive feudal system stHl in vogue throughout Hungary and its domination - a feudal inheritance that had put most of Slovakia's ;forests and ara!ble soil, its rivers and la:kes, a'S weH as its ,l)O\litica1 control, into the ha,nds of an exclusively foreigz:i aristocracy. Under this system the Slovaks were nothing more than servants in their own homes and the fruits of their labors were plucked by usur,peTS who had seized control of tlheiir household. Originally, Slovakia's nobility was largely Slovak by birth, but in the course of time it degenerated by wholesale pesertion to a foreign cause. In this · way, large tracts of Jand passed into the hand'S of those who no longer were Slovak by temperament or nature and, hence, their policies were not designed to benefit the Slovaks. Moreover, in modern times, many large estates came into the hands of fore1gners whose policies were injurious to Slovak interests and whose political al'ignment with ,parties hostile to the Slovaks constituted· a positive menace to the national ex,i stence of the Slovaks in their own country. There is no doubt that the loss of ownership by the majority of the Slovak gentry, which was the backbone of the nation, put the national destiny of Slovakia into a most precarious posit!i:on. Moreover, the necessity of brea:king up their smal>l estates, because of the increasing population, :I'65ttlted in reducing the land to such small units as to make them unprofitable. 'J.ihis inevitably forced the s·m all land-holders to go into debt whenever there was the least mi:sca}Jeulation in their p1ans, or when there was a crop fai-lure. Improvements, or an expansion of one's holdings, were out of the question, for there was seldom a:ny surplus which the Slovalk could use · as an investment in a new enterprise. As a matter of fact, iit often ha:rppened thiat a landpwner was unable to meet his interest, not to speak of reducing the principal on his loan. Eventually, therefore, mahy estates fell into the hands of receivers, arid ·1ater were �SLOVAKIA 11 1bought up by non-Slovaks. As a result, the Slovaks suffered. in a twofold manner: 1) native land-owners dmlinished greatly in numbers, and 2) many diispossessed Slovaks emigrated to o1!her lands where, having settled chiefly in industrial areas, they no longer cared to return to the land and, consequently, they and their children were lost to their country forever. The continual drain of human resources from the n_a ti.onal reservoi'I' of Slovakia weakened the country economica'1ly, morrully and poliitically, because non-Slovaks replaced. the original Slovaks in their native homeland. Under such conditions, Slovak life, as su~h, suffered a sharp decline. Without a doubt, the most essential unit of the Slovalk nation, w'hich gave it permanent character, solidarity and stability, was its independent gentry which had been close .to the sdil for centuries. It was imperative that this group be ,p reserved in its pristine strength and vigor if Slova'kia was to survive as a distinct race in its original niationrul domain. The land-holdings, instead of being sub_ject to di,visions, must be held intact - otherwise, a complete economic breakdown would result and national dissolution would inevitably follow. This was their fear, a well-founded one, of which the Slovaks were acutely aware. 1 America -came to the rescue in this national crisis. The many opportunities for work and good pay in the new world offered a solution to the problems of economic reihabili~ tion at home. Accordingly, t:Jhousands of debt-r:idden and almost destitute Slovaks departed. for American shores with high hopes for the future. And that they were not disillusioned is attested to by the fact that, in a few years, many returned home again with savings which reestablishe d their fortunes in thcir homeland. New homes a.ppeared, old ones were repaired, new equipment and livestock were purchased, old debts were liquidated and Slova'kia's national economy was once more in the hands of iits own native population. ParadoxicaUy enough, the emigration on a large scale from Slovakia which threatened to destroy the nation irre- �12 SLOVAKIA :voca;bly beyond revival, actually restored it to its rightful ownership and renewed vigor. The returning emigrants manifested remarkable energy and enthusiasm in this national restoration. Moreover, many former workers and tenants upon their return were a)ble to buy sufficient parcels pf land to insure a preponderantly Slovak ownership. Others, profiting from their varied experiences abroad, established some sort of business by buying a sawmill, a flour mill, a tavern, etc., and thereby reenforced Slovakia's eco-, nomy by their initiative in founding diversified enterprises. These manifold activities by a thoroughly-awakened Slovak populace were greeted with keen competition by alien interlopers who had established a monopoly in many fields, but the returning Slovaks, having had the advantages of rich experience in the new world, proved to be a match for them. Of tantamount importance was the need for wider education, so that their children might have the opportunity to acquire a high school and college training. The need was both soci'a.'l and political, for they needed Slovak leaders in public Hfe and industry. It was a serious menace, indeed, to have a large percentage of their sons desert to an alien camp and serve a foreign cause stmply because of their training in the anti-Slovak schools sponsored by chauvinistic Magyar regimes which produced countless renegades. Fortunately, not all the Slovak graduates of these schools turned against their Slovak nation. The blessings of American capital became aga,in apparent in the struggle of the Slovak nationalists to maintain the Slovak spirit of loyalty in their ~hildren by providing speciali>zed training for them. Thus, Slovak fathers in America secured the funds necessary for the task of educating their sons in Slovakia for the common welfare of their own countrymen. In homes that had an Ameri'c an background, the spirit of democracy and patriotism kept alive the national life of Slovakia. This is to be .attribulted to Amerka as her gift of freedom to a small nation which was struggling to emancipate itself from foreign domination. An essentia~ element in directing the destiny of a nation is undoubtedly the press, for newspapers, magazines �SLOVAKIA 13 and books provide an index for the spiritual condition of a people. In this respect, the situation in Slovakia was really ~ploralble, because. only a fow Slovak neiwspaipers were published, and these did not enjoy wide circulation. The masses, as yet, had:·not acquired the habit of reading, because they did not feel the need of it. Moreover, they were impoverished and, hence, bought few boolks. For a long time, the only reading they had at hand was limited to their praye:tibodks, religious .bulletins and an occasional publication of the Spalok sv. Vojtecha (St. Adalbert's Society). The average Slovak showed l.ittle or no interest in politics, for he had become accustomed to the view that this was a game, or hobby, exclusively reserved for the nobility. The Americanized Slovaik, however, adopted a different view, and even native-born Slovaks, who had never been outside the confines of their country, gradually cihanged their attitude by reading Slovak newspapers which were sent to them from across the sea. From their pages they learned for the first time how grave the situation was in reality in their own b'ac'k yards. It was truly paradoxical that they were informed of things that happened right at home by receiving newspapers, published in their own language and spirit, more than three thousand miles away. They learned to defend their rights by a unified public opinion which was being crysta1Uzed largely through the influence of publications from foreign lands. And returning emigi.·ants strengthened this movement by keeping up their subscriptions to American newspapers. Many of them kept in close touch with their brother Slovaks abroad by retaining their membership in American Slovak societies for several years after coming back to Slovakia. Perhaps the most precious gift that America presented to Slovakia were the Slovaks who returned to their na.tive country, not only because they brought their savings, but also because these men had learned much by their new experiences whirch had matured them in many ways and which were to help Slovakia on the way towards winning her national freedom. Men who had left their country, dejected and despirrited, now returned refreshed and revivified by the atmosphere of American democracy. �14 SLOVAKIA In America, the Slovak who became a naturalized citizen lost his inferiority complex and acquired a healthy selfconfidence. He felt important once more as an individual, for he was proud of his new staJtus as a full-fledged citi'zeri of a great, democratic country. He respected the rights of others, While his own rights were a'liso respected. Moreover, as a member of free Slovak organizations, he learned to work not only in his own, but also in other's !interests. In fulfilling his responsibilities, as well as in insisting on his own rights, he was doing his work well in the spirit of true democracy. Although he became a vital part of American democratic life, the new citizen of S'lovak ancestry did not forget his native counrtrymen who lived in the land of his fathers in the Slovaik hills and woodlands and fields that stretched from the Low Carpathians in the West to the High Carpathians in the East. The Slovak language became a golden bond by whkh he was united to his fellow-countrymen beyond the seas ; and the concept ·of a wider extention of these rights to his people back home inspired him to work for the realrization of that idea!. Thus America became the fertile soil for the growth of Siovak national consciousness and freedom. Every Slovak town and village felt the impact of American democracy. The returning emigrant did not remain aloof from affairs of public welfare, but plunged 'into the thick of thfogs. Polirt:fos was no longer the here noire of the common man, for, after learning the democratic technique of American life, the Slovak entered into the arena of political struggles for his rights. He had both the courage and confidence to carry on the fight for his country's freedom as well as for his rights as a free man. While tracing 1:he direct influence of American democratic elements on Slovakia, we ought to reca:11 tha,t there was a strong cross-current that was felt in Slovak circles in America. This mutual assistance was ruppreciaited by leading Slovaks on both sides of the Atlantic, and they tried to establish closer ties of rela1Jionshilp with ea:ch other in order to achieve their goal of freedom. Communications �SLOVAKIA 15 betw~n leading Slovak thinkers in Slovakia and America were mruintained through · personal messages, · writings in the mag~ines a,nd,_ newsipapers, annuals and almanacs in which the freedom-lov,ing Slovaks at home kept in touch with their brothers across the sea. Americans of Slovak descent, former immigrants from Slovakia, learned the iJ.esson of democracy and freedom well in Ameri'Ca. Freedom, they learned, is the natural birthright of all mankind. If and when the Slovak nation wins its fight for fireedom and complete pwitical independenrce, the Slovak people will have America to tJhank for it. Am~ rica was, and still is, a constant source of insipiration and hope for the Slovaks in their hom~land, despite what has happened in 1945. 'I1he Slovaks shall remain eternally grateful to Ameri'ca and Americans of Slo,va'k ancestry for the priceless contributions to their struggle for freedom and independence, for the many sacrifices made so that true democracy once may rule not only in Slovakia, butt in an countries of the world. The roots of democracy and freedom in .Slovalk,i a had their beginnings in America, and Slovaks everywhere, at home and aJbroad in foreign lands, firmly believe that America will not abandon Slovakia in her darkest hour. The Slovaks look longingly to America for liberat ion from the scourge of manlkind, the greatest enemy of the democratic way of life - Communism . 1 • • • WHO SAID IT? "We lay pa;roiooJar stress on ithe fadt that the few Slovaik rei:f.ugees wandering about in the we:sit, adwooating the idea of a Ozooh.os!lova!k State, do not r~resent the Slovalk people, who are today fanat~ca'lly anti-Czeoh. Ozeohoslovakia can only be restored against the wi:H of the S-loivaks. Concerning the Czeicihs, they s'hould wnderstand that onJy the federation suggested aJbQlVe (!the Da.nulbian federation) can protect theisr nation from new adventures." - (F. 0. Miksche - a Czech - in UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER, p. 216 ; Faber and Faber Ltd .. London). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document DECEMBER, 1953 SLOVAKIA 1 INFLUENCE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY ON SWVAK LIFE Dr. Francis Hrusovsky Actual living conditions of the Slovak immigrants in the new warild, especially in the United States oif America, were very much different from those in hi1s homeland which was under the domination of Hungary until the end of the first world war. The natural temperament of the average Slovak was determined, to some degree, by the circumstances of his life in a land that had been under foreign nrle for centuries. Economically, the native of Slovakia found life hard and difficult; socially, his lot was unprogressive; politically, freedom and equality had no practical meaning for him. His energies were drained by the relentless struggle for survival. Not infrequently, he suffered from want; his entire life was spent in misery and poverty. The downtrodden Slovak peasant, though inwardly protesting against social inequality and injustice, had not suffi. cient strength and vitality to break the chains of his servitude. He resigned hims~lf to his misfortune, concluding that unkind fate decreed that misery was to be his n a tural lot on earth. Under such adverse circumstances, it was extremely difficult to arouse and maintain a feeling of Slovak national patriotism ; and it was doubly difficult to organize a Slovak society that would espouse the idea of Slovak nationalism, because the average Slovak was hampered at every step by his enemies who tenaciously held to the age-old concept of Magyar feudalism, a way of life that was contrary to the idea of Slovak nationalism. Every Slovak knew that he was not a Magyar but a Slovak; yet, this consciousness of nationalism was never allowed to develop freely. Patriotism and loyalty in the Hugarian State was only one: all had to acknowledge their adherence to the Crown of St. Stephen and Magyar hegemony. It is not surprising, therefore, that the peasant in Slovaikia had no clearcut understanding of the meaning of nationalism ; that he failed to aspire to national emancipation is manifestly an indication that he 2 SLOVA-IHA failed to grasp the glorious meaning of having one's own government in power and one's own native language as the official tongue of the land. And, hence, at first, the aver age Slovak was not inclined to partici,pate in political gatherings that were designe'd· to bring his own country ultimate freedom and democra;cy. Weighed . down ,b y the burdens of life as an oppressed human being, the Slovak's paJtience and endurance were truly remarkable. In the long succession of centuries of political servitude and 'tymnny, he had become resigned to his unchanging misery, injustice, humiliation and serfdom, for to him it seemed that this was decreed by fate, or a higher power. This was, then, the average Slova,k immigrant who came to America. Imagine how great was his amazement upon discovering that living an:d social conditions in the New World were so diametrically different from his life in the land of his birth, his Slova:kia beneath the Tatras. He was amazed by the vast difference between life at home in Slovakia and here in America and the unlimited opportunities offered the immigrant, provided he was willing to work. And since hard work was practica,lly s~cond nature to the Slovak immigra,nrt, he found his new home to his liking. At home, his sphere of activity ha,d been limited, while here, in his new home land, unlimited opportunities presented themselves on all sides, so that a man of inte1ligence, ingenuity and industry just could not fail to become a success in America. At hame, the Slovak could only hope to eke out a bare existence with hardly a chance for improvement; here in America he could look forward to a steady improvement of his social conditions. Here, in the new world, his .progress was not impeded by circumstances, on the contrary, the conditions for his advancement exceeded his fondest dreams. No doubt the primary motive for Slovak emigration was to seek a solution for financial difficulties; the Slovak went abroad chiefly to secure economic advantages which were lacking at home. He envisioned the day when he would rise above his lowly station in life with the help of his incr:eased earning power. Hence, there was no job, no matter SLOVAKIA 3 how strenuorus or dangerous, that he shirked S'O long as ft promised him immediate returns. There is little doubt that tlhe Slovak immigrant in America worked harder than he had ever worked at home, •b ut t:Jhis was a sacrifice well worthwhile, in his estimation, if it helped his loved one$ in the old country and improved his own condition. America attracted the simple peaJsant from the hills and villages throughout Slovakfa. He was uneducated, though generally not illiterate, but equirpped with the natural gifts of remarkahle stamina, courage, ingenuity, industry and native intelligence. Possessing unusual powers of observation, sound judgment and ability to assimilate new ways of life, as well as being blessed witJh a good moral training, the Slov,a k found America a fertile field for his endeavors. He learned much in the new land of freedom and opportunity; and though he received much from it, he ailso gave much in return. He put his heart and will in his work, employed his mind in developing new tech:. niques, spared no effort, time and energy to produce an unending stream of goods for human consumption and welfare. Thus, the Slovak, who had been held in political bondage and who had lapsed into a state of social and economic retrogression, suddenly found a dynamic release for his pent-up energies in a land that was forever dedicated to freedom and equality, a land which offered him constant inspiration for his enterprising spirit and proved to be a never-ending source of visions of a great destiny. The de_~ mocratic atmosphere of America was to him a tonic, an elixir of magical powers that turned him into a veritable giant who feared no undertaking, avoided no difficulty. Consequently, many of his kind, working doggedly and persistently with indomitable energy, achieved comparative success in America. The typical American immigr ant from Slovakia was confronted with the difficulties of language, strange cus~ toms and new surroundings, and the immedi•a te necessity of employment. After securing a job, he quickly adjusted · himself to his new emrironment, acquired vaJ1uaJble expe~ riences over a period of years, steadHy increased his earnings and saved his money. He soon perceived that he, too, 4 SLOVAKIA ·was a human being with natural aspirations, desires and ideals which he knew could be realized if he worked for their attainment. It wa;s in America that he found himself as an ind!iividual, no:t only with civic responstbilites, but with personal rights as weH. As a full-fledged naturalized citizen of hi:s adopted country, he became acutely aware of his added dignity as a free man. This both satisfied him and aLso aroused in him the determination to emulate his fellow-citizens in the fullest a;ppreciation of his precious inheritance. Of course, there were some unfortunate exceptions to the general respon:se of the typical Slovak to his Ameriican surroundings; but on the whole, the great majority reacted favorably to the stimulating influences of a democratic way of life in the United States. Life's vicissitudes make human existence a constant struggle with obstacles strewn on the path that ,l eads to the ultimaJte goal. The SlovaJk lras never been without hardships and, therefore, he has never been afraid of the future. At home, all his efforts to overcome the handicaps of his lowly station in life were to no avail. He was doomed to remain in the same social caiste into which he was born. If he was born in poverty, he was destined to a lifelong struggle for a mere livelhood. There was no opportunity for him to rise above his station, being inextricably bound by ties of an outmoded feudal ,s ystem which kept him hopelessly mired in a bog of caste-privileged society. But his patient endurance and peritina;city, his indefatigable industry, which had helped him to survive under the most adverse conditions, served him well in the new land; and his ingrained habits of determination, dependability and native ingenuity were qualities which gave him the impetus to succeed when he was suddenly thrust into the fresh atmosphere of American free enterpr1se and democracy. The a;ma:zing discovery that he was on a plane of political and social equality with men of more than a score of nationa-lities, enjoy}ng freedom under one flag, the Stars and Stripes, made him feel that he had accomplished something worthwhile; and the consciousness of his abilities and achievements inspired him to work even harder to advance further on the road to Americanization, a process that SLOVAKIA 5 brought out the native powers of the Slovak to adopt himself to new surroundings and to assimilate without losing his identity as a new American of Slovak ancestry. The immigrant Slovak's contacts with men of various races made him conscious of his own distinctness as a national figure, for he was unable to converse with them and he did not understand their ways. This factor affected him in two ways: 1) he was inclined to keep aloof from "strangers" and, 2) he was instinctively drawn to follow Slovaks who spoke his language and who knew his ways. Thus, it was but natural for him to draw closer to men of his own kind for companionship and understanding. All Slovak immigrants came together wherever they went, being drawn to each other by their common longing for the homes they had but recently left behind across the sea. Following the example of other nationalities, they organized societies and founded churches thaJt soon became the centers of their activities. This association kept them closely united and helped them to protect and enhance their common interests. Moreover, the feeling of national consciousness grew stronger among them as they sought refuge and comfort in these islands of Slovak memories and realities in the midst of a sea of representatives of every nation on earth. Slovaks in their homeland could not publicly express their national aspirations without reprisals, but here in America they were free to profess their patriotism and write about their ideals of nationhood. Every American of Slovak parentage could acknowledge his Slovak heritage publicly, and no one took it amiss, nobody was suspicious of his motives, no one insulted him for it. Moreover, his fellow-citizens of other national origins, in business and politics, accepted the new Americans as equals without regard to national origins. A Slovak immigrant who became a naturalized American citizen soon realized that he not only had civic responsibilities but personal rights, too, and the fact that 'he did · not have to renounce his Slovak heritage as such, while pledging loyalty to his new homeland, became the source SLOVAKIA of his national pride of being a descendant of Slovak an~estors who had not been able to call their ancient hearths their own for many centuries. They cherished the national traditions of their forefathers and soon gave voice to them in this new land of freedom. In a comparatively short time, the Slovak in America · teaHzed that he, too, could voice his opinions freely, that he could have convictions wiithout fear of repression. Slovak organizations gave him ample opportunities to express himself; and hls newspapers were for him mediums of information, instruction and inspiration. These <:!orrstituted the keystone of Slovak unity for all fellow Americans of Slovak ancestry. From the stand,point of individual advancement, any Slovak, no matter how humble his origin, could ·air his views in his own newspapers. This was a veritable school for many simple, uneducated Slovaks who became well-informed and law-abiding citizens of their •a dopted -country, but who, nevertheless, spoke proudly of their native Slovakia, the land in which they had been born, the ·land of their forefathers. The Slovak immigrant found it impossible to forget the land of his birth; he fondly recalled the scenes of Ms childhood, and often spolke of the relatives and friends beyond the sea. This was perfectly natural, for despite 1:!he hard lot and misery •o f his oTiginal home, yet he longed to be with his parents and friends, if only for a little whHe. He could see the village church wit'h its cross uplifted to the sky, as an eternal sign of salvation, a symbol of the deep faith in God that was in his soul, a symbol at once of his own pain and suffering, of his strength and hope. The church, located in the center of Slovak village life, with spires rising high above the simple peasant huts in whose shadow they reclined, stood out in sharp relief in his memory, for religion was the keystone of his existence. The church was his fortress in time of danger, his solace in time of grief, his hope in time of despair. Without his qhurch, his village priest, without prayer, his life would, indeed, be empty and forelorn. The Slovak has been able to bear life's burdens because he staunchly believes in Di- SLOVAKIA 7 vine Providence and because he seeks resources in prayer at all times. Abroad, in foreign lands, the church with its Slovak prayers and hymns, has been the bulwaTk of the Slovak immigrant. It has been his ,anchor on a foreign shore, a compass in an uncharted sea. Because the church is all hnportant in his life, the Slovak has invariably built a church, then school. With a ,s trong religious and social foundation, the Slovak in America maintained his national character and expanded his cultural endeavors as the years went by. It was his faith that kept him loyal to his sacred traditions, preserved his language, and made him cherish his nationality. On Sundays, he joined his fellow countrymen in Slovak prayers and hymns; this, perhaps, more than any ot'her single factor, perpetuated the most sacred and treasured memories of Slovakia. Imposing Slovak churches, modern parish and school buildings, and office building,s· of the Slovak societies are. concrete expressions of the deep religious convictions a:nd· cultural aspirations of the Slovak immigrant. They are monuments of self-sacrifice and devotion to time-honored institutions, permeated with the same fervent spirit of his forefathers who cherished their Christian traditions be·neath the Tatras since time immemorial. At home, unfortunately, genuine Slovaik societies and organizations did not exist, and the few that functioned were -p rimarily designed to serve elements and interests that were alien to the Slovak cause. Even ibhe churcih, in some instances, became an agency for these forces. But · in America, Slovak churches, organizations and schools became the centers of Slovak national culture. Moreover, the .spark of nationalism which was barely kept alight ait home, burst into a bright flame in the new Land of freedom. The Slovak immigrant caught t:Jhe spirit of American democracy whose blessings he had personally experienced in his daily life. He accepted these with a deep sense of gratitude. He was proud of his new status of citizenship, an'd now · tlia.t he was content, he yearned to have his folks back home· enjoy these self-same rights and advantages of the democratic way of life. 8 SLOVAKIA Slovak poets and writers, keenly aware of this stifling atmosphere in which their people were slowly expiring, made every effort to arouse the masses out of their lethargy. Although their voices were unheeded in their native land, where the people were submissive and demoralized, nevertheless, a small but determined minority of patriaticminded Slovaks organized political clubs to fight for their nation's inherent rights and to formulate a program for an active political movement. The Slovaks had leadership, but failed to support their leaders efficiently, and on various occasions some of their leaders joined the opposition to work against the best interests and welfare of their nat,ion. Before the first World War Slovakia's national life was caught in a nut-cracker net-wor'k of political and social intrigue and seemed doomed. National extinction was. indeed, a grave danger which had to be averted. The Slovaks were helpless in the fa:ce of the opposition whi•c h prevented them from developing their native culture and realizing their right to self-government and independence. Internally, the Slovak nation was vitally sound-physically, biologically and morally it was sound - and it possessed untapped natural resources, but needed an external force to set it free. And this dynamic force came from America. Actual statistics are not available to indicate to what extent the American Slovaks influenced various developments in their ancient homeland, but, perhaps, in the future this vital information will be gathered and compiled in order to determine approximately, if nat precisely, to what measure they affected the social and political progress of their native country. Even without this material, however, w~ are able to mention the beginnings of the movements that were inspired and inaugurated by the Slorvaks in America. Naturally, a considerable number of Slovak emigrants returned home after spending several years abroad. These had. fulfilled. their goal to attain sufficient funds for their particular needs; but a large number, the majority as a matter of fact, remained in America and made their permanent home in the land of their adoption. These had overcome the almost irresistable desire to return to their native land SLOVAKIA 9 and, though they never returned, during their entire life-time they nevertheless maintained close contaet with their relatives and friends in Slovakia. Even those, who brdke their ties with Europe irrevoc~bly, sti'll remained in touch w.iith their fellow-countrymen and, consequently, ma.de some contribution to the S'lovak cause indirectly. Actual instances of individua1s who broke completely wi1:Jh their past and lost contact wii!h their fellow Slovaks in Amerka were so rare that they can be d1scounted in our attempts to evaluate the destiny of the Slovaks in America and to arrive at a realistic analysis of the influence of American Slovaks on Slovia'k life in the country of their birtJh. The American phase of Slovak life, with its democratic texture and blend, effected several significant changes on home life in their native land. S,i nce the impeUing force of ~heir emigration in many cases was economic, there is no doubt whatsoever that corresponding returns from their labors abroad became the direct and immediate source of a relatiivelly large national income in Slovakia. The amount of new capital that was brought in by returning , Slovak emigrants is, perhaps, impossible to determine even approximately, but the fact remains that it was a windfall which gave Slovakia a new lease on its economic life. Foremost among the effec,ts of this influx of new capital to Slova'kia, was the ability of the average Slovak to own his own land by redeeming it if he hia,d lost it, and to purchase the necessary equiipment and livestock to insure his future economically. This gave him a chance to live as a free man to a large degree, for he was no longer subject completely to the whims and caprice's of his overlords in a smaill country, where the steadily increasing population made it imperative for the native Slovak to have .his plot of land, if he hoped to survive. The emergence of a growing number of debt-free, well-equipped arrd wellstocked small landowners marked the estalblishment, imperceptrbly but none-the-less surely, of a sound well-balanced economic unit in Slovakia's clhanging social order, Sma!ll landowners formed the nucleus of Slovakia's national life, for now they not only inha;bited the land of their forefathers, but they aetually owned it. Economic power, though 10 SLOVAKIA lllodest, indeed, had nevertheless enabled them to effect their social emancipation. Their improved status i'S readily ~derstood and appreciaited if we realize to what extent it freed them from the dead-weight of an oppressive feudal system stHl in vogue throughout Hungary and its domination - a feudal inheritance that had put most of Slovakia's ;forests and ara!ble soil, its rivers and la:kes, a'S weH as its ,l)O\litica1 control, into the ha,nds of an exclusively foreigz:i aristocracy. Under this system the Slovaks were nothing more than servants in their own homes and the fruits of their labors were plucked by usur,peTS who had seized control of tlheiir household. Originally, Slovakia's nobility was largely Slovak by birth, but in the course of time it degenerated by wholesale pesertion to a foreign cause. In this · way, large tracts of Jand passed into the hand'S of those who no longer were Slovak by temperament or nature and, hence, their policies were not designed to benefit the Slovaks. Moreover, in modern times, many large estates came into the hands of fore1gners whose policies were injurious to Slovak interests and whose political al'ignment with ,parties hostile to the Slovaks constituted· a positive menace to the national ex,i stence of the Slovaks in their own country. There is no doubt that the loss of ownership by the majority of the Slovak gentry, which was the backbone of the nation, put the national destiny of Slovakia into a most precarious posit!i:on. Moreover, the necessity of brea:king up their smal>l estates, because of the increasing population, :I'65ttlted in reducing the land to such small units as to make them unprofitable. 'J.ihis inevitably forced the s·m all land-holders to go into debt whenever there was the least mi:sca}Jeulation in their p1ans, or when there was a crop fai-lure. Improvements, or an expansion of one's holdings, were out of the question, for there was seldom a:ny surplus which the Slovalk could use · as an investment in a new enterprise. As a matter of fact, iit often ha:rppened thiat a landpwner was unable to meet his interest, not to speak of reducing the principal on his loan. Eventually, therefore, mahy estates fell into the hands of receivers, arid ·1ater were SLOVAKIA 11 1bought up by non-Slovaks. As a result, the Slovaks suffered. in a twofold manner: 1) native land-owners dmlinished greatly in numbers, and 2) many diispossessed Slovaks emigrated to o1!her lands where, having settled chiefly in industrial areas, they no longer cared to return to the land and, consequently, they and their children were lost to their country forever. The continual drain of human resources from the n_a ti.onal reservoi'I' of Slovakia weakened the country economica'1ly, morrully and poliitically, because non-Slovaks replaced. the original Slovaks in their native homeland. Under such conditions, Slovak life, as su~h, suffered a sharp decline. Without a doubt, the most essential unit of the Slovalk nation, w'hich gave it permanent character, solidarity and stability, was its independent gentry which had been close .to the sdil for centuries. It was imperative that this group be ,p reserved in its pristine strength and vigor if Slova'kia was to survive as a distinct race in its original niationrul domain. The land-holdings, instead of being sub_ject to di,visions, must be held intact - otherwise, a complete economic breakdown would result and national dissolution would inevitably follow. This was their fear, a well-founded one, of which the Slovaks were acutely aware. 1 America -came to the rescue in this national crisis. The many opportunities for work and good pay in the new world offered a solution to the problems of economic reihabili~ tion at home. Accordingly, t:Jhousands of debt-r:idden and almost destitute Slovaks departed. for American shores with high hopes for the future. And that they were not disillusioned is attested to by the fact that, in a few years, many returned home again with savings which reestablishe d their fortunes in thcir homeland. New homes a.ppeared, old ones were repaired, new equipment and livestock were purchased, old debts were liquidated and Slova'kia's national economy was once more in the hands of iits own native population. ParadoxicaUy enough, the emigration on a large scale from Slovakia which threatened to destroy the nation irre- 12 SLOVAKIA :voca;bly beyond revival, actually restored it to its rightful ownership and renewed vigor. The returning emigrants manifested remarkable energy and enthusiasm in this national restoration. Moreover, many former workers and tenants upon their return were a)ble to buy sufficient parcels pf land to insure a preponderantly Slovak ownership. Others, profiting from their varied experiences abroad, established some sort of business by buying a sawmill, a flour mill, a tavern, etc., and thereby reenforced Slovakia's eco-, nomy by their initiative in founding diversified enterprises. These manifold activities by a thoroughly-awakened Slovak populace were greeted with keen competition by alien interlopers who had established a monopoly in many fields, but the returning Slovaks, having had the advantages of rich experience in the new world, proved to be a match for them. Of tantamount importance was the need for wider education, so that their children might have the opportunity to acquire a high school and college training. The need was both soci'a.'l and political, for they needed Slovak leaders in public Hfe and industry. It was a serious menace, indeed, to have a large percentage of their sons desert to an alien camp and serve a foreign cause stmply because of their training in the anti-Slovak schools sponsored by chauvinistic Magyar regimes which produced countless renegades. Fortunately, not all the Slovak graduates of these schools turned against their Slovak nation. The blessings of American capital became aga,in apparent in the struggle of the Slovak nationalists to maintain the Slovak spirit of loyalty in their ~hildren by providing speciali>zed training for them. Thus, Slovak fathers in America secured the funds necessary for the task of educating their sons in Slovakia for the common welfare of their own countrymen. In homes that had an Ameri'c an background, the spirit of democracy and patriotism kept alive the national life of Slovakia. This is to be .attribulted to Amerka as her gift of freedom to a small nation which was struggling to emancipate itself from foreign domination. An essentia~ element in directing the destiny of a nation is undoubtedly the press, for newspapers, magazines SLOVAKIA 13 and books provide an index for the spiritual condition of a people. In this respect, the situation in Slovakia was really ~ploralble, because. only a fow Slovak neiwspaipers were published, and these did not enjoy wide circulation. The masses, as yet, had:·not acquired the habit of reading, because they did not feel the need of it. Moreover, they were impoverished and, hence, bought few boolks. For a long time, the only reading they had at hand was limited to their praye:tibodks, religious .bulletins and an occasional publication of the Spalok sv. Vojtecha (St. Adalbert's Society). The average Slovak showed l.ittle or no interest in politics, for he had become accustomed to the view that this was a game, or hobby, exclusively reserved for the nobility. The Americanized Slovaik, however, adopted a different view, and even native-born Slovaks, who had never been outside the confines of their country, gradually cihanged their attitude by reading Slovak newspapers which were sent to them from across the sea. From their pages they learned for the first time how grave the situation was in reality in their own b'ac'k yards. It was truly paradoxical that they were informed of things that happened right at home by receiving newspapers, published in their own language and spirit, more than three thousand miles away. They learned to defend their rights by a unified public opinion which was being crysta1Uzed largely through the influence of publications from foreign lands. And returning emigi.·ants strengthened this movement by keeping up their subscriptions to American newspapers. Many of them kept in close touch with their brother Slovaks abroad by retaining their membership in American Slovak societies for several years after coming back to Slovakia. Perhaps the most precious gift that America presented to Slovakia were the Slovaks who returned to their na.tive country, not only because they brought their savings, but also because these men had learned much by their new experiences whirch had matured them in many ways and which were to help Slovakia on the way towards winning her national freedom. Men who had left their country, dejected and despirrited, now returned refreshed and revivified by the atmosphere of American democracy. 14 SLOVAKIA In America, the Slovak who became a naturalized citizen lost his inferiority complex and acquired a healthy selfconfidence. He felt important once more as an individual, for he was proud of his new staJtus as a full-fledged citi'zeri of a great, democratic country. He respected the rights of others, While his own rights were a'liso respected. Moreover, as a member of free Slovak organizations, he learned to work not only in his own, but also in other's !interests. In fulfilling his responsibilities, as well as in insisting on his own rights, he was doing his work well in the spirit of true democracy. Although he became a vital part of American democratic life, the new citizen of S'lovak ancestry did not forget his native counrtrymen who lived in the land of his fathers in the Slovaik hills and woodlands and fields that stretched from the Low Carpathians in the West to the High Carpathians in the East. The Slovak language became a golden bond by whkh he was united to his fellow-countrymen beyond the seas ; and the concept ·of a wider extention of these rights to his people back home inspired him to work for the realrization of that idea!. Thus America became the fertile soil for the growth of Siovak national consciousness and freedom. Every Slovak town and village felt the impact of American democracy. The returning emigrant did not remain aloof from affairs of public welfare, but plunged 'into the thick of thfogs. Polirt:fos was no longer the here noire of the common man, for, after learning the democratic technique of American life, the Slovak entered into the arena of political struggles for his rights. He had both the courage and confidence to carry on the fight for his country's freedom as well as for his rights as a free man. While tracing 1:he direct influence of American democratic elements on Slovakia, we ought to reca:11 tha,t there was a strong cross-current that was felt in Slovak circles in America. This mutual assistance was ruppreciaited by leading Slovaks on both sides of the Atlantic, and they tried to establish closer ties of rela1Jionshilp with ea:ch other in order to achieve their goal of freedom. Communications SLOVAKIA 15 betw~n leading Slovak thinkers in Slovakia and America were mruintained through · personal messages, · writings in the mag~ines a,nd,_ newsipapers, annuals and almanacs in which the freedom-lov,ing Slovaks at home kept in touch with their brothers across the sea. Americans of Slovak descent, former immigrants from Slovakia, learned the iJ.esson of democracy and freedom well in Ameri'Ca. Freedom, they learned, is the natural birthright of all mankind. If and when the Slovak nation wins its fight for fireedom and complete pwitical independenrce, the Slovak people will have America to tJhank for it. Am~ rica was, and still is, a constant source of insipiration and hope for the Slovaks in their hom~land, despite what has happened in 1945. 'I1he Slovaks shall remain eternally grateful to Ameri'ca and Americans of Slo,va'k ancestry for the priceless contributions to their struggle for freedom and independence, for the many sacrifices made so that true democracy once may rule not only in Slovakia, butt in an countries of the world. The roots of democracy and freedom in .Slovalk,i a had their beginnings in America, and Slovaks everywhere, at home and aJbroad in foreign lands, firmly believe that America will not abandon Slovakia in her darkest hour. The Slovaks look longingly to America for liberat ion from the scourge of manlkind, the greatest enemy of the democratic way of life - Communism . 1 • • • WHO SAID IT? "We lay pa;roiooJar stress on ithe fadt that the few Slovaik rei:f.ugees wandering about in the we:sit, adwooating the idea of a Ozooh.os!lova!k State, do not r~resent the Slovalk people, who are today fanat~ca'lly anti-Czeoh. Ozeohoslovakia can only be restored against the wi:H of the S-loivaks. Concerning the Czeicihs, they s'hould wnderstand that onJy the federation suggested aJbQlVe (!the Da.nulbian federation) can protect theisr nation from new adventures." - (F. 0. Miksche - a Czech - in UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER, p. 216 ; Faber and Faber Ltd .. London).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Influence of American Democracy on Slovak Life Description An account of the resource Dr. Francis Hrušovský Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953 pp. 1-15 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Hrušovský, František, 1903-1956 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1953 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/b53c4395391beb62c9c502a71a3b4099.pdf 02ecce86e7f735a5d9d6ac3243f9e1f5 PDF Text Text 68 SLOVAKIA IN RETROSPECT - SLOVAK ISSUES IN EVERY LI'.lTLE TOWN Alexander Kendrick (In the Chicago Sun, Sept. 14, 1947.) In every little town in Slovakia the Cross of the Church stands high above everything else. In many places there is an industrial plant not far away, with a hammer and sickle or a red star above its gates. There two symbols starkly represent the struggle that is taking place among 3,500,000 Slovaks, from the high Tatras to the Danube lowland. And the conflict has become compounded by the fact that the religious symbol, the Cross, has entered -p olitics also. In most pf the things which make this one third of the Czecho.:Slovak Republic a real economic, political and psychological problem - indeed, the chief problem by all odds of the coalition government - the Catholic Church and the Communist party are on opposing sides. On the No. 1 issue of Slovak autonomy, many church leaders who before the war belonged to the IIlinka party and who during the German occupation fared extremely well in the "independent" Slovak State, continue to be for full separation of 'Slovakia from the rest of the land. The Communists used to favor the "one state, one Czechoslovak nation" idea, but under pressure of the traditional and very real Slovak urge for as much self-rule as possible, they now are willing to place a hyphen in Czecho-Slovakia and have adopted the formula "two nationals in a single state." But they are against federation and, of course, against Slovak independence. On the basic economic issue of nationalization and state planning, which are accomplished facts, the church and its civil arm, the Slovakian Democratic Party, are for less of them while the Communists are for more. On the surface, Slovakia, the Ireland of central Europe, is a pleasant land, much more easy-going that the busy �SLOVAKIA 69 "Czech lands" up north. There is no rationing here as in the rest of Czecho-Slovakia. There is plenty to eat, good ibeer to drink, and fine native wines including a .p assable imitation of French champagne called Chateau Trencin. The Carpathians are filled with rest homes for workers. Everything looks fine. But underneath there are unhealed scars and smoldering fires·. Many people feel that "it was better under the Germans." Hitler, trying to demonstrate a model "independent" state, let the Slovaks pretty much alone. The other side of the picture is equally clear. The Slovak legions which Hitler sent to fight the Soviet Union deserted to the other side and came back to fight the Germans. The Slov;ak uprising in Banska Bystrica and Turciansky Svaty Martin - the third anniversary of which was joyously celebrated here the other day - were the first signs of a new Slovakia being born. Though they were put down with heavy bloodshed and the leaders had to flee to Moscow - I have talked with one of them, who flew all of Slovakia's gold reserve there - they came back with the returning Czecho-Slovakian government, and many of them hold high places in the present Slovakian Council of Trustees, the governing body, and in the trade unions. Most of them are Communists. This explains the phenomenom of the hammer and sickle and the red star over factory plants. They merely denote the fact that the plant union happens to be a Communist union. For more than two years, since the liberation of CzechoSlovakia, the opposing forces in Slovakia have had an armed truce. Now it appears to be coming to an end. Elections and a new constitution are due next year, and the campaign for both has started. Feelings run high. Armed bands are reported roving the lower Slovakian countryside, making attacks on small villages. They are the remnants of the socalled Benderovtsi, formed by a Ukrainian nationalist named Bender for anti-'Soviet action. Slovak Partisans who fought the Germans have demanded that they be rearmed to clean up the Benderovtsi, and this has aroused fears of Democratic party members that some other sort of "plot" may be afoot. �60 SLOVAKIA Members of Husak's entourage made no bones about the part they thought the Catholic church was playing in the present Slovakian turmoil. They said that by adopting an outright anti-Commun ist platform the Catholic leaders were able to attract a great many Slovak Protestants who also have no love for Communism or Russia, and were using the supposedly non-sectarian Democratic party as their instrument. In addition to anti-Commun ist and anti-Soviet feeling, anti-Czech sentiments are widespread. The recent war has heightened these feelings, for as an "independent" State Slovakia speeded up her economy and attained a considerable prosperity. Now Slovaks say they were held back by the Czechs from showing what they could do. But not all the sentiment here is anti-Commun ist, anti-.Soviet and anti-Czech. As far as the Russians are concerned, there are too many Russian graves and markers along every footpath in the Carpathians to let Slovaks forget what the Red Army did there. Agriculture and transport are to be modernized. Moreover, although the Slovaks are eating well this year, the harvest is poor because of the drqught. The Soviet grain which Czecho-Slovakia is now receiving under the new Cz.echSoviet trade agreement will go largely to Slovakia. Thus the economics of the full stomach, a language always understood in Slovakia, may help to bring about a solution of a politically terider and potentially dangerous situation. But even such a solution will not resolve the inner conflict which is outwardly represented here by the Cross on one side and the hammer and sickle on the other. That conflict will go on as long as there is a Czecho-Slovak Republic. • • • WHO SAID IT? " It is not true that an anti-Communist front exists in our coun, try (Slovakia) . . . . And nobody Is thinking of organizing one . ... such is the situation in our country today. What shall it be tomorrow? We do not think the conditions exist tor forming an anti-Communist front in our country. We do not feel the necessity for it and we do not ever( \1esire it. But just the opposite." - (CAS, offi ci al organ of Lettrich's D'E!mocratlc "Party, January 11, 19-t7.) � 68 SLOVAKIA IN RETROSPECT - SLOVAK ISSUES IN EVERY LI'.lTLE TOWN Alexander Kendrick (In the Chicago Sun, Sept. 14, 1947.) In every little town in Slovakia the Cross of the Church stands high above everything else. In many places there is an industrial plant not far away, with a hammer and sickle or a red star above its gates. There two symbols starkly represent the struggle that is taking place among 3,500,000 Slovaks, from the high Tatras to the Danube lowland. And the conflict has become compounded by the fact that the religious symbol, the Cross, has entered -p olitics also. In most pf the things which make this one third of the Czecho.:Slovak Republic a real economic, political and psychological problem - indeed, the chief problem by all odds of the coalition government - the Catholic Church and the Communist party are on opposing sides. On the No. 1 issue of Slovak autonomy, many church leaders who before the war belonged to the IIlinka party and who during the German occupation fared extremely well in the "independent" Slovak State, continue to be for full separation of 'Slovakia from the rest of the land. The Communists used to favor the "one state, one Czechoslovak nation" idea, but under pressure of the traditional and very real Slovak urge for as much self-rule as possible, they now are willing to place a hyphen in Czecho-Slovakia and have adopted the formula "two nationals in a single state." But they are against federation and, of course, against Slovak independence. On the basic economic issue of nationalization and state planning, which are accomplished facts, the church and its civil arm, the Slovakian Democratic Party, are for less of them while the Communists are for more. On the surface, Slovakia, the Ireland of central Europe, is a pleasant land, much more easy-going that the busy �SLOVAKIA 69 "Czech lands" up north. There is no rationing here as in the rest of Czecho-Slovakia. There is plenty to eat, good ibeer to drink, and fine native wines including a .p assable imitation of French champagne called Chateau Trencin. The Carpathians are filled with rest homes for workers. Everything looks fine. But underneath there are unhealed scars and smoldering fires·. Many people feel that "it was better under the Germans." Hitler, trying to demonstrate a model "independent" state, let the Slovaks pretty much alone. The other side of the picture is equally clear. The Slovak legions which Hitler sent to fight the Soviet Union deserted to the other side and came back to fight the Germans. The Slov;ak uprising in Banska Bystrica and Turciansky Svaty Martin - the third anniversary of which was joyously celebrated here the other day - were the first signs of a new Slovakia being born. Though they were put down with heavy bloodshed and the leaders had to flee to Moscow - I have talked with one of them, who flew all of Slovakia's gold reserve there - they came back with the returning Czecho-Slovakian government, and many of them hold high places in the present Slovakian Council of Trustees, the governing body, and in the trade unions. Most of them are Communists. This explains the phenomenom of the hammer and sickle and the red star over factory plants. They merely denote the fact that the plant union happens to be a Communist union. For more than two years, since the liberation of CzechoSlovakia, the opposing forces in Slovakia have had an armed truce. Now it appears to be coming to an end. Elections and a new constitution are due next year, and the campaign for both has started. Feelings run high. Armed bands are reported roving the lower Slovakian countryside, making attacks on small villages. They are the remnants of the socalled Benderovtsi, formed by a Ukrainian nationalist named Bender for anti-'Soviet action. Slovak Partisans who fought the Germans have demanded that they be rearmed to clean up the Benderovtsi, and this has aroused fears of Democratic party members that some other sort of "plot" may be afoot. �60 SLOVAKIA Members of Husak's entourage made no bones about the part they thought the Catholic church was playing in the present Slovakian turmoil. They said that by adopting an outright anti-Commun ist platform the Catholic leaders were able to attract a great many Slovak Protestants who also have no love for Communism or Russia, and were using the supposedly non-sectarian Democratic party as their instrument. In addition to anti-Commun ist and anti-Soviet feeling, anti-Czech sentiments are widespread. The recent war has heightened these feelings, for as an "independent" State Slovakia speeded up her economy and attained a considerable prosperity. Now Slovaks say they were held back by the Czechs from showing what they could do. But not all the sentiment here is anti-Commun ist, anti-.Soviet and anti-Czech. As far as the Russians are concerned, there are too many Russian graves and markers along every footpath in the Carpathians to let Slovaks forget what the Red Army did there. Agriculture and transport are to be modernized. Moreover, although the Slovaks are eating well this year, the harvest is poor because of the drqught. The Soviet grain which Czecho-Slovakia is now receiving under the new Cz.echSoviet trade agreement will go largely to Slovakia. Thus the economics of the full stomach, a language always understood in Slovakia, may help to bring about a solution of a politically terider and potentially dangerous situation. But even such a solution will not resolve the inner conflict which is outwardly represented here by the Cross on one side and the hammer and sickle on the other. That conflict will go on as long as there is a Czecho-Slovak Republic. • • • WHO SAID IT? " It is not true that an anti-Communist front exists in our coun, try (Slovakia) . . . . And nobody Is thinking of organizing one . ... such is the situation in our country today. What shall it be tomorrow? We do not think the conditions exist tor forming an anti-Communist front in our country. We do not feel the necessity for it and we do not ever( \1esire it. But just the opposite." - (CAS, offi ci al organ of Lettrich's D'E!mocratlc "Party, January 11, 19-t7.) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data 58 SLOVAKIA IN RETROSPECT - SLOVAK ISSUES IN EVERY LI'.lTLE TOWN Alexander Kendrick (In the Chicago Sun, Sept. 14, 1947.) In every little town in Slovakia the Cross of the Church stands high above everything else. In many places there is an industrial plant not far away, with a hammer and sickle or a red star above its gates. There two symbols starkly represent the struggle that is taking place among 3,500,000 Slovaks, from the high Tatras to the Danube lowland. And the conflict has become compounded by the fact that the religious symbol, the Cross, has entered -p olitics also. In most pf the things which make this one third of the Czecho.:Slovak Republic a real economic, political and psychological problem - indeed, the chief problem by all odds of the coalition government - the Catholic Church and the Communist party are on opposing sides. On the No. 1 issue of Slovak autonomy, many church leaders who before the war belonged to the IIlinka party and who during the German occupation fared extremely well in the "independent" Slovak State, continue to be for full separation of 'Slovakia from the rest of the land. The Communists used to favor the "one state, one Czechoslovak nation" idea, but under pressure of the traditional and very real Slovak urge for as much self-rule as possible, they now are willing to place a hyphen in Czecho-Slovakia and have adopted the formula "two nationals in a single state." But they are against federation and, of course, against Slovak independence. On the basic economic issue of nationalization and state planning, which are accomplished facts, the church and its civil arm, the Slovakian Democratic Party, are for less of them while the Communists are for more. On the surface, Slovakia, the Ireland of central Europe, is a pleasant land, much more easy-going that the busy SLOVAKIA 69 "Czech lands" up north. There is no rationing here as in the rest of Czecho-Slovakia. There is plenty to eat, good ibeer to drink, and fine native wines including a .p assable imitation of French champagne called Chateau Trencin. The Carpathians are filled with rest homes for workers. Everything looks fine. But underneath there are unhealed scars and smoldering fires·. Many people feel that "it was better under the Germans." Hitler, trying to demonstrate a model "independent" state, let the Slovaks pretty much alone. The other side of the picture is equally clear. The Slovak legions which Hitler sent to fight the Soviet Union deserted to the other side and came back to fight the Germans. The Slov;ak uprising in Banska Bystrica and Turciansky Svaty Martin - the third anniversary of which was joyously celebrated here the other day - were the first signs of a new Slovakia being born. Though they were put down with heavy bloodshed and the leaders had to flee to Moscow - I have talked with one of them, who flew all of Slovakia's gold reserve there - they came back with the returning Czecho-Slovakian government, and many of them hold high places in the present Slovakian Council of Trustees, the governing body, and in the trade unions. Most of them are Communists. This explains the phenomenom of the hammer and sickle and the red star over factory plants. They merely denote the fact that the plant union happens to be a Communist union. For more than two years, since the liberation of CzechoSlovakia, the opposing forces in Slovakia have had an armed truce. Now it appears to be coming to an end. Elections and a new constitution are due next year, and the campaign for both has started. Feelings run high. Armed bands are reported roving the lower Slovakian countryside, making attacks on small villages. They are the remnants of the socalled Benderovtsi, formed by a Ukrainian nationalist named Bender for anti-'Soviet action. Slovak Partisans who fought the Germans have demanded that they be rearmed to clean up the Benderovtsi, and this has aroused fears of Democratic party members that some other sort of "plot" may be afoot. 60 SLOVAKIA Members of Husak's entourage made no bones about the part they thought the Catholic church was playing in the present Slovakian turmoil. They said that by adopting an outright anti-Commun ist platform the Catholic leaders were able to attract a great many Slovak Protestants who also have no love for Communism or Russia, and were using the supposedly non-sectarian Democratic party as their instrument. In addition to anti-Commun ist and anti-Soviet feeling, anti-Czech sentiments are widespread. The recent war has heightened these feelings, for as an "independent" State Slovakia speeded up her economy and attained a considerable prosperity. Now Slovaks say they were held back by the Czechs from showing what they could do. But not all the sentiment here is anti-Commun ist, anti-.Soviet and anti-Czech. As far as the Russians are concerned, there are too many Russian graves and markers along every footpath in the Carpathians to let Slovaks forget what the Red Army did there. Agriculture and transport are to be modernized. Moreover, although the Slovaks are eating well this year, the harvest is poor because of the drqught. The Soviet grain which Czecho-Slovakia is now receiving under the new Cz.echSoviet trade agreement will go largely to Slovakia. Thus the economics of the full stomach, a language always understood in Slovakia, may help to bring about a solution of a politically terider and potentially dangerous situation. But even such a solution will not resolve the inner conflict which is outwardly represented here by the Cross on one side and the hammer and sickle on the other. That conflict will go on as long as there is a Czecho-Slovak Republic. • • • WHO SAID IT? " It is not true that an anti-Communist front exists in our coun, try (Slovakia) . . . . And nobody Is thinking of organizing one . ... such is the situation in our country today. What shall it be tomorrow? We do not think the conditions exist tor forming an anti-Communist front in our country. We do not feel the necessity for it and we do not ever( \1esire it. But just the opposite." - (CAS, offi ci al organ of Lettrich's D'E!mocratlc "Party, January 11, 19-t7.)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovak Issues in Every Little Town Description An account of the resource Alexander Kendrick Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 1 (6), April 1953 pp. 58-60 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kendrick, Alexander Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource April 1953 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/5740bcb2c8466cf7731faeb73a771caf.pdf 0861438e95b1cf0142c007040c57cb37 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 41 and East :mu.rope wi'hl .r equire all the wisdom, courage, and persist.eillCe we can commaind. Lt will mean further suffering and blood saic:riifice on the part of the peoples of that area, possilbly on OUT own part. But in the end right wm t.:r,iumiph over might. The signs ,t hat the tide is at last b,eginnin.g to turn in Riight's fawor a.re ruppearing on the horizon, and we will :liive to see the task to whlch we haive set ourselves accomplished. ,SlolV'alkia, too, shall lbe free! • • • SLOVA.KIA AND INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN 1938 Joseph Kirschbaum From the very beginning of Czecho-Slovakia, for twenty entire years, Czech policy and diplomacy succeeded in presenting the Slovak question as an internal problem, about which the outside world could say nothing without disturbing the sovereignty of the Czecho..Slovak State. Even professor Ernest Denis of the Sorbonne in Paris, who was quite partial to the Czech nation, wrote as early as 1917 that "the Slovak question is of European importance" (1), but for Czech politicians it was only an insignificant administrative problem. They refused to admit the existence of any Slovak problem. Thus it happened that Slovakia and Slovak politicians were not mentioned in international official documents until the fall of 1938. The storm, which broke loose over CzechoSlovakia, tore the cloak of Czech propaganda to shreds, and Slovakia, together with other problems of the Czecho-Slovak State, came to the forefront of European interests. This happened primarily through the neighbors of Czecho-Slovakia, each of whom wished to solve the Slovak question according to their own interests. Since these were not always in accord with the interests of the Slovaks, the representatives of the Slovak nation undertook everything possible to save Slovakia from the catastrophe into which the Czecho..Slovak Republic was led lby the policy of Prague. And so, almost simultaneously, we find documents which tell us, on the one hand, of the efforts to annex Slovakia to Hungary or �42 SLOVAKIA Poland, and, on the other hand, of the valiant struggle ef Slovak politicians, especially of Dr. Joseph Tiso, Karol Sidor, Dr. Ferdinand Durcansky and Dr. Vojtech Tuka, who fought for every inch of Slovak territory and !Slovak freedom. Four solutions of the Slovak question are dealt with in diplomatic documents of 1938; these were publish_ed by the British and American governments under the title "Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945" (Vol. IV, Series D). The solutions considered were: 1. Independence of Slovakia; 2. autonomy of Slovakia within the framework of the Czecho-Slovak _RElpublic; 3. autonomous Slovakia orientated to Hungary; and, 4. autonomous Slovakia orientated to Poland (2). Magyar diplomacy did everything possible to gain Slovakia for itself. And s1nce, after Munich, Germany practically had a "free hand" in Central Europe, !Magyar demands were addressed to Berlin, either directly or through Rome. German diplomacy and the German General Staff, however, did not favor either the Magyar or the Polish solution. Iri 1938, Germany persistently and consistently held the position that Slovakia should remain within the framework of the Czecho-Slovak Republic ; Germany even in the least did not want an independent· .Slovakia. This is proved clearly and authoritatively by many documents, of which the most important are: a) The Memorandum bf ;the General Staff of the Wehrmacht of October 6, 1938, wherein we find this statenrent: "Consequently, it is in our military interest that Slovakia should not be separated from the Czecho-Slovak union, but should remain with Czecho-Slovakia under strong German influence" (3). b) The Memorandum for the Flihrer of October 7, 1938, prepared by the German Foreign Ministry, which tells about the changes that took place in Czecho-Slovakia after the Zilina Agreement, according to which the Czecho-'Slovak Republic took on a federative form. The !Memorandum stresses that this solution "even presents certain advantages compared with an independent Slovakia." It then continues that "from the point of view of (German) foreign policy, the �SLOVAKIA 43 solution of Slovakia united with Czechia is the easiest of achievement" ( 4). c) The note of Erich Kordt, an official of the Foreign Ministry, of October 8, 1938, which says that "with regard to :Slovakia, the Ftihrer thinks it opportune to support the Sillein resolutions (autonomy and orientation toward Prague)" (5). This struggle over the fate of Slovakia took place, of course, without the knowledge and participation of :Slovak political factors, 'behind the scenes of European diplomacy. It happened just as Andrew Hlinka would have expressed it: "De nobis sine nobis." We mention these facts so that the development that took place in Slovakia later might better be understood - that the Slovaks worked to attain independence already at the time that Germany, from Hitler through the Foreign Ministry and the General Staff of the Wehrmacht, wished to see Slovakia united with Prague. In this period we meet with the names of the Slovak representatives during the fight for the integrity of Slovakia, in the defense of Slovak territories in the south and north. And it may be interesting to note that the first official meeting of the Slovaks with German representatives was arranged by Minister Chvalkovsky of the Prague regime. In the negotiations about the fate of Bratislava, Nitra and Kosice, which the Magyars made a claim to with the aid of Italy, the Czech factors were so yielding that the Slovak autonomous government considered it its bounden puty not to rely on Prague, but to seek out every possible means to prevent those Slovak cities from falling into the hands of the Magyars. At , that time the Slovaks harbored no illusions about the fact that Germany really had a free hand in Europe and was determined to use it forcefully. Willy-nilly they had to accept the fact that only Berlin could possibly prevent the grab of Slovak territory and, in fact, a total invasion of Slovakia by the Magyars. Thus it was that on October 19, 1938, the first meeting of :Slovak political leaders took place with the Germans: Msgr. Dr. Joseph Tiso, president of the autonomous government of Slovakia, and Dr. F~rdinand :Durcansky, Minister of Justice, met with the · Foreign Minister of the Third Reich, Dr. Ribbentrop (6). ' 1 �44 SLOVAKIA According to the record of ·this meeting, Dr. Tiso told Ribbentrop that the Slovaks were a peace-loving nation and wanted to live independently. "The !Slovaks had followed," said Dr. Tiso, "the principle of nationality since 1918, when Hlinka went to Versailles, although this had been unsuccessful. !Slovakia was ethnologically, as well as in her language and literature, an independent territory. On June 5 the draft law had been introduced providing for autonomy for Slovakia under Prague, in which she had only foreign affairs, the army and finance in common with Czechia. On October 6 all Slovaks 1had united at Sillein and had taken power into their own hands." After this introduction, Dr. Tiso went on to the question of Komarno and Kosice and the efforts of the Magyars to use the statistics of 1910 to determine what cities of southern Slovakia should fall to the Magyars. Dr. Tiso stated that the Slovaks can prove that the statistics of 1910 were incorrect, nay, even falsified, to enhance the Magyar claims ; furthermore, if the Magyar demands were accepted, 300,000 more Slovaks would ·b e forced under Hungary- this in addition to the 300,000 already living there. Dr. Tiso and Dr. 1'.>urcansky, therefore, asked the German Reich to support their claims in the interest of the Slovak nation, but especially for economic and co mmunicationa:l reasons. Ribbentrop answered Dr. Tiso diplomatically. He said that "Germany had great understanding for the Slovak problems and felt the warmest sympathy for the Slovak people. Our attitude toward the Slovak problems was very simple: we would welcome the greatest possible measure of independence, which in the end was the prerequisite for peace in this part of Europe." But Ribbentrop immediately added: "If Slovakia placed great value on national necessities, she must also respect the national aspirations of the Hungarians." It was only after Dr. Tiso presented further arguments that Ribbentrop promised to instruct the German ambassador in Budapest, Erdmansdorf, to tell the Magyars that "they should renounce their claims to Pressburg, Nitra, Kaschau, Munkatsch and Ungvar, as these towns were vital �SLOVAKIA 45 for Slovakia. He further expressed the hope that the negotiations would ibe resumed in one or two days." That same day, October 19, 1938, Ribbentrop again re-ceived the Slovak representatives. He himself called them for an unofficial 'Visit, during which conversation took place not only about the southern territory of Slovakia, but involved the whole Slovak problem as well. The record of this meeting is so important for the understanding of ensuing -events in Slovakia, that we feel it should he quoted in its -entirety. Published as Document No. 73, the record is dated in Munich, October 19, 1938, and its text is as follows: "MEMORANDUM BY AN OFFlICIAL OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S .PERSONAL STAFF Munich, October 19, 1938 At about 7 P. M. the Reich Foreign Minister again received at his hotel Tiso, the Slovak Prime Minister, and ,M inister Durcansky. He told these gentlemen that he had invited them quite unofficially and privately in order to ask them what they thought of their relations with Prague. Whereas Tiso elaborated at length his aim of an autonomous Slovakia collaborating with an autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine under Prague, :Durcansky seemed to be striving rather for the complete independence of Slovakia, perhaps in union with Carpatho-Ukraine. Tiso thought that he would have to steer developments slowly and methodically. At Sillein he had not wished to make any sudden move. If Prague did not adhere to the agreements which had been made regarding complete autonomy, with the exception of a common foreign policy and common army and common State finances, complete separation would soon follow. As a matter of fact, the administrative side of finance had already been taken over, so that joint control remained only in the State finances. In the army, too, agreement had been reached in theory to form purely Slovak regiments, but this had not yet been put into practice. �46 SLOVAKIA In reply to a question by the Foreign Minister, Tiso said that Slovakia could maintain her independence and economy as long as she was helped militarily ·b y guarantees from the Great Powers. It was, of course, impossible for her to form a modern army for the defense of her frontiers. There were three possible orientations in the event of Slovakia's becoming independent. The first was orientation toward Czechia, which in the end was probably nearest to the Slovaks' hearts, as ·Prague had been politically weakened and as Slovakia, because of her large raw material resources, was also economically the equal of the Czech 'State. The second possibility was orientation toward Hungary, for which the Hungarians were making great efforts; and the third was orienta.t ion toward Poland. He could not foresee which of these tendencies was strongest in the Slovak people at present. If the Hungarians persisted in their stiff demands, he did not think that there would be much sympathy left among the Slovak people for throwing in their lot with the Magyars. In conclusion, the Minister told his visitors that he was naturally interested in the development of their country, and he asked them to apply directly to him if they ever · had any particular or economic Hewel." (7) problems. After this visit, excepting the visit of Dr. Ferdinand :Durcansky in the middle of November 1938, official Slovak factors did not have any contacts with representatives of the German Reich, neither according to documents, nor reality, until March 13, 1939. The visit of Dr. :Durcansky to Goering, according to the official record, but also according to the knowledge of the writer of these lines who accompanied Dr. :Durcansky to Berlin, was forced by two circumstances: 1. the Germans demanded the annexation of Devin to the German Reich, and, 2. the Czechs were endeavoring to prove that Slovak autonomy could not be upheld economically and so forced the Slovaks to. seek economic contacts with Germany directly. �SI.;OVAKIA 47 The talk with Goering was mainly about Devin; in this matter we were effectively aided by Ing. Karmasin, the representative of the Reich in Slovakia, who emphasized the point that "the castle of Theben on the rock at the confluence of the ,Morava and Danube was Slovakia's sole historic monument and that all Slovak history books would have to be burned if the castle were lost." Goering, however, also felt that politically Slovakia should remain united with Prague. According to the record, "the Field Marshall explained that at the moment the Slovak and the Ukrainian questions could ,b e dealt with only within the framework of the Czecho.,Slovak State" (8). Germany, therefore, did not allow the annexation of Slovakia to Hungary, nor an autonomous Slovakia orientated toward Poland and thus ena:bled !S lovakia tb escape the catastrophe which threatened it in 1938. · How did Prague appraise the situation in Slovakia? In the fall of 1938, according to the diplomatic report of the German Charge d'Affaires in Prague, Hencke, the situation was described as follows: "According to reports here" - says Mr. Hencke's telegram - · "independence movement in Slovakia is gaining ground steadily. Far-reaching autonomy is now demanded by political circles in Slovakia formerly loyal to Prague. A tendency is evident toward declaration of complete independence. "Hungarian Minister here stated that Budapest would regard voluntary union of :Slovakia, including CarpathoUkraine, with Hungary as the most practical solution of the Slovak question. "Polish Legation in Prague is more inclined to the idea of an independent Slovak State which would leave open the possibility of protectorate under Poland or Hungary" (9). References: 1. Ernest Denis, LES .SLOVAQUJDS, Ltbrairie Delagrave, Paris, 1917; 2. Memorandum for the Fiihrer, p. 46; 3. 1See p. 40; 4. .See ,p. 47; 5. .See p. 49; 6. Memorandum ,b y an of:ficial of the Foreign Minister's Personal Stailf, pp. 8·6-92; 7. See pp, 92-93; 8. Note 'by the Director of the Political Department, p. 142; 9. Telegram of Charge d'Affaires Hencke, p. 32. � SLOVAKIA 41 and East :mu.rope wi'hl .r equire all the wisdom, courage, and persist.eillCe we can commaind. Lt will mean further suffering and blood saic:riifice on the part of the peoples of that area, possilbly on OUT own part. But in the end right wm t.:r,iumiph over might. The signs ,t hat the tide is at last b,eginnin.g to turn in Riight's fawor a.re ruppearing on the horizon, and we will :liive to see the task to whlch we haive set ourselves accomplished. ,SlolV'alkia, too, shall lbe free! • • • SLOVA.KIA AND INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN 1938 Joseph Kirschbaum From the very beginning of Czecho-Slovakia, for twenty entire years, Czech policy and diplomacy succeeded in presenting the Slovak question as an internal problem, about which the outside world could say nothing without disturbing the sovereignty of the Czecho..Slovak State. Even professor Ernest Denis of the Sorbonne in Paris, who was quite partial to the Czech nation, wrote as early as 1917 that "the Slovak question is of European importance" (1), but for Czech politicians it was only an insignificant administrative problem. They refused to admit the existence of any Slovak problem. Thus it happened that Slovakia and Slovak politicians were not mentioned in international official documents until the fall of 1938. The storm, which broke loose over CzechoSlovakia, tore the cloak of Czech propaganda to shreds, and Slovakia, together with other problems of the Czecho-Slovak State, came to the forefront of European interests. This happened primarily through the neighbors of Czecho-Slovakia, each of whom wished to solve the Slovak question according to their own interests. Since these were not always in accord with the interests of the Slovaks, the representatives of the Slovak nation undertook everything possible to save Slovakia from the catastrophe into which the Czecho..Slovak Republic was led lby the policy of Prague. And so, almost simultaneously, we find documents which tell us, on the one hand, of the efforts to annex Slovakia to Hungary or �42 SLOVAKIA Poland, and, on the other hand, of the valiant struggle ef Slovak politicians, especially of Dr. Joseph Tiso, Karol Sidor, Dr. Ferdinand Durcansky and Dr. Vojtech Tuka, who fought for every inch of Slovak territory and !Slovak freedom. Four solutions of the Slovak question are dealt with in diplomatic documents of 1938; these were publish_ed by the British and American governments under the title "Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945" (Vol. IV, Series D). The solutions considered were: 1. Independence of Slovakia; 2. autonomy of Slovakia within the framework of the Czecho-Slovak _RElpublic; 3. autonomous Slovakia orientated to Hungary; and, 4. autonomous Slovakia orientated to Poland (2). Magyar diplomacy did everything possible to gain Slovakia for itself. And s1nce, after Munich, Germany practically had a "free hand" in Central Europe, !Magyar demands were addressed to Berlin, either directly or through Rome. German diplomacy and the German General Staff, however, did not favor either the Magyar or the Polish solution. Iri 1938, Germany persistently and consistently held the position that Slovakia should remain within the framework of the Czecho-Slovak Republic ; Germany even in the least did not want an independent· .Slovakia. This is proved clearly and authoritatively by many documents, of which the most important are: a) The Memorandum bf ;the General Staff of the Wehrmacht of October 6, 1938, wherein we find this statenrent: "Consequently, it is in our military interest that Slovakia should not be separated from the Czecho-Slovak union, but should remain with Czecho-Slovakia under strong German influence" (3). b) The Memorandum for the Flihrer of October 7, 1938, prepared by the German Foreign Ministry, which tells about the changes that took place in Czecho-Slovakia after the Zilina Agreement, according to which the Czecho-'Slovak Republic took on a federative form. The !Memorandum stresses that this solution "even presents certain advantages compared with an independent Slovakia." It then continues that "from the point of view of (German) foreign policy, the �SLOVAKIA 43 solution of Slovakia united with Czechia is the easiest of achievement" ( 4). c) The note of Erich Kordt, an official of the Foreign Ministry, of October 8, 1938, which says that "with regard to :Slovakia, the Ftihrer thinks it opportune to support the Sillein resolutions (autonomy and orientation toward Prague)" (5). This struggle over the fate of Slovakia took place, of course, without the knowledge and participation of :Slovak political factors, 'behind the scenes of European diplomacy. It happened just as Andrew Hlinka would have expressed it: "De nobis sine nobis." We mention these facts so that the development that took place in Slovakia later might better be understood - that the Slovaks worked to attain independence already at the time that Germany, from Hitler through the Foreign Ministry and the General Staff of the Wehrmacht, wished to see Slovakia united with Prague. In this period we meet with the names of the Slovak representatives during the fight for the integrity of Slovakia, in the defense of Slovak territories in the south and north. And it may be interesting to note that the first official meeting of the Slovaks with German representatives was arranged by Minister Chvalkovsky of the Prague regime. In the negotiations about the fate of Bratislava, Nitra and Kosice, which the Magyars made a claim to with the aid of Italy, the Czech factors were so yielding that the Slovak autonomous government considered it its bounden puty not to rely on Prague, but to seek out every possible means to prevent those Slovak cities from falling into the hands of the Magyars. At , that time the Slovaks harbored no illusions about the fact that Germany really had a free hand in Europe and was determined to use it forcefully. Willy-nilly they had to accept the fact that only Berlin could possibly prevent the grab of Slovak territory and, in fact, a total invasion of Slovakia by the Magyars. Thus it was that on October 19, 1938, the first meeting of :Slovak political leaders took place with the Germans: Msgr. Dr. Joseph Tiso, president of the autonomous government of Slovakia, and Dr. F~rdinand :Durcansky, Minister of Justice, met with the · Foreign Minister of the Third Reich, Dr. Ribbentrop (6). ' 1 �44 SLOVAKIA According to the record of ·this meeting, Dr. Tiso told Ribbentrop that the Slovaks were a peace-loving nation and wanted to live independently. "The !Slovaks had followed," said Dr. Tiso, "the principle of nationality since 1918, when Hlinka went to Versailles, although this had been unsuccessful. !Slovakia was ethnologically, as well as in her language and literature, an independent territory. On June 5 the draft law had been introduced providing for autonomy for Slovakia under Prague, in which she had only foreign affairs, the army and finance in common with Czechia. On October 6 all Slovaks 1had united at Sillein and had taken power into their own hands." After this introduction, Dr. Tiso went on to the question of Komarno and Kosice and the efforts of the Magyars to use the statistics of 1910 to determine what cities of southern Slovakia should fall to the Magyars. Dr. Tiso stated that the Slovaks can prove that the statistics of 1910 were incorrect, nay, even falsified, to enhance the Magyar claims ; furthermore, if the Magyar demands were accepted, 300,000 more Slovaks would ·b e forced under Hungary- this in addition to the 300,000 already living there. Dr. Tiso and Dr. 1'.>urcansky, therefore, asked the German Reich to support their claims in the interest of the Slovak nation, but especially for economic and co mmunicationa:l reasons. Ribbentrop answered Dr. Tiso diplomatically. He said that "Germany had great understanding for the Slovak problems and felt the warmest sympathy for the Slovak people. Our attitude toward the Slovak problems was very simple: we would welcome the greatest possible measure of independence, which in the end was the prerequisite for peace in this part of Europe." But Ribbentrop immediately added: "If Slovakia placed great value on national necessities, she must also respect the national aspirations of the Hungarians." It was only after Dr. Tiso presented further arguments that Ribbentrop promised to instruct the German ambassador in Budapest, Erdmansdorf, to tell the Magyars that "they should renounce their claims to Pressburg, Nitra, Kaschau, Munkatsch and Ungvar, as these towns were vital �SLOVAKIA 45 for Slovakia. He further expressed the hope that the negotiations would ibe resumed in one or two days." That same day, October 19, 1938, Ribbentrop again re-ceived the Slovak representatives. He himself called them for an unofficial 'Visit, during which conversation took place not only about the southern territory of Slovakia, but involved the whole Slovak problem as well. The record of this meeting is so important for the understanding of ensuing -events in Slovakia, that we feel it should he quoted in its -entirety. Published as Document No. 73, the record is dated in Munich, October 19, 1938, and its text is as follows: "MEMORANDUM BY AN OFFlICIAL OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S .PERSONAL STAFF Munich, October 19, 1938 At about 7 P. M. the Reich Foreign Minister again received at his hotel Tiso, the Slovak Prime Minister, and ,M inister Durcansky. He told these gentlemen that he had invited them quite unofficially and privately in order to ask them what they thought of their relations with Prague. Whereas Tiso elaborated at length his aim of an autonomous Slovakia collaborating with an autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine under Prague, :Durcansky seemed to be striving rather for the complete independence of Slovakia, perhaps in union with Carpatho-Ukraine. Tiso thought that he would have to steer developments slowly and methodically. At Sillein he had not wished to make any sudden move. If Prague did not adhere to the agreements which had been made regarding complete autonomy, with the exception of a common foreign policy and common army and common State finances, complete separation would soon follow. As a matter of fact, the administrative side of finance had already been taken over, so that joint control remained only in the State finances. In the army, too, agreement had been reached in theory to form purely Slovak regiments, but this had not yet been put into practice. �46 SLOVAKIA In reply to a question by the Foreign Minister, Tiso said that Slovakia could maintain her independence and economy as long as she was helped militarily ·b y guarantees from the Great Powers. It was, of course, impossible for her to form a modern army for the defense of her frontiers. There were three possible orientations in the event of Slovakia's becoming independent. The first was orientation toward Czechia, which in the end was probably nearest to the Slovaks' hearts, as ·Prague had been politically weakened and as Slovakia, because of her large raw material resources, was also economically the equal of the Czech 'State. The second possibility was orientation toward Hungary, for which the Hungarians were making great efforts; and the third was orienta.t ion toward Poland. He could not foresee which of these tendencies was strongest in the Slovak people at present. If the Hungarians persisted in their stiff demands, he did not think that there would be much sympathy left among the Slovak people for throwing in their lot with the Magyars. In conclusion, the Minister told his visitors that he was naturally interested in the development of their country, and he asked them to apply directly to him if they ever · had any particular or economic Hewel." (7) problems. After this visit, excepting the visit of Dr. Ferdinand :Durcansky in the middle of November 1938, official Slovak factors did not have any contacts with representatives of the German Reich, neither according to documents, nor reality, until March 13, 1939. The visit of Dr. :Durcansky to Goering, according to the official record, but also according to the knowledge of the writer of these lines who accompanied Dr. :Durcansky to Berlin, was forced by two circumstances: 1. the Germans demanded the annexation of Devin to the German Reich, and, 2. the Czechs were endeavoring to prove that Slovak autonomy could not be upheld economically and so forced the Slovaks to. seek economic contacts with Germany directly. �SI.;OVAKIA 47 The talk with Goering was mainly about Devin; in this matter we were effectively aided by Ing. Karmasin, the representative of the Reich in Slovakia, who emphasized the point that "the castle of Theben on the rock at the confluence of the ,Morava and Danube was Slovakia's sole historic monument and that all Slovak history books would have to be burned if the castle were lost." Goering, however, also felt that politically Slovakia should remain united with Prague. According to the record, "the Field Marshall explained that at the moment the Slovak and the Ukrainian questions could ,b e dealt with only within the framework of the Czecho.,Slovak State" (8). Germany, therefore, did not allow the annexation of Slovakia to Hungary, nor an autonomous Slovakia orientated toward Poland and thus ena:bled !S lovakia tb escape the catastrophe which threatened it in 1938. · How did Prague appraise the situation in Slovakia? In the fall of 1938, according to the diplomatic report of the German Charge d'Affaires in Prague, Hencke, the situation was described as follows: "According to reports here" - says Mr. Hencke's telegram - · "independence movement in Slovakia is gaining ground steadily. Far-reaching autonomy is now demanded by political circles in Slovakia formerly loyal to Prague. A tendency is evident toward declaration of complete independence. "Hungarian Minister here stated that Budapest would regard voluntary union of :Slovakia, including CarpathoUkraine, with Hungary as the most practical solution of the Slovak question. "Polish Legation in Prague is more inclined to the idea of an independent Slovak State which would leave open the possibility of protectorate under Poland or Hungary" (9). References: 1. Ernest Denis, LES .SLOVAQUJDS, Ltbrairie Delagrave, Paris, 1917; 2. Memorandum for the Fiihrer, p. 46; 3. 1See p. 40; 4. .See ,p. 47; 5. .See p. 49; 6. Memorandum ,b y an of:ficial of the Foreign Minister's Personal Stailf, pp. 8·6-92; 7. See pp, 92-93; 8. Note 'by the Director of the Political Department, p. 142; 9. Telegram of Charge d'Affaires Hencke, p. 32. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 41 and East :mu.rope wi'hl .r equire all the wisdom, courage, and persist.eillCe we can commaind. Lt will mean further suffering and blood saic:riifice on the part of the peoples of that area, possilbly on OUT own part. But in the end right wm t.:r,iumiph over might. The signs ,t hat the tide is at last b,eginnin.g to turn in Riight's fawor a.re ruppearing on the horizon, and we will :liive to see the task to whlch we haive set ourselves accomplished. ,SlolV'alkia, too, shall lbe free! • • • SLOVA.KIA AND INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN 1938 Joseph Kirschbaum From the very beginning of Czecho-Slovakia, for twenty entire years, Czech policy and diplomacy succeeded in presenting the Slovak question as an internal problem, about which the outside world could say nothing without disturbing the sovereignty of the Czecho..Slovak State. Even professor Ernest Denis of the Sorbonne in Paris, who was quite partial to the Czech nation, wrote as early as 1917 that "the Slovak question is of European importance" (1), but for Czech politicians it was only an insignificant administrative problem. They refused to admit the existence of any Slovak problem. Thus it happened that Slovakia and Slovak politicians were not mentioned in international official documents until the fall of 1938. The storm, which broke loose over CzechoSlovakia, tore the cloak of Czech propaganda to shreds, and Slovakia, together with other problems of the Czecho-Slovak State, came to the forefront of European interests. This happened primarily through the neighbors of Czecho-Slovakia, each of whom wished to solve the Slovak question according to their own interests. Since these were not always in accord with the interests of the Slovaks, the representatives of the Slovak nation undertook everything possible to save Slovakia from the catastrophe into which the Czecho..Slovak Republic was led lby the policy of Prague. And so, almost simultaneously, we find documents which tell us, on the one hand, of the efforts to annex Slovakia to Hungary or 42 SLOVAKIA Poland, and, on the other hand, of the valiant struggle ef Slovak politicians, especially of Dr. Joseph Tiso, Karol Sidor, Dr. Ferdinand Durcansky and Dr. Vojtech Tuka, who fought for every inch of Slovak territory and !Slovak freedom. Four solutions of the Slovak question are dealt with in diplomatic documents of 1938; these were publish_ed by the British and American governments under the title "Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945" (Vol. IV, Series D). The solutions considered were: 1. Independence of Slovakia; 2. autonomy of Slovakia within the framework of the Czecho-Slovak _RElpublic; 3. autonomous Slovakia orientated to Hungary; and, 4. autonomous Slovakia orientated to Poland (2). Magyar diplomacy did everything possible to gain Slovakia for itself. And s1nce, after Munich, Germany practically had a "free hand" in Central Europe, !Magyar demands were addressed to Berlin, either directly or through Rome. German diplomacy and the German General Staff, however, did not favor either the Magyar or the Polish solution. Iri 1938, Germany persistently and consistently held the position that Slovakia should remain within the framework of the Czecho-Slovak Republic ; Germany even in the least did not want an independent· .Slovakia. This is proved clearly and authoritatively by many documents, of which the most important are: a) The Memorandum bf ;the General Staff of the Wehrmacht of October 6, 1938, wherein we find this statenrent: "Consequently, it is in our military interest that Slovakia should not be separated from the Czecho-Slovak union, but should remain with Czecho-Slovakia under strong German influence" (3). b) The Memorandum for the Flihrer of October 7, 1938, prepared by the German Foreign Ministry, which tells about the changes that took place in Czecho-Slovakia after the Zilina Agreement, according to which the Czecho-'Slovak Republic took on a federative form. The !Memorandum stresses that this solution "even presents certain advantages compared with an independent Slovakia." It then continues that "from the point of view of (German) foreign policy, the SLOVAKIA 43 solution of Slovakia united with Czechia is the easiest of achievement" ( 4). c) The note of Erich Kordt, an official of the Foreign Ministry, of October 8, 1938, which says that "with regard to :Slovakia, the Ftihrer thinks it opportune to support the Sillein resolutions (autonomy and orientation toward Prague)" (5). This struggle over the fate of Slovakia took place, of course, without the knowledge and participation of :Slovak political factors, 'behind the scenes of European diplomacy. It happened just as Andrew Hlinka would have expressed it: "De nobis sine nobis." We mention these facts so that the development that took place in Slovakia later might better be understood - that the Slovaks worked to attain independence already at the time that Germany, from Hitler through the Foreign Ministry and the General Staff of the Wehrmacht, wished to see Slovakia united with Prague. In this period we meet with the names of the Slovak representatives during the fight for the integrity of Slovakia, in the defense of Slovak territories in the south and north. And it may be interesting to note that the first official meeting of the Slovaks with German representatives was arranged by Minister Chvalkovsky of the Prague regime. In the negotiations about the fate of Bratislava, Nitra and Kosice, which the Magyars made a claim to with the aid of Italy, the Czech factors were so yielding that the Slovak autonomous government considered it its bounden puty not to rely on Prague, but to seek out every possible means to prevent those Slovak cities from falling into the hands of the Magyars. At , that time the Slovaks harbored no illusions about the fact that Germany really had a free hand in Europe and was determined to use it forcefully. Willy-nilly they had to accept the fact that only Berlin could possibly prevent the grab of Slovak territory and, in fact, a total invasion of Slovakia by the Magyars. Thus it was that on October 19, 1938, the first meeting of :Slovak political leaders took place with the Germans: Msgr. Dr. Joseph Tiso, president of the autonomous government of Slovakia, and Dr. F~rdinand :Durcansky, Minister of Justice, met with the · Foreign Minister of the Third Reich, Dr. Ribbentrop (6). ' 1 44 SLOVAKIA According to the record of ·this meeting, Dr. Tiso told Ribbentrop that the Slovaks were a peace-loving nation and wanted to live independently. "The !Slovaks had followed," said Dr. Tiso, "the principle of nationality since 1918, when Hlinka went to Versailles, although this had been unsuccessful. !Slovakia was ethnologically, as well as in her language and literature, an independent territory. On June 5 the draft law had been introduced providing for autonomy for Slovakia under Prague, in which she had only foreign affairs, the army and finance in common with Czechia. On October 6 all Slovaks 1had united at Sillein and had taken power into their own hands." After this introduction, Dr. Tiso went on to the question of Komarno and Kosice and the efforts of the Magyars to use the statistics of 1910 to determine what cities of southern Slovakia should fall to the Magyars. Dr. Tiso stated that the Slovaks can prove that the statistics of 1910 were incorrect, nay, even falsified, to enhance the Magyar claims ; furthermore, if the Magyar demands were accepted, 300,000 more Slovaks would ·b e forced under Hungary- this in addition to the 300,000 already living there. Dr. Tiso and Dr. 1'.>urcansky, therefore, asked the German Reich to support their claims in the interest of the Slovak nation, but especially for economic and co mmunicationa:l reasons. Ribbentrop answered Dr. Tiso diplomatically. He said that "Germany had great understanding for the Slovak problems and felt the warmest sympathy for the Slovak people. Our attitude toward the Slovak problems was very simple: we would welcome the greatest possible measure of independence, which in the end was the prerequisite for peace in this part of Europe." But Ribbentrop immediately added: "If Slovakia placed great value on national necessities, she must also respect the national aspirations of the Hungarians." It was only after Dr. Tiso presented further arguments that Ribbentrop promised to instruct the German ambassador in Budapest, Erdmansdorf, to tell the Magyars that "they should renounce their claims to Pressburg, Nitra, Kaschau, Munkatsch and Ungvar, as these towns were vital SLOVAKIA 45 for Slovakia. He further expressed the hope that the negotiations would ibe resumed in one or two days." That same day, October 19, 1938, Ribbentrop again re-ceived the Slovak representatives. He himself called them for an unofficial 'Visit, during which conversation took place not only about the southern territory of Slovakia, but involved the whole Slovak problem as well. The record of this meeting is so important for the understanding of ensuing -events in Slovakia, that we feel it should he quoted in its -entirety. Published as Document No. 73, the record is dated in Munich, October 19, 1938, and its text is as follows: "MEMORANDUM BY AN OFFlICIAL OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S .PERSONAL STAFF Munich, October 19, 1938 At about 7 P. M. the Reich Foreign Minister again received at his hotel Tiso, the Slovak Prime Minister, and ,M inister Durcansky. He told these gentlemen that he had invited them quite unofficially and privately in order to ask them what they thought of their relations with Prague. Whereas Tiso elaborated at length his aim of an autonomous Slovakia collaborating with an autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine under Prague, :Durcansky seemed to be striving rather for the complete independence of Slovakia, perhaps in union with Carpatho-Ukraine. Tiso thought that he would have to steer developments slowly and methodically. At Sillein he had not wished to make any sudden move. If Prague did not adhere to the agreements which had been made regarding complete autonomy, with the exception of a common foreign policy and common army and common State finances, complete separation would soon follow. As a matter of fact, the administrative side of finance had already been taken over, so that joint control remained only in the State finances. In the army, too, agreement had been reached in theory to form purely Slovak regiments, but this had not yet been put into practice. 46 SLOVAKIA In reply to a question by the Foreign Minister, Tiso said that Slovakia could maintain her independence and economy as long as she was helped militarily ·b y guarantees from the Great Powers. It was, of course, impossible for her to form a modern army for the defense of her frontiers. There were three possible orientations in the event of Slovakia's becoming independent. The first was orientation toward Czechia, which in the end was probably nearest to the Slovaks' hearts, as ·Prague had been politically weakened and as Slovakia, because of her large raw material resources, was also economically the equal of the Czech 'State. The second possibility was orientation toward Hungary, for which the Hungarians were making great efforts; and the third was orienta.t ion toward Poland. He could not foresee which of these tendencies was strongest in the Slovak people at present. If the Hungarians persisted in their stiff demands, he did not think that there would be much sympathy left among the Slovak people for throwing in their lot with the Magyars. In conclusion, the Minister told his visitors that he was naturally interested in the development of their country, and he asked them to apply directly to him if they ever · had any particular or economic Hewel." (7) problems. After this visit, excepting the visit of Dr. Ferdinand :Durcansky in the middle of November 1938, official Slovak factors did not have any contacts with representatives of the German Reich, neither according to documents, nor reality, until March 13, 1939. The visit of Dr. :Durcansky to Goering, according to the official record, but also according to the knowledge of the writer of these lines who accompanied Dr. :Durcansky to Berlin, was forced by two circumstances: 1. the Germans demanded the annexation of Devin to the German Reich, and, 2. the Czechs were endeavoring to prove that Slovak autonomy could not be upheld economically and so forced the Slovaks to. seek economic contacts with Germany directly. SI.;OVAKIA 47 The talk with Goering was mainly about Devin; in this matter we were effectively aided by Ing. Karmasin, the representative of the Reich in Slovakia, who emphasized the point that "the castle of Theben on the rock at the confluence of the ,Morava and Danube was Slovakia's sole historic monument and that all Slovak history books would have to be burned if the castle were lost." Goering, however, also felt that politically Slovakia should remain united with Prague. According to the record, "the Field Marshall explained that at the moment the Slovak and the Ukrainian questions could ,b e dealt with only within the framework of the Czecho.,Slovak State" (8). Germany, therefore, did not allow the annexation of Slovakia to Hungary, nor an autonomous Slovakia orientated toward Poland and thus ena:bled !S lovakia tb escape the catastrophe which threatened it in 1938. · How did Prague appraise the situation in Slovakia? In the fall of 1938, according to the diplomatic report of the German Charge d'Affaires in Prague, Hencke, the situation was described as follows: "According to reports here" - says Mr. Hencke's telegram - · "independence movement in Slovakia is gaining ground steadily. Far-reaching autonomy is now demanded by political circles in Slovakia formerly loyal to Prague. A tendency is evident toward declaration of complete independence. "Hungarian Minister here stated that Budapest would regard voluntary union of :Slovakia, including CarpathoUkraine, with Hungary as the most practical solution of the Slovak question. "Polish Legation in Prague is more inclined to the idea of an independent Slovak State which would leave open the possibility of protectorate under Poland or Hungary" (9). References: 1. Ernest Denis, LES .SLOVAQUJDS, Ltbrairie Delagrave, Paris, 1917; 2. Memorandum for the Fiihrer, p. 46; 3. 1See p. 40; 4. .See ,p. 47; 5. .See p. 49; 6. Memorandum ,b y an of:ficial of the Foreign Minister's Personal Stailf, pp. 8·6-92; 7. See pp, 92-93; 8. Note 'by the Director of the Political Department, p. 142; 9. Telegram of Charge d'Affaires Hencke, p. 32.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovakia and International Interests in 1938 Description An account of the resource Joseph Kirschbaum Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953 pp. 41-47 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1953 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/ae5428178125aeb910bcd7dd99c6ef17.pdf fa604aa054ec872cd30311720bd3078d PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 27 THE CZECHS FOR A CENTRAL EUROPEAN FEDERATION? Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum Ozec):l. emigrants publish a neiwsipa,per in Paris. It is called "The Free Tomorrow" (Svobodny zitfek) and is con.. sidered the mouthpiece of Dr. HUibert Riipka, a weiI.Umown newspaper man, who after 194'5 became one Oif Dr. Benes's ministers. In the sll!mmer olf 1949, this neWSlpaiper published am article of Dr. Riipka's that deserives some attention. It g1ves us am. ide,a of what Dr. Riipl{a's ipro,g ram is. And Dr. Ripka is considered a leading Czech emigrant; he is one of those who initiated the so-called "third revolution" on the Continent - in Paris. We recaU that the other two revolutions for Ozecho.-SlOIVakia originated there also,. This gives his article weight, am.d even though 1t may not be tlle credo of the whole of the Czech emig,raition, in sub.stance it does express the tendency of a great part of it. In that article Dr. Riipka made the following noteworthy statement: "During the last war our pro.g ram was: a free CzechoSlovakia in a free Europe. IDven though this motto loses none of its significance today, it is hardly swffic,ient for us by itself. It is necessary to complement it with an idea which would gain for our cause the sympathies of the democratic world. That idea is the idea Oif federation." And Ripka continues: "Masaryk was well aiware that the disintegration of AustriaJlfongary into nationa!l 'states is not, should not be and cannot be the final airrangement of tihe complex conditions in central Euroipe. 'Dhat is why, in his very :f:i-rst messruge to the liberated naJtion in Decemlber 1918, he encouraged it to seek ways to haive the smaller nations of central IDurope become friends and work together. Masaryk recalled the pOilitical program exipressed by Palacky, m w licek, and Saifarik in 1848: a free federation of free and legally equal nations of the Danube basin. AustriaHungary perished because it did not know how to transform itself into such a free federation. But the naitional sovereignties of the individual central European states, estalblished �28 SLOVAKIA in 1918, also collapsed. In 1938-1941 they strocumbed to German imiperialism and, after Hitler's defeat, in the years 1945.J.948 to Soviet iin!Perialism. "These nations cain preserve theiT freedom only iif tJhey UJllite in a free federation which wouJld. be strong enough, in cooperation with a federation of western ElN"ope, to oppose any Gevman da'Illger or Riussian hegemony." Those rure solber words even irf they probalbly are not ba:sed on conJVilction - as judged hy the remark of. Dr-. Ripka's albout the necessity "of gaining the sympaJthies of the demoorat:i.,c world for the Ozeoh cause with the aid of the f ederatilve idea." Crech enrig.vation, in whose naJllle Dr. llipk,a speaks, has thu:s come close to the conceptions that Slovaks hawe promoted and booked from the beginning of World War II -· am intensively especially sinlce its concliusion, if we can really say that it has ended. True, with a fundamental differen,ce. Dr. Ripka taliks a:bout Czecho~Slova!kia, whereas SlovaJks - the vast majority of whom are nationaJ:ly contJal,k albout Slovatkfa scious alnd think as Euro,peams as a legrefily equal central European unit or part of the proposed Erurqpean federation. The return of Coochs to the central European conception wi1Jh the hope m preser.ving C.zecho-SlO!V'aki•a , b.Olwever is not on:1y in oomliict wi,th our views, but differs also from the views m other central European nations and deviates especially from the histork conceiption of a central European federation. In no plan to reooganize central Europe on a federnlistic basis did we meet with a Czech~Slova!k unit until the ~~ond World War, thowgh there were tens ()If sueih plans from Ostrozinsky to Popovi.ci in the last hoo<lred years. None of the promote~s for a federated central Europe demanded this, nor could d~and it, because such a demand was at variance with 1Jhe ethni:c pvindple and the historic principle concerning territories as well. Slovakia prior to 1918 never did belong to the hlistoric Czech lands." 'l'he assertion that the Great Mora,v,ian Empire.was some sort of "Ozecho--Slovaik" state is a histori'C fuble of recent 1 1 �SLOVAKIA 29 date. The trnfill is that the Ozech territory was included in the GreaJt Morruvi.ian Empire only for a short period as a land co:aquered by Svatopluik, the ruler of the Slovalk people, and that Czech princes called the Germans to help them throw off Svatopluk's ruie. Alb.out the ethnieal differenices of the Ozechts and SlovaJks there was no doubt from 1848 and t1mJt is w!hy, for example, Popoviici in his rather ela!borrute wol1k "Die Vereinigiten Staiaten von GrossOestreich" proposes also the Slovak state a;s a mem/ber of the federation. That Riplm's conception spealks aJbOUJt a "Ozechoslovakia" and not even about a "Ozecho-Sfo:v<8Jkia" (Bohemia and SllO'VaJlcia) is in conlfllict, however, even Wii!th the fiumdannental princitPJ.es of federalism. 'Dhe i'dea of federation originated from the needs of securing freedOIIIl for the smaller national, cul:turaA units. that stT-ive to preserrve their dhamcter, their traddtions and indelpeindoot developmenrt. Federation - as Dr. Ripka correctly writes - "does not mean the suppression of independence, but, coruversel~, federation OIIl fille oither hand: ocganizes national soivereignties into a hitgher system founded on the legal equality of i:ts mem.lbers and ruflfo:rds a guarantee of their free intemial development." A Czecho-Slav'8Jkia is indisputaibi,y a negation of the principles of feiderailtism to the SlQi\71aJk DJation. If Dr. Ripka thought a/bouJt SOIIlle !kind of "Czecho-1Slo1V'ak confederation," then fuat would amount to an unreasoniaJble druipliicity: a federation wirbhin a regioina~ federation, wherein the SlD~ vaJk.s would hawe to sulITender some of their S01Vereignty in the interest of ~ho:4SlO'Vaikia and some to the c~trail. EurQpean felde;ration, but without 'benefit oif doufble prirvileges. A thoughtful person undOOibtedly undembaDlds readily that Dr. Ripkia - and with him a definite part of the Ozeohs - is striving to continue the ~istence of Coocho-Slovakia in EUTO(pe or in a federated centra;l Euirope. Whrut nation in the world was not seduced iby :imiperialism ,MlJd, \PI'3-Y, which one would not be, if it found itself in such a goographica!l location amd ipoliti<cal situation as the Owch nation finds itself in today? �30 SLOVAKIA But why should any one who proclaims himself a disciple of freedom and democracy force the Czecho-Slovak State on a nation that does not want to be a part of it? And this at a time when Ire}a,n!d has proclaimed its indelpendooce, when democratic coll!I1tries aJP!prOIVed the establishment of a Jewish Strute, when Indonesia and several countries in Afric,a and India hruve been reicogindzed as independent. And we still rememlber tJhrat the last bloody war wa s fought by pratctica:llry the whole world against the, pohroy of "lebensraum" that d~anded the swppression of the independence of other nations in the interests of some, •~He&erwo~k" ! The Slovaks have had their fill of Magyars, Czechs and Germans and have emphatically stated and proved time and again that they do not want to be a colony of the Czechs. They proclaimed the independence of their country on March 14, 'J 939, and still insist that they want an independent Slovak State. Why, then, not let them have what they are inherently and by God-given right entitled to? In this connection, however, we must _stress t,he fact that the indination of the Oze-c,h s to the idea of a federated centra:l IDurQPe is a departure from the poiliti~al conceptions and practices of Dr. Edward Benes. If there was any one in IDurope during the ipast 30 years who was an enemy of the idea of a federated Europe with his policies, that person was Benes, anything that he might have said to the contrar~ notwithstanding, I1n his boak "Dissertations about Shwdom" (Uvahy o SlOiV'anstvi) , Benes writes a!bout the formation of a central European federation. Hie says: "I do no:t wish to make such politics a:nd I do not wish th'is fate either for the Ozechs or some kind of new SlovaJk state in a central European federation . . . . lnto such a federation the Ozechs never would be ruble to enter. . . . " In another connection he noted the surrender Oif <Swb..Ca:r,pathian Ruthenia to Moscow, not without pe11sonal satiwruction, as "the end of all dreams of some kind of centra:l European federation" (,vd. his ta1k to Lettri~h and associates,, February 18, 1947). Are the Czechs sincere when they talk a!bout a central .European federation? Those for whom Dr. Ripka speallrs rupparenbly are not. They are for any European system that 1 �31 SLOVAKIA would guarantee the existence oif a 0zeicho-Sloivakia in which they would rule. They 3Jre true foUowers oif Benes: If they are for a central Euroq>ean federation, it is only because of political exiped!iency, or, as Ripka himself so a'PtlY put it: "to gain the sympathies of the demo.craitic world for the CZECH caJuse." The Slovaks, on the other hand, are against any and all forms of Czecho-Slovakia - the federation they were forced into against their will. They are stricmgl,y for a '.Central :IDuropean federation in which Sloiva'kia would be an independent ethnic part, independent oif Bohemia and the 0zechs, and an equal among equals. 1 • • • SLOVAKIA'S RIGHT TO BE HEARD Ann Su Cardwell The Slovak nation has a fong and enrv'iaJble record in the :struggle for freedom and the rights O!f man. That struggle continiues, ,w ith the SlovaJks in this country carrying the'ir share of the rbul'den. How clifrfiicwlt they find it I know only too well it:rom actual experience. '!'here were years when getting the trutJh 1before the Amerilca,n reading 'PUIJ:>lic was next to impossi!ble, and those writers who did succeed oocasional,l y were the ,reciipients ,of letters ()If sha11p criticism and even inrveC:ti!ve. On th3Jt point, too, ·I speak out of experience. It is not necessa'I1)' for me to tell the Slova.tks that Americans in generall hawe ,known ail.I too little of SlovaJkia and its pface in Centra!l European lirfe and 'C!iviliization; and if irn Eastern European life, and dvilization, then in that of Western. Eu1:1oipe and America as well. ,F or despite geograiphical distances am.di differences in lamrgruarge and customs, the entire Western world - and hy that I mean all Europe and Amerrea - is bOIUDd together throughout histo!IY to agree that we do not st-Olp to realize. What haipnot hruppen to one ipeorple has its effect upon pens or the rest, though thait effect may be long in beoom:ing manifest. Surely that point does not need argument these days, does � SLOVAKIA 27 THE CZECHS FOR A CENTRAL EUROPEAN FEDERATION? Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum Ozec):l. emigrants publish a neiwsipa,per in Paris. It is called "The Free Tomorrow" (Svobodny zitfek) and is con.. sidered the mouthpiece of Dr. HUibert Riipka, a weiI.Umown newspaper man, who after 194'5 became one Oif Dr. Benes's ministers. In the sll!mmer olf 1949, this neWSlpaiper published am article of Dr. Riipka's that deserives some attention. It g1ves us am. ide,a of what Dr. Riipl{a's ipro,g ram is. And Dr. Ripka is considered a leading Czech emigrant; he is one of those who initiated the so-called "third revolution" on the Continent - in Paris. We recaU that the other two revolutions for Ozecho.-SlOIVakia originated there also,. This gives his article weight, am.d even though 1t may not be tlle credo of the whole of the Czech emig,raition, in sub.stance it does express the tendency of a great part of it. In that article Dr. Riipka made the following noteworthy statement: "During the last war our pro.g ram was: a free CzechoSlovakia in a free Europe. IDven though this motto loses none of its significance today, it is hardly swffic,ient for us by itself. It is necessary to complement it with an idea which would gain for our cause the sympathies of the democratic world. That idea is the idea Oif federation." And Ripka continues: "Masaryk was well aiware that the disintegration of AustriaJlfongary into nationa!l 'states is not, should not be and cannot be the final airrangement of tihe complex conditions in central Euroipe. 'Dhat is why, in his very :f:i-rst messruge to the liberated naJtion in Decemlber 1918, he encouraged it to seek ways to haive the smaller nations of central IDurope become friends and work together. Masaryk recalled the pOilitical program exipressed by Palacky, m w licek, and Saifarik in 1848: a free federation of free and legally equal nations of the Danube basin. AustriaHungary perished because it did not know how to transform itself into such a free federation. But the naitional sovereignties of the individual central European states, estalblished �28 SLOVAKIA in 1918, also collapsed. In 1938-1941 they strocumbed to German imiperialism and, after Hitler's defeat, in the years 1945.J.948 to Soviet iin!Perialism. "These nations cain preserve theiT freedom only iif tJhey UJllite in a free federation which wouJld. be strong enough, in cooperation with a federation of western ElN"ope, to oppose any Gevman da'Illger or Riussian hegemony." Those rure solber words even irf they probalbly are not ba:sed on conJVilction - as judged hy the remark of. Dr-. Ripka's albout the necessity "of gaining the sympaJthies of the demoorat:i.,c world for the Ozeoh cause with the aid of the f ederatilve idea." Crech enrig.vation, in whose naJllle Dr. llipk,a speaks, has thu:s come close to the conceptions that Slovaks hawe promoted and booked from the beginning of World War II -· am intensively especially sinlce its concliusion, if we can really say that it has ended. True, with a fundamental differen,ce. Dr. Ripka taliks a:bout Czecho~Slova!kia, whereas SlovaJks - the vast majority of whom are nationaJ:ly contJal,k albout Slovatkfa scious alnd think as Euro,peams as a legrefily equal central European unit or part of the proposed Erurqpean federation. The return of Coochs to the central European conception wi1Jh the hope m preser.ving C.zecho-SlO!V'aki•a , b.Olwever is not on:1y in oomliict wi,th our views, but differs also from the views m other central European nations and deviates especially from the histork conceiption of a central European federation. In no plan to reooganize central Europe on a federnlistic basis did we meet with a Czech~Slova!k unit until the ~~ond World War, thowgh there were tens ()If sueih plans from Ostrozinsky to Popovi.ci in the last hoo<lred years. None of the promote~s for a federated central Europe demanded this, nor could d~and it, because such a demand was at variance with 1Jhe ethni:c pvindple and the historic principle concerning territories as well. Slovakia prior to 1918 never did belong to the hlistoric Czech lands." 'l'he assertion that the Great Mora,v,ian Empire.was some sort of "Ozecho--Slovaik" state is a histori'C fuble of recent 1 1 �SLOVAKIA 29 date. The trnfill is that the Ozech territory was included in the GreaJt Morruvi.ian Empire only for a short period as a land co:aquered by Svatopluik, the ruler of the Slovalk people, and that Czech princes called the Germans to help them throw off Svatopluk's ruie. Alb.out the ethnieal differenices of the Ozechts and SlovaJks there was no doubt from 1848 and t1mJt is w!hy, for example, Popoviici in his rather ela!borrute wol1k "Die Vereinigiten Staiaten von GrossOestreich" proposes also the Slovak state a;s a mem/ber of the federation. That Riplm's conception spealks aJbOUJt a "Ozechoslovakia" and not even about a "Ozecho-Sfo:v<8Jkia" (Bohemia and SllO'VaJlcia) is in conlfllict, however, even Wii!th the fiumdannental princitPJ.es of federalism. 'Dhe i'dea of federation originated from the needs of securing freedOIIIl for the smaller national, cul:turaA units. that stT-ive to preserrve their dhamcter, their traddtions and indelpeindoot developmenrt. Federation - as Dr. Ripka correctly writes - "does not mean the suppression of independence, but, coruversel~, federation OIIl fille oither hand: ocganizes national soivereignties into a hitgher system founded on the legal equality of i:ts mem.lbers and ruflfo:rds a guarantee of their free intemial development." A Czecho-Slav'8Jkia is indisputaibi,y a negation of the principles of feiderailtism to the SlQi\71aJk DJation. If Dr. Ripka thought a/bouJt SOIIlle !kind of "Czecho-1Slo1V'ak confederation," then fuat would amount to an unreasoniaJble druipliicity: a federation wirbhin a regioina~ federation, wherein the SlD~ vaJk.s would hawe to sulITender some of their S01Vereignty in the interest of ~ho:4SlO'Vaikia and some to the c~trail. EurQpean felde;ration, but without 'benefit oif doufble prirvileges. A thoughtful person undOOibtedly undembaDlds readily that Dr. Ripkia - and with him a definite part of the Ozeohs - is striving to continue the ~istence of Coocho-Slovakia in EUTO(pe or in a federated centra;l Euirope. Whrut nation in the world was not seduced iby :imiperialism ,MlJd, \PI'3-Y, which one would not be, if it found itself in such a goographica!l location amd ipoliti<cal situation as the Owch nation finds itself in today? �30 SLOVAKIA But why should any one who proclaims himself a disciple of freedom and democracy force the Czecho-Slovak State on a nation that does not want to be a part of it? And this at a time when Ire}a,n!d has proclaimed its indelpendooce, when democratic coll!I1tries aJP!prOIVed the establishment of a Jewish Strute, when Indonesia and several countries in Afric,a and India hruve been reicogindzed as independent. And we still rememlber tJhrat the last bloody war wa s fought by pratctica:llry the whole world against the, pohroy of "lebensraum" that d~anded the swppression of the independence of other nations in the interests of some, •~He&erwo~k" ! The Slovaks have had their fill of Magyars, Czechs and Germans and have emphatically stated and proved time and again that they do not want to be a colony of the Czechs. They proclaimed the independence of their country on March 14, 'J 939, and still insist that they want an independent Slovak State. Why, then, not let them have what they are inherently and by God-given right entitled to? In this connection, however, we must _stress t,he fact that the indination of the Oze-c,h s to the idea of a federated centra:l IDurQPe is a departure from the poiliti~al conceptions and practices of Dr. Edward Benes. If there was any one in IDurope during the ipast 30 years who was an enemy of the idea of a federated Europe with his policies, that person was Benes, anything that he might have said to the contrar~ notwithstanding, I1n his boak "Dissertations about Shwdom" (Uvahy o SlOiV'anstvi) , Benes writes a!bout the formation of a central European federation. Hie says: "I do no:t wish to make such politics a:nd I do not wish th'is fate either for the Ozechs or some kind of new SlovaJk state in a central European federation . . . . lnto such a federation the Ozechs never would be ruble to enter. . . . " In another connection he noted the surrender Oif <Swb..Ca:r,pathian Ruthenia to Moscow, not without pe11sonal satiwruction, as "the end of all dreams of some kind of centra:l European federation" (,vd. his ta1k to Lettri~h and associates,, February 18, 1947). Are the Czechs sincere when they talk a!bout a central .European federation? Those for whom Dr. Ripka speallrs rupparenbly are not. They are for any European system that 1 �31 SLOVAKIA would guarantee the existence oif a 0zeicho-Sloivakia in which they would rule. They 3Jre true foUowers oif Benes: If they are for a central Euroq>ean federation, it is only because of political exiped!iency, or, as Ripka himself so a'PtlY put it: "to gain the sympathies of the demo.craitic world for the CZECH caJuse." The Slovaks, on the other hand, are against any and all forms of Czecho-Slovakia - the federation they were forced into against their will. They are stricmgl,y for a '.Central :IDuropean federation in which Sloiva'kia would be an independent ethnic part, independent oif Bohemia and the 0zechs, and an equal among equals. 1 • • • SLOVAKIA'S RIGHT TO BE HEARD Ann Su Cardwell The Slovak nation has a fong and enrv'iaJble record in the :struggle for freedom and the rights O!f man. That struggle continiues, ,w ith the SlovaJks in this country carrying the'ir share of the rbul'den. How clifrfiicwlt they find it I know only too well it:rom actual experience. '!'here were years when getting the trutJh 1before the Amerilca,n reading 'PUIJ:>lic was next to impossi!ble, and those writers who did succeed oocasional,l y were the ,reciipients ,of letters ()If sha11p criticism and even inrveC:ti!ve. On th3Jt point, too, ·I speak out of experience. It is not necessa'I1)' for me to tell the Slova.tks that Americans in generall hawe ,known ail.I too little of SlovaJkia and its pface in Centra!l European lirfe and 'C!iviliization; and if irn Eastern European life, and dvilization, then in that of Western. Eu1:1oipe and America as well. ,F or despite geograiphical distances am.di differences in lamrgruarge and customs, the entire Western world - and hy that I mean all Europe and Amerrea - is bOIUDd together throughout histo!IY to agree that we do not st-Olp to realize. What haipnot hruppen to one ipeorple has its effect upon pens or the rest, though thait effect may be long in beoom:ing manifest. Surely that point does not need argument these days, does � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 27 THE CZECHS FOR A CENTRAL EUROPEAN FEDERATION? Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum Ozec):l. emigrants publish a neiwsipa,per in Paris. It is called "The Free Tomorrow" (Svobodny zitfek) and is con.. sidered the mouthpiece of Dr. HUibert Riipka, a weiI.Umown newspaper man, who after 194'5 became one Oif Dr. Benes's ministers. In the sll!mmer olf 1949, this neWSlpaiper published am article of Dr. Riipka's that deserives some attention. It g1ves us am. ide,a of what Dr. Riipl{a's ipro,g ram is. And Dr. Ripka is considered a leading Czech emigrant; he is one of those who initiated the so-called "third revolution" on the Continent - in Paris. We recaU that the other two revolutions for Ozecho.-SlOIVakia originated there also,. This gives his article weight, am.d even though 1t may not be tlle credo of the whole of the Czech emig,raition, in sub.stance it does express the tendency of a great part of it. In that article Dr. Riipka made the following noteworthy statement: "During the last war our pro.g ram was: a free CzechoSlovakia in a free Europe. IDven though this motto loses none of its significance today, it is hardly swffic,ient for us by itself. It is necessary to complement it with an idea which would gain for our cause the sympathies of the democratic world. That idea is the idea Oif federation." And Ripka continues: "Masaryk was well aiware that the disintegration of AustriaJlfongary into nationa!l 'states is not, should not be and cannot be the final airrangement of tihe complex conditions in central Euroipe. 'Dhat is why, in his very :f:i-rst messruge to the liberated naJtion in Decemlber 1918, he encouraged it to seek ways to haive the smaller nations of central IDurope become friends and work together. Masaryk recalled the pOilitical program exipressed by Palacky, m w licek, and Saifarik in 1848: a free federation of free and legally equal nations of the Danube basin. AustriaHungary perished because it did not know how to transform itself into such a free federation. But the naitional sovereignties of the individual central European states, estalblished 28 SLOVAKIA in 1918, also collapsed. In 1938-1941 they strocumbed to German imiperialism and, after Hitler's defeat, in the years 1945.J.948 to Soviet iin!Perialism. "These nations cain preserve theiT freedom only iif tJhey UJllite in a free federation which wouJld. be strong enough, in cooperation with a federation of western ElN"ope, to oppose any Gevman da'Illger or Riussian hegemony." Those rure solber words even irf they probalbly are not ba:sed on conJVilction - as judged hy the remark of. Dr-. Ripka's albout the necessity "of gaining the sympaJthies of the demoorat:i.,c world for the Ozeoh cause with the aid of the f ederatilve idea." Crech enrig.vation, in whose naJllle Dr. llipk,a speaks, has thu:s come close to the conceptions that Slovaks hawe promoted and booked from the beginning of World War II -· am intensively especially sinlce its concliusion, if we can really say that it has ended. True, with a fundamental differen,ce. Dr. Ripka taliks a:bout Czecho~Slova!kia, whereas SlovaJks - the vast majority of whom are nationaJ:ly contJal,k albout Slovatkfa scious alnd think as Euro,peams as a legrefily equal central European unit or part of the proposed Erurqpean federation. The return of Coochs to the central European conception wi1Jh the hope m preser.ving C.zecho-SlO!V'aki•a , b.Olwever is not on:1y in oomliict wi,th our views, but differs also from the views m other central European nations and deviates especially from the histork conceiption of a central European federation. In no plan to reooganize central Europe on a federnlistic basis did we meet with a Czech~Slova!k unit until the ~~ond World War, thowgh there were tens ()If sueih plans from Ostrozinsky to Popovi.ci in the last hoo<lred years. None of the promote~s for a federated central Europe demanded this, nor could d~and it, because such a demand was at variance with 1Jhe ethni:c pvindple and the historic principle concerning territories as well. Slovakia prior to 1918 never did belong to the hlistoric Czech lands." 'l'he assertion that the Great Mora,v,ian Empire.was some sort of "Ozecho--Slovaik" state is a histori'C fuble of recent 1 1 SLOVAKIA 29 date. The trnfill is that the Ozech territory was included in the GreaJt Morruvi.ian Empire only for a short period as a land co:aquered by Svatopluik, the ruler of the Slovalk people, and that Czech princes called the Germans to help them throw off Svatopluk's ruie. Alb.out the ethnieal differenices of the Ozechts and SlovaJks there was no doubt from 1848 and t1mJt is w!hy, for example, Popoviici in his rather ela!borrute wol1k "Die Vereinigiten Staiaten von GrossOestreich" proposes also the Slovak state a;s a mem/ber of the federation. That Riplm's conception spealks aJbOUJt a "Ozechoslovakia" and not even about a "Ozecho-Sfo:v<8Jkia" (Bohemia and SllO'VaJlcia) is in conlfllict, however, even Wii!th the fiumdannental princitPJ.es of federalism. 'Dhe i'dea of federation originated from the needs of securing freedOIIIl for the smaller national, cul:turaA units. that stT-ive to preserrve their dhamcter, their traddtions and indelpeindoot developmenrt. Federation - as Dr. Ripka correctly writes - "does not mean the suppression of independence, but, coruversel~, federation OIIl fille oither hand: ocganizes national soivereignties into a hitgher system founded on the legal equality of i:ts mem.lbers and ruflfo:rds a guarantee of their free intemial development." A Czecho-Slav'8Jkia is indisputaibi,y a negation of the principles of feiderailtism to the SlQi\71aJk DJation. If Dr. Ripka thought a/bouJt SOIIlle !kind of "Czecho-1Slo1V'ak confederation," then fuat would amount to an unreasoniaJble druipliicity: a federation wirbhin a regioina~ federation, wherein the SlD~ vaJk.s would hawe to sulITender some of their S01Vereignty in the interest of ~ho:4SlO'Vaikia and some to the c~trail. EurQpean felde;ration, but without 'benefit oif doufble prirvileges. A thoughtful person undOOibtedly undembaDlds readily that Dr. Ripkia - and with him a definite part of the Ozeohs - is striving to continue the ~istence of Coocho-Slovakia in EUTO(pe or in a federated centra;l Euirope. Whrut nation in the world was not seduced iby :imiperialism ,MlJd, \PI'3-Y, which one would not be, if it found itself in such a goographica!l location amd ipoliti<cal situation as the Owch nation finds itself in today? 30 SLOVAKIA But why should any one who proclaims himself a disciple of freedom and democracy force the Czecho-Slovak State on a nation that does not want to be a part of it? And this at a time when Ire}a,n!d has proclaimed its indelpendooce, when democratic coll!I1tries aJP!prOIVed the establishment of a Jewish Strute, when Indonesia and several countries in Afric,a and India hruve been reicogindzed as independent. And we still rememlber tJhrat the last bloody war wa s fought by pratctica:llry the whole world against the, pohroy of "lebensraum" that d~anded the swppression of the independence of other nations in the interests of some, •~He&erwo~k" ! The Slovaks have had their fill of Magyars, Czechs and Germans and have emphatically stated and proved time and again that they do not want to be a colony of the Czechs. They proclaimed the independence of their country on March 14, 'J 939, and still insist that they want an independent Slovak State. Why, then, not let them have what they are inherently and by God-given right entitled to? In this connection, however, we must _stress t,he fact that the indination of the Oze-c,h s to the idea of a federated centra:l IDurQPe is a departure from the poiliti~al conceptions and practices of Dr. Edward Benes. If there was any one in IDurope during the ipast 30 years who was an enemy of the idea of a federated Europe with his policies, that person was Benes, anything that he might have said to the contrar~ notwithstanding, I1n his boak "Dissertations about Shwdom" (Uvahy o SlOiV'anstvi) , Benes writes a!bout the formation of a central European federation. Hie says: "I do no:t wish to make such politics a:nd I do not wish th'is fate either for the Ozechs or some kind of new SlovaJk state in a central European federation . . . . lnto such a federation the Ozechs never would be ruble to enter. . . . " In another connection he noted the surrender Oif <Swb..Ca:r,pathian Ruthenia to Moscow, not without pe11sonal satiwruction, as "the end of all dreams of some kind of centra:l European federation" (,vd. his ta1k to Lettri~h and associates,, February 18, 1947). Are the Czechs sincere when they talk a!bout a central .European federation? Those for whom Dr. Ripka speallrs rupparenbly are not. They are for any European system that 1 31 SLOVAKIA would guarantee the existence oif a 0zeicho-Sloivakia in which they would rule. They 3Jre true foUowers oif Benes: If they are for a central Euroq>ean federation, it is only because of political exiped!iency, or, as Ripka himself so a'PtlY put it: "to gain the sympathies of the demo.craitic world for the CZECH caJuse." The Slovaks, on the other hand, are against any and all forms of Czecho-Slovakia - the federation they were forced into against their will. They are stricmgl,y for a '.Central :IDuropean federation in which Sloiva'kia would be an independent ethnic part, independent oif Bohemia and the 0zechs, and an equal among equals. 1 • • • SLOVAKIA'S RIGHT TO BE HEARD Ann Su Cardwell The Slovak nation has a fong and enrv'iaJble record in the :struggle for freedom and the rights O!f man. That struggle continiues, ,w ith the SlovaJks in this country carrying the'ir share of the rbul'den. How clifrfiicwlt they find it I know only too well it:rom actual experience. '!'here were years when getting the trutJh 1before the Amerilca,n reading 'PUIJ:>lic was next to impossi!ble, and those writers who did succeed oocasional,l y were the ,reciipients ,of letters ()If sha11p criticism and even inrveC:ti!ve. On th3Jt point, too, ·I speak out of experience. It is not necessa'I1)' for me to tell the Slova.tks that Americans in generall hawe ,known ail.I too little of SlovaJkia and its pface in Centra!l European lirfe and 'C!iviliization; and if irn Eastern European life, and dvilization, then in that of Western. Eu1:1oipe and America as well. ,F or despite geograiphical distances am.di differences in lamrgruarge and customs, the entire Western world - and hy that I mean all Europe and Amerrea - is bOIUDd together throughout histo!IY to agree that we do not st-Olp to realize. What haipnot hruppen to one ipeorple has its effect upon pens or the rest, though thait effect may be long in beoom:ing manifest. Surely that point does not need argument these days, does  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Czechs for a Central European Federation? Description An account of the resource Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953 pp. 27-31 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1953 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/044357522c52853da1a344e606669d95.pdf 69c2b082e074d0f90f76f0df0cc936cd PDF Text Text JULY, 1953 SLOV.AKI.A 1 THE TRUE FACE OF SLOVAK.IA Joseph M. Kirschbaum, M.A., LL.D. There is a peculiar phenomenon in the political and historical works of American or English scholars about Slovakia. With the exception of the British author C. A. Macartney, followed to a certain extent by A. J. D. Taylor and professor Seton-Watson, the Anglo-Saxon history writers an:d -p ublicists show not only a considerable lack of knowledge of historical facts concerning Slovakia, but they serve, probably unconsciously, the aims of imperialistic tendencies of some Central-European ,peoples. For many of them "Slovak is the name given to the easternmost division of the Czech speaking people" (1) and they seem to know nothing about the fact that the Slovaks were among the first Slovanic peoples converted to Christianity and that as early as the ninth century they founded the first Slovanic state, known in history under the name of the Great Moravian Empire (2); they also persistently present Slovakia as a backward agrarian country marked by illiteracy and poverty. This misrepresentation happens especially when comparison is made between Slovaks and, in the Anglo-Saxon world, the very favored Czechs who are, from the linguistic point of view, quite close to the Slovaks, from the cultural and historical standpoint, however, quite different. Or as Wm. Diamond writes: "Slovakia and the Czech lands are two areas speaking quite similar languages but having different histories and political traditions. They have a deep-rooted and intense distrust, sometimes amounting to antipathy, for each other. A thousand years of separat~on, during which ,p olitical and economic development went off on different tracks, were neither forgotten nor overcome after the establishment of the (Czecho-'Slovak) Republic." The line followed by Anglo-Saxon writers when speaking about Slovakia is nearly the same as that expressed in the books of J. S. Roucek (Eastern-Central Europe, crucible of world wars, and Slavonic Encyclopedia) and R. J. Kerner (Czechoslovakia), who as late as 1946-1949 presented Slovakia as follows: �SLOVAKIA 1. "In the Slovak province of Czechoslovakia, for instance, as many as 57 per cent could not read and write. The (Czechoslovak) Republic esta:blished middleschool and university education in Slovakia, where it was practically non-existent ,b efore 1918." - J. S. Roucek (3). 2. "Wherea'S 1:Jhe standard of ,] iteracy among the Czechs was high, the •p ercentage of Slovaks who could read and write was very low in 1919. For that reason, many officials, teachers and intellectuals from the Czech regions had to be sent to Slovakia" - Kerner <4). 1 3. The Slovaks are according to Mr. Roucek "simple and pastoral" and in the opinion of Mr. Kerner "the Slovaks remained agriculturists and under a Magyar (that is, Eastern) type of culture." This portrayal of Slovakia i,s so general in the American and English ,p ress that to many people, who are not acquainted with the Slovak past and the actual circm;nstances, it may appear not only probruble ,b ut true. Slovakia has been presented in this light for about 35 years. The world is supposed to 'believe that culture, literacy and civilization were brought into Slovakia only by the Czechs in 1918-19, according to these "scientific revelations", and that Slovakia remained even during the last 30 years predominantly agrarian, pastoral and illiterate. What is the truth? Now, the truth is quite different. After having lost their political independence in the tenth and definitely in the 13th century in favor of the· Hungarians, the Slovaks did not appear in European history as a political factor for many centuries. Germans, Hungarians and Czechs, who in a common effort succeeded to disintegrate the first Slovak State, could not, however, destroy the civilization which had already existed in that country. As a result Slovakia became even under the Hungarian rule a first-rate cultural centre in Ce11tral Europe with a university at Bratislava as early as the 1'5th century and a Catholic university in the 17th century at Trnava (5). �SLOVAKIA 3 The culture spread from these universities developed, naturally, not in the 'Slovak, but in the Latin language, a general phenomenon at that time in Central Europe. Nevertheless, it was a culture of the •p opulation of Slovakia which at all times has been predominantly of Slovak origin, and the archives prove that the majority of professors and students was Slovak also. The same rule can be applied to the epoch when, under the influence of nationalism, the Hungarians began to demand the use of the Magyar language instead of the Latin and when expressions of growing national consciousness of the non~Magyar nationalities were answered by an increased attempt at Magyarization. It is true that .Slovak schools were closed by the Hungarian regime in the last decades of the 19th century, and nobody can deny the tendency of Budapest to assimilate the Slovak population. On the other hand, it is false and tendencious to say that Slova:kia before 1918 was a .b ackward and illiterate country and that culture was brought into Slovakia by Czech teachers and intellectuals. If we can measure the cultural level of any country by the number of schools, as it is generally done, then the statistics regarding the number of schools in Slovakia at the end of the Hungarian rule (1918) and at the end of the Czech rule (1939) obviously deny the Czech .propaganda about the illiteracy and the Czech cultural mission in Slovakia. The data pU!blished in this regard by a former member of the Prague government, Prof. A. Stefanek (6) give us the following picture: A) Number of public schools in Slovakia 1917-18 1937-38 Schools administered by church ____ 2723 2487 Schools administered by state _____ 797 1104 Total ________________ 3520 3591 B) Number of high schools in Slovakia 1918-19 1936-37 High schools ____________________ _ 44 46 Teachers' schools ________________ _ 15 16 Tot~ _________________ _ 61 63 �4 SLOVAKIA The number of students at the above schools in 1918 was 15,354; and in 1939 - 23,937; but only 20,018 of them were of Slovak origin. As far as the percentage of Slovaks who could not read and write is concerned, the above quoted statement of Prof. Roucek is obviously at odds with the truth. Unfortunately, there are in exile no statistics available aJbout the situation in this regard in Slovakia at the end of the Hungarian rule. But if we take into consideration the fact that according to the official Czech statistics there were in 1930 only 6.8 % inhabitants of Slovak origin who could not read and write and the number of schools was as shown above, it may be safely assumed that in 1919, when the number of schools was nearly the same, the percentage of analphabets could hardly be much different. Logic does not admit any doubt in this regard. At present about 3 % of the inhabitants of Slovakia cannot read and write, which means that Slovakia comes not only before many Central-European countries, but is much ahead of countries like Italy, Spain, etc. II As false at the presentation of Slovakia in the light of illiteracy is also any talk about Slovakia's economic backwardness. After the first World War when the Slovaks and Czechs came together, it was decided ,b y the Czech government that Slovakia must remain an agricultural complement of the Czech lands. Consequently, the rise in the industrial population of Slovakia which 1b egan in the 19th century, when the industrial revolution took hold in Hungary, not only began to slow down, but, according to Macartney, one third of Slovakia's industry was dismantled and destroyed by the Czech banks and industrialists who did not wish to have any competition in Slovakia (7). 1 Despite these anti-Slovak economic measures of the Prague government and Czech industrialists, the majority of Slovakia's population was neither ",pastoral" nor agrarian. According to Czech official statistics the percentage of Slovakia's population which gave their occupation as agriculture was as follows (8) : �SLOVAKIA Year 1900 1921 1930 5 % 63.0 60.6 56.8 Measured by Central-European standards, Slovakia in 1930 was one of the well industrialized countries, since in Poland, ,Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Yugoslavia the percentage of agrarian population at that time was much higher (Poland 69 % , Bulgaria 80 % , Romania 80% , etc.) even according Mr. Roucek's "Central Eastern Europe". Since 1930 the above percentage changed in Slovakia to a considera'ble extent, especially during the years 19391945. Wm. Dia:mond in his book "Czechoslovakia between East and West" - very favorable to the post-war Czechoslovakia and to Czechs writes in this regard: "Slovakia's brief experience as an independent state had a salutary effect on its industry, which expanded in an effort to replace products once obtained from the factories of the Czech lands and, under German pressure, to increase the output of armaments. The esta'blishment of new enteq,rises and the increase in the number of industrial workers raised the importance of Slovak industry in the country as a whole. The industrial ca:pacity of Slovakia increased particularly in metal- and wood-working, mining, textiles, footwear, and food processing" (9). The Czech Minister on Industry described the situation as follows: •~on the whole, it may ,b e said of Slovak industry that its development in the last few years, with the exception of armament production, was, comparatively speaking, quick and sound. It is true that not many new factories have been built, but many of the existing ones have been enlarged and modernized. The most important structural change 'has :b een an increased emphasis on metallurgy, textiles and, to a certain extent, on mining" (10). �6 SLOVAKIA The Communist regime in Slovakia did not stop this development. On the contrary, if we can trust Communist statistics, many new industries have been built in Slovakia and the percentage of the population working in agriculture should be only a,bout 35 % at the .present time. The regime is inhuman, tyrannic and cruel, but it changes the social structure of Slovakia in favor of the industrial "proletariat" not only in order to furnish Russia industrial products, ibut also because of political reasons: a peasant is considered an enemy of Communism. III · While, consciously or unconsciously, American authors present, under the cover of "scientific" works, the Slovak people as a part of the Czech nation and Slovakia as a backward country in order to support the Czech claim to rule over Slovakia, life marks quite different tracks of evolution in the relations between Czechs and Slovaks. "Slovak tradition and economy stand as a barrier between Czechs and Slovaks," writes Wm. Diamond and continues: "So important was the Slovak problem in the minds of both Czech and Slovak leaders, that it was a major subject of study and debate during the war and has continued to be ever since. An effort was made to solve the problem in 194'5 in the Kosice .Programme, in which Czechs and Slovaks are defined as two distinct nations united by common interest in a single state. This is in itself a complete reversal of the ethni~ theory on which the first Repubilc was built: the belief that Czechs and Slovaks constituted a single nation. The Kosice Program further provided that "the Slovaks should :be the masters in their Slovak lands, just as the Czechs in their Czech homeland" and that the government "will regard the Slovak National Council not only as the rightful representative of the individual Slovak nation, but also as the bearer of sovereign right on Slovak territory" (11). The same change as in the political relations between Czechs and Slovaks was ,b rought a;bout in regard to the �S LOVAKIA 7 general level of civilization in Slovakia. Already during the Second World War there was no lack of trained and educateq. officials, professors, lawyers, physicians, etc., but a constderable surplus. When the "Czechoslovak Republic" had been restored against the wishes of the majority of Slovakia's population in 1945 and a bout 5 thousand Slovak intellectuals left the country and other thousands were jailed, deported to Siberia, and confined in concentration camps for alleged collaboration with Nazis, but in fact for their anti-Communism, there was no difficulty to replace them, ·b ecause the trend of civilization and development, which, since the First World War, brought to maturity and self-government about 30 former colonies and mandatory territories, did not stop in Slovakia in order to fulfill the wishes of some Czech politicians who desired to see Slovakia as a backward country and the Slovaks as a part of the Czech nation. Slovakia developed considerably not only economically during its short separation from the Czech lands, but also from the point of view of culture and civilization. This can be seen again in the light of statistics concerning the number of university students during the Czech rule (1918--38) and during the Slovakia's independence (1939-415) ,published by Prof. Stefanek. 1 After 20 years of Czech rule in Slovakia, there were at the University in Bratislava in the schoolyear 1938--39 only 153'5 students of Slovak origin, but this number increased to 4485 in the third year of Slovakia's independence (1942-43), while aibout 500 others studied abroad. Altogether, during the five years of Slovakia's separation from Czechs, 14,965 students studied at the University of Bratislava, which also became an attractive center for foreign students. In the year 1941-42, for instance, there were 518 students from Bulgaria, 120 Czech students, 154 Germans, 106 Russians, 171 Hungarians and many others. As far as the professors were concerned, out of a total of 107 professors, 78 were of Slovak origin, 20 Czechs, 7 Russians, one German, one Italian; the 1'59 assistants and lecturers were all of Slovak origin (12). This is the true face of Slovakia, ,p resented by some 1 �SLOVAKIA 8 American writers and university professors as a backward country of illiteracy and poverty. Do not American students deserve professors and lecturers who respect facts and the truth more objectively and more consistently? (1) J. S. Roucek, Central Eastern Europe, New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1946, p. 353; 2) Dr. Milan Hodza, Federation in Central Europe, London, Jarolds, 1942, pp. 85-94, 104, 131, etc.; 3) Lbidem, p. 354; 4) "Czechoslovakia" edited by R. J. Kerner, University of California Press, Berkeley, Cal. 1949, pp. 184-185; 5) Dr. M. Hodza, op. cit.; 6) Anton Stefanek, Zur Sociographie Der Geistigen Kultur in der Slowakei, Academia Scientiarum et Artiurn Slovaca, Bratislava, 1944, pp. 40'4-405; 7) C. A. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, London, 19·3 7; 8) Annuaire statistique de la Republique Tcheco,Slovaque, 1938, p. 15; 9) William Diamond, Czechoslovakia between East and West, London, Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1947, p. 172; 10) Prumyslovy Vestnik, March 10, 1947, p. 180-1; 11) Ibidem, p. 50; 12) A. Stefanek, op. cit., ·p. 413-15. WHO SAID IT? - "Basically our political program, our political llne, completely agrees with the line and the program of the Slovak Communist Party. Up to the rebellion there really was no difference between an adherent of the Slovak Communist Party and an adherent of the Democratic Party. When did this relationship deteriorate? I t.hink it was after our complete liberation. Well, in general, there can be no taJk about any great deterioration. But I think that if we let ourselves get drunk by our present victory in the elections and if, incidentally, even the effectiveness of the Slovak Communist Party should decrease because of the factual failure in the elections, then we would fall and the communists also would fail. I emphasize that we must mutually help each other and th 'l-t all of us mu.st solve common problems together, because onoe and for all time we must realize that there is no fundamental difference between the Slovak Communist Party and the Democratic Party. Differences have appeared a.nd are appearing, but only In methods." (Dr. Joseph Lettrich, former Chairman of the Slovak Democratic Party and President of the Slovak National Council and now Y.ice-Preeident of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia: "My 46" - No. 23, June 8, 1946 - Prague) . WHO SAID IT? - • • • "The religious cleft (between the Slovaks ana the Czechs) is deep. For the Czechs, Master John Hus was and is not only a religious but essentially a national figure; and, if the nation returned to Catholicism under the pressure of the Counter-Reformation, it is a truism that every Czech is a H ussite at heart - a Hussfte in the wider sense of the term, denoting a blend of somewhat selfassertive nationalism with a "Protestant" attitude towards all authority, social, national, or religious, which is felt to be in any way alien. For the Slovaks, Hussitism was the alien doctrine, Catholicism the natural faith." (C. A. Macartney: HUNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS - London, 1937). � JULY, 1953 SLOV.AKI.A 1 THE TRUE FACE OF SLOVAK.IA Joseph M. Kirschbaum, M.A., LL.D. There is a peculiar phenomenon in the political and historical works of American or English scholars about Slovakia. With the exception of the British author C. A. Macartney, followed to a certain extent by A. J. D. Taylor and professor Seton-Watson, the Anglo-Saxon history writers an:d -p ublicists show not only a considerable lack of knowledge of historical facts concerning Slovakia, but they serve, probably unconsciously, the aims of imperialistic tendencies of some Central-European ,peoples. For many of them "Slovak is the name given to the easternmost division of the Czech speaking people" (1) and they seem to know nothing about the fact that the Slovaks were among the first Slovanic peoples converted to Christianity and that as early as the ninth century they founded the first Slovanic state, known in history under the name of the Great Moravian Empire (2); they also persistently present Slovakia as a backward agrarian country marked by illiteracy and poverty. This misrepresentation happens especially when comparison is made between Slovaks and, in the Anglo-Saxon world, the very favored Czechs who are, from the linguistic point of view, quite close to the Slovaks, from the cultural and historical standpoint, however, quite different. Or as Wm. Diamond writes: "Slovakia and the Czech lands are two areas speaking quite similar languages but having different histories and political traditions. They have a deep-rooted and intense distrust, sometimes amounting to antipathy, for each other. A thousand years of separat~on, during which ,p olitical and economic development went off on different tracks, were neither forgotten nor overcome after the establishment of the (Czecho-'Slovak) Republic." The line followed by Anglo-Saxon writers when speaking about Slovakia is nearly the same as that expressed in the books of J. S. Roucek (Eastern-Central Europe, crucible of world wars, and Slavonic Encyclopedia) and R. J. Kerner (Czechoslovakia), who as late as 1946-1949 presented Slovakia as follows: �SLOVAKIA 1. "In the Slovak province of Czechoslovakia, for instance, as many as 57 per cent could not read and write. The (Czechoslovak) Republic esta:blished middleschool and university education in Slovakia, where it was practically non-existent ,b efore 1918." - J. S. Roucek (3). 2. "Wherea'S 1:Jhe standard of ,] iteracy among the Czechs was high, the •p ercentage of Slovaks who could read and write was very low in 1919. For that reason, many officials, teachers and intellectuals from the Czech regions had to be sent to Slovakia" - Kerner <4). 1 3. The Slovaks are according to Mr. Roucek "simple and pastoral" and in the opinion of Mr. Kerner "the Slovaks remained agriculturists and under a Magyar (that is, Eastern) type of culture." This portrayal of Slovakia i,s so general in the American and English ,p ress that to many people, who are not acquainted with the Slovak past and the actual circm;nstances, it may appear not only probruble ,b ut true. Slovakia has been presented in this light for about 35 years. The world is supposed to 'believe that culture, literacy and civilization were brought into Slovakia only by the Czechs in 1918-19, according to these "scientific revelations", and that Slovakia remained even during the last 30 years predominantly agrarian, pastoral and illiterate. What is the truth? Now, the truth is quite different. After having lost their political independence in the tenth and definitely in the 13th century in favor of the· Hungarians, the Slovaks did not appear in European history as a political factor for many centuries. Germans, Hungarians and Czechs, who in a common effort succeeded to disintegrate the first Slovak State, could not, however, destroy the civilization which had already existed in that country. As a result Slovakia became even under the Hungarian rule a first-rate cultural centre in Ce11tral Europe with a university at Bratislava as early as the 1'5th century and a Catholic university in the 17th century at Trnava (5). �SLOVAKIA 3 The culture spread from these universities developed, naturally, not in the 'Slovak, but in the Latin language, a general phenomenon at that time in Central Europe. Nevertheless, it was a culture of the •p opulation of Slovakia which at all times has been predominantly of Slovak origin, and the archives prove that the majority of professors and students was Slovak also. The same rule can be applied to the epoch when, under the influence of nationalism, the Hungarians began to demand the use of the Magyar language instead of the Latin and when expressions of growing national consciousness of the non~Magyar nationalities were answered by an increased attempt at Magyarization. It is true that .Slovak schools were closed by the Hungarian regime in the last decades of the 19th century, and nobody can deny the tendency of Budapest to assimilate the Slovak population. On the other hand, it is false and tendencious to say that Slova:kia before 1918 was a .b ackward and illiterate country and that culture was brought into Slovakia by Czech teachers and intellectuals. If we can measure the cultural level of any country by the number of schools, as it is generally done, then the statistics regarding the number of schools in Slovakia at the end of the Hungarian rule (1918) and at the end of the Czech rule (1939) obviously deny the Czech .propaganda about the illiteracy and the Czech cultural mission in Slovakia. The data pU!blished in this regard by a former member of the Prague government, Prof. A. Stefanek (6) give us the following picture: A) Number of public schools in Slovakia 1917-18 1937-38 Schools administered by church ____ 2723 2487 Schools administered by state _____ 797 1104 Total ________________ 3520 3591 B) Number of high schools in Slovakia 1918-19 1936-37 High schools ____________________ _ 44 46 Teachers' schools ________________ _ 15 16 Tot~ _________________ _ 61 63 �4 SLOVAKIA The number of students at the above schools in 1918 was 15,354; and in 1939 - 23,937; but only 20,018 of them were of Slovak origin. As far as the percentage of Slovaks who could not read and write is concerned, the above quoted statement of Prof. Roucek is obviously at odds with the truth. Unfortunately, there are in exile no statistics available aJbout the situation in this regard in Slovakia at the end of the Hungarian rule. But if we take into consideration the fact that according to the official Czech statistics there were in 1930 only 6.8 % inhabitants of Slovak origin who could not read and write and the number of schools was as shown above, it may be safely assumed that in 1919, when the number of schools was nearly the same, the percentage of analphabets could hardly be much different. Logic does not admit any doubt in this regard. At present about 3 % of the inhabitants of Slovakia cannot read and write, which means that Slovakia comes not only before many Central-European countries, but is much ahead of countries like Italy, Spain, etc. II As false at the presentation of Slovakia in the light of illiteracy is also any talk about Slovakia's economic backwardness. After the first World War when the Slovaks and Czechs came together, it was decided ,b y the Czech government that Slovakia must remain an agricultural complement of the Czech lands. Consequently, the rise in the industrial population of Slovakia which 1b egan in the 19th century, when the industrial revolution took hold in Hungary, not only began to slow down, but, according to Macartney, one third of Slovakia's industry was dismantled and destroyed by the Czech banks and industrialists who did not wish to have any competition in Slovakia (7). 1 Despite these anti-Slovak economic measures of the Prague government and Czech industrialists, the majority of Slovakia's population was neither ",pastoral" nor agrarian. According to Czech official statistics the percentage of Slovakia's population which gave their occupation as agriculture was as follows (8) : �SLOVAKIA Year 1900 1921 1930 5 % 63.0 60.6 56.8 Measured by Central-European standards, Slovakia in 1930 was one of the well industrialized countries, since in Poland, ,Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Yugoslavia the percentage of agrarian population at that time was much higher (Poland 69 % , Bulgaria 80 % , Romania 80% , etc.) even according Mr. Roucek's "Central Eastern Europe". Since 1930 the above percentage changed in Slovakia to a considera'ble extent, especially during the years 19391945. Wm. Dia:mond in his book "Czechoslovakia between East and West" - very favorable to the post-war Czechoslovakia and to Czechs writes in this regard: "Slovakia's brief experience as an independent state had a salutary effect on its industry, which expanded in an effort to replace products once obtained from the factories of the Czech lands and, under German pressure, to increase the output of armaments. The esta'blishment of new enteq,rises and the increase in the number of industrial workers raised the importance of Slovak industry in the country as a whole. The industrial ca:pacity of Slovakia increased particularly in metal- and wood-working, mining, textiles, footwear, and food processing" (9). The Czech Minister on Industry described the situation as follows: •~on the whole, it may ,b e said of Slovak industry that its development in the last few years, with the exception of armament production, was, comparatively speaking, quick and sound. It is true that not many new factories have been built, but many of the existing ones have been enlarged and modernized. The most important structural change 'has :b een an increased emphasis on metallurgy, textiles and, to a certain extent, on mining" (10). �6 SLOVAKIA The Communist regime in Slovakia did not stop this development. On the contrary, if we can trust Communist statistics, many new industries have been built in Slovakia and the percentage of the population working in agriculture should be only a,bout 35 % at the .present time. The regime is inhuman, tyrannic and cruel, but it changes the social structure of Slovakia in favor of the industrial "proletariat" not only in order to furnish Russia industrial products, ibut also because of political reasons: a peasant is considered an enemy of Communism. III · While, consciously or unconsciously, American authors present, under the cover of "scientific" works, the Slovak people as a part of the Czech nation and Slovakia as a backward country in order to support the Czech claim to rule over Slovakia, life marks quite different tracks of evolution in the relations between Czechs and Slovaks. "Slovak tradition and economy stand as a barrier between Czechs and Slovaks," writes Wm. Diamond and continues: "So important was the Slovak problem in the minds of both Czech and Slovak leaders, that it was a major subject of study and debate during the war and has continued to be ever since. An effort was made to solve the problem in 194'5 in the Kosice .Programme, in which Czechs and Slovaks are defined as two distinct nations united by common interest in a single state. This is in itself a complete reversal of the ethni~ theory on which the first Repubilc was built: the belief that Czechs and Slovaks constituted a single nation. The Kosice Program further provided that "the Slovaks should :be the masters in their Slovak lands, just as the Czechs in their Czech homeland" and that the government "will regard the Slovak National Council not only as the rightful representative of the individual Slovak nation, but also as the bearer of sovereign right on Slovak territory" (11). The same change as in the political relations between Czechs and Slovaks was ,b rought a;bout in regard to the �S LOVAKIA 7 general level of civilization in Slovakia. Already during the Second World War there was no lack of trained and educateq. officials, professors, lawyers, physicians, etc., but a constderable surplus. When the "Czechoslovak Republic" had been restored against the wishes of the majority of Slovakia's population in 1945 and a bout 5 thousand Slovak intellectuals left the country and other thousands were jailed, deported to Siberia, and confined in concentration camps for alleged collaboration with Nazis, but in fact for their anti-Communism, there was no difficulty to replace them, ·b ecause the trend of civilization and development, which, since the First World War, brought to maturity and self-government about 30 former colonies and mandatory territories, did not stop in Slovakia in order to fulfill the wishes of some Czech politicians who desired to see Slovakia as a backward country and the Slovaks as a part of the Czech nation. Slovakia developed considerably not only economically during its short separation from the Czech lands, but also from the point of view of culture and civilization. This can be seen again in the light of statistics concerning the number of university students during the Czech rule (1918--38) and during the Slovakia's independence (1939-415) ,published by Prof. Stefanek. 1 After 20 years of Czech rule in Slovakia, there were at the University in Bratislava in the schoolyear 1938--39 only 153'5 students of Slovak origin, but this number increased to 4485 in the third year of Slovakia's independence (1942-43), while aibout 500 others studied abroad. Altogether, during the five years of Slovakia's separation from Czechs, 14,965 students studied at the University of Bratislava, which also became an attractive center for foreign students. In the year 1941-42, for instance, there were 518 students from Bulgaria, 120 Czech students, 154 Germans, 106 Russians, 171 Hungarians and many others. As far as the professors were concerned, out of a total of 107 professors, 78 were of Slovak origin, 20 Czechs, 7 Russians, one German, one Italian; the 1'59 assistants and lecturers were all of Slovak origin (12). This is the true face of Slovakia, ,p resented by some 1 �SLOVAKIA 8 American writers and university professors as a backward country of illiteracy and poverty. Do not American students deserve professors and lecturers who respect facts and the truth more objectively and more consistently? (1) J. S. Roucek, Central Eastern Europe, New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1946, p. 353; 2) Dr. Milan Hodza, Federation in Central Europe, London, Jarolds, 1942, pp. 85-94, 104, 131, etc.; 3) Lbidem, p. 354; 4) "Czechoslovakia" edited by R. J. Kerner, University of California Press, Berkeley, Cal. 1949, pp. 184-185; 5) Dr. M. Hodza, op. cit.; 6) Anton Stefanek, Zur Sociographie Der Geistigen Kultur in der Slowakei, Academia Scientiarum et Artiurn Slovaca, Bratislava, 1944, pp. 40'4-405; 7) C. A. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, London, 19·3 7; 8) Annuaire statistique de la Republique Tcheco,Slovaque, 1938, p. 15; 9) William Diamond, Czechoslovakia between East and West, London, Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1947, p. 172; 10) Prumyslovy Vestnik, March 10, 1947, p. 180-1; 11) Ibidem, p. 50; 12) A. Stefanek, op. cit., ·p. 413-15. WHO SAID IT? - "Basically our political program, our political llne, completely agrees with the line and the program of the Slovak Communist Party. Up to the rebellion there really was no difference between an adherent of the Slovak Communist Party and an adherent of the Democratic Party. When did this relationship deteriorate? I t.hink it was after our complete liberation. Well, in general, there can be no taJk about any great deterioration. But I think that if we let ourselves get drunk by our present victory in the elections and if, incidentally, even the effectiveness of the Slovak Communist Party should decrease because of the factual failure in the elections, then we would fall and the communists also would fail. I emphasize that we must mutually help each other and th 'l-t all of us mu.st solve common problems together, because onoe and for all time we must realize that there is no fundamental difference between the Slovak Communist Party and the Democratic Party. Differences have appeared a.nd are appearing, but only In methods." (Dr. Joseph Lettrich, former Chairman of the Slovak Democratic Party and President of the Slovak National Council and now Y.ice-Preeident of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia: "My 46" - No. 23, June 8, 1946 - Prague) . WHO SAID IT? - • • • "The religious cleft (between the Slovaks ana the Czechs) is deep. For the Czechs, Master John Hus was and is not only a religious but essentially a national figure; and, if the nation returned to Catholicism under the pressure of the Counter-Reformation, it is a truism that every Czech is a H ussite at heart - a Hussfte in the wider sense of the term, denoting a blend of somewhat selfassertive nationalism with a "Protestant" attitude towards all authority, social, national, or religious, which is felt to be in any way alien. For the Slovaks, Hussitism was the alien doctrine, Catholicism the natural faith." (C. A. Macartney: HUNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS - London, 1937). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document JULY, 1953 SLOV.AKI.A 1 THE TRUE FACE OF SLOVAK.IA Joseph M. Kirschbaum, M.A., LL.D. There is a peculiar phenomenon in the political and historical works of American or English scholars about Slovakia. With the exception of the British author C. A. Macartney, followed to a certain extent by A. J. D. Taylor and professor Seton-Watson, the Anglo-Saxon history writers an:d -p ublicists show not only a considerable lack of knowledge of historical facts concerning Slovakia, but they serve, probably unconsciously, the aims of imperialistic tendencies of some Central-European ,peoples. For many of them "Slovak is the name given to the easternmost division of the Czech speaking people" (1) and they seem to know nothing about the fact that the Slovaks were among the first Slovanic peoples converted to Christianity and that as early as the ninth century they founded the first Slovanic state, known in history under the name of the Great Moravian Empire (2); they also persistently present Slovakia as a backward agrarian country marked by illiteracy and poverty. This misrepresentation happens especially when comparison is made between Slovaks and, in the Anglo-Saxon world, the very favored Czechs who are, from the linguistic point of view, quite close to the Slovaks, from the cultural and historical standpoint, however, quite different. Or as Wm. Diamond writes: "Slovakia and the Czech lands are two areas speaking quite similar languages but having different histories and political traditions. They have a deep-rooted and intense distrust, sometimes amounting to antipathy, for each other. A thousand years of separat~on, during which ,p olitical and economic development went off on different tracks, were neither forgotten nor overcome after the establishment of the (Czecho-'Slovak) Republic." The line followed by Anglo-Saxon writers when speaking about Slovakia is nearly the same as that expressed in the books of J. S. Roucek (Eastern-Central Europe, crucible of world wars, and Slavonic Encyclopedia) and R. J. Kerner (Czechoslovakia), who as late as 1946-1949 presented Slovakia as follows: SLOVAKIA 1. "In the Slovak province of Czechoslovakia, for instance, as many as 57 per cent could not read and write. The (Czechoslovak) Republic esta:blished middleschool and university education in Slovakia, where it was practically non-existent ,b efore 1918." - J. S. Roucek (3). 2. "Wherea'S 1:Jhe standard of ,] iteracy among the Czechs was high, the •p ercentage of Slovaks who could read and write was very low in 1919. For that reason, many officials, teachers and intellectuals from the Czech regions had to be sent to Slovakia" - Kerner <4). 1 3. The Slovaks are according to Mr. Roucek "simple and pastoral" and in the opinion of Mr. Kerner "the Slovaks remained agriculturists and under a Magyar (that is, Eastern) type of culture." This portrayal of Slovakia i,s so general in the American and English ,p ress that to many people, who are not acquainted with the Slovak past and the actual circm;nstances, it may appear not only probruble ,b ut true. Slovakia has been presented in this light for about 35 years. The world is supposed to 'believe that culture, literacy and civilization were brought into Slovakia only by the Czechs in 1918-19, according to these "scientific revelations", and that Slovakia remained even during the last 30 years predominantly agrarian, pastoral and illiterate. What is the truth? Now, the truth is quite different. After having lost their political independence in the tenth and definitely in the 13th century in favor of the· Hungarians, the Slovaks did not appear in European history as a political factor for many centuries. Germans, Hungarians and Czechs, who in a common effort succeeded to disintegrate the first Slovak State, could not, however, destroy the civilization which had already existed in that country. As a result Slovakia became even under the Hungarian rule a first-rate cultural centre in Ce11tral Europe with a university at Bratislava as early as the 1'5th century and a Catholic university in the 17th century at Trnava (5). SLOVAKIA 3 The culture spread from these universities developed, naturally, not in the 'Slovak, but in the Latin language, a general phenomenon at that time in Central Europe. Nevertheless, it was a culture of the •p opulation of Slovakia which at all times has been predominantly of Slovak origin, and the archives prove that the majority of professors and students was Slovak also. The same rule can be applied to the epoch when, under the influence of nationalism, the Hungarians began to demand the use of the Magyar language instead of the Latin and when expressions of growing national consciousness of the non~Magyar nationalities were answered by an increased attempt at Magyarization. It is true that .Slovak schools were closed by the Hungarian regime in the last decades of the 19th century, and nobody can deny the tendency of Budapest to assimilate the Slovak population. On the other hand, it is false and tendencious to say that Slova:kia before 1918 was a .b ackward and illiterate country and that culture was brought into Slovakia by Czech teachers and intellectuals. If we can measure the cultural level of any country by the number of schools, as it is generally done, then the statistics regarding the number of schools in Slovakia at the end of the Hungarian rule (1918) and at the end of the Czech rule (1939) obviously deny the Czech .propaganda about the illiteracy and the Czech cultural mission in Slovakia. The data pU!blished in this regard by a former member of the Prague government, Prof. A. Stefanek (6) give us the following picture: A) Number of public schools in Slovakia 1917-18 1937-38 Schools administered by church ____ 2723 2487 Schools administered by state _____ 797 1104 Total ________________ 3520 3591 B) Number of high schools in Slovakia 1918-19 1936-37 High schools ____________________ _ 44 46 Teachers' schools ________________ _ 15 16 Tot~ _________________ _ 61 63 4 SLOVAKIA The number of students at the above schools in 1918 was 15,354; and in 1939 - 23,937; but only 20,018 of them were of Slovak origin. As far as the percentage of Slovaks who could not read and write is concerned, the above quoted statement of Prof. Roucek is obviously at odds with the truth. Unfortunately, there are in exile no statistics available aJbout the situation in this regard in Slovakia at the end of the Hungarian rule. But if we take into consideration the fact that according to the official Czech statistics there were in 1930 only 6.8 % inhabitants of Slovak origin who could not read and write and the number of schools was as shown above, it may be safely assumed that in 1919, when the number of schools was nearly the same, the percentage of analphabets could hardly be much different. Logic does not admit any doubt in this regard. At present about 3 % of the inhabitants of Slovakia cannot read and write, which means that Slovakia comes not only before many Central-European countries, but is much ahead of countries like Italy, Spain, etc. II As false at the presentation of Slovakia in the light of illiteracy is also any talk about Slovakia's economic backwardness. After the first World War when the Slovaks and Czechs came together, it was decided ,b y the Czech government that Slovakia must remain an agricultural complement of the Czech lands. Consequently, the rise in the industrial population of Slovakia which 1b egan in the 19th century, when the industrial revolution took hold in Hungary, not only began to slow down, but, according to Macartney, one third of Slovakia's industry was dismantled and destroyed by the Czech banks and industrialists who did not wish to have any competition in Slovakia (7). 1 Despite these anti-Slovak economic measures of the Prague government and Czech industrialists, the majority of Slovakia's population was neither ",pastoral" nor agrarian. According to Czech official statistics the percentage of Slovakia's population which gave their occupation as agriculture was as follows (8) : SLOVAKIA Year 1900 1921 1930 5 % 63.0 60.6 56.8 Measured by Central-European standards, Slovakia in 1930 was one of the well industrialized countries, since in Poland, ,Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Yugoslavia the percentage of agrarian population at that time was much higher (Poland 69 % , Bulgaria 80 % , Romania 80% , etc.) even according Mr. Roucek's "Central Eastern Europe". Since 1930 the above percentage changed in Slovakia to a considera'ble extent, especially during the years 19391945. Wm. Dia:mond in his book "Czechoslovakia between East and West" - very favorable to the post-war Czechoslovakia and to Czechs writes in this regard: "Slovakia's brief experience as an independent state had a salutary effect on its industry, which expanded in an effort to replace products once obtained from the factories of the Czech lands and, under German pressure, to increase the output of armaments. The esta'blishment of new enteq,rises and the increase in the number of industrial workers raised the importance of Slovak industry in the country as a whole. The industrial ca:pacity of Slovakia increased particularly in metal- and wood-working, mining, textiles, footwear, and food processing" (9). The Czech Minister on Industry described the situation as follows: •~on the whole, it may ,b e said of Slovak industry that its development in the last few years, with the exception of armament production, was, comparatively speaking, quick and sound. It is true that not many new factories have been built, but many of the existing ones have been enlarged and modernized. The most important structural change 'has :b een an increased emphasis on metallurgy, textiles and, to a certain extent, on mining" (10). 6 SLOVAKIA The Communist regime in Slovakia did not stop this development. On the contrary, if we can trust Communist statistics, many new industries have been built in Slovakia and the percentage of the population working in agriculture should be only a,bout 35 % at the .present time. The regime is inhuman, tyrannic and cruel, but it changes the social structure of Slovakia in favor of the industrial "proletariat" not only in order to furnish Russia industrial products, ibut also because of political reasons: a peasant is considered an enemy of Communism. III · While, consciously or unconsciously, American authors present, under the cover of "scientific" works, the Slovak people as a part of the Czech nation and Slovakia as a backward country in order to support the Czech claim to rule over Slovakia, life marks quite different tracks of evolution in the relations between Czechs and Slovaks. "Slovak tradition and economy stand as a barrier between Czechs and Slovaks," writes Wm. Diamond and continues: "So important was the Slovak problem in the minds of both Czech and Slovak leaders, that it was a major subject of study and debate during the war and has continued to be ever since. An effort was made to solve the problem in 194'5 in the Kosice .Programme, in which Czechs and Slovaks are defined as two distinct nations united by common interest in a single state. This is in itself a complete reversal of the ethni~ theory on which the first Repubilc was built: the belief that Czechs and Slovaks constituted a single nation. The Kosice Program further provided that "the Slovaks should :be the masters in their Slovak lands, just as the Czechs in their Czech homeland" and that the government "will regard the Slovak National Council not only as the rightful representative of the individual Slovak nation, but also as the bearer of sovereign right on Slovak territory" (11). The same change as in the political relations between Czechs and Slovaks was ,b rought a;bout in regard to the S LOVAKIA 7 general level of civilization in Slovakia. Already during the Second World War there was no lack of trained and educateq. officials, professors, lawyers, physicians, etc., but a constderable surplus. When the "Czechoslovak Republic" had been restored against the wishes of the majority of Slovakia's population in 1945 and a bout 5 thousand Slovak intellectuals left the country and other thousands were jailed, deported to Siberia, and confined in concentration camps for alleged collaboration with Nazis, but in fact for their anti-Communism, there was no difficulty to replace them, ·b ecause the trend of civilization and development, which, since the First World War, brought to maturity and self-government about 30 former colonies and mandatory territories, did not stop in Slovakia in order to fulfill the wishes of some Czech politicians who desired to see Slovakia as a backward country and the Slovaks as a part of the Czech nation. Slovakia developed considerably not only economically during its short separation from the Czech lands, but also from the point of view of culture and civilization. This can be seen again in the light of statistics concerning the number of university students during the Czech rule (1918--38) and during the Slovakia's independence (1939-415) ,published by Prof. Stefanek. 1 After 20 years of Czech rule in Slovakia, there were at the University in Bratislava in the schoolyear 1938--39 only 153'5 students of Slovak origin, but this number increased to 4485 in the third year of Slovakia's independence (1942-43), while aibout 500 others studied abroad. Altogether, during the five years of Slovakia's separation from Czechs, 14,965 students studied at the University of Bratislava, which also became an attractive center for foreign students. In the year 1941-42, for instance, there were 518 students from Bulgaria, 120 Czech students, 154 Germans, 106 Russians, 171 Hungarians and many others. As far as the professors were concerned, out of a total of 107 professors, 78 were of Slovak origin, 20 Czechs, 7 Russians, one German, one Italian; the 1'59 assistants and lecturers were all of Slovak origin (12). This is the true face of Slovakia, ,p resented by some 1 SLOVAKIA 8 American writers and university professors as a backward country of illiteracy and poverty. Do not American students deserve professors and lecturers who respect facts and the truth more objectively and more consistently? (1) J. S. Roucek, Central Eastern Europe, New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1946, p. 353; 2) Dr. Milan Hodza, Federation in Central Europe, London, Jarolds, 1942, pp. 85-94, 104, 131, etc.; 3) Lbidem, p. 354; 4) "Czechoslovakia" edited by R. J. Kerner, University of California Press, Berkeley, Cal. 1949, pp. 184-185; 5) Dr. M. Hodza, op. cit.; 6) Anton Stefanek, Zur Sociographie Der Geistigen Kultur in der Slowakei, Academia Scientiarum et Artiurn Slovaca, Bratislava, 1944, pp. 40'4-405; 7) C. A. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, London, 19·3 7; 8) Annuaire statistique de la Republique Tcheco,Slovaque, 1938, p. 15; 9) William Diamond, Czechoslovakia between East and West, London, Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1947, p. 172; 10) Prumyslovy Vestnik, March 10, 1947, p. 180-1; 11) Ibidem, p. 50; 12) A. Stefanek, op. cit., ·p. 413-15. WHO SAID IT? - "Basically our political program, our political llne, completely agrees with the line and the program of the Slovak Communist Party. Up to the rebellion there really was no difference between an adherent of the Slovak Communist Party and an adherent of the Democratic Party. When did this relationship deteriorate? I t.hink it was after our complete liberation. Well, in general, there can be no taJk about any great deterioration. But I think that if we let ourselves get drunk by our present victory in the elections and if, incidentally, even the effectiveness of the Slovak Communist Party should decrease because of the factual failure in the elections, then we would fall and the communists also would fail. I emphasize that we must mutually help each other and th 'l-t all of us mu.st solve common problems together, because onoe and for all time we must realize that there is no fundamental difference between the Slovak Communist Party and the Democratic Party. Differences have appeared a.nd are appearing, but only In methods." (Dr. Joseph Lettrich, former Chairman of the Slovak Democratic Party and President of the Slovak National Council and now Y.ice-Preeident of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia: "My 46" - No. 23, June 8, 1946 - Prague) . WHO SAID IT? - • • • "The religious cleft (between the Slovaks ana the Czechs) is deep. For the Czechs, Master John Hus was and is not only a religious but essentially a national figure; and, if the nation returned to Catholicism under the pressure of the Counter-Reformation, it is a truism that every Czech is a H ussite at heart - a Hussfte in the wider sense of the term, denoting a blend of somewhat selfassertive nationalism with a "Protestant" attitude towards all authority, social, national, or religious, which is felt to be in any way alien. For the Slovaks, Hussitism was the alien doctrine, Catholicism the natural faith." (C. A. Macartney: HUNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS - London, 1937).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The True Face of Slovakia Description An account of the resource Joseph Kirschbaum, M. A., LL. D. Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 2 (7), July 1953 pp. 1-8 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource July 1953 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/4de0f9b3f07a1d48924005bb08767f0b.pdf 3fb70797b3aaf1a050b830587ab19be9 PDF Text Text 46 SLOVAKIA COULD CZECHS AND SLOVAKS AGREE? Joseph Kirschbaum, M. A., LL. D. In his schol,a rly work "The HaJbsburrg Monare'hy," the emment English historian A. J. P. Taylor, writing in regard to O.rech tenden:cies to assimilate the SIJ.ovak people and to dommate 'Slovakia, stated that the Ozechs overlooked the fact that the age of national amal gama<tion was over and, therefore, ".the Czech could outplay the Slovaks; .they could not satisfy them." According to Mr. Ta:yJor: "Masaryk revived the radical idea of 1848 and · proposed to create a sing;le 'Oreclloslovak' nation 1by will power. Masaryk knew little of ·t he Slovaks; others knew even less This was his strength in dealing 'with the al1ied leaders; it ,c ould not solve the Slovak rproiblem. Masaryk had hoped thaJt the Czechs ,amd the Slovaks would come together as the English and the Scotch had done ; the Slovaks tUTned out to lbe the Irish." 1 Just recenUy I quoted this statement of Mr. Taylor's whi:le converaing with a representative of American politics. My interilocutor said nothing a/bout 1t, but asked whether the Czechs ·t hemselves ,t hought along .those lines. "Not all Czechs," I replied; "however, I do not think that would or could alter the fact ,s tated by Taylor." In reality, even though Taylor notes olbjectively the development of the relationship between the Czechs and the Slova,ks, the leadershi1p of the Czech exile obstinately refuses to see this historic aotuality and dr.aw from i,t the logical ·c onclusion. Still imbued with imperialistic ideas, certain Ozeoh exiles continue to foHow the illusions of the hrupless past which can never return. IDven today they are ,n ot interested in a federated Ozecho-Slova'kia, but are dreaJining of forcing the Slovaks once a,gain into a political system which came into .b eing with the Constitution orf 1920, the 1preamlble of which begins wiith the words "We the Ozechoslcwak nation." That Constitution was �46 SLOV.AKJA authored. iby the Czechs without Slovak participation. Of course, the P•r ague Government, headed by T. G. Masaryik, saw to it that the Slovaks had a voice in it: it 8JPpointed. such genuine S1oivaks Hke Dr. Edward Benes and Alice Masaryk (lboth Ozechs ! ) to represent the Slovak nation on the committee on the constitution! On the other ,hand, these Ozech emigrants forget the "imponderalbilia," such as the faict that their names inevita'bly evoke in the Slovaks not only bjtter reminiscences of the twenty-yeaT-o ld centralism, but aJso the phantom orf the galllQlws, concenJtration ca:mps, deportations, murders and the destruction of properties of thousands of Slovak families after the re-establishm ent of Crecho-Slova1kia in 1945. Ail this is connected with the names of Rvpka, Peroutka, Zen1kl, Prochazka and the political parties which the Czech emigrants in the "Ootmcil of Free Czeichoslovalkia" represent. For every selt--consoious Slovaik, therefore, it i:s an insult when these Ozech emigraints thinik that the Slovak nation could agree wiith their political conceptions, or thaJt it could recognruze a representati'On of people with an antliS1ovaik record such as has practically every representative of the "Council of Free Czechoslovak ia." They definitely do 111ot represent the will of the Sllovak nation, and when the representative s of the "Council orf Free Ozechoslova:kia" pretend ,t hat they do, they are only deceiving the international pUlblic. 'Dhe mandate given them in the shadow of the gallows and under the threat of Russian bayonets for services rendered to CommUiliist expansion has long lost its validity. Does this mean that every understanding and cooperation between the Czechs and Slovaks in exile and between the Czeicih nation and the Slovak nation is excluded a priori after liberation? It does not. The Slovaik nation and its representa•ti<ves in exile are suffi•cient:Jly aware of the fact that the fig,ht against Communism and, later, the destiny of Central Eu.Tope require the understanding and cooperation of all the Central- �47 European nations. That is why the Slovaks are for an understand ing in Cent:r,al Europe. At the same time, however, it is clear to the Sfovruks that a new organizatio n of Central Europe must lbe built on realities whi'ch respect historical rea,litJies and geopolitica l laws, and !Ilot on the im1perialisti'c dreams of the emigrants in the "Council of Free Ozechoslov iakia." Therefore, the Slovaks are conrvinced tha;t cooperation with the Czech emigrants of the Council cannat be considered in the interest of a better future of Central Europe. This has already become dear even to severaJl individuals of the Czech exile. Unfortll!Ilat ely, their numlber is small, but they are pohtically sober and in.Jt:ella!tually strong. Professor Dr. Bohdian Ohuddba is the foremost among them. He has ithe oourage not only to see the problems of Europe in their right perspective , 'b ut also to •p ersistently propa;gate a;nd defend his truth against all the hatred of his own countryme n in exile. lt is self-eviden t to Dr. Chudoba that "just as a hundred years ago, so even today aH Central-IDu,r opean nations, including the Sudeten Geimans, want to have their own properties and their own administrat ions." Therefore, says Chudolba altogetiher correctly, Czech politics will either "concur with this reality and so also have chance to say somet!hing alb.o ut it, or ~lse it will continue in the captivity of imperialisti c dreams, which can be nothing else ,b ut an ephemeral chapter in Czech ,h istory, and then reality will develop without the Czechs exactly as it did during MUilli.ch" (ROZPRAV Y, Rome, Vol. IV, No. 1). In practical ,politics, for Dr. Chuddba this means: 1. A new Central European order must have the full assent of Germany right from the beginning, because otherwise it would not be real ; 2. the Czechs must resolrve the question of the Sudeten Germans as quickly as ;possible; 3. the Czechs must come to an agreement, just as quiokly a,s possible, with the Slovaks so that they could have at least one friend in Central . Europe. Undoll!bted ly no one will object to Chudoba's views, a t least no one who is realJy interested in estaiblishin g a �SLOVAKIA 48 reaJ, permanent peace in Central Europe, and not a new, dangerous, provisional condition. Conversei,y, such an outlook on CentraJ-Eu:rop ean problems must be truken as an indication that not onlry sensilble talks •w ould be possible with the younger Czech generation, but even a sober cooperatio1I1 couft.d be ef.fected with it on the ibasi.s of "suum cuique." Of course, in ,p ractical politics further development will depend on how mainy Czooh ipo1iticians will haive :bhe ooura;ge to fiace realities and also adrupt political acts to reality. Im the last amailysis, whether Ozecih politics will be governed by the spirit of mpka and Zen'kl, or by the spirit of the views fomrnfated lby Chudo!ba, on this will depend the relationship 1between the Ozechs amd ,t he Slov,a ks. Today, ail.ong with Communiism, the Czech exihle amd espedaUy the "Council oif Free Cze~hoslovaki,a" is the greatest enemy of the SlovaJks. The incontrover:t~ble fact is the Ozechs are the only nation on earth fighting a:gainst the freedom and ,independenice of Slovaks. • • • WHO SAID IT? "WE ARE THE ALLIES OF THE SOVIET UNION A.ND SHALL REMAIN FAITHFUL TO THAT ALLIANCE. We are friends of the Western Allies, we shall maintain our friendship towards them and will do our loyal best to retain their friendship and we shall sincerely (Dr. Bene!, Message to the pursue A NEW SLAVONIC Policy." Provisional N'a.tional Assembly, Prague, Oct. 28. 1945) . • • • • • • "There are some individuals who assert that we are in the hands of the Soviets, yet the governments look upon us In a different way. WE ARE ALLIES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND WE SHALL ALWAYS REMAIN FAITHFUL TO THE SOVIETS. We are friends of the west, and we shall remain SUCH friends. In the form of our alliance with the Soviet Union we proceed and we shall proceed IN OUR OWN WAY." - (Dr. Bene!§ Statement to the Praesidium of the Slovak National Council, Prague, 0-ot. 9. 1945) . "But I say quite openly that the path which Soviet Russia took after the last war Is not the one which will be followed in Czechoslovakia. Our conditions are completely different from every point of view, and we shall not abandon our old method of evolutionary adaptation and our old policy of ba.Jance between the east and the west. Our geographical position does not permit us to change thl1 (Dr. Benes , Foreign Affairs, New century-old policy violently." York , Oct. 1944). � 46 SLOVAKIA COULD CZECHS AND SLOVAKS AGREE? Joseph Kirschbaum, M. A., LL. D. In his schol,a rly work "The HaJbsburrg Monare'hy," the emment English historian A. J. P. Taylor, writing in regard to O.rech tenden:cies to assimilate the SIJ.ovak people and to dommate 'Slovakia, stated that the Ozechs overlooked the fact that the age of national amal gama<tion was over and, therefore, ".the Czech could outplay the Slovaks; .they could not satisfy them." According to Mr. Ta:yJor: "Masaryk revived the radical idea of 1848 and · proposed to create a sing;le 'Oreclloslovak' nation 1by will power. Masaryk knew little of ·t he Slovaks; others knew even less This was his strength in dealing 'with the al1ied leaders; it ,c ould not solve the Slovak rproiblem. Masaryk had hoped thaJt the Czechs ,amd the Slovaks would come together as the English and the Scotch had done ; the Slovaks tUTned out to lbe the Irish." 1 Just recenUy I quoted this statement of Mr. Taylor's whi:le converaing with a representative of American politics. My interilocutor said nothing a/bout 1t, but asked whether the Czechs ·t hemselves ,t hought along .those lines. "Not all Czechs," I replied; "however, I do not think that would or could alter the fact ,s tated by Taylor." In reality, even though Taylor notes olbjectively the development of the relationship between the Czechs and the Slova,ks, the leadershi1p of the Czech exile obstinately refuses to see this historic aotuality and dr.aw from i,t the logical ·c onclusion. Still imbued with imperialistic ideas, certain Ozeoh exiles continue to foHow the illusions of the hrupless past which can never return. IDven today they are ,n ot interested in a federated Ozecho-Slova'kia, but are dreaJining of forcing the Slovaks once a,gain into a political system which came into .b eing with the Constitution orf 1920, the 1preamlble of which begins wiith the words "We the Ozechoslcwak nation." That Constitution was �46 SLOV.AKJA authored. iby the Czechs without Slovak participation. Of course, the P•r ague Government, headed by T. G. Masaryik, saw to it that the Slovaks had a voice in it: it 8JPpointed. such genuine S1oivaks Hke Dr. Edward Benes and Alice Masaryk (lboth Ozechs ! ) to represent the Slovak nation on the committee on the constitution! On the other ,hand, these Ozech emigrants forget the "imponderalbilia," such as the faict that their names inevita'bly evoke in the Slovaks not only bjtter reminiscences of the twenty-yeaT-o ld centralism, but aJso the phantom orf the galllQlws, concenJtration ca:mps, deportations, murders and the destruction of properties of thousands of Slovak families after the re-establishm ent of Crecho-Slova1kia in 1945. Ail this is connected with the names of Rvpka, Peroutka, Zen1kl, Prochazka and the political parties which the Czech emigrants in the "Ootmcil of Free Czeichoslovalkia" represent. For every selt--consoious Slovaik, therefore, it i:s an insult when these Ozech emigraints thinik that the Slovak nation could agree wiith their political conceptions, or thaJt it could recognruze a representati'On of people with an antliS1ovaik record such as has practically every representative of the "Council of Free Czechoslovak ia." They definitely do 111ot represent the will of the Sllovak nation, and when the representative s of the "Council orf Free Ozechoslova:kia" pretend ,t hat they do, they are only deceiving the international pUlblic. 'Dhe mandate given them in the shadow of the gallows and under the threat of Russian bayonets for services rendered to CommUiliist expansion has long lost its validity. Does this mean that every understanding and cooperation between the Czechs and Slovaks in exile and between the Czeicih nation and the Slovak nation is excluded a priori after liberation? It does not. The Slovaik nation and its representa•ti<ves in exile are suffi•cient:Jly aware of the fact that the fig,ht against Communism and, later, the destiny of Central Eu.Tope require the understanding and cooperation of all the Central- �47 European nations. That is why the Slovaks are for an understand ing in Cent:r,al Europe. At the same time, however, it is clear to the Sfovruks that a new organizatio n of Central Europe must lbe built on realities whi'ch respect historical rea,litJies and geopolitica l laws, and !Ilot on the im1perialisti'c dreams of the emigrants in the "Council of Free Ozechoslov iakia." Therefore, the Slovaks are conrvinced tha;t cooperation with the Czech emigrants of the Council cannat be considered in the interest of a better future of Central Europe. This has already become dear even to severaJl individuals of the Czech exile. Unfortll!Ilat ely, their numlber is small, but they are pohtically sober and in.Jt:ella!tually strong. Professor Dr. Bohdian Ohuddba is the foremost among them. He has ithe oourage not only to see the problems of Europe in their right perspective , 'b ut also to •p ersistently propa;gate a;nd defend his truth against all the hatred of his own countryme n in exile. lt is self-eviden t to Dr. Chudoba that "just as a hundred years ago, so even today aH Central-IDu,r opean nations, including the Sudeten Geimans, want to have their own properties and their own administrat ions." Therefore, says Chudolba altogetiher correctly, Czech politics will either "concur with this reality and so also have chance to say somet!hing alb.o ut it, or ~lse it will continue in the captivity of imperialisti c dreams, which can be nothing else ,b ut an ephemeral chapter in Czech ,h istory, and then reality will develop without the Czechs exactly as it did during MUilli.ch" (ROZPRAV Y, Rome, Vol. IV, No. 1). In practical ,politics, for Dr. Chuddba this means: 1. A new Central European order must have the full assent of Germany right from the beginning, because otherwise it would not be real ; 2. the Czechs must resolrve the question of the Sudeten Germans as quickly as ;possible; 3. the Czechs must come to an agreement, just as quiokly a,s possible, with the Slovaks so that they could have at least one friend in Central . Europe. Undoll!bted ly no one will object to Chudoba's views, a t least no one who is realJy interested in estaiblishin g a �SLOVAKIA 48 reaJ, permanent peace in Central Europe, and not a new, dangerous, provisional condition. Conversei,y, such an outlook on CentraJ-Eu:rop ean problems must be truken as an indication that not onlry sensilble talks •w ould be possible with the younger Czech generation, but even a sober cooperatio1I1 couft.d be ef.fected with it on the ibasi.s of "suum cuique." Of course, in ,p ractical politics further development will depend on how mainy Czooh ipo1iticians will haive :bhe ooura;ge to fiace realities and also adrupt political acts to reality. Im the last amailysis, whether Ozecih politics will be governed by the spirit of mpka and Zen'kl, or by the spirit of the views fomrnfated lby Chudo!ba, on this will depend the relationship 1between the Ozechs amd ,t he Slov,a ks. Today, ail.ong with Communiism, the Czech exihle amd espedaUy the "Council oif Free Cze~hoslovaki,a" is the greatest enemy of the SlovaJks. The incontrover:t~ble fact is the Ozechs are the only nation on earth fighting a:gainst the freedom and ,independenice of Slovaks. • • • WHO SAID IT? "WE ARE THE ALLIES OF THE SOVIET UNION A.ND SHALL REMAIN FAITHFUL TO THAT ALLIANCE. We are friends of the Western Allies, we shall maintain our friendship towards them and will do our loyal best to retain their friendship and we shall sincerely (Dr. Bene!, Message to the pursue A NEW SLAVONIC Policy." Provisional N'a.tional Assembly, Prague, Oct. 28. 1945) . • • • • • • "There are some individuals who assert that we are in the hands of the Soviets, yet the governments look upon us In a different way. WE ARE ALLIES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND WE SHALL ALWAYS REMAIN FAITHFUL TO THE SOVIETS. We are friends of the west, and we shall remain SUCH friends. In the form of our alliance with the Soviet Union we proceed and we shall proceed IN OUR OWN WAY." - (Dr. Bene!§ Statement to the Praesidium of the Slovak National Council, Prague, 0-ot. 9. 1945) . "But I say quite openly that the path which Soviet Russia took after the last war Is not the one which will be followed in Czechoslovakia. Our conditions are completely different from every point of view, and we shall not abandon our old method of evolutionary adaptation and our old policy of ba.Jance between the east and the west. Our geographical position does not permit us to change thl1 (Dr. Benes , Foreign Affairs, New century-old policy violently." York , Oct. 1944). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 45 SLOVAKIA COULD CZECHS AND SLOVAKS AGREE? Joseph Kirschbaum, M. A., LL. D. In his schol,a rly work "The HaJbsburrg Monare'hy," the emment English historian A. J. P. Taylor, writing in regard to O.rech tenden:cies to assimilate the SIJ.ovak people and to dommate 'Slovakia, stated that the Ozechs overlooked the fact that the age of national amal gama<tion was over and, therefore, ".the Czech could outplay the Slovaks; .they could not satisfy them." According to Mr. Ta:yJor: "Masaryk revived the radical idea of 1848 and · proposed to create a sing;le 'Oreclloslovak' nation 1by will power. Masaryk knew little of ·t he Slovaks; others knew even less This was his strength in dealing 'with the al1ied leaders; it ,c ould not solve the Slovak rproiblem. Masaryk had hoped thaJt the Czechs ,amd the Slovaks would come together as the English and the Scotch had done ; the Slovaks tUTned out to lbe the Irish." 1 Just recenUy I quoted this statement of Mr. Taylor's whi:le converaing with a representative of American politics. My interilocutor said nothing a/bout 1t, but asked whether the Czechs ·t hemselves ,t hought along .those lines. "Not all Czechs," I replied; "however, I do not think that would or could alter the fact ,s tated by Taylor." In reality, even though Taylor notes olbjectively the development of the relationship between the Czechs and the Slova,ks, the leadershi1p of the Czech exile obstinately refuses to see this historic aotuality and dr.aw from i,t the logical ·c onclusion. Still imbued with imperialistic ideas, certain Ozeoh exiles continue to foHow the illusions of the hrupless past which can never return. IDven today they are ,n ot interested in a federated Ozecho-Slova'kia, but are dreaJining of forcing the Slovaks once a,gain into a political system which came into .b eing with the Constitution orf 1920, the 1preamlble of which begins wiith the words "We the Ozechoslcwak nation." That Constitution was 46 SLOV.AKJA authored. iby the Czechs without Slovak participation. Of course, the P•r ague Government, headed by T. G. Masaryik, saw to it that the Slovaks had a voice in it: it 8JPpointed. such genuine S1oivaks Hke Dr. Edward Benes and Alice Masaryk (lboth Ozechs ! ) to represent the Slovak nation on the committee on the constitution! On the other ,hand, these Ozech emigrants forget the "imponderalbilia," such as the faict that their names inevita'bly evoke in the Slovaks not only bjtter reminiscences of the twenty-yeaT-o ld centralism, but aJso the phantom orf the galllQlws, concenJtration ca:mps, deportations, murders and the destruction of properties of thousands of Slovak families after the re-establishm ent of Crecho-Slova1kia in 1945. Ail this is connected with the names of Rvpka, Peroutka, Zen1kl, Prochazka and the political parties which the Czech emigrants in the "Ootmcil of Free Czeichoslovalkia" represent. For every selt--consoious Slovaik, therefore, it i:s an insult when these Ozech emigraints thinik that the Slovak nation could agree wiith their political conceptions, or thaJt it could recognruze a representati'On of people with an antliS1ovaik record such as has practically every representative of the "Council of Free Czechoslovak ia." They definitely do 111ot represent the will of the Sllovak nation, and when the representative s of the "Council orf Free Ozechoslova:kia" pretend ,t hat they do, they are only deceiving the international pUlblic. 'Dhe mandate given them in the shadow of the gallows and under the threat of Russian bayonets for services rendered to CommUiliist expansion has long lost its validity. Does this mean that every understanding and cooperation between the Czechs and Slovaks in exile and between the Czeicih nation and the Slovak nation is excluded a priori after liberation? It does not. The Slovaik nation and its representa•ti<ves in exile are suffi•cient:Jly aware of the fact that the fig,ht against Communism and, later, the destiny of Central Eu.Tope require the understanding and cooperation of all the Central- 47 European nations. That is why the Slovaks are for an understand ing in Cent:r,al Europe. At the same time, however, it is clear to the Sfovruks that a new organizatio n of Central Europe must lbe built on realities whi'ch respect historical rea,litJies and geopolitica l laws, and !Ilot on the im1perialisti'c dreams of the emigrants in the "Council of Free Ozechoslov iakia." Therefore, the Slovaks are conrvinced tha;t cooperation with the Czech emigrants of the Council cannat be considered in the interest of a better future of Central Europe. This has already become dear even to severaJl individuals of the Czech exile. Unfortll!Ilat ely, their numlber is small, but they are pohtically sober and in.Jt:ella!tually strong. Professor Dr. Bohdian Ohuddba is the foremost among them. He has ithe oourage not only to see the problems of Europe in their right perspective , 'b ut also to •p ersistently propa;gate a;nd defend his truth against all the hatred of his own countryme n in exile. lt is self-eviden t to Dr. Chudoba that "just as a hundred years ago, so even today aH Central-IDu,r opean nations, including the Sudeten Geimans, want to have their own properties and their own administrat ions." Therefore, says Chudolba altogetiher correctly, Czech politics will either "concur with this reality and so also have chance to say somet!hing alb.o ut it, or ~lse it will continue in the captivity of imperialisti c dreams, which can be nothing else ,b ut an ephemeral chapter in Czech ,h istory, and then reality will develop without the Czechs exactly as it did during MUilli.ch" (ROZPRAV Y, Rome, Vol. IV, No. 1). In practical ,politics, for Dr. Chuddba this means: 1. A new Central European order must have the full assent of Germany right from the beginning, because otherwise it would not be real ; 2. the Czechs must resolrve the question of the Sudeten Germans as quickly as ;possible; 3. the Czechs must come to an agreement, just as quiokly a,s possible, with the Slovaks so that they could have at least one friend in Central . Europe. Undoll!bted ly no one will object to Chudoba's views, a t least no one who is realJy interested in estaiblishin g a SLOVAKIA 48 reaJ, permanent peace in Central Europe, and not a new, dangerous, provisional condition. Conversei,y, such an outlook on CentraJ-Eu:rop ean problems must be truken as an indication that not onlry sensilble talks •w ould be possible with the younger Czech generation, but even a sober cooperatio1I1 couft.d be ef.fected with it on the ibasi.s of "suum cuique." Of course, in ,p ractical politics further development will depend on how mainy Czooh ipo1iticians will haive :bhe ooura;ge to fiace realities and also adrupt political acts to reality. Im the last amailysis, whether Ozecih politics will be governed by the spirit of mpka and Zen'kl, or by the spirit of the views fomrnfated lby Chudo!ba, on this will depend the relationship 1between the Ozechs amd ,t he Slov,a ks. Today, ail.ong with Communiism, the Czech exihle amd espedaUy the "Council oif Free Cze~hoslovaki,a" is the greatest enemy of the SlovaJks. The incontrover:t~ble fact is the Ozechs are the only nation on earth fighting a:gainst the freedom and ,independenice of Slovaks. • • • WHO SAID IT? "WE ARE THE ALLIES OF THE SOVIET UNION A.ND SHALL REMAIN FAITHFUL TO THAT ALLIANCE. We are friends of the Western Allies, we shall maintain our friendship towards them and will do our loyal best to retain their friendship and we shall sincerely (Dr. Bene!, Message to the pursue A NEW SLAVONIC Policy." Provisional N'a.tional Assembly, Prague, Oct. 28. 1945) . • • • • • • "There are some individuals who assert that we are in the hands of the Soviets, yet the governments look upon us In a different way. WE ARE ALLIES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND WE SHALL ALWAYS REMAIN FAITHFUL TO THE SOVIETS. We are friends of the west, and we shall remain SUCH friends. In the form of our alliance with the Soviet Union we proceed and we shall proceed IN OUR OWN WAY." - (Dr. Bene!§ Statement to the Praesidium of the Slovak National Council, Prague, 0-ot. 9. 1945) . "But I say quite openly that the path which Soviet Russia took after the last war Is not the one which will be followed in Czechoslovakia. Our conditions are completely different from every point of view, and we shall not abandon our old method of evolutionary adaptation and our old policy of ba.Jance between the east and the west. Our geographical position does not permit us to change thl1 (Dr. Benes , Foreign Affairs, New century-old policy violently." York , Oct. 1944).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Could Czechs and Slovaks Agree? Description An account of the resource Joseph Kirschbaum, M. A., LL. D. Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 1 (6), April 1953 pp. 45-48 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource April 1953 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/246aaecc7fbdb68855219d458968dfc3.pdf 71517e9c2056577c91057c7e3f1fd7af PDF Text Text APRIL, 1953 SLOVAKIA 1 SLOVAKIA AND CENTRAL-EUROPEAN FEDERATION PLANS Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum Slovrukia with its three and a haJrf million inhiaJbitants and area 45,000 square kilometers lies in the very heart of Central EUTope and its fate in the ,past has been most bitter. After losing their first State, Great Moravia, which during the reign oif King svatopluk included a part of today's Poland, Hmgary, Yugoslavia and for a short time even the Czech lands (1), the SlovaJks as a political factor could not validate themselves in CentraJl Europe for whole centuries. The leading Sloivak group shed its blood first in battles with the Ge:rmians and Magyars and, later, also in battles with the Tu:rks and Tartars. And still later it suffered under tthe pressure of the assimilatory tendencies of the Magyars, which ilrl it.he 19th century and the 1b eginn. ing of this century re8iChed the broadest masses of Slovaks and ruppreciaJbly reduced the growth of the Slovak nation . The Slovaks, who already in 830 had theiT own sta:te and chUI1Ch or,ganization and tthus placed the first foundations of European civili Z8Jtion in the Danube area (2), ap pear more clearly on the ipolitica:l scene again only in 1848, when they rebelled to regain their national independenct>. Decimated and .pushed into the mountains of the north eastern part of their first State, the Great Moravii.8Jl1 Empire, the Slov,a ks were more a cutural than politioo.l factor , up to the 18th century. "During the 17th century," wrote Dr. Milan Hodza, "when the Turks had occupied •all the rest oif old Hungary, Slovakia became the refoge of many lofty intellectual ef forts on behalif of that country. For some time to come_ 1 . 1) Dr. Francis Hrusovsky, GESCHICHTE DER S-LOWAKEI, · pp. 9-15; Julius Pauler, A MAGYARNEMZET TORTJ!JNETE SZENT ISTVAN!G; Dr. Joseph ~kult~ty, ORTY ZO SLOVENSKEJ MINU• LOSTI, p. 13 ; Dr. Milan Hodza, FEDERATION IN CEN'mlAL EUROPE, p . 86; AL'Phoise Huber, GESCHICHTE OESTERREICHE, Vol. 1. 2) Dr. Milan Hodza, FEDERATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE, p. 86. �SLOVAKIA 2 in Slovaikia, there was much morn cultural mo;vement than in Bohemia or occupied Hungacy. At the end of the eighteenth century Slovakia prepared not only her racial rebirth. Trnaiva, which housed the Catholic University before it was tra:nsferred to Budaipest, became a centre of Catholic culture in the realm. Slova!kia was going to be the seat of the first serious democratic movement which had its raimifications in the whole of Hungary and which ended in a conspiracy directed against HaJbSlburg, and Slovakia revealed itselif as a meeting place of prructi:cally all contemporary currents of cultural and ipo>litica;l ideas. (3). After 1848, on the one side under the independence and politfrcal equality of a11 nations, and on the other side under the increasing pressure of assimilaitory Magyar policy, the Slova:k nation beg8;Jl a systematic fight for its polibcal riights. After the Slovak armed revolt of 1848 failed, the Slova!ks within the Hrubsburg monarchy dared to demand an individual self-administr ative unit, such as the Croaits demanded through Ostrozinsky, the Czechs through Pala cky, the Magyars, after Kossuth's revolution was squelched, through DeaJk. This was .p roposed also by Count Valerian Krasinski in his work "Panslavi.sm and Bangernnanism . " What the Slovaks really demanded was a federative solution. The Slovaks remained faithful to the idea of a fede rative solution of the Monarchy in the memorandum , pre sented to the Emperor in 1861, and aigailll at the Conigress of Na:tionaHties in Budrupest in 1867. At the second Congress of Nationa1ities, which took plruce August 10, 1895, in Budaipes't, despite ,persecutions, "the Rumanians, Serbs and Slova:ks, who assemlbled in Buda.pest, "wrote the Neue Freie Presse," dernand ,t he division of Hungary into ethnic self-administra iti;ve units, whreh in effect is equall to the demand to aJbol:ish the un.ion between Hungary and Tr.ainsylviania, to renew the Serbian Duchy and create a selfadmini,s trati:ve Slova:kia, suoh as Huriban (,leader of the 1 1 3) Dr. Mil an Hod za, IBIDEM, pp.208- 213. �SLOVAKIA 3 1848 Slo'Vak rebellion - Author) promoted already thi•r ty years earlier" ( 4). This stand of the Slovaks, if we consider the Nuropean situation oif thaJt time and even the special position of the Slovaks, is readily understandaJble. Not only because the federalization olf the Habs!burg Monarchy, fearing Pangermanism, was the political program also of the Test of the nations of the Monarchy, except the Poles, but also because the rest of Europe was inclined toward this solution, considering the Habslburg Monarchy in its politics of "'balance of poiwer" as a factor of balance betiween Germany and Russia. In this policy, dictated primarily 'by fear of the Germans who called a congress to Frankfurt i:n 1:848 to attempt a union orf all Germans, the Czechs plruyed a leading part. Palacky's arguments and slogan "if AIU'stria did not exist, we would have to create it" gained the rest of the nations.who were satisfiied with the demand of a federalized empire. Even the Emperor seemed ·favo:rable to the idea as long as the danger lasted. "Th~ preservation of Austria, its integrity and solidification, is and must be the great and important concern not only of the Czech nation, but of the whole of Europe, nay of all hUJmanity and foreign lands," wrote Palacky to the Frankfurt Congress in 1848. In this regard Dr. Edward Benes wrote in 1908: "It is frequently spoken about the dissoluti-on of Austria. I aJbsolutely do not believe in it. The historical and economic ties, which mutua:lly u.nite the nations of Austria, are too strong to allow Austria to collaJP5e" (5). The rest of Europe, oif course, also feared Russia and its efforts to realize Panslavism as related by J . Danilevskij in his book "Russia and Europe" and by General Fadejev in his writings. "Slovanic nations," wrote Fadejev, "must try to attain two aims, that is, political and ~onomic development in their present homelands, and then a 4) Quoted from book DIE VEREINIGTEN STAATEN VON GROSSOESTER!RELCH, by Aurel Popovic!, Leipzig, 1906. 5) LE PROBLEME .ArTJTRIOHIEN ET LA QUESTION TCHEQUE, p. 307. �·4 SLOVAKIA closer union with the general Slovanic uni:on, whkh must be headed by Russia in international and military Tela. tions. Ea,ch of these Slovanic tribes needs a ruler for inter nal affairs and for the ·general interests of the great Slovanic Czar. Without the fulifiltlme:nt of these conditions self-admmistra.tion a:nd independence of the BaJikaJD. and Danube Slovak tr}bes is unthinka,ble" (6). Danilevskij, who pUlblished his boolk in 1871, also proposed a Russian-Slovanic confedemtion, in which would · be uni,ted all the Slova,nic people (Slavs) from the Adriatic to the Pacific under the leadershtp of Russia. In this situation, always feeling that it was thr~tened by Germany, France regarded the Habsbu:rg ffimpire as "the only barrier, sufficiently strong, at the beginning of the 20th century, whkh could discourage German a,mbi. tions the day when these would begin to threaten the European bafance," WTote Henry Rene (7). And France saw this balance threatened also by Russia, about whioh Th. Funk-Brentano wrote: "No longer is Rus:sia our ally, as it neither is for Germany or Austria, for England or Turkey : it has only one concern - to expand. It has only one ambition - to g,row. If it uses definite form s . besides, then it does so only to be better understood and allowed into the so-called European concern . . . We make offers to it and it · presents them to Berlin, w,hi'ch makes it a bett er oitlfer . .. Every alliance ls good thrut h elps it to exp.and. All other alliances are bad. It partakes in the divLsion of .s tates with the same ruthlessness with which it m a r ches to conquer them; it will reduce Poland and support · t he Balkans , because they are .Slovanic peoples, and it will annex · t he CJiinese, Turks, Armenians because they are not. That is Russia always . . . " (8). · Fear of Russia and Pamslavism, of which the Magyars and Ruma,nians were afraid and ·b y which the Polish · nation w1as stilf.led periodically, and the fear of the German "'Drang nach · Osten," forced the nations of Centi.·al Europe · -to seek a solution, which would expose it to the least -dangers. This solution they saw in a federalized Hrubsburg 6) Biresvija Vjedomosti; UVAHY O ORIENTA.LNEJ OT A.ZKE ; NEUESTE SCHRIFTEN, pgs.37-4 9. . 7) H enry Rene, . QUESTIONS D'AUTRICHE-HONGRIE ET . 'Q UESTIONIS D'ORIENT, Paris, 1903. 8) Th. .Funk-Brentano, LA POLITIQUE , PR·I NCIPES. ORI· .TIQUES, REFORMES. P.aris, 1892. �SLOVAKIA 5 MonaTchy. As early as 1902 a representative of the Czech nation, one Oharles Kramaf, wTOte: "The wor1d does riot need a feeble, sickly Austria; only a strong, vigorous, interna!lly healthy Empiire can perform the all important task of keeping watch over the ba:lance of power in the world" (9). And Aurel C. Popovici, a Rumanian, WI'Orte a great woirk in 1906 in the defense of the e~istence of a federaliized HalbsJburg Monarchy under the title: Die Vereinigten Staaten von Gross-Oesterreich. Of course, this cry of the nations of the Halbsiburg Monarchy could find little SU!ppolit at the Royal Court, so the natioins constituting the Empire had to seek some other solution of theiir national problems, especially when the war whi-ch broke out in 1914 offered them an opportunity to do so. Furthermore, when the war ended, fear of Russia and Genmany, it was said, precluded the necessity of Austria, because Germany was defeaited, disarmed and "decrnilitar~zed," while Russia was in the throes of a politica:l and social revolution. Emerging from this situation, which the vrotorious a:llies somehow forgot to regard as transitory, the Peace Conference sanctioned the destruction of the Halbsbw,g Empire and the estaJblishment of national and nationaJi:stic states on its ruins. Centrnl Europe got a new face and a new OI1gani'zation on the basis of the right of self-determination of nations. But even this · new organization did not bring an end to fedemtional efforts , especiaHy not those of the Slovaks. II. FEDERALIZATION EFFORTS 1918-1945 The situation,· into whi-ch the Siovaks were forced after WorJd .War I, on the one hand, and the over-all situation of Central Europe in the period between the two wars, on the other, forced the Slovaks to continue their struggle for fedemlization: for a . federalization of Czecho-Slova:kia and simuitaneousiy also for -a federali,z ation of Central Europe. 9) NATIONAL REVIIDW, 1902. �6 S LOVAKIA In fact, 0zecho~Slovaikia was born on the basis of an aigreement between the Slova:ks and the Czechs that it woU!ld be a federart:ive state. In Cleveland Agreemelllt of 1915 and the Pittsburgh A!greement of 1918, the latter undersigned by T. G. Masaryk himself, t'hiJS was promised to the Slaviak:S. At the Peace Conference in 191'9 even Dr. Edward Benes promised this in the name of the 0zechoSlovak Gorvernment when he stated that "it is the intention of the Czecho-1Slovak Government to create the organization of the State ·b y accepting as a basis of natural rights the prindples aipplied in the constitution of the Swiss RelpUJblic, that is, to mrake the 0zecho;Slovak Republic a sort of Switzerland.... " (10). These agreements and commitments, however, were not rkept 1b y the Praigue government, which was dominated by the Czechs, and Czecho-1Slovakia became a centralistk state with apparent tendencies to assimHiate the non-Czech population, especiially the Slovaks on t'he basis of the artificia.Ny created conception of an ethnic "Czechoslovak" nation. - The eminent historian C. A. Macartney saw through the situation very clea11ly when he wrote: "The fact remains that the (Czech~Slova:k) government has been obliged more of:ten than not to rule Slovakia against the wishes of most of its inhabitants, maintaining itself only by the exipedienits of .restricting the powers of the .sellfgovernmg bodies to within the narrowest possilble limits, of filling the seats designated for "ex;perts" with its own nominees, and utilizi'Il!g. freely weapons of censorshi,p and po1i:ce supervision ... " About the economic policy of the Czech toward the S'1ovruks, the same author stated : "The richer (Ozech) firms bought up, or obtained control through holding barri!ks (notable the 2ivnostenska Ba'Il!ka) over the greater part of the Slovak establishments. The latter were thus left at the mel'cy of t'he owners in the Historic Lands (Bohemia), who worked them or closed them down as they pleased. Pro'balb.ly nearly one-third of all Slovak industries disaippeared in this way during the 10) Lloyd George, THE TRU TH ABOUT THE PEACE TREA· TIES, pg. 937 . �SLOVAI\.IA 7 immediate postwar peri'Od, the heavy industries and textile factories beiing chiefly ruffe:cted" (11) . . . It was only natural, then, that the Slova;ks opposed the system whioh put them at such a great disadvaintage econooniically, politically and cultura:lly. The vast majority of Sllova1-cs, under the leadership of Andrew Hlinka and Martin Razus, demanded the fedemii zation od: Ozecho-Slovakia from the very begin~ing of its existence. 1 On J•a nua;ry 23, 1920, one of the foremost Slovak politicians, Deputy Dr. Ferdis Juriga, demanded the federalization of the OzeclhoJSlovak RepUiblic on the floor of the Pa:rliament with these words : "We must tend to decentralization, toward sel:f-1administra;tion, so that the Republic could develop on a federalistic basis, because federalism is the system of the future - We must preserve our individual1ity and not let ourselves be absoribed. Federalization is not only in the interest of our naition, and the OzechoSlova!k Repwblic, but also answers the spirit of all mankind. It is an ahl-hu:man tenderrcy, the tendency of all mankind, this tendency to validate oneself, develop, to which every individual person and every national unit should have the right, whkh should crystallize out into a [egal personality, so tha;t these various nations could then become federalized in one, great world re4)u'bliic. This would be the highest ideal and the path that leads to it is : federalism (12). 1 But the Ozechs, just like the Ha'bsburgs, would not accede to the detrnands of the Siovaks and the minorities while there still was time. The Slovaks, therefore, "reacted in the form of a fl a,m'boyant Slovax nationalism which was a main reason for the albsence of revo[t with which they accepted the dissolution of the Ozecho-1Slovak State" (13). 1 11) C. A. Macartney, HUNGARY AND HER SIUCCESSOBS, London, 1937; pgs. 145, 130. J 2) Karol Sador, SLOVENSK.A. POLITJ:KA NA P<>DE PR.A2SKEHO SNEMU, Vol. I, pg.69. 13) ,C. A . Mwcartney, PROBLEMS OF 'DRE DANUBE BASIN, London; p. 122. �SLOVAKli. 8 Between 1918 and 1945, there were evident tendencies among the Slovaks for the creation of a federated Central ffiurope. The organimti{)IIl, whiich was given t!his area by the pea>ce treaties, soon proved to lbe unsatisfactory economically and poilitioolly. On the OIIle hand, the principle of the right of self--determination was valida,,ted only :parti•a lly and as a consequen!ce the several nations of Central EurO!pe awaited only the opporlunity ~o alter the given situation. States like Czecho-Slovakia or Yugoslavia, made up of several nations and minorities, resembled old Austria.JHungary sitructurally, and soon enough their unjust policies toward t'he national minorities caused distrust and revisionism and excluded harmonious cooperation in Central Europe. On May 8, 1919, Rdbert Lam.sing, Secretary of State of tJhe United States, had this to say a!bout this new organiizati'on : "Examine the Treaty and you •wiU find peoples delivered agaill.8t their wills into t,he hands of those whom they hate... Resentment and bitterness, if not desperation, are 'bound to be the oonsequen<:es oof such provisions . It may be years ·b efore these oppressed pooples are able to tih<row otif their yoke, 1but as wre as day follows night the time will eome when they will make the effort" (14). On the other hiand, the dissolution of the economic crises, especial'ly in the accession states. T,he period between 1918 and 1938 wa,,s one of constant seeking of a ·r eorgaruzaition of Central Europe into a harmonious econo.m.ic and political whole. The Little Ein.tente, estalblished in 1920, Hiantos',s plan in 1925, Tardieu's plan in 1932, the Danulbe ·Paict in 1935 and Hodza's fiTst plan in 1936, to note at least t'he better we11 known plans, all of these in sUJbstan>ce had but o~e purpose: to create in an acceptable form such an organization in Central Europe whi1ch would hasve the adivanrtaiges of former Austria-Hungary, 'but would lack al[ its politica;l and social .shortcomings. Preserving the nationaJl states and democratm regimes, the economic arising from the partition of the Danube area were to •b e .removed by a system of alHances. Thus would lb e removed the tense atmosphere whi'c h reigned in this region and provoked neighboring powers to acts of aggression. 1 14) THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, London, 1921; p. 245. �SLOVAKIA t Naturally, aU these plans and endeavors, including the Little Entente, resulted primarily !because of economiic condiitions; and their aim was not indi,c,ated as an effort to create a Centra:1-Euiropean Federation. This ,t hought, however, was deeply rooted in the minds of political leaders, even Dr. Edwaro Benes himself. A'1ways fearing the loss Otf the political and economic role which Ozecho-Slova:kia was playing, Dr. Edward Benes fought against every plan to unite Cenitra:l IDurape, 'but in 1936 he admiltted that "the plan of a Danube Federation is t!he widely propagated and best known conception proposed as a solution Otf the Austxian and Centro-European pro'blem." The reasons why this solution was not realized -w ere, according to Benes, "much more of a sentimental, psychologicrul and mora:1 nature than of a political and economic nature" (15) . 1 At , the end of the first World War, Dr. Stephen Osusky, foreimost representative of the Slovaks at that time on the side of the Entente, wrote a lb,o ok in F,renc'h, 1n whielh we find these words: "The defenders Otf AttstriaHunga:ry, in foreign lands as well as in the interior Otf the dual Monarchy, are aJCting very Hlog,rcaMy. They are very much for the 1ilberation of Poland, !b ut do not want to allow the ltberation of the remaining nations. Let us liberate all nations who wrunt to 'b e free, allowing them to create their own independent states, and we shall fulfill one of the tasks confronting us. Fav,o ring then the approchement of great Poland, whielh shall have access to the Ba:ltic Sea in Danzig, Rumania and the land$ of Czecho-Slova!kia, on the one hand, and Ukrainia, to which we must give serious thoug,ht, on the other hand, a ,powerful federation of free states will be created in the nor,th (of Central Europe)" (16). In the southern part of this area, Osus.ky proposed to support efforts to create a federation of .Southern Slavs, (15) LE PROBLEME DE L'EUROPE CENTIRALE: p.' 47, Sources et documents tchecoslovaques, No. 24. 16) Stephen Osuslky, ClJOPIN, MAGY:ARff ET ~4-NGERM.NNISTIDS, Paris, 1918. �SLOVAKIA 10 after the realiizaition of which, "we shall on'1y have to connect these two federaitioins with a bridge which once existed but collapsed under the blow of historic events. T,hiu:s would come to an end the Orang nach Osten, to German a:ggression to the ffiast, and Europe and the world could work in peaJCe" (17). The plan, however, was Oipposed by T. G. Masaryk and Edward Benes. Another Sllovaik, Dr. Milan Hod'za, came forth with a d:irfferent plan, the so-called "Danube Plan." Fkst as Minister of Agriculture , later as Premier of the Ozecho-iSlo<vak Governmen t, Dr. Hodza endeavored to develop cooperation between the Central Eruropean nations and the consolidation of the oconomic situation in this pa1t of Europe- The climax of these endeavors was his "Danu!be Plan," which aimed to create, ·aJccording to Hodza's own words, "one single, great economic urut in Central Europe." This was to be attained by removing tariff ba.roiers and establishing a customs union, regu1'atmg agriculture and industrial production, reorganizin g the system of payments and transportation, etc. (18). The first steps in this dirootion were already made in 1937 by treaJties conduded between the indwidu.ail Danulbfan States and Bulgaria. Hodm's initiatiive found understand ing both in France and ffingla.nd, but Gemnany and Italy opposed it, thinking the plan was aimed against their influence in Central Europe, nay that it was an "effort to surround Germany," a:s the Germian press e,cpressed it. The plan failed not only 'beca;use orf this opposition, but also because of the crisis which began to aippear within the framework of the Little Entente and the developmen t of an inter-natioD.ial situation which tended in the opposite direction. The politico-mil itary actions of nationaHy socialist Germany and Mussolini's ltaly began to have far-reachim.g i:nd:iluenice on the whole of EUTope, but the most marked consequenc es began to appeax in Central and Souithea:stern Europe. Yugoslavia was 17) A. Ohervin, L'AUTRIOHE ET LA HONGRIE DE DE- MAIN, Paris, 1915. 18) Dr. Milan Hodza, i;,JDDERATI-ON IN CENTRAL EUROPE, pgs. 131-133. �SLOVAKIA 11 the first to suffer the consequences froim the cha.rnged situation and, with Stojadinovic leading it, began to look toward Berlin. Mter a;n internal crisis and a change of governments, Rum-ani•a a'lso ibeca:m.e equaJil.y uncertain. The Little filntente, w'hioh •w as considered the pillar and guarantor of the OTder, created by pea:ce aigreements, went headlong into ruin. lit crashed even •b efore the Germans began their march into the DanuJbe basin and oould not prevent the colla;pse of the order built up in 1918, nor the political and economical hegemony of Hitler's Germany. UndoulbtecNy, the rea;sons for the collapse of the European system and, therefore, also of the Cenltral-European organization, were many- But it ca11!Ilot be denied that Hitler's plans and ructions in the Danube basin were suJbstantially facilitated by the political and economic conditions which governed there after 1918. Oonsequeinitly, the discontented nations, as predicted :ey Lansing, iif they did not work to overthrow that system, as did Hungary and Austria, then they certainly were not willing in the least to defend it, as was the case with c~echo-Slovatkiia a111d Yugoslavia. The dissolution of Czecho~Slova1kia was in fact caused by the German minoriity, as even Dr. Benes stated, because : In Munioh Czecho..:Slovakia was fatally wounded from the outside. " Munich, however, meant much more tha:n thaJt. "It opened the way along the Danulbe all the way to the Blacik Sea to German expamsion," as Winston Churchill said in the British Parliament O'l1 Oct. 5, 1938. Munich meant the end of the European system ,b uilt up by the •peace treaties of 19181920 and installed in Central Europe a Germ.an- Italian Russian co-dominiOIIl whioh, even though it did not last long, did bring new elements into the organization of the CentralEuropean area. Germany was in its politics consistent and adroit, and thus "milita;ry might, dwplomacy, propaganda and the feeling of helplessness before the preponderance of their neighbors, as well as the economic interests, were the causes of the voluntary or forced subordination of the Danulbian �12 SL0VAKlA nations, their new political orientation and cooperation with the Axis," says Graham Hutton (19). "•I n Belgrade, Bucharest and naturally in Sophia, kings and princes did not trust international obligations of collective security. They fuought tha,t every state must endeavor by its own means to serve the peace of all, buit t hat its first task ls to preserve its own peace" (20). And what 'hruppened in Prague was nothing else but what Dr. Benes had already told Minister Sfona in 1936: "If they (the French) aJbandon us without helping us in ·the face of German threats, we shall suI1prise the world by the limitless possilbilities of servility toward Berlin" (21) . This dissolution of the Versailles organization by German policies, whiich endeavored to make of this region a German "lebensraum," forced the representatives of the Central-European nations to return to the efforts to create a Cenitral-European federation, or confederation. A federalistic solution of Central-European problems seemed to be the only strong solution especial1.y when Gerniainy and Russia, with the pact of August 23, 1939, temporarily shared government over Central and Southeastern Europe, annexing territories, nay, even whole states and esta/t,lishing a dictatorship over them. In that situation even the most bigoted enemies of federalistic endeavors of Centr.a:l-Europe in the period between the two wars, politicians who ",p referred to see Hitler in Vienna than the Habsburgs," returned to the idea of creating a great federative unit in Central Europe after the end of the war. The Soviet-German Pact convinced even the nations, which in an effort to hold their own advantageous position in Central Europe wished its partition, that their own security, nay even their own existence in fact, could be guaranteed oltly by an intimate union of all the Central European nations. 19) Graihaim Hutton, LES NOUVEAUX DES'DINS DU DANiUBE, Paris, 1939. . 20) Gregoke Gafencu, DERNIERS J0URS DE L'EU'R0PE, p. 105. 21) Comte Sforza, ILLUS IONS ET REALITES DE L'EUR0PE, Neuch-atel 1944; p. 196. �SLOVAKIA 13 Russia, wrote Gregoire, "revea~ed her face, which had nothlng encouragin g either fur her neig1hlbors or for a peaceful order of the world. The Moscow aigreement unmasked the Soviet Union, in whrch the cult of might and the practice of dou!ble..dealing so strikingly reminded one of the times of Catherine the Great ,a nd the ooarrs of the past centuries. 'It seemed that she obeys the ancient and mighty impulses, siimilrur to those, which drove the Gennan masses in the opposite direction, to the East. But the Russian aggression was at the same time more corufusilng and mysterious. Opposing every .Umitation not because the area which this aggression included was too narrow, lbut conversely beca,use the concepti:on of borders is alien to the nature of Russia" (22). It was, therefore, only natural, that in such a situation the plans of l.lIWying Central Europe on a federalistic basis were again revived and that together . with t!he representativ es of other Central-EUTdpeain nations the Slovvaks - those who fought on the side of the Mlies, as well as the political representat ives who remained at home will:ih the people and sought to lead it into •postwar Europe with as little loss as possible - endeavored to realize a federated Central Europe. On the side of the AUies, it was especiaAly the Slovak political group led by Dr. M. Hodfa and Peter Pridavo~, which led an open strwg,gle for these conceptions . In his book "Federatio n in Central Europe" H~a writes that already in Jainuary 1940 Slovalk political emigrants had come to an understand ing that they wowld endeavor to create a Central-Eu ropean federation. The fotliildation of this federation was to be the union between Poland, the Czech. lands and Slovakia. On January 23, 1942, there wais such an agreement cone'luded between the Polish and Czecho-Slovak g(?vemmen ts with the __ jntention that it wouJd be. the nudeu:s of a great Central-Eu ropean £-Oll22) Gregoire Gafeneu, PRELIMINA,:fRES DE LA -, GUERRE A L'EST, Fri-bourg, 1944. �1-4 SLOVAKIA federation. Matters common to all were to be foreign, military, economic, social and furancial affairs, as weH as transportation, communications and the postaJl. service (23). Milan Hod'za's book, published in 1942, contained all the more serious reasO!I1s for a federated Central IDuroipe. "WaT event'S in Central Europe," wrote Hodza, "dhviously fully vindi<:ate the idea <Yf a solidly org,anized futuTe cooperatron <Yf ahl those eight States whicih aTe placed in complete geogrruphic coherenice between Russia, Germany amd Irtaily. A federali.lzed Centrall Europe is one of the absolute necessi-ties of a new postwaT order." In the preface <Yf his >book, Hodza te1ls us that the Oentral-EuTopean federation should be composed of four Sl'O'Vainic and four non"Slovanic nations, which should £ind a new, great and sohd foundation for their own national lilfe, keeping in balance all possi!ble ra;cial and imperialistic aspirations in the broad territory, the consolidated system of whioh is to be the strongest contribution to the new arraingement of Europe. The federation proposed 1b y Hodza was supposed to rest on a customs union. Fina<n:ces, trade policies, foreign ·p olicy, defense, communioations were to be managed jointly. The p1'am also called for a Ministry of Federal Law 8Jlld a Ministry <Yf Trade Unions and Professional Associations. Altogether there were to be eight commQ!Il. ministries, forming the federal government, which would be headed by a chancellor appoiinted by the president af the federation. In the central goverrunent all the nations were to ·b e represented by ministers without 1portfolio. Ministers with pol'tfOllfo were to perform their functiooo in cooperation with the state secretaries representing all.I the federated nations. The president was to be elected first by the presidents of the national governments, then 1b y the congress of the federation for a period of one yeaT. The memlbers af congress were to be elected by a two-thirds majority of the national parliaments in the proportion of 23) F.r om the French text of the Treaty in the Stoc![,holm review L'AVENIR, Vol. 1, No. 2. �SLOVAKIA one memlber for a million inhaib1tants. The ministers oif the federation, under the plan, could not be deputies of oongress. The solution ,p roposed iby Hod.fa would ha,v e a twofold advantage, wrote the "Voix des Peuples," the Swiss politicail review (Oct- 1944): "it would minimize the natio-nal antagonisms and would recreate the harmonius economic area, which !benefited Centrrul Europe before 1914. The sOilution, therefore, seems to be the wisest, because it is most advantageous for all the nations concerned." A positive stand to Hodfa's prnposal, on the assumption that SlO'Vlrukii:a iin the Europe confederation would figure as an ind~vidual member state, was truken by the main political o!I1gan in Slorva!kia, the "Slovfuk" (24), and in the Vatican diplomatic circles the interpreter of federalistic sqova,,k efforts was Ambassador Karol Sidor. At the beginniing af 1944, Dr. Ferdinand :Du11cansiky, university professoir and the first Fm·eign Minister of the Slovak Repulblic, published a technical study albout the problem of Centrail Euro;pe. The study ap:peaTed in the "Revue de droiit international, de sciences diplomatiques et politiques" (~fil annee, No. 1), putb lished in Gene,va. The status Which prevailed m Central Euro;pe up to 1938, led :Duvcansky to the log,i10al conclusion that a new Central Euro1p e must be orgaJnized on other fQ!Ulld:ations than those ()If 1'918 or those ruifteir that time; it must be organi:zed on the basis ()If coope:riation of the (Je,ntra!l-European niations and their equality. "We can imagine theoretically a cooperiati'On of the nations of Central Europe," wrote :DUTCam;ky, "either in a form of completely independent states, or in a form ()If close, mutual relation in a t.mrion of states. This cooperatiion would be directed by interna.tiona1 a:greement, or by a manner of federation in which every state would have •a special position defined by law." Campiete independence is, according .to :Dur1can:Sky, UJildou!btedly t!he most ad\.'amtageous. With regaro to the 1 24) Dr. Joseph Kirs:chlbaum, HODZ0V PLAN S'l'RED0-EUROPSKEJ F'EDERAOIE, article in tth e SLOVAK, Aug. 20, 1944. �}6 SLOVAKIA ciromnsta:nce that the majority of the Central-European nations, as far as their number and the exitent of their territories, are small nations, this coU!ld mean, said Durcansky, certain dangers. Furthermore, tendencies to limit the sovereignty of small[ nations, endeavors to create laxge eoonomiJC units, the result of technical development and experience from previous wars that sma:ller nations could not defend their independence rb y being neutral - all these led to tlle creation of larger units. :Dutcansky continues: "From these motives there is talk aJbout more active cooperation which ought to guar-amtee lasting peace aind a greater prosperity- This cooperation cannot overstep the framework of a confederation the cooperation 'between independent states diirected by norms of international law. This solution gives guarantees of independence and freedom to the nations of CentralEurope, enaJbles a s01lurti:on of incidental disputes which could arise between the individual states of the confederation and, on the other hand, could defend Central IDurope against external attacks." WthaJt are the arguments 3/gain.st the federation of Central Europe? :Duircainsky points ~mt that ail such arguments rest on the psychologica:l situation in Central-Euroipe, the prejudices emanating from the past and the tendencies of certain nations to renew their former status. The development of war events, however, did not respect the federalistic tendencies of Central-European nations as much as it did during the first World War. Desp~¼ the P-01ish-OzechJSlovak Agreement, despite the positive stand of influential Anglo~Saxon circles and despite tlle general conviction (25) that the Central-European prgaLD!ization created in 191'8 was aib,solutely unsatisfact,:ory _, :t9-r,, ~h~ majority of Centra,l-European nations, as it also ·was for the rest of Europe, nevertheless at the end of 25) What the indivrldual Centra)-Europel).n na.tions thought Stojan Pribil!evil!, about federating Central Europe is told by: WORLD WITHOUT END, New York, 1939; Edmoll'd Demaltre in the review 1/A:VENIR; Gr. Gl\,fencu, PRElJIMlNAIRES DE LA GUERRE A L'EST; ~ - A. Mccartney; PROBLEMS OF THE DANUBE BASIN. �SLOVAKIA 17 the war the very same states were renewed in their old forms, excepting maimed Poland and a smaller OzechoSlova:kia. The Altlantic Charter, the Charter of the United Nations, the natural rilght of every nation to its own state and the solemn prooLa.matioos of the waT years were qu'i.okly forgotten or e:,opediently a:bandoned. Furt:!hernnore, the dei1icate prolb'lem of the minorities began to lbe solved in a manner which was supported by the momenitary situation, in its co1I1Sequences, however, it ibroUJght new da:ngers for the Central-Ell.lropean area and ther~y for the whole of Europe. We are all witnesses of this today. The policy of the Soviet Union towaTd the n81tions of Central Euroipe and, therefore, feder81tiorral efforts did not die out even after World War II. m. THE PRESENT STRUGGLE OF THE SLOVAKS FOR A COMMONWEALTH OF CENTRAL-EUROPEAN NATIONS In 1945 Slova;kiia was occwpied by ,b oth the Russians and the Czechs, and the Communist-dOlminated regime installed there with the help of Moscow and Pr.ague reached to the very roots O!f the existence O!f the Slavalk nation. This irirefotaible fact has led the S1ov,a;k!s to fight uncompromisingly· from the very end of World War II :foT the liberation of Central Europe from alien hegemony rund for its federaJlirza:tion. The representatives O!f the Slovak nation are firmly convinced tha:t Central Europerun nations, if they do not waint to live under the hegemony of the one or the other otf their strong neig1hlbor,s, must unite in a larger · economic am.d stra:tegic unit. There i's no other solution. The entire politica1 and social development of Central EJurope from 1848 coofi:rnns this conclusfon. International policy, as well as the .p olfoy of individUJa1 1powers, is gu~ded by definilte coootants and lastinrg interests wihlch have Olll,tlived and shall out1we all changes o,f regimes. 'Dha:t is why today, just as in the past century, the CentraJl-IDuropeain nations must rookoo with the revival O!f German expansioo, �18 SLOVAKIA: which can change only its forms but not its aims, just as, on the other ham.d, Russi an JmperiaHsm haiS not changed and no regime will ever change it. The object of the expansionist endeavorrs of Russia and Gemniany is Central Europe, because of its geographical position and ethnic composition. These two powers have attaJdked each other for centuries for the control of the Centra~-Eumpeam nations. With the passage of centuries only the forms and pretenses of their imperiaJlism have changed. Pam.-Gerimanism and Pam-1Sllavism a1way:s followed and will follow the very sa:me pur,pose, and the only defense ,a grumst them is the unification of the Central-EJuropean nations on the basis of equality. ThaJt is the lesson of history. On the other hand, the experience of the ipast thirty years have proved that the system, which prevailed in Central and Eastern Europe s-ince 1918 and was again reestablished in 1945 by committing the very same mistakes, cotcld not giuai-antee Europe pea:ce and stalbNity, a:nd to the nations 'between Russia and Germany it could guarantee neither economic prosperity, nor security and freedom . ThUIS it hruppened that with the first blow of German imperiail~sm in 1938, as welil as a result of expansion of the Soviet Uni-on, the system succumbed, and with its downfall Ewrope and the wodd hruve boon thmst into dangerous crises, of whi:ch the first ended in war and the seoond threatoos with war. At the end of both waris, the nations of Central Europe were forced under regimes of terror, which were alien and hostile to the most fundamental cultur~d, po1i,tiical, economi:c and sociaiJ. traditions of all the CentraJl~Eurropeain natiions, who a.Te deeply devoted to the prindples of democr8Jcy and Christianity, the two concepts which are in prJndp1e at odds with both Nazism and materialistri1c OomJmunism. • 1 'I"housamds of Slov,ruk emigrants in Europe and elsewhere, am.d over a million Americruns of Slovak descent, have, therrefore, ,p roclaimed themselves since 194'5 for such a demooratic concepUon of a new Europe which would remove the o1d shortcomings of Europe, and especially of �SLOVAKIA 19 Central Europe, and would rest on the principle of equality of au nations alild be united in a federative uni'on. The organiization of Central and Eastern Europe, as it has proved thusfar, could not fulfill its mission orf strength against imperialism which has threatened the pea:.ce of Europe for Centuries, but conversely, it even facilitated the victory orf these imperirulismsThe weakest part of this organization was CzechoSlovakia, a heterogenous amd polyglotic state, which gave an OipipOrlU'lle excuse to ,the · Third Reich for its expansion and, on the other hand, made cooperation impossible with other Central Euiropean nations, because the millions of inhrubitants of the minorities which were included a:gainst their will into the Czecho-Slovak Republic. Instead of strength against the "Drang nach Osten," the Czecho-Slovak Repwblic became in 191'8 the gateway for the German march into the Dam.Iibe Basin, a,nd in 1945 the bridge 01Ver which the Russian-Bolshevist expainsion penetrated into the very heart of Europe without any resistence. A new orga:nization of Central Europe is therefore, according to the v,i ews orf the representatives of the Slovak emigiration, rubsoiutely ne<:essary not only in the interest of CentraiJ.-Euroipean nations, but also, and in the very first ¢ace, in the interest oif the security orf Euroipe and the peace of the world. We rememib er that both world conflrugrations broke out in this a:rea. Until the extensive region between Germany and Russia is organized on a new basis, gua1ramteeing justice, equality and freedom to every nation, Europe cannot have secured its security and prosperity. Aggression of imperialism , tending to dominaite Central Euro-pe, and then the whole of Euro,pe, could again be facilitated, nay aggressors could even find opportune pretenses and allies, if any one of the Central-European nations were wronged and forced under the rule od' another. The poHticai and economic development from the end of World War I has made the nations of Central Europe conscious enough orf the fact that a more pernnanent �SLOVAKIA !O and solid organization of this region demands that the r1ght to freedom and independence of every nation living there 'be recognired and respected. Being aiware of all this, the Slovak Lerugue of America, in the name of Americans of Slovak descent, as well as in the name of the Slovialk natioo, decl~re.d at its Congress in Oleve1and, Ohio, on Octdber 21, 1947, that "ibasicaliy it welcomes the idea of a federative union of the European nations." It was especially in agreement wiilth the thought of a fedei,aitive uni:on of the centra.1-IDuropean states, in which the nations of that part of Europe would find the prerequj.1s ities for peaceful coha/bitation, fruitful cooperation and effeicti.Jve defense of their individual and ool.lective interests. Of cou.rise, American Slovaks were for such an arrangement of Central Europe on the supposition that "the internal life of the indi,viduial member states amd their mu~ua.1 relationshi p ibe bui!l.t on the Christian principles of true democracy, mutual respect and solidarity," and if among the member states of this federation will be included "also Slovakia as an indrivid'l.Jlal , state, as an equiivalent state, as an equi,v alent and equal member." Slovak em~grants in Europe and elsewhere stand back of the same conceptions. They have so e~pressed themselves in numerous memoranda addressed to the Pe~e Conference, the United Nations, ind:ividua1l governments and to the represenitaltives of the various emigrant groups of the nations from behind the Iron Curtain. The Slovak nation never was am aggressor or imperi·a!list nation; it seeks nothing that does not rilghtfolly belong to it, and nothmg more than every naJtion, however large or small, has an inherent rig'hrt to .seek. The 'S lovaks are a deeply religious and democ-rati'c people, ruble and willing to cooperate with ·au nations of Europe who are determined to wipe out the pl,a gue oif Oommunism and fight for the freedom and independence of allil nati·ons. 1 It is, therefore, onl,y na,1:,ural that the representatiives of all the nations behintl the Iiron Curtain in emigration, among them aJlso Slo,va!k effii.gram.ts, are for the .remo,val �SLOVAKIA 21 of the organizations and regimes of terror which call themsclves "1p eople's democracies." Just as the hitherto unhealthy arralillgement clid not satisfy the needs of the Central-European nations - .one in which practreally hailf the nations of Central Europe did not attain the valid!aition of the right of selrf-detevmination - just so· the system of totali1:arian ":people's democracies" does not satisfy and ,is not in aocord with the traditions of these nations. The ,p olitical and social chaniges, effected iby the 30year economic and socia!l development in t'his region of Europe, whether in regard to the spreaJd oif cidization among the broad masses, or in the social structure, chang~ ed the features <if Cenitral Europe to such an extent that in the future onily true demooracy, extended to the e{!onomic field as ,well, can b.e the system which woU!ld satisfy the · mentality, the spiritual foundiaition and the social needs of t'he natio!IllS of Central Europe. Ainy other system than the democratic, especially the totalitarian system of the " 1people's democracies," is opposed to the most basic mOTal and poiitioail traditi'ons of these countries and, therefore, could be instaJ11ed only ,b y force and maintained only br terror. The freedom of Europe, however, cannot be · Se{!Ured as long as one half of it is under a government of tert01r. On the other hand, the ipeaice of ' Etl!iope and , tbe world cannot be secured as long as Centra1 ·: Europe _i,'s not free and tmi.ted :in sUJCh a manner that '-'it ' could cfufend its own freedom and security .and thereby , also the seciirity of Eumpe Thi,s ios ipossible only if a United Staites of Central Euro,p e be:c~mes a reality in one foT-m or another, Hugh Seton-W:atson, in the int,vodUJCtion of his book "Eiastem Europe Between the Wars," stressed this point when he wrote: "IndividuaLEastern countries ·o.fifer ·interesting fields of study to the speda,list, but are · of smaJ.l importance in world politics. But the Eastern · European proiblem, the problem of the hundred millions,· is· one :of •the ma,jor problems of oor age. Each of the peoiples of ffiaJstern Europe must enjoy liiberty aind self-government if unrest is to be aivoided." � APRIL, 1953 SLOVAKIA 1 SLOVAKIA AND CENTRAL-EUROPEAN FEDERATION PLANS Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum Slovrukia with its three and a haJrf million inhiaJbitants and area 45,000 square kilometers lies in the very heart of Central EUTope and its fate in the ,past has been most bitter. After losing their first State, Great Moravia, which during the reign oif King svatopluk included a part of today's Poland, Hmgary, Yugoslavia and for a short time even the Czech lands (1), the SlovaJks as a political factor could not validate themselves in CentraJl Europe for whole centuries. The leading Sloivak group shed its blood first in battles with the Ge:rmians and Magyars and, later, also in battles with the Tu:rks and Tartars. And still later it suffered under tthe pressure of the assimilatory tendencies of the Magyars, which ilrl it.he 19th century and the 1b eginn. ing of this century re8iChed the broadest masses of Slovaks and ruppreciaJbly reduced the growth of the Slovak nation . The Slovaks, who already in 830 had theiT own sta:te and chUI1Ch or,ganization and tthus placed the first foundations of European civili Z8Jtion in the Danube area (2), ap pear more clearly on the ipolitica:l scene again only in 1848, when they rebelled to regain their national independenct>. Decimated and .pushed into the mountains of the north eastern part of their first State, the Great Moravii.8Jl1 Empire, the Slov,a ks were more a cutural than politioo.l factor , up to the 18th century. "During the 17th century," wrote Dr. Milan Hodza, "when the Turks had occupied •all the rest oif old Hungary, Slovakia became the refoge of many lofty intellectual ef forts on behalif of that country. For some time to come_ 1 . 1) Dr. Francis Hrusovsky, GESCHICHTE DER S-LOWAKEI, · pp. 9-15; Julius Pauler, A MAGYARNEMZET TORTJ!JNETE SZENT ISTVAN!G; Dr. Joseph ~kult~ty, ORTY ZO SLOVENSKEJ MINU• LOSTI, p. 13 ; Dr. Milan Hodza, FEDERATION IN CEN'mlAL EUROPE, p . 86; AL'Phoise Huber, GESCHICHTE OESTERREICHE, Vol. 1. 2) Dr. Milan Hodza, FEDERATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE, p. 86. �SLOVAKIA 2 in Slovaikia, there was much morn cultural mo;vement than in Bohemia or occupied Hungacy. At the end of the eighteenth century Slovakia prepared not only her racial rebirth. Trnaiva, which housed the Catholic University before it was tra:nsferred to Budaipest, became a centre of Catholic culture in the realm. Slova!kia was going to be the seat of the first serious democratic movement which had its raimifications in the whole of Hungary and which ended in a conspiracy directed against HaJbSlburg, and Slovakia revealed itselif as a meeting place of prructi:cally all contemporary currents of cultural and ipo>litica;l ideas. (3). After 1848, on the one side under the independence and politfrcal equality of a11 nations, and on the other side under the increasing pressure of assimilaitory Magyar policy, the Slova:k nation beg8;Jl a systematic fight for its polibcal riights. After the Slovak armed revolt of 1848 failed, the Slova!ks within the Hrubsburg monarchy dared to demand an individual self-administr ative unit, such as the Croaits demanded through Ostrozinsky, the Czechs through Pala cky, the Magyars, after Kossuth's revolution was squelched, through DeaJk. This was .p roposed also by Count Valerian Krasinski in his work "Panslavi.sm and Bangernnanism . " What the Slovaks really demanded was a federative solution. The Slovaks remained faithful to the idea of a fede rative solution of the Monarchy in the memorandum , pre sented to the Emperor in 1861, and aigailll at the Conigress of Na:tionaHties in Budrupest in 1867. At the second Congress of Nationa1ities, which took plruce August 10, 1895, in Budaipes't, despite ,persecutions, "the Rumanians, Serbs and Slova:ks, who assemlbled in Buda.pest, "wrote the Neue Freie Presse," dernand ,t he division of Hungary into ethnic self-administra iti;ve units, whreh in effect is equall to the demand to aJbol:ish the un.ion between Hungary and Tr.ainsylviania, to renew the Serbian Duchy and create a selfadmini,s trati:ve Slova:kia, suoh as Huriban (,leader of the 1 1 3) Dr. Mil an Hod za, IBIDEM, pp.208- 213. �SLOVAKIA 3 1848 Slo'Vak rebellion - Author) promoted already thi•r ty years earlier" ( 4). This stand of the Slovaks, if we consider the Nuropean situation oif thaJt time and even the special position of the Slovaks, is readily understandaJble. Not only because the federalization olf the Habs!burg Monarchy, fearing Pangermanism, was the political program also of the Test of the nations of the Monarchy, except the Poles, but also because the rest of Europe was inclined toward this solution, considering the Habslburg Monarchy in its politics of "'balance of poiwer" as a factor of balance betiween Germany and Russia. In this policy, dictated primarily 'by fear of the Germans who called a congress to Frankfurt i:n 1:848 to attempt a union orf all Germans, the Czechs plruyed a leading part. Palacky's arguments and slogan "if AIU'stria did not exist, we would have to create it" gained the rest of the nations.who were satisfiied with the demand of a federalized empire. Even the Emperor seemed ·favo:rable to the idea as long as the danger lasted. "Th~ preservation of Austria, its integrity and solidification, is and must be the great and important concern not only of the Czech nation, but of the whole of Europe, nay of all hUJmanity and foreign lands," wrote Palacky to the Frankfurt Congress in 1848. In this regard Dr. Edward Benes wrote in 1908: "It is frequently spoken about the dissoluti-on of Austria. I aJbsolutely do not believe in it. The historical and economic ties, which mutua:lly u.nite the nations of Austria, are too strong to allow Austria to collaJP5e" (5). The rest of Europe, oif course, also feared Russia and its efforts to realize Panslavism as related by J . Danilevskij in his book "Russia and Europe" and by General Fadejev in his writings. "Slovanic nations," wrote Fadejev, "must try to attain two aims, that is, political and ~onomic development in their present homelands, and then a 4) Quoted from book DIE VEREINIGTEN STAATEN VON GROSSOESTER!RELCH, by Aurel Popovic!, Leipzig, 1906. 5) LE PROBLEME .ArTJTRIOHIEN ET LA QUESTION TCHEQUE, p. 307. �·4 SLOVAKIA closer union with the general Slovanic uni:on, whkh must be headed by Russia in international and military Tela. tions. Ea,ch of these Slovanic tribes needs a ruler for inter nal affairs and for the ·general interests of the great Slovanic Czar. Without the fulifiltlme:nt of these conditions self-admmistra.tion a:nd independence of the BaJikaJD. and Danube Slovak tr}bes is unthinka,ble" (6). Danilevskij, who pUlblished his boolk in 1871, also proposed a Russian-Slovanic confedemtion, in which would · be uni,ted all the Slova,nic people (Slavs) from the Adriatic to the Pacific under the leadershtp of Russia. In this situation, always feeling that it was thr~tened by Germany, France regarded the Habsbu:rg ffimpire as "the only barrier, sufficiently strong, at the beginning of the 20th century, whkh could discourage German a,mbi. tions the day when these would begin to threaten the European bafance," WTote Henry Rene (7). And France saw this balance threatened also by Russia, about whioh Th. Funk-Brentano wrote: "No longer is Rus:sia our ally, as it neither is for Germany or Austria, for England or Turkey : it has only one concern - to expand. It has only one ambition - to g,row. If it uses definite form s . besides, then it does so only to be better understood and allowed into the so-called European concern . . . We make offers to it and it · presents them to Berlin, w,hi'ch makes it a bett er oitlfer . .. Every alliance ls good thrut h elps it to exp.and. All other alliances are bad. It partakes in the divLsion of .s tates with the same ruthlessness with which it m a r ches to conquer them; it will reduce Poland and support · t he Balkans , because they are .Slovanic peoples, and it will annex · t he CJiinese, Turks, Armenians because they are not. That is Russia always . . . " (8). · Fear of Russia and Pamslavism, of which the Magyars and Ruma,nians were afraid and ·b y which the Polish · nation w1as stilf.led periodically, and the fear of the German "'Drang nach · Osten," forced the nations of Centi.·al Europe · -to seek a solution, which would expose it to the least -dangers. This solution they saw in a federalized Hrubsburg 6) Biresvija Vjedomosti; UVAHY O ORIENTA.LNEJ OT A.ZKE ; NEUESTE SCHRIFTEN, pgs.37-4 9. . 7) H enry Rene, . QUESTIONS D'AUTRICHE-HONGRIE ET . 'Q UESTIONIS D'ORIENT, Paris, 1903. 8) Th. .Funk-Brentano, LA POLITIQUE , PR·I NCIPES. ORI· .TIQUES, REFORMES. P.aris, 1892. �SLOVAKIA 5 MonaTchy. As early as 1902 a representative of the Czech nation, one Oharles Kramaf, wTOte: "The wor1d does riot need a feeble, sickly Austria; only a strong, vigorous, interna!lly healthy Empiire can perform the all important task of keeping watch over the ba:lance of power in the world" (9). And Aurel C. Popovici, a Rumanian, WI'Orte a great woirk in 1906 in the defense of the e~istence of a federaliized HalbsJburg Monarchy under the title: Die Vereinigten Staaten von Gross-Oesterreich. Of course, this cry of the nations of the Halbsiburg Monarchy could find little SU!ppolit at the Royal Court, so the natioins constituting the Empire had to seek some other solution of theiir national problems, especially when the war whi-ch broke out in 1914 offered them an opportunity to do so. Furthermore, when the war ended, fear of Russia and Genmany, it was said, precluded the necessity of Austria, because Germany was defeaited, disarmed and "decrnilitar~zed," while Russia was in the throes of a politica:l and social revolution. Emerging from this situation, which the vrotorious a:llies somehow forgot to regard as transitory, the Peace Conference sanctioned the destruction of the Halbsbw,g Empire and the estaJblishment of national and nationaJi:stic states on its ruins. Centrnl Europe got a new face and a new OI1gani'zation on the basis of the right of self-determination of nations. But even this · new organization did not bring an end to fedemtional efforts , especiaHy not those of the Slovaks. II. FEDERALIZATION EFFORTS 1918-1945 The situation,· into whi-ch the Siovaks were forced after WorJd .War I, on the one hand, and the over-all situation of Central Europe in the period between the two wars, on the other, forced the Slovaks to continue their struggle for fedemlization: for a . federalization of Czecho-Slova:kia and simuitaneousiy also for -a federali,z ation of Central Europe. 9) NATIONAL REVIIDW, 1902. �6 S LOVAKIA In fact, 0zecho~Slovaikia was born on the basis of an aigreement between the Slova:ks and the Czechs that it woU!ld be a federart:ive state. In Cleveland Agreemelllt of 1915 and the Pittsburgh A!greement of 1918, the latter undersigned by T. G. Masaryk himself, t'hiJS was promised to the Slaviak:S. At the Peace Conference in 191'9 even Dr. Edward Benes promised this in the name of the 0zechoSlovak Gorvernment when he stated that "it is the intention of the Czecho-1Slovak Government to create the organization of the State ·b y accepting as a basis of natural rights the prindples aipplied in the constitution of the Swiss RelpUJblic, that is, to mrake the 0zecho;Slovak Republic a sort of Switzerland.... " (10). These agreements and commitments, however, were not rkept 1b y the Praigue government, which was dominated by the Czechs, and Czecho-1Slovakia became a centralistk state with apparent tendencies to assimHiate the non-Czech population, especiially the Slovaks on t'he basis of the artificia.Ny created conception of an ethnic "Czechoslovak" nation. - The eminent historian C. A. Macartney saw through the situation very clea11ly when he wrote: "The fact remains that the (Czech~Slova:k) government has been obliged more of:ten than not to rule Slovakia against the wishes of most of its inhabitants, maintaining itself only by the exipedienits of .restricting the powers of the .sellfgovernmg bodies to within the narrowest possilble limits, of filling the seats designated for "ex;perts" with its own nominees, and utilizi'Il!g. freely weapons of censorshi,p and po1i:ce supervision ... " About the economic policy of the Czech toward the S'1ovruks, the same author stated : "The richer (Ozech) firms bought up, or obtained control through holding barri!ks (notable the 2ivnostenska Ba'Il!ka) over the greater part of the Slovak establishments. The latter were thus left at the mel'cy of t'he owners in the Historic Lands (Bohemia), who worked them or closed them down as they pleased. Pro'balb.ly nearly one-third of all Slovak industries disaippeared in this way during the 10) Lloyd George, THE TRU TH ABOUT THE PEACE TREA· TIES, pg. 937 . �SLOVAI\.IA 7 immediate postwar peri'Od, the heavy industries and textile factories beiing chiefly ruffe:cted" (11) . . . It was only natural, then, that the Slova;ks opposed the system whioh put them at such a great disadvaintage econooniically, politically and cultura:lly. The vast majority of Sllova1-cs, under the leadership of Andrew Hlinka and Martin Razus, demanded the fedemii zation od: Ozecho-Slovakia from the very begin~ing of its existence. 1 On J•a nua;ry 23, 1920, one of the foremost Slovak politicians, Deputy Dr. Ferdis Juriga, demanded the federalization of the OzeclhoJSlovak RepUiblic on the floor of the Pa:rliament with these words : "We must tend to decentralization, toward sel:f-1administra;tion, so that the Republic could develop on a federalistic basis, because federalism is the system of the future - We must preserve our individual1ity and not let ourselves be absoribed. Federalization is not only in the interest of our naition, and the OzechoSlova!k Repwblic, but also answers the spirit of all mankind. It is an ahl-hu:man tenderrcy, the tendency of all mankind, this tendency to validate oneself, develop, to which every individual person and every national unit should have the right, whkh should crystallize out into a [egal personality, so tha;t these various nations could then become federalized in one, great world re4)u'bliic. This would be the highest ideal and the path that leads to it is : federalism (12). 1 But the Ozechs, just like the Ha'bsburgs, would not accede to the detrnands of the Siovaks and the minorities while there still was time. The Slovaks, therefore, "reacted in the form of a fl a,m'boyant Slovax nationalism which was a main reason for the albsence of revo[t with which they accepted the dissolution of the Ozecho-1Slovak State" (13). 1 11) C. A. Macartney, HUNGARY AND HER SIUCCESSOBS, London, 1937; pgs. 145, 130. J 2) Karol Sador, SLOVENSK.A. POLITJ:KA NA P<>DE PR.A2SKEHO SNEMU, Vol. I, pg.69. 13) ,C. A . Mwcartney, PROBLEMS OF 'DRE DANUBE BASIN, London; p. 122. �SLOVAKli. 8 Between 1918 and 1945, there were evident tendencies among the Slovaks for the creation of a federated Central ffiurope. The organimti{)IIl, whiich was given t!his area by the pea>ce treaties, soon proved to lbe unsatisfactory economically and poilitioolly. On the OIIle hand, the principle of the right of self--determination was valida,,ted only :parti•a lly and as a consequen!ce the several nations of Central EurO!pe awaited only the opporlunity ~o alter the given situation. States like Czecho-Slovakia or Yugoslavia, made up of several nations and minorities, resembled old Austria.JHungary sitructurally, and soon enough their unjust policies toward t'he national minorities caused distrust and revisionism and excluded harmonious cooperation in Central Europe. On May 8, 1919, Rdbert Lam.sing, Secretary of State of tJhe United States, had this to say a!bout this new organiizati'on : "Examine the Treaty and you •wiU find peoples delivered agaill.8t their wills into t,he hands of those whom they hate... Resentment and bitterness, if not desperation, are 'bound to be the oonsequen<:es oof such provisions . It may be years ·b efore these oppressed pooples are able to tih<row otif their yoke, 1but as wre as day follows night the time will eome when they will make the effort" (14). On the other hiand, the dissolution of the economic crises, especial'ly in the accession states. T,he period between 1918 and 1938 wa,,s one of constant seeking of a ·r eorgaruzaition of Central Europe into a harmonious econo.m.ic and political whole. The Little Ein.tente, estalblished in 1920, Hiantos',s plan in 1925, Tardieu's plan in 1932, the Danulbe ·Paict in 1935 and Hodza's fiTst plan in 1936, to note at least t'he better we11 known plans, all of these in sUJbstan>ce had but o~e purpose: to create in an acceptable form such an organization in Central Europe whi1ch would hasve the adivanrtaiges of former Austria-Hungary, 'but would lack al[ its politica;l and social .shortcomings. Preserving the nationaJl states and democratm regimes, the economic arising from the partition of the Danube area were to •b e .removed by a system of alHances. Thus would lb e removed the tense atmosphere whi'c h reigned in this region and provoked neighboring powers to acts of aggression. 1 14) THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, London, 1921; p. 245. �SLOVAKIA t Naturally, aU these plans and endeavors, including the Little Entente, resulted primarily !because of economiic condiitions; and their aim was not indi,c,ated as an effort to create a Centra:1-Euiropean Federation. This ,t hought, however, was deeply rooted in the minds of political leaders, even Dr. Edwaro Benes himself. A'1ways fearing the loss Otf the political and economic role which Ozecho-Slova:kia was playing, Dr. Edward Benes fought against every plan to unite Cenitra:l IDurape, 'but in 1936 he admiltted that "the plan of a Danube Federation is t!he widely propagated and best known conception proposed as a solution Otf the Austxian and Centro-European pro'blem." The reasons why this solution was not realized -w ere, according to Benes, "much more of a sentimental, psychologicrul and mora:1 nature than of a political and economic nature" (15) . 1 At , the end of the first World War, Dr. Stephen Osusky, foreimost representative of the Slovaks at that time on the side of the Entente, wrote a lb,o ok in F,renc'h, 1n whielh we find these words: "The defenders Otf AttstriaHunga:ry, in foreign lands as well as in the interior Otf the dual Monarchy, are aJCting very Hlog,rcaMy. They are very much for the 1ilberation of Poland, !b ut do not want to allow the ltberation of the remaining nations. Let us liberate all nations who wrunt to 'b e free, allowing them to create their own independent states, and we shall fulfill one of the tasks confronting us. Fav,o ring then the approchement of great Poland, whielh shall have access to the Ba:ltic Sea in Danzig, Rumania and the land$ of Czecho-Slova!kia, on the one hand, and Ukrainia, to which we must give serious thoug,ht, on the other hand, a ,powerful federation of free states will be created in the nor,th (of Central Europe)" (16). In the southern part of this area, Osus.ky proposed to support efforts to create a federation of .Southern Slavs, (15) LE PROBLEME DE L'EUROPE CENTIRALE: p.' 47, Sources et documents tchecoslovaques, No. 24. 16) Stephen Osuslky, ClJOPIN, MAGY:ARff ET ~4-NGERM.NNISTIDS, Paris, 1918. �SLOVAKIA 10 after the realiizaition of which, "we shall on'1y have to connect these two federaitioins with a bridge which once existed but collapsed under the blow of historic events. T,hiu:s would come to an end the Orang nach Osten, to German a:ggression to the ffiast, and Europe and the world could work in peaJCe" (17). The plan, however, was Oipposed by T. G. Masaryk and Edward Benes. Another Sllovaik, Dr. Milan Hod'za, came forth with a d:irfferent plan, the so-called "Danube Plan." Fkst as Minister of Agriculture , later as Premier of the Ozecho-iSlo<vak Governmen t, Dr. Hodza endeavored to develop cooperation between the Central Eruropean nations and the consolidation of the oconomic situation in this pa1t of Europe- The climax of these endeavors was his "Danu!be Plan," which aimed to create, ·aJccording to Hodza's own words, "one single, great economic urut in Central Europe." This was to be attained by removing tariff ba.roiers and establishing a customs union, regu1'atmg agriculture and industrial production, reorganizin g the system of payments and transportation, etc. (18). The first steps in this dirootion were already made in 1937 by treaJties conduded between the indwidu.ail Danulbfan States and Bulgaria. Hodm's initiatiive found understand ing both in France and ffingla.nd, but Gemnany and Italy opposed it, thinking the plan was aimed against their influence in Central Europe, nay that it was an "effort to surround Germany," a:s the Germian press e,cpressed it. The plan failed not only 'beca;use orf this opposition, but also because of the crisis which began to aippear within the framework of the Little Entente and the developmen t of an inter-natioD.ial situation which tended in the opposite direction. The politico-mil itary actions of nationaHy socialist Germany and Mussolini's ltaly began to have far-reachim.g i:nd:iluenice on the whole of EUTope, but the most marked consequenc es began to appeax in Central and Souithea:stern Europe. Yugoslavia was 17) A. Ohervin, L'AUTRIOHE ET LA HONGRIE DE DE- MAIN, Paris, 1915. 18) Dr. Milan Hodza, i;,JDDERATI-ON IN CENTRAL EUROPE, pgs. 131-133. �SLOVAKIA 11 the first to suffer the consequences froim the cha.rnged situation and, with Stojadinovic leading it, began to look toward Berlin. Mter a;n internal crisis and a change of governments, Rum-ani•a a'lso ibeca:m.e equaJil.y uncertain. The Little filntente, w'hioh •w as considered the pillar and guarantor of the OTder, created by pea:ce aigreements, went headlong into ruin. lit crashed even •b efore the Germans began their march into the DanuJbe basin and oould not prevent the colla;pse of the order built up in 1918, nor the political and economical hegemony of Hitler's Germany. UndoulbtecNy, the rea;sons for the collapse of the European system and, therefore, also of the Cenltral-European organization, were many- But it ca11!Ilot be denied that Hitler's plans and ructions in the Danube basin were suJbstantially facilitated by the political and economic conditions which governed there after 1918. Oonsequeinitly, the discontented nations, as predicted :ey Lansing, iif they did not work to overthrow that system, as did Hungary and Austria, then they certainly were not willing in the least to defend it, as was the case with c~echo-Slovatkiia a111d Yugoslavia. The dissolution of Czecho~Slova1kia was in fact caused by the German minoriity, as even Dr. Benes stated, because : In Munioh Czecho..:Slovakia was fatally wounded from the outside. " Munich, however, meant much more tha:n thaJt. "It opened the way along the Danulbe all the way to the Blacik Sea to German expamsion," as Winston Churchill said in the British Parliament O'l1 Oct. 5, 1938. Munich meant the end of the European system ,b uilt up by the •peace treaties of 19181920 and installed in Central Europe a Germ.an- Italian Russian co-dominiOIIl whioh, even though it did not last long, did bring new elements into the organization of the CentralEuropean area. Germany was in its politics consistent and adroit, and thus "milita;ry might, dwplomacy, propaganda and the feeling of helplessness before the preponderance of their neighbors, as well as the economic interests, were the causes of the voluntary or forced subordination of the Danulbian �12 SL0VAKlA nations, their new political orientation and cooperation with the Axis," says Graham Hutton (19). "•I n Belgrade, Bucharest and naturally in Sophia, kings and princes did not trust international obligations of collective security. They fuought tha,t every state must endeavor by its own means to serve the peace of all, buit t hat its first task ls to preserve its own peace" (20). And what 'hruppened in Prague was nothing else but what Dr. Benes had already told Minister Sfona in 1936: "If they (the French) aJbandon us without helping us in ·the face of German threats, we shall suI1prise the world by the limitless possilbilities of servility toward Berlin" (21) . This dissolution of the Versailles organization by German policies, whiich endeavored to make of this region a German "lebensraum," forced the representatives of the Central-European nations to return to the efforts to create a Cenitral-European federation, or confederation. A federalistic solution of Central-European problems seemed to be the only strong solution especial1.y when Gerniainy and Russia, with the pact of August 23, 1939, temporarily shared government over Central and Southeastern Europe, annexing territories, nay, even whole states and esta/t,lishing a dictatorship over them. In that situation even the most bigoted enemies of federalistic endeavors of Centr.a:l-Europe in the period between the two wars, politicians who ",p referred to see Hitler in Vienna than the Habsburgs," returned to the idea of creating a great federative unit in Central Europe after the end of the war. The Soviet-German Pact convinced even the nations, which in an effort to hold their own advantageous position in Central Europe wished its partition, that their own security, nay even their own existence in fact, could be guaranteed oltly by an intimate union of all the Central European nations. 19) Graihaim Hutton, LES NOUVEAUX DES'DINS DU DANiUBE, Paris, 1939. . 20) Gregoke Gafencu, DERNIERS J0URS DE L'EU'R0PE, p. 105. 21) Comte Sforza, ILLUS IONS ET REALITES DE L'EUR0PE, Neuch-atel 1944; p. 196. �SLOVAKIA 13 Russia, wrote Gregoire, "revea~ed her face, which had nothlng encouragin g either fur her neig1hlbors or for a peaceful order of the world. The Moscow aigreement unmasked the Soviet Union, in whrch the cult of might and the practice of dou!ble..dealing so strikingly reminded one of the times of Catherine the Great ,a nd the ooarrs of the past centuries. 'It seemed that she obeys the ancient and mighty impulses, siimilrur to those, which drove the Gennan masses in the opposite direction, to the East. But the Russian aggression was at the same time more corufusilng and mysterious. Opposing every .Umitation not because the area which this aggression included was too narrow, lbut conversely beca,use the concepti:on of borders is alien to the nature of Russia" (22). It was, therefore, only natural, that in such a situation the plans of l.lIWying Central Europe on a federalistic basis were again revived and that together . with t!he representativ es of other Central-EUTdpeain nations the Slovvaks - those who fought on the side of the Mlies, as well as the political representat ives who remained at home will:ih the people and sought to lead it into •postwar Europe with as little loss as possible - endeavored to realize a federated Central Europe. On the side of the AUies, it was especiaAly the Slovak political group led by Dr. M. Hodfa and Peter Pridavo~, which led an open strwg,gle for these conceptions . In his book "Federatio n in Central Europe" H~a writes that already in Jainuary 1940 Slovalk political emigrants had come to an understand ing that they wowld endeavor to create a Central-Eu ropean federation. The fotliildation of this federation was to be the union between Poland, the Czech. lands and Slovakia. On January 23, 1942, there wais such an agreement cone'luded between the Polish and Czecho-Slovak g(?vemmen ts with the __ jntention that it wouJd be. the nudeu:s of a great Central-Eu ropean £-Oll22) Gregoire Gafeneu, PRELIMINA,:fRES DE LA -, GUERRE A L'EST, Fri-bourg, 1944. �1-4 SLOVAKIA federation. Matters common to all were to be foreign, military, economic, social and furancial affairs, as weH as transportation, communications and the postaJl. service (23). Milan Hod'za's book, published in 1942, contained all the more serious reasO!I1s for a federated Central IDuroipe. "WaT event'S in Central Europe," wrote Hodza, "dhviously fully vindi<:ate the idea <Yf a solidly org,anized futuTe cooperatron <Yf ahl those eight States whicih aTe placed in complete geogrruphic coherenice between Russia, Germany amd Irtaily. A federali.lzed Centrall Europe is one of the absolute necessi-ties of a new postwaT order." In the preface <Yf his >book, Hodza te1ls us that the Oentral-EuTopean federation should be composed of four Sl'O'Vainic and four non"Slovanic nations, which should £ind a new, great and sohd foundation for their own national lilfe, keeping in balance all possi!ble ra;cial and imperialistic aspirations in the broad territory, the consolidated system of whioh is to be the strongest contribution to the new arraingement of Europe. The federation proposed 1b y Hodza was supposed to rest on a customs union. Fina<n:ces, trade policies, foreign ·p olicy, defense, communioations were to be managed jointly. The p1'am also called for a Ministry of Federal Law 8Jlld a Ministry <Yf Trade Unions and Professional Associations. Altogether there were to be eight commQ!Il. ministries, forming the federal government, which would be headed by a chancellor appoiinted by the president af the federation. In the central goverrunent all the nations were to ·b e represented by ministers without 1portfolio. Ministers with pol'tfOllfo were to perform their functiooo in cooperation with the state secretaries representing all.I the federated nations. The president was to be elected first by the presidents of the national governments, then 1b y the congress of the federation for a period of one yeaT. The memlbers af congress were to be elected by a two-thirds majority of the national parliaments in the proportion of 23) F.r om the French text of the Treaty in the Stoc![,holm review L'AVENIR, Vol. 1, No. 2. �SLOVAKIA one memlber for a million inhaib1tants. The ministers oif the federation, under the plan, could not be deputies of oongress. The solution ,p roposed iby Hod.fa would ha,v e a twofold advantage, wrote the "Voix des Peuples," the Swiss politicail review (Oct- 1944): "it would minimize the natio-nal antagonisms and would recreate the harmonius economic area, which !benefited Centrrul Europe before 1914. The sOilution, therefore, seems to be the wisest, because it is most advantageous for all the nations concerned." A positive stand to Hodfa's prnposal, on the assumption that SlO'Vlrukii:a iin the Europe confederation would figure as an ind~vidual member state, was truken by the main political o!I1gan in Slorva!kia, the "Slovfuk" (24), and in the Vatican diplomatic circles the interpreter of federalistic sqova,,k efforts was Ambassador Karol Sidor. At the beginniing af 1944, Dr. Ferdinand :Du11cansiky, university professoir and the first Fm·eign Minister of the Slovak Repulblic, published a technical study albout the problem of Centrail Euro;pe. The study ap:peaTed in the "Revue de droiit international, de sciences diplomatiques et politiques" (~fil annee, No. 1), putb lished in Gene,va. The status Which prevailed m Central Euro;pe up to 1938, led :Duvcansky to the log,i10al conclusion that a new Central Euro1p e must be orgaJnized on other fQ!Ulld:ations than those ()If 1'918 or those ruifteir that time; it must be organi:zed on the basis ()If coope:riation of the (Je,ntra!l-European niations and their equality. "We can imagine theoretically a cooperiati'On of the nations of Central Europe," wrote :DUTCam;ky, "either in a form of completely independent states, or in a form ()If close, mutual relation in a t.mrion of states. This cooperatiion would be directed by interna.tiona1 a:greement, or by a manner of federation in which every state would have •a special position defined by law." Campiete independence is, according .to :Dur1can:Sky, UJildou!btedly t!he most ad\.'amtageous. With regaro to the 1 24) Dr. Joseph Kirs:chlbaum, HODZ0V PLAN S'l'RED0-EUROPSKEJ F'EDERAOIE, article in tth e SLOVAK, Aug. 20, 1944. �}6 SLOVAKIA ciromnsta:nce that the majority of the Central-European nations, as far as their number and the exitent of their territories, are small nations, this coU!ld mean, said Durcansky, certain dangers. Furthermore, tendencies to limit the sovereignty of small[ nations, endeavors to create laxge eoonomiJC units, the result of technical development and experience from previous wars that sma:ller nations could not defend their independence rb y being neutral - all these led to tlle creation of larger units. :Dutcansky continues: "From these motives there is talk aJbout more active cooperation which ought to guar-amtee lasting peace aind a greater prosperity- This cooperation cannot overstep the framework of a confederation the cooperation 'between independent states diirected by norms of international law. This solution gives guarantees of independence and freedom to the nations of CentralEurope, enaJbles a s01lurti:on of incidental disputes which could arise between the individual states of the confederation and, on the other hand, could defend Central IDurope against external attacks." WthaJt are the arguments 3/gain.st the federation of Central Europe? :Duircainsky points ~mt that ail such arguments rest on the psychologica:l situation in Central-Euroipe, the prejudices emanating from the past and the tendencies of certain nations to renew their former status. The development of war events, however, did not respect the federalistic tendencies of Central-European nations as much as it did during the first World War. Desp~¼ the P-01ish-OzechJSlovak Agreement, despite the positive stand of influential Anglo~Saxon circles and despite tlle general conviction (25) that the Central-European prgaLD!ization created in 191'8 was aib,solutely unsatisfact,:ory _, :t9-r,, ~h~ majority of Centra,l-European nations, as it also ·was for the rest of Europe, nevertheless at the end of 25) What the indivrldual Centra)-Europel).n na.tions thought Stojan Pribil!evil!, about federating Central Europe is told by: WORLD WITHOUT END, New York, 1939; Edmoll'd Demaltre in the review 1/A:VENIR; Gr. Gl\,fencu, PRElJIMlNAIRES DE LA GUERRE A L'EST; ~ - A. Mccartney; PROBLEMS OF THE DANUBE BASIN. �SLOVAKIA 17 the war the very same states were renewed in their old forms, excepting maimed Poland and a smaller OzechoSlova:kia. The Altlantic Charter, the Charter of the United Nations, the natural rilght of every nation to its own state and the solemn prooLa.matioos of the waT years were qu'i.okly forgotten or e:,opediently a:bandoned. Furt:!hernnore, the dei1icate prolb'lem of the minorities began to lbe solved in a manner which was supported by the momenitary situation, in its co1I1Sequences, however, it ibroUJght new da:ngers for the Central-Ell.lropean area and ther~y for the whole of Europe. We are all witnesses of this today. The policy of the Soviet Union towaTd the n81tions of Central Euroipe and, therefore, feder81tiorral efforts did not die out even after World War II. m. THE PRESENT STRUGGLE OF THE SLOVAKS FOR A COMMONWEALTH OF CENTRAL-EUROPEAN NATIONS In 1945 Slova;kiia was occwpied by ,b oth the Russians and the Czechs, and the Communist-dOlminated regime installed there with the help of Moscow and Pr.ague reached to the very roots O!f the existence O!f the Slavalk nation. This irirefotaible fact has led the S1ov,a;k!s to fight uncompromisingly· from the very end of World War II :foT the liberation of Central Europe from alien hegemony rund for its federaJlirza:tion. The representatives O!f the Slovak nation are firmly convinced tha:t Central Europerun nations, if they do not waint to live under the hegemony of the one or the other otf their strong neig1hlbor,s, must unite in a larger · economic am.d stra:tegic unit. There i's no other solution. The entire politica1 and social development of Central EJurope from 1848 coofi:rnns this conclusfon. International policy, as well as the .p olfoy of individUJa1 1powers, is gu~ded by definilte coootants and lastinrg interests wihlch have Olll,tlived and shall out1we all changes o,f regimes. 'Dha:t is why today, just as in the past century, the CentraJl-IDuropeain nations must rookoo with the revival O!f German expansioo, �18 SLOVAKIA: which can change only its forms but not its aims, just as, on the other ham.d, Russi an JmperiaHsm haiS not changed and no regime will ever change it. The object of the expansionist endeavorrs of Russia and Gemniany is Central Europe, because of its geographical position and ethnic composition. These two powers have attaJdked each other for centuries for the control of the Centra~-Eumpeam nations. With the passage of centuries only the forms and pretenses of their imperiaJlism have changed. Pam.-Gerimanism and Pam-1Sllavism a1way:s followed and will follow the very sa:me pur,pose, and the only defense ,a grumst them is the unification of the Central-EJuropean nations on the basis of equality. ThaJt is the lesson of history. On the other hand, the experience of the ipast thirty years have proved that the system, which prevailed in Central and Eastern Europe s-ince 1918 and was again reestablished in 1945 by committing the very same mistakes, cotcld not giuai-antee Europe pea:ce and stalbNity, a:nd to the nations 'between Russia and Germany it could guarantee neither economic prosperity, nor security and freedom . ThUIS it hruppened that with the first blow of German imperiail~sm in 1938, as welil as a result of expansion of the Soviet Uni-on, the system succumbed, and with its downfall Ewrope and the wodd hruve boon thmst into dangerous crises, of whi:ch the first ended in war and the seoond threatoos with war. At the end of both waris, the nations of Central Europe were forced under regimes of terror, which were alien and hostile to the most fundamental cultur~d, po1i,tiical, economi:c and sociaiJ. traditions of all the CentraJl~Eurropeain natiions, who a.Te deeply devoted to the prindples of democr8Jcy and Christianity, the two concepts which are in prJndp1e at odds with both Nazism and materialistri1c OomJmunism. • 1 'I"housamds of Slov,ruk emigrants in Europe and elsewhere, am.d over a million Americruns of Slovak descent, have, therrefore, ,p roclaimed themselves since 194'5 for such a demooratic concepUon of a new Europe which would remove the o1d shortcomings of Europe, and especially of �SLOVAKIA 19 Central Europe, and would rest on the principle of equality of au nations alild be united in a federative uni'on. The organiization of Central and Eastern Europe, as it has proved thusfar, could not fulfill its mission orf strength against imperialism which has threatened the pea:.ce of Europe for Centuries, but conversely, it even facilitated the victory orf these imperirulismsThe weakest part of this organization was CzechoSlovakia, a heterogenous amd polyglotic state, which gave an OipipOrlU'lle excuse to ,the · Third Reich for its expansion and, on the other hand, made cooperation impossible with other Central Euiropean nations, because the millions of inhrubitants of the minorities which were included a:gainst their will into the Czecho-Slovak Republic. Instead of strength against the "Drang nach Osten," the Czecho-Slovak Repwblic became in 191'8 the gateway for the German march into the Dam.Iibe Basin, a,nd in 1945 the bridge 01Ver which the Russian-Bolshevist expainsion penetrated into the very heart of Europe without any resistence. A new orga:nization of Central Europe is therefore, according to the v,i ews orf the representatives of the Slovak emigiration, rubsoiutely ne<:essary not only in the interest of CentraiJ.-Euroipean nations, but also, and in the very first ¢ace, in the interest oif the security orf Euroipe and the peace of the world. We rememib er that both world conflrugrations broke out in this a:rea. Until the extensive region between Germany and Russia is organized on a new basis, gua1ramteeing justice, equality and freedom to every nation, Europe cannot have secured its security and prosperity. Aggression of imperialism , tending to dominaite Central Euro-pe, and then the whole of Euro,pe, could again be facilitated, nay aggressors could even find opportune pretenses and allies, if any one of the Central-European nations were wronged and forced under the rule od' another. The poHticai and economic development from the end of World War I has made the nations of Central Europe conscious enough orf the fact that a more pernnanent �SLOVAKIA !O and solid organization of this region demands that the r1ght to freedom and independence of every nation living there 'be recognired and respected. Being aiware of all this, the Slovak Lerugue of America, in the name of Americans of Slovak descent, as well as in the name of the Slovialk natioo, decl~re.d at its Congress in Oleve1and, Ohio, on Octdber 21, 1947, that "ibasicaliy it welcomes the idea of a federative union of the European nations." It was especially in agreement wiilth the thought of a fedei,aitive uni:on of the centra.1-IDuropean states, in which the nations of that part of Europe would find the prerequj.1s ities for peaceful coha/bitation, fruitful cooperation and effeicti.Jve defense of their individual and ool.lective interests. Of cou.rise, American Slovaks were for such an arrangement of Central Europe on the supposition that "the internal life of the indi,viduial member states amd their mu~ua.1 relationshi p ibe bui!l.t on the Christian principles of true democracy, mutual respect and solidarity," and if among the member states of this federation will be included "also Slovakia as an indrivid'l.Jlal , state, as an equiivalent state, as an equi,v alent and equal member." Slovak em~grants in Europe and elsewhere stand back of the same conceptions. They have so e~pressed themselves in numerous memoranda addressed to the Pe~e Conference, the United Nations, ind:ividua1l governments and to the represenitaltives of the various emigrant groups of the nations from behind the Iron Curtain. The Slovak nation never was am aggressor or imperi·a!list nation; it seeks nothing that does not rilghtfolly belong to it, and nothmg more than every naJtion, however large or small, has an inherent rig'hrt to .seek. The 'S lovaks are a deeply religious and democ-rati'c people, ruble and willing to cooperate with ·au nations of Europe who are determined to wipe out the pl,a gue oif Oommunism and fight for the freedom and independence of allil nati·ons. 1 It is, therefore, onl,y na,1:,ural that the representatiives of all the nations behintl the Iiron Curtain in emigration, among them aJlso Slo,va!k effii.gram.ts, are for the .remo,val �SLOVAKIA 21 of the organizations and regimes of terror which call themsclves "1p eople's democracies." Just as the hitherto unhealthy arralillgement clid not satisfy the needs of the Central-European nations - .one in which practreally hailf the nations of Central Europe did not attain the valid!aition of the right of selrf-detevmination - just so· the system of totali1:arian ":people's democracies" does not satisfy and ,is not in aocord with the traditions of these nations. The ,p olitical and social chaniges, effected iby the 30year economic and socia!l development in t'his region of Europe, whether in regard to the spreaJd oif cidization among the broad masses, or in the social structure, chang~ ed the features <if Cenitral Europe to such an extent that in the future onily true demooracy, extended to the e{!onomic field as ,well, can b.e the system which woU!ld satisfy the · mentality, the spiritual foundiaition and the social needs of t'he natio!IllS of Central Europe. Ainy other system than the democratic, especially the totalitarian system of the " 1people's democracies," is opposed to the most basic mOTal and poiitioail traditi'ons of these countries and, therefore, could be instaJ11ed only ,b y force and maintained only br terror. The freedom of Europe, however, cannot be · Se{!Ured as long as one half of it is under a government of tert01r. On the other hand, the ipeaice of ' Etl!iope and , tbe world cannot be secured as long as Centra1 ·: Europe _i,'s not free and tmi.ted :in sUJCh a manner that '-'it ' could cfufend its own freedom and security .and thereby , also the seciirity of Eumpe Thi,s ios ipossible only if a United Staites of Central Euro,p e be:c~mes a reality in one foT-m or another, Hugh Seton-W:atson, in the int,vodUJCtion of his book "Eiastem Europe Between the Wars," stressed this point when he wrote: "IndividuaLEastern countries ·o.fifer ·interesting fields of study to the speda,list, but are · of smaJ.l importance in world politics. But the Eastern · European proiblem, the problem of the hundred millions,· is· one :of •the ma,jor problems of oor age. Each of the peoiples of ffiaJstern Europe must enjoy liiberty aind self-government if unrest is to be aivoided." � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document APRIL, 1953 SLOVAKIA 1 SLOVAKIA AND CENTRAL-EUROPEAN FEDERATION PLANS Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum Slovrukia with its three and a haJrf million inhiaJbitants and area 45,000 square kilometers lies in the very heart of Central EUTope and its fate in the ,past has been most bitter. After losing their first State, Great Moravia, which during the reign oif King svatopluk included a part of today's Poland, Hmgary, Yugoslavia and for a short time even the Czech lands (1), the SlovaJks as a political factor could not validate themselves in CentraJl Europe for whole centuries. The leading Sloivak group shed its blood first in battles with the Ge:rmians and Magyars and, later, also in battles with the Tu:rks and Tartars. And still later it suffered under tthe pressure of the assimilatory tendencies of the Magyars, which ilrl it.he 19th century and the 1b eginn. ing of this century re8iChed the broadest masses of Slovaks and ruppreciaJbly reduced the growth of the Slovak nation . The Slovaks, who already in 830 had theiT own sta:te and chUI1Ch or,ganization and tthus placed the first foundations of European civili Z8Jtion in the Danube area (2), ap pear more clearly on the ipolitica:l scene again only in 1848, when they rebelled to regain their national independenct>. Decimated and .pushed into the mountains of the north eastern part of their first State, the Great Moravii.8Jl1 Empire, the Slov,a ks were more a cutural than politioo.l factor , up to the 18th century. "During the 17th century," wrote Dr. Milan Hodza, "when the Turks had occupied •all the rest oif old Hungary, Slovakia became the refoge of many lofty intellectual ef forts on behalif of that country. For some time to come_ 1 . 1) Dr. Francis Hrusovsky, GESCHICHTE DER S-LOWAKEI, · pp. 9-15; Julius Pauler, A MAGYARNEMZET TORTJ!JNETE SZENT ISTVAN!G; Dr. Joseph ~kult~ty, ORTY ZO SLOVENSKEJ MINU• LOSTI, p. 13 ; Dr. Milan Hodza, FEDERATION IN CEN'mlAL EUROPE, p . 86; AL'Phoise Huber, GESCHICHTE OESTERREICHE, Vol. 1. 2) Dr. Milan Hodza, FEDERATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE, p. 86. SLOVAKIA 2 in Slovaikia, there was much morn cultural mo;vement than in Bohemia or occupied Hungacy. At the end of the eighteenth century Slovakia prepared not only her racial rebirth. Trnaiva, which housed the Catholic University before it was tra:nsferred to Budaipest, became a centre of Catholic culture in the realm. Slova!kia was going to be the seat of the first serious democratic movement which had its raimifications in the whole of Hungary and which ended in a conspiracy directed against HaJbSlburg, and Slovakia revealed itselif as a meeting place of prructi:cally all contemporary currents of cultural and ipo>litica;l ideas. (3). After 1848, on the one side under the independence and politfrcal equality of a11 nations, and on the other side under the increasing pressure of assimilaitory Magyar policy, the Slova:k nation beg8;Jl a systematic fight for its polibcal riights. After the Slovak armed revolt of 1848 failed, the Slova!ks within the Hrubsburg monarchy dared to demand an individual self-administr ative unit, such as the Croaits demanded through Ostrozinsky, the Czechs through Pala cky, the Magyars, after Kossuth's revolution was squelched, through DeaJk. This was .p roposed also by Count Valerian Krasinski in his work "Panslavi.sm and Bangernnanism . " What the Slovaks really demanded was a federative solution. The Slovaks remained faithful to the idea of a fede rative solution of the Monarchy in the memorandum , pre sented to the Emperor in 1861, and aigailll at the Conigress of Na:tionaHties in Budrupest in 1867. At the second Congress of Nationa1ities, which took plruce August 10, 1895, in Budaipes't, despite ,persecutions, "the Rumanians, Serbs and Slova:ks, who assemlbled in Buda.pest, "wrote the Neue Freie Presse," dernand ,t he division of Hungary into ethnic self-administra iti;ve units, whreh in effect is equall to the demand to aJbol:ish the un.ion between Hungary and Tr.ainsylviania, to renew the Serbian Duchy and create a selfadmini,s trati:ve Slova:kia, suoh as Huriban (,leader of the 1 1 3) Dr. Mil an Hod za, IBIDEM, pp.208- 213. SLOVAKIA 3 1848 Slo'Vak rebellion - Author) promoted already thi•r ty years earlier" ( 4). This stand of the Slovaks, if we consider the Nuropean situation oif thaJt time and even the special position of the Slovaks, is readily understandaJble. Not only because the federalization olf the Habs!burg Monarchy, fearing Pangermanism, was the political program also of the Test of the nations of the Monarchy, except the Poles, but also because the rest of Europe was inclined toward this solution, considering the Habslburg Monarchy in its politics of "'balance of poiwer" as a factor of balance betiween Germany and Russia. In this policy, dictated primarily 'by fear of the Germans who called a congress to Frankfurt i:n 1:848 to attempt a union orf all Germans, the Czechs plruyed a leading part. Palacky's arguments and slogan "if AIU'stria did not exist, we would have to create it" gained the rest of the nations.who were satisfiied with the demand of a federalized empire. Even the Emperor seemed ·favo:rable to the idea as long as the danger lasted. "Th~ preservation of Austria, its integrity and solidification, is and must be the great and important concern not only of the Czech nation, but of the whole of Europe, nay of all hUJmanity and foreign lands," wrote Palacky to the Frankfurt Congress in 1848. In this regard Dr. Edward Benes wrote in 1908: "It is frequently spoken about the dissoluti-on of Austria. I aJbsolutely do not believe in it. The historical and economic ties, which mutua:lly u.nite the nations of Austria, are too strong to allow Austria to collaJP5e" (5). The rest of Europe, oif course, also feared Russia and its efforts to realize Panslavism as related by J . Danilevskij in his book "Russia and Europe" and by General Fadejev in his writings. "Slovanic nations," wrote Fadejev, "must try to attain two aims, that is, political and ~onomic development in their present homelands, and then a 4) Quoted from book DIE VEREINIGTEN STAATEN VON GROSSOESTER!RELCH, by Aurel Popovic!, Leipzig, 1906. 5) LE PROBLEME .ArTJTRIOHIEN ET LA QUESTION TCHEQUE, p. 307. ·4 SLOVAKIA closer union with the general Slovanic uni:on, whkh must be headed by Russia in international and military Tela. tions. Ea,ch of these Slovanic tribes needs a ruler for inter nal affairs and for the ·general interests of the great Slovanic Czar. Without the fulifiltlme:nt of these conditions self-admmistra.tion a:nd independence of the BaJikaJD. and Danube Slovak tr}bes is unthinka,ble" (6). Danilevskij, who pUlblished his boolk in 1871, also proposed a Russian-Slovanic confedemtion, in which would · be uni,ted all the Slova,nic people (Slavs) from the Adriatic to the Pacific under the leadershtp of Russia. In this situation, always feeling that it was thr~tened by Germany, France regarded the Habsbu:rg ffimpire as "the only barrier, sufficiently strong, at the beginning of the 20th century, whkh could discourage German a,mbi. tions the day when these would begin to threaten the European bafance," WTote Henry Rene (7). And France saw this balance threatened also by Russia, about whioh Th. Funk-Brentano wrote: "No longer is Rus:sia our ally, as it neither is for Germany or Austria, for England or Turkey : it has only one concern - to expand. It has only one ambition - to g,row. If it uses definite form s . besides, then it does so only to be better understood and allowed into the so-called European concern . . . We make offers to it and it · presents them to Berlin, w,hi'ch makes it a bett er oitlfer . .. Every alliance ls good thrut h elps it to exp.and. All other alliances are bad. It partakes in the divLsion of .s tates with the same ruthlessness with which it m a r ches to conquer them; it will reduce Poland and support · t he Balkans , because they are .Slovanic peoples, and it will annex · t he CJiinese, Turks, Armenians because they are not. That is Russia always . . . " (8). · Fear of Russia and Pamslavism, of which the Magyars and Ruma,nians were afraid and ·b y which the Polish · nation w1as stilf.led periodically, and the fear of the German "'Drang nach · Osten," forced the nations of Centi.·al Europe · -to seek a solution, which would expose it to the least -dangers. This solution they saw in a federalized Hrubsburg 6) Biresvija Vjedomosti; UVAHY O ORIENTA.LNEJ OT A.ZKE ; NEUESTE SCHRIFTEN, pgs.37-4 9. . 7) H enry Rene, . QUESTIONS D'AUTRICHE-HONGRIE ET . 'Q UESTIONIS D'ORIENT, Paris, 1903. 8) Th. .Funk-Brentano, LA POLITIQUE , PR·I NCIPES. ORI· .TIQUES, REFORMES. P.aris, 1892. SLOVAKIA 5 MonaTchy. As early as 1902 a representative of the Czech nation, one Oharles Kramaf, wTOte: "The wor1d does riot need a feeble, sickly Austria; only a strong, vigorous, interna!lly healthy Empiire can perform the all important task of keeping watch over the ba:lance of power in the world" (9). And Aurel C. Popovici, a Rumanian, WI'Orte a great woirk in 1906 in the defense of the e~istence of a federaliized HalbsJburg Monarchy under the title: Die Vereinigten Staaten von Gross-Oesterreich. Of course, this cry of the nations of the Halbsiburg Monarchy could find little SU!ppolit at the Royal Court, so the natioins constituting the Empire had to seek some other solution of theiir national problems, especially when the war whi-ch broke out in 1914 offered them an opportunity to do so. Furthermore, when the war ended, fear of Russia and Genmany, it was said, precluded the necessity of Austria, because Germany was defeaited, disarmed and "decrnilitar~zed," while Russia was in the throes of a politica:l and social revolution. Emerging from this situation, which the vrotorious a:llies somehow forgot to regard as transitory, the Peace Conference sanctioned the destruction of the Halbsbw,g Empire and the estaJblishment of national and nationaJi:stic states on its ruins. Centrnl Europe got a new face and a new OI1gani'zation on the basis of the right of self-determination of nations. But even this · new organization did not bring an end to fedemtional efforts , especiaHy not those of the Slovaks. II. FEDERALIZATION EFFORTS 1918-1945 The situation,· into whi-ch the Siovaks were forced after WorJd .War I, on the one hand, and the over-all situation of Central Europe in the period between the two wars, on the other, forced the Slovaks to continue their struggle for fedemlization: for a . federalization of Czecho-Slova:kia and simuitaneousiy also for -a federali,z ation of Central Europe. 9) NATIONAL REVIIDW, 1902. 6 S LOVAKIA In fact, 0zecho~Slovaikia was born on the basis of an aigreement between the Slova:ks and the Czechs that it woU!ld be a federart:ive state. In Cleveland Agreemelllt of 1915 and the Pittsburgh A!greement of 1918, the latter undersigned by T. G. Masaryk himself, t'hiJS was promised to the Slaviak:S. At the Peace Conference in 191'9 even Dr. Edward Benes promised this in the name of the 0zechoSlovak Gorvernment when he stated that "it is the intention of the Czecho-1Slovak Government to create the organization of the State ·b y accepting as a basis of natural rights the prindples aipplied in the constitution of the Swiss RelpUJblic, that is, to mrake the 0zecho;Slovak Republic a sort of Switzerland.... " (10). These agreements and commitments, however, were not rkept 1b y the Praigue government, which was dominated by the Czechs, and Czecho-1Slovakia became a centralistk state with apparent tendencies to assimHiate the non-Czech population, especiially the Slovaks on t'he basis of the artificia.Ny created conception of an ethnic "Czechoslovak" nation. - The eminent historian C. A. Macartney saw through the situation very clea11ly when he wrote: "The fact remains that the (Czech~Slova:k) government has been obliged more of:ten than not to rule Slovakia against the wishes of most of its inhabitants, maintaining itself only by the exipedienits of .restricting the powers of the .sellfgovernmg bodies to within the narrowest possilble limits, of filling the seats designated for "ex;perts" with its own nominees, and utilizi'Il!g. freely weapons of censorshi,p and po1i:ce supervision ... " About the economic policy of the Czech toward the S'1ovruks, the same author stated : "The richer (Ozech) firms bought up, or obtained control through holding barri!ks (notable the 2ivnostenska Ba'Il!ka) over the greater part of the Slovak establishments. The latter were thus left at the mel'cy of t'he owners in the Historic Lands (Bohemia), who worked them or closed them down as they pleased. Pro'balb.ly nearly one-third of all Slovak industries disaippeared in this way during the 10) Lloyd George, THE TRU TH ABOUT THE PEACE TREA· TIES, pg. 937 . SLOVAI\.IA 7 immediate postwar peri'Od, the heavy industries and textile factories beiing chiefly ruffe:cted" (11) . . . It was only natural, then, that the Slova;ks opposed the system whioh put them at such a great disadvaintage econooniically, politically and cultura:lly. The vast majority of Sllova1-cs, under the leadership of Andrew Hlinka and Martin Razus, demanded the fedemii zation od: Ozecho-Slovakia from the very begin~ing of its existence. 1 On J•a nua;ry 23, 1920, one of the foremost Slovak politicians, Deputy Dr. Ferdis Juriga, demanded the federalization of the OzeclhoJSlovak RepUiblic on the floor of the Pa:rliament with these words : "We must tend to decentralization, toward sel:f-1administra;tion, so that the Republic could develop on a federalistic basis, because federalism is the system of the future - We must preserve our individual1ity and not let ourselves be absoribed. Federalization is not only in the interest of our naition, and the OzechoSlova!k Repwblic, but also answers the spirit of all mankind. It is an ahl-hu:man tenderrcy, the tendency of all mankind, this tendency to validate oneself, develop, to which every individual person and every national unit should have the right, whkh should crystallize out into a [egal personality, so tha;t these various nations could then become federalized in one, great world re4)u'bliic. This would be the highest ideal and the path that leads to it is : federalism (12). 1 But the Ozechs, just like the Ha'bsburgs, would not accede to the detrnands of the Siovaks and the minorities while there still was time. The Slovaks, therefore, "reacted in the form of a fl a,m'boyant Slovax nationalism which was a main reason for the albsence of revo[t with which they accepted the dissolution of the Ozecho-1Slovak State" (13). 1 11) C. A. Macartney, HUNGARY AND HER SIUCCESSOBS, London, 1937; pgs. 145, 130. J 2) Karol Sador, SLOVENSK.A. POLITJ:KA NA P<>DE PR.A2SKEHO SNEMU, Vol. I, pg.69. 13) ,C. A . Mwcartney, PROBLEMS OF 'DRE DANUBE BASIN, London; p. 122. SLOVAKli. 8 Between 1918 and 1945, there were evident tendencies among the Slovaks for the creation of a federated Central ffiurope. The organimti{)IIl, whiich was given t!his area by the pea>ce treaties, soon proved to lbe unsatisfactory economically and poilitioolly. On the OIIle hand, the principle of the right of self--determination was valida,,ted only :parti•a lly and as a consequen!ce the several nations of Central EurO!pe awaited only the opporlunity ~o alter the given situation. States like Czecho-Slovakia or Yugoslavia, made up of several nations and minorities, resembled old Austria.JHungary sitructurally, and soon enough their unjust policies toward t'he national minorities caused distrust and revisionism and excluded harmonious cooperation in Central Europe. On May 8, 1919, Rdbert Lam.sing, Secretary of State of tJhe United States, had this to say a!bout this new organiizati'on : "Examine the Treaty and you •wiU find peoples delivered agaill.8t their wills into t,he hands of those whom they hate... Resentment and bitterness, if not desperation, are 'bound to be the oonsequen<:es oof such provisions . It may be years ·b efore these oppressed pooples are able to tih<row otif their yoke, 1but as wre as day follows night the time will eome when they will make the effort" (14). On the other hiand, the dissolution of the economic crises, especial'ly in the accession states. T,he period between 1918 and 1938 wa,,s one of constant seeking of a ·r eorgaruzaition of Central Europe into a harmonious econo.m.ic and political whole. The Little Ein.tente, estalblished in 1920, Hiantos',s plan in 1925, Tardieu's plan in 1932, the Danulbe ·Paict in 1935 and Hodza's fiTst plan in 1936, to note at least t'he better we11 known plans, all of these in sUJbstan>ce had but o~e purpose: to create in an acceptable form such an organization in Central Europe whi1ch would hasve the adivanrtaiges of former Austria-Hungary, 'but would lack al[ its politica;l and social .shortcomings. Preserving the nationaJl states and democratm regimes, the economic arising from the partition of the Danube area were to •b e .removed by a system of alHances. Thus would lb e removed the tense atmosphere whi'c h reigned in this region and provoked neighboring powers to acts of aggression. 1 14) THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, London, 1921; p. 245. SLOVAKIA t Naturally, aU these plans and endeavors, including the Little Entente, resulted primarily !because of economiic condiitions; and their aim was not indi,c,ated as an effort to create a Centra:1-Euiropean Federation. This ,t hought, however, was deeply rooted in the minds of political leaders, even Dr. Edwaro Benes himself. A'1ways fearing the loss Otf the political and economic role which Ozecho-Slova:kia was playing, Dr. Edward Benes fought against every plan to unite Cenitra:l IDurape, 'but in 1936 he admiltted that "the plan of a Danube Federation is t!he widely propagated and best known conception proposed as a solution Otf the Austxian and Centro-European pro'blem." The reasons why this solution was not realized -w ere, according to Benes, "much more of a sentimental, psychologicrul and mora:1 nature than of a political and economic nature" (15) . 1 At , the end of the first World War, Dr. Stephen Osusky, foreimost representative of the Slovaks at that time on the side of the Entente, wrote a lb,o ok in F,renc'h, 1n whielh we find these words: "The defenders Otf AttstriaHunga:ry, in foreign lands as well as in the interior Otf the dual Monarchy, are aJCting very Hlog,rcaMy. They are very much for the 1ilberation of Poland, !b ut do not want to allow the ltberation of the remaining nations. Let us liberate all nations who wrunt to 'b e free, allowing them to create their own independent states, and we shall fulfill one of the tasks confronting us. Fav,o ring then the approchement of great Poland, whielh shall have access to the Ba:ltic Sea in Danzig, Rumania and the land$ of Czecho-Slova!kia, on the one hand, and Ukrainia, to which we must give serious thoug,ht, on the other hand, a ,powerful federation of free states will be created in the nor,th (of Central Europe)" (16). In the southern part of this area, Osus.ky proposed to support efforts to create a federation of .Southern Slavs, (15) LE PROBLEME DE L'EUROPE CENTIRALE: p.' 47, Sources et documents tchecoslovaques, No. 24. 16) Stephen Osuslky, ClJOPIN, MAGY:ARff ET ~4-NGERM.NNISTIDS, Paris, 1918. SLOVAKIA 10 after the realiizaition of which, "we shall on'1y have to connect these two federaitioins with a bridge which once existed but collapsed under the blow of historic events. T,hiu:s would come to an end the Orang nach Osten, to German a:ggression to the ffiast, and Europe and the world could work in peaJCe" (17). The plan, however, was Oipposed by T. G. Masaryk and Edward Benes. Another Sllovaik, Dr. Milan Hod'za, came forth with a d:irfferent plan, the so-called "Danube Plan." Fkst as Minister of Agriculture , later as Premier of the Ozecho-iSlo<vak Governmen t, Dr. Hodza endeavored to develop cooperation between the Central Eruropean nations and the consolidation of the oconomic situation in this pa1t of Europe- The climax of these endeavors was his "Danu!be Plan," which aimed to create, ·aJccording to Hodza's own words, "one single, great economic urut in Central Europe." This was to be attained by removing tariff ba.roiers and establishing a customs union, regu1'atmg agriculture and industrial production, reorganizin g the system of payments and transportation, etc. (18). The first steps in this dirootion were already made in 1937 by treaJties conduded between the indwidu.ail Danulbfan States and Bulgaria. Hodm's initiatiive found understand ing both in France and ffingla.nd, but Gemnany and Italy opposed it, thinking the plan was aimed against their influence in Central Europe, nay that it was an "effort to surround Germany," a:s the Germian press e,cpressed it. The plan failed not only 'beca;use orf this opposition, but also because of the crisis which began to aippear within the framework of the Little Entente and the developmen t of an inter-natioD.ial situation which tended in the opposite direction. The politico-mil itary actions of nationaHy socialist Germany and Mussolini's ltaly began to have far-reachim.g i:nd:iluenice on the whole of EUTope, but the most marked consequenc es began to appeax in Central and Souithea:stern Europe. Yugoslavia was 17) A. Ohervin, L'AUTRIOHE ET LA HONGRIE DE DE- MAIN, Paris, 1915. 18) Dr. Milan Hodza, i;,JDDERATI-ON IN CENTRAL EUROPE, pgs. 131-133. SLOVAKIA 11 the first to suffer the consequences froim the cha.rnged situation and, with Stojadinovic leading it, began to look toward Berlin. Mter a;n internal crisis and a change of governments, Rum-ani•a a'lso ibeca:m.e equaJil.y uncertain. The Little filntente, w'hioh •w as considered the pillar and guarantor of the OTder, created by pea:ce aigreements, went headlong into ruin. lit crashed even •b efore the Germans began their march into the DanuJbe basin and oould not prevent the colla;pse of the order built up in 1918, nor the political and economical hegemony of Hitler's Germany. UndoulbtecNy, the rea;sons for the collapse of the European system and, therefore, also of the Cenltral-European organization, were many- But it ca11!Ilot be denied that Hitler's plans and ructions in the Danube basin were suJbstantially facilitated by the political and economic conditions which governed there after 1918. Oonsequeinitly, the discontented nations, as predicted :ey Lansing, iif they did not work to overthrow that system, as did Hungary and Austria, then they certainly were not willing in the least to defend it, as was the case with c~echo-Slovatkiia a111d Yugoslavia. The dissolution of Czecho~Slova1kia was in fact caused by the German minoriity, as even Dr. Benes stated, because : In Munioh Czecho..:Slovakia was fatally wounded from the outside. " Munich, however, meant much more tha:n thaJt. "It opened the way along the Danulbe all the way to the Blacik Sea to German expamsion," as Winston Churchill said in the British Parliament O'l1 Oct. 5, 1938. Munich meant the end of the European system ,b uilt up by the •peace treaties of 19181920 and installed in Central Europe a Germ.an- Italian Russian co-dominiOIIl whioh, even though it did not last long, did bring new elements into the organization of the CentralEuropean area. Germany was in its politics consistent and adroit, and thus "milita;ry might, dwplomacy, propaganda and the feeling of helplessness before the preponderance of their neighbors, as well as the economic interests, were the causes of the voluntary or forced subordination of the Danulbian 12 SL0VAKlA nations, their new political orientation and cooperation with the Axis," says Graham Hutton (19). "•I n Belgrade, Bucharest and naturally in Sophia, kings and princes did not trust international obligations of collective security. They fuought tha,t every state must endeavor by its own means to serve the peace of all, buit t hat its first task ls to preserve its own peace" (20). And what 'hruppened in Prague was nothing else but what Dr. Benes had already told Minister Sfona in 1936: "If they (the French) aJbandon us without helping us in ·the face of German threats, we shall suI1prise the world by the limitless possilbilities of servility toward Berlin" (21) . This dissolution of the Versailles organization by German policies, whiich endeavored to make of this region a German "lebensraum," forced the representatives of the Central-European nations to return to the efforts to create a Cenitral-European federation, or confederation. A federalistic solution of Central-European problems seemed to be the only strong solution especial1.y when Gerniainy and Russia, with the pact of August 23, 1939, temporarily shared government over Central and Southeastern Europe, annexing territories, nay, even whole states and esta/t,lishing a dictatorship over them. In that situation even the most bigoted enemies of federalistic endeavors of Centr.a:l-Europe in the period between the two wars, politicians who ",p referred to see Hitler in Vienna than the Habsburgs," returned to the idea of creating a great federative unit in Central Europe after the end of the war. The Soviet-German Pact convinced even the nations, which in an effort to hold their own advantageous position in Central Europe wished its partition, that their own security, nay even their own existence in fact, could be guaranteed oltly by an intimate union of all the Central European nations. 19) Graihaim Hutton, LES NOUVEAUX DES'DINS DU DANiUBE, Paris, 1939. . 20) Gregoke Gafencu, DERNIERS J0URS DE L'EU'R0PE, p. 105. 21) Comte Sforza, ILLUS IONS ET REALITES DE L'EUR0PE, Neuch-atel 1944; p. 196. SLOVAKIA 13 Russia, wrote Gregoire, "revea~ed her face, which had nothlng encouragin g either fur her neig1hlbors or for a peaceful order of the world. The Moscow aigreement unmasked the Soviet Union, in whrch the cult of might and the practice of dou!ble..dealing so strikingly reminded one of the times of Catherine the Great ,a nd the ooarrs of the past centuries. 'It seemed that she obeys the ancient and mighty impulses, siimilrur to those, which drove the Gennan masses in the opposite direction, to the East. But the Russian aggression was at the same time more corufusilng and mysterious. Opposing every .Umitation not because the area which this aggression included was too narrow, lbut conversely beca,use the concepti:on of borders is alien to the nature of Russia" (22). It was, therefore, only natural, that in such a situation the plans of l.lIWying Central Europe on a federalistic basis were again revived and that together . with t!he representativ es of other Central-EUTdpeain nations the Slovvaks - those who fought on the side of the Mlies, as well as the political representat ives who remained at home will:ih the people and sought to lead it into •postwar Europe with as little loss as possible - endeavored to realize a federated Central Europe. On the side of the AUies, it was especiaAly the Slovak political group led by Dr. M. Hodfa and Peter Pridavo~, which led an open strwg,gle for these conceptions . In his book "Federatio n in Central Europe" H~a writes that already in Jainuary 1940 Slovalk political emigrants had come to an understand ing that they wowld endeavor to create a Central-Eu ropean federation. The fotliildation of this federation was to be the union between Poland, the Czech. lands and Slovakia. On January 23, 1942, there wais such an agreement cone'luded between the Polish and Czecho-Slovak g(?vemmen ts with the __ jntention that it wouJd be. the nudeu:s of a great Central-Eu ropean £-Oll22) Gregoire Gafeneu, PRELIMINA,:fRES DE LA -, GUERRE A L'EST, Fri-bourg, 1944. 1-4 SLOVAKIA federation. Matters common to all were to be foreign, military, economic, social and furancial affairs, as weH as transportation, communications and the postaJl. service (23). Milan Hod'za's book, published in 1942, contained all the more serious reasO!I1s for a federated Central IDuroipe. "WaT event'S in Central Europe," wrote Hodza, "dhviously fully vindi<:ate the idea <Yf a solidly org,anized futuTe cooperatron <Yf ahl those eight States whicih aTe placed in complete geogrruphic coherenice between Russia, Germany amd Irtaily. A federali.lzed Centrall Europe is one of the absolute necessi-ties of a new postwaT order." In the preface <Yf his >book, Hodza te1ls us that the Oentral-EuTopean federation should be composed of four Sl'O'Vainic and four non"Slovanic nations, which should £ind a new, great and sohd foundation for their own national lilfe, keeping in balance all possi!ble ra;cial and imperialistic aspirations in the broad territory, the consolidated system of whioh is to be the strongest contribution to the new arraingement of Europe. The federation proposed 1b y Hodza was supposed to rest on a customs union. Fina<n:ces, trade policies, foreign ·p olicy, defense, communioations were to be managed jointly. The p1'am also called for a Ministry of Federal Law 8Jlld a Ministry <Yf Trade Unions and Professional Associations. Altogether there were to be eight commQ!Il. ministries, forming the federal government, which would be headed by a chancellor appoiinted by the president af the federation. In the central goverrunent all the nations were to ·b e represented by ministers without 1portfolio. Ministers with pol'tfOllfo were to perform their functiooo in cooperation with the state secretaries representing all.I the federated nations. The president was to be elected first by the presidents of the national governments, then 1b y the congress of the federation for a period of one yeaT. The memlbers af congress were to be elected by a two-thirds majority of the national parliaments in the proportion of 23) F.r om the French text of the Treaty in the Stoc![,holm review L'AVENIR, Vol. 1, No. 2. SLOVAKIA one memlber for a million inhaib1tants. The ministers oif the federation, under the plan, could not be deputies of oongress. The solution ,p roposed iby Hod.fa would ha,v e a twofold advantage, wrote the "Voix des Peuples," the Swiss politicail review (Oct- 1944): "it would minimize the natio-nal antagonisms and would recreate the harmonius economic area, which !benefited Centrrul Europe before 1914. The sOilution, therefore, seems to be the wisest, because it is most advantageous for all the nations concerned." A positive stand to Hodfa's prnposal, on the assumption that SlO'Vlrukii:a iin the Europe confederation would figure as an ind~vidual member state, was truken by the main political o!I1gan in Slorva!kia, the "Slovfuk" (24), and in the Vatican diplomatic circles the interpreter of federalistic sqova,,k efforts was Ambassador Karol Sidor. At the beginniing af 1944, Dr. Ferdinand :Du11cansiky, university professoir and the first Fm·eign Minister of the Slovak Repulblic, published a technical study albout the problem of Centrail Euro;pe. The study ap:peaTed in the "Revue de droiit international, de sciences diplomatiques et politiques" (~fil annee, No. 1), putb lished in Gene,va. The status Which prevailed m Central Euro;pe up to 1938, led :Duvcansky to the log,i10al conclusion that a new Central Euro1p e must be orgaJnized on other fQ!Ulld:ations than those ()If 1'918 or those ruifteir that time; it must be organi:zed on the basis ()If coope:riation of the (Je,ntra!l-European niations and their equality. "We can imagine theoretically a cooperiati'On of the nations of Central Europe," wrote :DUTCam;ky, "either in a form of completely independent states, or in a form ()If close, mutual relation in a t.mrion of states. This cooperatiion would be directed by interna.tiona1 a:greement, or by a manner of federation in which every state would have •a special position defined by law." Campiete independence is, according .to :Dur1can:Sky, UJildou!btedly t!he most ad\.'amtageous. With regaro to the 1 24) Dr. Joseph Kirs:chlbaum, HODZ0V PLAN S'l'RED0-EUROPSKEJ F'EDERAOIE, article in tth e SLOVAK, Aug. 20, 1944. }6 SLOVAKIA ciromnsta:nce that the majority of the Central-European nations, as far as their number and the exitent of their territories, are small nations, this coU!ld mean, said Durcansky, certain dangers. Furthermore, tendencies to limit the sovereignty of small[ nations, endeavors to create laxge eoonomiJC units, the result of technical development and experience from previous wars that sma:ller nations could not defend their independence rb y being neutral - all these led to tlle creation of larger units. :Dutcansky continues: "From these motives there is talk aJbout more active cooperation which ought to guar-amtee lasting peace aind a greater prosperity- This cooperation cannot overstep the framework of a confederation the cooperation 'between independent states diirected by norms of international law. This solution gives guarantees of independence and freedom to the nations of CentralEurope, enaJbles a s01lurti:on of incidental disputes which could arise between the individual states of the confederation and, on the other hand, could defend Central IDurope against external attacks." WthaJt are the arguments 3/gain.st the federation of Central Europe? :Duircainsky points ~mt that ail such arguments rest on the psychologica:l situation in Central-Euroipe, the prejudices emanating from the past and the tendencies of certain nations to renew their former status. The development of war events, however, did not respect the federalistic tendencies of Central-European nations as much as it did during the first World War. Desp~¼ the P-01ish-OzechJSlovak Agreement, despite the positive stand of influential Anglo~Saxon circles and despite tlle general conviction (25) that the Central-European prgaLD!ization created in 191'8 was aib,solutely unsatisfact,:ory _, :t9-r,, ~h~ majority of Centra,l-European nations, as it also ·was for the rest of Europe, nevertheless at the end of 25) What the indivrldual Centra)-Europel).n na.tions thought Stojan Pribil!evil!, about federating Central Europe is told by: WORLD WITHOUT END, New York, 1939; Edmoll'd Demaltre in the review 1/A:VENIR; Gr. Gl\,fencu, PRElJIMlNAIRES DE LA GUERRE A L'EST; ~ - A. Mccartney; PROBLEMS OF THE DANUBE BASIN. SLOVAKIA 17 the war the very same states were renewed in their old forms, excepting maimed Poland and a smaller OzechoSlova:kia. The Altlantic Charter, the Charter of the United Nations, the natural rilght of every nation to its own state and the solemn prooLa.matioos of the waT years were qu'i.okly forgotten or e:,opediently a:bandoned. Furt:!hernnore, the dei1icate prolb'lem of the minorities began to lbe solved in a manner which was supported by the momenitary situation, in its co1I1Sequences, however, it ibroUJght new da:ngers for the Central-Ell.lropean area and ther~y for the whole of Europe. We are all witnesses of this today. The policy of the Soviet Union towaTd the n81tions of Central Euroipe and, therefore, feder81tiorral efforts did not die out even after World War II. m. THE PRESENT STRUGGLE OF THE SLOVAKS FOR A COMMONWEALTH OF CENTRAL-EUROPEAN NATIONS In 1945 Slova;kiia was occwpied by ,b oth the Russians and the Czechs, and the Communist-dOlminated regime installed there with the help of Moscow and Pr.ague reached to the very roots O!f the existence O!f the Slavalk nation. This irirefotaible fact has led the S1ov,a;k!s to fight uncompromisingly· from the very end of World War II :foT the liberation of Central Europe from alien hegemony rund for its federaJlirza:tion. The representatives O!f the Slovak nation are firmly convinced tha:t Central Europerun nations, if they do not waint to live under the hegemony of the one or the other otf their strong neig1hlbor,s, must unite in a larger · economic am.d stra:tegic unit. There i's no other solution. The entire politica1 and social development of Central EJurope from 1848 coofi:rnns this conclusfon. International policy, as well as the .p olfoy of individUJa1 1powers, is gu~ded by definilte coootants and lastinrg interests wihlch have Olll,tlived and shall out1we all changes o,f regimes. 'Dha:t is why today, just as in the past century, the CentraJl-IDuropeain nations must rookoo with the revival O!f German expansioo, 18 SLOVAKIA: which can change only its forms but not its aims, just as, on the other ham.d, Russi an JmperiaHsm haiS not changed and no regime will ever change it. The object of the expansionist endeavorrs of Russia and Gemniany is Central Europe, because of its geographical position and ethnic composition. These two powers have attaJdked each other for centuries for the control of the Centra~-Eumpeam nations. With the passage of centuries only the forms and pretenses of their imperiaJlism have changed. Pam.-Gerimanism and Pam-1Sllavism a1way:s followed and will follow the very sa:me pur,pose, and the only defense ,a grumst them is the unification of the Central-EJuropean nations on the basis of equality. ThaJt is the lesson of history. On the other hand, the experience of the ipast thirty years have proved that the system, which prevailed in Central and Eastern Europe s-ince 1918 and was again reestablished in 1945 by committing the very same mistakes, cotcld not giuai-antee Europe pea:ce and stalbNity, a:nd to the nations 'between Russia and Germany it could guarantee neither economic prosperity, nor security and freedom . ThUIS it hruppened that with the first blow of German imperiail~sm in 1938, as welil as a result of expansion of the Soviet Uni-on, the system succumbed, and with its downfall Ewrope and the wodd hruve boon thmst into dangerous crises, of whi:ch the first ended in war and the seoond threatoos with war. At the end of both waris, the nations of Central Europe were forced under regimes of terror, which were alien and hostile to the most fundamental cultur~d, po1i,tiical, economi:c and sociaiJ. traditions of all the CentraJl~Eurropeain natiions, who a.Te deeply devoted to the prindples of democr8Jcy and Christianity, the two concepts which are in prJndp1e at odds with both Nazism and materialistri1c OomJmunism. • 1 'I"housamds of Slov,ruk emigrants in Europe and elsewhere, am.d over a million Americruns of Slovak descent, have, therrefore, ,p roclaimed themselves since 194'5 for such a demooratic concepUon of a new Europe which would remove the o1d shortcomings of Europe, and especially of SLOVAKIA 19 Central Europe, and would rest on the principle of equality of au nations alild be united in a federative uni'on. The organiization of Central and Eastern Europe, as it has proved thusfar, could not fulfill its mission orf strength against imperialism which has threatened the pea:.ce of Europe for Centuries, but conversely, it even facilitated the victory orf these imperirulismsThe weakest part of this organization was CzechoSlovakia, a heterogenous amd polyglotic state, which gave an OipipOrlU'lle excuse to ,the · Third Reich for its expansion and, on the other hand, made cooperation impossible with other Central Euiropean nations, because the millions of inhrubitants of the minorities which were included a:gainst their will into the Czecho-Slovak Republic. Instead of strength against the "Drang nach Osten," the Czecho-Slovak Repwblic became in 191'8 the gateway for the German march into the Dam.Iibe Basin, a,nd in 1945 the bridge 01Ver which the Russian-Bolshevist expainsion penetrated into the very heart of Europe without any resistence. A new orga:nization of Central Europe is therefore, according to the v,i ews orf the representatives of the Slovak emigiration, rubsoiutely ne<:essary not only in the interest of CentraiJ.-Euroipean nations, but also, and in the very first ¢ace, in the interest oif the security orf Euroipe and the peace of the world. We rememib er that both world conflrugrations broke out in this a:rea. Until the extensive region between Germany and Russia is organized on a new basis, gua1ramteeing justice, equality and freedom to every nation, Europe cannot have secured its security and prosperity. Aggression of imperialism , tending to dominaite Central Euro-pe, and then the whole of Euro,pe, could again be facilitated, nay aggressors could even find opportune pretenses and allies, if any one of the Central-European nations were wronged and forced under the rule od' another. The poHticai and economic development from the end of World War I has made the nations of Central Europe conscious enough orf the fact that a more pernnanent SLOVAKIA !O and solid organization of this region demands that the r1ght to freedom and independence of every nation living there 'be recognired and respected. Being aiware of all this, the Slovak Lerugue of America, in the name of Americans of Slovak descent, as well as in the name of the Slovialk natioo, decl~re.d at its Congress in Oleve1and, Ohio, on Octdber 21, 1947, that "ibasicaliy it welcomes the idea of a federative union of the European nations." It was especially in agreement wiilth the thought of a fedei,aitive uni:on of the centra.1-IDuropean states, in which the nations of that part of Europe would find the prerequj.1s ities for peaceful coha/bitation, fruitful cooperation and effeicti.Jve defense of their individual and ool.lective interests. Of cou.rise, American Slovaks were for such an arrangement of Central Europe on the supposition that "the internal life of the indi,viduial member states amd their mu~ua.1 relationshi p ibe bui!l.t on the Christian principles of true democracy, mutual respect and solidarity," and if among the member states of this federation will be included "also Slovakia as an indrivid'l.Jlal , state, as an equiivalent state, as an equi,v alent and equal member." Slovak em~grants in Europe and elsewhere stand back of the same conceptions. They have so e~pressed themselves in numerous memoranda addressed to the Pe~e Conference, the United Nations, ind:ividua1l governments and to the represenitaltives of the various emigrant groups of the nations from behind the Iron Curtain. The Slovak nation never was am aggressor or imperi·a!list nation; it seeks nothing that does not rilghtfolly belong to it, and nothmg more than every naJtion, however large or small, has an inherent rig'hrt to .seek. The 'S lovaks are a deeply religious and democ-rati'c people, ruble and willing to cooperate with ·au nations of Europe who are determined to wipe out the pl,a gue oif Oommunism and fight for the freedom and independence of allil nati·ons. 1 It is, therefore, onl,y na,1:,ural that the representatiives of all the nations behintl the Iiron Curtain in emigration, among them aJlso Slo,va!k effii.gram.ts, are for the .remo,val SLOVAKIA 21 of the organizations and regimes of terror which call themsclves "1p eople's democracies." Just as the hitherto unhealthy arralillgement clid not satisfy the needs of the Central-European nations - .one in which practreally hailf the nations of Central Europe did not attain the valid!aition of the right of selrf-detevmination - just so· the system of totali1:arian ":people's democracies" does not satisfy and ,is not in aocord with the traditions of these nations. The ,p olitical and social chaniges, effected iby the 30year economic and socia!l development in t'his region of Europe, whether in regard to the spreaJd oif cidization among the broad masses, or in the social structure, chang~ ed the features <if Cenitral Europe to such an extent that in the future onily true demooracy, extended to the e{!onomic field as ,well, can b.e the system which woU!ld satisfy the · mentality, the spiritual foundiaition and the social needs of t'he natio!IllS of Central Europe. Ainy other system than the democratic, especially the totalitarian system of the " 1people's democracies," is opposed to the most basic mOTal and poiitioail traditi'ons of these countries and, therefore, could be instaJ11ed only ,b y force and maintained only br terror. The freedom of Europe, however, cannot be · Se{!Ured as long as one half of it is under a government of tert01r. On the other hand, the ipeaice of ' Etl!iope and , tbe world cannot be secured as long as Centra1 ·: Europe _i,'s not free and tmi.ted :in sUJCh a manner that '-'it ' could cfufend its own freedom and security .and thereby , also the seciirity of Eumpe Thi,s ios ipossible only if a United Staites of Central Euro,p e be:c~mes a reality in one foT-m or another, Hugh Seton-W:atson, in the int,vodUJCtion of his book "Eiastem Europe Between the Wars," stressed this point when he wrote: "IndividuaLEastern countries ·o.fifer ·interesting fields of study to the speda,list, but are · of smaJ.l importance in world politics. But the Eastern · European proiblem, the problem of the hundred millions,· is· one :of •the ma,jor problems of oor age. Each of the peoiples of ffiaJstern Europe must enjoy liiberty aind self-government if unrest is to be aivoided."  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovakia and Central European Federation Plans Description An account of the resource Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 1 (6), April 1953 pp. 1-21 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource April 1953 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/300872b1fc16055c2aec32c5cd361906.pdf 995df54c6ac5008b178fc60e105406cc PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA A VOICE FOR SWVAK.IA James McVann He stood about five feet ten, angular, and with the tenseness marked in so many priests who have fled from Communist countries. We met in Albany, N. Y ., at the home of Father B. Culver Alford, a diocesan official and a friend from Roman days. When I was introduced to the stranger, my curiosity rose at the announcement that this Father Augustin Zan came from Slovakia, where he had been assistant to Monsignor Tiso; later for six years he worked as the Papal Relief Mission's representative to Slovak D. P.'s throughout Germany and Austria. "Here was a man to interview. My first question had to do with the antecedents of Father Zan (prounonced Zan-yeh). He replied in an English by no means faultless but very good for one in this country only a year. "Forty-one years ago I was born at Prievidza, a Slovakian village in the foothills of the Carpathians. Prievidza means 'long view'; our village got the name because in old times there the government guards could see down the roads that went straight into the forests. "My seminary education was obtained at Nitra, ancient capital of Slovakia." Tiso The next question had to do with Monsignor Joseph Tiso, President of the Slovak Republic from 1939 to 1945, who was hanged in 1947 by the Red government of Prague. "How did Monsignor Tiso come to power?" "He succeeded Monsignor Andrew IIlinka as head of what was called the H'linka Party. When Slovakia, freed from the Czech government by the Nazi occupation of Bohemia, set up its own republic, Monsignor Tiso was elected president by the free votes of the country." "Wasn't Slovakia occupied by Hitler like the rest of Czechoslovakia?" �SLOVAKIA "No," he emphasized. "We stayed free. All during the war my country had neither German nor Russian occupation." "What sort of man was Tiso?" "He was a courageous - what do you call it? straight out, no speaking around." "Forthright?" "Forthright. He was a man prepared at all times to die. The Nazis tried to assassinate him at Bratislava in 1944. He had refused to let Slova,k soldiers be taken into the German army. When eleven American pilots were downed in Slovakia combatting Nazi fliers, he refused to give them up to Germany and spirited them to freedom via Jugoslavia. "Then the Reds pressed him to form a Soviet Slovak Republic. He refused, knowing they would take his life when the Allies won." "What was your own relation to Tiso?" I next asked. "Were you his political secretary or lieutenant?" "Oh, no. From 1938 to 1939 I was assistant - what you call curate - in the parish where he was pastor, at Banovce. All week Tiso was head of the government. On Sunday he came bacik to be priest of his people." "But why did he, a priest, accept the Presidency?" "He didn't want to. Sfovakia was under Nazi domination - four million against fifty million. What could they do? Tiso knew his position was almost impossible. But he accepted because he wanted to do all he could for his country. Once the West condemned him for things he had to do. They know better now. He was a great hero." Papal Almoner "Were you with him when he was executed?" "I had fled. A year before Monsignor Tiso died, the Catholic underground sent me a letter saying that the Reds had decided to hang me. The underground helped me to escape into the American zone of Austria." "Then what?" "Return to Slovakia was out of the question. I determined- to help my people - thousands of them - who were refugees in Western Germany and Austria. With the �SLOVAKIA aid of Archbishop Carlo Chiarlo, head of the Third Papal Relief Mission to G€rmany, I was appointed to look after Slovaks in eighty centers." "What was your work?" "Spiritual, charitable - not political. I tried to provide them with priests, sacraments and money raised by the Papal Relief. For that I made a hundred trips to Germany. Seventeen Slovak exile priests helped me. The Holy Father gave me the power to confer Confirmation. " "Why do you say your work was not political?" "As a priest and delegate of the Pope's charitable agency, I avoided politics. The nearest to political action I approached was when, on behalf of the Holy See, I questioned Polish, Hungarian, Slovakian, and Ukrainian refugees about church conditions in their country." Immigrant I asked him next how he came to the United States. "I knew I couJd get no help from the IRO - International Relief Organization - because some of their agents opposed my religious work. So I went direct to the American consulate at Salzburg, where I obtained entry not as a refugee official but strictly in terms of American immigration law. "Monsignor Emil Komora of New York, director of the Catholic Committee for Refugees, was helpful. And I am grateful to Bishop Gib.hons for admitting me to his diocese. They helped me to come to this nice country." I smiled a,t the little touch of newcomer's English, "nice country," Father Zan's one lapse in an otherwise good performance. The questions continued. "Why did you come to America?" "To work among the Slovaks here. There are two million in the United States and one million in Canada. And to obtain assistance for our unhappy people back home." "Tell me of your people's unhappiness " Intrepid Faith He leaned back in his chair, like a man recollecting-. "You will have to be patient with me a little if you would �SLOVAKIA 43 understand my nation's plight. We Slovaks are proud of our religious history - the oldest Christian nation in Central Europe, dating back from the fifth century. Then in 863 the great saints Cyril and Methodius came from Constantinople and renewed the Catholicism not only of the Slovaks but of all the various Slavic nations - Czechs, Poles, Ukrainians, Croatians, Slovenes - as well as the Hungarians. "Though Slovakia lost its political independence in the eleventh century, it never let go its national consciousness. No, not even under the domination of the Prague government when the regimes of Masaryk and Benes, violating the autonomy assured Slovakia by Wilson at Versailles, forced on us a Czech control in government, police, and education. "So when Hitler took over Bohemia and Moravia, our people seized the chance and proclaimed their Independent Republic. Until 1945 the country was free of occupation. In the war it took sides with Nazi Germany by defending its borders against Russia; there could be no neutrality with godless Communism. "In the Red invasion many towns and villages were razed to the ground (the way the Nazis had razed Lidice ) . Women were raped, about thirty thousand Slovaks were deported to Siberia. Thousands more fled to the West. "Then when the Reds took control at Prague, the Slovaks voted 70 per cent against Communism. For that they have been persecuted by the so-called People's Courts. It is essentially a religious persecution, as the whole question of Central Europe is a religious question. "Now all churches and clergy are under Red supervision No priest may preach anything but state-issued bullet ins. Catholic education has been turned over to Marxism. The seminary at Bratislava has only Communist youth who go out passing for priests until the people detect them in their Marxist doctrine and walk out on their sermons. Every bishop is in prison or under house arrest. So severe is their confinement that they cannot go to confession except in the presence of a Red observer - · and they must confess in Slovak for him to understand. A thousand' priests are �SLOVAKIA in concentration camps, forced to ]31bor in mines and factories." I interupted him to ask, "Are any priests being sent to Siberia ?" "So far they are being kept in Slovakia. But Catholic laymen are sent to concentration camps. "Has this weakened the faith of the people?" "On the contrary." he replied with a touch of pride, "their faith is stronger. They fill the churches. Since the government seizes all Church collections, they support the clergy privately." Voice of Hope "Are you in a position now to help your nation?" "To some extent. To needy priests I send Mass stipends. and the money I collect for the people is transmitted to Father Vojtech Bucko, my successor as delegate to the Slovak exiles in Europe. We both shifted in our chairs for the last question. "Father Zan, what do you hope for your country?" "I hope Slovakia will be free again I hope it will have the same freedom as America, to worship God and decide its own affairs." - (INFORMATION, Dec. 1952). • • • • • WHO SAi D IT? - "However close the original bonds (between the Slovaks and the Czechs) may have been, the ten centuries during which the Slovaks formed a part of the kingdom of Hungary, while the ,Czechs were subjected to German and Austrian influences, naturally ' brought .. about a marked differentation between the two peoples. Even the physical stocks CaJ'iilOt be so closely related today as they were a thousand years ago, for the Czechs are today inextricably mingled with German elements, while the Slovak mountaineers have retained their racial purity to a larger degree . . . . 'l'he.re is, however, a noticeable difference both in physical appearance and in character between the dour, efficient, but somewhat ungainly Czech, and the airy, talkative, happy-go-lucky Slovak." (C. A. Macartney: HUNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS; 1937, London) . • WHO SAID IT? "Slovakia has never been too happy in its union with Bohemia and Moravia in the synthetic Czechoslovak state. The Masaryk-Benes Government sentenced Dr. Vojtech Tuka to fifteen years imprisonment in 1928 for ,ieparatlsm. The Benes-Gottwald Government hanged Monsignor Tiso for the same offense in 1947, and Clementls Is to be tried for it In 1951." - (John MacCormac, The NEW YORK TIMES, 3-3-51). � SLOVAKIA A VOICE FOR SWVAK.IA James McVann He stood about five feet ten, angular, and with the tenseness marked in so many priests who have fled from Communist countries. We met in Albany, N. Y ., at the home of Father B. Culver Alford, a diocesan official and a friend from Roman days. When I was introduced to the stranger, my curiosity rose at the announcement that this Father Augustin Zan came from Slovakia, where he had been assistant to Monsignor Tiso; later for six years he worked as the Papal Relief Mission's representative to Slovak D. P.'s throughout Germany and Austria. "Here was a man to interview. My first question had to do with the antecedents of Father Zan (prounonced Zan-yeh). He replied in an English by no means faultless but very good for one in this country only a year. "Forty-one years ago I was born at Prievidza, a Slovakian village in the foothills of the Carpathians. Prievidza means 'long view'; our village got the name because in old times there the government guards could see down the roads that went straight into the forests. "My seminary education was obtained at Nitra, ancient capital of Slovakia." Tiso The next question had to do with Monsignor Joseph Tiso, President of the Slovak Republic from 1939 to 1945, who was hanged in 1947 by the Red government of Prague. "How did Monsignor Tiso come to power?" "He succeeded Monsignor Andrew IIlinka as head of what was called the H'linka Party. When Slovakia, freed from the Czech government by the Nazi occupation of Bohemia, set up its own republic, Monsignor Tiso was elected president by the free votes of the country." "Wasn't Slovakia occupied by Hitler like the rest of Czechoslovakia?" �SLOVAKIA "No," he emphasized. "We stayed free. All during the war my country had neither German nor Russian occupation." "What sort of man was Tiso?" "He was a courageous - what do you call it? straight out, no speaking around." "Forthright?" "Forthright. He was a man prepared at all times to die. The Nazis tried to assassinate him at Bratislava in 1944. He had refused to let Slova,k soldiers be taken into the German army. When eleven American pilots were downed in Slovakia combatting Nazi fliers, he refused to give them up to Germany and spirited them to freedom via Jugoslavia. "Then the Reds pressed him to form a Soviet Slovak Republic. He refused, knowing they would take his life when the Allies won." "What was your own relation to Tiso?" I next asked. "Were you his political secretary or lieutenant?" "Oh, no. From 1938 to 1939 I was assistant - what you call curate - in the parish where he was pastor, at Banovce. All week Tiso was head of the government. On Sunday he came bacik to be priest of his people." "But why did he, a priest, accept the Presidency?" "He didn't want to. Sfovakia was under Nazi domination - four million against fifty million. What could they do? Tiso knew his position was almost impossible. But he accepted because he wanted to do all he could for his country. Once the West condemned him for things he had to do. They know better now. He was a great hero." Papal Almoner "Were you with him when he was executed?" "I had fled. A year before Monsignor Tiso died, the Catholic underground sent me a letter saying that the Reds had decided to hang me. The underground helped me to escape into the American zone of Austria." "Then what?" "Return to Slovakia was out of the question. I determined- to help my people - thousands of them - who were refugees in Western Germany and Austria. With the �SLOVAKIA aid of Archbishop Carlo Chiarlo, head of the Third Papal Relief Mission to G€rmany, I was appointed to look after Slovaks in eighty centers." "What was your work?" "Spiritual, charitable - not political. I tried to provide them with priests, sacraments and money raised by the Papal Relief. For that I made a hundred trips to Germany. Seventeen Slovak exile priests helped me. The Holy Father gave me the power to confer Confirmation. " "Why do you say your work was not political?" "As a priest and delegate of the Pope's charitable agency, I avoided politics. The nearest to political action I approached was when, on behalf of the Holy See, I questioned Polish, Hungarian, Slovakian, and Ukrainian refugees about church conditions in their country." Immigrant I asked him next how he came to the United States. "I knew I couJd get no help from the IRO - International Relief Organization - because some of their agents opposed my religious work. So I went direct to the American consulate at Salzburg, where I obtained entry not as a refugee official but strictly in terms of American immigration law. "Monsignor Emil Komora of New York, director of the Catholic Committee for Refugees, was helpful. And I am grateful to Bishop Gib.hons for admitting me to his diocese. They helped me to come to this nice country." I smiled a,t the little touch of newcomer's English, "nice country," Father Zan's one lapse in an otherwise good performance. The questions continued. "Why did you come to America?" "To work among the Slovaks here. There are two million in the United States and one million in Canada. And to obtain assistance for our unhappy people back home." "Tell me of your people's unhappiness " Intrepid Faith He leaned back in his chair, like a man recollecting-. "You will have to be patient with me a little if you would �SLOVAKIA 43 understand my nation's plight. We Slovaks are proud of our religious history - the oldest Christian nation in Central Europe, dating back from the fifth century. Then in 863 the great saints Cyril and Methodius came from Constantinople and renewed the Catholicism not only of the Slovaks but of all the various Slavic nations - Czechs, Poles, Ukrainians, Croatians, Slovenes - as well as the Hungarians. "Though Slovakia lost its political independence in the eleventh century, it never let go its national consciousness. No, not even under the domination of the Prague government when the regimes of Masaryk and Benes, violating the autonomy assured Slovakia by Wilson at Versailles, forced on us a Czech control in government, police, and education. "So when Hitler took over Bohemia and Moravia, our people seized the chance and proclaimed their Independent Republic. Until 1945 the country was free of occupation. In the war it took sides with Nazi Germany by defending its borders against Russia; there could be no neutrality with godless Communism. "In the Red invasion many towns and villages were razed to the ground (the way the Nazis had razed Lidice ) . Women were raped, about thirty thousand Slovaks were deported to Siberia. Thousands more fled to the West. "Then when the Reds took control at Prague, the Slovaks voted 70 per cent against Communism. For that they have been persecuted by the so-called People's Courts. It is essentially a religious persecution, as the whole question of Central Europe is a religious question. "Now all churches and clergy are under Red supervision No priest may preach anything but state-issued bullet ins. Catholic education has been turned over to Marxism. The seminary at Bratislava has only Communist youth who go out passing for priests until the people detect them in their Marxist doctrine and walk out on their sermons. Every bishop is in prison or under house arrest. So severe is their confinement that they cannot go to confession except in the presence of a Red observer - · and they must confess in Slovak for him to understand. A thousand' priests are �SLOVAKIA in concentration camps, forced to ]31bor in mines and factories." I interupted him to ask, "Are any priests being sent to Siberia ?" "So far they are being kept in Slovakia. But Catholic laymen are sent to concentration camps. "Has this weakened the faith of the people?" "On the contrary." he replied with a touch of pride, "their faith is stronger. They fill the churches. Since the government seizes all Church collections, they support the clergy privately." Voice of Hope "Are you in a position now to help your nation?" "To some extent. To needy priests I send Mass stipends. and the money I collect for the people is transmitted to Father Vojtech Bucko, my successor as delegate to the Slovak exiles in Europe. We both shifted in our chairs for the last question. "Father Zan, what do you hope for your country?" "I hope Slovakia will be free again I hope it will have the same freedom as America, to worship God and decide its own affairs." - (INFORMATION, Dec. 1952). • • • • • WHO SAi D IT? - "However close the original bonds (between the Slovaks and the Czechs) may have been, the ten centuries during which the Slovaks formed a part of the kingdom of Hungary, while the ,Czechs were subjected to German and Austrian influences, naturally ' brought .. about a marked differentation between the two peoples. Even the physical stocks CaJ'iilOt be so closely related today as they were a thousand years ago, for the Czechs are today inextricably mingled with German elements, while the Slovak mountaineers have retained their racial purity to a larger degree . . . . 'l'he.re is, however, a noticeable difference both in physical appearance and in character between the dour, efficient, but somewhat ungainly Czech, and the airy, talkative, happy-go-lucky Slovak." (C. A. Macartney: HUNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS; 1937, London) . • WHO SAID IT? "Slovakia has never been too happy in its union with Bohemia and Moravia in the synthetic Czechoslovak state. The Masaryk-Benes Government sentenced Dr. Vojtech Tuka to fifteen years imprisonment in 1928 for ,ieparatlsm. The Benes-Gottwald Government hanged Monsignor Tiso for the same offense in 1947, and Clementls Is to be tried for it In 1951." - (John MacCormac, The NEW YORK TIMES, 3-3-51). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA A VOICE FOR SLOVAKIA James McVann He stood about five feet ten, angular, and with the tenseness marked in so many priests who have fled from Communist countries. We met in Albany, N. Y ., at the home of Father B. Culver Alford, a diocesan official and a friend from Roman days. When I was introduced to the stranger, my curiosity rose at the announcement that this Father Augustin Zan came from Slovakia, where he had been assistant to Monsignor Tiso; later for six years he worked as the Papal Relief Mission's representative to Slovak D. P.'s throughout Germany and Austria. "Here was a man to interview. My first question had to do with the antecedents of Father Zan (prounonced Zan-yeh). He replied in an English by no means faultless but very good for one in this country only a year. "Forty-one years ago I was born at Prievidza, a Slovakian village in the foothills of the Carpathians. Prievidza means 'long view'; our village got the name because in old times there the government guards could see down the roads that went straight into the forests. "My seminary education was obtained at Nitra, ancient capital of Slovakia." Tiso The next question had to do with Monsignor Joseph Tiso, President of the Slovak Republic from 1939 to 1945, who was hanged in 1947 by the Red government of Prague. "How did Monsignor Tiso come to power?" "He succeeded Monsignor Andrew IIlinka as head of what was called the H'linka Party. When Slovakia, freed from the Czech government by the Nazi occupation of Bohemia, set up its own republic, Monsignor Tiso was elected president by the free votes of the country." "Wasn't Slovakia occupied by Hitler like the rest of Czechoslovakia?" SLOVAKIA "No," he emphasized. "We stayed free. All during the war my country had neither German nor Russian occupation." "What sort of man was Tiso?" "He was a courageous - what do you call it? straight out, no speaking around." "Forthright?" "Forthright. He was a man prepared at all times to die. The Nazis tried to assassinate him at Bratislava in 1944. He had refused to let Slova,k soldiers be taken into the German army. When eleven American pilots were downed in Slovakia combatting Nazi fliers, he refused to give them up to Germany and spirited them to freedom via Jugoslavia. "Then the Reds pressed him to form a Soviet Slovak Republic. He refused, knowing they would take his life when the Allies won." "What was your own relation to Tiso?" I next asked. "Were you his political secretary or lieutenant?" "Oh, no. From 1938 to 1939 I was assistant - what you call curate - in the parish where he was pastor, at Banovce. All week Tiso was head of the government. On Sunday he came bacik to be priest of his people." "But why did he, a priest, accept the Presidency?" "He didn't want to. Sfovakia was under Nazi domination - four million against fifty million. What could they do? Tiso knew his position was almost impossible. But he accepted because he wanted to do all he could for his country. Once the West condemned him for things he had to do. They know better now. He was a great hero." Papal Almoner "Were you with him when he was executed?" "I had fled. A year before Monsignor Tiso died, the Catholic underground sent me a letter saying that the Reds had decided to hang me. The underground helped me to escape into the American zone of Austria." "Then what?" "Return to Slovakia was out of the question. I determined- to help my people - thousands of them - who were refugees in Western Germany and Austria. With the SLOVAKIA aid of Archbishop Carlo Chiarlo, head of the Third Papal Relief Mission to G€rmany, I was appointed to look after Slovaks in eighty centers." "What was your work?" "Spiritual, charitable - not political. I tried to provide them with priests, sacraments and money raised by the Papal Relief. For that I made a hundred trips to Germany. Seventeen Slovak exile priests helped me. The Holy Father gave me the power to confer Confirmation. " "Why do you say your work was not political?" "As a priest and delegate of the Pope's charitable agency, I avoided politics. The nearest to political action I approached was when, on behalf of the Holy See, I questioned Polish, Hungarian, Slovakian, and Ukrainian refugees about church conditions in their country." Immigrant I asked him next how he came to the United States. "I knew I couJd get no help from the IRO - International Relief Organization - because some of their agents opposed my religious work. So I went direct to the American consulate at Salzburg, where I obtained entry not as a refugee official but strictly in terms of American immigration law. "Monsignor Emil Komora of New York, director of the Catholic Committee for Refugees, was helpful. And I am grateful to Bishop Gib.hons for admitting me to his diocese. They helped me to come to this nice country." I smiled a,t the little touch of newcomer's English, "nice country," Father Zan's one lapse in an otherwise good performance. The questions continued. "Why did you come to America?" "To work among the Slovaks here. There are two million in the United States and one million in Canada. And to obtain assistance for our unhappy people back home." "Tell me of your people's unhappiness " Intrepid Faith He leaned back in his chair, like a man recollecting-. "You will have to be patient with me a little if you would SLOVAKIA 43 understand my nation's plight. We Slovaks are proud of our religious history - the oldest Christian nation in Central Europe, dating back from the fifth century. Then in 863 the great saints Cyril and Methodius came from Constantinople and renewed the Catholicism not only of the Slovaks but of all the various Slavic nations - Czechs, Poles, Ukrainians, Croatians, Slovenes - as well as the Hungarians. "Though Slovakia lost its political independence in the eleventh century, it never let go its national consciousness. No, not even under the domination of the Prague government when the regimes of Masaryk and Benes, violating the autonomy assured Slovakia by Wilson at Versailles, forced on us a Czech control in government, police, and education. "So when Hitler took over Bohemia and Moravia, our people seized the chance and proclaimed their Independent Republic. Until 1945 the country was free of occupation. In the war it took sides with Nazi Germany by defending its borders against Russia; there could be no neutrality with godless Communism. "In the Red invasion many towns and villages were razed to the ground (the way the Nazis had razed Lidice ) . Women were raped, about thirty thousand Slovaks were deported to Siberia. Thousands more fled to the West. "Then when the Reds took control at Prague, the Slovaks voted 70 per cent against Communism. For that they have been persecuted by the so-called People's Courts. It is essentially a religious persecution, as the whole question of Central Europe is a religious question. "Now all churches and clergy are under Red supervision No priest may preach anything but state-issued bullet ins. Catholic education has been turned over to Marxism. The seminary at Bratislava has only Communist youth who go out passing for priests until the people detect them in their Marxist doctrine and walk out on their sermons. Every bishop is in prison or under house arrest. So severe is their confinement that they cannot go to confession except in the presence of a Red observer - · and they must confess in Slovak for him to understand. A thousand' priests are SLOVAKIA in concentration camps, forced to ]31bor in mines and factories." I interupted him to ask, "Are any priests being sent to Siberia ?" "So far they are being kept in Slovakia. But Catholic laymen are sent to concentration camps. "Has this weakened the faith of the people?" "On the contrary." he replied with a touch of pride, "their faith is stronger. They fill the churches. Since the government seizes all Church collections, they support the clergy privately." Voice of Hope "Are you in a position now to help your nation?" "To some extent. To needy priests I send Mass stipends. and the money I collect for the people is transmitted to Father Vojtech Bucko, my successor as delegate to the Slovak exiles in Europe. We both shifted in our chairs for the last question. "Father Zan, what do you hope for your country?" "I hope Slovakia will be free again I hope it will have the same freedom as America, to worship God and decide its own affairs." - (INFORMATION, Dec. 1952). • • • • • WHO SAi D IT? - "However close the original bonds (between the Slovaks and the Czechs) may have been, the ten centuries during which the Slovaks formed a part of the kingdom of Hungary, while the ,Czechs were subjected to German and Austrian influences, naturally ' brought .. about a marked differentation between the two peoples. Even the physical stocks CaJ'iilOt be so closely related today as they were a thousand years ago, for the Czechs are today inextricably mingled with German elements, while the Slovak mountaineers have retained their racial purity to a larger degree . . . . 'l'he.re is, however, a noticeable difference both in physical appearance and in character between the dour, efficient, but somewhat ungainly Czech, and the airy, talkative, happy-go-lucky Slovak." (C. A. Macartney: HUNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS; 1937, London) . • WHO SAID IT? "Slovakia has never been too happy in its union with Bohemia and Moravia in the synthetic Czechoslovak state. The Masaryk-Benes Government sentenced Dr. Vojtech Tuka to fifteen years imprisonment in 1928 for ,ieparatlsm. The Benes-Gottwald Government hanged Monsignor Tiso for the same offense in 1947, and Clementls Is to be tried for it In 1951." - (John MacCormac, The NEW YORK TIMES, 3-3-51).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource A Voice for Slovakia Description An account of the resource James McVann Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 1 (6), April 1953 pp. 40-44 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource McVann, James Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource April 1953 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/4355d5fa608dcbd2e5899b446d1a939b.pdf 80ffe57af0f2baf80c1a8cf5b8032a04 PDF Text Text 26 SLOVAKIA SLOVAK AND EUROPEAN SEPARATISM (AN INTERVIEW WITH THE LATE ROYAL TAYLOR) Joseph A. Mikus "The National Committee for a Free Eu.Tope" has a district office in Paris. After 1949, political exiles from Central Europe, from newsp3ipeI1lllen to students desiring scholarships, visited this office seeiking .American aid. The Czechs, in particu[ar, passed frequently throogh its doors. In order to infornn Americans that there was a large and well-organized group of Slo.vruks in Paris which desired to have direct contact with political personalities in the free West, I sought an a.ppointment by telephone, one day in the su!mmer of 1950, with Mr. Loyal TayJor, Chief of the American Divisi'on of NOFE in Paris. · Wihen I appeared in the waiting room of the office on F'ooh .AJvenue at five o'clock the following afternoon, I was welcomed iby a ipleasant, elderly gentleman. Shaking my hand and smiling while measuring me from head to foot, he greeted me with the words: "So you are that Sloivruk separatist!" ''That depends on how you take it, Mr. Taylor," I re1plied. "It is evident that unrtil now you have been informed by the Czechs. It is well that I harve come." ; . "Well, welicome and haive a chair!" "'Dhanlk you; gladly! As soon as I hang 'my coat I will exiplain our stand on thi,s matter." "I aim very curious," he said. In the meantime, we had entered his ctffice and sat down. Mr. Taylor crossed his legs and settled himself behind a. large desk, and I made myself comfortaible in the easy c•h air opposite him. "The matter is very simpie," I began. "The difference ,b etween the Ozechs and the Slovaks is the same as between any two indi.vhluals. Certainly, Mr. Taylor, you would not think to claim, for exarniple, that there is any relationship between you and me that could be designated as separatism. We are two different pel"SOns, not?" �SLOVAKIA 27 "That I admit," Mr. Taylor said, "but I am not certain that your comparison is correct. You form with the Czechs one Czechoslovak (sic) nation, I mean, one State." "That is what the Ozechs claim. But that is not true," I answered. "We are two, nations, two historic and ethnic individualities which existed long before Czecho-Slovakia and Wlhich, since 191'8, formed one State on a basis of a mutua!l and voluntary decision. The original aim of CzechoSloivakia was to guarantee ,p olitical freedom to both nations within the joint State, to the Czechs as well as to the Slovaks. That is what Benes ,s aid at the peace conference. That is the waiy it is stated in the Treaty otf St. Gernl.ain. But, sinlce the ~ h s by unilateral a:ction changed the original pUI'lpOSe of the Ozecho-Slovak State, and misused this jointly-creruted b,ody, so that through the fiction of a 'Czechoslovatk' nation they cOUlld enthrone their own hegemony, the SlovaJk,s ceased to. consider this State as their own." "These, then, are the reasons which led the Slovaks to separatism?" Mr. Taylor inquired. "Well, taiken logically, as I have already stated, there ,c an be no question albout a Ozech and Slovak separatism. It would be ,possi!ble to tallk rubout separatism only where a breaich of a natural entity unit would be conoorned. Separatism cannot be 31PPlied in describing the relation.ship of. one nation to another. They can be close or distant neighbors; they can be friends or enemies; but not separatists. Our relationshilp to the Ozechs is an international relationship, and the Owcho..,Slovak State was actuaUy the result Olf that international interest for the guarantee of the freedom of its peoples. As soon as this interest faided on the one side, so fell Czecho~Slovalkia - just as a bridge falls, when the swpiporting pillars on one side of the river are washed o.ut by a flood." "Just what do you mean?" interrwpted Mr. Taylor. "Well, as you certainly will admit, we si,g ned a treaty with the Czechs in 1918, the contents of which they changed on their own initiatiive and to their own adivanta.ge. To put it more conJCretely, we ordered ten wagons of wheat and they delivered ten wagons of chaff. Naturainy, we refused to accept the delivery." 1 �2·8 S LOVAKIA "What exactly do you wish to say when you claim that the Czechs unilaterally changed the treaty with the Slova:ks regarding a common state?" pressed Mr. Taylor, _ . '.'Specifically this: in 1920, the Prague Government dictated .a Constitution for Slo1Vrukia which depr:ived the Slovaks of all . national rights," I explained. "How did it do that?" Mr. Taylor askeid -w ith much surprise. ''Why Masaryik's Czecho~Slovakia was a democratic state! And, as far as I know, the Constitution was not dictated by the Goverillillent but was adopted by the CzechoSlovak parliaiment." "In regard to the first point, there are democracies and democracies," I replied. "There is an American democra cy, a British democracy, a French democracy. There was, then, a 'Ozechoslava!k' democracy and now there is a 'people's' democracy. W1h.at I mean to say is. that these all d1ffer, that is, they are political systems of varied content. In regard to tJhe Constitution, you are right in saying that it was adopted by the so~called National Re1Volutionary Assem1bly. What, perhaips., you do not know, i-s that the members of this so-called parliament had been named by the Government. In short, the revolutionary Government appoint.e<l the revolutionary parliament which confirmed and adopted the revolutionary Constitution which this same revolutionary government presented to it." •~Dr. Mikus, are you serious in making this claim?" asked Mr. Taylor witJh astonishment. "It seems to me, Mr. Taylor, that it would 'be out of place were I not to speak seriously," I replied. "But I will tell you another in:cred:ilble thing. Mr. Benes, as Minister of that revolutionary government, named himself and eleven other Czechs as SLOV\AK 'deputies' to this. revolutionary parlirument." "Really? I must admit that this is exciting and unfamiliar history to me. " ''That does not surziprise me, Mr. Taylor. The period dming which the Czech0-1Slovruk Republic was created, as well as tlh~_. indifvidual acts of the 'Czechoslova:k' democracy, is a terrain pm,posely bedimrrned, from the very beginmng, by �SLOVAKIA 29 Ozech propaganda. A strict, 'blackout,' imposed by Czech pro1paiganda and Czech political history, hangs oyer this period." ·' •No matter what the situation was in the past, Dr. M;i.kus, I belie;ve that you underestimate the determination with which the Czechs will fight for the maintenance of the Czecho..,Slovalk State." "I, on the other hand, am of the opinion that the West is n'()lt fully aware of the tenacity of the Slovaks in their struggle for national independence. Moreo:ver, while the struggle Olf the Czechs is ordinary greed for political power, the struggle Olf the Slovalks is much more. It is a struggle for freedom, for the very existence of the nation. While a state is only a form, a nation is a living, moral being. Even Masaryik, whom the Czechs like to quote so much, recognized the priority of a nation over a state when he said: 'Wihen indirvidual nations are striving for their independence and are attempting to break up states in which they have until now been incor,porated, that is not a fight against humanity and internationalism, but a fight against those who used the states for an artificial levelling of the status among peoples and politiical uniformity. Humanity, however, does not seek uniformity but union, and it is the independence of nations which will maike possible an organic association, an organiic federation of Europe'." "That is an astQIUilding statement," ejaculated Mr. Taylor. "Certainly! But it i,s important to know when Masaryk said these words. That quotation does not come from Masaryk, the post-,war statesman, but from Masaryk, the exiled politician, who, in 1917, in hi:s book The New Europe, was explaining to the Allies why Austria-Hungary should be bro/ken up. Even though the Slovaks regard Masaryk as an unfriendly personal, µevertheless, except for a few national separatists, we all a:gree with hlm on this point." "Then you do admit that there are separatists among · the S}()IV:aJks ?" said Mr. Taylor, smiling triumphantly. 'There are! How colJlld there not be? The question is, who are they? It is not Sidor, or Durcansky, as the Czechs claim." �30 SLOVAKIA "Then who can they ~ ?" "They are, beginning with Pa:panek, the Slovaks in the so-called 'Council of Free Czechoslovakia'." "Dr. Milkus, your deductions certainly suT!prise me." "Believe me, Mr. TaJYloir, that was not my intention. But it is as clear as tlhe sun. The Slovaks are a nation and a political individuality in Central Europe. From a nation.al standpoint, those S1ov,aJks are separatists who deserted. their nation.a1 heritaige, jomed the Czechs of their 01Wn free will., formed the 'Council of Free CZ'echoslovaikia' with them and, so, as a minority, franik,l y disregard the will of the nation from which they descended. This is a classi'cal example of separatiSIID." ."WeH, UJPOn my word, this is, the first time I ever heard of it! It certainly is something when a separatist like you, designates men lilke Papanek separatists." "I swppose it wiH remain so with these gentlemen until they die," 1 sa,id. "They haive lived and died so long with the Ozechs that politically they have ·o ocome completely captured ,b y them. The Slovak nation will probably have to strike tlhem off its list. Just look well. Even now they are setting out on the .p olitical waters of Central Europe playing host on .iboard to the Ozooh secessionists. And with them they wou.W. li!ke to win in the fight for a thing which, from the point of view od' IDuropean devel01pIDent, must certainly collalPse." "You mean, perhaips, with Chudoba, Prehala, etc."? "No! Certainly not!" I contradicted, laughing 'heartily. "I mean with Zenkl, Ripka, etc." "I must say, Dr. Milkus, that I find it diffioolt to overcome my astonishment over your unusual interpretation of a:ffairs." "It is poosilble. But, just think aver it, Mr. Taylor. Europe is maviDJg and <beginnin,g to unite. There wi!M be a joint IDuropean coail and steel. There is much talik of a Euiropean Council at Stra.sslmrg, of a European parliament, even of a IDuropean army. But Zenikl and his group do not wish to see such a development. He continues to see another Ver- �SLOVAKIA 31 sallies Ozecho..;SlovaJlda, which guaranteed to the Ozechs priority in power. Do you not think that these gentlemen 'let the world pass them by' as the Czech poet Vrehlitoky would hasve said of them? Don't you think that the politics of the 'Council of Free Ozechoslova1kia' is a typical case of European secession? When I compare the politilcs of the Czechs and their Sl()IVaJk colia!borato;rs to the effort ~nded for a united Europe, it appeara to me entirely the same as if the State of Ohio and the State of Pe:rmsylivania, for instance, attempted to secede from the American Union and to estaJblish an independent federated State, Penn-Ohi:o, right in the heart of the United States." "I note, Dr. Mikus, that your comparisons become bolder as you continue." "That, too, is possible," I said, smiling. "Nevertheless, one thing is certain. Whiie .America certainliy woUJld not tolerate aniy secession in her midst, yet politically and finaJ11.cially she s~rts the open separatism of the 'Council of Free Ozechoslovaki,a' in Central Europe. For today anyone, living between Germany and the Soviet Union who is for the status quo of 1918, is a European secessionist and separatist. Yet, on the other hand, the SlovaJks who are for a free Slovakia in a federated Europe are aipparentliy ignored by America. • • • As I was leaiving, Mr. Taylor accompanied me to the door and, shaiking his head, made a final comment: ''l lived in Buda;pest many years and I heard much of SlovaJki:a. I confess, however, that our conversation has troubled many of my current views. I must give it more thought.'' "Irf that is true, my visit to you will be well justified. Until we meet again, Mr. Taylor." Bowing to, him, I thought to mysel.tf: "It woll'ld be fatal for America, if in such a diy:n:a:mic period as exists today, her destiny and the destiny of the whole world should be directed ,b y political conformists." But this reflection was not heard by Mr. Taiylor. � 26 SLOVAKIA SLOVAK AND EUROPEAN SEPARATISM (AN INTERVIEW WITH THE LATE ROYAL TAYLOR) Joseph A. Mikus "The National Committee for a Free Eu.Tope" has a district office in Paris. After 1949, political exiles from Central Europe, from newsp3ipeI1lllen to students desiring scholarships, visited this office seeiking .American aid. The Czechs, in particu[ar, passed frequently throogh its doors. In order to infornn Americans that there was a large and well-organized group of Slo.vruks in Paris which desired to have direct contact with political personalities in the free West, I sought an a.ppointment by telephone, one day in the su!mmer of 1950, with Mr. Loyal TayJor, Chief of the American Divisi'on of NOFE in Paris. · Wihen I appeared in the waiting room of the office on F'ooh .AJvenue at five o'clock the following afternoon, I was welcomed iby a ipleasant, elderly gentleman. Shaking my hand and smiling while measuring me from head to foot, he greeted me with the words: "So you are that Sloivruk separatist!" ''That depends on how you take it, Mr. Taylor," I re1plied. "It is evident that unrtil now you have been informed by the Czechs. It is well that I harve come." ; . "Well, welicome and haive a chair!" "'Dhanlk you; gladly! As soon as I hang 'my coat I will exiplain our stand on thi,s matter." "I aim very curious," he said. In the meantime, we had entered his ctffice and sat down. Mr. Taylor crossed his legs and settled himself behind a. large desk, and I made myself comfortaible in the easy c•h air opposite him. "The matter is very simpie," I began. "The difference ,b etween the Ozechs and the Slovaks is the same as between any two indi.vhluals. Certainly, Mr. Taylor, you would not think to claim, for exarniple, that there is any relationship between you and me that could be designated as separatism. We are two different pel"SOns, not?" �SLOVAKIA 27 "That I admit," Mr. Taylor said, "but I am not certain that your comparison is correct. You form with the Czechs one Czechoslovak (sic) nation, I mean, one State." "That is what the Ozechs claim. But that is not true," I answered. "We are two, nations, two historic and ethnic individualities which existed long before Czecho-Slovakia and Wlhich, since 191'8, formed one State on a basis of a mutua!l and voluntary decision. The original aim of CzechoSloivakia was to guarantee ,p olitical freedom to both nations within the joint State, to the Czechs as well as to the Slovaks. That is what Benes ,s aid at the peace conference. That is the waiy it is stated in the Treaty otf St. Gernl.ain. But, sinlce the ~ h s by unilateral a:ction changed the original pUI'lpOSe of the Ozecho-Slovak State, and misused this jointly-creruted b,ody, so that through the fiction of a 'Czechoslovatk' nation they cOUlld enthrone their own hegemony, the SlovaJk,s ceased to. consider this State as their own." "These, then, are the reasons which led the Slovaks to separatism?" Mr. Taylor inquired. "Well, taiken logically, as I have already stated, there ,c an be no question albout a Ozech and Slovak separatism. It would be ,possi!ble to tallk rubout separatism only where a breaich of a natural entity unit would be conoorned. Separatism cannot be 31PPlied in describing the relation.ship of. one nation to another. They can be close or distant neighbors; they can be friends or enemies; but not separatists. Our relationshilp to the Ozechs is an international relationship, and the Owcho..,Slovak State was actuaUy the result Olf that international interest for the guarantee of the freedom of its peoples. As soon as this interest faided on the one side, so fell Czecho~Slovalkia - just as a bridge falls, when the swpiporting pillars on one side of the river are washed o.ut by a flood." "Just what do you mean?" interrwpted Mr. Taylor. "Well, as you certainly will admit, we si,g ned a treaty with the Czechs in 1918, the contents of which they changed on their own initiatiive and to their own adivanta.ge. To put it more conJCretely, we ordered ten wagons of wheat and they delivered ten wagons of chaff. Naturainy, we refused to accept the delivery." 1 �2·8 S LOVAKIA "What exactly do you wish to say when you claim that the Czechs unilaterally changed the treaty with the Slova:ks regarding a common state?" pressed Mr. Taylor, _ . '.'Specifically this: in 1920, the Prague Government dictated .a Constitution for Slo1Vrukia which depr:ived the Slovaks of all . national rights," I explained. "How did it do that?" Mr. Taylor askeid -w ith much surprise. ''Why Masaryik's Czecho~Slovakia was a democratic state! And, as far as I know, the Constitution was not dictated by the Goverillillent but was adopted by the CzechoSlovak parliaiment." "In regard to the first point, there are democracies and democracies," I replied. "There is an American democra cy, a British democracy, a French democracy. There was, then, a 'Ozechoslava!k' democracy and now there is a 'people's' democracy. W1h.at I mean to say is. that these all d1ffer, that is, they are political systems of varied content. In regard to tJhe Constitution, you are right in saying that it was adopted by the so~called National Re1Volutionary Assem1bly. What, perhaips., you do not know, i-s that the members of this so-called parliament had been named by the Government. In short, the revolutionary Government appoint.e<l the revolutionary parliament which confirmed and adopted the revolutionary Constitution which this same revolutionary government presented to it." •~Dr. Mikus, are you serious in making this claim?" asked Mr. Taylor witJh astonishment. "It seems to me, Mr. Taylor, that it would 'be out of place were I not to speak seriously," I replied. "But I will tell you another in:cred:ilble thing. Mr. Benes, as Minister of that revolutionary government, named himself and eleven other Czechs as SLOV\AK 'deputies' to this. revolutionary parlirument." "Really? I must admit that this is exciting and unfamiliar history to me. " ''That does not surziprise me, Mr. Taylor. The period dming which the Czech0-1Slovruk Republic was created, as well as tlh~_. indifvidual acts of the 'Czechoslova:k' democracy, is a terrain pm,posely bedimrrned, from the very beginmng, by �SLOVAKIA 29 Ozech propaganda. A strict, 'blackout,' imposed by Czech pro1paiganda and Czech political history, hangs oyer this period." ·' •No matter what the situation was in the past, Dr. M;i.kus, I belie;ve that you underestimate the determination with which the Czechs will fight for the maintenance of the Czecho..,Slovalk State." "I, on the other hand, am of the opinion that the West is n'()lt fully aware of the tenacity of the Slovaks in their struggle for national independence. Moreo:ver, while the struggle Olf the Czechs is ordinary greed for political power, the struggle Olf the Slovalks is much more. It is a struggle for freedom, for the very existence of the nation. While a state is only a form, a nation is a living, moral being. Even Masaryik, whom the Czechs like to quote so much, recognized the priority of a nation over a state when he said: 'Wihen indirvidual nations are striving for their independence and are attempting to break up states in which they have until now been incor,porated, that is not a fight against humanity and internationalism, but a fight against those who used the states for an artificial levelling of the status among peoples and politiical uniformity. Humanity, however, does not seek uniformity but union, and it is the independence of nations which will maike possible an organic association, an organiic federation of Europe'." "That is an astQIUilding statement," ejaculated Mr. Taylor. "Certainly! But it i,s important to know when Masaryk said these words. That quotation does not come from Masaryk, the post-,war statesman, but from Masaryk, the exiled politician, who, in 1917, in hi:s book The New Europe, was explaining to the Allies why Austria-Hungary should be bro/ken up. Even though the Slovaks regard Masaryk as an unfriendly personal, µevertheless, except for a few national separatists, we all a:gree with hlm on this point." "Then you do admit that there are separatists among · the S}()IV:aJks ?" said Mr. Taylor, smiling triumphantly. 'There are! How colJlld there not be? The question is, who are they? It is not Sidor, or Durcansky, as the Czechs claim." �30 SLOVAKIA "Then who can they ~ ?" "They are, beginning with Pa:panek, the Slovaks in the so-called 'Council of Free Czechoslovakia'." "Dr. Milkus, your deductions certainly suT!prise me." "Believe me, Mr. TaJYloir, that was not my intention. But it is as clear as tlhe sun. The Slovaks are a nation and a political individuality in Central Europe. From a nation.al standpoint, those S1ov,aJks are separatists who deserted. their nation.a1 heritaige, jomed the Czechs of their 01Wn free will., formed the 'Council of Free CZ'echoslovaikia' with them and, so, as a minority, franik,l y disregard the will of the nation from which they descended. This is a classi'cal example of separatiSIID." ."WeH, UJPOn my word, this is, the first time I ever heard of it! It certainly is something when a separatist like you, designates men lilke Papanek separatists." "I swppose it wiH remain so with these gentlemen until they die," 1 sa,id. "They haive lived and died so long with the Ozechs that politically they have ·o ocome completely captured ,b y them. The Slovak nation will probably have to strike tlhem off its list. Just look well. Even now they are setting out on the .p olitical waters of Central Europe playing host on .iboard to the Ozooh secessionists. And with them they wou.W. li!ke to win in the fight for a thing which, from the point of view od' IDuropean devel01pIDent, must certainly collalPse." "You mean, perhaips, with Chudoba, Prehala, etc."? "No! Certainly not!" I contradicted, laughing 'heartily. "I mean with Zenkl, Ripka, etc." "I must say, Dr. Milkus, that I find it diffioolt to overcome my astonishment over your unusual interpretation of a:ffairs." "It is poosilble. But, just think aver it, Mr. Taylor. Europe is maviDJg and <beginnin,g to unite. There wi!M be a joint IDuropean coail and steel. There is much talik of a Euiropean Council at Stra.sslmrg, of a European parliament, even of a IDuropean army. But Zenikl and his group do not wish to see such a development. He continues to see another Ver- �SLOVAKIA 31 sallies Ozecho..;SlovaJlda, which guaranteed to the Ozechs priority in power. Do you not think that these gentlemen 'let the world pass them by' as the Czech poet Vrehlitoky would hasve said of them? Don't you think that the politics of the 'Council of Free Ozechoslova1kia' is a typical case of European secession? When I compare the politilcs of the Czechs and their Sl()IVaJk colia!borato;rs to the effort ~nded for a united Europe, it appeara to me entirely the same as if the State of Ohio and the State of Pe:rmsylivania, for instance, attempted to secede from the American Union and to estaJblish an independent federated State, Penn-Ohi:o, right in the heart of the United States." "I note, Dr. Mikus, that your comparisons become bolder as you continue." "That, too, is possible," I said, smiling. "Nevertheless, one thing is certain. Whiie .America certainliy woUJld not tolerate aniy secession in her midst, yet politically and finaJ11.cially she s~rts the open separatism of the 'Council of Free Ozechoslovaki,a' in Central Europe. For today anyone, living between Germany and the Soviet Union who is for the status quo of 1918, is a European secessionist and separatist. Yet, on the other hand, the SlovaJks who are for a free Slovakia in a federated Europe are aipparentliy ignored by America. • • • As I was leaiving, Mr. Taylor accompanied me to the door and, shaiking his head, made a final comment: ''l lived in Buda;pest many years and I heard much of SlovaJki:a. I confess, however, that our conversation has troubled many of my current views. I must give it more thought.'' "Irf that is true, my visit to you will be well justified. Until we meet again, Mr. Taylor." Bowing to, him, I thought to mysel.tf: "It woll'ld be fatal for America, if in such a diy:n:a:mic period as exists today, her destiny and the destiny of the whole world should be directed ,b y political conformists." But this reflection was not heard by Mr. Taiylor. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 26 SLOVAKIA SLOVAK AND EUROPEAN SEPARATISM (AN INTERVIEW WITH THE LATE ROYAL TAYLOR) Joseph A. Mikus "The National Committee for a Free Eu.Tope" has a district office in Paris. After 1949, political exiles from Central Europe, from newsp3ipeI1lllen to students desiring scholarships, visited this office seeiking .American aid. The Czechs, in particu[ar, passed frequently throogh its doors. In order to infornn Americans that there was a large and well-organized group of Slo.vruks in Paris which desired to have direct contact with political personalities in the free West, I sought an a.ppointment by telephone, one day in the su!mmer of 1950, with Mr. Loyal TayJor, Chief of the American Divisi'on of NOFE in Paris. · Wihen I appeared in the waiting room of the office on F'ooh .AJvenue at five o'clock the following afternoon, I was welcomed iby a ipleasant, elderly gentleman. Shaking my hand and smiling while measuring me from head to foot, he greeted me with the words: "So you are that Sloivruk separatist!" ''That depends on how you take it, Mr. Taylor," I re1plied. "It is evident that unrtil now you have been informed by the Czechs. It is well that I harve come." ; . "Well, welicome and haive a chair!" "'Dhanlk you; gladly! As soon as I hang 'my coat I will exiplain our stand on thi,s matter." "I aim very curious," he said. In the meantime, we had entered his ctffice and sat down. Mr. Taylor crossed his legs and settled himself behind a. large desk, and I made myself comfortaible in the easy c•h air opposite him. "The matter is very simpie," I began. "The difference ,b etween the Ozechs and the Slovaks is the same as between any two indi.vhluals. Certainly, Mr. Taylor, you would not think to claim, for exarniple, that there is any relationship between you and me that could be designated as separatism. We are two different pel"SOns, not?" SLOVAKIA 27 "That I admit," Mr. Taylor said, "but I am not certain that your comparison is correct. You form with the Czechs one Czechoslovak (sic) nation, I mean, one State." "That is what the Ozechs claim. But that is not true," I answered. "We are two, nations, two historic and ethnic individualities which existed long before Czecho-Slovakia and Wlhich, since 191'8, formed one State on a basis of a mutua!l and voluntary decision. The original aim of CzechoSloivakia was to guarantee ,p olitical freedom to both nations within the joint State, to the Czechs as well as to the Slovaks. That is what Benes ,s aid at the peace conference. That is the waiy it is stated in the Treaty otf St. Gernl.ain. But, sinlce the ~ h s by unilateral a:ction changed the original pUI'lpOSe of the Ozecho-Slovak State, and misused this jointly-creruted b,ody, so that through the fiction of a 'Czechoslovatk' nation they cOUlld enthrone their own hegemony, the SlovaJk,s ceased to. consider this State as their own." "These, then, are the reasons which led the Slovaks to separatism?" Mr. Taylor inquired. "Well, taiken logically, as I have already stated, there ,c an be no question albout a Ozech and Slovak separatism. It would be ,possi!ble to tallk rubout separatism only where a breaich of a natural entity unit would be conoorned. Separatism cannot be 31PPlied in describing the relation.ship of. one nation to another. They can be close or distant neighbors; they can be friends or enemies; but not separatists. Our relationshilp to the Ozechs is an international relationship, and the Owcho..,Slovak State was actuaUy the result Olf that international interest for the guarantee of the freedom of its peoples. As soon as this interest faided on the one side, so fell Czecho~Slovalkia - just as a bridge falls, when the swpiporting pillars on one side of the river are washed o.ut by a flood." "Just what do you mean?" interrwpted Mr. Taylor. "Well, as you certainly will admit, we si,g ned a treaty with the Czechs in 1918, the contents of which they changed on their own initiatiive and to their own adivanta.ge. To put it more conJCretely, we ordered ten wagons of wheat and they delivered ten wagons of chaff. Naturainy, we refused to accept the delivery." 1 2·8 S LOVAKIA "What exactly do you wish to say when you claim that the Czechs unilaterally changed the treaty with the Slova:ks regarding a common state?" pressed Mr. Taylor, _ . '.'Specifically this: in 1920, the Prague Government dictated .a Constitution for Slo1Vrukia which depr:ived the Slovaks of all . national rights," I explained. "How did it do that?" Mr. Taylor askeid -w ith much surprise. ''Why Masaryik's Czecho~Slovakia was a democratic state! And, as far as I know, the Constitution was not dictated by the Goverillillent but was adopted by the CzechoSlovak parliaiment." "In regard to the first point, there are democracies and democracies," I replied. "There is an American democra cy, a British democracy, a French democracy. There was, then, a 'Ozechoslava!k' democracy and now there is a 'people's' democracy. W1h.at I mean to say is. that these all d1ffer, that is, they are political systems of varied content. In regard to tJhe Constitution, you are right in saying that it was adopted by the so~called National Re1Volutionary Assem1bly. What, perhaips., you do not know, i-s that the members of this so-called parliament had been named by the Government. In short, the revolutionary Government appoint.e<l the revolutionary parliament which confirmed and adopted the revolutionary Constitution which this same revolutionary government presented to it." •~Dr. Mikus, are you serious in making this claim?" asked Mr. Taylor witJh astonishment. "It seems to me, Mr. Taylor, that it would 'be out of place were I not to speak seriously," I replied. "But I will tell you another in:cred:ilble thing. Mr. Benes, as Minister of that revolutionary government, named himself and eleven other Czechs as SLOV\AK 'deputies' to this. revolutionary parlirument." "Really? I must admit that this is exciting and unfamiliar history to me. " ''That does not surziprise me, Mr. Taylor. The period dming which the Czech0-1Slovruk Republic was created, as well as tlh~_. indifvidual acts of the 'Czechoslova:k' democracy, is a terrain pm,posely bedimrrned, from the very beginmng, by SLOVAKIA 29 Ozech propaganda. A strict, 'blackout,' imposed by Czech pro1paiganda and Czech political history, hangs oyer this period." ·' •No matter what the situation was in the past, Dr. M;i.kus, I belie;ve that you underestimate the determination with which the Czechs will fight for the maintenance of the Czecho..,Slovalk State." "I, on the other hand, am of the opinion that the West is n'()lt fully aware of the tenacity of the Slovaks in their struggle for national independence. Moreo:ver, while the struggle Olf the Czechs is ordinary greed for political power, the struggle Olf the Slovalks is much more. It is a struggle for freedom, for the very existence of the nation. While a state is only a form, a nation is a living, moral being. Even Masaryik, whom the Czechs like to quote so much, recognized the priority of a nation over a state when he said: 'Wihen indirvidual nations are striving for their independence and are attempting to break up states in which they have until now been incor,porated, that is not a fight against humanity and internationalism, but a fight against those who used the states for an artificial levelling of the status among peoples and politiical uniformity. Humanity, however, does not seek uniformity but union, and it is the independence of nations which will maike possible an organic association, an organiic federation of Europe'." "That is an astQIUilding statement," ejaculated Mr. Taylor. "Certainly! But it i,s important to know when Masaryk said these words. That quotation does not come from Masaryk, the post-,war statesman, but from Masaryk, the exiled politician, who, in 1917, in hi:s book The New Europe, was explaining to the Allies why Austria-Hungary should be bro/ken up. Even though the Slovaks regard Masaryk as an unfriendly personal, µevertheless, except for a few national separatists, we all a:gree with hlm on this point." "Then you do admit that there are separatists among · the S}()IV:aJks ?" said Mr. Taylor, smiling triumphantly. 'There are! How colJlld there not be? The question is, who are they? It is not Sidor, or Durcansky, as the Czechs claim." 30 SLOVAKIA "Then who can they ~ ?" "They are, beginning with Pa:panek, the Slovaks in the so-called 'Council of Free Czechoslovakia'." "Dr. Milkus, your deductions certainly suT!prise me." "Believe me, Mr. TaJYloir, that was not my intention. But it is as clear as tlhe sun. The Slovaks are a nation and a political individuality in Central Europe. From a nation.al standpoint, those S1ov,aJks are separatists who deserted. their nation.a1 heritaige, jomed the Czechs of their 01Wn free will., formed the 'Council of Free CZ'echoslovaikia' with them and, so, as a minority, franik,l y disregard the will of the nation from which they descended. This is a classi'cal example of separatiSIID." ."WeH, UJPOn my word, this is, the first time I ever heard of it! It certainly is something when a separatist like you, designates men lilke Papanek separatists." "I swppose it wiH remain so with these gentlemen until they die," 1 sa,id. "They haive lived and died so long with the Ozechs that politically they have ·o ocome completely captured ,b y them. The Slovak nation will probably have to strike tlhem off its list. Just look well. Even now they are setting out on the .p olitical waters of Central Europe playing host on .iboard to the Ozooh secessionists. And with them they wou.W. li!ke to win in the fight for a thing which, from the point of view od' IDuropean devel01pIDent, must certainly collalPse." "You mean, perhaips, with Chudoba, Prehala, etc."? "No! Certainly not!" I contradicted, laughing 'heartily. "I mean with Zenkl, Ripka, etc." "I must say, Dr. Milkus, that I find it diffioolt to overcome my astonishment over your unusual interpretation of a:ffairs." "It is poosilble. But, just think aver it, Mr. Taylor. Europe is maviDJg and <beginnin,g to unite. There wi!M be a joint IDuropean coail and steel. There is much talik of a Euiropean Council at Stra.sslmrg, of a European parliament, even of a IDuropean army. But Zenikl and his group do not wish to see such a development. He continues to see another Ver- SLOVAKIA 31 sallies Ozecho..;SlovaJlda, which guaranteed to the Ozechs priority in power. Do you not think that these gentlemen 'let the world pass them by' as the Czech poet Vrehlitoky would hasve said of them? Don't you think that the politics of the 'Council of Free Ozechoslova1kia' is a typical case of European secession? When I compare the politilcs of the Czechs and their Sl()IVaJk colia!borato;rs to the effort ~nded for a united Europe, it appeara to me entirely the same as if the State of Ohio and the State of Pe:rmsylivania, for instance, attempted to secede from the American Union and to estaJblish an independent federated State, Penn-Ohi:o, right in the heart of the United States." "I note, Dr. Mikus, that your comparisons become bolder as you continue." "That, too, is possible," I said, smiling. "Nevertheless, one thing is certain. Whiie .America certainliy woUJld not tolerate aniy secession in her midst, yet politically and finaJ11.cially she s~rts the open separatism of the 'Council of Free Ozechoslovaki,a' in Central Europe. For today anyone, living between Germany and the Soviet Union who is for the status quo of 1918, is a European secessionist and separatist. Yet, on the other hand, the SlovaJks who are for a free Slovakia in a federated Europe are aipparentliy ignored by America. • • • As I was leaiving, Mr. Taylor accompanied me to the door and, shaiking his head, made a final comment: ''l lived in Buda;pest many years and I heard much of SlovaJki:a. I confess, however, that our conversation has troubled many of my current views. I must give it more thought.'' "Irf that is true, my visit to you will be well justified. Until we meet again, Mr. Taylor." Bowing to, him, I thought to mysel.tf: "It woll'ld be fatal for America, if in such a diy:n:a:mic period as exists today, her destiny and the destiny of the whole world should be directed ,b y political conformists." But this reflection was not heard by Mr. Taiylor.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovak and European Separatism: An Interview with the Late Royal Taylor Description An account of the resource Joseph A. Mikus Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 3 (8), September 1953 pp. 26-31 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Mikuš, Joseph A., 1909-2005 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September 1953 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/f7c9d1a75e0451ddb6cf16ce129e65fa.pdf 50aa08ee2cb27a68097dac0f0dcc5754 PDF Text Text 57 SLOVAKIA PAST AND PRESENT OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA JOSEPH A. MIKUS Firom 1918 untirl 1948, Ohristian democracy was a dominant poliltical fo11ce ,i n S}ovrukia. Orig1nated ,u nder Hungarian rll!le at the >beginning olf the twentieth cenrtn.ury, Sloviak Chilistiian demo·c r-rucy realflf,iirmed i.itself and a,r ose ,v i1ctorious from ,t he i:dedl'og~all. cha:O's whicli existed in Czecho-iSlovakia and in Centrail EuTope af1ter 1918. W:hi'le Trj,anon Hunga,r y was the vidiim of the Oommilliru.Sm of Belia Kuihn in 1919, SociaJl Demo:crat:s fomne:d the .strongest :po1itica1 pairty in Czecho.,Sloivaikia. It remains t'he histodcal merit of the great Slovaik Caitholi:c and nationa[ leader, Msg1r. Andrew Hlinlka, for having saved Slo,vaJkia from spi.ri.itual anarchy. As founder of ,t he Slovak Peo:ple'·s Party amd. i.ts. leader, Hli:nlka designed for .SlovaJkia the right way of Christian demoCTa'Cy. 'Tihe ,program of his party w:as Ito work "foir God and the nation." - What did it mean? From the .r eligious standpoint, the People's Party always defended the Oa;tholic tramtion of the country against a narrow and panti-cmlarist Ozecih Husritiscrn which attempted to conquer the Slovak people. In the hard spirituaJl struggle Slovakia remained loyally on the side of the Roman Catholic Chu:rc:h amd in opposirt:ion to .t'he effo,r t of the governmental circles of P:mgiue which used ail[ the iresauirces. of the State to bring ,a bowt the "emancipati on" of Ozecho~Slovakia from the infllueI11Ce ~ Rome. T. G . Ma:saryk authored the •s 'logans "Asway from Rome" and •~Rome must ibe brought to tria•l and ,e;onrvioted !" The Slovruks were decidedly opposed ,to the estiaJb!lishment of the soJcal,led national "Czechoglovruk cihurClh" in Sil01v;akia, whtch .they re:cognirzed onl,y as a tool orf foreign spi.rii.itil.la1 influence. 1 From the naJtionall point orf view, the People's Party defended the natUTal rights of the Sloivak nation which were systema:tiica:Uy being abbTe-viated by the Prague Administration. The Czecho-S1-o;vak State in 1918, was sUipposed to be a federal union, such as the United States, be- �58 SLOVAKIA tween two equial par.tneTs, Ozechia (Bohemia, Moravia and SHesia) and Slova~ia, with a common cm,rency, forei1gn policy and m~litaey defel1$e. In fa.dt, howeveT, the Ce;echs ar'bitraril;y ohanged this nationally drualistic State into a strong centralized, umoorian "Czoohoslovaik" State by the Cons,titution of Fe/brua:ry 29, 1920, which was imipdsed on the Slo:vak nation lby the so-Oal[ed "RevoluJtiorrary Pa,rliament" tihat had .been handpicked by the Prague Government. In this way, .u nder Czech :r,ule, the SlOIV'aks were deprived of thek nationa!l rights and ;b ecame an initernal minority. In 1923, the Czech major1ty in Parfa1ment su,ppressed the ind'iJviidu,a,l consti'burtionaJ libertiies of minorities (the right olf free press•, tree spooclh, free asseniibl,y, etc) by adopting the Internal Seicurirty Aot. (No. 50-1923) which indica.ted alil efforts to;wa~d federa!lisrn as subversive. So, "OrechoslloviaJkia" never was, in fad, a country of f:ree politiica,l ins't!ituitfons, nor a t:riue democratic State. For these reasons, the SloJVlalk People's Party claimed in accordanice with dispositions of .t he Cleveland (191'5 ) and the Pilttshw-gh (1918) agreements signed by the Slovaik League of Ameriica and various Czech organmaitions - a dualist federation, which would bring to an end the privileged situaition of the Czechs and carry on the pr.inci,ple of equaility of bolth :peOiples in the oommon Staite If the Slovak peop'le were dlisiposed, in spkit and in ,t he interests of Christian integration, to abandon ceI1ta·i n national prerogatives in favor of a Czecho-iSlovaJk federal government, it was not at a1Jl disposed to relinquish the Slov<aJk nationa!l idea in favor of a Czech, that is a foreign nationalism. From the point of view of foreign policy, the Slovaik Peoiple's Pairty strongly .cr.ftici'Zed the miilita,:r,y alliance which MT. Benes signed in 1935 in Moscow with the Soviet Union. After the M'Uilich Agreement, when Hiit:Jler was giiven a fa:·ee hand in Central EJwro.pe by the Western Powers, Slova;k Christian democra:cy, the biggest 1po[irtica1 force in Slovakia, was charged with the task to cond~, at su.ch a d:iJfficuilt stage, th~ policy of thalt country. Foir such a small 1 �SLOVAKIA 59 nation it was very hrurd, ind:eeld, both spiritually and politically, to oppose eff~ctiivcly a totalitarian sys'tem such as Nazism. An iimipaI"tia:l historiography wiM, nevertheless, recognize the resist'a.rrce which Msgr. Joseph Tiso, the President of the Slov•aJk Repulblic, devcloped diuring World War II against the attempt of Nazism to estaJb'lish i.tself in his rarucaUy pro-German elements in the Sloivak Government, represenited m:aJinly by Vojtech Tu!k•a, the Brime Minister and the Minister of Fore,i,gn Affaiirs, and Afexander Mach, the Minister of Interior. The 'l:'uka-iMaich cornlbine iplayed uip to the Namis to win t!heir favor and thus to e:Hmina'te Tiso and his regime and ,puit 'l:'uka and his followers in their place. But they l,ruaked popular suipport. Being .previailed upon by the SlOIVak hiera~hiy and the people, Msgr. Joseph Tiso ..::.ecided to stay at his .p ost, and stay he did to the very end. Tiso's merit consists in hiruving saved Slovakia and his people from territorial d'ismeimlbeI1Inent, which was planned by Hungary and Gemniany, as proved at the Nuremberg trials, and in h'a!V,i ng preserved from Na'2li influence the spiritual individua!lilty of Slov,aJkia whose Christian tradition goes back to the eighth century. But Christian democra'Cy in Sfovakia faced its hardest task after 1'94,5. Slovalkia was at that time occupied by the Soviet Aruny and talken OIVer by Mir. Benes's Government forrr:ed in the shadow of the Kremlin. Since that time Slovakia has been exposed to a terrific ideological and po'lttical pressure from t he outside. In the elections in 1946. ChPi:sitian democra·c y in Slovakia manifested its strength. The Cathoilics, instructed by their hieiraTchy, gave an heroic example of great political disciopJ.i.ne. They •v oted for ,t he Slovalk Democratic Party, which gained 62 p€!r cent of the total ~lectorai vote; meanwhile in Czechia 56 per cent voted for pro-Communist parties ( 42 per cent for the Communists and 14 -p er cent for the Social Democrats). Those elections were the :b est expression of the Western orientation of the Slovaik people and of the fatal pro~Soviet position of the Czechs. In this distinction we . the internal ,p aradox of Czecho-Slova,kia. Though territorially farther West, the Czechs looked to Soviet Rus- see �60 SLOVAKIA sia as their best ally and protector, while the S[o,vaiks, the immediate neighbors of the Soviet Union, looked to the Western Powers. The Benes~Gottwa!ld regime regarded this altitude of the Sl~aks as "trea:cherouis" and, theTefore, decided to do s01rnething aJbout it to save face in Moscow. In the autumn of 1947, under the pretext oif con1eealing a girouip of "sepaJI1aJtists and consptrators agaiins.t the secwrity of ,t,he State," the Sl:ovak Demo'CraNc Party was attacked - not ontlry ,b y the Cotnmiun.ists, Qt.I't the Ozec,h democratic par,ties, too - !n ruch a way that it could never recover from the blo,w ''.Dwo thoU1Sand of its memlbers were imprisonoo, among them thrne olf its: deputies (iBugar, Kempny, Stasko) and. bne of its representatiJVes in the_ GoJVernment of the "Nationrul Fronrt," Vi'Ce~Premier John Uirsiny. With this "coup de fooce'' by which fta:gue imposed on democratic Slovakia a Oo:mrmunist ma:jorrty in the autonomous. Government in Bmtislava, the biggest political fac'tor in that country was crushed. HaJVing removed in this manner their strongest opponent in the Prague P.arJiament, the Communists coulld afterwards easiil y consoHda.te their ,p osition, shi,fting sirrnply from the system of "Na'tiona'1 Front" to that of the "M_a rxist majority." Contrary to what Mr. Hubert Ripka states in his book "Le coup d'Etat de Prague en 1948," there was, therefore, no revolution in Prague in February 1948. There was only a change in the internal structure of the government. 'Jihe present situation oi Christian demoomc,y in Slo·v akia is that of a resisting force to the Communist impact. This resistance is both religious and national. Catholiroism in Slovakia is a proven eounter-force to Communis:n. By the imprisonment of three Bishops, Msgr. V:oJtassruk, Msgr. Buza:lka and Msgr. Gojclic, and by keeping in house-arrest others of the Hierarchy, .the Chrur.ch finds it icrr:ipossilble to full.fill its obligations. But though there aire several hundred priests in jaH, though aH the Catholic lay elite has been "eliminated," though Christian demooracy as a poliiticail force has been crushed, . the Sl01V'8Jk peopie neventheless have retained a deep re!i,gious ooillViiction a:nd have defended chU'I'Ches an:d 'Priests with no more than �61 SLOVAKIA sticks and bare hands against the intervention of the State police. From the naHonal point of view, present-day OzechoSlavaJkia offers Vhe Slovaks nothing common to a national 'Staite. 'Bheir mherenit and ,a utonomous rights hruve been repudiated by Prag;ue once again. Ozecho~S!lwalkia today is simply one of the nll!mer()!U:s Socia[ist Reipuibl,ic.s of the Soviet orbit. Slovrukia has been depri·v ed of naitionail liberty in the name of the SocialiSIID preached by Moscow and executed by Prague. The Slovaks are firmly convinced that there is only one possible solution to the situation: the application of the right of national self-determination within the framework of a Federated Europe. This 'belief is shaired by the Slovak Lea,g ue of America and by aJl:l organie;ations of Slo-, J.!k political ref,u,gees in the free world. Slovak Ohnist:ian deimocraoy counts and relies on a nu1C'l eus oif prominent exi1ed peI'.sonallitities in the United .Jtrutes and Canada : some former Deiputies orf the Praigue Parlrarrnernt (Dr. :EJmanruel Boehm, St€iphen B1 aslko, John Daxner, Dr. Michael Zi:brin, Rev. Ferdinad Mondok, Dr. Francis Orlicky, Siteiphen BeniaJk), se;veral professors (Dr. J,o seph Cin:cik, Rev. Bonarventwre Ewe, Dr. Francis. Hrrusovsky, Reiv. Joseph PaJpin), nU1merous writers and jaurnaJlists George Gajdos-Bre~a, Rev. Nicha1as Sprinc, Constantine Ct.den, Dr. Joseipih Pa.iuco, Louis Kandra, Charles Sitrmen, John Okal'). and s.evera!l former Sllova!k diploona;ts (Charles Sidor, Dr. John Kassovk, Dr. Joseiph Kirs'Cihibaum, Dr. Joseph OmiliaJk) . All these men consider the United Statt•s as a fixed poh11t i;n the unive~se of Archi!Inides, frOim which it wilfil be possi,ble one day, by spiritual and physi.cal strength, to rock Communism from its foundations. They are most willing to conbrilbute their aJbilities and talents to effect the h'beration of Centra!l ffiurope and the formation of a European Federati'On with a free Slovrukia in it 1 WHO SAi D IT? - • • • "The importance of our trea ty with the U. S. S. R. is self-evident. Soviet Russia is rapidly freeing Europe from Nazi tyranny. Close ties have always existed between Russia and Czechoslovakia, and they have now been strengthened. We are proud to be an ally of that great power, which is bound to play the leading role in Europe after the war." - (Jan Mas aryk to "Overseas News Agency," February 6, 1944) . � 57 SLOVAKIA PAST AND PRESENT OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA JOSEPH A. MIKUS Firom 1918 untirl 1948, Ohristian democracy was a dominant poliltical fo11ce ,i n S}ovrukia. Orig1nated ,u nder Hungarian rll!le at the >beginning olf the twentieth cenrtn.ury, Sloviak Chilistiian demo·c r-rucy realflf,iirmed i.itself and a,r ose ,v i1ctorious from ,t he i:dedl'og~all. cha:O's whicli existed in Czecho-iSlovakia and in Centrail EuTope af1ter 1918. W:hi'le Trj,anon Hunga,r y was the vidiim of the Oommilliru.Sm of Belia Kuihn in 1919, SociaJl Demo:crat:s fomne:d the .strongest :po1itica1 pairty in Czecho.,Sloivaikia. It remains t'he histodcal merit of the great Slovaik Caitholi:c and nationa[ leader, Msg1r. Andrew Hlinlka, for having saved Slo,vaJkia from spi.ri.itual anarchy. As founder of ,t he Slovak Peo:ple'·s Party amd. i.ts. leader, Hli:nlka designed for .SlovaJkia the right way of Christian demoCTa'Cy. 'Tihe ,program of his party w:as Ito work "foir God and the nation." - What did it mean? From the .r eligious standpoint, the People's Party always defended the Oa;tholic tramtion of the country against a narrow and panti-cmlarist Ozecih Husritiscrn which attempted to conquer the Slovak people. In the hard spirituaJl struggle Slovakia remained loyally on the side of the Roman Catholic Chu:rc:h amd in opposirt:ion to .t'he effo,r t of the governmental circles of P:mgiue which used ail[ the iresauirces. of the State to bring ,a bowt the "emancipati on" of Ozecho~Slovakia from the infllueI11Ce ~ Rome. T. G . Ma:saryk authored the •s 'logans "Asway from Rome" and •~Rome must ibe brought to tria•l and ,e;onrvioted !" The Slovruks were decidedly opposed ,to the estiaJb!lishment of the soJcal,led national "Czechoglovruk cihurClh" in Sil01v;akia, whtch .they re:cognirzed onl,y as a tool orf foreign spi.rii.itil.la1 influence. 1 From the naJtionall point orf view, the People's Party defended the natUTal rights of the Sloivak nation which were systema:tiica:Uy being abbTe-viated by the Prague Administration. The Czecho-S1-o;vak State in 1918, was sUipposed to be a federal union, such as the United States, be- �58 SLOVAKIA tween two equial par.tneTs, Ozechia (Bohemia, Moravia and SHesia) and Slova~ia, with a common cm,rency, forei1gn policy and m~litaey defel1$e. In fa.dt, howeveT, the Ce;echs ar'bitraril;y ohanged this nationally drualistic State into a strong centralized, umoorian "Czoohoslovaik" State by the Cons,titution of Fe/brua:ry 29, 1920, which was imipdsed on the Slo:vak nation lby the so-Oal[ed "RevoluJtiorrary Pa,rliament" tihat had .been handpicked by the Prague Government. In this way, .u nder Czech :r,ule, the SlOIV'aks were deprived of thek nationa!l rights and ;b ecame an initernal minority. In 1923, the Czech major1ty in Parfa1ment su,ppressed the ind'iJviidu,a,l consti'burtionaJ libertiies of minorities (the right olf free press•, tree spooclh, free asseniibl,y, etc) by adopting the Internal Seicurirty Aot. (No. 50-1923) which indica.ted alil efforts to;wa~d federa!lisrn as subversive. So, "OrechoslloviaJkia" never was, in fad, a country of f:ree politiica,l ins't!ituitfons, nor a t:riue democratic State. For these reasons, the SloJVlalk People's Party claimed in accordanice with dispositions of .t he Cleveland (191'5 ) and the Pilttshw-gh (1918) agreements signed by the Slovaik League of Ameriica and various Czech organmaitions - a dualist federation, which would bring to an end the privileged situaition of the Czechs and carry on the pr.inci,ple of equaility of bolth :peOiples in the oommon Staite If the Slovak peop'le were dlisiposed, in spkit and in ,t he interests of Christian integration, to abandon ceI1ta·i n national prerogatives in favor of a Czecho-iSlovaJk federal government, it was not at a1Jl disposed to relinquish the Slov<aJk nationa!l idea in favor of a Czech, that is a foreign nationalism. From the point of view of foreign policy, the Slovaik Peoiple's Pairty strongly .cr.ftici'Zed the miilita,:r,y alliance which MT. Benes signed in 1935 in Moscow with the Soviet Union. After the M'Uilich Agreement, when Hiit:Jler was giiven a fa:·ee hand in Central EJwro.pe by the Western Powers, Slova;k Christian democra:cy, the biggest 1po[irtica1 force in Slovakia, was charged with the task to cond~, at su.ch a d:iJfficuilt stage, th~ policy of thalt country. Foir such a small 1 �SLOVAKIA 59 nation it was very hrurd, ind:eeld, both spiritually and politically, to oppose eff~ctiivcly a totalitarian sys'tem such as Nazism. An iimipaI"tia:l historiography wiM, nevertheless, recognize the resist'a.rrce which Msgr. Joseph Tiso, the President of the Slov•aJk Repulblic, devcloped diuring World War II against the attempt of Nazism to estaJb'lish i.tself in his rarucaUy pro-German elements in the Sloivak Government, represenited m:aJinly by Vojtech Tu!k•a, the Brime Minister and the Minister of Fore,i,gn Affaiirs, and Afexander Mach, the Minister of Interior. The 'l:'uka-iMaich cornlbine iplayed uip to the Namis to win t!heir favor and thus to e:Hmina'te Tiso and his regime and ,puit 'l:'uka and his followers in their place. But they l,ruaked popular suipport. Being .previailed upon by the SlOIVak hiera~hiy and the people, Msgr. Joseph Tiso ..::.ecided to stay at his .p ost, and stay he did to the very end. Tiso's merit consists in hiruving saved Slovakia and his people from territorial d'ismeimlbeI1Inent, which was planned by Hungary and Gemniany, as proved at the Nuremberg trials, and in h'a!V,i ng preserved from Na'2li influence the spiritual individua!lilty of Slov,aJkia whose Christian tradition goes back to the eighth century. But Christian democra'Cy in Sfovakia faced its hardest task after 1'94,5. Slovalkia was at that time occupied by the Soviet Aruny and talken OIVer by Mir. Benes's Government forrr:ed in the shadow of the Kremlin. Since that time Slovakia has been exposed to a terrific ideological and po'lttical pressure from t he outside. In the elections in 1946. ChPi:sitian democra·c y in Slovakia manifested its strength. The Cathoilics, instructed by their hieiraTchy, gave an heroic example of great political disciopJ.i.ne. They •v oted for ,t he Slovalk Democratic Party, which gained 62 p€!r cent of the total ~lectorai vote; meanwhile in Czechia 56 per cent voted for pro-Communist parties ( 42 per cent for the Communists and 14 -p er cent for the Social Democrats). Those elections were the :b est expression of the Western orientation of the Slovaik people and of the fatal pro~Soviet position of the Czechs. In this distinction we . the internal ,p aradox of Czecho-Slova,kia. Though territorially farther West, the Czechs looked to Soviet Rus- see �60 SLOVAKIA sia as their best ally and protector, while the S[o,vaiks, the immediate neighbors of the Soviet Union, looked to the Western Powers. The Benes~Gottwa!ld regime regarded this altitude of the Sl~aks as "trea:cherouis" and, theTefore, decided to do s01rnething aJbout it to save face in Moscow. In the autumn of 1947, under the pretext oif con1eealing a girouip of "sepaJI1aJtists and consptrators agaiins.t the secwrity of ,t,he State," the Sl:ovak Demo'CraNc Party was attacked - not ontlry ,b y the Cotnmiun.ists, Qt.I't the Ozec,h democratic par,ties, too - !n ruch a way that it could never recover from the blo,w ''.Dwo thoU1Sand of its memlbers were imprisonoo, among them thrne olf its: deputies (iBugar, Kempny, Stasko) and. bne of its representatiJVes in the_ GoJVernment of the "Nationrul Fronrt," Vi'Ce~Premier John Uirsiny. With this "coup de fooce'' by which fta:gue imposed on democratic Slovakia a Oo:mrmunist ma:jorrty in the autonomous. Government in Bmtislava, the biggest political fac'tor in that country was crushed. HaJVing removed in this manner their strongest opponent in the Prague P.arJiament, the Communists coulld afterwards easiil y consoHda.te their ,p osition, shi,fting sirrnply from the system of "Na'tiona'1 Front" to that of the "M_a rxist majority." Contrary to what Mr. Hubert Ripka states in his book "Le coup d'Etat de Prague en 1948," there was, therefore, no revolution in Prague in February 1948. There was only a change in the internal structure of the government. 'Jihe present situation oi Christian demoomc,y in Slo·v akia is that of a resisting force to the Communist impact. This resistance is both religious and national. Catholiroism in Slovakia is a proven eounter-force to Communis:n. By the imprisonment of three Bishops, Msgr. V:oJtassruk, Msgr. Buza:lka and Msgr. Gojclic, and by keeping in house-arrest others of the Hierarchy, .the Chrur.ch finds it icrr:ipossilble to full.fill its obligations. But though there aire several hundred priests in jaH, though aH the Catholic lay elite has been "eliminated," though Christian demooracy as a poliiticail force has been crushed, . the Sl01V'8Jk peopie neventheless have retained a deep re!i,gious ooillViiction a:nd have defended chU'I'Ches an:d 'Priests with no more than �61 SLOVAKIA sticks and bare hands against the intervention of the State police. From the naHonal point of view, present-day OzechoSlavaJkia offers Vhe Slovaks nothing common to a national 'Staite. 'Bheir mherenit and ,a utonomous rights hruve been repudiated by Prag;ue once again. Ozecho~S!lwalkia today is simply one of the nll!mer()!U:s Socia[ist Reipuibl,ic.s of the Soviet orbit. Slovrukia has been depri·v ed of naitionail liberty in the name of the SocialiSIID preached by Moscow and executed by Prague. The Slovaks are firmly convinced that there is only one possible solution to the situation: the application of the right of national self-determination within the framework of a Federated Europe. This 'belief is shaired by the Slovak Lea,g ue of America and by aJl:l organie;ations of Slo-, J.!k political ref,u,gees in the free world. Slovak Ohnist:ian deimocraoy counts and relies on a nu1C'l eus oif prominent exi1ed peI'.sonallitities in the United .Jtrutes and Canada : some former Deiputies orf the Praigue Parlrarrnernt (Dr. :EJmanruel Boehm, St€iphen B1 aslko, John Daxner, Dr. Michael Zi:brin, Rev. Ferdinad Mondok, Dr. Francis Orlicky, Siteiphen BeniaJk), se;veral professors (Dr. J,o seph Cin:cik, Rev. Bonarventwre Ewe, Dr. Francis. Hrrusovsky, Reiv. Joseph PaJpin), nU1merous writers and jaurnaJlists George Gajdos-Bre~a, Rev. Nicha1as Sprinc, Constantine Ct.den, Dr. Joseipih Pa.iuco, Louis Kandra, Charles Sitrmen, John Okal'). and s.evera!l former Sllova!k diploona;ts (Charles Sidor, Dr. John Kassovk, Dr. Joseiph Kirs'Cihibaum, Dr. Joseph OmiliaJk) . All these men consider the United Statt•s as a fixed poh11t i;n the unive~se of Archi!Inides, frOim which it wilfil be possi,ble one day, by spiritual and physi.cal strength, to rock Communism from its foundations. They are most willing to conbrilbute their aJbilities and talents to effect the h'beration of Centra!l ffiurope and the formation of a European Federati'On with a free Slovrukia in it 1 WHO SAi D IT? - • • • "The importance of our trea ty with the U. S. S. R. is self-evident. Soviet Russia is rapidly freeing Europe from Nazi tyranny. Close ties have always existed between Russia and Czechoslovakia, and they have now been strengthened. We are proud to be an ally of that great power, which is bound to play the leading role in Europe after the war." - (Jan Mas aryk to "Overseas News Agency," February 6, 1944) . � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 57 SLOVAKIA PAST AND PRESENT OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA JOSEPH A. MIKUS Firom 1918 untirl 1948, Ohristian democracy was a dominant poliltical fo11ce ,i n S}ovrukia. Orig1nated ,u nder Hungarian rll!le at the >beginning olf the twentieth cenrtn.ury, Sloviak Chilistiian demo·c r-rucy realflf,iirmed i.itself and a,r ose ,v i1ctorious from ,t he i:dedl'og~all. cha:O's whicli existed in Czecho-iSlovakia and in Centrail EuTope af1ter 1918. W:hi'le Trj,anon Hunga,r y was the vidiim of the Oommilliru.Sm of Belia Kuihn in 1919, SociaJl Demo:crat:s fomne:d the .strongest :po1itica1 pairty in Czecho.,Sloivaikia. It remains t'he histodcal merit of the great Slovaik Caitholi:c and nationa[ leader, Msg1r. Andrew Hlinlka, for having saved Slo,vaJkia from spi.ri.itual anarchy. As founder of ,t he Slovak Peo:ple'·s Party amd. i.ts. leader, Hli:nlka designed for .SlovaJkia the right way of Christian demoCTa'Cy. 'Tihe ,program of his party w:as Ito work "foir God and the nation." - What did it mean? From the .r eligious standpoint, the People's Party always defended the Oa;tholic tramtion of the country against a narrow and panti-cmlarist Ozecih Husritiscrn which attempted to conquer the Slovak people. In the hard spirituaJl struggle Slovakia remained loyally on the side of the Roman Catholic Chu:rc:h amd in opposirt:ion to .t'he effo,r t of the governmental circles of P:mgiue which used ail[ the iresauirces. of the State to bring ,a bowt the "emancipati on" of Ozecho~Slovakia from the infllueI11Ce ~ Rome. T. G . Ma:saryk authored the •s 'logans "Asway from Rome" and •~Rome must ibe brought to tria•l and ,e;onrvioted !" The Slovruks were decidedly opposed ,to the estiaJb!lishment of the soJcal,led national "Czechoglovruk cihurClh" in Sil01v;akia, whtch .they re:cognirzed onl,y as a tool orf foreign spi.rii.itil.la1 influence. 1 From the naJtionall point orf view, the People's Party defended the natUTal rights of the Sloivak nation which were systema:tiica:Uy being abbTe-viated by the Prague Administration. The Czecho-S1-o;vak State in 1918, was sUipposed to be a federal union, such as the United States, be- 58 SLOVAKIA tween two equial par.tneTs, Ozechia (Bohemia, Moravia and SHesia) and Slova~ia, with a common cm,rency, forei1gn policy and m~litaey defel1$e. In fa.dt, howeveT, the Ce;echs ar'bitraril;y ohanged this nationally drualistic State into a strong centralized, umoorian "Czoohoslovaik" State by the Cons,titution of Fe/brua:ry 29, 1920, which was imipdsed on the Slo:vak nation lby the so-Oal[ed "RevoluJtiorrary Pa,rliament" tihat had .been handpicked by the Prague Government. In this way, .u nder Czech :r,ule, the SlOIV'aks were deprived of thek nationa!l rights and ;b ecame an initernal minority. In 1923, the Czech major1ty in Parfa1ment su,ppressed the ind'iJviidu,a,l consti'burtionaJ libertiies of minorities (the right olf free press•, tree spooclh, free asseniibl,y, etc) by adopting the Internal Seicurirty Aot. (No. 50-1923) which indica.ted alil efforts to;wa~d federa!lisrn as subversive. So, "OrechoslloviaJkia" never was, in fad, a country of f:ree politiica,l ins't!ituitfons, nor a t:riue democratic State. For these reasons, the SloJVlalk People's Party claimed in accordanice with dispositions of .t he Cleveland (191'5 ) and the Pilttshw-gh (1918) agreements signed by the Slovaik League of Ameriica and various Czech organmaitions - a dualist federation, which would bring to an end the privileged situaition of the Czechs and carry on the pr.inci,ple of equaility of bolth :peOiples in the oommon Staite If the Slovak peop'le were dlisiposed, in spkit and in ,t he interests of Christian integration, to abandon ceI1ta·i n national prerogatives in favor of a Czecho-iSlovaJk federal government, it was not at a1Jl disposed to relinquish the Slov<aJk nationa!l idea in favor of a Czech, that is a foreign nationalism. From the point of view of foreign policy, the Slovaik Peoiple's Pairty strongly .cr.ftici'Zed the miilita,:r,y alliance which MT. Benes signed in 1935 in Moscow with the Soviet Union. After the M'Uilich Agreement, when Hiit:Jler was giiven a fa:·ee hand in Central EJwro.pe by the Western Powers, Slova;k Christian democra:cy, the biggest 1po[irtica1 force in Slovakia, was charged with the task to cond~, at su.ch a d:iJfficuilt stage, th~ policy of thalt country. Foir such a small 1 SLOVAKIA 59 nation it was very hrurd, ind:eeld, both spiritually and politically, to oppose eff~ctiivcly a totalitarian sys'tem such as Nazism. An iimipaI"tia:l historiography wiM, nevertheless, recognize the resist'a.rrce which Msgr. Joseph Tiso, the President of the Slov•aJk Repulblic, devcloped diuring World War II against the attempt of Nazism to estaJb'lish i.tself in his rarucaUy pro-German elements in the Sloivak Government, represenited m:aJinly by Vojtech Tu!k•a, the Brime Minister and the Minister of Fore,i,gn Affaiirs, and Afexander Mach, the Minister of Interior. The 'l:'uka-iMaich cornlbine iplayed uip to the Namis to win t!heir favor and thus to e:Hmina'te Tiso and his regime and ,puit 'l:'uka and his followers in their place. But they l,ruaked popular suipport. Being .previailed upon by the SlOIVak hiera~hiy and the people, Msgr. Joseph Tiso ..::.ecided to stay at his .p ost, and stay he did to the very end. Tiso's merit consists in hiruving saved Slovakia and his people from territorial d'ismeimlbeI1Inent, which was planned by Hungary and Gemniany, as proved at the Nuremberg trials, and in h'a!V,i ng preserved from Na'2li influence the spiritual individua!lilty of Slov,aJkia whose Christian tradition goes back to the eighth century. But Christian democra'Cy in Sfovakia faced its hardest task after 1'94,5. Slovalkia was at that time occupied by the Soviet Aruny and talken OIVer by Mir. Benes's Government forrr:ed in the shadow of the Kremlin. Since that time Slovakia has been exposed to a terrific ideological and po'lttical pressure from t he outside. In the elections in 1946. ChPi:sitian democra·c y in Slovakia manifested its strength. The Cathoilics, instructed by their hieiraTchy, gave an heroic example of great political disciopJ.i.ne. They •v oted for ,t he Slovalk Democratic Party, which gained 62 p€!r cent of the total ~lectorai vote; meanwhile in Czechia 56 per cent voted for pro-Communist parties ( 42 per cent for the Communists and 14 -p er cent for the Social Democrats). Those elections were the :b est expression of the Western orientation of the Slovaik people and of the fatal pro~Soviet position of the Czechs. In this distinction we . the internal ,p aradox of Czecho-Slova,kia. Though territorially farther West, the Czechs looked to Soviet Rus- see 60 SLOVAKIA sia as their best ally and protector, while the S[o,vaiks, the immediate neighbors of the Soviet Union, looked to the Western Powers. The Benes~Gottwa!ld regime regarded this altitude of the Sl~aks as "trea:cherouis" and, theTefore, decided to do s01rnething aJbout it to save face in Moscow. In the autumn of 1947, under the pretext oif con1eealing a girouip of "sepaJI1aJtists and consptrators agaiins.t the secwrity of ,t,he State," the Sl:ovak Demo'CraNc Party was attacked - not ontlry ,b y the Cotnmiun.ists, Qt.I't the Ozec,h democratic par,ties, too - !n ruch a way that it could never recover from the blo,w ''.Dwo thoU1Sand of its memlbers were imprisonoo, among them thrne olf its: deputies (iBugar, Kempny, Stasko) and. bne of its representatiJVes in the_ GoJVernment of the "Nationrul Fronrt," Vi'Ce~Premier John Uirsiny. With this "coup de fooce'' by which fta:gue imposed on democratic Slovakia a Oo:mrmunist ma:jorrty in the autonomous. Government in Bmtislava, the biggest political fac'tor in that country was crushed. HaJVing removed in this manner their strongest opponent in the Prague P.arJiament, the Communists coulld afterwards easiil y consoHda.te their ,p osition, shi,fting sirrnply from the system of "Na'tiona'1 Front" to that of the "M_a rxist majority." Contrary to what Mr. Hubert Ripka states in his book "Le coup d'Etat de Prague en 1948," there was, therefore, no revolution in Prague in February 1948. There was only a change in the internal structure of the government. 'Jihe present situation oi Christian demoomc,y in Slo·v akia is that of a resisting force to the Communist impact. This resistance is both religious and national. Catholiroism in Slovakia is a proven eounter-force to Communis:n. By the imprisonment of three Bishops, Msgr. V:oJtassruk, Msgr. Buza:lka and Msgr. Gojclic, and by keeping in house-arrest others of the Hierarchy, .the Chrur.ch finds it icrr:ipossilble to full.fill its obligations. But though there aire several hundred priests in jaH, though aH the Catholic lay elite has been "eliminated," though Christian demooracy as a poliiticail force has been crushed, . the Sl01V'8Jk peopie neventheless have retained a deep re!i,gious ooillViiction a:nd have defended chU'I'Ches an:d 'Priests with no more than 61 SLOVAKIA sticks and bare hands against the intervention of the State police. From the naHonal point of view, present-day OzechoSlavaJkia offers Vhe Slovaks nothing common to a national 'Staite. 'Bheir mherenit and ,a utonomous rights hruve been repudiated by Prag;ue once again. Ozecho~S!lwalkia today is simply one of the nll!mer()!U:s Socia[ist Reipuibl,ic.s of the Soviet orbit. Slovrukia has been depri·v ed of naitionail liberty in the name of the SocialiSIID preached by Moscow and executed by Prague. The Slovaks are firmly convinced that there is only one possible solution to the situation: the application of the right of national self-determination within the framework of a Federated Europe. This 'belief is shaired by the Slovak Lea,g ue of America and by aJl:l organie;ations of Slo-, J.!k political ref,u,gees in the free world. Slovak Ohnist:ian deimocraoy counts and relies on a nu1C'l eus oif prominent exi1ed peI'.sonallitities in the United .Jtrutes and Canada : some former Deiputies orf the Praigue Parlrarrnernt (Dr. :EJmanruel Boehm, St€iphen B1 aslko, John Daxner, Dr. Michael Zi:brin, Rev. Ferdinad Mondok, Dr. Francis Orlicky, Siteiphen BeniaJk), se;veral professors (Dr. J,o seph Cin:cik, Rev. Bonarventwre Ewe, Dr. Francis. Hrrusovsky, Reiv. Joseph PaJpin), nU1merous writers and jaurnaJlists George Gajdos-Bre~a, Rev. Nicha1as Sprinc, Constantine Ct.den, Dr. Joseipih Pa.iuco, Louis Kandra, Charles Sitrmen, John Okal'). and s.evera!l former Sllova!k diploona;ts (Charles Sidor, Dr. John Kassovk, Dr. Joseiph Kirs'Cihibaum, Dr. Joseph OmiliaJk) . All these men consider the United Statt•s as a fixed poh11t i;n the unive~se of Archi!Inides, frOim which it wilfil be possi,ble one day, by spiritual and physi.cal strength, to rock Communism from its foundations. They are most willing to conbrilbute their aJbilities and talents to effect the h'beration of Centra!l ffiurope and the formation of a European Federati'On with a free Slovrukia in it 1 WHO SAi D IT? - • • • "The importance of our trea ty with the U. S. S. R. is self-evident. Soviet Russia is rapidly freeing Europe from Nazi tyranny. Close ties have always existed between Russia and Czechoslovakia, and they have now been strengthened. We are proud to be an ally of that great power, which is bound to play the leading role in Europe after the war." - (Jan Mas aryk to "Overseas News Agency," February 6, 1944) .  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Christian Democracy in Slovakia Description An account of the resource Joseph A. Mikuš Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 2 (7), July 1953 pp. 57-61 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Mikuš, Joseph A., 1909-2005 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource July 1953 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/65d497ab39df6b0f93cbb39130c9fec7.pdf 7b27e4881f6d9f38358ccc2e2afa5066 PDF Text Text 26 SLOVAKIA THE PRACTICAL ASPECT OF A FEDERATION Joseph Pauco, Ph.D. I Eastern Europe provides a political observer with a motley mosaic of opinions. Living here are many nations and ra.c es which even a Central European does not properly recognize and many times does not know whether to classify them with European nations or with the Asiatics. Whoever searches more profoundly into their history and studies their political struggles at least cursorily will notice that in many regards their history and their programs are very similar to those of every p.ation in Central or Western Europe. You will find smaller and larger groups; small nations bound to the destiny of great ones, and their mutual relationship is manifested nearly always by the same complaints as those of other nations-suppressi on, imperialism, wars, revolutions, heroic deeds of national leaders, etc. In general, it is said that the East-European nations a.re politically less developed. Enemies of their freedom say that they are the more primitive nations and, therefore, certain slogans and principles of program are more highly spirited and sometimes sound like a voice from the romantic times of the past century. One thing is certain, that generally in almost all East-European nations, as can be seen from the course of their emigration, there is a great deal of conservatism both with regard to the form of warfare as well as the peaceful arrangement of Eastern Europe, or the territory of Asia Minor. Usually in all ideological proclamations, which are designated not only for the limited domestic public, but also for foreign countries, the stereotyped assertion is re-iterated that it is imperative to build national states in the whole of Eastern Europe. They promote not only the disintegration of Soviet Russia, but also oppose every form of a greater Russian empire. And systematically they oppose the much used Russian thesis about several Russian nations, incidentally, the false naming of some non-Russian nations (Little Russia, correctly the Ukrainia, etc.). �SLOVAKIA 27 Taken <Ybjectively, these nations must be fully understood. Not only small nations, that is tribes (as for example, of the Upper Caucasus), but also large nations (forty million Ukrainian and eighteen million Byelorussian people) did not have their own state for long centuries. Then in this conglomeration of East-European nations there also are such that cannot at all claim that they are building upon their own state traditions. And we may go even farther. Not until the twentieth century did small tribes or groups begin to create individual units which claimed national rights as nations with all the attributes of culturally and politically mature nations to manage their own destiny (Upper Caucasus). It was, for example, quite unknown to Europeans and less so to Americans that the Cossacks declared themselves an independent nation. History discloses that the Cossacks were in the service of Russian Czars and one part of them was inclined towards the Ukrainians; their language is Russian and Ukrainian. But we were acquainted only with legendary Cossack heroes. We knew very little about their political endeavors. But now there exists a strong movement for a Cossackia, i. e. an independent Cossack state. Besides all this, many of the East-European nations experienced a transfer process, especially during the Soviet reign of terror. The Ceceni (Tchetchene) of the Upper Caucasus are no longer in their original place. They were spread over the entire Soviet Union simply because they were a healthy and belligerent nation. A similar fate befell the small (two hundred thousands) Kalmuck nation and many other small nations. Transfer or resettling of nations is the best tactic of the Soviet. Already a whole million inhabitants of the Baltic states has been forcefully transferred to the Soviet interior and to Siberia; Russi.ans, Tartars, Uzbcks, and many others have supplanted them. It is no wonder then that all the nations of Eastern Europe and Asia Minor nations from an instinct of self-preservation insist on national independent states. Naturally, these tendencies manifest themselves most acutely within the strong nations, as for example, the Ukrainians. The Ukrainian �28 SLOVAKIA emigration is divided into at least ten political parties: from the most extreme rightists to socialists. But there is hardly one Ukrainian factor in emigration who does not favor an independent Great Ukrainia. Many times it appears that it is impossible to speak with East-European representatives about any other type of political organization other than national states. Fear of the entire future arrangement is often responsible for this. But all things considered, there is no fundamental aversion toward fedemlistic endeavors. True, the East-European is little interested in a West-European federation, because he is convinced that Western Europe has an insignificant interest in the correct solution of the Eastern question. But, inadvertantly, all thoughts and manifestations, which come to light in connection with either a West-European or a federation involving the whole of Europe, affect also the spiritual stratum of East-European emigration. And so, in their club meetings and their reviews, periodicals, and newspapers, they often discuss this most recent political problem seriously and minutely. This is not merely a confirmation of what has already been done in this matter, but learned East-European professors, politicians and publicists have the courage to draw a parallel between the West and East, between the intellectual efforts for a federation in the West and the practical ,possibilities in the East. Few are those who will analyze all the problems publicly. However, we have found many instances of debates concerning a European and a. regional Central-European and East-EuropeanAsia Minor federation. And it was not always a voice from the East which took a negative stand to the conception of a federation itself. Finally, even exclusive, nationalistic, international emigrant organizations allow for a closer or liberal relationship of individual nations. Such an International of Freedom, consisting of twenty one Central and East-European emigrations, bases its fundamental program on an inter-continental confederation of states, including all of Eastern Europe, except Russia and all of Asia Minor. The Anti-Bolshevik Block of nations, building exclusively on national states, has within its Constitution a clause which �SLOVAKIA 29 speaks of the possibility of creating smaller or larger units and co-states. The oldest East-European anti-bolshevik international emigrant organization, Prometheus, working already twenty eight years, receives most sympathetically the trends which favor a European federation and a regional federation. Therefore, the idea of federalism is not foreign to the East-European peoples, nor to those who never had their own state and who yearn to be free. In comparing these efforts from the East, undoubtedly the thought arises with regard to Central Europe where the Slov,a ks dwell. What is the situation there? II One argument against Slovak persistence and perseverance in the struggle for an indpendent state usually is its national "youthfulness". This argument was used especially during the years following World War I, when the struggle of the Slovaks began to be serious both in form and intensivity, and opponents of Slovak freedom had to resort to all kinds of, and many times, less successful arguments. This argument could have been valid to a certain extent only until Slovak intellectuals refuted the false legend that the Slovak nation has no history and until the Slovaks themselves proved by their creative spirit that their naJt:ion can ad~pt itself m a'Il!y period to its neiighibors in all fields and that its cultural endeavors are not more inferior, but in many respects the Slovak genius surpasses its partners and becomes distinctly original. Therefore, such an argument could not carry weight for very long. It lost in realism very quickly with the Slo• vak people, and it was the spirit of the Slovaks that proved it is possible to create a new Slovak environement in the spiritual and national-political regard without lures and snares, without thorough saturation from secondary sources. The "youthful" Slovak nation had chosen its own course so that it could live its own national life. Against facts, and particularly the vitality of all the component parts of the Slovak nation, it was difficult to �30 SLOVAKIA keep on using endlessly the arguments used during the first few years following World War I. Quickly, therefore, as the views of the Slovak people began to change, and as the course of the policy of "lures" was changed by facts, the very same people suddenly ascertained that the Slovak nation is biologically so strong that its neighbors will have to draw from this healthy blood bank to preserve themselves, to revive, and also become stronger. This was an immoral attempt to destroy the national Slovak body. After drawing upon the biological vitality, a degeneration of spiritual values among the Slovak nation would be inevitable. It was not possible, therefore, from motives of self-preservation, to agree with such "allurements." From this theory our Czech neighbors moved further. Not only biologically were we supposed to save one of our neighbors, but we were also supposed to contribute to its cultural and religious revival. These voices were heard frequently after World War II. All this is defective and for the Slovaks extremely dangerous. Surely, to save, let us say, a nation twice as large, from certain ruin, is a beautiful and historically valuable sacrifice. But nothing more or less than a sacrifice. Probably, our investments would be faulty and all our magnanimity could once avenge itself on our nation. By our own efforts we would be perhaps the cause of new dramas in the years to come, similar to the various struggles of the past. On the surface, it would 'be a sublime act, but in reality the murder of our own nation. We would in fact be guilty of perpetrating national suicide. We admit that we feel sorry for the decline and demise of any nation and its culture. Higher motives and self-love prevent us from pouring into the disintegrating body of our neighbor - even if he asks us to do so - all that God has given us as a manifestation of our own strength and cultural development. We realize that our development was hampered, that we are just beginning to live, that the culmination of our life is yet to come. Because of this motive -- that we would not collapse before we present evidence of our spiritual and �SLOVAKIA 31 national-political heroism to the world - there is for us no enticement which would lead us from the path of our very own interests. True, this is not an egotistic and selfish course. We have the highest interest in this only because we do not want to fall and perish under the guise of such dangerous and, frequently, even enticing allurements. On the other hand, we are fully convinced that in a more extensive Central and All-European society we will be able to do more even from the spiritual and material viewpoints. Binding ourselves exclusively to the interests of just one neighbor would mean our gradual extinction and destruction. Even if we were the center of attraction for a definite time, this would be a very narrow circle and our rapid exhaustion would soon turn away the attention of all friends. Nevertheless, natural development can be assured to us only in a healthy competition in a normal advancement which is not weighed down with too great a burden. An alliance, let us say, with the Czechs - an alliance of complete biological and spiritual growing-together - would stifle within us all manifestations of individuality exclusively for the benefit of the larger Czech nation. We are for co-operation, but we wish to put it on a real foundation of as extensive a co-operation as possible. If it is true that we are still a "youthful" nation, immature, but full of life and having all the prerequisites for the restoration of biological and cultural life of a certain nation, then the realistic hypothesis is more valid, that is, that all the energy which we should invest in behalf of one of our neighbors, in time will uphold the Slovak nation much longer as an individual factor within the Central European family of nations, healthy and capable of its own undertakings. The healthy Slovak nation, being fully willing to accept the closest co-operation within the framework of an European federation, wants to be equal with its political and cultural sense to the most serious factors of world political planning. The health and resources in which the Slovak nation abounds - and in this respect it has many preferences �32 SLOVAKIA over some European nations - assures it of all suppositions, that it will know how to maintain itself in the European family of states. And, of course, everything it produces with its intellect and hands above the average and above its living standards, it will gladly let its partners have. There is a great difference whether the healthy and elementally powerful expressions of the Slovaks, about which many do not doubt, should benefit one of our neighbors exclusively, or whether we should share them with the whole of Europe. Definitely, we shall choose the latter course. It is direct, logical and free of allurements. We do not fear a contest, competition, or spiritual rivalry. Our healthy construction, which others envy, certainly will overcome all remnants of prejudice and, above all, will convince all the other European partners that they can count on the Slovak nation in every field of endeavor that this nation is aware of its duty not only to itself, but also to others. It is not envious, or even hazardous. III There is no doUJbt ,t hat the time will come for the creation of larige staite unilts even in the Old World. Europe already has '1:a,id 1Jhe fourndat'ions of a .federation which, in the eyes of 1Jheori1S1ts - the mo·s t oUJtstanding contemporrury politicians oif :Eill!rope - ii.,s. dea;r f.ro:rn almost every side. Oillly groUJps nolt ,i nterested in the welfare of Europe tum away fll'om tMs ,i,d'ea. We SlcwaJks cannot but be interested even in the pracllical side of the maJtter, i'nasmruch as we wolllld liike to see ouriselves, on the one hand, among the independent naltiorrs of Centra'l Europe, who are waiting for the creation of a European f ederrution, anld, on the other, we do not wamrt ,t o stand unipreprured .toward aJll those facto1rs, who rure placing obstacles in the way of Slovakia beco ming a member of sUldh a European federrution. One of tlhe most serious rea!sons why some groups op,pose our diredt pairbic~pation in the European federaJtion, and at best wish to see us in it only through the medium of Czecho..Slovakia, usually is an alleged extreme Slovak nrutionali:s m. Pruradoxically as it sounds, this allegation �SLOVAKIA 33 is not casua!l, ,b ut is used systemaiticruly as a seriOUJS rurgu,men,t ·a gainst us. ]t simply d0€S not sound naJtuiral and serious that the Slovaks come w.iith the thawght of mer,ginig Slovakia, as an ,i ndependent state unit, into run EUII'Opean federaltion. Many SJlo;v,aJk politicians aire figihting very effectively for this idea already sevarall decades. Dr. M,;IJ.an Ho~a was noit an extreme Slovak naMonalist, even though he we:nit tJhrough a CO!Ill/Paratiively motley degree of .poilitical thoughit. Thiis MiJan Hlod:za dedicated all h~s intelilect Ito the federalistic idea and, therefore, belongs among tihe most s,i,g,n!iificant figwres in this modern movement not on!ly in owr Slovak enVliromnent, but in relation to Central Emrope as well. Even though he was a ceilltra[ist in the Ozec!ho-Slo:vaik Republic, nevertheless, with the greater pairt of hlis spirilt he belonged .to the broader CentralEJuropean environment. Olther Sl01Vak politicians also emerged and aTe still emer,gi,rug wiith the ildea o!f a fedarrutJion. The Ptresidenlt of the Slovak Repulb1:ic, Dr. Joseph 'Dirso, did not conceal his convicltion tihat evolution coU!ld not proceed otfherwise than in the sipinit of federa[iization. In his ,pUlbli'C wtterances he made several allusions to .this grave pr-ob'lem as if to prepare tlhe Slo,v~k puibHc for a new epoch of national and state life. Kairol Sidor, lfo11mer .Sl'ovak ambassador, does noit deny his conception of federal,i'SIID. Even the officia,l program of the Sllova!k NaJtiona1 Oouncil Abroad, which Karol Sidor heads, is ma;rked as a pro·g ram for an independent Slovak State within a framework Olf an EurQpean federation. Per'hrups, the moslt pr6dluotive ,t heol'ist, in the ranks of those ,w ho comprise the .Slovak NaJtional Com11ci1 and are coming on the scene from the young Slo,vaJk generation to take the responsiJM.lity for trhe devel01p.merut of affairs, is Dr. Joseph Kinschlbamn. Not only firom the view.point of evo[utionary necessity, bwt chiefly because he grrusped 1:!his complex of questions sensibly and soientificahly, KiTsch!baum, since the end of World War II, prepared and pu.fbliished numemus d.Jisserta;tions and studies which aiim to prove to the wor+ld that Sfova:ks have t!heir own modern poilitica,l con- �34 SLOVAKIA ceiption amJd also people who display an animruted an:d interest ~111 the problem of a fedel'a!lirzed ffiurolpe. 'Siimill'a dy, other SIJ.avak ipoliltical wOII1kers, publ!idats and wriiters, tea/Che.rs a!Ild iinltellootuals are worlmnig for a federation (Dr. Iilin.amJUel Bohm, Dr. Francis Hrusovsky, Reiv. Niicho'las Siprinc, Dr. Joseph Mi!lrus, Dr. JO'Seph Cieker, Tu-. Imrrich KrUIZlia:k, Dr . .A;r.ved Grr-ebert., Louis IVcmdra and many othem). In contemporary trends of Sllorvaik politics the most foscinalting connedt:ling lilnk is the idea of federa,tion. Thruruk. !imig in a pradtiicaJl way, i1t is imipossiible to picture a Slovalk p,oliitician or pol'ilticaJ theorist who seriiously de<~ls wiltih the idea of lar,ge un1its, s'U/Ch as a Cerubrrul-Ewropeam or Eiulropean federation WOllfild be, and wOllNd wish to lead his nation along the path oif inltoierance and of nationally scOIUTg'ed p8JSISions. Therefore, tJhe Slovaks and t!heir politiicrul and oUJlrtural representatives are not ibwillding a diam on the poinlted edge of chaUMiin:iSlm, but adhere to the notion of a futm-·e EUTopean federation. IV U'IllU'Sual ]t is interesting to note that it was chiefly rthe Czech Socialistic pam'ties wlhreh both in Czechia and Siovalkia ooleashed the most saiv-age conflict about the unfilty of the "Czeclhoslavialk" langwa.ge. 'Dhe same parties who diid not forget to pdse even in our country as progressive prurties. in oocoirdlalllCe to Marxislt ideolo.g y. Iif tJhe Slov3/k naltion opposed this the'ir "progress," then it was in a lar,ge meaiswre becaJUJse they ibrOll.lglht confusion inlto the tiundamenitaJ oonceipts of polliitiiJool Iiife, and, in fact, reaction which excludes aiN criticism. Czech socl,rulism has shown ilbself as the pioneer of f,r ustrruted thinking, and if we tiram:sfer i'ts conception to a practlicall field, we see that it has 1,i1dikuled iltself as has no otller move1ment whiibh had anything to do, directly or indirectly, wti.th the SlO!Vak natioo.. For twenty fuM yerurs, Ozecll poliitiios tenaciously held to ''OzoohO'SlovaikiSin" as a sally bridge into S'lov:alkia. Other Ozedh parties ad/Opted thlis slogan from the socirulists. Scientists seized wpon i1t and were fuhlowed by OI.ech journalists. �SLOVAKIA 35 And thus, in fact, a period ensued when representatirves of Ozech spirit and prruatioa1 pdliitircs were more enraged in gaining a position for the artificial construdtion of "OzechiQslavaJkism" than a real settlement of relaitionshi1ps among 'the minorilties Indisputably we muist thank their inC'ons!i.derate, one-si'ded and undemocratic pol1'tiicail program fo:r the faot 1:hat Prague centralism found irt:se'lf in ruirrs wilt!h the first thrust. The so-called "Czechoslovaks" have denied the Slovaiks the right to self-existence. The Slo,v ak naltion, nevertheless, persistently fought for the recognition otf this most naturaJl right. And it did so in harmony witlh cmltural Europe, which no one, except the Communhrts labeled as reactionary or backward. In politica! morals, tile stirug,gle for the recognition of the suptreme riig1hlts of a nation signifies, in ,t he .p ositive sense d:f the ward, the most noble expression of progressiveness. The Slovaks, therefore, a.ire ahead of the Ozetdhs in thlis re~ard by t!hirtty years. Many exipeniments were .necessary to reform. the "Czechoslovruks" rut least prurtliail'1.y. There had to be a war - for tfrlem new exiperieniceis both on the domestic and fureig.n fronts. Once moce they had ,t o ascertain the mmd of the S'lO,VM{ nation, to scrutinize the trends of European and nonIDuropean politilc's, so that rome of them ta:o'tica.1.[,y, others per1haps sincerely, woulld rubandon the ruinous policy of •~czeichosllO'V'alkifum." After WoI"ld War H, less was said albout "OzeclhO's:lovaJk" unity and, partliculrurly, about a united lan.guiage. It mu'Slt be mentioned again, tha.'t :the most Ulillprog.ressirve of all in this regarrtl were the ~etch Socialists. The otfrler Czech polrnicians and theiT Slovak a.Hies rewgn.ized the right of the Sfovruk nation to its own existence . But at that time the Slovaks were more advanced. They had gone through the hist.orically rich segment of their own state. ft is certain that there is a greait deaft of difference between "Oze1ehosi1ova'k" comprehension - it stilil is bound Uip with a joint state aind the standipdinrt: of t!he Slovaks. To get ruhead by means oif a steady for-warn effort and in aiM farms - to find what benefi't!s best t!he 11:fe am.d development of the nation - the SlovaJks provoo that they rure marehing �36 SLOVAKIA in 1:Jhe spirit of the ,t imes and, as an independenlt ,and competitiive ,_po1fficai unit, seek to persevere aloll!gside the most cmltwred European naltions. Toda,y, ffiurope ,is ffillllch frul"bher a'long t'he way than the "0zec'ho,SilovaJks." Theorelti.cafily and practica'lliy it i,s prepa,r ed for a federation of ai1l nations. The so-caUed "Czecihoslova'k1s " are ait tJhe crossroa;dis. Some a~ere to the form of the fiirt;t Ozecho-!SlovaJk Repuiblic, while others rure silent and say nolt!hlil!g a!boult a forurtlh or fitfth Czecho-Slova.!k Repulblic for whiich they would want to fight. StillJ. others ta:l:k obscurely about the possibillity of a federafted Czecho·~SIJ.oivakia. There i's allso a founth 0zech g,r1oop whi'ch does not wish to interfere in Slova!k affaiiI"S and i's f[gh'ting for a CentralEuropean or IDwopean federation in w'hiich it reckons wilth an inde,pendent Czech Ulnit and a separate Sloivaik unilt. On tlhe ort:her hand, conltemporary SIJ.ovak ,p oHtits is following clearly and .ll!nreserveidly whait is best for an inde,pendenrt Sl01Vak State wli:thin the framework of a European federation. Compari.Il!g 1:Jhe effort's of t'he "Czechoslava1ki:;" wi'bh those of the Sl0iv-alks, we see, that even now there is a brusiic dliifrferenice b.e'tween them and that "CzechoSl01Va:k,i sm" wppears in the role of the mo'sit reactionary factor in Central Ewrope. But, willy-nilly, some of its representatiives have come oloser to the tlhinking of the .S1'oivaJk nati:on and ,g radually are rcliinquish~n,g their b1goited and ar,chaii.c views. Hoiweiver, t'here stiifl remains the difference of thirty yerurs. We can, therefore, clearly see from these .s imply-staited realities thaJt llhe sen:se of SlovaJk pol,i rtks tended toward a broader lilirI10ipean and worM society. There its a basic diffeirence whether we get into tJhi,s broader so'o iety of nations throrugh owr OiWll doors, or wihether we shalJ.l be led m'to it throrugh foreign dooirs wiit!h those of others; whether we wm lodk ,pa.ssi.rvely lllpOn the work, or whether we shali talke part in ilt w~tJh joint forces. A IDuropean fed:era/tlion will bring run end to these mistaJkes. We are det:inilteliy decfarin1g for a European associatioo, becruuse, rucicording to moral,s , ciulltll!re and p<Ylitical ma!tuirity, we rightfully beloD!g in it. � 26 SLOVAKIA THE PRACTICAL ASPECT OF A FEDERATION Joseph Pauco, Ph.D. I Eastern Europe provides a political observer with a motley mosaic of opinions. Living here are many nations and ra.c es which even a Central European does not properly recognize and many times does not know whether to classify them with European nations or with the Asiatics. Whoever searches more profoundly into their history and studies their political struggles at least cursorily will notice that in many regards their history and their programs are very similar to those of every p.ation in Central or Western Europe. You will find smaller and larger groups; small nations bound to the destiny of great ones, and their mutual relationship is manifested nearly always by the same complaints as those of other nations-suppressi on, imperialism, wars, revolutions, heroic deeds of national leaders, etc. In general, it is said that the East-European nations a.re politically less developed. Enemies of their freedom say that they are the more primitive nations and, therefore, certain slogans and principles of program are more highly spirited and sometimes sound like a voice from the romantic times of the past century. One thing is certain, that generally in almost all East-European nations, as can be seen from the course of their emigration, there is a great deal of conservatism both with regard to the form of warfare as well as the peaceful arrangement of Eastern Europe, or the territory of Asia Minor. Usually in all ideological proclamations, which are designated not only for the limited domestic public, but also for foreign countries, the stereotyped assertion is re-iterated that it is imperative to build national states in the whole of Eastern Europe. They promote not only the disintegration of Soviet Russia, but also oppose every form of a greater Russian empire. And systematically they oppose the much used Russian thesis about several Russian nations, incidentally, the false naming of some non-Russian nations (Little Russia, correctly the Ukrainia, etc.). �SLOVAKIA 27 Taken <Ybjectively, these nations must be fully understood. Not only small nations, that is tribes (as for example, of the Upper Caucasus), but also large nations (forty million Ukrainian and eighteen million Byelorussian people) did not have their own state for long centuries. Then in this conglomeration of East-European nations there also are such that cannot at all claim that they are building upon their own state traditions. And we may go even farther. Not until the twentieth century did small tribes or groups begin to create individual units which claimed national rights as nations with all the attributes of culturally and politically mature nations to manage their own destiny (Upper Caucasus). It was, for example, quite unknown to Europeans and less so to Americans that the Cossacks declared themselves an independent nation. History discloses that the Cossacks were in the service of Russian Czars and one part of them was inclined towards the Ukrainians; their language is Russian and Ukrainian. But we were acquainted only with legendary Cossack heroes. We knew very little about their political endeavors. But now there exists a strong movement for a Cossackia, i. e. an independent Cossack state. Besides all this, many of the East-European nations experienced a transfer process, especially during the Soviet reign of terror. The Ceceni (Tchetchene) of the Upper Caucasus are no longer in their original place. They were spread over the entire Soviet Union simply because they were a healthy and belligerent nation. A similar fate befell the small (two hundred thousands) Kalmuck nation and many other small nations. Transfer or resettling of nations is the best tactic of the Soviet. Already a whole million inhabitants of the Baltic states has been forcefully transferred to the Soviet interior and to Siberia; Russi.ans, Tartars, Uzbcks, and many others have supplanted them. It is no wonder then that all the nations of Eastern Europe and Asia Minor nations from an instinct of self-preservation insist on national independent states. Naturally, these tendencies manifest themselves most acutely within the strong nations, as for example, the Ukrainians. The Ukrainian �28 SLOVAKIA emigration is divided into at least ten political parties: from the most extreme rightists to socialists. But there is hardly one Ukrainian factor in emigration who does not favor an independent Great Ukrainia. Many times it appears that it is impossible to speak with East-European representatives about any other type of political organization other than national states. Fear of the entire future arrangement is often responsible for this. But all things considered, there is no fundamental aversion toward fedemlistic endeavors. True, the East-European is little interested in a West-European federation, because he is convinced that Western Europe has an insignificant interest in the correct solution of the Eastern question. But, inadvertantly, all thoughts and manifestations, which come to light in connection with either a West-European or a federation involving the whole of Europe, affect also the spiritual stratum of East-European emigration. And so, in their club meetings and their reviews, periodicals, and newspapers, they often discuss this most recent political problem seriously and minutely. This is not merely a confirmation of what has already been done in this matter, but learned East-European professors, politicians and publicists have the courage to draw a parallel between the West and East, between the intellectual efforts for a federation in the West and the practical ,possibilities in the East. Few are those who will analyze all the problems publicly. However, we have found many instances of debates concerning a European and a. regional Central-European and East-EuropeanAsia Minor federation. And it was not always a voice from the East which took a negative stand to the conception of a federation itself. Finally, even exclusive, nationalistic, international emigrant organizations allow for a closer or liberal relationship of individual nations. Such an International of Freedom, consisting of twenty one Central and East-European emigrations, bases its fundamental program on an inter-continental confederation of states, including all of Eastern Europe, except Russia and all of Asia Minor. The Anti-Bolshevik Block of nations, building exclusively on national states, has within its Constitution a clause which �SLOVAKIA 29 speaks of the possibility of creating smaller or larger units and co-states. The oldest East-European anti-bolshevik international emigrant organization, Prometheus, working already twenty eight years, receives most sympathetically the trends which favor a European federation and a regional federation. Therefore, the idea of federalism is not foreign to the East-European peoples, nor to those who never had their own state and who yearn to be free. In comparing these efforts from the East, undoubtedly the thought arises with regard to Central Europe where the Slov,a ks dwell. What is the situation there? II One argument against Slovak persistence and perseverance in the struggle for an indpendent state usually is its national "youthfulness". This argument was used especially during the years following World War I, when the struggle of the Slovaks began to be serious both in form and intensivity, and opponents of Slovak freedom had to resort to all kinds of, and many times, less successful arguments. This argument could have been valid to a certain extent only until Slovak intellectuals refuted the false legend that the Slovak nation has no history and until the Slovaks themselves proved by their creative spirit that their naJt:ion can ad~pt itself m a'Il!y period to its neiighibors in all fields and that its cultural endeavors are not more inferior, but in many respects the Slovak genius surpasses its partners and becomes distinctly original. Therefore, such an argument could not carry weight for very long. It lost in realism very quickly with the Slo• vak people, and it was the spirit of the Slovaks that proved it is possible to create a new Slovak environement in the spiritual and national-political regard without lures and snares, without thorough saturation from secondary sources. The "youthful" Slovak nation had chosen its own course so that it could live its own national life. Against facts, and particularly the vitality of all the component parts of the Slovak nation, it was difficult to �30 SLOVAKIA keep on using endlessly the arguments used during the first few years following World War I. Quickly, therefore, as the views of the Slovak people began to change, and as the course of the policy of "lures" was changed by facts, the very same people suddenly ascertained that the Slovak nation is biologically so strong that its neighbors will have to draw from this healthy blood bank to preserve themselves, to revive, and also become stronger. This was an immoral attempt to destroy the national Slovak body. After drawing upon the biological vitality, a degeneration of spiritual values among the Slovak nation would be inevitable. It was not possible, therefore, from motives of self-preservation, to agree with such "allurements." From this theory our Czech neighbors moved further. Not only biologically were we supposed to save one of our neighbors, but we were also supposed to contribute to its cultural and religious revival. These voices were heard frequently after World War II. All this is defective and for the Slovaks extremely dangerous. Surely, to save, let us say, a nation twice as large, from certain ruin, is a beautiful and historically valuable sacrifice. But nothing more or less than a sacrifice. Probably, our investments would be faulty and all our magnanimity could once avenge itself on our nation. By our own efforts we would be perhaps the cause of new dramas in the years to come, similar to the various struggles of the past. On the surface, it would 'be a sublime act, but in reality the murder of our own nation. We would in fact be guilty of perpetrating national suicide. We admit that we feel sorry for the decline and demise of any nation and its culture. Higher motives and self-love prevent us from pouring into the disintegrating body of our neighbor - even if he asks us to do so - all that God has given us as a manifestation of our own strength and cultural development. We realize that our development was hampered, that we are just beginning to live, that the culmination of our life is yet to come. Because of this motive -- that we would not collapse before we present evidence of our spiritual and �SLOVAKIA 31 national-political heroism to the world - there is for us no enticement which would lead us from the path of our very own interests. True, this is not an egotistic and selfish course. We have the highest interest in this only because we do not want to fall and perish under the guise of such dangerous and, frequently, even enticing allurements. On the other hand, we are fully convinced that in a more extensive Central and All-European society we will be able to do more even from the spiritual and material viewpoints. Binding ourselves exclusively to the interests of just one neighbor would mean our gradual extinction and destruction. Even if we were the center of attraction for a definite time, this would be a very narrow circle and our rapid exhaustion would soon turn away the attention of all friends. Nevertheless, natural development can be assured to us only in a healthy competition in a normal advancement which is not weighed down with too great a burden. An alliance, let us say, with the Czechs - an alliance of complete biological and spiritual growing-together - would stifle within us all manifestations of individuality exclusively for the benefit of the larger Czech nation. We are for co-operation, but we wish to put it on a real foundation of as extensive a co-operation as possible. If it is true that we are still a "youthful" nation, immature, but full of life and having all the prerequisites for the restoration of biological and cultural life of a certain nation, then the realistic hypothesis is more valid, that is, that all the energy which we should invest in behalf of one of our neighbors, in time will uphold the Slovak nation much longer as an individual factor within the Central European family of nations, healthy and capable of its own undertakings. The healthy Slovak nation, being fully willing to accept the closest co-operation within the framework of an European federation, wants to be equal with its political and cultural sense to the most serious factors of world political planning. The health and resources in which the Slovak nation abounds - and in this respect it has many preferences �32 SLOVAKIA over some European nations - assures it of all suppositions, that it will know how to maintain itself in the European family of states. And, of course, everything it produces with its intellect and hands above the average and above its living standards, it will gladly let its partners have. There is a great difference whether the healthy and elementally powerful expressions of the Slovaks, about which many do not doubt, should benefit one of our neighbors exclusively, or whether we should share them with the whole of Europe. Definitely, we shall choose the latter course. It is direct, logical and free of allurements. We do not fear a contest, competition, or spiritual rivalry. Our healthy construction, which others envy, certainly will overcome all remnants of prejudice and, above all, will convince all the other European partners that they can count on the Slovak nation in every field of endeavor that this nation is aware of its duty not only to itself, but also to others. It is not envious, or even hazardous. III There is no doUJbt ,t hat the time will come for the creation of larige staite unilts even in the Old World. Europe already has '1:a,id 1Jhe fourndat'ions of a .federation which, in the eyes of 1Jheori1S1ts - the mo·s t oUJtstanding contemporrury politicians oif :Eill!rope - ii.,s. dea;r f.ro:rn almost every side. Oillly groUJps nolt ,i nterested in the welfare of Europe tum away fll'om tMs ,i,d'ea. We SlcwaJks cannot but be interested even in the pracllical side of the maJtter, i'nasmruch as we wolllld liike to see ouriselves, on the one hand, among the independent naltiorrs of Centra'l Europe, who are waiting for the creation of a European f ederrution, anld, on the other, we do not wamrt ,t o stand unipreprured .toward aJll those facto1rs, who rure placing obstacles in the way of Slovakia beco ming a member of sUldh a European federrution. One of tlhe most serious rea!sons why some groups op,pose our diredt pairbic~pation in the European federaJtion, and at best wish to see us in it only through the medium of Czecho..Slovakia, usually is an alleged extreme Slovak nrutionali:s m. Pruradoxically as it sounds, this allegation �SLOVAKIA 33 is not casua!l, ,b ut is used systemaiticruly as a seriOUJS rurgu,men,t ·a gainst us. ]t simply d0€S not sound naJtuiral and serious that the Slovaks come w.iith the thawght of mer,ginig Slovakia, as an ,i ndependent state unit, into run EUII'Opean federaltion. Many SJlo;v,aJk politicians aire figihting very effectively for this idea already sevarall decades. Dr. M,;IJ.an Ho~a was noit an extreme Slovak naMonalist, even though he we:nit tJhrough a CO!Ill/Paratiively motley degree of .poilitical thoughit. Thiis MiJan Hlod:za dedicated all h~s intelilect Ito the federalistic idea and, therefore, belongs among tihe most s,i,g,n!iificant figwres in this modern movement not on!ly in owr Slovak enVliromnent, but in relation to Central Emrope as well. Even though he was a ceilltra[ist in the Ozec!ho-Slo:vaik Republic, nevertheless, with the greater pairt of hlis spirilt he belonged .to the broader CentralEJuropean environment. Olther Sl01Vak politicians also emerged and aTe still emer,gi,rug wiith the ildea o!f a fedarrutJion. The Ptresidenlt of the Slovak Repulb1:ic, Dr. Joseph 'Dirso, did not conceal his convicltion tihat evolution coU!ld not proceed otfherwise than in the sipinit of federa[iization. In his ,pUlbli'C wtterances he made several allusions to .this grave pr-ob'lem as if to prepare tlhe Slo,v~k puibHc for a new epoch of national and state life. Kairol Sidor, lfo11mer .Sl'ovak ambassador, does noit deny his conception of federal,i'SIID. Even the officia,l program of the Sllova!k NaJtiona1 Oouncil Abroad, which Karol Sidor heads, is ma;rked as a pro·g ram for an independent Slovak State within a framework Olf an EurQpean federation. Per'hrups, the moslt pr6dluotive ,t heol'ist, in the ranks of those ,w ho comprise the .Slovak NaJtional Com11ci1 and are coming on the scene from the young Slo,vaJk generation to take the responsiJM.lity for trhe devel01p.merut of affairs, is Dr. Joseph Kinschlbamn. Not only firom the view.point of evo[utionary necessity, bwt chiefly because he grrusped 1:!his complex of questions sensibly and soientificahly, KiTsch!baum, since the end of World War II, prepared and pu.fbliished numemus d.Jisserta;tions and studies which aiim to prove to the wor+ld that Sfova:ks have t!heir own modern poilitica,l con- �34 SLOVAKIA ceiption amJd also people who display an animruted an:d interest ~111 the problem of a fedel'a!lirzed ffiurolpe. 'Siimill'a dy, other SIJ.avak ipoliltical wOII1kers, publ!idats and wriiters, tea/Che.rs a!Ild iinltellootuals are worlmnig for a federation (Dr. Iilin.amJUel Bohm, Dr. Francis Hrusovsky, Reiv. Niicho'las Siprinc, Dr. Joseph Mi!lrus, Dr. JO'Seph Cieker, Tu-. Imrrich KrUIZlia:k, Dr . .A;r.ved Grr-ebert., Louis IVcmdra and many othem). In contemporary trends of Sllorvaik politics the most foscinalting connedt:ling lilnk is the idea of federa,tion. Thruruk. !imig in a pradtiicaJl way, i1t is imipossiible to picture a Slovalk p,oliitician or pol'ilticaJ theorist who seriiously de<~ls wiltih the idea of lar,ge un1its, s'U/Ch as a Cerubrrul-Ewropeam or Eiulropean federation WOllfild be, and wOllNd wish to lead his nation along the path oif inltoierance and of nationally scOIUTg'ed p8JSISions. Therefore, tJhe Slovaks and t!heir politiicrul and oUJlrtural representatives are not ibwillding a diam on the poinlted edge of chaUMiin:iSlm, but adhere to the notion of a futm-·e EUTopean federation. IV U'IllU'Sual ]t is interesting to note that it was chiefly rthe Czech Socialistic pam'ties wlhreh both in Czechia and Siovalkia ooleashed the most saiv-age conflict about the unfilty of the "Czeclhoslavialk" langwa.ge. 'Dhe same parties who diid not forget to pdse even in our country as progressive prurties. in oocoirdlalllCe to Marxislt ideolo.g y. Iif tJhe Slov3/k naltion opposed this the'ir "progress," then it was in a lar,ge meaiswre becaJUJse they ibrOll.lglht confusion inlto the tiundamenitaJ oonceipts of polliitiiJool Iiife, and, in fact, reaction which excludes aiN criticism. Czech socl,rulism has shown ilbself as the pioneer of f,r ustrruted thinking, and if we tiram:sfer i'ts conception to a practlicall field, we see that it has 1,i1dikuled iltself as has no otller move1ment whiibh had anything to do, directly or indirectly, wti.th the SlO!Vak natioo.. For twenty fuM yerurs, Ozecll poliitiios tenaciously held to ''OzoohO'SlovaikiSin" as a sally bridge into S'lov:alkia. Other Ozedh parties ad/Opted thlis slogan from the socirulists. Scientists seized wpon i1t and were fuhlowed by OI.ech journalists. �SLOVAKIA 35 And thus, in fact, a period ensued when representatirves of Ozech spirit and prruatioa1 pdliitircs were more enraged in gaining a position for the artificial construdtion of "OzechiQslavaJkism" than a real settlement of relaitionshi1ps among 'the minorilties Indisputably we muist thank their inC'ons!i.derate, one-si'ded and undemocratic pol1'tiicail program fo:r the faot 1:hat Prague centralism found irt:se'lf in ruirrs wilt!h the first thrust. The so-called "Czechoslovaks" have denied the Slovaiks the right to self-existence. The Slo,v ak naltion, nevertheless, persistently fought for the recognition otf this most naturaJl right. And it did so in harmony witlh cmltural Europe, which no one, except the Communhrts labeled as reactionary or backward. In politica! morals, tile stirug,gle for the recognition of the suptreme riig1hlts of a nation signifies, in ,t he .p ositive sense d:f the ward, the most noble expression of progressiveness. The Slovaks, therefore, a.ire ahead of the Ozetdhs in thlis re~ard by t!hirtty years. Many exipeniments were .necessary to reform. the "Czechoslovruks" rut least prurtliail'1.y. There had to be a war - for tfrlem new exiperieniceis both on the domestic and fureig.n fronts. Once moce they had ,t o ascertain the mmd of the S'lO,VM{ nation, to scrutinize the trends of European and nonIDuropean politilc's, so that rome of them ta:o'tica.1.[,y, others per1haps sincerely, woulld rubandon the ruinous policy of •~czeichosllO'V'alkifum." After WoI"ld War H, less was said albout "OzeclhO's:lovaJk" unity and, partliculrurly, about a united lan.guiage. It mu'Slt be mentioned again, tha.'t :the most Ulillprog.ressirve of all in this regarrtl were the ~etch Socialists. The otfrler Czech polrnicians and theiT Slovak a.Hies rewgn.ized the right of the Sfovruk nation to its own existence . But at that time the Slovaks were more advanced. They had gone through the hist.orically rich segment of their own state. ft is certain that there is a greait deaft of difference between "Oze1ehosi1ova'k" comprehension - it stilil is bound Uip with a joint state aind the standipdinrt: of t!he Slovaks. To get ruhead by means oif a steady for-warn effort and in aiM farms - to find what benefi't!s best t!he 11:fe am.d development of the nation - the SlovaJks provoo that they rure marehing �36 SLOVAKIA in 1:Jhe spirit of the ,t imes and, as an independenlt ,and competitiive ,_po1fficai unit, seek to persevere aloll!gside the most cmltwred European naltions. Toda,y, ffiurope ,is ffillllch frul"bher a'long t'he way than the "0zec'ho,SilovaJks." Theorelti.cafily and practica'lliy it i,s prepa,r ed for a federation of ai1l nations. The so-caUed "Czecihoslova'k1s " are ait tJhe crossroa;dis. Some a~ere to the form of the fiirt;t Ozecho-!SlovaJk Repuiblic, while others rure silent and say nolt!hlil!g a!boult a forurtlh or fitfth Czecho-Slova.!k Repulblic for whiich they would want to fight. StillJ. others ta:l:k obscurely about the possibillity of a federafted Czecho·~SIJ.oivakia. There i's allso a founth 0zech g,r1oop whi'ch does not wish to interfere in Slova!k affaiiI"S and i's f[gh'ting for a CentralEuropean or IDwopean federation in w'hiich it reckons wilth an inde,pendent Czech Ulnit and a separate Sloivaik unilt. On tlhe ort:her hand, conltemporary SIJ.ovak ,p oHtits is following clearly and .ll!nreserveidly whait is best for an inde,pendenrt Sl01Vak State wli:thin the framework of a European federation. Compari.Il!g 1:Jhe effort's of t'he "Czechoslava1ki:;" wi'bh those of the Sl0iv-alks, we see, that even now there is a brusiic dliifrferenice b.e'tween them and that "CzechoSl01Va:k,i sm" wppears in the role of the mo'sit reactionary factor in Central Ewrope. But, willy-nilly, some of its representatiives have come oloser to the tlhinking of the .S1'oivaJk nati:on and ,g radually are rcliinquish~n,g their b1goited and ar,chaii.c views. Hoiweiver, t'here stiifl remains the difference of thirty yerurs. We can, therefore, clearly see from these .s imply-staited realities thaJt llhe sen:se of SlovaJk pol,i rtks tended toward a broader lilirI10ipean and worM society. There its a basic diffeirence whether we get into tJhi,s broader so'o iety of nations throrugh owr OiWll doors, or wihether we shalJ.l be led m'to it throrugh foreign dooirs wiit!h those of others; whether we wm lodk ,pa.ssi.rvely lllpOn the work, or whether we shali talke part in ilt w~tJh joint forces. A IDuropean fed:era/tlion will bring run end to these mistaJkes. We are det:inilteliy decfarin1g for a European associatioo, becruuse, rucicording to moral,s , ciulltll!re and p<Ylitical ma!tuirity, we rightfully beloD!g in it. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 26 SLOVAKIA THE PRACTICAL ASPECT OF A FEDERATION Joseph Pauco, Ph.D. I Eastern Europe provides a political observer with a motley mosaic of opinions. Living here are many nations and ra.c es which even a Central European does not properly recognize and many times does not know whether to classify them with European nations or with the Asiatics. Whoever searches more profoundly into their history and studies their political struggles at least cursorily will notice that in many regards their history and their programs are very similar to those of every p.ation in Central or Western Europe. You will find smaller and larger groups; small nations bound to the destiny of great ones, and their mutual relationship is manifested nearly always by the same complaints as those of other nations-suppressi on, imperialism, wars, revolutions, heroic deeds of national leaders, etc. In general, it is said that the East-European nations a.re politically less developed. Enemies of their freedom say that they are the more primitive nations and, therefore, certain slogans and principles of program are more highly spirited and sometimes sound like a voice from the romantic times of the past century. One thing is certain, that generally in almost all East-European nations, as can be seen from the course of their emigration, there is a great deal of conservatism both with regard to the form of warfare as well as the peaceful arrangement of Eastern Europe, or the territory of Asia Minor. Usually in all ideological proclamations, which are designated not only for the limited domestic public, but also for foreign countries, the stereotyped assertion is re-iterated that it is imperative to build national states in the whole of Eastern Europe. They promote not only the disintegration of Soviet Russia, but also oppose every form of a greater Russian empire. And systematically they oppose the much used Russian thesis about several Russian nations, incidentally, the false naming of some non-Russian nations (Little Russia, correctly the Ukrainia, etc.). SLOVAKIA 27 Taken <Ybjectively, these nations must be fully understood. Not only small nations, that is tribes (as for example, of the Upper Caucasus), but also large nations (forty million Ukrainian and eighteen million Byelorussian people) did not have their own state for long centuries. Then in this conglomeration of East-European nations there also are such that cannot at all claim that they are building upon their own state traditions. And we may go even farther. Not until the twentieth century did small tribes or groups begin to create individual units which claimed national rights as nations with all the attributes of culturally and politically mature nations to manage their own destiny (Upper Caucasus). It was, for example, quite unknown to Europeans and less so to Americans that the Cossacks declared themselves an independent nation. History discloses that the Cossacks were in the service of Russian Czars and one part of them was inclined towards the Ukrainians; their language is Russian and Ukrainian. But we were acquainted only with legendary Cossack heroes. We knew very little about their political endeavors. But now there exists a strong movement for a Cossackia, i. e. an independent Cossack state. Besides all this, many of the East-European nations experienced a transfer process, especially during the Soviet reign of terror. The Ceceni (Tchetchene) of the Upper Caucasus are no longer in their original place. They were spread over the entire Soviet Union simply because they were a healthy and belligerent nation. A similar fate befell the small (two hundred thousands) Kalmuck nation and many other small nations. Transfer or resettling of nations is the best tactic of the Soviet. Already a whole million inhabitants of the Baltic states has been forcefully transferred to the Soviet interior and to Siberia; Russi.ans, Tartars, Uzbcks, and many others have supplanted them. It is no wonder then that all the nations of Eastern Europe and Asia Minor nations from an instinct of self-preservation insist on national independent states. Naturally, these tendencies manifest themselves most acutely within the strong nations, as for example, the Ukrainians. The Ukrainian 28 SLOVAKIA emigration is divided into at least ten political parties: from the most extreme rightists to socialists. But there is hardly one Ukrainian factor in emigration who does not favor an independent Great Ukrainia. Many times it appears that it is impossible to speak with East-European representatives about any other type of political organization other than national states. Fear of the entire future arrangement is often responsible for this. But all things considered, there is no fundamental aversion toward fedemlistic endeavors. True, the East-European is little interested in a West-European federation, because he is convinced that Western Europe has an insignificant interest in the correct solution of the Eastern question. But, inadvertantly, all thoughts and manifestations, which come to light in connection with either a West-European or a federation involving the whole of Europe, affect also the spiritual stratum of East-European emigration. And so, in their club meetings and their reviews, periodicals, and newspapers, they often discuss this most recent political problem seriously and minutely. This is not merely a confirmation of what has already been done in this matter, but learned East-European professors, politicians and publicists have the courage to draw a parallel between the West and East, between the intellectual efforts for a federation in the West and the practical ,possibilities in the East. Few are those who will analyze all the problems publicly. However, we have found many instances of debates concerning a European and a. regional Central-European and East-EuropeanAsia Minor federation. And it was not always a voice from the East which took a negative stand to the conception of a federation itself. Finally, even exclusive, nationalistic, international emigrant organizations allow for a closer or liberal relationship of individual nations. Such an International of Freedom, consisting of twenty one Central and East-European emigrations, bases its fundamental program on an inter-continental confederation of states, including all of Eastern Europe, except Russia and all of Asia Minor. The Anti-Bolshevik Block of nations, building exclusively on national states, has within its Constitution a clause which SLOVAKIA 29 speaks of the possibility of creating smaller or larger units and co-states. The oldest East-European anti-bolshevik international emigrant organization, Prometheus, working already twenty eight years, receives most sympathetically the trends which favor a European federation and a regional federation. Therefore, the idea of federalism is not foreign to the East-European peoples, nor to those who never had their own state and who yearn to be free. In comparing these efforts from the East, undoubtedly the thought arises with regard to Central Europe where the Slov,a ks dwell. What is the situation there? II One argument against Slovak persistence and perseverance in the struggle for an indpendent state usually is its national "youthfulness". This argument was used especially during the years following World War I, when the struggle of the Slovaks began to be serious both in form and intensivity, and opponents of Slovak freedom had to resort to all kinds of, and many times, less successful arguments. This argument could have been valid to a certain extent only until Slovak intellectuals refuted the false legend that the Slovak nation has no history and until the Slovaks themselves proved by their creative spirit that their naJt:ion can ad~pt itself m a'Il!y period to its neiighibors in all fields and that its cultural endeavors are not more inferior, but in many respects the Slovak genius surpasses its partners and becomes distinctly original. Therefore, such an argument could not carry weight for very long. It lost in realism very quickly with the Slo• vak people, and it was the spirit of the Slovaks that proved it is possible to create a new Slovak environement in the spiritual and national-political regard without lures and snares, without thorough saturation from secondary sources. The "youthful" Slovak nation had chosen its own course so that it could live its own national life. Against facts, and particularly the vitality of all the component parts of the Slovak nation, it was difficult to 30 SLOVAKIA keep on using endlessly the arguments used during the first few years following World War I. Quickly, therefore, as the views of the Slovak people began to change, and as the course of the policy of "lures" was changed by facts, the very same people suddenly ascertained that the Slovak nation is biologically so strong that its neighbors will have to draw from this healthy blood bank to preserve themselves, to revive, and also become stronger. This was an immoral attempt to destroy the national Slovak body. After drawing upon the biological vitality, a degeneration of spiritual values among the Slovak nation would be inevitable. It was not possible, therefore, from motives of self-preservation, to agree with such "allurements." From this theory our Czech neighbors moved further. Not only biologically were we supposed to save one of our neighbors, but we were also supposed to contribute to its cultural and religious revival. These voices were heard frequently after World War II. All this is defective and for the Slovaks extremely dangerous. Surely, to save, let us say, a nation twice as large, from certain ruin, is a beautiful and historically valuable sacrifice. But nothing more or less than a sacrifice. Probably, our investments would be faulty and all our magnanimity could once avenge itself on our nation. By our own efforts we would be perhaps the cause of new dramas in the years to come, similar to the various struggles of the past. On the surface, it would 'be a sublime act, but in reality the murder of our own nation. We would in fact be guilty of perpetrating national suicide. We admit that we feel sorry for the decline and demise of any nation and its culture. Higher motives and self-love prevent us from pouring into the disintegrating body of our neighbor - even if he asks us to do so - all that God has given us as a manifestation of our own strength and cultural development. We realize that our development was hampered, that we are just beginning to live, that the culmination of our life is yet to come. Because of this motive -- that we would not collapse before we present evidence of our spiritual and SLOVAKIA 31 national-political heroism to the world - there is for us no enticement which would lead us from the path of our very own interests. True, this is not an egotistic and selfish course. We have the highest interest in this only because we do not want to fall and perish under the guise of such dangerous and, frequently, even enticing allurements. On the other hand, we are fully convinced that in a more extensive Central and All-European society we will be able to do more even from the spiritual and material viewpoints. Binding ourselves exclusively to the interests of just one neighbor would mean our gradual extinction and destruction. Even if we were the center of attraction for a definite time, this would be a very narrow circle and our rapid exhaustion would soon turn away the attention of all friends. Nevertheless, natural development can be assured to us only in a healthy competition in a normal advancement which is not weighed down with too great a burden. An alliance, let us say, with the Czechs - an alliance of complete biological and spiritual growing-together - would stifle within us all manifestations of individuality exclusively for the benefit of the larger Czech nation. We are for co-operation, but we wish to put it on a real foundation of as extensive a co-operation as possible. If it is true that we are still a "youthful" nation, immature, but full of life and having all the prerequisites for the restoration of biological and cultural life of a certain nation, then the realistic hypothesis is more valid, that is, that all the energy which we should invest in behalf of one of our neighbors, in time will uphold the Slovak nation much longer as an individual factor within the Central European family of nations, healthy and capable of its own undertakings. The healthy Slovak nation, being fully willing to accept the closest co-operation within the framework of an European federation, wants to be equal with its political and cultural sense to the most serious factors of world political planning. The health and resources in which the Slovak nation abounds - and in this respect it has many preferences 32 SLOVAKIA over some European nations - assures it of all suppositions, that it will know how to maintain itself in the European family of states. And, of course, everything it produces with its intellect and hands above the average and above its living standards, it will gladly let its partners have. There is a great difference whether the healthy and elementally powerful expressions of the Slovaks, about which many do not doubt, should benefit one of our neighbors exclusively, or whether we should share them with the whole of Europe. Definitely, we shall choose the latter course. It is direct, logical and free of allurements. We do not fear a contest, competition, or spiritual rivalry. Our healthy construction, which others envy, certainly will overcome all remnants of prejudice and, above all, will convince all the other European partners that they can count on the Slovak nation in every field of endeavor that this nation is aware of its duty not only to itself, but also to others. It is not envious, or even hazardous. III There is no doUJbt ,t hat the time will come for the creation of larige staite unilts even in the Old World. Europe already has '1:a,id 1Jhe fourndat'ions of a .federation which, in the eyes of 1Jheori1S1ts - the mo·s t oUJtstanding contemporrury politicians oif :Eill!rope - ii.,s. dea;r f.ro:rn almost every side. Oillly groUJps nolt ,i nterested in the welfare of Europe tum away fll'om tMs ,i,d'ea. We SlcwaJks cannot but be interested even in the pracllical side of the maJtter, i'nasmruch as we wolllld liike to see ouriselves, on the one hand, among the independent naltiorrs of Centra'l Europe, who are waiting for the creation of a European f ederrution, anld, on the other, we do not wamrt ,t o stand unipreprured .toward aJll those facto1rs, who rure placing obstacles in the way of Slovakia beco ming a member of sUldh a European federrution. One of tlhe most serious rea!sons why some groups op,pose our diredt pairbic~pation in the European federaJtion, and at best wish to see us in it only through the medium of Czecho..Slovakia, usually is an alleged extreme Slovak nrutionali:s m. Pruradoxically as it sounds, this allegation SLOVAKIA 33 is not casua!l, ,b ut is used systemaiticruly as a seriOUJS rurgu,men,t ·a gainst us. ]t simply d0€S not sound naJtuiral and serious that the Slovaks come w.iith the thawght of mer,ginig Slovakia, as an ,i ndependent state unit, into run EUII'Opean federaltion. Many SJlo;v,aJk politicians aire figihting very effectively for this idea already sevarall decades. Dr. M,;IJ.an Ho~a was noit an extreme Slovak naMonalist, even though he we:nit tJhrough a CO!Ill/Paratiively motley degree of .poilitical thoughit. Thiis MiJan Hlod:za dedicated all h~s intelilect Ito the federalistic idea and, therefore, belongs among tihe most s,i,g,n!iificant figwres in this modern movement not on!ly in owr Slovak enVliromnent, but in relation to Central Emrope as well. Even though he was a ceilltra[ist in the Ozec!ho-Slo:vaik Republic, nevertheless, with the greater pairt of hlis spirilt he belonged .to the broader CentralEJuropean environment. Olther Sl01Vak politicians also emerged and aTe still emer,gi,rug wiith the ildea o!f a fedarrutJion. The Ptresidenlt of the Slovak Repulb1:ic, Dr. Joseph 'Dirso, did not conceal his convicltion tihat evolution coU!ld not proceed otfherwise than in the sipinit of federa[iization. In his ,pUlbli'C wtterances he made several allusions to .this grave pr-ob'lem as if to prepare tlhe Slo,v~k puibHc for a new epoch of national and state life. Kairol Sidor, lfo11mer .Sl'ovak ambassador, does noit deny his conception of federal,i'SIID. Even the officia,l program of the Sllova!k NaJtiona1 Oouncil Abroad, which Karol Sidor heads, is ma;rked as a pro·g ram for an independent Slovak State within a framework Olf an EurQpean federation. Per'hrups, the moslt pr6dluotive ,t heol'ist, in the ranks of those ,w ho comprise the .Slovak NaJtional Com11ci1 and are coming on the scene from the young Slo,vaJk generation to take the responsiJM.lity for trhe devel01p.merut of affairs, is Dr. Joseph Kinschlbamn. Not only firom the view.point of evo[utionary necessity, bwt chiefly because he grrusped 1:!his complex of questions sensibly and soientificahly, KiTsch!baum, since the end of World War II, prepared and pu.fbliished numemus d.Jisserta;tions and studies which aiim to prove to the wor+ld that Sfova:ks have t!heir own modern poilitica,l con- 34 SLOVAKIA ceiption amJd also people who display an animruted an:d interest ~111 the problem of a fedel'a!lirzed ffiurolpe. 'Siimill'a dy, other SIJ.avak ipoliltical wOII1kers, publ!idats and wriiters, tea/Che.rs a!Ild iinltellootuals are worlmnig for a federation (Dr. Iilin.amJUel Bohm, Dr. Francis Hrusovsky, Reiv. Niicho'las Siprinc, Dr. Joseph Mi!lrus, Dr. JO'Seph Cieker, Tu-. Imrrich KrUIZlia:k, Dr . .A;r.ved Grr-ebert., Louis IVcmdra and many othem). In contemporary trends of Sllorvaik politics the most foscinalting connedt:ling lilnk is the idea of federa,tion. Thruruk. !imig in a pradtiicaJl way, i1t is imipossiible to picture a Slovalk p,oliitician or pol'ilticaJ theorist who seriiously de<~ls wiltih the idea of lar,ge un1its, s'U/Ch as a Cerubrrul-Ewropeam or Eiulropean federation WOllfild be, and wOllNd wish to lead his nation along the path oif inltoierance and of nationally scOIUTg'ed p8JSISions. Therefore, tJhe Slovaks and t!heir politiicrul and oUJlrtural representatives are not ibwillding a diam on the poinlted edge of chaUMiin:iSlm, but adhere to the notion of a futm-·e EUTopean federation. IV U'IllU'Sual ]t is interesting to note that it was chiefly rthe Czech Socialistic pam'ties wlhreh both in Czechia and Siovalkia ooleashed the most saiv-age conflict about the unfilty of the "Czeclhoslavialk" langwa.ge. 'Dhe same parties who diid not forget to pdse even in our country as progressive prurties. in oocoirdlalllCe to Marxislt ideolo.g y. Iif tJhe Slov3/k naltion opposed this the'ir "progress," then it was in a lar,ge meaiswre becaJUJse they ibrOll.lglht confusion inlto the tiundamenitaJ oonceipts of polliitiiJool Iiife, and, in fact, reaction which excludes aiN criticism. Czech socl,rulism has shown ilbself as the pioneer of f,r ustrruted thinking, and if we tiram:sfer i'ts conception to a practlicall field, we see that it has 1,i1dikuled iltself as has no otller move1ment whiibh had anything to do, directly or indirectly, wti.th the SlO!Vak natioo.. For twenty fuM yerurs, Ozecll poliitiios tenaciously held to ''OzoohO'SlovaikiSin" as a sally bridge into S'lov:alkia. Other Ozedh parties ad/Opted thlis slogan from the socirulists. Scientists seized wpon i1t and were fuhlowed by OI.ech journalists. SLOVAKIA 35 And thus, in fact, a period ensued when representatirves of Ozech spirit and prruatioa1 pdliitircs were more enraged in gaining a position for the artificial construdtion of "OzechiQslavaJkism" than a real settlement of relaitionshi1ps among 'the minorilties Indisputably we muist thank their inC'ons!i.derate, one-si'ded and undemocratic pol1'tiicail program fo:r the faot 1:hat Prague centralism found irt:se'lf in ruirrs wilt!h the first thrust. The so-called "Czechoslovaks" have denied the Slovaiks the right to self-existence. The Slo,v ak naltion, nevertheless, persistently fought for the recognition otf this most naturaJl right. And it did so in harmony witlh cmltural Europe, which no one, except the Communhrts labeled as reactionary or backward. In politica! morals, tile stirug,gle for the recognition of the suptreme riig1hlts of a nation signifies, in ,t he .p ositive sense d:f the ward, the most noble expression of progressiveness. The Slovaks, therefore, a.ire ahead of the Ozetdhs in thlis re~ard by t!hirtty years. Many exipeniments were .necessary to reform. the "Czechoslovruks" rut least prurtliail'1.y. There had to be a war - for tfrlem new exiperieniceis both on the domestic and fureig.n fronts. Once moce they had ,t o ascertain the mmd of the S'lO,VM{ nation, to scrutinize the trends of European and nonIDuropean politilc's, so that rome of them ta:o'tica.1.[,y, others per1haps sincerely, woulld rubandon the ruinous policy of •~czeichosllO'V'alkifum." After WoI"ld War H, less was said albout "OzeclhO's:lovaJk" unity and, partliculrurly, about a united lan.guiage. It mu'Slt be mentioned again, tha.'t :the most Ulillprog.ressirve of all in this regarrtl were the ~etch Socialists. The otfrler Czech polrnicians and theiT Slovak a.Hies rewgn.ized the right of the Sfovruk nation to its own existence . But at that time the Slovaks were more advanced. They had gone through the hist.orically rich segment of their own state. ft is certain that there is a greait deaft of difference between "Oze1ehosi1ova'k" comprehension - it stilil is bound Uip with a joint state aind the standipdinrt: of t!he Slovaks. To get ruhead by means oif a steady for-warn effort and in aiM farms - to find what benefi't!s best t!he 11:fe am.d development of the nation - the SlovaJks provoo that they rure marehing 36 SLOVAKIA in 1:Jhe spirit of the ,t imes and, as an independenlt ,and competitiive ,_po1fficai unit, seek to persevere aloll!gside the most cmltwred European naltions. Toda,y, ffiurope ,is ffillllch frul"bher a'long t'he way than the "0zec'ho,SilovaJks." Theorelti.cafily and practica'lliy it i,s prepa,r ed for a federation of ai1l nations. The so-caUed "Czecihoslova'k1s " are ait tJhe crossroa;dis. Some a~ere to the form of the fiirt;t Ozecho-!SlovaJk Repuiblic, while others rure silent and say nolt!hlil!g a!boult a forurtlh or fitfth Czecho-Slova.!k Repulblic for whiich they would want to fight. StillJ. others ta:l:k obscurely about the possibillity of a federafted Czecho·~SIJ.oivakia. There i's allso a founth 0zech g,r1oop whi'ch does not wish to interfere in Slova!k affaiiI"S and i's f[gh'ting for a CentralEuropean or IDwopean federation in w'hiich it reckons wilth an inde,pendent Czech Ulnit and a separate Sloivaik unilt. On tlhe ort:her hand, conltemporary SIJ.ovak ,p oHtits is following clearly and .ll!nreserveidly whait is best for an inde,pendenrt Sl01Vak State wli:thin the framework of a European federation. Compari.Il!g 1:Jhe effort's of t'he "Czechoslava1ki:;" wi'bh those of the Sl0iv-alks, we see, that even now there is a brusiic dliifrferenice b.e'tween them and that "CzechoSl01Va:k,i sm" wppears in the role of the mo'sit reactionary factor in Central Ewrope. But, willy-nilly, some of its representatiives have come oloser to the tlhinking of the .S1'oivaJk nati:on and ,g radually are rcliinquish~n,g their b1goited and ar,chaii.c views. Hoiweiver, t'here stiifl remains the difference of thirty yerurs. We can, therefore, clearly see from these .s imply-staited realities thaJt llhe sen:se of SlovaJk pol,i rtks tended toward a broader lilirI10ipean and worM society. There its a basic diffeirence whether we get into tJhi,s broader so'o iety of nations throrugh owr OiWll doors, or wihether we shalJ.l be led m'to it throrugh foreign dooirs wiit!h those of others; whether we wm lodk ,pa.ssi.rvely lllpOn the work, or whether we shali talke part in ilt w~tJh joint forces. A IDuropean fed:era/tlion will bring run end to these mistaJkes. We are det:inilteliy decfarin1g for a European associatioo, becruuse, rucicording to moral,s , ciulltll!re and p<Ylitical ma!tuirity, we rightfully beloD!g in it.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Practical Aspect of a Federation Description An account of the resource Joseph Pauco, Ph. D. Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 2 (7), July 1953 pp. 26-36 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Paučo, Jozef, 1914-1975 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource July 1953 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/b5cbfdd20f357ed8329aae999cb2576f.pdf a243bef75596fc23bed53bced6ba65b0 PDF Text Text 18 SLOVAKIA THE EVOLUTION OF SLOVAK LITERATURE ANTON BERNOLAK'S INFLUENCE By Eleonor Podkrivacky There still are some people who believe erroneously that the Slo1vaJk languruge was not written prior to the ninetee.n th century. The fact that Hiving languages undergo change should be kept in mind by those who ipoint to differences in the literary language of the Slovalk ,people of today and in the languaige used a century or more a:go. Also the history of a people should not be overlooked in the study of their language. Among the Slav nations, most of which had varied external inf,l uences causing linguistic mutationis, we find that the literary langua,ge of eruch, closely resettnibling that in co.nterruporary use, had its fomnal beginnings in the late se.venteenth, in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. For example, in the seventeenth century the Lusatians though a very small nation numerically they have two main had literary langua:ges: Lower and Upper Lusatian grammars and selection of dialects for literary use in both their languages; during the eighteenth century after the reforuns of Peter the Great, Lomonosov was responsilble for the standardi.ization of Russian; and f.rom the sbcteenth century throUJgh the nineteenth the ":p opular" Bulgarian ,w as used in writings until 1869, when Drinov estaJblished the eastern dialect as the literary language. Before examining the ,p eriod when the Slovak language underwent literary formalization, it is necessary to explore its baJClk,ground briefly. After the death of St. Methodius, who with St. Cyril prapagated and strengthened Christianity among the Slovaks, German prelates who came to Slovalkia in the tenth century substituted the Latin languruge for the Slo.vanic in the liturgy. IDventually Latin was used in pulblitc life, iboth literary and diplomatic. Latin was· the official language used in documents in central Europe for several centuries. R. G. A. de Bray in Guide to the Slavonic Languages states �SLOVAKIA 19 that in the period from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries the Slovruk language was used with the Latin in some documents. ·P erhaps the oldest written Slov3ik work is that of V a.claw of Bzenec, Glossovane spevy cirkevne, a collection of religious songs which he wrote in 1385 in the dialect of Halie. Another of the most ancient written records is also a religious song, "Jezu Kriste scedry Kneze," which J. Ka.c:ka in Dejiny literatiiry slovenskej dates ba,cik to the fourteenth or p.ossd.lbJy the thirteenth century. And Fr. Hr1lSOVsky in Slovenske Dejiny tells of the use of the Slovak language made in the records of the guilds during the sixteenth century. This sanne histo.r ian relates that many Slorvak ex:pTessions and phrases are to be found in doouments written in Slovakia in the ~ech language whi'ch in the fifteenth century (Hussite Movement) was used in official documents in addition to La-tin and Germ an. German was in use because of the large Genman population in certain Slo1Vaik cities. Ge11mans were g1rven special prirvileges by the king who ill!Vited them to settle in sections of the CO'lliiltry which afforded sources of wealth either because of natural resources (mines and mm.ts, etc.) or because cxf their locations as trade centers. It must be kept in mind that for several centuries, by that time, the SlovaJks had been ruled by foreign kings. S. Krcmery in St.opafdesiat rokov slovenskej literatury Sipea(ks cxf the three cultures in SloJVa;kia ,w hich intermingled: the Latin in political, academic and religious life; the German in business and commercia'1 life; and the 1Slovaik in the home. Early in the fi!fteenth century two events were resiponsible for the official use of Cze:ch in some sections of Slovakia. In the first place there were the extensi,ve raids and occwpation by the Czech Hussites in western Slo,vaikia. Secondly, Jan Jisikra, the renowned Ozech CathoLk warrio:r, quartered his army, which was made up of many Czech Hussites and some Germans, in central and eastern SlovaJkia, when he was entreated by Elizrubeth, the queen~mother of Ladislav Posthumous, then a child, DU'ke of Austria, King oif Bohe(mia, and Htmgary, to ,prevent Vladislav of Poland �20 SLOVAlGA from usuripi.ng her son's throne. Jisikra maintained his hold on that section of Sllovakia for many years, even after the death of King Ladislav in 14'57. The Turkish Wars in the sixteenth century left their mark also. There are legends, folk songs and poems in the Slovak language dating frOIIll that unhappy period which give accounts of the i.nlvasions of the Turks and the a;bduction of many .SlovaJks. In addition to the hU1man li,ves lost orthe ,g reat nUlmlber of the population carried away into caiptivity, the devastation which the Turks brought upon the country is an irrepara,ble loss because much historical and literary material perished in the ipilla:ging. Although there were so many unfavoraJble outside elements, as far as the ,l anguage is concerned, the Slovak language did not fade aiwa,y. On the contrary, by the seventeenth century a national consciousness of their heritage and culture .b egan to manifest itse1f among the Slov8Jks. Catholic priests were the initial spark of the flame which was spread eventually throughout the country. An import.ant center for this a;cti.Jvity was in western Sloivrukia where the Uniiversity of Trnruva - whose press printed in 1655, among its, first .boOlks, a Latin-Slovaik hymnal - played a leading roJ.e in turning out men who reali~ed that their native tongue was as important as other languages. The needs of the ordinary man had to be c onstdered both in spiritual and temporal matters. Students who knew •:Gatin particiipated in plays in that language. However, the perfovmances ,w ere often presented for audiences of non...academilc people from neighboring towns, and there are evidences that plays were penfomned fo Slovak early in the seventeenth century. At the lb eginnmg oif the eighteenth century with the Counter-Refonmat ion came a definite concentration on writing in the vernacular instead of in Czech in, which language the Slova,k Protestants continued writing their books. With the religious writings 1partioularly of the Jesuits, although there are manuscripts and 1ptfulished wor1krs in Slovak by other religious orders, the prot!ess orf grrummatical consciousness of the Slovak langua:ge began. The number �SLOVAKIA 21 and quality of writings by the Jesuits prompted J. Ka&a, in his book mentioned earlier, to state that the Slovak language ()If that period could be called Jesuit Slovak. By the second half of the eighteenth century the Slovak nationalistic revival was accentuated by greater political oppression. Among the controversial issues of the reform.s of Marie Therese and Joseph I was the measuTe by whi~h Latin was to be replaced by another officia:l language in the empire. Laws were passed which established Genman as the official language in non~Genman lands of the empire. Tihe Hungarians, who at first wished to keep Latin, reacted to this law by Later insisting that Hungarian, and no other language, be taught in all the schools oif Hungarian and non-Htmgarian suibjects in their domain. The Slovaks also rea.cted. In literature, b.oth Latin and Sloivruk, writers refered back to the glorious past of the Slovaks, before the Hungarians settled in that part olf Eurorpe, when Christianity was introduced and when they had a powerfw king and oojoyed ,p olitical inderpendence in the ninth century. It was left for Anton Bernonak, through his philological and linguistic studies, to become the outstanding initiator of a literary SloivaJk language. Bernolruk's ancestI1Y was distinguished. His family coat of a.nrns dated ba'Cik to 1681 when Leopold I added to their family name the title Slanicky, derived from the town Slanica, in Orruva County, where Anton was born OctOlber 4, 1762. His elementary education was completed in his natiive northeastern part of Sloiva;kia, at Namestovo, from where he went south to central Slovrukia to situdy in the classical high school (gyimn1aJZi,um) in RU!Zombero'k. His talents were recognired by the ar,c.bibishop of OstrihOIIIl (Estergom in Hlungary), ,w hose protege he became at the a.ge of 16, and he was sent to study ,i n the seminary in Bratislava in western SlovaJkia in 1778. After two years there he transferred to the seminary· in Trnava from where, after two more years of .study which .he realized with high honors, he went to Vienna to study theology. Among the reforuns of Joseph II were those which affected the Church. Aocording to his reforms the theological course was also offered in the gen- �22 SLOVAKIA eral seminary which the ®mpernr established in the castle at BratislaJVa. The course was of a five:-year duration. Hence, when Bernoilak returned to Bratislawa in the autumn of 1784, he had three more years of theology to complete. While studymg for the .p riesthood he became very interested in Slruvic la.ngua,ges, especially in the ,s tudy of his own tongue. By his twen:ty...fifth year he had written in Latin and pulblished two wonks which are conSidered the basis of literary Slovak. In the introduction to his Dissertatio philologico-critica de literis Slavonun which was carnipleted May 21, 1787, Bernolak states that he was advised by circumspect men to write these works in order to establish rules for .w riting the Slo.vruk Jamguaige. In this dissertation he e)C!)ressed the basic ,p rinciples o:f Slovak literary langua,ge. To mruke prarctical -t he prin:ciples o:f literary Slovak which he en'llll!ciated in the Dissert.atio, he stated orthogI_"aphic rules by which literary men would be guided in Linguae Slavonicae per regnmn Hungariae usit.at.ae compendiosa sumul et facilis orthographia. This second important wonk which he ipulblished also in 1787 was annexed to his famous Dissert.atio. J. Vlcek in Dejiny literatury slovenskej states that BernolaJk was well acquainted with the wol"k done in the field o:f linguis-tics by predecessors such as iMatej Bel and Pavel Dolelfal, both from the, first half of the 18th century, and with the tendencies oif the popular Slovruk 1'anguage to be found in the pUlblications from Trnaiva. Bernolalk's work was not revolutionary, rb ut rather evolutionary, in that contrary to his agreement with Bel that the best literar,y Slovak is that equidistant from the Czechs, Poles, and Hungarians, namely central Slovruk - he practiically followed the Catholic writers before him who wrote in the western dialect. The significance of these works at that period in history cannot be underestimated. The newly--estaiblislhed seminary in BratiSilava castle lasted only six years, until the death of Joseph I, but it housed annually a,pproxirmately five hundred seminarians from all parts of Slwakia. The interest aroused in the seminarians by these linguistitc ·s tu- �SLOVAKIA dies was soon oibserved even in neighboring ,countries. And their efforts were encouraiged surprisingly enough by men of their nationality ,w ho, did not agree with their endeavors. While he was a oUTate in Ceklis he had published in 1790, in Bratislaiva, a gra,rrumar written in Latin of the Slova:k language entitled Grammatica slavica. (Sources vary in their spelling of the complete title of this work: J. Ka.cka Hsts it is Grammatica slavica ad systema scholarum rationalium in dicionibus caesareo-regiis introductum acoomo-data; Rev. J. Porulbsky varies from this only in "diictionibus" ; and J. Vlcek writes . . . scholarum nationalium in di· tionibus" . . . "). Bernola:k based his ,g rammar on phonetics. He selected the western dialect - there are three main dialects in Slcwalkia: western, central, and eastern - as the most surited for literary writing. He eliminated diphthongs and soft "r's" (f). He SUJbstituted "6" for "u", and "i" for "j" and "y". 'Dhe softening of the consonants "d, 1, n, t" was aocomplished according to his rules by ,s oftening the consonant "d', l'. n, f" and writing "d'e," etc., instead oif following the consonant with a soft vowel. In 1791 he was ruppointed secretary to the Archlbishop in Trnaiva. Undouibtedly he had begun earlier and continued in this city and elsewhere .until his death in Nove Zrumky, where he was ,pastor imd swpervisor of schools, January 15, 1813, compiling a dictionary Slowar slowenski in five languages: Slovaik, Ozedh, Latin, German, Magyar. This sixvolume masterwonk consisting of some 5,300 pages was not pulblished, however, until 1825-27, in Budin, with the financial baoking of the Canon of Ostrihom, Jruraj Pallkovic (not to he confused with his contemporary, the Lutheran Jifi PalJkovic), who colmlpleted Bernolak's dictionary with the sixth volume. During his appointment in Trnava, Bernola;k founded in 1792, the literary and cultural society "Slowenske ucene Towarisstwo" (:Slovalk Learned Sodety) whose aim it was to further the advancement of education and culture of the SlO!Vak · pepple by means of Sl01Vak literature. The majority of the memberE of this group, numbering close to five hun- �SLOVAKIA dred, were Catholic priests who promised to write Slovak bOOlks and support the prOI_Pagation -of Slovak literature. Branches of this society were esta:blished throughout Slovakia. Sources do not all list the, same towns where literary centexs, were fornned. S. Kromery names only three towns where branches were formed: Nitra, Rovne, and Banska Bystrica. To .tJhes,e centers are a:dded Sotl'na Bairn near Presov by J. Vlcek, J. Kaicka and J. Poru'bslky,. and the two last named authorities mention Trencin as well. The historian Fr. HrusovSky enumerate·s Nitra, Rovne, Banska Bystrica, ,Solirvar, Roziiav,a and Kosice in SlovaJlda. He goes on to state that the society was represented also in other lands. In Austria them wa:s a branch in Vienna, and in Hungary there was a gro,UJp in Ja;ger. Thus the writers of the Bernolak s:chool decided to meet the- literary needs of those not lirving in their homeland . .A!Illong tlhe society's most outstanding l,i tera:ry men, in addition to its founder, were Juraj Pal1kovic, who translated the Bi!ble into the SlOiVaJk language; the Archlbishop of Ostriho:m, Alexande,r Cardinal RUJdnay, who, besides writing many semnons a:nd translating Cicero assisted the society financially ; Juraj Fandli, also a priest, who even in his botanica..l and agricultural wonks urged the Slovak people to a greater aippreciation of theiir mother tongue; another priest, the first famous SlovaJk ,p oet, Jan Holly ; the first Slovak literary historian, Rev. Michael Resetka; and Martin Haimuija:k who, in 1834, co--founded another organization in Budapest, the "Spolek miloviiikov reci a literatury slovenskej" (Organi'.zation of the Lovers of the Slovak Language and Literature) to ex:pand the work commenced by Bernola;k'"S society. Varied were the types of ,books published ,b y the Bernolalk school of writecrs. Their pulblications consisted orf theses on practical agriculture; religious, poetilc and pedagogic works; and histori'cal, literary and linguistic studies. · ·Truly, Anton Bernolak and his group are men worthy of admiration for the great love for their language and the efforts they put forth for its sake. �SLOVAKIA BIBLIOGRAPHY BOOKS : \J Botto·, Julius, Slovaci, Vyvin ich narodneho povedomia, Turciansky sv. Martin; Vydanie knihkuipooko-Nwkladatel'skeho Spolku, 1906. \J DeBray, R. G. A. Guide to the Slavonic Lan~ges. London: J. -M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1951. (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc.) Hruso:vsky, Fr. Slovenske Dejiny. Turcianslky sv. Mar\J tin, Matica SlovellSlka., 1940 (Fifth Edition). Kaolrn, Jozef. Dejiny literatury slovenskej. Ruzomlberok: Leva, 1921. Krcmery, Stefan. Stopafdesiat rokov slovenskej literatury. Sva.zok Prvy. Turcia.nsky sv. Martin: Matica Slovenska., 1943. Pietro, Amlbro. Napor-Odpor, Ako postupovala mad'a.risacia v Uhorsku. Turcia.nsiky sv. Martin: Nakladom vilastnym, 1905. Ponibsky, Rev. Jan. K Stemu Vyrociu Literarnej Slovenciny 1844-1944. Scranton, Pa.: Obrana Press, Inc., 1944. Vlcek, Jaroslav. Dejiny literatiiry slovenskej. Turciansky sv. Martin: Matica Slovenska, ( obnovienie vydanie z roku 1890) 1923. PERIODICALS : Banik, Ant. Aug. "Rok zo zivota Juraja Fa.ndliho" Slovenske Pohfady, Vol. LXVI, 9 (1950), pp. 507-51. Jarouseik, Rudolf. "Anton Bernola.k Ako Ucenec a Narodny BuditeY." Slov. Uc. Reprinted in Slovenska Obrana, August 3, 1937. Kovac ml., Edo. "Anton Bernola.k," Slovak v Amerike, May 9, 1933. Skuiltety, Jozef. "Pa:miat.ka Antona BernolaJka" Slovak, date unknown. � 18 SLOVAKIA THE EVOLUTION OF SLOVAK LITERATURE ANTON BERNOLAK'S INFLUENCE By Eleonor Podkrivacky There still are some people who believe erroneously that the Slo1vaJk languruge was not written prior to the ninetee.n th century. The fact that Hiving languages undergo change should be kept in mind by those who ipoint to differences in the literary language of the Slovalk ,people of today and in the languaige used a century or more a:go. Also the history of a people should not be overlooked in the study of their language. Among the Slav nations, most of which had varied external inf,l uences causing linguistic mutationis, we find that the literary langua,ge of eruch, closely resettnibling that in co.nterruporary use, had its fomnal beginnings in the late se.venteenth, in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. For example, in the seventeenth century the Lusatians though a very small nation numerically they have two main had literary langua:ges: Lower and Upper Lusatian grammars and selection of dialects for literary use in both their languages; during the eighteenth century after the reforuns of Peter the Great, Lomonosov was responsilble for the standardi.ization of Russian; and f.rom the sbcteenth century throUJgh the nineteenth the ":p opular" Bulgarian ,w as used in writings until 1869, when Drinov estaJblished the eastern dialect as the literary language. Before examining the ,p eriod when the Slovak language underwent literary formalization, it is necessary to explore its baJClk,ground briefly. After the death of St. Methodius, who with St. Cyril prapagated and strengthened Christianity among the Slovaks, German prelates who came to Slovalkia in the tenth century substituted the Latin languruge for the Slo.vanic in the liturgy. IDventually Latin was used in pulblitc life, iboth literary and diplomatic. Latin was· the official language used in documents in central Europe for several centuries. R. G. A. de Bray in Guide to the Slavonic Languages states �SLOVAKIA 19 that in the period from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries the Slovruk language was used with the Latin in some documents. ·P erhaps the oldest written Slov3ik work is that of V a.claw of Bzenec, Glossovane spevy cirkevne, a collection of religious songs which he wrote in 1385 in the dialect of Halie. Another of the most ancient written records is also a religious song, "Jezu Kriste scedry Kneze," which J. Ka.c:ka in Dejiny literatiiry slovenskej dates ba,cik to the fourteenth or p.ossd.lbJy the thirteenth century. And Fr. Hr1lSOVsky in Slovenske Dejiny tells of the use of the Slovak language made in the records of the guilds during the sixteenth century. This sanne histo.r ian relates that many Slorvak ex:pTessions and phrases are to be found in doouments written in Slovakia in the ~ech language whi'ch in the fifteenth century (Hussite Movement) was used in official documents in addition to La-tin and Germ an. German was in use because of the large Genman population in certain Slo1Vaik cities. Ge11mans were g1rven special prirvileges by the king who ill!Vited them to settle in sections of the CO'lliiltry which afforded sources of wealth either because of natural resources (mines and mm.ts, etc.) or because cxf their locations as trade centers. It must be kept in mind that for several centuries, by that time, the SlovaJks had been ruled by foreign kings. S. Krcmery in St.opafdesiat rokov slovenskej literatury Sipea(ks cxf the three cultures in SloJVa;kia ,w hich intermingled: the Latin in political, academic and religious life; the German in business and commercia'1 life; and the 1Slovaik in the home. Early in the fi!fteenth century two events were resiponsible for the official use of Cze:ch in some sections of Slovakia. In the first place there were the extensi,ve raids and occwpation by the Czech Hussites in western Slo,vaikia. Secondly, Jan Jisikra, the renowned Ozech CathoLk warrio:r, quartered his army, which was made up of many Czech Hussites and some Germans, in central and eastern SlovaJkia, when he was entreated by Elizrubeth, the queen~mother of Ladislav Posthumous, then a child, DU'ke of Austria, King oif Bohe(mia, and Htmgary, to ,prevent Vladislav of Poland �20 SLOVAlGA from usuripi.ng her son's throne. Jisikra maintained his hold on that section of Sllovakia for many years, even after the death of King Ladislav in 14'57. The Turkish Wars in the sixteenth century left their mark also. There are legends, folk songs and poems in the Slovak language dating frOIIll that unhappy period which give accounts of the i.nlvasions of the Turks and the a;bduction of many .SlovaJks. In addition to the hU1man li,ves lost orthe ,g reat nUlmlber of the population carried away into caiptivity, the devastation which the Turks brought upon the country is an irrepara,ble loss because much historical and literary material perished in the ipilla:ging. Although there were so many unfavoraJble outside elements, as far as the ,l anguage is concerned, the Slovak language did not fade aiwa,y. On the contrary, by the seventeenth century a national consciousness of their heritage and culture .b egan to manifest itse1f among the Slov8Jks. Catholic priests were the initial spark of the flame which was spread eventually throughout the country. An import.ant center for this a;cti.Jvity was in western Sloivrukia where the Uniiversity of Trnruva - whose press printed in 1655, among its, first .boOlks, a Latin-Slovaik hymnal - played a leading roJ.e in turning out men who reali~ed that their native tongue was as important as other languages. The needs of the ordinary man had to be c onstdered both in spiritual and temporal matters. Students who knew •:Gatin particiipated in plays in that language. However, the perfovmances ,w ere often presented for audiences of non...academilc people from neighboring towns, and there are evidences that plays were penfomned fo Slovak early in the seventeenth century. At the lb eginnmg oif the eighteenth century with the Counter-Refonmat ion came a definite concentration on writing in the vernacular instead of in Czech in, which language the Slova,k Protestants continued writing their books. With the religious writings 1partioularly of the Jesuits, although there are manuscripts and 1ptfulished wor1krs in Slovak by other religious orders, the prot!ess orf grrummatical consciousness of the Slovak langua:ge began. The number �SLOVAKIA 21 and quality of writings by the Jesuits prompted J. Ka&a, in his book mentioned earlier, to state that the Slovak language ()If that period could be called Jesuit Slovak. By the second half of the eighteenth century the Slovak nationalistic revival was accentuated by greater political oppression. Among the controversial issues of the reform.s of Marie Therese and Joseph I was the measuTe by whi~h Latin was to be replaced by another officia:l language in the empire. Laws were passed which established Genman as the official language in non~Genman lands of the empire. Tihe Hungarians, who at first wished to keep Latin, reacted to this law by Later insisting that Hungarian, and no other language, be taught in all the schools oif Hungarian and non-Htmgarian suibjects in their domain. The Slovaks also rea.cted. In literature, b.oth Latin and Sloivruk, writers refered back to the glorious past of the Slovaks, before the Hungarians settled in that part olf Eurorpe, when Christianity was introduced and when they had a powerfw king and oojoyed ,p olitical inderpendence in the ninth century. It was left for Anton Bernonak, through his philological and linguistic studies, to become the outstanding initiator of a literary SloivaJk language. Bernolruk's ancestI1Y was distinguished. His family coat of a.nrns dated ba'Cik to 1681 when Leopold I added to their family name the title Slanicky, derived from the town Slanica, in Orruva County, where Anton was born OctOlber 4, 1762. His elementary education was completed in his natiive northeastern part of Sloiva;kia, at Namestovo, from where he went south to central Slovrukia to situdy in the classical high school (gyimn1aJZi,um) in RU!Zombero'k. His talents were recognired by the ar,c.bibishop of OstrihOIIIl (Estergom in Hlungary), ,w hose protege he became at the a.ge of 16, and he was sent to study ,i n the seminary in Bratislava in western SlovaJkia in 1778. After two years there he transferred to the seminary· in Trnava from where, after two more years of .study which .he realized with high honors, he went to Vienna to study theology. Among the reforuns of Joseph II were those which affected the Church. Aocording to his reforms the theological course was also offered in the gen- �22 SLOVAKIA eral seminary which the ®mpernr established in the castle at BratislaJVa. The course was of a five:-year duration. Hence, when Bernoilak returned to Bratislawa in the autumn of 1784, he had three more years of theology to complete. While studymg for the .p riesthood he became very interested in Slruvic la.ngua,ges, especially in the ,s tudy of his own tongue. By his twen:ty...fifth year he had written in Latin and pulblished two wonks which are conSidered the basis of literary Slovak. In the introduction to his Dissertatio philologico-critica de literis Slavonun which was carnipleted May 21, 1787, Bernolak states that he was advised by circumspect men to write these works in order to establish rules for .w riting the Slo.vruk Jamguaige. In this dissertation he e)C!)ressed the basic ,p rinciples o:f Slovak literary langua,ge. To mruke prarctical -t he prin:ciples o:f literary Slovak which he en'llll!ciated in the Dissert.atio, he stated orthogI_"aphic rules by which literary men would be guided in Linguae Slavonicae per regnmn Hungariae usit.at.ae compendiosa sumul et facilis orthographia. This second important wonk which he ipulblished also in 1787 was annexed to his famous Dissert.atio. J. Vlcek in Dejiny literatury slovenskej states that BernolaJk was well acquainted with the wol"k done in the field o:f linguis-tics by predecessors such as iMatej Bel and Pavel Dolelfal, both from the, first half of the 18th century, and with the tendencies oif the popular Slovruk 1'anguage to be found in the pUlblications from Trnaiva. Bernolalk's work was not revolutionary, rb ut rather evolutionary, in that contrary to his agreement with Bel that the best literar,y Slovak is that equidistant from the Czechs, Poles, and Hungarians, namely central Slovruk - he practiically followed the Catholic writers before him who wrote in the western dialect. The significance of these works at that period in history cannot be underestimated. The newly--estaiblislhed seminary in BratiSilava castle lasted only six years, until the death of Joseph I, but it housed annually a,pproxirmately five hundred seminarians from all parts of Slwakia. The interest aroused in the seminarians by these linguistitc ·s tu- �SLOVAKIA dies was soon oibserved even in neighboring ,countries. And their efforts were encouraiged surprisingly enough by men of their nationality ,w ho, did not agree with their endeavors. While he was a oUTate in Ceklis he had published in 1790, in Bratislaiva, a gra,rrumar written in Latin of the Slova:k language entitled Grammatica slavica. (Sources vary in their spelling of the complete title of this work: J. Ka.cka Hsts it is Grammatica slavica ad systema scholarum rationalium in dicionibus caesareo-regiis introductum acoomo-data; Rev. J. Porulbsky varies from this only in "diictionibus" ; and J. Vlcek writes . . . scholarum nationalium in di· tionibus" . . . "). Bernola:k based his ,g rammar on phonetics. He selected the western dialect - there are three main dialects in Slcwalkia: western, central, and eastern - as the most surited for literary writing. He eliminated diphthongs and soft "r's" (f). He SUJbstituted "6" for "u", and "i" for "j" and "y". 'Dhe softening of the consonants "d, 1, n, t" was aocomplished according to his rules by ,s oftening the consonant "d', l'. n, f" and writing "d'e," etc., instead oif following the consonant with a soft vowel. In 1791 he was ruppointed secretary to the Archlbishop in Trnaiva. Undouibtedly he had begun earlier and continued in this city and elsewhere .until his death in Nove Zrumky, where he was ,pastor imd swpervisor of schools, January 15, 1813, compiling a dictionary Slowar slowenski in five languages: Slovaik, Ozedh, Latin, German, Magyar. This sixvolume masterwonk consisting of some 5,300 pages was not pulblished, however, until 1825-27, in Budin, with the financial baoking of the Canon of Ostrihom, Jruraj Pallkovic (not to he confused with his contemporary, the Lutheran Jifi PalJkovic), who colmlpleted Bernolak's dictionary with the sixth volume. During his appointment in Trnava, Bernola;k founded in 1792, the literary and cultural society "Slowenske ucene Towarisstwo" (:Slovalk Learned Sodety) whose aim it was to further the advancement of education and culture of the SlO!Vak · pepple by means of Sl01Vak literature. The majority of the memberE of this group, numbering close to five hun- �SLOVAKIA dred, were Catholic priests who promised to write Slovak bOOlks and support the prOI_Pagation -of Slovak literature. Branches of this society were esta:blished throughout Slovakia. Sources do not all list the, same towns where literary centexs, were fornned. S. Kromery names only three towns where branches were formed: Nitra, Rovne, and Banska Bystrica. To .tJhes,e centers are a:dded Sotl'na Bairn near Presov by J. Vlcek, J. Kaicka and J. Poru'bslky,. and the two last named authorities mention Trencin as well. The historian Fr. HrusovSky enumerate·s Nitra, Rovne, Banska Bystrica, ,Solirvar, Roziiav,a and Kosice in SlovaJlda. He goes on to state that the society was represented also in other lands. In Austria them wa:s a branch in Vienna, and in Hungary there was a gro,UJp in Ja;ger. Thus the writers of the Bernolak s:chool decided to meet the- literary needs of those not lirving in their homeland . .A!Illong tlhe society's most outstanding l,i tera:ry men, in addition to its founder, were Juraj Pal1kovic, who translated the Bi!ble into the SlOiVaJk language; the Archlbishop of Ostriho:m, Alexande,r Cardinal RUJdnay, who, besides writing many semnons a:nd translating Cicero assisted the society financially ; Juraj Fandli, also a priest, who even in his botanica..l and agricultural wonks urged the Slovak people to a greater aippreciation of theiir mother tongue; another priest, the first famous SlovaJk ,p oet, Jan Holly ; the first Slovak literary historian, Rev. Michael Resetka; and Martin Haimuija:k who, in 1834, co--founded another organization in Budapest, the "Spolek miloviiikov reci a literatury slovenskej" (Organi'.zation of the Lovers of the Slovak Language and Literature) to ex:pand the work commenced by Bernola;k'"S society. Varied were the types of ,books published ,b y the Bernolalk school of writecrs. Their pulblications consisted orf theses on practical agriculture; religious, poetilc and pedagogic works; and histori'cal, literary and linguistic studies. · ·Truly, Anton Bernolak and his group are men worthy of admiration for the great love for their language and the efforts they put forth for its sake. �SLOVAKIA BIBLIOGRAPHY BOOKS : \J Botto·, Julius, Slovaci, Vyvin ich narodneho povedomia, Turciansky sv. Martin; Vydanie knihkuipooko-Nwkladatel'skeho Spolku, 1906. \J DeBray, R. G. A. Guide to the Slavonic Lan~ges. London: J. -M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1951. (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc.) Hruso:vsky, Fr. Slovenske Dejiny. Turcianslky sv. Mar\J tin, Matica SlovellSlka., 1940 (Fifth Edition). Kaolrn, Jozef. Dejiny literatury slovenskej. Ruzomlberok: Leva, 1921. Krcmery, Stefan. Stopafdesiat rokov slovenskej literatury. Sva.zok Prvy. Turcia.nsky sv. Martin: Matica Slovenska., 1943. Pietro, Amlbro. Napor-Odpor, Ako postupovala mad'a.risacia v Uhorsku. Turcia.nsiky sv. Martin: Nakladom vilastnym, 1905. Ponibsky, Rev. Jan. K Stemu Vyrociu Literarnej Slovenciny 1844-1944. Scranton, Pa.: Obrana Press, Inc., 1944. Vlcek, Jaroslav. Dejiny literatiiry slovenskej. Turciansky sv. Martin: Matica Slovenska, ( obnovienie vydanie z roku 1890) 1923. PERIODICALS : Banik, Ant. Aug. "Rok zo zivota Juraja Fa.ndliho" Slovenske Pohfady, Vol. LXVI, 9 (1950), pp. 507-51. Jarouseik, Rudolf. "Anton Bernola.k Ako Ucenec a Narodny BuditeY." Slov. Uc. Reprinted in Slovenska Obrana, August 3, 1937. Kovac ml., Edo. "Anton Bernola.k," Slovak v Amerike, May 9, 1933. Skuiltety, Jozef. "Pa:miat.ka Antona BernolaJka" Slovak, date unknown. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 18 SLOVAKIA THE EVOLUTION OF SLOVAK LITERATURE ANTON BERNOLAK'S INFLUENCE By Eleonor Podkrivacky There still are some people who believe erroneously that the Slo1vaJk languruge was not written prior to the ninetee.n th century. The fact that Hiving languages undergo change should be kept in mind by those who ipoint to differences in the literary language of the Slovalk ,people of today and in the languaige used a century or more a:go. Also the history of a people should not be overlooked in the study of their language. Among the Slav nations, most of which had varied external inf,l uences causing linguistic mutationis, we find that the literary langua,ge of eruch, closely resettnibling that in co.nterruporary use, had its fomnal beginnings in the late se.venteenth, in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. For example, in the seventeenth century the Lusatians though a very small nation numerically they have two main had literary langua:ges: Lower and Upper Lusatian grammars and selection of dialects for literary use in both their languages; during the eighteenth century after the reforuns of Peter the Great, Lomonosov was responsilble for the standardi.ization of Russian; and f.rom the sbcteenth century throUJgh the nineteenth the ":p opular" Bulgarian ,w as used in writings until 1869, when Drinov estaJblished the eastern dialect as the literary language. Before examining the ,p eriod when the Slovak language underwent literary formalization, it is necessary to explore its baJClk,ground briefly. After the death of St. Methodius, who with St. Cyril prapagated and strengthened Christianity among the Slovaks, German prelates who came to Slovalkia in the tenth century substituted the Latin languruge for the Slo.vanic in the liturgy. IDventually Latin was used in pulblitc life, iboth literary and diplomatic. Latin was· the official language used in documents in central Europe for several centuries. R. G. A. de Bray in Guide to the Slavonic Languages states SLOVAKIA 19 that in the period from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries the Slovruk language was used with the Latin in some documents. ·P erhaps the oldest written Slov3ik work is that of V a.claw of Bzenec, Glossovane spevy cirkevne, a collection of religious songs which he wrote in 1385 in the dialect of Halie. Another of the most ancient written records is also a religious song, "Jezu Kriste scedry Kneze," which J. Ka.c:ka in Dejiny literatiiry slovenskej dates ba,cik to the fourteenth or p.ossd.lbJy the thirteenth century. And Fr. Hr1lSOVsky in Slovenske Dejiny tells of the use of the Slovak language made in the records of the guilds during the sixteenth century. This sanne histo.r ian relates that many Slorvak ex:pTessions and phrases are to be found in doouments written in Slovakia in the ~ech language whi'ch in the fifteenth century (Hussite Movement) was used in official documents in addition to La-tin and Germ an. German was in use because of the large Genman population in certain Slo1Vaik cities. Ge11mans were g1rven special prirvileges by the king who ill!Vited them to settle in sections of the CO'lliiltry which afforded sources of wealth either because of natural resources (mines and mm.ts, etc.) or because cxf their locations as trade centers. It must be kept in mind that for several centuries, by that time, the SlovaJks had been ruled by foreign kings. S. Krcmery in St.opafdesiat rokov slovenskej literatury Sipea(ks cxf the three cultures in SloJVa;kia ,w hich intermingled: the Latin in political, academic and religious life; the German in business and commercia'1 life; and the 1Slovaik in the home. Early in the fi!fteenth century two events were resiponsible for the official use of Cze:ch in some sections of Slovakia. In the first place there were the extensi,ve raids and occwpation by the Czech Hussites in western Slo,vaikia. Secondly, Jan Jisikra, the renowned Ozech CathoLk warrio:r, quartered his army, which was made up of many Czech Hussites and some Germans, in central and eastern SlovaJkia, when he was entreated by Elizrubeth, the queen~mother of Ladislav Posthumous, then a child, DU'ke of Austria, King oif Bohe(mia, and Htmgary, to ,prevent Vladislav of Poland 20 SLOVAlGA from usuripi.ng her son's throne. Jisikra maintained his hold on that section of Sllovakia for many years, even after the death of King Ladislav in 14'57. The Turkish Wars in the sixteenth century left their mark also. There are legends, folk songs and poems in the Slovak language dating frOIIll that unhappy period which give accounts of the i.nlvasions of the Turks and the a;bduction of many .SlovaJks. In addition to the hU1man li,ves lost orthe ,g reat nUlmlber of the population carried away into caiptivity, the devastation which the Turks brought upon the country is an irrepara,ble loss because much historical and literary material perished in the ipilla:ging. Although there were so many unfavoraJble outside elements, as far as the ,l anguage is concerned, the Slovak language did not fade aiwa,y. On the contrary, by the seventeenth century a national consciousness of their heritage and culture .b egan to manifest itse1f among the Slov8Jks. Catholic priests were the initial spark of the flame which was spread eventually throughout the country. An import.ant center for this a;cti.Jvity was in western Sloivrukia where the Uniiversity of Trnruva - whose press printed in 1655, among its, first .boOlks, a Latin-Slovaik hymnal - played a leading roJ.e in turning out men who reali~ed that their native tongue was as important as other languages. The needs of the ordinary man had to be c onstdered both in spiritual and temporal matters. Students who knew •:Gatin particiipated in plays in that language. However, the perfovmances ,w ere often presented for audiences of non...academilc people from neighboring towns, and there are evidences that plays were penfomned fo Slovak early in the seventeenth century. At the lb eginnmg oif the eighteenth century with the Counter-Refonmat ion came a definite concentration on writing in the vernacular instead of in Czech in, which language the Slova,k Protestants continued writing their books. With the religious writings 1partioularly of the Jesuits, although there are manuscripts and 1ptfulished wor1krs in Slovak by other religious orders, the prot!ess orf grrummatical consciousness of the Slovak langua:ge began. The number SLOVAKIA 21 and quality of writings by the Jesuits prompted J. Ka&a, in his book mentioned earlier, to state that the Slovak language ()If that period could be called Jesuit Slovak. By the second half of the eighteenth century the Slovak nationalistic revival was accentuated by greater political oppression. Among the controversial issues of the reform.s of Marie Therese and Joseph I was the measuTe by whi~h Latin was to be replaced by another officia:l language in the empire. Laws were passed which established Genman as the official language in non~Genman lands of the empire. Tihe Hungarians, who at first wished to keep Latin, reacted to this law by Later insisting that Hungarian, and no other language, be taught in all the schools oif Hungarian and non-Htmgarian suibjects in their domain. The Slovaks also rea.cted. In literature, b.oth Latin and Sloivruk, writers refered back to the glorious past of the Slovaks, before the Hungarians settled in that part olf Eurorpe, when Christianity was introduced and when they had a powerfw king and oojoyed ,p olitical inderpendence in the ninth century. It was left for Anton Bernonak, through his philological and linguistic studies, to become the outstanding initiator of a literary SloivaJk language. Bernolruk's ancestI1Y was distinguished. His family coat of a.nrns dated ba'Cik to 1681 when Leopold I added to their family name the title Slanicky, derived from the town Slanica, in Orruva County, where Anton was born OctOlber 4, 1762. His elementary education was completed in his natiive northeastern part of Sloiva;kia, at Namestovo, from where he went south to central Slovrukia to situdy in the classical high school (gyimn1aJZi,um) in RU!Zombero'k. His talents were recognired by the ar,c.bibishop of OstrihOIIIl (Estergom in Hlungary), ,w hose protege he became at the a.ge of 16, and he was sent to study ,i n the seminary in Bratislava in western SlovaJkia in 1778. After two years there he transferred to the seminary· in Trnava from where, after two more years of .study which .he realized with high honors, he went to Vienna to study theology. Among the reforuns of Joseph II were those which affected the Church. Aocording to his reforms the theological course was also offered in the gen- 22 SLOVAKIA eral seminary which the ®mpernr established in the castle at BratislaJVa. The course was of a five:-year duration. Hence, when Bernoilak returned to Bratislawa in the autumn of 1784, he had three more years of theology to complete. While studymg for the .p riesthood he became very interested in Slruvic la.ngua,ges, especially in the ,s tudy of his own tongue. By his twen:ty...fifth year he had written in Latin and pulblished two wonks which are conSidered the basis of literary Slovak. In the introduction to his Dissertatio philologico-critica de literis Slavonun which was carnipleted May 21, 1787, Bernolak states that he was advised by circumspect men to write these works in order to establish rules for .w riting the Slo.vruk Jamguaige. In this dissertation he e)C!)ressed the basic ,p rinciples o:f Slovak literary langua,ge. To mruke prarctical -t he prin:ciples o:f literary Slovak which he en'llll!ciated in the Dissert.atio, he stated orthogI_"aphic rules by which literary men would be guided in Linguae Slavonicae per regnmn Hungariae usit.at.ae compendiosa sumul et facilis orthographia. This second important wonk which he ipulblished also in 1787 was annexed to his famous Dissert.atio. J. Vlcek in Dejiny literatury slovenskej states that BernolaJk was well acquainted with the wol"k done in the field o:f linguis-tics by predecessors such as iMatej Bel and Pavel Dolelfal, both from the, first half of the 18th century, and with the tendencies oif the popular Slovruk 1'anguage to be found in the pUlblications from Trnaiva. Bernolalk's work was not revolutionary, rb ut rather evolutionary, in that contrary to his agreement with Bel that the best literar,y Slovak is that equidistant from the Czechs, Poles, and Hungarians, namely central Slovruk - he practiically followed the Catholic writers before him who wrote in the western dialect. The significance of these works at that period in history cannot be underestimated. The newly--estaiblislhed seminary in BratiSilava castle lasted only six years, until the death of Joseph I, but it housed annually a,pproxirmately five hundred seminarians from all parts of Slwakia. The interest aroused in the seminarians by these linguistitc ·s tu- SLOVAKIA dies was soon oibserved even in neighboring ,countries. And their efforts were encouraiged surprisingly enough by men of their nationality ,w ho, did not agree with their endeavors. While he was a oUTate in Ceklis he had published in 1790, in Bratislaiva, a gra,rrumar written in Latin of the Slova:k language entitled Grammatica slavica. (Sources vary in their spelling of the complete title of this work: J. Ka.cka Hsts it is Grammatica slavica ad systema scholarum rationalium in dicionibus caesareo-regiis introductum acoomo-data; Rev. J. Porulbsky varies from this only in "diictionibus" ; and J. Vlcek writes . . . scholarum nationalium in di· tionibus" . . . "). Bernola:k based his ,g rammar on phonetics. He selected the western dialect - there are three main dialects in Slcwalkia: western, central, and eastern - as the most surited for literary writing. He eliminated diphthongs and soft "r's" (f). He SUJbstituted "6" for "u", and "i" for "j" and "y". 'Dhe softening of the consonants "d, 1, n, t" was aocomplished according to his rules by ,s oftening the consonant "d', l'. n, f" and writing "d'e," etc., instead oif following the consonant with a soft vowel. In 1791 he was ruppointed secretary to the Archlbishop in Trnaiva. Undouibtedly he had begun earlier and continued in this city and elsewhere .until his death in Nove Zrumky, where he was ,pastor imd swpervisor of schools, January 15, 1813, compiling a dictionary Slowar slowenski in five languages: Slovaik, Ozedh, Latin, German, Magyar. This sixvolume masterwonk consisting of some 5,300 pages was not pulblished, however, until 1825-27, in Budin, with the financial baoking of the Canon of Ostrihom, Jruraj Pallkovic (not to he confused with his contemporary, the Lutheran Jifi PalJkovic), who colmlpleted Bernolak's dictionary with the sixth volume. During his appointment in Trnava, Bernola;k founded in 1792, the literary and cultural society "Slowenske ucene Towarisstwo" (:Slovalk Learned Sodety) whose aim it was to further the advancement of education and culture of the SlO!Vak · pepple by means of Sl01Vak literature. The majority of the memberE of this group, numbering close to five hun- SLOVAKIA dred, were Catholic priests who promised to write Slovak bOOlks and support the prOI_Pagation -of Slovak literature. Branches of this society were esta:blished throughout Slovakia. Sources do not all list the, same towns where literary centexs, were fornned. S. Kromery names only three towns where branches were formed: Nitra, Rovne, and Banska Bystrica. To .tJhes,e centers are a:dded Sotl'na Bairn near Presov by J. Vlcek, J. Kaicka and J. Poru'bslky,. and the two last named authorities mention Trencin as well. The historian Fr. HrusovSky enumerate·s Nitra, Rovne, Banska Bystrica, ,Solirvar, Roziiav,a and Kosice in SlovaJlda. He goes on to state that the society was represented also in other lands. In Austria them wa:s a branch in Vienna, and in Hungary there was a gro,UJp in Ja;ger. Thus the writers of the Bernolak s:chool decided to meet the- literary needs of those not lirving in their homeland . .A!Illong tlhe society's most outstanding l,i tera:ry men, in addition to its founder, were Juraj Pal1kovic, who translated the Bi!ble into the SlOiVaJk language; the Archlbishop of Ostriho:m, Alexande,r Cardinal RUJdnay, who, besides writing many semnons a:nd translating Cicero assisted the society financially ; Juraj Fandli, also a priest, who even in his botanica..l and agricultural wonks urged the Slovak people to a greater aippreciation of theiir mother tongue; another priest, the first famous SlovaJk ,p oet, Jan Holly ; the first Slovak literary historian, Rev. Michael Resetka; and Martin Haimuija:k who, in 1834, co--founded another organization in Budapest, the "Spolek miloviiikov reci a literatury slovenskej" (Organi'.zation of the Lovers of the Slovak Language and Literature) to ex:pand the work commenced by Bernola;k'"S society. Varied were the types of ,books published ,b y the Bernolalk school of writecrs. Their pulblications consisted orf theses on practical agriculture; religious, poetilc and pedagogic works; and histori'cal, literary and linguistic studies. · ·Truly, Anton Bernolak and his group are men worthy of admiration for the great love for their language and the efforts they put forth for its sake. SLOVAKIA BIBLIOGRAPHY BOOKS : \J Botto·, Julius, Slovaci, Vyvin ich narodneho povedomia, Turciansky sv. Martin; Vydanie knihkuipooko-Nwkladatel'skeho Spolku, 1906. \J DeBray, R. G. A. Guide to the Slavonic Lan~ges. London: J. -M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1951. (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc.) Hruso:vsky, Fr. Slovenske Dejiny. Turcianslky sv. Mar\J tin, Matica SlovellSlka., 1940 (Fifth Edition). Kaolrn, Jozef. Dejiny literatury slovenskej. Ruzomlberok: Leva, 1921. Krcmery, Stefan. Stopafdesiat rokov slovenskej literatury. Sva.zok Prvy. Turcia.nsky sv. Martin: Matica Slovenska., 1943. Pietro, Amlbro. Napor-Odpor, Ako postupovala mad'a.risacia v Uhorsku. Turcia.nsiky sv. Martin: Nakladom vilastnym, 1905. Ponibsky, Rev. Jan. K Stemu Vyrociu Literarnej Slovenciny 1844-1944. Scranton, Pa.: Obrana Press, Inc., 1944. Vlcek, Jaroslav. Dejiny literatiiry slovenskej. Turciansky sv. Martin: Matica Slovenska, ( obnovienie vydanie z roku 1890) 1923. PERIODICALS : Banik, Ant. Aug. "Rok zo zivota Juraja Fa.ndliho" Slovenske Pohfady, Vol. LXVI, 9 (1950), pp. 507-51. Jarouseik, Rudolf. "Anton Bernola.k Ako Ucenec a Narodny BuditeY." Slov. Uc. Reprinted in Slovenska Obrana, August 3, 1937. Kovac ml., Edo. "Anton Bernola.k," Slovak v Amerike, May 9, 1933. Skuiltety, Jozef. "Pa:miat.ka Antona BernolaJka" Slovak, date unknown.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Anton Bernolak's Influence on Slovak Literature Description An account of the resource Eleonor Podkrivacký Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 3 (8), September 1953 pp. 18-25 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Podkrivacký, Eleonor Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September 1953 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/7d97e1ae997cc00824b72d452319f796.pdf 25acadf4a597bdd67b6c46605eb3835b PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- ----- -JOHN HOLLY.:.:.:.. PIONEER IN SLOVAK POETRY Cyril J. Potocek What ma dness beset you, what evil spirit urged you, That brother s redden their swords with brothers' blood; And the kingd om for which your ancestors toiled, Should through your ha te, crumble to dust? Thus did John Holly (1785-1849) in his ELEGIES lament the fall of the Great Moravian Empire. The Bernolak school produced this first Slovak poet, Holly, whose works were composed in the classical style. ,·~1··.1. The Age of Romanticism had been ushered into the .literatures of Britain by Byron, France by Hugo, Italy by Leopardi, Germany by Heine, Russia by Pushkin, and Poland by Mickiewicz. The Slovaks were familiar with the new romanticism appeared in 1833, retained the classical form. Holly's adherence to the classical form stemmed directly from the pattern of his life. He w~· born in Bury, nea:r Sastin, Bratislava County. He attended school at Skalica and Bratislava and then went to the seminary at Trnava to study for the priesthood. After his ordination in 1808, John Holly served as curate in Pobedim and IDohovec and in 1814 became the pastor at Madunice, a village overlooking the beautiful Vah River. In his ODES, Hollf tells how he composed his poetry under the leafy arms of an old oak tree. But his pastoral idyll ended abruptly in 1843 when his house took fire and the flames left him badly burned and almost blind. Holly went to live with a friend, the parish priest at Dobra Voda, and died there, totally blind, on April 14, 1849. In 1854 his grateful countrymen erected a monument over his grave in Dobra Voda. We have seen that the spirit of romanticism did not touch the poet, and from the review .of his life one can surmise the reason. Holly's education-jn•, .the Greek and Latin classics and his life as a priest, spent,·amid the Latin liturgical services, contributed to his preference of the classical form. �64 SLOVAKIA As a student, Holly had rendered translations from Virgil, Homer, Ovid, and Horace, which he published at Trnava in 1824 under the title MISCffiLLANEX)US POEMS (Rozlicne basne). The translations from Homer won the commendation of Jungmann, Safarik, and Niederle. In 1828 his translation of Virgil's AENEID was published at Trnava. In 1833 appeared Holly's longest poem, SVATOPLUK , a heroic epic in twelve cantos, also published at Trnava. This work, on which he had labored from 1827 to 1830, evidenced the author's profound study of Homer and Virgil. But the Svatopluk of Holly is not the Svatopluk of history, the ruler of the Great Moravian Empire from 870 to 894. Holly entwined history and mythology to present an ideal Svatopluk, not the treacherous prince of Nitra who joined the Germans against his uncle, Rastislav, the ruler of the empire, in the hope of winning the crown for himself. Holly's poetic genius had used a Slovak dialect in the composition of a masterpiece of Slovak literature. DAWN (Zora), the organ of Bernolak's school in Budapest, published his next work IDYLIJS (rSelanky) in 1835. These verses are poetic pictures of the happy pastoral life, composed between 1830 to 1835. The poet takes his reader through fertile fields watered by the river Vah, which served as the pasture ground for the villagers' cows and sheep, to meet the playful, music-loving, pastoral people. In a series of twenty-one idylls you meet the shepherd; mourn the death of the popular village singer ; greet a young couple on their way to be married; witness the fight between two powerful shepherds ; console the spurned lover; attend a marriage feast; and tend sheep in the lush meadows. Of his poetry Holly loved most his IDYiLLS because they recalled to him the pleasant life of his pastorate among a kind, simple, loveable flock. In 1835 at Budapest Holly's heroic epic in six cantos, CYRILLO-ME THODIADA, was published. Unlike his Svatopluk, this poem is historically accurate. Again the poet returns to the time of the Great Moravian Empire to describe the coming of the Apostles of the Slovaks and their missionary labors. �SLOVAKIA 66 In his SLAV, another heroic epic poem, Holly describes in seven cantos the deeds of Slav, the mythical father of the Slovaks, who led his people to victory against their enemies, the fierce Cudi. The events of this poem are wholly imaginative. The final creations of the first Slovak poet were his ELEGIES (Zalospevy) and ODES (Ody), published in 1839 and 1840, followed by two Catholic hymnals (Spevniky) in 1842 and 1846. The ffiLEGIES were the poetic lament of Holly for the destruction of the Slovak kingdom, the Great Moravian Empire, in 907 by Magyar horsemen. Again and again he returns to the rulers of that empire, Mojmir, Rastislav, Svatopluk; to the treachery, perfidy, and villainy that brought ruin to the Slovak State. His ODES treat of the present: the ode on Anton Bernolak glowingly praises the Slovak language; the one on the Slovak nation looks to the future with firm faith. The works of Holly created a Slovak national poetry and, despite their absorption in the Slovak past, these poems served to r evive the Slovak spirit then at a very low ebb. They urged the people to regard their past with pride and look to the future with hope. When we consider the difficulties that Holly had overcome in using the western Slovak dialect, a new literary medium, in the composition of his poetry, we must admire the talent of an artist forced to use imperfect tools for his creations. Holly's genius influenced his contemporaries, who were to establish central Slovak as the literary language. In 1846, when Andrew Sladkovic, the greatest poet of Stu.r's school, gave his lovely MARINA to the Slovak people, a blind old priest, spending his last years at Dobra V oda, was fondly recalling the .p leasant days when he lay beneath an ancient oak at Madunice composing his pastoral idylls . • • • WHO SAID IT ? "The Russians like ourselves are Slavs, but when our blood brothers are Communists and Bolsheviks, we'll figlit them to the last man." (Statemen t m ade b y Dr. Josef Tiso, m ar- tyred P resident of Slovakia, to E . L. Delan ey, inite rnaUonally k nown American writer, co rre,s,pondenlt, speake r and n ew s commentator.) � SLOVAKIA - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- ----- -JOHN HOLLY.:.:.:.. PIONEER IN SLOVAK POETRY Cyril J. Potocek What ma dness beset you, what evil spirit urged you, That brother s redden their swords with brothers' blood; And the kingd om for which your ancestors toiled, Should through your ha te, crumble to dust? Thus did John Holly (1785-1849) in his ELEGIES lament the fall of the Great Moravian Empire. The Bernolak school produced this first Slovak poet, Holly, whose works were composed in the classical style. ,·~1··.1. The Age of Romanticism had been ushered into the .literatures of Britain by Byron, France by Hugo, Italy by Leopardi, Germany by Heine, Russia by Pushkin, and Poland by Mickiewicz. The Slovaks were familiar with the new romanticism appeared in 1833, retained the classical form. Holly's adherence to the classical form stemmed directly from the pattern of his life. He w~· born in Bury, nea:r Sastin, Bratislava County. He attended school at Skalica and Bratislava and then went to the seminary at Trnava to study for the priesthood. After his ordination in 1808, John Holly served as curate in Pobedim and IDohovec and in 1814 became the pastor at Madunice, a village overlooking the beautiful Vah River. In his ODES, Hollf tells how he composed his poetry under the leafy arms of an old oak tree. But his pastoral idyll ended abruptly in 1843 when his house took fire and the flames left him badly burned and almost blind. Holly went to live with a friend, the parish priest at Dobra Voda, and died there, totally blind, on April 14, 1849. In 1854 his grateful countrymen erected a monument over his grave in Dobra Voda. We have seen that the spirit of romanticism did not touch the poet, and from the review .of his life one can surmise the reason. Holly's education-jn•, .the Greek and Latin classics and his life as a priest, spent,·amid the Latin liturgical services, contributed to his preference of the classical form. �64 SLOVAKIA As a student, Holly had rendered translations from Virgil, Homer, Ovid, and Horace, which he published at Trnava in 1824 under the title MISCffiLLANEX)US POEMS (Rozlicne basne). The translations from Homer won the commendation of Jungmann, Safarik, and Niederle. In 1828 his translation of Virgil's AENEID was published at Trnava. In 1833 appeared Holly's longest poem, SVATOPLUK , a heroic epic in twelve cantos, also published at Trnava. This work, on which he had labored from 1827 to 1830, evidenced the author's profound study of Homer and Virgil. But the Svatopluk of Holly is not the Svatopluk of history, the ruler of the Great Moravian Empire from 870 to 894. Holly entwined history and mythology to present an ideal Svatopluk, not the treacherous prince of Nitra who joined the Germans against his uncle, Rastislav, the ruler of the empire, in the hope of winning the crown for himself. Holly's poetic genius had used a Slovak dialect in the composition of a masterpiece of Slovak literature. DAWN (Zora), the organ of Bernolak's school in Budapest, published his next work IDYLIJS (rSelanky) in 1835. These verses are poetic pictures of the happy pastoral life, composed between 1830 to 1835. The poet takes his reader through fertile fields watered by the river Vah, which served as the pasture ground for the villagers' cows and sheep, to meet the playful, music-loving, pastoral people. In a series of twenty-one idylls you meet the shepherd; mourn the death of the popular village singer ; greet a young couple on their way to be married; witness the fight between two powerful shepherds ; console the spurned lover; attend a marriage feast; and tend sheep in the lush meadows. Of his poetry Holly loved most his IDYiLLS because they recalled to him the pleasant life of his pastorate among a kind, simple, loveable flock. In 1835 at Budapest Holly's heroic epic in six cantos, CYRILLO-ME THODIADA, was published. Unlike his Svatopluk, this poem is historically accurate. Again the poet returns to the time of the Great Moravian Empire to describe the coming of the Apostles of the Slovaks and their missionary labors. �SLOVAKIA 66 In his SLAV, another heroic epic poem, Holly describes in seven cantos the deeds of Slav, the mythical father of the Slovaks, who led his people to victory against their enemies, the fierce Cudi. The events of this poem are wholly imaginative. The final creations of the first Slovak poet were his ELEGIES (Zalospevy) and ODES (Ody), published in 1839 and 1840, followed by two Catholic hymnals (Spevniky) in 1842 and 1846. The ffiLEGIES were the poetic lament of Holly for the destruction of the Slovak kingdom, the Great Moravian Empire, in 907 by Magyar horsemen. Again and again he returns to the rulers of that empire, Mojmir, Rastislav, Svatopluk; to the treachery, perfidy, and villainy that brought ruin to the Slovak State. His ODES treat of the present: the ode on Anton Bernolak glowingly praises the Slovak language; the one on the Slovak nation looks to the future with firm faith. The works of Holly created a Slovak national poetry and, despite their absorption in the Slovak past, these poems served to r evive the Slovak spirit then at a very low ebb. They urged the people to regard their past with pride and look to the future with hope. When we consider the difficulties that Holly had overcome in using the western Slovak dialect, a new literary medium, in the composition of his poetry, we must admire the talent of an artist forced to use imperfect tools for his creations. Holly's genius influenced his contemporaries, who were to establish central Slovak as the literary language. In 1846, when Andrew Sladkovic, the greatest poet of Stu.r's school, gave his lovely MARINA to the Slovak people, a blind old priest, spending his last years at Dobra V oda, was fondly recalling the .p leasant days when he lay beneath an ancient oak at Madunice composing his pastoral idylls . • • • WHO SAID IT ? "The Russians like ourselves are Slavs, but when our blood brothers are Communists and Bolsheviks, we'll figlit them to the last man." (Statemen t m ade b y Dr. Josef Tiso, m ar- tyred P resident of Slovakia, to E . L. Delan ey, inite rnaUonally k nown American writer, co rre,s,pondenlt, speake r and n ew s commentator.) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document JOHN HOLLY. - PIONEER IN SLOVAK POETRY Cyril J. Potocek What ma dness beset you, what evil spirit urged you, That brother s redden their swords with brothers' blood; And the kingd om for which your ancestors toiled, Should through your ha te, crumble to dust? Thus did John Holly (1785-1849) in his ELEGIES lament the fall of the Great Moravian Empire. The Bernolak school produced this first Slovak poet, Holly, whose works were composed in the classical style. ,·~1··.1. The Age of Romanticism had been ushered into the .literatures of Britain by Byron, France by Hugo, Italy by Leopardi, Germany by Heine, Russia by Pushkin, and Poland by Mickiewicz. The Slovaks were familiar with the new romanticism appeared in 1833, retained the classical form. Holly's adherence to the classical form stemmed directly from the pattern of his life. He w~· born in Bury, nea:r Sastin, Bratislava County. He attended school at Skalica and Bratislava and then went to the seminary at Trnava to study for the priesthood. After his ordination in 1808, John Holly served as curate in Pobedim and IDohovec and in 1814 became the pastor at Madunice, a village overlooking the beautiful Vah River. In his ODES, Hollf tells how he composed his poetry under the leafy arms of an old oak tree. But his pastoral idyll ended abruptly in 1843 when his house took fire and the flames left him badly burned and almost blind. Holly went to live with a friend, the parish priest at Dobra Voda, and died there, totally blind, on April 14, 1849. In 1854 his grateful countrymen erected a monument over his grave in Dobra Voda. We have seen that the spirit of romanticism did not touch the poet, and from the review .of his life one can surmise the reason. Holly's education-jn•, .the Greek and Latin classics and his life as a priest, spent,·amid the Latin liturgical services, contributed to his preference of the classical form. 64 SLOVAKIA As a student, Holly had rendered translations from Virgil, Homer, Ovid, and Horace, which he published at Trnava in 1824 under the title MISCffiLLANEX)US POEMS (Rozlicne basne). The translations from Homer won the commendation of Jungmann, Safarik, and Niederle. In 1828 his translation of Virgil's AENEID was published at Trnava. In 1833 appeared Holly's longest poem, SVATOPLUK , a heroic epic in twelve cantos, also published at Trnava. This work, on which he had labored from 1827 to 1830, evidenced the author's profound study of Homer and Virgil. But the Svatopluk of Holly is not the Svatopluk of history, the ruler of the Great Moravian Empire from 870 to 894. Holly entwined history and mythology to present an ideal Svatopluk, not the treacherous prince of Nitra who joined the Germans against his uncle, Rastislav, the ruler of the empire, in the hope of winning the crown for himself. Holly's poetic genius had used a Slovak dialect in the composition of a masterpiece of Slovak literature. DAWN (Zora), the organ of Bernolak's school in Budapest, published his next work IDYLIJS (rSelanky) in 1835. These verses are poetic pictures of the happy pastoral life, composed between 1830 to 1835. The poet takes his reader through fertile fields watered by the river Vah, which served as the pasture ground for the villagers' cows and sheep, to meet the playful, music-loving, pastoral people. In a series of twenty-one idylls you meet the shepherd; mourn the death of the popular village singer ; greet a young couple on their way to be married; witness the fight between two powerful shepherds ; console the spurned lover; attend a marriage feast; and tend sheep in the lush meadows. Of his poetry Holly loved most his IDYiLLS because they recalled to him the pleasant life of his pastorate among a kind, simple, loveable flock. In 1835 at Budapest Holly's heroic epic in six cantos, CYRILLO-ME THODIADA, was published. Unlike his Svatopluk, this poem is historically accurate. Again the poet returns to the time of the Great Moravian Empire to describe the coming of the Apostles of the Slovaks and their missionary labors. SLOVAKIA 66 In his SLAV, another heroic epic poem, Holly describes in seven cantos the deeds of Slav, the mythical father of the Slovaks, who led his people to victory against their enemies, the fierce Cudi. The events of this poem are wholly imaginative. The final creations of the first Slovak poet were his ELEGIES (Zalospevy) and ODES (Ody), published in 1839 and 1840, followed by two Catholic hymnals (Spevniky) in 1842 and 1846. The ffiLEGIES were the poetic lament of Holly for the destruction of the Slovak kingdom, the Great Moravian Empire, in 907 by Magyar horsemen. Again and again he returns to the rulers of that empire, Mojmir, Rastislav, Svatopluk; to the treachery, perfidy, and villainy that brought ruin to the Slovak State. His ODES treat of the present: the ode on Anton Bernolak glowingly praises the Slovak language; the one on the Slovak nation looks to the future with firm faith. The works of Holly created a Slovak national poetry and, despite their absorption in the Slovak past, these poems served to r evive the Slovak spirit then at a very low ebb. They urged the people to regard their past with pride and look to the future with hope. When we consider the difficulties that Holly had overcome in using the western Slovak dialect, a new literary medium, in the composition of his poetry, we must admire the talent of an artist forced to use imperfect tools for his creations. Holly's genius influenced his contemporaries, who were to establish central Slovak as the literary language. In 1846, when Andrew Sladkovic, the greatest poet of Stu.r's school, gave his lovely MARINA to the Slovak people, a blind old priest, spending his last years at Dobra V oda, was fondly recalling the .p leasant days when he lay beneath an ancient oak at Madunice composing his pastoral idylls . • • • WHO SAID IT ? "The Russians like ourselves are Slavs, but when our blood brothers are Communists and Bolsheviks, we'll figlit them to the last man." (Statemen t m ade b y Dr. Josef Tiso, m ar- tyred P resident of Slovakia, to E . L. Delan ey, inite rnaUonally k nown American writer, co rre,s,pondenlt, speake r and n ew s commentator.)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource John Hollý - Pioneer in Slovak Poetry Description An account of the resource Cyril J. Potoček Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 1 (6), April 1953 pp. 53-55 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Potoček, Cyril J. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource April 1953 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/208254f95568e58a0bb64b8eba392d53.pdf 745c5ac46407f7c329eb3082fa1b68d6 PDF Text Text 32 SLOVAKIA DR. HUBERT RIPKA'S VERSION OF THE COMMUNliST "PUTSCH" IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA Karol Sidor Fourteen months after the Communists took over Czecho-,Slovalda, Hubert R~pka, former minister orf various resorts cxf the late Dr. Edward Benes, decided to write a series o,f articles under the head.mg of "A Prefabricated Revolution" (Une Revolution Prefabriquee) . The articles, telling what happened in Prague in February 1948, were published in several European dailies. Why Riipka waited so long to tell the world his version of what happened in Ozecho--lSlovaikia early in 1948, he does not d~V'll:lge, but it is quite obvioUIS that he wanted time to do a little healing. Rilpka's trade was journ.alism. He was the editor o:f the "Lldove Noviny" (People's News), the daily cxf · the Czech intelligentsia published in Brno, and during his six years in exile he was Minister of Propaganda - and what propaganda! - of Dr. Benes's London government-in-exile. R iipka, then, was ruble and crupafbJe of writing. The Roman daily "II POipolo" paid quite a tribute to Ripka when it began pUJblishmg his series of articles. It presented Ripka as "the only Czechoslovak democratic minister, who successfully escaped from his country after last February's putsch"! Of course, that was a bit far.fetched, because we know that ministers Zenkl, Kocvara, Stransky, Pieto.r , Prochazka, Majer and Franelk also escruped from Praigue after the Felbruary "putscih ." These collea,gues of Ripka were just a s "Czechoslovak" and "democratic" as he was himself. They all had one thing irn common with Ripka: they helped Benes sell out both the Slovaks and the Czechs to the USSR. It is quite s1gnifiicant that after sUJCh a "terrible putsch" so many Ozeoh ministers, officials and leading politicians could escape without incident or accident. Robert Ingrim -,. author cxf "After Hitler Stalin?" - wrote a:bout this phenomenal exodus in the Swiss "ViATIDRLAND" of �SLOVAKIA 33 September 25, 1948. One is led to suspect with Ingrim that so many Czech ministers, generals, politicians and thousands of Czech go.vernment officials and workers could hardly escaipe wtthout incident or accident without a "deal" with Comrade Gottwald. Any one who has read Riplta's articles must admit that Ripka was careful not to attook Gottwald or Zapotocky. What is more, Riplk a did not conrfess that he played bad politics, or that he was sorry for what he had done, or that he would never again collaiborate with Communism. On the contrary, Ripka wrote: "Today more than ever before, I cannot stop believing that a free and independent Czecho-Slovakia can exist only in Europe that is brought to balance, where the West and Russia find a proper agreement to collaborate. Even the events of February 1948 could not shake me from this conviction, which remains the basis of my whole conception of national politics." - ("Fi,garo., " Paris, April 4, 1949). Stanisl•aN Mikolaj,czylk, Nagy Ferencz, and other refugees frOIID 'beyO!Ild the Lron Cm·tain wrote in a different tone. They corufessed that they were mistaiken in thinking they could negotiate a decent agreement with Soviet Russia. But Riipka stated pulblicly, even arrter the so...;called February "putsch," that he shall persist in his error, and his articles only corufirm the fact that in the "new" CzechoSloivaikia which Ripka would build - he would again cultivate contacts with the Communist USSR just as enthusiastically and loyally as does Antonin Zapotocky today in the name of Czecho-Slovakia. R~pka is lo•a th to admit that politically he is bankrupt. He keeps on talking aJbout a "new agreement" between the West and Russia meaning Czecho..Sl01Vakia when he sarys "West." In fact, w:hat he told us in his articles was equivalent to saying that ne and his "Czechoslovak democratic" colleagues would even now be collaborating with the Communists and Stalin's stooge in Czech-Slovakia, if they would have been allowed to keep their ministries. But in Washington, Ripka, Zenkl and the other soc_alled ·"OzechoslovaJk democrats" - now organized in tihe �34 SLOVAKIA "Council oif Free OzechoSilwakia" - talk aJbout their fight against Communism. Wihat kind of fight agaill'st Comm'll.Ilism? As far as is kno:wn there was no fight against Communism in Czeteho-1Sloivaikia as a whole, but only in Slovakia. Deception, appea:sement, crupitulation, and shameful mght mto other ilands can hardliy be called a "fight against Communism"! The mass "escape" oif Ozech Sociialists was undoulbtedly arranged and assured in advance, and the socalled "OzoohoslovaJk dernoorats" did not esc~ emptyhanded either. What can be tni.rthlfully said about the: fight of the Ozech emigration against Communism? Only this: We are still patiently waiting for it to start! It aippea,rs to us that Czech emigrants - both the right and left wings - are agreed on only one thing: to carry on their fight against Slovak emigrants and refugees whom they have termed "separatists." They vilify them before the Red Cross, the U. S. oocwpation forces and their allies, and the U. S. State Department. The Slovaiks, aocording to them, simply are no good; they are Hitlerites, Fascists, Nazis and, worst of all, "separatists." Aocording to Rilpka, Zenkl, Lebtrich and other "has.beens" of Dr. IDdward Benes's bankrl.llpt political ikd.ngdom, the Slovaks hiwe no right to freedom and independence, no right to an indeipendent po~mcal state. To the "Czechoslovak democrats" the fight against Slovak freedom and independence means more than the fight against Communism. T. G. Masaryk and Benes fooled the world in 1918. Benes did it again in 1945. And their disciples are dete:rmined to continue the propagation of the fraud that was "Czechoslovaik democracy.'' Ripka, Zenikl and their followers are not fighting Communism. The ra'llks oif Ozech emigrants are fiull or' agents of the Ozeich secret police and spies of the Communist Party. More Czech emigrants "escaped" back home than all'y other class of emigrants. That is not suITTprising to any one who really knows the Benes Czechs. There was veriy little difference between Benes's "Czechoslovak democracy" and Communism. The former was in fact a handmaid of the �SLOVAKIA 35 latter. Benes and his "Czechoslovaks" could not suffer political opposition ~ more than the Reds or the Nazis. Loolk at their rewrds: they tell us tihat these queer "democrats" ipla,y ed a'long with Communism and actively collaborated with Communists for many yea,rs. Ripka enthusiastically welcomed the c0Ua.1boration and eternal frien<lshlp between Soviet Russia and Czecho...slovalkia in 1935 (Vd. his article in "Zahranicni politilka," Pra)gue, 1935,pgs. 14-l7). At that tilme Riipka wrote that the Ozechs wanted to 'b e "not only mediators between the old West and the new East, but also factors, actively cocreating a synthesis of lasting values of the old European civilization and the new civilization being born in the Soviet Union." Ten years later - in 19415 - the Benes Ozechs really got the chance to play the role of "factorris." They were given the opporturuty "to aictilvely cocreaite a synthesis" between Russia and Czec'ho~Slovakia. Just how suocessful they were in this, we shall see later when we anal~ Ripka's articles. But let us say at the outset: in Central Europe it was only the BENES CZECHS who actually want.ed to collaborate with the Communists! In Ma~, 194'5, when the Soviet a:ranies rolled into Prague, it was only the Ozechs cxf all the peoples of Central Eurorpe who welcomed them with oipen joy and enthusiasm a'S the "armies o,f lilbeTation." In the first Ozech post-wa,r government, Clement Gottwald, chairnnran of the Czech Communist party was named Vice-iPrennier am.d, after the parliamentary elections in 1946, as Premier of the government in Prague by "!president" Benes. At that time no;where did the Communists in a parliamentary election receive so many votes as they did in Bohemia a!Ild MoraJVia; in Slovaikia they were beaten dedsive1y by the SlovaJk electorate. 1 Such was the political line of Benes and his followers. In Prwgue the Cotmmunists, a;nd not Benes and Ripka, 1becrume the "factors." And the Communists lost no time in creating Rilpka's "synthesis" of 1935 between the "old West" and the "new East." Benes and Ripka had prepared for this synthesis already since 1935 and were beaming �SLOVAKIA 36 with joy because the whole world was astounded by · their political recltlessness. Collaib,oration with the Communists in internal politics had begll!Il in 193'5 when Benes needed the votes orf the COimmunist Party · to be elected president. The C.omimunisits promised to vote fOl" Benes on the condition that Gottwald, Kopecky and Stetka, whose political mandates the Court of Election of Czecho-Slovakia would not verify and approve, would be approved as members of the Prague parliament. Benes promised to do that little thing and so enaJbled three Communists to become members of par1i'a,ment in 1935. 'Dhe Communists voted for Benes and later proved their sympathy for him by voting for the presildential budget every ye·a r. The Communists were for everything that •~President" Benes himself asked for in the budget, but either refrained from voting or voted against all other items of the State budget. 1 When Benes resigned as ,president of CzechO-iSlovakia in June, 1948 - the second time within a decade - the Communists voted him full presidential rpay for life and mrugnanimously gruve him the Limy Castle and the properties belonging to it. In a word, Benes and Ripka did collruborate with the Communists for many years. That collaboration did not cease because orf ideological reasons, but only because the Communists in February, 1948, told their collaborators what amounted to: "We thank you with communistic sincerity for your collab.o ration O!f many years with us. You can go now; we do not need you any mo:re. You can even go alb road if you wish; at hQlme you are useless to us, and id' you go abroad we shall not fear you." "The Czechoslovak people" - said Hubert Riplka in his article in the "IL POPOLO" ( 4--30-49) - "with singular joy welcomed the first allied treaty with Russia in 1935." In the first place, no "Czechoslovak" people exists, ethnJ1cally 51peruking. But there are Czechs a!lld Slovaks. There are two nations - the Czech and the Slovak - who do ~ t to all phenomena aocording to their training and traditions. And so it was with the treaty of Benes with Stalin in 193'5: the Czechs reacted one way, while the Slovruks reacted altogether differently. The ~ h s reacted "with singular �SLOVAKIA 37 joy;" they welcomed that treaty, because they thought just as Ripka himself had thought in 1935 - that together they would be able to form a synthesis of the "old" European ciiv:i lization and the "new" civilization which was being born in the Soviet Union. Soviet ci'Vilization was not brought to Europe by Ripka; but by the soldiers of the Soviet armies. The nations of the "old" ciivilization felt the sting of this "new" civilization on their bodies. And they shall continue to feel it as long as they do not :wcept it 100 per cent by discarding the "old" civilization which was founded on Christianity and is almost 2000 yea:rs oJd. Personally, Ri;pka was terrified by Soviet . "'Ciivi.lilzation" in praclice. He did not remain in C?.echo-Slovakia to take part in the creation of the "synthesis," but fled far beyond her borders. Yes, as far a:s he could go Jrorn this "new" civilization which in 1935, he praised highly and recommended so zealously not only to the Czech peoiple, but to the whole world as well. Why did Ripka do that? Did he not ,know what was happemng in the S()IViet Union? From 191,8 to 1935 there were aJbout 100,000 Rlussians, Ukranian and White Russian emrl.grants in OzechoJS[,()IValkia. They had fled from the Soviet Union and told the Czechs what they saw aind e~rienced in Soviet Rlussia. 'Ilhe Benes Oze.chs, however, did not ~Ii.eve those eye-<Witneses. 'Ilhe Czechs were blinded by their old lave for the "Sl01Vanic Ea:st" and thought that Communism of the 1935 vintage was no longer the Communism of 1917. They forgot tllat Communism, as a doctrine and a system of government, is one and the saime for all peoples aJild all times. It does not relate only to the Russian Ozars, but to all n0;tions of the earth and to aH states. The substance of CommuniSIIll is not sulbject to the ohangeis of time. Ripka evidently met with real Communist civilization only in 194'8, in Prague, when it too:k aiway his ministry. He fled before it, we are sruq:~posed to believe, to saive his life. And yet 1n 1949 he wrote that he still believed in colla.borating with the UISSR. so Ripka, too, was a product of Czech na:tiona:l development, whlch was a1ways directed to the left. The Czedhs �38 ::,LOVAKIA made Jan Hus (1'370~141'5) the symlbol of their rebellion aigainst Rome. '.Dhey grolllped ooder his banner and always emphasized more and more the negati~stic ·elements of Hus' character, suppressing all his positive qualities. As a result large grOUfPS of the Ozech nation, matriculated as Catholics at baptism, got themselves. in the periphery of world Christianity, their roots of solidarity w~th the Ohristian civilization of the west dried Ulp in tilme and the Ozech masses aH the more readily joined the "111ew" civiHzation which Ripka said was being born in the Soviet Union. Thrs ideological development of the Czechs to the left explains why in 193'5 the Czechs welcomed a treaty with Moscow and why in 1946 in the parliamentary elections in Ozetcho-1Slovakia the international and atheistic Oommunist Party came out on top in Bohemia and Morrruvia. But the Ozechs were accustomed to belonging to laiI'!ge economiic and politkal units. Their outstanding historian, Francis Palacky, wrote to the FrMllkfurt Assemlbly in 1848: "The preservation of Austria, its integrity and cOl11SOlidation, is and must be a great and important th!ing not only to the Czech nation, but also to the whole, olf IDurope, nay, to all humanity and cultU'l"e." That same Palaciky is the author of the staitement: "H Austria did not exist, we would have to create it." Dr. Edward Benes shared similar ideas. In his bodk, "Le Problem Autrichien et la QuestiO!ll Tcheque" (pg. 307) ·b e wrote in 1908: "Frequently we bear talk about the collapse of Austria. I absolutely do not believe it. The historical and economic ties that mutually unite the 1181tions of Austria are too strong to allow Austria to collapse.'' This was written at a time when the Czechs were becomilllg a nation of oifificia.ils and directors, administering not only in Bohemia, Morruvia and Silesia, but even in Galicia, a signdficant part of Vienna and later even in Bosnta and Hercegcwina. True, this was all under the supernsion of Vienna and ac:corddng to her laws. During the first World War T. G. Masar,yik and Edward Benes came upon the idea of making the Czech nation independent by destroying Austria-Hungary. To help them �SLOVAKIA 39 with that plan tihey SIUCCeeded in getting 1,'500,000 Slovaks to whom T. G. Masaryk had solemruy promised in Pittsburgh, Pa., on May 30, 1918, that Slovalk ia, within the framewonk af Czecho-SlovaJkia, would hiwe, arrnong other things, her own assembly, her own courts and her own ,s chools. On the 0:ther hand, Dr. Edward Benes, wJth his signature attaiched to the Peace Treaty of St. Germain Se!ptem\ber 19, 1919) , haid guaranteed the Ruthenfans territorial autonomy, a legislative a:ssemlbly, their own governor, etc. Both Masaryk and Benes la~r repudiated their solemn promises. As lonig as Masaryk and Benes · ruled Czecho,.,SloV'akia, neither the Slwaiks nor the Rut>henians were guaranteed autonomy. Nolbody 'bothered to ask the other peoples orf Czecho-SloV1aLkia - the 3,500,000 Germans, albout a miUion Magyars, SOIIIle 200,000 Po.les, etc., whether they wanted to live together with the · Czechs in the common staite of CzeohoSlorvaJkia. The frirst Constitution of 1920 was approved by the Prague parliament when that body did not have a single representative of the Germans, the Poles, Magyars and Ruthenians, and when the Slovaks were represented not by deputies elected by the Slovak people, but by deputies named by Prague, i.e., by T. G. Masaryk and Edward Benes. And that Constitution - a tyipi~al Benes creation remained tmchanged and was binding U!pon every citizen of Czeicho..iSllovaikia until N oivemlbe~, 193-8. It is understandiaJbJe that the majority Olf nations of the ReipUJblk did not fare well in Ozecho-.Slo,vaikia. The existence of Czecho-1Slovaikia was not supPorted by the will of the majority of her mhrubitants. 'l'he Czechs themseLves knew that, and the old desire for broader economical and political spheres, whereby the life o,f the Czechs could bet.t er be safeguarded and ·p rotected, began to awaken in them. They knew that internally Czecho-Slovakia was weak and that externally she wws threatened lb y the Germans. Czech leaders, therefore, ,b egan looking to;ward the So~fot Union which emlbraces one-SQxth o1: the unilverse. They began to tell their ,people and the world that the So'Viet Union was •a Slovian:ic land, that a "new" cirvi:lization and a new ally and ( 1 �40 SLOVAKIA defender Oif the Ozech nation, especially against German aggression was being born there. This thought was strengthened by the Ozech...SOviet Treaty of 1935. The Czechrs saw before themselves the vast expansiveness Oif the Soviet cowntry which was incomparably larger and rilcher than Austria-iliungacy. Culturally and politicai11y the Russii'am,s were far ~hind the Czechs. The Czeohs dreamed that in time they might even rule the Russian roost! They thought that by collruborating with the Soviets they would sooner or later find themselves on top even if it were oruy in the sense of the old Czech and even sicikly inclination toward Panslavism - at one time the Czarist and Ortlhod-0x variety and now the Red and atheistic kind. Slovaik national development went along a completely different course. The SlOIVruks not only did not welcome the treaty with Moscow in 1935, but openly condemned it through their elected deputies, in the Prague parliament. The Slova3c naition built its spiritual world consistently on its own national tradition. That tradition was Christian. It was created with equal zeal by both the Slovak Catholics and the Slovalk Protestants. Thait S1walk tradition is the common property olf aU Slovalks, no matter what their political or religious beliefs. The Slovak Protestant L'udovit Stur (1815-1856), Slovak patriot and national philogq>her, left the Slovalk nation in his books valua/b'le sources on how to correctly orientate itself in new social and national tendencies. Stur's book "The Slavs and the World of the Future," published after his deaith, has this to sary albout the Communism of his day: ''In every instan1ee Communism means the collapse and the destruiction oif the state. Communism arrived at this aim through atheism and apostacy from Christianity. In every fornn of Communism, no matter w:hat its origin, the outlook on life is da,r,k, laicking every tender j'oy. It brings the most c:mel sJaivery. Commun,i:sm, let it striive. and pretend in any manner whatsoever that it will make all peoples share in all rights, nevertheless, knows nothing a!bout humanity; it degrades humanity and, because it holds to sys- �SLOVAKIA 41 tams that are imipractiea!l and unrealizaJble, it belongs among the most stupid innovations that harve th'llS far been created by the human mind." The Slovak Catholic priest Jan Palarik (1822-1870) wrote a dissel'ta,tion in 1:864 "Albout SlOlVanic Mutuality." In it he resolutely stands fo.r a Slorvalk Sta,te and desires to see it in a federation of staites in EurOipe. But ne:ver under the direction of Russia. Pa1arik strongly repudiated Russia,n Panslavism and ,predicted thart "the whole of Europe wouM rebel against the Slovanic peoples" if they should ever come under the rule of the Russians. The Slovak Protestant, Milan R. Stefanik (1880-1919), a General in the French Army and the first Minister of War in Czooho-lSlovaikiia, was in Rus,s,i a in 191'8..1919 and saw Communism at close range. In February, 191'9, he tele. graphed his government at Prague: "To flirt with Bolshevik tendencies would be comparable to foresaking the path of honor and sane reason. The fight against Bolshevism in all its manifestations must prevail in our politics." On such foundations, then, was, buiilt the Slovak stand against Communism. It was built on the foundations of Christianity and nationalism, and never on the foundation whi~h Mussolini amd Hitler gave to their anti-Communism. The Communists and their friends had pro~1aimed that Mus-solini and Hitler dervised anti-Communism in Europe and that the SIJ.ovaJks had taken it over from them. That does not correspond with the truth. Slovak phifosophers long before Mussolini and Hitler warned their nations not to acceipt Communistic teaJChing. In the po1itiical life w Slov-a kia the party of Msgr. Andrew Hli'Dlka consciously fortified and strengthened this SlovaJk anti-Communism in the broad masses of the Slovak nation. Anti-Communism had thus become a component part of Slovak national beliefs. That is why the pa11ty of Andrew Hllinka pmtested a,g ainst the apprwal of Benes's treaty with Stalin in 1935 when it came up for approval on the floor of the Prague Parliament. At that time Hlinika's Farly haid 30.1 per cent of all the voters in Slovakia, while the Communist Party in Sfovakia had 13 per cent, and the �42 SLOVAKIA party orf Benes and Riipka only 3.2 per cent of the total Slovia:k electorate. The Slovak stanqpoint was ideologically and rightd'uUy represented by Hlinika's Party which was the first and largest political party in Slovakia since 1925. On November 6, 1935, as a Slovak deputy I sipotk e in the IllMil.e of Hlinlka's Party on the floor of the Pra:g,ue parliament. In the presence of the Foreign Minister, Dr. Edward Benes, I said: "Alas, foreign policy under the direction m Dr. Edward Benes has deviated from the tendency that General Stefanik followed in 1919. He requested the Prag;ue government to fight against Bolsheivism in all its manifestations and warned not even to flirt w.ith Bolshe'Viik tendencies. IDven flirting with Bolshevik tend.endes he called foresaiking the road of hooor and sanity. 1n the meantime the Prague government already conoluded various rugreements with the bloody offspring o;f Bolshevism~ the Soviet Union. "The Hlinlka Slovak People's Party rejects the theory of Bolshevism, co:ndemns its bloody ipra:ctices as well as its inhuman methods, and with a very heavy heart tolerates the fact that OzeichoJSlo'Wllkia has deviated from the course that was 'Plotted b,y her co-d'ounder and first Minister of War, Ge111eral Stman:i!k. The no:mnali.!zation of diplomatic contaiots can be understood even between such st:riucturally different states as is our democrartic Ozecho-slovaJk RepubHc and the SOIVieit Union. Fimdly other states similar to ours have such diiplomatic contacts. But imrrnediatetly following the esta!blishment otf contacts, there were so many expressions of sympathy within the Ozooho.,Slo;va:k Reipublic for the Soviet Union and its system that this must fJll us who are nationally orientated in a Christian way - with fears about the future Czecho-Slovaikia. To· tie ouir destiny with the destinies of the Soviet Union, to build on agreements signed by Bolshevii.ks, I consider as the greatest bl,un. der made by our present foreign policy. "We slovak,s warn the Czechs away from the political mista!kes being committed by our Fcreign Minister, Dr. Edward Benes, because . too zealously he binds us with the Soviet Union that is so distant to us. In the interests of the �SLOVAKIA 43 State we demamd a change in the lime followed by our foreign polilcy, we demand thait the defense of the State be built on a more realistic 'basi'S - one that conforms mo•r e with the mentality of the poipulation. Stating ·a ll these insufficiencies, I intvoduce them as one of tihe reasons that force us SloivaJks not to express our confidence in the present leailersh'ip of our foreign policy." Is it necessary to bring in more evidence to show that the SloviaJks were conisristently orientJated anti-Cottnlmun.istically? It proives co!D'clusively that Riipka was wrong when he said that "the Ozecho--!Slov.a!k people un:anilmously welc,ooned with joy the first allied agreement with Russia in 1935." The Ozec'hs, especialily the Sovieto,phiie Ozech intellectuals headed by R~pka, were made h~y by the treaty. The Slova!ks, however, eX1perieniced aJbsolutely no joy on that ocoasioo; nay, they aiticized and rejected the treaty and voted against it in 1936 in the Pra:gue Parliament. And this aJso attests to the fact that we are here concerned with two very different nations whose development and political convictio1J1S were altogether distin'Ct and diffe:rent. 1Riipka was rilght when he said that afiter the conclusion of a;greemnts with Moscow, in 19315 and 1943, Benes and his goveI1Il!ment exipressed "their complete confidence in the Soviet government." In return they expected the Sov.iet to return the friendshiip, confidenice and, rubove a'll, tihe assuraI1JCe that the USSR shall not intervene in our internal affairs." "That conrfidence has been betrayed" - Hulbert Ripka is screeching today. In February 1948 Moscow proceeded against democracy in Ozecho~Slovakia, ·be'Cause "it wanted to see in Pra;gue a totalitarian Communistic goivernment swbsement to. its will." So Ripka acknowledges th,at Moscow was dissaJtisfied with coHruborating in the fomnation of Riipk,a 's "synthesis." Ripka finally dis,wvered that Red Moscow wants its allies to be totaHy sulbserivierut to its dictates. But Ripka came upon this self-evident matter only in 1948, when he was thrown out of the g01VeTil!IIlent, or was at least prevented from co-governing in Prague with the Reds, and after he fled Ozecho-SlofVlakia. Before that time, however, Ripka was the man, who - act)ing like somebody in �44 SLOVAKIA the pay of Moscow - assured the Czechs and the uninformed world that reports about Moscow intervening in the internal affairs of individual states were absolutey false! Philip Panetili in his boO!k "Ed.war:d Benes, Leader of Democracy," on pgs. 123-124, notes the commentary of Dr. HUibert Ripka on the treaty of December, 1943, which Dr. Benes concluded with Moscow. "This Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty," said Riipk:a at that time, "had as its aim to strengthen the security of Europe." Ripka rejected the contention that this pact would mean the bolshevization of Euro,pe or Ozecho,Slovaikia. "The treaty," Ripka stated categorically, "gives a clear answer to all those who continue to suspect the Soviet Union of the intention of bolshevizing the countries of Central Europe that are its neighbors, nay, of intending even to annex them to the Soviet Union. The treaty gives a clear answer to all who are continuing to present Czecho-Slovakia as a tool in the hands of the Soviets. In the agr.e ement of 1943, the Soviet Union once again binds itself to respect her independence and that it shall not intervene in her internal affairs. Czecho-Slovakia binds iself in a similar fashion. By these formal ties the fact was confirmed again that the Soviet government had no intention of forcing its political regime on other nations and so much the less to annex the nations of Central Europe or any others to the Soviet framework." Whence did Dr. Ripka know these things? Was he ignorant of the fates of the Caucasian repulblics, or the painful fate oif the three Ba:ltic states, Latvia, Lithuania and Est01I1ia? Since the S01viet government acted imperlalisti:c . ally to.ward those states, why did Ri,pka think that the same thing would not aiso happen in the case of Czecho~Sl()IV3ikia? But Riipka wenlt mucli farther . He said thait the treaty which Ozeicho-SlavaJkiia conicluided with the Soviet Union not only did not weaken her S01Verdgnty and independence, but, converseJy, that 'basically it strengthened and secured them. As a real progressive, aJ.way;s wanting to instruct and teach other nations, R1pka offered thi,s instruction: "Not in distrust and in a hostile stand toward the Soviet Union, but in confidence and sincere willingness for a clean, friendly cooperation with the Soviet Union is the re- �SLOVAKIA 45 liable guarant.ee for assuring the freedom and independence of every country, namely, the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe. Every nation in this region with which the Soviet Union borders directly can be certain if it cultivates a friendship with this great power - that it certainly shall get from it help to defend its freedom and independence." Note the certainty with whioh Ripka spo!ke in 1943 about the future conduct of Moscow toward the states that trust it. What swperfJdality that was, what irresponsrbility, nay, what rookllesness oif the first degree! The years have proved that the Slovaks were right when they warned in the Piiag,ue Parliament that the union of Ozecho-,Slovakia with Moscow was "the greatest blunder ever committed by Ozecho~Slovaik foceign ,p olitics." The blunder of 1'93'5 was duplii cated in 1943, and its consequences showed up in July, 1947, in a dram'atic way. On Jul,y 7, 1947, the Prrugue Council oif Ministers, whose presidoot was K1lement Gottwald, unanimously aJOCepted the hwitation to the confereI11ce in Paris, where Czecho-Sl'Ovakia was to join the Marshall Plan. Not a single minister voted against it. On Jruly 9th, Gottwald, Jan Masaryk, and Drt1na flew to Moscow. There the representatirves of s01vereign and independent Repulb1ic of Czecllo-Sloviak:ia were ordered by Stalin to annul their unanimous decision. and tell Paris that the Ozecho-Slov;aJk RepuibHc would not join in the · Marshall Plan. Behold the crude Soviet mterventi:on in the internal affairs of a state to which the :S oviets had guaranteed SOIV·· ereignty and independence, in two treaties. And the Czech delegation, of which Gottwald was the only Communist, unanimously accepted Stalin's dictate in Moscow! Gottwald, just as Masaryk, telephoned several tirmes from Moocow to Prague to have the Coun.cil @f Miniisters convene and unanimous!~ "ruccept" Stalin's order. It must be stressed that at this time the Council of Ministers was presided over by Dr. Peter Zenkl, the first Vice-Premier of the government and presently the chairman of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" of Washington, D. C. Capitulation! 1 �4-6 SLOVAKIA The small nation of the. Finns and Tito did not capitulate before the dictates of Moscow. The Czechs C8l{)itulated and t:hey themselves, headed by Benes, Ma.saryk, Zen!kl and Rilpka, voluntariJy went over into the Soviet camp. That is their handiiwork and, hence, they t:hemselrves are responsibie fo1.' it. And it is their ulllpardOO!aJble sin that into their caJmp they also dvrugged the S}QIV'a;ks who never a.greed with the Sovietophile po:lilcy of Benes, Mla.saryik, Zen!ki and Ripka. The Slo:vaks from the very beginning warned the Czechs that they were on the wrong road when they fraternized with Communi'sti:c Moscow. A. J. Janda·cek wrote the truth in his boOlk•l et ''Behind the Iron Curtain'' (Chicago·, 1948) , when he said: "Everything that happened in Prague in February, 1948, was only the result and climax of all former provisions of the Czech government in London." To this I might add, that it was the result of the decisions oif not onJy the London government, but also that government in Prrugue, which, after 1945, rupproved all decrees and accepted all legal motions which the Communists placed before it and the Parliament. Not once did the anti-Communist majority in Parliament reject Communistic bills. Thus, in a,n altogether legal manner, the ground was prepared for Communism in Czecho-Slovakia. Under those laws, serving only Communism, we find the signatures of Zenkl, Ripka and the rest of the Communist collaborators. All these gentlemen thought that they could flirt with Communism to build in Central Europe some kind of greater Czech power, greater than it really was. We s•a w how without ptllblic protest the whole Czech government caipituJl:ated to the dictates of Stalin. It reversed itself completely on the Marshahl Plan. The goverD!ID.ent newspa.pers - which a few days 'befOTe had ,prruised the Marshall Plan and the acwantages of entering into it - now began a heaiviy bomlbardment against America and the Marshall Plan. Now, let us see what was happening in Slcwakiia aJt that same time. Ripka says tJhat President Benes in the summer oif 1947 went to Slwakia for a rest. He went to Toporcia.niky which lies some 2 kilometers from the capital city of Slova:kia , �SLOVAKIA 47 Bratislava. At the Topof,cian:ky castle, for six years (19391944), the president of Slorvaikia, Dr. Joseph Tiso, used to spend his summers. It was the summer holffie df the same Dr. Tiso who was hanged in Bratisilava on Aprii 18, 1947, after Benes refused to grant clemency. Most decent peoiple thought it was tactiless on the part oif Benes to go to Slovakia in 1947. Benes, it seems, with his presence in sorrowing SlOIV'akia wanted to boast of his triumph over Tiso, just as a year before he had done in Bohemia with the former president of Ozecho-Slovaikia, Dr. ffimfil Ha;cha. The Slovak s always lwke to welcome guests. In Slovakia there is a motto: a guest in the home - God in the home. Well, in the case of Benes, this motto did not holld. The Slovaks bitte:rly s:uifd'ered the presence of Benes in their land, in their own home. They de1uged Benes with letters, anonymous and signed, ~n which they called him tlhe heartless mwrderer .o f Dr. T~so, and the greatest enemy oif the Slovaks, predicting for him a most shameful end within a year. In his memoirs RJiipka admits that Benes did not feel physicaJ1y w~ll in Slovrukia. Within a few daJYiS he was threatened with an atta~k of paralysis (aipoplexy). The Slorvaiks loolked upon these re[>Orts with satisifa:cition, seeing ilil them the fJniger of God. As soon as, Benes le:ft .Sloviakia a mass political perseoution olf S'IO!Vaik paitriots began in that hapless countey. The Communists were seeking to gain their ends, while the Ozechs, on the oither hand, their OiWil aims. But their common goal was: to master Slovakia and break her resistance. 1 Both the Communists and the Benes Oze~hs wanrted to frighten the Slava!k'S who had on the who,l e remained tr:ue to the idea of the Slovaik State. The Slorv ~s were forced to live together with the Czechs in a common state against their will from 1945, the State they had parted with on March 14, 1939. It is known that the Communists were more tactfruJ. with the S1oivaJk national question. They admitted th.tat a nation that on.ce had its own State would never re~ nounce it wilfwlly. Ripka recalls correctly that when Ben~ returned from Moscow in 1944, he told his intilmates in London of the possibility of establishing an independent SlovaJk �48 SLOVAKIA State. That was at a time when Moscow, in the agreement of 1943, solemnly recognized Ozecho-Slovaikia, resipected the integrity of her territory, nay, even recognized Benes as the "president" of the "new" Czecho.,SlovaJkia. ·.1n Mosicow, Benes was given to understand that a S1oviak Repulblic was not only possilble, but also quite a~ceiptaible to Stalin. 1 Of course, the Communists at that time (1944) ~pected the Slovaik president, Dr. Jo£qph Tiso, to go to Moscow, or to send his plenipotentiary, to negotiate the possi.bility of saving the SlovaJk Repuiblic under a Communistic disguise. Dr. Tiso, however, refused to go to Mosicow, whilE Benes aJlld the ruJers of Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria did go. With Dr. Tiso a ,principle was at stake. With the others only tact. But one cannot malke tad out of principle. It never pays. And nothing permanent or valU'aJble can be attained by surrendering prindples. It was not oruy Dr. Tiso, but all the SlovaJks loyal to him, who refused to go along with the Slova;k CO!mlffiunists or the Commumsts of Moscow. In the elections of 1946, the SlQ!VaJks voted over 70 per cent against Communism and, this, clearly made it known that they did not want to coUa:borate with Communism under any ciroumstainces. The SloiVa;ks pr01Ved in practice their loyalty to the principles exipressed by Stur, Palarik, Stefanik, Hlinika, Tiso and otfue:r rpolitical representatiives of the Slovak nation. This wa:s a pra'CticaJl demonstration of the high political consciousness of the Slovaks, the basis of which was a clean and practical Christianity. Ripka knows well that the Czechs were not i!J:nlbued with any such consciousness. In Bohemia not only Czech workers, but even Czech peasants voted for Communism. What is mo:re, even Kral'ovske VinOihrady, where the wealthiest groups of Ozech boungeoisie resided, voted for Communism. The rich Czechs wanted to save their wealth, their 'b anks and factories, just as Czech wonkers wanted to save their work and the Czech faI'Illers their lands. In Slovakia, however, the fight against Comrnunism was waged on an. ideological basis of clean national traditioo. �SLOVAKIA 49 and of adherence to the Catholic Church. It thus happened that the Communists and Ozeich centralists had to come to grips with a spiritual power such as CatholiciSlm. R~pka wrote that "the Communists, favoring Slovak nationalism, were, not successful in paralyzing the influence of Slovak Catho&cism, which is not only nationalistic, but also passionately anti-Communist." We might add that even the Ozech centralists could not paralyze the influeD1Ce of Catholic-ism on publilc affairs in Slorvaldia. At that time, Riipka mentions in his memoirs, he, Zenkl, the Stra.nskys, father and son, and Drtina came together at Karls1bad. They worked out a plan to haive the Slovak Democrati~ Party - representing aver 60 per cent of the anti-Communist voters olf Slorva.kia - "ta;ke the initiative to rid itsellf olf 'undesirable' elements in its rrunk,~." The Communists were for the plan 100 per cent; not only with words, burt with deeds as wel!l. The Minister of Interior in Bratislava was a certain General Nicholas Ferjenci!k, a man without prindple and a willing exeouito.r of CommUJnistic orders. On Octo!ber 6, 1947, this Ferjenrcik broadcast that his o:5fice had tmcOIVered a plot against the Reipulblic and had already arrested 380 young memlbers of the ,S lovak anti..icentralistic and anti-Communistic intelligentsia. He accused them, as Rijpka states, "of colla:b orating with emigrants who were in foreign lands under the leadershtp of Sidor and :Our- cansky." Immediately the State representatives at Bratislaiva demanded the Prague parLiament to. deprive of immunity two Slovak Catholic gentlemen, deputies and general secretaries of the Slorvak Democratic Party, Dr. Mi<los Bugar and Dr. Jan Kempny, who were, it was chavged, connected with the "plot against the Reipulblic" Rtpka himself confirms that this was all a Communist inrvention. The offidals were not concerned with punishing ou1prits, because there were none. But they did want to terrorize the anti-COimimunistic elements in Sloiviakia, which meant pra-ctically the whole pOipulation of SlovaJkia. And, in this case, a shameful thing happened. Within the SlovaJk Democratic Party and within the Czech Government parties the Red colla!borators began their shady work. �50 SLOVAKIA They demanded Bugar and Kempny be deprived of immunity. These two deputies, mind you, belonged to the largest anti-Comnn,tmist party in. Sl01Vakia tha,t was represented in the Prague Government by Jan Ursiny, Vice-Premier of the Government, Dr. liV'an Pietor, Minister of Railroads, Dr. N. Franetk, Minilster of Unification, and Jan Lic'lmer, State UndersecTetary in the Ministry of National Defense. And in 194 7 the Prague Parliament had an absolute majority of non-Communist deputies. Something that should not have ha.'Ppened dild haq>pen. The Prague Government decided to sur.re:nder both Slo,vak deputies,. and immediately thereafter Parliament deprived both the general secretaries of a Government party in Slovalkia of their deputorial immunity. Dr. Bwgar and Dr. Kempny had to sit in jail, while Dr: Joseph Lettri'ch, president af the Democratic Party, !kept on sitting in the chairman's seat of the Slovak Naition,a;l Council in Bratislava and the other ministers remained sitting in their ministerial chairs in Prague. In the history af parliamentarism this is probably the only case of its kind. It was possible only bec8.lllse none of the people in the Government of Prague and Bratislava had enough co.ura:ge and p&sonal integrity to fight the Commtmists. A1l tihe SlO'V'ak and Czech people in Goive:rmnent were willing to make any and aill compromi<ses, treaties ano concessions, as long as they could pay for them with the freedOIIn and Sltlffering oif others. The case of Bu,gar and Kemipny presented the occasion to begin a .g reat offensive against the extortions af the Communists in the OzechoSlovaik Republic. The Slova!ks, as one man, todk the lead, in this ba,ttle, bec8.lllse here the principle af freedom was· at stake and the freedom of two af their sons was threatened. But they were hopelessly overpowered by the Reds and the Benes Czechs. True it is tha:t Benes, Riipka and others of their kind were of the opinion that onJy the western powers were supiposed to oppose the Communists and to stem the tide of Communism. Benes, Riiipka, and others of their political entourage, thought that their yielding, duplicity, nay, even their hostility toward their two co-workers, Dr. Bugar and Dr. Kempny, was appealing to the Soviets. And such was �SLOVAKIA 51 the case. A great opportunity to sihow up the Reds was lost in the case of Bugar aind Kempny. It meant that the first fight on internal policy was lost, and that only shortly after Pra:gue also lost its first battle on foreign policy by olbeying Stalin and refusing to join in the Ma.I1S:hall P}an. Let us not forget that all this was done with the assent of Dr. Benes. Even here he · had his own "plan," and according t,o it he direct.ed especially the Czech National Socialists. We must rememb.er that Dr. Benes was a deputy and vice-president of the Czech National Soc,ialist Part.y from 1920 to 193'5, and that he financed it generously out of the State treasury. Benes needed that party as a means to gain his ends. He wanted first of all the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then, af:ter T. G. Masaryk, the office of -p resident. Then, when he noticed that the pallty hindered him in attaimng his ends, he easily renounced it. And so it was that in 1926 the party of the Ozetch National Socialists went into opposition to the Government rund its deputy, Dr. Edward Benes, was supposed to follow it. But he preferred to .r esign his mandate of deputy so that he cowd remain in the goivernment as an "impartial" (non...politi'cal) Minister of Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, the C.oo<!h National Socialists always regarded Benes as their man - their leader. Little wonder, then, that the Czech National Socialist ministers went to President Benes for adMce during the crisis that broke out in the Government between the Communists and the non-Communists in 194-8. Without Benes's assent nothmg was underta.ken, and Benes assured his followers that he Wa!S bacikinig them, that he would not desert them as he did in 1926. That was sUipposed to mean that he wowd not use them as tools to hold his position, but that he wowd stay with them to the end in the fight against the Communists in government, rugainst Gottwald's faction. In the moo:nitime. the Comunists sought to strengthen their positions, the key positions in the government which Benes had given them. In 1947 the Communists held these positions in the Pra;gue Government: Klement Gottwald, Premier; Viliam Siroky, Vi:ce~~ e r ; Vaclav Nosek, Min- �1i2 SLOVAKIA ister of Interior; Ja.romil Dolansky, Minister of Finance; Vaclav Kopecky, Minister of Infomnation; Ant.on Zmrhal, Minister of Internal 00immerce; Zdenek Nejedly, Minister of Labor and Social Welfare; Julius Duris, Minister of Agriculture; Vlado Clementis, StiaJte Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. All these Corrununist ministers did what was in the interest of their Party. And this jolb they did loyally and thoroughly. The Minister of the Interior, Nosek, purged the leadership of the Deipartment oif National Security in Bohemia of all non-Co1rmmmist eilements. He had eight regional commanders of the polrce tra..."'lsferred and fiUed their places with eight reliallJle Communists. The non-Communist ministers had a pretext to attack. This was one of the most foolish quarrels thiat ever took pla:ce. But President Benes rupproved it and was happy that the Communists occasioned it. The time to stir Uip the masses in Slovaikia and the whole Reipulblic, as weH a,s for rousing the sincere anger of the people, was when the Corrumunists demanded the arrest of the two SlovaJk deputies, Dr. Bugar and Dr. Kempny. But this opportunity was not used by Benes and his followers. Why should i.t be? Noithing b:uit the freedom and the lives of two Slo:viak Catholic deputies was ait stake ! Benes, Riipka, Zelllkl and company figured that they could better move the masses by starting a fight O!Ver such a great affair as No~ transferring eight po1icemen in Prague and supplanting them witih eight others. The police affair could not enthuse the Slav'c!Jkis and mll!c:h less the Czechs, who never were fighters. Besides the Czechs are educated by their witty journalist P. Haivlicek to hate and ridicule the police. But Benes, Zookl, Ri:pika and others, who did not go a:mong the peo,ple, but made politics in offices and editorial rooms, wanted to rescue eight poHcemen on account of whom a "graJve goveirrnmenual crisis" was initiated. On Felbruary 13, 1948, Zelllkl and other non-Communist ministers demanded that Nosek rescind his order. The Communists answered that the matter belOil!ged to the Ministry of Interior, and Nosek would rescind nothing. Every minister performs his office and does th,i ngs as he noiws best. The �SLOVAKIA 53 government can caiH a minister to answer for his office, but in this case Premier Gottwald would not do that. Gottwald agreed completely with Nosek and would not disavow anything the Minister of t:Jhe futerior had approved. The nonCommunist ministers considered for a few days whether they should or shou;ld not resign. They told Nosek that they would not a,ttend any meetings of the GOfVernment or the National Front as long as Noselk would not rescind his order. On February 18th, Ripka and Zenk.I again hurried to Rresident Benes, who. approved of their taJctics and encouraged them to peraevere. He advised them to resign and so force the Commurusts to yield. Again and again :he asS1Ned them that he would stand by them "no, matter what happens!'' Fiil!ally, on Felbruacy 20, 1948, three parties - the Ozech Nationa,l Socialists, Sramek's Czech People's Party, and the S1ovruk Democrats - reca:Ued their ministers from the Government. Before resigning, Zenkl, as chairman of the National Socialist Party, telephoned President Benes and as Ripka himself tells it - Benes said over the telephone : "Finally! And now 'b e careful! No false moves!" Benes aiso peTsonally assured the resigning ministers that they acted co:rirectly when they resigned. He stated emphatically that he would not aC'Capt their resignations and so force the Comttnunists to yield. J,f there was any one who did not belieive in the strength and persona.:l honesty of Be,. nes, that person was the leader of the Czech Populists, Msgr. Sramelk. A. J. Janda:ceik in his booklet "Behind the !Ton Curtain" writes (ipg. 29): "Verry fow people, however, knew President Benes as well as Msgr. Sramek did. He knew how Benes conducted himself during the Munich crisis and 1kne,w some of his irresolute and 01Verly philosqphk views. That is why he expressed the fear at the time: whether too m1.11ch responsibility WalS not •b eing placed on the President, whether it was wise to put all the burden on the shoulders of one man. In his judgment Sramek went so far as to express a grave fear whether the President - with regard to his health would not aJotually disappoint in this decisive moment and �54 SLOVAKIA whether his nerves woulrl last to oppose the hard and well considered plans olf the Communists. Dr. Peter Zenkl, however, was so satisfied with the president's conduct that he dispelled Srarrnek's fears aJt least partially." In a word, it was known that Benes could not withstand the ordeal, as he could not even in 193'8 in Mund.ch. It was known that Benes's assurances had to be taken with great reserve - on the baisis of past experiences. Burt: why, then, did the tiwe1ve ministers ha,nd in their resignations, when Benes was not supposed to accept them and when with their resignation he was suwosed to peinform some sort of magic before the eyes of the Communists? Such utter silliness was SlllPposed to frighten the Communists and maike them concede, when they ha,d the masses on the move and headed in one direction in the Prwgue "of Benes" - the Prague that was ail Solkol and true to democracy?! The Communists used St.ate funds to call a rally of workers and farmers from the whole Republic to Pragqe. They commanded the streets of Prague. They already had the police safely in their hands since 1945, and General Ludo vik Sloboda, whom Benes named Minister ·of National Defense, promised to have the entire army ready if Gottwald should need it. Into the situation, directly from Moscow, flew Valerian A!exandroviic Zorin, Soviet deputy minister of Foreign Mfuirs and fo:mner Soviet aanibassador in Kosi.ce and, then, in Prrugue. Against these enthusiastic Communist masses that filled the streets of Prague and against· Zorin, who represented the whole diploma:tic and military might of the Soviet Union, Dr. Edward Benes stood alone. Behind him were the twe1ve ministers shaking with fear - the ministers who real1y did not want to resign, but wanted to stay on as .rninistem and in the Government, that is to say, to eogoveI1I1 with the Carrurruunists. That really was a scene for a puppet theatre! SraimeJk, as a good soothsayer, kept on cautioning that Be:nes would not hold up, that Benes was capiturlating even as he had capitulated in the fall of 193·8 to Ado1ph Hitler. And so it happened. Goittwa:ld and Nosek visited Benes two or three times to tallk things over. These were in~ �SLOVAKIA 55 teresting coowersiations. "The president," writes A. J. Janda.eek, "ordered liistening deivices be placed in the room in which Benes conferred with the Communists. President Benes at that moment did not \know that a:ll his conversations and telephone calls were followed and heard 'by a system whi:ch already was rigged up by the Communist police without Benes's knoiwledige." Borth negotiarting parties tried to ,b eat each other in being cralfty. But the Communists were always a step ahead of Benes. Mteir Go.ttwa1d and Nosek left Benes, he was vdsited by two Nat:ionai Socialist ministers, Riipka and Stran. sky: This was Benes's l1ast conive1:1sation with these two ministers. Ripka noted the folloiwing as coming out of that conversation: Benes 'began the colllVersation with an energetic cry: "I shall not give in! I said openly and clearly to Gottwald: 'You are preparing to overthrow the St.ate, for a putsch, but I shall not let myseH be terrorized : by you'!" And then Benes told them the ·contents of his Wk with Premier Gottwald. I (Ripka) tQlld hd,m without mincing words: "That which you are preparing is another Munkh." The President's face grew serious. He said to us: "You .Jroow the Communists. You know that they do not hesitate to use any means to real±ze their pla:ns. We must be ·prepared for anything." There were reports, which I persona:hly _did not believe, that is that Russia was going to at~ck us. I told the President that I thought Russia would ,be S'atisfied to extend political help to our Corrm:i.un~sts, 'but that _w ith regard to the internatio.n•a l comp1ications that ' might result - Russia would not decide on a single military intemrention. The president listened with great attention. Then · he said to me literally: "I agree with you. I also think that way; Moscow will not take a risk -that would mean · military intenvention. Nevertheless, I .cannot -exclude the possi.ibility that the Soviet av.my would cross our · ,'bo:rders and then what would we do?" 1 �56 SLOVAKIA "What would we do?" - repeated the president, looking at me and then at Stransky, "Yes, what would you do?" I answered that in such a case we would be occupied and defeated. But the nation and the whole world would see that we suC'Cumlbed to violence. It would be known that the COiIDmunist regime was forced upon us, that Ozecho.,Slwakia was a victim of an attack, agruinst which she could not defend herself. This defeat woud carry us to a new victory. A moment of silence intet,vened. Then the president 1begain to say: "Maybe," - he said - '~but that is not cerbain. Nolbody will helip us. Moscow knows tha:t." Then with growing feeling, raising his voice, Benes said: "I know them well, those peo,ple frO!lll MOS'COw. I had a chanice to know them more iintimaitely than you have known them. You overrate their intel1igence and their foresight. Even I committed the same mistalke. They do not U!Ilderstand the other states ait a!H. They thinlk they are realists. But, in fact, they are only fain.a.tics. Their whole policy is nothi,IJJg else but one of provoki.n!g war. But with them everything will end up as it did wlith Hitler." Stransky who never heard the president speak so, cried out: "And you tell us that? You who have done more than any!body else on earth to bring albout colla1boraition with Soviet Russia?" ,B enes smiled sadly and said: "I repeat what I have already told you: I shall not yield! You may rest assured on that!" With tha,t sentence our last carwersation with president Benes ended. None orf us ait that moment could know that we shall never again see him. So wrote Ripka albout his last conversation with Benes. The coniversation tells us that Benes knew the Soviet factors in Moscow and 'knew them for a long time. And, yet, he continually and without end recommended to Roosevelt and Churehill to collaborate wlith them. He demanded that the West believe Stalin. Benes dressed up the lies of Soviet �SLOVAKIA 57 propaganda in a gartb of truth and thus, presented them to the uninfoI1II1ed West. That is how Benes sinned against the whole Christian world. He did not go unrewarded. He had to stand alone and face to face wi,t h the Soviet danger knowing that "nl()(body will helip us -- Moscow knows that." Despit,e all hlis assurances that he would not submit, that he knew the Communists well, Benes, nevertheless, did give in to the Communists. He capitulated to Clement Gottwald. He accepted the resignations of the 12 non-Communist minist,ers a-nd named the Government that Gottwald dictated! And what haJPPOOed with the 12 ministers who resigned? Espeicialiy what happened with the four ministers who belonged to, the Czech Na,tional Socia,1ist Party of Dr. :&!ward Benes? On May 6, 1948, deputies Dr. Duchacek, Dr. Krajina, Dr. StraJI1Skiy, VHim and Firt collaJborated in preparing a report on the .Alls,a{!e HoUJSe in FranikfuTt. This is what it says literally: "On the ad:temoon of Februacy 28, 1948, the National Socialist ministers assembled in the residence of Dr. Stransky. Durinig this meeting they telephoned Dr. Jina, political adviser af President Benes, and aslked him whether the President wotrld reiceiive them, as is the custom when ministers resign. Dr. Jina answered tha.t the President will not receive them and he repeated this statement when Dr. Rilpka asked a,g,a.in. Dr. Rilpka then said to Jina: "Tell Mr. President for us that he would not corner wJth the fouir ministers who during the who,l e period stood uncompromisingly behind his program. with him in full agreement. We want Dr. Benes to know just how the people who coUaiborated so closely witlh him feel rubout his not giving them an audience to e:,cplain his stand." Benes had fivst eooouraged the miru.stera to resign, then he assured them of his loyalty and persevea-ence, and, in the end, without theiir knowledge of it, had decided to accept their resignations. Then Benes did not even want to tadlk with them in parting. To keep the presidency Benes no longer needed the Czech N'aittonal Socialist Party nor its �58 S LOVAKIA four ministers. Now he needed only the Communists, because at the m01Inent they were stronge,r and in power. On February 27th Benes received the whole Gottwald gavernrment. Gottiwald said his speech, presented his ministers to Benes, and Benes replied to Gottwald's speech. By doing so, Benes accoided the recognition od' legality to the Coonmll!Ilist ministers for aH their future orders. · ..t\ifter Mlunich Benes proclaimed that he had a "plan." That w,as th~ plan by which he fled from Czecho..SlovaJkia. After cwpitulating t o Gottwald - the caipitulation that Benes himself ca'lied a "second Munich" - Benes burst into tears and said to editor Janda.eek, ,aecordin:g to 'J andacek : "Tell all the people who love democraicy to woiik in its interest and to try to validate its principles everywhere, and that eyen there, where they were for a time outraged." But did not Benes disgrace them? Did he haive to wp• prove the Communistic system? Were only othel's swppooed to work and fight for democracy, while Benes and his people were entitled to roop its advanta:ges and oo.j'Oy its privileges? After this secood capitulation Benes did not have an aerop1ane. He could not fly rubroad. He had only an automdbile. In it he left for his priv,ate residence in Sezimova U sti. He left, but only alter lie had legalired. every~ thing that the Oommumsts did and what they were still to do with the poople oif Ozecho-SfovaJlda. Benes, "the great de~ mocrat and builder," had done all that for the Communists! At the .end of his memoirs Ripk!a displayed .t he pinnacle of his cynicism. He whit~washed the Benes Czechs. They could not prevent the second Munich, even with weapons, he says, because the Soviet army would probably walk in and swbject the Czechs to untold brutalities. "After the oooupation of our country by the Soviet a11my in 1945," Ripka writes cynically, "we knew well what the Soviet army was cwpalble of!" (Il P01polo, Rome, May 15, 1949) . . Whether Ripka was in London or in Prague, until February 1948, he ·a-Iways spoke and wrote about the "liberation" ,of •Czecho,.JSlovakia a,nd the victorious Soviet . ·army; �SLOVAKIA 59 The Czechs actuaHy welcomed that amiy enthusiastically. While Benes and the Czecihs 'kept tal!kiing about "liiberation" from 1945 to 194'8, we Slovaks, on the other hand, claimed that SlovaJkia was octmipied, that the Sio:viruk State was suppressed by force and th at the Soiviet soldiers in 1M4-1946 committed the most terrible bestialities against unarmed Slovak men and women. 1 Even Czech emigrants told me to my face that Slovakia was "liberated" in 1945. But today, even Ripka confesses, rather belatedJy, that his Bohemia, too, was occupied by Red Moscow already in 1946 ! That really is unmitigated cynici,s m, coming as it does from a person who played "independent minister" from 1945 to 1948 in his occupied country and then, looving the country, would agiain - with some other kind of army of "liberation" - save not only his own country, but also our beaten and crucified . SloviaJkia. We began our remarks to Ripka's memoirs by citing the ar.gumenit of R:dbert Ingrim about the possibility of the existenice of a secret a·g rooment between. Benes, Ripka, Zenkl and Gottwa:ld. Now we read in the newspaper of the Czech National Socialist deiputy Fr.anois Klatil ("CA.IS," London, The Wa!Wi(j}c Printing Co. , issue No. 1, 1949) a note from the pen of Dr. Edward Benes a:bout the conferenJce with Gottwald on May 1'4, 194'8. In it Benes carries on a long dialogue with Gottwald aiboot wanting to resign from the presidency. Let us quote at least a few sentences from it: "The president does not want to tell the Communists to do things dififerently, since he does not want to hinder them. That is why he repeats to the Premier o!f the Government not to loOlk for any foreign influences in his action. It is only and only his personal decision. . . . The president again emphasizes that (in Sezimovo Usti) he did not receive any1body, neither did he aiSlk anyibod,y for any exiplanations or to let him kno:w his stand. Eive:rything is exclusively his own.. .. Therefore he .is g1ving the Communist PM'ty freedom of action to arr.ange things to suit its needs. The President further states that he is taLkiDJg with the Prime Minister of the government witlh complete sincerity �60 SL OV AK IA and con1Viction and he is asking him to judge what he is saying from that standpoint. He does not quarrel, nor in the end, does he want to part with t!he Prime Minister of the Governrment in a quarrel. . . . He does not want the Communists to hasve any quaITels with the President, nor the President to quarrel with the Communists, 1because it would be possi!ble to a.lbuse this. The State is so dear to the President, that he will do nothing that might harm it. . . . Prime Minister Gottwald at first replied in general terms to the President's explanation. and his initention orf abdiooting. He says that the Communists wotl'ld prefer not to have to discuss the question olf the departure of the President. He knows what moti1Ves the President has, he respects them aoo thinks that id' it is already necessary to part, that they would want to part as friends. The President answers, that he wishes the same. He said that to Smutny and hopes that they shall pa.rt as friends. He reminded even Dr. Clementi'! that he, Benes, will not undertake any action against his own State, that he will not go against the Communists and he shall not undertake any act that would be direct.e<l against the Soviet Union." That, then, is how Benes spoke to Gottwald in Sezimoivo Usti. He assured him he would do nothing against the Communists or the Soviet Union. He expressed a sincere desire to part with Got:Jtwal:d and the Communists in Governmeint as a friend. He wanted to retire and hand over everything to Gottwald and his Ozech Reds peaoofully. And he did eventually. Gottwald then saw to it th,a t Dr. Edward Benes got full pay "for life," too. Does the international anti-Com.mt.mist pU!blic think that the sa,me principles do not hold for Bene.s's close colila:borators - for Ripka, ZenJk,l , and for the many other Czechs, who fled Ozechoslovaikia after February 19~8? We must be on our g:uard. The legends olf "li'beration" and "Jiberntors" from 1948 to 1945 are well knolWil. to us and must ever be a warning not only for us Slova:ks, but a'lso for the whole civilized Christian world. � 32 SLOVAKIA DR. HUBERT RIPKA'S VERSION OF THE COMMUNliST "PUTSCH" IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA Karol Sidor Fourteen months after the Communists took over Czecho-,Slovalda, Hubert R~pka, former minister orf various resorts cxf the late Dr. Edward Benes, decided to write a series o,f articles under the head.mg of "A Prefabricated Revolution" (Une Revolution Prefabriquee) . The articles, telling what happened in Prague in February 1948, were published in several European dailies. Why Riipka waited so long to tell the world his version of what happened in Ozecho--lSlovaikia early in 1948, he does not d~V'll:lge, but it is quite obvioUIS that he wanted time to do a little healing. Rilpka's trade was journ.alism. He was the editor o:f the "Lldove Noviny" (People's News), the daily cxf · the Czech intelligentsia published in Brno, and during his six years in exile he was Minister of Propaganda - and what propaganda! - of Dr. Benes's London government-in-exile. R iipka, then, was ruble and crupafbJe of writing. The Roman daily "II POipolo" paid quite a tribute to Ripka when it began pUJblishmg his series of articles. It presented Ripka as "the only Czechoslovak democratic minister, who successfully escaped from his country after last February's putsch"! Of course, that was a bit far.fetched, because we know that ministers Zenkl, Kocvara, Stransky, Pieto.r , Prochazka, Majer and Franelk also escruped from Praigue after the Felbruary "putscih ." These collea,gues of Ripka were just a s "Czechoslovak" and "democratic" as he was himself. They all had one thing irn common with Ripka: they helped Benes sell out both the Slovaks and the Czechs to the USSR. It is quite s1gnifiicant that after sUJCh a "terrible putsch" so many Ozeoh ministers, officials and leading politicians could escape without incident or accident. Robert Ingrim -,. author cxf "After Hitler Stalin?" - wrote a:bout this phenomenal exodus in the Swiss "ViATIDRLAND" of �SLOVAKIA 33 September 25, 1948. One is led to suspect with Ingrim that so many Czech ministers, generals, politicians and thousands of Czech go.vernment officials and workers could hardly escaipe wtthout incident or accident without a "deal" with Comrade Gottwald. Any one who has read Riplta's articles must admit that Ripka was careful not to attook Gottwald or Zapotocky. What is more, Riplk a did not conrfess that he played bad politics, or that he was sorry for what he had done, or that he would never again collaiborate with Communism. On the contrary, Ripka wrote: "Today more than ever before, I cannot stop believing that a free and independent Czecho-Slovakia can exist only in Europe that is brought to balance, where the West and Russia find a proper agreement to collaborate. Even the events of February 1948 could not shake me from this conviction, which remains the basis of my whole conception of national politics." - ("Fi,garo., " Paris, April 4, 1949). Stanisl•aN Mikolaj,czylk, Nagy Ferencz, and other refugees frOIID 'beyO!Ild the Lron Cm·tain wrote in a different tone. They corufessed that they were mistaiken in thinking they could negotiate a decent agreement with Soviet Russia. But Riipka stated pulblicly, even arrter the so...;called February "putsch," that he shall persist in his error, and his articles only corufirm the fact that in the "new" CzechoSloivaikia which Ripka would build - he would again cultivate contacts with the Communist USSR just as enthusiastically and loyally as does Antonin Zapotocky today in the name of Czecho-Slovakia. R~pka is lo•a th to admit that politically he is bankrupt. He keeps on talking aJbout a "new agreement" between the West and Russia meaning Czecho..Sl01Vakia when he sarys "West." In fact, w:hat he told us in his articles was equivalent to saying that ne and his "Czechoslovak democratic" colleagues would even now be collaborating with the Communists and Stalin's stooge in Czech-Slovakia, if they would have been allowed to keep their ministries. But in Washington, Ripka, Zenkl and the other soc_alled ·"OzechoslovaJk democrats" - now organized in tihe �34 SLOVAKIA "Council oif Free OzechoSilwakia" - talk aJbout their fight against Communism. Wihat kind of fight agaill'st Comm'll.Ilism? As far as is kno:wn there was no fight against Communism in Czeteho-1Sloivaikia as a whole, but only in Slovakia. Deception, appea:sement, crupitulation, and shameful mght mto other ilands can hardliy be called a "fight against Communism"! The mass "escape" oif Ozech Sociialists was undoulbtedly arranged and assured in advance, and the socalled "OzoohoslovaJk dernoorats" did not esc~ emptyhanded either. What can be tni.rthlfully said about the: fight of the Ozech emigration against Communism? Only this: We are still patiently waiting for it to start! It aippea,rs to us that Czech emigrants - both the right and left wings - are agreed on only one thing: to carry on their fight against Slovak emigrants and refugees whom they have termed "separatists." They vilify them before the Red Cross, the U. S. oocwpation forces and their allies, and the U. S. State Department. The Slovaiks, aocording to them, simply are no good; they are Hitlerites, Fascists, Nazis and, worst of all, "separatists." Aocording to Rilpka, Zenkl, Lebtrich and other "has.beens" of Dr. IDdward Benes's bankrl.llpt political ikd.ngdom, the Slovaks hiwe no right to freedom and independence, no right to an indeipendent po~mcal state. To the "Czechoslovak democrats" the fight against Slovak freedom and independence means more than the fight against Communism. T. G. Masaryk and Benes fooled the world in 1918. Benes did it again in 1945. And their disciples are dete:rmined to continue the propagation of the fraud that was "Czechoslovaik democracy.'' Ripka, Zenikl and their followers are not fighting Communism. The ra'llks oif Ozech emigrants are fiull or' agents of the Ozeich secret police and spies of the Communist Party. More Czech emigrants "escaped" back home than all'y other class of emigrants. That is not suITTprising to any one who really knows the Benes Czechs. There was veriy little difference between Benes's "Czechoslovak democracy" and Communism. The former was in fact a handmaid of the �SLOVAKIA 35 latter. Benes and his "Czechoslovaks" could not suffer political opposition ~ more than the Reds or the Nazis. Loolk at their rewrds: they tell us tihat these queer "democrats" ipla,y ed a'long with Communism and actively collaborated with Communists for many yea,rs. Ripka enthusiastically welcomed the c0Ua.1boration and eternal frien<lshlp between Soviet Russia and Czecho...slovalkia in 1935 (Vd. his article in "Zahranicni politilka," Pra)gue, 1935,pgs. 14-l7). At that tilme Riipka wrote that the Ozechs wanted to 'b e "not only mediators between the old West and the new East, but also factors, actively cocreating a synthesis of lasting values of the old European civilization and the new civilization being born in the Soviet Union." Ten years later - in 19415 - the Benes Ozechs really got the chance to play the role of "factorris." They were given the opporturuty "to aictilvely cocreaite a synthesis" between Russia and Czec'ho~Slovakia. Just how suocessful they were in this, we shall see later when we anal~ Ripka's articles. But let us say at the outset: in Central Europe it was only the BENES CZECHS who actually want.ed to collaborate with the Communists! In Ma~, 194'5, when the Soviet a:ranies rolled into Prague, it was only the Ozechs cxf all the peoples of Central Eurorpe who welcomed them with oipen joy and enthusiasm a'S the "armies o,f lilbeTation." In the first Ozech post-wa,r government, Clement Gottwald, chairnnran of the Czech Communist party was named Vice-iPrennier am.d, after the parliamentary elections in 1946, as Premier of the government in Prague by "!president" Benes. At that time no;where did the Communists in a parliamentary election receive so many votes as they did in Bohemia a!Ild MoraJVia; in Slovaikia they were beaten dedsive1y by the SlovaJk electorate. 1 Such was the political line of Benes and his followers. In Prwgue the Cotmmunists, a;nd not Benes and Ripka, 1becrume the "factors." And the Communists lost no time in creating Rilpka's "synthesis" of 1935 between the "old West" and the "new East." Benes and Ripka had prepared for this synthesis already since 1935 and were beaming �SLOVAKIA 36 with joy because the whole world was astounded by · their political recltlessness. Collaib,oration with the Communists in internal politics had begll!Il in 193'5 when Benes needed the votes orf the COimmunist Party · to be elected president. The C.omimunisits promised to vote fOl" Benes on the condition that Gottwald, Kopecky and Stetka, whose political mandates the Court of Election of Czecho-Slovakia would not verify and approve, would be approved as members of the Prague parliament. Benes promised to do that little thing and so enaJbled three Communists to become members of par1i'a,ment in 1935. 'Dhe Communists voted for Benes and later proved their sympathy for him by voting for the presildential budget every ye·a r. The Communists were for everything that •~President" Benes himself asked for in the budget, but either refrained from voting or voted against all other items of the State budget. 1 When Benes resigned as ,president of CzechO-iSlovakia in June, 1948 - the second time within a decade - the Communists voted him full presidential rpay for life and mrugnanimously gruve him the Limy Castle and the properties belonging to it. In a word, Benes and Ripka did collruborate with the Communists for many years. That collaboration did not cease because orf ideological reasons, but only because the Communists in February, 1948, told their collaborators what amounted to: "We thank you with communistic sincerity for your collab.o ration O!f many years with us. You can go now; we do not need you any mo:re. You can even go alb road if you wish; at hQlme you are useless to us, and id' you go abroad we shall not fear you." "The Czechoslovak people" - said Hubert Riplka in his article in the "IL POPOLO" ( 4--30-49) - "with singular joy welcomed the first allied treaty with Russia in 1935." In the first place, no "Czechoslovak" people exists, ethnJ1cally 51peruking. But there are Czechs a!lld Slovaks. There are two nations - the Czech and the Slovak - who do ~ t to all phenomena aocording to their training and traditions. And so it was with the treaty of Benes with Stalin in 193'5: the Czechs reacted one way, while the Slovruks reacted altogether differently. The ~ h s reacted "with singular �SLOVAKIA 37 joy;" they welcomed that treaty, because they thought just as Ripka himself had thought in 1935 - that together they would be able to form a synthesis of the "old" European ciiv:i lization and the "new" civilization which was being born in the Soviet Union. Soviet ci'Vilization was not brought to Europe by Ripka; but by the soldiers of the Soviet armies. The nations of the "old" ciivilization felt the sting of this "new" civilization on their bodies. And they shall continue to feel it as long as they do not :wcept it 100 per cent by discarding the "old" civilization which was founded on Christianity and is almost 2000 yea:rs oJd. Personally, Ri;pka was terrified by Soviet . "'Ciivi.lilzation" in praclice. He did not remain in C?.echo-Slovakia to take part in the creation of the "synthesis," but fled far beyond her borders. Yes, as far a:s he could go Jrorn this "new" civilization which in 1935, he praised highly and recommended so zealously not only to the Czech peoiple, but to the whole world as well. Why did Ripka do that? Did he not ,know what was happemng in the S()IViet Union? From 191,8 to 1935 there were aJbout 100,000 Rlussians, Ukranian and White Russian emrl.grants in OzechoJS[,()IValkia. They had fled from the Soviet Union and told the Czechs what they saw aind e~rienced in Soviet Rlussia. 'Ilhe Benes Oze.chs, however, did not ~Ii.eve those eye-<Witneses. 'Ilhe Czechs were blinded by their old lave for the "Sl01Vanic Ea:st" and thought that Communism of the 1935 vintage was no longer the Communism of 1917. They forgot tllat Communism, as a doctrine and a system of government, is one and the saime for all peoples aJild all times. It does not relate only to the Russian Ozars, but to all n0;tions of the earth and to aH states. The substance of CommuniSIIll is not sulbject to the ohangeis of time. Ripka evidently met with real Communist civilization only in 194'8, in Prague, when it too:k aiway his ministry. He fled before it, we are sruq:~posed to believe, to saive his life. And yet 1n 1949 he wrote that he still believed in colla.borating with the UISSR. so Ripka, too, was a product of Czech na:tiona:l development, whlch was a1ways directed to the left. The Czedhs �38 ::,LOVAKIA made Jan Hus (1'370~141'5) the symlbol of their rebellion aigainst Rome. '.Dhey grolllped ooder his banner and always emphasized more and more the negati~stic ·elements of Hus' character, suppressing all his positive qualities. As a result large grOUfPS of the Ozech nation, matriculated as Catholics at baptism, got themselves. in the periphery of world Christianity, their roots of solidarity w~th the Ohristian civilization of the west dried Ulp in tilme and the Ozech masses aH the more readily joined the "111ew" civiHzation which Ripka said was being born in the Soviet Union. Thrs ideological development of the Czechs to the left explains why in 193'5 the Czechs welcomed a treaty with Moscow and why in 1946 in the parliamentary elections in Ozetcho-1Slovakia the international and atheistic Oommunist Party came out on top in Bohemia and Morrruvia. But the Ozechs were accustomed to belonging to laiI'!ge economiic and politkal units. Their outstanding historian, Francis Palacky, wrote to the FrMllkfurt Assemlbly in 1848: "The preservation of Austria, its integrity and cOl11SOlidation, is and must be a great and important th!ing not only to the Czech nation, but also to the whole, olf IDurope, nay, to all humanity and cultU'l"e." That same Palaciky is the author of the staitement: "H Austria did not exist, we would have to create it." Dr. Edward Benes shared similar ideas. In his bodk, "Le Problem Autrichien et la QuestiO!ll Tcheque" (pg. 307) ·b e wrote in 1908: "Frequently we bear talk about the collapse of Austria. I absolutely do not believe it. The historical and economic ties that mutually unite the 1181tions of Austria are too strong to allow Austria to collapse.'' This was written at a time when the Czechs were becomilllg a nation of oifificia.ils and directors, administering not only in Bohemia, Morruvia and Silesia, but even in Galicia, a signdficant part of Vienna and later even in Bosnta and Hercegcwina. True, this was all under the supernsion of Vienna and ac:corddng to her laws. During the first World War T. G. Masar,yik and Edward Benes came upon the idea of making the Czech nation independent by destroying Austria-Hungary. To help them �SLOVAKIA 39 with that plan tihey SIUCCeeded in getting 1,'500,000 Slovaks to whom T. G. Masaryk had solemruy promised in Pittsburgh, Pa., on May 30, 1918, that Slovalk ia, within the framewonk af Czecho-SlovaJkia, would hiwe, arrnong other things, her own assembly, her own courts and her own ,s chools. On the 0:ther hand, Dr. Edward Benes, wJth his signature attaiched to the Peace Treaty of St. Germain Se!ptem\ber 19, 1919) , haid guaranteed the Ruthenfans territorial autonomy, a legislative a:ssemlbly, their own governor, etc. Both Masaryk and Benes la~r repudiated their solemn promises. As lonig as Masaryk and Benes · ruled Czecho,.,SloV'akia, neither the Slwaiks nor the Rut>henians were guaranteed autonomy. Nolbody 'bothered to ask the other peoples orf Czecho-SloV1aLkia - the 3,500,000 Germans, albout a miUion Magyars, SOIIIle 200,000 Po.les, etc., whether they wanted to live together with the · Czechs in the common staite of CzeohoSlorvaJkia. The frirst Constitution of 1920 was approved by the Prague parliament when that body did not have a single representative of the Germans, the Poles, Magyars and Ruthenians, and when the Slovaks were represented not by deputies elected by the Slovak people, but by deputies named by Prague, i.e., by T. G. Masaryk and Edward Benes. And that Constitution - a tyipi~al Benes creation remained tmchanged and was binding U!pon every citizen of Czeicho..iSllovaikia until N oivemlbe~, 193-8. It is understandiaJbJe that the majority Olf nations of the ReipUJblk did not fare well in Ozecho-.Slo,vaikia. The existence of Czecho-1Slovaikia was not supPorted by the will of the majority of her mhrubitants. 'l'he Czechs themseLves knew that, and the old desire for broader economical and political spheres, whereby the life o,f the Czechs could bet.t er be safeguarded and ·p rotected, began to awaken in them. They knew that internally Czecho-Slovakia was weak and that externally she wws threatened lb y the Germans. Czech leaders, therefore, ,b egan looking to;ward the So~fot Union which emlbraces one-SQxth o1: the unilverse. They began to tell their ,people and the world that the So'Viet Union was •a Slovian:ic land, that a "new" cirvi:lization and a new ally and ( 1 �40 SLOVAKIA defender Oif the Ozech nation, especially against German aggression was being born there. This thought was strengthened by the Ozech...SOviet Treaty of 1935. The Czechrs saw before themselves the vast expansiveness Oif the Soviet cowntry which was incomparably larger and rilcher than Austria-iliungacy. Culturally and politicai11y the Russii'am,s were far ~hind the Czechs. The Czeohs dreamed that in time they might even rule the Russian roost! They thought that by collruborating with the Soviets they would sooner or later find themselves on top even if it were oruy in the sense of the old Czech and even sicikly inclination toward Panslavism - at one time the Czarist and Ortlhod-0x variety and now the Red and atheistic kind. Slovaik national development went along a completely different course. The SlOIVruks not only did not welcome the treaty with Moscow in 1935, but openly condemned it through their elected deputies, in the Prague parliament. The Slova3c naition built its spiritual world consistently on its own national tradition. That tradition was Christian. It was created with equal zeal by both the Slovak Catholics and the Slovalk Protestants. Thait S1walk tradition is the common property olf aU Slovalks, no matter what their political or religious beliefs. The Slovak Protestant L'udovit Stur (1815-1856), Slovak patriot and national philogq>her, left the Slovalk nation in his books valua/b'le sources on how to correctly orientate itself in new social and national tendencies. Stur's book "The Slavs and the World of the Future," published after his deaith, has this to sary albout the Communism of his day: ''In every instan1ee Communism means the collapse and the destruiction oif the state. Communism arrived at this aim through atheism and apostacy from Christianity. In every fornn of Communism, no matter w:hat its origin, the outlook on life is da,r,k, laicking every tender j'oy. It brings the most c:mel sJaivery. Commun,i:sm, let it striive. and pretend in any manner whatsoever that it will make all peoples share in all rights, nevertheless, knows nothing a!bout humanity; it degrades humanity and, because it holds to sys- �SLOVAKIA 41 tams that are imipractiea!l and unrealizaJble, it belongs among the most stupid innovations that harve th'llS far been created by the human mind." The Slovak Catholic priest Jan Palarik (1822-1870) wrote a dissel'ta,tion in 1:864 "Albout SlOlVanic Mutuality." In it he resolutely stands fo.r a Slorvalk Sta,te and desires to see it in a federation of staites in EurOipe. But ne:ver under the direction of Russia. Pa1arik strongly repudiated Russia,n Panslavism and ,predicted thart "the whole of Europe wouM rebel against the Slovanic peoples" if they should ever come under the rule of the Russians. The Slovak Protestant, Milan R. Stefanik (1880-1919), a General in the French Army and the first Minister of War in Czooho-lSlovaikiia, was in Rus,s,i a in 191'8..1919 and saw Communism at close range. In February, 191'9, he tele. graphed his government at Prague: "To flirt with Bolshevik tendencies would be comparable to foresaking the path of honor and sane reason. The fight against Bolshevism in all its manifestations must prevail in our politics." On such foundations, then, was, buiilt the Slovak stand against Communism. It was built on the foundations of Christianity and nationalism, and never on the foundation whi~h Mussolini amd Hitler gave to their anti-Communism. The Communists and their friends had pro~1aimed that Mus-solini and Hitler dervised anti-Communism in Europe and that the SIJ.ovaJks had taken it over from them. That does not correspond with the truth. Slovak phifosophers long before Mussolini and Hitler warned their nations not to acceipt Communistic teaJChing. In the po1itiical life w Slov-a kia the party of Msgr. Andrew Hli'Dlka consciously fortified and strengthened this SlovaJk anti-Communism in the broad masses of the Slovak nation. Anti-Communism had thus become a component part of Slovak national beliefs. That is why the pa11ty of Andrew Hllinka pmtested a,g ainst the apprwal of Benes's treaty with Stalin in 1935 when it came up for approval on the floor of the Prague Parliament. At that time Hlinika's Farly haid 30.1 per cent of all the voters in Slovakia, while the Communist Party in Sfovakia had 13 per cent, and the �42 SLOVAKIA party orf Benes and Riipka only 3.2 per cent of the total Slovia:k electorate. The Slovak stanqpoint was ideologically and rightd'uUy represented by Hlinika's Party which was the first and largest political party in Slovakia since 1925. On November 6, 1935, as a Slovak deputy I sipotk e in the IllMil.e of Hlinlka's Party on the floor of the Pra:g,ue parliament. In the presence of the Foreign Minister, Dr. Edward Benes, I said: "Alas, foreign policy under the direction m Dr. Edward Benes has deviated from the tendency that General Stefanik followed in 1919. He requested the Prag;ue government to fight against Bolsheivism in all its manifestations and warned not even to flirt w.ith Bolshe'Viik tendencies. IDven flirting with Bolshevik tend.endes he called foresaiking the road of hooor and sanity. 1n the meantime the Prague government already conoluded various rugreements with the bloody offspring o;f Bolshevism~ the Soviet Union. "The Hlinlka Slovak People's Party rejects the theory of Bolshevism, co:ndemns its bloody ipra:ctices as well as its inhuman methods, and with a very heavy heart tolerates the fact that OzeichoJSlo'Wllkia has deviated from the course that was 'Plotted b,y her co-d'ounder and first Minister of War, Ge111eral Stman:i!k. The no:mnali.!zation of diplomatic contaiots can be understood even between such st:riucturally different states as is our democrartic Ozecho-slovaJk RepubHc and the SOIVieit Union. Fimdly other states similar to ours have such diiplomatic contacts. But imrrnediatetly following the esta!blishment otf contacts, there were so many expressions of sympathy within the Ozooho.,Slo;va:k Reipublic for the Soviet Union and its system that this must fJll us who are nationally orientated in a Christian way - with fears about the future Czecho-Slovaikia. To· tie ouir destiny with the destinies of the Soviet Union, to build on agreements signed by Bolshevii.ks, I consider as the greatest bl,un. der made by our present foreign policy. "We slovak,s warn the Czechs away from the political mista!kes being committed by our Fcreign Minister, Dr. Edward Benes, because . too zealously he binds us with the Soviet Union that is so distant to us. In the interests of the �SLOVAKIA 43 State we demamd a change in the lime followed by our foreign polilcy, we demand thait the defense of the State be built on a more realistic 'basi'S - one that conforms mo•r e with the mentality of the poipulation. Stating ·a ll these insufficiencies, I intvoduce them as one of tihe reasons that force us SloivaJks not to express our confidence in the present leailersh'ip of our foreign policy." Is it necessary to bring in more evidence to show that the SloviaJks were conisristently orientJated anti-Cottnlmun.istically? It proives co!D'clusively that Riipka was wrong when he said that "the Ozecho--!Slov.a!k people un:anilmously welc,ooned with joy the first allied agreement with Russia in 1935." The Ozec'hs, especialily the Sovieto,phiie Ozech intellectuals headed by R~pka, were made h~y by the treaty. The Slova!ks, however, eX1perieniced aJbsolutely no joy on that ocoasioo; nay, they aiticized and rejected the treaty and voted against it in 1936 in the Pra:gue Parliament. And this aJso attests to the fact that we are here concerned with two very different nations whose development and political convictio1J1S were altogether distin'Ct and diffe:rent. 1Riipka was rilght when he said that afiter the conclusion of a;greemnts with Moscow, in 19315 and 1943, Benes and his goveI1Il!ment exipressed "their complete confidence in the Soviet government." In return they expected the Sov.iet to return the friendshiip, confidenice and, rubove a'll, tihe assuraI1JCe that the USSR shall not intervene in our internal affairs." "That conrfidence has been betrayed" - Hulbert Ripka is screeching today. In February 1948 Moscow proceeded against democracy in Ozecho~Slovakia, ·be'Cause "it wanted to see in Pra;gue a totalitarian Communistic goivernment swbsement to. its will." So Ripka acknowledges th,at Moscow was dissaJtisfied with coHruborating in the fomnation of Riipk,a 's "synthesis." Ripka finally dis,wvered that Red Moscow wants its allies to be totaHy sulbserivierut to its dictates. But Ripka came upon this self-evident matter only in 1948, when he was thrown out of the g01VeTil!IIlent, or was at least prevented from co-governing in Prague with the Reds, and after he fled Ozecho-SlofVlakia. Before that time, however, Ripka was the man, who - act)ing like somebody in �44 SLOVAKIA the pay of Moscow - assured the Czechs and the uninformed world that reports about Moscow intervening in the internal affairs of individual states were absolutey false! Philip Panetili in his boO!k "Ed.war:d Benes, Leader of Democracy," on pgs. 123-124, notes the commentary of Dr. HUibert Ripka on the treaty of December, 1943, which Dr. Benes concluded with Moscow. "This Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty," said Riipk:a at that time, "had as its aim to strengthen the security of Europe." Ripka rejected the contention that this pact would mean the bolshevization of Euro,pe or Ozecho,Slovaikia. "The treaty," Ripka stated categorically, "gives a clear answer to all those who continue to suspect the Soviet Union of the intention of bolshevizing the countries of Central Europe that are its neighbors, nay, of intending even to annex them to the Soviet Union. The treaty gives a clear answer to all who are continuing to present Czecho-Slovakia as a tool in the hands of the Soviets. In the agr.e ement of 1943, the Soviet Union once again binds itself to respect her independence and that it shall not intervene in her internal affairs. Czecho-Slovakia binds iself in a similar fashion. By these formal ties the fact was confirmed again that the Soviet government had no intention of forcing its political regime on other nations and so much the less to annex the nations of Central Europe or any others to the Soviet framework." Whence did Dr. Ripka know these things? Was he ignorant of the fates of the Caucasian repulblics, or the painful fate oif the three Ba:ltic states, Latvia, Lithuania and Est01I1ia? Since the S01viet government acted imperlalisti:c . ally to.ward those states, why did Ri,pka think that the same thing would not aiso happen in the case of Czecho~Sl()IV3ikia? But Riipka wenlt mucli farther . He said thait the treaty which Ozeicho-SlavaJkiia conicluided with the Soviet Union not only did not weaken her S01Verdgnty and independence, but, converseJy, that 'basically it strengthened and secured them. As a real progressive, aJ.way;s wanting to instruct and teach other nations, R1pka offered thi,s instruction: "Not in distrust and in a hostile stand toward the Soviet Union, but in confidence and sincere willingness for a clean, friendly cooperation with the Soviet Union is the re- �SLOVAKIA 45 liable guarant.ee for assuring the freedom and independence of every country, namely, the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe. Every nation in this region with which the Soviet Union borders directly can be certain if it cultivates a friendship with this great power - that it certainly shall get from it help to defend its freedom and independence." Note the certainty with whioh Ripka spo!ke in 1943 about the future conduct of Moscow toward the states that trust it. What swperfJdality that was, what irresponsrbility, nay, what rookllesness oif the first degree! The years have proved that the Slovaks were right when they warned in the Piiag,ue Parliament that the union of Ozecho-,Slovakia with Moscow was "the greatest blunder ever committed by Ozecho~Slovaik foceign ,p olitics." The blunder of 1'93'5 was duplii cated in 1943, and its consequences showed up in July, 1947, in a dram'atic way. On Jul,y 7, 1947, the Prrugue Council oif Ministers, whose presidoot was K1lement Gottwald, unanimously aJOCepted the hwitation to the confereI11ce in Paris, where Czecho-Sl'Ovakia was to join the Marshall Plan. Not a single minister voted against it. On Jruly 9th, Gottwald, Jan Masaryk, and Drt1na flew to Moscow. There the representatirves of s01vereign and independent Repulb1ic of Czecllo-Sloviak:ia were ordered by Stalin to annul their unanimous decision. and tell Paris that the Ozecho-Slov;aJk RepuibHc would not join in the · Marshall Plan. Behold the crude Soviet mterventi:on in the internal affairs of a state to which the :S oviets had guaranteed SOIV·· ereignty and independence, in two treaties. And the Czech delegation, of which Gottwald was the only Communist, unanimously accepted Stalin's dictate in Moscow! Gottwald, just as Masaryk, telephoned several tirmes from Moocow to Prague to have the Coun.cil @f Miniisters convene and unanimous!~ "ruccept" Stalin's order. It must be stressed that at this time the Council of Ministers was presided over by Dr. Peter Zenkl, the first Vice-Premier of the government and presently the chairman of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" of Washington, D. C. Capitulation! 1 �4-6 SLOVAKIA The small nation of the. Finns and Tito did not capitulate before the dictates of Moscow. The Czechs C8l{)itulated and t:hey themselves, headed by Benes, Ma.saryk, Zen!kl and Rilpka, voluntariJy went over into the Soviet camp. That is their handiiwork and, hence, they t:hemselrves are responsibie fo1.' it. And it is their ulllpardOO!aJble sin that into their caJmp they also dvrugged the S}QIV'a;ks who never a.greed with the Sovietophile po:lilcy of Benes, Mla.saryik, Zen!ki and Ripka. The Slo:vaks from the very beginning warned the Czechs that they were on the wrong road when they fraternized with Communi'sti:c Moscow. A. J. Janda·cek wrote the truth in his boOlk•l et ''Behind the Iron Curtain'' (Chicago·, 1948) , when he said: "Everything that happened in Prague in February, 1948, was only the result and climax of all former provisions of the Czech government in London." To this I might add, that it was the result of the decisions oif not onJy the London government, but also that government in Prrugue, which, after 1945, rupproved all decrees and accepted all legal motions which the Communists placed before it and the Parliament. Not once did the anti-Communist majority in Parliament reject Communistic bills. Thus, in a,n altogether legal manner, the ground was prepared for Communism in Czecho-Slovakia. Under those laws, serving only Communism, we find the signatures of Zenkl, Ripka and the rest of the Communist collaborators. All these gentlemen thought that they could flirt with Communism to build in Central Europe some kind of greater Czech power, greater than it really was. We s•a w how without ptllblic protest the whole Czech government caipituJl:ated to the dictates of Stalin. It reversed itself completely on the Marshahl Plan. The goverD!ID.ent newspa.pers - which a few days 'befOTe had ,prruised the Marshall Plan and the acwantages of entering into it - now began a heaiviy bomlbardment against America and the Marshall Plan. Now, let us see what was happening in Slcwakiia aJt that same time. Ripka says tJhat President Benes in the summer oif 1947 went to Slwakia for a rest. He went to Toporcia.niky which lies some 2 kilometers from the capital city of Slova:kia , �SLOVAKIA 47 Bratislava. At the Topof,cian:ky castle, for six years (19391944), the president of Slorvaikia, Dr. Joseph Tiso, used to spend his summers. It was the summer holffie df the same Dr. Tiso who was hanged in Bratisilava on Aprii 18, 1947, after Benes refused to grant clemency. Most decent peoiple thought it was tactiless on the part oif Benes to go to Slovakia in 1947. Benes, it seems, with his presence in sorrowing SlOIV'akia wanted to boast of his triumph over Tiso, just as a year before he had done in Bohemia with the former president of Ozecho-Slovaikia, Dr. ffimfil Ha;cha. The Slovak s always lwke to welcome guests. In Slovakia there is a motto: a guest in the home - God in the home. Well, in the case of Benes, this motto did not holld. The Slovaks bitte:rly s:uifd'ered the presence of Benes in their land, in their own home. They de1uged Benes with letters, anonymous and signed, ~n which they called him tlhe heartless mwrderer .o f Dr. T~so, and the greatest enemy oif the Slovaks, predicting for him a most shameful end within a year. In his memoirs RJiipka admits that Benes did not feel physicaJ1y w~ll in Slovrukia. Within a few daJYiS he was threatened with an atta~k of paralysis (aipoplexy). The Slorvaiks loolked upon these re[>Orts with satisifa:cition, seeing ilil them the fJniger of God. As soon as, Benes le:ft .Sloviakia a mass political perseoution olf S'IO!Vaik paitriots began in that hapless countey. The Communists were seeking to gain their ends, while the Ozechs, on the oither hand, their OiWil aims. But their common goal was: to master Slovakia and break her resistance. 1 Both the Communists and the Benes Oze~hs wanrted to frighten the Slava!k'S who had on the who,l e remained tr:ue to the idea of the Slovaik State. The Slorv ~s were forced to live together with the Czechs in a common state against their will from 1945, the State they had parted with on March 14, 1939. It is known that the Communists were more tactfruJ. with the S1oivaJk national question. They admitted th.tat a nation that on.ce had its own State would never re~ nounce it wilfwlly. Ripka recalls correctly that when Ben~ returned from Moscow in 1944, he told his intilmates in London of the possibility of establishing an independent SlovaJk �48 SLOVAKIA State. That was at a time when Moscow, in the agreement of 1943, solemnly recognized Ozecho-Slovaikia, resipected the integrity of her territory, nay, even recognized Benes as the "president" of the "new" Czecho.,SlovaJkia. ·.1n Mosicow, Benes was given to understand that a S1oviak Repulblic was not only possilble, but also quite a~ceiptaible to Stalin. 1 Of course, the Communists at that time (1944) ~pected the Slovaik president, Dr. Jo£qph Tiso, to go to Moscow, or to send his plenipotentiary, to negotiate the possi.bility of saving the SlovaJk Repuiblic under a Communistic disguise. Dr. Tiso, however, refused to go to Mosicow, whilE Benes aJlld the ruJers of Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria did go. With Dr. Tiso a ,principle was at stake. With the others only tact. But one cannot malke tad out of principle. It never pays. And nothing permanent or valU'aJble can be attained by surrendering prindples. It was not oruy Dr. Tiso, but all the SlovaJks loyal to him, who refused to go along with the Slova;k CO!mlffiunists or the Commumsts of Moscow. In the elections of 1946, the SlQ!VaJks voted over 70 per cent against Communism and, this, clearly made it known that they did not want to coUa:borate with Communism under any ciroumstainces. The SloiVa;ks pr01Ved in practice their loyalty to the principles exipressed by Stur, Palarik, Stefanik, Hlinika, Tiso and otfue:r rpolitical representatiives of the Slovak nation. This wa:s a pra'CticaJl demonstration of the high political consciousness of the Slovaks, the basis of which was a clean and practical Christianity. Ripka knows well that the Czechs were not i!J:nlbued with any such consciousness. In Bohemia not only Czech workers, but even Czech peasants voted for Communism. What is mo:re, even Kral'ovske VinOihrady, where the wealthiest groups of Ozech boungeoisie resided, voted for Communism. The rich Czechs wanted to save their wealth, their 'b anks and factories, just as Czech wonkers wanted to save their work and the Czech faI'Illers their lands. In Slovakia, however, the fight against Comrnunism was waged on an. ideological basis of clean national traditioo. �SLOVAKIA 49 and of adherence to the Catholic Church. It thus happened that the Communists and Ozeich centralists had to come to grips with a spiritual power such as CatholiciSlm. R~pka wrote that "the Communists, favoring Slovak nationalism, were, not successful in paralyzing the influence of Slovak Catho&cism, which is not only nationalistic, but also passionately anti-Communist." We might add that even the Ozech centralists could not paralyze the influeD1Ce of Catholic-ism on publilc affairs in Slorvaldia. At that time, Riipka mentions in his memoirs, he, Zenkl, the Stra.nskys, father and son, and Drtina came together at Karls1bad. They worked out a plan to haive the Slovak Democrati~ Party - representing aver 60 per cent of the anti-Communist voters olf Slorva.kia - "ta;ke the initiative to rid itsellf olf 'undesirable' elements in its rrunk,~." The Communists were for the plan 100 per cent; not only with words, burt with deeds as wel!l. The Minister of Interior in Bratislava was a certain General Nicholas Ferjenci!k, a man without prindple and a willing exeouito.r of CommUJnistic orders. On Octo!ber 6, 1947, this Ferjenrcik broadcast that his o:5fice had tmcOIVered a plot against the Reipulblic and had already arrested 380 young memlbers of the ,S lovak anti..icentralistic and anti-Communistic intelligentsia. He accused them, as Rijpka states, "of colla:b orating with emigrants who were in foreign lands under the leadershtp of Sidor and :Our- cansky." Immediately the State representatives at Bratislaiva demanded the Prague parLiament to. deprive of immunity two Slovak Catholic gentlemen, deputies and general secretaries of the Slorvak Democratic Party, Dr. Mi<los Bugar and Dr. Jan Kempny, who were, it was chavged, connected with the "plot against the Reipulblic" Rtpka himself confirms that this was all a Communist inrvention. The offidals were not concerned with punishing ou1prits, because there were none. But they did want to terrorize the anti-COimimunistic elements in Sloiviakia, which meant pra-ctically the whole pOipulation of SlovaJkia. And, in this case, a shameful thing happened. Within the SlovaJk Democratic Party and within the Czech Government parties the Red colla!borators began their shady work. �50 SLOVAKIA They demanded Bugar and Kempny be deprived of immunity. These two deputies, mind you, belonged to the largest anti-Comnn,tmist party in. Sl01Vakia tha,t was represented in the Prague Government by Jan Ursiny, Vice-Premier of the Government, Dr. liV'an Pietor, Minister of Railroads, Dr. N. Franetk, Minilster of Unification, and Jan Lic'lmer, State UndersecTetary in the Ministry of National Defense. And in 194 7 the Prague Parliament had an absolute majority of non-Communist deputies. Something that should not have ha.'Ppened dild haq>pen. The Prague Government decided to sur.re:nder both Slo,vak deputies,. and immediately thereafter Parliament deprived both the general secretaries of a Government party in Slovalkia of their deputorial immunity. Dr. Bwgar and Dr. Kempny had to sit in jail, while Dr: Joseph Lettri'ch, president af the Democratic Party, !kept on sitting in the chairman's seat of the Slovak Naition,a;l Council in Bratislava and the other ministers remained sitting in their ministerial chairs in Prague. In the history af parliamentarism this is probably the only case of its kind. It was possible only bec8.lllse none of the people in the Government of Prague and Bratislava had enough co.ura:ge and p&sonal integrity to fight the Commtmists. A1l tihe SlO'V'ak and Czech people in Goive:rmnent were willing to make any and aill compromi<ses, treaties ano concessions, as long as they could pay for them with the freedOIIn and Sltlffering oif others. The case of Bu,gar and Kemipny presented the occasion to begin a .g reat offensive against the extortions af the Communists in the OzechoSlovaik Republic. The Slova!ks, as one man, todk the lead, in this ba,ttle, bec8.lllse here the principle af freedom was· at stake and the freedom of two af their sons was threatened. But they were hopelessly overpowered by the Reds and the Benes Czechs. True it is tha:t Benes, Riipka and others of their kind were of the opinion that onJy the western powers were supiposed to oppose the Communists and to stem the tide of Communism. Benes, Riiipka, and others of their political entourage, thought that their yielding, duplicity, nay, even their hostility toward their two co-workers, Dr. Bugar and Dr. Kempny, was appealing to the Soviets. And such was �SLOVAKIA 51 the case. A great opportunity to sihow up the Reds was lost in the case of Bugar aind Kempny. It meant that the first fight on internal policy was lost, and that only shortly after Pra:gue also lost its first battle on foreign policy by olbeying Stalin and refusing to join in the Ma.I1S:hall P}an. Let us not forget that all this was done with the assent of Dr. Benes. Even here he · had his own "plan," and according t,o it he direct.ed especially the Czech National Socialists. We must rememb.er that Dr. Benes was a deputy and vice-president of the Czech National Soc,ialist Part.y from 1920 to 193'5, and that he financed it generously out of the State treasury. Benes needed that party as a means to gain his ends. He wanted first of all the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then, af:ter T. G. Masaryk, the office of -p resident. Then, when he noticed that the pallty hindered him in attaimng his ends, he easily renounced it. And so it was that in 1926 the party of the Ozetch National Socialists went into opposition to the Government rund its deputy, Dr. Edward Benes, was supposed to follow it. But he preferred to .r esign his mandate of deputy so that he cowd remain in the goivernment as an "impartial" (non...politi'cal) Minister of Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, the C.oo<!h National Socialists always regarded Benes as their man - their leader. Little wonder, then, that the Czech National Socialist ministers went to President Benes for adMce during the crisis that broke out in the Government between the Communists and the non-Communists in 194-8. Without Benes's assent nothmg was underta.ken, and Benes assured his followers that he Wa!S bacikinig them, that he would not desert them as he did in 1926. That was sUipposed to mean that he wowd not use them as tools to hold his position, but that he wowd stay with them to the end in the fight against the Communists in government, rugainst Gottwald's faction. In the moo:nitime. the Comunists sought to strengthen their positions, the key positions in the government which Benes had given them. In 1947 the Communists held these positions in the Pra;gue Government: Klement Gottwald, Premier; Viliam Siroky, Vi:ce~~ e r ; Vaclav Nosek, Min- �1i2 SLOVAKIA ister of Interior; Ja.romil Dolansky, Minister of Finance; Vaclav Kopecky, Minister of Infomnation; Ant.on Zmrhal, Minister of Internal 00immerce; Zdenek Nejedly, Minister of Labor and Social Welfare; Julius Duris, Minister of Agriculture; Vlado Clementis, StiaJte Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. All these Corrununist ministers did what was in the interest of their Party. And this jolb they did loyally and thoroughly. The Minister of the Interior, Nosek, purged the leadership of the Deipartment oif National Security in Bohemia of all non-Co1rmmmist eilements. He had eight regional commanders of the polrce tra..."'lsferred and fiUed their places with eight reliallJle Communists. The non-Communist ministers had a pretext to attack. This was one of the most foolish quarrels thiat ever took pla:ce. But President Benes rupproved it and was happy that the Communists occasioned it. The time to stir Uip the masses in Slovaikia and the whole Reipulblic, as weH a,s for rousing the sincere anger of the people, was when the Corrumunists demanded the arrest of the two SlovaJk deputies, Dr. Bugar and Dr. Kempny. But this opportunity was not used by Benes and his followers. Why should i.t be? Noithing b:uit the freedom and the lives of two Slo:viak Catholic deputies was ait stake ! Benes, Riipka, Zelllkl and company figured that they could better move the masses by starting a fight O!Ver such a great affair as No~ transferring eight po1icemen in Prague and supplanting them witih eight others. The police affair could not enthuse the Slav'c!Jkis and mll!c:h less the Czechs, who never were fighters. Besides the Czechs are educated by their witty journalist P. Haivlicek to hate and ridicule the police. But Benes, Zookl, Ri:pika and others, who did not go a:mong the peo,ple, but made politics in offices and editorial rooms, wanted to rescue eight poHcemen on account of whom a "graJve goveirrnmenual crisis" was initiated. On Felbruary 13, 1948, Zelllkl and other non-Communist ministers demanded that Nosek rescind his order. The Communists answered that the matter belOil!ged to the Ministry of Interior, and Nosek would rescind nothing. Every minister performs his office and does th,i ngs as he noiws best. The �SLOVAKIA 53 government can caiH a minister to answer for his office, but in this case Premier Gottwald would not do that. Gottwald agreed completely with Nosek and would not disavow anything the Minister of t:Jhe futerior had approved. The nonCommunist ministers considered for a few days whether they should or shou;ld not resign. They told Nosek that they would not a,ttend any meetings of the GOfVernment or the National Front as long as Noselk would not rescind his order. On February 18th, Ripka and Zenk.I again hurried to Rresident Benes, who. approved of their taJctics and encouraged them to peraevere. He advised them to resign and so force the Commurusts to yield. Again and again :he asS1Ned them that he would stand by them "no, matter what happens!'' Fiil!ally, on Felbruacy 20, 1948, three parties - the Ozech Nationa,l Socialists, Sramek's Czech People's Party, and the S1ovruk Democrats - reca:Ued their ministers from the Government. Before resigning, Zenkl, as chairman of the National Socialist Party, telephoned President Benes and as Ripka himself tells it - Benes said over the telephone : "Finally! And now 'b e careful! No false moves!" Benes aiso peTsonally assured the resigning ministers that they acted co:rirectly when they resigned. He stated emphatically that he would not aC'Capt their resignations and so force the Comttnunists to yield. J,f there was any one who did not belieive in the strength and persona.:l honesty of Be,. nes, that person was the leader of the Czech Populists, Msgr. Sramelk. A. J. Janda:ceik in his booklet "Behind the !Ton Curtain" writes (ipg. 29): "Verry fow people, however, knew President Benes as well as Msgr. Sramek did. He knew how Benes conducted himself during the Munich crisis and 1kne,w some of his irresolute and 01Verly philosqphk views. That is why he expressed the fear at the time: whether too m1.11ch responsibility WalS not •b eing placed on the President, whether it was wise to put all the burden on the shoulders of one man. In his judgment Sramek went so far as to express a grave fear whether the President - with regard to his health would not aJotually disappoint in this decisive moment and �54 SLOVAKIA whether his nerves woulrl last to oppose the hard and well considered plans olf the Communists. Dr. Peter Zenkl, however, was so satisfied with the president's conduct that he dispelled Srarrnek's fears aJt least partially." In a word, it was known that Benes could not withstand the ordeal, as he could not even in 193'8 in Mund.ch. It was known that Benes's assurances had to be taken with great reserve - on the baisis of past experiences. Burt: why, then, did the tiwe1ve ministers ha,nd in their resignations, when Benes was not supposed to accept them and when with their resignation he was suwosed to peinform some sort of magic before the eyes of the Communists? Such utter silliness was SlllPposed to frighten the Communists and maike them concede, when they ha,d the masses on the move and headed in one direction in the Prwgue "of Benes" - the Prague that was ail Solkol and true to democracy?! The Communists used St.ate funds to call a rally of workers and farmers from the whole Republic to Pragqe. They commanded the streets of Prague. They already had the police safely in their hands since 1945, and General Ludo vik Sloboda, whom Benes named Minister ·of National Defense, promised to have the entire army ready if Gottwald should need it. Into the situation, directly from Moscow, flew Valerian A!exandroviic Zorin, Soviet deputy minister of Foreign Mfuirs and fo:mner Soviet aanibassador in Kosi.ce and, then, in Prrugue. Against these enthusiastic Communist masses that filled the streets of Prague and against· Zorin, who represented the whole diploma:tic and military might of the Soviet Union, Dr. Edward Benes stood alone. Behind him were the twe1ve ministers shaking with fear - the ministers who real1y did not want to resign, but wanted to stay on as .rninistem and in the Government, that is to say, to eogoveI1I1 with the Carrurruunists. That really was a scene for a puppet theatre! SraimeJk, as a good soothsayer, kept on cautioning that Be:nes would not hold up, that Benes was capiturlating even as he had capitulated in the fall of 193·8 to Ado1ph Hitler. And so it happened. Goittwa:ld and Nosek visited Benes two or three times to tallk things over. These were in~ �SLOVAKIA 55 teresting coowersiations. "The president," writes A. J. Janda.eek, "ordered liistening deivices be placed in the room in which Benes conferred with the Communists. President Benes at that moment did not \know that a:ll his conversations and telephone calls were followed and heard 'by a system whi:ch already was rigged up by the Communist police without Benes's knoiwledige." Borth negotiarting parties tried to ,b eat each other in being cralfty. But the Communists were always a step ahead of Benes. Mteir Go.ttwa1d and Nosek left Benes, he was vdsited by two Nat:ionai Socialist ministers, Riipka and Stran. sky: This was Benes's l1ast conive1:1sation with these two ministers. Ripka noted the folloiwing as coming out of that conversation: Benes 'began the colllVersation with an energetic cry: "I shall not give in! I said openly and clearly to Gottwald: 'You are preparing to overthrow the St.ate, for a putsch, but I shall not let myseH be terrorized : by you'!" And then Benes told them the ·contents of his Wk with Premier Gottwald. I (Ripka) tQlld hd,m without mincing words: "That which you are preparing is another Munkh." The President's face grew serious. He said to us: "You .Jroow the Communists. You know that they do not hesitate to use any means to real±ze their pla:ns. We must be ·prepared for anything." There were reports, which I persona:hly _did not believe, that is that Russia was going to at~ck us. I told the President that I thought Russia would ,be S'atisfied to extend political help to our Corrm:i.un~sts, 'but that _w ith regard to the internatio.n•a l comp1ications that ' might result - Russia would not decide on a single military intemrention. The president listened with great attention. Then · he said to me literally: "I agree with you. I also think that way; Moscow will not take a risk -that would mean · military intenvention. Nevertheless, I .cannot -exclude the possi.ibility that the Soviet av.my would cross our · ,'bo:rders and then what would we do?" 1 �56 SLOVAKIA "What would we do?" - repeated the president, looking at me and then at Stransky, "Yes, what would you do?" I answered that in such a case we would be occupied and defeated. But the nation and the whole world would see that we suC'Cumlbed to violence. It would be known that the COiIDmunist regime was forced upon us, that Ozecho.,Slwakia was a victim of an attack, agruinst which she could not defend herself. This defeat woud carry us to a new victory. A moment of silence intet,vened. Then the president 1begain to say: "Maybe," - he said - '~but that is not cerbain. Nolbody will helip us. Moscow knows tha:t." Then with growing feeling, raising his voice, Benes said: "I know them well, those peo,ple frO!lll MOS'COw. I had a chanice to know them more iintimaitely than you have known them. You overrate their intel1igence and their foresight. Even I committed the same mistalke. They do not U!Ilderstand the other states ait a!H. They thinlk they are realists. But, in fact, they are only fain.a.tics. Their whole policy is nothi,IJJg else but one of provoki.n!g war. But with them everything will end up as it did wlith Hitler." Stransky who never heard the president speak so, cried out: "And you tell us that? You who have done more than any!body else on earth to bring albout colla1boraition with Soviet Russia?" ,B enes smiled sadly and said: "I repeat what I have already told you: I shall not yield! You may rest assured on that!" With tha,t sentence our last carwersation with president Benes ended. None orf us ait that moment could know that we shall never again see him. So wrote Ripka albout his last conversation with Benes. The coniversation tells us that Benes knew the Soviet factors in Moscow and 'knew them for a long time. And, yet, he continually and without end recommended to Roosevelt and Churehill to collaborate wlith them. He demanded that the West believe Stalin. Benes dressed up the lies of Soviet �SLOVAKIA 57 propaganda in a gartb of truth and thus, presented them to the uninfoI1II1ed West. That is how Benes sinned against the whole Christian world. He did not go unrewarded. He had to stand alone and face to face wi,t h the Soviet danger knowing that "nl()(body will helip us -- Moscow knows that." Despit,e all hlis assurances that he would not submit, that he knew the Communists well, Benes, nevertheless, did give in to the Communists. He capitulated to Clement Gottwald. He accepted the resignations of the 12 non-Communist minist,ers a-nd named the Government that Gottwald dictated! And what haJPPOOed with the 12 ministers who resigned? Espeicialiy what happened with the four ministers who belonged to, the Czech Na,tional Socia,1ist Party of Dr. :&!ward Benes? On May 6, 1948, deputies Dr. Duchacek, Dr. Krajina, Dr. StraJI1Skiy, VHim and Firt collaJborated in preparing a report on the .Alls,a{!e HoUJSe in FranikfuTt. This is what it says literally: "On the ad:temoon of Februacy 28, 1948, the National Socialist ministers assembled in the residence of Dr. Stransky. Durinig this meeting they telephoned Dr. Jina, political adviser af President Benes, and aslked him whether the President wotrld reiceiive them, as is the custom when ministers resign. Dr. Jina answered tha.t the President will not receive them and he repeated this statement when Dr. Rilpka asked a,g,a.in. Dr. Rilpka then said to Jina: "Tell Mr. President for us that he would not corner wJth the fouir ministers who during the who,l e period stood uncompromisingly behind his program. with him in full agreement. We want Dr. Benes to know just how the people who coUaiborated so closely witlh him feel rubout his not giving them an audience to e:,cplain his stand." Benes had fivst eooouraged the miru.stera to resign, then he assured them of his loyalty and persevea-ence, and, in the end, without theiir knowledge of it, had decided to accept their resignations. Then Benes did not even want to tadlk with them in parting. To keep the presidency Benes no longer needed the Czech N'aittonal Socialist Party nor its �58 S LOVAKIA four ministers. Now he needed only the Communists, because at the m01Inent they were stronge,r and in power. On February 27th Benes received the whole Gottwald gavernrment. Gottiwald said his speech, presented his ministers to Benes, and Benes replied to Gottwald's speech. By doing so, Benes accoided the recognition od' legality to the Coonmll!Ilist ministers for aH their future orders. · ..t\ifter Mlunich Benes proclaimed that he had a "plan." That w,as th~ plan by which he fled from Czecho..SlovaJkia. After cwpitulating t o Gottwald - the caipitulation that Benes himself ca'lied a "second Munich" - Benes burst into tears and said to editor Janda.eek, ,aecordin:g to 'J andacek : "Tell all the people who love democraicy to woiik in its interest and to try to validate its principles everywhere, and that eyen there, where they were for a time outraged." But did not Benes disgrace them? Did he haive to wp• prove the Communistic system? Were only othel's swppooed to work and fight for democracy, while Benes and his people were entitled to roop its advanta:ges and oo.j'Oy its privileges? After this secood capitulation Benes did not have an aerop1ane. He could not fly rubroad. He had only an automdbile. In it he left for his priv,ate residence in Sezimova U sti. He left, but only alter lie had legalired. every~ thing that the Oommumsts did and what they were still to do with the poople oif Ozecho-SfovaJlda. Benes, "the great de~ mocrat and builder," had done all that for the Communists! At the .end of his memoirs Ripk!a displayed .t he pinnacle of his cynicism. He whit~washed the Benes Czechs. They could not prevent the second Munich, even with weapons, he says, because the Soviet army would probably walk in and swbject the Czechs to untold brutalities. "After the oooupation of our country by the Soviet a11my in 1945," Ripka writes cynically, "we knew well what the Soviet army was cwpalble of!" (Il P01polo, Rome, May 15, 1949) . . Whether Ripka was in London or in Prague, until February 1948, he ·a-Iways spoke and wrote about the "liberation" ,of •Czecho,.JSlovakia a,nd the victorious Soviet . ·army; �SLOVAKIA 59 The Czechs actuaHy welcomed that amiy enthusiastically. While Benes and the Czecihs 'kept tal!kiing about "liiberation" from 1945 to 194'8, we Slovaks, on the other hand, claimed that SlovaJkia was octmipied, that the Sio:viruk State was suppressed by force and th at the Soiviet soldiers in 1M4-1946 committed the most terrible bestialities against unarmed Slovak men and women. 1 Even Czech emigrants told me to my face that Slovakia was "liberated" in 1945. But today, even Ripka confesses, rather belatedJy, that his Bohemia, too, was occupied by Red Moscow already in 1946 ! That really is unmitigated cynici,s m, coming as it does from a person who played "independent minister" from 1945 to 1948 in his occupied country and then, looving the country, would agiain - with some other kind of army of "liberation" - save not only his own country, but also our beaten and crucified . SloviaJkia. We began our remarks to Ripka's memoirs by citing the ar.gumenit of R:dbert Ingrim about the possibility of the existenice of a secret a·g rooment between. Benes, Ripka, Zenkl and Gottwa:ld. Now we read in the newspaper of the Czech National Socialist deiputy Fr.anois Klatil ("CA.IS," London, The Wa!Wi(j}c Printing Co. , issue No. 1, 1949) a note from the pen of Dr. Edward Benes a:bout the conferenJce with Gottwald on May 1'4, 194'8. In it Benes carries on a long dialogue with Gottwald aiboot wanting to resign from the presidency. Let us quote at least a few sentences from it: "The president does not want to tell the Communists to do things dififerently, since he does not want to hinder them. That is why he repeats to the Premier o!f the Government not to loOlk for any foreign influences in his action. It is only and only his personal decision. . . . The president again emphasizes that (in Sezimovo Usti) he did not receive any1body, neither did he aiSlk anyibod,y for any exiplanations or to let him kno:w his stand. Eive:rything is exclusively his own.. .. Therefore he .is g1ving the Communist PM'ty freedom of action to arr.ange things to suit its needs. The President further states that he is taLkiDJg with the Prime Minister of the government witlh complete sincerity �60 SL OV AK IA and con1Viction and he is asking him to judge what he is saying from that standpoint. He does not quarrel, nor in the end, does he want to part with t!he Prime Minister of the Governrment in a quarrel. . . . He does not want the Communists to hasve any quaITels with the President, nor the President to quarrel with the Communists, 1because it would be possi!ble to a.lbuse this. The State is so dear to the President, that he will do nothing that might harm it. . . . Prime Minister Gottwald at first replied in general terms to the President's explanation. and his initention orf abdiooting. He says that the Communists wotl'ld prefer not to have to discuss the question olf the departure of the President. He knows what moti1Ves the President has, he respects them aoo thinks that id' it is already necessary to part, that they would want to part as friends. The President answers, that he wishes the same. He said that to Smutny and hopes that they shall pa.rt as friends. He reminded even Dr. Clementi'! that he, Benes, will not undertake any action against his own State, that he will not go against the Communists and he shall not undertake any act that would be direct.e<l against the Soviet Union." That, then, is how Benes spoke to Gottwald in Sezimoivo Usti. He assured him he would do nothing against the Communists or the Soviet Union. He expressed a sincere desire to part with Got:Jtwal:d and the Communists in Governmeint as a friend. He wanted to retire and hand over everything to Gottwald and his Ozech Reds peaoofully. And he did eventually. Gottwald then saw to it th,a t Dr. Edward Benes got full pay "for life," too. Does the international anti-Com.mt.mist pU!blic think that the sa,me principles do not hold for Bene.s's close colila:borators - for Ripka, ZenJk,l , and for the many other Czechs, who fled Ozechoslovaikia after February 19~8? We must be on our g:uard. The legends olf "li'beration" and "Jiberntors" from 1948 to 1945 are well knolWil. to us and must ever be a warning not only for us Slova:ks, but a'lso for the whole civilized Christian world. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 32 SLOVAKIA DR. HUBERT RIPKA'S VERSION OF THE COMMUNliST "PUTSCH" IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA Karol Sidor Fourteen months after the Communists took over Czecho-,Slovalda, Hubert R~pka, former minister orf various resorts cxf the late Dr. Edward Benes, decided to write a series o,f articles under the head.mg of "A Prefabricated Revolution" (Une Revolution Prefabriquee) . The articles, telling what happened in Prague in February 1948, were published in several European dailies. Why Riipka waited so long to tell the world his version of what happened in Ozecho--lSlovaikia early in 1948, he does not d~V'll:lge, but it is quite obvioUIS that he wanted time to do a little healing. Rilpka's trade was journ.alism. He was the editor o:f the "Lldove Noviny" (People's News), the daily cxf · the Czech intelligentsia published in Brno, and during his six years in exile he was Minister of Propaganda - and what propaganda! - of Dr. Benes's London government-in-exile. R iipka, then, was ruble and crupafbJe of writing. The Roman daily "II POipolo" paid quite a tribute to Ripka when it began pUJblishmg his series of articles. It presented Ripka as "the only Czechoslovak democratic minister, who successfully escaped from his country after last February's putsch"! Of course, that was a bit far.fetched, because we know that ministers Zenkl, Kocvara, Stransky, Pieto.r , Prochazka, Majer and Franelk also escruped from Praigue after the Felbruary "putscih ." These collea,gues of Ripka were just a s "Czechoslovak" and "democratic" as he was himself. They all had one thing irn common with Ripka: they helped Benes sell out both the Slovaks and the Czechs to the USSR. It is quite s1gnifiicant that after sUJCh a "terrible putsch" so many Ozeoh ministers, officials and leading politicians could escape without incident or accident. Robert Ingrim -,. author cxf "After Hitler Stalin?" - wrote a:bout this phenomenal exodus in the Swiss "ViATIDRLAND" of SLOVAKIA 33 September 25, 1948. One is led to suspect with Ingrim that so many Czech ministers, generals, politicians and thousands of Czech go.vernment officials and workers could hardly escaipe wtthout incident or accident without a "deal" with Comrade Gottwald. Any one who has read Riplta's articles must admit that Ripka was careful not to attook Gottwald or Zapotocky. What is more, Riplk a did not conrfess that he played bad politics, or that he was sorry for what he had done, or that he would never again collaiborate with Communism. On the contrary, Ripka wrote: "Today more than ever before, I cannot stop believing that a free and independent Czecho-Slovakia can exist only in Europe that is brought to balance, where the West and Russia find a proper agreement to collaborate. Even the events of February 1948 could not shake me from this conviction, which remains the basis of my whole conception of national politics." - ("Fi,garo., " Paris, April 4, 1949). Stanisl•aN Mikolaj,czylk, Nagy Ferencz, and other refugees frOIID 'beyO!Ild the Lron Cm·tain wrote in a different tone. They corufessed that they were mistaiken in thinking they could negotiate a decent agreement with Soviet Russia. But Riipka stated pulblicly, even arrter the so...;called February "putsch," that he shall persist in his error, and his articles only corufirm the fact that in the "new" CzechoSloivaikia which Ripka would build - he would again cultivate contacts with the Communist USSR just as enthusiastically and loyally as does Antonin Zapotocky today in the name of Czecho-Slovakia. R~pka is lo•a th to admit that politically he is bankrupt. He keeps on talking aJbout a "new agreement" between the West and Russia meaning Czecho..Sl01Vakia when he sarys "West." In fact, w:hat he told us in his articles was equivalent to saying that ne and his "Czechoslovak democratic" colleagues would even now be collaborating with the Communists and Stalin's stooge in Czech-Slovakia, if they would have been allowed to keep their ministries. But in Washington, Ripka, Zenkl and the other soc_alled ·"OzechoslovaJk democrats" - now organized in tihe 34 SLOVAKIA "Council oif Free OzechoSilwakia" - talk aJbout their fight against Communism. Wihat kind of fight agaill'st Comm'll.Ilism? As far as is kno:wn there was no fight against Communism in Czeteho-1Sloivaikia as a whole, but only in Slovakia. Deception, appea:sement, crupitulation, and shameful mght mto other ilands can hardliy be called a "fight against Communism"! The mass "escape" oif Ozech Sociialists was undoulbtedly arranged and assured in advance, and the socalled "OzoohoslovaJk dernoorats" did not esc~ emptyhanded either. What can be tni.rthlfully said about the: fight of the Ozech emigration against Communism? Only this: We are still patiently waiting for it to start! It aippea,rs to us that Czech emigrants - both the right and left wings - are agreed on only one thing: to carry on their fight against Slovak emigrants and refugees whom they have termed "separatists." They vilify them before the Red Cross, the U. S. oocwpation forces and their allies, and the U. S. State Department. The Slovaiks, aocording to them, simply are no good; they are Hitlerites, Fascists, Nazis and, worst of all, "separatists." Aocording to Rilpka, Zenkl, Lebtrich and other "has.beens" of Dr. IDdward Benes's bankrl.llpt political ikd.ngdom, the Slovaks hiwe no right to freedom and independence, no right to an indeipendent po~mcal state. To the "Czechoslovak democrats" the fight against Slovak freedom and independence means more than the fight against Communism. T. G. Masaryk and Benes fooled the world in 1918. Benes did it again in 1945. And their disciples are dete:rmined to continue the propagation of the fraud that was "Czechoslovaik democracy.'' Ripka, Zenikl and their followers are not fighting Communism. The ra'llks oif Ozech emigrants are fiull or' agents of the Ozeich secret police and spies of the Communist Party. More Czech emigrants "escaped" back home than all'y other class of emigrants. That is not suITTprising to any one who really knows the Benes Czechs. There was veriy little difference between Benes's "Czechoslovak democracy" and Communism. The former was in fact a handmaid of the SLOVAKIA 35 latter. Benes and his "Czechoslovaks" could not suffer political opposition ~ more than the Reds or the Nazis. Loolk at their rewrds: they tell us tihat these queer "democrats" ipla,y ed a'long with Communism and actively collaborated with Communists for many yea,rs. Ripka enthusiastically welcomed the c0Ua.1boration and eternal frien<lshlp between Soviet Russia and Czecho...slovalkia in 1935 (Vd. his article in "Zahranicni politilka," Pra)gue, 1935,pgs. 14-l7). At that tilme Riipka wrote that the Ozechs wanted to 'b e "not only mediators between the old West and the new East, but also factors, actively cocreating a synthesis of lasting values of the old European civilization and the new civilization being born in the Soviet Union." Ten years later - in 19415 - the Benes Ozechs really got the chance to play the role of "factorris." They were given the opporturuty "to aictilvely cocreaite a synthesis" between Russia and Czec'ho~Slovakia. Just how suocessful they were in this, we shall see later when we anal~ Ripka's articles. But let us say at the outset: in Central Europe it was only the BENES CZECHS who actually want.ed to collaborate with the Communists! In Ma~, 194'5, when the Soviet a:ranies rolled into Prague, it was only the Ozechs cxf all the peoples of Central Eurorpe who welcomed them with oipen joy and enthusiasm a'S the "armies o,f lilbeTation." In the first Ozech post-wa,r government, Clement Gottwald, chairnnran of the Czech Communist party was named Vice-iPrennier am.d, after the parliamentary elections in 1946, as Premier of the government in Prague by "!president" Benes. At that time no;where did the Communists in a parliamentary election receive so many votes as they did in Bohemia a!Ild MoraJVia; in Slovaikia they were beaten dedsive1y by the SlovaJk electorate. 1 Such was the political line of Benes and his followers. In Prwgue the Cotmmunists, a;nd not Benes and Ripka, 1becrume the "factors." And the Communists lost no time in creating Rilpka's "synthesis" of 1935 between the "old West" and the "new East." Benes and Ripka had prepared for this synthesis already since 1935 and were beaming SLOVAKIA 36 with joy because the whole world was astounded by · their political recltlessness. Collaib,oration with the Communists in internal politics had begll!Il in 193'5 when Benes needed the votes orf the COimmunist Party · to be elected president. The C.omimunisits promised to vote fOl" Benes on the condition that Gottwald, Kopecky and Stetka, whose political mandates the Court of Election of Czecho-Slovakia would not verify and approve, would be approved as members of the Prague parliament. Benes promised to do that little thing and so enaJbled three Communists to become members of par1i'a,ment in 1935. 'Dhe Communists voted for Benes and later proved their sympathy for him by voting for the presildential budget every ye·a r. The Communists were for everything that •~President" Benes himself asked for in the budget, but either refrained from voting or voted against all other items of the State budget. 1 When Benes resigned as ,president of CzechO-iSlovakia in June, 1948 - the second time within a decade - the Communists voted him full presidential rpay for life and mrugnanimously gruve him the Limy Castle and the properties belonging to it. In a word, Benes and Ripka did collruborate with the Communists for many years. That collaboration did not cease because orf ideological reasons, but only because the Communists in February, 1948, told their collaborators what amounted to: "We thank you with communistic sincerity for your collab.o ration O!f many years with us. You can go now; we do not need you any mo:re. You can even go alb road if you wish; at hQlme you are useless to us, and id' you go abroad we shall not fear you." "The Czechoslovak people" - said Hubert Riplka in his article in the "IL POPOLO" ( 4--30-49) - "with singular joy welcomed the first allied treaty with Russia in 1935." In the first place, no "Czechoslovak" people exists, ethnJ1cally 51peruking. But there are Czechs a!lld Slovaks. There are two nations - the Czech and the Slovak - who do ~ t to all phenomena aocording to their training and traditions. And so it was with the treaty of Benes with Stalin in 193'5: the Czechs reacted one way, while the Slovruks reacted altogether differently. The ~ h s reacted "with singular SLOVAKIA 37 joy;" they welcomed that treaty, because they thought just as Ripka himself had thought in 1935 - that together they would be able to form a synthesis of the "old" European ciiv:i lization and the "new" civilization which was being born in the Soviet Union. Soviet ci'Vilization was not brought to Europe by Ripka; but by the soldiers of the Soviet armies. The nations of the "old" ciivilization felt the sting of this "new" civilization on their bodies. And they shall continue to feel it as long as they do not :wcept it 100 per cent by discarding the "old" civilization which was founded on Christianity and is almost 2000 yea:rs oJd. Personally, Ri;pka was terrified by Soviet . "'Ciivi.lilzation" in praclice. He did not remain in C?.echo-Slovakia to take part in the creation of the "synthesis," but fled far beyond her borders. Yes, as far a:s he could go Jrorn this "new" civilization which in 1935, he praised highly and recommended so zealously not only to the Czech peoiple, but to the whole world as well. Why did Ripka do that? Did he not ,know what was happemng in the S()IViet Union? From 191,8 to 1935 there were aJbout 100,000 Rlussians, Ukranian and White Russian emrl.grants in OzechoJS[,()IValkia. They had fled from the Soviet Union and told the Czechs what they saw aind e~rienced in Soviet Rlussia. 'Ilhe Benes Oze.chs, however, did not ~Ii.eve those eye-<Witneses. 'Ilhe Czechs were blinded by their old lave for the "Sl01Vanic Ea:st" and thought that Communism of the 1935 vintage was no longer the Communism of 1917. They forgot tllat Communism, as a doctrine and a system of government, is one and the saime for all peoples aJild all times. It does not relate only to the Russian Ozars, but to all n0;tions of the earth and to aH states. The substance of CommuniSIIll is not sulbject to the ohangeis of time. Ripka evidently met with real Communist civilization only in 194'8, in Prague, when it too:k aiway his ministry. He fled before it, we are sruq:~posed to believe, to saive his life. And yet 1n 1949 he wrote that he still believed in colla.borating with the UISSR. so Ripka, too, was a product of Czech na:tiona:l development, whlch was a1ways directed to the left. The Czedhs 38 ::,LOVAKIA made Jan Hus (1'370~141'5) the symlbol of their rebellion aigainst Rome. '.Dhey grolllped ooder his banner and always emphasized more and more the negati~stic ·elements of Hus' character, suppressing all his positive qualities. As a result large grOUfPS of the Ozech nation, matriculated as Catholics at baptism, got themselves. in the periphery of world Christianity, their roots of solidarity w~th the Ohristian civilization of the west dried Ulp in tilme and the Ozech masses aH the more readily joined the "111ew" civiHzation which Ripka said was being born in the Soviet Union. Thrs ideological development of the Czechs to the left explains why in 193'5 the Czechs welcomed a treaty with Moscow and why in 1946 in the parliamentary elections in Ozetcho-1Slovakia the international and atheistic Oommunist Party came out on top in Bohemia and Morrruvia. But the Ozechs were accustomed to belonging to laiI'!ge economiic and politkal units. Their outstanding historian, Francis Palacky, wrote to the FrMllkfurt Assemlbly in 1848: "The preservation of Austria, its integrity and cOl11SOlidation, is and must be a great and important th!ing not only to the Czech nation, but also to the whole, olf IDurope, nay, to all humanity and cultU'l"e." That same Palaciky is the author of the staitement: "H Austria did not exist, we would have to create it." Dr. Edward Benes shared similar ideas. In his bodk, "Le Problem Autrichien et la QuestiO!ll Tcheque" (pg. 307) ·b e wrote in 1908: "Frequently we bear talk about the collapse of Austria. I absolutely do not believe it. The historical and economic ties that mutually unite the 1181tions of Austria are too strong to allow Austria to collapse.'' This was written at a time when the Czechs were becomilllg a nation of oifificia.ils and directors, administering not only in Bohemia, Morruvia and Silesia, but even in Galicia, a signdficant part of Vienna and later even in Bosnta and Hercegcwina. True, this was all under the supernsion of Vienna and ac:corddng to her laws. During the first World War T. G. Masar,yik and Edward Benes came upon the idea of making the Czech nation independent by destroying Austria-Hungary. To help them SLOVAKIA 39 with that plan tihey SIUCCeeded in getting 1,'500,000 Slovaks to whom T. G. Masaryk had solemruy promised in Pittsburgh, Pa., on May 30, 1918, that Slovalk ia, within the framewonk af Czecho-SlovaJkia, would hiwe, arrnong other things, her own assembly, her own courts and her own ,s chools. On the 0:ther hand, Dr. Edward Benes, wJth his signature attaiched to the Peace Treaty of St. Germain Se!ptem\ber 19, 1919) , haid guaranteed the Ruthenfans territorial autonomy, a legislative a:ssemlbly, their own governor, etc. Both Masaryk and Benes la~r repudiated their solemn promises. As lonig as Masaryk and Benes · ruled Czecho,.,SloV'akia, neither the Slwaiks nor the Rut>henians were guaranteed autonomy. Nolbody 'bothered to ask the other peoples orf Czecho-SloV1aLkia - the 3,500,000 Germans, albout a miUion Magyars, SOIIIle 200,000 Po.les, etc., whether they wanted to live together with the · Czechs in the common staite of CzeohoSlorvaJkia. The frirst Constitution of 1920 was approved by the Prague parliament when that body did not have a single representative of the Germans, the Poles, Magyars and Ruthenians, and when the Slovaks were represented not by deputies elected by the Slovak people, but by deputies named by Prague, i.e., by T. G. Masaryk and Edward Benes. And that Constitution - a tyipi~al Benes creation remained tmchanged and was binding U!pon every citizen of Czeicho..iSllovaikia until N oivemlbe~, 193-8. It is understandiaJbJe that the majority Olf nations of the ReipUJblk did not fare well in Ozecho-.Slo,vaikia. The existence of Czecho-1Slovaikia was not supPorted by the will of the majority of her mhrubitants. 'l'he Czechs themseLves knew that, and the old desire for broader economical and political spheres, whereby the life o,f the Czechs could bet.t er be safeguarded and ·p rotected, began to awaken in them. They knew that internally Czecho-Slovakia was weak and that externally she wws threatened lb y the Germans. Czech leaders, therefore, ,b egan looking to;ward the So~fot Union which emlbraces one-SQxth o1: the unilverse. They began to tell their ,people and the world that the So'Viet Union was •a Slovian:ic land, that a "new" cirvi:lization and a new ally and ( 1 40 SLOVAKIA defender Oif the Ozech nation, especially against German aggression was being born there. This thought was strengthened by the Ozech...SOviet Treaty of 1935. The Czechrs saw before themselves the vast expansiveness Oif the Soviet cowntry which was incomparably larger and rilcher than Austria-iliungacy. Culturally and politicai11y the Russii'am,s were far ~hind the Czechs. The Czeohs dreamed that in time they might even rule the Russian roost! They thought that by collruborating with the Soviets they would sooner or later find themselves on top even if it were oruy in the sense of the old Czech and even sicikly inclination toward Panslavism - at one time the Czarist and Ortlhod-0x variety and now the Red and atheistic kind. Slovaik national development went along a completely different course. The SlOIVruks not only did not welcome the treaty with Moscow in 1935, but openly condemned it through their elected deputies, in the Prague parliament. The Slova3c naition built its spiritual world consistently on its own national tradition. That tradition was Christian. It was created with equal zeal by both the Slovak Catholics and the Slovalk Protestants. Thait S1walk tradition is the common property olf aU Slovalks, no matter what their political or religious beliefs. The Slovak Protestant L'udovit Stur (1815-1856), Slovak patriot and national philogq>her, left the Slovalk nation in his books valua/b'le sources on how to correctly orientate itself in new social and national tendencies. Stur's book "The Slavs and the World of the Future," published after his deaith, has this to sary albout the Communism of his day: ''In every instan1ee Communism means the collapse and the destruiction oif the state. Communism arrived at this aim through atheism and apostacy from Christianity. In every fornn of Communism, no matter w:hat its origin, the outlook on life is da,r,k, laicking every tender j'oy. It brings the most c:mel sJaivery. Commun,i:sm, let it striive. and pretend in any manner whatsoever that it will make all peoples share in all rights, nevertheless, knows nothing a!bout humanity; it degrades humanity and, because it holds to sys- SLOVAKIA 41 tams that are imipractiea!l and unrealizaJble, it belongs among the most stupid innovations that harve th'llS far been created by the human mind." The Slovak Catholic priest Jan Palarik (1822-1870) wrote a dissel'ta,tion in 1:864 "Albout SlOlVanic Mutuality." In it he resolutely stands fo.r a Slorvalk Sta,te and desires to see it in a federation of staites in EurOipe. But ne:ver under the direction of Russia. Pa1arik strongly repudiated Russia,n Panslavism and ,predicted thart "the whole of Europe wouM rebel against the Slovanic peoples" if they should ever come under the rule of the Russians. The Slovak Protestant, Milan R. Stefanik (1880-1919), a General in the French Army and the first Minister of War in Czooho-lSlovaikiia, was in Rus,s,i a in 191'8..1919 and saw Communism at close range. In February, 191'9, he tele. graphed his government at Prague: "To flirt with Bolshevik tendencies would be comparable to foresaking the path of honor and sane reason. The fight against Bolshevism in all its manifestations must prevail in our politics." On such foundations, then, was, buiilt the Slovak stand against Communism. It was built on the foundations of Christianity and nationalism, and never on the foundation whi~h Mussolini amd Hitler gave to their anti-Communism. The Communists and their friends had pro~1aimed that Mus-solini and Hitler dervised anti-Communism in Europe and that the SIJ.ovaJks had taken it over from them. That does not correspond with the truth. Slovak phifosophers long before Mussolini and Hitler warned their nations not to acceipt Communistic teaJChing. In the po1itiical life w Slov-a kia the party of Msgr. Andrew Hli'Dlka consciously fortified and strengthened this SlovaJk anti-Communism in the broad masses of the Slovak nation. Anti-Communism had thus become a component part of Slovak national beliefs. That is why the pa11ty of Andrew Hllinka pmtested a,g ainst the apprwal of Benes's treaty with Stalin in 1935 when it came up for approval on the floor of the Prague Parliament. At that time Hlinika's Farly haid 30.1 per cent of all the voters in Slovakia, while the Communist Party in Sfovakia had 13 per cent, and the 42 SLOVAKIA party orf Benes and Riipka only 3.2 per cent of the total Slovia:k electorate. The Slovak stanqpoint was ideologically and rightd'uUy represented by Hlinika's Party which was the first and largest political party in Slovakia since 1925. On November 6, 1935, as a Slovak deputy I sipotk e in the IllMil.e of Hlinlka's Party on the floor of the Pra:g,ue parliament. In the presence of the Foreign Minister, Dr. Edward Benes, I said: "Alas, foreign policy under the direction m Dr. Edward Benes has deviated from the tendency that General Stefanik followed in 1919. He requested the Prag;ue government to fight against Bolsheivism in all its manifestations and warned not even to flirt w.ith Bolshe'Viik tendencies. IDven flirting with Bolshevik tend.endes he called foresaiking the road of hooor and sanity. 1n the meantime the Prague government already conoluded various rugreements with the bloody offspring o;f Bolshevism~ the Soviet Union. "The Hlinlka Slovak People's Party rejects the theory of Bolshevism, co:ndemns its bloody ipra:ctices as well as its inhuman methods, and with a very heavy heart tolerates the fact that OzeichoJSlo'Wllkia has deviated from the course that was 'Plotted b,y her co-d'ounder and first Minister of War, Ge111eral Stman:i!k. The no:mnali.!zation of diplomatic contaiots can be understood even between such st:riucturally different states as is our democrartic Ozecho-slovaJk RepubHc and the SOIVieit Union. Fimdly other states similar to ours have such diiplomatic contacts. But imrrnediatetly following the esta!blishment otf contacts, there were so many expressions of sympathy within the Ozooho.,Slo;va:k Reipublic for the Soviet Union and its system that this must fJll us who are nationally orientated in a Christian way - with fears about the future Czecho-Slovaikia. To· tie ouir destiny with the destinies of the Soviet Union, to build on agreements signed by Bolshevii.ks, I consider as the greatest bl,un. der made by our present foreign policy. "We slovak,s warn the Czechs away from the political mista!kes being committed by our Fcreign Minister, Dr. Edward Benes, because . too zealously he binds us with the Soviet Union that is so distant to us. In the interests of the SLOVAKIA 43 State we demamd a change in the lime followed by our foreign polilcy, we demand thait the defense of the State be built on a more realistic 'basi'S - one that conforms mo•r e with the mentality of the poipulation. Stating ·a ll these insufficiencies, I intvoduce them as one of tihe reasons that force us SloivaJks not to express our confidence in the present leailersh'ip of our foreign policy." Is it necessary to bring in more evidence to show that the SloviaJks were conisristently orientJated anti-Cottnlmun.istically? It proives co!D'clusively that Riipka was wrong when he said that "the Ozecho--!Slov.a!k people un:anilmously welc,ooned with joy the first allied agreement with Russia in 1935." The Ozec'hs, especialily the Sovieto,phiie Ozech intellectuals headed by R~pka, were made h~y by the treaty. The Slova!ks, however, eX1perieniced aJbsolutely no joy on that ocoasioo; nay, they aiticized and rejected the treaty and voted against it in 1936 in the Pra:gue Parliament. And this aJso attests to the fact that we are here concerned with two very different nations whose development and political convictio1J1S were altogether distin'Ct and diffe:rent. 1Riipka was rilght when he said that afiter the conclusion of a;greemnts with Moscow, in 19315 and 1943, Benes and his goveI1Il!ment exipressed "their complete confidence in the Soviet government." In return they expected the Sov.iet to return the friendshiip, confidenice and, rubove a'll, tihe assuraI1JCe that the USSR shall not intervene in our internal affairs." "That conrfidence has been betrayed" - Hulbert Ripka is screeching today. In February 1948 Moscow proceeded against democracy in Ozecho~Slovakia, ·be'Cause "it wanted to see in Pra;gue a totalitarian Communistic goivernment swbsement to. its will." So Ripka acknowledges th,at Moscow was dissaJtisfied with coHruborating in the fomnation of Riipk,a 's "synthesis." Ripka finally dis,wvered that Red Moscow wants its allies to be totaHy sulbserivierut to its dictates. But Ripka came upon this self-evident matter only in 1948, when he was thrown out of the g01VeTil!IIlent, or was at least prevented from co-governing in Prague with the Reds, and after he fled Ozecho-SlofVlakia. Before that time, however, Ripka was the man, who - act)ing like somebody in 44 SLOVAKIA the pay of Moscow - assured the Czechs and the uninformed world that reports about Moscow intervening in the internal affairs of individual states were absolutey false! Philip Panetili in his boO!k "Ed.war:d Benes, Leader of Democracy," on pgs. 123-124, notes the commentary of Dr. HUibert Ripka on the treaty of December, 1943, which Dr. Benes concluded with Moscow. "This Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty," said Riipk:a at that time, "had as its aim to strengthen the security of Europe." Ripka rejected the contention that this pact would mean the bolshevization of Euro,pe or Ozecho,Slovaikia. "The treaty," Ripka stated categorically, "gives a clear answer to all those who continue to suspect the Soviet Union of the intention of bolshevizing the countries of Central Europe that are its neighbors, nay, of intending even to annex them to the Soviet Union. The treaty gives a clear answer to all who are continuing to present Czecho-Slovakia as a tool in the hands of the Soviets. In the agr.e ement of 1943, the Soviet Union once again binds itself to respect her independence and that it shall not intervene in her internal affairs. Czecho-Slovakia binds iself in a similar fashion. By these formal ties the fact was confirmed again that the Soviet government had no intention of forcing its political regime on other nations and so much the less to annex the nations of Central Europe or any others to the Soviet framework." Whence did Dr. Ripka know these things? Was he ignorant of the fates of the Caucasian repulblics, or the painful fate oif the three Ba:ltic states, Latvia, Lithuania and Est01I1ia? Since the S01viet government acted imperlalisti:c . ally to.ward those states, why did Ri,pka think that the same thing would not aiso happen in the case of Czecho~Sl()IV3ikia? But Riipka wenlt mucli farther . He said thait the treaty which Ozeicho-SlavaJkiia conicluided with the Soviet Union not only did not weaken her S01Verdgnty and independence, but, converseJy, that 'basically it strengthened and secured them. As a real progressive, aJ.way;s wanting to instruct and teach other nations, R1pka offered thi,s instruction: "Not in distrust and in a hostile stand toward the Soviet Union, but in confidence and sincere willingness for a clean, friendly cooperation with the Soviet Union is the re- SLOVAKIA 45 liable guarant.ee for assuring the freedom and independence of every country, namely, the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe. Every nation in this region with which the Soviet Union borders directly can be certain if it cultivates a friendship with this great power - that it certainly shall get from it help to defend its freedom and independence." Note the certainty with whioh Ripka spo!ke in 1943 about the future conduct of Moscow toward the states that trust it. What swperfJdality that was, what irresponsrbility, nay, what rookllesness oif the first degree! The years have proved that the Slovaks were right when they warned in the Piiag,ue Parliament that the union of Ozecho-,Slovakia with Moscow was "the greatest blunder ever committed by Ozecho~Slovaik foceign ,p olitics." The blunder of 1'93'5 was duplii cated in 1943, and its consequences showed up in July, 1947, in a dram'atic way. On Jul,y 7, 1947, the Prrugue Council oif Ministers, whose presidoot was K1lement Gottwald, unanimously aJOCepted the hwitation to the confereI11ce in Paris, where Czecho-Sl'Ovakia was to join the Marshall Plan. Not a single minister voted against it. On Jruly 9th, Gottwald, Jan Masaryk, and Drt1na flew to Moscow. There the representatirves of s01vereign and independent Repulb1ic of Czecllo-Sloviak:ia were ordered by Stalin to annul their unanimous decision. and tell Paris that the Ozecho-Slov;aJk RepuibHc would not join in the · Marshall Plan. Behold the crude Soviet mterventi:on in the internal affairs of a state to which the :S oviets had guaranteed SOIV·· ereignty and independence, in two treaties. And the Czech delegation, of which Gottwald was the only Communist, unanimously accepted Stalin's dictate in Moscow! Gottwald, just as Masaryk, telephoned several tirmes from Moocow to Prague to have the Coun.cil @f Miniisters convene and unanimous!~ "ruccept" Stalin's order. It must be stressed that at this time the Council of Ministers was presided over by Dr. Peter Zenkl, the first Vice-Premier of the government and presently the chairman of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" of Washington, D. C. Capitulation! 1 4-6 SLOVAKIA The small nation of the. Finns and Tito did not capitulate before the dictates of Moscow. The Czechs C8l{)itulated and t:hey themselves, headed by Benes, Ma.saryk, Zen!kl and Rilpka, voluntariJy went over into the Soviet camp. That is their handiiwork and, hence, they t:hemselrves are responsibie fo1.' it. And it is their ulllpardOO!aJble sin that into their caJmp they also dvrugged the S}QIV'a;ks who never a.greed with the Sovietophile po:lilcy of Benes, Mla.saryik, Zen!ki and Ripka. The Slo:vaks from the very beginning warned the Czechs that they were on the wrong road when they fraternized with Communi'sti:c Moscow. A. J. Janda·cek wrote the truth in his boOlk•l et ''Behind the Iron Curtain'' (Chicago·, 1948) , when he said: "Everything that happened in Prague in February, 1948, was only the result and climax of all former provisions of the Czech government in London." To this I might add, that it was the result of the decisions oif not onJy the London government, but also that government in Prrugue, which, after 1945, rupproved all decrees and accepted all legal motions which the Communists placed before it and the Parliament. Not once did the anti-Communist majority in Parliament reject Communistic bills. Thus, in a,n altogether legal manner, the ground was prepared for Communism in Czecho-Slovakia. Under those laws, serving only Communism, we find the signatures of Zenkl, Ripka and the rest of the Communist collaborators. All these gentlemen thought that they could flirt with Communism to build in Central Europe some kind of greater Czech power, greater than it really was. We s•a w how without ptllblic protest the whole Czech government caipituJl:ated to the dictates of Stalin. It reversed itself completely on the Marshahl Plan. The goverD!ID.ent newspa.pers - which a few days 'befOTe had ,prruised the Marshall Plan and the acwantages of entering into it - now began a heaiviy bomlbardment against America and the Marshall Plan. Now, let us see what was happening in Slcwakiia aJt that same time. Ripka says tJhat President Benes in the summer oif 1947 went to Slwakia for a rest. He went to Toporcia.niky which lies some 2 kilometers from the capital city of Slova:kia , SLOVAKIA 47 Bratislava. At the Topof,cian:ky castle, for six years (19391944), the president of Slorvaikia, Dr. Joseph Tiso, used to spend his summers. It was the summer holffie df the same Dr. Tiso who was hanged in Bratisilava on Aprii 18, 1947, after Benes refused to grant clemency. Most decent peoiple thought it was tactiless on the part oif Benes to go to Slovakia in 1947. Benes, it seems, with his presence in sorrowing SlOIV'akia wanted to boast of his triumph over Tiso, just as a year before he had done in Bohemia with the former president of Ozecho-Slovaikia, Dr. ffimfil Ha;cha. The Slovak s always lwke to welcome guests. In Slovakia there is a motto: a guest in the home - God in the home. Well, in the case of Benes, this motto did not holld. The Slovaks bitte:rly s:uifd'ered the presence of Benes in their land, in their own home. They de1uged Benes with letters, anonymous and signed, ~n which they called him tlhe heartless mwrderer .o f Dr. T~so, and the greatest enemy oif the Slovaks, predicting for him a most shameful end within a year. In his memoirs RJiipka admits that Benes did not feel physicaJ1y w~ll in Slovrukia. Within a few daJYiS he was threatened with an atta~k of paralysis (aipoplexy). The Slorvaiks loolked upon these re[>Orts with satisifa:cition, seeing ilil them the fJniger of God. As soon as, Benes le:ft .Sloviakia a mass political perseoution olf S'IO!Vaik paitriots began in that hapless countey. The Communists were seeking to gain their ends, while the Ozechs, on the oither hand, their OiWil aims. But their common goal was: to master Slovakia and break her resistance. 1 Both the Communists and the Benes Oze~hs wanrted to frighten the Slava!k'S who had on the who,l e remained tr:ue to the idea of the Slovaik State. The Slorv ~s were forced to live together with the Czechs in a common state against their will from 1945, the State they had parted with on March 14, 1939. It is known that the Communists were more tactfruJ. with the S1oivaJk national question. They admitted th.tat a nation that on.ce had its own State would never re~ nounce it wilfwlly. Ripka recalls correctly that when Ben~ returned from Moscow in 1944, he told his intilmates in London of the possibility of establishing an independent SlovaJk 48 SLOVAKIA State. That was at a time when Moscow, in the agreement of 1943, solemnly recognized Ozecho-Slovaikia, resipected the integrity of her territory, nay, even recognized Benes as the "president" of the "new" Czecho.,SlovaJkia. ·.1n Mosicow, Benes was given to understand that a S1oviak Repulblic was not only possilble, but also quite a~ceiptaible to Stalin. 1 Of course, the Communists at that time (1944) ~pected the Slovaik president, Dr. Jo£qph Tiso, to go to Moscow, or to send his plenipotentiary, to negotiate the possi.bility of saving the SlovaJk Repuiblic under a Communistic disguise. Dr. Tiso, however, refused to go to Mosicow, whilE Benes aJlld the ruJers of Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria did go. With Dr. Tiso a ,principle was at stake. With the others only tact. But one cannot malke tad out of principle. It never pays. And nothing permanent or valU'aJble can be attained by surrendering prindples. It was not oruy Dr. Tiso, but all the SlovaJks loyal to him, who refused to go along with the Slova;k CO!mlffiunists or the Commumsts of Moscow. In the elections of 1946, the SlQ!VaJks voted over 70 per cent against Communism and, this, clearly made it known that they did not want to coUa:borate with Communism under any ciroumstainces. The SloiVa;ks pr01Ved in practice their loyalty to the principles exipressed by Stur, Palarik, Stefanik, Hlinika, Tiso and otfue:r rpolitical representatiives of the Slovak nation. This wa:s a pra'CticaJl demonstration of the high political consciousness of the Slovaks, the basis of which was a clean and practical Christianity. Ripka knows well that the Czechs were not i!J:nlbued with any such consciousness. In Bohemia not only Czech workers, but even Czech peasants voted for Communism. What is mo:re, even Kral'ovske VinOihrady, where the wealthiest groups of Ozech boungeoisie resided, voted for Communism. The rich Czechs wanted to save their wealth, their 'b anks and factories, just as Czech wonkers wanted to save their work and the Czech faI'Illers their lands. In Slovakia, however, the fight against Comrnunism was waged on an. ideological basis of clean national traditioo. SLOVAKIA 49 and of adherence to the Catholic Church. It thus happened that the Communists and Ozeich centralists had to come to grips with a spiritual power such as CatholiciSlm. R~pka wrote that "the Communists, favoring Slovak nationalism, were, not successful in paralyzing the influence of Slovak Catho&cism, which is not only nationalistic, but also passionately anti-Communist." We might add that even the Ozech centralists could not paralyze the influeD1Ce of Catholic-ism on publilc affairs in Slorvaldia. At that time, Riipka mentions in his memoirs, he, Zenkl, the Stra.nskys, father and son, and Drtina came together at Karls1bad. They worked out a plan to haive the Slovak Democrati~ Party - representing aver 60 per cent of the anti-Communist voters olf Slorva.kia - "ta;ke the initiative to rid itsellf olf 'undesirable' elements in its rrunk,~." The Communists were for the plan 100 per cent; not only with words, burt with deeds as wel!l. The Minister of Interior in Bratislava was a certain General Nicholas Ferjenci!k, a man without prindple and a willing exeouito.r of CommUJnistic orders. On Octo!ber 6, 1947, this Ferjenrcik broadcast that his o:5fice had tmcOIVered a plot against the Reipulblic and had already arrested 380 young memlbers of the ,S lovak anti..icentralistic and anti-Communistic intelligentsia. He accused them, as Rijpka states, "of colla:b orating with emigrants who were in foreign lands under the leadershtp of Sidor and :Our- cansky." Immediately the State representatives at Bratislaiva demanded the Prague parLiament to. deprive of immunity two Slovak Catholic gentlemen, deputies and general secretaries of the Slorvak Democratic Party, Dr. Mi<los Bugar and Dr. Jan Kempny, who were, it was chavged, connected with the "plot against the Reipulblic" Rtpka himself confirms that this was all a Communist inrvention. The offidals were not concerned with punishing ou1prits, because there were none. But they did want to terrorize the anti-COimimunistic elements in Sloiviakia, which meant pra-ctically the whole pOipulation of SlovaJkia. And, in this case, a shameful thing happened. Within the SlovaJk Democratic Party and within the Czech Government parties the Red colla!borators began their shady work. 50 SLOVAKIA They demanded Bugar and Kempny be deprived of immunity. These two deputies, mind you, belonged to the largest anti-Comnn,tmist party in. Sl01Vakia tha,t was represented in the Prague Government by Jan Ursiny, Vice-Premier of the Government, Dr. liV'an Pietor, Minister of Railroads, Dr. N. Franetk, Minilster of Unification, and Jan Lic'lmer, State UndersecTetary in the Ministry of National Defense. And in 194 7 the Prague Parliament had an absolute majority of non-Communist deputies. Something that should not have ha.'Ppened dild haq>pen. The Prague Government decided to sur.re:nder both Slo,vak deputies,. and immediately thereafter Parliament deprived both the general secretaries of a Government party in Slovalkia of their deputorial immunity. Dr. Bwgar and Dr. Kempny had to sit in jail, while Dr: Joseph Lettri'ch, president af the Democratic Party, !kept on sitting in the chairman's seat of the Slovak Naition,a;l Council in Bratislava and the other ministers remained sitting in their ministerial chairs in Prague. In the history af parliamentarism this is probably the only case of its kind. It was possible only bec8.lllse none of the people in the Government of Prague and Bratislava had enough co.ura:ge and p&sonal integrity to fight the Commtmists. A1l tihe SlO'V'ak and Czech people in Goive:rmnent were willing to make any and aill compromi<ses, treaties ano concessions, as long as they could pay for them with the freedOIIn and Sltlffering oif others. The case of Bu,gar and Kemipny presented the occasion to begin a .g reat offensive against the extortions af the Communists in the OzechoSlovaik Republic. The Slova!ks, as one man, todk the lead, in this ba,ttle, bec8.lllse here the principle af freedom was· at stake and the freedom of two af their sons was threatened. But they were hopelessly overpowered by the Reds and the Benes Czechs. True it is tha:t Benes, Riipka and others of their kind were of the opinion that onJy the western powers were supiposed to oppose the Communists and to stem the tide of Communism. Benes, Riiipka, and others of their political entourage, thought that their yielding, duplicity, nay, even their hostility toward their two co-workers, Dr. Bugar and Dr. Kempny, was appealing to the Soviets. And such was SLOVAKIA 51 the case. A great opportunity to sihow up the Reds was lost in the case of Bugar aind Kempny. It meant that the first fight on internal policy was lost, and that only shortly after Pra:gue also lost its first battle on foreign policy by olbeying Stalin and refusing to join in the Ma.I1S:hall P}an. Let us not forget that all this was done with the assent of Dr. Benes. Even here he · had his own "plan," and according t,o it he direct.ed especially the Czech National Socialists. We must rememb.er that Dr. Benes was a deputy and vice-president of the Czech National Soc,ialist Part.y from 1920 to 193'5, and that he financed it generously out of the State treasury. Benes needed that party as a means to gain his ends. He wanted first of all the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then, af:ter T. G. Masaryk, the office of -p resident. Then, when he noticed that the pallty hindered him in attaimng his ends, he easily renounced it. And so it was that in 1926 the party of the Ozetch National Socialists went into opposition to the Government rund its deputy, Dr. Edward Benes, was supposed to follow it. But he preferred to .r esign his mandate of deputy so that he cowd remain in the goivernment as an "impartial" (non...politi'cal) Minister of Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, the C.oo<!h National Socialists always regarded Benes as their man - their leader. Little wonder, then, that the Czech National Socialist ministers went to President Benes for adMce during the crisis that broke out in the Government between the Communists and the non-Communists in 194-8. Without Benes's assent nothmg was underta.ken, and Benes assured his followers that he Wa!S bacikinig them, that he would not desert them as he did in 1926. That was sUipposed to mean that he wowd not use them as tools to hold his position, but that he wowd stay with them to the end in the fight against the Communists in government, rugainst Gottwald's faction. In the moo:nitime. the Comunists sought to strengthen their positions, the key positions in the government which Benes had given them. In 1947 the Communists held these positions in the Pra;gue Government: Klement Gottwald, Premier; Viliam Siroky, Vi:ce~~ e r ; Vaclav Nosek, Min- 1i2 SLOVAKIA ister of Interior; Ja.romil Dolansky, Minister of Finance; Vaclav Kopecky, Minister of Infomnation; Ant.on Zmrhal, Minister of Internal 00immerce; Zdenek Nejedly, Minister of Labor and Social Welfare; Julius Duris, Minister of Agriculture; Vlado Clementis, StiaJte Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. All these Corrununist ministers did what was in the interest of their Party. And this jolb they did loyally and thoroughly. The Minister of the Interior, Nosek, purged the leadership of the Deipartment oif National Security in Bohemia of all non-Co1rmmmist eilements. He had eight regional commanders of the polrce tra..."'lsferred and fiUed their places with eight reliallJle Communists. The non-Communist ministers had a pretext to attack. This was one of the most foolish quarrels thiat ever took pla:ce. But President Benes rupproved it and was happy that the Communists occasioned it. The time to stir Uip the masses in Slovaikia and the whole Reipulblic, as weH a,s for rousing the sincere anger of the people, was when the Corrumunists demanded the arrest of the two SlovaJk deputies, Dr. Bugar and Dr. Kempny. But this opportunity was not used by Benes and his followers. Why should i.t be? Noithing b:uit the freedom and the lives of two Slo:viak Catholic deputies was ait stake ! Benes, Riipka, Zelllkl and company figured that they could better move the masses by starting a fight O!Ver such a great affair as No~ transferring eight po1icemen in Prague and supplanting them witih eight others. The police affair could not enthuse the Slav'c!Jkis and mll!c:h less the Czechs, who never were fighters. Besides the Czechs are educated by their witty journalist P. Haivlicek to hate and ridicule the police. But Benes, Zookl, Ri:pika and others, who did not go a:mong the peo,ple, but made politics in offices and editorial rooms, wanted to rescue eight poHcemen on account of whom a "graJve goveirrnmenual crisis" was initiated. On Felbruary 13, 1948, Zelllkl and other non-Communist ministers demanded that Nosek rescind his order. The Communists answered that the matter belOil!ged to the Ministry of Interior, and Nosek would rescind nothing. Every minister performs his office and does th,i ngs as he noiws best. The SLOVAKIA 53 government can caiH a minister to answer for his office, but in this case Premier Gottwald would not do that. Gottwald agreed completely with Nosek and would not disavow anything the Minister of t:Jhe futerior had approved. The nonCommunist ministers considered for a few days whether they should or shou;ld not resign. They told Nosek that they would not a,ttend any meetings of the GOfVernment or the National Front as long as Noselk would not rescind his order. On February 18th, Ripka and Zenk.I again hurried to Rresident Benes, who. approved of their taJctics and encouraged them to peraevere. He advised them to resign and so force the Commurusts to yield. Again and again :he asS1Ned them that he would stand by them "no, matter what happens!'' Fiil!ally, on Felbruacy 20, 1948, three parties - the Ozech Nationa,l Socialists, Sramek's Czech People's Party, and the S1ovruk Democrats - reca:Ued their ministers from the Government. Before resigning, Zenkl, as chairman of the National Socialist Party, telephoned President Benes and as Ripka himself tells it - Benes said over the telephone : "Finally! And now 'b e careful! No false moves!" Benes aiso peTsonally assured the resigning ministers that they acted co:rirectly when they resigned. He stated emphatically that he would not aC'Capt their resignations and so force the Comttnunists to yield. J,f there was any one who did not belieive in the strength and persona.:l honesty of Be,. nes, that person was the leader of the Czech Populists, Msgr. Sramelk. A. J. Janda:ceik in his booklet "Behind the !Ton Curtain" writes (ipg. 29): "Verry fow people, however, knew President Benes as well as Msgr. Sramek did. He knew how Benes conducted himself during the Munich crisis and 1kne,w some of his irresolute and 01Verly philosqphk views. That is why he expressed the fear at the time: whether too m1.11ch responsibility WalS not •b eing placed on the President, whether it was wise to put all the burden on the shoulders of one man. In his judgment Sramek went so far as to express a grave fear whether the President - with regard to his health would not aJotually disappoint in this decisive moment and 54 SLOVAKIA whether his nerves woulrl last to oppose the hard and well considered plans olf the Communists. Dr. Peter Zenkl, however, was so satisfied with the president's conduct that he dispelled Srarrnek's fears aJt least partially." In a word, it was known that Benes could not withstand the ordeal, as he could not even in 193'8 in Mund.ch. It was known that Benes's assurances had to be taken with great reserve - on the baisis of past experiences. Burt: why, then, did the tiwe1ve ministers ha,nd in their resignations, when Benes was not supposed to accept them and when with their resignation he was suwosed to peinform some sort of magic before the eyes of the Communists? Such utter silliness was SlllPposed to frighten the Communists and maike them concede, when they ha,d the masses on the move and headed in one direction in the Prwgue "of Benes" - the Prague that was ail Solkol and true to democracy?! The Communists used St.ate funds to call a rally of workers and farmers from the whole Republic to Pragqe. They commanded the streets of Prague. They already had the police safely in their hands since 1945, and General Ludo vik Sloboda, whom Benes named Minister ·of National Defense, promised to have the entire army ready if Gottwald should need it. Into the situation, directly from Moscow, flew Valerian A!exandroviic Zorin, Soviet deputy minister of Foreign Mfuirs and fo:mner Soviet aanibassador in Kosi.ce and, then, in Prrugue. Against these enthusiastic Communist masses that filled the streets of Prague and against· Zorin, who represented the whole diploma:tic and military might of the Soviet Union, Dr. Edward Benes stood alone. Behind him were the twe1ve ministers shaking with fear - the ministers who real1y did not want to resign, but wanted to stay on as .rninistem and in the Government, that is to say, to eogoveI1I1 with the Carrurruunists. That really was a scene for a puppet theatre! SraimeJk, as a good soothsayer, kept on cautioning that Be:nes would not hold up, that Benes was capiturlating even as he had capitulated in the fall of 193·8 to Ado1ph Hitler. And so it happened. Goittwa:ld and Nosek visited Benes two or three times to tallk things over. These were in~ SLOVAKIA 55 teresting coowersiations. "The president," writes A. J. Janda.eek, "ordered liistening deivices be placed in the room in which Benes conferred with the Communists. President Benes at that moment did not \know that a:ll his conversations and telephone calls were followed and heard 'by a system whi:ch already was rigged up by the Communist police without Benes's knoiwledige." Borth negotiarting parties tried to ,b eat each other in being cralfty. But the Communists were always a step ahead of Benes. Mteir Go.ttwa1d and Nosek left Benes, he was vdsited by two Nat:ionai Socialist ministers, Riipka and Stran. sky: This was Benes's l1ast conive1:1sation with these two ministers. Ripka noted the folloiwing as coming out of that conversation: Benes 'began the colllVersation with an energetic cry: "I shall not give in! I said openly and clearly to Gottwald: 'You are preparing to overthrow the St.ate, for a putsch, but I shall not let myseH be terrorized : by you'!" And then Benes told them the ·contents of his Wk with Premier Gottwald. I (Ripka) tQlld hd,m without mincing words: "That which you are preparing is another Munkh." The President's face grew serious. He said to us: "You .Jroow the Communists. You know that they do not hesitate to use any means to real±ze their pla:ns. We must be ·prepared for anything." There were reports, which I persona:hly _did not believe, that is that Russia was going to at~ck us. I told the President that I thought Russia would ,be S'atisfied to extend political help to our Corrm:i.un~sts, 'but that _w ith regard to the internatio.n•a l comp1ications that ' might result - Russia would not decide on a single military intemrention. The president listened with great attention. Then · he said to me literally: "I agree with you. I also think that way; Moscow will not take a risk -that would mean · military intenvention. Nevertheless, I .cannot -exclude the possi.ibility that the Soviet av.my would cross our · ,'bo:rders and then what would we do?" 1 56 SLOVAKIA "What would we do?" - repeated the president, looking at me and then at Stransky, "Yes, what would you do?" I answered that in such a case we would be occupied and defeated. But the nation and the whole world would see that we suC'Cumlbed to violence. It would be known that the COiIDmunist regime was forced upon us, that Ozecho.,Slwakia was a victim of an attack, agruinst which she could not defend herself. This defeat woud carry us to a new victory. A moment of silence intet,vened. Then the president 1begain to say: "Maybe," - he said - '~but that is not cerbain. Nolbody will helip us. Moscow knows tha:t." Then with growing feeling, raising his voice, Benes said: "I know them well, those peo,ple frO!lll MOS'COw. I had a chanice to know them more iintimaitely than you have known them. You overrate their intel1igence and their foresight. Even I committed the same mistalke. They do not U!Ilderstand the other states ait a!H. They thinlk they are realists. But, in fact, they are only fain.a.tics. Their whole policy is nothi,IJJg else but one of provoki.n!g war. But with them everything will end up as it did wlith Hitler." Stransky who never heard the president speak so, cried out: "And you tell us that? You who have done more than any!body else on earth to bring albout colla1boraition with Soviet Russia?" ,B enes smiled sadly and said: "I repeat what I have already told you: I shall not yield! You may rest assured on that!" With tha,t sentence our last carwersation with president Benes ended. None orf us ait that moment could know that we shall never again see him. So wrote Ripka albout his last conversation with Benes. The coniversation tells us that Benes knew the Soviet factors in Moscow and 'knew them for a long time. And, yet, he continually and without end recommended to Roosevelt and Churehill to collaborate wlith them. He demanded that the West believe Stalin. Benes dressed up the lies of Soviet SLOVAKIA 57 propaganda in a gartb of truth and thus, presented them to the uninfoI1II1ed West. That is how Benes sinned against the whole Christian world. He did not go unrewarded. He had to stand alone and face to face wi,t h the Soviet danger knowing that "nl()(body will helip us -- Moscow knows that." Despit,e all hlis assurances that he would not submit, that he knew the Communists well, Benes, nevertheless, did give in to the Communists. He capitulated to Clement Gottwald. He accepted the resignations of the 12 non-Communist minist,ers a-nd named the Government that Gottwald dictated! And what haJPPOOed with the 12 ministers who resigned? Espeicialiy what happened with the four ministers who belonged to, the Czech Na,tional Socia,1ist Party of Dr. :&!ward Benes? On May 6, 1948, deputies Dr. Duchacek, Dr. Krajina, Dr. StraJI1Skiy, VHim and Firt collaJborated in preparing a report on the .Alls,a{!e HoUJSe in FranikfuTt. This is what it says literally: "On the ad:temoon of Februacy 28, 1948, the National Socialist ministers assembled in the residence of Dr. Stransky. Durinig this meeting they telephoned Dr. Jina, political adviser af President Benes, and aslked him whether the President wotrld reiceiive them, as is the custom when ministers resign. Dr. Jina answered tha.t the President will not receive them and he repeated this statement when Dr. Rilpka asked a,g,a.in. Dr. Rilpka then said to Jina: "Tell Mr. President for us that he would not corner wJth the fouir ministers who during the who,l e period stood uncompromisingly behind his program. with him in full agreement. We want Dr. Benes to know just how the people who coUaiborated so closely witlh him feel rubout his not giving them an audience to e:,cplain his stand." Benes had fivst eooouraged the miru.stera to resign, then he assured them of his loyalty and persevea-ence, and, in the end, without theiir knowledge of it, had decided to accept their resignations. Then Benes did not even want to tadlk with them in parting. To keep the presidency Benes no longer needed the Czech N'aittonal Socialist Party nor its 58 S LOVAKIA four ministers. Now he needed only the Communists, because at the m01Inent they were stronge,r and in power. On February 27th Benes received the whole Gottwald gavernrment. Gottiwald said his speech, presented his ministers to Benes, and Benes replied to Gottwald's speech. By doing so, Benes accoided the recognition od' legality to the Coonmll!Ilist ministers for aH their future orders. · ..t\ifter Mlunich Benes proclaimed that he had a "plan." That w,as th~ plan by which he fled from Czecho..SlovaJkia. After cwpitulating t o Gottwald - the caipitulation that Benes himself ca'lied a "second Munich" - Benes burst into tears and said to editor Janda.eek, ,aecordin:g to 'J andacek : "Tell all the people who love democraicy to woiik in its interest and to try to validate its principles everywhere, and that eyen there, where they were for a time outraged." But did not Benes disgrace them? Did he haive to wp• prove the Communistic system? Were only othel's swppooed to work and fight for democracy, while Benes and his people were entitled to roop its advanta:ges and oo.j'Oy its privileges? After this secood capitulation Benes did not have an aerop1ane. He could not fly rubroad. He had only an automdbile. In it he left for his priv,ate residence in Sezimova U sti. He left, but only alter lie had legalired. every~ thing that the Oommumsts did and what they were still to do with the poople oif Ozecho-SfovaJlda. Benes, "the great de~ mocrat and builder," had done all that for the Communists! At the .end of his memoirs Ripk!a displayed .t he pinnacle of his cynicism. He whit~washed the Benes Czechs. They could not prevent the second Munich, even with weapons, he says, because the Soviet army would probably walk in and swbject the Czechs to untold brutalities. "After the oooupation of our country by the Soviet a11my in 1945," Ripka writes cynically, "we knew well what the Soviet army was cwpalble of!" (Il P01polo, Rome, May 15, 1949) . . Whether Ripka was in London or in Prague, until February 1948, he ·a-Iways spoke and wrote about the "liberation" ,of •Czecho,.JSlovakia a,nd the victorious Soviet . ·army; SLOVAKIA 59 The Czechs actuaHy welcomed that amiy enthusiastically. While Benes and the Czecihs 'kept tal!kiing about "liiberation" from 1945 to 194'8, we Slovaks, on the other hand, claimed that SlovaJkia was octmipied, that the Sio:viruk State was suppressed by force and th at the Soiviet soldiers in 1M4-1946 committed the most terrible bestialities against unarmed Slovak men and women. 1 Even Czech emigrants told me to my face that Slovakia was "liberated" in 1945. But today, even Ripka confesses, rather belatedJy, that his Bohemia, too, was occupied by Red Moscow already in 1946 ! That really is unmitigated cynici,s m, coming as it does from a person who played "independent minister" from 1945 to 1948 in his occupied country and then, looving the country, would agiain - with some other kind of army of "liberation" - save not only his own country, but also our beaten and crucified . SloviaJkia. We began our remarks to Ripka's memoirs by citing the ar.gumenit of R:dbert Ingrim about the possibility of the existenice of a secret a·g rooment between. Benes, Ripka, Zenkl and Gottwa:ld. Now we read in the newspaper of the Czech National Socialist deiputy Fr.anois Klatil ("CA.IS," London, The Wa!Wi(j}c Printing Co. , issue No. 1, 1949) a note from the pen of Dr. Edward Benes a:bout the conferenJce with Gottwald on May 1'4, 194'8. In it Benes carries on a long dialogue with Gottwald aiboot wanting to resign from the presidency. Let us quote at least a few sentences from it: "The president does not want to tell the Communists to do things dififerently, since he does not want to hinder them. That is why he repeats to the Premier o!f the Government not to loOlk for any foreign influences in his action. It is only and only his personal decision. . . . The president again emphasizes that (in Sezimovo Usti) he did not receive any1body, neither did he aiSlk anyibod,y for any exiplanations or to let him kno:w his stand. Eive:rything is exclusively his own.. .. Therefore he .is g1ving the Communist PM'ty freedom of action to arr.ange things to suit its needs. The President further states that he is taLkiDJg with the Prime Minister of the government witlh complete sincerity 60 SL OV AK IA and con1Viction and he is asking him to judge what he is saying from that standpoint. He does not quarrel, nor in the end, does he want to part with t!he Prime Minister of the Governrment in a quarrel. . . . He does not want the Communists to hasve any quaITels with the President, nor the President to quarrel with the Communists, 1because it would be possi!ble to a.lbuse this. The State is so dear to the President, that he will do nothing that might harm it. . . . Prime Minister Gottwald at first replied in general terms to the President's explanation. and his initention orf abdiooting. He says that the Communists wotl'ld prefer not to have to discuss the question olf the departure of the President. He knows what moti1Ves the President has, he respects them aoo thinks that id' it is already necessary to part, that they would want to part as friends. The President answers, that he wishes the same. He said that to Smutny and hopes that they shall pa.rt as friends. He reminded even Dr. Clementi'! that he, Benes, will not undertake any action against his own State, that he will not go against the Communists and he shall not undertake any act that would be direct.e<l against the Soviet Union." That, then, is how Benes spoke to Gottwald in Sezimoivo Usti. He assured him he would do nothing against the Communists or the Soviet Union. He expressed a sincere desire to part with Got:Jtwal:d and the Communists in Governmeint as a friend. He wanted to retire and hand over everything to Gottwald and his Ozech Reds peaoofully. And he did eventually. Gottwald then saw to it th,a t Dr. Edward Benes got full pay "for life," too. Does the international anti-Com.mt.mist pU!blic think that the sa,me principles do not hold for Bene.s's close colila:borators - for Ripka, ZenJk,l , and for the many other Czechs, who fled Ozechoslovaikia after February 19~8? We must be on our g:uard. The legends olf "li'beration" and "Jiberntors" from 1948 to 1945 are well knolWil. to us and must ever be a warning not only for us Slova:ks, but a'lso for the whole civilized Christian world.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dr. Hubert Ripka's Version of the Communist "Putsch" in Czecho-Slovakia Description An account of the resource Karol Sidor Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 3 (8), September 1953 pp. 32-60 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Sidor, Karol, 1901-1953 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September 1953 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/e671f9a0729587476aa87bdf6b89fe1d.pdf df8a30534e23f2d62470a780e171cea0 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 63 IT'S HISTORY NOW - CZECHO-SLOV AKIA F. A. VOIGHT The submissive nature of the Czechs, which has made them collaborate almost as closely with the Germans as they are now collaborating with the Russians, has promoted the delusion that, unlike the Poles and Yugoslavs, they have recovered their national independence. The truth is that they have as little independence under the Russians as they had under the Germans, perhaps even less, for German domination, ruthless as it was, did not go as deep as Russian and was not so comprehensive. The Czecho-Slovak Government in Prague is but a fiction. The country is administered, in effect, by the National Committees, which are controlled by the Communists who, like Communists everywhere, are but Russian agents. By 'the country' we mean Bohemia and Moravia, for Czecho-Slovakia has ceased to exist. Poland exists, though she is mutilated and a vassal, but Czecho-Slovakia does not exist. Carpathian-Ruthenia has been annexed by Russia (without a ·p rotest from anyone), and Slovakia, though not independent of Moscow, is independent from Prague. It is hardly conceivable that Czecho-Slovakia will ever be restored - not even when Europe will at last have been liberated. When that happens, the Sudetenlanders will surely return to their own country and the Slovaks will surely proclaim their independence. But the liberation of Europe, which will surely include the liberation of the Czechs, can but perpetuate the extinction of Czecho-Slovakia. There is no failure in Europe so complete and so enduring as the failure of Dr. Benes. • "To-day all Slavs are being forced into unity by Russia." She dominates all North-Eastern, Eastern, Central, and South-Eastern Europe (except for Greece and a part of Austria). Karl Marx himself was highly critical of the PanSlav movement as an instrument of Russia imperialism. He maintained that unless the Slav nations enjoyed complete independence, Russia's western frontier would run 'from Danzig or Stettin to Trieste'. This is almost exactly what �64 SLOV.AXIA has come to pass. Russia's European conquests can mean much, even now - far more than is realized in this country. But they mean even more for the future, seeing that they are a base, a hinterland, a glacis, a.ind a source of supply, from which Russia can advance westwards towards further conquests. Her control over the countries she has conquered is absolute. Their populations number 130,000,000 or 140,000,000 in all ( death through war, hunger, and disease, deportations and 'transfers' make it impossible to give a .p recise figure), their fighting forces, their skilled labour, their experts _a nd technicians, their science, art, and literature, their natural resources, their trade and industry, their canals, roads, and railways, their strategic advantages, and so on, are all at the disposal of Russia. AH these countries are severally and collectively a means to her ends - not one of them can live for itself, no one person in them can live for himself, or for his country, or for Europe, for mankind, for science, art, or religion, but only .for Russia. And yet, save for a few zealots, there are none who wish to live for Russia - ninetynine out of a hundred at least have the wish that the Russians may leave Europe, never to return. But, for the time being at least, Russia. is omnipotent in the countries she has conquered. Legally they are independent - that is so, even of the Baltic States which have been i,;icorpo-r ated in the Soviet Union. But even those which have not been incorporated are being forced into one political and economic order which approximates more and more closely to that of the Soviet Union. In all of them, the Russians are hated by the entire population, except for that small minority of ·p ersons who derive some advantage - office, a job, money, or influence - from the new Russian order. If there were to be free elections, and the issue were for or against the withdrawal of the Russians, the majority for withdrawal would· be overwhelming. If the Russians were to withdraw, their instniments - Tito, Bierut, Groza, Benes, and so on, would be swept out of existence. The ,R ussians would have to take -the Communists along with them to save (The Nineteenth Century and them from massacre." After, April 1946.) � SLOVAKIA 63 IT'S HISTORY NOW - CZECHO-SLOV AKIA F. A. VOIGHT The submissive nature of the Czechs, which has made them collaborate almost as closely with the Germans as they are now collaborating with the Russians, has promoted the delusion that, unlike the Poles and Yugoslavs, they have recovered their national independence. The truth is that they have as little independence under the Russians as they had under the Germans, perhaps even less, for German domination, ruthless as it was, did not go as deep as Russian and was not so comprehensive. The Czecho-Slovak Government in Prague is but a fiction. The country is administered, in effect, by the National Committees, which are controlled by the Communists who, like Communists everywhere, are but Russian agents. By 'the country' we mean Bohemia and Moravia, for Czecho-Slovakia has ceased to exist. Poland exists, though she is mutilated and a vassal, but Czecho-Slovakia does not exist. Carpathian-Ruthenia has been annexed by Russia (without a ·p rotest from anyone), and Slovakia, though not independent of Moscow, is independent from Prague. It is hardly conceivable that Czecho-Slovakia will ever be restored - not even when Europe will at last have been liberated. When that happens, the Sudetenlanders will surely return to their own country and the Slovaks will surely proclaim their independence. But the liberation of Europe, which will surely include the liberation of the Czechs, can but perpetuate the extinction of Czecho-Slovakia. There is no failure in Europe so complete and so enduring as the failure of Dr. Benes. • "To-day all Slavs are being forced into unity by Russia." She dominates all North-Eastern, Eastern, Central, and South-Eastern Europe (except for Greece and a part of Austria). Karl Marx himself was highly critical of the PanSlav movement as an instrument of Russia imperialism. He maintained that unless the Slav nations enjoyed complete independence, Russia's western frontier would run 'from Danzig or Stettin to Trieste'. This is almost exactly what �64 SLOV.AXIA has come to pass. Russia's European conquests can mean much, even now - far more than is realized in this country. But they mean even more for the future, seeing that they are a base, a hinterland, a glacis, a.ind a source of supply, from which Russia can advance westwards towards further conquests. Her control over the countries she has conquered is absolute. Their populations number 130,000,000 or 140,000,000 in all ( death through war, hunger, and disease, deportations and 'transfers' make it impossible to give a .p recise figure), their fighting forces, their skilled labour, their experts _a nd technicians, their science, art, and literature, their natural resources, their trade and industry, their canals, roads, and railways, their strategic advantages, and so on, are all at the disposal of Russia. AH these countries are severally and collectively a means to her ends - not one of them can live for itself, no one person in them can live for himself, or for his country, or for Europe, for mankind, for science, art, or religion, but only .for Russia. And yet, save for a few zealots, there are none who wish to live for Russia - ninetynine out of a hundred at least have the wish that the Russians may leave Europe, never to return. But, for the time being at least, Russia. is omnipotent in the countries she has conquered. Legally they are independent - that is so, even of the Baltic States which have been i,;icorpo-r ated in the Soviet Union. But even those which have not been incorporated are being forced into one political and economic order which approximates more and more closely to that of the Soviet Union. In all of them, the Russians are hated by the entire population, except for that small minority of ·p ersons who derive some advantage - office, a job, money, or influence - from the new Russian order. If there were to be free elections, and the issue were for or against the withdrawal of the Russians, the majority for withdrawal would· be overwhelming. If the Russians were to withdraw, their instniments - Tito, Bierut, Groza, Benes, and so on, would be swept out of existence. The ,R ussians would have to take -the Communists along with them to save (The Nineteenth Century and them from massacre." After, April 1946.) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 63 IT'S HISTORY NOW - CZECHO-SLOV AKIA F. A. VOIGHT The submissive nature of the Czechs, which has made them collaborate almost as closely with the Germans as they are now collaborating with the Russians, has promoted the delusion that, unlike the Poles and Yugoslavs, they have recovered their national independence. The truth is that they have as little independence under the Russians as they had under the Germans, perhaps even less, for German domination, ruthless as it was, did not go as deep as Russian and was not so comprehensive. The Czecho-Slovak Government in Prague is but a fiction. The country is administered, in effect, by the National Committees, which are controlled by the Communists who, like Communists everywhere, are but Russian agents. By 'the country' we mean Bohemia and Moravia, for Czecho-Slovakia has ceased to exist. Poland exists, though she is mutilated and a vassal, but Czecho-Slovakia does not exist. Carpathian-Ruthenia has been annexed by Russia (without a ·p rotest from anyone), and Slovakia, though not independent of Moscow, is independent from Prague. It is hardly conceivable that Czecho-Slovakia will ever be restored - not even when Europe will at last have been liberated. When that happens, the Sudetenlanders will surely return to their own country and the Slovaks will surely proclaim their independence. But the liberation of Europe, which will surely include the liberation of the Czechs, can but perpetuate the extinction of Czecho-Slovakia. There is no failure in Europe so complete and so enduring as the failure of Dr. Benes. • "To-day all Slavs are being forced into unity by Russia." She dominates all North-Eastern, Eastern, Central, and South-Eastern Europe (except for Greece and a part of Austria). Karl Marx himself was highly critical of the PanSlav movement as an instrument of Russia imperialism. He maintained that unless the Slav nations enjoyed complete independence, Russia's western frontier would run 'from Danzig or Stettin to Trieste'. This is almost exactly what 64 SLOV.AXIA has come to pass. Russia's European conquests can mean much, even now - far more than is realized in this country. But they mean even more for the future, seeing that they are a base, a hinterland, a glacis, a.ind a source of supply, from which Russia can advance westwards towards further conquests. Her control over the countries she has conquered is absolute. Their populations number 130,000,000 or 140,000,000 in all ( death through war, hunger, and disease, deportations and 'transfers' make it impossible to give a .p recise figure), their fighting forces, their skilled labour, their experts _a nd technicians, their science, art, and literature, their natural resources, their trade and industry, their canals, roads, and railways, their strategic advantages, and so on, are all at the disposal of Russia. AH these countries are severally and collectively a means to her ends - not one of them can live for itself, no one person in them can live for himself, or for his country, or for Europe, for mankind, for science, art, or religion, but only .for Russia. And yet, save for a few zealots, there are none who wish to live for Russia - ninetynine out of a hundred at least have the wish that the Russians may leave Europe, never to return. But, for the time being at least, Russia. is omnipotent in the countries she has conquered. Legally they are independent - that is so, even of the Baltic States which have been i,;icorpo-r ated in the Soviet Union. But even those which have not been incorporated are being forced into one political and economic order which approximates more and more closely to that of the Soviet Union. In all of them, the Russians are hated by the entire population, except for that small minority of ·p ersons who derive some advantage - office, a job, money, or influence - from the new Russian order. If there were to be free elections, and the issue were for or against the withdrawal of the Russians, the majority for withdrawal would· be overwhelming. If the Russians were to withdraw, their instniments - Tito, Bierut, Groza, Benes, and so on, would be swept out of existence. The ,R ussians would have to take -the Communists along with them to save (The Nineteenth Century and them from massacre." After, April 1946.)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource It's History Now - Czecho-Slovakia Description An account of the resource F. A. Voight Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 1 (6), April 1953 pp. 63-64 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Voight, F. A. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource April 1953 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/70a93da5d0fe81afca3bd24f1c559d77.pdf 9ce6376d7b082d4e046e69dff47642f2 PDF Text Text YOU CAN LEARN SLOVAK as easily as you can any other mode;: n language. Slovak should be a MUST for students of Slovanic languages, because it is the simplest of all of them and a KEY to all of them . Prove it to yourself with the most scholarly text on Slovak, the SLOV AI( LESSONS A practical study of the Slovak Grammar, 92 lessons, 400 pages; exercises in Slovak and English; English-Slovak and Slovak-English vocabulary. Hard cover, bound in cloth, $3.50 HROBAK'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY - the best and most complete dictionary of its kind; 702 pages with a brief sumary of the Slovak Grammar. Hard cover, bound in cloth, $4.00 THE SLOVAKS, by Peter P. Yurchak, should be read by all students interested in the history and traditions of the Slovak nation; 312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $3.00; paper cover - $2.00 SKETCHES FROl\'i SLOVAK HISTORY by Joseph Skultety, translation by 0 . D. Koreff; a documented refutation of several errors propagated by writers and historians; 229 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover $1.00. Order from: P.A.HROBAK Box 150 Middletown, Pa. �SLOVAIDA: The Stiavnicka Castle in Liptov County � YOU CAN LEARN SLOVAK as easily as you can any other mode;: n language. Slovak should be a MUST for students of Slovanic languages, because it is the simplest of all of them and a KEY to all of them . Prove it to yourself with the most scholarly text on Slovak, the SLOV AI( LESSONS A practical study of the Slovak Grammar, 92 lessons, 400 pages; exercises in Slovak and English; English-Slovak and Slovak-English vocabulary. Hard cover, bound in cloth, $3.50 HROBAK'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY - the best and most complete dictionary of its kind; 702 pages with a brief sumary of the Slovak Grammar. Hard cover, bound in cloth, $4.00 THE SLOVAKS, by Peter P. Yurchak, should be read by all students interested in the history and traditions of the Slovak nation; 312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $3.00; paper cover - $2.00 SKETCHES FROl\'i SLOVAK HISTORY by Joseph Skultety, translation by 0 . D. Koreff; a documented refutation of several errors propagated by writers and historians; 229 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover $1.00. Order from: P.A.HROBAK Box 150 Middletown, Pa. �SLOVAIDA: The Stiavnicka Castle in Liptov County � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAIDA: The Stiavnicka Castle in Liptov County  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9) Description An account of the resource includes photo of Štiavnička Castle Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1953 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/cb56504b2fb7b5b01b1e5cccaadb7e64.pdf 08cd7f1762d80154fe56332576d6d7d8 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 59 protected it aigainst invasion, occupation and annexation, gas chambers and concentration camps. But for that Benes and his poli1Jcal regime denounced them as traitors. The Sl,ovaks were held responsible foT a situation which they thema situation into which they wetre sellVes had not created thrust alOIIlg with the Czech nation by the aniti-diemocratic, anit-Chri<Sltian, anti-Slovalk and imperialistic policies of the late but not lamented Dr. Edward Benes, the man who sold out the Slovaik and Ozech nations twice within a decade to tota'1itarian powers. • • • CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA BUDATIN The ruins of the Budatin Castle stand opposite 2ilina, just about where the Kysuca pours into the Vah. In its time it stood guard over the J ablunkov Pass and the old commercial highways. Slovak history tells us that the Slovaks, led by Joseph Hurban, fought two battles here during the rebellion of the 1848-1849: the first one September 11, 1848, and the second January 2, 1849. During the latter fight the archives of Budatin, which today undoubtedly could have shed some light on the foggy history of ancient Slovakia, were destroyed by fire. In 1922-23, the lower part of the castle was restored which was adorned with a typical Budatin tower. In the castle there are two spacious rooms, one on the ground floor and the other on the upper floor, which are adorned with numerous pictures, most of them portraits of former owners of the castle. In one of the side rooms is a portrait of Ludmila Lazansky, to whom the Slovaks even today refer to as "our good Ludmila." The people still recall that the mistresses of Budatin Castle treated the Slovaks rather decently and that one of them even had a bridge built across the Vah river at a time when there was no work and people were starving. The rooms of the castle tower are especially interesting, containing as they do many precious antiquities. The view of the river and the vicinity �60 S LOVAKIA from the tower is very beautiful. In the corridor of the tower one can also see the memorable cell with the escutcheon of the Sunog-Komar family, where the daughter of Gaspar Sunog, Catherine, was walled in, according to popular legend for refusing to marry the man of her father's choice. From the highest point of Budatin one can see the topmost parts of the ruins of Lieta va Castle. Budatin is mentioned in history as early as 1250; at that time the tower existed, but not the other adjacent buildings. That year the Budatin Chapter issued the document which determined and defined the properties of the Dukes of Zvolen. The village of "Wudatin" is also mentioned in the thirteenth century. At the beginning of the following century, Budatin became the property of the king. It is interesting to note that although Matthew Cak, "the lord of the Vah and the Tatras," ruled over thirty castles, he never was the lord of Budatin. Maximilian, a loyal adherent of Robert, was awarded Budatin shortly after it came into royal possession. During the r eign of King Zigmund of the House of Luxembourg, the Czech Brethren from Tabor settled beneath Budatin. In 1431 they captured '~ ilina which was well fortified at that time, according to a document left by Zigmund. Old documents mention a certain Ladislaus of Hatna, a valiant warrior, who was called to Budatin from Bohemia by King Zigmund. Undoubtedly he became the captain of the castle because he served Zigmund well; he escorted the king to Milan for a coronation and two years later (1433) also to Rome. The widow of Ladislaus, Raphaela, married Gaspar Sunog, a Slovak whose name really was Komar (Magyar translation "Szunyok"). In the sixteenth century, there was a struggle for the throne of Hungary between King Ferdinand and John Zap of sky, just when the Turks threatened to take everything. While the rivals fought it out for the crown of Hungary, the wealthy landowners exploited the situation to enhance their own positions. Many castles were taken by the plunderers. The vicinity of ~ilina was terrorized by the notorious John and Raphael of Podmanin, who finally even took Buda- �SLOVAKIA 61 tin away from the Sunog-Komar family. The castles Hricov and Lednica, together with Budatin, became the feared residences of the robber knights. Zilina was their political centrum. The Podmanin brothers were apprehended and convicted by the regional court for their crimes, but when they humbled themselves and begged forgiveness, the king amnestied them and returned their properties. But they had to give up Budatin to the Sunog-Komar clan. Later Budatin came into the hands of Gaspar Sunog; the story of the walled-in bride originated in his time. At the beginning of December 1848, Joseph Miloslav Hurban, Slovak patriot from Beckov, and emperor's officers Bloudek, Zach and Janecek organized an expedition of volunteers in Tesin, Silesia. This volunteer army joined with a division of the Austrian army, which then took everything along the Kysuca and stood before Budatin on December 11th. At that time, Budatin was guarded by a Magyar garrison, but the volunteers had little trouble in dispersing it. When, however, they attempted to cross the bridge into Zilina, they were surprised ·b y the Magyars who cannonaded them and forced the expedition back to Budatin. With the Magyar army was also the son of the mistress of the Budatin Castle, Lady Caky, who in the meantime had fled from the castle disguised as a peasant. On January 2, 1849, another battle was staged at Budatin. The volunteers, led by Hurban, Zach and Bloudek, were aided by the forces of General Gatz of Austria. After surprising the Magyars and taking the bridge over the Vah, the volunteers rested in Zilina for six days and then moved farther into the Trencin country. The archives of Budatin Castle were destroyed by fire during this battle . • • • WHO SAID IT ? "Some pussy-footing ostriches criticize the treaty between Soviet Russia rund Czechoslovakia Our close collaboration with the Soviet Union needs no explanation. We do not want anything from the Russia,ns except protection frOiffi the Germ8!Ils, a:nd the Russians want nothing whatsoever from us." - (Jan Masaryk, BUSINESS WEEK, May 13, 1944). � SLOVAKIA 59 protected it aigainst invasion, occupation and annexation, gas chambers and concentration camps. But for that Benes and his poli1Jcal regime denounced them as traitors. The Sl,ovaks were held responsible foT a situation which they thema situation into which they wetre sellVes had not created thrust alOIIlg with the Czech nation by the aniti-diemocratic, anit-Chri<Sltian, anti-Slovalk and imperialistic policies of the late but not lamented Dr. Edward Benes, the man who sold out the Slovaik and Ozech nations twice within a decade to tota'1itarian powers. • • • CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA BUDATIN The ruins of the Budatin Castle stand opposite 2ilina, just about where the Kysuca pours into the Vah. In its time it stood guard over the J ablunkov Pass and the old commercial highways. Slovak history tells us that the Slovaks, led by Joseph Hurban, fought two battles here during the rebellion of the 1848-1849: the first one September 11, 1848, and the second January 2, 1849. During the latter fight the archives of Budatin, which today undoubtedly could have shed some light on the foggy history of ancient Slovakia, were destroyed by fire. In 1922-23, the lower part of the castle was restored which was adorned with a typical Budatin tower. In the castle there are two spacious rooms, one on the ground floor and the other on the upper floor, which are adorned with numerous pictures, most of them portraits of former owners of the castle. In one of the side rooms is a portrait of Ludmila Lazansky, to whom the Slovaks even today refer to as "our good Ludmila." The people still recall that the mistresses of Budatin Castle treated the Slovaks rather decently and that one of them even had a bridge built across the Vah river at a time when there was no work and people were starving. The rooms of the castle tower are especially interesting, containing as they do many precious antiquities. The view of the river and the vicinity �60 S LOVAKIA from the tower is very beautiful. In the corridor of the tower one can also see the memorable cell with the escutcheon of the Sunog-Komar family, where the daughter of Gaspar Sunog, Catherine, was walled in, according to popular legend for refusing to marry the man of her father's choice. From the highest point of Budatin one can see the topmost parts of the ruins of Lieta va Castle. Budatin is mentioned in history as early as 1250; at that time the tower existed, but not the other adjacent buildings. That year the Budatin Chapter issued the document which determined and defined the properties of the Dukes of Zvolen. The village of "Wudatin" is also mentioned in the thirteenth century. At the beginning of the following century, Budatin became the property of the king. It is interesting to note that although Matthew Cak, "the lord of the Vah and the Tatras," ruled over thirty castles, he never was the lord of Budatin. Maximilian, a loyal adherent of Robert, was awarded Budatin shortly after it came into royal possession. During the r eign of King Zigmund of the House of Luxembourg, the Czech Brethren from Tabor settled beneath Budatin. In 1431 they captured '~ ilina which was well fortified at that time, according to a document left by Zigmund. Old documents mention a certain Ladislaus of Hatna, a valiant warrior, who was called to Budatin from Bohemia by King Zigmund. Undoubtedly he became the captain of the castle because he served Zigmund well; he escorted the king to Milan for a coronation and two years later (1433) also to Rome. The widow of Ladislaus, Raphaela, married Gaspar Sunog, a Slovak whose name really was Komar (Magyar translation "Szunyok"). In the sixteenth century, there was a struggle for the throne of Hungary between King Ferdinand and John Zap of sky, just when the Turks threatened to take everything. While the rivals fought it out for the crown of Hungary, the wealthy landowners exploited the situation to enhance their own positions. Many castles were taken by the plunderers. The vicinity of ~ilina was terrorized by the notorious John and Raphael of Podmanin, who finally even took Buda- �SLOVAKIA 61 tin away from the Sunog-Komar family. The castles Hricov and Lednica, together with Budatin, became the feared residences of the robber knights. Zilina was their political centrum. The Podmanin brothers were apprehended and convicted by the regional court for their crimes, but when they humbled themselves and begged forgiveness, the king amnestied them and returned their properties. But they had to give up Budatin to the Sunog-Komar clan. Later Budatin came into the hands of Gaspar Sunog; the story of the walled-in bride originated in his time. At the beginning of December 1848, Joseph Miloslav Hurban, Slovak patriot from Beckov, and emperor's officers Bloudek, Zach and Janecek organized an expedition of volunteers in Tesin, Silesia. This volunteer army joined with a division of the Austrian army, which then took everything along the Kysuca and stood before Budatin on December 11th. At that time, Budatin was guarded by a Magyar garrison, but the volunteers had little trouble in dispersing it. When, however, they attempted to cross the bridge into Zilina, they were surprised ·b y the Magyars who cannonaded them and forced the expedition back to Budatin. With the Magyar army was also the son of the mistress of the Budatin Castle, Lady Caky, who in the meantime had fled from the castle disguised as a peasant. On January 2, 1849, another battle was staged at Budatin. The volunteers, led by Hurban, Zach and Bloudek, were aided by the forces of General Gatz of Austria. After surprising the Magyars and taking the bridge over the Vah, the volunteers rested in Zilina for six days and then moved farther into the Trencin country. The archives of Budatin Castle were destroyed by fire during this battle . • • • WHO SAID IT ? "Some pussy-footing ostriches criticize the treaty between Soviet Russia rund Czechoslovakia Our close collaboration with the Soviet Union needs no explanation. We do not want anything from the Russia,ns except protection frOiffi the Germ8!Ils, a:nd the Russians want nothing whatsoever from us." - (Jan Masaryk, BUSINESS WEEK, May 13, 1944). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 59 protected it aigainst invasion, occupation and annexation, gas chambers and concentration camps. But for that Benes and his poli1Jcal regime denounced them as traitors. The Sl,ovaks were held responsible foT a situation which they thema situation into which they wetre sellVes had not created thrust alOIIlg with the Czech nation by the aniti-diemocratic, anit-Chri<Sltian, anti-Slovalk and imperialistic policies of the late but not lamented Dr. Edward Benes, the man who sold out the Slovaik and Ozech nations twice within a decade to tota'1itarian powers. • • • CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA BUDATIN The ruins of the Budatin Castle stand opposite 2ilina, just about where the Kysuca pours into the Vah. In its time it stood guard over the J ablunkov Pass and the old commercial highways. Slovak history tells us that the Slovaks, led by Joseph Hurban, fought two battles here during the rebellion of the 1848-1849: the first one September 11, 1848, and the second January 2, 1849. During the latter fight the archives of Budatin, which today undoubtedly could have shed some light on the foggy history of ancient Slovakia, were destroyed by fire. In 1922-23, the lower part of the castle was restored which was adorned with a typical Budatin tower. In the castle there are two spacious rooms, one on the ground floor and the other on the upper floor, which are adorned with numerous pictures, most of them portraits of former owners of the castle. In one of the side rooms is a portrait of Ludmila Lazansky, to whom the Slovaks even today refer to as "our good Ludmila." The people still recall that the mistresses of Budatin Castle treated the Slovaks rather decently and that one of them even had a bridge built across the Vah river at a time when there was no work and people were starving. The rooms of the castle tower are especially interesting, containing as they do many precious antiquities. The view of the river and the vicinity 60 S LOVAKIA from the tower is very beautiful. In the corridor of the tower one can also see the memorable cell with the escutcheon of the Sunog-Komar family, where the daughter of Gaspar Sunog, Catherine, was walled in, according to popular legend for refusing to marry the man of her father's choice. From the highest point of Budatin one can see the topmost parts of the ruins of Lieta va Castle. Budatin is mentioned in history as early as 1250; at that time the tower existed, but not the other adjacent buildings. That year the Budatin Chapter issued the document which determined and defined the properties of the Dukes of Zvolen. The village of "Wudatin" is also mentioned in the thirteenth century. At the beginning of the following century, Budatin became the property of the king. It is interesting to note that although Matthew Cak, "the lord of the Vah and the Tatras," ruled over thirty castles, he never was the lord of Budatin. Maximilian, a loyal adherent of Robert, was awarded Budatin shortly after it came into royal possession. During the r eign of King Zigmund of the House of Luxembourg, the Czech Brethren from Tabor settled beneath Budatin. In 1431 they captured '~ ilina which was well fortified at that time, according to a document left by Zigmund. Old documents mention a certain Ladislaus of Hatna, a valiant warrior, who was called to Budatin from Bohemia by King Zigmund. Undoubtedly he became the captain of the castle because he served Zigmund well; he escorted the king to Milan for a coronation and two years later (1433) also to Rome. The widow of Ladislaus, Raphaela, married Gaspar Sunog, a Slovak whose name really was Komar (Magyar translation "Szunyok"). In the sixteenth century, there was a struggle for the throne of Hungary between King Ferdinand and John Zap of sky, just when the Turks threatened to take everything. While the rivals fought it out for the crown of Hungary, the wealthy landowners exploited the situation to enhance their own positions. Many castles were taken by the plunderers. The vicinity of ~ilina was terrorized by the notorious John and Raphael of Podmanin, who finally even took Buda- SLOVAKIA 61 tin away from the Sunog-Komar family. The castles Hricov and Lednica, together with Budatin, became the feared residences of the robber knights. Zilina was their political centrum. The Podmanin brothers were apprehended and convicted by the regional court for their crimes, but when they humbled themselves and begged forgiveness, the king amnestied them and returned their properties. But they had to give up Budatin to the Sunog-Komar clan. Later Budatin came into the hands of Gaspar Sunog; the story of the walled-in bride originated in his time. At the beginning of December 1848, Joseph Miloslav Hurban, Slovak patriot from Beckov, and emperor's officers Bloudek, Zach and Janecek organized an expedition of volunteers in Tesin, Silesia. This volunteer army joined with a division of the Austrian army, which then took everything along the Kysuca and stood before Budatin on December 11th. At that time, Budatin was guarded by a Magyar garrison, but the volunteers had little trouble in dispersing it. When, however, they attempted to cross the bridge into Zilina, they were surprised ·b y the Magyars who cannonaded them and forced the expedition back to Budatin. With the Magyar army was also the son of the mistress of the Budatin Castle, Lady Caky, who in the meantime had fled from the castle disguised as a peasant. On January 2, 1849, another battle was staged at Budatin. The volunteers, led by Hurban, Zach and Bloudek, were aided by the forces of General Gatz of Austria. After surprising the Magyars and taking the bridge over the Vah, the volunteers rested in Zilina for six days and then moved farther into the Trencin country. The archives of Budatin Castle were destroyed by fire during this battle . • • • WHO SAID IT ? "Some pussy-footing ostriches criticize the treaty between Soviet Russia rund Czechoslovakia Our close collaboration with the Soviet Union needs no explanation. We do not want anything from the Russia,ns except protection frOiffi the Germ8!Ils, a:nd the Russians want nothing whatsoever from us." - (Jan Masaryk, BUSINESS WEEK, May 13, 1944).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Castles of Slovakia: Budatín Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953 pp. 59-61 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1953 castles https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/cb03e26aa3acb215579376ed63028435.pdf f040d644392e73fd9863035830cbd646 PDF Text Text DECEMBER 1953 VQL. Ill NO. 4 IN THIS ISSUE: INFLUENCE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY ON SLOVAK LIF E CHRISTMAS IN THE LOW TATRA REGION . SLOVAKIA AND THE WEST THE CZECHS FOR A CENTRAL EUROPEAN FEDERATION ? SLOVAKIA' S RIGHT TO BE HEARD s SLOVAKIA AND INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN 1938 WHY THE SLOVAKS WERE NOT CONTENT IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA SLOVAKIA IN THE LIGHT OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA: BUDATIN LETTRICH ' S REGIME IN THE LIGHT OF TRUTH WHO SAID IT ? - PP. 15, 21 , 26, 54, 61 • • • Edited and compi led by PHILIP A. HROBAK Pub I ished by THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA �SLOV A.KIA is µublished periodically by the Slovak League of America, a cultural and civic federation of Amerteans of Slovak descent. The chief purpose of S.LOV AK.IA is to promote a better understanding and appreciation of the Slovak nation and its long struggle for freedom and independence. As Americans, members of the Slovak League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all nations, has an inherent and God-given right to freedom and independence. They are dedicated to the cause of the American way of life, Slovak freedom and world peace and are determined to oppose the plague of Communism and all other totalitarian political systems. Subscription to Slovakia $1.00 per year in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere. Send subscriptions to: SLOVAKIA Box 150 Middletown, Pa. Printed in the U. S. A. JEDNOTA PRESS Middletown, Pa. � DECEMBER 1953 VQL. Ill NO. 4 IN THIS ISSUE: INFLUENCE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY ON SLOVAK LIF E CHRISTMAS IN THE LOW TATRA REGION . SLOVAKIA AND THE WEST THE CZECHS FOR A CENTRAL EUROPEAN FEDERATION ? SLOVAKIA' S RIGHT TO BE HEARD s SLOVAKIA AND INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN 1938 WHY THE SLOVAKS WERE NOT CONTENT IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA SLOVAKIA IN THE LIGHT OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA: BUDATIN LETTRICH ' S REGIME IN THE LIGHT OF TRUTH WHO SAID IT ? - PP. 15, 21 , 26, 54, 61 • • • Edited and compi led by PHILIP A. HROBAK Pub I ished by THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA �SLOV A.KIA is µublished periodically by the Slovak League of America, a cultural and civic federation of Amerteans of Slovak descent. The chief purpose of S.LOV AK.IA is to promote a better understanding and appreciation of the Slovak nation and its long struggle for freedom and independence. As Americans, members of the Slovak League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all nations, has an inherent and God-given right to freedom and independence. They are dedicated to the cause of the American way of life, Slovak freedom and world peace and are determined to oppose the plague of Communism and all other totalitarian political systems. Subscription to Slovakia $1.00 per year in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere. Send subscriptions to: SLOVAKIA Box 150 Middletown, Pa. Printed in the U. S. A. JEDNOTA PRESS Middletown, Pa. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1953 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/7cb18e5e0a77ab067de6c9a0fae8cb11.pdf 1e20dc5f9190e730a960390f4bf3731d PDF Text Text YOU CAN LEARN SLOV Al( as easily as you can any other modern language. Slovak should be a MUST for students of Slovanic languages, because it is the simplest of all of them and a KEY to all of them. Prove it to yourself with the most scholarly text on Slovak, the SLOVAK LESSONS A practical study of the Slovak Grammar, 9'.2 lessons, 400 pages ; exercises in Slovak and English ; English-Slovak and Slovak-English vocabulary. Hard cover, bound in cloth, $3.50 HROBAK'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY - the best and most complete dictionary of it s kind; 702 pages with a brief sumary of the Slovak Grammar. Hard cover, bound in cloth, $4.00 THE SLOVAKS, by Peter P. Yurchak, should be read by all students interested in the history and traditions of the Slovak nation; 312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $3.00; paper cover - $2.00 SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK HISTORY by Joseph Skultety, translation by 0. D. Koreff; a documented refutation of several errors propagated by writers and historians; 229 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover $1.00. Order from : P.A.HROBAK Box 150 Middletown, Pa. �SLOVAKIA: A picturesque vi,~w of the ruins of the Beckov castle, the story of which is told in this issue � YOU CAN LEARN SLOV Al( as easily as you can any other modern language. Slovak should be a MUST for students of Slovanic languages, because it is the simplest of all of them and a KEY to all of them. Prove it to yourself with the most scholarly text on Slovak, the SLOVAK LESSONS A practical study of the Slovak Grammar, 9'.2 lessons, 400 pages ; exercises in Slovak and English ; English-Slovak and Slovak-English vocabulary. Hard cover, bound in cloth, $3.50 HROBAK'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY - the best and most complete dictionary of it s kind; 702 pages with a brief sumary of the Slovak Grammar. Hard cover, bound in cloth, $4.00 THE SLOVAKS, by Peter P. Yurchak, should be read by all students interested in the history and traditions of the Slovak nation; 312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $3.00; paper cover - $2.00 SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK HISTORY by Joseph Skultety, translation by 0. D. Koreff; a documented refutation of several errors propagated by writers and historians; 229 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover $1.00. Order from : P.A.HROBAK Box 150 Middletown, Pa. �SLOVAKIA: A picturesque vi,~w of the ruins of the Beckov castle, the story of which is told in this issue � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA: A picturesque vi,~w of the ruins of the Beckov castle, the story of which is told in this issue  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 3 (8) Description An account of the resource includes photo of Beckov Castle Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September 1953 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/7cd17d0344bde42a0a0e78c075006252.pdf 1bc6bb2984939dcd15a5a6d7a8eae570 PDF Text Text 64 SLOVAKIA DR. JOSEPH LETTRICH was head man in Slovakia from 1945 to 1948. The Slovak National Council, which he was chairman of, was absolute in all matters pertaining to Slovakia. He was a member of the Communist-dominated "National Front" Government of Prague until February 1948. Today ha is Vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" (Washington, D. C.). which is headed by former Czech "National Fronters" who collaborated with the Communists in the Prague Government before the so-called Communist "putsch" of February 1948. Lettrich, the man who helped to destroy his own country, the independent Republic of Slovakia, suddenly became a "democratic, anti-Communist exile from Czecho,Slovakla" - as did many of the other members of the Council - after that "putsch.'' What kind of a "democrat" and "anti-Communist" Lettrlch actually was is reflected by the following quotations from his articles and speeches: "We cannot stress the fact often enough t'hat witho'll/t the help of the Soviet Army we would not have been ruble to meet here today. We shall never forget the saorifices and efforts made by ,t he Soviiet Union for the oause of political freedom. This showld be exipla:ined. to the yol.l'Ilgest people oif our generation. The Slovak oration and the Czechoslovruk Republic are. morally bound to the Soviet Union by very stron:g ties." - (CAS, Bratislaiva, June 5, 1945 . • • • • • • "Political parties which have outlived themseLves, which are politically unaiccepta.ble or guilty, may not be reviived in our country, nor renewed in any form ... The Democratic Party, together with the Communist Party in Slovakia, have created a well-,coordinated working body, hithento unknown, which bore witness and proved in a:11 fielas of endeavor that they weire united in a common punpose and by common interests that they had been faced by a cOIIIUllon enemy and by the same perils Today they are U1I1ited anew in a common endeavor to rebuild our nation. It is the firm convktion of all political leaders in the Democratic Party that this bond of collaboration shall be further strength(Before the Provisional National Assembly, ened.." Prague, October 30, 1945) . "Generalissimo stalin is the leader of tJhe great So.Vliet Uruion, our good ally and friend, whose Red .All'Iny fought so heroically against Nazism and brought freedom f)Ven to us." - (NARODNA OBRODA, Janiuary 26, 1947) . � 64 SLOVAKIA DR. JOSEPH LETTRICH was head man in Slovakia from 1945 to 1948. The Slovak National Council, which he was chairman of, was absolute in all matters pertaining to Slovakia. He was a member of the Communist-dominated "National Front" Government of Prague until February 1948. Today ha is Vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" (Washington, D. C.). which is headed by former Czech "National Fronters" who collaborated with the Communists in the Prague Government before the so-called Communist "putsch" of February 1948. Lettrich, the man who helped to destroy his own country, the independent Republic of Slovakia, suddenly became a "democratic, anti-Communist exile from Czecho,Slovakla" - as did many of the other members of the Council - after that "putsch.'' What kind of a "democrat" and "anti-Communist" Lettrlch actually was is reflected by the following quotations from his articles and speeches: "We cannot stress the fact often enough t'hat witho'll/t the help of the Soviet Army we would not have been ruble to meet here today. We shall never forget the saorifices and efforts made by ,t he Soviiet Union for the oause of political freedom. This showld be exipla:ined. to the yol.l'Ilgest people oif our generation. The Slovak oration and the Czechoslovruk Republic are. morally bound to the Soviet Union by very stron:g ties." - (CAS, Bratislaiva, June 5, 1945 . • • • • • • "Political parties which have outlived themseLves, which are politically unaiccepta.ble or guilty, may not be reviived in our country, nor renewed in any form ... The Democratic Party, together with the Communist Party in Slovakia, have created a well-,coordinated working body, hithento unknown, which bore witness and proved in a:11 fielas of endeavor that they weire united in a common punpose and by common interests that they had been faced by a cOIIIUllon enemy and by the same perils Today they are U1I1ited anew in a common endeavor to rebuild our nation. It is the firm convktion of all political leaders in the Democratic Party that this bond of collaboration shall be further strength(Before the Provisional National Assembly, ened.." Prague, October 30, 1945) . "Generalissimo stalin is the leader of tJhe great So.Vliet Uruion, our good ally and friend, whose Red .All'Iny fought so heroically against Nazism and brought freedom f)Ven to us." - (NARODNA OBRODA, Janiuary 26, 1947) . � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 64 SLOVAKIA DR. JOSEPH LETTRICH was head man in Slovakia from 1945 to 1948. The Slovak National Council, which he was chairman of, was absolute in all matters pertaining to Slovakia. He was a member of the Communist-dominated "National Front" Government of Prague until February 1948. Today ha is Vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" (Washington, D. C.). which is headed by former Czech "National Fronters" who collaborated with the Communists in the Prague Government before the so-called Communist "putsch" of February 1948. Lettrich, the man who helped to destroy his own country, the independent Republic of Slovakia, suddenly became a "democratic, anti-Communist exile from Czecho,Slovakla" - as did many of the other members of the Council - after that "putsch.'' What kind of a "democrat" and "anti-Communist" Lettrlch actually was is reflected by the following quotations from his articles and speeches: "We cannot stress the fact often enough t'hat witho'll/t the help of the Soviet Army we would not have been ruble to meet here today. We shall never forget the saorifices and efforts made by ,t he Soviiet Union for the oause of political freedom. This showld be exipla:ined. to the yol.l'Ilgest people oif our generation. The Slovak oration and the Czechoslovruk Republic are. morally bound to the Soviet Union by very stron:g ties." - (CAS, Bratislaiva, June 5, 1945 . • • • • • • "Political parties which have outlived themseLves, which are politically unaiccepta.ble or guilty, may not be reviived in our country, nor renewed in any form ... The Democratic Party, together with the Communist Party in Slovakia, have created a well-,coordinated working body, hithento unknown, which bore witness and proved in a:11 fielas of endeavor that they weire united in a common punpose and by common interests that they had been faced by a cOIIIUllon enemy and by the same perils Today they are U1I1ited anew in a common endeavor to rebuild our nation. It is the firm convktion of all political leaders in the Democratic Party that this bond of collaboration shall be further strength(Before the Provisional National Assembly, ened.." Prague, October 30, 1945) . "Generalissimo stalin is the leader of tJhe great So.Vliet Uruion, our good ally and friend, whose Red .All'Iny fought so heroically against Nazism and brought freedom f)Ven to us." - (NARODNA OBRODA, Janiuary 26, 1947) .  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dr. Joseph Lettrich in Retrospect Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 3 (8), September 1953 p. 64 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September 1953 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/fffb2baa8fcbabe8af38a838ff5d3dfb.pdf 9ddca8ebd9a2c57f524a16334c4c7b13 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 61 CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA BECKOV Beclkov - proibalbly caUed "Bludinec" originally - belongs to the group of the oldest citadels or castles of the Vah region which were situated for the mos.t part on the left banlk of the Vah river. Beneath BeckOIV there was an old military and commercial road, whi'ch deiviated from the main Czech highway near Jablonica and extended through Brezova to the Vah region. According to tradition, °the Beclwv Castle already existed during the time of the Great Mora. vran Empire, so that the legend aJbout its originating druoring the time of Ct"iJbor (a'bout 1412) prdbaibly has no historical basis. Bookov is mentioned in docUilllents already in 1208 under the name of "BlU'lldix." In descri!bing Ska.Jilm, the documents tell us of a road "ooming from Beokov." The bishop of Nitra (rubout 1228), we learn, donated a fourth of the wine he had received as a tithe from Beckov to the monastery on Skalka. That means that in those days the vicinity of Bec•k ov was intersted in growing grapes. In the 13th centll.'ry, Anonymous ("Belae regis notarius") oalled Becko;v "Ca.strum Blundus" (Bolondoc), and Bela I. himself called it "Bolondtuich." The Belelkov · fortress was at first a royal military station and, later, bieneath the castle there originated the settlement of Beckov, which was once surrounded by fortifications. Matthew Cak oif Trencin, "the Lord of the V ah and the Tatras," ruled over Bedkov at one time. After him to Beckov came the royal solicitor, which means that during the rule o.f King Robert and King Louis I , Bedkov was in the hands of the king. When Zigmond of Luxemburg sought men in Boland in 1386 to fight his dvaJ, Charles of Durazza, he was escorted on this trip by four soldiers from Slovakia, one of whom, OtiJbor ("Tilbu'l'tius" in Latin) , received extensiive lands from Zigmond for faithful services rendered. This CUbor was generally known as the Lord of the Vah river ("dominus fluvii Vagi"), even though he also was �62 SLOVAKIA the admrinistrator of Bratislava (.Press/burg) amd, later, the Duke of TransyWania. At that time Zigmond and his wife donated wen Beckov to Ctilbor and this gift is confiitrned by a special document, dated in Trencin in 1396. OUbor relbuilt and renovated the castle for his own use and then dona!l:ed Podhrad to his old oasteMan J a.mes from Nasil.O!V. Otiibor founded the ipr~osture in Norve Mesto (nad Vahom) amd ,pa;rtiiciipated in the CouI11Cil of Kostmca (14141418). DUike Ctilbor, Lord of Treinici111, Hlohorvec and many other casitles·, died in 1424 after he was stung by a bee. His oldest son, • Ctihor II, . became BishOtp of Jager and Oti!bor III inherited his father's properties and led his people in the fights agaiinst the Hus.sites. Ten years after his father's death, Ctibor NI also passed away and the family's v,ast hoWmgis, excepting Beckov, were wen orver by the r01yal soli'c;itOT. Boolmv came in.to the hands, of the Banflfy family from Dol111a Lindia:va; the last desicendant of this clan, John Banffy died fighting the Tunks in 1595. While the Banfey family nrled orver Bookorv, the preacller Borne~ missa visited them and wrote his collection of sermons, known as "Postla," which was .published in 1584 and thus prepared the way for the Retformatioo. When the Turks attaciked Piestlany in 1599, they took with them 13,000 eruptives from that part of the country and plll'lldered and piilaged the entire vicinity Ulp to Trencin. History notes, howerver, that the people who sought refuge in the Beokorv Oa,,stle were spared, even though the TurlIB had oome under the very fortifications of the castle. Imrich Thakoly used Beickov as a prison for his eruptives aftetr his MoraJVian eJQpedition (Uherslky Brod). Bult how did Beokov fall into ruins? Some say that the castle was riazed durin1g the rei<gn of Leopold I, while others say something else. Nervertheless, it is quite certain that the great confla;gra:tion which devoured the commU!Ility of Bookov in 1729, also completely ruined the castle. The legend aJbout the oriigin orf the castle, which the Slwaks oif BookOIV love to teH, relates that Ctilbor built the c.astle to fwfill. his ;promise to his clown Beiclko. Ct:ifbor, the legend says, was a passionate hunter. One evening, after �S LOVAKIA 63 a successful day o,f hunting, Ctibo,r and his group made cam11p near the high limestone rook upon whiclh the ruins of .Beckov rest tod!ay. Ctilbor was in a jovJal mood. After eating heartily, the group burst oot in song; some mernfbe:rs of the party recounted tales of heroism, witches and goblins; others told jokes. But no one could te11 a tale or a joke like Bedim, Ctilbor's court jester. Betoko had Otiibor and his entourage in stirtJches. A.ifter the clown had rel,a ted his last "just one more" taill tale, Ctibor s,aid to him: "Booko, my fool, well done. Demand o!f me what you will and I, iif your wish is at a'll humacly attrunaJble, shall grant it." Becka, seated at.oip a hrl.l!ge b1aclk bear the party had ba;gged that da;y, grinned, fixed his eyes on the rook above and said: "Look, if you are sll!ch a frumous mam, build me, if you please, a castle upon that rook!" The crowd roared with laughter, because every one thoUJght that impossible. But Ctilbor lodked up art tilie rock, rulbbed his, whiskers, smiled and r~lied: "You shall have it!" The legend continues that Ctilbor did fulfill his promise. A few days l•aiter he had his people start woI1k on the new castle. We are toJd that Ctibor ordered his men to stO!p all traivelers along the road beneath the site of the castle and put them to work for ei ght days. In a year the castle was bui,l t and Ctibor arnd his people celebriated the a-ccom:plishment. The new castle wa s beaurt1ful beyond comparison. Ctilbor named it Beckov in honor of his olown Beclco. But Ctilbor did not give it to Beclko. Aiocordin,g to the legend, Ctibor lilked the castle so much that he moved into it himsellf and gave Be'clko one of his other castles. The great Slovak patriot, writer and publisher, Joseph MilosJ.av Hurban, was born in the viHaige of Becikov, March 19, 1817. He was one of the leaders of the SlOIVaJk rebellion against the Haibsiburg,s in 1848-49; with Louis Stur and Michael Hoooa, he led the revolt for equal rights for the Slovak nation. Hur.ban and Hodza joined with Stu.ir to establish the literary Slovak that is used today by Slovaks everywhere. 1 � SLOVAKIA 61 CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA BECKOV Beclkov - proibalbly caUed "Bludinec" originally - belongs to the group of the oldest citadels or castles of the Vah region which were situated for the mos.t part on the left banlk of the Vah river. Beneath BeckOIV there was an old military and commercial road, whi'ch deiviated from the main Czech highway near Jablonica and extended through Brezova to the Vah region. According to tradition, °the Beclwv Castle already existed during the time of the Great Mora. vran Empire, so that the legend aJbout its originating druoring the time of Ct"iJbor (a'bout 1412) prdbaibly has no historical basis. Bookov is mentioned in docUilllents already in 1208 under the name of "BlU'lldix." In descri!bing Ska.Jilm, the documents tell us of a road "ooming from Beokov." The bishop of Nitra (rubout 1228), we learn, donated a fourth of the wine he had received as a tithe from Beckov to the monastery on Skalka. That means that in those days the vicinity of Bec•k ov was intersted in growing grapes. In the 13th centll.'ry, Anonymous ("Belae regis notarius") oalled Becko;v "Ca.strum Blundus" (Bolondoc), and Bela I. himself called it "Bolondtuich." The Belelkov · fortress was at first a royal military station and, later, bieneath the castle there originated the settlement of Beckov, which was once surrounded by fortifications. Matthew Cak oif Trencin, "the Lord of the V ah and the Tatras," ruled over Bedkov at one time. After him to Beckov came the royal solicitor, which means that during the rule o.f King Robert and King Louis I , Bedkov was in the hands of the king. When Zigmond of Luxemburg sought men in Boland in 1386 to fight his dvaJ, Charles of Durazza, he was escorted on this trip by four soldiers from Slovakia, one of whom, OtiJbor ("Tilbu'l'tius" in Latin) , received extensiive lands from Zigmond for faithful services rendered. This CUbor was generally known as the Lord of the Vah river ("dominus fluvii Vagi"), even though he also was �62 SLOVAKIA the admrinistrator of Bratislava (.Press/burg) amd, later, the Duke of TransyWania. At that time Zigmond and his wife donated wen Beckov to Ctilbor and this gift is confiitrned by a special document, dated in Trencin in 1396. OUbor relbuilt and renovated the castle for his own use and then dona!l:ed Podhrad to his old oasteMan J a.mes from Nasil.O!V. Otiibor founded the ipr~osture in Norve Mesto (nad Vahom) amd ,pa;rtiiciipated in the CouI11Cil of Kostmca (14141418). DUike Ctilbor, Lord of Treinici111, Hlohorvec and many other casitles·, died in 1424 after he was stung by a bee. His oldest son, • Ctihor II, . became BishOtp of Jager and Oti!bor III inherited his father's properties and led his people in the fights agaiinst the Hus.sites. Ten years after his father's death, Ctibor NI also passed away and the family's v,ast hoWmgis, excepting Beckov, were wen orver by the r01yal soli'c;itOT. Boolmv came in.to the hands, of the Banflfy family from Dol111a Lindia:va; the last desicendant of this clan, John Banffy died fighting the Tunks in 1595. While the Banfey family nrled orver Bookorv, the preacller Borne~ missa visited them and wrote his collection of sermons, known as "Postla," which was .published in 1584 and thus prepared the way for the Retformatioo. When the Turks attaciked Piestlany in 1599, they took with them 13,000 eruptives from that part of the country and plll'lldered and piilaged the entire vicinity Ulp to Trencin. History notes, howerver, that the people who sought refuge in the Beokorv Oa,,stle were spared, even though the TurlIB had oome under the very fortifications of the castle. Imrich Thakoly used Beickov as a prison for his eruptives aftetr his MoraJVian eJQpedition (Uherslky Brod). Bult how did Beokov fall into ruins? Some say that the castle was riazed durin1g the rei<gn of Leopold I, while others say something else. Nervertheless, it is quite certain that the great confla;gra:tion which devoured the commU!Ility of Bookov in 1729, also completely ruined the castle. The legend aJbout the oriigin orf the castle, which the Slwaks oif BookOIV love to teH, relates that Ctilbor built the c.astle to fwfill. his ;promise to his clown Beiclko. Ct:ifbor, the legend says, was a passionate hunter. One evening, after �S LOVAKIA 63 a successful day o,f hunting, Ctibo,r and his group made cam11p near the high limestone rook upon whiclh the ruins of .Beckov rest tod!ay. Ctilbor was in a jovJal mood. After eating heartily, the group burst oot in song; some mernfbe:rs of the party recounted tales of heroism, witches and goblins; others told jokes. But no one could te11 a tale or a joke like Bedim, Ctilbor's court jester. Betoko had Otiibor and his entourage in stirtJches. A.ifter the clown had rel,a ted his last "just one more" taill tale, Ctibor s,aid to him: "Booko, my fool, well done. Demand o!f me what you will and I, iif your wish is at a'll humacly attrunaJble, shall grant it." Becka, seated at.oip a hrl.l!ge b1aclk bear the party had ba;gged that da;y, grinned, fixed his eyes on the rook above and said: "Look, if you are sll!ch a frumous mam, build me, if you please, a castle upon that rook!" The crowd roared with laughter, because every one thoUJght that impossible. But Ctilbor lodked up art tilie rock, rulbbed his, whiskers, smiled and r~lied: "You shall have it!" The legend continues that Ctilbor did fulfill his promise. A few days l•aiter he had his people start woI1k on the new castle. We are toJd that Ctibor ordered his men to stO!p all traivelers along the road beneath the site of the castle and put them to work for ei ght days. In a year the castle was bui,l t and Ctibor arnd his people celebriated the a-ccom:plishment. The new castle wa s beaurt1ful beyond comparison. Ctilbor named it Beckov in honor of his olown Beclco. But Ctilbor did not give it to Beclko. Aiocordin,g to the legend, Ctibor lilked the castle so much that he moved into it himsellf and gave Be'clko one of his other castles. The great Slovak patriot, writer and publisher, Joseph MilosJ.av Hurban, was born in the viHaige of Becikov, March 19, 1817. He was one of the leaders of the SlOIVaJk rebellion against the Haibsiburg,s in 1848-49; with Louis Stur and Michael Hoooa, he led the revolt for equal rights for the Slovak nation. Hur.ban and Hodza joined with Stu.ir to establish the literary Slovak that is used today by Slovaks everywhere. 1 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 61 CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA BECKOV Beclkov - proibalbly caUed "Bludinec" originally - belongs to the group of the oldest citadels or castles of the Vah region which were situated for the mos.t part on the left banlk of the Vah river. Beneath BeckOIV there was an old military and commercial road, whi'ch deiviated from the main Czech highway near Jablonica and extended through Brezova to the Vah region. According to tradition, °the Beclwv Castle already existed during the time of the Great Mora. vran Empire, so that the legend aJbout its originating druoring the time of Ct"iJbor (a'bout 1412) prdbaibly has no historical basis. Bookov is mentioned in docUilllents already in 1208 under the name of "BlU'lldix." In descri!bing Ska.Jilm, the documents tell us of a road "ooming from Beokov." The bishop of Nitra (rubout 1228), we learn, donated a fourth of the wine he had received as a tithe from Beckov to the monastery on Skalka. That means that in those days the vicinity of Bec•k ov was intersted in growing grapes. In the 13th centll.'ry, Anonymous ("Belae regis notarius") oalled Becko;v "Ca.strum Blundus" (Bolondoc), and Bela I. himself called it "Bolondtuich." The Belelkov · fortress was at first a royal military station and, later, bieneath the castle there originated the settlement of Beckov, which was once surrounded by fortifications. Matthew Cak oif Trencin, "the Lord of the V ah and the Tatras," ruled over Bedkov at one time. After him to Beckov came the royal solicitor, which means that during the rule o.f King Robert and King Louis I , Bedkov was in the hands of the king. When Zigmond of Luxemburg sought men in Boland in 1386 to fight his dvaJ, Charles of Durazza, he was escorted on this trip by four soldiers from Slovakia, one of whom, OtiJbor ("Tilbu'l'tius" in Latin) , received extensiive lands from Zigmond for faithful services rendered. This CUbor was generally known as the Lord of the Vah river ("dominus fluvii Vagi"), even though he also was 62 SLOVAKIA the admrinistrator of Bratislava (.Press/burg) amd, later, the Duke of TransyWania. At that time Zigmond and his wife donated wen Beckov to Ctilbor and this gift is confiitrned by a special document, dated in Trencin in 1396. OUbor relbuilt and renovated the castle for his own use and then dona!l:ed Podhrad to his old oasteMan J a.mes from Nasil.O!V. Otiibor founded the ipr~osture in Norve Mesto (nad Vahom) amd ,pa;rtiiciipated in the CouI11Cil of Kostmca (14141418). DUike Ctilbor, Lord of Treinici111, Hlohorvec and many other casitles·, died in 1424 after he was stung by a bee. His oldest son, • Ctihor II, . became BishOtp of Jager and Oti!bor III inherited his father's properties and led his people in the fights agaiinst the Hus.sites. Ten years after his father's death, Ctibor NI also passed away and the family's v,ast hoWmgis, excepting Beckov, were wen orver by the r01yal soli'c;itOT. Boolmv came in.to the hands, of the Banflfy family from Dol111a Lindia:va; the last desicendant of this clan, John Banffy died fighting the Tunks in 1595. While the Banfey family nrled orver Bookorv, the preacller Borne~ missa visited them and wrote his collection of sermons, known as "Postla," which was .published in 1584 and thus prepared the way for the Retformatioo. When the Turks attaciked Piestlany in 1599, they took with them 13,000 eruptives from that part of the country and plll'lldered and piilaged the entire vicinity Ulp to Trencin. History notes, howerver, that the people who sought refuge in the Beokorv Oa,,stle were spared, even though the TurlIB had oome under the very fortifications of the castle. Imrich Thakoly used Beickov as a prison for his eruptives aftetr his MoraJVian eJQpedition (Uherslky Brod). Bult how did Beokov fall into ruins? Some say that the castle was riazed durin1g the rei<gn of Leopold I, while others say something else. Nervertheless, it is quite certain that the great confla;gra:tion which devoured the commU!Ility of Bookov in 1729, also completely ruined the castle. The legend aJbout the oriigin orf the castle, which the Slwaks oif BookOIV love to teH, relates that Ctilbor built the c.astle to fwfill. his ;promise to his clown Beiclko. Ct:ifbor, the legend says, was a passionate hunter. One evening, after S LOVAKIA 63 a successful day o,f hunting, Ctibo,r and his group made cam11p near the high limestone rook upon whiclh the ruins of .Beckov rest tod!ay. Ctilbor was in a jovJal mood. After eating heartily, the group burst oot in song; some mernfbe:rs of the party recounted tales of heroism, witches and goblins; others told jokes. But no one could te11 a tale or a joke like Bedim, Ctilbor's court jester. Betoko had Otiibor and his entourage in stirtJches. A.ifter the clown had rel,a ted his last "just one more" taill tale, Ctibor s,aid to him: "Booko, my fool, well done. Demand o!f me what you will and I, iif your wish is at a'll humacly attrunaJble, shall grant it." Becka, seated at.oip a hrl.l!ge b1aclk bear the party had ba;gged that da;y, grinned, fixed his eyes on the rook above and said: "Look, if you are sll!ch a frumous mam, build me, if you please, a castle upon that rook!" The crowd roared with laughter, because every one thoUJght that impossible. But Ctilbor lodked up art tilie rock, rulbbed his, whiskers, smiled and r~lied: "You shall have it!" The legend continues that Ctilbor did fulfill his promise. A few days l•aiter he had his people start woI1k on the new castle. We are toJd that Ctibor ordered his men to stO!p all traivelers along the road beneath the site of the castle and put them to work for ei ght days. In a year the castle was bui,l t and Ctibor arnd his people celebriated the a-ccom:plishment. The new castle wa s beaurt1ful beyond comparison. Ctilbor named it Beckov in honor of his olown Beclco. But Ctilbor did not give it to Beclko. Aiocordin,g to the legend, Ctibor lilked the castle so much that he moved into it himsellf and gave Be'clko one of his other castles. The great Slovak patriot, writer and publisher, Joseph MilosJ.av Hurban, was born in the viHaige of Becikov, March 19, 1817. He was one of the leaders of the SlOIVaJk rebellion against the Haibsiburg,s in 1848-49; with Louis Stur and Michael Hoooa, he led the revolt for equal rights for the Slovak nation. Hur.ban and Hodza joined with Stu.ir to establish the literary Slovak that is used today by Slovaks everywhere. 1  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Castles of Slovakia: Beckov Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 3 (8), September 1953 pp. 61-63 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September 1953 castles https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/c261397e85eed23c862735032fef621e.pdf 4100e82bdcd463eb507b52bc5b6fb54f PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 13 MILESTONES OF SLOVAK HISTORY OCTOBER 6, 1938 The Slovaik nation, one olf the olde.st Christian nations in Central Europe, decided to fonm a c01mmon political state with the Czech nation during World War I. Equality in all matters ,w as the basis Ol:f that decision. Slovakia ,w as to be governed as a state of the Ozech-Slova:k federation by the Slovruks and the Czech lands by the Ozechs. The Pittsburgh Pact of May 30, 1918, drawn UJP and signed by T. G. Masarylk and irepresentati'Ves of the Czechs and the •S lovaks of America, guaranteed Sloivakia complete autonomy, i e., home rule or states rights. Unfortunately, T. G. Masaryk repudiated the pruct and condemned the very state he prop8!gated to premature ruin. For twenty years the. Slovaks kerpt clamoring for recognition of and respect for their inherent rights, for the fulfillment of the ,b argain they had concluded with T. G. Masaryk, but to .no avail. The Ruthe1I1ians,, who had voluntarily entered the political state of Czeicho~Slovakia on the basis of an autonomous region, were also sadly disaippointed by the regime olf T. G. Masaryik and his underst/Udy, Dr. Edward Benes. The forceful inchtsion of 3,500,000 Sudeten Germans in the Ozecho~lo:vaik Repulbliic did not help relieve the tensiOIIlS or to consolidate the state, burt rather aggravated the situation. The regimes of T. G. Masaryk and Dr. Edward Benes antrugonized the non-Czech majority of the population against the Czechs and doomed the Republic to an early death. When the first major crisis stmmk, there was no one to defend the ill~fated Ozecho~SlovaJkia and it collapsed like a house ibuilt of cards. On October 6, 193,8, the Slo1V1aiks mrude a great step forward toward urufiying their fOiI1Ces in their struggle for state independence. All paTties, except the .Social Democrats and the Communists, accepted the principle of an autonomous SlovaJkia in the spirit of the draft of a bill, which was prepared by the ID:inka Slovak People's Party and made pU!blic Jun€ 5, 1938. The result of the October meet~ �14 SLOVAKIA ing,s oif the representatives of all Slovak parties in Zilina,, S1ovalkia, was that "the Government of the Ozecho..slovalk Repulblic named, in the p1ruce of the President of the RepuJblic (a paragrruph of the Constitutional Document), deputy Dr. Joseph Tiso, the executive vice-president of the SlO'Vak POOlple's Party, as mii.nister for the administration of SloV'a!kia. By a supplement to this law, the Government requested Dr. Tiso to name other SlovaJk ministers to execute governmental power in Slovakia. From this it is evident that the Prague Government had accepted the fundamental propositions of the Slo:vaJk People's Party and the other participating parties" (A-l~ET, official organ of Dr. Benes's National Socialistic Party, Octolber 7, 1938). Dr. Edward Benes, as is iknown, resigned the presidency of the Republic V1oluntarily on Octolber 5, 1938. The first Slovak ruutonomous government oif Slova.kia was composed oif the following: Dr. Joseph Tiso, Premier and Minister O'f Interior; ,professor Matthew Cernak, Minister oif Education and National Enlightenment; Dr. Ferdinand DUT'canSlky, Minister of Justl!ce, Social Welfare and Health; Paul TeplanSlky, Minister of Agriculture,, Prublic WOTks, Commerce, Business and Finance; John Lichner, Minister of the Mail and the Railroads. ( Slovensky mas, Dr. Milan Hodza's 1pulblication, October 8, 1938). Dr. J,o seph Tiso, •CernaJk and :Dwcansky were representatives of the Hlinka Slovalk PeQple's Party, while Teplans:ky and Lkhner represented the party oif Slovak republicans, since there really were only two genuine Slovak parties in Slovakia - the People's Party and the National $loiv~k Party. All the other parties were only affiliates of the ;variOUJs Ozeich and so-<Called "Czechoslovak" ,p arties; the representatives of these parties sp0ike of the Slova;k coalition ,parties, as 1s attested to by the "A-~ET" article of Emil Boleslav Lukac orf October 7, 193'8. Analy~g and evaluating the Zilina events, LuJkac wrote: "It was ,plainly necessary that the Slovalk People's Party pass over from the ,position of opposition to a responsible position, one commensu,r ate with its strength, to a leading position. It was necessary that it use its strength �SLOVAKIA 15 especially today to protect Slovak national interests inside and outside its territory. Even the cbalition parties of Slova1da haJVe united on its main demand - the decentralization of pulbliic administraA:ion and a ,b road autonomy for SlovaJkia. And it was aecepted even by the Governrment of the Repulblic. SlovaJkia shall hruve its legislaitive assembly, a Slovruk government of all resorts, except finances , national defense, and ,f oreign affairs - whi-ch are common resorts. Today all S-loivaJk parties stand behind this agreement, behind this new arrangement of Slovruk afrfairs, and, hence, even our Nationai Socialistic Party in Slovakia. We shall stand by it loyally and responsibly." The republicans (agrarians) welcomed the first .SlovaJk Autonomous Government even more enthusiasticaH y. In their '"SLOVENSK Y TY~DEJNNfK." (Slovalk Weekly) of OctOlber 13, 1938, their leadiillg editorial "M8JIIle Slovensku Vladiu" (We Have a Sloivak Goivernment) , contained the following: "We recall that the ('IDinka Sl01VaJk) ·People's Party not so long ago thought and appeared to 1b e sufficient of itself for such a role. But when it actuaHy came to the brealking of bread, it realized what a great responstbility it is before the nation ·a nd how much woirk must 1b e aocompUshed to organize Slo.'V'aik statehood and an autonomous, independent Slovruk life. Under these circumstances and dtflficulties it was a real blessing that the Republican ,P arty of Slovakia was deternnined rwith all its forces to build a Slovak autonomous state unit. . . " SlovaJk centralists - the so~a,lled "Ozechoslova,ks" who had defended .and propagated a strong, centralized Prague government - openly and enthusiastkal ly spoke out not only for a;utonomy, but for SlovaJk statehood after October 6,. 1938. Their -w illingness to wor,k with the SloivaJk People's Party was not only evident, but also quite convincing, as demonstrawd by their manifestation s and the ,parti~ipation of the RepU'blican Party in the Slovak Government. Analyzing the whole brucikgro.und of these events, we find that the representative s of the political parties in Slovakia did nothing in 2ilina which was not approved of by �16 SLOVAKIA Prague. And the Prague leadership oif the coalition iparties even gaive pU!blic testimoniy of this on October 8, 193'8, by stating: ''The undersigned representatiive s of the Crech political parties declare that - in the sense of the 2ilina agreement of Octolber 6, 1938 - we adopt the ,proiposition of the Hlinika .SlovaJk People's Party to issue a Constitutiona l law in regard to the autonomy of SlovaJkia as ~t was presented in the .Asoornlbly of Deputies in 1938 and pulblished in the SLOVAK, No. 129, of Jrune 5, 1938, and we ibind ourselves that we shal,l endeavor to have it acted on and aoceipted as soon as possilble." The statement was, signed .by: Deputy Rudoliph Beran, chairman of the Repulbli<can Party; Deputy Anthony Hampl. chairman of the ,Social Democratic Party; Deputy Dr. Klaipka for the National Socialist Party; Deputy Monsignor Stasetk for the 0ze:ch Poople's Parly; Dr. Franicis Hodac. vice-ichairman oif the Party of Unity; and De:puty Rudolph Mlcoch, chail'lffian of Tradesman's Party. (!SLOVAK, October 9, 1938). Here we harve proof that even the leadership of the Social Democrati1c Party in Prague fully approrved the Zilina .A!greement, despite the fad that the Slovak Pe01ple's Party did not come to an:y agreement with the Slovruk Socialists. It is quite obvious, therefore, that October 6, 1938 Slova!k Autonomy Day - was baoked not only by the H1inka Slovak People's Party, but also the rest of the Slovak civk parties then in existence. All went along with the Peoiple's Party willingly and spontaneously and accepted the resiponsilbility for the future development of Sloiva!lda. Whether they were sincere 8'bout it or not is questionable in the light of what transpireid later, but the fact is that all ·political parties operating in Slova·k ia in 1938 - except the Social Demdcrats and the Communists - realized ,t he necessity od' uniting in the common interests oif .Slovakia, in fact in the interests of the national existence of the SlOIVruk nation itself. They were not re$ponsihle for the tense international political situation of that time, but were sufficiently intelligent to adapt themselves accordingly and save �SLOVAKIA 17 whatever could ,b e saved under the given cir~umstances. It was, in fact, the old Btory Oi:f history repeating its.elf all poJitioal leaders wo11king together for the benefit of all the people of Slovakia, or hanging separately. On October 6, 1938, the just demands of. the Slovak nation,; so aiptly e~ressed by the Pittsiburgh Pact of May 30, 191'8, were finally recognized and fulfilled by the recalcitrant gorvernment of Prague. As we looik bruclk in retrospect today, we can only say that lruok of foresi:ght, statesmansMp, Christian charity and democracy on the part of Dr. Edward Benes and his National Socialists and other Ozech leftist - so...called "progressive" - growps prevented the realization o;f Slovak autonomy sooner and ,p recipatated the collapse of the Czecho,. Slova:k Repll!blic. October 6, 1938, no matter how enemies o;f Slovaik freedom and indeipendenoe may look ,wpon it, was a milestone in Slovak history, maI1king another lap olf the march of the Slovak nation to free dom and complete political independence. • • • WHO SAID IT? "After the Turkish invasion came tile religious wars which many historians made the mistake orf regarding as manifestaJtions of nationaJ1. resistance against Germanism. Here in Cenltrai Europe the conflicts were identical with those taJking plaice in other prurts o:f the Continent at the same time. The struggle Oi:f the Huguenots against Henry IV was no more -a nationaJl. conflict than the share of the Czechs in the Thi.irty Years.' War was a radal fight against Germanism. They fought against the HaJbsboogs beeause the latter were Catholks, _and the Battle of the White Mountain (1620) the Ozechs, together with their German rully, Prince Frederick, Elector of the Palatinate, were !b eaten 1by the Catholic tro01ps of the Austrian emperor. The legend about the Mountain is an outstanding exMn.ple Off historical forgery, for it was. a purely religious and dynastic affaiir." (F. 0. Miksche - a Czech - in UNCONDITIONA L SURREND@R, p. 71; Faber and Fruber, Ltd., London). � SLOVAKIA 13 MILESTONES OF SLOVAK HISTORY OCTOBER 6, 1938 The Slovaik nation, one olf the olde.st Christian nations in Central Europe, decided to fonm a c01mmon political state with the Czech nation during World War I. Equality in all matters ,w as the basis Ol:f that decision. Slovakia ,w as to be governed as a state of the Ozech-Slova:k federation by the Slovruks and the Czech lands by the Ozechs. The Pittsburgh Pact of May 30, 1918, drawn UJP and signed by T. G. Masarylk and irepresentati'Ves of the Czechs and the •S lovaks of America, guaranteed Sloivakia complete autonomy, i e., home rule or states rights. Unfortunately, T. G. Masaryk repudiated the pruct and condemned the very state he prop8!gated to premature ruin. For twenty years the. Slovaks kerpt clamoring for recognition of and respect for their inherent rights, for the fulfillment of the ,b argain they had concluded with T. G. Masaryk, but to .no avail. The Ruthe1I1ians,, who had voluntarily entered the political state of Czeicho~Slovakia on the basis of an autonomous region, were also sadly disaippointed by the regime olf T. G. Masaryik and his underst/Udy, Dr. Edward Benes. The forceful inchtsion of 3,500,000 Sudeten Germans in the Ozecho~lo:vaik Repulbliic did not help relieve the tensiOIIlS or to consolidate the state, burt rather aggravated the situation. The regimes of T. G. Masaryk and Dr. Edward Benes antrugonized the non-Czech majority of the population against the Czechs and doomed the Republic to an early death. When the first major crisis stmmk, there was no one to defend the ill~fated Ozecho~SlovaJkia and it collapsed like a house ibuilt of cards. On October 6, 193,8, the Slo1V1aiks mrude a great step forward toward urufiying their fOiI1Ces in their struggle for state independence. All paTties, except the .Social Democrats and the Communists, accepted the principle of an autonomous SlovaJkia in the spirit of the draft of a bill, which was prepared by the ID:inka Slovak People's Party and made pU!blic Jun€ 5, 1938. The result of the October meet~ �14 SLOVAKIA ing,s oif the representatives of all Slovak parties in Zilina,, S1ovalkia, was that "the Government of the Ozecho..slovalk Repulblic named, in the p1ruce of the President of the RepuJblic (a paragrruph of the Constitutional Document), deputy Dr. Joseph Tiso, the executive vice-president of the SlO'Vak POOlple's Party, as mii.nister for the administration of SloV'a!kia. By a supplement to this law, the Government requested Dr. Tiso to name other SlovaJk ministers to execute governmental power in Slovakia. From this it is evident that the Prague Government had accepted the fundamental propositions of the Slo:vaJk People's Party and the other participating parties" (A-l~ET, official organ of Dr. Benes's National Socialistic Party, Octolber 7, 1938). Dr. Edward Benes, as is iknown, resigned the presidency of the Republic V1oluntarily on Octolber 5, 1938. The first Slovak ruutonomous government oif Slova.kia was composed oif the following: Dr. Joseph Tiso, Premier and Minister O'f Interior; ,professor Matthew Cernak, Minister oif Education and National Enlightenment; Dr. Ferdinand DUT'canSlky, Minister of Justl!ce, Social Welfare and Health; Paul TeplanSlky, Minister of Agriculture,, Prublic WOTks, Commerce, Business and Finance; John Lichner, Minister of the Mail and the Railroads. ( Slovensky mas, Dr. Milan Hodza's 1pulblication, October 8, 1938). Dr. J,o seph Tiso, •CernaJk and :Dwcansky were representatives of the Hlinka Slovalk PeQple's Party, while Teplans:ky and Lkhner represented the party oif Slovak republicans, since there really were only two genuine Slovak parties in Slovakia - the People's Party and the National $loiv~k Party. All the other parties were only affiliates of the ;variOUJs Ozeich and so-<Called "Czechoslovak" ,p arties; the representatives of these parties sp0ike of the Slova;k coalition ,parties, as 1s attested to by the "A-~ET" article of Emil Boleslav Lukac orf October 7, 193'8. Analy~g and evaluating the Zilina events, LuJkac wrote: "It was ,plainly necessary that the Slovalk People's Party pass over from the ,position of opposition to a responsible position, one commensu,r ate with its strength, to a leading position. It was necessary that it use its strength �SLOVAKIA 15 especially today to protect Slovak national interests inside and outside its territory. Even the cbalition parties of Slova1da haJVe united on its main demand - the decentralization of pulbliic administraA:ion and a ,b road autonomy for SlovaJkia. And it was aecepted even by the Governrment of the Repulblic. SlovaJkia shall hruve its legislaitive assembly, a Slovruk government of all resorts, except finances , national defense, and ,f oreign affairs - whi-ch are common resorts. Today all S-loivaJk parties stand behind this agreement, behind this new arrangement of Slovruk afrfairs, and, hence, even our Nationai Socialistic Party in Slovakia. We shall stand by it loyally and responsibly." The republicans (agrarians) welcomed the first .SlovaJk Autonomous Government even more enthusiasticaH y. In their '"SLOVENSK Y TY~DEJNNfK." (Slovalk Weekly) of OctOlber 13, 1938, their leadiillg editorial "M8JIIle Slovensku Vladiu" (We Have a Sloivak Goivernment) , contained the following: "We recall that the ('IDinka Sl01VaJk) ·People's Party not so long ago thought and appeared to 1b e sufficient of itself for such a role. But when it actuaHy came to the brealking of bread, it realized what a great responstbility it is before the nation ·a nd how much woirk must 1b e aocompUshed to organize Slo.'V'aik statehood and an autonomous, independent Slovruk life. Under these circumstances and dtflficulties it was a real blessing that the Republican ,P arty of Slovakia was deternnined rwith all its forces to build a Slovak autonomous state unit. . . " SlovaJk centralists - the so~a,lled "Ozechoslova,ks" who had defended .and propagated a strong, centralized Prague government - openly and enthusiastkal ly spoke out not only for a;utonomy, but for SlovaJk statehood after October 6,. 1938. Their -w illingness to wor,k with the SloivaJk People's Party was not only evident, but also quite convincing, as demonstrawd by their manifestation s and the ,parti~ipation of the RepU'blican Party in the Slovak Government. Analyzing the whole brucikgro.und of these events, we find that the representative s of the political parties in Slovakia did nothing in 2ilina which was not approved of by �16 SLOVAKIA Prague. And the Prague leadership oif the coalition iparties even gaive pU!blic testimoniy of this on October 8, 193'8, by stating: ''The undersigned representatiive s of the Crech political parties declare that - in the sense of the 2ilina agreement of Octolber 6, 1938 - we adopt the ,proiposition of the Hlinika .SlovaJk People's Party to issue a Constitutiona l law in regard to the autonomy of SlovaJkia as ~t was presented in the .Asoornlbly of Deputies in 1938 and pulblished in the SLOVAK, No. 129, of Jrune 5, 1938, and we ibind ourselves that we shal,l endeavor to have it acted on and aoceipted as soon as possilble." The statement was, signed .by: Deputy Rudoliph Beran, chairman of the Repulbli<can Party; Deputy Anthony Hampl. chairman of the ,Social Democratic Party; Deputy Dr. Klaipka for the National Socialist Party; Deputy Monsignor Stasetk for the 0ze:ch Poople's Parly; Dr. Franicis Hodac. vice-ichairman oif the Party of Unity; and De:puty Rudolph Mlcoch, chail'lffian of Tradesman's Party. (!SLOVAK, October 9, 1938). Here we harve proof that even the leadership of the Social Democrati1c Party in Prague fully approrved the Zilina .A!greement, despite the fad that the Slovak Pe01ple's Party did not come to an:y agreement with the Slovruk Socialists. It is quite obvious, therefore, that October 6, 1938 Slova!k Autonomy Day - was baoked not only by the H1inka Slovak People's Party, but also the rest of the Slovak civk parties then in existence. All went along with the Peoiple's Party willingly and spontaneously and accepted the resiponsilbility for the future development of Sloiva!lda. Whether they were sincere 8'bout it or not is questionable in the light of what transpireid later, but the fact is that all ·political parties operating in Slova·k ia in 1938 - except the Social Demdcrats and the Communists - realized ,t he necessity od' uniting in the common interests oif .Slovakia, in fact in the interests of the national existence of the SlOIVruk nation itself. They were not re$ponsihle for the tense international political situation of that time, but were sufficiently intelligent to adapt themselves accordingly and save �SLOVAKIA 17 whatever could ,b e saved under the given cir~umstances. It was, in fact, the old Btory Oi:f history repeating its.elf all poJitioal leaders wo11king together for the benefit of all the people of Slovakia, or hanging separately. On October 6, 1938, the just demands of. the Slovak nation,; so aiptly e~ressed by the Pittsiburgh Pact of May 30, 191'8, were finally recognized and fulfilled by the recalcitrant gorvernment of Prague. As we looik bruclk in retrospect today, we can only say that lruok of foresi:ght, statesmansMp, Christian charity and democracy on the part of Dr. Edward Benes and his National Socialists and other Ozech leftist - so...called "progressive" - growps prevented the realization o;f Slovak autonomy sooner and ,p recipatated the collapse of the Czecho,. Slova:k Repll!blic. October 6, 1938, no matter how enemies o;f Slovaik freedom and indeipendenoe may look ,wpon it, was a milestone in Slovak history, maI1king another lap olf the march of the Slovak nation to free dom and complete political independence. • • • WHO SAID IT? "After the Turkish invasion came tile religious wars which many historians made the mistake orf regarding as manifestaJtions of nationaJ1. resistance against Germanism. Here in Cenltrai Europe the conflicts were identical with those taJking plaice in other prurts o:f the Continent at the same time. The struggle Oi:f the Huguenots against Henry IV was no more -a nationaJl. conflict than the share of the Czechs in the Thi.irty Years.' War was a radal fight against Germanism. They fought against the HaJbsboogs beeause the latter were Catholks, _and the Battle of the White Mountain (1620) the Ozechs, together with their German rully, Prince Frederick, Elector of the Palatinate, were !b eaten 1by the Catholic tro01ps of the Austrian emperor. The legend about the Mountain is an outstanding exMn.ple Off historical forgery, for it was. a purely religious and dynastic affaiir." (F. 0. Miksche - a Czech - in UNCONDITIONA L SURREND@R, p. 71; Faber and Fruber, Ltd., London). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 13 MILESTONES OF SLOVAK HISTORY OCTOBER 6, 1938 The Slovaik nation, one olf the olde.st Christian nations in Central Europe, decided to fonm a c01mmon political state with the Czech nation during World War I. Equality in all matters ,w as the basis Ol:f that decision. Slovakia ,w as to be governed as a state of the Ozech-Slova:k federation by the Slovruks and the Czech lands by the Ozechs. The Pittsburgh Pact of May 30, 1918, drawn UJP and signed by T. G. Masarylk and irepresentati'Ves of the Czechs and the •S lovaks of America, guaranteed Sloivakia complete autonomy, i e., home rule or states rights. Unfortunately, T. G. Masaryk repudiated the pruct and condemned the very state he prop8!gated to premature ruin. For twenty years the. Slovaks kerpt clamoring for recognition of and respect for their inherent rights, for the fulfillment of the ,b argain they had concluded with T. G. Masaryk, but to .no avail. The Ruthe1I1ians,, who had voluntarily entered the political state of Czeicho~Slovakia on the basis of an autonomous region, were also sadly disaippointed by the regime olf T. G. Masaryik and his underst/Udy, Dr. Edward Benes. The forceful inchtsion of 3,500,000 Sudeten Germans in the Ozecho~lo:vaik Repulbliic did not help relieve the tensiOIIlS or to consolidate the state, burt rather aggravated the situation. The regimes of T. G. Masaryk and Dr. Edward Benes antrugonized the non-Czech majority of the population against the Czechs and doomed the Republic to an early death. When the first major crisis stmmk, there was no one to defend the ill~fated Ozecho~SlovaJkia and it collapsed like a house ibuilt of cards. On October 6, 193,8, the Slo1V1aiks mrude a great step forward toward urufiying their fOiI1Ces in their struggle for state independence. All paTties, except the .Social Democrats and the Communists, accepted the principle of an autonomous SlovaJkia in the spirit of the draft of a bill, which was prepared by the ID:inka Slovak People's Party and made pU!blic Jun€ 5, 1938. The result of the October meet~ 14 SLOVAKIA ing,s oif the representatives of all Slovak parties in Zilina,, S1ovalkia, was that "the Government of the Ozecho..slovalk Repulblic named, in the p1ruce of the President of the RepuJblic (a paragrruph of the Constitutional Document), deputy Dr. Joseph Tiso, the executive vice-president of the SlO'Vak POOlple's Party, as mii.nister for the administration of SloV'a!kia. By a supplement to this law, the Government requested Dr. Tiso to name other SlovaJk ministers to execute governmental power in Slovakia. From this it is evident that the Prague Government had accepted the fundamental propositions of the Slo:vaJk People's Party and the other participating parties" (A-l~ET, official organ of Dr. Benes's National Socialistic Party, Octolber 7, 1938). Dr. Edward Benes, as is iknown, resigned the presidency of the Republic V1oluntarily on Octolber 5, 1938. The first Slovak ruutonomous government oif Slova.kia was composed oif the following: Dr. Joseph Tiso, Premier and Minister O'f Interior; ,professor Matthew Cernak, Minister oif Education and National Enlightenment; Dr. Ferdinand DUT'canSlky, Minister of Justl!ce, Social Welfare and Health; Paul TeplanSlky, Minister of Agriculture,, Prublic WOTks, Commerce, Business and Finance; John Lichner, Minister of the Mail and the Railroads. ( Slovensky mas, Dr. Milan Hodza's 1pulblication, October 8, 1938). Dr. J,o seph Tiso, •CernaJk and :Dwcansky were representatives of the Hlinka Slovalk PeQple's Party, while Teplans:ky and Lkhner represented the party oif Slovak republicans, since there really were only two genuine Slovak parties in Slovakia - the People's Party and the National $loiv~k Party. All the other parties were only affiliates of the ;variOUJs Ozeich and so-<Called "Czechoslovak" ,p arties; the representatives of these parties sp0ike of the Slova;k coalition ,parties, as 1s attested to by the "A-~ET" article of Emil Boleslav Lukac orf October 7, 193'8. Analy~g and evaluating the Zilina events, LuJkac wrote: "It was ,plainly necessary that the Slovalk People's Party pass over from the ,position of opposition to a responsible position, one commensu,r ate with its strength, to a leading position. It was necessary that it use its strength SLOVAKIA 15 especially today to protect Slovak national interests inside and outside its territory. Even the cbalition parties of Slova1da haJVe united on its main demand - the decentralization of pulbliic administraA:ion and a ,b road autonomy for SlovaJkia. And it was aecepted even by the Governrment of the Repulblic. SlovaJkia shall hruve its legislaitive assembly, a Slovruk government of all resorts, except finances , national defense, and ,f oreign affairs - whi-ch are common resorts. Today all S-loivaJk parties stand behind this agreement, behind this new arrangement of Slovruk afrfairs, and, hence, even our Nationai Socialistic Party in Slovakia. We shall stand by it loyally and responsibly." The republicans (agrarians) welcomed the first .SlovaJk Autonomous Government even more enthusiasticaH y. In their '"SLOVENSK Y TY~DEJNNfK." (Slovalk Weekly) of OctOlber 13, 1938, their leadiillg editorial "M8JIIle Slovensku Vladiu" (We Have a Sloivak Goivernment) , contained the following: "We recall that the ('IDinka Sl01VaJk) ·People's Party not so long ago thought and appeared to 1b e sufficient of itself for such a role. But when it actuaHy came to the brealking of bread, it realized what a great responstbility it is before the nation ·a nd how much woirk must 1b e aocompUshed to organize Slo.'V'aik statehood and an autonomous, independent Slovruk life. Under these circumstances and dtflficulties it was a real blessing that the Republican ,P arty of Slovakia was deternnined rwith all its forces to build a Slovak autonomous state unit. . . " SlovaJk centralists - the so~a,lled "Ozechoslova,ks" who had defended .and propagated a strong, centralized Prague government - openly and enthusiastkal ly spoke out not only for a;utonomy, but for SlovaJk statehood after October 6,. 1938. Their -w illingness to wor,k with the SloivaJk People's Party was not only evident, but also quite convincing, as demonstrawd by their manifestation s and the ,parti~ipation of the RepU'blican Party in the Slovak Government. Analyzing the whole brucikgro.und of these events, we find that the representative s of the political parties in Slovakia did nothing in 2ilina which was not approved of by 16 SLOVAKIA Prague. And the Prague leadership oif the coalition iparties even gaive pU!blic testimoniy of this on October 8, 193'8, by stating: ''The undersigned representatiive s of the Crech political parties declare that - in the sense of the 2ilina agreement of Octolber 6, 1938 - we adopt the ,proiposition of the Hlinika .SlovaJk People's Party to issue a Constitutiona l law in regard to the autonomy of SlovaJkia as ~t was presented in the .Asoornlbly of Deputies in 1938 and pulblished in the SLOVAK, No. 129, of Jrune 5, 1938, and we ibind ourselves that we shal,l endeavor to have it acted on and aoceipted as soon as possilble." The statement was, signed .by: Deputy Rudoliph Beran, chairman of the Repulbli<can Party; Deputy Anthony Hampl. chairman of the ,Social Democratic Party; Deputy Dr. Klaipka for the National Socialist Party; Deputy Monsignor Stasetk for the 0ze:ch Poople's Parly; Dr. Franicis Hodac. vice-ichairman oif the Party of Unity; and De:puty Rudolph Mlcoch, chail'lffian of Tradesman's Party. (!SLOVAK, October 9, 1938). Here we harve proof that even the leadership of the Social Democrati1c Party in Prague fully approrved the Zilina .A!greement, despite the fad that the Slovak Pe01ple's Party did not come to an:y agreement with the Slovruk Socialists. It is quite obvious, therefore, that October 6, 1938 Slova!k Autonomy Day - was baoked not only by the H1inka Slovak People's Party, but also the rest of the Slovak civk parties then in existence. All went along with the Peoiple's Party willingly and spontaneously and accepted the resiponsilbility for the future development of Sloiva!lda. Whether they were sincere 8'bout it or not is questionable in the light of what transpireid later, but the fact is that all ·political parties operating in Slova·k ia in 1938 - except the Social Demdcrats and the Communists - realized ,t he necessity od' uniting in the common interests oif .Slovakia, in fact in the interests of the national existence of the SlOIVruk nation itself. They were not re$ponsihle for the tense international political situation of that time, but were sufficiently intelligent to adapt themselves accordingly and save SLOVAKIA 17 whatever could ,b e saved under the given cir~umstances. It was, in fact, the old Btory Oi:f history repeating its.elf all poJitioal leaders wo11king together for the benefit of all the people of Slovakia, or hanging separately. On October 6, 1938, the just demands of. the Slovak nation,; so aiptly e~ressed by the Pittsiburgh Pact of May 30, 191'8, were finally recognized and fulfilled by the recalcitrant gorvernment of Prague. As we looik bruclk in retrospect today, we can only say that lruok of foresi:ght, statesmansMp, Christian charity and democracy on the part of Dr. Edward Benes and his National Socialists and other Ozech leftist - so...called "progressive" - growps prevented the realization o;f Slovak autonomy sooner and ,p recipatated the collapse of the Czecho,. Slova:k Repll!blic. October 6, 1938, no matter how enemies o;f Slovaik freedom and indeipendenoe may look ,wpon it, was a milestone in Slovak history, maI1king another lap olf the march of the Slovak nation to free dom and complete political independence. • • • WHO SAID IT? "After the Turkish invasion came tile religious wars which many historians made the mistake orf regarding as manifestaJtions of nationaJ1. resistance against Germanism. Here in Cenltrai Europe the conflicts were identical with those taJking plaice in other prurts o:f the Continent at the same time. The struggle Oi:f the Huguenots against Henry IV was no more -a nationaJl. conflict than the share of the Czechs in the Thi.irty Years.' War was a radal fight against Germanism. They fought against the HaJbsboogs beeause the latter were Catholks, _and the Battle of the White Mountain (1620) the Ozechs, together with their German rully, Prince Frederick, Elector of the Palatinate, were !b eaten 1by the Catholic tro01ps of the Austrian emperor. The legend about the Mountain is an outstanding exMn.ple Off historical forgery, for it was. a purely religious and dynastic affaiir." (F. 0. Miksche - a Czech - in UNCONDITIONA L SURREND@R, p. 71; Faber and Fruber, Ltd., London).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Milestones of Slovak History: October 6, 1938 Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 3 (8), September 1953 pp. 13-17 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September 1953 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/99390e5254760796a92608d0eccdcbbf.pdf af051250952e6ff94281853f1da67576 PDF Text Text SEPTEMBER 1953 VOL. Ill IN THJS ISSUE : WAS CZECHO-SLOVAKIA A DEMOCRACY ? OCTOBER 6, 1938 BERNOLAK ' S INFLUENCE ON SLOVAK LITERATURE SLOVAK AND EUROPEAN SEPARATISM RIPKA ON THE " PUTSCH " IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA CASTLES DR . JOSEPH OF SLOVAKIA : LETTRICH BECKOV IN RETROSPECT WHO SAID IT ?: 12, 17, 64 • • • Edi t ed and co m pi l ed by P HI LI P A . HROBA K Pub lish ed by THE SLOV A K L EAGUE OF AMERICA NO. 3 �Sl. OV AKL\ is published periodically by the Slovak League of America, a cultural and civic federation of Americans of Slovak descent. 'l'he chief purpose of SLOVAKIA 1s to promote a better understanding an<l appreciation of the Slovak nation a11<l its long struggle for freedom and independence. As Americans, members of the 3ltiv~k League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all nations, has an inherent and God-given right to freedom and independence. They are dedicated to the cause of the American way of life, Slovak freedom and world peace and are determined to oppose the plague of Communism and all other totalitarian political systems. Subscription to Slovakia $1.00 per year in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere. Send subscriptions to: SLOVAKIA Box 150 Middletown, Pa. ----------------------------- ---Printed in the U. S. A. JEDNOTA PRESS Middletown, Pa. � SEPTEMBER 1953 VOL. Ill IN THJS ISSUE : WAS CZECHO-SLOVAKIA A DEMOCRACY ? OCTOBER 6, 1938 BERNOLAK ' S INFLUENCE ON SLOVAK LITERATURE SLOVAK AND EUROPEAN SEPARATISM RIPKA ON THE " PUTSCH " IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA CASTLES DR . JOSEPH OF SLOVAKIA : LETTRICH BECKOV IN RETROSPECT WHO SAID IT ?: 12, 17, 64 • • • Edi t ed and co m pi l ed by P HI LI P A . HROBA K Pub lish ed by THE SLOV A K L EAGUE OF AMERICA NO. 3 �Sl. OV AKL\ is published periodically by the Slovak League of America, a cultural and civic federation of Americans of Slovak descent. 'l'he chief purpose of SLOVAKIA 1s to promote a better understanding an<l appreciation of the Slovak nation a11<l its long struggle for freedom and independence. As Americans, members of the 3ltiv~k League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all nations, has an inherent and God-given right to freedom and independence. They are dedicated to the cause of the American way of life, Slovak freedom and world peace and are determined to oppose the plague of Communism and all other totalitarian political systems. Subscription to Slovakia $1.00 per year in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere. Send subscriptions to: SLOVAKIA Box 150 Middletown, Pa. ----------------------------- ---Printed in the U. S. A. JEDNOTA PRESS Middletown, Pa. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 3 (8) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September 1953 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/31f6bdae7735eaa1e341e18e7d571f61.pdf dad8a00651f64e8e41d04ea0d96d617d PDF Text Text YOU CAN LEARN SLOVAK as easily as you can any other modern language. Slovak should be a MUST for students of Slovanic languages, because it is the simplest of all of them and a KEY to all of them. Prove it to yourself with the most scholarly text on Slovak, the SLOVAl( LESSONS A practical study of the Slovak Grammar, 92 lessons, 400 pages ; exercises in Slovak and English; English-Slovak and Slovak-English vocabulary. Hard cover, bound in cloth, $3.50 HROBAK'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY - the best and most complete dictionary of its kind; 702 pages with a brief sumary of the Slovak Grammar. Hard cover, bound in cloth, $4.00 THE SLOVAKS, by Peter P. Yurchak, should be read by all students interested in the history and traditions of the Slovak nation; 312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $3.00; paper cover - $2.00 SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK HISTORY by Joseph Skultety, translation by 0. D. Koreff; a documented refutation of several errors propagated by writers and historians; 229 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover $1.00. Order from: P.A.HROBAK Box 150 Middletown, Pa. �PRINCE PRIBINA, the first Slovak prince mentioned in history, resided in Nitra, Slovakia, where he built a Christian church in 830. The Slovaks are one of the oldest Christian nations of Central Europe. � YOU CAN LEARN SLOVAK as easily as you can any other modern language. Slovak should be a MUST for students of Slovanic languages, because it is the simplest of all of them and a KEY to all of them. Prove it to yourself with the most scholarly text on Slovak, the SLOVAl( LESSONS A practical study of the Slovak Grammar, 92 lessons, 400 pages ; exercises in Slovak and English; English-Slovak and Slovak-English vocabulary. Hard cover, bound in cloth, $3.50 HROBAK'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY - the best and most complete dictionary of its kind; 702 pages with a brief sumary of the Slovak Grammar. Hard cover, bound in cloth, $4.00 THE SLOVAKS, by Peter P. Yurchak, should be read by all students interested in the history and traditions of the Slovak nation; 312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $3.00; paper cover - $2.00 SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK HISTORY by Joseph Skultety, translation by 0. D. Koreff; a documented refutation of several errors propagated by writers and historians; 229 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover $1.00. Order from: P.A.HROBAK Box 150 Middletown, Pa. �PRINCE PRIBINA, the first Slovak prince mentioned in history, resided in Nitra, Slovakia, where he built a Christian church in 830. The Slovaks are one of the oldest Christian nations of Central Europe. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document PRINCE PRIBINA, the first Slovak prince mentioned in history, resided in Nitra, Slovakia, where he built a Christian church in 830. The Slovaks are one of the oldest Christian nations of Central Europe.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 2 (7) Description An account of the resource includes bust of Prince Pribina Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource July 1953 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/c068f9fc7cd4a586d430a70de3f6c892.pdf 0ad587cb3ca08c1b499e0ec4d59b5d33 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 62 SLOVAK FOLKLORE THE DEVIl, HAS TO WORK One .poor woodkmtter went into the mountains with his last piece of ibread, which he ca:rried in a small d:ooh bag. It was to 1ast him t!he wh<ile diay. When he came into the mountams, he hung the bag on a •b ranch and went to worik. The poor fellow choipped. and ch'Opped and split thick oaks until stirerums of sweat flowed from his. brow. Suddenly out of nowhere a blaick, dirty devil oame unawares f.rom the deepest depths of hades and stdl.e the last ,piece of bread fr·om the woodcutter's brug. When ,he returned to hades, the horny rascal boasted of his deed to his comrades.. "Look, 'bhi•s was supposed to last one woodcutter a who'le d:ay and I stole it from him." "What',s that, wihat's that?" roared Lulcifer himself. Wihen Luicifer heard the sto~y, he became very angry at the horny litble thief for having drured to steal the last piece of ,b read from a poor man. "And for that," said Lucifer, "you win have to serve that poor man for a whole yerur, commencing forthwith." The next day, as the woodcuitter was a:gain preparing to go into the hills with his ax on his shoU!lder, the door suddenly opened and a strong young man entered tlhe room. "Good day, .b oss!" the stranger said, "how albout letting me wo:rik for you?" "Aoh, my son, what would I do with you?" replied the woodcutter. "I have nothing to eat myse1f and, as you see, in that corner al[ my chil.dren a:re weeping ibecaooe they are hung-r y." "Well, just taike me on a:nyway. For my services you shall owe me nothing, and I assure you that you wiU be completely satisfied with me." "Well, ,t hen, come with me to chop trees, if that is what you want," said the woodcutter handing him an ax Before three days had passed, the hill, which the woodcutter wOUJld not have out in a year by himself, was aJlmos,t bare of brees, and the rows and rows of cord wood made the old woodoutter hruppy. From t!hait time on our woodcutter �SLOVAKIA 6::1 got along very wal!l, 8.!lld his chikliren no longer cried in the corner from huniger; they were ,h appy and healthy, because they were satfated. "Well, ,b oss," began :the servant, "you just keep on chopping little 1b y litJtle while l ,g o athreshing somewhere so that you might have bread and enoUJgh of everything in the howse for the wh'ole winter." "Go ahead, just go ahead," replied the woodcutter, "and whi1le you're gone, I',11 out as many trees as l can." In a g,r eat wN~erness dlweUed a wealthy man. Three hundred stooks of g,rain were in his fields and in his pens he had three htliildreld steers and tllree hundred ipigs. The woodicmrtter's serwant oarrne to this weaiLthy man and offered to thresh his graJin. "But wihere are you,r companions?" asked the man. "Do not worry abol.lit my compan~ons, just let me know whether you want yOU'r grain threshed." "Of coorse, I ,a m going to hawe it threshed, but don't tell me that you are going to d'O it yourrelf ?" "Whether I do it or not, yoo sha:N see the jdb done." "And w'haJt do you want for the threshing?" "Nothing my lorn, e:ireept whaJt I can carry away at one time," answered the serivant. "We11," the wea,l'thy man mused, "you will not be able to truke ten kilos away, so go to it." When it was .midnighlt, three thousand flails suddenly reso,u,ntled a,round the .stoclks of grain with a: whis:h, whash, whees'h, whoosh! The devils from the fires of hades came to helip their comrade By morni.intg the whole jdb of threshing was comp'leted and the grain stored in lra:rge saclks. Dawn was just .brealking as the thresher cruNed on the wea:lthy man to come out and see the jdb he had done. The man oo,tili:l not believe his eyes. The threshing was finished and the rich man was glad it was done so quickly. "Welil done, my lad," said the weialthy man, "and now you may taike whalt is y01UJrs for the threshing." Therewpon the disguised little devil ordered the lcmi's servants to plaJCe sa:clks of grain upon his shoU!l.ders. After ten kilos of wheat were 1plaieed upon his sh.ouJlders, the master smi>led and said: "WeN, young man, is that enough?" �64 SLOVAKIA "What do you mean encrugh ?" laughed ,t he thresher. "Ju.st keep pi'l.ing it on; look I can still hop around with it spryly.'' So the servants kept :p iling the saJoks of grain on the thresher's baok ,u ntil lib.ere were no more left. The wealthy man's hairr stood 'Uip from fear. "Well, w-eJl-1, now do ydu thinlk you have enough?" he asked. But the thresher let out a roar of laugihter, saying: "Not quite enOill!gh, my lord, just keep ptling on whatever you hruve. You see I .can stm dance around wit'h this stwflf " A huniclTed fattened ho,g s were taken out of their pens and pu<t on the bhres:her's .baok. The rich man was stupefied. "WeH, now perha•ps yoiu il:m'Ve enough?" he stuttered. But the ,l ittle devil danced around gayly and howled with giee: "J.ust keep ,pi.'ling it on!" The wealthy man was bUTsting with aD!ger, but he kept his word. "Let ouit a hundred fattened steers," he bar,ked at his senvants, "these he certainly ,wi!i not be able to carry." But the devil-thresher todk even the hundred steers, laughed in the master's face and then ran off to his boss as if he carried nothing at all. "WeH, boss, this is for y01U," said the servant ,ooiburdenh11g himself in t!he woodcutter's yard. "Now, even if I do leaive you, I do not thinlk that you shaM haive to fear hunger any more. My year is u1p, you know, but say, do you know who I am? Do you remember the day when yowr last piece of bread disappeared in the mountain?" The woodcutter shook his head and said: "I remember, yes, I do remem1ber." "Well, now I'U tell you who I am. I am a devil. It was I who stole your last piece of bread and as punishment I had to work for you one whole year Now my time is up. Fareweill." At that very moment the woodcutter's home was surrounded by laughter as if three thousand horses had brayed. It was the deviils who laughed at their comrade because he had to work for a poor woodcutter. � SLOVAKIA 62 SLOVAK FOLKLORE THE DEVIl, HAS TO WORK One .poor woodkmtter went into the mountains with his last piece of ibread, which he ca:rried in a small d:ooh bag. It was to 1ast him t!he wh<ile diay. When he came into the mountams, he hung the bag on a •b ranch and went to worik. The poor fellow choipped. and ch'Opped and split thick oaks until stirerums of sweat flowed from his. brow. Suddenly out of nowhere a blaick, dirty devil oame unawares f.rom the deepest depths of hades and stdl.e the last ,piece of bread fr·om the woodcutter's brug. When ,he returned to hades, the horny rascal boasted of his deed to his comrades.. "Look, 'bhi•s was supposed to last one woodcutter a who'le d:ay and I stole it from him." "What',s that, wihat's that?" roared Lulcifer himself. Wihen Luicifer heard the sto~y, he became very angry at the horny litble thief for having drured to steal the last piece of ,b read from a poor man. "And for that," said Lucifer, "you win have to serve that poor man for a whole yerur, commencing forthwith." The next day, as the woodcuitter was a:gain preparing to go into the hills with his ax on his shoU!lder, the door suddenly opened and a strong young man entered tlhe room. "Good day, .b oss!" the stranger said, "how albout letting me wo:rik for you?" "Aoh, my son, what would I do with you?" replied the woodcutter. "I have nothing to eat myse1f and, as you see, in that corner al[ my chil.dren a:re weeping ibecaooe they are hung-r y." "Well, just taike me on a:nyway. For my services you shall owe me nothing, and I assure you that you wiU be completely satisfied with me." "Well, ,t hen, come with me to chop trees, if that is what you want," said the woodcutter handing him an ax Before three days had passed, the hill, which the woodcutter wOUJld not have out in a year by himself, was aJlmos,t bare of brees, and the rows and rows of cord wood made the old woodoutter hruppy. From t!hait time on our woodcutter �SLOVAKIA 6::1 got along very wal!l, 8.!lld his chikliren no longer cried in the corner from huniger; they were ,h appy and healthy, because they were satfated. "Well, ,b oss," began :the servant, "you just keep on chopping little 1b y litJtle while l ,g o athreshing somewhere so that you might have bread and enoUJgh of everything in the howse for the wh'ole winter." "Go ahead, just go ahead," replied the woodcutter, "and whi1le you're gone, I',11 out as many trees as l can." In a g,r eat wN~erness dlweUed a wealthy man. Three hundred stooks of g,rain were in his fields and in his pens he had three htliildreld steers and tllree hundred ipigs. The woodicmrtter's serwant oarrne to this weaiLthy man and offered to thresh his graJin. "But wihere are you,r companions?" asked the man. "Do not worry abol.lit my compan~ons, just let me know whether you want yOU'r grain threshed." "Of coorse, I ,a m going to hawe it threshed, but don't tell me that you are going to d'O it yourrelf ?" "Whether I do it or not, yoo sha:N see the jdb done." "And w'haJt do you want for the threshing?" "Nothing my lorn, e:ireept whaJt I can carry away at one time," answered the serivant. "We11," the wea,l'thy man mused, "you will not be able to truke ten kilos away, so go to it." When it was .midnighlt, three thousand flails suddenly reso,u,ntled a,round the .stoclks of grain with a: whis:h, whash, whees'h, whoosh! The devils from the fires of hades came to helip their comrade By morni.intg the whole jdb of threshing was comp'leted and the grain stored in lra:rge saclks. Dawn was just .brealking as the thresher cruNed on the wea:lthy man to come out and see the jdb he had done. The man oo,tili:l not believe his eyes. The threshing was finished and the rich man was glad it was done so quickly. "Welil done, my lad," said the weialthy man, "and now you may taike whalt is y01UJrs for the threshing." Therewpon the disguised little devil ordered the lcmi's servants to plaJCe sa:clks of grain upon his shoU!l.ders. After ten kilos of wheat were 1plaieed upon his sh.ouJlders, the master smi>led and said: "WeN, young man, is that enough?" �64 SLOVAKIA "What do you mean encrugh ?" laughed ,t he thresher. "Ju.st keep pi'l.ing it on; look I can still hop around with it spryly.'' So the servants kept :p iling the saJoks of grain on the thresher's baok ,u ntil lib.ere were no more left. The wealthy man's hairr stood 'Uip from fear. "Well, w-eJl-1, now do ydu thinlk you have enough?" he asked. But the thresher let out a roar of laugihter, saying: "Not quite enOill!gh, my lord, just keep ptling on whatever you hruve. You see I .can stm dance around wit'h this stwflf " A huniclTed fattened ho,g s were taken out of their pens and pu<t on the bhres:her's .baok. The rich man was stupefied. "WeH, now perha•ps yoiu il:m'Ve enough?" he stuttered. But the ,l ittle devil danced around gayly and howled with giee: "J.ust keep ,pi.'ling it on!" The wealthy man was bUTsting with aD!ger, but he kept his word. "Let ouit a hundred fattened steers," he bar,ked at his senvants, "these he certainly ,wi!i not be able to carry." But the devil-thresher todk even the hundred steers, laughed in the master's face and then ran off to his boss as if he carried nothing at all. "WeH, boss, this is for y01U," said the servant ,ooiburdenh11g himself in t!he woodcutter's yard. "Now, even if I do leaive you, I do not thinlk that you shaM haive to fear hunger any more. My year is u1p, you know, but say, do you know who I am? Do you remember the day when yowr last piece of bread disappeared in the mountain?" The woodcutter shook his head and said: "I remember, yes, I do remem1ber." "Well, now I'U tell you who I am. I am a devil. It was I who stole your last piece of bread and as punishment I had to work for you one whole year Now my time is up. Fareweill." At that very moment the woodcutter's home was surrounded by laughter as if three thousand horses had brayed. It was the deviils who laughed at their comrade because he had to work for a poor woodcutter. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 62 SLOVAK FOLKLORE THE DEVIl, HAS TO WORK One .poor woodkmtter went into the mountains with his last piece of ibread, which he ca:rried in a small d:ooh bag. It was to 1ast him t!he wh<ile diay. When he came into the mountams, he hung the bag on a •b ranch and went to worik. The poor fellow choipped. and ch'Opped and split thick oaks until stirerums of sweat flowed from his. brow. Suddenly out of nowhere a blaick, dirty devil oame unawares f.rom the deepest depths of hades and stdl.e the last ,piece of bread fr·om the woodcutter's brug. When ,he returned to hades, the horny rascal boasted of his deed to his comrades.. "Look, 'bhi•s was supposed to last one woodcutter a who'le d:ay and I stole it from him." "What',s that, wihat's that?" roared Lulcifer himself. Wihen Luicifer heard the sto~y, he became very angry at the horny litble thief for having drured to steal the last piece of ,b read from a poor man. "And for that," said Lucifer, "you win have to serve that poor man for a whole yerur, commencing forthwith." The next day, as the woodcuitter was a:gain preparing to go into the hills with his ax on his shoU!lder, the door suddenly opened and a strong young man entered tlhe room. "Good day, .b oss!" the stranger said, "how albout letting me wo:rik for you?" "Aoh, my son, what would I do with you?" replied the woodcutter. "I have nothing to eat myse1f and, as you see, in that corner al[ my chil.dren a:re weeping ibecaooe they are hung-r y." "Well, just taike me on a:nyway. For my services you shall owe me nothing, and I assure you that you wiU be completely satisfied with me." "Well, ,t hen, come with me to chop trees, if that is what you want," said the woodcutter handing him an ax Before three days had passed, the hill, which the woodcutter wOUJld not have out in a year by himself, was aJlmos,t bare of brees, and the rows and rows of cord wood made the old woodoutter hruppy. From t!hait time on our woodcutter SLOVAKIA 6::1 got along very wal!l, 8.!lld his chikliren no longer cried in the corner from huniger; they were ,h appy and healthy, because they were satfated. "Well, ,b oss," began :the servant, "you just keep on chopping little 1b y litJtle while l ,g o athreshing somewhere so that you might have bread and enoUJgh of everything in the howse for the wh'ole winter." "Go ahead, just go ahead," replied the woodcutter, "and whi1le you're gone, I',11 out as many trees as l can." In a g,r eat wN~erness dlweUed a wealthy man. Three hundred stooks of g,rain were in his fields and in his pens he had three htliildreld steers and tllree hundred ipigs. The woodicmrtter's serwant oarrne to this weaiLthy man and offered to thresh his graJin. "But wihere are you,r companions?" asked the man. "Do not worry abol.lit my compan~ons, just let me know whether you want yOU'r grain threshed." "Of coorse, I ,a m going to hawe it threshed, but don't tell me that you are going to d'O it yourrelf ?" "Whether I do it or not, yoo sha:N see the jdb done." "And w'haJt do you want for the threshing?" "Nothing my lorn, e:ireept whaJt I can carry away at one time," answered the serivant. "We11," the wea,l'thy man mused, "you will not be able to truke ten kilos away, so go to it." When it was .midnighlt, three thousand flails suddenly reso,u,ntled a,round the .stoclks of grain with a: whis:h, whash, whees'h, whoosh! The devils from the fires of hades came to helip their comrade By morni.intg the whole jdb of threshing was comp'leted and the grain stored in lra:rge saclks. Dawn was just .brealking as the thresher cruNed on the wea:lthy man to come out and see the jdb he had done. The man oo,tili:l not believe his eyes. The threshing was finished and the rich man was glad it was done so quickly. "Welil done, my lad," said the weialthy man, "and now you may taike whalt is y01UJrs for the threshing." Therewpon the disguised little devil ordered the lcmi's servants to plaJCe sa:clks of grain upon his shoU!l.ders. After ten kilos of wheat were 1plaieed upon his sh.ouJlders, the master smi>led and said: "WeN, young man, is that enough?" 64 SLOVAKIA "What do you mean encrugh ?" laughed ,t he thresher. "Ju.st keep pi'l.ing it on; look I can still hop around with it spryly.'' So the servants kept :p iling the saJoks of grain on the thresher's baok ,u ntil lib.ere were no more left. The wealthy man's hairr stood 'Uip from fear. "Well, w-eJl-1, now do ydu thinlk you have enough?" he asked. But the thresher let out a roar of laugihter, saying: "Not quite enOill!gh, my lord, just keep ptling on whatever you hruve. You see I .can stm dance around wit'h this stwflf " A huniclTed fattened ho,g s were taken out of their pens and pu<t on the bhres:her's .baok. The rich man was stupefied. "WeH, now perha•ps yoiu il:m'Ve enough?" he stuttered. But the ,l ittle devil danced around gayly and howled with giee: "J.ust keep ,pi.'ling it on!" The wealthy man was bUTsting with aD!ger, but he kept his word. "Let ouit a hundred fattened steers," he bar,ked at his senvants, "these he certainly ,wi!i not be able to carry." But the devil-thresher todk even the hundred steers, laughed in the master's face and then ran off to his boss as if he carried nothing at all. "WeH, boss, this is for y01U," said the servant ,ooiburdenh11g himself in t!he woodcutter's yard. "Now, even if I do leaive you, I do not thinlk that you shaM haive to fear hunger any more. My year is u1p, you know, but say, do you know who I am? Do you remember the day when yowr last piece of bread disappeared in the mountain?" The woodcutter shook his head and said: "I remember, yes, I do remem1ber." "Well, now I'U tell you who I am. I am a devil. It was I who stole your last piece of bread and as punishment I had to work for you one whole year Now my time is up. Fareweill." At that very moment the woodcutter's home was surrounded by laughter as if three thousand horses had brayed. It was the deviils who laughed at their comrade because he had to work for a poor woodcutter.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovak Folklore: The Devil Has to Work Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 2 (7), July 1953 pp. 62-64 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource July 1953 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/a15debfb5d6d1ab2940f0d9a0159c322.pdf 764e50b948cc470aff2359cbfcb1c1bd PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 39 THREE MONTHS IN "LIBERAT ED" BRATISLA VA BY: AN EYEWITNES S Urut'hl 1944 tJhe capiW city of S10V1akira, Bralbis1ava, lived far remoived from mililtaey operations. Ltfe wars a,,1together nor,ma;J. both c1.1llltmraUy and sodaiJ.l.y. 'Dhe siltuation dhanged. sU!bstantli.la!ley after Italy wars occuipied, when Bratislava came withi111 the range of the alliied air :f.iorce. Mirl itary oib'jeldt:s of Bratisl ruva were first bombed rby the al'lied aiir force in the focenooo. of June 16, 1944. The "ApO'llo" ref.inery, the adjacenit faotory and lha!1bor quarters we.re hit. But indrirscriminaite Russian 1b om11:iing was more fatal. Soviet flliers did not specialize on miiitairy objects, but let bombs loose anyiw\here in the city. They ce11ba:irillry did not glorify themselves witih the 1bombing of SpitMsrka street, where tlhey destroyed a church, a convent and the hospital of St. EliizaJbeth. Sorviet planes ruppea:red aibove Braitislava on Holy Satu,rdary and peppered the civi[fans on the crowded streets with tlherir deck guns. The front had moved up consideraJblly and Soviielt p:lranes were comin,g over practically every houir to drop their b.ombs into the streets. 1 Easter 1945 in Bratislava During Holy Weelk it. was evident to most of us that the Germa'I1S were preparing ,t o defend Bratisfav.a. The streets were emptied, bM'ricades were constructed , huge g'uns were put u,p The Germans themsel;ves, '.however, did not appear to be very interested in tlhe defense of our ctity and hauled whaitever they couftd out of it. 'Dhe units whkJh remained were to be used to c01Ver the retrea,ting Germans. The Ger-• man com.man.der urged the Slovak Governmen t to leave Bratislava. Since only a small number of Germans remained, it was ~rieved that tJhey were not going to defend the city very lon.g. The poipuilation co'l.tld not decide whether to leave tbe ciity or stay putt. Sa.Jturday evening everything was being taiken into cel10Jrs and hritl!ing places. The monotonou s bomibing of the Russian air force, the ofose booming of cannons annOIUll1Ced that the Russians we.re a:pproachin g steadily U111spea.JkaJble ne:rrV'O!U'Sness gr.~pped the crirty. AH the men h~d �40 SLOVAKIA themselves, booaiuse iJt was said thait the Germans were going to taJke rull 1!he men out of Braitislava. On Easter Sunday, at nine o'dock in the morning, Soviet fliers aigain ffilade them- appearance and in the afternoon huge Russian g,uns were 'bombarding Bralti:slava. The we'l!l-.Jmown Ruissian "Kaltuse", also da!lled "1Sta~ iln'is organs," began to pJ.ay the following day, i.e., Easter Monday. Every. thiinig shook to the foundatio!l'S and fires hroike out in many p'lia;ces. T,h e retreating Germans fired the SloV'ak University and ala the reserwe piiles of food and war maJterials. Thick smoike rose from Bratiis'lruva for three days and three niighlbs, and the fire sprerud because there were neither waiter nor the pe01ple to f,i ght tlhe fires. The heaviiest fii:ghting took place in the ea'S'tern paJI't of the cilty, where praeitiic~ly every factory quariter wrus ruined, the stireets of Trnruva and Krizna, Stein's Brewery and the viJcinity. On 'l'uesday tlhe Gemnans began to f11ee, destroying every;th'i ng that had n~t a-lre'ad,y <been desitvoyed. They blew u1p the bridge ,to PetrizJalka and the last g,rowp bariricruded iltself in the Braitis,la,va Castrle. The Russians aiready were in the sulburbs of Bratislava, when the Germans in the western hil!J.s of the c1ty began cannonading it. Thiis hurl BTati'slava the moist. On Thursday morning fue first Russian d'i•visions were in the very heart oif the city. Graduailly the booming died aiway and the streets began to be filled w1th Russian soldiers. The "Liberation" Begins 1 The SolV'iet soldiers first Hib.e.rated us from our watches with their well-tlmown "Davaj easy" (Give your waltches). EX!cept for solldiers, tlhe streets were empty; on1y coz,pses were being b alked in .the sipring sun. After a few days, when we cra.,wled out of our bunlkers and cellairs., we saiw the ghastly pioture of ruin anld desolation. Sffiloke s,tii-1 ro!Hed out of buildings and 1:lhe atmosphere was. satwrated Wli'th dust and gunpowder. Glass wa·s ground under foolt. Rdl::fueries were in fU'l'l swing. Soviet soidiers brdke windows of business places with their rule butts and sa-cked and pitMaiged everything. A few dats later, not a sitIJ.g1le shop remamed whO'le. Wh'atever could rrot be taken �SLOVAKIA 41 was knocked to pieces. Of course, the l'a wless mob helped very efferdtive1y in thi's work. Reports. olf the raping of women began coming in. It was nothing um.t'sua!l to see franltic W()lffien rUIUNng wildly from their aJttaokeirs; they sm-eamed, k'iciked and fought, -but to no avail. The 'hordes of the RUJSsii'an steppe's were on the loose. Who shall desc,dbe the sta.rk terror- in the eyes of the Slo;v:ak women and girls who 00U!l.1d not get away f,r -()lffi the beasts olf Moscow? Even ii£ I tmoo, I believe that my pen woul:d have to blush if it had to detail the brutalities and abroc'~ties committed. There is no need to exipand on :the fate of many, many women, who remained lya.ng in their bllood aflter such a ba'I1barian shaw of "a!f.feotion" of the Sov,i et soldiers. They to,l d us that it was the "nationa!l duty" o.f the S1avaJk women to repay the So'Vliet arimies rih love! Vinko, Vinko, Vinko Cervene We thOUJght that SlovaJk wiine would not attract the Soviets after tJhey had tasted of strong Tokay in Hurngary. Bult we were mi!stJaken even tJhis time (as usu:a1). Slovak wine memhanits di:d not wanit to sel'l us wine since January, becau:se they had 'hiOiped to sell it at a high price to the Soviet sohliers. But how quijic,k1ly they soibered UJP, when, instead of the jingle-jangle of gCJld 11ulbles, they he:ard shots from rifiles anld. aUlbomaitics in their otherwise irnmcessible ceUars. Barrels were shot wp and the precious liquid o.f the Slova1k earth began flowing; first into pitchers an'<i all so!'ts of containers, dean and uncilean, even bernzine cans. When aU these were fi'1le'd, tlhe wine t11ic'k:led iruto soLdieirs' boots, then flowed over the cellars and vestilbll!les an'<i finaliy onto. the streets. Tos strong aroma mixed w1th the gih:astly stench of decayiing cO'l",pses, whk:h even after a week were stili lying on the sidewaiJ.ks. of the city. The soldiers drank and so d<id the civilians; ch!iMren drank and so did the oldsters. It seemed that the barrels were bottomless. "Viniko, vinko, vinko cerivene" (Wtine, wine, red wine - a popclaT Slovak drinlking song) ! I shail1l never forget tJhe tovaris-comrade who had two botJtles of reld. champaigne stucik in his fuT crup, a bottle in �42 SLOVAKIA eadh. pocket and his hands full. He was approached by another comrade whn .rolblbed hiim on the street of his precious bu.Tden in broad d'a.yuilghlt. The two lashed at each other li'ke antlmals and drew blood on the 'ha.rd pavement of Kapitulska street. Bratishwa wine merchants. 'loolk ed on stupidly and si.'lently ait this Sodiomic destruction of their cellars, and the SO!Ulr odor of the wine reminded them of the old times, when they were s'till:l. bosses of their wine and thought that they themselrves wolU.ld ·haive the honor to treat the "liberat0rs." They rea[irz;eJd tlhe bitter truth that they we·r e "liberated," i.e. comip1etely roiblbed of all their world!ly possessions on the very threshold of a neiw life, the new order promised by the men of the K.re:rnUn. Where Do You Stay, Tovaris? If you were in the aI1II1y, you know w'hat obedience and di'Scilplme means. Withoult bhe:rn, there hardly could be an effecltiive rurmy. A soldier beil.ong,s to some particular company or di'Vlisi:on, must haJVe his gear, be fed and quartered, even th<Ylligh it be under a tent or in a barn. Bult the Soviet soltl!iers wlho swa:runed iiruto Bratislava had no definite quarters and, hence, were everywhere. Usuany aJbout midnight it occurred to· tihe:rn that they had to get some sleep, so the,y began to looik for shelter. Door:s and lodks and bars were no hindrance. Wihether of glass or wood, doors were booted in or smasheJd wiitJh rifile butts, if they were niot opened immediately. "You, bourgeoisie, you did not fighlt ... " Threatened, 1:Jhere wa·s nothing one cou[d c1o bult flee from .h is own home and consider himse1f liUCky if he was not shot- A soldier does not undress for sleep very oflte:n at the fuiont, bult Ivan the RUJSsian never ll!Ildressed even when he had a bed, bwt simply piled on the bed f.wl1y g,ar,bed, 'boots, rifle, pi•s tols, grena:des and a:M. And the frolllt was sixty miles away from us. Investigation After Investigation We thought the war was over when the slh!ooting subsided and the boomdng resounded f.rom a dristanice. We began �SLOVAKIA 43 to clean the streets, coll!lect the dead, and put whatever was left oif ,ouir homes in order. A ,penson slO!Wly fongets what he lost, because onlly then, when he did not die during the bomfbardment, does he reaili.ize that it is beaultiifiu[ to live, even tJhoug'h in feaJr, hunger rund thirst, and in raJgs. Things tha,t were a.ire no more, and other things tfhat were not will oome into being. L'iife is all that matters. On'l,y he knows the reail meamng of water and light who has li,v ed thI10UJgh the terror of the front in hiding wilthoult light and water. I.Me will returm to iits dld ways and time wiH heal aJhl wounds ()If the soiwl a,nd bod,y ()If inld.wii.dUJaJl's and nations. Well, wlh,y shoUJld nO/t a person a:gaJin imagine that liJfe can be beruuttilfiull, when he is sitting on tile 'l'Uins ()If his home ~nd the ashes of hi1s dreams? Why, there is no more bc»nibing and even the streets are lighted up in the evenings. Buit empty a.ire the inns, empty are the ce11'3JI"s, empty are tJhe stores and shops Brolken windows and smashed doors attest tJo the min which the Soviet soldiers had WOOU1ght. But the wihl to live r,i,ses alb,ove all this. We must forget everyttJhing thaJt pruined us, a.IN the in:justi<Ces, subdue om thd,r st for blood, when the sap of a new spring is awakening, when everythfun.g is being ren01Vateld, everything is in bloom, the thrush sings and the chiildren play. Burt aH this is but a dream, an ~lluision. '.Dhe 'b attle has ended on the streets, but just the sa:me a mare fiurious invi:siib1e baittle is going on. As you step out of your home, you are co,nrfronlted with tJhe bayonet o;f a Russian soldier or the various "safety" ciommittees. You look a:rO'llnd and notice that yornr home, nay the whole street is sUJITounded by guards. You re'tl.l!rn h'llITTriedly to your room and wait to see what wiM h'appen. Y.ou wait and wait and waJit unti[ the sUISpense aJlrrnost d11ives you mad. Your blood thins in your veins and you look sadly aJbowt you - and wait! F'iinaMy they came, sO'l1d iers and civiili ians: they go through the house and take whatever they want. '.Dhey ask you whether you are a GeI1IDan or not, whebher any Germans or "coll'<llbaratilonists" a,re in your house. You lod.k them icily in the face. 'Tihey depart but only to come rugruin. �44 SLOVAKIA Organs of Security Mter two weeks oif the Russian occupation everything was phmdered. People had no more than they had buried or secreted in such a place where even the Russian hunters and t,hey are eXlpe'tUy schooled in the art of flinding wailled-in objects - would not come. There was a clirth oif everything, even a serforus lack of bread. But we had plenty o.f police! They sprang Ulp like m:ushrnoms aflter a rain. In t'he first place, ,t he dreaded NKVD (OGPU), the Secret So,vi•e t Police, n10toirioo~ for its birurt:al and ghasitl;y crimes. Woe to him that faHis intto its hanids. The NiKViD goes from home to home, drags peoipile aiway and nolbody ever hears of their fate. Fvom eastern S'JO'V'aJkia alone more tihan 4,000 peo~e were draigiged oiff into Siiberia. I was fonbunate to be 'home during the investigation. AU the en'tralllces to the 'bwil.ding were covered by soldiers wit!h a:utomattics. I •t r:wersed my room ne.rvous•ly. A'lthough I had a c:leair clon1science, yet I was di-squited. (No one is sufficiently olear or safe with the Soviet Po[ice) . Finally I wenlt into the haiJ.llway. I was greeted by a soMier and a civilian. A IDQlfilenrt later came the caiptain. He asked me my naJme, what I wa:s doing here, what my profession was, and wheither I was a mem1ber orf IIlin:ka's People'1s Parity. A mac1hinist l,iived on the same floo,r. His room was locketl. Tlhe caiptain OII'<lered me to open it. "I haven't the key," I told hlm. The maic!hini.st had the key and the soldiers had him in hand alt the gate. I ran to the gate. The NKVD g,u1a rd had an a.ultomatti~ on the machinist. I approached him and said that tlhe c~pta;in wants to open the machinist's room, but the madh~nrist had the key. The latter alre'ardy wanted to hand it to me, when the s:o'ldier suddenly tuirned the aurt:omatiic on me and said: "You ha.ve the key" - "'BUit I dlo not have t'he key, the madhinlist has it" - "No, you will 'h,ruve it, if the caiptain says so." - "But I do not have it; loolk, tovaris, the machimst has. it." - "No, I have a.Qready told you that you wi-11 have the key and will open the door, when the captam orders you to do so." I was dumlbfounded by the profound stU1piclilty and returned without t1he key. I told the captain thait the to:varis �SLOVAKIA 45 wowd not let me take the key from the machinist because, he said, the captain had ordered me and not the machinist to open the room. I also was a sOJldier and I know whait military dbedience means. Bult this cannot be called obedience, but some kind of unmentionaJble stupidilty or i!Illfbecility which wouid be capable of sticking pins under my fingernails just to find a key on me whirch I do not haive. I realized then wlhy people, during the investigaltions in tJhe tortrure cha.im!bers of the NKVD, confess to things which they never committed. The invest1gation began at seven in the morning and lasted un1ti'l nine. I went to town on business arrd returned a1boU1t eleven. Upon my arr,ivai the building was a·gai,n surrounded biy guards, but this time by the Prurtisans Security c:1it. I wanted to enter the bui'1ding, but they wouid not let me. I identified myse1f and said that I ld.ved there. Finailly a boy, about 17, wit:Jh an automatic in his hands, let me enter. It was very liive:ly in the hallways. The partrsa,n captain was giving orders. I did not know wh1at they were seeiking. I went through the investigation tortures again, but qUJite fortunately. Again aftl the rooms, closets, desks, and dressing cabinets were opened. The investigation was over at about one o'ciock. Again some innocent peoiple were taken. But that was not alt That was onJy t'he beginning. Night feJ.,l and the stars shone brighUy over Br.atislava. Finany, a lilttle rest, I thought But there is no restful or peaceful night duiring a Russian occl..llpaition. A'boUJt midnight I was awa.ikened by some one pounding on my door. Another investigaition ! I was on my feet in an instant and <jpened the door. Before me in the semidankness stood a man and a lady. Instead of identifying themselves, t!hey opened their short coats so that I could see the revolvers in leather 'holsters. "But, but, this is a spe:cia l visit, and so laite at night!" "Your documents," said the man. "Here they a,re, t:hank you." "Were you a memlber of IDinka's Party?" - "I was." "Since when?" - "From 1933." - "Were you in the 1 �46 SLOVAKIA Hlinka Guards?" - "I was not." - "Did you be'1ong to Hlinlka's Youth?" - "No." - "Are you a So'ld!ieir?" - "I am an oftfircer in the Sloivalk airnny." - "Did you ta.Ike pa.rt in the revollit ?" - "No." - "Why not?" - "I was on druty in Nitra." - "Are you a Slova;k ?" - "I am." Then they entered my room. On my taJble was a small bust o{ Andrew Hlin!k'a. "And .t his?" - "That is a bust of Andrew Hilinlka." "Hman., we adivi,se you, to destroy irt." - "I don't understand, whiy?" - "Welil, may!be tomorrow you will understand." Wilth that t'.hey depa,rited. Ait thrr-ee in the morning the inrve-stigat'ion olf .tlhe secret police was completed. At eight in the morn.mg came the olffictaJl police, the so-calied "Naitiona1 Secruritiy" po~ice, to find out who i,t was thaJt a1hlowro an in1VestigaJtion at mghit when the ipolice knew nothing aJbout it. "What kind o{ peop1e were they, how did they look, w:hiat did they want?" I was asked. This then was the new oroer - so ter:rrilbly dangerous because iit had so many .srufety biU1reaus thalt one dlid not know aibout the other! Or did they? The Bratislava Commander Complains A month had already passed since the occ'Ulpation of Bratisla1Va , but the streets were stilil wn:swept; dirt and ruiblble were everywhere; liice and infectious diseases were spreading rapidly. 'Ilhe local "National Oommittee" had a loog session to decirle what to do with the riwbbish and rull:fule clutterinig and burning in the streets. But how was the mess to be C'leared ruway, wlhen the Ru'Ssians took an the city dump trucks, a1l pri,v ate cars and al,l wagons and horse's ? Typhoid fever spread danger01Us ly; the numibers of inflicted increased. The Office of P.ropruganda, or, as it was then called, the "Commissary of InfoTfl'nation" pfa'stered the city witJh huge plaic-ards depio'ting a s'keleton poUII"iing lice over BraJtis lava and t'.he wairning : "WATCH THID LICE, THEY SPREAD TYPHOID. '' People stared at the placarids and barked: "Bwt who in �SLOVAKIA 47 tarnation broughlt lice here? Send the lousy Russians baok to their lousy ooumrtey !" 'I.1he first plwcards had liiittle e.fifoot. Severrul druys later new ones appeared: Origanilze energeti'C brig,ades of clearuiness ! But Il!cibodiy paid any atJtenMon. The :riUJbbish iblliI'Iled on and spread its poisonous fiumes over the .popuil.<ati.on. There were no autos, no wrugons wiith which to do the hau[ing. Hiarses, oows and siheeip were kept in the panks. The hot sun blruzeid away and laughingJy loolked at the me!SS, which the "new" government prdbalbly did not dear aJWay to this day. And so the skeleton keipt pouring the lice, and t:Jhe placaros aJb,o ut the brig,a des. of cleanliness were covered witlh new red ones, whicih unged us to attend lec!tUll'es on the moraie of the SoVli.et man, So:vieit woman, and the Soviet youth. The Soviet Russians wasted no time in edlucating the masses accordtinlg to the dootrines orf Marx and Lenin. A Soviet Soldier Confesses lit wrus a bea:urtri.:titd June afternoon in K 1rurl'ova Ves near Bratislava, when a Riu'SSian sOlldier rupproacihed us and struclk up a oonvwsaiti.on. He reproved us saying tha.Jt we Slovruks were Ullldiscipllined amid un.gratefUll. We shOIUJd not siay OII' believe tJhat t:Jhe RJussi,ans rure taikin.g everything that can be ha'l.lll€1d aJWay, booau1se thaJt is only ibrud propaganda. Since he was in a t~aJtiive mood', and did not have a revolver, we dooided to malke WIOrds with him. He spdke at length albout d!i.scipil[n.e in RUISSia, both in thiin.lk.ing and in spealk~ng. In Slovaki·a, he said, everyone says whatever he 'Pleases. "ThaJt does not exist in Ruissia. One must hiO:ld to what St-a!lin says. That is the truth and a.Ill else is ,proprugantla. Sta!lin to-Id UIS thaJt in Russia everything iis fine a!nd dandy, everyrtJhin,g is beaut.if.td, that we have enoUJgh to eait. And even though we know that everything i:s not fine and dan:dy, be.mt'i:fiul, and thtat we do not ha;ve enough to eaJt, yet we must say that everythmg is f,i ne and dandy, and thaJt we have plenty to ea.t. Stalin has so ordered! Stalin has so spdken!" He bec'ame so excited trying to prove his impossible stand that I reaHy pit'ioo. him. I s:m:il.ed and sa,id softly: �48 SLOVAKIA "My dear tovaris! We're a different kind of people, strange to you, indeed. When a tihinrg is white, we say it is white; when it is bladk, we say iJt is black. When we have nothing to eat, we say thaJt we a~ hungry oir that we are starving And if anyone orders us to speak otheirwise, we still. say the truth. Stra'lin telJs you different, so be hruppy in your belief. We believe in God, too, but with reason, never against reason." But our tovaris seemed to be far away; his mouth opened, but he said nothing further. Shaiking hiis head, he pwlled at his ear as he slowly wa;llked away. The Soviet Lady Doct.or We weire oirdered to hand 01Ver the miili'ta,r y hospdital in Bratishwa to the RUJSsians. As we were preparing inventory lists, a Rmlssilan l'ady doctor stepped iruto .the room. After talking for a time, we struck upon religion, belieif in God, and other ba.pics. But my Russian colleague, a lieutenant, !)TOclaimetl thait it was in vain we were trying to convince her, becruuse she wm.tltl nort believe l1'S no matter what the airgumenlts. I assured her that she had nothing to fear, because I had no ruposJtoilic intentions. "Why do we write 1945," I asked her. "I know but I won't tell you!" "Burt even you designalte this year by thaJt numlber." "You won't oon'V'ince me " "I db not want to. But even the unbelieving world admits that Christ was born." "I heard rubout that also; burt I do not believe i,t." "Why?" "Becruuse in the history of the Communist Party there isn't anything aJbout it." "Alh, so!" WhaJt is the use of debating? We looked at each other srgnifioa,ntly, smiled, and talked aibout otheir things. "How long did you study medicine?" "I finished the course during the wair in a year and a haJlf. In peaceful times the study takes aliJ. of two and a half years." �SLOVAKIA 49 We 1,amghed loud1iy amd pitied the prutients who happened to get under her kmfe. Placards: Religious Freedom DtN-ing the veriy first weelk:s of occupatfon the Slovak Communist Party posted placiar:ds everywhere, arnnlQuncing that the ComJmuni'Slts wiant to respect the relii.g,ioos feelings of a!hl the SloviaJk people and, therefore, are c,alloog aU Slovaks, regardless of the:ir religious convictions, into the Party. Nay, eiven Catho'l:ic priests coul'd and shlOuiltl join the party, we were to1ld. People sing a nfoe tune, when they want to catch a biro! But wlhrut if a mira'Cle had rea!Uy happened? Suppose Comrm.mism had made a tll!I"11 for the ,better? May/be Commun:ism was no longer so excilusive; perhrups it was even reipernting and had decided to let itself be baptized in Christian SlO'V'a'l da! We knew that the Communists were not sincere, but the fact is thaJt oultwarilly they did try tb deal humanely with the peopie for a wht[e to convince them that Communism was not as bad as they thought. It was evident that they were instiru~teld not to insult the sacred and traditionai feel'ings of the SlOIVak ,peop1e. But the pretense soon wore off and the Reds opecl,y a1:>t8iC'ked a11 ece'lesfastical instilbutions. Catholic Schools in Nationalized Slovakia lf there were some Sloivaiks who had iHu'Sions a,bout the Communists going sofit., thek tllu1sions eJOPloded like b,u!bbles, W:hen Laoo Novomesky, Commissar ('br:ulsitee) of Exiucation, annOlmceld that ai11 Catholic scbioo[,s m Slovakia were to be aJbo:Iished and their property was to be taken over iby t!he Stale. He was leld to this action, he said, because it wais inadimissaJble that the Ohiurich should o!ffer a different kind of education than the State. The unity of the nation, sa•: d No;voimesky, required a unifo:r,m eduicaJtiona1 system, cultural and religious st!'.ife must cease, etc. What could not be accomplished even during the first Ozooho.jSloV'ruk republk, was done now with one stroke of the pen · in tJhe shadow of Russi8JI1 bayionets. The Cat'ho[ic institrntions were hit first for ob:vious reasoos. The Reds had �50 SLOVAKIA little dififiicuM.y in getting the badking of the non-Caitholiic Christians. Al!l they ha:d to dt> was promise them that they w()IU[d get the CaJthoiJ.ii:c Churelh proiperrt:.ies. So-cailled followers oif Christ a1Jtadking and despoiling the fo1lowers of Christ! The Reds knew what they were doing, but evidently the non.CathoJic Christians did not, because they tooik the bait. Slovaik IJuithera.ns, Jews, Unitarians, Baptists, etic , expected to gain by the deail against the Catho[ic Slovaks (80 per cent oif tJhe poipuliaibi.on) and, therefore, went a'long with the Reds. !Ton mrust be forged while it is hot. After publishing the decree, all diredtors of Cruthoiic sciho01ls were dismissed. Their places were taken over by so-ca;Ued "Czechoslovaks" and Lwtherans. That was done e:spe'Cially in gymna'Sit1ms managed by the reJl'igiorus <YI'ders, for example, alt the UrS'llline s:c!hools in BrrutislJ.ava and Tuna.va. It was done designecily and systemaiticaHy. Fists were clenched and hearts were steeled. Freedom, freedom! The Slova!k Catholic public becrume extremely inili.gnarnt. People were saying that the women of Tmava were getting ready to storm the Ursuline institution there and throw oot tlhe new di!rectre'SIS, who was perseC'lllting and intimidating the reiigioruis Sisters there. The Bishops of Slovakia Protest E:ven though Siova..ks knew that nothing would be accomplished by protests, neverthe'Jess ail Catholics we.re a.rgreed that they simply coufttl ndt a!hlow the fundamental right of the Ohurch to iits own school's be taken away from them without uttering a word. The peopile had to make thernse1ves heard, or else the stones wmcld complain. The CaithOllic Bishop's Collliloil presented a memorandll!In to the government and the Central Cat holic Chancery was organizing a si-grratn.ure C·Mnipaign against the nationaHzing of scllodls. Lerufllets were distmi.lb uted, and on July 8, 1945, 1!he protest aigainst the confiscrution of the schools was read from ahl puipiits. 1 Well, alter Ju:ly 8, the Bratislava radio was heard from. It blasted and attacked the Bishop's Council, using the wellknown phrase: The parish church belongs to the Church, �SLOVAKIA 51 Mlld the school to the StaJte ! Things came to a head and the resrullt Olf the ,protest was that the dirootors Olf the Central Cath~lic Bureau, who teohmca;Ny organi!Zed the action, were jailed. We were again gilven prood' thaJt we were living in a "democracy" and thiaJt the people were dooiding their own fOiitunes. Wlhat a modkery ! Catholic Bishops Imprisoned The ffrst wa,s Hlis ExicellJency John Vojtassak, bjshop of Spis. Hailf of Slwaikia was a'1ready occupied by the Russian rumy. The Sl'O!VaJk National Council was already giving orders from Kosice. At the end of .AipriJ, Dr. Vav,r o Srobar, chalirma.n of the S1ov,aik NaJtiorra1 CouncH at that time, came to the Spisslka Ifupiroula (ISpis Chapter) to gain Bishop Vojtassak for the Slov:aJk Na.lbiona:l COIUnoil and for Dr. Edwa..ro Benes. Srobar wanted ,t hat prilze catch, bec'ause he knew that Bishop Vojttassa'k was an old and 'hard Slovak. As they meit in the corri'd.10r of the bi,s hop's residence, Dr. Srolbar explained why he came and then asked the bishO!p to back the new government. The bishop eyed him co:l d[y for a moment and then srud: "I do nolt reoogni ze any S'1ovruk Nationall Council and president Benes. My government is stilil in Bratislava, and as president of the SlrovaJks I recognize oruy the Siovak, Ms.g r. Dr. Tiso!" The ~ytihe stmrok upon a stone. Dr. Srobar departed, and bishop John VojtassaJk went to his room. Several days later when the bishop received an order from the Slovak N atiorral OownJCirl to beget himsellif to his p1race of confinement i-n Stl,ruvru:k, Vojtassaik replied energetica.!Uy: "I do not have an auto, nor any means of transportation, not even a horse. They -took ever.yrthing from me. I wi'M yie[d only to force." On May 5, 1945, an auto stopped in front oif the Kaipitula; it was a,mned with machine guns and severrul men with auito:matiJc:s. The wovds of Ohris't again rang ou't: You are come out as it were aigain,st a robber with clubs. The good bishop of Spis was forcefuilily talken to Stiaivnik and, later, to the jaml of the federal court in Bratislava. 1 �52 SLOVAKIA What hruppened to him? A1[ I knew at that time was that the commwn1i1,it "Plravd'a" of Bramislava was inciting aigainst h!im., head!linirrug its avticleis thus: "The Lord Bishop is against chi:ldren of tJhe wmikers." It was a brazen lie, designed to U!Ilderunine the 1:Jrnst of the fovthfol in the social ideO'logy of iits bishop, who during hd:s whole life proved himself to be the most social o,f alil episcopa:l dignitaries in Sl0V1aikia. Soon aflter the OOOU1pation of Bratislava by the Russians, the bishoip Ol.f Trnava, Mii.H'.tary Vicar and Rector of the BraJtislaiva seminary, J. E. BwzaLka, was ja1iled. F\irst he wais lodged in the pohce stati'On and tJhen transferred to the federail prison where "heiavy offenders" weire penned. He slept on a spring, no m'aJttress ,b eing availaJble, and the siliveT-haired poet, Va'lentine Beniruk, slept alongside him on the bare stone :flloor. After the bishops, t:he Slwialk National Co'Ullcil "took care" of the oonons and other pre1'aJtes. Among the first to be truken was Joseph Srobar of BraJti.sl'a:va, brother of Dr. Vaviro Srdbar. The old churehman, ail heart, would never hairun even a fly. But bo[shev,rk justice did not consider that. In him it sa,w an "enem:y of the people" and inrcaTcerated him. . Ma:nry othevs foHowed him, among them Dr. Charles Kovper, weH-iknown among .American S:lova\ks, former editor of a Cathoi1'i'c neWS1pruper. Monsignor Marsina of Trenci.n cO'llild not even OOJt for nothing in the jail, but had to work. And what work! He was forced to dig c011pses wit!h his bare hand's firom ma$$ graves, then forced to wash and ·k!iss each one. I have a strong su1S1pidon thalt those mass graives were made lby the Russians and not by the Germans as claimed by the So:vie'ts. "Fascist Post.enyi Arrest.ed" That's what a heai!'line said in the communist "Pravda." And it stumned just albout the whole of Slo.vrukila. The discovery of America O!I' the Law of GI"avitation was no more sensationall. Up to that time nobody knew that Monsignor Postenyi was a fascilSt. Aime11ida,ri Slovaks know Msgr. �SLOVAKIA 53 Postenyi very weiN. He visiited America in the interests of the S't Ada!llbert Society, pulljlisher of Catholiic literature and inrf.cmmat<ion, an origanwation equiivalent to the Book of the Month 01wbs in Amerti!C'a. The Reds knew that his Slovak ,paltriotism was beyond question and that his merits, as far as the l31rgesit CIUll,bural, Slovak, Catholk institution was concerned, were greaJt. Monsignoir Po:s tenyi is an exemplary priest of Gad, a S1ovaik hough and through, and an indefatfJi,gruble worlcer for the common people of his nation. He was pe!I1S€Kmted for his Slovak ,p atriotism when the Commumst leaders and editors of the "Pravda" were strn in the bOSOIIn of Albraham. Never aclmvel.l,y interested in politics, Msg,r. Postenyi sUldden!ly became a "fascist!" We knew whalt the C01Inmunisits wanted to aJOcorrniplish. 'Do put Posteny,i out of the way woold me'an to destroy the Society of St. Ad•rutbert with iJts libraries, priillt sh01ps and origan.izationrul appruratus. And so the SlOViaJk N ationa;l CO'U!Ilici1 appointed the fina.ncirul secretary of the Sooiety, a Ozedh named Wa;gner, as the commissary of the Society. A few days l1ater a new management was named, one that was rucceptaJble to the spirit and program of tJhe C01Inmunist-idk>minia.ted SlovaJk NaJtional Cooncil. This institution which was bui[it by generations of Slov,a ks inrto a going cultural concern wrus wiped oult in a momenit by the ruthilegs Reds The 150.000 members of the Society of St. Ada1be,rtt co:uM not say a word against the action without inviting punishment, either inciariceration or exile into Silberia. That is how the "people's demooracy" of the Soviets operates. Charit,a,ble Ecclesiastical Institutions The la;rgesit oharitalble ooganization in Slovrukia wa,s the Central Charity (Ustredna Karita), the central Catho1.ic institute of al'l the welfare, socitail, anld religious societi'es. It ha;d its own hea11th cenltets, hospiita!ls for incuraJbO.es, children's nurseries, etc. The women'1s "Charilta:s" was a'1so a mem~ of tJhe organi.<Za,tion. 'Dhe CommUll!ists took (Wer ruH soci:ail insbitiuttions of the Church. Some weeks after the ocCUipation, tihe Communist Union of Sloviak Women confi:s- �54 SLOVAKIA cated the children's nuTsery of the Ustredna ~arita in Dornk~le, BraJtislava, and the Union of SloivaJk Y ouith toolk over the ·b oarding sch06l nea,r the forestry school in Koliba, Braltislavia. The hwmanitari.an division oif the city o.f Bratislava comisoated the estate of "Oharitas" in Braltisfava near the Red Bridge. For the women's home of "Charitas" the commissari'at foT Social Welifare named as commissary the Communist Fla:TIIIly Hirusovsky. Dr. Ivan Horvath, the commissary for sooiall welfare, prod.aimed that a:1'1 the charitable, social instituJtions of the Church would be taken over by the state. Protests clid not mean a thing, as usual. "Freedom" of the Press One of the first ,a cts of the Commissariat for Initernal AffaiTs was the suppression o;f aM news,prupers. With th~s general order all Oathollic newpaJpers and :periodicais weTe wiped out aultomalt!roally; noit only cruturrul and literrury periodicals, such as the "Ku!litura" (a.rl.,tmre.) and the "Obroda" (Rffi"ilvaJl), but even an the religious and educational periodicals, such as The MessengeT of the Srucred Heart, The Holy Family, The Queen of May, etc. And, ]ater the only Caltholk Sloivruk weeldy "Katolicke Noviny" (The Catholic News), which had a suibscription of 170,000, was also swppressed and ta:ken 01Ver by 1:!he Reds. Cathollics protested to the authorities, but in. vadn. The Catholic press was gone. Attaclks against the Church and its priests increased daily, but they could not defend themselves; it was an unequa:l strwggk The enemy fought wfth powerfU!l we8lpons, whi[e the Catholics had none. "Freedom" of Conscience The wax was fought, we were told, aga.inst the suppressi~n of consoien.ce by imperial~stic means, and we haJVe lived to see sucll a diclatorship and s:uch a barbaric viOllia.tion of conscience and its inlterrra:l freedom, the likes of whl'C'h perhrups not even the most frurious f:aslci'Slt ever dreamed of. On aH fronts of tlhis terrible wrur died the best sons of humanity for the rigih:t to speak free'ly about the most fundamental questions of 1iife against tlhe fascist terror. Men �SLOVAKIA 55 shed their blood so that concentration camps, wiith all theiT horrors, might never a:ga:in operaJte. But soon aif.ter the war's end aN dliistriot cities in SlovaJlda were ordered to set up a concent.Taition camp and jaill. The war was fol.light for the freed'Olffi of poilft.ic-aiJ. conviotlions, but in Sl'OVlalkia today there are not enOUJgh jai!ls to talke care of aH those, whose only gui,It is that they wilM not swear on the Siclcl.e anld: Hammer, but prefer to rematin loyal to the fupal eneyclilc'als and the fiUJnd:amen'ta:l princiiples of demooraJCy. ln a wore, the Slovaks want to be demO!crat:s and not 'boisiheviks. What has rea;filry changed? Every ni!ght we waited tensely to see whether they were coming for us. We had no peace duirmg the day or night. Forever they were screening and investiigaJting UIS just 'becaUJSe we haippened to live during the past era, and had to wor1k and keeip OUir families. They perseouted us for "co'l:1-aborating" because we recorded oftficiail writings, in some office, or because we were insigruffoant wiheells in the great machinery of life. In Conclusion If I had not seen it, I would not hruve be'liieived it. Those first three months in "l~beraJted" Bra;tislruva were a nightmare. It .st;ilfil hamnts me. The S[ovalk people dild not ha,ve a clharuce. The,i r country was overrun bry bar:barians whom the .AilHes had Wlken on as pa:rtners. Slovalkia was ru!led bry terror and violence f.rom the moment it was "rnberaJted" lby the so-calil ed "Uniiteld Nations," which placed it in the Soviet sphere o!f irufiluence. ]t was ruied 'by the Communist-dominated regime o!f the man who r~gned the presitleTIJCy in 1938 and returned as president..a.venger behind the Soviet ho:rdes in 1945. 'Dhe independenJt Slo.ivaJk Repull:Afc, established by the dully eledted representatives olf t!he Slovak people in 1939 and reoognlizetl by 27 countries, including GreaJt Britain and F,r ance, was wanton!ly destroyed against the wiili of the Slova:k people. The vast majority of the Slovaik nation, the Catholics of Slovakia - representing 80 per cent of the poipll1ation was oulUawed. No politioail parities, newspaipers, organizations, and eilltenprises cou~d exist, except th()[se aUowed by �56 SLOVAKIA Dr. IDdwa,rd Benes and his Communist-dominated regime. The non-Catholic minority in Slovakia - including aN those who ca;Ned t!hemsetlives "Christians" - hel,p ed Benes and the Co!Ir.JII1UJill1S'ts ruin Ca1fud1irc Slovrukia and so helped to ruin themseilves and thetk in:stilbulticms. Whereas, in the beginning, only Crutholics were perisem.uted and onily Cathol'i:c institUJtion:s and enter,prises were nabion:a,lized, laJter the foNowers of ail Christian faiths were crucified and their institulti'ons confiscalted b;y the State. Hi:istor:y repeateld itseJ.if. But ha,tred of the Cathohc Ch'l11l'ch in S'lovakia did n01t solive any of the social or economic probllems, bult oll!l.y aggrawated them; in faot, it only he'lped the Communists realize their ends all the more speedilly. It is high time thait a'11 Christians realized this an:d aoted accordmgly. In Slovalkia tihere sha/U be no rea;l peace, no flI'eedom, as long 3IS 1t is governed by peopte wlho are hostile to the nationa1 traditions of the Slovak nation and its rel:i!gious and political convictions and, hence, are bent on the destru<:tion of the SIJ.O'Vruk people. Slovaikia, one of the oldest Christian countries of Centra1 :Eiu!rope, never sho:uil(l. haive been desbroyed as an independent StaJte. That is more evident today than it was in 1945. No nrution has fought Coonmunism more pel'.sistentily and consistently than the Slovaik nation It's time that this trutlh was recognized by a.Ill freedom-rl<wing, a:ruti-Com:rrmmist coll!Il1Jri-es and that they adj1U1st theiir pOllicies to,w ard the Slovaks to fit the present siitU1aition. Even today the people of Slovruk.ia find iJt ha~d to belrieve that they were sdld oUJt to the men of the Kremlin with the help of file United StaJtes and Great Britain, the great sym'bols of freedom and demooraicy. But they stitl exipect to be liberated by them. • • • "THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA is an American institu- tion. Its primary interest is America. As an American of Slovak descent, I say again and again that it ls in the interest of Amerlc-a and the democratic world at large to work for the freedom and Independence of Slovakia. The Individuals and organizations affiliated with the Slovak League of America - as true Americans - cannot wish their brethren in Slovakia less fre edom than they themselves enjoy in the U. S. A. We say: Give Slovakia back to the Slovak people!" - (P. A. Hrobak, Detroit. Mich., 11-18-51) � SLOVAKIA 39 THREE MONTHS IN "LIBERAT ED" BRATISLA VA BY: AN EYEWITNES S Urut'hl 1944 tJhe capiW city of S10V1akira, Bralbis1ava, lived far remoived from mililtaey operations. Ltfe wars a,,1together nor,ma;J. both c1.1llltmraUy and sodaiJ.l.y. 'Dhe siltuation dhanged. sU!bstantli.la!ley after Italy wars occuipied, when Bratislava came withi111 the range of the alliied air :f.iorce. Mirl itary oib'jeldt:s of Bratisl ruva were first bombed rby the al'lied aiir force in the focenooo. of June 16, 1944. The "ApO'llo" ref.inery, the adjacenit faotory and lha!1bor quarters we.re hit. But indrirscriminaite Russian 1b om11:iing was more fatal. Soviet flliers did not specialize on miiitairy objects, but let bombs loose anyiw\here in the city. They ce11ba:irillry did not glorify themselves witih the 1bombing of SpitMsrka street, where tlhey destroyed a church, a convent and the hospital of St. EliizaJbeth. Sorviet planes ruppea:red aibove Braitislava on Holy Satu,rdary and peppered the civi[fans on the crowded streets with tlherir deck guns. The front had moved up consideraJblly and Soviielt p:lranes were comin,g over practically every houir to drop their b.ombs into the streets. 1 Easter 1945 in Bratislava During Holy Weelk it. was evident to most of us that the Germa'I1S were preparing ,t o defend Bratisfav.a. The streets were emptied, bM'ricades were constructed , huge g'uns were put u,p The Germans themsel;ves, '.however, did not appear to be very interested in tlhe defense of our ctity and hauled whaitever they couftd out of it. 'Dhe units whkJh remained were to be used to c01Ver the retrea,ting Germans. The Ger-• man com.man.der urged the Slovak Governmen t to leave Bratislava. Since only a small number of Germans remained, it was ~rieved that tJhey were not going to defend the city very lon.g. The poipuilation co'l.tld not decide whether to leave tbe ciity or stay putt. Sa.Jturday evening everything was being taiken into cel10Jrs and hritl!ing places. The monotonou s bomibing of the Russian air force, the ofose booming of cannons annOIUll1Ced that the Russians we.re a:pproachin g steadily U111spea.JkaJble ne:rrV'O!U'Sness gr.~pped the crirty. AH the men h~d �40 SLOVAKIA themselves, booaiuse iJt was said thait the Germans were going to taJke rull 1!he men out of Braitislava. On Easter Sunday, at nine o'dock in the morning, Soviet fliers aigain ffilade them- appearance and in the afternoon huge Russian g,uns were 'bombarding Bralti:slava. The we'l!l-.Jmown Ruissian "Kaltuse", also da!lled "1Sta~ iln'is organs," began to pJ.ay the following day, i.e., Easter Monday. Every. thiinig shook to the foundatio!l'S and fires hroike out in many p'lia;ces. T,h e retreating Germans fired the SloV'ak University and ala the reserwe piiles of food and war maJterials. Thick smoike rose from Bratiis'lruva for three days and three niighlbs, and the fire sprerud because there were neither waiter nor the pe01ple to f,i ght tlhe fires. The heaviiest fii:ghting took place in the ea'S'tern paJI't of the cilty, where praeitiic~ly every factory quariter wrus ruined, the stireets of Trnruva and Krizna, Stein's Brewery and the viJcinity. On 'l'uesday tlhe Gemnans began to f11ee, destroying every;th'i ng that had n~t a-lre'ad,y <been desitvoyed. They blew u1p the bridge ,to PetrizJalka and the last g,rowp bariricruded iltself in the Braitis,la,va Castrle. The Russians aiready were in the sulburbs of Bratislava, when the Germans in the western hil!J.s of the c1ty began cannonading it. Thiis hurl BTati'slava the moist. On Thursday morning fue first Russian d'i•visions were in the very heart oif the city. Graduailly the booming died aiway and the streets began to be filled w1th Russian soldiers. The "Liberation" Begins 1 The SolV'iet soldiers first Hib.e.rated us from our watches with their well-tlmown "Davaj easy" (Give your waltches). EX!cept for solldiers, tlhe streets were empty; on1y coz,pses were being b alked in .the sipring sun. After a few days, when we cra.,wled out of our bunlkers and cellairs., we saiw the ghastly pioture of ruin anld desolation. Sffiloke s,tii-1 ro!Hed out of buildings and 1:lhe atmosphere was. satwrated Wli'th dust and gunpowder. Glass wa·s ground under foolt. Rdl::fueries were in fU'l'l swing. Soviet soidiers brdke windows of business places with their rule butts and sa-cked and pitMaiged everything. A few dats later, not a sitIJ.g1le shop remamed whO'le. Wh'atever could rrot be taken �SLOVAKIA 41 was knocked to pieces. Of course, the l'a wless mob helped very efferdtive1y in thi's work. Reports. olf the raping of women began coming in. It was nothing um.t'sua!l to see franltic W()lffien rUIUNng wildly from their aJttaokeirs; they sm-eamed, k'iciked and fought, -but to no avail. The 'hordes of the RUJSsii'an steppe's were on the loose. Who shall desc,dbe the sta.rk terror- in the eyes of the Slo;v:ak women and girls who 00U!l.1d not get away f,r -()lffi the beasts olf Moscow? Even ii£ I tmoo, I believe that my pen woul:d have to blush if it had to detail the brutalities and abroc'~ties committed. There is no need to exipand on :the fate of many, many women, who remained lya.ng in their bllood aflter such a ba'I1barian shaw of "a!f.feotion" of the Sov,i et soldiers. They to,l d us that it was the "nationa!l duty" o.f the S1avaJk women to repay the So'Vliet arimies rih love! Vinko, Vinko, Vinko Cervene We thOUJght that SlovaJk wiine would not attract the Soviets after tJhey had tasted of strong Tokay in Hurngary. Bult we were mi!stJaken even tJhis time (as usu:a1). Slovak wine memhanits di:d not wanit to sel'l us wine since January, becau:se they had 'hiOiped to sell it at a high price to the Soviet sohliers. But how quijic,k1ly they soibered UJP, when, instead of the jingle-jangle of gCJld 11ulbles, they he:ard shots from rifiles anld. aUlbomaitics in their otherwise irnmcessible ceUars. Barrels were shot wp and the precious liquid o.f the Slova1k earth began flowing; first into pitchers an'<i all so!'ts of containers, dean and uncilean, even bernzine cans. When aU these were fi'1le'd, tlhe wine t11ic'k:led iruto soLdieirs' boots, then flowed over the cellars and vestilbll!les an'<i finaliy onto. the streets. Tos strong aroma mixed w1th the gih:astly stench of decayiing cO'l",pses, whk:h even after a week were stili lying on the sidewaiJ.ks. of the city. The soldiers drank and so d<id the civilians; ch!iMren drank and so did the oldsters. It seemed that the barrels were bottomless. "Viniko, vinko, vinko cerivene" (Wtine, wine, red wine - a popclaT Slovak drinlking song) ! I shail1l never forget tJhe tovaris-comrade who had two botJtles of reld. champaigne stucik in his fuT crup, a bottle in �42 SLOVAKIA eadh. pocket and his hands full. He was approached by another comrade whn .rolblbed hiim on the street of his precious bu.Tden in broad d'a.yuilghlt. The two lashed at each other li'ke antlmals and drew blood on the 'ha.rd pavement of Kapitulska street. Bratishwa wine merchants. 'loolk ed on stupidly and si.'lently ait this Sodiomic destruction of their cellars, and the SO!Ulr odor of the wine reminded them of the old times, when they were s'till:l. bosses of their wine and thought that they themselrves wolU.ld ·haive the honor to treat the "liberat0rs." They rea[irz;eJd tlhe bitter truth that they we·r e "liberated," i.e. comip1etely roiblbed of all their world!ly possessions on the very threshold of a neiw life, the new order promised by the men of the K.re:rnUn. Where Do You Stay, Tovaris? If you were in the aI1II1y, you know w'hat obedience and di'Scilplme means. Withoult bhe:rn, there hardly could be an effecltiive rurmy. A soldier beil.ong,s to some particular company or di'Vlisi:on, must haJVe his gear, be fed and quartered, even th<Ylligh it be under a tent or in a barn. Bult the Soviet soltl!iers wlho swa:runed iiruto Bratislava had no definite quarters and, hence, were everywhere. Usuany aJbout midnight it occurred to· tihe:rn that they had to get some sleep, so the,y began to looik for shelter. Door:s and lodks and bars were no hindrance. Wihether of glass or wood, doors were booted in or smasheJd wiitJh rifile butts, if they were niot opened immediately. "You, bourgeoisie, you did not fighlt ... " Threatened, 1:Jhere wa·s nothing one cou[d c1o bult flee from .h is own home and consider himse1f liUCky if he was not shot- A soldier does not undress for sleep very oflte:n at the fuiont, bult Ivan the RUJSsian never ll!Ildressed even when he had a bed, bwt simply piled on the bed f.wl1y g,ar,bed, 'boots, rifle, pi•s tols, grena:des and a:M. And the frolllt was sixty miles away from us. Investigation After Investigation We thought the war was over when the slh!ooting subsided and the boomdng resounded f.rom a dristanice. We began �SLOVAKIA 43 to clean the streets, coll!lect the dead, and put whatever was left oif ,ouir homes in order. A ,penson slO!Wly fongets what he lost, because onlly then, when he did not die during the bomfbardment, does he reaili.ize that it is beaultiifiu[ to live, even tJhoug'h in feaJr, hunger rund thirst, and in raJgs. Things tha,t were a.ire no more, and other things tfhat were not will oome into being. L'iife is all that matters. On'l,y he knows the reail meamng of water and light who has li,v ed thI10UJgh the terror of the front in hiding wilthoult light and water. I.Me will returm to iits dld ways and time wiH heal aJhl wounds ()If the soiwl a,nd bod,y ()If inld.wii.dUJaJl's and nations. Well, wlh,y shoUJld nO/t a person a:gaJin imagine that liJfe can be beruuttilfiull, when he is sitting on tile 'l'Uins ()If his home ~nd the ashes of hi1s dreams? Why, there is no more bc»nibing and even the streets are lighted up in the evenings. Buit empty a.ire the inns, empty are the ce11'3JI"s, empty are tJhe stores and shops Brolken windows and smashed doors attest tJo the min which the Soviet soldiers had WOOU1ght. But the wihl to live r,i,ses alb,ove all this. We must forget everyttJhing thaJt pruined us, a.IN the in:justi<Ces, subdue om thd,r st for blood, when the sap of a new spring is awakening, when everythfun.g is being ren01Vateld, everything is in bloom, the thrush sings and the chiildren play. Burt aH this is but a dream, an ~lluision. '.Dhe 'b attle has ended on the streets, but just the sa:me a mare fiurious invi:siib1e baittle is going on. As you step out of your home, you are co,nrfronlted with tJhe bayonet o;f a Russian soldier or the various "safety" ciommittees. You look a:rO'llnd and notice that yornr home, nay the whole street is sUJITounded by guards. You re'tl.l!rn h'llITTriedly to your room and wait to see what wiM h'appen. Y.ou wait and wait and waJit unti[ the sUISpense aJlrrnost d11ives you mad. Your blood thins in your veins and you look sadly aJbowt you - and wait! F'iinaMy they came, sO'l1d iers and civiili ians: they go through the house and take whatever they want. '.Dhey ask you whether you are a GeI1IDan or not, whebher any Germans or "coll'<llbaratilonists" a,re in your house. You lod.k them icily in the face. 'Tihey depart but only to come rugruin. �44 SLOVAKIA Organs of Security Mter two weeks oif the Russian occupation everything was phmdered. People had no more than they had buried or secreted in such a place where even the Russian hunters and t,hey are eXlpe'tUy schooled in the art of flinding wailled-in objects - would not come. There was a clirth oif everything, even a serforus lack of bread. But we had plenty o.f police! They sprang Ulp like m:ushrnoms aflter a rain. In t'he first place, ,t he dreaded NKVD (OGPU), the Secret So,vi•e t Police, n10toirioo~ for its birurt:al and ghasitl;y crimes. Woe to him that faHis intto its hanids. The NiKViD goes from home to home, drags peoipile aiway and nolbody ever hears of their fate. Fvom eastern S'JO'V'aJkia alone more tihan 4,000 peo~e were draigiged oiff into Siiberia. I was fonbunate to be 'home during the investigation. AU the en'tralllces to the 'bwil.ding were covered by soldiers wit!h a:utomattics. I •t r:wersed my room ne.rvous•ly. A'lthough I had a c:leair clon1science, yet I was di-squited. (No one is sufficiently olear or safe with the Soviet Po[ice) . Finally I wenlt into the haiJ.llway. I was greeted by a soMier and a civilian. A IDQlfilenrt later came the caiptain. He asked me my naJme, what I wa:s doing here, what my profession was, and wheither I was a mem1ber orf IIlin:ka's People'1s Parity. A mac1hinist l,iived on the same floo,r. His room was locketl. Tlhe caiptain OII'<lered me to open it. "I haven't the key," I told hlm. The maic!hini.st had the key and the soldiers had him in hand alt the gate. I ran to the gate. The NKVD g,u1a rd had an a.ultomatti~ on the machinist. I approached him and said that tlhe c~pta;in wants to open the machinist's room, but the madh~nrist had the key. The latter alre'ardy wanted to hand it to me, when the s:o'ldier suddenly tuirned the aurt:omatiic on me and said: "You ha.ve the key" - "'BUit I dlo not have t'he key, the madhinlist has it" - "No, you will 'h,ruve it, if the caiptain says so." - "But I do not have it; loolk, tovaris, the machimst has. it." - "No, I have a.Qready told you that you wi-11 have the key and will open the door, when the captam orders you to do so." I was dumlbfounded by the profound stU1piclilty and returned without t1he key. I told the captain thait the to:varis �SLOVAKIA 45 wowd not let me take the key from the machinist because, he said, the captain had ordered me and not the machinist to open the room. I also was a sOJldier and I know whait military dbedience means. Bult this cannot be called obedience, but some kind of unmentionaJble stupidilty or i!Illfbecility which wouid be capable of sticking pins under my fingernails just to find a key on me whirch I do not haive. I realized then wlhy people, during the investigaltions in tJhe tortrure cha.im!bers of the NKVD, confess to things which they never committed. The invest1gation began at seven in the morning and lasted un1ti'l nine. I went to town on business arrd returned a1boU1t eleven. Upon my arr,ivai the building was a·gai,n surrounded biy guards, but this time by the Prurtisans Security c:1it. I wanted to enter the bui'1ding, but they wouid not let me. I identified myse1f and said that I ld.ved there. Finailly a boy, about 17, wit:Jh an automatic in his hands, let me enter. It was very liive:ly in the hallways. The partrsa,n captain was giving orders. I did not know wh1at they were seeiking. I went through the investigation tortures again, but qUJite fortunately. Again aftl the rooms, closets, desks, and dressing cabinets were opened. The investigation was over at about one o'ciock. Again some innocent peoiple were taken. But that was not alt That was onJy t'he beginning. Night feJ.,l and the stars shone brighUy over Br.atislava. Finany, a lilttle rest, I thought But there is no restful or peaceful night duiring a Russian occl..llpaition. A'boUJt midnight I was awa.ikened by some one pounding on my door. Another investigaition ! I was on my feet in an instant and <jpened the door. Before me in the semidankness stood a man and a lady. Instead of identifying themselves, t!hey opened their short coats so that I could see the revolvers in leather 'holsters. "But, but, this is a spe:cia l visit, and so laite at night!" "Your documents," said the man. "Here they a,re, t:hank you." "Were you a memlber of IDinka's Party?" - "I was." "Since when?" - "From 1933." - "Were you in the 1 �46 SLOVAKIA Hlinka Guards?" - "I was not." - "Did you be'1ong to Hlinlka's Youth?" - "No." - "Are you a So'ld!ieir?" - "I am an oftfircer in the Sloivalk airnny." - "Did you ta.Ike pa.rt in the revollit ?" - "No." - "Why not?" - "I was on druty in Nitra." - "Are you a Slova;k ?" - "I am." Then they entered my room. On my taJble was a small bust o{ Andrew Hlin!k'a. "And .t his?" - "That is a bust of Andrew Hilinlka." "Hman., we adivi,se you, to destroy irt." - "I don't understand, whiy?" - "Welil, may!be tomorrow you will understand." Wilth that t'.hey depa,rited. Ait thrr-ee in the morning the inrve-stigat'ion olf .tlhe secret police was completed. At eight in the morn.mg came the olffictaJl police, the so-calied "Naitiona1 Secruritiy" po~ice, to find out who i,t was thaJt a1hlowro an in1VestigaJtion at mghit when the ipolice knew nothing aJbout it. "What kind o{ peop1e were they, how did they look, w:hiat did they want?" I was asked. This then was the new oroer - so ter:rrilbly dangerous because iit had so many .srufety biU1reaus thalt one dlid not know aibout the other! Or did they? The Bratislava Commander Complains A month had already passed since the occ'Ulpation of Bratisla1Va , but the streets were stilil wn:swept; dirt and ruiblble were everywhere; liice and infectious diseases were spreading rapidly. 'Ilhe local "National Oommittee" had a loog session to decirle what to do with the riwbbish and rull:fule clutterinig and burning in the streets. But how was the mess to be C'leared ruway, wlhen the Ru'Ssians took an the city dump trucks, a1l pri,v ate cars and al,l wagons and horse's ? Typhoid fever spread danger01Us ly; the numibers of inflicted increased. The Office of P.ropruganda, or, as it was then called, the "Commissary of InfoTfl'nation" pfa'stered the city witJh huge plaic-ards depio'ting a s'keleton poUII"iing lice over BraJtis lava and t'.he wairning : "WATCH THID LICE, THEY SPREAD TYPHOID. '' People stared at the placarids and barked: "Bwt who in �SLOVAKIA 47 tarnation broughlt lice here? Send the lousy Russians baok to their lousy ooumrtey !" 'I.1he first plwcards had liiittle e.fifoot. Severrul druys later new ones appeared: Origanilze energeti'C brig,ades of clearuiness ! But Il!cibodiy paid any atJtenMon. The :riUJbbish iblliI'Iled on and spread its poisonous fiumes over the .popuil.<ati.on. There were no autos, no wrugons wiith which to do the hau[ing. Hiarses, oows and siheeip were kept in the panks. The hot sun blruzeid away and laughingJy loolked at the me!SS, which the "new" government prdbalbly did not dear aJWay to this day. And so the skeleton keipt pouring the lice, and t:Jhe placaros aJb,o ut the brig,a des. of cleanliness were covered witlh new red ones, whicih unged us to attend lec!tUll'es on the moraie of the SoVli.et man, So:vieit woman, and the Soviet youth. The Soviet Russians wasted no time in edlucating the masses accordtinlg to the dootrines orf Marx and Lenin. A Soviet Soldier Confesses lit wrus a bea:urtri.:titd June afternoon in K 1rurl'ova Ves near Bratislava, when a Riu'SSian sOlldier rupproacihed us and struclk up a oonvwsaiti.on. He reproved us saying tha.Jt we Slovruks were Ullldiscipllined amid un.gratefUll. We shOIUJd not siay OII' believe tJhat t:Jhe RJussi,ans rure taikin.g everything that can be ha'l.lll€1d aJWay, booau1se thaJt is only ibrud propaganda. Since he was in a t~aJtiive mood', and did not have a revolver, we dooided to malke WIOrds with him. He spdke at length albout d!i.scipil[n.e in RUISSia, both in thiin.lk.ing and in spealk~ng. In Slovaki·a, he said, everyone says whatever he 'Pleases. "ThaJt does not exist in Ruissia. One must hiO:ld to what St-a!lin says. That is the truth and a.Ill else is ,proprugantla. Sta!lin to-Id UIS thaJt in Russia everything iis fine a!nd dandy, everyrtJhin,g is beaut.if.td, that we have enoUJgh to eait. And even though we know that everything i:s not fine and dan:dy, be.mt'i:fiul, and thtat we do not ha;ve enough to eaJt, yet we must say that everythmg is f,i ne and dandy, and thaJt we have plenty to ea.t. Stalin has so ordered! Stalin has so spdken!" He bec'ame so excited trying to prove his impossible stand that I reaHy pit'ioo. him. I s:m:il.ed and sa,id softly: �48 SLOVAKIA "My dear tovaris! We're a different kind of people, strange to you, indeed. When a tihinrg is white, we say it is white; when it is bladk, we say iJt is black. When we have nothing to eat, we say thaJt we a~ hungry oir that we are starving And if anyone orders us to speak otheirwise, we still. say the truth. Stra'lin telJs you different, so be hruppy in your belief. We believe in God, too, but with reason, never against reason." But our tovaris seemed to be far away; his mouth opened, but he said nothing further. Shaiking hiis head, he pwlled at his ear as he slowly wa;llked away. The Soviet Lady Doct.or We weire oirdered to hand 01Ver the miili'ta,r y hospdital in Bratishwa to the RUJSsians. As we were preparing inventory lists, a Rmlssilan l'ady doctor stepped iruto .the room. After talking for a time, we struck upon religion, belieif in God, and other ba.pics. But my Russian colleague, a lieutenant, !)TOclaimetl thait it was in vain we were trying to convince her, becruuse she wm.tltl nort believe l1'S no matter what the airgumenlts. I assured her that she had nothing to fear, because I had no ruposJtoilic intentions. "Why do we write 1945," I asked her. "I know but I won't tell you!" "Burt even you designalte this year by thaJt numlber." "You won't oon'V'ince me " "I db not want to. But even the unbelieving world admits that Christ was born." "I heard rubout that also; burt I do not believe i,t." "Why?" "Becruuse in the history of the Communist Party there isn't anything aJbout it." "Alh, so!" WhaJt is the use of debating? We looked at each other srgnifioa,ntly, smiled, and talked aibout otheir things. "How long did you study medicine?" "I finished the course during the wair in a year and a haJlf. In peaceful times the study takes aliJ. of two and a half years." �SLOVAKIA 49 We 1,amghed loud1iy amd pitied the prutients who happened to get under her kmfe. Placards: Religious Freedom DtN-ing the veriy first weelk:s of occupatfon the Slovak Communist Party posted placiar:ds everywhere, arnnlQuncing that the ComJmuni'Slts wiant to respect the relii.g,ioos feelings of a!hl the SloviaJk people and, therefore, are c,alloog aU Slovaks, regardless of the:ir religious convictions, into the Party. Nay, eiven Catho'l:ic priests coul'd and shlOuiltl join the party, we were to1ld. People sing a nfoe tune, when they want to catch a biro! But wlhrut if a mira'Cle had rea!Uy happened? Suppose Comrm.mism had made a tll!I"11 for the ,better? May/be Commun:ism was no longer so excilusive; perhrups it was even reipernting and had decided to let itself be baptized in Christian SlO'V'a'l da! We knew that the Communists were not sincere, but the fact is thaJt oultwarilly they did try tb deal humanely with the peopie for a wht[e to convince them that Communism was not as bad as they thought. It was evident that they were instiru~teld not to insult the sacred and traditionai feel'ings of the SlOIVak ,peop1e. But the pretense soon wore off and the Reds opecl,y a1:>t8iC'ked a11 ece'lesfastical instilbutions. Catholic Schools in Nationalized Slovakia lf there were some Sloivaiks who had iHu'Sions a,bout the Communists going sofit., thek tllu1sions eJOPloded like b,u!bbles, W:hen Laoo Novomesky, Commissar ('br:ulsitee) of Exiucation, annOlmceld that ai11 Catholic scbioo[,s m Slovakia were to be aJbo:Iished and their property was to be taken over iby t!he Stale. He was leld to this action, he said, because it wais inadimissaJble that the Ohiurich should o!ffer a different kind of education than the State. The unity of the nation, sa•: d No;voimesky, required a unifo:r,m eduicaJtiona1 system, cultural and religious st!'.ife must cease, etc. What could not be accomplished even during the first Ozooho.jSloV'ruk republk, was done now with one stroke of the pen · in tJhe shadow of Russi8JI1 bayionets. The Cat'ho[ic institrntions were hit first for ob:vious reasoos. The Reds had �50 SLOVAKIA little dififiicuM.y in getting the badking of the non-Caitholiic Christians. Al!l they ha:d to dt> was promise them that they w()IU[d get the CaJthoiJ.ii:c Churelh proiperrt:.ies. So-cailled followers oif Christ a1Jtadking and despoiling the fo1lowers of Christ! The Reds knew what they were doing, but evidently the non.CathoJic Christians did not, because they tooik the bait. Slovaik IJuithera.ns, Jews, Unitarians, Baptists, etic , expected to gain by the deail against the Catho[ic Slovaks (80 per cent oif tJhe poipuliaibi.on) and, therefore, went a'long with the Reds. !Ton mrust be forged while it is hot. After publishing the decree, all diredtors of Cruthoiic sciho01ls were dismissed. Their places were taken over by so-ca;Ued "Czechoslovaks" and Lwtherans. That was done e:spe'Cially in gymna'Sit1ms managed by the reJl'igiorus <YI'ders, for example, alt the UrS'llline s:c!hools in BrrutislJ.ava and Tuna.va. It was done designecily and systemaiticaHy. Fists were clenched and hearts were steeled. Freedom, freedom! The Slova!k Catholic public becrume extremely inili.gnarnt. People were saying that the women of Tmava were getting ready to storm the Ursuline institution there and throw oot tlhe new di!rectre'SIS, who was perseC'lllting and intimidating the reiigioruis Sisters there. The Bishops of Slovakia Protest E:ven though Siova..ks knew that nothing would be accomplished by protests, neverthe'Jess ail Catholics we.re a.rgreed that they simply coufttl ndt a!hlow the fundamental right of the Ohurch to iits own school's be taken away from them without uttering a word. The peopile had to make thernse1ves heard, or else the stones wmcld complain. The CaithOllic Bishop's Collliloil presented a memorandll!In to the government and the Central Cat holic Chancery was organizing a si-grratn.ure C·Mnipaign against the nationaHzing of scllodls. Lerufllets were distmi.lb uted, and on July 8, 1945, 1!he protest aigainst the confiscrution of the schools was read from ahl puipiits. 1 Well, alter Ju:ly 8, the Bratislava radio was heard from. It blasted and attacked the Bishop's Council, using the wellknown phrase: The parish church belongs to the Church, �SLOVAKIA 51 Mlld the school to the StaJte ! Things came to a head and the resrullt Olf the ,protest was that the dirootors Olf the Central Cath~lic Bureau, who teohmca;Ny organi!Zed the action, were jailed. We were again gilven prood' thaJt we were living in a "democracy" and thiaJt the people were dooiding their own fOiitunes. Wlhat a modkery ! Catholic Bishops Imprisoned The ffrst wa,s Hlis ExicellJency John Vojtassak, bjshop of Spis. Hailf of Slwaikia was a'1ready occupied by the Russian rumy. The Sl'O!VaJk National Council was already giving orders from Kosice. At the end of .AipriJ, Dr. Vav,r o Srobar, chalirma.n of the S1ov,aik NaJtiorra1 CouncH at that time, came to the Spisslka Ifupiroula (ISpis Chapter) to gain Bishop Vojtassak for the Slov:aJk Na.lbiona:l COIUnoil and for Dr. Edwa..ro Benes. Srobar wanted ,t hat prilze catch, bec'ause he knew that Bishop Vojttassa'k was an old and 'hard Slovak. As they meit in the corri'd.10r of the bi,s hop's residence, Dr. Srolbar explained why he came and then asked the bishO!p to back the new government. The bishop eyed him co:l d[y for a moment and then srud: "I do nolt reoogni ze any S'1ovruk Nationall Council and president Benes. My government is stilil in Bratislava, and as president of the SlrovaJks I recognize oruy the Siovak, Ms.g r. Dr. Tiso!" The ~ytihe stmrok upon a stone. Dr. Srobar departed, and bishop John VojtassaJk went to his room. Several days later when the bishop received an order from the Slovak N atiorral OownJCirl to beget himsellif to his p1race of confinement i-n Stl,ruvru:k, Vojtassaik replied energetica.!Uy: "I do not have an auto, nor any means of transportation, not even a horse. They -took ever.yrthing from me. I wi'M yie[d only to force." On May 5, 1945, an auto stopped in front oif the Kaipitula; it was a,mned with machine guns and severrul men with auito:matiJc:s. The wovds of Ohris't again rang ou't: You are come out as it were aigain,st a robber with clubs. The good bishop of Spis was forcefuilily talken to Stiaivnik and, later, to the jaml of the federal court in Bratislava. 1 �52 SLOVAKIA What hruppened to him? A1[ I knew at that time was that the commwn1i1,it "Plravd'a" of Bramislava was inciting aigainst h!im., head!linirrug its avticleis thus: "The Lord Bishop is against chi:ldren of tJhe wmikers." It was a brazen lie, designed to U!Ilderunine the 1:Jrnst of the fovthfol in the social ideO'logy of iits bishop, who during hd:s whole life proved himself to be the most social o,f alil episcopa:l dignitaries in Sl0V1aikia. Soon aflter the OOOU1pation of Bratislava by the Russians, the bishoip Ol.f Trnava, Mii.H'.tary Vicar and Rector of the BraJtislaiva seminary, J. E. BwzaLka, was ja1iled. F\irst he wais lodged in the pohce stati'On and tJhen transferred to the federail prison where "heiavy offenders" weire penned. He slept on a spring, no m'aJttress ,b eing availaJble, and the siliveT-haired poet, Va'lentine Beniruk, slept alongside him on the bare stone :flloor. After the bishops, t:he Slwialk National Co'Ullcil "took care" of the oonons and other pre1'aJtes. Among the first to be truken was Joseph Srobar of BraJti.sl'a:va, brother of Dr. Vaviro Srdbar. The old churehman, ail heart, would never hairun even a fly. But bo[shev,rk justice did not consider that. In him it sa,w an "enem:y of the people" and inrcaTcerated him. . Ma:nry othevs foHowed him, among them Dr. Charles Kovper, weH-iknown among .American S:lova\ks, former editor of a Cathoi1'i'c neWS1pruper. Monsignor Marsina of Trenci.n cO'llild not even OOJt for nothing in the jail, but had to work. And what work! He was forced to dig c011pses wit!h his bare hand's firom ma$$ graves, then forced to wash and ·k!iss each one. I have a strong su1S1pidon thalt those mass graives were made lby the Russians and not by the Germans as claimed by the So:vie'ts. "Fascist Post.enyi Arrest.ed" That's what a heai!'line said in the communist "Pravda." And it stumned just albout the whole of Slo.vrukila. The discovery of America O!I' the Law of GI"avitation was no more sensationall. Up to that time nobody knew that Monsignor Postenyi was a fascilSt. Aime11ida,ri Slovaks know Msgr. �SLOVAKIA 53 Postenyi very weiN. He visiited America in the interests of the S't Ada!llbert Society, pulljlisher of Catholiic literature and inrf.cmmat<ion, an origanwation equiivalent to the Book of the Month 01wbs in Amerti!C'a. The Reds knew that his Slovak ,paltriotism was beyond question and that his merits, as far as the l31rgesit CIUll,bural, Slovak, Catholk institution was concerned, were greaJt. Monsignoir Po:s tenyi is an exemplary priest of Gad, a S1ovaik hough and through, and an indefatfJi,gruble worlcer for the common people of his nation. He was pe!I1S€Kmted for his Slovak ,p atriotism when the Commumst leaders and editors of the "Pravda" were strn in the bOSOIIn of Albraham. Never aclmvel.l,y interested in politics, Msg,r. Postenyi sUldden!ly became a "fascist!" We knew whalt the C01Inmunisits wanted to aJOcorrniplish. 'Do put Posteny,i out of the way woold me'an to destroy the Society of St. Ad•rutbert with iJts libraries, priillt sh01ps and origan.izationrul appruratus. And so the SlOViaJk N ationa;l CO'U!Ilici1 appointed the fina.ncirul secretary of the Sooiety, a Ozedh named Wa;gner, as the commissary of the Society. A few days l1ater a new management was named, one that was rucceptaJble to the spirit and program of tJhe C01Inmunist-idk>minia.ted SlovaJk NaJtional Cooncil. This institution which was bui[it by generations of Slov,a ks inrto a going cultural concern wrus wiped oult in a momenit by the ruthilegs Reds The 150.000 members of the Society of St. Ada1be,rtt co:uM not say a word against the action without inviting punishment, either inciariceration or exile into Silberia. That is how the "people's demooracy" of the Soviets operates. Charit,a,ble Ecclesiastical Institutions The la;rgesit oharitalble ooganization in Slovrukia wa,s the Central Charity (Ustredna Karita), the central Catho1.ic institute of al'l the welfare, socitail, anld religious societi'es. It ha;d its own hea11th cenltets, hospiita!ls for incuraJbO.es, children's nurseries, etc. The women'1s "Charilta:s" was a'1so a mem~ of tJhe organi.<Za,tion. 'Dhe CommUll!ists took (Wer ruH soci:ail insbitiuttions of the Church. Some weeks after the ocCUipation, tihe Communist Union of Sloviak Women confi:s- �54 SLOVAKIA cated the children's nuTsery of the Ustredna ~arita in Dornk~le, BraJtislava, and the Union of SloivaJk Y ouith toolk over the ·b oarding sch06l nea,r the forestry school in Koliba, Braltislavia. The hwmanitari.an division oif the city o.f Bratislava comisoated the estate of "Oharitas" in Braltisfava near the Red Bridge. For the women's home of "Charitas" the commissari'at foT Social Welifare named as commissary the Communist Fla:TIIIly Hirusovsky. Dr. Ivan Horvath, the commissary for sooiall welfare, prod.aimed that a:1'1 the charitable, social instituJtions of the Church would be taken over by the state. Protests clid not mean a thing, as usual. "Freedom" of the Press One of the first ,a cts of the Commissariat for Initernal AffaiTs was the suppression o;f aM news,prupers. With th~s general order all Oathollic newpaJpers and :periodicais weTe wiped out aultomalt!roally; noit only cruturrul and literrury periodicals, such as the "Ku!litura" (a.rl.,tmre.) and the "Obroda" (Rffi"ilvaJl), but even an the religious and educational periodicals, such as The MessengeT of the Srucred Heart, The Holy Family, The Queen of May, etc. And, ]ater the only Caltholk Sloivruk weeldy "Katolicke Noviny" (The Catholic News), which had a suibscription of 170,000, was also swppressed and ta:ken 01Ver by 1:!he Reds. Cathollics protested to the authorities, but in. vadn. The Catholic press was gone. Attaclks against the Church and its priests increased daily, but they could not defend themselves; it was an unequa:l strwggk The enemy fought wfth powerfU!l we8lpons, whi[e the Catholics had none. "Freedom" of Conscience The wax was fought, we were told, aga.inst the suppressi~n of consoien.ce by imperial~stic means, and we haJVe lived to see sucll a diclatorship and s:uch a barbaric viOllia.tion of conscience and its inlterrra:l freedom, the likes of whl'C'h perhrups not even the most frurious f:aslci'Slt ever dreamed of. On aH fronts of tlhis terrible wrur died the best sons of humanity for the rigih:t to speak free'ly about the most fundamental questions of 1iife against tlhe fascist terror. Men �SLOVAKIA 55 shed their blood so that concentration camps, wiith all theiT horrors, might never a:ga:in operaJte. But soon aif.ter the war's end aN dliistriot cities in SlovaJlda were ordered to set up a concent.Taition camp and jaill. The war was fol.light for the freed'Olffi of poilft.ic-aiJ. conviotlions, but in Sl'OVlalkia today there are not enOUJgh jai!ls to talke care of aH those, whose only gui,It is that they wilM not swear on the Siclcl.e anld: Hammer, but prefer to rematin loyal to the fupal eneyclilc'als and the fiUJnd:amen'ta:l princiiples of demooraJCy. ln a wore, the Slovaks want to be demO!crat:s and not 'boisiheviks. What has rea;filry changed? Every ni!ght we waited tensely to see whether they were coming for us. We had no peace duirmg the day or night. Forever they were screening and investiigaJting UIS just 'becaUJSe we haippened to live during the past era, and had to wor1k and keeip OUir families. They perseouted us for "co'l:1-aborating" because we recorded oftficiail writings, in some office, or because we were insigruffoant wiheells in the great machinery of life. In Conclusion If I had not seen it, I would not hruve be'liieived it. Those first three months in "l~beraJted" Bra;tislruva were a nightmare. It .st;ilfil hamnts me. The S[ovalk people dild not ha,ve a clharuce. The,i r country was overrun bry bar:barians whom the .AilHes had Wlken on as pa:rtners. Slovalkia was ru!led bry terror and violence f.rom the moment it was "rnberaJted" lby the so-calil ed "Uniiteld Nations," which placed it in the Soviet sphere o!f irufiluence. ]t was ruied 'by the Communist-dominated regime o!f the man who r~gned the presitleTIJCy in 1938 and returned as president..a.venger behind the Soviet ho:rdes in 1945. 'Dhe independenJt Slo.ivaJk Repull:Afc, established by the dully eledted representatives olf t!he Slovak people in 1939 and reoognlizetl by 27 countries, including GreaJt Britain and F,r ance, was wanton!ly destroyed against the wiili of the Slova:k people. The vast majority of the Slovaik nation, the Catholics of Slovakia - representing 80 per cent of the poipll1ation was oulUawed. No politioail parities, newspaipers, organizations, and eilltenprises cou~d exist, except th()[se aUowed by �56 SLOVAKIA Dr. IDdwa,rd Benes and his Communist-dominated regime. The non-Catholic minority in Slovakia - including aN those who ca;Ned t!hemsetlives "Christians" - hel,p ed Benes and the Co!Ir.JII1UJill1S'ts ruin Ca1fud1irc Slovrukia and so helped to ruin themseilves and thetk in:stilbulticms. Whereas, in the beginning, only Crutholics were perisem.uted and onily Cathol'i:c institUJtion:s and enter,prises were nabion:a,lized, laJter the foNowers of ail Christian faiths were crucified and their institulti'ons confiscalted b;y the State. Hi:istor:y repeateld itseJ.if. But ha,tred of the Cathohc Ch'l11l'ch in S'lovakia did n01t solive any of the social or economic probllems, bult oll!l.y aggrawated them; in faot, it only he'lped the Communists realize their ends all the more speedilly. It is high time thait a'11 Christians realized this an:d aoted accordmgly. In Slovalkia tihere sha/U be no rea;l peace, no flI'eedom, as long 3IS 1t is governed by peopte wlho are hostile to the nationa1 traditions of the Slovak nation and its rel:i!gious and political convictions and, hence, are bent on the destru<:tion of the SIJ.O'Vruk people. Slovaikia, one of the oldest Christian countries of Centra1 :Eiu!rope, never sho:uil(l. haive been desbroyed as an independent StaJte. That is more evident today than it was in 1945. No nrution has fought Coonmunism more pel'.sistentily and consistently than the Slovaik nation It's time that this trutlh was recognized by a.Ill freedom-rl<wing, a:ruti-Com:rrmmist coll!Il1Jri-es and that they adj1U1st theiir pOllicies to,w ard the Slovaks to fit the present siitU1aition. Even today the people of Slovruk.ia find iJt ha~d to belrieve that they were sdld oUJt to the men of the Kremlin with the help of file United StaJtes and Great Britain, the great sym'bols of freedom and demooraicy. But they stitl exipect to be liberated by them. • • • "THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA is an American institu- tion. Its primary interest is America. As an American of Slovak descent, I say again and again that it ls in the interest of Amerlc-a and the democratic world at large to work for the freedom and Independence of Slovakia. The Individuals and organizations affiliated with the Slovak League of America - as true Americans - cannot wish their brethren in Slovakia less fre edom than they themselves enjoy in the U. S. A. We say: Give Slovakia back to the Slovak people!" - (P. A. Hrobak, Detroit. Mich., 11-18-51) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 39 THREE MONTHS IN "LIBERAT ED" BRATISLA VA BY: AN EYEWITNES S Urut'hl 1944 tJhe capiW city of S10V1akira, Bralbis1ava, lived far remoived from mililtaey operations. Ltfe wars a,,1together nor,ma;J. both c1.1llltmraUy and sodaiJ.l.y. 'Dhe siltuation dhanged. sU!bstantli.la!ley after Italy wars occuipied, when Bratislava came withi111 the range of the alliied air :f.iorce. Mirl itary oib'jeldt:s of Bratisl ruva were first bombed rby the al'lied aiir force in the focenooo. of June 16, 1944. The "ApO'llo" ref.inery, the adjacenit faotory and lha!1bor quarters we.re hit. But indrirscriminaite Russian 1b om11:iing was more fatal. Soviet flliers did not specialize on miiitairy objects, but let bombs loose anyiw\here in the city. They ce11ba:irillry did not glorify themselves witih the 1bombing of SpitMsrka street, where tlhey destroyed a church, a convent and the hospital of St. EliizaJbeth. Sorviet planes ruppea:red aibove Braitislava on Holy Satu,rdary and peppered the civi[fans on the crowded streets with tlherir deck guns. The front had moved up consideraJblly and Soviielt p:lranes were comin,g over practically every houir to drop their b.ombs into the streets. 1 Easter 1945 in Bratislava During Holy Weelk it. was evident to most of us that the Germa'I1S were preparing ,t o defend Bratisfav.a. The streets were emptied, bM'ricades were constructed , huge g'uns were put u,p The Germans themsel;ves, '.however, did not appear to be very interested in tlhe defense of our ctity and hauled whaitever they couftd out of it. 'Dhe units whkJh remained were to be used to c01Ver the retrea,ting Germans. The Ger-• man com.man.der urged the Slovak Governmen t to leave Bratislava. Since only a small number of Germans remained, it was ~rieved that tJhey were not going to defend the city very lon.g. The poipuilation co'l.tld not decide whether to leave tbe ciity or stay putt. Sa.Jturday evening everything was being taiken into cel10Jrs and hritl!ing places. The monotonou s bomibing of the Russian air force, the ofose booming of cannons annOIUll1Ced that the Russians we.re a:pproachin g steadily U111spea.JkaJble ne:rrV'O!U'Sness gr.~pped the crirty. AH the men h~d 40 SLOVAKIA themselves, booaiuse iJt was said thait the Germans were going to taJke rull 1!he men out of Braitislava. On Easter Sunday, at nine o'dock in the morning, Soviet fliers aigain ffilade them- appearance and in the afternoon huge Russian g,uns were 'bombarding Bralti:slava. The we'l!l-.Jmown Ruissian "Kaltuse", also da!lled "1Sta~ iln'is organs," began to pJ.ay the following day, i.e., Easter Monday. Every. thiinig shook to the foundatio!l'S and fires hroike out in many p'lia;ces. T,h e retreating Germans fired the SloV'ak University and ala the reserwe piiles of food and war maJterials. Thick smoike rose from Bratiis'lruva for three days and three niighlbs, and the fire sprerud because there were neither waiter nor the pe01ple to f,i ght tlhe fires. The heaviiest fii:ghting took place in the ea'S'tern paJI't of the cilty, where praeitiic~ly every factory quariter wrus ruined, the stireets of Trnruva and Krizna, Stein's Brewery and the viJcinity. On 'l'uesday tlhe Gemnans began to f11ee, destroying every;th'i ng that had n~t a-lre'ad,y <been desitvoyed. They blew u1p the bridge ,to PetrizJalka and the last g,rowp bariricruded iltself in the Braitis,la,va Castrle. The Russians aiready were in the sulburbs of Bratislava, when the Germans in the western hil!J.s of the c1ty began cannonading it. Thiis hurl BTati'slava the moist. On Thursday morning fue first Russian d'i•visions were in the very heart oif the city. Graduailly the booming died aiway and the streets began to be filled w1th Russian soldiers. The "Liberation" Begins 1 The SolV'iet soldiers first Hib.e.rated us from our watches with their well-tlmown "Davaj easy" (Give your waltches). EX!cept for solldiers, tlhe streets were empty; on1y coz,pses were being b alked in .the sipring sun. After a few days, when we cra.,wled out of our bunlkers and cellairs., we saiw the ghastly pioture of ruin anld desolation. Sffiloke s,tii-1 ro!Hed out of buildings and 1:lhe atmosphere was. satwrated Wli'th dust and gunpowder. Glass wa·s ground under foolt. Rdl::fueries were in fU'l'l swing. Soviet soidiers brdke windows of business places with their rule butts and sa-cked and pitMaiged everything. A few dats later, not a sitIJ.g1le shop remamed whO'le. Wh'atever could rrot be taken SLOVAKIA 41 was knocked to pieces. Of course, the l'a wless mob helped very efferdtive1y in thi's work. Reports. olf the raping of women began coming in. It was nothing um.t'sua!l to see franltic W()lffien rUIUNng wildly from their aJttaokeirs; they sm-eamed, k'iciked and fought, -but to no avail. The 'hordes of the RUJSsii'an steppe's were on the loose. Who shall desc,dbe the sta.rk terror- in the eyes of the Slo;v:ak women and girls who 00U!l.1d not get away f,r -()lffi the beasts olf Moscow? Even ii£ I tmoo, I believe that my pen woul:d have to blush if it had to detail the brutalities and abroc'~ties committed. There is no need to exipand on :the fate of many, many women, who remained lya.ng in their bllood aflter such a ba'I1barian shaw of "a!f.feotion" of the Sov,i et soldiers. They to,l d us that it was the "nationa!l duty" o.f the S1avaJk women to repay the So'Vliet arimies rih love! Vinko, Vinko, Vinko Cervene We thOUJght that SlovaJk wiine would not attract the Soviets after tJhey had tasted of strong Tokay in Hurngary. Bult we were mi!stJaken even tJhis time (as usu:a1). Slovak wine memhanits di:d not wanit to sel'l us wine since January, becau:se they had 'hiOiped to sell it at a high price to the Soviet sohliers. But how quijic,k1ly they soibered UJP, when, instead of the jingle-jangle of gCJld 11ulbles, they he:ard shots from rifiles anld. aUlbomaitics in their otherwise irnmcessible ceUars. Barrels were shot wp and the precious liquid o.f the Slova1k earth began flowing; first into pitchers an'<i all so!'ts of containers, dean and uncilean, even bernzine cans. When aU these were fi'1le'd, tlhe wine t11ic'k:led iruto soLdieirs' boots, then flowed over the cellars and vestilbll!les an'<i finaliy onto. the streets. Tos strong aroma mixed w1th the gih:astly stench of decayiing cO'l",pses, whk:h even after a week were stili lying on the sidewaiJ.ks. of the city. The soldiers drank and so d<id the civilians; ch!iMren drank and so did the oldsters. It seemed that the barrels were bottomless. "Viniko, vinko, vinko cerivene" (Wtine, wine, red wine - a popclaT Slovak drinlking song) ! I shail1l never forget tJhe tovaris-comrade who had two botJtles of reld. champaigne stucik in his fuT crup, a bottle in 42 SLOVAKIA eadh. pocket and his hands full. He was approached by another comrade whn .rolblbed hiim on the street of his precious bu.Tden in broad d'a.yuilghlt. The two lashed at each other li'ke antlmals and drew blood on the 'ha.rd pavement of Kapitulska street. Bratishwa wine merchants. 'loolk ed on stupidly and si.'lently ait this Sodiomic destruction of their cellars, and the SO!Ulr odor of the wine reminded them of the old times, when they were s'till:l. bosses of their wine and thought that they themselrves wolU.ld ·haive the honor to treat the "liberat0rs." They rea[irz;eJd tlhe bitter truth that they we·r e "liberated," i.e. comip1etely roiblbed of all their world!ly possessions on the very threshold of a neiw life, the new order promised by the men of the K.re:rnUn. Where Do You Stay, Tovaris? If you were in the aI1II1y, you know w'hat obedience and di'Scilplme means. Withoult bhe:rn, there hardly could be an effecltiive rurmy. A soldier beil.ong,s to some particular company or di'Vlisi:on, must haJVe his gear, be fed and quartered, even th<Ylligh it be under a tent or in a barn. Bult the Soviet soltl!iers wlho swa:runed iiruto Bratislava had no definite quarters and, hence, were everywhere. Usuany aJbout midnight it occurred to· tihe:rn that they had to get some sleep, so the,y began to looik for shelter. Door:s and lodks and bars were no hindrance. Wihether of glass or wood, doors were booted in or smasheJd wiitJh rifile butts, if they were niot opened immediately. "You, bourgeoisie, you did not fighlt ... " Threatened, 1:Jhere wa·s nothing one cou[d c1o bult flee from .h is own home and consider himse1f liUCky if he was not shot- A soldier does not undress for sleep very oflte:n at the fuiont, bult Ivan the RUJSsian never ll!Ildressed even when he had a bed, bwt simply piled on the bed f.wl1y g,ar,bed, 'boots, rifle, pi•s tols, grena:des and a:M. And the frolllt was sixty miles away from us. Investigation After Investigation We thought the war was over when the slh!ooting subsided and the boomdng resounded f.rom a dristanice. We began SLOVAKIA 43 to clean the streets, coll!lect the dead, and put whatever was left oif ,ouir homes in order. A ,penson slO!Wly fongets what he lost, because onlly then, when he did not die during the bomfbardment, does he reaili.ize that it is beaultiifiu[ to live, even tJhoug'h in feaJr, hunger rund thirst, and in raJgs. Things tha,t were a.ire no more, and other things tfhat were not will oome into being. L'iife is all that matters. On'l,y he knows the reail meamng of water and light who has li,v ed thI10UJgh the terror of the front in hiding wilthoult light and water. I.Me will returm to iits dld ways and time wiH heal aJhl wounds ()If the soiwl a,nd bod,y ()If inld.wii.dUJaJl's and nations. Well, wlh,y shoUJld nO/t a person a:gaJin imagine that liJfe can be beruuttilfiull, when he is sitting on tile 'l'Uins ()If his home ~nd the ashes of hi1s dreams? Why, there is no more bc»nibing and even the streets are lighted up in the evenings. Buit empty a.ire the inns, empty are the ce11'3JI"s, empty are tJhe stores and shops Brolken windows and smashed doors attest tJo the min which the Soviet soldiers had WOOU1ght. But the wihl to live r,i,ses alb,ove all this. We must forget everyttJhing thaJt pruined us, a.IN the in:justi<Ces, subdue om thd,r st for blood, when the sap of a new spring is awakening, when everythfun.g is being ren01Vateld, everything is in bloom, the thrush sings and the chiildren play. Burt aH this is but a dream, an ~lluision. '.Dhe 'b attle has ended on the streets, but just the sa:me a mare fiurious invi:siib1e baittle is going on. As you step out of your home, you are co,nrfronlted with tJhe bayonet o;f a Russian soldier or the various "safety" ciommittees. You look a:rO'llnd and notice that yornr home, nay the whole street is sUJITounded by guards. You re'tl.l!rn h'llITTriedly to your room and wait to see what wiM h'appen. Y.ou wait and wait and waJit unti[ the sUISpense aJlrrnost d11ives you mad. Your blood thins in your veins and you look sadly aJbowt you - and wait! F'iinaMy they came, sO'l1d iers and civiili ians: they go through the house and take whatever they want. '.Dhey ask you whether you are a GeI1IDan or not, whebher any Germans or "coll'<llbaratilonists" a,re in your house. You lod.k them icily in the face. 'Tihey depart but only to come rugruin. 44 SLOVAKIA Organs of Security Mter two weeks oif the Russian occupation everything was phmdered. People had no more than they had buried or secreted in such a place where even the Russian hunters and t,hey are eXlpe'tUy schooled in the art of flinding wailled-in objects - would not come. There was a clirth oif everything, even a serforus lack of bread. But we had plenty o.f police! They sprang Ulp like m:ushrnoms aflter a rain. In t'he first place, ,t he dreaded NKVD (OGPU), the Secret So,vi•e t Police, n10toirioo~ for its birurt:al and ghasitl;y crimes. Woe to him that faHis intto its hanids. The NiKViD goes from home to home, drags peoipile aiway and nolbody ever hears of their fate. Fvom eastern S'JO'V'aJkia alone more tihan 4,000 peo~e were draigiged oiff into Siiberia. I was fonbunate to be 'home during the investigation. AU the en'tralllces to the 'bwil.ding were covered by soldiers wit!h a:utomattics. I •t r:wersed my room ne.rvous•ly. A'lthough I had a c:leair clon1science, yet I was di-squited. (No one is sufficiently olear or safe with the Soviet Po[ice) . Finally I wenlt into the haiJ.llway. I was greeted by a soMier and a civilian. A IDQlfilenrt later came the caiptain. He asked me my naJme, what I wa:s doing here, what my profession was, and wheither I was a mem1ber orf IIlin:ka's People'1s Parity. A mac1hinist l,iived on the same floo,r. His room was locketl. Tlhe caiptain OII'<lered me to open it. "I haven't the key," I told hlm. The maic!hini.st had the key and the soldiers had him in hand alt the gate. I ran to the gate. The NKVD g,u1a rd had an a.ultomatti~ on the machinist. I approached him and said that tlhe c~pta;in wants to open the machinist's room, but the madh~nrist had the key. The latter alre'ardy wanted to hand it to me, when the s:o'ldier suddenly tuirned the aurt:omatiic on me and said: "You ha.ve the key" - "'BUit I dlo not have t'he key, the madhinlist has it" - "No, you will 'h,ruve it, if the caiptain says so." - "But I do not have it; loolk, tovaris, the machimst has. it." - "No, I have a.Qready told you that you wi-11 have the key and will open the door, when the captam orders you to do so." I was dumlbfounded by the profound stU1piclilty and returned without t1he key. I told the captain thait the to:varis SLOVAKIA 45 wowd not let me take the key from the machinist because, he said, the captain had ordered me and not the machinist to open the room. I also was a sOJldier and I know whait military dbedience means. Bult this cannot be called obedience, but some kind of unmentionaJble stupidilty or i!Illfbecility which wouid be capable of sticking pins under my fingernails just to find a key on me whirch I do not haive. I realized then wlhy people, during the investigaltions in tJhe tortrure cha.im!bers of the NKVD, confess to things which they never committed. The invest1gation began at seven in the morning and lasted un1ti'l nine. I went to town on business arrd returned a1boU1t eleven. Upon my arr,ivai the building was a·gai,n surrounded biy guards, but this time by the Prurtisans Security c:1it. I wanted to enter the bui'1ding, but they wouid not let me. I identified myse1f and said that I ld.ved there. Finailly a boy, about 17, wit:Jh an automatic in his hands, let me enter. It was very liive:ly in the hallways. The partrsa,n captain was giving orders. I did not know wh1at they were seeiking. I went through the investigation tortures again, but qUJite fortunately. Again aftl the rooms, closets, desks, and dressing cabinets were opened. The investigation was over at about one o'ciock. Again some innocent peoiple were taken. But that was not alt That was onJy t'he beginning. Night feJ.,l and the stars shone brighUy over Br.atislava. Finany, a lilttle rest, I thought But there is no restful or peaceful night duiring a Russian occl..llpaition. A'boUJt midnight I was awa.ikened by some one pounding on my door. Another investigaition ! I was on my feet in an instant and <jpened the door. Before me in the semidankness stood a man and a lady. Instead of identifying themselves, t!hey opened their short coats so that I could see the revolvers in leather 'holsters. "But, but, this is a spe:cia l visit, and so laite at night!" "Your documents," said the man. "Here they a,re, t:hank you." "Were you a memlber of IDinka's Party?" - "I was." "Since when?" - "From 1933." - "Were you in the 1 46 SLOVAKIA Hlinka Guards?" - "I was not." - "Did you be'1ong to Hlinlka's Youth?" - "No." - "Are you a So'ld!ieir?" - "I am an oftfircer in the Sloivalk airnny." - "Did you ta.Ike pa.rt in the revollit ?" - "No." - "Why not?" - "I was on druty in Nitra." - "Are you a Slova;k ?" - "I am." Then they entered my room. On my taJble was a small bust o{ Andrew Hlin!k'a. "And .t his?" - "That is a bust of Andrew Hilinlka." "Hman., we adivi,se you, to destroy irt." - "I don't understand, whiy?" - "Welil, may!be tomorrow you will understand." Wilth that t'.hey depa,rited. Ait thrr-ee in the morning the inrve-stigat'ion olf .tlhe secret police was completed. At eight in the morn.mg came the olffictaJl police, the so-calied "Naitiona1 Secruritiy" po~ice, to find out who i,t was thaJt a1hlowro an in1VestigaJtion at mghit when the ipolice knew nothing aJbout it. "What kind o{ peop1e were they, how did they look, w:hiat did they want?" I was asked. This then was the new oroer - so ter:rrilbly dangerous because iit had so many .srufety biU1reaus thalt one dlid not know aibout the other! Or did they? The Bratislava Commander Complains A month had already passed since the occ'Ulpation of Bratisla1Va , but the streets were stilil wn:swept; dirt and ruiblble were everywhere; liice and infectious diseases were spreading rapidly. 'Ilhe local "National Oommittee" had a loog session to decirle what to do with the riwbbish and rull:fule clutterinig and burning in the streets. But how was the mess to be C'leared ruway, wlhen the Ru'Ssians took an the city dump trucks, a1l pri,v ate cars and al,l wagons and horse's ? Typhoid fever spread danger01Us ly; the numibers of inflicted increased. The Office of P.ropruganda, or, as it was then called, the "Commissary of InfoTfl'nation" pfa'stered the city witJh huge plaic-ards depio'ting a s'keleton poUII"iing lice over BraJtis lava and t'.he wairning : "WATCH THID LICE, THEY SPREAD TYPHOID. '' People stared at the placarids and barked: "Bwt who in SLOVAKIA 47 tarnation broughlt lice here? Send the lousy Russians baok to their lousy ooumrtey !" 'I.1he first plwcards had liiittle e.fifoot. Severrul druys later new ones appeared: Origanilze energeti'C brig,ades of clearuiness ! But Il!cibodiy paid any atJtenMon. The :riUJbbish iblliI'Iled on and spread its poisonous fiumes over the .popuil.<ati.on. There were no autos, no wrugons wiith which to do the hau[ing. Hiarses, oows and siheeip were kept in the panks. The hot sun blruzeid away and laughingJy loolked at the me!SS, which the "new" government prdbalbly did not dear aJWay to this day. And so the skeleton keipt pouring the lice, and t:Jhe placaros aJb,o ut the brig,a des. of cleanliness were covered witlh new red ones, whicih unged us to attend lec!tUll'es on the moraie of the SoVli.et man, So:vieit woman, and the Soviet youth. The Soviet Russians wasted no time in edlucating the masses accordtinlg to the dootrines orf Marx and Lenin. A Soviet Soldier Confesses lit wrus a bea:urtri.:titd June afternoon in K 1rurl'ova Ves near Bratislava, when a Riu'SSian sOlldier rupproacihed us and struclk up a oonvwsaiti.on. He reproved us saying tha.Jt we Slovruks were Ullldiscipllined amid un.gratefUll. We shOIUJd not siay OII' believe tJhat t:Jhe RJussi,ans rure taikin.g everything that can be ha'l.lll€1d aJWay, booau1se thaJt is only ibrud propaganda. Since he was in a t~aJtiive mood', and did not have a revolver, we dooided to malke WIOrds with him. He spdke at length albout d!i.scipil[n.e in RUISSia, both in thiin.lk.ing and in spealk~ng. In Slovaki·a, he said, everyone says whatever he 'Pleases. "ThaJt does not exist in Ruissia. One must hiO:ld to what St-a!lin says. That is the truth and a.Ill else is ,proprugantla. Sta!lin to-Id UIS thaJt in Russia everything iis fine a!nd dandy, everyrtJhin,g is beaut.if.td, that we have enoUJgh to eait. And even though we know that everything i:s not fine and dan:dy, be.mt'i:fiul, and thtat we do not ha;ve enough to eaJt, yet we must say that everythmg is f,i ne and dandy, and thaJt we have plenty to ea.t. Stalin has so ordered! Stalin has so spdken!" He bec'ame so excited trying to prove his impossible stand that I reaHy pit'ioo. him. I s:m:il.ed and sa,id softly: 48 SLOVAKIA "My dear tovaris! We're a different kind of people, strange to you, indeed. When a tihinrg is white, we say it is white; when it is bladk, we say iJt is black. When we have nothing to eat, we say thaJt we a~ hungry oir that we are starving And if anyone orders us to speak otheirwise, we still. say the truth. Stra'lin telJs you different, so be hruppy in your belief. We believe in God, too, but with reason, never against reason." But our tovaris seemed to be far away; his mouth opened, but he said nothing further. Shaiking hiis head, he pwlled at his ear as he slowly wa;llked away. The Soviet Lady Doct.or We weire oirdered to hand 01Ver the miili'ta,r y hospdital in Bratishwa to the RUJSsians. As we were preparing inventory lists, a Rmlssilan l'ady doctor stepped iruto .the room. After talking for a time, we struck upon religion, belieif in God, and other ba.pics. But my Russian colleague, a lieutenant, !)TOclaimetl thait it was in vain we were trying to convince her, becruuse she wm.tltl nort believe l1'S no matter what the airgumenlts. I assured her that she had nothing to fear, because I had no ruposJtoilic intentions. "Why do we write 1945," I asked her. "I know but I won't tell you!" "Burt even you designalte this year by thaJt numlber." "You won't oon'V'ince me " "I db not want to. But even the unbelieving world admits that Christ was born." "I heard rubout that also; burt I do not believe i,t." "Why?" "Becruuse in the history of the Communist Party there isn't anything aJbout it." "Alh, so!" WhaJt is the use of debating? We looked at each other srgnifioa,ntly, smiled, and talked aibout otheir things. "How long did you study medicine?" "I finished the course during the wair in a year and a haJlf. In peaceful times the study takes aliJ. of two and a half years." SLOVAKIA 49 We 1,amghed loud1iy amd pitied the prutients who happened to get under her kmfe. Placards: Religious Freedom DtN-ing the veriy first weelk:s of occupatfon the Slovak Communist Party posted placiar:ds everywhere, arnnlQuncing that the ComJmuni'Slts wiant to respect the relii.g,ioos feelings of a!hl the SloviaJk people and, therefore, are c,alloog aU Slovaks, regardless of the:ir religious convictions, into the Party. Nay, eiven Catho'l:ic priests coul'd and shlOuiltl join the party, we were to1ld. People sing a nfoe tune, when they want to catch a biro! But wlhrut if a mira'Cle had rea!Uy happened? Suppose Comrm.mism had made a tll!I"11 for the ,better? May/be Commun:ism was no longer so excilusive; perhrups it was even reipernting and had decided to let itself be baptized in Christian SlO'V'a'l da! We knew that the Communists were not sincere, but the fact is thaJt oultwarilly they did try tb deal humanely with the peopie for a wht[e to convince them that Communism was not as bad as they thought. It was evident that they were instiru~teld not to insult the sacred and traditionai feel'ings of the SlOIVak ,peop1e. But the pretense soon wore off and the Reds opecl,y a1:>t8iC'ked a11 ece'lesfastical instilbutions. Catholic Schools in Nationalized Slovakia lf there were some Sloivaiks who had iHu'Sions a,bout the Communists going sofit., thek tllu1sions eJOPloded like b,u!bbles, W:hen Laoo Novomesky, Commissar ('br:ulsitee) of Exiucation, annOlmceld that ai11 Catholic scbioo[,s m Slovakia were to be aJbo:Iished and their property was to be taken over iby t!he Stale. He was leld to this action, he said, because it wais inadimissaJble that the Ohiurich should o!ffer a different kind of education than the State. The unity of the nation, sa•: d No;voimesky, required a unifo:r,m eduicaJtiona1 system, cultural and religious st!'.ife must cease, etc. What could not be accomplished even during the first Ozooho.jSloV'ruk republk, was done now with one stroke of the pen · in tJhe shadow of Russi8JI1 bayionets. The Cat'ho[ic institrntions were hit first for ob:vious reasoos. The Reds had 50 SLOVAKIA little dififiicuM.y in getting the badking of the non-Caitholiic Christians. Al!l they ha:d to dt> was promise them that they w()IU[d get the CaJthoiJ.ii:c Churelh proiperrt:.ies. So-cailled followers oif Christ a1Jtadking and despoiling the fo1lowers of Christ! The Reds knew what they were doing, but evidently the non.CathoJic Christians did not, because they tooik the bait. Slovaik IJuithera.ns, Jews, Unitarians, Baptists, etic , expected to gain by the deail against the Catho[ic Slovaks (80 per cent oif tJhe poipuliaibi.on) and, therefore, went a'long with the Reds. !Ton mrust be forged while it is hot. After publishing the decree, all diredtors of Cruthoiic sciho01ls were dismissed. Their places were taken over by so-ca;Ued "Czechoslovaks" and Lwtherans. That was done e:spe'Cially in gymna'Sit1ms managed by the reJl'igiorus <YI'ders, for example, alt the UrS'llline s:c!hools in BrrutislJ.ava and Tuna.va. It was done designecily and systemaiticaHy. Fists were clenched and hearts were steeled. Freedom, freedom! The Slova!k Catholic public becrume extremely inili.gnarnt. People were saying that the women of Tmava were getting ready to storm the Ursuline institution there and throw oot tlhe new di!rectre'SIS, who was perseC'lllting and intimidating the reiigioruis Sisters there. The Bishops of Slovakia Protest E:ven though Siova..ks knew that nothing would be accomplished by protests, neverthe'Jess ail Catholics we.re a.rgreed that they simply coufttl ndt a!hlow the fundamental right of the Ohurch to iits own school's be taken away from them without uttering a word. The peopile had to make thernse1ves heard, or else the stones wmcld complain. The CaithOllic Bishop's Collliloil presented a memorandll!In to the government and the Central Cat holic Chancery was organizing a si-grratn.ure C·Mnipaign against the nationaHzing of scllodls. Lerufllets were distmi.lb uted, and on July 8, 1945, 1!he protest aigainst the confiscrution of the schools was read from ahl puipiits. 1 Well, alter Ju:ly 8, the Bratislava radio was heard from. It blasted and attacked the Bishop's Council, using the wellknown phrase: The parish church belongs to the Church, SLOVAKIA 51 Mlld the school to the StaJte ! Things came to a head and the resrullt Olf the ,protest was that the dirootors Olf the Central Cath~lic Bureau, who teohmca;Ny organi!Zed the action, were jailed. We were again gilven prood' thaJt we were living in a "democracy" and thiaJt the people were dooiding their own fOiitunes. Wlhat a modkery ! Catholic Bishops Imprisoned The ffrst wa,s Hlis ExicellJency John Vojtassak, bjshop of Spis. Hailf of Slwaikia was a'1ready occupied by the Russian rumy. The Sl'O!VaJk National Council was already giving orders from Kosice. At the end of .AipriJ, Dr. Vav,r o Srobar, chalirma.n of the S1ov,aik NaJtiorra1 CouncH at that time, came to the Spisslka Ifupiroula (ISpis Chapter) to gain Bishop Vojtassak for the Slov:aJk Na.lbiona:l COIUnoil and for Dr. Edwa..ro Benes. Srobar wanted ,t hat prilze catch, bec'ause he knew that Bishop Vojttassa'k was an old and 'hard Slovak. As they meit in the corri'd.10r of the bi,s hop's residence, Dr. Srolbar explained why he came and then asked the bishO!p to back the new government. The bishop eyed him co:l d[y for a moment and then srud: "I do nolt reoogni ze any S'1ovruk Nationall Council and president Benes. My government is stilil in Bratislava, and as president of the SlrovaJks I recognize oruy the Siovak, Ms.g r. Dr. Tiso!" The ~ytihe stmrok upon a stone. Dr. Srobar departed, and bishop John VojtassaJk went to his room. Several days later when the bishop received an order from the Slovak N atiorral OownJCirl to beget himsellif to his p1race of confinement i-n Stl,ruvru:k, Vojtassaik replied energetica.!Uy: "I do not have an auto, nor any means of transportation, not even a horse. They -took ever.yrthing from me. I wi'M yie[d only to force." On May 5, 1945, an auto stopped in front oif the Kaipitula; it was a,mned with machine guns and severrul men with auito:matiJc:s. The wovds of Ohris't again rang ou't: You are come out as it were aigain,st a robber with clubs. The good bishop of Spis was forcefuilily talken to Stiaivnik and, later, to the jaml of the federal court in Bratislava. 1 52 SLOVAKIA What hruppened to him? A1[ I knew at that time was that the commwn1i1,it "Plravd'a" of Bramislava was inciting aigainst h!im., head!linirrug its avticleis thus: "The Lord Bishop is against chi:ldren of tJhe wmikers." It was a brazen lie, designed to U!Ilderunine the 1:Jrnst of the fovthfol in the social ideO'logy of iits bishop, who during hd:s whole life proved himself to be the most social o,f alil episcopa:l dignitaries in Sl0V1aikia. Soon aflter the OOOU1pation of Bratislava by the Russians, the bishoip Ol.f Trnava, Mii.H'.tary Vicar and Rector of the BraJtislaiva seminary, J. E. BwzaLka, was ja1iled. F\irst he wais lodged in the pohce stati'On and tJhen transferred to the federail prison where "heiavy offenders" weire penned. He slept on a spring, no m'aJttress ,b eing availaJble, and the siliveT-haired poet, Va'lentine Beniruk, slept alongside him on the bare stone :flloor. After the bishops, t:he Slwialk National Co'Ullcil "took care" of the oonons and other pre1'aJtes. Among the first to be truken was Joseph Srobar of BraJti.sl'a:va, brother of Dr. Vaviro Srdbar. The old churehman, ail heart, would never hairun even a fly. But bo[shev,rk justice did not consider that. In him it sa,w an "enem:y of the people" and inrcaTcerated him. . Ma:nry othevs foHowed him, among them Dr. Charles Kovper, weH-iknown among .American S:lova\ks, former editor of a Cathoi1'i'c neWS1pruper. Monsignor Marsina of Trenci.n cO'llild not even OOJt for nothing in the jail, but had to work. And what work! He was forced to dig c011pses wit!h his bare hand's firom ma$$ graves, then forced to wash and ·k!iss each one. I have a strong su1S1pidon thalt those mass graives were made lby the Russians and not by the Germans as claimed by the So:vie'ts. "Fascist Post.enyi Arrest.ed" That's what a heai!'line said in the communist "Pravda." And it stumned just albout the whole of Slo.vrukila. The discovery of America O!I' the Law of GI"avitation was no more sensationall. Up to that time nobody knew that Monsignor Postenyi was a fascilSt. Aime11ida,ri Slovaks know Msgr. SLOVAKIA 53 Postenyi very weiN. He visiited America in the interests of the S't Ada!llbert Society, pulljlisher of Catholiic literature and inrf.cmmat<ion, an origanwation equiivalent to the Book of the Month 01wbs in Amerti!C'a. The Reds knew that his Slovak ,paltriotism was beyond question and that his merits, as far as the l31rgesit CIUll,bural, Slovak, Catholk institution was concerned, were greaJt. Monsignoir Po:s tenyi is an exemplary priest of Gad, a S1ovaik hough and through, and an indefatfJi,gruble worlcer for the common people of his nation. He was pe!I1S€Kmted for his Slovak ,p atriotism when the Commumst leaders and editors of the "Pravda" were strn in the bOSOIIn of Albraham. Never aclmvel.l,y interested in politics, Msg,r. Postenyi sUldden!ly became a "fascist!" We knew whalt the C01Inmunisits wanted to aJOcorrniplish. 'Do put Posteny,i out of the way woold me'an to destroy the Society of St. Ad•rutbert with iJts libraries, priillt sh01ps and origan.izationrul appruratus. And so the SlOViaJk N ationa;l CO'U!Ilici1 appointed the fina.ncirul secretary of the Sooiety, a Ozedh named Wa;gner, as the commissary of the Society. A few days l1ater a new management was named, one that was rucceptaJble to the spirit and program of tJhe C01Inmunist-idk>minia.ted SlovaJk NaJtional Cooncil. This institution which was bui[it by generations of Slov,a ks inrto a going cultural concern wrus wiped oult in a momenit by the ruthilegs Reds The 150.000 members of the Society of St. Ada1be,rtt co:uM not say a word against the action without inviting punishment, either inciariceration or exile into Silberia. That is how the "people's demooracy" of the Soviets operates. Charit,a,ble Ecclesiastical Institutions The la;rgesit oharitalble ooganization in Slovrukia wa,s the Central Charity (Ustredna Karita), the central Catho1.ic institute of al'l the welfare, socitail, anld religious societi'es. It ha;d its own hea11th cenltets, hospiita!ls for incuraJbO.es, children's nurseries, etc. The women'1s "Charilta:s" was a'1so a mem~ of tJhe organi.<Za,tion. 'Dhe CommUll!ists took (Wer ruH soci:ail insbitiuttions of the Church. Some weeks after the ocCUipation, tihe Communist Union of Sloviak Women confi:s- 54 SLOVAKIA cated the children's nuTsery of the Ustredna ~arita in Dornk~le, BraJtislava, and the Union of SloivaJk Y ouith toolk over the ·b oarding sch06l nea,r the forestry school in Koliba, Braltislavia. The hwmanitari.an division oif the city o.f Bratislava comisoated the estate of "Oharitas" in Braltisfava near the Red Bridge. For the women's home of "Charitas" the commissari'at foT Social Welifare named as commissary the Communist Fla:TIIIly Hirusovsky. Dr. Ivan Horvath, the commissary for sooiall welfare, prod.aimed that a:1'1 the charitable, social instituJtions of the Church would be taken over by the state. Protests clid not mean a thing, as usual. "Freedom" of the Press One of the first ,a cts of the Commissariat for Initernal AffaiTs was the suppression o;f aM news,prupers. With th~s general order all Oathollic newpaJpers and :periodicais weTe wiped out aultomalt!roally; noit only cruturrul and literrury periodicals, such as the "Ku!litura" (a.rl.,tmre.) and the "Obroda" (Rffi"ilvaJl), but even an the religious and educational periodicals, such as The MessengeT of the Srucred Heart, The Holy Family, The Queen of May, etc. And, ]ater the only Caltholk Sloivruk weeldy "Katolicke Noviny" (The Catholic News), which had a suibscription of 170,000, was also swppressed and ta:ken 01Ver by 1:!he Reds. Cathollics protested to the authorities, but in. vadn. The Catholic press was gone. Attaclks against the Church and its priests increased daily, but they could not defend themselves; it was an unequa:l strwggk The enemy fought wfth powerfU!l we8lpons, whi[e the Catholics had none. "Freedom" of Conscience The wax was fought, we were told, aga.inst the suppressi~n of consoien.ce by imperial~stic means, and we haJVe lived to see sucll a diclatorship and s:uch a barbaric viOllia.tion of conscience and its inlterrra:l freedom, the likes of whl'C'h perhrups not even the most frurious f:aslci'Slt ever dreamed of. On aH fronts of tlhis terrible wrur died the best sons of humanity for the rigih:t to speak free'ly about the most fundamental questions of 1iife against tlhe fascist terror. Men SLOVAKIA 55 shed their blood so that concentration camps, wiith all theiT horrors, might never a:ga:in operaJte. But soon aif.ter the war's end aN dliistriot cities in SlovaJlda were ordered to set up a concent.Taition camp and jaill. The war was fol.light for the freed'Olffi of poilft.ic-aiJ. conviotlions, but in Sl'OVlalkia today there are not enOUJgh jai!ls to talke care of aH those, whose only gui,It is that they wilM not swear on the Siclcl.e anld: Hammer, but prefer to rematin loyal to the fupal eneyclilc'als and the fiUJnd:amen'ta:l princiiples of demooraJCy. ln a wore, the Slovaks want to be demO!crat:s and not 'boisiheviks. What has rea;filry changed? Every ni!ght we waited tensely to see whether they were coming for us. We had no peace duirmg the day or night. Forever they were screening and investiigaJting UIS just 'becaUJSe we haippened to live during the past era, and had to wor1k and keeip OUir families. They perseouted us for "co'l:1-aborating" because we recorded oftficiail writings, in some office, or because we were insigruffoant wiheells in the great machinery of life. In Conclusion If I had not seen it, I would not hruve be'liieived it. Those first three months in "l~beraJted" Bra;tislruva were a nightmare. It .st;ilfil hamnts me. The S[ovalk people dild not ha,ve a clharuce. The,i r country was overrun bry bar:barians whom the .AilHes had Wlken on as pa:rtners. Slovalkia was ru!led bry terror and violence f.rom the moment it was "rnberaJted" lby the so-calil ed "Uniiteld Nations," which placed it in the Soviet sphere o!f irufiluence. ]t was ruied 'by the Communist-dominated regime o!f the man who r~gned the presitleTIJCy in 1938 and returned as president..a.venger behind the Soviet ho:rdes in 1945. 'Dhe independenJt Slo.ivaJk Repull:Afc, established by the dully eledted representatives olf t!he Slovak people in 1939 and reoognlizetl by 27 countries, including GreaJt Britain and F,r ance, was wanton!ly destroyed against the wiili of the Slova:k people. The vast majority of the Slovaik nation, the Catholics of Slovakia - representing 80 per cent of the poipll1ation was oulUawed. No politioail parities, newspaipers, organizations, and eilltenprises cou~d exist, except th()[se aUowed by 56 SLOVAKIA Dr. IDdwa,rd Benes and his Communist-dominated regime. The non-Catholic minority in Slovakia - including aN those who ca;Ned t!hemsetlives "Christians" - hel,p ed Benes and the Co!Ir.JII1UJill1S'ts ruin Ca1fud1irc Slovrukia and so helped to ruin themseilves and thetk in:stilbulticms. Whereas, in the beginning, only Crutholics were perisem.uted and onily Cathol'i:c institUJtion:s and enter,prises were nabion:a,lized, laJter the foNowers of ail Christian faiths were crucified and their institulti'ons confiscalted b;y the State. Hi:istor:y repeateld itseJ.if. But ha,tred of the Cathohc Ch'l11l'ch in S'lovakia did n01t solive any of the social or economic probllems, bult oll!l.y aggrawated them; in faot, it only he'lped the Communists realize their ends all the more speedilly. It is high time thait a'11 Christians realized this an:d aoted accordmgly. In Slovalkia tihere sha/U be no rea;l peace, no flI'eedom, as long 3IS 1t is governed by peopte wlho are hostile to the nationa1 traditions of the Slovak nation and its rel:i!gious and political convictions and, hence, are bent on the destru<:tion of the SIJ.O'Vruk people. Slovaikia, one of the oldest Christian countries of Centra1 :Eiu!rope, never sho:uil(l. haive been desbroyed as an independent StaJte. That is more evident today than it was in 1945. No nrution has fought Coonmunism more pel'.sistentily and consistently than the Slovaik nation It's time that this trutlh was recognized by a.Ill freedom-rl<wing, a:ruti-Com:rrmmist coll!Il1Jri-es and that they adj1U1st theiir pOllicies to,w ard the Slovaks to fit the present siitU1aition. Even today the people of Slovruk.ia find iJt ha~d to belrieve that they were sdld oUJt to the men of the Kremlin with the help of file United StaJtes and Great Britain, the great sym'bols of freedom and demooraicy. But they stitl exipect to be liberated by them. • • • "THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA is an American institu- tion. Its primary interest is America. As an American of Slovak descent, I say again and again that it ls in the interest of Amerlc-a and the democratic world at large to work for the freedom and Independence of Slovakia. The Individuals and organizations affiliated with the Slovak League of America - as true Americans - cannot wish their brethren in Slovakia less fre edom than they themselves enjoy in the U. S. A. We say: Give Slovakia back to the Slovak people!" - (P. A. Hrobak, Detroit. Mich., 11-18-51)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Three Months in "Liberated" Bratislava Description An account of the resource By: An Eyewitness Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 2 (7), July 1953 pp. 39-56 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource July 1953 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/897116960dab5f9b4d9855af6c6c4ab7.pdf fa85b96fb9aaef7f59a38563e06e5135 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 37 CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA HRICOV The ruins of Hni 001v (IHiritcllov) Castle m the Trencin Distriot aire the smallest orf thO'se which stud the Vah vialley. At ()IIl.e time it was connected with the Sul'O!V Castle by a road whildh sna'ked i'ts way over tlhe ,rMJge:s of mountains. The ruins of Hiri.1co,v rest on a steep roc:k wit!h whi:c!h the rem'a ins of the waJ111s are. grown toge'fuer. The rulins are almlQls't ih'atelcess;iJble. The s,u mmiit on which the :mins rest is one of the last sipll'I's orf the St'.rl'ov Roiciks, and tlhe castle reaUy loolks like a ,rOlbber's hideout. 1 Hric·ov, it seems did not m'8Jke history, thoUJgh a document from 1'265 mentions it and chronicles say that the castle wa'S buHt iby one Kia1i:jan, .the manager of the Bytca Castile. The story goes tihia t t!he Lehar robber clan took it from Kriliijan arud held it for many years. When the widOIW of the la;st ~har d!ied, the caJSt'le rpassed on to her adopted son, Franiciis Thur,zo. ~rom rtJhe time of Blazej Podmanin (1496) 1Jhe f1ate of Htiicloiv was closely tied up wi'th 1Jhat of Byitca and: the Lieitav<a Castle. After the deatih of the 1'ast Lehar, his widow ,r emained in SO'l'rOW for three years, as. it wrus ouistorrl'ary in those time!S. Hricoiv was a s;aJd and mournfu1l place. But rufter three years the gates orf Hricoiv weire thrown open to receive guests. Among the hopeifo1 caillers, who exipeeted to wed the widow of Hriicov, was Frandis Tht1ir210, t!he you~g and gallant owner of ithe neig1hlbo,r ing Lietaiva •s ltronghold. Thrur,zo had his eye on Hricov for some time and wrus de'term'ine'd to get i,t even if 'he had to marry the aging Leharr wiidow. The widow took a f1aney to 'Dhruirz•o, ,b ut told him t!hait marriage was out af the questi'()IIl becalllSe orf her age. But she did ad'opt him as her son and maJde him heir of her possessions . 'DhuJ:1zo, it seeims, soon became tired of waiting for hi's "mother" to die, so he decided to truke possession of Hricov by foul means. One ni.ghlt he oirdered his men to seize her and imprison her in the dungeon. The following morning Francis an- �38 SLOVAKIA nOUDJCed that the wlidow had become mental11y unbalanced and had ito be placed in the dungeon. But Ftranci's Thurzo, to keep his evil deed wvered Ulp at all times, had to be oo glll'ard am.d ,t hat v.irtuiailly made him a prisoner in the castle also. And so the years roB.e!d. on. The legend has it thait a monk approached the castle pO!rtaJls, made knolW'Il his ,p resence with his stafd', and begged a mght''S lodging. Thwrzo ordered the monk away. The latter ,t urned Ulpon Thuma and threatened to di,sdose th€ haugfu..ty lard's orime. Thu11"2Jo flared up and 'Set his dogs on the monk. Bult the moolk returned and toid Thurzo to do penance. Thunzo, in turn, ordered his men to seize the monk, beat him Ulp, cast lhfilll into the dungeon and starved him to death. In the meantime fea:r .ruled Hlrifov and Thurao himself was losing his nerwe. While ,t he monlk was starving, his ima;ge ilil stone ,beg,an to grow before the castle entrance. Thwrzo had the petrified monk smashed to bits, but the following mornmg the same petrified monk stood guard at his door. This was too mucih even for Tihuirzo. Overcome by compurnc,tion and fear, he decided to iet the Lehar widow h•aive !her freediom. He set out for the dungeon with hisserv,anits - on1y to find the widow dead. Thurno .became 1Jhe sole owner of Hricov at last. But he did not stay for 1ong; his servants fled one by one and, fina['ly, evern 'J:1hurzo aibantloned the haunlted castle. In time H11icov foll into de-caiy. Bu:t the legend goes on to say th'at the peitrifd.ed monlk stilil stands witness to 1:Jhe crime of F,rancis Thuirzo at the castle entrance. The S1~wa:ks liiV'i!ng in the vioiruty of HricolV, however, say that Thurzo did not get away so easily with hls crime. T.hey claim that he actually did lO'Se his mind and committed suicide by jumipin!g off the ca$tle wa'tl into the precipice below. At nd,g1ht the pitifll!l cries anrl screams cxf tJhe imprisoned widow coulld be heard by the V'fill:agers below. And Thnrr:z:o, beca:u:se o,f his crime, evern rur.ter death wandered restlessly aJbout the vicinri:ty od' Hr.icov . .Alf1ter Tihurno's death, the 1100k on whkh Hricov was built burst into flames which ruined everything. That is the st'Olry being passed on by generrutlions of Slovaks from Hrioov. � SLOVAKIA 37 CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA HRICOV The ruins of Hni 001v (IHiritcllov) Castle m the Trencin Distriot aire the smallest orf thO'se which stud the Vah vialley. At ()IIl.e time it was connected with the Sul'O!V Castle by a road whildh sna'ked i'ts way over tlhe ,rMJge:s of mountains. The ruins of Hiri.1co,v rest on a steep roc:k wit!h whi:c!h the rem'a ins of the waJ111s are. grown toge'fuer. The rulins are almlQls't ih'atelcess;iJble. The s,u mmiit on which the :mins rest is one of the last sipll'I's orf the St'.rl'ov Roiciks, and tlhe castle reaUy loolks like a ,rOlbber's hideout. 1 Hric·ov, it seems did not m'8Jke history, thoUJgh a document from 1'265 mentions it and chronicles say that the castle wa'S buHt iby one Kia1i:jan, .the manager of the Bytca Castile. The story goes tihia t t!he Lehar robber clan took it from Kriliijan arud held it for many years. When the widOIW of the la;st ~har d!ied, the caJSt'le rpassed on to her adopted son, Franiciis Thur,zo. ~rom rtJhe time of Blazej Podmanin (1496) 1Jhe f1ate of Htiicloiv was closely tied up wi'th 1Jhat of Byitca and: the Lieitav<a Castle. After the deatih of the 1'ast Lehar, his widow ,r emained in SO'l'rOW for three years, as. it wrus ouistorrl'ary in those time!S. Hricoiv was a s;aJd and mournfu1l place. But rufter three years the gates orf Hricoiv weire thrown open to receive guests. Among the hopeifo1 caillers, who exipeeted to wed the widow of Hriicov, was Frandis Tht1ir210, t!he you~g and gallant owner of ithe neig1hlbo,r ing Lietaiva •s ltronghold. Thrur,zo had his eye on Hricov for some time and wrus de'term'ine'd to get i,t even if 'he had to marry the aging Leharr wiidow. The widow took a f1aney to 'Dhruirz•o, ,b ut told him t!hait marriage was out af the questi'()IIl becalllSe orf her age. But she did ad'opt him as her son and maJde him heir of her possessions . 'DhuJ:1zo, it seeims, soon became tired of waiting for hi's "mother" to die, so he decided to truke possession of Hricov by foul means. One ni.ghlt he oirdered his men to seize her and imprison her in the dungeon. The following morning Francis an- �38 SLOVAKIA nOUDJCed that the wlidow had become mental11y unbalanced and had ito be placed in the dungeon. But Ftranci's Thurzo, to keep his evil deed wvered Ulp at all times, had to be oo glll'ard am.d ,t hat v.irtuiailly made him a prisoner in the castle also. And so the years roB.e!d. on. The legend has it thait a monk approached the castle pO!rtaJls, made knolW'Il his ,p resence with his stafd', and begged a mght''S lodging. Thwrzo ordered the monk away. The latter ,t urned Ulpon Thuma and threatened to di,sdose th€ haugfu..ty lard's orime. Thu11"2Jo flared up and 'Set his dogs on the monk. Bult the moolk returned and toid Thurzo to do penance. Thunzo, in turn, ordered his men to seize the monk, beat him Ulp, cast lhfilll into the dungeon and starved him to death. In the meantime fea:r .ruled Hlrifov and Thurao himself was losing his nerwe. While ,t he monlk was starving, his ima;ge ilil stone ,beg,an to grow before the castle entrance. Thwrzo had the petrified monk smashed to bits, but the following mornmg the same petrified monk stood guard at his door. This was too mucih even for Tihuirzo. Overcome by compurnc,tion and fear, he decided to iet the Lehar widow h•aive !her freediom. He set out for the dungeon with hisserv,anits - on1y to find the widow dead. Thurno .became 1Jhe sole owner of Hricov at last. But he did not stay for 1ong; his servants fled one by one and, fina['ly, evern 'J:1hurzo aibantloned the haunlted castle. In time H11icov foll into de-caiy. Bu:t the legend goes on to say th'at the peitrifd.ed monlk stilil stands witness to 1:Jhe crime of F,rancis Thuirzo at the castle entrance. The S1~wa:ks liiV'i!ng in the vioiruty of HricolV, however, say that Thurzo did not get away so easily with hls crime. T.hey claim that he actually did lO'Se his mind and committed suicide by jumipin!g off the ca$tle wa'tl into the precipice below. At nd,g1ht the pitifll!l cries anrl screams cxf tJhe imprisoned widow coulld be heard by the V'fill:agers below. And Thnrr:z:o, beca:u:se o,f his crime, evern rur.ter death wandered restlessly aJbout the vicinri:ty od' Hr.icov . .Alf1ter Tihurno's death, the 1100k on whkh Hricov was built burst into flames which ruined everything. That is the st'Olry being passed on by generrutlions of Slovaks from Hrioov. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 37 CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA HRICOV The ruins of Hni 001v (IHiritcllov) Castle m the Trencin Distriot aire the smallest orf thO'se which stud the Vah vialley. At ()IIl.e time it was connected with the Sul'O!V Castle by a road whildh sna'ked i'ts way over tlhe ,rMJge:s of mountains. The ruins of Hiri.1co,v rest on a steep roc:k wit!h whi:c!h the rem'a ins of the waJ111s are. grown toge'fuer. The rulins are almlQls't ih'atelcess;iJble. The s,u mmiit on which the :mins rest is one of the last sipll'I's orf the St'.rl'ov Roiciks, and tlhe castle reaUy loolks like a ,rOlbber's hideout. 1 Hric·ov, it seems did not m'8Jke history, thoUJgh a document from 1'265 mentions it and chronicles say that the castle wa'S buHt iby one Kia1i:jan, .the manager of the Bytca Castile. The story goes tihia t t!he Lehar robber clan took it from Kriliijan arud held it for many years. When the widOIW of the la;st ~har d!ied, the caJSt'le rpassed on to her adopted son, Franiciis Thur,zo. ~rom rtJhe time of Blazej Podmanin (1496) 1Jhe f1ate of Htiicloiv was closely tied up wi'th 1Jhat of Byitca and: the Lieitav<a Castle. After the deatih of the 1'ast Lehar, his widow ,r emained in SO'l'rOW for three years, as. it wrus ouistorrl'ary in those time!S. Hricoiv was a s;aJd and mournfu1l place. But rufter three years the gates orf Hricoiv weire thrown open to receive guests. Among the hopeifo1 caillers, who exipeeted to wed the widow of Hriicov, was Frandis Tht1ir210, t!he you~g and gallant owner of ithe neig1hlbo,r ing Lietaiva •s ltronghold. Thrur,zo had his eye on Hricov for some time and wrus de'term'ine'd to get i,t even if 'he had to marry the aging Leharr wiidow. The widow took a f1aney to 'Dhruirz•o, ,b ut told him t!hait marriage was out af the questi'()IIl becalllSe orf her age. But she did ad'opt him as her son and maJde him heir of her possessions . 'DhuJ:1zo, it seeims, soon became tired of waiting for hi's "mother" to die, so he decided to truke possession of Hricov by foul means. One ni.ghlt he oirdered his men to seize her and imprison her in the dungeon. The following morning Francis an- 38 SLOVAKIA nOUDJCed that the wlidow had become mental11y unbalanced and had ito be placed in the dungeon. But Ftranci's Thurzo, to keep his evil deed wvered Ulp at all times, had to be oo glll'ard am.d ,t hat v.irtuiailly made him a prisoner in the castle also. And so the years roB.e!d. on. The legend has it thait a monk approached the castle pO!rtaJls, made knolW'Il his ,p resence with his stafd', and begged a mght''S lodging. Thwrzo ordered the monk away. The latter ,t urned Ulpon Thuma and threatened to di,sdose th€ haugfu..ty lard's orime. Thu11"2Jo flared up and 'Set his dogs on the monk. Bult the moolk returned and toid Thurzo to do penance. Thunzo, in turn, ordered his men to seize the monk, beat him Ulp, cast lhfilll into the dungeon and starved him to death. In the meantime fea:r .ruled Hlrifov and Thurao himself was losing his nerwe. While ,t he monlk was starving, his ima;ge ilil stone ,beg,an to grow before the castle entrance. Thwrzo had the petrified monk smashed to bits, but the following mornmg the same petrified monk stood guard at his door. This was too mucih even for Tihuirzo. Overcome by compurnc,tion and fear, he decided to iet the Lehar widow h•aive !her freediom. He set out for the dungeon with hisserv,anits - on1y to find the widow dead. Thurno .became 1Jhe sole owner of Hricov at last. But he did not stay for 1ong; his servants fled one by one and, fina['ly, evern 'J:1hurzo aibantloned the haunlted castle. In time H11icov foll into de-caiy. Bu:t the legend goes on to say th'at the peitrifd.ed monlk stilil stands witness to 1:Jhe crime of F,rancis Thuirzo at the castle entrance. The S1~wa:ks liiV'i!ng in the vioiruty of HricolV, however, say that Thurzo did not get away so easily with hls crime. T.hey claim that he actually did lO'Se his mind and committed suicide by jumipin!g off the ca$tle wa'tl into the precipice below. At nd,g1ht the pitifll!l cries anrl screams cxf tJhe imprisoned widow coulld be heard by the V'fill:agers below. And Thnrr:z:o, beca:u:se o,f his crime, evern rur.ter death wandered restlessly aJbout the vicinri:ty od' Hr.icov . .Alf1ter Tihurno's death, the 1100k on whkh Hricov was built burst into flames which ruined everything. That is the st'Olry being passed on by generrutlions of Slovaks from Hrioov.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Castles of Slovakia: Hričov Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 2 (7), July 1953 pp. 37-38 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource July 1953 castles https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/14d9aa1cd0a470dc9de5ca76a6d90670.pdf fff1cd896634d603fd9f016a79e43d98 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 13 INTERVIEW Sir Robert Bruce Lockhardt and_ the Slovak Aviators (Broadcast by the B.B.C. May 8 at 7 p. m. EST and May 9 at 2:45 p. m. EST. Released on May 8, 1953, 7 p. m. EST.) Tlh e thrree Slovak avfatars, Lieutenant Kmrnan, Sergeant FleiS'Clhhacker and Sergeant Momar, who .fiew, Mrurch 13, 1953, from Piest'.amy into the Brr,i'tish 2i0Ile 'in Austria, are now in London. Sill' Robert Bruce Locldlardlt had an interview ,wJtJh them there whiicll was brooo'casit by the B.B.C. into Czecho-Slovrukfo.. Sir Robert Bruce Loci{hardt, former di'Plomat in Pirague, spoke in Czech while the three aviaJtors answered in Sfovak. Sir Robert: Tell me, plea;se, the reason foir yoUJr courageouis escaipe :Erorn Ozeicfuo~Slovakia? Have you fled beca UJSe ()(f rpoJi'tiK!a,l or ooonomiic motives, or ibecause of both? Krman: We .fled Czech·o~Slovrukiia because of pdli'tical and economic reasons. Our 1poli.tical convictions have never been along Communist lines and our sympathies went to the Western AJI:li~s. To .remain in Communist Czecho,Slovalkda when we had the ;pos!silbility of flying abroad wou!ld have been equal to giviing Ulp living. Any acti:viity against the Communist regime at lbhe pr~enrt time ~ing irmpossllble, theire is now ibult one opportuni,'ty to work for our people and !this oppontunilty lies outside of the lron Curtain. For these reasons we had no pers_peotirve in"' Ozec'llo,SlovaJkia. 01.l1I' officers reproached U'S many times on. accoun/t of our political ind;tfference. FuPthermore, conditions in a:11 branches of life were tenrilble, impossible to imrugine for people in the Western World. Sir Robert: What diflference did you olbserwe after your escape between the life in Ozecllo-Slovakia and tJhaJt ilil Wes.tern IDurope? War imltance, what do people on the stre~s looik Hke or what !kind of .artilcles are being sold in ,t he stores? Fleischhacker: After my escaipe I wa·s sU1I1prised to see how many rtJhings people were a!ble to buy for a small amount of money . For example, I had to spend my two month's salary to get a decent suit, while here a worker can �14 SLOVAKIA bu~ a silt with one week of worik. Freedom of speec'h impressed me deeply and I was immensely sur,pziised to see in a London ,prur'k a crowd which any one, wlho desilred to do so, icowld address on a sulbject of hiis f.ree choice. I was most impressed by ,t he faces of the persons -:- wilbh whom I am not yet aJble to speak -- which reflected satisfaction and poise. ENery one is rwel.1.iJ. dressed and every(bodiy belhaves nicely with one andt:Jher. Motorists rure very courteous to pedestrians, and waiitJin,g lfoc the buses - in so orderly a manner rwi'bhou't even one pushing - seems to me ailmost unbelievaible. Sir Robert: Blow st-rong is rt'he anti-communist feeling in Czecho-Slovakia:? Couid you tell me, Wlhat is, in _your ~ timation, the per,centage of the po,p ulation whiic'h adheres to Communi,s m? Molnar: W!hait ,t he conditions are in this respect in Czechia, I do not ,knorw. As for Slo'Vakia, .the anti-Comunist attitude of tlhe ipopu4ation e~ends all over the counltry. Resistance a;ga'ioot the regime is 'Very strong. Every person who follows with open eyes the activities of the :regume is, as a matter of prin!Ciiple, a,gaiilllst it. Expressed in .p ercentage, the ,situa;tion [odk•s ld!ke this: eighty per cent of tlle Slovaks are not memb~rs of tlle Communist Party, neiJther a;re they adherents of Communism. The o.v erwhelmmg majority of them are against Communism wilbh tlhei:r wiho1e hearts and souJs. Twenty per cenlt are Communists, but even ha1:f of tllese are only because they w,ant ,t o keep theilr jobs or get better ones. Sir Robert: Do you mean t:haJt the Communist regime is more hated now ltJhan it was in 1948? Krman: I know that in Slovaikia resistance to Communism is of an older date. Alf1ter the First World War, OU!l' fatillers tasted of Communism during the strug.gle against the Bo:lshevism of Bella lfohn in Hungary. So, the dldest generation have inifornned us very we1'1 '3J'bout this danger. During the Hife of the Slovak State, W1hen Slovak soldiers fOU!ght against Coonmun:ism on Soviet temitory, they had tlle oppoa:-tunilty to e,operience fiirst 'hand what Oommtmism is. T,here- �SLOVAKIA 15 fore, I am coiwinced .fuaJt in S'loIValkia there was from tihe beginning of fue Comlmltmist dominamion greater and moire decisive oppO'siltion aigainst the regime than in Ozechiia. T,he Red A'I1my, aJt tlhe ti!me of ' 11:iJberaticm" of our cotm'try, only conf:iimned whait our soldiera saw in Sovti.et Russia. Sir Robert: Wlhat is the alttitude of the non-Communist population towa,rd foz,mer ipolitical parties and refugees? Molnar: The non-Communist population of SlovaJkia condemns these parties and bhcir leading personaJltities who fled to the Western coU!Illtries. 'Dhe reason for bb/is attitude is that in 'Spite of the fact that t!hey have had a greater percentage of people on theiir side, they weire unable to check the expansion of the CommU!Ilist reg1ime and ,t o prevent its taking over of the ,w'hole Government. Sir Robert: Iis the anti-CommUillisit attiltulde stronger among fuose who are ll!Ildeir 30 years of age or among the older ones·? Fleischlt3(cker: The anltli..Communist feeling is stronger among ·people more than 30 yeairs old, because, s1ionce tlhe end of fue Second Wo,r,ld War, the youth is educ-aJted in the Communist spirilt in tlhe sohools, in the factories, in the military servke. There are many yOU!Il.g men of 25 wiho fall for Communist promises. The majo:rd.ty of men of 30, however, still remembers well the times of lilberty, the times when food and cl·o thes were not rationed and wlhen there was a great possilbility for everylbod,y to get a job. Sir Robert: Do the Czechs and S1oivaks stiH remember the great men like T. G. Masairyk, Milan Steifanrnk, Edward Benes, Jan Masa.iryik, and Alrchlbishop Beram.? Are these personalities known ,b y the young generaJtion? Krman: '11he young ,p eople know very little o!f ,tihese men, because the Commll!Ilist regime - wifuout any consideraition for theli,r merilts - is ipresenlting them in a very bad 1ight. Neverth~less, Milan Ra'stislav Stefanik enjo,yetl the fame of a national saint in Slovakia. Lately, however, tJhe Communists in our country try to destroy everything which draws the attention of our people to his memory. �16 SLOVAKIA In Bohemia and Moraivia the names Olf T. G. Masaryk, Edward Benes and Archbishop Beran axe still. quite popuiar, but not m S1ovaJkia, where the names of Hlinka, Tiso, Stefanik preva,i'l. Sir Robert: How do the anti-Communist Czecho~Slovalks im~,gii,ne lbhe ,1ilberation of Ozecho-Siovrukia. and the future of their Staite in a li!beraited Elllrope? Molnar: The majorilty of the anti-Communist Slovaks i:. for a Central-European federaJtion of peoples, in which every nation wi.N decide its. own af,fa:II'ls and wihere every memlber whlll have equal,i ty o,f r~ghrts wtiith oither pairtners. But :t!he main task i'S to be seen in the common decision o!f all these peoip[e,s - Czeclhs, S1ovaJks, Magyars and alt.hens to destroy the Communist tyranny. - ('Slovruk League PTess BU!reau by pemnission of the BBC, London, and ,t he interviewed). • • • WHO SAID IT? "I fully understand the reasons which led France and Great Britain to demand that we should not fight in September 1938 • . . . In that year, I think the only countries in Europe prepared for the war were GERMANY, THE SOVIET UNION AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA. I had no doubts whatever about Czechoslovak preparedness. Our resources were great and they were fully mobilized. From 1933, when Hitler took the whole power in Germany into his hands, I WAS SU RE that Europe was moving rapidly towards a great and terrible crisis . . . . In 1938 in September we had ONE MILLION AND A HALF splendidly equipped soldiers. They were at the disposal of the struggle for democracy and freedom together with all our powerful industries. The events in 1938 prevented it.' Nazi Germany disbanded and destroyed this splendid army. Only a very small part of it succeeded In reaching the Allied countries." Dr. Benes, Speech, New York, May 26, 1943). • • • "Czecho-Slovakia and Germany were the only two countries in Europe, which, in the September 1938 crisis, were TOTALLY PREPARED FOR WAR. As for us, our resources were mobilized to the highest degree. And these resources were very great! • . • Had not PRAGUE adopted during the September crisis a passive attitude, Hitler would have unleashed the war then • • • . WE, therefore, under irresistible pressure submitted to the decision which had been made. I RESIGNED THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENT, made preparations in the country for a struggle against Naziism in the event of war, and went into exile. The whole nation very soon understood." - Dr. Edward Benes, Central European Observer, 1-17-41) . � SLOVAKIA 13 INTERVIEW Sir Robert Bruce Lockhardt and_ the Slovak Aviators (Broadcast by the B.B.C. May 8 at 7 p. m. EST and May 9 at 2:45 p. m. EST. Released on May 8, 1953, 7 p. m. EST.) Tlh e thrree Slovak avfatars, Lieutenant Kmrnan, Sergeant FleiS'Clhhacker and Sergeant Momar, who .fiew, Mrurch 13, 1953, from Piest'.amy into the Brr,i'tish 2i0Ile 'in Austria, are now in London. Sill' Robert Bruce Locldlardlt had an interview ,wJtJh them there whiicll was brooo'casit by the B.B.C. into Czecho-Slovrukfo.. Sir Robert Bruce Loci{hardt, former di'Plomat in Pirague, spoke in Czech while the three aviaJtors answered in Sfovak. Sir Robert: Tell me, plea;se, the reason foir yoUJr courageouis escaipe :Erorn Ozeicfuo~Slovakia? Have you fled beca UJSe ()(f rpoJi'tiK!a,l or ooonomiic motives, or ibecause of both? Krman: We .fled Czech·o~Slovrukiia because of pdli'tical and economic reasons. Our 1poli.tical convictions have never been along Communist lines and our sympathies went to the Western AJI:li~s. To .remain in Communist Czecho,Slovalkda when we had the ;pos!silbility of flying abroad wou!ld have been equal to giviing Ulp living. Any acti:viity against the Communist regime at lbhe pr~enrt time ~ing irmpossllble, theire is now ibult one opportuni,'ty to work for our people and !this oppontunilty lies outside of the lron Curtain. For these reasons we had no pers_peotirve in"' Ozec'llo,SlovaJkia. 01.l1I' officers reproached U'S many times on. accoun/t of our political ind;tfference. FuPthermore, conditions in a:11 branches of life were tenrilble, impossible to imrugine for people in the Western World. Sir Robert: What diflference did you olbserwe after your escape between the life in Ozecllo-Slovakia and tJhaJt ilil Wes.tern IDurope? War imltance, what do people on the stre~s looik Hke or what !kind of .artilcles are being sold in ,t he stores? Fleischhacker: After my escaipe I wa·s sU1I1prised to see how many rtJhings people were a!ble to buy for a small amount of money . For example, I had to spend my two month's salary to get a decent suit, while here a worker can �14 SLOVAKIA bu~ a silt with one week of worik. Freedom of speec'h impressed me deeply and I was immensely sur,pziised to see in a London ,prur'k a crowd which any one, wlho desilred to do so, icowld address on a sulbject of hiis f.ree choice. I was most impressed by ,t he faces of the persons -:- wilbh whom I am not yet aJble to speak -- which reflected satisfaction and poise. ENery one is rwel.1.iJ. dressed and every(bodiy belhaves nicely with one andt:Jher. Motorists rure very courteous to pedestrians, and waiitJin,g lfoc the buses - in so orderly a manner rwi'bhou't even one pushing - seems to me ailmost unbelievaible. Sir Robert: Blow st-rong is rt'he anti-communist feeling in Czecho-Slovakia:? Couid you tell me, Wlhat is, in _your ~ timation, the per,centage of the po,p ulation whiic'h adheres to Communi,s m? Molnar: W!hait ,t he conditions are in this respect in Czechia, I do not ,knorw. As for Slo'Vakia, .the anti-Comunist attitude of tlhe ipopu4ation e~ends all over the counltry. Resistance a;ga'ioot the regime is 'Very strong. Every person who follows with open eyes the activities of the :regume is, as a matter of prin!Ciiple, a,gaiilllst it. Expressed in .p ercentage, the ,situa;tion [odk•s ld!ke this: eighty per cent of tlle Slovaks are not memb~rs of tlle Communist Party, neiJther a;re they adherents of Communism. The o.v erwhelmmg majority of them are against Communism wilbh tlhei:r wiho1e hearts and souJs. Twenty per cenlt are Communists, but even ha1:f of tllese are only because they w,ant ,t o keep theilr jobs or get better ones. Sir Robert: Do you mean t:haJt the Communist regime is more hated now ltJhan it was in 1948? Krman: I know that in Slovaikia resistance to Communism is of an older date. Alf1ter the First World War, OU!l' fatillers tasted of Communism during the strug.gle against the Bo:lshevism of Bella lfohn in Hungary. So, the dldest generation have inifornned us very we1'1 '3J'bout this danger. During the Hife of the Slovak State, W1hen Slovak soldiers fOU!ght against Coonmun:ism on Soviet temitory, they had tlle oppoa:-tunilty to e,operience fiirst 'hand what Oommtmism is. T,here- �SLOVAKIA 15 fore, I am coiwinced .fuaJt in S'loIValkia there was from tihe beginning of fue Comlmltmist dominamion greater and moire decisive oppO'siltion aigainst the regime than in Ozechiia. T,he Red A'I1my, aJt tlhe ti!me of ' 11:iJberaticm" of our cotm'try, only conf:iimned whait our soldiera saw in Sovti.et Russia. Sir Robert: Wlhat is the alttitude of the non-Communist population towa,rd foz,mer ipolitical parties and refugees? Molnar: The non-Communist population of SlovaJkia condemns these parties and bhcir leading personaJltities who fled to the Western coU!Illtries. 'Dhe reason for bb/is attitude is that in 'Spite of the fact that t!hey have had a greater percentage of people on theiir side, they weire unable to check the expansion of the CommU!Ilist reg1ime and ,t o prevent its taking over of the ,w'hole Government. Sir Robert: Iis the anti-CommUillisit attiltulde stronger among fuose who are ll!Ildeir 30 years of age or among the older ones·? Fleischlt3(cker: The anltli..Communist feeling is stronger among ·people more than 30 yeairs old, because, s1ionce tlhe end of fue Second Wo,r,ld War, the youth is educ-aJted in the Communist spirilt in tlhe sohools, in the factories, in the military servke. There are many yOU!Il.g men of 25 wiho fall for Communist promises. The majo:rd.ty of men of 30, however, still remembers well the times of lilberty, the times when food and cl·o thes were not rationed and wlhen there was a great possilbility for everylbod,y to get a job. Sir Robert: Do the Czechs and S1oivaks stiH remember the great men like T. G. Masairyk, Milan Steifanrnk, Edward Benes, Jan Masa.iryik, and Alrchlbishop Beram.? Are these personalities known ,b y the young generaJtion? Krman: '11he young ,p eople know very little o!f ,tihese men, because the Commll!Ilist regime - wifuout any consideraition for theli,r merilts - is ipresenlting them in a very bad 1ight. Neverth~less, Milan Ra'stislav Stefanik enjo,yetl the fame of a national saint in Slovakia. Lately, however, tJhe Communists in our country try to destroy everything which draws the attention of our people to his memory. �16 SLOVAKIA In Bohemia and Moraivia the names Olf T. G. Masaryk, Edward Benes and Archbishop Beran axe still. quite popuiar, but not m S1ovaJkia, where the names of Hlinka, Tiso, Stefanik preva,i'l. Sir Robert: How do the anti-Communist Czecho~Slovalks im~,gii,ne lbhe ,1ilberation of Ozecho-Siovrukia. and the future of their Staite in a li!beraited Elllrope? Molnar: The majorilty of the anti-Communist Slovaks i:. for a Central-European federaJtion of peoples, in which every nation wi.N decide its. own af,fa:II'ls and wihere every memlber whlll have equal,i ty o,f r~ghrts wtiith oither pairtners. But :t!he main task i'S to be seen in the common decision o!f all these peoip[e,s - Czeclhs, S1ovaJks, Magyars and alt.hens to destroy the Communist tyranny. - ('Slovruk League PTess BU!reau by pemnission of the BBC, London, and ,t he interviewed). • • • WHO SAID IT? "I fully understand the reasons which led France and Great Britain to demand that we should not fight in September 1938 • . . . In that year, I think the only countries in Europe prepared for the war were GERMANY, THE SOVIET UNION AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA. I had no doubts whatever about Czechoslovak preparedness. Our resources were great and they were fully mobilized. From 1933, when Hitler took the whole power in Germany into his hands, I WAS SU RE that Europe was moving rapidly towards a great and terrible crisis . . . . In 1938 in September we had ONE MILLION AND A HALF splendidly equipped soldiers. They were at the disposal of the struggle for democracy and freedom together with all our powerful industries. The events in 1938 prevented it.' Nazi Germany disbanded and destroyed this splendid army. Only a very small part of it succeeded In reaching the Allied countries." Dr. Benes, Speech, New York, May 26, 1943). • • • "Czecho-Slovakia and Germany were the only two countries in Europe, which, in the September 1938 crisis, were TOTALLY PREPARED FOR WAR. As for us, our resources were mobilized to the highest degree. And these resources were very great! • . • Had not PRAGUE adopted during the September crisis a passive attitude, Hitler would have unleashed the war then • • • . WE, therefore, under irresistible pressure submitted to the decision which had been made. I RESIGNED THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENT, made preparations in the country for a struggle against Naziism in the event of war, and went into exile. The whole nation very soon understood." - Dr. Edward Benes, Central European Observer, 1-17-41) . � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 13 INTERVIEW Sir Robert Bruce Lockhardt and_ the Slovak Aviators (Broadcast by the B.B.C. May 8 at 7 p. m. EST and May 9 at 2:45 p. m. EST. Released on May 8, 1953, 7 p. m. EST.) Tlh e thrree Slovak avfatars, Lieutenant Kmrnan, Sergeant FleiS'Clhhacker and Sergeant Momar, who .fiew, Mrurch 13, 1953, from Piest'.amy into the Brr,i'tish 2i0Ile 'in Austria, are now in London. Sill' Robert Bruce Locldlardlt had an interview ,wJtJh them there whiicll was brooo'casit by the B.B.C. into Czecho-Slovrukfo.. Sir Robert Bruce Loci{hardt, former di'Plomat in Pirague, spoke in Czech while the three aviaJtors answered in Sfovak. Sir Robert: Tell me, plea;se, the reason foir yoUJr courageouis escaipe :Erorn Ozeicfuo~Slovakia? Have you fled beca UJSe ()(f rpoJi'tiK!a,l or ooonomiic motives, or ibecause of both? Krman: We .fled Czech·o~Slovrukiia because of pdli'tical and economic reasons. Our 1poli.tical convictions have never been along Communist lines and our sympathies went to the Western AJI:li~s. To .remain in Communist Czecho,Slovalkda when we had the ;pos!silbility of flying abroad wou!ld have been equal to giviing Ulp living. Any acti:viity against the Communist regime at lbhe pr~enrt time ~ing irmpossllble, theire is now ibult one opportuni,'ty to work for our people and !this oppontunilty lies outside of the lron Curtain. For these reasons we had no pers_peotirve in"' Ozec'llo,SlovaJkia. 01.l1I' officers reproached U'S many times on. accoun/t of our political ind;tfference. FuPthermore, conditions in a:11 branches of life were tenrilble, impossible to imrugine for people in the Western World. Sir Robert: What diflference did you olbserwe after your escape between the life in Ozecllo-Slovakia and tJhaJt ilil Wes.tern IDurope? War imltance, what do people on the stre~s looik Hke or what !kind of .artilcles are being sold in ,t he stores? Fleischhacker: After my escaipe I wa·s sU1I1prised to see how many rtJhings people were a!ble to buy for a small amount of money . For example, I had to spend my two month's salary to get a decent suit, while here a worker can 14 SLOVAKIA bu~ a silt with one week of worik. Freedom of speec'h impressed me deeply and I was immensely sur,pziised to see in a London ,prur'k a crowd which any one, wlho desilred to do so, icowld address on a sulbject of hiis f.ree choice. I was most impressed by ,t he faces of the persons -:- wilbh whom I am not yet aJble to speak -- which reflected satisfaction and poise. ENery one is rwel.1.iJ. dressed and every(bodiy belhaves nicely with one andt:Jher. Motorists rure very courteous to pedestrians, and waiitJin,g lfoc the buses - in so orderly a manner rwi'bhou't even one pushing - seems to me ailmost unbelievaible. Sir Robert: Blow st-rong is rt'he anti-communist feeling in Czecho-Slovakia:? Couid you tell me, Wlhat is, in _your ~ timation, the per,centage of the po,p ulation whiic'h adheres to Communi,s m? Molnar: W!hait ,t he conditions are in this respect in Czechia, I do not ,knorw. As for Slo'Vakia, .the anti-Comunist attitude of tlhe ipopu4ation e~ends all over the counltry. Resistance a;ga'ioot the regime is 'Very strong. Every person who follows with open eyes the activities of the :regume is, as a matter of prin!Ciiple, a,gaiilllst it. Expressed in .p ercentage, the ,situa;tion [odk•s ld!ke this: eighty per cent of tlle Slovaks are not memb~rs of tlle Communist Party, neiJther a;re they adherents of Communism. The o.v erwhelmmg majority of them are against Communism wilbh tlhei:r wiho1e hearts and souJs. Twenty per cenlt are Communists, but even ha1:f of tllese are only because they w,ant ,t o keep theilr jobs or get better ones. Sir Robert: Do you mean t:haJt the Communist regime is more hated now ltJhan it was in 1948? Krman: I know that in Slovaikia resistance to Communism is of an older date. Alf1ter the First World War, OU!l' fatillers tasted of Communism during the strug.gle against the Bo:lshevism of Bella lfohn in Hungary. So, the dldest generation have inifornned us very we1'1 '3J'bout this danger. During the Hife of the Slovak State, W1hen Slovak soldiers fOU!ght against Coonmun:ism on Soviet temitory, they had tlle oppoa:-tunilty to e,operience fiirst 'hand what Oommtmism is. T,here- SLOVAKIA 15 fore, I am coiwinced .fuaJt in S'loIValkia there was from tihe beginning of fue Comlmltmist dominamion greater and moire decisive oppO'siltion aigainst the regime than in Ozechiia. T,he Red A'I1my, aJt tlhe ti!me of ' 11:iJberaticm" of our cotm'try, only conf:iimned whait our soldiera saw in Sovti.et Russia. Sir Robert: Wlhat is the alttitude of the non-Communist population towa,rd foz,mer ipolitical parties and refugees? Molnar: The non-Communist population of SlovaJkia condemns these parties and bhcir leading personaJltities who fled to the Western coU!Illtries. 'Dhe reason for bb/is attitude is that in 'Spite of the fact that t!hey have had a greater percentage of people on theiir side, they weire unable to check the expansion of the CommU!Ilist reg1ime and ,t o prevent its taking over of the ,w'hole Government. Sir Robert: Iis the anti-CommUillisit attiltulde stronger among fuose who are ll!Ildeir 30 years of age or among the older ones·? Fleischlt3(cker: The anltli..Communist feeling is stronger among ·people more than 30 yeairs old, because, s1ionce tlhe end of fue Second Wo,r,ld War, the youth is educ-aJted in the Communist spirilt in tlhe sohools, in the factories, in the military servke. There are many yOU!Il.g men of 25 wiho fall for Communist promises. The majo:rd.ty of men of 30, however, still remembers well the times of lilberty, the times when food and cl·o thes were not rationed and wlhen there was a great possilbility for everylbod,y to get a job. Sir Robert: Do the Czechs and S1oivaks stiH remember the great men like T. G. Masairyk, Milan Steifanrnk, Edward Benes, Jan Masa.iryik, and Alrchlbishop Beram.? Are these personalities known ,b y the young generaJtion? Krman: '11he young ,p eople know very little o!f ,tihese men, because the Commll!Ilist regime - wifuout any consideraition for theli,r merilts - is ipresenlting them in a very bad 1ight. Neverth~less, Milan Ra'stislav Stefanik enjo,yetl the fame of a national saint in Slovakia. Lately, however, tJhe Communists in our country try to destroy everything which draws the attention of our people to his memory. 16 SLOVAKIA In Bohemia and Moraivia the names Olf T. G. Masaryk, Edward Benes and Archbishop Beran axe still. quite popuiar, but not m S1ovaJkia, where the names of Hlinka, Tiso, Stefanik preva,i'l. Sir Robert: How do the anti-Communist Czecho~Slovalks im~,gii,ne lbhe ,1ilberation of Ozecho-Siovrukia. and the future of their Staite in a li!beraited Elllrope? Molnar: The majorilty of the anti-Communist Slovaks i:. for a Central-European federaJtion of peoples, in which every nation wi.N decide its. own af,fa:II'ls and wihere every memlber whlll have equal,i ty o,f r~ghrts wtiith oither pairtners. But :t!he main task i'S to be seen in the common decision o!f all these peoip[e,s - Czeclhs, S1ovaJks, Magyars and alt.hens to destroy the Communist tyranny. - ('Slovruk League PTess BU!reau by pemnission of the BBC, London, and ,t he interviewed). • • • WHO SAID IT? "I fully understand the reasons which led France and Great Britain to demand that we should not fight in September 1938 • . . . In that year, I think the only countries in Europe prepared for the war were GERMANY, THE SOVIET UNION AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA. I had no doubts whatever about Czechoslovak preparedness. Our resources were great and they were fully mobilized. From 1933, when Hitler took the whole power in Germany into his hands, I WAS SU RE that Europe was moving rapidly towards a great and terrible crisis . . . . In 1938 in September we had ONE MILLION AND A HALF splendidly equipped soldiers. They were at the disposal of the struggle for democracy and freedom together with all our powerful industries. The events in 1938 prevented it.' Nazi Germany disbanded and destroyed this splendid army. Only a very small part of it succeeded In reaching the Allied countries." Dr. Benes, Speech, New York, May 26, 1943). • • • "Czecho-Slovakia and Germany were the only two countries in Europe, which, in the September 1938 crisis, were TOTALLY PREPARED FOR WAR. As for us, our resources were mobilized to the highest degree. And these resources were very great! • . • Had not PRAGUE adopted during the September crisis a passive attitude, Hitler would have unleashed the war then • • • . WE, therefore, under irresistible pressure submitted to the decision which had been made. I RESIGNED THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENT, made preparations in the country for a struggle against Naziism in the event of war, and went into exile. The whole nation very soon understood." - Dr. Edward Benes, Central European Observer, 1-17-41) .  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Sir Robert Bruce Lockhardt and the Slovak Aviators Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 2 (7), July 1953 pp. 13-16 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource July 1953 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/2c82a300fcc80b3010544178ccc6c9e4.pdf 57656682930c6a62eefb3d76cdf36399 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 9 BUILDING ANOTHER BRIDGE? Genera,l Lev :PIIX:'ha'la, head of the Czech Nationa'l Committee in London, broke ,wiltfh lli. Edwaxd Benes /When he could no longer ,surfifer in silenice ,his dildtatorial, :imperiom; and pro-lSOVliet 1po1'icy. ]t hruppened in London during the wair. Prchala fost .his lave for Benes in 1938, when he oapitullarted to the M1.midh Alg;reemen't witlhourt 1the consent of the 0zecho~Slovruk Prurliarrnent, .then resigned ifrom :the Presidency, thus surrendering his coll!Iltry, lodk, stock and ba,rrel, :to HiltJler w.iithout -Olffering tJhe slightest physical resistance, and then cowardly fled rto London. From thrut time on, Prchwla re.gamded Benes and his political clii.que - .the Czech NaJtional Socialists, or Ozedh N aizis, as they axe .referred to - as hypocrites and frauds who h elched forth volumes of democratic slogans and S'peeches, bwt kept idiri'Vliing Czooho-iSlovrukia and tlhe who-le of Erurope inito ,t he dultldhe:s af -Moscow. In the Fcllruacy . 9, 19153, ,i ssue of the "<Ceske Listy" (Ozech News), .t he oflfilcial organ of ,B rehala's ·giroll!p, the General .reilates ,a nother inciderut to ,p rove the ,hy;pocrisy of the (in)lfamous ,bridge-ib-ui[der, Dr. Edward Benes, who brought Communism into Ozecho-Slovakia and Centrail Eu•r ope to threaJten ,tJhe secudty and democraitlic ,l:tfe of the entire Euiropean contilllerut. 'Dhe i'Il!ci:dent goes baok to ,tfue time of the :presidenltial elec'tlionlS in 1935. Uncertam of the swpport of ,the Caitholics in the various par.ties, especially ,t he support of tlhe Slovalks, ibecause Dr. Edwar.d Benes dlid cOiilltrilbute many articles to "f.ree-thinkriillg" iperiodica!lis and iwas a Freemason even before World War I, lri's followers (,rut his 1b ehest) suddenly ,d iscovered that Benes was a "loyall SOIIl of the Roman Catholic Ohurdh since the dlay he was lbarn." Monsignor John Sraimek',s caiptains in his 0zech People's Party tooik up the cry, even though Sramek .knew 1betlter, and used every me·a ns to convince the Vatican that Benes •reruJily was a "loyal son" of the Catholic Church. Prc,hal-a -clai.!ffis thaJt eventll!ally the Sramek Czechs put their: story across and Rome urgently requested the CaJt!ho- �10 SLOVAKIA l:i!c members of the Ozecho-'SlovaJk National Assemlbly to vote and wonk for !the election of Dr. Edward iBenes. We know thalt Benes ,was eleclted. lwen the Sfova'ks 'Voted for brim wilthout a dissenlt!ing vote, · !beoamse Dr. Joseph Tiso had cornrinced them ito do so on the stTeng:th of the piromise m'ade iby Benes that :Slovruk!ia wowld ibe granted full au'tonom~ wiitihin a yerur. We :know ,tlhaJt Benes never fulfilled it!hat ipromi'se, or eiven meant to fulifiM ilt. And he ireipaid iDr. J ·O'Seplh Ti:so in 1947 by senldling him to .the igallows. That's the kind of man Benes was. W:hat hruppened after ,t he elections of 1935, aJs told lby Prchala, wfillJ. oorlou\btedily •s hook €/Ven the most ardent admiireirs of Benes, General Lev Prcha.O.a says: "Alflter ithe presidential elections, jjt was by sheer a.ocidenit that tlhe edge of the curtain, which had hid'den the 1rea;lrity, was rai!sed. Alf1teir the elootion of Benes as 'Presidenlt, I wa·s just leaving the Vladis1av Hill in the Brag,ue Castle, when suddenllY I overheard a very familiar voiice sing olllt in open •rrupture: 'Well, we put it across, didn't we? !' The senltenice wais spoken in godd Russian. I was right - it .rea:Hy was A lexandrovsky, the Russian ambassadw, who was joyously swinging his amns. The inlto~ication over the sU1CCeSIS was stronger than the diplom!atic resei,ve for wlhich I had previiously known him. Those Russian words opened my eyes. "When I iresigned .firom the .:£unction of Vke-Commander of ithe Czed'no-Sl'ovak General Staff in 1933 and went to eastern SlovaJkia, I was quft.te a di stan1Ce from eveirything that was 1::a.king jplace in P,r ague I wrus a soldier and not a poilitician; I did not belong to any panty, bl.lit inlterna1 and foreign. deve'loipments. did interest me. AB I traveled by tra:in :frrom Kosi'Ce to Praigue, I met the Slova'k depulties and senaJtors. I learned that Hlinka's party probaJbly woulltl ivote for Benes in the presidentia:1 elections. This su!I1prised rme a:nd, therefore, after my arrival in Brague I soug1ht the .reason for ffiinka''S turning over to the Castle and to Benes. I found ouJt tih at tJhe V:aJt~can had recommended Benes to Hlinlka. 1 1 �SLOVAKIA 11 "However, after accidentally oivezfuearing the words of .Am'baJSador Afex:andirovsky, it was c[ear to me ,t hat · Benes was Sta'1in's candidaite ! I was aware that the V a,tJican knowin,gJy ,coll!ld nOlt recommend a candidate of the Bolshewks. '.Dhe exp1anaitioin was simple: tlhe V:atican wias a vtl.dtim of an unheard af hoax!" It is very mudh ;possi!ble tha;t even now some of the Benes "Ozechosloviaik!s" rure lbrying rto dece'i!ve tJhe Vatican. 'llhe .puiblfuhers of i'bhe "Tribuna" (The Tribune), the official organ of itlhe •~Ozeclloslovalk Foreign Institute in Exile" pub:J.ished in .Paris, do nolt say so directly, but their articles tend in thaJt di-rect_ion. The socialists writing for the '":Dribuna" keep on bringmg Ulp T. G. Masaryk and hils statement that tihe proiblem of the sigmficance of Czech hristory is a religfoUJS qu~on. Of course, they oonvenientliy forget to mention that T. G. MasaJr!Ylk ,had ,1!he Ozeoh Reifonmaation ,in mind ·a nd tJhat ait ,t he time he :had sai'd those words, he was the Jeader of tJhe mti-Caitholic firght in Czedho-!SlovaJlda. Ag:ain it is evident ltJhaJt the Benes sociaAi'sts thriive on frauds, deceiits and initmig!ll'e. Referring to the itrend lin the "Tri!bU111a," General P'lrohala says: "By means of this ,t rick, however, the 'Dribuna is endeavoring to realize a muich greater firaJUd. It is try. ing to evdke in the high Roman Caitlholic Hierarclhy a faJVOraJble impression for itself and iits cmn political ends. 'Jlhis time, however, uninformed .readers and tlh.e 'Czechoslovak' exi:les in genera;! are ·swppo.sed to bre inspked to ~buikl a 1brid!ge' to Rome. It wi!H not sw-prise me ,i f this is being done by atlteimpting a f1raudlulent explanaJtion Olf Masary1k's thesis, becM1se every one knows that the peopl'e in t:Jh.e 'Councii of Free ~echo-SIJ.01Vakiiia.' are not interested m princi~es, hut only in tactics, aJltoget'her an:ording to the reci,pe of old MachiavelJi anrl his modern a<lmilrer'S." We rure inclined to lbelieve General .Brohala. Enough damage and suffering has been inflidted by the lfoHowers of Benes and his ruinous poHcy of "CzechOislovaklism" and pro. SO'V'ietism on the Czech and Slovak nations, nay, on the �12 SLOVAKIA whcle of tJhe EU1ropean conrtinent. '.Dhe former Ozecll National !Socialists - all memlbers of the Communist-dominated "Naltional F1ront" ,go;vernmenlt of Benes and Gottwald s'hou[(i not 1b e tir:u1sted, 1b ut releg.aJted ,to the po[iibi.cal rubbish herup. Today theli,r ,l eaders (Zenkll, Rilpka) a.re disc:redi1ted and disowned ,b y the Ozecihs at home and aJbroad and represenlt no one hut themselves and their mercenrury clique. The saime may be said for lthe "Wlindow-dressin,g " Slovak renegades in tile ,servJce am:l 1pay of t;he Benes CzecihlS. (Leittricli, Sla:vilk, OsUJSky, Kocivara), ,w ho spealk for and represent oniy themseilves and not tlhe Slovaik nation. Under the leadership of Dr EdwaTd Benes they lb uilt the "lb;rM1ge" between the Ewst and the West, over wlhiich oame ,S talin's h-011des into Central Europe. They must not be given the chance to build S'lllc:h "bridges" to Rome, or ,b etween the USA and Moscow. • • • "The story of the gradual adoption by ·the Allies of the (Czechoslovak) theses of Mas aryk and his group cannot and need not be retold h ere. By patient and lndefatiga.ble propaganda they Implanted their major postulates - the existence of a 'CzechoSlovak nation ' and the desire of the Slovak branch of it to form a part of a Czechoslovak State - so firmly in the minds of the Allies that they were never seriously questioned at the Peace Conference. The 'Czecho-Slovak' Govern ment h ad b een recognized by all the Principal Allied a nd Ass o ciated Powers even BEFORE the peace negotiations began - an act which implied that the Slovak question was in principle already settled - while when the moment arrived for settling all questions of de tail, including the drafting of a frontier, it found the Czecho-Slovak Government firmly established as a :negotiating party; Indeed, in something like a privileged position." ~A . Mac a rtney: HUNGA'RY AND HER SUCCESSORS, London, 1937, page 98) . WHO SAID IT? - • WHO SAi D IT? - • • " If a single dynasty h ad united both peoples (Czechs and Slovaks) in a permanent, or at least an enduring union, a Czechoslovak nationality would assuredly have been formed and with ft ···a Czechoslovak lang uage any minor dialectal differences which existed would have been smoothed out. This did not happen; and w hil e t he Slavs of Bohemia developed the Czech nationality and language, to which the intermediate dialects of Moravia graiitated, the Slovaks, under l,lungarian rule, not only developed along different lines from the ·czechs, but were not even able to form a single literary language with them." (C. A. Macartney: HUNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS.::..:_ London, 1937). � SLOVAKIA 9 BUILDING ANOTHER BRIDGE? Genera,l Lev :PIIX:'ha'la, head of the Czech Nationa'l Committee in London, broke ,wiltfh lli. Edwaxd Benes /When he could no longer ,surfifer in silenice ,his dildtatorial, :imperiom; and pro-lSOVliet 1po1'icy. ]t hruppened in London during the wair. Prchala fost .his lave for Benes in 1938, when he oapitullarted to the M1.midh Alg;reemen't witlhourt 1the consent of the 0zecho~Slovruk Prurliarrnent, .then resigned ifrom :the Presidency, thus surrendering his coll!Iltry, lodk, stock and ba,rrel, :to HiltJler w.iithout -Olffering tJhe slightest physical resistance, and then cowardly fled rto London. From thrut time on, Prchwla re.gamded Benes and his political clii.que - .the Czech NaJtional Socialists, or Ozedh N aizis, as they axe .referred to - as hypocrites and frauds who h elched forth volumes of democratic slogans and S'peeches, bwt kept idiri'Vliing Czooho-iSlovrukia and tlhe who-le of Erurope inito ,t he dultldhe:s af -Moscow. In the Fcllruacy . 9, 19153, ,i ssue of the "<Ceske Listy" (Ozech News), .t he oflfilcial organ of ,B rehala's ·giroll!p, the General .reilates ,a nother inciderut to ,p rove the ,hy;pocrisy of the (in)lfamous ,bridge-ib-ui[der, Dr. Edward Benes, who brought Communism into Ozecho-Slovakia and Centrail Eu•r ope to threaJten ,tJhe secudty and democraitlic ,l:tfe of the entire Euiropean contilllerut. 'Dhe i'Il!ci:dent goes baok to ,tfue time of the :presidenltial elec'tlionlS in 1935. Uncertam of the swpport of ,the Caitholics in the various par.ties, especially ,t he support of tlhe Slovalks, ibecause Dr. Edwar.d Benes dlid cOiilltrilbute many articles to "f.ree-thinkriillg" iperiodica!lis and iwas a Freemason even before World War I, lri's followers (,rut his 1b ehest) suddenly ,d iscovered that Benes was a "loyall SOIIl of the Roman Catholic Ohurdh since the dlay he was lbarn." Monsignor John Sraimek',s caiptains in his 0zech People's Party tooik up the cry, even though Sramek .knew 1betlter, and used every me·a ns to convince the Vatican that Benes •reruJily was a "loyal son" of the Catholic Church. Prc,hal-a -clai.!ffis thaJt eventll!ally the Sramek Czechs put their: story across and Rome urgently requested the CaJt!ho- �10 SLOVAKIA l:i!c members of the Ozecho-'SlovaJk National Assemlbly to vote and wonk for !the election of Dr. Edward iBenes. We know thalt Benes ,was eleclted. lwen the Sfova'ks 'Voted for brim wilthout a dissenlt!ing vote, · !beoamse Dr. Joseph Tiso had cornrinced them ito do so on the stTeng:th of the piromise m'ade iby Benes that :Slovruk!ia wowld ibe granted full au'tonom~ wiitihin a yerur. We :know ,tlhaJt Benes never fulfilled it!hat ipromi'se, or eiven meant to fulifiM ilt. And he ireipaid iDr. J ·O'Seplh Ti:so in 1947 by senldling him to .the igallows. That's the kind of man Benes was. W:hat hruppened after ,t he elections of 1935, aJs told lby Prchala, wfillJ. oorlou\btedily •s hook €/Ven the most ardent admiireirs of Benes, General Lev Prcha.O.a says: "Alflter ithe presidential elections, jjt was by sheer a.ocidenit that tlhe edge of the curtain, which had hid'den the 1rea;lrity, was rai!sed. Alf1teir the elootion of Benes as 'Presidenlt, I wa·s just leaving the Vladis1av Hill in the Brag,ue Castle, when suddenllY I overheard a very familiar voiice sing olllt in open •rrupture: 'Well, we put it across, didn't we? !' The senltenice wais spoken in godd Russian. I was right - it .rea:Hy was A lexandrovsky, the Russian ambassadw, who was joyously swinging his amns. The inlto~ication over the sU1CCeSIS was stronger than the diplom!atic resei,ve for wlhich I had previiously known him. Those Russian words opened my eyes. "When I iresigned .firom the .:£unction of Vke-Commander of ithe Czed'no-Sl'ovak General Staff in 1933 and went to eastern SlovaJkia, I was quft.te a di stan1Ce from eveirything that was 1::a.king jplace in P,r ague I wrus a soldier and not a poilitician; I did not belong to any panty, bl.lit inlterna1 and foreign. deve'loipments. did interest me. AB I traveled by tra:in :frrom Kosi'Ce to Praigue, I met the Slova'k depulties and senaJtors. I learned that Hlinka's party probaJbly woulltl ivote for Benes in the presidentia:1 elections. This su!I1prised rme a:nd, therefore, after my arrival in Brague I soug1ht the .reason for ffiinka''S turning over to the Castle and to Benes. I found ouJt tih at tJhe V:aJt~can had recommended Benes to Hlinlka. 1 1 �SLOVAKIA 11 "However, after accidentally oivezfuearing the words of .Am'baJSador Afex:andirovsky, it was c[ear to me ,t hat · Benes was Sta'1in's candidaite ! I was aware that the V a,tJican knowin,gJy ,coll!ld nOlt recommend a candidate of the Bolshewks. '.Dhe exp1anaitioin was simple: tlhe V:atican wias a vtl.dtim of an unheard af hoax!" It is very mudh ;possi!ble tha;t even now some of the Benes "Ozechosloviaik!s" rure lbrying rto dece'i!ve tJhe Vatican. 'llhe .puiblfuhers of i'bhe "Tribuna" (The Tribune), the official organ of itlhe •~Ozeclloslovalk Foreign Institute in Exile" pub:J.ished in .Paris, do nolt say so directly, but their articles tend in thaJt di-rect_ion. The socialists writing for the '":Dribuna" keep on bringmg Ulp T. G. Masaryk and hils statement that tihe proiblem of the sigmficance of Czech hristory is a religfoUJS qu~on. Of course, they oonvenientliy forget to mention that T. G. MasaJr!Ylk ,had ,1!he Ozeoh Reifonmaation ,in mind ·a nd tJhat ait ,t he time he :had sai'd those words, he was the Jeader of tJhe mti-Caitholic firght in Czedho-!SlovaJlda. Ag:ain it is evident ltJhaJt the Benes sociaAi'sts thriive on frauds, deceiits and initmig!ll'e. Referring to the itrend lin the "Tri!bU111a," General P'lrohala says: "By means of this ,t rick, however, the 'Dribuna is endeavoring to realize a muich greater firaJUd. It is try. ing to evdke in the high Roman Caitlholic Hierarclhy a faJVOraJble impression for itself and iits cmn political ends. 'Jlhis time, however, uninformed .readers and tlh.e 'Czechoslovak' exi:les in genera;! are ·swppo.sed to bre inspked to ~buikl a 1brid!ge' to Rome. It wi!H not sw-prise me ,i f this is being done by atlteimpting a f1raudlulent explanaJtion Olf Masary1k's thesis, becM1se every one knows that the peopl'e in t:Jh.e 'Councii of Free ~echo-SIJ.01Vakiiia.' are not interested m princi~es, hut only in tactics, aJltoget'her an:ording to the reci,pe of old MachiavelJi anrl his modern a<lmilrer'S." We rure inclined to lbelieve General .Brohala. Enough damage and suffering has been inflidted by the lfoHowers of Benes and his ruinous poHcy of "CzechOislovaklism" and pro. SO'V'ietism on the Czech and Slovak nations, nay, on the �12 SLOVAKIA whcle of tJhe EU1ropean conrtinent. '.Dhe former Ozecll National !Socialists - all memlbers of the Communist-dominated "Naltional F1ront" ,go;vernmenlt of Benes and Gottwald s'hou[(i not 1b e tir:u1sted, 1b ut releg.aJted ,to the po[iibi.cal rubbish herup. Today theli,r ,l eaders (Zenkll, Rilpka) a.re disc:redi1ted and disowned ,b y the Ozecihs at home and aJbroad and represenlt no one hut themselves and their mercenrury clique. The saime may be said for lthe "Wlindow-dressin,g " Slovak renegades in tile ,servJce am:l 1pay of t;he Benes CzecihlS. (Leittricli, Sla:vilk, OsUJSky, Kocivara), ,w ho spealk for and represent oniy themseilves and not tlhe Slovaik nation. Under the leadership of Dr EdwaTd Benes they lb uilt the "lb;rM1ge" between the Ewst and the West, over wlhiich oame ,S talin's h-011des into Central Europe. They must not be given the chance to build S'lllc:h "bridges" to Rome, or ,b etween the USA and Moscow. • • • "The story of the gradual adoption by ·the Allies of the (Czechoslovak) theses of Mas aryk and his group cannot and need not be retold h ere. By patient and lndefatiga.ble propaganda they Implanted their major postulates - the existence of a 'CzechoSlovak nation ' and the desire of the Slovak branch of it to form a part of a Czechoslovak State - so firmly in the minds of the Allies that they were never seriously questioned at the Peace Conference. The 'Czecho-Slovak' Govern ment h ad b een recognized by all the Principal Allied a nd Ass o ciated Powers even BEFORE the peace negotiations began - an act which implied that the Slovak question was in principle already settled - while when the moment arrived for settling all questions of de tail, including the drafting of a frontier, it found the Czecho-Slovak Government firmly established as a :negotiating party; Indeed, in something like a privileged position." ~A . Mac a rtney: HUNGA'RY AND HER SUCCESSORS, London, 1937, page 98) . WHO SAID IT? - • WHO SAi D IT? - • • " If a single dynasty h ad united both peoples (Czechs and Slovaks) in a permanent, or at least an enduring union, a Czechoslovak nationality would assuredly have been formed and with ft ···a Czechoslovak lang uage any minor dialectal differences which existed would have been smoothed out. This did not happen; and w hil e t he Slavs of Bohemia developed the Czech nationality and language, to which the intermediate dialects of Moravia graiitated, the Slovaks, under l,lungarian rule, not only developed along different lines from the ·czechs, but were not even able to form a single literary language with them." (C. A. Macartney: HUNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS.::..:_ London, 1937). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 9 BUILDING ANOTHER BRIDGE? Genera,l Lev :PIIX:'ha'la, head of the Czech Nationa'l Committee in London, broke ,wiltfh lli. Edwaxd Benes /When he could no longer ,surfifer in silenice ,his dildtatorial, :imperiom; and pro-lSOVliet 1po1'icy. ]t hruppened in London during the wair. Prchala fost .his lave for Benes in 1938, when he oapitullarted to the M1.midh Alg;reemen't witlhourt 1the consent of the 0zecho~Slovruk Prurliarrnent, .then resigned ifrom :the Presidency, thus surrendering his coll!Iltry, lodk, stock and ba,rrel, :to HiltJler w.iithout -Olffering tJhe slightest physical resistance, and then cowardly fled rto London. From thrut time on, Prchwla re.gamded Benes and his political clii.que - .the Czech NaJtional Socialists, or Ozedh N aizis, as they axe .referred to - as hypocrites and frauds who h elched forth volumes of democratic slogans and S'peeches, bwt kept idiri'Vliing Czooho-iSlovrukia and tlhe who-le of Erurope inito ,t he dultldhe:s af -Moscow. In the Fcllruacy . 9, 19153, ,i ssue of the "<Ceske Listy" (Ozech News), .t he oflfilcial organ of ,B rehala's ·giroll!p, the General .reilates ,a nother inciderut to ,p rove the ,hy;pocrisy of the (in)lfamous ,bridge-ib-ui[der, Dr. Edward Benes, who brought Communism into Ozecho-Slovakia and Centrail Eu•r ope to threaJten ,tJhe secudty and democraitlic ,l:tfe of the entire Euiropean contilllerut. 'Dhe i'Il!ci:dent goes baok to ,tfue time of the :presidenltial elec'tlionlS in 1935. Uncertam of the swpport of ,the Caitholics in the various par.ties, especially ,t he support of tlhe Slovalks, ibecause Dr. Edwar.d Benes dlid cOiilltrilbute many articles to "f.ree-thinkriillg" iperiodica!lis and iwas a Freemason even before World War I, lri's followers (,rut his 1b ehest) suddenly ,d iscovered that Benes was a "loyall SOIIl of the Roman Catholic Ohurdh since the dlay he was lbarn." Monsignor John Sraimek',s caiptains in his 0zech People's Party tooik up the cry, even though Sramek .knew 1betlter, and used every me·a ns to convince the Vatican that Benes •reruJily was a "loyal son" of the Catholic Church. Prc,hal-a -clai.!ffis thaJt eventll!ally the Sramek Czechs put their: story across and Rome urgently requested the CaJt!ho- 10 SLOVAKIA l:i!c members of the Ozecho-'SlovaJk National Assemlbly to vote and wonk for !the election of Dr. Edward iBenes. We know thalt Benes ,was eleclted. lwen the Sfova'ks 'Voted for brim wilthout a dissenlt!ing vote, · !beoamse Dr. Joseph Tiso had cornrinced them ito do so on the stTeng:th of the piromise m'ade iby Benes that :Slovruk!ia wowld ibe granted full au'tonom~ wiitihin a yerur. We :know ,tlhaJt Benes never fulfilled it!hat ipromi'se, or eiven meant to fulifiM ilt. And he ireipaid iDr. J ·O'Seplh Ti:so in 1947 by senldling him to .the igallows. That's the kind of man Benes was. W:hat hruppened after ,t he elections of 1935, aJs told lby Prchala, wfillJ. oorlou\btedily •s hook €/Ven the most ardent admiireirs of Benes, General Lev Prcha.O.a says: "Alflter ithe presidential elections, jjt was by sheer a.ocidenit that tlhe edge of the curtain, which had hid'den the 1rea;lrity, was rai!sed. Alf1teir the elootion of Benes as 'Presidenlt, I wa·s just leaving the Vladis1av Hill in the Brag,ue Castle, when suddenllY I overheard a very familiar voiice sing olllt in open •rrupture: 'Well, we put it across, didn't we? !' The senltenice wais spoken in godd Russian. I was right - it .rea:Hy was A lexandrovsky, the Russian ambassadw, who was joyously swinging his amns. The inlto~ication over the sU1CCeSIS was stronger than the diplom!atic resei,ve for wlhich I had previiously known him. Those Russian words opened my eyes. "When I iresigned .firom the .:£unction of Vke-Commander of ithe Czed'no-Sl'ovak General Staff in 1933 and went to eastern SlovaJkia, I was quft.te a di stan1Ce from eveirything that was 1::a.king jplace in P,r ague I wrus a soldier and not a poilitician; I did not belong to any panty, bl.lit inlterna1 and foreign. deve'loipments. did interest me. AB I traveled by tra:in :frrom Kosi'Ce to Praigue, I met the Slova'k depulties and senaJtors. I learned that Hlinka's party probaJbly woulltl ivote for Benes in the presidentia:1 elections. This su!I1prised rme a:nd, therefore, after my arrival in Brague I soug1ht the .reason for ffiinka''S turning over to the Castle and to Benes. I found ouJt tih at tJhe V:aJt~can had recommended Benes to Hlinlka. 1 1 SLOVAKIA 11 "However, after accidentally oivezfuearing the words of .Am'baJSador Afex:andirovsky, it was c[ear to me ,t hat · Benes was Sta'1in's candidaite ! I was aware that the V a,tJican knowin,gJy ,coll!ld nOlt recommend a candidate of the Bolshewks. '.Dhe exp1anaitioin was simple: tlhe V:atican wias a vtl.dtim of an unheard af hoax!" It is very mudh ;possi!ble tha;t even now some of the Benes "Ozechosloviaik!s" rure lbrying rto dece'i!ve tJhe Vatican. 'llhe .puiblfuhers of i'bhe "Tribuna" (The Tribune), the official organ of itlhe •~Ozeclloslovalk Foreign Institute in Exile" pub:J.ished in .Paris, do nolt say so directly, but their articles tend in thaJt di-rect_ion. The socialists writing for the '":Dribuna" keep on bringmg Ulp T. G. Masaryk and hils statement that tihe proiblem of the sigmficance of Czech hristory is a religfoUJS qu~on. Of course, they oonvenientliy forget to mention that T. G. MasaJr!Ylk ,had ,1!he Ozeoh Reifonmaation ,in mind ·a nd tJhat ait ,t he time he :had sai'd those words, he was the Jeader of tJhe mti-Caitholic firght in Czedho-!SlovaJlda. Ag:ain it is evident ltJhaJt the Benes sociaAi'sts thriive on frauds, deceiits and initmig!ll'e. Referring to the itrend lin the "Tri!bU111a," General P'lrohala says: "By means of this ,t rick, however, the 'Dribuna is endeavoring to realize a muich greater firaJUd. It is try. ing to evdke in the high Roman Caitlholic Hierarclhy a faJVOraJble impression for itself and iits cmn political ends. 'Jlhis time, however, uninformed .readers and tlh.e 'Czechoslovak' exi:les in genera;! are ·swppo.sed to bre inspked to ~buikl a 1brid!ge' to Rome. It wi!H not sw-prise me ,i f this is being done by atlteimpting a f1raudlulent explanaJtion Olf Masary1k's thesis, becM1se every one knows that the peopl'e in t:Jh.e 'Councii of Free ~echo-SIJ.01Vakiiia.' are not interested m princi~es, hut only in tactics, aJltoget'her an:ording to the reci,pe of old MachiavelJi anrl his modern a<lmilrer'S." We rure inclined to lbelieve General .Brohala. Enough damage and suffering has been inflidted by the lfoHowers of Benes and his ruinous poHcy of "CzechOislovaklism" and pro. SO'V'ietism on the Czech and Slovak nations, nay, on the 12 SLOVAKIA whcle of tJhe EU1ropean conrtinent. '.Dhe former Ozecll National !Socialists - all memlbers of the Communist-dominated "Naltional F1ront" ,go;vernmenlt of Benes and Gottwald s'hou[(i not 1b e tir:u1sted, 1b ut releg.aJted ,to the po[iibi.cal rubbish herup. Today theli,r ,l eaders (Zenkll, Rilpka) a.re disc:redi1ted and disowned ,b y the Ozecihs at home and aJbroad and represenlt no one hut themselves and their mercenrury clique. The saime may be said for lthe "Wlindow-dressin,g " Slovak renegades in tile ,servJce am:l 1pay of t;he Benes CzecihlS. (Leittricli, Sla:vilk, OsUJSky, Kocivara), ,w ho spealk for and represent oniy themseilves and not tlhe Slovaik nation. Under the leadership of Dr EdwaTd Benes they lb uilt the "lb;rM1ge" between the Ewst and the West, over wlhiich oame ,S talin's h-011des into Central Europe. They must not be given the chance to build S'lllc:h "bridges" to Rome, or ,b etween the USA and Moscow. • • • "The story of the gradual adoption by ·the Allies of the (Czechoslovak) theses of Mas aryk and his group cannot and need not be retold h ere. By patient and lndefatiga.ble propaganda they Implanted their major postulates - the existence of a 'CzechoSlovak nation ' and the desire of the Slovak branch of it to form a part of a Czechoslovak State - so firmly in the minds of the Allies that they were never seriously questioned at the Peace Conference. The 'Czecho-Slovak' Govern ment h ad b een recognized by all the Principal Allied a nd Ass o ciated Powers even BEFORE the peace negotiations began - an act which implied that the Slovak question was in principle already settled - while when the moment arrived for settling all questions of de tail, including the drafting of a frontier, it found the Czecho-Slovak Government firmly established as a :negotiating party; Indeed, in something like a privileged position." ~A . Mac a rtney: HUNGA'RY AND HER SUCCESSORS, London, 1937, page 98) . WHO SAID IT? - • WHO SAi D IT? - • • " If a single dynasty h ad united both peoples (Czechs and Slovaks) in a permanent, or at least an enduring union, a Czechoslovak nationality would assuredly have been formed and with ft ···a Czechoslovak lang uage any minor dialectal differences which existed would have been smoothed out. This did not happen; and w hil e t he Slavs of Bohemia developed the Czech nationality and language, to which the intermediate dialects of Moravia graiitated, the Slovaks, under l,lungarian rule, not only developed along different lines from the ·czechs, but were not even able to form a single literary language with them." (C. A. Macartney: HUNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS.::..:_ London, 1937).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Building Another Bridge? Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 2 (7), July 1953 pp. 9-12 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource July 1953 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/30370abbad833529b5b5369b482485bc.pdf d042de9e573abccd4ef69fd6b09254b6 PDF Text Text JULY 195 3 VOL. Ill IN THIS ISSUE : THE TRUE FACE OF SLOVAKIA BUILDING ANOTHER BRIDGE ? R. B. LOCKHARDT AND THE SLOVAK AVIATORS OUR BLUNDERING CZECHO-SLOVAKIA POLICY_ THE PRACTICAL ASPECT OF A FEDERATION CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA : HRICOV THREE MONTHS IN " LIBERATED" BRATIS L AVA CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY I N SLOVAKI A SLOVAK F OLKLORE: THE DEVIL HAS TO WORK WHO SAID IT ?: 8, 12, 16, 25, 56, 61 Edi t ed and compi led by P HILIP A . H RO BAK Published by THE SLOV A K LEAGUE OF AMERICA NO. 2 �SLOV A.KIA is published periodically by the Slovak League of America, a cultural and civic federation of Amerteans of Slovak descent. The chief purpose of SLOVA.KIA s to promote a better understanding and appreciation of the Slovak nation and its long struggle for freedom and independence. 1 As Americans, members of the Slovak League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all nations, has an inherent and God-given right to freedom and independence. They are dedicated to the cause of the American way of life, Slovak freedom and world peace and are determined to oppose the plague of Communism and all other totalitarian political systems. Subscription to Slovakia $1.00 per year in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere. Send subscriptions to: SLOVAKIA Box 150 Middletown, Pa. Printed in the U.S. A. JEDNOTA PRESS Middletown, Pa. � JULY 195 3 VOL. Ill IN THIS ISSUE : THE TRUE FACE OF SLOVAKIA BUILDING ANOTHER BRIDGE ? R. B. LOCKHARDT AND THE SLOVAK AVIATORS OUR BLUNDERING CZECHO-SLOVAKIA POLICY_ THE PRACTICAL ASPECT OF A FEDERATION CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA : HRICOV THREE MONTHS IN " LIBERATED" BRATIS L AVA CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY I N SLOVAKI A SLOVAK F OLKLORE: THE DEVIL HAS TO WORK WHO SAID IT ?: 8, 12, 16, 25, 56, 61 Edi t ed and compi led by P HILIP A . H RO BAK Published by THE SLOV A K LEAGUE OF AMERICA NO. 2 �SLOV A.KIA is published periodically by the Slovak League of America, a cultural and civic federation of Amerteans of Slovak descent. The chief purpose of SLOVA.KIA s to promote a better understanding and appreciation of the Slovak nation and its long struggle for freedom and independence. 1 As Americans, members of the Slovak League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all nations, has an inherent and God-given right to freedom and independence. They are dedicated to the cause of the American way of life, Slovak freedom and world peace and are determined to oppose the plague of Communism and all other totalitarian political systems. Subscription to Slovakia $1.00 per year in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere. Send subscriptions to: SLOVAKIA Box 150 Middletown, Pa. Printed in the U.S. A. JEDNOTA PRESS Middletown, Pa. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 2 (7) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource July 1953 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/c7b85cca4b0b64d97a27d4955f292f97.pdf dc679d7aa01724a49ab22387c94bb99d PDF Text Text YOU CAN LEARN SLOVAK as easily as you can any other modern language. Slovak should be a MUST for students of Slovanic languages, because it is the simplest of all of them and a KEY to all of them. Prove it to yourself with the most scholarly text on Slovak, the SLOVAK LESSONS A practical study of the Slovak Grammar, 92 lessons, 400 pages ; exercises in Slovak and English; English-Slovak and Slovak-English vocabulary. Hard cover, bound in cloth, $3.50 HROBAK'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY - the best and most complete dictionary of its kind; 702 pages with a brief sumary of the Slovak Grammar. Hard cover, bound in cloth, $4.00 THE SLOVAKS, by Peter P. Yurchak, should be read by all students interested in the history and traditions of the Slovak nation; 312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $3.00; paper cover - $2.00 SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK IUSTORY by Joseph Skultety, translation by 0. D. Koreff; a documented refutation of several errors propagated by writers and historians; 229 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover $1.00. Order from: P.A.HROBAK Box 150 Middletown, Pa. �SLOVAKIA Festive headdress of the women of Vefky Lorn, southeastern Slovakia � YOU CAN LEARN SLOVAK as easily as you can any other modern language. Slovak should be a MUST for students of Slovanic languages, because it is the simplest of all of them and a KEY to all of them. Prove it to yourself with the most scholarly text on Slovak, the SLOVAK LESSONS A practical study of the Slovak Grammar, 92 lessons, 400 pages ; exercises in Slovak and English; English-Slovak and Slovak-English vocabulary. Hard cover, bound in cloth, $3.50 HROBAK'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY - the best and most complete dictionary of its kind; 702 pages with a brief sumary of the Slovak Grammar. Hard cover, bound in cloth, $4.00 THE SLOVAKS, by Peter P. Yurchak, should be read by all students interested in the history and traditions of the Slovak nation; 312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $3.00; paper cover - $2.00 SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK IUSTORY by Joseph Skultety, translation by 0. D. Koreff; a documented refutation of several errors propagated by writers and historians; 229 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover $1.00. Order from: P.A.HROBAK Box 150 Middletown, Pa. �SLOVAKIA Festive headdress of the women of Vefky Lorn, southeastern Slovakia � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA Festive headdress of the women of Vefky Lorn, southeastern Slovakia  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 1 (6) Description An account of the resource includes portrait of woman showing festive headdress of Veľký Lom, southeastern Slovakia Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource April 1953 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/4492c25b0d17d146832900fba8e031c6.pdf 751016d5778459600a6bdada2d7bbfbc PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 61 MEDICINAL SPRINGS OF SLOVAKIA Nature has endowed Slovakia with medicinal springs in a truly prolific manner. In fact, Slovakia, in this respect, is the first land of Europe. There are fifteen larger thermal watering places, forty-six medicinal springs, and a large number of spots where cold mineral water gushes forth out of the earth. In addition there are several springs to which until about 1930 no attention had been paid. Some of the spas have rbeen operating for many decades, even centuries, and enjoy a worldwide reputation. In respect to the perfect comfort of their inner furnishings, they can be placed side by side with any of the world's great watering places. Especially well-known are Piesfany and Trencianske Teplice with their hot springs which have temperatures of 67 and 42 degrees Centigrade respectively. At these two spas rheumatism, ischias, and related diseases are healed. Unique is Sliac, the Slovak Nauheim, where there are warm carbon springs having a temperature of forty degrees Centigrade. Women's ailments, severe heart diseases, and illnesses of the spine are cured here in almost miraculous manner. At Vysne Ruzbachy there is a swimming basin, in the middle of the woods, supplied by a warm mineral spring. The springs at Ciz are considered the strongest in Europe in their content of iodine and bromium. Herlany has a geyser 180 feet high which comes out of a depth of 1200 feet. Korytnica is the best-known of the alkali-saline baths. Bojnice is a sulphur spa with strongly radioactive slime. The sulphur water has a temperature of forty-six degrees Centigrade. Rajecke Teplice, Sklenne Teplice, Brusno, Kovacovo, Bardejovske kupele, Ganovce, and Vyhne, are a few of the many otoor mineral spas of Slovakia. The magnificent scenic situation of the spas of Slovakia makes them particularly beautiful places to tarry at. Most of them are located in the romantic valleys of rivers and are surrounded by extensive forests. Unlimited opportunities �tiZ :::;LOVAKIA are provided for walks and drives. There is abundant chance to fish and to hunt, and to enjoy other sports as well. The best known climatic resorts are situated in the High Tatra Mountains. The hotels are unusually comfortable and lie at high altitudes, the maximum being 1360 meters above sea level. They possess the advantage of complete protection against North winds and are nestled in vast forests. Among them are Strbske Pleso, Tatranska Poljanka, Stary Smokovec, Novy Smokovec, Tatranska Lomnica, and Tatranske Matliary. The intense radiation of the sun in protected areas makes them comparable with the most famous mountain resort of Switzerland. Here there are de luxe hotels as well as simpler pensions and tourist homes. Adjacent to the mountain resorts is a natural park which serves as a reservation for the flora and fauna of the region. The other chains of the Carpathian Mountains, as the Bela Alps, the so-called Low Tatras, etc, offer an inexhaustible multitude of places where provisions for visitors are comfortable though simple. Lubochna possesses especially comfortable villas and hotels. Unfortunately, today everything in Slovakia belongs to the Czecho-Communis t state which is greatly concerned about who visits Slovakia. However, tourists will again visit the springs of Slovakia when the present tyranny passes . • • • WHO SAID IT? "TODAY it is clear to every observer who is not blind that if Slovakia is liberated from the power of communism, it w ill be an independent state. Just as independent as my own homeland, the Cze<:h kingdom. The certainty of this prospect in the future is prompted by: a) the enthusiastic will of the great majority of Slovaks; b) by the absence of a factor which could prevent this." (Dr. Bohdan Chu- ,loba, former member of the CZECH People's Party and the Prague Parliament). • • • "We have been accused of sullying the good relations between the USSR and the Czechoslovak Republic, but the Democratic Party has clearly stated that it is aware of what it is doing on that score. It is aware of the fact that only an intimately united friendship with the USSR must be our policy in the future. Thereby we do not follow our narrow party interests, but we are convinced that this is in the interest of the entire Czechoslovak Republic." (Jan Lichner, one of Lettrich's democrats, CAS, 5-14-46). � SLOVAKIA 61 MEDICINAL SPRINGS OF SLOVAKIA Nature has endowed Slovakia with medicinal springs in a truly prolific manner. In fact, Slovakia, in this respect, is the first land of Europe. There are fifteen larger thermal watering places, forty-six medicinal springs, and a large number of spots where cold mineral water gushes forth out of the earth. In addition there are several springs to which until about 1930 no attention had been paid. Some of the spas have rbeen operating for many decades, even centuries, and enjoy a worldwide reputation. In respect to the perfect comfort of their inner furnishings, they can be placed side by side with any of the world's great watering places. Especially well-known are Piesfany and Trencianske Teplice with their hot springs which have temperatures of 67 and 42 degrees Centigrade respectively. At these two spas rheumatism, ischias, and related diseases are healed. Unique is Sliac, the Slovak Nauheim, where there are warm carbon springs having a temperature of forty degrees Centigrade. Women's ailments, severe heart diseases, and illnesses of the spine are cured here in almost miraculous manner. At Vysne Ruzbachy there is a swimming basin, in the middle of the woods, supplied by a warm mineral spring. The springs at Ciz are considered the strongest in Europe in their content of iodine and bromium. Herlany has a geyser 180 feet high which comes out of a depth of 1200 feet. Korytnica is the best-known of the alkali-saline baths. Bojnice is a sulphur spa with strongly radioactive slime. The sulphur water has a temperature of forty-six degrees Centigrade. Rajecke Teplice, Sklenne Teplice, Brusno, Kovacovo, Bardejovske kupele, Ganovce, and Vyhne, are a few of the many otoor mineral spas of Slovakia. The magnificent scenic situation of the spas of Slovakia makes them particularly beautiful places to tarry at. Most of them are located in the romantic valleys of rivers and are surrounded by extensive forests. Unlimited opportunities �tiZ :::;LOVAKIA are provided for walks and drives. There is abundant chance to fish and to hunt, and to enjoy other sports as well. The best known climatic resorts are situated in the High Tatra Mountains. The hotels are unusually comfortable and lie at high altitudes, the maximum being 1360 meters above sea level. They possess the advantage of complete protection against North winds and are nestled in vast forests. Among them are Strbske Pleso, Tatranska Poljanka, Stary Smokovec, Novy Smokovec, Tatranska Lomnica, and Tatranske Matliary. The intense radiation of the sun in protected areas makes them comparable with the most famous mountain resort of Switzerland. Here there are de luxe hotels as well as simpler pensions and tourist homes. Adjacent to the mountain resorts is a natural park which serves as a reservation for the flora and fauna of the region. The other chains of the Carpathian Mountains, as the Bela Alps, the so-called Low Tatras, etc, offer an inexhaustible multitude of places where provisions for visitors are comfortable though simple. Lubochna possesses especially comfortable villas and hotels. Unfortunately, today everything in Slovakia belongs to the Czecho-Communis t state which is greatly concerned about who visits Slovakia. However, tourists will again visit the springs of Slovakia when the present tyranny passes . • • • WHO SAID IT? "TODAY it is clear to every observer who is not blind that if Slovakia is liberated from the power of communism, it w ill be an independent state. Just as independent as my own homeland, the Cze<:h kingdom. The certainty of this prospect in the future is prompted by: a) the enthusiastic will of the great majority of Slovaks; b) by the absence of a factor which could prevent this." (Dr. Bohdan Chu- ,loba, former member of the CZECH People's Party and the Prague Parliament). • • • "We have been accused of sullying the good relations between the USSR and the Czechoslovak Republic, but the Democratic Party has clearly stated that it is aware of what it is doing on that score. It is aware of the fact that only an intimately united friendship with the USSR must be our policy in the future. Thereby we do not follow our narrow party interests, but we are convinced that this is in the interest of the entire Czechoslovak Republic." (Jan Lichner, one of Lettrich's democrats, CAS, 5-14-46). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 61 MEDICINAL SPRINGS OF SLOVAKIA Nature has endowed Slovakia with medicinal springs in a truly prolific manner. In fact, Slovakia, in this respect, is the first land of Europe. There are fifteen larger thermal watering places, forty-six medicinal springs, and a large number of spots where cold mineral water gushes forth out of the earth. In addition there are several springs to which until about 1930 no attention had been paid. Some of the spas have rbeen operating for many decades, even centuries, and enjoy a worldwide reputation. In respect to the perfect comfort of their inner furnishings, they can be placed side by side with any of the world's great watering places. Especially well-known are Piesfany and Trencianske Teplice with their hot springs which have temperatures of 67 and 42 degrees Centigrade respectively. At these two spas rheumatism, ischias, and related diseases are healed. Unique is Sliac, the Slovak Nauheim, where there are warm carbon springs having a temperature of forty degrees Centigrade. Women's ailments, severe heart diseases, and illnesses of the spine are cured here in almost miraculous manner. At Vysne Ruzbachy there is a swimming basin, in the middle of the woods, supplied by a warm mineral spring. The springs at Ciz are considered the strongest in Europe in their content of iodine and bromium. Herlany has a geyser 180 feet high which comes out of a depth of 1200 feet. Korytnica is the best-known of the alkali-saline baths. Bojnice is a sulphur spa with strongly radioactive slime. The sulphur water has a temperature of forty-six degrees Centigrade. Rajecke Teplice, Sklenne Teplice, Brusno, Kovacovo, Bardejovske kupele, Ganovce, and Vyhne, are a few of the many otoor mineral spas of Slovakia. The magnificent scenic situation of the spas of Slovakia makes them particularly beautiful places to tarry at. Most of them are located in the romantic valleys of rivers and are surrounded by extensive forests. Unlimited opportunities tiZ :::;LOVAKIA are provided for walks and drives. There is abundant chance to fish and to hunt, and to enjoy other sports as well. The best known climatic resorts are situated in the High Tatra Mountains. The hotels are unusually comfortable and lie at high altitudes, the maximum being 1360 meters above sea level. They possess the advantage of complete protection against North winds and are nestled in vast forests. Among them are Strbske Pleso, Tatranska Poljanka, Stary Smokovec, Novy Smokovec, Tatranska Lomnica, and Tatranske Matliary. The intense radiation of the sun in protected areas makes them comparable with the most famous mountain resort of Switzerland. Here there are de luxe hotels as well as simpler pensions and tourist homes. Adjacent to the mountain resorts is a natural park which serves as a reservation for the flora and fauna of the region. The other chains of the Carpathian Mountains, as the Bela Alps, the so-called Low Tatras, etc, offer an inexhaustible multitude of places where provisions for visitors are comfortable though simple. Lubochna possesses especially comfortable villas and hotels. Unfortunately, today everything in Slovakia belongs to the Czecho-Communis t state which is greatly concerned about who visits Slovakia. However, tourists will again visit the springs of Slovakia when the present tyranny passes . • • • WHO SAID IT? "TODAY it is clear to every observer who is not blind that if Slovakia is liberated from the power of communism, it w ill be an independent state. Just as independent as my own homeland, the Cze<:h kingdom. The certainty of this prospect in the future is prompted by: a) the enthusiastic will of the great majority of Slovaks; b) by the absence of a factor which could prevent this." (Dr. Bohdan Chu- ,loba, former member of the CZECH People's Party and the Prague Parliament). • • • "We have been accused of sullying the good relations between the USSR and the Czechoslovak Republic, but the Democratic Party has clearly stated that it is aware of what it is doing on that score. It is aware of the fact that only an intimately united friendship with the USSR must be our policy in the future. Thereby we do not follow our narrow party interests, but we are convinced that this is in the interest of the entire Czechoslovak Republic." (Jan Lichner, one of Lettrich's democrats, CAS, 5-14-46).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Medicinal Springs in Slovakia Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 1 (6), April 1953 pp. 61-62 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource April 1953 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/7a3033fbc750bf84e96852cef9a672bb.pdf f62ed6b74ec119818831168f1938ea87 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA STREONO One orf the fourteen fortresses in ruins along the river Vah is the castle Sltrecno, lbuiit, they say, by the fea-rless Matthew C8ik, "the Lord orf the Vah and the Tatras." Mainy were the occupants of this stronghold, the glory orf a past era, nestled on the summit of Mt. Bieda. We read that St·r ecno was the home orf Francis Veseliny in the 17th century. The wife of Veseliny, Sophia Bosniak, died in the stronghold .A!pril 28, 1644, Mld her body, interned in the Lamretanian side-cllapel of the Teplicka ohuroh, has remained practicailly whole for over 300 years. Sophia married the haJndsome Veseliny in her best years; they were ve-ry h-ruppy at Streono. They were haippy, thaJt is untH Veseliny was cailed aiway by duty. When he returned Veseliny was ra very changed man. He practicaJUy ignored Sophia who had n.m out to welcome him home. He spent daiys ,a t a time in his room or on the hunt and ate his meals alone. Sophia became very sad indeed; she was alone and in tears. Then the news came to her . that Vese1iny was prepa,ring to leave the castle the Tuesday before IDaster. The night before the said Tuesday, Solphia receiived a letter from her slister, W1hiClh explained why her husband acted so strangely. The news broke her heart, when she learned that Veseliny had fallen in love with another rund wanted to lea,ve her. Near the narrow pa,th which led to Stroono was a higih boulder, inside of which was an altiar of the Blessed Virgin Maxy. Sophia hastened there with a heavy heart and spent the whole night in prayer. The following morning, Veseliny noticed her as he was ready to leave the castle. Sophie was all spent from tears. Veseliiny was moved exceedingly. Sophia's prayers were heard. Her husband leaped from his horse, embraced his wife, a,nd begged her forg~veness. That was easy enough to do for the fuithful, haippy witfe. That Tuesday beoome a special day for Sophia. �SLOVAKIA 39 Every year on ,t he Tuesday before Easter she would go baxefoot to the caive of the Blessed Mother. She visited the church in Tepli'c:ka every day and during advent made the visit ib,amoot. Sophia was noted for her kindness, the ipoor were her wards and she founded a hospitall. Mter Sophia died at Strecno, April 28, 1644, the chrupel of the Blessed Mother was oipened to the pulblic, as the saintly Sophia had wished before her death. Her body w8JS not preserved artificially or scientifioaUy, yet it has not fallen into decay. The story goes on to say that when Thokoly invaded the vicinity in 1678, he plundered and burned Stroono ;and had the casket conta!ining the body of Sophia taken from the chapel and opened, intending to rab it of jewelry and valuaibles. Wihen he found but 01J1e finger bearing a ring, Thokoly flew into a rage, cut the ring finger off, and threw the 1body of Sophia into lime. But her body remained practically the same as it was. Sophia's body was removed to the Teplmka church in 1'698, when Leopold I. ordered Strecno destro3/ed. In 1729 the ·casket was placed in the Lau:retanian Ohapel. Albove the casket i s a portrait of Sophia. The Slovaks of the vicinity say that the casket contains the body of a saint. The people of 2iHna even today honor Sophia as the mother- of widows rund onphruns. 1 • • • "In the most important decisions, such for instance as concerned the foreign policy of the state, the government never consulted the parliament. In the summer of 1947, when the government was confronted with a Soviet demand not to participate in the Paris conference on the Marshall Plan, it did not even consult the parliamentary committee of foreign affairs, and the chairman of the committee. lvo Duchacek, a former Socialist newsWHO SAID IT? - paperman, refused my demand for an immediate convocation of the committee. Although the great majority of citizens, including even most of the supporters of the Socialist parties, were in favor of participation and although the minis ters were warned to this effect by several deputies, the government unanimously decided not to participate. This was extraordinary in view of the fact that there were only nine Communist members in the government of twenty-aix minis- ters, the seventeen non-Communists clearly having a preponderant majority. Through this decision, the last opportunity to have new elections was probably lost." (Bohdan Chudoba, former member of the Czech Parliament, in THOUGHT, Fordham University Quarterly, Vol 25. No 96, 1950) . � SLOVAKIA CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA STREONO One orf the fourteen fortresses in ruins along the river Vah is the castle Sltrecno, lbuiit, they say, by the fea-rless Matthew C8ik, "the Lord orf the Vah and the Tatras." Mainy were the occupants of this stronghold, the glory orf a past era, nestled on the summit of Mt. Bieda. We read that St·r ecno was the home orf Francis Veseliny in the 17th century. The wife of Veseliny, Sophia Bosniak, died in the stronghold .A!pril 28, 1644, Mld her body, interned in the Lamretanian side-cllapel of the Teplicka ohuroh, has remained practicailly whole for over 300 years. Sophia married the haJndsome Veseliny in her best years; they were ve-ry h-ruppy at Streono. They were haippy, thaJt is untH Veseliny was cailed aiway by duty. When he returned Veseliny was ra very changed man. He practicaJUy ignored Sophia who had n.m out to welcome him home. He spent daiys ,a t a time in his room or on the hunt and ate his meals alone. Sophia became very sad indeed; she was alone and in tears. Then the news came to her . that Vese1iny was prepa,ring to leave the castle the Tuesday before IDaster. The night before the said Tuesday, Solphia receiived a letter from her slister, W1hiClh explained why her husband acted so strangely. The news broke her heart, when she learned that Veseliny had fallen in love with another rund wanted to lea,ve her. Near the narrow pa,th which led to Stroono was a higih boulder, inside of which was an altiar of the Blessed Virgin Maxy. Sophia hastened there with a heavy heart and spent the whole night in prayer. The following morning, Veseliny noticed her as he was ready to leave the castle. Sophie was all spent from tears. Veseliiny was moved exceedingly. Sophia's prayers were heard. Her husband leaped from his horse, embraced his wife, a,nd begged her forg~veness. That was easy enough to do for the fuithful, haippy witfe. That Tuesday beoome a special day for Sophia. �SLOVAKIA 39 Every year on ,t he Tuesday before Easter she would go baxefoot to the caive of the Blessed Mother. She visited the church in Tepli'c:ka every day and during advent made the visit ib,amoot. Sophia was noted for her kindness, the ipoor were her wards and she founded a hospitall. Mter Sophia died at Strecno, April 28, 1644, the chrupel of the Blessed Mother was oipened to the pulblic, as the saintly Sophia had wished before her death. Her body w8JS not preserved artificially or scientifioaUy, yet it has not fallen into decay. The story goes on to say that when Thokoly invaded the vicinity in 1678, he plundered and burned Stroono ;and had the casket conta!ining the body of Sophia taken from the chapel and opened, intending to rab it of jewelry and valuaibles. Wihen he found but 01J1e finger bearing a ring, Thokoly flew into a rage, cut the ring finger off, and threw the 1body of Sophia into lime. But her body remained practically the same as it was. Sophia's body was removed to the Teplmka church in 1'698, when Leopold I. ordered Strecno destro3/ed. In 1729 the ·casket was placed in the Lau:retanian Ohapel. Albove the casket i s a portrait of Sophia. The Slovaks of the vicinity say that the casket contains the body of a saint. The people of 2iHna even today honor Sophia as the mother- of widows rund onphruns. 1 • • • "In the most important decisions, such for instance as concerned the foreign policy of the state, the government never consulted the parliament. In the summer of 1947, when the government was confronted with a Soviet demand not to participate in the Paris conference on the Marshall Plan, it did not even consult the parliamentary committee of foreign affairs, and the chairman of the committee. lvo Duchacek, a former Socialist newsWHO SAID IT? - paperman, refused my demand for an immediate convocation of the committee. Although the great majority of citizens, including even most of the supporters of the Socialist parties, were in favor of participation and although the minis ters were warned to this effect by several deputies, the government unanimously decided not to participate. This was extraordinary in view of the fact that there were only nine Communist members in the government of twenty-aix minis- ters, the seventeen non-Communists clearly having a preponderant majority. Through this decision, the last opportunity to have new elections was probably lost." (Bohdan Chudoba, former member of the Czech Parliament, in THOUGHT, Fordham University Quarterly, Vol 25. No 96, 1950) . � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA STREONO One orf the fourteen fortresses in ruins along the river Vah is the castle Sltrecno, lbuiit, they say, by the fea-rless Matthew C8ik, "the Lord orf the Vah and the Tatras." Mainy were the occupants of this stronghold, the glory orf a past era, nestled on the summit of Mt. Bieda. We read that St·r ecno was the home orf Francis Veseliny in the 17th century. The wife of Veseliny, Sophia Bosniak, died in the stronghold .A!pril 28, 1644, Mld her body, interned in the Lamretanian side-cllapel of the Teplicka ohuroh, has remained practicailly whole for over 300 years. Sophia married the haJndsome Veseliny in her best years; they were ve-ry h-ruppy at Streono. They were haippy, thaJt is untH Veseliny was cailed aiway by duty. When he returned Veseliny was ra very changed man. He practicaJUy ignored Sophia who had n.m out to welcome him home. He spent daiys ,a t a time in his room or on the hunt and ate his meals alone. Sophia became very sad indeed; she was alone and in tears. Then the news came to her . that Vese1iny was prepa,ring to leave the castle the Tuesday before IDaster. The night before the said Tuesday, Solphia receiived a letter from her slister, W1hiClh explained why her husband acted so strangely. The news broke her heart, when she learned that Veseliny had fallen in love with another rund wanted to lea,ve her. Near the narrow pa,th which led to Stroono was a higih boulder, inside of which was an altiar of the Blessed Virgin Maxy. Sophia hastened there with a heavy heart and spent the whole night in prayer. The following morning, Veseliny noticed her as he was ready to leave the castle. Sophie was all spent from tears. Veseliiny was moved exceedingly. Sophia's prayers were heard. Her husband leaped from his horse, embraced his wife, a,nd begged her forg~veness. That was easy enough to do for the fuithful, haippy witfe. That Tuesday beoome a special day for Sophia. SLOVAKIA 39 Every year on ,t he Tuesday before Easter she would go baxefoot to the caive of the Blessed Mother. She visited the church in Tepli'c:ka every day and during advent made the visit ib,amoot. Sophia was noted for her kindness, the ipoor were her wards and she founded a hospitall. Mter Sophia died at Strecno, April 28, 1644, the chrupel of the Blessed Mother was oipened to the pulblic, as the saintly Sophia had wished before her death. Her body w8JS not preserved artificially or scientifioaUy, yet it has not fallen into decay. The story goes on to say that when Thokoly invaded the vicinity in 1678, he plundered and burned Stroono ;and had the casket conta!ining the body of Sophia taken from the chapel and opened, intending to rab it of jewelry and valuaibles. Wihen he found but 01J1e finger bearing a ring, Thokoly flew into a rage, cut the ring finger off, and threw the 1body of Sophia into lime. But her body remained practically the same as it was. Sophia's body was removed to the Teplmka church in 1'698, when Leopold I. ordered Strecno destro3/ed. In 1729 the ·casket was placed in the Lau:retanian Ohapel. Albove the casket i s a portrait of Sophia. The Slovaks of the vicinity say that the casket contains the body of a saint. The people of 2iHna even today honor Sophia as the mother- of widows rund onphruns. 1 • • • "In the most important decisions, such for instance as concerned the foreign policy of the state, the government never consulted the parliament. In the summer of 1947, when the government was confronted with a Soviet demand not to participate in the Paris conference on the Marshall Plan, it did not even consult the parliamentary committee of foreign affairs, and the chairman of the committee. lvo Duchacek, a former Socialist newsWHO SAID IT? - paperman, refused my demand for an immediate convocation of the committee. Although the great majority of citizens, including even most of the supporters of the Socialist parties, were in favor of participation and although the minis ters were warned to this effect by several deputies, the government unanimously decided not to participate. This was extraordinary in view of the fact that there were only nine Communist members in the government of twenty-aix minis- ters, the seventeen non-Communists clearly having a preponderant majority. Through this decision, the last opportunity to have new elections was probably lost." (Bohdan Chudoba, former member of the Czech Parliament, in THOUGHT, Fordham University Quarterly, Vol 25. No 96, 1950) .  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Castles of Slovakia: Strečno Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 1 (6), April 1953 pp. 38-39 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource April 1953 castles https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/2e00c1a5a00320878474ec6eeb1cf4c2.pdf fd3d26399edffe1e6a7635c4c34b45b6 PDF Text Text SLOVAKI.A ANNIVERSARY OF A MURDER · April 18, 1953, marks the sixth anniversary of the blackest deed in the history of Czecho-Slovakia - the µiµ,rder of Dr. Joseph Tiso, champion of Slovak freedom, exemplary priest of God, and first president of the independent Slovak Republic. This day will be solemnly commemorated by Slovaks everywhere, at home and abroad, as long as they live. For them Tiso will always be a hero and a martyr; he was the most beloved man in Slovakia, because he ruled his country wisely under the most trying circumstances and saved his nation from destruction. During the summer of 1946, Dr. Edward Benes told the Slovak Council of Commissioners that Dr. Joseph Tiso would be put to death, but the majority of Slovaks still believed that Benes would change his mind and spare Tiso's life. When the "peo·p le's" court pronounced sentence on Dr. Tiso and ordered him to be hanged, Dr. Edward Benes had the opportunity to improve the deteriorated relationship between the Czechs and the Slovaks, As president, he could have granted clemency after Tiso filed his plea for mercy, but Benes preferred to reject it. Benes refused clemency to and ordered the execution of the man who was in a large measure responsible for his election to the presidency in 1935 ! _When Dr. Benes gave in to the demand of the CzechoSlovak stooges of the Kremlin who demanded Tiso's head, he drove the last nail into the coffin of Czecho-Slovakia and killed the last hope of ever bringing the Czechs and the Slovaks together again under one political roof. True, the Slovaks are under that roof today, but not because they willed it; they were forced under it. And nothing but force and terror will keep them under it. The Slovaks proclaimed the independence of their country through their duly elected representatives in the Slovak Parliament on March 14, 1939. The same parliament elected Dr. Joseph Tiso president of the independent Slovak Republic in October of that same year. From then un- �ILOVAKIA 29 til the wanton and violent destruction of the Slovak Re- pulic in 1945, when the Slovak Government and Dr. Joseph Tiso were forced to flee Bratislava, there was not a single official execution in Slovakia bearing Dr. Tiso's signature. And .during the war the people of Slovakia fared . better than even most neutral countries. The Slovaks still firmly believe that no matter what the circumstances under which the independent Slovak Republic was born, it should have never been destroyed. It could have served Christianity and the western democracies effectively after 1945. Dr. Joseph Tiso, who had refused to have Slovakia join the Soviet system as an "independent" state during the war, died on the gallows in the courtyard of the Bratislava prison when dawn broke on April 18, 1947. His greatest crime was his great love for his people and the Christian-democratic way of life. He believed that his nation, just as all nations large and small, had the God-given, inherent right to freedom and independence. Tiso was an implacable enemy of Godless, materialistic Communism. In the tradition of his people he fought the dread plague. of Communism in and out of season. Even as he was being led to the gallows, Dr. Tiso prayed and begged his people to continue their fight against the system which would pervert and enslave mankind. Father Joseph Tiso, who had not signed a single order of execution and had saved thousands of Christians and Jews from death at the hands of Hitler's madmen, was himself shamefully put to death on the gallows by the man who resigned and betrayed the highest trust of his people and cowardly fled his country during its darkest hour - - Dr. Edward Benes. But the Communistdominated Prague Government of Dr. Edward Benes was not satisfied with the murder of Tiso- It even denied him his last request: to be buried in a plot in his own parish cemetery in Banovce. The lifeless body of Tiso was buried secretly; later, it is said, it was disintered and cremated, the ashes being ~attered to the winds, or, as , some say, cast into the waters of the Vltava which long ago •claimed the life of St. John Nepomucene. �30 SLOVAKIA The Prague government tried to erase the memory of Tiso from the hearts and minds of the Slovak people by all means at its disposal. It was and still is a crime to utter Tiso's name publicly, or mention it in the CzechoSlovak press or broadcasts. Bu~ the more Prague tries to suppress the memory of Tiso, the more it becomes endeared and steeled in the hearts of Slovaks everywhere. They know that Tiso died for his faith and for his people. Father Tiso still lives in his countrymen, who today are more determined than ever that Communism shall be crushed and that they shall once again have their own independent Slovak Republic. They believe that, because Father Tiso believed it. And they believe, too, that the murderers of their beloved martyr and hero shall not escape the just punishment of God. When a Slovak meets a Slovak at home or in exile, he says: "Remember Tiso - carry on!" • • • WHO SAID IT? "TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES : - Your comment of November 18 (1947) on 'the dark curtain descending on Prague' seems to me to be overrated. that the Communist power in Czechoslovakia is 'entrenched in the internal administration' Is an ii· Jusion. It is untru e that the Army is In the Communist hand s. The fact that a Communist is Secretary of the Interior doesn't mean at all that Communists control the internal machinery of the State. . . . Your comment on the new leadership of the Socialist (Marxist) party appears to be influenced by yom fear of the Russi an interference in the Internal affairs of Czechoslovakia. Everi your correspondent at Prague had to state, however {THE TIMES, Oct. 19 ), that 'the Czechs and Slovaks are made of different stuff from that of some of the ir neighboring countries.' The replacement of a pro-Soviet president of the party by a new man, which was carried out by a free voting of the members, is new evidence of the independent spirit of the 70. year-old Socialist party in Bohemia, whiob is friendly to the Russians but which always has beeu opposed to the overrule of the competitive Communist party." Vlastimal Kybal, THE NEW YORK TIMES. 11-27-47. • • • "Our people at home are united. All the Czechs are . .. as is the overwhelming majority of the Slovaks. . . . They have tabled all internal issues; t;hey are interested only in the liberation of the nation and the state and the reunification of the Czech lands with Slovakia." - Dr. Edward Benes, Nov. 12, 194-2 (BENE$ AND SLOVAKIA by Dr. Stephen Osusky, 19'43). � SLOVAKI.A ANNIVERSARY OF A MURDER · April 18, 1953, marks the sixth anniversary of the blackest deed in the history of Czecho-Slovakia - the µiµ,rder of Dr. Joseph Tiso, champion of Slovak freedom, exemplary priest of God, and first president of the independent Slovak Republic. This day will be solemnly commemorated by Slovaks everywhere, at home and abroad, as long as they live. For them Tiso will always be a hero and a martyr; he was the most beloved man in Slovakia, because he ruled his country wisely under the most trying circumstances and saved his nation from destruction. During the summer of 1946, Dr. Edward Benes told the Slovak Council of Commissioners that Dr. Joseph Tiso would be put to death, but the majority of Slovaks still believed that Benes would change his mind and spare Tiso's life. When the "peo·p le's" court pronounced sentence on Dr. Tiso and ordered him to be hanged, Dr. Edward Benes had the opportunity to improve the deteriorated relationship between the Czechs and the Slovaks, As president, he could have granted clemency after Tiso filed his plea for mercy, but Benes preferred to reject it. Benes refused clemency to and ordered the execution of the man who was in a large measure responsible for his election to the presidency in 1935 ! _When Dr. Benes gave in to the demand of the CzechoSlovak stooges of the Kremlin who demanded Tiso's head, he drove the last nail into the coffin of Czecho-Slovakia and killed the last hope of ever bringing the Czechs and the Slovaks together again under one political roof. True, the Slovaks are under that roof today, but not because they willed it; they were forced under it. And nothing but force and terror will keep them under it. The Slovaks proclaimed the independence of their country through their duly elected representatives in the Slovak Parliament on March 14, 1939. The same parliament elected Dr. Joseph Tiso president of the independent Slovak Republic in October of that same year. From then un- �ILOVAKIA 29 til the wanton and violent destruction of the Slovak Re- pulic in 1945, when the Slovak Government and Dr. Joseph Tiso were forced to flee Bratislava, there was not a single official execution in Slovakia bearing Dr. Tiso's signature. And .during the war the people of Slovakia fared . better than even most neutral countries. The Slovaks still firmly believe that no matter what the circumstances under which the independent Slovak Republic was born, it should have never been destroyed. It could have served Christianity and the western democracies effectively after 1945. Dr. Joseph Tiso, who had refused to have Slovakia join the Soviet system as an "independent" state during the war, died on the gallows in the courtyard of the Bratislava prison when dawn broke on April 18, 1947. His greatest crime was his great love for his people and the Christian-democratic way of life. He believed that his nation, just as all nations large and small, had the God-given, inherent right to freedom and independence. Tiso was an implacable enemy of Godless, materialistic Communism. In the tradition of his people he fought the dread plague. of Communism in and out of season. Even as he was being led to the gallows, Dr. Tiso prayed and begged his people to continue their fight against the system which would pervert and enslave mankind. Father Joseph Tiso, who had not signed a single order of execution and had saved thousands of Christians and Jews from death at the hands of Hitler's madmen, was himself shamefully put to death on the gallows by the man who resigned and betrayed the highest trust of his people and cowardly fled his country during its darkest hour - - Dr. Edward Benes. But the Communistdominated Prague Government of Dr. Edward Benes was not satisfied with the murder of Tiso- It even denied him his last request: to be buried in a plot in his own parish cemetery in Banovce. The lifeless body of Tiso was buried secretly; later, it is said, it was disintered and cremated, the ashes being ~attered to the winds, or, as , some say, cast into the waters of the Vltava which long ago •claimed the life of St. John Nepomucene. �30 SLOVAKIA The Prague government tried to erase the memory of Tiso from the hearts and minds of the Slovak people by all means at its disposal. It was and still is a crime to utter Tiso's name publicly, or mention it in the CzechoSlovak press or broadcasts. Bu~ the more Prague tries to suppress the memory of Tiso, the more it becomes endeared and steeled in the hearts of Slovaks everywhere. They know that Tiso died for his faith and for his people. Father Tiso still lives in his countrymen, who today are more determined than ever that Communism shall be crushed and that they shall once again have their own independent Slovak Republic. They believe that, because Father Tiso believed it. And they believe, too, that the murderers of their beloved martyr and hero shall not escape the just punishment of God. When a Slovak meets a Slovak at home or in exile, he says: "Remember Tiso - carry on!" • • • WHO SAID IT? "TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES : - Your comment of November 18 (1947) on 'the dark curtain descending on Prague' seems to me to be overrated. that the Communist power in Czechoslovakia is 'entrenched in the internal administration' Is an ii· Jusion. It is untru e that the Army is In the Communist hand s. The fact that a Communist is Secretary of the Interior doesn't mean at all that Communists control the internal machinery of the State. . . . Your comment on the new leadership of the Socialist (Marxist) party appears to be influenced by yom fear of the Russi an interference in the Internal affairs of Czechoslovakia. Everi your correspondent at Prague had to state, however {THE TIMES, Oct. 19 ), that 'the Czechs and Slovaks are made of different stuff from that of some of the ir neighboring countries.' The replacement of a pro-Soviet president of the party by a new man, which was carried out by a free voting of the members, is new evidence of the independent spirit of the 70. year-old Socialist party in Bohemia, whiob is friendly to the Russians but which always has beeu opposed to the overrule of the competitive Communist party." Vlastimal Kybal, THE NEW YORK TIMES. 11-27-47. • • • "Our people at home are united. All the Czechs are . .. as is the overwhelming majority of the Slovaks. . . . They have tabled all internal issues; t;hey are interested only in the liberation of the nation and the state and the reunification of the Czech lands with Slovakia." - Dr. Edward Benes, Nov. 12, 194-2 (BENE$ AND SLOVAKIA by Dr. Stephen Osusky, 19'43). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKI.A ANNIVERSARY OF A MURDER · April 18, 1953, marks the sixth anniversary of the blackest deed in the history of Czecho-Slovakia - the µiµ,rder of Dr. Joseph Tiso, champion of Slovak freedom, exemplary priest of God, and first president of the independent Slovak Republic. This day will be solemnly commemorated by Slovaks everywhere, at home and abroad, as long as they live. For them Tiso will always be a hero and a martyr; he was the most beloved man in Slovakia, because he ruled his country wisely under the most trying circumstances and saved his nation from destruction. During the summer of 1946, Dr. Edward Benes told the Slovak Council of Commissioners that Dr. Joseph Tiso would be put to death, but the majority of Slovaks still believed that Benes would change his mind and spare Tiso's life. When the "peo·p le's" court pronounced sentence on Dr. Tiso and ordered him to be hanged, Dr. Edward Benes had the opportunity to improve the deteriorated relationship between the Czechs and the Slovaks, As president, he could have granted clemency after Tiso filed his plea for mercy, but Benes preferred to reject it. Benes refused clemency to and ordered the execution of the man who was in a large measure responsible for his election to the presidency in 1935 ! _When Dr. Benes gave in to the demand of the CzechoSlovak stooges of the Kremlin who demanded Tiso's head, he drove the last nail into the coffin of Czecho-Slovakia and killed the last hope of ever bringing the Czechs and the Slovaks together again under one political roof. True, the Slovaks are under that roof today, but not because they willed it; they were forced under it. And nothing but force and terror will keep them under it. The Slovaks proclaimed the independence of their country through their duly elected representatives in the Slovak Parliament on March 14, 1939. The same parliament elected Dr. Joseph Tiso president of the independent Slovak Republic in October of that same year. From then un- ILOVAKIA 29 til the wanton and violent destruction of the Slovak Re- pulic in 1945, when the Slovak Government and Dr. Joseph Tiso were forced to flee Bratislava, there was not a single official execution in Slovakia bearing Dr. Tiso's signature. And .during the war the people of Slovakia fared . better than even most neutral countries. The Slovaks still firmly believe that no matter what the circumstances under which the independent Slovak Republic was born, it should have never been destroyed. It could have served Christianity and the western democracies effectively after 1945. Dr. Joseph Tiso, who had refused to have Slovakia join the Soviet system as an "independent" state during the war, died on the gallows in the courtyard of the Bratislava prison when dawn broke on April 18, 1947. His greatest crime was his great love for his people and the Christian-democratic way of life. He believed that his nation, just as all nations large and small, had the God-given, inherent right to freedom and independence. Tiso was an implacable enemy of Godless, materialistic Communism. In the tradition of his people he fought the dread plague. of Communism in and out of season. Even as he was being led to the gallows, Dr. Tiso prayed and begged his people to continue their fight against the system which would pervert and enslave mankind. Father Joseph Tiso, who had not signed a single order of execution and had saved thousands of Christians and Jews from death at the hands of Hitler's madmen, was himself shamefully put to death on the gallows by the man who resigned and betrayed the highest trust of his people and cowardly fled his country during its darkest hour - - Dr. Edward Benes. But the Communistdominated Prague Government of Dr. Edward Benes was not satisfied with the murder of Tiso- It even denied him his last request: to be buried in a plot in his own parish cemetery in Banovce. The lifeless body of Tiso was buried secretly; later, it is said, it was disintered and cremated, the ashes being ~attered to the winds, or, as , some say, cast into the waters of the Vltava which long ago •claimed the life of St. John Nepomucene. 30 SLOVAKIA The Prague government tried to erase the memory of Tiso from the hearts and minds of the Slovak people by all means at its disposal. It was and still is a crime to utter Tiso's name publicly, or mention it in the CzechoSlovak press or broadcasts. Bu~ the more Prague tries to suppress the memory of Tiso, the more it becomes endeared and steeled in the hearts of Slovaks everywhere. They know that Tiso died for his faith and for his people. Father Tiso still lives in his countrymen, who today are more determined than ever that Communism shall be crushed and that they shall once again have their own independent Slovak Republic. They believe that, because Father Tiso believed it. And they believe, too, that the murderers of their beloved martyr and hero shall not escape the just punishment of God. When a Slovak meets a Slovak at home or in exile, he says: "Remember Tiso - carry on!" • • • WHO SAID IT? "TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES : - Your comment of November 18 (1947) on 'the dark curtain descending on Prague' seems to me to be overrated. that the Communist power in Czechoslovakia is 'entrenched in the internal administration' Is an ii· Jusion. It is untru e that the Army is In the Communist hand s. The fact that a Communist is Secretary of the Interior doesn't mean at all that Communists control the internal machinery of the State. . . . Your comment on the new leadership of the Socialist (Marxist) party appears to be influenced by yom fear of the Russi an interference in the Internal affairs of Czechoslovakia. Everi your correspondent at Prague had to state, however {THE TIMES, Oct. 19 ), that 'the Czechs and Slovaks are made of different stuff from that of some of the ir neighboring countries.' The replacement of a pro-Soviet president of the party by a new man, which was carried out by a free voting of the members, is new evidence of the independent spirit of the 70. year-old Socialist party in Bohemia, whiob is friendly to the Russians but which always has beeu opposed to the overrule of the competitive Communist party." Vlastimal Kybal, THE NEW YORK TIMES. 11-27-47. • • • "Our people at home are united. All the Czechs are . .. as is the overwhelming majority of the Slovaks. . . . They have tabled all internal issues; t;hey are interested only in the liberation of the nation and the state and the reunification of the Czech lands with Slovakia." - Dr. Edward Benes, Nov. 12, 194-2 (BENE$ AND SLOVAKIA by Dr. Stephen Osusky, 19'43).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Anniversary of a Murder Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 1 (6), April 1953 pp. 28-30 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource April 1953 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/a83255c1c53af815564410caaea602e8.pdf d36d283cbe9e54d89f9c0fd782c87040 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA CAPRONI: NUMBER 11,495 THE TRAGEDY OF GENERAL STEFANIK May 4, 1919, was a beautiful day. The Slov3Jks of BTatislaJVa and vi~i.Jni,ty were uip bright and ear.1y polis'hiing their boots and dressing in their best clothes. And there was a good reason for it. Genera:l Millan R- Stefam&, wa,r id01l cxf the Slwak nation, was returniil!g home to Slova:kia - the Slo'Vl8Jkia that was beginning to /breathe a new ilife, the life of a free nation wiit:h.in the foamework of the newly born Czecho slovak Repulblic. He wa:s coming home to taike up his duties as minister of Defense in ,t he sta;te he helped create with T. G. Masaryk and Dr. fildward' Benes. A Httle ai,ter 11 A. M., the Italian plane - Oaproni No. 11,495 - cire1ed the field near BratisJ!ava (Vajnocy) and prepared for a landing. Then something terrible happened. The Ca:pI1001ii rocked, bUII"st into flames and crashed to the .grolliild, oaim-ymg General Stefanik and his Italian friends to their death. The plane was shot down by the Ozecho-S1ova:k mililtairy ga,rrison staJtioned near Vajnory ai'I'pOrt. lit was shot down oo. orders from the commanding officem at the garirison. Masruryik's government explained that it was a;Il a tiraig,iic mistake. T,he oomrrnandring officer thought it was an enemy plane - the men did not know Stefani!k was arriving in an Italian plane - they did not know he was in that particular pliane. And more. There were eye witnesses. Some of the men in that garrison, still alive today, insisted thait Stefanik was murdered. The fi:rst volley, they saiy, missed the ipliane, /but the second hit its target. stefaniik the sold!ie:r, statesman a:nd astronomer was dead. The SloV13Jks demanded that an inrvestigatiron ·b e made by the government. Masaryk ·a nd his government wouM not aillow it. IDvertihing wa,s done to hush up the affair. The world got to kn'()IW little rubout the tragedy cxf Stefanik. But the Slova:ks kept ga,thering evidence. It pointed to one thlng: Stefanik, co-creator of the Ozecho~Slovak Repufblic, �SLOVAKIA 27 wa,s not wamted rby the men orf Prague; he wouid be in their way and appose every act of the Ozechs to mruke a cdlooy of SlO'Vak,i a; he would msist on a free Slo:vaki1a within the framework of Czec'ho-Slovaki!a as Masaryk haJd promised the :SlovaJks it wow1d be. Today - thirty-fowr years af.ter Stefanik's tr.agic death - the Slovak,s still beliieve thiat General Milan R. Stefanilk was murdered - murdered by the men who had plotted against the hfe of the S1ovaik nation. By the men who promised the Slovalks a free life, their own state government, thei,r own legdslaltive assembly, Slovak schools and institutions to get them into a common state with the Ozechs and then failled to keep their promises- The ,anti-demooratic, anti-!Slovak and anti-Ohrat1an polilcy of those men wias responsible for what happened in and to Czecho-Slovakia since 191'8. Czecho-Slova'kiia wa;s a fallacy from the start. It was bud!l.t on sand. It coll.aipsed when the fimt hurri'crune struck, because there was no one to defend it. Even the OLechs would not fire a shot at the NaJzis or Communists in its defense. Stefarak's wor,k of liberating his nation from tyranny is not done. The Slovaks at home and in emigration are determined more than ever to complete the joib that he had begun. Slovrukia shaH. ibe free and the Slova:ks s!ha.ll · again Liive a life of firee men in their 01W11 independent Slovak Repuiblic. • WHO SAID IT? - • • "In a more general way, the Czechs have <lone much to arouse the resentment even of Slovak naturally favorable towards them, and have grievously damaged their own cause by overstressing the "Czechoslovak" idea and by certain measures regarded by the Slovaks as attempts to deprive them of their own nationality. It is paradoxical, but natural, that the weakness of the foundations on whi ch the "Czechoslovak" Idea rested became most apparent the moment tliat the idea received official recognition. Such phrases as "Czechoslovak nationallty" and "Czechoslovak Ian• guage" might be used for the benefit of the out.side world and in constitutional and other State documents, but the fact remains that to the vast majority of both peoples the idea remained a pure fiction, and the languages, like the peoples, were, in solid fact, two and not one." - (C. A. Macartney: HUNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS; 1937, London). � SLOVAKIA CAPRONI: NUMBER 11,495 THE TRAGEDY OF GENERAL STEFANIK May 4, 1919, was a beautiful day. The Slov3Jks of BTatislaJVa and vi~i.Jni,ty were uip bright and ear.1y polis'hiing their boots and dressing in their best clothes. And there was a good reason for it. Genera:l Millan R- Stefam&, wa,r id01l cxf the Slwak nation, was returniil!g home to Slova:kia - the Slo'Vl8Jkia that was beginning to /breathe a new ilife, the life of a free nation wiit:h.in the foamework of the newly born Czecho slovak Repulblic. He wa:s coming home to taike up his duties as minister of Defense in ,t he sta;te he helped create with T. G. Masaryk and Dr. fildward' Benes. A Httle ai,ter 11 A. M., the Italian plane - Oaproni No. 11,495 - cire1ed the field near BratisJ!ava (Vajnocy) and prepared for a landing. Then something terrible happened. The Ca:pI1001ii rocked, bUII"st into flames and crashed to the .grolliild, oaim-ymg General Stefanik and his Italian friends to their death. The plane was shot down by the Ozecho-S1ova:k mililtairy ga,rrison staJtioned near Vajnory ai'I'pOrt. lit was shot down oo. orders from the commanding officem at the garirison. Masruryik's government explained that it was a;Il a tiraig,iic mistake. T,he oomrrnandring officer thought it was an enemy plane - the men did not know Stefani!k was arriving in an Italian plane - they did not know he was in that particular pliane. And more. There were eye witnesses. Some of the men in that garrison, still alive today, insisted thait Stefanik was murdered. The fi:rst volley, they saiy, missed the ipliane, /but the second hit its target. stefaniik the sold!ie:r, statesman a:nd astronomer was dead. The SloV13Jks demanded that an inrvestigatiron ·b e made by the government. Masaryk ·a nd his government wouM not aillow it. IDvertihing wa,s done to hush up the affair. The world got to kn'()IW little rubout the tragedy cxf Stefanik. But the Slova:ks kept ga,thering evidence. It pointed to one thlng: Stefanik, co-creator of the Ozecho~Slovak Repufblic, �SLOVAKIA 27 wa,s not wamted rby the men orf Prague; he wouid be in their way and appose every act of the Ozechs to mruke a cdlooy of SlO'Vak,i a; he would msist on a free Slo:vaki1a within the framework of Czec'ho-Slovaki!a as Masaryk haJd promised the :SlovaJks it wow1d be. Today - thirty-fowr years af.ter Stefanik's tr.agic death - the Slovak,s still beliieve thiat General Milan R. Stefanilk was murdered - murdered by the men who had plotted against the hfe of the S1ovaik nation. By the men who promised the Slovalks a free life, their own state government, thei,r own legdslaltive assembly, Slovak schools and institutions to get them into a common state with the Ozechs and then failled to keep their promises- The ,anti-demooratic, anti-!Slovak and anti-Ohrat1an polilcy of those men wias responsible for what happened in and to Czecho-Slovakia since 191'8. Czecho-Slova'kiia wa;s a fallacy from the start. It was bud!l.t on sand. It coll.aipsed when the fimt hurri'crune struck, because there was no one to defend it. Even the OLechs would not fire a shot at the NaJzis or Communists in its defense. Stefarak's wor,k of liberating his nation from tyranny is not done. The Slovaks at home and in emigration are determined more than ever to complete the joib that he had begun. Slovrukia shaH. ibe free and the Slova:ks s!ha.ll · again Liive a life of firee men in their 01W11 independent Slovak Repuiblic. • WHO SAID IT? - • • "In a more general way, the Czechs have <lone much to arouse the resentment even of Slovak naturally favorable towards them, and have grievously damaged their own cause by overstressing the "Czechoslovak" idea and by certain measures regarded by the Slovaks as attempts to deprive them of their own nationality. It is paradoxical, but natural, that the weakness of the foundations on whi ch the "Czechoslovak" Idea rested became most apparent the moment tliat the idea received official recognition. Such phrases as "Czechoslovak nationallty" and "Czechoslovak Ian• guage" might be used for the benefit of the out.side world and in constitutional and other State documents, but the fact remains that to the vast majority of both peoples the idea remained a pure fiction, and the languages, like the peoples, were, in solid fact, two and not one." - (C. A. Macartney: HUNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS; 1937, London). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA CAPRONI: NUMBER 11,495 THE TRAGEDY OF GENERAL STEFANIK May 4, 1919, was a beautiful day. The Slov3Jks of BTatislaJVa and vi~i.Jni,ty were uip bright and ear.1y polis'hiing their boots and dressing in their best clothes. And there was a good reason for it. Genera:l Millan R- Stefam&, wa,r id01l cxf the Slwak nation, was returniil!g home to Slova:kia - the Slo'Vl8Jkia that was beginning to /breathe a new ilife, the life of a free nation wiit:h.in the foamework of the newly born Czecho slovak Repulblic. He wa:s coming home to taike up his duties as minister of Defense in ,t he sta;te he helped create with T. G. Masaryk and Dr. fildward' Benes. A Httle ai,ter 11 A. M., the Italian plane - Oaproni No. 11,495 - cire1ed the field near BratisJ!ava (Vajnocy) and prepared for a landing. Then something terrible happened. The Ca:pI1001ii rocked, bUII"st into flames and crashed to the .grolliild, oaim-ymg General Stefanik and his Italian friends to their death. The plane was shot down by the Ozecho-S1ova:k mililtairy ga,rrison staJtioned near Vajnory ai'I'pOrt. lit was shot down oo. orders from the commanding officem at the garirison. Masruryik's government explained that it was a;Il a tiraig,iic mistake. T,he oomrrnandring officer thought it was an enemy plane - the men did not know Stefani!k was arriving in an Italian plane - they did not know he was in that particular pliane. And more. There were eye witnesses. Some of the men in that garrison, still alive today, insisted thait Stefanik was murdered. The fi:rst volley, they saiy, missed the ipliane, /but the second hit its target. stefaniik the sold!ie:r, statesman a:nd astronomer was dead. The SloV13Jks demanded that an inrvestigatiron ·b e made by the government. Masaryk ·a nd his government wouM not aillow it. IDvertihing wa,s done to hush up the affair. The world got to kn'()IW little rubout the tragedy cxf Stefanik. But the Slova:ks kept ga,thering evidence. It pointed to one thlng: Stefanik, co-creator of the Ozecho~Slovak Repufblic, SLOVAKIA 27 wa,s not wamted rby the men orf Prague; he wouid be in their way and appose every act of the Ozechs to mruke a cdlooy of SlO'Vak,i a; he would msist on a free Slo:vaki1a within the framework of Czec'ho-Slovaki!a as Masaryk haJd promised the :SlovaJks it wow1d be. Today - thirty-fowr years af.ter Stefanik's tr.agic death - the Slovak,s still beliieve thiat General Milan R. Stefanilk was murdered - murdered by the men who had plotted against the hfe of the S1ovaik nation. By the men who promised the Slovalks a free life, their own state government, thei,r own legdslaltive assembly, Slovak schools and institutions to get them into a common state with the Ozechs and then failled to keep their promises- The ,anti-demooratic, anti-!Slovak and anti-Ohrat1an polilcy of those men wias responsible for what happened in and to Czecho-Slovakia since 191'8. Czecho-Slova'kiia wa;s a fallacy from the start. It was bud!l.t on sand. It coll.aipsed when the fimt hurri'crune struck, because there was no one to defend it. Even the OLechs would not fire a shot at the NaJzis or Communists in its defense. Stefarak's wor,k of liberating his nation from tyranny is not done. The Slovaks at home and in emigration are determined more than ever to complete the joib that he had begun. Slovrukia shaH. ibe free and the Slova:ks s!ha.ll · again Liive a life of firee men in their 01W11 independent Slovak Repuiblic. • WHO SAID IT? - • • "In a more general way, the Czechs have <lone much to arouse the resentment even of Slovak naturally favorable towards them, and have grievously damaged their own cause by overstressing the "Czechoslovak" idea and by certain measures regarded by the Slovaks as attempts to deprive them of their own nationality. It is paradoxical, but natural, that the weakness of the foundations on whi ch the "Czechoslovak" Idea rested became most apparent the moment tliat the idea received official recognition. Such phrases as "Czechoslovak nationallty" and "Czechoslovak Ian• guage" might be used for the benefit of the out.side world and in constitutional and other State documents, but the fact remains that to the vast majority of both peoples the idea remained a pure fiction, and the languages, like the peoples, were, in solid fact, two and not one." - (C. A. Macartney: HUNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS; 1937, London).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Tragedy of General Štefánik Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 1 (6), April 1953 pp. 26-27 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource April 1953 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/3fccb11f4d283110b2fc8ee7a7bb96f2.pdf ab176c3e7fd44f306078bae227de8f92 PDF Text Text APRIL 195 3 VOL. Ill \1/f ,; '. :, ~ IN THilS ISSUE: SLOVAKIA AND CENTRAL EUROPEAN FEDERATION PLAN S THE SLOVAKS AND PRESIDENT EISENHOWER THE TRAGEDY OF GENERAL STEFANIK ANNIVERSARY OF A MURDER THE " RUSSIA FIRST" BOYS IN RADIO FREE EUROP E I.. , ; CA STLES OF SLOVAKIA : STRECNO . (.' A VOICE FOR SLO V A K I A i ! ; ) i COULD CZECHS AND SLOVAKS A GREE ? THE TRAGIC CASE OF DUSAN SLAVIK JOHN HOLL Y - PIONEER IN SLOVAK POETR Y Tf:I E SLOVAK TO N GUE SLOVAK ISSUES IN EVER Y LITTLE T OW N I MEDICINAL SPRINGS I N S LOVAKIA CZECHO-S L OVA K I A WHO SAID IT ? - PP. 25, 27, 30, 39, 44, 48, 52, 55, 57, 60, 62 Edited a nd compiled by ,'pf-ilLIP A. H ROBAK Published by THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA �SLOV A.KIA is published periodically by the Slovak League of America, a cultural and civic federation of Americans of Slovak descent. The chief purpose of SLOVAKIA is to promote a better understanding and appreciation of the Slovak nation and its long struggle for freedom and in dependence. As Americans, members of the Gluvak League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all nat:i:ons, has an inherent and God-given right to freedom and independence. They are dedicated to the cause of the American way of life, Slovak freedom and world peace and are determined to · oppose the plague of Communism and all other totalitarian political systems. Subscription to Slovakia $1.00 per year in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere. Send subscriptions to: SLOV AKIA Box 150 Middletown, Pa. Printed in the U.S. A. JEDNOTA PRESS Middletown, Pa. � APRIL 195 3 VOL. Ill \1/f ,; '. :, ~ IN THilS ISSUE: SLOVAKIA AND CENTRAL EUROPEAN FEDERATION PLAN S THE SLOVAKS AND PRESIDENT EISENHOWER THE TRAGEDY OF GENERAL STEFANIK ANNIVERSARY OF A MURDER THE " RUSSIA FIRST" BOYS IN RADIO FREE EUROP E I.. , ; CA STLES OF SLOVAKIA : STRECNO . (.' A VOICE FOR SLO V A K I A i ! ; ) i COULD CZECHS AND SLOVAKS A GREE ? THE TRAGIC CASE OF DUSAN SLAVIK JOHN HOLL Y - PIONEER IN SLOVAK POETR Y Tf:I E SLOVAK TO N GUE SLOVAK ISSUES IN EVER Y LITTLE T OW N I MEDICINAL SPRINGS I N S LOVAKIA CZECHO-S L OVA K I A WHO SAID IT ? - PP. 25, 27, 30, 39, 44, 48, 52, 55, 57, 60, 62 Edited a nd compiled by ,'pf-ilLIP A. H ROBAK Published by THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA �SLOV A.KIA is published periodically by the Slovak League of America, a cultural and civic federation of Americans of Slovak descent. The chief purpose of SLOVAKIA is to promote a better understanding and appreciation of the Slovak nation and its long struggle for freedom and in dependence. As Americans, members of the Gluvak League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all nat:i:ons, has an inherent and God-given right to freedom and independence. They are dedicated to the cause of the American way of life, Slovak freedom and world peace and are determined to · oppose the plague of Communism and all other totalitarian political systems. Subscription to Slovakia $1.00 per year in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere. Send subscriptions to: SLOV AKIA Box 150 Middletown, Pa. Printed in the U.S. A. JEDNOTA PRESS Middletown, Pa. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 1 (6) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource April 1953