1 50 40 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/55a952cd0f0ec80384ad5eaa57ef3d6c.pdf 38b04017f5c4f1151050f6988208938b PDF Text Text 44 SLOVA.K:IA "FREE" AND "CZECHOSLOVAKIAN" DON'T RHYME ! Not all Czechs insist on the existencť' or Czec·boslovakla, the arti· !icial state establisbed by Czech imperialist,; to exploit the non-Czech nations of that territory wbich were in the majority. 'ľhe Czech National Committee in London, bť'aded by General Leľ Prchala, has been outspoken in this respect for many years. The (ollowing ·'Open Letter" by a member of tbat committee <'ame to us tbc latter part or February. We publish it in full Cor its exposé o[ the COUNCIL :>1<, FREE CZECHOSLOVAKIA whicb poses as a representative group •Jf "democratic" exiles from Czechoslovakla. AN OPEN LETTER From V. L. Borin, Editor of Pravda, and Member of the Czech National Committee, London England, to the Chairman of the United States Senate Committee on Un-American Activities, Washington, D. C. SIR: To support the struggle of alt nations for freerlom became a historical misslon of the U. S. sinťe President Lincoln won his struggle against slavery. Freerlom of nations is tbe principal question in the struggle of Centra! and Southeastern Europeon natlons a!('alnst Bolshevik oppre!;· i,lon. To support their struggle means to repudiate imperialisiil ot any kind and to 1ecognize unconditionally the right to self-dterminatiou of a~l nations on the territory in their ethnographi<'al boundarles and to assist them in their endeavor to form a federation o[ free nations. Some prominent citizens of the U. S. and some officials of the U. S. State Department sup1>ort tbe so-called ·•czechoslc,vaks" and tbeir organizations, givlng them a monopoli!ltic position in the Grew Com· mlttee anrl in American broadcasting Cor Czechoslovakia. The top :lľ· ganization of thE> so-called "C1.ecboslovaks" was, until Jánuary 25, 1951, the Council of Free Cze<'hoslovakia. To say "FREE CZECHOSLOVAKIA'' means to manifest a pro. found hypocrisy, or ignorance. "Free Czechoslovakia" means not freedom for nations in Czechoslovakia, but freedom for Czech imperialists to oppress Sudeten Germans and Hungarians who, in 1919, were forced against their will to live in Czechoslovakia; and to deny the r ight of self-determlnation to Slovaks who joined Czechoslovakia because full autonomy was promised them a promise which was never kept. Tbere are undoubtedly many refugees ft'om Czechoslovakia who maintain that their country was a paradisf' and they are perfectly rigbt [rom tbeir persona] point of view, for tbese were Czechoslova• kian professlonal soldiers, state officials, and rullng pollticlans wbo lost their paradlse. But the nations of Czechoslovakia, including the Czecha, do not wish to have anything in common with the paradise of the Czech imperialista and their state, which brought them from Nazi to Bolshevik �SLOVAKIA 46 occupation, from one great to another, greater, disaster. The nations of Czechoslovakia wish to live freely, on equal terms and in a large federation which would be able to protect their fredeom. The leading political party of the Czech imperialists is the Czech National Socialist Party of the late Dr. Benes, which dif[ers from the German National Socialist Party of the late Adolf Hitler in its attitude to Russia. While the German National Socialista were violently anti-Russian, the Czech National Socialists were pro-Russian and consequently pro-Bolshevik, considering Russian Bolshevism (which for propaganda reasons i called Communim) as a new form of pan-Slavism. In thls belief the Czech National Socialists became agents of Russian Bolshevism and during the war their so-called "Czechoslovakian" exiled Government was a Trojan Horse - a Bolshevik Fiftn Column in Great Britain and in the U. S. One of the leaders of the Czech Nationa l Socialists, Mr. Hubert Ripka, broadcast through the B. B. C. on Novembe„ 7, 1942, as fol· lows: "The November revolution turned Russia into a modem state; technically, militarily and politically a powerful s overeign s tate. That revolution did nol only increase the strength of the Russlan Soviet State but it also raised to greater heights than ever before the standard of civilization, culture and living of the wide masses of the Soviet people." T))is !s not an accidental quotation. I can su pply you with a htmdred si milar. In this spirit Czech imperialists spoke and ac ted during the war, making pro-Bol■hevik propaganda among Ame ricans of Czech origin and among Czech people in their motherland. As a result of their activities 40 per cent of Czechs voted pro-Bolshevik in 1946. In February 1948 thP- Czech National Socialist Party split. Th~ Party itsel( still exists in Czechoslovakia. rollaborates with the Bol· sheviks and has its ministers in the present Czechoslovakian Govern ment. Some leaders of t his party emigrated abroad and their attitude changed apparently into an anti-Bolshevik one. Under the chairmans hip of the Czech National Socialist Peter Zenkl, they established In Washington t he so-called ·•councll ot Free Czechoslovaki a." They represent nobody and nothing but their past mismanagement of Czechoslovakia and their desire for the restoration of the ir lost paradise. They well know their real position and. therefore, try to keep tbeir power by political frauds and terror. They denoonce al\ Czech as well as Slovak democrats and Sudeten Germans as fascists. Confidential and false denunciations against their democratic opponents have been their principal political weapon slnce 1939. To give a concrete example of their a ctivities I would like to call your attention to a camp for refugees from Czecho~lovakia in Murnau. Germany, U. S. Zone. In this camp there were democratic Czechs. adherents of the Czech National Committee in London and democratic Slovaks, adherents of the Slovakian National Council Abroad. During one year the adberents of the so-called Council of Free Czechoslovakia in Washington made 241 denunciatlons against thelr democratlc Czech and Slovakian opponents In camp Murnau. The U . S. authorities investigated a ll these denun clatlons and they a ll pro,·ed to be fals"l. �SLOVAXIA Such is the situatlon in . ev~ry camp [or refugees trom Czechoslovakia in Germany. · r can glve you an example of thei·r activltles in the U. S. Lasi year there arrlved In the U. S. the Slovaklan leader Mr. Karol Sldor, who during the war was in clisgrace with tbe German Nazls and was shelterecl In the Vatlcan. An Amerlcan columnist, Mr. Walter Wlnchell, started a public campaign agalnst Sldor denouncing bim falsely as a Nazl. When Mr. WlnchelJ was compelled to say what he knew about Sldor, he <'Onfessed that he knew nothing whatsoever, and that he hati , eceived all his information frÔm Congressman Kleln. But Mr. Kleln also ronfessed to know notbing about Sidor ani! he received all hls informatlon from Mr. Andrew · Valushek. Who is thls gentleman? He ia the manager of the "New-Yorkské Listy", a· Czech newspaper published in New York, which durlng the war was edited by two internaitonal Bolsheviks, Bension Batt and Desider Benau, disguised as " Czechoslovakian democratic refugees."' Mr. Valushek is also the se<'retary of th e American Fund for Czechoslovak RP.fugees, lne.. 1775 Broadway, Room 607, ,'<ew York 19. Among the sponsors or this organlzatlon are Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, Senator H erbert Lehman, Governor Frank J . Lausche, Dorothy Thompson, and others. And Mr. Valushek is also in tbe Executlve Committee o! tbe Anti-Názi League wbose pro-Bolshveik cbaracter is certalnly well known to you. On August 25. 1950, tbe so-calJed "Councll of Free Czechoslovakit1" decided to make evldence or all refugees from Czechoslovakia in Germany'. Tbelr branob organizatlon In Germany i!ssued a circular N<l. 1010-201-Br. on August 31. 1950. in which they stated as follows: "The Council of Free Czechoslovakia ia the only recognized rep. resentative of political refugees from Czechoslovakia. ·. .• We need evidence of all refugees trom Czechoslovakla for their eventual transfer. The Government• requested to take our refugees ask that guarantee for every refugee concerning his politlcal reliability be given. "Please ke„p those who refuse to sign our evldence questionnaire under ca1·eful surveillance, and send us their names.•. .'' People do not want to sign tbe questlonnaires of the so-called Cruncll of Free Czechoslovakla, because they clo not wish to have anything in common wlth it. and they are afraid, conslderlng how ľlosely tbese gentlemen colJaborat!'d wlth the Russian Bolshevlks. 'ľbose who refuse to sign are talsely denounced to tbe U. S. and IRO Junctionaries and persecuted. On tbe ground of their false denunclatlon a Czecb Professor of Law from Prague University was recently d~prived of bis O.P.'s card. They are forcing refugees froro Czechoslova•kla to sign in order to have "evidence" tbat a majority ot retugees from Czecboslovakia are their adherents. I can glve you an example of how they deal with people wbo refuse to be their adherents. At Dijon. France, on September 7, 1950. Karol Vasak. a Czech lay student from Dijon University, was arrestecl by tbe Frencb Police as an alleged aRent of the Soviet Russlan NKVD. His arrest <'ausecl a sensation in Dijon because Vasak was known as an ardent Catbolle, very active in Catboliť organizatlons. Thernfore bis <'lise was publicized in tbe French press. Aťcording to titf> ' '. Aurore" of September 12. 1950, the <'Onstable wbo arreeted Vasak tol<I that n.ewspaper's ťorrespon~ent_: "Va.sak I!>. elther th!' viťtllll ot a tri\- �SLOVAKIA 41 glc mlstake, or he ls such a dlsslmulator as I have never met In roy long police servlce." Thanks to some doubts whlch the police had, Vasak was not transported to Czechoslovak ia, bu t was gtven the c hoice: Czechostovak la or Alglers. or course he chose Alglers, whlther he was deported. Tha nks to the lnterest of French Cathollc circles h ls case was thoroughly lnvestlgated and the "Le Monde" or September 16, 1950, published an article under the headlng: "Arrest ól .Karel Vasak was a result of rlvalry between Czech studenLs." In the meant ime, the French police discovered that Vasak was an ardent antlCommunlst, and that the accusatlon, made agalnst him by two other Cze chs, was talse. But falae alao waa the atatement in " Le Monde"; becauae Vaaak waa denoun ced by two ad herenta of the Councll of Free Czechoalovak la In Waahlngton. Were the Sureté Natlonale to go througb thelr flles, they would {Ind that a tready In 1939 the offlclals of the Czechoslovak la Natlonal Commlttee of Mr. Benes had denounced a ll Czech and Slovaklan antlCommunlsts In France to the French Police as "dangerous Communlst agents." Thls was at the tíme when thls Czechoslovak lan Commltttle was a cover-up organlzatlon for Bolshevlk agents a'n d Mr. RipJ<a, I n hia office at 52 Avenua Bourdonala, Paria, waa hiding an internatlonal Bolahevlk agent, Simon Katz, who was wanted by the F rel)ch police. After the cottapse of France, the same Czech s and Stovaks, who In France were falsely denounced as dangerous communiata, were later confldentlally denounced in Brltaln by tbe same Benes adherents a11 Nazi agents and were imprlsoned, without investlgatlon , by the British. The Vasak affalr in France ls _oi;ily a contlnuatlon o! the late Renes' pollcy: it la a policy of Czech · Ímperlalista who. allied themaelvea with the Ru11ian Bolsheviks, adopted their methoda of 'd~é:elving the enemy, and perfected them with typlcal Czech thoroughne11. On J anuary 25, 1951, there was In Washington a meeflng or th~ so-called Councll or Free Czecboslovak ia, at wblch 17 members out of ľo passed a vote of censure agalnst P eter Zenkt, th e Natlonal Soclali).IL chairman of the Council. Mr. Zenk.l, therefore, declare~ that "the Council of F ree Czechoalovak la had disaolved itaelf and ceased to exist" because " the party syatem proved unworkable and the de le gates of the political parties had been unrepresenta tive anyway." Thls is the way In wbich _Czech Natlonal . Soclallsts understand democracy. 'ľheir conťeption of democracy does 11ot dlffer ffOTU that of German National Socialists. Mr. Zenkl then formed a new organization, th~ Czechoslovak lan Natlonal Commlttee. In thls new Czechoslovak lan Committee, ~r. Zenkl is obvlously the chairman ä~'<f among hls pro• mlnent "Cezchoslova ks" are Messrs. Papanek, Fi'ŕl-Fuerth, General lngr, Felerbend and the brother or the late PťesicÍEľnt Benes. No matter what they call themselves they cannot but conttnue the pollcy, of the late I;lenes _in deceiving the Western public a~d terrorízing polltical refu geea from Czec hoa lovakia. They can do th ls oply because they are sponsored by some prominent Axnerlcans and by offlclals of the U. S. State Department who I am sure mean. well, but are not lnformed. And many <Usasters have happened becau\je or the policy of l!Ome Amerlcans wtio were -not lnformed about :Eu~o,P,e ap<! Russlan Bo)shevlsm. , . ' . ,1 • I would like to call your attention to \he .faci that the actlvlties or these ·•czecboslova ks" are In contradlctlon ' to the U. S. prlnclples �48 SLOVAKIA of democracy and the U. S. historical mlssion in the world. In spite of thls, they are supported by American flnanťes, they have monopoly in broadcasting from tbe IJ. S., and the effect on people in Czecboslovakia is an absolute failure. They have the as ~istance .of the U. $. authorities in Germany and also of the I RO authoritles. their organizations have the monopoly of informing the authorities of Western Governments about refugees from Czechos\ovakia and, wltb thelr a.ssistance, arranged the emigration to tbe U. S. (as well as to Australia, New Zealand and other coun tries) of people who have never been Czecboslovaklan citizens and refugees. Therefore, I tbink tbat tbeir activitles deserve the attention of the United States Sena.te Committee on Un-Amerlcan Activities. Yours faithfully, V. L. BORIN. • • • WH O SAID IT? " CZECHS bow east POLITICALLY but west INTELLECTUALLY . . · . Not behind "Iron Curtain" - Communist police state doubted . . . Soviet withdrawal s een . . . . Most observers bere {In Prague) are incllned to doubt that Russia ig going to try to de•,elop in Czechoslovakia, Austria and Germany the kind of Communist police state that prevalia in Rumania, Bulgaria and Poland. . . . One popular tboory in Prague is tbat the Russians a lways withdraw from the West sooner or later for fear of being contaminated. . . Maybe it ia all just a dream but it ia a pleasant one though anyway a nd the Czeehoslovaks nurse lt Jealously ." - {NEW YORK TIMES, 8-5-47) . • "We are neighbors or Russia. Our security policy depends upon Russla. We bave no choice. . . . But any statement to the effect that we are behlnd a curtain or occupied by the Ru ■sians is absolute nonsense. This country and its poople are ABSOLUTELY DEMOCRATIC and we will remaln so, come what may. . . . We are a typical non. Soviet regime w ith no intention of so becoming. We are sociali!ltic and we w!ll develop along those Unes by evolution. . . But our conception or d emocracy remains the same now as before. . . . 1 am eonvinced th at in two or three years ou r position w ill be ve ry healthy.'' (Dr. Edward Benes, NEW YORK TIMES, 5-7-47) . • " l am genuinely grieved when I see a country like Czechoslovakia lost to the democratic cause. Here is a republic MODELLED AFTER AMERICAN POLITJCAL TRADITIONS BY MEN WHO l,OVED FREEDOM - transformed into a totalitarian Russlan satelIite state. . . . Most of the CZECHS don't like it. but there is nothing they can do about it. Dr. Benes. the able President of the country, has d~cid~ that only c!ose political and economic rela.tlon.,; wltb Communlst Russ la CAN GUARANTEE Czechoslovakla's future . . . . Eaeb time we have stoO<l up against Russia on a matter of prlnciple, she has ma'de CONCESSIONS that, from her point of vie"\!, were generous. I AM CONVlNCED THAT STALIN WANTS FRIEND~1-HP AND COOPERATION WITH BRITAIN AND THE UNITED ~'ľA 'ľE>S." (H. W. Kaltenborn. Radlo Broa<lcast. 7-6-45). � 44 SLOVA.K:IA "FREE" AND "CZECHOSLOVAKIAN" DON'T RHYME ! Not all Czechs insist on the existencť' or Czec·boslovakla, the arti· !icial state establisbed by Czech imperialist,; to exploit the non-Czech nations of that territory wbich were in the majority. 'ľhe Czech National Committee in London, bť'aded by General Leľ Prchala, has been outspoken in this respect for many years. The (ollowing ·'Open Letter" by a member of tbat committee <'ame to us tbc latter part or February. We publish it in full Cor its exposé o[ the COUNCIL :>1<, FREE CZECHOSLOVAKIA whicb poses as a representative group •Jf "democratic" exiles from Czechoslovakla. AN OPEN LETTER From V. L. Borin, Editor of Pravda, and Member of the Czech National Committee, London England, to the Chairman of the United States Senate Committee on Un-American Activities, Washington, D. C. SIR: To support the struggle of alt nations for freerlom became a historical misslon of the U. S. sinťe President Lincoln won his struggle against slavery. Freerlom of nations is tbe principal question in the struggle of Centra! and Southeastern Europeon natlons a!('alnst Bolshevik oppre!;· i,lon. To support their struggle means to repudiate imperialisiil ot any kind and to 1ecognize unconditionally the right to self-dterminatiou of a~l nations on the territory in their ethnographi<'al boundarles and to assist them in their endeavor to form a federation o[ free nations. Some prominent citizens of the U. S. and some officials of the U. S. State Department sup1>ort tbe so-called ·•czechoslc,vaks" and tbeir organizations, givlng them a monopoli!ltic position in the Grew Com· mlttee anrl in American broadcasting Cor Czechoslovakia. The top :lľ· ganization of thE> so-called "C1.ecboslovaks" was, until Jánuary 25, 1951, the Council of Free Cze<'hoslovakia. To say "FREE CZECHOSLOVAKIA'' means to manifest a pro. found hypocrisy, or ignorance. "Free Czechoslovakia" means not freedom for nations in Czechoslovakia, but freedom for Czech imperialists to oppress Sudeten Germans and Hungarians who, in 1919, were forced against their will to live in Czechoslovakia; and to deny the r ight of self-determlnation to Slovaks who joined Czechoslovakia because full autonomy was promised them a promise which was never kept. Tbere are undoubtedly many refugees ft'om Czechoslovakia who maintain that their country was a paradisf' and they are perfectly rigbt [rom tbeir persona] point of view, for tbese were Czechoslova• kian professlonal soldiers, state officials, and rullng pollticlans wbo lost their paradlse. But the nations of Czechoslovakia, including the Czecha, do not wish to have anything in common with the paradise of the Czech imperialista and their state, which brought them from Nazi to Bolshevik �SLOVAKIA 46 occupation, from one great to another, greater, disaster. The nations of Czechoslovakia wish to live freely, on equal terms and in a large federation which would be able to protect their fredeom. The leading political party of the Czech imperialists is the Czech National Socialist Party of the late Dr. Benes, which dif[ers from the German National Socialist Party of the late Adolf Hitler in its attitude to Russia. While the German National Socialista were violently anti-Russian, the Czech National Socialists were pro-Russian and consequently pro-Bolshevik, considering Russian Bolshevism (which for propaganda reasons i called Communim) as a new form of pan-Slavism. In thls belief the Czech National Socialists became agents of Russian Bolshevism and during the war their so-called "Czechoslovakian" exiled Government was a Trojan Horse - a Bolshevik Fiftn Column in Great Britain and in the U. S. One of the leaders of the Czech Nationa l Socialists, Mr. Hubert Ripka, broadcast through the B. B. C. on Novembe„ 7, 1942, as fol· lows: "The November revolution turned Russia into a modem state; technically, militarily and politically a powerful s overeign s tate. That revolution did nol only increase the strength of the Russlan Soviet State but it also raised to greater heights than ever before the standard of civilization, culture and living of the wide masses of the Soviet people." T))is !s not an accidental quotation. I can su pply you with a htmdred si milar. In this spirit Czech imperialists spoke and ac ted during the war, making pro-Bol■hevik propaganda among Ame ricans of Czech origin and among Czech people in their motherland. As a result of their activities 40 per cent of Czechs voted pro-Bolshevik in 1946. In February 1948 thP- Czech National Socialist Party split. Th~ Party itsel( still exists in Czechoslovakia. rollaborates with the Bol· sheviks and has its ministers in the present Czechoslovakian Govern ment. Some leaders of t his party emigrated abroad and their attitude changed apparently into an anti-Bolshevik one. Under the chairmans hip of the Czech National Socialist Peter Zenkl, they established In Washington t he so-called ·•councll ot Free Czechoslovaki a." They represent nobody and nothing but their past mismanagement of Czechoslovakia and their desire for the restoration of the ir lost paradise. They well know their real position and. therefore, try to keep tbeir power by political frauds and terror. They denoonce al\ Czech as well as Slovak democrats and Sudeten Germans as fascists. Confidential and false denunciations against their democratic opponents have been their principal political weapon slnce 1939. To give a concrete example of their a ctivities I would like to call your attention to a camp for refugees from Czecho~lovakia in Murnau. Germany, U. S. Zone. In this camp there were democratic Czechs. adherents of the Czech National Committee in London and democratic Slovaks, adherents of the Slovakian National Council Abroad. During one year the adberents of the so-called Council of Free Czechoslovakia in Washington made 241 denunciatlons against thelr democratlc Czech and Slovakian opponents In camp Murnau. The U . S. authorities investigated a ll these denun clatlons and they a ll pro,·ed to be fals"l. �SLOVAXIA Such is the situatlon in . ev~ry camp [or refugees trom Czechoslovakia in Germany. · r can glve you an example of thei·r activltles in the U. S. Lasi year there arrlved In the U. S. the Slovaklan leader Mr. Karol Sldor, who during the war was in clisgrace with tbe German Nazls and was shelterecl In the Vatlcan. An Amerlcan columnist, Mr. Walter Wlnchell, started a public campaign agalnst Sldor denouncing bim falsely as a Nazl. When Mr. WlnchelJ was compelled to say what he knew about Sldor, he <'Onfessed that he knew nothing whatsoever, and that he hati , eceived all his information frÔm Congressman Kleln. But Mr. Kleln also ronfessed to know notbing about Sidor ani! he received all hls informatlon from Mr. Andrew · Valushek. Who is thls gentleman? He ia the manager of the "New-Yorkské Listy", a· Czech newspaper published in New York, which durlng the war was edited by two internaitonal Bolsheviks, Bension Batt and Desider Benau, disguised as " Czechoslovakian democratic refugees."' Mr. Valushek is also the se<'retary of th e American Fund for Czechoslovak RP.fugees, lne.. 1775 Broadway, Room 607, ,'<ew York 19. Among the sponsors or this organlzatlon are Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, Senator H erbert Lehman, Governor Frank J . Lausche, Dorothy Thompson, and others. And Mr. Valushek is also in tbe Executlve Committee o! tbe Anti-Názi League wbose pro-Bolshveik cbaracter is certalnly well known to you. On August 25. 1950, tbe so-calJed "Councll of Free Czechoslovakit1" decided to make evldence or all refugees from Czechoslovakia in Germany'. Tbelr branob organizatlon In Germany i!ssued a circular N<l. 1010-201-Br. on August 31. 1950. in which they stated as follows: "The Council of Free Czechoslovakia ia the only recognized rep. resentative of political refugees from Czechoslovakia. ·. .• We need evidence of all refugees trom Czechoslovakla for their eventual transfer. The Government• requested to take our refugees ask that guarantee for every refugee concerning his politlcal reliability be given. "Please ke„p those who refuse to sign our evldence questionnaire under ca1·eful surveillance, and send us their names.•. .'' People do not want to sign tbe questlonnaires of the so-called Cruncll of Free Czechoslovakla, because they clo not wish to have anything in common wlth it. and they are afraid, conslderlng how ľlosely tbese gentlemen colJaborat!'d wlth the Russian Bolshevlks. 'ľbose who refuse to sign are talsely denounced to tbe U. S. and IRO Junctionaries and persecuted. On tbe ground of their false denunclatlon a Czecb Professor of Law from Prague University was recently d~prived of bis O.P.'s card. They are forcing refugees froro Czechoslova•kla to sign in order to have "evidence" tbat a majority ot retugees from Czecboslovakia are their adherents. I can glve you an example of how they deal with people wbo refuse to be their adherents. At Dijon. France, on September 7, 1950. Karol Vasak. a Czech lay student from Dijon University, was arrestecl by tbe Frencb Police as an alleged aRent of the Soviet Russlan NKVD. His arrest <'ausecl a sensation in Dijon because Vasak was known as an ardent Catbolle, very active in Catboliť organizatlons. Thernfore bis <'lise was publicized in tbe French press. Aťcording to titf> ' '. Aurore" of September 12. 1950, the <'Onstable wbo arreeted Vasak tol<I that n.ewspaper's ťorrespon~ent_: "Va.sak I!>. elther th!' viťtllll ot a tri\- �SLOVAKIA 41 glc mlstake, or he ls such a dlsslmulator as I have never met In roy long police servlce." Thanks to some doubts whlch the police had, Vasak was not transported to Czechoslovak ia, bu t was gtven the c hoice: Czechostovak la or Alglers. or course he chose Alglers, whlther he was deported. Tha nks to the lnterest of French Cathollc circles h ls case was thoroughly lnvestlgated and the "Le Monde" or September 16, 1950, published an article under the headlng: "Arrest ól .Karel Vasak was a result of rlvalry between Czech studenLs." In the meant ime, the French police discovered that Vasak was an ardent antlCommunlst, and that the accusatlon, made agalnst him by two other Cze chs, was talse. But falae alao waa the atatement in " Le Monde"; becauae Vaaak waa denoun ced by two ad herenta of the Councll of Free Czechoalovak la In Waahlngton. Were the Sureté Natlonale to go througb thelr flles, they would {Ind that a tready In 1939 the offlclals of the Czechoslovak la Natlonal Commlttee of Mr. Benes had denounced a ll Czech and Slovaklan antlCommunlsts In France to the French Police as "dangerous Communlst agents." Thls was at the tíme when thls Czechoslovak lan Commltttle was a cover-up organlzatlon for Bolshevlk agents a'n d Mr. RipJ<a, I n hia office at 52 Avenua Bourdonala, Paria, waa hiding an internatlonal Bolahevlk agent, Simon Katz, who was wanted by the F rel)ch police. After the cottapse of France, the same Czech s and Stovaks, who In France were falsely denounced as dangerous communiata, were later confldentlally denounced in Brltaln by tbe same Benes adherents a11 Nazi agents and were imprlsoned, without investlgatlon , by the British. The Vasak affalr in France ls _oi;ily a contlnuatlon o! the late Renes' pollcy: it la a policy of Czech · Ímperlalista who. allied themaelvea with the Ru11ian Bolsheviks, adopted their methoda of 'd~é:elving the enemy, and perfected them with typlcal Czech thoroughne11. On J anuary 25, 1951, there was In Washington a meeflng or th~ so-called Councll or Free Czecboslovak ia, at wblch 17 members out of ľo passed a vote of censure agalnst P eter Zenkt, th e Natlonal Soclali).IL chairman of the Council. Mr. Zenk.l, therefore, declare~ that "the Council of F ree Czechoalovak la had disaolved itaelf and ceased to exist" because " the party syatem proved unworkable and the de le gates of the political parties had been unrepresenta tive anyway." Thls is the way In wbich _Czech Natlonal . Soclallsts understand democracy. 'ľheir conťeption of democracy does 11ot dlffer ffOTU that of German National Socialists. Mr. Zenkl then formed a new organization, th~ Czechoslovak lan Natlonal Commlttee. In thls new Czechoslovak lan Committee, ~r. Zenkl is obvlously the chairman ä~'<f among hls pro• mlnent "Cezchoslova ks" are Messrs. Papanek, Fi'ŕl-Fuerth, General lngr, Felerbend and the brother or the late PťesicÍEľnt Benes. No matter what they call themselves they cannot but conttnue the pollcy, of the late I;lenes _in deceiving the Western public a~d terrorízing polltical refu geea from Czec hoa lovakia. They can do th ls oply because they are sponsored by some prominent Axnerlcans and by offlclals of the U. S. State Department who I am sure mean. well, but are not lnformed. And many <Usasters have happened becau\je or the policy of l!Ome Amerlcans wtio were -not lnformed about :Eu~o,P,e ap<! Russlan Bo)shevlsm. , . ' . ,1 • I would like to call your attention to \he .faci that the actlvlties or these ·•czecboslova ks" are In contradlctlon ' to the U. S. prlnclples �48 SLOVAKIA of democracy and the U. S. historical mlssion in the world. In spite of thls, they are supported by American flnanťes, they have monopoly in broadcasting from tbe IJ. S., and the effect on people in Czecboslovakia is an absolute failure. They have the as ~istance .of the U. $. authorities in Germany and also of the I RO authoritles. their organizations have the monopoly of informing the authorities of Western Governments about refugees from Czechos\ovakia and, wltb thelr a.ssistance, arranged the emigration to tbe U. S. (as well as to Australia, New Zealand and other coun tries) of people who have never been Czecboslovaklan citizens and refugees. Therefore, I tbink tbat tbeir activitles deserve the attention of the United States Sena.te Committee on Un-Amerlcan Activities. Yours faithfully, V. L. BORIN. • • • WH O SAID IT? " CZECHS bow east POLITICALLY but west INTELLECTUALLY . . · . Not behind "Iron Curtain" - Communist police state doubted . . . Soviet withdrawal s een . . . . Most observers bere {In Prague) are incllned to doubt that Russia ig going to try to de•,elop in Czechoslovakia, Austria and Germany the kind of Communist police state that prevalia in Rumania, Bulgaria and Poland. . . . One popular tboory in Prague is tbat the Russians a lways withdraw from the West sooner or later for fear of being contaminated. . . Maybe it ia all just a dream but it ia a pleasant one though anyway a nd the Czeehoslovaks nurse lt Jealously ." - {NEW YORK TIMES, 8-5-47) . • "We are neighbors or Russia. Our security policy depends upon Russla. We bave no choice. . . . But any statement to the effect that we are behlnd a curtain or occupied by the Ru ■sians is absolute nonsense. This country and its poople are ABSOLUTELY DEMOCRATIC and we will remaln so, come what may. . . . We are a typical non. Soviet regime w ith no intention of so becoming. We are sociali!ltic and we w!ll develop along those Unes by evolution. . . But our conception or d emocracy remains the same now as before. . . . 1 am eonvinced th at in two or three years ou r position w ill be ve ry healthy.'' (Dr. Edward Benes, NEW YORK TIMES, 5-7-47) . • " l am genuinely grieved when I see a country like Czechoslovakia lost to the democratic cause. Here is a republic MODELLED AFTER AMERICAN POLITJCAL TRADITIONS BY MEN WHO l,OVED FREEDOM - transformed into a totalitarian Russlan satelIite state. . . . Most of the CZECHS don't like it. but there is nothing they can do about it. Dr. Benes. the able President of the country, has d~cid~ that only c!ose political and economic rela.tlon.,; wltb Communlst Russ la CAN GUARANTEE Czechoslovakla's future . . . . Eaeb time we have stoO<l up against Russia on a matter of prlnciple, she has ma'de CONCESSIONS that, from her point of vie"\!, were generous. I AM CONVlNCED THAT STALIN WANTS FRIEND~1-HP AND COOPERATION WITH BRITAIN AND THE UNITED ~'ľA 'ľE>S." (H. W. Kaltenborn. Radlo Broa<lcast. 7-6-45). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 44 SLOVA.K:IA "FREE" AND "CZECHOSLOVAKIAN" DON'T RHYME ! Not all Czechs insist on the existencť' or Czec·boslovakla, the arti· !icial state establisbed by Czech imperialist,; to exploit the non-Czech nations of that territory wbich were in the majority. 'ľhe Czech National Committee in London, bť'aded by General Leľ Prchala, has been outspoken in this respect for many years. The (ollowing ·'Open Letter" by a member of tbat committee <'ame to us tbc latter part or February. We publish it in full Cor its exposé o[ the COUNCIL :>1<, FREE CZECHOSLOVAKIA whicb poses as a representative group •Jf "democratic" exiles from Czechoslovakla. AN OPEN LETTER From V. L. Borin, Editor of Pravda, and Member of the Czech National Committee, London England, to the Chairman of the United States Senate Committee on Un-American Activities, Washington, D. C. SIR: To support the struggle of alt nations for freerlom became a historical misslon of the U. S. sinťe President Lincoln won his struggle against slavery. Freerlom of nations is tbe principal question in the struggle of Centra! and Southeastern Europeon natlons a!('alnst Bolshevik oppre!;· i,lon. To support their struggle means to repudiate imperialisiil ot any kind and to 1ecognize unconditionally the right to self-dterminatiou of a~l nations on the territory in their ethnographi<'al boundarles and to assist them in their endeavor to form a federation o[ free nations. Some prominent citizens of the U. S. and some officials of the U. S. State Department sup1>ort tbe so-called ·•czechoslc,vaks" and tbeir organizations, givlng them a monopoli!ltic position in the Grew Com· mlttee anrl in American broadcasting Cor Czechoslovakia. The top :lľ· ganization of thE> so-called "C1.ecboslovaks" was, until Jánuary 25, 1951, the Council of Free Cze<'hoslovakia. To say "FREE CZECHOSLOVAKIA'' means to manifest a pro. found hypocrisy, or ignorance. "Free Czechoslovakia" means not freedom for nations in Czechoslovakia, but freedom for Czech imperialists to oppress Sudeten Germans and Hungarians who, in 1919, were forced against their will to live in Czechoslovakia; and to deny the r ight of self-determlnation to Slovaks who joined Czechoslovakia because full autonomy was promised them a promise which was never kept. Tbere are undoubtedly many refugees ft'om Czechoslovakia who maintain that their country was a paradisf' and they are perfectly rigbt [rom tbeir persona] point of view, for tbese were Czechoslova• kian professlonal soldiers, state officials, and rullng pollticlans wbo lost their paradlse. But the nations of Czechoslovakia, including the Czecha, do not wish to have anything in common with the paradise of the Czech imperialista and their state, which brought them from Nazi to Bolshevik SLOVAKIA 46 occupation, from one great to another, greater, disaster. The nations of Czechoslovakia wish to live freely, on equal terms and in a large federation which would be able to protect their fredeom. The leading political party of the Czech imperialists is the Czech National Socialist Party of the late Dr. Benes, which dif[ers from the German National Socialist Party of the late Adolf Hitler in its attitude to Russia. While the German National Socialista were violently anti-Russian, the Czech National Socialists were pro-Russian and consequently pro-Bolshevik, considering Russian Bolshevism (which for propaganda reasons i called Communim) as a new form of pan-Slavism. In thls belief the Czech National Socialists became agents of Russian Bolshevism and during the war their so-called "Czechoslovakian" exiled Government was a Trojan Horse - a Bolshevik Fiftn Column in Great Britain and in the U. S. One of the leaders of the Czech Nationa l Socialists, Mr. Hubert Ripka, broadcast through the B. B. C. on Novembe„ 7, 1942, as fol· lows: "The November revolution turned Russia into a modem state; technically, militarily and politically a powerful s overeign s tate. That revolution did nol only increase the strength of the Russlan Soviet State but it also raised to greater heights than ever before the standard of civilization, culture and living of the wide masses of the Soviet people." T))is !s not an accidental quotation. I can su pply you with a htmdred si milar. In this spirit Czech imperialists spoke and ac ted during the war, making pro-Bol■hevik propaganda among Ame ricans of Czech origin and among Czech people in their motherland. As a result of their activities 40 per cent of Czechs voted pro-Bolshevik in 1946. In February 1948 thP- Czech National Socialist Party split. Th~ Party itsel( still exists in Czechoslovakia. rollaborates with the Bol· sheviks and has its ministers in the present Czechoslovakian Govern ment. Some leaders of t his party emigrated abroad and their attitude changed apparently into an anti-Bolshevik one. Under the chairmans hip of the Czech National Socialist Peter Zenkl, they established In Washington t he so-called ·•councll ot Free Czechoslovaki a." They represent nobody and nothing but their past mismanagement of Czechoslovakia and their desire for the restoration of the ir lost paradise. They well know their real position and. therefore, try to keep tbeir power by political frauds and terror. They denoonce al\ Czech as well as Slovak democrats and Sudeten Germans as fascists. Confidential and false denunciations against their democratic opponents have been their principal political weapon slnce 1939. To give a concrete example of their a ctivities I would like to call your attention to a camp for refugees from Czecho~lovakia in Murnau. Germany, U. S. Zone. In this camp there were democratic Czechs. adherents of the Czech National Committee in London and democratic Slovaks, adherents of the Slovakian National Council Abroad. During one year the adberents of the so-called Council of Free Czechoslovakia in Washington made 241 denunciatlons against thelr democratlc Czech and Slovakian opponents In camp Murnau. The U . S. authorities investigated a ll these denun clatlons and they a ll pro,·ed to be fals"l. SLOVAXIA Such is the situatlon in . ev~ry camp [or refugees trom Czechoslovakia in Germany. · r can glve you an example of thei·r activltles in the U. S. Lasi year there arrlved In the U. S. the Slovaklan leader Mr. Karol Sldor, who during the war was in clisgrace with tbe German Nazls and was shelterecl In the Vatlcan. An Amerlcan columnist, Mr. Walter Wlnchell, started a public campaign agalnst Sldor denouncing bim falsely as a Nazl. When Mr. WlnchelJ was compelled to say what he knew about Sldor, he <'Onfessed that he knew nothing whatsoever, and that he hati , eceived all his information frÔm Congressman Kleln. But Mr. Kleln also ronfessed to know notbing about Sidor ani! he received all hls informatlon from Mr. Andrew · Valushek. Who is thls gentleman? He ia the manager of the "New-Yorkské Listy", a· Czech newspaper published in New York, which durlng the war was edited by two internaitonal Bolsheviks, Bension Batt and Desider Benau, disguised as " Czechoslovakian democratic refugees."' Mr. Valushek is also the se<'retary of th e American Fund for Czechoslovak RP.fugees, lne.. 1775 Broadway, Room 607, ,'<ew York 19. Among the sponsors or this organlzatlon are Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, Senator H erbert Lehman, Governor Frank J . Lausche, Dorothy Thompson, and others. And Mr. Valushek is also in tbe Executlve Committee o! tbe Anti-Názi League wbose pro-Bolshveik cbaracter is certalnly well known to you. On August 25. 1950, tbe so-calJed "Councll of Free Czechoslovakit1" decided to make evldence or all refugees from Czechoslovakia in Germany'. Tbelr branob organizatlon In Germany i!ssued a circular N<l. 1010-201-Br. on August 31. 1950. in which they stated as follows: "The Council of Free Czechoslovakia ia the only recognized rep. resentative of political refugees from Czechoslovakia. ·. .• We need evidence of all refugees trom Czechoslovakla for their eventual transfer. The Government• requested to take our refugees ask that guarantee for every refugee concerning his politlcal reliability be given. "Please ke„p those who refuse to sign our evldence questionnaire under ca1·eful surveillance, and send us their names.•. .'' People do not want to sign tbe questlonnaires of the so-called Cruncll of Free Czechoslovakla, because they clo not wish to have anything in common wlth it. and they are afraid, conslderlng how ľlosely tbese gentlemen colJaborat!'d wlth the Russian Bolshevlks. 'ľbose who refuse to sign are talsely denounced to tbe U. S. and IRO Junctionaries and persecuted. On tbe ground of their false denunclatlon a Czecb Professor of Law from Prague University was recently d~prived of bis O.P.'s card. They are forcing refugees froro Czechoslova•kla to sign in order to have "evidence" tbat a majority ot retugees from Czecboslovakia are their adherents. I can glve you an example of how they deal with people wbo refuse to be their adherents. At Dijon. France, on September 7, 1950. Karol Vasak. a Czech lay student from Dijon University, was arrestecl by tbe Frencb Police as an alleged aRent of the Soviet Russlan NKVD. His arrest <'ausecl a sensation in Dijon because Vasak was known as an ardent Catbolle, very active in Catboliť organizatlons. Thernfore bis <'lise was publicized in tbe French press. Aťcording to titf> ' '. Aurore" of September 12. 1950, the <'Onstable wbo arreeted Vasak tol<I that n.ewspaper's ťorrespon~ent_: "Va.sak I!>. elther th!' viťtllll ot a tri\- SLOVAKIA 41 glc mlstake, or he ls such a dlsslmulator as I have never met In roy long police servlce." Thanks to some doubts whlch the police had, Vasak was not transported to Czechoslovak ia, bu t was gtven the c hoice: Czechostovak la or Alglers. or course he chose Alglers, whlther he was deported. Tha nks to the lnterest of French Cathollc circles h ls case was thoroughly lnvestlgated and the "Le Monde" or September 16, 1950, published an article under the headlng: "Arrest ól .Karel Vasak was a result of rlvalry between Czech studenLs." In the meant ime, the French police discovered that Vasak was an ardent antlCommunlst, and that the accusatlon, made agalnst him by two other Cze chs, was talse. But falae alao waa the atatement in " Le Monde"; becauae Vaaak waa denoun ced by two ad herenta of the Councll of Free Czechoalovak la In Waahlngton. Were the Sureté Natlonale to go througb thelr flles, they would {Ind that a tready In 1939 the offlclals of the Czechoslovak la Natlonal Commlttee of Mr. Benes had denounced a ll Czech and Slovaklan antlCommunlsts In France to the French Police as "dangerous Communlst agents." Thls was at the tíme when thls Czechoslovak lan Commltttle was a cover-up organlzatlon for Bolshevlk agents a'n d Mr. RipJ<a, I n hia office at 52 Avenua Bourdonala, Paria, waa hiding an internatlonal Bolahevlk agent, Simon Katz, who was wanted by the F rel)ch police. After the cottapse of France, the same Czech s and Stovaks, who In France were falsely denounced as dangerous communiata, were later confldentlally denounced in Brltaln by tbe same Benes adherents a11 Nazi agents and were imprlsoned, without investlgatlon , by the British. The Vasak affalr in France ls _oi;ily a contlnuatlon o! the late Renes' pollcy: it la a policy of Czech · Ímperlalista who. allied themaelvea with the Ru11ian Bolsheviks, adopted their methoda of 'd~é:elving the enemy, and perfected them with typlcal Czech thoroughne11. On J anuary 25, 1951, there was In Washington a meeflng or th~ so-called Councll or Free Czecboslovak ia, at wblch 17 members out of ľo passed a vote of censure agalnst P eter Zenkt, th e Natlonal Soclali).IL chairman of the Council. Mr. Zenk.l, therefore, declare~ that "the Council of F ree Czechoalovak la had disaolved itaelf and ceased to exist" because " the party syatem proved unworkable and the de le gates of the political parties had been unrepresenta tive anyway." Thls is the way In wbich _Czech Natlonal . Soclallsts understand democracy. 'ľheir conťeption of democracy does 11ot dlffer ffOTU that of German National Socialists. Mr. Zenkl then formed a new organization, th~ Czechoslovak lan Natlonal Commlttee. In thls new Czechoslovak lan Committee, ~r. Zenkl is obvlously the chairman ä~'<f among hls pro• mlnent "Cezchoslova ks" are Messrs. Papanek, Fi'ŕl-Fuerth, General lngr, Felerbend and the brother or the late PťesicÍEľnt Benes. No matter what they call themselves they cannot but conttnue the pollcy, of the late I;lenes _in deceiving the Western public a~d terrorízing polltical refu geea from Czec hoa lovakia. They can do th ls oply because they are sponsored by some prominent Axnerlcans and by offlclals of the U. S. State Department who I am sure mean. well, but are not lnformed. And many <Usasters have happened becau\je or the policy of l!Ome Amerlcans wtio were -not lnformed about :Eu~o,P,e ap<! Russlan Bo)shevlsm. , . ' . ,1 • I would like to call your attention to \he .faci that the actlvlties or these ·•czecboslova ks" are In contradlctlon ' to the U. S. prlnclples 48 SLOVAKIA of democracy and the U. S. historical mlssion in the world. In spite of thls, they are supported by American flnanťes, they have monopoly in broadcasting from tbe IJ. S., and the effect on people in Czecboslovakia is an absolute failure. They have the as ~istance .of the U. $. authorities in Germany and also of the I RO authoritles. their organizations have the monopoly of informing the authorities of Western Governments about refugees from Czechos\ovakia and, wltb thelr a.ssistance, arranged the emigration to tbe U. S. (as well as to Australia, New Zealand and other coun tries) of people who have never been Czecboslovaklan citizens and refugees. Therefore, I tbink tbat tbeir activitles deserve the attention of the United States Sena.te Committee on Un-Amerlcan Activities. Yours faithfully, V. L. BORIN. • • • WH O SAID IT? " CZECHS bow east POLITICALLY but west INTELLECTUALLY . . · . Not behind "Iron Curtain" - Communist police state doubted . . . Soviet withdrawal s een . . . . Most observers bere {In Prague) are incllned to doubt that Russia ig going to try to de•,elop in Czechoslovakia, Austria and Germany the kind of Communist police state that prevalia in Rumania, Bulgaria and Poland. . . . One popular tboory in Prague is tbat the Russians a lways withdraw from the West sooner or later for fear of being contaminated. . . Maybe it ia all just a dream but it ia a pleasant one though anyway a nd the Czeehoslovaks nurse lt Jealously ." - {NEW YORK TIMES, 8-5-47) . • "We are neighbors or Russia. Our security policy depends upon Russla. We bave no choice. . . . But any statement to the effect that we are behlnd a curtain or occupied by the Ru ■sians is absolute nonsense. This country and its poople are ABSOLUTELY DEMOCRATIC and we will remaln so, come what may. . . . We are a typical non. Soviet regime w ith no intention of so becoming. We are sociali!ltic and we w!ll develop along those Unes by evolution. . . But our conception or d emocracy remains the same now as before. . . . 1 am eonvinced th at in two or three years ou r position w ill be ve ry healthy.'' (Dr. Edward Benes, NEW YORK TIMES, 5-7-47) . • " l am genuinely grieved when I see a country like Czechoslovakia lost to the democratic cause. Here is a republic MODELLED AFTER AMERICAN POLITJCAL TRADITIONS BY MEN WHO l,OVED FREEDOM - transformed into a totalitarian Russlan satelIite state. . . . Most of the CZECHS don't like it. but there is nothing they can do about it. Dr. Benes. the able President of the country, has d~cid~ that only c!ose political and economic rela.tlon.,; wltb Communlst Russ la CAN GUARANTEE Czechoslovakla's future . . . . Eaeb time we have stoO<l up against Russia on a matter of prlnciple, she has ma'de CONCESSIONS that, from her point of vie"\!, were generous. I AM CONVlNCED THAT STALIN WANTS FRIEND~1-HP AND COOPERATION WITH BRITAIN AND THE UNITED ~'ľA 'ľE>S." (H. W. Kaltenborn. Radlo Broa<lcast. 7-6-45).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource "Free" and "Czechoslovakian" Don't Rhyme! Description An account of the resource V. L. Borin Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952 pp. 44-48 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Borin, V. L. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/2cdaac0688357b8c1d5f4f9d35026a92.pdf ef5e9274705487f6301c7fef1bdeed56 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 47 AN HONOR IN SWVAK SEPARA'l1ISM By E. W ., an Amer i c an Stude n t of Centra l E u r opean Polit ics The above title should not cause surprise and if it causes talk, then its main purpose is accompl!shed. Slovak and Czech friends, permit an American who has learned your languages and history to throw a few comments into the .slowly-but-surely boiling pot now termed "separatism." Curiosity arouaed by friends of both nationalities has propelled me headlong into reference books, newspaper research, etc., from the time of SS. Cyril and Methodlus to the present to "look the ground over" of this old question wlth a new face dealing wlth independent statehood for both nations. The study of the past and observation of today's events boil down to the plain fact that neither nation fared too well down the centuries while being tied to another, even in the pre.sent-day tie of two people closely related to each other. Even in a family where two brothers go into a partnershlp it must be understood that to succeed neither must try to get a head of the other; either both must proceed together or both must remain at an even pace. Otherwise, one will soon "lord it" over the other. Now in tbe Slovak and Czech issue, very frankly, both have a list of grievances against the Czechoslovak republ!c, though it is most obvious that the Slovak list is much, much Jonger. And that, breeding dlscontent and an unhealthy atmo• sphere, Jong ago signaled the tíme for a termlnation of all relationshlps before lt comes to blows. In fact, that tíme did come and the Slovaks did get the opportunity for self-rule, but world affairs engulfed and finally rulned the little state and brought it to former surveillance. The loglcal conclusion now, when the fight for freedom is again essential, is to have each nation go its own way, live peacefully apart and stm be good frlends. Actually, ~wo relatives can always be better friends by going to two separate City Halls, churches, markets, etc. Furthe rmore, it is only inherent in every creature as in every nation to be independent, for only in that way can lts polltical, economlc and spiritual rlghts be freely exercised and protected. Two cooks in one kitchen never did too well except to mess it up, and even worse when one gets the honors and the other peels the potatoes. There is no progress in such a system for both, but only for one. Matter of fact, it amazes an outsider that two peoples of such greatly dlfferent temperaments ever did go into such a partnership. The only apparent reason seems to be that the Slovaks after centurles of oppression thought that the Czechs might give them a better deal. The irony was, however, that the Slovak never did get a fair deal, for the big-hearted, good, though a bit naive soul, was made a fool of at every occasion.. No Slovak who went to a federal office bulldlng after 1918 will ever forget when he asked for s omethlng and was told in sing-song fashion "nelze vyhovHi; mluvte po česky" ("Can't help you; speak in Ozech"). But that belongs to the list of grlevances, for whlch the good Czech people are not responslble, but only thelr regime whlch milked the good Slovak cow and insulted lt too. �SLOVAKIA Tbe Slovaks apparently feel confident enougb, as ľm aure all good Czecbs do, to try a little country of thelr own for a change. Tbey feel tbey can succeed at it. And tbey did !rom 1939-194-5. Slnce tbey are certain tbat tbey can run thelr own government, carry on sound economlcs lnternally and in outslde trade, not be afraid to be llttle in tbe midst of big odds, etc., then wby should the larger Bohemla have anytbing to fear in belng a country on lts own? However, and tbis from the record, Bohemia herself was never afrald for she was alwa.ys tbe leader, but only a certain group of ber degenerate, of!iceseeking, renegade "leaders" do not want Bohemia independent, for tben tbere would be less titles and more centralized work (wb at tbat breed never liked), and then there would be no Slovakla to rule and from wbicb to take •·ror free," because tben they would have to pay for everythlng in fair trade. Yes, the fear 1s not in good Czechs, but in some poor ex-leaders wbo would hate to lose Slovakia, the happy huntlng ground for food, labor, graft and taxes. The ill-begotten, Benes-betrayed republic. according to this renegade· group, should continue to exist, holding two un wllllng natlons iu bondage to a regime that dared call itself democratic and pro· gresslve. How democratic was that r egime when a Slovak had no word In it? How progressive was it when it curbed every desire for Slovak independence and wanted to pave the streets of Bratislava with Slovak heads should same attempt at freedom be made? The greatest !ie of the century was the claim that Czechoslovakla was democratlc. Apparently the word sounded good but they didn't know just what it meant. And. tbe fact that "equal" partner Slovakla was beld as a colony and exploited proves the fact. Tbose who fought and stlll flght against Slovak independence are the backward, underoocratic ones, and tbose who figbt for Slovak freedom are the truly democratlc and progresslve ones. Tbls small Czech imperlallstlc group has also coined tbe word "Czechoslovak." Since God never did create such a species of man, lt ls a barefaced insult to H im (but then tbey didn't believe In Hlm) and an insult to every Czecb to be called half a Czech and half a Slovak for tbe same reason. Tbe ,\·hole idea ls ridlculous blologicaUy and morally, as well. Of course, tbe title is a pure, underbanded political scbeme to attempt asslmilatlon of the Slovaks by the Czechs. Had this group any foresight, they would have understood that sucb attempts at assimilation do not work anywhere on earth except in America where dozens of nations make.s lt expedient and even beneficial to assume one name of identification. But In a republlc of only two natlons, and partlcularly in a !and where both natlons never did have too much freedom for centuries, the scheme smeUs of subordlnatlon of one nation to another or ellmlnation of both to create a new breed. Tbat only creates contempt and averslon. Con• sequently, that bright idea has helped to create a good bit of lll• teellng. Equality 1s misconstrued in such a case, because the true concept of equality lies not in adoptlng the name of another natlon but in retalnlng your own and belng irble to go just as far wlth' lt as your neighbor. In any case, however, tbe Slovaks stubbornly re• fused to be assimillated by the Czechs. �SLOVAKlA 49 Next, this same group goes further in the game of antagonizing, but not shamlng the Slovaks, by coining another word "aeparatist" and "aeparatiam" by whlch they thlnk they wlll abuse all freedomloving Slovaks and, perbaps, s quelcb tbelr movement for independence. Anotber rldlculous title wblcb ls so wrong morally, and whicb causes more aversion towards tbe old regime tban a desire to come back to tbe [old. And, to attempt to squelcb or ridicule any at• tempts for justified independence is morally wrong, for it !s a Godgiven rigbt to flght for freedom from evil, In fact, it !s a patriotlc duty to demand freedom. Tbe "Czechoslovak" group apparently fails to comprebend tbat tbe Slovaks wlll never be contented in a republic wltb anotber 11ation, regardless of wbo that migbt be, after they have tasted some freedom, and tbere will always be discontentment wltb wblch tbey will always have to contend, and wbicb will only be a wblp for tbeir own backs. Apparently, bes ides a lack of comprehenslon of the real situatlon, they also fall to admit this truth to themselves and follow through on the obvious and the apparent. The Slovaks have had enougb of subjugatlon, in any form; they do not wish to be a colony; they wísb to "fly alone and fly right." This separatist movement, then, wlll go on untfl klngdom come so long as Slovaks keep hoping and praying for freedom and inde• pendence. Tbe boil has long been rípe but always there were world affalrs and new terrors which forced domestlc problems l nto tbe background. First the Nazis and then the Commles. But after tbat the current discontentment wlll sweep away every trace of a republic of two nations . The Slovaks and Czechs abroad wlll work out thelr indivídua! states and elect thelr own governments, but some or the groundwork can and should be done here to pave a favorable impressíon and receptlon for the two little countries into the western world when the tlme comes for the debut. In the meantime, the group o( "Czechoslovak" agitators !s running hlgh fever to stem the tide of separatlsm and attempt to klll lt b efore Communism is cleaned out. And thelr cbief weapon apparently is bostlle propaganda, abuse and every trick to dlscredit Slovak leaders here and abroad and. particularly, In front of the United Nations and our own American government. To be a separatist is termed by them a crime, and some foollsh people believe them, as do some uninformed American offlclals who at present are too preoccupied with our own affairs to get the facts on the Slovaks. However, that will pass too, and then there will be time to study the matter of the small natlons. Communlsm is our first problem today and Interna] dlsputes must come second for a whlle. This apparently makes the " Czechoslovak" feel confident that lt wlll al• ways be second and that Washington is sold and fooled by tbeir propaganda for the renewal of the old republlc. But tbat !s only Cor tbe time being, definltely. However, wben there w!ll be time to thlnk of small nations and tbeír battles, there will then be time to flnd tbe Slovak truth and botb Czecb and Slovak aversion towards the renewal of a joint republic. How absolutel y ridiculous the "Czechoslovak" group will �60 SLOVA.K.IA look when the facts are analyzed and they flnd they have been abuslng and dlscredltlng an honorable t hing. lf separa t iam ia a crime, they will then be to ld, and rlght In Wa shington, w hat awfu l criminala our forefahera were when they struggied unde r t he Brit iah a nd went t o war a gainst them; what ug ly fanatics they w ere w hen they met and wrote up t he lis t of grievances against Great Britai n a nd finally the Declara t ion of lndepe ndence and the Constitution which formed t h is g reat and wonderful America. - Sepa ra tista of t he first class ! And it is the same wondertul America, founded by separatlsts, which has given a home to such as they and protects thelr wild propaganda under the articJe or freedom of speech even when they a buse those w ho als o fi ght for freedom tro m a regime wors e t han t he old Engl ish crown because it functioned in a more modern, civilized age. In a bus ing a Slovak desire for independence, they ope n ly tell the whole w orld that after all t hese yeara, Amerlca had no rig ht t o independence fro m Brita in. They aJso abuse the memory ot our honorable, brave and tarsighted coJonists, and even Washington who Jed them, for having Jaid the foundation for the greatest nation in the world. ConcJuslveJy, the Americans or 1776 were the greatest separatista on the face or the earth when they wrote the Declaration ot Independence. How blgoted can the "Czechoslovaks" be and just how blind can they be? What troubJe-maklng separatlsts were lhe French with all thelr revoJutlons, and the Irlsh, and the Israelis, and h osts of o thers who waged wars for years untll their voice in the w!lderness was heard. Now that they have won their independence, we praise them for the!r patience, bravery and do au we can to help them and welcome them lnto our world of free natlons. It is a plty, though, that all such separatlsts have to work so hard, pay such great prices for their freedom, when their partners could have granted them thelr liberty from the start, an_d instead of becoming an enemy could have been a benefactor and friend immediateJy. Look around, you who are separatists, Czechs and Slovaks, and see how separatlsm ls golng on today in every field for a better worJd, and how much glorious hlstory ha.s been made by separatista through the centuries, for it is they who turn the wheeJs of progress. It is the separatist from the standard scheme that is enterprlslng, progressive and democratlc in every field. And yet, accordlng to your own papers, the "CzechosJovaks" cJaim that the separatlsts are not democrat!c, progresslve, etc. The tact that t.hey are separatista proves othel'Wise, and the ones who retard their progress are the duJI conservatives, dictatorial and contradictory. Hence, separatista, your Jot ls a glorious and an honorabJe one. There is no shame in wantlng freedom, rather lt is a duty to flght for it, even when your own ldnd curb lt and attempt to dlscredlt you. That, as all things, wiJI pass, and at least by the Jaw ot averages, with your ettorts, the SJovaks musJ, be tree some day. The day ls at your flngertlps to name and reallze. Read your own hlstory and that ot thls land, and you wlll flnd lt full of freedom-lovlng people as yoursel!. There is no shame, then, in belng a separatist, and th!s applles to both Slovaks and Czechs. �SLOVAKIA 61 The Cz.e chs must free themselves of their own leaders who have betrayed them and led them lnto chaos; and they should prepare now to rlse with new leaders, true Czechs, who are lnterested In thelr own people and not with artillatlons wlth powers who would swallow them up. Let them also prove that they do not need Slovakla, that they can subsist wlthout ber, and that they can truly be slsters and exemplary natlons. Leave the renegades and weakllng.s behlnd, and forge ahead lnto new horlzons, not back to stale systems that wlll hurt all over agaln. Come up wlth new leaders, fresh leaders, pro• gresslve leaders who aren't afrald to live alone. A separatlst move• ment should be as strong among Czechs as among the Slovaks. Form two nations as friends, not one republic as enemies. And, to those that want the old republlc and are waltlng to re• sume office, and to those who trumpet this false ldeology on reams and reams of paper to keep such a degenerate idea allve, conslder how foolish you sound now when you think you abuse good people by calling them separatists and think you are plnnlng a crlme to thelr backs when actually you are flatterlng them and placlng them lnto a glorious classlflcation. Consider how even more foollsh you wlll feel when all your evll, dlrty work of dlscredlting wlll ltself be discredited and separatlsm will after all win out and produce some• t hlng decent and fine which the old republlc was not capable ot do· ing. And above all, you are not only politically but also morally wrong, as are all who curb movements for freedom. The separatlsts are the real democrats and progressives, for it !s they who want freedom and democracy and not you who want to bind two natlons lnto an outdated and hated republic. Yours !s only a cause of contradlction and stubborn hate to preserve something that 1s rotten trom the core. For every move to stamp out independent ideas you only acquire new enemies, and the more enemies the more stronger the separatlsts; and the more ot those, the sooner two independent countrles wlll be formed. Any decent Czech w!ll tllll you that the old republlc was a ml.stake and "just not right," and any decent Slovak, by God• insplred love of country, automatlca\ly wants independence for hls natlon. What percentage then do you rea\ly have In your camp? 5 per cent or even less? And a Gallup poli is not needed to reallze that, inherently, the Slovak wants hls own government and country! Any Slovak that wants the old Czechoslovak republlc !s a twisted and spoiled breed that, frankly, even the Czechs ot the old regime should not care to associate with and form a partnersh!p wlth. That rene• gade type, wlth shame must be admitted, count up to a fractlon ot one percent of all Slovaks, no more. It !s amazing and tantastic, that with this tiny group then, the old regime wants to form a republlc. How will they contend with the rest? Satan himself has walked about the earth sowing dissenslon and oppre.ssion. Those who curb freedom anrl abuse thoše who flgbt for it, must once reap Satan's trash. The floor o[ every ball is yours, separatists„ and the movement i~ yours to complete and the fruits of lndependence wlll be yours to enjoy. This 1s the exhortatlon of an A.m erlcan whose studles prove you ha.ve a cause - a just and holy cause. �52 SLOVAKIA WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO "By executing Dr. Tiso, priest-presldent of wartlme Slovakia, the Czechoslov.ak governm ent of Dr. Beneš h as turned t he clock of civilizatlon back a few centuries in Czecho-Slovakia. T he mu rder of this gallant and upright Slovak leader and exemplary priest, w ho remained wlth b is people under the most trying condltions, by Dr. Edward Beneš, who resigned as president of his country and surrendered it 'in toto' to the Nazis, must s hock every Christian and every believer In the democratic way of life. Tbe infamous act of th e Beneš governm ent rightfully deserves the »evere.st condemnation of all righteous people." - Stephen Šuhaj čik, Councilman Second W ard, Cleveland, Ohio, April 1947. • • • "MURDER IN SLOVAKIA" ( From the speech of Hon. Alvin E . O' Konski of Wisconsin, in the House of Representati ves, Wednesday, Aprí l 23, 1947) . Mr. Speaker, the recent hanging by the Communists of Czech0slovakia of the brave and gallant Monsignor Joseph Tiso was murder in its most ghastl y and shameful form.••• But the hanging of Monsignor Tiso itself is not the greatest tragedy. The greatest tragedy is the silence by our American President and by our American State Department while this murder was going o n. Our Government gave the Czec hosl ovakian Government hundreds of million of dollars in the past two years. We are going to give them mi llions of dollars more. Vet, with this giving of millions of dollars to the Government of Czechoslovakia, our President and our State Department are not even men enough to stand up and protest against this murder by the Soviets. AII of this leads me to believe that the l eaders of our country in the White House and in our State Department no longer understand the meaning of the term " honor." Monsignor Tiso is dead. H e was murdered. Whi l e he was murd ered America was sil ent. The day is not very far distant when these American leaders will regret their silence. The day may come and may be too soon when these leaders who were so shamefully silent wi l l b e treated the same way that Monsignor Tiso and Bishop Ste• panic and General Mihailovitc h were treated. Then maybe there will be protests. But then it wi II be too late. Frankly, 1 do not think America coulá have saved the life of Monsignor Tiso. But I am ashamed that my country did not even have the decency and honor to file a protest just for the record. By some miracl e suc h a protest might have at least postponed the exec utio n. Here in Ame r i ca our o fficials grant our basest cr i minals a stay of execution. The least that our national leaders could have done i s f ile a p lea for the same consideration for a Christian lover of freedom M onsignor T i so whose only c rime was that he hated Communi sm just as he hated nazism. But Ameri ca remains silent and murder has free sway. � SLOVAKIA 47 AN HONOR IN SWVAK SEPARA'l1ISM By E. W ., an Amer i c an Stude n t of Centra l E u r opean Polit ics The above title should not cause surprise and if it causes talk, then its main purpose is accompl!shed. Slovak and Czech friends, permit an American who has learned your languages and history to throw a few comments into the .slowly-but-surely boiling pot now termed "separatism." Curiosity arouaed by friends of both nationalities has propelled me headlong into reference books, newspaper research, etc., from the time of SS. Cyril and Methodlus to the present to "look the ground over" of this old question wlth a new face dealing wlth independent statehood for both nations. The study of the past and observation of today's events boil down to the plain fact that neither nation fared too well down the centuries while being tied to another, even in the pre.sent-day tie of two people closely related to each other. Even in a family where two brothers go into a partnershlp it must be understood that to succeed neither must try to get a head of the other; either both must proceed together or both must remain at an even pace. Otherwise, one will soon "lord it" over the other. Now in tbe Slovak and Czech issue, very frankly, both have a list of grievances against the Czechoslovak republ!c, though it is most obvious that the Slovak list is much, much Jonger. And that, breeding dlscontent and an unhealthy atmo• sphere, Jong ago signaled the tíme for a termlnation of all relationshlps before lt comes to blows. In fact, that tíme did come and the Slovaks did get the opportunity for self-rule, but world affairs engulfed and finally rulned the little state and brought it to former surveillance. The loglcal conclusion now, when the fight for freedom is again essential, is to have each nation go its own way, live peacefully apart and stm be good frlends. Actually, ~wo relatives can always be better friends by going to two separate City Halls, churches, markets, etc. Furthe rmore, it is only inherent in every creature as in every nation to be independent, for only in that way can lts polltical, economlc and spiritual rlghts be freely exercised and protected. Two cooks in one kitchen never did too well except to mess it up, and even worse when one gets the honors and the other peels the potatoes. There is no progress in such a system for both, but only for one. Matter of fact, it amazes an outsider that two peoples of such greatly dlfferent temperaments ever did go into such a partnership. The only apparent reason seems to be that the Slovaks after centurles of oppression thought that the Czechs might give them a better deal. The irony was, however, that the Slovak never did get a fair deal, for the big-hearted, good, though a bit naive soul, was made a fool of at every occasion.. No Slovak who went to a federal office bulldlng after 1918 will ever forget when he asked for s omethlng and was told in sing-song fashion "nelze vyhovHi; mluvte po česky" ("Can't help you; speak in Ozech"). But that belongs to the list of grlevances, for whlch the good Czech people are not responslble, but only thelr regime whlch milked the good Slovak cow and insulted lt too. �SLOVAKIA Tbe Slovaks apparently feel confident enougb, as ľm aure all good Czecbs do, to try a little country of thelr own for a change. Tbey feel tbey can succeed at it. And tbey did !rom 1939-194-5. Slnce tbey are certain tbat tbey can run thelr own government, carry on sound economlcs lnternally and in outslde trade, not be afraid to be llttle in tbe midst of big odds, etc., then wby should the larger Bohemla have anytbing to fear in belng a country on lts own? However, and tbis from the record, Bohemia herself was never afrald for she was alwa.ys tbe leader, but only a certain group of ber degenerate, of!iceseeking, renegade "leaders" do not want Bohemia independent, for tben tbere would be less titles and more centralized work (wb at tbat breed never liked), and then there would be no Slovakla to rule and from wbicb to take •·ror free," because tben they would have to pay for everythlng in fair trade. Yes, the fear 1s not in good Czechs, but in some poor ex-leaders wbo would hate to lose Slovakia, the happy huntlng ground for food, labor, graft and taxes. The ill-begotten, Benes-betrayed republic. according to this renegade· group, should continue to exist, holding two un wllllng natlons iu bondage to a regime that dared call itself democratic and pro· gresslve. How democratic was that r egime when a Slovak had no word In it? How progressive was it when it curbed every desire for Slovak independence and wanted to pave the streets of Bratislava with Slovak heads should same attempt at freedom be made? The greatest !ie of the century was the claim that Czechoslovakla was democratlc. Apparently the word sounded good but they didn't know just what it meant. And. tbe fact that "equal" partner Slovakla was beld as a colony and exploited proves the fact. Tbose who fought and stlll flght against Slovak independence are the backward, underoocratic ones, and tbose who figbt for Slovak freedom are the truly democratlc and progresslve ones. Tbls small Czech imperlallstlc group has also coined tbe word "Czechoslovak." Since God never did create such a species of man, lt ls a barefaced insult to H im (but then tbey didn't believe In Hlm) and an insult to every Czecb to be called half a Czech and half a Slovak for tbe same reason. Tbe ,\·hole idea ls ridlculous blologicaUy and morally, as well. Of course, tbe title is a pure, underbanded political scbeme to attempt asslmilatlon of the Slovaks by the Czechs. Had this group any foresight, they would have understood that sucb attempts at assimilation do not work anywhere on earth except in America where dozens of nations make.s lt expedient and even beneficial to assume one name of identification. But In a republlc of only two natlons, and partlcularly in a !and where both natlons never did have too much freedom for centuries, the scheme smeUs of subordlnatlon of one nation to another or ellmlnation of both to create a new breed. Tbat only creates contempt and averslon. Con• sequently, that bright idea has helped to create a good bit of lll• teellng. Equality 1s misconstrued in such a case, because the true concept of equality lies not in adoptlng the name of another natlon but in retalnlng your own and belng irble to go just as far wlth' lt as your neighbor. In any case, however, tbe Slovaks stubbornly re• fused to be assimillated by the Czechs. �SLOVAKlA 49 Next, this same group goes further in the game of antagonizing, but not shamlng the Slovaks, by coining another word "aeparatist" and "aeparatiam" by whlch they thlnk they wlll abuse all freedomloving Slovaks and, perbaps, s quelcb tbelr movement for independence. Anotber rldlculous title wblcb ls so wrong morally, and whicb causes more aversion towards tbe old regime tban a desire to come back to tbe [old. And, to attempt to squelcb or ridicule any at• tempts for justified independence is morally wrong, for it !s a Godgiven rigbt to flght for freedom from evil, In fact, it !s a patriotlc duty to demand freedom. Tbe "Czechoslovak" group apparently fails to comprebend tbat tbe Slovaks wlll never be contented in a republic wltb anotber 11ation, regardless of wbo that migbt be, after they have tasted some freedom, and tbere will always be discontentment wltb wblch tbey will always have to contend, and wbicb will only be a wblp for tbeir own backs. Apparently, bes ides a lack of comprehenslon of the real situatlon, they also fall to admit this truth to themselves and follow through on the obvious and the apparent. The Slovaks have had enougb of subjugatlon, in any form; they do not wish to be a colony; they wísb to "fly alone and fly right." This separatist movement, then, wlll go on untfl klngdom come so long as Slovaks keep hoping and praying for freedom and inde• pendence. Tbe boil has long been rípe but always there were world affalrs and new terrors which forced domestlc problems l nto tbe background. First the Nazis and then the Commles. But after tbat the current discontentment wlll sweep away every trace of a republic of two nations . The Slovaks and Czechs abroad wlll work out thelr indivídua! states and elect thelr own governments, but some or the groundwork can and should be done here to pave a favorable impressíon and receptlon for the two little countries into the western world when the tlme comes for the debut. In the meantime, the group o( "Czechoslovak" agitators !s running hlgh fever to stem the tide of separatlsm and attempt to klll lt b efore Communism is cleaned out. And thelr cbief weapon apparently is bostlle propaganda, abuse and every trick to dlscredit Slovak leaders here and abroad and. particularly, In front of the United Nations and our own American government. To be a separatist is termed by them a crime, and some foollsh people believe them, as do some uninformed American offlclals who at present are too preoccupied with our own affairs to get the facts on the Slovaks. However, that will pass too, and then there will be time to study the matter of the small natlons. Communlsm is our first problem today and Interna] dlsputes must come second for a whlle. This apparently makes the " Czechoslovak" feel confident that lt wlll al• ways be second and that Washington is sold and fooled by tbeir propaganda for the renewal of the old republlc. But tbat !s only Cor tbe time being, definltely. However, wben there w!ll be time to thlnk of small nations and tbeír battles, there will then be time to flnd tbe Slovak truth and botb Czecb and Slovak aversion towards the renewal of a joint republic. How absolutel y ridiculous the "Czechoslovak" group will �60 SLOVA.K.IA look when the facts are analyzed and they flnd they have been abuslng and dlscredltlng an honorable t hing. lf separa t iam ia a crime, they will then be to ld, and rlght In Wa shington, w hat awfu l criminala our forefahera were when they struggied unde r t he Brit iah a nd went t o war a gainst them; what ug ly fanatics they w ere w hen they met and wrote up t he lis t of grievances against Great Britai n a nd finally the Declara t ion of lndepe ndence and the Constitution which formed t h is g reat and wonderful America. - Sepa ra tista of t he first class ! And it is the same wondertul America, founded by separatlsts, which has given a home to such as they and protects thelr wild propaganda under the articJe or freedom of speech even when they a buse those w ho als o fi ght for freedom tro m a regime wors e t han t he old Engl ish crown because it functioned in a more modern, civilized age. In a bus ing a Slovak desire for independence, they ope n ly tell the whole w orld that after all t hese yeara, Amerlca had no rig ht t o independence fro m Brita in. They aJso abuse the memory ot our honorable, brave and tarsighted coJonists, and even Washington who Jed them, for having Jaid the foundation for the greatest nation in the world. ConcJuslveJy, the Americans or 1776 were the greatest separatista on the face or the earth when they wrote the Declaration ot Independence. How blgoted can the "Czechoslovaks" be and just how blind can they be? What troubJe-maklng separatlsts were lhe French with all thelr revoJutlons, and the Irlsh, and the Israelis, and h osts of o thers who waged wars for years untll their voice in the w!lderness was heard. Now that they have won their independence, we praise them for the!r patience, bravery and do au we can to help them and welcome them lnto our world of free natlons. It is a plty, though, that all such separatlsts have to work so hard, pay such great prices for their freedom, when their partners could have granted them thelr liberty from the start, an_d instead of becoming an enemy could have been a benefactor and friend immediateJy. Look around, you who are separatists, Czechs and Slovaks, and see how separatlsm ls golng on today in every field for a better worJd, and how much glorious hlstory ha.s been made by separatista through the centuries, for it is they who turn the wheeJs of progress. It is the separatist from the standard scheme that is enterprlslng, progressive and democratlc in every field. And yet, accordlng to your own papers, the "CzechosJovaks" cJaim that the separatlsts are not democrat!c, progresslve, etc. The tact that t.hey are separatista proves othel'Wise, and the ones who retard their progress are the duJI conservatives, dictatorial and contradictory. Hence, separatista, your Jot ls a glorious and an honorabJe one. There is no shame in wantlng freedom, rather lt is a duty to flght for it, even when your own ldnd curb lt and attempt to dlscredlt you. That, as all things, wiJI pass, and at least by the Jaw ot averages, with your ettorts, the SJovaks musJ, be tree some day. The day ls at your flngertlps to name and reallze. Read your own hlstory and that ot thls land, and you wlll flnd lt full of freedom-lovlng people as yoursel!. There is no shame, then, in belng a separatist, and th!s applles to both Slovaks and Czechs. �SLOVAKIA 61 The Cz.e chs must free themselves of their own leaders who have betrayed them and led them lnto chaos; and they should prepare now to rlse with new leaders, true Czechs, who are lnterested In thelr own people and not with artillatlons wlth powers who would swallow them up. Let them also prove that they do not need Slovakla, that they can subsist wlthout ber, and that they can truly be slsters and exemplary natlons. Leave the renegades and weakllng.s behlnd, and forge ahead lnto new horlzons, not back to stale systems that wlll hurt all over agaln. Come up wlth new leaders, fresh leaders, pro• gresslve leaders who aren't afrald to live alone. A separatlst move• ment should be as strong among Czechs as among the Slovaks. Form two nations as friends, not one republic as enemies. And, to those that want the old republlc and are waltlng to re• sume office, and to those who trumpet this false ldeology on reams and reams of paper to keep such a degenerate idea allve, conslder how foolish you sound now when you think you abuse good people by calling them separatists and think you are plnnlng a crlme to thelr backs when actually you are flatterlng them and placlng them lnto a glorious classlflcation. Consider how even more foollsh you wlll feel when all your evll, dlrty work of dlscredlting wlll ltself be discredited and separatlsm will after all win out and produce some• t hlng decent and fine which the old republlc was not capable ot do· ing. And above all, you are not only politically but also morally wrong, as are all who curb movements for freedom. The separatlsts are the real democrats and progressives, for it !s they who want freedom and democracy and not you who want to bind two natlons lnto an outdated and hated republic. Yours !s only a cause of contradlction and stubborn hate to preserve something that 1s rotten trom the core. For every move to stamp out independent ideas you only acquire new enemies, and the more enemies the more stronger the separatlsts; and the more ot those, the sooner two independent countrles wlll be formed. Any decent Czech w!ll tllll you that the old republlc was a ml.stake and "just not right," and any decent Slovak, by God• insplred love of country, automatlca\ly wants independence for hls natlon. What percentage then do you rea\ly have In your camp? 5 per cent or even less? And a Gallup poli is not needed to reallze that, inherently, the Slovak wants hls own government and country! Any Slovak that wants the old Czechoslovak republlc !s a twisted and spoiled breed that, frankly, even the Czechs ot the old regime should not care to associate with and form a partnersh!p wlth. That rene• gade type, wlth shame must be admitted, count up to a fractlon ot one percent of all Slovaks, no more. It !s amazing and tantastic, that with this tiny group then, the old regime wants to form a republlc. How will they contend with the rest? Satan himself has walked about the earth sowing dissenslon and oppre.ssion. Those who curb freedom anrl abuse thoše who flgbt for it, must once reap Satan's trash. The floor o[ every ball is yours, separatists„ and the movement i~ yours to complete and the fruits of lndependence wlll be yours to enjoy. This 1s the exhortatlon of an A.m erlcan whose studles prove you ha.ve a cause - a just and holy cause. �52 SLOVAKIA WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO "By executing Dr. Tiso, priest-presldent of wartlme Slovakia, the Czechoslov.ak governm ent of Dr. Beneš h as turned t he clock of civilizatlon back a few centuries in Czecho-Slovakia. T he mu rder of this gallant and upright Slovak leader and exemplary priest, w ho remained wlth b is people under the most trying condltions, by Dr. Edward Beneš, who resigned as president of his country and surrendered it 'in toto' to the Nazis, must s hock every Christian and every believer In the democratic way of life. Tbe infamous act of th e Beneš governm ent rightfully deserves the »evere.st condemnation of all righteous people." - Stephen Šuhaj čik, Councilman Second W ard, Cleveland, Ohio, April 1947. • • • "MURDER IN SLOVAKIA" ( From the speech of Hon. Alvin E . O' Konski of Wisconsin, in the House of Representati ves, Wednesday, Aprí l 23, 1947) . Mr. Speaker, the recent hanging by the Communists of Czech0slovakia of the brave and gallant Monsignor Joseph Tiso was murder in its most ghastl y and shameful form.••• But the hanging of Monsignor Tiso itself is not the greatest tragedy. The greatest tragedy is the silence by our American President and by our American State Department while this murder was going o n. Our Government gave the Czec hosl ovakian Government hundreds of million of dollars in the past two years. We are going to give them mi llions of dollars more. Vet, with this giving of millions of dollars to the Government of Czechoslovakia, our President and our State Department are not even men enough to stand up and protest against this murder by the Soviets. AII of this leads me to believe that the l eaders of our country in the White House and in our State Department no longer understand the meaning of the term " honor." Monsignor Tiso is dead. H e was murdered. Whi l e he was murd ered America was sil ent. The day is not very far distant when these American leaders will regret their silence. The day may come and may be too soon when these leaders who were so shamefully silent wi l l b e treated the same way that Monsignor Tiso and Bishop Ste• panic and General Mihailovitc h were treated. Then maybe there will be protests. But then it wi II be too late. Frankly, 1 do not think America coulá have saved the life of Monsignor Tiso. But I am ashamed that my country did not even have the decency and honor to file a protest just for the record. By some miracl e suc h a protest might have at least postponed the exec utio n. Here in Ame r i ca our o fficials grant our basest cr i minals a stay of execution. The least that our national leaders could have done i s f ile a p lea for the same consideration for a Christian lover of freedom M onsignor T i so whose only c rime was that he hated Communi sm just as he hated nazism. But Ameri ca remains silent and murder has free sway. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 47 AN HONOR IN SWVAK SEPARA'l1ISM By E. W ., an Amer i c an Stude n t of Centra l E u r opean Polit ics The above title should not cause surprise and if it causes talk, then its main purpose is accompl!shed. Slovak and Czech friends, permit an American who has learned your languages and history to throw a few comments into the .slowly-but-surely boiling pot now termed "separatism." Curiosity arouaed by friends of both nationalities has propelled me headlong into reference books, newspaper research, etc., from the time of SS. Cyril and Methodlus to the present to "look the ground over" of this old question wlth a new face dealing wlth independent statehood for both nations. The study of the past and observation of today's events boil down to the plain fact that neither nation fared too well down the centuries while being tied to another, even in the pre.sent-day tie of two people closely related to each other. Even in a family where two brothers go into a partnershlp it must be understood that to succeed neither must try to get a head of the other; either both must proceed together or both must remain at an even pace. Otherwise, one will soon "lord it" over the other. Now in tbe Slovak and Czech issue, very frankly, both have a list of grievances against the Czechoslovak republ!c, though it is most obvious that the Slovak list is much, much Jonger. And that, breeding dlscontent and an unhealthy atmo• sphere, Jong ago signaled the tíme for a termlnation of all relationshlps before lt comes to blows. In fact, that tíme did come and the Slovaks did get the opportunity for self-rule, but world affairs engulfed and finally rulned the little state and brought it to former surveillance. The loglcal conclusion now, when the fight for freedom is again essential, is to have each nation go its own way, live peacefully apart and stm be good frlends. Actually, ~wo relatives can always be better friends by going to two separate City Halls, churches, markets, etc. Furthe rmore, it is only inherent in every creature as in every nation to be independent, for only in that way can lts polltical, economlc and spiritual rlghts be freely exercised and protected. Two cooks in one kitchen never did too well except to mess it up, and even worse when one gets the honors and the other peels the potatoes. There is no progress in such a system for both, but only for one. Matter of fact, it amazes an outsider that two peoples of such greatly dlfferent temperaments ever did go into such a partnership. The only apparent reason seems to be that the Slovaks after centurles of oppression thought that the Czechs might give them a better deal. The irony was, however, that the Slovak never did get a fair deal, for the big-hearted, good, though a bit naive soul, was made a fool of at every occasion.. No Slovak who went to a federal office bulldlng after 1918 will ever forget when he asked for s omethlng and was told in sing-song fashion "nelze vyhovHi; mluvte po česky" ("Can't help you; speak in Ozech"). But that belongs to the list of grlevances, for whlch the good Czech people are not responslble, but only thelr regime whlch milked the good Slovak cow and insulted lt too. SLOVAKIA Tbe Slovaks apparently feel confident enougb, as ľm aure all good Czecbs do, to try a little country of thelr own for a change. Tbey feel tbey can succeed at it. And tbey did !rom 1939-194-5. Slnce tbey are certain tbat tbey can run thelr own government, carry on sound economlcs lnternally and in outslde trade, not be afraid to be llttle in tbe midst of big odds, etc., then wby should the larger Bohemla have anytbing to fear in belng a country on lts own? However, and tbis from the record, Bohemia herself was never afrald for she was alwa.ys tbe leader, but only a certain group of ber degenerate, of!iceseeking, renegade "leaders" do not want Bohemia independent, for tben tbere would be less titles and more centralized work (wb at tbat breed never liked), and then there would be no Slovakla to rule and from wbicb to take •·ror free," because tben they would have to pay for everythlng in fair trade. Yes, the fear 1s not in good Czechs, but in some poor ex-leaders wbo would hate to lose Slovakia, the happy huntlng ground for food, labor, graft and taxes. The ill-begotten, Benes-betrayed republic. according to this renegade· group, should continue to exist, holding two un wllllng natlons iu bondage to a regime that dared call itself democratic and pro· gresslve. How democratic was that r egime when a Slovak had no word In it? How progressive was it when it curbed every desire for Slovak independence and wanted to pave the streets of Bratislava with Slovak heads should same attempt at freedom be made? The greatest !ie of the century was the claim that Czechoslovakla was democratlc. Apparently the word sounded good but they didn't know just what it meant. And. tbe fact that "equal" partner Slovakla was beld as a colony and exploited proves the fact. Tbose who fought and stlll flght against Slovak independence are the backward, underoocratic ones, and tbose who figbt for Slovak freedom are the truly democratlc and progresslve ones. Tbls small Czech imperlallstlc group has also coined tbe word "Czechoslovak." Since God never did create such a species of man, lt ls a barefaced insult to H im (but then tbey didn't believe In Hlm) and an insult to every Czecb to be called half a Czech and half a Slovak for tbe same reason. Tbe ,\·hole idea ls ridlculous blologicaUy and morally, as well. Of course, tbe title is a pure, underbanded political scbeme to attempt asslmilatlon of the Slovaks by the Czechs. Had this group any foresight, they would have understood that sucb attempts at assimilation do not work anywhere on earth except in America where dozens of nations make.s lt expedient and even beneficial to assume one name of identification. But In a republlc of only two natlons, and partlcularly in a !and where both natlons never did have too much freedom for centuries, the scheme smeUs of subordlnatlon of one nation to another or ellmlnation of both to create a new breed. Tbat only creates contempt and averslon. Con• sequently, that bright idea has helped to create a good bit of lll• teellng. Equality 1s misconstrued in such a case, because the true concept of equality lies not in adoptlng the name of another natlon but in retalnlng your own and belng irble to go just as far wlth' lt as your neighbor. In any case, however, tbe Slovaks stubbornly re• fused to be assimillated by the Czechs. SLOVAKlA 49 Next, this same group goes further in the game of antagonizing, but not shamlng the Slovaks, by coining another word "aeparatist" and "aeparatiam" by whlch they thlnk they wlll abuse all freedomloving Slovaks and, perbaps, s quelcb tbelr movement for independence. Anotber rldlculous title wblcb ls so wrong morally, and whicb causes more aversion towards tbe old regime tban a desire to come back to tbe [old. And, to attempt to squelcb or ridicule any at• tempts for justified independence is morally wrong, for it !s a Godgiven rigbt to flght for freedom from evil, In fact, it !s a patriotlc duty to demand freedom. Tbe "Czechoslovak" group apparently fails to comprebend tbat tbe Slovaks wlll never be contented in a republic wltb anotber 11ation, regardless of wbo that migbt be, after they have tasted some freedom, and tbere will always be discontentment wltb wblch tbey will always have to contend, and wbicb will only be a wblp for tbeir own backs. Apparently, bes ides a lack of comprehenslon of the real situatlon, they also fall to admit this truth to themselves and follow through on the obvious and the apparent. The Slovaks have had enougb of subjugatlon, in any form; they do not wish to be a colony; they wísb to "fly alone and fly right." This separatist movement, then, wlll go on untfl klngdom come so long as Slovaks keep hoping and praying for freedom and inde• pendence. Tbe boil has long been rípe but always there were world affalrs and new terrors which forced domestlc problems l nto tbe background. First the Nazis and then the Commles. But after tbat the current discontentment wlll sweep away every trace of a republic of two nations . The Slovaks and Czechs abroad wlll work out thelr indivídua! states and elect thelr own governments, but some or the groundwork can and should be done here to pave a favorable impressíon and receptlon for the two little countries into the western world when the tlme comes for the debut. In the meantime, the group o( "Czechoslovak" agitators !s running hlgh fever to stem the tide of separatlsm and attempt to klll lt b efore Communism is cleaned out. And thelr cbief weapon apparently is bostlle propaganda, abuse and every trick to dlscredit Slovak leaders here and abroad and. particularly, In front of the United Nations and our own American government. To be a separatist is termed by them a crime, and some foollsh people believe them, as do some uninformed American offlclals who at present are too preoccupied with our own affairs to get the facts on the Slovaks. However, that will pass too, and then there will be time to study the matter of the small natlons. Communlsm is our first problem today and Interna] dlsputes must come second for a whlle. This apparently makes the " Czechoslovak" feel confident that lt wlll al• ways be second and that Washington is sold and fooled by tbeir propaganda for the renewal of the old republlc. But tbat !s only Cor tbe time being, definltely. However, wben there w!ll be time to thlnk of small nations and tbeír battles, there will then be time to flnd tbe Slovak truth and botb Czecb and Slovak aversion towards the renewal of a joint republic. How absolutel y ridiculous the "Czechoslovak" group will 60 SLOVA.K.IA look when the facts are analyzed and they flnd they have been abuslng and dlscredltlng an honorable t hing. lf separa t iam ia a crime, they will then be to ld, and rlght In Wa shington, w hat awfu l criminala our forefahera were when they struggied unde r t he Brit iah a nd went t o war a gainst them; what ug ly fanatics they w ere w hen they met and wrote up t he lis t of grievances against Great Britai n a nd finally the Declara t ion of lndepe ndence and the Constitution which formed t h is g reat and wonderful America. - Sepa ra tista of t he first class ! And it is the same wondertul America, founded by separatlsts, which has given a home to such as they and protects thelr wild propaganda under the articJe or freedom of speech even when they a buse those w ho als o fi ght for freedom tro m a regime wors e t han t he old Engl ish crown because it functioned in a more modern, civilized age. In a bus ing a Slovak desire for independence, they ope n ly tell the whole w orld that after all t hese yeara, Amerlca had no rig ht t o independence fro m Brita in. They aJso abuse the memory ot our honorable, brave and tarsighted coJonists, and even Washington who Jed them, for having Jaid the foundation for the greatest nation in the world. ConcJuslveJy, the Americans or 1776 were the greatest separatista on the face or the earth when they wrote the Declaration ot Independence. How blgoted can the "Czechoslovaks" be and just how blind can they be? What troubJe-maklng separatlsts were lhe French with all thelr revoJutlons, and the Irlsh, and the Israelis, and h osts of o thers who waged wars for years untll their voice in the w!lderness was heard. Now that they have won their independence, we praise them for the!r patience, bravery and do au we can to help them and welcome them lnto our world of free natlons. It is a plty, though, that all such separatlsts have to work so hard, pay such great prices for their freedom, when their partners could have granted them thelr liberty from the start, an_d instead of becoming an enemy could have been a benefactor and friend immediateJy. Look around, you who are separatists, Czechs and Slovaks, and see how separatlsm ls golng on today in every field for a better worJd, and how much glorious hlstory ha.s been made by separatista through the centuries, for it is they who turn the wheeJs of progress. It is the separatist from the standard scheme that is enterprlslng, progressive and democratlc in every field. And yet, accordlng to your own papers, the "CzechosJovaks" cJaim that the separatlsts are not democrat!c, progresslve, etc. The tact that t.hey are separatista proves othel'Wise, and the ones who retard their progress are the duJI conservatives, dictatorial and contradictory. Hence, separatista, your Jot ls a glorious and an honorabJe one. There is no shame in wantlng freedom, rather lt is a duty to flght for it, even when your own ldnd curb lt and attempt to dlscredlt you. That, as all things, wiJI pass, and at least by the Jaw ot averages, with your ettorts, the SJovaks musJ, be tree some day. The day ls at your flngertlps to name and reallze. Read your own hlstory and that ot thls land, and you wlll flnd lt full of freedom-lovlng people as yoursel!. There is no shame, then, in belng a separatist, and th!s applles to both Slovaks and Czechs. SLOVAKIA 61 The Cz.e chs must free themselves of their own leaders who have betrayed them and led them lnto chaos; and they should prepare now to rlse with new leaders, true Czechs, who are lnterested In thelr own people and not with artillatlons wlth powers who would swallow them up. Let them also prove that they do not need Slovakla, that they can subsist wlthout ber, and that they can truly be slsters and exemplary natlons. Leave the renegades and weakllng.s behlnd, and forge ahead lnto new horlzons, not back to stale systems that wlll hurt all over agaln. Come up wlth new leaders, fresh leaders, pro• gresslve leaders who aren't afrald to live alone. A separatlst move• ment should be as strong among Czechs as among the Slovaks. Form two nations as friends, not one republic as enemies. And, to those that want the old republlc and are waltlng to re• sume office, and to those who trumpet this false ldeology on reams and reams of paper to keep such a degenerate idea allve, conslder how foolish you sound now when you think you abuse good people by calling them separatists and think you are plnnlng a crlme to thelr backs when actually you are flatterlng them and placlng them lnto a glorious classlflcation. Consider how even more foollsh you wlll feel when all your evll, dlrty work of dlscredlting wlll ltself be discredited and separatlsm will after all win out and produce some• t hlng decent and fine which the old republlc was not capable ot do· ing. And above all, you are not only politically but also morally wrong, as are all who curb movements for freedom. The separatlsts are the real democrats and progressives, for it !s they who want freedom and democracy and not you who want to bind two natlons lnto an outdated and hated republic. Yours !s only a cause of contradlction and stubborn hate to preserve something that 1s rotten trom the core. For every move to stamp out independent ideas you only acquire new enemies, and the more enemies the more stronger the separatlsts; and the more ot those, the sooner two independent countrles wlll be formed. Any decent Czech w!ll tllll you that the old republlc was a ml.stake and "just not right," and any decent Slovak, by God• insplred love of country, automatlca\ly wants independence for hls natlon. What percentage then do you rea\ly have In your camp? 5 per cent or even less? And a Gallup poli is not needed to reallze that, inherently, the Slovak wants hls own government and country! Any Slovak that wants the old Czechoslovak republlc !s a twisted and spoiled breed that, frankly, even the Czechs ot the old regime should not care to associate with and form a partnersh!p wlth. That rene• gade type, wlth shame must be admitted, count up to a fractlon ot one percent of all Slovaks, no more. It !s amazing and tantastic, that with this tiny group then, the old regime wants to form a republlc. How will they contend with the rest? Satan himself has walked about the earth sowing dissenslon and oppre.ssion. Those who curb freedom anrl abuse thoše who flgbt for it, must once reap Satan's trash. The floor o[ every ball is yours, separatists„ and the movement i~ yours to complete and the fruits of lndependence wlll be yours to enjoy. This 1s the exhortatlon of an A.m erlcan whose studles prove you ha.ve a cause - a just and holy cause. 52 SLOVAKIA WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO "By executing Dr. Tiso, priest-presldent of wartlme Slovakia, the Czechoslov.ak governm ent of Dr. Beneš h as turned t he clock of civilizatlon back a few centuries in Czecho-Slovakia. T he mu rder of this gallant and upright Slovak leader and exemplary priest, w ho remained wlth b is people under the most trying condltions, by Dr. Edward Beneš, who resigned as president of his country and surrendered it 'in toto' to the Nazis, must s hock every Christian and every believer In the democratic way of life. Tbe infamous act of th e Beneš governm ent rightfully deserves the »evere.st condemnation of all righteous people." - Stephen Šuhaj čik, Councilman Second W ard, Cleveland, Ohio, April 1947. • • • "MURDER IN SLOVAKIA" ( From the speech of Hon. Alvin E . O' Konski of Wisconsin, in the House of Representati ves, Wednesday, Aprí l 23, 1947) . Mr. Speaker, the recent hanging by the Communists of Czech0slovakia of the brave and gallant Monsignor Joseph Tiso was murder in its most ghastl y and shameful form.••• But the hanging of Monsignor Tiso itself is not the greatest tragedy. The greatest tragedy is the silence by our American President and by our American State Department while this murder was going o n. Our Government gave the Czec hosl ovakian Government hundreds of million of dollars in the past two years. We are going to give them mi llions of dollars more. Vet, with this giving of millions of dollars to the Government of Czechoslovakia, our President and our State Department are not even men enough to stand up and protest against this murder by the Soviets. AII of this leads me to believe that the l eaders of our country in the White House and in our State Department no longer understand the meaning of the term " honor." Monsignor Tiso is dead. H e was murdered. Whi l e he was murd ered America was sil ent. The day is not very far distant when these American leaders will regret their silence. The day may come and may be too soon when these leaders who were so shamefully silent wi l l b e treated the same way that Monsignor Tiso and Bishop Ste• panic and General Mihailovitc h were treated. Then maybe there will be protests. But then it wi II be too late. Frankly, 1 do not think America coulá have saved the life of Monsignor Tiso. But I am ashamed that my country did not even have the decency and honor to file a protest just for the record. By some miracl e suc h a protest might have at least postponed the exec utio n. Here in Ame r i ca our o fficials grant our basest cr i minals a stay of execution. The least that our national leaders could have done i s f ile a p lea for the same consideration for a Christian lover of freedom M onsignor T i so whose only c rime was that he hated Communi sm just as he hated nazism. But Ameri ca remains silent and murder has free sway.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource An Honor in Slovak Separatism Description An account of the resource By E. W., an American Student of Central European Politics Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952 pp. 47-52 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Anonymous Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/8db9dd47a0cbc4f10cc1ef6b84edb23c.pdf 83131de0e65840790ccb5638a6cb6ae1 PDF Text Text 58 SLOVA:KIA ARE TIIE SWVAKS AND CZECHS TWO "CWSELY RELATED'' NATIONS? DR. A . GRÉBERT Official propaganda of all Czech governments trom 1918 to 1938 (the era of T. G. Masaryk and Edward Beneš) stated cat&gorically that the Slovaks and the Czechs were "two very closely related" na· tiona. We say "Czech" governments advlsedly, because the Slovaks had llttle or no lnfluence In them; the wm o! the Slovak natlon was totally lgnored when lt came to policy and natlonal and lnternatlonal relationships. The "Czecho-Slovak" (wlth or wlthout the hyphen) admlnlstrations during that tlme were in reality "Czech" admlnlstratlons; "Czecho-Slovak" government was In fact a "Czech" govern· ment. Even the national "Czechoslovak" church was strlctly a "Czech" en terprise. During and immedlately after World War I, T. G. Masary'k and Edward Beneš had to offer some "loglcal" reasons for the creation of a joint political stalte for the Czechs and the Slovaks, because Presldent Wllson had insisted on the appllcation of the democratlc principle of the right of self-determinatlon to all natlons. So. T. G. Masaryk and Beneš set out to prove that the Slov,aks really were not a distinct nation, but only a branch of the Czech natlon, and that the Slovak language was but a dialect of the Czech language. 'l'he CzechoSlovak Republlc was bom of th'!s "big Ile" In 1918. Slnce that tlme, the "big !ie" was promoted constantly by the propaganda aP'l)aratus of the Czecbo·Slovak state. Many non-CZech politiclana, statesmen, hlstorlans and writers succumbed to lt. Among them were some who repudlated the concept ot a "common state," but still thought that the Slovaks and Czechs were, nevertheless, "two very closely related" nations. Among the factors which dec!de the Individuality of a nation, we find: the natural framework within which a nation Ilves, lts racia! composltlon, language, cultural !nfluences, llterature, rellglous develop. ment, social structure, economlc relations, etc. Now, how "very close-Jy related" are the Slovaks and the Czechs? IN THE BEGINNING THERE WERE TWO NATIONS The Slovaks and Czechs already at the beginnlng ot the!r recorded hlstor!es were not members of one natlon, or a common polltlcal state, as most Czech pol!tlcians, hlstorlans an<l writers - and many unlnformed non-Czech commE\lltators, writers, hlstor!ans and polit!· cians, lnfluenced by or in tbe pay ot Czech propaganda - would have the world believe. There !s nothlng in recorded blstory to ind!· cate that the Slovaks and tbe Cze-cbs dld not go separate ways. Thls hlstorlcal fact was upheld even by sueh a typlcal representatlve ot pol!tlcal and cultural "Czechoslovaklsm" as Dr. K. Krofta (Tchéques et Slovaques jusqu' á leur union polltlque," in the LE MONDE SLAVE, March·April, 1933, pg. 2). Chronlclers of the nlntb and tenth centurles clearly dlstlngulshed betwen the two natlons. Paul J. Šafárlk clted many examples to prove thls point In hls "Slawlsche Alterttimer" (Vo!. 2, pages 208, 458, 493). Tbe dlt!erentatlon between the Slovaks and tbe Czecbs, however, be• �SLO:YAKIA 69 gan a Jong tíme ,be!ore that. 1t already began In their ancient, prehlstorlc, common Slovanic homeland. Later, In their new homelands, the indlvJduallty of both natloM became more pronounced. NATURE SEPARATED THEM The Slovak.s are a natlon whose core lives in mountains and hllls, whereas the c ore of the Czech people lnhabits plains. And molllltains and hllls generaJly breed an altogether d<ifferent type of man, psychologically and even physically, than do the Jowlands. Rivers of Czech lands empty lnto the North Sea, whereas the rlvers of Slovaltia, w1th ihe exceptlon of the Dunajec, flow lnto the Black Sea. Wlth the rlV'ers even Slovak !ife gravitated In a d.ifferent directlon from the llfe of úhe Czech nation. The Czech lands, on the one hand, and the Slovak lands, on the other, represent two very distlnct geographical environments, which tended to create two dlstlnct national in• dividualltles. In some Czech propaganda publlcations deslgned for the Engllsh-speaking world, it ls even admitted that after one crosses the Czech border lnto Slovakla "we have the impresslon that we have come to a different world. Nature ls different and the people, too, ls dlstinctly drnferent" (J. Czeoh-J. E. Mellon: "Czechoslovakla, Land of Dream and Enterprise," pg, 132). lf nothing else but nature separated the Slovaks from the Czechs, it undoubtedly would suffice to create and to preserve the dlstlnctly ;;,pecial lndlvlduality of the Slovak natlon. But the Slovaks were un!lke the Czechs In other respects as well. RACIAL COMPOSITION SEPARATE D THEM T•he Czech natlon, surrounded on three sldes as it !s by the German world, undoubtedly was open to racia! lnfluences of tha,t world. T he racia! structure of the Slovaks, on the other hand, was lnfluenced to some extent not only by the Germans, but also by the Slovanlc nat!ons (Poles, Ruthenes, Czechs) and -the U ralo-Alta:!c Magyars, A vars, Pechengs, Cumans, Turks, etc. The Avars ruled over the !and of the Slovaks almost 250 years (to bhe end of the 8th century) and, hence, certainly must have had s ome influence on the racia} structure of t-he Slovak popula,t!on, held in bondage. And hlstory tells u.s, too, that the Slovaks llved In a com• mon poli-tlcal state wlth the Magyars over 900 yeans; and close to the Turks, when they conquered most of Hungary, for some 150 years. And we know that the Poles ruled the Spiš reg.ion of Slovakla from 1412 to 1772. The racia! structure of the Czechs was not affected by the.se lnfluences. Hence, we are lnclined to agree with Podhradszky that raclal composltlon "sharply separates the Slovaks from all the nelghborlng nations and In a special manner deflnes thelr place among all other natlons of the unlverse" ( A t6toklata feldold politikai és kultúrgeo1 gráflája, pg. 53). THEY SPEAK DIFFERENT LANGUAGES Professor Louis Novák once wrote that the Slovak language was a "very ancient" llngual formatlon, one "whlch has had an orlglnal and independent evolutlon, Quite dlfferent from the Czech langua.ge." And he added that "the language ot centra! Slovakla today 1s the �60 SLOVAKIA direct organic contlnuation of the older centra! Slovak tongue, whlch in turn was the direct organlc con-tinuation o[ the respective pre-Slovanlc dialect" (Jazykovedné glosy k čsl. otázke, pg. 89). Pro[essor Henrich Bartek, noted Slovak philologist who ma.de an t'xhaustlve study of the Slovak and Czech languages, concluded that •·the Slovak language in many of its aspects had a different evolution than the Czech language and this fact guarantees it an independent place in the family of Slovanic languages" ( Príspevok k dejinám slovenčiny, pg. 117). 'l'he diHerences between the Slovak and Czech languages are greater than most people are aware of, especially people who have been confounded by Ozech propaganda, Czech schools and books. The Czech language belongs to the group of languages which have a preponderance of the higher vowels, and 1-t has sounds or vocala whlch are not to be found in Slovak. On the oúher hand, we flnd various vocals In Slovak that are foreign to the Czech tongue. The Slovak employs an abundance of diphthongs, while the Czech has only a few. The centra) dialect of Slovakia, the basis of llterary Slovak, has only one declenslon of adjectives, while the Czech has three. 'l'hey also d.tffer greatly in the matter of inflectlon of nouns and verbs. Rules of acc811t, syllable formation, rhythm, composition and syntax, and word formation are also different. The languages are dlfferent lexically, too. Miroslav Kálal, Czech lexicograpber, collected over 35,000 words in three years for hls differential dictionary whlch are not found In Czech, or which have an entirely different meaning ťha.n the corresponding Slovak words. 'l'he language ques'lion has been doolt with in great detail by Trnovský; if the reader is interested he mlght consult bis work "K rečovej otázke Slovákov" - especially pages 126-157 (published by the "Spolok sv. Vojtecha," Trnava, 1937). Little wonder then that M. Sečenský wrote a book (about 1700) for Slovaks "llving In Hungary" who wanted to learn Czech. The book, called "Swétlonos Cžeský," would teaoh talented and industrlous Slovaks how to read Czech correctly in a week and eventually how to dlst!nguish between words and ,nite correctly in Czech. Thls also proves that the Czecb language was a foreign language to Slovaks, wbo had to learn lt just as any other forelgn language, if they wanted to acqulre the use of lt. But even lf the Slovaks did speak the same language as the Czechs, would that be a valid argument for ~he formatlon of a "Czechoslovak" natlon, ethnically speaklng? Certainly not. And it is less valid as an argument for a joint state lJfe. We have German-speaklng Sw!ss, French-speaking Belgians, Engllsh.,speaklng Irlsh, South Americans speaking Spanish and Portuguese. When books are written in the same language, tbey often belong to dlstlnct llteratures. And the Slovaks are indlsput.ably distinct from tbe Czechs wibh thelr Independent Slovak llterature, whlch is the expre,ssion of Slovak cultural individuality. THE PAST SEPARATES THEM The Slovaks and Czechs neve-r formed a joint state up to 1918. True, Svätopluk annexed the Czecb lamds to tbe Slovak state and held them a few years, but these were politlcally completely autonomous under their own Czech princes. History tells us, too, tbat •the Czechs used the first opportunity that came thefr way to break away from the Slovak state with the help of tbe Germans. Whlle the Czechs l!ved in �SLOVAKIA 61 the broad framework of the German empire, "the Roman Empi•re of the German nation," that is witl1in the framework of the Austrian Erop,ire, the Slovaks on the other hand, were within the framework of the Hungarian empire. T•hese were two distinct worlds, which could not remaln wil!hout influence on the political thought, cultural development, economlc cond,i tlons and social status of both these natlons. "We Czechs know well," wrote the "Narodní Listy" {Nationa l ~ews) at the end of the last centUľY, "that even the strongest movement, wh1ch stlrred our na,tion in all Czech lands from the lowest to <the hlghest strata, was halted at the Hungarian border. The entire past does not show even a single example that a,t home in Bohemia {Czechia), or again in Slovak-ia, t.here was evldent any desire for a political union of the Czechs and Slovaks, not even at the tlme when the Czech kindom was independen,t and the Czech na,tion the ruling element in it." The economic history of Slovakia was altogether different from that of the Cz.ech lands. W,hlle in l!he Cz.eoh lands, under the lnfluence of the indus,trlalization policy of the Habsburgs, capitallstic forms of economy b egan to talke root comparatively very early, In Slovakia the conserva,tive nobility, with the aid of the dominant posltion l<t held in the Hungarian s,tate, successfully defended feudalism until the middle of the nineteen,th century. In Czech Jands, capitallsm could thus begin muoh sooner to form t,he Czech person. while In Slovakia Lhe Slovak person still lived a long time back and worked and was influenced by the economic forms of feudalism. To thls very day •there have been preserved in the Slovaks and Czechs distinct traces of thls 1•ar!ed economic development. CZECH ORIENTATION SEPARATES THEM While the Czechs lived primarily under the cultural influence of the German world and looked out into the world through t,he medium of German windows, the Slovaks Jlved in an entirely different cultural environment. Medieval Hungary .gravltated more towards fäe culture of the Italian peninsula, to Roman culture. Besides that, Hungary on its southern and eastern borders was in contact w!th the culture of the Byzanit:ine,Slovanic world, Into all thls came the cult ure of an Aslatic nation w!tb its own particular flavor: the culture of tbe Magyar nation. F. Wollman, a Czech univers!,ty professor, pointed to the intenslty of Roman cultural influences on the '81ovaks. According to -bim, the Slovaks are In substance slmilarly Romanized as the Poles are. Wbile the Czechs represent a ty.pe of culture common to Germanlzed Slovana {'81avs), the Slovaks are a type of Romanized Slovana ("Východ, východnosť, východnictví," in Nová Svoboda, Feb. 20, 1924). RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS SEPARATE THEM While the Czech religious organizations were influenced by the German world, the Slovaks were in direct contact wlth Roman Christian!ty. While Huss'.itism, Protestantism and the Czedh Brethren Jeft deep traces in Czech religlous hlstory, the rellgious development of the Slovaks went in an entirely different d irect!on. It 1s very slgniflcant and most ,highly characterlstlc that Hu.ssltism, which ls perhaps the mos,t marked manifestat!on of Czech religious development, and one w·hloh took hold to some extent In southern Hungary, malnly �SLOVAKIA among 1:he Rumanlans, evoked practlcally no response in the Slovaks, as wa.s demonstrated by Prof. Varsik in hls book " Husiti a reformácia na Slovensku" (Tbe Hussites and the Reformatlon In Slovak.ia) . Similarly -the movement of the so-called "Czechoslovak Chureh, ' whlch cost Czech Cathollclsm over a million souls, remained completely wlthout response In Slovakla. The national "Czechoslovak" churoh was strictly a Czech enterprise with notihing Slovak about it. The name, of course, was meant to confuse the little-informed and deceive the world in general. This holds for practically all things called "Czechoslovak." Whlle in Bohemia, In 1930, over 10 per cent or the populatlon was wlthout any religlous fa:lth, In Slovakia only 0.51 per cent belonged ,to that category - and tlie greatest part of this was made up of lmmigrant Czech officials, soldiers and police. Indlrectly, the dlsUnctness of rellgious traditions is also shown by the dJstln ct stand taken by the Czech collecUve toward Communism: the Czechs are less negative towards Jt than are the Slovaks. SOCIAL STRUCTURE SEPARATES THEM While in Czechia, In 1921, only 29 per cent of the lnhab itants was engaged in agriculture, in Slovalda 60 per cent of the inhab itants belonged to that category. In Czechia 46 per cent of the lnhabltants lived from industry and buslness, In Slovakia only 21 per cent. It 1s not necessary to stress that people and natlons living from agriculture, represent an altogetber different type of person and natlon tban peoples and nations engaged In buslness and industry. The varied social and economlc struoture of both these natlons and countries appears In other rubrics of statls-tics. The denslty ot the population in Bobemla 1s about 128 lnhabitanots per .square kilometer, while in Slovakia lt is only 62. The biological potentlal 1s different also: Jn 1932, 17.10 Jlving chlldren were bom for each 1000 Czechs In Bobemia, whlle in Slovakla 28.46 Slovak children were born. The Czechs belong to the group of biologically very weak nations, whlle the Slovaks be long to -the group of nations which are biologically strong. Whlle a large part of the Czech nation llves in small towns, the core of the Slovak nation lives in vlllages. Tbe dominant Czech type 1s the small4.owner and industria) worker, whlle the Slovak type is tbe agrlculturlst. ŠVEJK V ERSUS JÁNOŠÍK These actualitles engraved their own deep traces on booth natlon.s. Il dld not happen by chance that the ratlonal, materialistlc, calculatlng "small Czech fellow" found adequate expression for the most popular of his own people's hero In the figure of tbe legendary "good soldler "Švejk" (Shveyk). We find nothlng llke bim wltb. the Slo• va.ks, wbose most typical and most popular type of people's hero 1s tb& rebel Jánošík (Yabnowsheek), tbe romantlc, ldea!ISltlc, magnanimous and herolc Slovak Robin Hood. švejk flghts against Austrian begemony wltb a hunched ba.ek, wi-tb cunning and stealth, petty "sabotage." and wlth polsonous needles. Jánošik. on the other hand, goes lnto the mountalns, flghts herolcally and rallles the people untll he dles for bis idea!. Švejk �63 and J áno!!lk stand agalnst each other as two absolutely distlnct, special tlgures of popu\ar "reslslance" types of two absolutely dlslinot natlonal indlvlduallties. TWO DISTIN CT WORLD S There !s no doubt that the Slovak and Czech worlds are two substantlally dlstlnct worlds. "SlovakJa !s a component part of our Republlc," wrote the Czech newspaperma n Václav Kapllcký in the "Svobodný Zlti'ek" (Free Tomorrow) of July 24, 1947, "but it ls, nevertheless, still forelgn to us, unkuown; a dlfferent people llves there and there are there altogebher d!fferent condltlons of !1fe than In our country." Slmllarly, the French unlverslty professor Ancel, after a stay in Slovakla, declared that "the vila! form.s of the Slovak.s are just as dlstinct trom Czech llfe as they are from Magyar llfe" ( Lea frontierea slovaquea, pg. 28). A Swiss corresponden t, after studylng Jlfe In Slova.kla, wrote: "Only 800 kilometera separate Bratislava from Prague, but arrlvlng In Slovakia, you meet wlth the sounds of a dlfrerent language, a dlfferent ma.nner of llfe, a different manner of thlnklog, a dlfferent po\ltlcal atmosphere" (Journal de Geneve, Sep. tember 30, 1947). Today the Slova.ks and Czechs are more dlstant trom and more allen to each other than they were a thousand years ago, or than they were even In 1938. And as tlme goes on, these natlonal lndivlduallsts wlll be even more pronounced. Thls statement 1s based on the self-evldent soclologlcal development, whlch no one wlll be able to stop or alter. It wlll go on whetber any one likes lt or not. The so-called "<:zechO&lovaks," together wlth thelr Czeoh masters, are effect1vely speedlng thls process wlth thelr limited, short-slghted, un• realistlc pollcy. Once hi.Story undoubtedly wlll prove thls convlnclngly. We bave mentloned only tbe most Jmportaut actuaJltles, whlch &cted together ln tbe dlfferent formatlon of the Slovak nation anu the Czeoh natlon. Tbe narrow tramework ot this perlodlcal does not al\ow us to go lnto more detail. But the tact.s presented clearly lndlcate that the expresslcm referrlng to the Slovaks and Czechs as "two very closely related natlons" slmply wlll not stand up under the cr1tlcal eye of sclentlflc analysls. Conversely, it ls very strlklng that these two nelghborlng natlons have so llttle In common. TWO DIFFERENT MI SSIONS Not only tbe past and present separate the S\ovaks and Czechs, but the tuture as well. The mlsslon of the Slovak natlon 1s In substance altogether dlfferent from that of the Czech natlon. The geo1>olltlcal tunotlon of Slovakla ls dlstinct !rom the runctlon of the Czech lands. Wblle Slova.kla occuples the centra] locatlon In the defense o! the Central-Euro pean area, Czech terrltory occuples the border posltlon. Wblle the Czech lands have a defenslve role agal nst the pressure o! the German world In the Danube, Basin, Slova.kla la supposed to ,bave a coordlnatlng role, and that not only toward German pressure, but even toward lncldental Russlan pressure. After the flrst World War the vlctorlous power.s gave SlovakJa the role to be "a support or the Czechs agalnst German pressure. �64 SLOVAKIA. This conceptlon proved to be !neffective. T he Danube Basin, or Centra! E urope, can be defended only with joint forces. And that !.s possible only when Slovakia wlll not be the cause of any CzechoMagyar or Czecho-Polis h antagonis ms. That will be so only wh en Slovakia is independent. The n s he will be able to fuJflll the function of a consolidating and coord!natlng factor in the pol!t!cal atmosphere of Centra! Europe. • • • WHO SAI D IT? "It is difficul t, nay right impossible, in a short artlcle to no te even in slogan for m the things that are connected with h istor!c November 7, 1947, for the USSR, for us, for Europe, for the whole cultural world. But one thlng can be expre ssed and interpreted fully. And th at is the sincere, deep hearty and undying gratitude of all Czechs a nd Slova ks t o the Soviet Union, to its people, to its Army and to it s s kipper, Generalissimo Stalin, for everyth ing they ha ve done and sti ll are doing for us. It is an unfalsified, selfless and clean feeling of friendshlp and sympathy, which we have for this great country that is so close to us and !s our ne!ghbor. l t is a pur e joy from the ,oys, the su ccesses and the progress of the USSR; !t !s the lnflexible hope that Slavdom, in its own new perception, w ill assure for itself and the world the deserved peace, in wh!ch all nations shall live a ccording to their manner, freely, without fears, democratically and w!th dign!ty, as well as in understanding, prosperity and happiness. In this s pirit, from my so ul I greet the jubileeing USSR, and congratulate lt from my heart for the results attained in peace and war. 1 wlsh it to continue to prosper, grow and become m ightier unto its own greatness, but a lso for the we lfa re of al l humanity. Long live the Soviet Un io n, and may its leader and ski pper, J . V. Stalin, live in fu ll health to see many more jubilees !" - (Dr. J oseph Lettrich, Pres!dent of the Slovak Democratic Party and the Slovak National Counc!I; ÔAS, ~ovember 7, 1947.) • • • • • • " Czechoslovakia a nd th e Uni on of Soviet Socialist Repub lics have united in the midst of fire a nd b lood - thls a lliance, the refore, is for eternity, as love and friendsh ip proven in affliction._,___, We are aware of th e fact that the USSR could sti ll exist w lthout us, but our free State certainly cou ld not exist without th e USS R .. .. Long live the victorlous Soviet Army ! Long live its Supreme Commande r, Gene ral issimo Stali n ! Long live the li berator of Bratislava, Marshal Ma• (ÔAS, the off!cial organ of Lettr!ch's Democratlc linovský !" Party. Apr!I 4. 19-17 ' "In parl!ament on November 7, 1935, when I spoke a bout the international sltuatlon, I s aid that it was my deep conviction that our contacts w ith t he Soviet Un io n shall be good and lasting, that Soviet Rus sia wi ll again beco me a powe rful Slova nic factor, a nd as the most powerfu l S lova n ic fact or would bri ng S lavdom muc h good. We are not c hang ing our stand - a nd th is is the permanent sta nd of the Demo(John U rsi ny, Vice-Premier of Czecho-Slovakla and c rati c Party." Vice-President of tbe Democ ratlr P arty. in Bratislava. February 22. 1947, according to ÔAS. offlclal orga n of tbe SDP, February 27, 1947.) � 58 SLOVA:KIA ARE TIIE SWVAKS AND CZECHS TWO "CWSELY RELATED'' NATIONS? DR. A . GRÉBERT Official propaganda of all Czech governments trom 1918 to 1938 (the era of T. G. Masaryk and Edward Beneš) stated cat&gorically that the Slovaks and the Czechs were "two very closely related" na· tiona. We say "Czech" governments advlsedly, because the Slovaks had llttle or no lnfluence In them; the wm o! the Slovak natlon was totally lgnored when lt came to policy and natlonal and lnternatlonal relationships. The "Czecho-Slovak" (wlth or wlthout the hyphen) admlnlstrations during that tlme were in reality "Czech" admlnlstratlons; "Czecho-Slovak" government was In fact a "Czech" govern· ment. Even the national "Czechoslovak" church was strlctly a "Czech" en terprise. During and immedlately after World War I, T. G. Masary'k and Edward Beneš had to offer some "loglcal" reasons for the creation of a joint political stalte for the Czechs and the Slovaks, because Presldent Wllson had insisted on the appllcation of the democratlc principle of the right of self-determinatlon to all natlons. So. T. G. Masaryk and Beneš set out to prove that the Slov,aks really were not a distinct nation, but only a branch of the Czech natlon, and that the Slovak language was but a dialect of the Czech language. 'l'he CzechoSlovak Republlc was bom of th'!s "big Ile" In 1918. Slnce that tlme, the "big !ie" was promoted constantly by the propaganda aP'l)aratus of the Czecbo·Slovak state. Many non-CZech politiclana, statesmen, hlstorlans and writers succumbed to lt. Among them were some who repudlated the concept ot a "common state," but still thought that the Slovaks and Czechs were, nevertheless, "two very closely related" nations. Among the factors which dec!de the Individuality of a nation, we find: the natural framework within which a nation Ilves, lts racia! composltlon, language, cultural !nfluences, llterature, rellglous develop. ment, social structure, economlc relations, etc. Now, how "very close-Jy related" are the Slovaks and the Czechs? IN THE BEGINNING THERE WERE TWO NATIONS The Slovaks and Czechs already at the beginnlng ot the!r recorded hlstor!es were not members of one natlon, or a common polltlcal state, as most Czech pol!tlcians, hlstorlans an<l writers - and many unlnformed non-Czech commE\lltators, writers, hlstor!ans and polit!· cians, lnfluenced by or in tbe pay ot Czech propaganda - would have the world believe. There !s nothlng in recorded blstory to ind!· cate that the Slovaks and tbe Cze-cbs dld not go separate ways. Thls hlstorlcal fact was upheld even by sueh a typlcal representatlve ot pol!tlcal and cultural "Czechoslovaklsm" as Dr. K. Krofta (Tchéques et Slovaques jusqu' á leur union polltlque," in the LE MONDE SLAVE, March·April, 1933, pg. 2). Chronlclers of the nlntb and tenth centurles clearly dlstlngulshed betwen the two natlons. Paul J. Šafárlk clted many examples to prove thls point In hls "Slawlsche Alterttimer" (Vo!. 2, pages 208, 458, 493). Tbe dlt!erentatlon between the Slovaks and tbe Czecbs, however, be• �SLO:YAKIA 69 gan a Jong tíme ,be!ore that. 1t already began In their ancient, prehlstorlc, common Slovanic homeland. Later, In their new homelands, the indlvJduallty of both natloM became more pronounced. NATURE SEPARATED THEM The Slovak.s are a natlon whose core lives in mountains and hllls, whereas the c ore of the Czech people lnhabits plains. And molllltains and hllls generaJly breed an altogether d<ifferent type of man, psychologically and even physically, than do the Jowlands. Rivers of Czech lands empty lnto the North Sea, whereas the rlvers of Slovaltia, w1th ihe exceptlon of the Dunajec, flow lnto the Black Sea. Wlth the rlV'ers even Slovak !ife gravitated In a d.ifferent directlon from the llfe of úhe Czech nation. The Czech lands, on the one hand, and the Slovak lands, on the other, represent two very distlnct geographical environments, which tended to create two dlstlnct national in• dividualltles. In some Czech propaganda publlcations deslgned for the Engllsh-speaking world, it ls even admitted that after one crosses the Czech border lnto Slovakla "we have the impresslon that we have come to a different world. Nature ls different and the people, too, ls dlstinctly drnferent" (J. Czeoh-J. E. Mellon: "Czechoslovakla, Land of Dream and Enterprise," pg, 132). lf nothing else but nature separated the Slovaks from the Czechs, it undoubtedly would suffice to create and to preserve the dlstlnctly ;;,pecial lndlvlduality of the Slovak natlon. But the Slovaks were un!lke the Czechs In other respects as well. RACIAL COMPOSITION SEPARATE D THEM T•he Czech natlon, surrounded on three sldes as it !s by the German world, undoubtedly was open to racia! lnfluences of tha,t world. T he racia! structure of the Slovaks, on the other hand, was lnfluenced to some extent not only by the Germans, but also by the Slovanlc nat!ons (Poles, Ruthenes, Czechs) and -the U ralo-Alta:!c Magyars, A vars, Pechengs, Cumans, Turks, etc. The Avars ruled over the !and of the Slovaks almost 250 years (to bhe end of the 8th century) and, hence, certainly must have had s ome influence on the racia} structure of t-he Slovak popula,t!on, held in bondage. And hlstory tells u.s, too, that the Slovaks llved In a com• mon poli-tlcal state wlth the Magyars over 900 yeans; and close to the Turks, when they conquered most of Hungary, for some 150 years. And we know that the Poles ruled the Spiš reg.ion of Slovakla from 1412 to 1772. The racia! structure of the Czechs was not affected by the.se lnfluences. Hence, we are lnclined to agree with Podhradszky that raclal composltlon "sharply separates the Slovaks from all the nelghborlng nations and In a special manner deflnes thelr place among all other natlons of the unlverse" ( A t6toklata feldold politikai és kultúrgeo1 gráflája, pg. 53). THEY SPEAK DIFFERENT LANGUAGES Professor Louis Novák once wrote that the Slovak language was a "very ancient" llngual formatlon, one "whlch has had an orlglnal and independent evolutlon, Quite dlfferent from the Czech langua.ge." And he added that "the language ot centra! Slovakla today 1s the �60 SLOVAKIA direct organic contlnuation of the older centra! Slovak tongue, whlch in turn was the direct organlc con-tinuation o[ the respective pre-Slovanlc dialect" (Jazykovedné glosy k čsl. otázke, pg. 89). Pro[essor Henrich Bartek, noted Slovak philologist who ma.de an t'xhaustlve study of the Slovak and Czech languages, concluded that •·the Slovak language in many of its aspects had a different evolution than the Czech language and this fact guarantees it an independent place in the family of Slovanic languages" ( Príspevok k dejinám slovenčiny, pg. 117). 'l'he diHerences between the Slovak and Czech languages are greater than most people are aware of, especially people who have been confounded by Ozech propaganda, Czech schools and books. The Czech language belongs to the group of languages which have a preponderance of the higher vowels, and 1-t has sounds or vocala whlch are not to be found in Slovak. On the oúher hand, we flnd various vocals In Slovak that are foreign to the Czech tongue. The Slovak employs an abundance of diphthongs, while the Czech has only a few. The centra) dialect of Slovakia, the basis of llterary Slovak, has only one declenslon of adjectives, while the Czech has three. 'l'hey also d.tffer greatly in the matter of inflectlon of nouns and verbs. Rules of acc811t, syllable formation, rhythm, composition and syntax, and word formation are also different. The languages are dlfferent lexically, too. Miroslav Kálal, Czech lexicograpber, collected over 35,000 words in three years for hls differential dictionary whlch are not found In Czech, or which have an entirely different meaning ťha.n the corresponding Slovak words. 'l'he language ques'lion has been doolt with in great detail by Trnovský; if the reader is interested he mlght consult bis work "K rečovej otázke Slovákov" - especially pages 126-157 (published by the "Spolok sv. Vojtecha," Trnava, 1937). Little wonder then that M. Sečenský wrote a book (about 1700) for Slovaks "llving In Hungary" who wanted to learn Czech. The book, called "Swétlonos Cžeský," would teaoh talented and industrlous Slovaks how to read Czech correctly in a week and eventually how to dlst!nguish between words and ,nite correctly in Czech. Thls also proves that the Czecb language was a foreign language to Slovaks, wbo had to learn lt just as any other forelgn language, if they wanted to acqulre the use of lt. But even lf the Slovaks did speak the same language as the Czechs, would that be a valid argument for ~he formatlon of a "Czechoslovak" natlon, ethnically speaklng? Certainly not. And it is less valid as an argument for a joint state lJfe. We have German-speaklng Sw!ss, French-speaking Belgians, Engllsh.,speaklng Irlsh, South Americans speaking Spanish and Portuguese. When books are written in the same language, tbey often belong to dlstlnct llteratures. And the Slovaks are indlsput.ably distinct from tbe Czechs wibh thelr Independent Slovak llterature, whlch is the expre,ssion of Slovak cultural individuality. THE PAST SEPARATES THEM The Slovaks and Czechs neve-r formed a joint state up to 1918. True, Svätopluk annexed the Czecb lamds to tbe Slovak state and held them a few years, but these were politlcally completely autonomous under their own Czech princes. History tells us, too, tbat •the Czechs used the first opportunity that came thefr way to break away from the Slovak state with the help of tbe Germans. Whlle the Czechs l!ved in �SLOVAKIA 61 the broad framework of the German empire, "the Roman Empi•re of the German nation," that is witl1in the framework of the Austrian Erop,ire, the Slovaks on the other hand, were within the framework of the Hungarian empire. T•hese were two distinct worlds, which could not remaln wil!hout influence on the political thought, cultural development, economlc cond,i tlons and social status of both these natlons. "We Czechs know well," wrote the "Narodní Listy" {Nationa l ~ews) at the end of the last centUľY, "that even the strongest movement, wh1ch stlrred our na,tion in all Czech lands from the lowest to <the hlghest strata, was halted at the Hungarian border. The entire past does not show even a single example that a,t home in Bohemia {Czechia), or again in Slovak-ia, t.here was evldent any desire for a political union of the Czechs and Slovaks, not even at the tlme when the Czech kindom was independen,t and the Czech na,tion the ruling element in it." The economic history of Slovakia was altogether different from that of the Cz.ech lands. W,hlle in l!he Cz.eoh lands, under the lnfluence of the indus,trlalization policy of the Habsburgs, capitallstic forms of economy b egan to talke root comparatively very early, In Slovakia the conserva,tive nobility, with the aid of the dominant posltion l<t held in the Hungarian s,tate, successfully defended feudalism until the middle of the nineteen,th century. In Czech Jands, capitallsm could thus begin muoh sooner to form t,he Czech person. while In Slovakia Lhe Slovak person still lived a long time back and worked and was influenced by the economic forms of feudalism. To thls very day •there have been preserved in the Slovaks and Czechs distinct traces of thls 1•ar!ed economic development. CZECH ORIENTATION SEPARATES THEM While the Czechs lived primarily under the cultural influence of the German world and looked out into the world through t,he medium of German windows, the Slovaks Jlved in an entirely different cultural environment. Medieval Hungary .gravltated more towards fäe culture of the Italian peninsula, to Roman culture. Besides that, Hungary on its southern and eastern borders was in contact w!th the culture of the Byzanit:ine,Slovanic world, Into all thls came the cult ure of an Aslatic nation w!tb its own particular flavor: the culture of tbe Magyar nation. F. Wollman, a Czech univers!,ty professor, pointed to the intenslty of Roman cultural influences on the '81ovaks. According to -bim, the Slovaks are In substance slmilarly Romanized as the Poles are. Wbile the Czechs represent a ty.pe of culture common to Germanlzed Slovana {'81avs), the Slovaks are a type of Romanized Slovana ("Východ, východnosť, východnictví," in Nová Svoboda, Feb. 20, 1924). RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS SEPARATE THEM While the Czech religious organizations were influenced by the German world, the Slovaks were in direct contact wlth Roman Christian!ty. While Huss'.itism, Protestantism and the Czedh Brethren Jeft deep traces in Czech religlous hlstory, the rellgious development of the Slovaks went in an entirely different d irect!on. It 1s very slgniflcant and most ,highly characterlstlc that Hu.ssltism, which ls perhaps the mos,t marked manifestat!on of Czech religious development, and one w·hloh took hold to some extent In southern Hungary, malnly �SLOVAKIA among 1:he Rumanlans, evoked practlcally no response in the Slovaks, as wa.s demonstrated by Prof. Varsik in hls book " Husiti a reformácia na Slovensku" (Tbe Hussites and the Reformatlon In Slovak.ia) . Similarly -the movement of the so-called "Czechoslovak Chureh, ' whlch cost Czech Cathollclsm over a million souls, remained completely wlthout response In Slovakla. The national "Czechoslovak" churoh was strictly a Czech enterprise with notihing Slovak about it. The name, of course, was meant to confuse the little-informed and deceive the world in general. This holds for practically all things called "Czechoslovak." Whlle in Bohemia, In 1930, over 10 per cent or the populatlon was wlthout any religlous fa:lth, In Slovakia only 0.51 per cent belonged ,to that category - and tlie greatest part of this was made up of lmmigrant Czech officials, soldiers and police. Indlrectly, the dlsUnctness of rellgious traditions is also shown by the dJstln ct stand taken by the Czech collecUve toward Communism: the Czechs are less negative towards Jt than are the Slovaks. SOCIAL STRUCTURE SEPARATES THEM While in Czechia, In 1921, only 29 per cent of the lnhab itants was engaged in agriculture, in Slovalda 60 per cent of the inhab itants belonged to that category. In Czechia 46 per cent of the lnhabltants lived from industry and buslness, In Slovakia only 21 per cent. It 1s not necessary to stress that people and natlons living from agriculture, represent an altogetber different type of person and natlon tban peoples and nations engaged In buslness and industry. The varied social and economlc struoture of both these natlons and countries appears In other rubrics of statls-tics. The denslty ot the population in Bobemla 1s about 128 lnhabitanots per .square kilometer, while in Slovakia lt is only 62. The biological potentlal 1s different also: Jn 1932, 17.10 Jlving chlldren were bom for each 1000 Czechs In Bobemia, whlle in Slovakla 28.46 Slovak children were born. The Czechs belong to the group of biologically very weak nations, whlle the Slovaks be long to -the group of nations which are biologically strong. Whlle a large part of the Czech nation llves in small towns, the core of the Slovak nation lives in vlllages. Tbe dominant Czech type 1s the small4.owner and industria) worker, whlle the Slovak type is tbe agrlculturlst. ŠVEJK V ERSUS JÁNOŠÍK These actualitles engraved their own deep traces on booth natlon.s. Il dld not happen by chance that the ratlonal, materialistlc, calculatlng "small Czech fellow" found adequate expression for the most popular of his own people's hero In the figure of tbe legendary "good soldler "Švejk" (Shveyk). We find nothlng llke bim wltb. the Slo• va.ks, wbose most typical and most popular type of people's hero 1s tb& rebel Jánošík (Yabnowsheek), tbe romantlc, ldea!ISltlc, magnanimous and herolc Slovak Robin Hood. švejk flghts against Austrian begemony wltb a hunched ba.ek, wi-tb cunning and stealth, petty "sabotage." and wlth polsonous needles. Jánošik. on the other hand, goes lnto the mountalns, flghts herolcally and rallles the people untll he dles for bis idea!. Švejk �63 and J áno!!lk stand agalnst each other as two absolutely distlnct, special tlgures of popu\ar "reslslance" types of two absolutely dlslinot natlonal indlvlduallties. TWO DISTIN CT WORLD S There !s no doubt that the Slovak and Czech worlds are two substantlally dlstlnct worlds. "SlovakJa !s a component part of our Republlc," wrote the Czech newspaperma n Václav Kapllcký in the "Svobodný Zlti'ek" (Free Tomorrow) of July 24, 1947, "but it ls, nevertheless, still forelgn to us, unkuown; a dlfferent people llves there and there are there altogebher d!fferent condltlons of !1fe than In our country." Slmllarly, the French unlverslty professor Ancel, after a stay in Slovakla, declared that "the vila! form.s of the Slovak.s are just as dlstinct trom Czech llfe as they are from Magyar llfe" ( Lea frontierea slovaquea, pg. 28). A Swiss corresponden t, after studylng Jlfe In Slova.kla, wrote: "Only 800 kilometera separate Bratislava from Prague, but arrlvlng In Slovakia, you meet wlth the sounds of a dlfrerent language, a dlfferent ma.nner of llfe, a different manner of thlnklog, a dlfferent po\ltlcal atmosphere" (Journal de Geneve, Sep. tember 30, 1947). Today the Slova.ks and Czechs are more dlstant trom and more allen to each other than they were a thousand years ago, or than they were even In 1938. And as tlme goes on, these natlonal lndivlduallsts wlll be even more pronounced. Thls statement 1s based on the self-evldent soclologlcal development, whlch no one wlll be able to stop or alter. It wlll go on whetber any one likes lt or not. The so-called "<:zechO&lovaks," together wlth thelr Czeoh masters, are effect1vely speedlng thls process wlth thelr limited, short-slghted, un• realistlc pollcy. Once hi.Story undoubtedly wlll prove thls convlnclngly. We bave mentloned only tbe most Jmportaut actuaJltles, whlch &cted together ln tbe dlfferent formatlon of the Slovak nation anu the Czeoh natlon. Tbe narrow tramework ot this perlodlcal does not al\ow us to go lnto more detail. But the tact.s presented clearly lndlcate that the expresslcm referrlng to the Slovaks and Czechs as "two very closely related natlons" slmply wlll not stand up under the cr1tlcal eye of sclentlflc analysls. Conversely, it ls very strlklng that these two nelghborlng natlons have so llttle In common. TWO DIFFERENT MI SSIONS Not only tbe past and present separate the S\ovaks and Czechs, but the tuture as well. The mlsslon of the Slovak natlon 1s In substance altogether dlfferent from that of the Czech natlon. The geo1>olltlcal tunotlon of Slovakla ls dlstinct !rom the runctlon of the Czech lands. Wblle Slova.kla occuples the centra] locatlon In the defense o! the Central-Euro pean area, Czech terrltory occuples the border posltlon. Wblle the Czech lands have a defenslve role agal nst the pressure o! the German world In the Danube, Basin, Slova.kla la supposed to ,bave a coordlnatlng role, and that not only toward German pressure, but even toward lncldental Russlan pressure. After the flrst World War the vlctorlous power.s gave SlovakJa the role to be "a support or the Czechs agalnst German pressure. �64 SLOVAKIA. This conceptlon proved to be !neffective. T he Danube Basin, or Centra! E urope, can be defended only with joint forces. And that !.s possible only when Slovakia wlll not be the cause of any CzechoMagyar or Czecho-Polis h antagonis ms. That will be so only wh en Slovakia is independent. The n s he will be able to fuJflll the function of a consolidating and coord!natlng factor in the pol!t!cal atmosphere of Centra! Europe. • • • WHO SAI D IT? "It is difficul t, nay right impossible, in a short artlcle to no te even in slogan for m the things that are connected with h istor!c November 7, 1947, for the USSR, for us, for Europe, for the whole cultural world. But one thlng can be expre ssed and interpreted fully. And th at is the sincere, deep hearty and undying gratitude of all Czechs a nd Slova ks t o the Soviet Union, to its people, to its Army and to it s s kipper, Generalissimo Stalin, for everyth ing they ha ve done and sti ll are doing for us. It is an unfalsified, selfless and clean feeling of friendshlp and sympathy, which we have for this great country that is so close to us and !s our ne!ghbor. l t is a pur e joy from the ,oys, the su ccesses and the progress of the USSR; !t !s the lnflexible hope that Slavdom, in its own new perception, w ill assure for itself and the world the deserved peace, in wh!ch all nations shall live a ccording to their manner, freely, without fears, democratically and w!th dign!ty, as well as in understanding, prosperity and happiness. In this s pirit, from my so ul I greet the jubileeing USSR, and congratulate lt from my heart for the results attained in peace and war. 1 wlsh it to continue to prosper, grow and become m ightier unto its own greatness, but a lso for the we lfa re of al l humanity. Long live the Soviet Un io n, and may its leader and ski pper, J . V. Stalin, live in fu ll health to see many more jubilees !" - (Dr. J oseph Lettrich, Pres!dent of the Slovak Democratic Party and the Slovak National Counc!I; ÔAS, ~ovember 7, 1947.) • • • • • • " Czechoslovakia a nd th e Uni on of Soviet Socialist Repub lics have united in the midst of fire a nd b lood - thls a lliance, the refore, is for eternity, as love and friendsh ip proven in affliction._,___, We are aware of th e fact that the USSR could sti ll exist w lthout us, but our free State certainly cou ld not exist without th e USS R .. .. Long live the victorlous Soviet Army ! Long live its Supreme Commande r, Gene ral issimo Stali n ! Long live the li berator of Bratislava, Marshal Ma• (ÔAS, the off!cial organ of Lettr!ch's Democratlc linovský !" Party. Apr!I 4. 19-17 ' "In parl!ament on November 7, 1935, when I spoke a bout the international sltuatlon, I s aid that it was my deep conviction that our contacts w ith t he Soviet Un io n shall be good and lasting, that Soviet Rus sia wi ll again beco me a powe rful Slova nic factor, a nd as the most powerfu l S lova n ic fact or would bri ng S lavdom muc h good. We are not c hang ing our stand - a nd th is is the permanent sta nd of the Demo(John U rsi ny, Vice-Premier of Czecho-Slovakla and c rati c Party." Vice-President of tbe Democ ratlr P arty. in Bratislava. February 22. 1947, according to ÔAS. offlclal orga n of tbe SDP, February 27, 1947.) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 58 SLOVA:KIA ARE TIIE SWVAKS AND CZECHS TWO "CWSELY RELATED'' NATIONS? DR. A . GRÉBERT Official propaganda of all Czech governments trom 1918 to 1938 (the era of T. G. Masaryk and Edward Beneš) stated cat&gorically that the Slovaks and the Czechs were "two very closely related" na· tiona. We say "Czech" governments advlsedly, because the Slovaks had llttle or no lnfluence In them; the wm o! the Slovak natlon was totally lgnored when lt came to policy and natlonal and lnternatlonal relationships. The "Czecho-Slovak" (wlth or wlthout the hyphen) admlnlstrations during that tlme were in reality "Czech" admlnlstratlons; "Czecho-Slovak" government was In fact a "Czech" govern· ment. Even the national "Czechoslovak" church was strlctly a "Czech" en terprise. During and immedlately after World War I, T. G. Masary'k and Edward Beneš had to offer some "loglcal" reasons for the creation of a joint political stalte for the Czechs and the Slovaks, because Presldent Wllson had insisted on the appllcation of the democratlc principle of the right of self-determinatlon to all natlons. So. T. G. Masaryk and Beneš set out to prove that the Slov,aks really were not a distinct nation, but only a branch of the Czech natlon, and that the Slovak language was but a dialect of the Czech language. 'l'he CzechoSlovak Republlc was bom of th'!s "big Ile" In 1918. Slnce that tlme, the "big !ie" was promoted constantly by the propaganda aP'l)aratus of the Czecbo·Slovak state. Many non-CZech politiclana, statesmen, hlstorlans and writers succumbed to lt. Among them were some who repudlated the concept ot a "common state," but still thought that the Slovaks and Czechs were, nevertheless, "two very closely related" nations. Among the factors which dec!de the Individuality of a nation, we find: the natural framework within which a nation Ilves, lts racia! composltlon, language, cultural !nfluences, llterature, rellglous develop. ment, social structure, economlc relations, etc. Now, how "very close-Jy related" are the Slovaks and the Czechs? IN THE BEGINNING THERE WERE TWO NATIONS The Slovaks and Czechs already at the beginnlng ot the!r recorded hlstor!es were not members of one natlon, or a common polltlcal state, as most Czech pol!tlcians, hlstorlans an<l writers - and many unlnformed non-Czech commE\lltators, writers, hlstor!ans and polit!· cians, lnfluenced by or in tbe pay ot Czech propaganda - would have the world believe. There !s nothlng in recorded blstory to ind!· cate that the Slovaks and tbe Cze-cbs dld not go separate ways. Thls hlstorlcal fact was upheld even by sueh a typlcal representatlve ot pol!tlcal and cultural "Czechoslovaklsm" as Dr. K. Krofta (Tchéques et Slovaques jusqu' á leur union polltlque," in the LE MONDE SLAVE, March·April, 1933, pg. 2). Chronlclers of the nlntb and tenth centurles clearly dlstlngulshed betwen the two natlons. Paul J. Šafárlk clted many examples to prove thls point In hls "Slawlsche Alterttimer" (Vo!. 2, pages 208, 458, 493). Tbe dlt!erentatlon between the Slovaks and tbe Czecbs, however, be• SLO:YAKIA 69 gan a Jong tíme ,be!ore that. 1t already began In their ancient, prehlstorlc, common Slovanic homeland. Later, In their new homelands, the indlvJduallty of both natloM became more pronounced. NATURE SEPARATED THEM The Slovak.s are a natlon whose core lives in mountains and hllls, whereas the c ore of the Czech people lnhabits plains. And molllltains and hllls generaJly breed an altogether d<ifferent type of man, psychologically and even physically, than do the Jowlands. Rivers of Czech lands empty lnto the North Sea, whereas the rlvers of Slovaltia, w1th ihe exceptlon of the Dunajec, flow lnto the Black Sea. Wlth the rlV'ers even Slovak !ife gravitated In a d.ifferent directlon from the llfe of úhe Czech nation. The Czech lands, on the one hand, and the Slovak lands, on the other, represent two very distlnct geographical environments, which tended to create two dlstlnct national in• dividualltles. In some Czech propaganda publlcations deslgned for the Engllsh-speaking world, it ls even admitted that after one crosses the Czech border lnto Slovakla "we have the impresslon that we have come to a different world. Nature ls different and the people, too, ls dlstinctly drnferent" (J. Czeoh-J. E. Mellon: "Czechoslovakla, Land of Dream and Enterprise," pg, 132). lf nothing else but nature separated the Slovaks from the Czechs, it undoubtedly would suffice to create and to preserve the dlstlnctly ;;,pecial lndlvlduality of the Slovak natlon. But the Slovaks were un!lke the Czechs In other respects as well. RACIAL COMPOSITION SEPARATE D THEM T•he Czech natlon, surrounded on three sldes as it !s by the German world, undoubtedly was open to racia! lnfluences of tha,t world. T he racia! structure of the Slovaks, on the other hand, was lnfluenced to some extent not only by the Germans, but also by the Slovanlc nat!ons (Poles, Ruthenes, Czechs) and -the U ralo-Alta:!c Magyars, A vars, Pechengs, Cumans, Turks, etc. The Avars ruled over the !and of the Slovaks almost 250 years (to bhe end of the 8th century) and, hence, certainly must have had s ome influence on the racia} structure of t-he Slovak popula,t!on, held in bondage. And hlstory tells u.s, too, that the Slovaks llved In a com• mon poli-tlcal state wlth the Magyars over 900 yeans; and close to the Turks, when they conquered most of Hungary, for some 150 years. And we know that the Poles ruled the Spiš reg.ion of Slovakla from 1412 to 1772. The racia! structure of the Czechs was not affected by the.se lnfluences. Hence, we are lnclined to agree with Podhradszky that raclal composltlon "sharply separates the Slovaks from all the nelghborlng nations and In a special manner deflnes thelr place among all other natlons of the unlverse" ( A t6toklata feldold politikai és kultúrgeo1 gráflája, pg. 53). THEY SPEAK DIFFERENT LANGUAGES Professor Louis Novák once wrote that the Slovak language was a "very ancient" llngual formatlon, one "whlch has had an orlglnal and independent evolutlon, Quite dlfferent from the Czech langua.ge." And he added that "the language ot centra! Slovakla today 1s the 60 SLOVAKIA direct organic contlnuation of the older centra! Slovak tongue, whlch in turn was the direct organlc con-tinuation o[ the respective pre-Slovanlc dialect" (Jazykovedné glosy k čsl. otázke, pg. 89). Pro[essor Henrich Bartek, noted Slovak philologist who ma.de an t'xhaustlve study of the Slovak and Czech languages, concluded that •·the Slovak language in many of its aspects had a different evolution than the Czech language and this fact guarantees it an independent place in the family of Slovanic languages" ( Príspevok k dejinám slovenčiny, pg. 117). 'l'he diHerences between the Slovak and Czech languages are greater than most people are aware of, especially people who have been confounded by Ozech propaganda, Czech schools and books. The Czech language belongs to the group of languages which have a preponderance of the higher vowels, and 1-t has sounds or vocala whlch are not to be found in Slovak. On the oúher hand, we flnd various vocals In Slovak that are foreign to the Czech tongue. The Slovak employs an abundance of diphthongs, while the Czech has only a few. The centra) dialect of Slovakia, the basis of llterary Slovak, has only one declenslon of adjectives, while the Czech has three. 'l'hey also d.tffer greatly in the matter of inflectlon of nouns and verbs. Rules of acc811t, syllable formation, rhythm, composition and syntax, and word formation are also different. The languages are dlfferent lexically, too. Miroslav Kálal, Czech lexicograpber, collected over 35,000 words in three years for hls differential dictionary whlch are not found In Czech, or which have an entirely different meaning ťha.n the corresponding Slovak words. 'l'he language ques'lion has been doolt with in great detail by Trnovský; if the reader is interested he mlght consult bis work "K rečovej otázke Slovákov" - especially pages 126-157 (published by the "Spolok sv. Vojtecha," Trnava, 1937). Little wonder then that M. Sečenský wrote a book (about 1700) for Slovaks "llving In Hungary" who wanted to learn Czech. The book, called "Swétlonos Cžeský," would teaoh talented and industrlous Slovaks how to read Czech correctly in a week and eventually how to dlst!nguish between words and ,nite correctly in Czech. Thls also proves that the Czecb language was a foreign language to Slovaks, wbo had to learn lt just as any other forelgn language, if they wanted to acqulre the use of lt. But even lf the Slovaks did speak the same language as the Czechs, would that be a valid argument for ~he formatlon of a "Czechoslovak" natlon, ethnically speaklng? Certainly not. And it is less valid as an argument for a joint state lJfe. We have German-speaklng Sw!ss, French-speaking Belgians, Engllsh.,speaklng Irlsh, South Americans speaking Spanish and Portuguese. When books are written in the same language, tbey often belong to dlstlnct llteratures. And the Slovaks are indlsput.ably distinct from tbe Czechs wibh thelr Independent Slovak llterature, whlch is the expre,ssion of Slovak cultural individuality. THE PAST SEPARATES THEM The Slovaks and Czechs neve-r formed a joint state up to 1918. True, Svätopluk annexed the Czecb lamds to tbe Slovak state and held them a few years, but these were politlcally completely autonomous under their own Czech princes. History tells us, too, tbat •the Czechs used the first opportunity that came thefr way to break away from the Slovak state with the help of tbe Germans. Whlle the Czechs l!ved in SLOVAKIA 61 the broad framework of the German empire, "the Roman Empi•re of the German nation," that is witl1in the framework of the Austrian Erop,ire, the Slovaks on the other hand, were within the framework of the Hungarian empire. T•hese were two distinct worlds, which could not remaln wil!hout influence on the political thought, cultural development, economlc cond,i tlons and social status of both these natlons. "We Czechs know well," wrote the "Narodní Listy" {Nationa l ~ews) at the end of the last centUľY, "that even the strongest movement, wh1ch stlrred our na,tion in all Czech lands from the lowest to <the hlghest strata, was halted at the Hungarian border. The entire past does not show even a single example that a,t home in Bohemia {Czechia), or again in Slovak-ia, t.here was evldent any desire for a political union of the Czechs and Slovaks, not even at the tlme when the Czech kindom was independen,t and the Czech na,tion the ruling element in it." The economic history of Slovakia was altogether different from that of the Cz.ech lands. W,hlle in l!he Cz.eoh lands, under the lnfluence of the indus,trlalization policy of the Habsburgs, capitallstic forms of economy b egan to talke root comparatively very early, In Slovakia the conserva,tive nobility, with the aid of the dominant posltion l<t held in the Hungarian s,tate, successfully defended feudalism until the middle of the nineteen,th century. In Czech Jands, capitallsm could thus begin muoh sooner to form t,he Czech person. while In Slovakia Lhe Slovak person still lived a long time back and worked and was influenced by the economic forms of feudalism. To thls very day •there have been preserved in the Slovaks and Czechs distinct traces of thls 1•ar!ed economic development. CZECH ORIENTATION SEPARATES THEM While the Czechs lived primarily under the cultural influence of the German world and looked out into the world through t,he medium of German windows, the Slovaks Jlved in an entirely different cultural environment. Medieval Hungary .gravltated more towards fäe culture of the Italian peninsula, to Roman culture. Besides that, Hungary on its southern and eastern borders was in contact w!th the culture of the Byzanit:ine,Slovanic world, Into all thls came the cult ure of an Aslatic nation w!tb its own particular flavor: the culture of tbe Magyar nation. F. Wollman, a Czech univers!,ty professor, pointed to the intenslty of Roman cultural influences on the '81ovaks. According to -bim, the Slovaks are In substance slmilarly Romanized as the Poles are. Wbile the Czechs represent a ty.pe of culture common to Germanlzed Slovana {'81avs), the Slovaks are a type of Romanized Slovana ("Východ, východnosť, východnictví," in Nová Svoboda, Feb. 20, 1924). RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS SEPARATE THEM While the Czech religious organizations were influenced by the German world, the Slovaks were in direct contact wlth Roman Christian!ty. While Huss'.itism, Protestantism and the Czedh Brethren Jeft deep traces in Czech religlous hlstory, the rellgious development of the Slovaks went in an entirely different d irect!on. It 1s very slgniflcant and most ,highly characterlstlc that Hu.ssltism, which ls perhaps the mos,t marked manifestat!on of Czech religious development, and one w·hloh took hold to some extent In southern Hungary, malnly SLOVAKIA among 1:he Rumanlans, evoked practlcally no response in the Slovaks, as wa.s demonstrated by Prof. Varsik in hls book " Husiti a reformácia na Slovensku" (Tbe Hussites and the Reformatlon In Slovak.ia) . Similarly -the movement of the so-called "Czechoslovak Chureh, ' whlch cost Czech Cathollclsm over a million souls, remained completely wlthout response In Slovakla. The national "Czechoslovak" churoh was strictly a Czech enterprise with notihing Slovak about it. The name, of course, was meant to confuse the little-informed and deceive the world in general. This holds for practically all things called "Czechoslovak." Whlle in Bohemia, In 1930, over 10 per cent or the populatlon was wlthout any religlous fa:lth, In Slovakia only 0.51 per cent belonged ,to that category - and tlie greatest part of this was made up of lmmigrant Czech officials, soldiers and police. Indlrectly, the dlsUnctness of rellgious traditions is also shown by the dJstln ct stand taken by the Czech collecUve toward Communism: the Czechs are less negative towards Jt than are the Slovaks. SOCIAL STRUCTURE SEPARATES THEM While in Czechia, In 1921, only 29 per cent of the lnhab itants was engaged in agriculture, in Slovalda 60 per cent of the inhab itants belonged to that category. In Czechia 46 per cent of the lnhabltants lived from industry and buslness, In Slovakia only 21 per cent. It 1s not necessary to stress that people and natlons living from agriculture, represent an altogetber different type of person and natlon tban peoples and nations engaged In buslness and industry. The varied social and economlc struoture of both these natlons and countries appears In other rubrics of statls-tics. The denslty ot the population in Bobemla 1s about 128 lnhabitanots per .square kilometer, while in Slovakia lt is only 62. The biological potentlal 1s different also: Jn 1932, 17.10 Jlving chlldren were bom for each 1000 Czechs In Bobemia, whlle in Slovakla 28.46 Slovak children were born. The Czechs belong to the group of biologically very weak nations, whlle the Slovaks be long to -the group of nations which are biologically strong. Whlle a large part of the Czech nation llves in small towns, the core of the Slovak nation lives in vlllages. Tbe dominant Czech type 1s the small4.owner and industria) worker, whlle the Slovak type is tbe agrlculturlst. ŠVEJK V ERSUS JÁNOŠÍK These actualitles engraved their own deep traces on booth natlon.s. Il dld not happen by chance that the ratlonal, materialistlc, calculatlng "small Czech fellow" found adequate expression for the most popular of his own people's hero In the figure of tbe legendary "good soldler "Švejk" (Shveyk). We find nothlng llke bim wltb. the Slo• va.ks, wbose most typical and most popular type of people's hero 1s tb& rebel Jánošík (Yabnowsheek), tbe romantlc, ldea!ISltlc, magnanimous and herolc Slovak Robin Hood. švejk flghts against Austrian begemony wltb a hunched ba.ek, wi-tb cunning and stealth, petty "sabotage." and wlth polsonous needles. Jánošik. on the other hand, goes lnto the mountalns, flghts herolcally and rallles the people untll he dles for bis idea!. Švejk 63 and J áno!!lk stand agalnst each other as two absolutely distlnct, special tlgures of popu\ar "reslslance" types of two absolutely dlslinot natlonal indlvlduallties. TWO DISTIN CT WORLD S There !s no doubt that the Slovak and Czech worlds are two substantlally dlstlnct worlds. "SlovakJa !s a component part of our Republlc," wrote the Czech newspaperma n Václav Kapllcký in the "Svobodný Zlti'ek" (Free Tomorrow) of July 24, 1947, "but it ls, nevertheless, still forelgn to us, unkuown; a dlfferent people llves there and there are there altogebher d!fferent condltlons of !1fe than In our country." Slmllarly, the French unlverslty professor Ancel, after a stay in Slovakla, declared that "the vila! form.s of the Slovak.s are just as dlstinct trom Czech llfe as they are from Magyar llfe" ( Lea frontierea slovaquea, pg. 28). A Swiss corresponden t, after studylng Jlfe In Slova.kla, wrote: "Only 800 kilometera separate Bratislava from Prague, but arrlvlng In Slovakia, you meet wlth the sounds of a dlfrerent language, a dlfferent ma.nner of llfe, a different manner of thlnklog, a dlfferent po\ltlcal atmosphere" (Journal de Geneve, Sep. tember 30, 1947). Today the Slova.ks and Czechs are more dlstant trom and more allen to each other than they were a thousand years ago, or than they were even In 1938. And as tlme goes on, these natlonal lndivlduallsts wlll be even more pronounced. Thls statement 1s based on the self-evldent soclologlcal development, whlch no one wlll be able to stop or alter. It wlll go on whetber any one likes lt or not. The so-called "<:zechO&lovaks," together wlth thelr Czeoh masters, are effect1vely speedlng thls process wlth thelr limited, short-slghted, un• realistlc pollcy. Once hi.Story undoubtedly wlll prove thls convlnclngly. We bave mentloned only tbe most Jmportaut actuaJltles, whlch &cted together ln tbe dlfferent formatlon of the Slovak nation anu the Czeoh natlon. Tbe narrow tramework ot this perlodlcal does not al\ow us to go lnto more detail. But the tact.s presented clearly lndlcate that the expresslcm referrlng to the Slovaks and Czechs as "two very closely related natlons" slmply wlll not stand up under the cr1tlcal eye of sclentlflc analysls. Conversely, it ls very strlklng that these two nelghborlng natlons have so llttle In common. TWO DIFFERENT MI SSIONS Not only tbe past and present separate the S\ovaks and Czechs, but the tuture as well. The mlsslon of the Slovak natlon 1s In substance altogether dlfferent from that of the Czech natlon. The geo1>olltlcal tunotlon of Slovakla ls dlstinct !rom the runctlon of the Czech lands. Wblle Slova.kla occuples the centra] locatlon In the defense o! the Central-Euro pean area, Czech terrltory occuples the border posltlon. Wblle the Czech lands have a defenslve role agal nst the pressure o! the German world In the Danube, Basin, Slova.kla la supposed to ,bave a coordlnatlng role, and that not only toward German pressure, but even toward lncldental Russlan pressure. After the flrst World War the vlctorlous power.s gave SlovakJa the role to be "a support or the Czechs agalnst German pressure. 64 SLOVAKIA. This conceptlon proved to be !neffective. T he Danube Basin, or Centra! E urope, can be defended only with joint forces. And that !.s possible only when Slovakia wlll not be the cause of any CzechoMagyar or Czecho-Polis h antagonis ms. That will be so only wh en Slovakia is independent. The n s he will be able to fuJflll the function of a consolidating and coord!natlng factor in the pol!t!cal atmosphere of Centra! Europe. • • • WHO SAI D IT? "It is difficul t, nay right impossible, in a short artlcle to no te even in slogan for m the things that are connected with h istor!c November 7, 1947, for the USSR, for us, for Europe, for the whole cultural world. But one thlng can be expre ssed and interpreted fully. And th at is the sincere, deep hearty and undying gratitude of all Czechs a nd Slova ks t o the Soviet Union, to its people, to its Army and to it s s kipper, Generalissimo Stalin, for everyth ing they ha ve done and sti ll are doing for us. It is an unfalsified, selfless and clean feeling of friendshlp and sympathy, which we have for this great country that is so close to us and !s our ne!ghbor. l t is a pur e joy from the ,oys, the su ccesses and the progress of the USSR; !t !s the lnflexible hope that Slavdom, in its own new perception, w ill assure for itself and the world the deserved peace, in wh!ch all nations shall live a ccording to their manner, freely, without fears, democratically and w!th dign!ty, as well as in understanding, prosperity and happiness. In this s pirit, from my so ul I greet the jubileeing USSR, and congratulate lt from my heart for the results attained in peace and war. 1 wlsh it to continue to prosper, grow and become m ightier unto its own greatness, but a lso for the we lfa re of al l humanity. Long live the Soviet Un io n, and may its leader and ski pper, J . V. Stalin, live in fu ll health to see many more jubilees !" - (Dr. J oseph Lettrich, Pres!dent of the Slovak Democratic Party and the Slovak National Counc!I; ÔAS, ~ovember 7, 1947.) • • • • • • " Czechoslovakia a nd th e Uni on of Soviet Socialist Repub lics have united in the midst of fire a nd b lood - thls a lliance, the refore, is for eternity, as love and friendsh ip proven in affliction._,___, We are aware of th e fact that the USSR could sti ll exist w lthout us, but our free State certainly cou ld not exist without th e USS R .. .. Long live the victorlous Soviet Army ! Long live its Supreme Commande r, Gene ral issimo Stali n ! Long live the li berator of Bratislava, Marshal Ma• (ÔAS, the off!cial organ of Lettr!ch's Democratlc linovský !" Party. Apr!I 4. 19-17 ' "In parl!ament on November 7, 1935, when I spoke a bout the international sltuatlon, I s aid that it was my deep conviction that our contacts w ith t he Soviet Un io n shall be good and lasting, that Soviet Rus sia wi ll again beco me a powe rful Slova nic factor, a nd as the most powerfu l S lova n ic fact or would bri ng S lavdom muc h good. We are not c hang ing our stand - a nd th is is the permanent sta nd of the Demo(John U rsi ny, Vice-Premier of Czecho-Slovakla and c rati c Party." Vice-President of tbe Democ ratlr P arty. in Bratislava. February 22. 1947, according to ÔAS. offlclal orga n of tbe SDP, February 27, 1947.)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Are the Slovaks and Czechs Two "Closely Related" Nations? Description An account of the resource Dr. A. Grébert Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952 pp. 58-64 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Grébert, Arvéd, 1915-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/e69a2a2f0d54637fbb50516f7b7967f3.pdf 8b2ea9aa98ff238a46467ca06d984ef8 PDF Text Text Monsignor Dr. Joseph Tiso (right) with the beloved Monsignor Andrew Hlinka, charnpion of Slovak freedom, and Monsignor Dr. Charles Korper (left) in Bratislava, Slovakia, June 5, 1938, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Pittsburgh P act. �DR. JOSEPH TISO National Hero of the Slovak Nation � Monsignor Dr. Joseph Tiso (right) with the beloved Monsignor Andrew Hlinka, charnpion of Slovak freedom, and Monsignor Dr. Charles Korper (left) in Bratislava, Slovakia, June 5, 1938, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Pittsburgh P act. �DR. JOSEPH TISO National Hero of the Slovak Nation � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3) Description An account of the resource includes photo of Joseph Tiso, Andrew Hlinka, and Charles Körper (June 5, 1938) and portrait of Joseph Tiso Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/b49364ff5e662df0a866f35276b20458.pdf 34a0be96c1ad38d3f8547688b8ebaaf2 PDF Text Text YOU CAN LEARN SLOVAl( as easily as you can any other modem language. Slovak should be a MUST for students of Slovanic languages, because it is the simplest of all of them and a KEY to all of them. Prove it to yourself with the most scholarly text on Slovak, the SLOVAK LESSONS A practical study of the Slovak Grammar, 92 lessons, 400 pages; cxercises in Slovak and English; English-Slovak and Slovak-English vocabulary. Hard cover , bound in cloth, $3.50 HROBAK'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY - the best and most complete dictionary of its kind ; 702 pages with a br ief sumary of the Slovak Grammar. Hard cover, bound in cloth, $4.00 THE SLOVAKS, by Pet er P. Yurchak, s hould be read by all students inter est ed in the history and traditions of the Slovak nation ; 312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $3.00 ; paper cover - $2.00 SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK WSTORY by Joseph Škultéty, translation by O. D. Koreff; a documented refutation of several errors propagated by writers and historians; 229 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover $1.00. Order from: P.A.HROBAK Box 150 Middletown, Pa. �Sept. 27, 1864-MSGR. ANDREW HLINKA-Aug. 16, 1938 Champion of Slovak Freedom � YOU CAN LEARN SLOVAl( as easily as you can any other modem language. Slovak should be a MUST for students of Slovanic languages, because it is the simplest of all of them and a KEY to all of them. Prove it to yourself with the most scholarly text on Slovak, the SLOVAK LESSONS A practical study of the Slovak Grammar, 92 lessons, 400 pages; cxercises in Slovak and English; English-Slovak and Slovak-English vocabulary. Hard cover , bound in cloth, $3.50 HROBAK'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY - the best and most complete dictionary of its kind ; 702 pages with a br ief sumary of the Slovak Grammar. Hard cover, bound in cloth, $4.00 THE SLOVAKS, by Pet er P. Yurchak, s hould be read by all students inter est ed in the history and traditions of the Slovak nation ; 312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $3.00 ; paper cover - $2.00 SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK WSTORY by Joseph Škultéty, translation by O. D. Koreff; a documented refutation of several errors propagated by writers and historians; 229 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover $1.00. Order from: P.A.HROBAK Box 150 Middletown, Pa. �Sept. 27, 1864-MSGR. ANDREW HLINKA-Aug. 16, 1938 Champion of Slovak Freedom � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4) Description An account of the resource includes photo of Andrew Hlinka (August 16, 1938) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/0c1574aed9759ceac81f746ecc985631.pdf 48197f46eb317f88e9b972eea385fe07 PDF Text Text YOU CAN LEARN SLOVAl( as easily as you can any other modern language. Slovak should be a MUST for students of Slovanic languages, because it is the simplest of all of them and a KEY to all of them. Prove it to youi self with the most scholarly text on Slovak, the SLOVAl LESSO S A practical study of the Slovak Grammar, 92 lessons, 400 pages; exercises in Slovak and English; English-Slovak and Slovak-English vocabulary. B ard cover, bound in cloth, $3.50 HROBAK'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY - the best and most complete dictionary of its kind ; 702 pages with a brief sumar y of the Slovak Grammar. Bard cover, bound in cloth, $4.00 THE SLOVAK.S, by Peter P. Yurchak, should be read by all students interested in the history and traditions of the Slovak nation; 312 pages, hard cover , bound in cloth - $3.00; paper cover - $2.00 SKETCHES F ROl\l SLOV AK HISTORY by Joseph škultéty, translation by O. D. Koreff ; a documented refutat ion of several errors propagated by writers and hist orians; 229 pages, bard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover $1.00. Order from : P.A. HROBAK Box 150 Middletown, Pa. �Sept. 2, 1855 - REV. S~EPHEN FURDEK - January 18, 1915 Organizer, publis her, writer, c hampion of Slovak freedom. Born in Trstená, Orava County, Slovakia, died in Cleveland, Ohio. Founder of the First Catholic Slovak Union of the U . S. A., the First Catholic Slovak Ladies Union of the U. S. A., and the Slovak League of America. Furdek is referred to as the apostle of Americans of Slovak descent. � YOU CAN LEARN SLOVAl( as easily as you can any other modern language. Slovak should be a MUST for students of Slovanic languages, because it is the simplest of all of them and a KEY to all of them. Prove it to youi self with the most scholarly text on Slovak, the SLOVAl LESSO S A practical study of the Slovak Grammar, 92 lessons, 400 pages; exercises in Slovak and English; English-Slovak and Slovak-English vocabulary. B ard cover, bound in cloth, $3.50 HROBAK'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY - the best and most complete dictionary of its kind ; 702 pages with a brief sumar y of the Slovak Grammar. Bard cover, bound in cloth, $4.00 THE SLOVAK.S, by Peter P. Yurchak, should be read by all students interested in the history and traditions of the Slovak nation; 312 pages, hard cover , bound in cloth - $3.00; paper cover - $2.00 SKETCHES F ROl\l SLOV AK HISTORY by Joseph škultéty, translation by O. D. Koreff ; a documented refutat ion of several errors propagated by writers and hist orians; 229 pages, bard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover $1.00. Order from : P.A. HROBAK Box 150 Middletown, Pa. �Sept. 2, 1855 - REV. S~EPHEN FURDEK - January 18, 1915 Organizer, publis her, writer, c hampion of Slovak freedom. Born in Trstená, Orava County, Slovakia, died in Cleveland, Ohio. Founder of the First Catholic Slovak Union of the U . S. A., the First Catholic Slovak Ladies Union of the U. S. A., and the Slovak League of America. Furdek is referred to as the apostle of Americans of Slovak descent. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 Description An account of the resource includes portrait of Rev. Stephen Furdek (January 18, 1915) https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/af2fdc2a646a90d08f95570fbd4a822d.pdf 5b12f46826b779824e8506f23cba600b PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 63 BENEš: KING OF POUTICAL CHEATS At the meeting of the Czech-Sudeten German Federal Commlttee at Bonn, last December, General Prchala, chairman of the Czech Natlonal Commlttee in London, declared that he considered the expu\sion of Sudeten Germans from their motherland as tbe darkest cbapter in Czecb bistory. It wa.s a dark cbapter, a crime equalled only by H itler's attempt to exterminate the J ews. About half a million Sudeten Germans lost tbeir lives. T he Czech R evolutionary Guards, composed of youngsters whose parents were lmprlsoned or executed by the Gestapo durlng the war, e mployed a thoroughly Nazi brutality against the Sudeten Germans. These wlld youngsters were glven a free hand by t he Bene/:í Government in Prague. They committed such atroclties, mostly on innocent people, that lt is disgustlng even to write about lt. It was beyond understanding h ow the Brltlsh and U. S . Governm ents, whlch were responsible for the existence of the s o-called Czechoslovakian exiled Government, could give their approval to the tarbarous expulslon of Sudeten Germans, who in 1918 b ecame Czechoslovaklan citizens against their will. A young Czech student of history, Mr. S. Brzobohaty, took the trouble to flnd out why and when tbe Western Allies gave thelr cousent to such barb arity. And he discover ed that it neve r happened. The story of this political fraud is as follows: In 1942, Mr. Beneš, who was personally a very revengeful man and believed that the Sudeten Germans were tbe principal reason of his misfortune wbich deprived him of the Presidency of Czechoslo• vakia, asked the Britlsh Forelgn Offlce to approve his pian to expel Germa n Nazis from Czechoslovakia a fter the war. The British Forelgn Office had nothing against th e expulslon of German Nazis trom Czechoslovak ia. Th en Beneš vlsited the Soviet Russian Ambassador to the Czechoslovakian exiled Government and asked h!m for permisslon to expe\ Germans from Czechoslovakia, and informed him that the B r ltish had agreed to it. Bogomilov informed bis Government in Moscow but the Russ!an Bolsh eviks refused to agree with the Beneš pian, for at that Ume they stm believed that there migbt be some posslbllity of a separate peace with Ger many, and tberefore they did not wlsb to provoke the Germans too much. In June 1943, Beneš left for Washington, wbere he had a 30 mlnute talk with President Roosevelt. H e asked bim for permission to expel Germans frrm Czechoslovakia, an d assured Roosevel t that t he Bri t i sh and Ru ssians h ad g iven t heir f ull consent t o the pian. Roosevelt answered that he would not oppose a pian approved by bis allies. Then Beneš returned to London, called aga!n on Bogomllov, and informed bim that the British and U. S. Governments had given thei r c onsent t o the expu lsion of Germans, and that on l y the Russi ans wer e opposi ng i t . Bogomilov agaln !nformed his Government in Moscow. In the meantime the German military sltuation had worsened, so tbat Moscow hoped for complete vlctory In Europe. And because London �54 SLOVAKIA and Washington took the responsibllity for the expulsion of Sudeten Germans, Moscow also gave its consent. But later, polltical experts in the U. S. State Department came aero.ss the Beneš pian and dlsa.g reed. In the material which Stettinius prepared for Roosevelt for Yalta, it was expressly etated that no expulsion of national groups should be permitted. Yalta, however, ended In d lscord, and thls question never came up on the program. The a sser• tlon of Beneš -and hls followers now organlzed in the so·called Councll ot Free Czecho.slovakla in Washington that thelr allles a pproved the expuls ion of Sudeten Germans 1s nothing but a colossal polltlcal fraud. Thle was not the firet political fraud perpetrated by Benei. His whole political career wae based upon lies and frauds. Czechoslovakia itself was brought into exilltence by a political fraud. The Czechs never wanted an independent state, having fought for a century for a reorganization of the Hapsburg Monarchy into a federal state of nations. Masaryk and Beneš had no followers for their adventure in the First World War, at leaat not among Czechs. AII the Czech politic.il partie& and legally elected representatives of the Czech nation, durlng the war, formed the Czech National Committee in Prague, which alone had the right to 11peak in the name of the Czech nation. On the 14th of January, 1917, this Committee iasued a declaration, condemning the war, and Masaryk's adventure abroad, and advocating the autonomous existence of the Czech nation within the Hapsburg Monarchy. After the flrst war, In 1925, Beneš publlshed hls book, "T,he World War and Our Revolutlon," in whlch he remarked concerning this declaration of .the representatlves of the Czech nation: "The rejection of our policy was solemn, without any reaervation, and de.::isive." lt really was so, because the Czechs did not wish to have anything to do with Masaryk and Beneš. But Mr. Beneš managed it otherwlse. On page 449 of the same book Beneš says: "Although this declaration rejected our policy, we managed to explain it in our favor to the public in the ENTENTE. We suppressed the passage about autonon,y within the framework of the Hapsburg Monarchy, publishing and emphasizing the paasages again11t the war and for the right of the independent existence of the Czech nation." Thls Ie what Beneš stated himself publicly about his politlcal methods. H e was a po\it!cal cheat and he was proud to be a polltlcal cheat. He possessed boundless arrogance in lylng and was tlreless in cheatlng. When the Britlsh Prime Minister, at the Peace Treaty Conference In 1919, asked about the three milllon Sudeten Germans. lleneš promlsed most solemnly that Czechoslovakia would be organlzed on t he Swiss model, thus glvlng autonomy to each national group. Hardly was the treaty signed than Czech s oldiers were ordered to shoot at Sudeten Germans who demanded autonomy. Slovakla was in• corporated lnto Czechoslovakla on the basls of a most solemn promise that it should be a federal state with full Slovakian autonomy, and when the Slovakian leaders asked for the fulflllment of tlils promlse they were imprlsoned for hlgh treason. At the Conference at Genoa, in 1922, Beneš swore eternal fidelity to his French and British benefactora and, behind their backs, and without the knowledge of the Czechoalovakian Government, concluded �SLOVAKU 66 a Treaty with the Ruaalan Bol1hevlk1. H 11 fame abroad waa based on money he paid out from the fund1 of the Czechoslov aklan Forelgn Mini1try to foreign journallats who made propaganda for hi1 per1on. When the German Nazl1 occupied Prague, the archlvea of the Czechoslovaklan Forelgn Miniatry fe ll lnto their handa. They publlahed a book contain ing a list of Frenc h, British and American per1onallt le1, who were paid by Benei durlng Czechoslov akia' a twenty year1' exlatence; and photocopiea of the recelpt1 slgned by theae people were alao publlahed - for Beneš never gave away a penny without demandlng a receipt, thus keeplng hla foreign agenta to hee l. The Brltiah Fore ign Office certain ly has a copy of thl1 book, and so ha■ the State Department in Wa1hington . Beneš proclalmed hlmself Czechoslov aklan Presldent In 1940, and unfortunate ly recelved the support ot some prominent Brltish people. In order to secure for hlmself t be asslstance ot the Russian Bolsbevlks he rendered tbem lnvaluable servlces durlng tbe war. lt waa he who, In 1939, auggested to Roo1evelt the Idea that Stalln wished to democratiz e hla regime. He brought and introduced into France, Great Britaln, and the U. S. the large1t Bolshevik F lfth Column, dl1gul1ed as "democrati c Czechoalov aklan refugees." The present Czechoslov akian Minister ot tbe lnterlor, Nosek, was durlng the war counsellor to tbe Beneš Governmen t In London and was paid trom tbe pockets of Brltlsb taxpayers to tbe tune of 70 pounds Sterllng a month, tax free. The present ch,ef of the Bolshevlk mllitary e1pionage again1t Britain, General Laatovicka, was in the . B. B. C. durlng the war. Also here were Belheller, Slan1ky, Sllnck, and a hundred other Bol1hevik agenta, all dl1guised a■ Czechoalov akia n democrata, and all pald by the Briti1h taxpayer. AII the Czecbs and Slovaks bere wbo were an obstacle to thls great fraud of Beneš and bis followers were falsely denounced as proNazl and, wltbout investlgatlo n, were lmprlsoned by tbe Britlsh police. The followers ot Beneš are now organlzed In the so-called Councll of Free Czechoslov akla, whose headquarte rs ls In Washington, Czechs, who know thls soclety and, therf'fore, do not wisb to have anythlng to do wlth it, are organlzed In the Czech Natlonal CommlttE>e in London. In the retugee camp at Murnau, Bavarla (U. S. Zone}. tbere are some adherents or Benei!; the remalnder of the refugees are adberents of the Czeoh Natlonal Comm.ittee . In one year, the Beneš .1dherent.s made 241 denunciatio n1 to the U. S. authorltie1 agalnst thelr opponenta. The U. S. authoritie1 lnve1tlgate d all the1e denunciatlon1 and they all proved to be false. The U. S. authorltles know the adherents of tbe Councll of Free Czechoslov akla pretty well by now, and they are fed up wltb them, desplte the protectlon accorded them by certaln personalltl es In tbe U. S. But, unrortunate ly, lt 1s not necessary to go as far as Oermany or the U. S. to experlenre the worklngs or the new "dJplomacy by denunclatlo n." I could draw upon my own experlence s to prove lt. 'ľbe Brltlsb securlty servlres a.ppear to be poUUcal\y uneducated however errtclent they may be In other respects and, as long as tbls 1s llO, our King of Fraud or, at \east, bis Trojan Horee, tbe Fren Czechos lovaklan Flfth Column. wlll contlnue to graze unharmerl In our mld.c;t. - (The Czec h "Pravda," London, January 1951 ). � SLOVAKIA 63 BENEš: KING OF POUTICAL CHEATS At the meeting of the Czech-Sudeten German Federal Commlttee at Bonn, last December, General Prchala, chairman of the Czech Natlonal Commlttee in London, declared that he considered the expu\sion of Sudeten Germans from their motherland as tbe darkest cbapter in Czecb bistory. It wa.s a dark cbapter, a crime equalled only by H itler's attempt to exterminate the J ews. About half a million Sudeten Germans lost tbeir lives. T he Czech R evolutionary Guards, composed of youngsters whose parents were lmprlsoned or executed by the Gestapo durlng the war, e mployed a thoroughly Nazi brutality against the Sudeten Germans. These wlld youngsters were glven a free hand by t he Bene/:í Government in Prague. They committed such atroclties, mostly on innocent people, that lt is disgustlng even to write about lt. It was beyond understanding h ow the Brltlsh and U. S . Governm ents, whlch were responsible for the existence of the s o-called Czechoslovakian exiled Government, could give their approval to the tarbarous expulslon of Sudeten Germans, who in 1918 b ecame Czechoslovaklan citizens against their will. A young Czech student of history, Mr. S. Brzobohaty, took the trouble to flnd out why and when tbe Western Allies gave thelr cousent to such barb arity. And he discover ed that it neve r happened. The story of this political fraud is as follows: In 1942, Mr. Beneš, who was personally a very revengeful man and believed that the Sudeten Germans were tbe principal reason of his misfortune wbich deprived him of the Presidency of Czechoslo• vakia, asked the Britlsh Forelgn Offlce to approve his pian to expel Germa n Nazis from Czechoslovakia a fter the war. The British Forelgn Office had nothing against th e expulslon of German Nazis trom Czechoslovak ia. Th en Beneš vlsited the Soviet Russian Ambassador to the Czechoslovakian exiled Government and asked h!m for permisslon to expe\ Germans from Czechoslovakia, and informed him that the B r ltish had agreed to it. Bogomilov informed bis Government in Moscow but the Russ!an Bolsh eviks refused to agree with the Beneš pian, for at that Ume they stm believed that there migbt be some posslbllity of a separate peace with Ger many, and tberefore they did not wlsb to provoke the Germans too much. In June 1943, Beneš left for Washington, wbere he had a 30 mlnute talk with President Roosevelt. H e asked bim for permission to expel Germans frrm Czechoslovakia, an d assured Roosevel t that t he Bri t i sh and Ru ssians h ad g iven t heir f ull consent t o the pian. Roosevelt answered that he would not oppose a pian approved by bis allies. Then Beneš returned to London, called aga!n on Bogomllov, and informed bim that the British and U. S. Governments had given thei r c onsent t o the expu lsion of Germans, and that on l y the Russi ans wer e opposi ng i t . Bogomilov agaln !nformed his Government in Moscow. In the meantime the German military sltuation had worsened, so tbat Moscow hoped for complete vlctory In Europe. And because London �54 SLOVAKIA and Washington took the responsibllity for the expulsion of Sudeten Germans, Moscow also gave its consent. But later, polltical experts in the U. S. State Department came aero.ss the Beneš pian and dlsa.g reed. In the material which Stettinius prepared for Roosevelt for Yalta, it was expressly etated that no expulsion of national groups should be permitted. Yalta, however, ended In d lscord, and thls question never came up on the program. The a sser• tlon of Beneš -and hls followers now organlzed in the so·called Councll ot Free Czecho.slovakla in Washington that thelr allles a pproved the expuls ion of Sudeten Germans 1s nothing but a colossal polltlcal fraud. Thle was not the firet political fraud perpetrated by Benei. His whole political career wae based upon lies and frauds. Czechoslovakia itself was brought into exilltence by a political fraud. The Czechs never wanted an independent state, having fought for a century for a reorganization of the Hapsburg Monarchy into a federal state of nations. Masaryk and Beneš had no followers for their adventure in the First World War, at leaat not among Czechs. AII the Czech politic.il partie& and legally elected representatives of the Czech nation, durlng the war, formed the Czech National Committee in Prague, which alone had the right to 11peak in the name of the Czech nation. On the 14th of January, 1917, this Committee iasued a declaration, condemning the war, and Masaryk's adventure abroad, and advocating the autonomous existence of the Czech nation within the Hapsburg Monarchy. After the flrst war, In 1925, Beneš publlshed hls book, "T,he World War and Our Revolutlon," in whlch he remarked concerning this declaration of .the representatlves of the Czech nation: "The rejection of our policy was solemn, without any reaervation, and de.::isive." lt really was so, because the Czechs did not wish to have anything to do with Masaryk and Beneš. But Mr. Beneš managed it otherwlse. On page 449 of the same book Beneš says: "Although this declaration rejected our policy, we managed to explain it in our favor to the public in the ENTENTE. We suppressed the passage about autonon,y within the framework of the Hapsburg Monarchy, publishing and emphasizing the paasages again11t the war and for the right of the independent existence of the Czech nation." Thls Ie what Beneš stated himself publicly about his politlcal methods. H e was a po\it!cal cheat and he was proud to be a polltlcal cheat. He possessed boundless arrogance in lylng and was tlreless in cheatlng. When the Britlsh Prime Minister, at the Peace Treaty Conference In 1919, asked about the three milllon Sudeten Germans. lleneš promlsed most solemnly that Czechoslovakia would be organlzed on t he Swiss model, thus glvlng autonomy to each national group. Hardly was the treaty signed than Czech s oldiers were ordered to shoot at Sudeten Germans who demanded autonomy. Slovakla was in• corporated lnto Czechoslovakla on the basls of a most solemn promise that it should be a federal state with full Slovakian autonomy, and when the Slovakian leaders asked for the fulflllment of tlils promlse they were imprlsoned for hlgh treason. At the Conference at Genoa, in 1922, Beneš swore eternal fidelity to his French and British benefactora and, behind their backs, and without the knowledge of the Czechoalovakian Government, concluded �SLOVAKU 66 a Treaty with the Ruaalan Bol1hevlk1. H 11 fame abroad waa based on money he paid out from the fund1 of the Czechoslov aklan Forelgn Mini1try to foreign journallats who made propaganda for hi1 per1on. When the German Nazl1 occupied Prague, the archlvea of the Czechoslovaklan Forelgn Miniatry fe ll lnto their handa. They publlahed a book contain ing a list of Frenc h, British and American per1onallt le1, who were paid by Benei durlng Czechoslov akia' a twenty year1' exlatence; and photocopiea of the recelpt1 slgned by theae people were alao publlahed - for Beneš never gave away a penny without demandlng a receipt, thus keeplng hla foreign agenta to hee l. The Brltiah Fore ign Office certain ly has a copy of thl1 book, and so ha■ the State Department in Wa1hington . Beneš proclalmed hlmself Czechoslov aklan Presldent In 1940, and unfortunate ly recelved the support ot some prominent Brltish people. In order to secure for hlmself t be asslstance ot the Russian Bolsbevlks he rendered tbem lnvaluable servlces durlng tbe war. lt waa he who, In 1939, auggested to Roo1evelt the Idea that Stalln wished to democratiz e hla regime. He brought and introduced into France, Great Britaln, and the U. S. the large1t Bolshevik F lfth Column, dl1gul1ed as "democrati c Czechoalov aklan refugees." The present Czechoslov akian Minister ot tbe lnterlor, Nosek, was durlng the war counsellor to tbe Beneš Governmen t In London and was paid trom tbe pockets of Brltlsb taxpayers to tbe tune of 70 pounds Sterllng a month, tax free. The present ch,ef of the Bolshevlk mllitary e1pionage again1t Britain, General Laatovicka, was in the . B. B. C. durlng the war. Also here were Belheller, Slan1ky, Sllnck, and a hundred other Bol1hevik agenta, all dl1guised a■ Czechoalov akia n democrata, and all pald by the Briti1h taxpayer. AII the Czecbs and Slovaks bere wbo were an obstacle to thls great fraud of Beneš and bis followers were falsely denounced as proNazl and, wltbout investlgatlo n, were lmprlsoned by tbe Britlsh police. The followers ot Beneš are now organlzed In the so-called Councll of Free Czechoslov akla, whose headquarte rs ls In Washington, Czechs, who know thls soclety and, therf'fore, do not wisb to have anythlng to do wlth it, are organlzed In the Czech Natlonal CommlttE>e in London. In the retugee camp at Murnau, Bavarla (U. S. Zone}. tbere are some adherents or Benei!; the remalnder of the refugees are adberents of the Czeoh Natlonal Comm.ittee . In one year, the Beneš .1dherent.s made 241 denunciatio n1 to the U. S. authorltie1 agalnst thelr opponenta. The U. S. authoritie1 lnve1tlgate d all the1e denunciatlon1 and they all proved to be false. The U. S. authorltles know the adherents of tbe Councll of Free Czechoslov akla pretty well by now, and they are fed up wltb them, desplte the protectlon accorded them by certaln personalltl es In tbe U. S. But, unrortunate ly, lt 1s not necessary to go as far as Oermany or the U. S. to experlenre the worklngs or the new "dJplomacy by denunclatlo n." I could draw upon my own experlence s to prove lt. 'ľbe Brltlsb securlty servlres a.ppear to be poUUcal\y uneducated however errtclent they may be In other respects and, as long as tbls 1s llO, our King of Fraud or, at \east, bis Trojan Horee, tbe Fren Czechos lovaklan Flfth Column. wlll contlnue to graze unharmerl In our mld.c;t. - (The Czec h "Pravda," London, January 1951 ). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 63 BENEš: KING OF POUTICAL CHEATS At the meeting of the Czech-Sudeten German Federal Commlttee at Bonn, last December, General Prchala, chairman of the Czech Natlonal Commlttee in London, declared that he considered the expu\sion of Sudeten Germans from their motherland as tbe darkest cbapter in Czecb bistory. It wa.s a dark cbapter, a crime equalled only by H itler's attempt to exterminate the J ews. About half a million Sudeten Germans lost tbeir lives. T he Czech R evolutionary Guards, composed of youngsters whose parents were lmprlsoned or executed by the Gestapo durlng the war, e mployed a thoroughly Nazi brutality against the Sudeten Germans. These wlld youngsters were glven a free hand by t he Bene/:í Government in Prague. They committed such atroclties, mostly on innocent people, that lt is disgustlng even to write about lt. It was beyond understanding h ow the Brltlsh and U. S . Governm ents, whlch were responsible for the existence of the s o-called Czechoslovakian exiled Government, could give their approval to the tarbarous expulslon of Sudeten Germans, who in 1918 b ecame Czechoslovaklan citizens against their will. A young Czech student of history, Mr. S. Brzobohaty, took the trouble to flnd out why and when tbe Western Allies gave thelr cousent to such barb arity. And he discover ed that it neve r happened. The story of this political fraud is as follows: In 1942, Mr. Beneš, who was personally a very revengeful man and believed that the Sudeten Germans were tbe principal reason of his misfortune wbich deprived him of the Presidency of Czechoslo• vakia, asked the Britlsh Forelgn Offlce to approve his pian to expel Germa n Nazis from Czechoslovakia a fter the war. The British Forelgn Office had nothing against th e expulslon of German Nazis trom Czechoslovak ia. Th en Beneš vlsited the Soviet Russian Ambassador to the Czechoslovakian exiled Government and asked h!m for permisslon to expe\ Germans from Czechoslovakia, and informed him that the B r ltish had agreed to it. Bogomilov informed bis Government in Moscow but the Russ!an Bolsh eviks refused to agree with the Beneš pian, for at that Ume they stm believed that there migbt be some posslbllity of a separate peace with Ger many, and tberefore they did not wlsb to provoke the Germans too much. In June 1943, Beneš left for Washington, wbere he had a 30 mlnute talk with President Roosevelt. H e asked bim for permission to expel Germans frrm Czechoslovakia, an d assured Roosevel t that t he Bri t i sh and Ru ssians h ad g iven t heir f ull consent t o the pian. Roosevelt answered that he would not oppose a pian approved by bis allies. Then Beneš returned to London, called aga!n on Bogomllov, and informed bim that the British and U. S. Governments had given thei r c onsent t o the expu lsion of Germans, and that on l y the Russi ans wer e opposi ng i t . Bogomilov agaln !nformed his Government in Moscow. In the meantime the German military sltuation had worsened, so tbat Moscow hoped for complete vlctory In Europe. And because London 54 SLOVAKIA and Washington took the responsibllity for the expulsion of Sudeten Germans, Moscow also gave its consent. But later, polltical experts in the U. S. State Department came aero.ss the Beneš pian and dlsa.g reed. In the material which Stettinius prepared for Roosevelt for Yalta, it was expressly etated that no expulsion of national groups should be permitted. Yalta, however, ended In d lscord, and thls question never came up on the program. The a sser• tlon of Beneš -and hls followers now organlzed in the so·called Councll ot Free Czecho.slovakla in Washington that thelr allles a pproved the expuls ion of Sudeten Germans 1s nothing but a colossal polltlcal fraud. Thle was not the firet political fraud perpetrated by Benei. His whole political career wae based upon lies and frauds. Czechoslovakia itself was brought into exilltence by a political fraud. The Czechs never wanted an independent state, having fought for a century for a reorganization of the Hapsburg Monarchy into a federal state of nations. Masaryk and Beneš had no followers for their adventure in the First World War, at leaat not among Czechs. AII the Czech politic.il partie& and legally elected representatives of the Czech nation, durlng the war, formed the Czech National Committee in Prague, which alone had the right to 11peak in the name of the Czech nation. On the 14th of January, 1917, this Committee iasued a declaration, condemning the war, and Masaryk's adventure abroad, and advocating the autonomous existence of the Czech nation within the Hapsburg Monarchy. After the flrst war, In 1925, Beneš publlshed hls book, "T,he World War and Our Revolutlon," in whlch he remarked concerning this declaration of .the representatlves of the Czech nation: "The rejection of our policy was solemn, without any reaervation, and de.::isive." lt really was so, because the Czechs did not wish to have anything to do with Masaryk and Beneš. But Mr. Beneš managed it otherwlse. On page 449 of the same book Beneš says: "Although this declaration rejected our policy, we managed to explain it in our favor to the public in the ENTENTE. We suppressed the passage about autonon,y within the framework of the Hapsburg Monarchy, publishing and emphasizing the paasages again11t the war and for the right of the independent existence of the Czech nation." Thls Ie what Beneš stated himself publicly about his politlcal methods. H e was a po\it!cal cheat and he was proud to be a polltlcal cheat. He possessed boundless arrogance in lylng and was tlreless in cheatlng. When the Britlsh Prime Minister, at the Peace Treaty Conference In 1919, asked about the three milllon Sudeten Germans. lleneš promlsed most solemnly that Czechoslovakia would be organlzed on t he Swiss model, thus glvlng autonomy to each national group. Hardly was the treaty signed than Czech s oldiers were ordered to shoot at Sudeten Germans who demanded autonomy. Slovakla was in• corporated lnto Czechoslovakla on the basls of a most solemn promise that it should be a federal state with full Slovakian autonomy, and when the Slovakian leaders asked for the fulflllment of tlils promlse they were imprlsoned for hlgh treason. At the Conference at Genoa, in 1922, Beneš swore eternal fidelity to his French and British benefactora and, behind their backs, and without the knowledge of the Czechoalovakian Government, concluded SLOVAKU 66 a Treaty with the Ruaalan Bol1hevlk1. H 11 fame abroad waa based on money he paid out from the fund1 of the Czechoslov aklan Forelgn Mini1try to foreign journallats who made propaganda for hi1 per1on. When the German Nazl1 occupied Prague, the archlvea of the Czechoslovaklan Forelgn Miniatry fe ll lnto their handa. They publlahed a book contain ing a list of Frenc h, British and American per1onallt le1, who were paid by Benei durlng Czechoslov akia' a twenty year1' exlatence; and photocopiea of the recelpt1 slgned by theae people were alao publlahed - for Beneš never gave away a penny without demandlng a receipt, thus keeplng hla foreign agenta to hee l. The Brltiah Fore ign Office certain ly has a copy of thl1 book, and so ha■ the State Department in Wa1hington . Beneš proclalmed hlmself Czechoslov aklan Presldent In 1940, and unfortunate ly recelved the support ot some prominent Brltish people. In order to secure for hlmself t be asslstance ot the Russian Bolsbevlks he rendered tbem lnvaluable servlces durlng tbe war. lt waa he who, In 1939, auggested to Roo1evelt the Idea that Stalln wished to democratiz e hla regime. He brought and introduced into France, Great Britaln, and the U. S. the large1t Bolshevik F lfth Column, dl1gul1ed as "democrati c Czechoalov aklan refugees." The present Czechoslov akian Minister ot tbe lnterlor, Nosek, was durlng the war counsellor to tbe Beneš Governmen t In London and was paid trom tbe pockets of Brltlsb taxpayers to tbe tune of 70 pounds Sterllng a month, tax free. The present ch,ef of the Bolshevlk mllitary e1pionage again1t Britain, General Laatovicka, was in the . B. B. C. durlng the war. Also here were Belheller, Slan1ky, Sllnck, and a hundred other Bol1hevik agenta, all dl1guised a■ Czechoalov akia n democrata, and all pald by the Briti1h taxpayer. AII the Czecbs and Slovaks bere wbo were an obstacle to thls great fraud of Beneš and bis followers were falsely denounced as proNazl and, wltbout investlgatlo n, were lmprlsoned by tbe Britlsh police. The followers ot Beneš are now organlzed In the so-called Councll of Free Czechoslov akla, whose headquarte rs ls In Washington, Czechs, who know thls soclety and, therf'fore, do not wisb to have anythlng to do wlth it, are organlzed In the Czech Natlonal CommlttE>e in London. In the retugee camp at Murnau, Bavarla (U. S. Zone}. tbere are some adherents or Benei!; the remalnder of the refugees are adberents of the Czeoh Natlonal Comm.ittee . In one year, the Beneš .1dherent.s made 241 denunciatio n1 to the U. S. authorltie1 agalnst thelr opponenta. The U. S. authoritie1 lnve1tlgate d all the1e denunciatlon1 and they all proved to be false. The U. S. authorltles know the adherents of tbe Councll of Free Czechoslov akla pretty well by now, and they are fed up wltb them, desplte the protectlon accorded them by certaln personalltl es In tbe U. S. But, unrortunate ly, lt 1s not necessary to go as far as Oermany or the U. S. to experlenre the worklngs or the new "dJplomacy by denunclatlo n." I could draw upon my own experlence s to prove lt. 'ľbe Brltlsb securlty servlres a.ppear to be poUUcal\y uneducated however errtclent they may be In other respects and, as long as tbls 1s llO, our King of Fraud or, at \east, bis Trojan Horee, tbe Fren Czechos lovaklan Flfth Column. wlll contlnue to graze unharmerl In our mld.c;t. - (The Czec h "Pravda," London, January 1951 ).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Beneš: King of Political Cheats Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952 pp. 53-55 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/da3f2ca94d04ff9e5d213069e50cef64.pdf 37bf27089082f711bbb586f539324490 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 23 CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA ORAVA The Orava Castle, one o! the most beautiful in Slovakla, nestles some 360 feet a bove the Orava River. The stronghold ls made up or three parts, bullt at different ti mes: the lower, centra), and upper. The centra) portlon is the oldest. Thls castle wa.,; royal property as early as 1010, and lts foundation goes back to the pagan perlod of Slovakia. lt is recorded that tbe castle sent aid to Trenčín In 1069, wben tbe Czeebs attacked the city, and t hat it was a safe refuge for tbe people in 1241, when the barbaric Tatars invaded Hungary. If you would enter the lower courtyard, you must pass througb a gate and a tower. On the gate you (Ind the inscription, "I. Z. C. 1543" and two beautlful escutcheons: one of George Thurzo and the other of Francis Zichy. Inside tbe lower courtyard are the residences of officers, tbe record room, a well, and a chapel. Members of tbe Thurzo and Tokoly families, as well as those of other notables, are buried witbin the cbapel walls. As you pass on, you pause before a beautlful stairease to vlew the two sculptured lions on columns stationed at the foot of the stalrs. You ascend the stairs, pass through a heavy gate, and enter the oldest part of the Orava Castle, tbe courtyard and the castle proper. In the courtyard is a well which flows lnto the Orava river b eneatb the Castle. To the rlght of the welI is a cave, within which, a Iegend says, Peter Varday, Archblshop of Kaloča, was imprlsoned in l 484, because he spoke too freely against higher taxes. Then you enter the castle, which was once occupled by the Thurzo family, and find the portraits of al-1 the administrators of Orava, trom George Thurzo down to Zichy. Odd, worn stairs In the wall and ladders take you to a long narrow bridge, wbich extends to the entrance of the upper. castle. This courtyard is quite small compared to the others. The chapel !s the highest point of this castle. Beneatb this are small narrow rooms or cells in wblch, the Oravans telI you, "the Red Monks once llved." The castle has passed through many hands. Records show that Peter Balaša, administrator of Hont, occupied it in 1267. The dauntless Matúš Čák - "the mightly lord of the Vah and the Tatras" became the owner in 1298, and some time Iater a man named Donč. In 1320 the King exchanged two other castles for Orava. Lambert became the .admlnlstrator in 1322, and Hypolytus, Count of Kremnica, succeeded bim in 1335. During the relgn of Louis (1342-1382), Stephen Katy (135(>), Dletricb Bebek (1379), Vladlslaus and Jobn Kakas (1380), and Count Nlcbolas (1382) were admlnistrators of Orava and occupled the Castle. Louis was a Crequent visitor at the castle; it was bere that he beld counsel wlth bis uncie Casimir, King of Poland. When Caslmir dled in 1370, Louls succeeded bim as· regent ot Poland and passed througb Orava many limes on bis way to Polnnd. · In 1398 King Zigmond gave the castle to Ctibor. who ruled over Bečkov and several otber castles in tbe upper Váb territory. Wben Ctibor dled in 1424, Zlgmond gave tbe castle to Nlcbolas and Andrew Dalucký, over the protests of Ct!bor's daugbter. Catherine. Jlskra, the Hussite, took the castle In 1440. Tbe Russian Duke, Peter Odrovaž, �24 SLOVAKIA was imprisoned in tbe castle by Jiskra in 1442. Peter Komorovský, who held Likava besides flve otber strongholds, became adn'linistrator of Orava in 1449. Komorovský Jost all except Orava to Matblas Corvin, ~ause he allied hlmself witb Prince Casimir of Poland, wbo sougbt to unseat Mathias as Regent of Hungary. Mathias could not take the stronghold by force; Komorovský sold it to bim for 8000 ducats In 1474. Komorovský left for Poland, but bis army, "tbe Black Regiment," joined · up wltb King Mathlas. Jobn Corvi:n, who succeeded bis father as regent, marrled into tbe Zápoľský family. After bis death in 1505, the castle became the property of the Zápoľský family. In 1526, the two Kostkas, Peter and Nicholas, Czecb noblemen, defended it in tbe name of Zápoľský so well, that Katzianer, commander of King Ferdinanďs army and the man who practlcally wlped out Trenčín in 1528, could not capture ít. S6metime later the Kostkas made up with Ferdinand, who recognized their possessions (Lietava and Strečno, received from Zrupoľský for valoai>Je services rendered) and gave Orava to the grandson of tbe Kostkas' sister, John of Dubová, in 15·34. The latter dled in 1545 without heirs and willed the castle to Wenceslaus Sedlnlcký on the condition that the Kostkas could have it on the payment of 9000 ducats, the sum expended in furnisblng the castle. Nicholas Kostka wanted tbe castle very mucb, but did not bave the stipulated 9000 ducats. lt became bis, bowever, ihdirectly some years later. Francis 'ľhurzo, adminlstrator of Nitra, Celi in love witb Bal'bara Kostka, Nicbolas' daughter, and married ber in 1554. Thurzo paid Sedlnický tbe requlred sum and became the next owner of the castle. He built the lower part of the castle and the well in tbe courtyard, furnlshed the rooms luxuriously, and planted fruit trees in tbe vlcinlty. Hls wlfe dled about ten years Jater wltbout bearing children, and Tburzo married Catherine Zrinský, who bore him four sons and two daugbters. Thurzo wllled the castle to bis oldest '·s on George when he died in 1576. Tbe Thurzo widow then married ·Emerich l<'orgáč. George Tburzo became palatinate. In 1611 he prnnounced judgment against "the Bloody Countess Bathory" of Čachtrce. He died in 1616 and left the castle to bis son Henry. The Jatter dled flve years later and the Orava stronghold passed lnto the hands of Catherine Tôkôly, a Tburzo by birth. The seventeenth century was packéd wlth ~~ouble for tbe occupants of tbe castle, whlch passed into the hands of klngs, rebel.s, and brigands. Emrlch Tôkôly fortified the castle ánd Caspar Pika was at the head of tbe garrlson stationed there. Tbe castle was taken In 1674 by generals Špork and Heister through tbe treacbery of the Polis)?. dlvislon of tbe garrison. Pika was pinned tó a pole and the otber defendants were sfaughtered. Tôkčily's four-year-old son and bis tutor got a.way with their llves. The rebels under Rákoczy won tbe castle 1back in 1703, only to lose lt to tbe EmJ?eror's anny In 1711. The Orava Ca.stle was dam~ed by fire May 18, 1800, but was partlally rebuilt soon after. In tbe first quarter of the twentleth century Orava came into the possession of tbe Zichy famlly, who restored it . to lts present cÓnditlon. If limes ever get norma! again and you wlll be allowed ·to travel t o Slovakla., v-isit Orava Castle and vlew the beautiful, enchanted Orava valley trom tbe castle heights. � SLOVAKIA 23 CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA ORAVA The Orava Castle, one o! the most beautiful in Slovakla, nestles some 360 feet a bove the Orava River. The stronghold ls made up or three parts, bullt at different ti mes: the lower, centra), and upper. The centra) portlon is the oldest. Thls castle wa.,; royal property as early as 1010, and lts foundation goes back to the pagan perlod of Slovakia. lt is recorded that tbe castle sent aid to Trenčín In 1069, wben tbe Czeebs attacked the city, and t hat it was a safe refuge for tbe people in 1241, when the barbaric Tatars invaded Hungary. If you would enter the lower courtyard, you must pass througb a gate and a tower. On the gate you (Ind the inscription, "I. Z. C. 1543" and two beautlful escutcheons: one of George Thurzo and the other of Francis Zichy. Inside tbe lower courtyard are the residences of officers, tbe record room, a well, and a chapel. Members of tbe Thurzo and Tokoly families, as well as those of other notables, are buried witbin the cbapel walls. As you pass on, you pause before a beautlful stairease to vlew the two sculptured lions on columns stationed at the foot of the stalrs. You ascend the stairs, pass through a heavy gate, and enter the oldest part of the Orava Castle, tbe courtyard and the castle proper. In the courtyard is a well which flows lnto the Orava river b eneatb the Castle. To the rlght of the welI is a cave, within which, a Iegend says, Peter Varday, Archblshop of Kaloča, was imprlsoned in l 484, because he spoke too freely against higher taxes. Then you enter the castle, which was once occupled by the Thurzo family, and find the portraits of al-1 the administrators of Orava, trom George Thurzo down to Zichy. Odd, worn stairs In the wall and ladders take you to a long narrow bridge, wbich extends to the entrance of the upper. castle. This courtyard is quite small compared to the others. The chapel !s the highest point of this castle. Beneatb this are small narrow rooms or cells in wblch, the Oravans telI you, "the Red Monks once llved." The castle has passed through many hands. Records show that Peter Balaša, administrator of Hont, occupied it in 1267. The dauntless Matúš Čák - "the mightly lord of the Vah and the Tatras" became the owner in 1298, and some time Iater a man named Donč. In 1320 the King exchanged two other castles for Orava. Lambert became the .admlnlstrator in 1322, and Hypolytus, Count of Kremnica, succeeded bim in 1335. During the relgn of Louis (1342-1382), Stephen Katy (135(>), Dletricb Bebek (1379), Vladlslaus and Jobn Kakas (1380), and Count Nlcbolas (1382) were admlnistrators of Orava and occupled the Castle. Louis was a Crequent visitor at the castle; it was bere that he beld counsel wlth bis uncie Casimir, King of Poland. When Caslmir dled in 1370, Louls succeeded bim as· regent ot Poland and passed througb Orava many limes on bis way to Polnnd. · In 1398 King Zigmond gave the castle to Ctibor. who ruled over Bečkov and several otber castles in tbe upper Váb territory. Wben Ctibor dled in 1424, Zlgmond gave tbe castle to Nlcbolas and Andrew Dalucký, over the protests of Ct!bor's daugbter. Catherine. Jlskra, the Hussite, took the castle In 1440. Tbe Russian Duke, Peter Odrovaž, �24 SLOVAKIA was imprisoned in tbe castle by Jiskra in 1442. Peter Komorovský, who held Likava besides flve otber strongholds, became adn'linistrator of Orava in 1449. Komorovský Jost all except Orava to Matblas Corvin, ~ause he allied hlmself witb Prince Casimir of Poland, wbo sougbt to unseat Mathias as Regent of Hungary. Mathias could not take the stronghold by force; Komorovský sold it to bim for 8000 ducats In 1474. Komorovský left for Poland, but bis army, "tbe Black Regiment," joined · up wltb King Mathlas. Jobn Corvi:n, who succeeded bis father as regent, marrled into tbe Zápoľský family. After bis death in 1505, the castle became the property of the Zápoľský family. In 1526, the two Kostkas, Peter and Nicholas, Czecb noblemen, defended it in tbe name of Zápoľský so well, that Katzianer, commander of King Ferdinanďs army and the man who practlcally wlped out Trenčín in 1528, could not capture ít. S6metime later the Kostkas made up with Ferdinand, who recognized their possessions (Lietava and Strečno, received from Zrupoľský for valoai>Je services rendered) and gave Orava to the grandson of tbe Kostkas' sister, John of Dubová, in 15·34. The latter dled in 1545 without heirs and willed the castle to Wenceslaus Sedlnlcký on the condition that the Kostkas could have it on the payment of 9000 ducats, the sum expended in furnisblng the castle. Nicholas Kostka wanted tbe castle very mucb, but did not bave the stipulated 9000 ducats. lt became bis, bowever, ihdirectly some years later. Francis 'ľhurzo, adminlstrator of Nitra, Celi in love witb Bal'bara Kostka, Nicbolas' daughter, and married ber in 1554. Thurzo paid Sedlnický tbe requlred sum and became the next owner of the castle. He built the lower part of the castle and the well in tbe courtyard, furnlshed the rooms luxuriously, and planted fruit trees in tbe vlcinlty. Hls wlfe dled about ten years Jater wltbout bearing children, and Tburzo married Catherine Zrinský, who bore him four sons and two daugbters. Thurzo wllled the castle to bis oldest '·s on George when he died in 1576. Tbe Thurzo widow then married ·Emerich l<'orgáč. George Tburzo became palatinate. In 1611 he prnnounced judgment against "the Bloody Countess Bathory" of Čachtrce. He died in 1616 and left the castle to bis son Henry. The Jatter dled flve years later and the Orava stronghold passed lnto the hands of Catherine Tôkôly, a Tburzo by birth. The seventeenth century was packéd wlth ~~ouble for tbe occupants of tbe castle, whlch passed into the hands of klngs, rebel.s, and brigands. Emrlch Tôkôly fortified the castle ánd Caspar Pika was at the head of tbe garrlson stationed there. Tbe castle was taken In 1674 by generals Špork and Heister through tbe treacbery of the Polis)?. dlvislon of tbe garrison. Pika was pinned tó a pole and the otber defendants were sfaughtered. Tôkčily's four-year-old son and bis tutor got a.way with their llves. The rebels under Rákoczy won tbe castle 1back in 1703, only to lose lt to tbe EmJ?eror's anny In 1711. The Orava Ca.stle was dam~ed by fire May 18, 1800, but was partlally rebuilt soon after. In tbe first quarter of the twentleth century Orava came into the possession of tbe Zichy famlly, who restored it . to lts present cÓnditlon. If limes ever get norma! again and you wlll be allowed ·to travel t o Slovakla., v-isit Orava Castle and vlew the beautiful, enchanted Orava valley trom tbe castle heights. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 23 CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA ORAVA The Orava Castle, one o! the most beautiful in Slovakla, nestles some 360 feet a bove the Orava River. The stronghold ls made up or three parts, bullt at different ti mes: the lower, centra), and upper. The centra) portlon is the oldest. Thls castle wa.,; royal property as early as 1010, and lts foundation goes back to the pagan perlod of Slovakia. lt is recorded that tbe castle sent aid to Trenčín In 1069, wben tbe Czeebs attacked the city, and t hat it was a safe refuge for tbe people in 1241, when the barbaric Tatars invaded Hungary. If you would enter the lower courtyard, you must pass througb a gate and a tower. On the gate you (Ind the inscription, "I. Z. C. 1543" and two beautlful escutcheons: one of George Thurzo and the other of Francis Zichy. Inside tbe lower courtyard are the residences of officers, tbe record room, a well, and a chapel. Members of tbe Thurzo and Tokoly families, as well as those of other notables, are buried witbin the cbapel walls. As you pass on, you pause before a beautlful stairease to vlew the two sculptured lions on columns stationed at the foot of the stalrs. You ascend the stairs, pass through a heavy gate, and enter the oldest part of the Orava Castle, tbe courtyard and the castle proper. In the courtyard is a well which flows lnto the Orava river b eneatb the Castle. To the rlght of the welI is a cave, within which, a Iegend says, Peter Varday, Archblshop of Kaloča, was imprlsoned in l 484, because he spoke too freely against higher taxes. Then you enter the castle, which was once occupled by the Thurzo family, and find the portraits of al-1 the administrators of Orava, trom George Thurzo down to Zichy. Odd, worn stairs In the wall and ladders take you to a long narrow bridge, wbich extends to the entrance of the upper. castle. This courtyard is quite small compared to the others. The chapel !s the highest point of this castle. Beneatb this are small narrow rooms or cells in wblch, the Oravans telI you, "the Red Monks once llved." The castle has passed through many hands. Records show that Peter Balaša, administrator of Hont, occupied it in 1267. The dauntless Matúš Čák - "the mightly lord of the Vah and the Tatras" became the owner in 1298, and some time Iater a man named Donč. In 1320 the King exchanged two other castles for Orava. Lambert became the .admlnlstrator in 1322, and Hypolytus, Count of Kremnica, succeeded bim in 1335. During the relgn of Louis (1342-1382), Stephen Katy (135(>), Dletricb Bebek (1379), Vladlslaus and Jobn Kakas (1380), and Count Nlcbolas (1382) were admlnistrators of Orava and occupled the Castle. Louis was a Crequent visitor at the castle; it was bere that he beld counsel wlth bis uncie Casimir, King of Poland. When Caslmir dled in 1370, Louls succeeded bim as· regent ot Poland and passed througb Orava many limes on bis way to Polnnd. · In 1398 King Zigmond gave the castle to Ctibor. who ruled over Bečkov and several otber castles in tbe upper Váb territory. Wben Ctibor dled in 1424, Zlgmond gave tbe castle to Nlcbolas and Andrew Dalucký, over the protests of Ct!bor's daugbter. Catherine. Jlskra, the Hussite, took the castle In 1440. Tbe Russian Duke, Peter Odrovaž, 24 SLOVAKIA was imprisoned in tbe castle by Jiskra in 1442. Peter Komorovský, who held Likava besides flve otber strongholds, became adn'linistrator of Orava in 1449. Komorovský Jost all except Orava to Matblas Corvin, ~ause he allied hlmself witb Prince Casimir of Poland, wbo sougbt to unseat Mathias as Regent of Hungary. Mathias could not take the stronghold by force; Komorovský sold it to bim for 8000 ducats In 1474. Komorovský left for Poland, but bis army, "tbe Black Regiment," joined · up wltb King Mathlas. Jobn Corvi:n, who succeeded bis father as regent, marrled into tbe Zápoľský family. After bis death in 1505, the castle became the property of the Zápoľský family. In 1526, the two Kostkas, Peter and Nicholas, Czecb noblemen, defended it in tbe name of Zápoľský so well, that Katzianer, commander of King Ferdinanďs army and the man who practlcally wlped out Trenčín in 1528, could not capture ít. S6metime later the Kostkas made up with Ferdinand, who recognized their possessions (Lietava and Strečno, received from Zrupoľský for valoai>Je services rendered) and gave Orava to the grandson of tbe Kostkas' sister, John of Dubová, in 15·34. The latter dled in 1545 without heirs and willed the castle to Wenceslaus Sedlnlcký on the condition that the Kostkas could have it on the payment of 9000 ducats, the sum expended in furnisblng the castle. Nicholas Kostka wanted tbe castle very mucb, but did not bave the stipulated 9000 ducats. lt became bis, bowever, ihdirectly some years later. Francis 'ľhurzo, adminlstrator of Nitra, Celi in love witb Bal'bara Kostka, Nicbolas' daughter, and married ber in 1554. Thurzo paid Sedlnický tbe requlred sum and became the next owner of the castle. He built the lower part of the castle and the well in tbe courtyard, furnlshed the rooms luxuriously, and planted fruit trees in tbe vlcinlty. Hls wlfe dled about ten years Jater wltbout bearing children, and Tburzo married Catherine Zrinský, who bore him four sons and two daugbters. Thurzo wllled the castle to bis oldest '·s on George when he died in 1576. Tbe Thurzo widow then married ·Emerich l<'orgáč. George Tburzo became palatinate. In 1611 he prnnounced judgment against "the Bloody Countess Bathory" of Čachtrce. He died in 1616 and left the castle to bis son Henry. The Jatter dled flve years later and the Orava stronghold passed lnto the hands of Catherine Tôkôly, a Tburzo by birth. The seventeenth century was packéd wlth ~~ouble for tbe occupants of tbe castle, whlch passed into the hands of klngs, rebel.s, and brigands. Emrlch Tôkôly fortified the castle ánd Caspar Pika was at the head of tbe garrlson stationed there. Tbe castle was taken In 1674 by generals Špork and Heister through tbe treacbery of the Polis)?. dlvislon of tbe garrison. Pika was pinned tó a pole and the otber defendants were sfaughtered. Tôkčily's four-year-old son and bis tutor got a.way with their llves. The rebels under Rákoczy won tbe castle 1back in 1703, only to lose lt to tbe EmJ?eror's anny In 1711. The Orava Ca.stle was dam~ed by fire May 18, 1800, but was partlally rebuilt soon after. In tbe first quarter of the twentleth century Orava came into the possession of tbe Zichy famlly, who restored it . to lts present cÓnditlon. If limes ever get norma! again and you wlll be allowed ·to travel t o Slovakla., v-isit Orava Castle and vlew the beautiful, enchanted Orava valley trom tbe castle heights.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Castles of Slovakia: Orava (The Orava Castle) Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952 pp. 23-24 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 castles https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/a19b874d39bd901d74ba5515132f17d0.pdf ae1523694f48a1f23883043c2922ad02 PDF Text Text 18 Castles of Slovakia SLOVAKIA TRENčlN Above the city of Trenčin (Trencheen), Slovakla, same 1230 feet above sea level, are sproocl the plcturesques ruins of a fonner mighty strong,hold. Its or.igln ls ancient; they say that the uppermost part was built durlng the reign of Emperor Marcus Aurelius (a,bout 176 A.D.l by a Roman legionnaire called Terence, hence the name Terencium Trenčín. Terence, it is recorded, was sent into the terl1itory to subjugate the Quadi and Markom.ani. The latter were conquered at the base of the stony mount on whlch the Tulns can be seen today. An inscriptlon on the rock "Victoriae Auguatorum•.•" bears mute testimony to the fact. Many years later Trenčín was taken by various groups, the Huns, the Gepidl, the Avars, and the Magyars. Bretislav, a Czech Prince, raided Trenčín in 1607 and led away many prlsoners and cattle into Bohemia. In 1100 the town was devastated by another Czech Prince, Svätopluk. In the minds of ,the ,Slovak people, however, the most illustrious owner of the castle and ruler of Trenčin was Matthew Čá.k (Tchak) - "Lord of the Váh and t he Tatras." A~ter the death of the last Arpad ruler, Andrew NI, In 1301, Čá.k beca.me the adversary of Charle-s Robert and ,an ally of the Czech King, Wencesl<aus III; the latter died in 1306. For a Ume Charles Robent was pOiWerless to deal with Matthew Čá.k who ruled lndependenbly over Slovakia. Čá.k had 'h is own .army aud coined his own money. In 1312 he was beaten at Rozhanovce near Koške, but Cha.rles Robert could not take the castle where Ma.tthew Čá.k had retreated. A pea.ce pact between the Poles, Czechs and Austrlans · was signed a.t the stronghold August 24, 1335, in the presence of the Bohemian King, John of Luxemberg, and his son Charles. It was in the Trenčin Castle that Charles, brother of Zigmund, became engaged to Marie, the daughter of Louis the Great and heir to Au.stria. In 1396 Zlgmund gave the castle to General Ctibor, owner of the nelgh·b orlng castle of Bečkov. When John Ctibor dled In 1424, ~gmund gave the Trenčín Castle to hls second wife, Barbara Celska. 'rule Hus,site chlef, John Jiskra of Br.andys took the castle in 1440, expanded and garrlsoned lt. In 1458 Jlskra surrendered Tren· čin, as well as all the other Slovak fortresse:i in his possesslon, to King Mat!Mas. The latter ma.rried Catherine, the daughter of the Czech George Podebrady, a.t the Castle May 25, 1461. In 1475 Mathias donated the cast1e to Stephen Zá.polský, whose da.ughter became the wlfe of King Zigmund of Pola.nd. Under Zá.polský the castle was furnished with costly furniture and some of t,he flnest works of art. Zá.polskťs· son John was chosen King of Hungary In 1526. His adversary Ferdinand of the Habsburg line besleged the pla.ce, and General Katza.nler a.ctua.lly took it over 1n 1528 and destroyed lt by fJre. The' ca.stle eventua:lly was rebu!Jt, but it n&Ver became as resplendent as it was during Zá.polský's Ume. There is a legend connected with the well on the castle grounds - "the lovera' well.'' Aooord1ng to the legend, Stephen Zá.polský, returning from his wa.rs agalnst the Turk$, brought a bea.utiful slave, Faitima, for his wdfe Hed~vlg. After a Ume a. Turklsh pedd1er galned �SLOVAKIA 19 entrance to the castle; lt wa.s Omar, the beloved of Fatima. Omar begged Zápolský to free Fatima. Tlring or Omar's pleas, Zápolský remarked: .. You cannot draw wat&r from thls stone, nor can you draiw a tear from my eye." Omar took Zápolský at bis word and, wlth a few of hls followers, began to dig for water in the stone. After three years of palnful effort, Omar was rewarded; he struck water. Zápolský was moved exceedlng1y by the deed and granted Omar's request. Alex Thurzo J·ecelved the Trenčin stronghold from Ferdinand; bis coat of arms marked wlth the year ló40 can be seen today on a w:!ndow of the lnner cais4le. Imrich Forgáč, who marrled the "Black Prlncess," Prince Wenceslaus' widow, inherlted the castJe in 1588. But already In 1600 we flnd the castle the property or tlhe llleehazye. The Turks tried to galn possesslon of the castle in 1663, but failed. Rakoczy II was also unsuccessful dn hl.s abtempt in 1703. I n 1742 Queen Marie Therese had the fortress re-p alred and the tow&r rebullt. The la.tter etand.s 105 feet hlgh and af·fords a.n exqulslte view of the vicinlty. There Ie a legend that t he orlginal tower was bullt by Louls I. When the Rakoczy rebellJons were quelled, a plague broke out ln Trenčln. People sought refuge In churches, but prayers did not seem to help. People dled In thelr homes and no one burled them. It seemed that death ruled over Trenčln. Then somethlng mlraculous took place. The guard on the castle tower sa,w a very br1ght llgM over the to-wer and then St. Francls Xavler stepped out of a cloud and blessed the people of Trenčin. Tihe guard sounded the alarm, and the whole garrlson went out to welcome the Salnt. The commander of the gar.ríso.n ma.de the sign oť the cross wlth hls sword and promlsed that the date of the Sa1nťs appearance would ever be a holy day In Trenčin. The plague passed and Trenčln wae saved. The people of Trenčin stm observe the memory of that day. But let me flnish bhe story of the Trenčin Ca.stle. A comma.nd ltad been gtlven that a garrlson occupy the castle at all tlmes. Klngs and queens pas,sed on, but the order was not revoked untll someone thought of 1t in 1782, when the garrlson wa.s called away at la.st, after occupylng the oastle for 112 years. Fire destroyed al! bulldlngs In 1790. • • • RED GEOGRAPHY: The news servlce of the Centra! Slovak Ca- thollc Bureau in Rome recently publlshed a story about a certain school inspector of the T rnava distrlct In Slovak!a who gave dlrectlvee to teachers on how to teach. Among other thlngs he sald that lf nuns were able to lnterest chlldren In a non-ex!etent being, God," then the teachers certalnly should be able to interest chlldren In Stalln who actually exlsts. "The Marx-Lenin doctrlnes of our Stalln," he contlnued, "must be applled In all classes. For exatnple, in gcography you teach the chlldren about the East and the West. Now, you could say: The sun rlses in the East; there 1s our great Stalln, the sun or the natlons whlch enllghtens all natlons wlth hls knOI\Vledge. The sun sets In the West; there you f!nd decayed capltallsm, the treacherous bourgeolele and murderous lmper!allsm." - But moot of the Slovak teachers and puplls prefer the advlce of Horace Greeley: Go West. young man! � 18 Castles of Slovakia SLOVAKIA TRENčlN Above the city of Trenčin (Trencheen), Slovakla, same 1230 feet above sea level, are sproocl the plcturesques ruins of a fonner mighty strong,hold. Its or.igln ls ancient; they say that the uppermost part was built durlng the reign of Emperor Marcus Aurelius (a,bout 176 A.D.l by a Roman legionnaire called Terence, hence the name Terencium Trenčín. Terence, it is recorded, was sent into the terl1itory to subjugate the Quadi and Markom.ani. The latter were conquered at the base of the stony mount on whlch the Tulns can be seen today. An inscriptlon on the rock "Victoriae Auguatorum•.•" bears mute testimony to the fact. Many years later Trenčín was taken by various groups, the Huns, the Gepidl, the Avars, and the Magyars. Bretislav, a Czech Prince, raided Trenčín in 1607 and led away many prlsoners and cattle into Bohemia. In 1100 the town was devastated by another Czech Prince, Svätopluk. In the minds of ,the ,Slovak people, however, the most illustrious owner of the castle and ruler of Trenčin was Matthew Čá.k (Tchak) - "Lord of the Váh and t he Tatras." A~ter the death of the last Arpad ruler, Andrew NI, In 1301, Čá.k beca.me the adversary of Charle-s Robert and ,an ally of the Czech King, Wencesl<aus III; the latter died in 1306. For a Ume Charles Robent was pOiWerless to deal with Matthew Čá.k who ruled lndependenbly over Slovakia. Čá.k had 'h is own .army aud coined his own money. In 1312 he was beaten at Rozhanovce near Koške, but Cha.rles Robert could not take the castle where Ma.tthew Čá.k had retreated. A pea.ce pact between the Poles, Czechs and Austrlans · was signed a.t the stronghold August 24, 1335, in the presence of the Bohemian King, John of Luxemberg, and his son Charles. It was in the Trenčin Castle that Charles, brother of Zigmund, became engaged to Marie, the daughter of Louis the Great and heir to Au.stria. In 1396 Zlgmund gave the castle to General Ctibor, owner of the nelgh·b orlng castle of Bečkov. When John Ctibor dled In 1424, ~gmund gave the Trenčín Castle to hls second wife, Barbara Celska. 'rule Hus,site chlef, John Jiskra of Br.andys took the castle in 1440, expanded and garrlsoned lt. In 1458 Jlskra surrendered Tren· čin, as well as all the other Slovak fortresse:i in his possesslon, to King Mat!Mas. The latter ma.rried Catherine, the daughter of the Czech George Podebrady, a.t the Castle May 25, 1461. In 1475 Mathias donated the cast1e to Stephen Zá.polský, whose da.ughter became the wlfe of King Zigmund of Pola.nd. Under Zá.polský the castle was furnished with costly furniture and some of t,he flnest works of art. Zá.polskťs· son John was chosen King of Hungary In 1526. His adversary Ferdinand of the Habsburg line besleged the pla.ce, and General Katza.nler a.ctua.lly took it over 1n 1528 and destroyed lt by fJre. The' ca.stle eventua:lly was rebu!Jt, but it n&Ver became as resplendent as it was during Zá.polský's Ume. There is a legend connected with the well on the castle grounds - "the lovera' well.'' Aooord1ng to the legend, Stephen Zá.polský, returning from his wa.rs agalnst the Turk$, brought a bea.utiful slave, Faitima, for his wdfe Hed~vlg. After a Ume a. Turklsh pedd1er galned �SLOVAKIA 19 entrance to the castle; lt wa.s Omar, the beloved of Fatima. Omar begged Zápolský to free Fatima. Tlring or Omar's pleas, Zápolský remarked: .. You cannot draw wat&r from thls stone, nor can you draiw a tear from my eye." Omar took Zápolský at bis word and, wlth a few of hls followers, began to dig for water in the stone. After three years of palnful effort, Omar was rewarded; he struck water. Zápolský was moved exceedlng1y by the deed and granted Omar's request. Alex Thurzo J·ecelved the Trenčin stronghold from Ferdinand; bis coat of arms marked wlth the year ló40 can be seen today on a w:!ndow of the lnner cais4le. Imrich Forgáč, who marrled the "Black Prlncess," Prince Wenceslaus' widow, inherlted the castJe in 1588. But already In 1600 we flnd the castle the property or tlhe llleehazye. The Turks tried to galn possesslon of the castle in 1663, but failed. Rakoczy II was also unsuccessful dn hl.s abtempt in 1703. I n 1742 Queen Marie Therese had the fortress re-p alred and the tow&r rebullt. The la.tter etand.s 105 feet hlgh and af·fords a.n exqulslte view of the vicinlty. There Ie a legend that t he orlginal tower was bullt by Louls I. When the Rakoczy rebellJons were quelled, a plague broke out ln Trenčln. People sought refuge In churches, but prayers did not seem to help. People dled In thelr homes and no one burled them. It seemed that death ruled over Trenčln. Then somethlng mlraculous took place. The guard on the castle tower sa,w a very br1ght llgM over the to-wer and then St. Francls Xavler stepped out of a cloud and blessed the people of Trenčin. Tihe guard sounded the alarm, and the whole garrlson went out to welcome the Salnt. The commander of the gar.ríso.n ma.de the sign oť the cross wlth hls sword and promlsed that the date of the Sa1nťs appearance would ever be a holy day In Trenčin. The plague passed and Trenčln wae saved. The people of Trenčin stm observe the memory of that day. But let me flnish bhe story of the Trenčin Ca.stle. A comma.nd ltad been gtlven that a garrlson occupy the castle at all tlmes. Klngs and queens pas,sed on, but the order was not revoked untll someone thought of 1t in 1782, when the garrlson wa.s called away at la.st, after occupylng the oastle for 112 years. Fire destroyed al! bulldlngs In 1790. • • • RED GEOGRAPHY: The news servlce of the Centra! Slovak Ca- thollc Bureau in Rome recently publlshed a story about a certain school inspector of the T rnava distrlct In Slovak!a who gave dlrectlvee to teachers on how to teach. Among other thlngs he sald that lf nuns were able to lnterest chlldren In a non-ex!etent being, God," then the teachers certalnly should be able to interest chlldren In Stalln who actually exlsts. "The Marx-Lenin doctrlnes of our Stalln," he contlnued, "must be applled In all classes. For exatnple, in gcography you teach the chlldren about the East and the West. Now, you could say: The sun rlses in the East; there 1s our great Stalln, the sun or the natlons whlch enllghtens all natlons wlth hls knOI\Vledge. The sun sets In the West; there you f!nd decayed capltallsm, the treacherous bourgeolele and murderous lmper!allsm." - But moot of the Slovak teachers and puplls prefer the advlce of Horace Greeley: Go West. young man! � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 18 Castles of Slovakia SLOVAKIA TRENčlN Above the city of Trenčin (Trencheen), Slovakla, same 1230 feet above sea level, are sproocl the plcturesques ruins of a fonner mighty strong,hold. Its or.igln ls ancient; they say that the uppermost part was built durlng the reign of Emperor Marcus Aurelius (a,bout 176 A.D.l by a Roman legionnaire called Terence, hence the name Terencium Trenčín. Terence, it is recorded, was sent into the terl1itory to subjugate the Quadi and Markom.ani. The latter were conquered at the base of the stony mount on whlch the Tulns can be seen today. An inscriptlon on the rock "Victoriae Auguatorum•.•" bears mute testimony to the fact. Many years later Trenčín was taken by various groups, the Huns, the Gepidl, the Avars, and the Magyars. Bretislav, a Czech Prince, raided Trenčín in 1607 and led away many prlsoners and cattle into Bohemia. In 1100 the town was devastated by another Czech Prince, Svätopluk. In the minds of ,the ,Slovak people, however, the most illustrious owner of the castle and ruler of Trenčin was Matthew Čá.k (Tchak) - "Lord of the Váh and t he Tatras." A~ter the death of the last Arpad ruler, Andrew NI, In 1301, Čá.k beca.me the adversary of Charle-s Robert and ,an ally of the Czech King, Wencesl<aus III; the latter died in 1306. For a Ume Charles Robent was pOiWerless to deal with Matthew Čá.k who ruled lndependenbly over Slovakia. Čá.k had 'h is own .army aud coined his own money. In 1312 he was beaten at Rozhanovce near Koške, but Cha.rles Robert could not take the castle where Ma.tthew Čá.k had retreated. A pea.ce pact between the Poles, Czechs and Austrlans · was signed a.t the stronghold August 24, 1335, in the presence of the Bohemian King, John of Luxemberg, and his son Charles. It was in the Trenčin Castle that Charles, brother of Zigmund, became engaged to Marie, the daughter of Louis the Great and heir to Au.stria. In 1396 Zlgmund gave the castle to General Ctibor, owner of the nelgh·b orlng castle of Bečkov. When John Ctibor dled In 1424, ~gmund gave the Trenčín Castle to hls second wife, Barbara Celska. 'rule Hus,site chlef, John Jiskra of Br.andys took the castle in 1440, expanded and garrlsoned lt. In 1458 Jlskra surrendered Tren· čin, as well as all the other Slovak fortresse:i in his possesslon, to King Mat!Mas. The latter ma.rried Catherine, the daughter of the Czech George Podebrady, a.t the Castle May 25, 1461. In 1475 Mathias donated the cast1e to Stephen Zá.polský, whose da.ughter became the wlfe of King Zigmund of Pola.nd. Under Zá.polský the castle was furnished with costly furniture and some of t,he flnest works of art. Zá.polskťs· son John was chosen King of Hungary In 1526. His adversary Ferdinand of the Habsburg line besleged the pla.ce, and General Katza.nler a.ctua.lly took it over 1n 1528 and destroyed lt by fJre. The' ca.stle eventua:lly was rebu!Jt, but it n&Ver became as resplendent as it was during Zá.polský's Ume. There is a legend connected with the well on the castle grounds - "the lovera' well.'' Aooord1ng to the legend, Stephen Zá.polský, returning from his wa.rs agalnst the Turk$, brought a bea.utiful slave, Faitima, for his wdfe Hed~vlg. After a Ume a. Turklsh pedd1er galned SLOVAKIA 19 entrance to the castle; lt wa.s Omar, the beloved of Fatima. Omar begged Zápolský to free Fatima. Tlring or Omar's pleas, Zápolský remarked: .. You cannot draw wat&r from thls stone, nor can you draiw a tear from my eye." Omar took Zápolský at bis word and, wlth a few of hls followers, began to dig for water in the stone. After three years of palnful effort, Omar was rewarded; he struck water. Zápolský was moved exceedlng1y by the deed and granted Omar's request. Alex Thurzo J·ecelved the Trenčin stronghold from Ferdinand; bis coat of arms marked wlth the year ló40 can be seen today on a w:!ndow of the lnner cais4le. Imrich Forgáč, who marrled the "Black Prlncess," Prince Wenceslaus' widow, inherlted the castJe in 1588. But already In 1600 we flnd the castle the property or tlhe llleehazye. The Turks tried to galn possesslon of the castle in 1663, but failed. Rakoczy II was also unsuccessful dn hl.s abtempt in 1703. I n 1742 Queen Marie Therese had the fortress re-p alred and the tow&r rebullt. The la.tter etand.s 105 feet hlgh and af·fords a.n exqulslte view of the vicinlty. There Ie a legend that t he orlginal tower was bullt by Louls I. When the Rakoczy rebellJons were quelled, a plague broke out ln Trenčln. People sought refuge In churches, but prayers did not seem to help. People dled In thelr homes and no one burled them. It seemed that death ruled over Trenčln. Then somethlng mlraculous took place. The guard on the castle tower sa,w a very br1ght llgM over the to-wer and then St. Francls Xavler stepped out of a cloud and blessed the people of Trenčin. Tihe guard sounded the alarm, and the whole garrlson went out to welcome the Salnt. The commander of the gar.ríso.n ma.de the sign oť the cross wlth hls sword and promlsed that the date of the Sa1nťs appearance would ever be a holy day In Trenčin. The plague passed and Trenčln wae saved. The people of Trenčin stm observe the memory of that day. But let me flnish bhe story of the Trenčin Ca.stle. A comma.nd ltad been gtlven that a garrlson occupy the castle at all tlmes. Klngs and queens pas,sed on, but the order was not revoked untll someone thought of 1t in 1782, when the garrlson wa.s called away at la.st, after occupylng the oastle for 112 years. Fire destroyed al! bulldlngs In 1790. • • • RED GEOGRAPHY: The news servlce of the Centra! Slovak Ca- thollc Bureau in Rome recently publlshed a story about a certain school inspector of the T rnava distrlct In Slovak!a who gave dlrectlvee to teachers on how to teach. Among other thlngs he sald that lf nuns were able to lnterest chlldren In a non-ex!etent being, God," then the teachers certalnly should be able to interest chlldren In Stalln who actually exlsts. "The Marx-Lenin doctrlnes of our Stalln," he contlnued, "must be applled In all classes. For exatnple, in gcography you teach the chlldren about the East and the West. Now, you could say: The sun rlses in the East; there 1s our great Stalln, the sun or the natlons whlch enllghtens all natlons wlth hls knOI\Vledge. The sun sets In the West; there you f!nd decayed capltallsm, the treacherous bourgeolele and murderous lmper!allsm." - But moot of the Slovak teachers and puplls prefer the advlce of Horace Greeley: Go West. young man!  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Castles of Slovakia: Trenčín Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952 pp. 18-19 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 castles https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/cd097d77bb364356e1484c3c8e2503bd.pdf 967b63980e85bd86edd8d53a5c90cddd PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 61 belleves that economic prosperity and national security can better be sa;fei uarded only in t he broader framework of a Centro-E uropean confederatlon composed of eth nic member States and by Slovak lndepende nce. This conceptlon has already been presented in detail on dlfferent occasions -b y Slovak polltlcal represenetatlves; 1t was prompted not on ly by Slovak lnterests, but also by the hlstorical development or t he Danub e Basin, lts natural geopolltical Jaws an d European lnterests. lf the Czech emigratlon accepts t his basis, certalnly t here shall be no opposition trom the Slovaks to conclude a federal agreement even wlth the Czech natlon, e ven though tbe Slovaks bave thus far a sad experience with three political agreements, concluded with Czech politlclans in -the past 35 years. "Pacta sunt servanda" !s somethlng unkn5>wn In Czech polltics as far as the Slovaks are concerned. Any other solution of t he Slovak question than that noted here would have to be forc ed on the Slovak nation. How Jong would 1t last, however, in the nelghborhood of Germany and Russla, an d in face of th'e oppositlon of not only th e Slovaks, but also tbe rest of the nat ions of t he Danube Basin of which not a single one deslres a renewal of the Versal))es order? In accord with the truth, therefore, it can be said in regard to the n ew attempt of the Czec h amigration to decelve t he lnternatlona l public with pronouncements about an agreemen t between the Czechs and the Slovaks, that "to t a lk about the reatoration of Czec hoelovakia ·n·owadays ia p lai n nonsense" {World Review) . • • • DR. BENES SOLD OUT TO TIIE KREMLJN R. UMIASTOWSKI (The following is an extract from the book " POLANiD, RUSSIA \ ND OREAT BRITAIN 1941- 1945" - a study of evidence - by R Umiastowski, which was published in November 1946 by Hollls and Carter, London. The author shows that Benes coJlaborated wlth tbe Stalinmen even against P oland.) • * • * T he results of the Moscow and Teheran Conferences and the s ubs'equent resolutions concerning the territorial changes about to be e ffected, were not pub llshed and only filtered slowly through the Press. It was a few months before it became generaJly known for 1nstance, that after the war Europe - not only Germany, but a\1 Europe (except, perhaps, the few neutrals on ber outskirts) - was to come under the occupation of the three Great Powers The Russians were to stay in Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia and In Germany as far as the rlver Oder, or perhaps the Elbe; the Americans would occupy navaria, Wurtemburg and Saxony and the British the remalnder of Germany. It could not be clearer -· Poland after the war was to be in the hands of the Kremlin. The secret agreements at Moscow a1td Teheran were explained by the subsequent policy of the Powers, or rather by tbe policy of t he .SO;v,iets, As prevlously mentioned, the details o! the dec•is ions were still �52 SLOVAKIA unknown to the public, and a general anxiety as to tbe future o[ Europe was bound to arlse among those nations concerned. Mo•cow made the firat move which revealed that •he had been able to galn a free hand in Central Europe, when she concluded a Treaty with Dr. Benea, a■ "Preaident of Czecho-Slovakia." lt was evldent by thls that tbe Kremlin was taklng over the States within its sphere of innuence as tbelr "protector and guarantor." The Czecha (a small nation numbering over seven mllllon) had 1iro-Russlan sympathles on the whole and were conaidered a■ the out. post of RuHian imperialiam in Europe and as reactlonaries supportlng 'ľsarist absolutism. Durlng the First Great War, they (the Czechs) had divided their loyalty. Soldiers in the Austrlan Army deserted en masse to the Rus• ;,ians, whlle at home they conducted the same policy as durlng thls Second Oreat War by pro!esslng loyalty to the occupant. Kenneth de Courcey, wrltlng in the REVIEW OF WORLD AFFAIRS. Aprll 28, 1944, said: "There is, in fact, almost no reslstance movement at all in Ruthenia, Slovakia, Mora via and Bohemia. The Rutheniana are ... anti-Ru• sian. The maHea in Slovakia are anti-Czech and anti-Ruaaian. The attitude of the Czech population ia curioua. Quite a number are now actually serving in the German forcea, viz., in the 5th and 8th Jaeger Divisiona, the 18th Motorized Oivialon, and the 81st, 122nd, 226th and 290th lnfantry Dlviaion. Czech induatry ia moat effectively aupporting the German war effort and many workers seem very much to dislike the idea of riaking the conaequencea of reaiatance. The Czech· clergy is largely supporUng Presldent Hacha, partly because of lts antl-Russian vlews and partly because it fears anti-clerlcalism from the radlcals abroad. AII theae facta are everywhere well-known on the Continent, and it cauaea a■toniahment to many frienda of the Alliea that they should be so little known In Britain and America. War-Time Ra• tioning and Conaumption, published by the Secretarlat ot the League of Natlons, Geneva, 1942, <itates that the inhabltants of Bol:jemia had t)le same ration as Germany (pp. 22-23)." · As the favored child of the Versallles Treaty, they (lhe; Czechs) were presented with Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia, aÍthough these countrles had neither previously belonged to, nor were united with Bohemia. Despite the extension towards the East, there was stlll no possiblllty of the Czechs achlevlng a common frontier with Russla. In thls Second Great War, Dr. Benes, the Czech's representative in the Allied camp, began bis politlcal campaign by acting in accord• 11nce with the Britlsh program for the recoostruction ot Europe. but when Moacow became one of the Alliea, he ehanged the cour1e of his policy to flow along Soviet linea. The Czech's federatioo with ]'oland, which had been patronlzed by Brltain, wa.s thrown lnto the waste paper bask~t. Dr. nenes a.nnounced bis lntentlon of shortly t oncluding a post-war pact wlth the Soviet Union, which meant tbat he was leaving the camp of the Western world and hitcblng his wagon to the Russlan star. It was a policy whlch compllcated the future sltuatlon !or Centra) Europe. and Britaln of 1942- 1943 showed herself to be !ar from satlsfled with the premature polltlcal solutlon to thl~ point on the part or Russla. London wa.s lert wlth two alternatlves; elther to allow Dr. nenes to go to Moscow and set up resldence �SLOVAKIA there, and so lose t hls pawn on its chessboard, or to hold a resentful <;:zech "Provisional Government" In London untll the war should further clarlfy the sltuation. lt was indeed soon to become clear, but In ravor Qf Russia. After the conference in Moacow, there aeemed no longer. any point in holdlng Dr. Benea in Eng land when he waa ao anxioua to offer hi• country aa a vaaaal to Stalin. On December 12, Moscow announced t he Treaty wlth Dr. Benes, In whlch the "close and frlendly collaboratlon after the re-establishmen t of peace ..." was mentloned. This Treaty had put Czecho-Slovakla at the mercy of Moscow to such a degree that the Russlans dld not even argue over the fate of the 700,000 Carpathlan Ruthenians in the frame of the Czecho-Slovakian State. Moscow, who had claimed the Polish Rut henians on racia! grounds as the kin of the Ukranians in the U.S.S .R., was apparently indlfferen t to thls group of Ruthenlan people, although the threat of tbe annexatlon of Carpatblan Ruthenla was later to prove useful wben the Czecbs showed a reluctance to carry out the orders of the Kremlin. The "union" of Carpathlan Ruthenla wltb the Soviets 1!eemed hardly necessary at this point, when Dr. Benes had, in fact, subordlnated all Czecho·Slovakia to Russia. The policy of Dr. Benes' Government was a repetltion on a larger scale of its pollcy during t he Flrst Great War, the most extreme polnts belng more strongly underllned beneath the lnfluence of a s trenger Russla. Dr. Benes lnterpreted this policy in connectlon wlth Poland in bis book "Smyal Ceskoalovenske Revoluce" (The Sense or ihe Czecho-Slovak 'Revolution) Prague 1924: "In a war against tbe Centra! P owers (Germany and Austria) we need the Poles, and the reason for thls war has compelled us to recog• nlze Polanďs rights. Endeavoring to have our rlght:, ackno wledged. we must acknowledge tbe rlghts of the Poles le!!t we ourselves morally !ose our own. But, to gíve proof of our loyalty to our frienda (viz., the Ru1alan1) we had to oppoae their eaaential, antl-Ruaalan policy. 'ľhere were moments when Russia because of Poland, adopted a dangerous attitude towards the Allles. Briand had had to tear the first concession for Poland and Russia. In a short. Ume, because of Poland é\lld interna! polltlcal reasons, the danger arose that Russia would even conclude a separate peace with Germany, I state impartlally, that the Allles were lncllned to solve certain questlons in a manner which was bound not to satlsfy t he Poles." The Russo-Benes Treaty, veiled in its vague clauses, gave little away. Afterwards In hls message to the Czecho-Slovak State Council on February 3, 1944, Dr. Benes sald that the time had not yet come to " examlne concretely tbe matters" which were negotlated at l\foscow, matters about whlch a "mutual understandlng" had been reacbed. Amongf!J: these "matters" was an agreement ampllfylng Artlcle 4 or the Treaty, which had stipulated that the two Powers "shall develop their economic relations on the largest posslble scale." The CzeehoSlovak lnduatrles, mine, and sourcea of hydraulie energy were to be nationallzed; the Czech war induatrles were to work for tt,e Ruaaian and Czecho-Slovak armiea ; war production waa , to be atandardized ao that it would conform wlth the Ruaalan war production; a new Czeeho-Slovak Army waa to be rai1ed and, "In the future interesta of Czecho-Slovakia," organized, trajned and equipped after the Red Army 0 �54 SLOVAK.IA standards. "In the interests of democracy and ror the extirpatlon of German lnfluences," educatlonal (political) oftlcers were to be lntroduced lnto all units. The Czecho-Stovak currency was to be atabilized in conformity with Russia. Their railway, motor-roada and air lines were to be constructed to meet the economic ne eda of both cou ntriea. Thia Czecho-Slovakia of Dr. Benes, was to be nothing lesa, therefore, than the outpost of Ruaaia in the center of Europe, atretching practically as far as Bavaria. In the above Treaty, Moscow was also clearly expresslng its intentions towards Poland. The Protocol to thls pact contained the clause: The U.S.S.R. and the Czecho-Slovak Republic agree that, in the event of any third State which has common frontiera wlth the U. S. S. R., or with the Czecho-Slovak Republic ... de■i rlng to become a pa rty to this agreement ... it could be a tri partite agreement." Moscow had no desire to make a direct proposal to the Pollsh Government, but the Soviet Press, together wlth the ins-plred World Press, were to publlsh many hints In thls dlrectlon. On December 17, 1943, "Dziennik Polakl" in London gave a semlofflclal comment on the Pollsh Governmenťs attltude towards tbe Soviet-Benes Treaty, statlng that: "Poland had not, so far, been invited to partlc!pate. She attached rundamental importance to havlng frlendly relatlons wlth Russla and regarded them a.s a vltal element towards a broader solutlon and a system of general securlty. The prlnclples or mutual recognltlon of State soverelgnty and of non-lntervention In the State's atralrs ľormed a basis for good neighborly relatlons. Prlnclples no less important for Poland should, bowever, be added to them. There were 1. liberty, independence, and Integrity of the State; 2. general securlty; 3. loyalty to the alllances already concluded; 4. good-ne!ghborly relations with Russla; 5. cooperatlon between the smaller Európean State!I, to protect them trom German hegemony." ' Poiish reluctance to become part of so vaguely worded a Pact wbich, in subsequent agreements, was to mean the absorptlÓn of the weaker partner, met a wave or dissatlsfactlon trom Moscow'. · Dr. Beneľ Provisional Government was t o be remolded according to the designs of the Kremlin, and Communist Ministera were to be in tro. duced into the most prominent positíons. In Bobemia, tbe concluded Treaty encountered protests, not only from tbe constltutional Government of Hacha. whlch stíll exlsted, but from those people who did not want to change thelr present system of life lnto the Soviet order Slovakia quite simply recorded that Dr. Benes did not represent their nation and had no right to conclude any agreement on her behalf. Such was the Statement of the Slovakian Government and analogous wlth lt was the oplnion of the Slovak National Council in London, as expressed in their open letter to Hls Majesty"s Secretarjof State for Foreign Affalrs. Anthony Eden (January, 1944). They stated: "lt ia against justice and against the spirit and letter of the Atlantic Charter to bind the Slovak people by iŕlternational treatiea concluded in their names and on thelr behalf by unauthorized negotiators whose chief aim is to get domination over Slovakla again. In view ôf alt these facts the Slovak people cannot feel themselves to be bound by the Treaty signed in Mosc!ow on December 12, 1943." · ' � SLOVAKIA 61 belleves that economic prosperity and national security can better be sa;fei uarded only in t he broader framework of a Centro-E uropean confederatlon composed of eth nic member States and by Slovak lndepende nce. This conceptlon has already been presented in detail on dlfferent occasions -b y Slovak polltlcal represenetatlves; 1t was prompted not on ly by Slovak lnterests, but also by the hlstorical development or t he Danub e Basin, lts natural geopolltical Jaws an d European lnterests. lf the Czech emigratlon accepts t his basis, certalnly t here shall be no opposition trom the Slovaks to conclude a federal agreement even wlth the Czech natlon, e ven though tbe Slovaks bave thus far a sad experience with three political agreements, concluded with Czech politlclans in -the past 35 years. "Pacta sunt servanda" !s somethlng unkn5>wn In Czech polltics as far as the Slovaks are concerned. Any other solution of t he Slovak question than that noted here would have to be forc ed on the Slovak nation. How Jong would 1t last, however, in the nelghborhood of Germany and Russla, an d in face of th'e oppositlon of not only th e Slovaks, but also tbe rest of the nat ions of t he Danube Basin of which not a single one deslres a renewal of the Versal))es order? In accord with the truth, therefore, it can be said in regard to the n ew attempt of the Czec h amigration to decelve t he lnternatlona l public with pronouncements about an agreemen t between the Czechs and the Slovaks, that "to t a lk about the reatoration of Czec hoelovakia ·n·owadays ia p lai n nonsense" {World Review) . • • • DR. BENES SOLD OUT TO TIIE KREMLJN R. UMIASTOWSKI (The following is an extract from the book " POLANiD, RUSSIA \ ND OREAT BRITAIN 1941- 1945" - a study of evidence - by R Umiastowski, which was published in November 1946 by Hollls and Carter, London. The author shows that Benes coJlaborated wlth tbe Stalinmen even against P oland.) • * • * T he results of the Moscow and Teheran Conferences and the s ubs'equent resolutions concerning the territorial changes about to be e ffected, were not pub llshed and only filtered slowly through the Press. It was a few months before it became generaJly known for 1nstance, that after the war Europe - not only Germany, but a\1 Europe (except, perhaps, the few neutrals on ber outskirts) - was to come under the occupation of the three Great Powers The Russians were to stay in Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia and In Germany as far as the rlver Oder, or perhaps the Elbe; the Americans would occupy navaria, Wurtemburg and Saxony and the British the remalnder of Germany. It could not be clearer -· Poland after the war was to be in the hands of the Kremlin. The secret agreements at Moscow a1td Teheran were explained by the subsequent policy of the Powers, or rather by tbe policy of t he .SO;v,iets, As prevlously mentioned, the details o! the dec•is ions were still �52 SLOVAKIA unknown to the public, and a general anxiety as to tbe future o[ Europe was bound to arlse among those nations concerned. Mo•cow made the firat move which revealed that •he had been able to galn a free hand in Central Europe, when she concluded a Treaty with Dr. Benea, a■ "Preaident of Czecho-Slovakia." lt was evldent by thls that tbe Kremlin was taklng over the States within its sphere of innuence as tbelr "protector and guarantor." The Czecha (a small nation numbering over seven mllllon) had 1iro-Russlan sympathles on the whole and were conaidered a■ the out. post of RuHian imperialiam in Europe and as reactlonaries supportlng 'ľsarist absolutism. Durlng the First Great War, they (the Czechs) had divided their loyalty. Soldiers in the Austrlan Army deserted en masse to the Rus• ;,ians, whlle at home they conducted the same policy as durlng thls Second Oreat War by pro!esslng loyalty to the occupant. Kenneth de Courcey, wrltlng in the REVIEW OF WORLD AFFAIRS. Aprll 28, 1944, said: "There is, in fact, almost no reslstance movement at all in Ruthenia, Slovakia, Mora via and Bohemia. The Rutheniana are ... anti-Ru• sian. The maHea in Slovakia are anti-Czech and anti-Ruaaian. The attitude of the Czech population ia curioua. Quite a number are now actually serving in the German forcea, viz., in the 5th and 8th Jaeger Divisiona, the 18th Motorized Oivialon, and the 81st, 122nd, 226th and 290th lnfantry Dlviaion. Czech induatry ia moat effectively aupporting the German war effort and many workers seem very much to dislike the idea of riaking the conaequencea of reaiatance. The Czech· clergy is largely supporUng Presldent Hacha, partly because of lts antl-Russian vlews and partly because it fears anti-clerlcalism from the radlcals abroad. AII theae facta are everywhere well-known on the Continent, and it cauaea a■toniahment to many frienda of the Alliea that they should be so little known In Britain and America. War-Time Ra• tioning and Conaumption, published by the Secretarlat ot the League of Natlons, Geneva, 1942, <itates that the inhabltants of Bol:jemia had t)le same ration as Germany (pp. 22-23)." · As the favored child of the Versallles Treaty, they (lhe; Czechs) were presented with Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia, aÍthough these countrles had neither previously belonged to, nor were united with Bohemia. Despite the extension towards the East, there was stlll no possiblllty of the Czechs achlevlng a common frontier with Russla. In thls Second Great War, Dr. Benes, the Czech's representative in the Allied camp, began bis politlcal campaign by acting in accord• 11nce with the Britlsh program for the recoostruction ot Europe. but when Moacow became one of the Alliea, he ehanged the cour1e of his policy to flow along Soviet linea. The Czech's federatioo with ]'oland, which had been patronlzed by Brltain, wa.s thrown lnto the waste paper bask~t. Dr. nenes a.nnounced bis lntentlon of shortly t oncluding a post-war pact wlth the Soviet Union, which meant tbat he was leaving the camp of the Western world and hitcblng his wagon to the Russlan star. It was a policy whlch compllcated the future sltuatlon !or Centra) Europe. and Britaln of 1942- 1943 showed herself to be !ar from satlsfled with the premature polltlcal solutlon to thl~ point on the part or Russla. London wa.s lert wlth two alternatlves; elther to allow Dr. nenes to go to Moscow and set up resldence �SLOVAKIA there, and so lose t hls pawn on its chessboard, or to hold a resentful <;:zech "Provisional Government" In London untll the war should further clarlfy the sltuation. lt was indeed soon to become clear, but In ravor Qf Russia. After the conference in Moacow, there aeemed no longer. any point in holdlng Dr. Benea in Eng land when he waa ao anxioua to offer hi• country aa a vaaaal to Stalin. On December 12, Moscow announced t he Treaty wlth Dr. Benes, In whlch the "close and frlendly collaboratlon after the re-establishmen t of peace ..." was mentloned. This Treaty had put Czecho-Slovakla at the mercy of Moscow to such a degree that the Russlans dld not even argue over the fate of the 700,000 Carpathlan Ruthenians in the frame of the Czecho-Slovakian State. Moscow, who had claimed the Polish Rut henians on racia! grounds as the kin of the Ukranians in the U.S.S .R., was apparently indlfferen t to thls group of Ruthenlan people, although the threat of tbe annexatlon of Carpatblan Ruthenla was later to prove useful wben the Czecbs showed a reluctance to carry out the orders of the Kremlin. The "union" of Carpathlan Ruthenla wltb the Soviets 1!eemed hardly necessary at this point, when Dr. Benes had, in fact, subordlnated all Czecho·Slovakia to Russia. The policy of Dr. Benes' Government was a repetltion on a larger scale of its pollcy during t he Flrst Great War, the most extreme polnts belng more strongly underllned beneath the lnfluence of a s trenger Russla. Dr. Benes lnterpreted this policy in connectlon wlth Poland in bis book "Smyal Ceskoalovenske Revoluce" (The Sense or ihe Czecho-Slovak 'Revolution) Prague 1924: "In a war against tbe Centra! P owers (Germany and Austria) we need the Poles, and the reason for thls war has compelled us to recog• nlze Polanďs rights. Endeavoring to have our rlght:, ackno wledged. we must acknowledge tbe rlghts of the Poles le!!t we ourselves morally !ose our own. But, to gíve proof of our loyalty to our frienda (viz., the Ru1alan1) we had to oppoae their eaaential, antl-Ruaalan policy. 'ľhere were moments when Russia because of Poland, adopted a dangerous attitude towards the Allles. Briand had had to tear the first concession for Poland and Russia. In a short. Ume, because of Poland é\lld interna! polltlcal reasons, the danger arose that Russia would even conclude a separate peace with Germany, I state impartlally, that the Allles were lncllned to solve certain questlons in a manner which was bound not to satlsfy t he Poles." The Russo-Benes Treaty, veiled in its vague clauses, gave little away. Afterwards In hls message to the Czecho-Slovak State Council on February 3, 1944, Dr. Benes sald that the time had not yet come to " examlne concretely tbe matters" which were negotlated at l\foscow, matters about whlch a "mutual understandlng" had been reacbed. Amongf!J: these "matters" was an agreement ampllfylng Artlcle 4 or the Treaty, which had stipulated that the two Powers "shall develop their economic relations on the largest posslble scale." The CzeehoSlovak lnduatrles, mine, and sourcea of hydraulie energy were to be nationallzed; the Czech war induatrles were to work for tt,e Ruaaian and Czecho-Slovak armiea ; war production waa , to be atandardized ao that it would conform wlth the Ruaalan war production; a new Czeeho-Slovak Army waa to be rai1ed and, "In the future interesta of Czecho-Slovakia," organized, trajned and equipped after the Red Army 0 �54 SLOVAK.IA standards. "In the interests of democracy and ror the extirpatlon of German lnfluences," educatlonal (political) oftlcers were to be lntroduced lnto all units. The Czecho-Stovak currency was to be atabilized in conformity with Russia. Their railway, motor-roada and air lines were to be constructed to meet the economic ne eda of both cou ntriea. Thia Czecho-Slovakia of Dr. Benes, was to be nothing lesa, therefore, than the outpost of Ruaaia in the center of Europe, atretching practically as far as Bavaria. In the above Treaty, Moscow was also clearly expresslng its intentions towards Poland. The Protocol to thls pact contained the clause: The U.S.S.R. and the Czecho-Slovak Republic agree that, in the event of any third State which has common frontiera wlth the U. S. S. R., or with the Czecho-Slovak Republic ... de■i rlng to become a pa rty to this agreement ... it could be a tri partite agreement." Moscow had no desire to make a direct proposal to the Pollsh Government, but the Soviet Press, together wlth the ins-plred World Press, were to publlsh many hints In thls dlrectlon. On December 17, 1943, "Dziennik Polakl" in London gave a semlofflclal comment on the Pollsh Governmenťs attltude towards tbe Soviet-Benes Treaty, statlng that: "Poland had not, so far, been invited to partlc!pate. She attached rundamental importance to havlng frlendly relatlons wlth Russla and regarded them a.s a vltal element towards a broader solutlon and a system of general securlty. The prlnclples or mutual recognltlon of State soverelgnty and of non-lntervention In the State's atralrs ľormed a basis for good neighborly relatlons. Prlnclples no less important for Poland should, bowever, be added to them. There were 1. liberty, independence, and Integrity of the State; 2. general securlty; 3. loyalty to the alllances already concluded; 4. good-ne!ghborly relations with Russla; 5. cooperatlon between the smaller Európean State!I, to protect them trom German hegemony." ' Poiish reluctance to become part of so vaguely worded a Pact wbich, in subsequent agreements, was to mean the absorptlÓn of the weaker partner, met a wave or dissatlsfactlon trom Moscow'. · Dr. Beneľ Provisional Government was t o be remolded according to the designs of the Kremlin, and Communist Ministera were to be in tro. duced into the most prominent positíons. In Bobemia, tbe concluded Treaty encountered protests, not only from tbe constltutional Government of Hacha. whlch stíll exlsted, but from those people who did not want to change thelr present system of life lnto the Soviet order Slovakia quite simply recorded that Dr. Benes did not represent their nation and had no right to conclude any agreement on her behalf. Such was the Statement of the Slovakian Government and analogous wlth lt was the oplnion of the Slovak National Council in London, as expressed in their open letter to Hls Majesty"s Secretarjof State for Foreign Affalrs. Anthony Eden (January, 1944). They stated: "lt ia against justice and against the spirit and letter of the Atlantic Charter to bind the Slovak people by iŕlternational treatiea concluded in their names and on thelr behalf by unauthorized negotiators whose chief aim is to get domination over Slovakla again. In view ôf alt these facts the Slovak people cannot feel themselves to be bound by the Treaty signed in Mosc!ow on December 12, 1943." · ' � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 61 belleves that economic prosperity and national security can better be sa;fei uarded only in t he broader framework of a Centro-E uropean confederatlon composed of eth nic member States and by Slovak lndepende nce. This conceptlon has already been presented in detail on dlfferent occasions -b y Slovak polltlcal represenetatlves; 1t was prompted not on ly by Slovak lnterests, but also by the hlstorical development or t he Danub e Basin, lts natural geopolltical Jaws an d European lnterests. lf the Czech emigratlon accepts t his basis, certalnly t here shall be no opposition trom the Slovaks to conclude a federal agreement even wlth the Czech natlon, e ven though tbe Slovaks bave thus far a sad experience with three political agreements, concluded with Czech politlclans in -the past 35 years. "Pacta sunt servanda" !s somethlng unkn5>wn In Czech polltics as far as the Slovaks are concerned. Any other solution of t he Slovak question than that noted here would have to be forc ed on the Slovak nation. How Jong would 1t last, however, in the nelghborhood of Germany and Russla, an d in face of th'e oppositlon of not only th e Slovaks, but also tbe rest of the nat ions of t he Danube Basin of which not a single one deslres a renewal of the Versal))es order? In accord with the truth, therefore, it can be said in regard to the n ew attempt of the Czec h amigration to decelve t he lnternatlona l public with pronouncements about an agreemen t between the Czechs and the Slovaks, that "to t a lk about the reatoration of Czec hoelovakia ·n·owadays ia p lai n nonsense" {World Review) . • • • DR. BENES SOLD OUT TO TIIE KREMLJN R. UMIASTOWSKI (The following is an extract from the book " POLANiD, RUSSIA \ ND OREAT BRITAIN 1941- 1945" - a study of evidence - by R Umiastowski, which was published in November 1946 by Hollls and Carter, London. The author shows that Benes coJlaborated wlth tbe Stalinmen even against P oland.) • * • * T he results of the Moscow and Teheran Conferences and the s ubs'equent resolutions concerning the territorial changes about to be e ffected, were not pub llshed and only filtered slowly through the Press. It was a few months before it became generaJly known for 1nstance, that after the war Europe - not only Germany, but a\1 Europe (except, perhaps, the few neutrals on ber outskirts) - was to come under the occupation of the three Great Powers The Russians were to stay in Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia and In Germany as far as the rlver Oder, or perhaps the Elbe; the Americans would occupy navaria, Wurtemburg and Saxony and the British the remalnder of Germany. It could not be clearer -· Poland after the war was to be in the hands of the Kremlin. The secret agreements at Moscow a1td Teheran were explained by the subsequent policy of the Powers, or rather by tbe policy of t he .SO;v,iets, As prevlously mentioned, the details o! the dec•is ions were still 52 SLOVAKIA unknown to the public, and a general anxiety as to tbe future o[ Europe was bound to arlse among those nations concerned. Mo•cow made the firat move which revealed that •he had been able to galn a free hand in Central Europe, when she concluded a Treaty with Dr. Benea, a■ "Preaident of Czecho-Slovakia." lt was evldent by thls that tbe Kremlin was taklng over the States within its sphere of innuence as tbelr "protector and guarantor." The Czecha (a small nation numbering over seven mllllon) had 1iro-Russlan sympathles on the whole and were conaidered a■ the out. post of RuHian imperialiam in Europe and as reactlonaries supportlng 'ľsarist absolutism. Durlng the First Great War, they (the Czechs) had divided their loyalty. Soldiers in the Austrlan Army deserted en masse to the Rus• ;,ians, whlle at home they conducted the same policy as durlng thls Second Oreat War by pro!esslng loyalty to the occupant. Kenneth de Courcey, wrltlng in the REVIEW OF WORLD AFFAIRS. Aprll 28, 1944, said: "There is, in fact, almost no reslstance movement at all in Ruthenia, Slovakia, Mora via and Bohemia. The Rutheniana are ... anti-Ru• sian. The maHea in Slovakia are anti-Czech and anti-Ruaaian. The attitude of the Czech population ia curioua. Quite a number are now actually serving in the German forcea, viz., in the 5th and 8th Jaeger Divisiona, the 18th Motorized Oivialon, and the 81st, 122nd, 226th and 290th lnfantry Dlviaion. Czech induatry ia moat effectively aupporting the German war effort and many workers seem very much to dislike the idea of riaking the conaequencea of reaiatance. The Czech· clergy is largely supporUng Presldent Hacha, partly because of lts antl-Russian vlews and partly because it fears anti-clerlcalism from the radlcals abroad. AII theae facta are everywhere well-known on the Continent, and it cauaea a■toniahment to many frienda of the Alliea that they should be so little known In Britain and America. War-Time Ra• tioning and Conaumption, published by the Secretarlat ot the League of Natlons, Geneva, 1942, <itates that the inhabltants of Bol:jemia had t)le same ration as Germany (pp. 22-23)." · As the favored child of the Versallles Treaty, they (lhe; Czechs) were presented with Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia, aÍthough these countrles had neither previously belonged to, nor were united with Bohemia. Despite the extension towards the East, there was stlll no possiblllty of the Czechs achlevlng a common frontier with Russla. In thls Second Great War, Dr. Benes, the Czech's representative in the Allied camp, began bis politlcal campaign by acting in accord• 11nce with the Britlsh program for the recoostruction ot Europe. but when Moacow became one of the Alliea, he ehanged the cour1e of his policy to flow along Soviet linea. The Czech's federatioo with ]'oland, which had been patronlzed by Brltain, wa.s thrown lnto the waste paper bask~t. Dr. nenes a.nnounced bis lntentlon of shortly t oncluding a post-war pact wlth the Soviet Union, which meant tbat he was leaving the camp of the Western world and hitcblng his wagon to the Russlan star. It was a policy whlch compllcated the future sltuatlon !or Centra) Europe. and Britaln of 1942- 1943 showed herself to be !ar from satlsfled with the premature polltlcal solutlon to thl~ point on the part or Russla. London wa.s lert wlth two alternatlves; elther to allow Dr. nenes to go to Moscow and set up resldence SLOVAKIA there, and so lose t hls pawn on its chessboard, or to hold a resentful <;:zech "Provisional Government" In London untll the war should further clarlfy the sltuation. lt was indeed soon to become clear, but In ravor Qf Russia. After the conference in Moacow, there aeemed no longer. any point in holdlng Dr. Benea in Eng land when he waa ao anxioua to offer hi• country aa a vaaaal to Stalin. On December 12, Moscow announced t he Treaty wlth Dr. Benes, In whlch the "close and frlendly collaboratlon after the re-establishmen t of peace ..." was mentloned. This Treaty had put Czecho-Slovakla at the mercy of Moscow to such a degree that the Russlans dld not even argue over the fate of the 700,000 Carpathlan Ruthenians in the frame of the Czecho-Slovakian State. Moscow, who had claimed the Polish Rut henians on racia! grounds as the kin of the Ukranians in the U.S.S .R., was apparently indlfferen t to thls group of Ruthenlan people, although the threat of tbe annexatlon of Carpatblan Ruthenla was later to prove useful wben the Czecbs showed a reluctance to carry out the orders of the Kremlin. The "union" of Carpathlan Ruthenla wltb the Soviets 1!eemed hardly necessary at this point, when Dr. Benes had, in fact, subordlnated all Czecho·Slovakia to Russia. The policy of Dr. Benes' Government was a repetltion on a larger scale of its pollcy during t he Flrst Great War, the most extreme polnts belng more strongly underllned beneath the lnfluence of a s trenger Russla. Dr. Benes lnterpreted this policy in connectlon wlth Poland in bis book "Smyal Ceskoalovenske Revoluce" (The Sense or ihe Czecho-Slovak 'Revolution) Prague 1924: "In a war against tbe Centra! P owers (Germany and Austria) we need the Poles, and the reason for thls war has compelled us to recog• nlze Polanďs rights. Endeavoring to have our rlght:, ackno wledged. we must acknowledge tbe rlghts of the Poles le!!t we ourselves morally !ose our own. But, to gíve proof of our loyalty to our frienda (viz., the Ru1alan1) we had to oppoae their eaaential, antl-Ruaalan policy. 'ľhere were moments when Russia because of Poland, adopted a dangerous attitude towards the Allles. Briand had had to tear the first concession for Poland and Russia. In a short. Ume, because of Poland é\lld interna! polltlcal reasons, the danger arose that Russia would even conclude a separate peace with Germany, I state impartlally, that the Allles were lncllned to solve certain questlons in a manner which was bound not to satlsfy t he Poles." The Russo-Benes Treaty, veiled in its vague clauses, gave little away. Afterwards In hls message to the Czecho-Slovak State Council on February 3, 1944, Dr. Benes sald that the time had not yet come to " examlne concretely tbe matters" which were negotlated at l\foscow, matters about whlch a "mutual understandlng" had been reacbed. Amongf!J: these "matters" was an agreement ampllfylng Artlcle 4 or the Treaty, which had stipulated that the two Powers "shall develop their economic relations on the largest posslble scale." The CzeehoSlovak lnduatrles, mine, and sourcea of hydraulie energy were to be nationallzed; the Czech war induatrles were to work for tt,e Ruaaian and Czecho-Slovak armiea ; war production waa , to be atandardized ao that it would conform wlth the Ruaalan war production; a new Czeeho-Slovak Army waa to be rai1ed and, "In the future interesta of Czecho-Slovakia," organized, trajned and equipped after the Red Army 0 54 SLOVAK.IA standards. "In the interests of democracy and ror the extirpatlon of German lnfluences," educatlonal (political) oftlcers were to be lntroduced lnto all units. The Czecho-Stovak currency was to be atabilized in conformity with Russia. Their railway, motor-roada and air lines were to be constructed to meet the economic ne eda of both cou ntriea. Thia Czecho-Slovakia of Dr. Benes, was to be nothing lesa, therefore, than the outpost of Ruaaia in the center of Europe, atretching practically as far as Bavaria. In the above Treaty, Moscow was also clearly expresslng its intentions towards Poland. The Protocol to thls pact contained the clause: The U.S.S.R. and the Czecho-Slovak Republic agree that, in the event of any third State which has common frontiera wlth the U. S. S. R., or with the Czecho-Slovak Republic ... de■i rlng to become a pa rty to this agreement ... it could be a tri partite agreement." Moscow had no desire to make a direct proposal to the Pollsh Government, but the Soviet Press, together wlth the ins-plred World Press, were to publlsh many hints In thls dlrectlon. On December 17, 1943, "Dziennik Polakl" in London gave a semlofflclal comment on the Pollsh Governmenťs attltude towards tbe Soviet-Benes Treaty, statlng that: "Poland had not, so far, been invited to partlc!pate. She attached rundamental importance to havlng frlendly relatlons wlth Russla and regarded them a.s a vltal element towards a broader solutlon and a system of general securlty. The prlnclples or mutual recognltlon of State soverelgnty and of non-lntervention In the State's atralrs ľormed a basis for good neighborly relatlons. Prlnclples no less important for Poland should, bowever, be added to them. There were 1. liberty, independence, and Integrity of the State; 2. general securlty; 3. loyalty to the alllances already concluded; 4. good-ne!ghborly relations with Russla; 5. cooperatlon between the smaller Európean State!I, to protect them trom German hegemony." ' Poiish reluctance to become part of so vaguely worded a Pact wbich, in subsequent agreements, was to mean the absorptlÓn of the weaker partner, met a wave or dissatlsfactlon trom Moscow'. · Dr. Beneľ Provisional Government was t o be remolded according to the designs of the Kremlin, and Communist Ministera were to be in tro. duced into the most prominent positíons. In Bobemia, tbe concluded Treaty encountered protests, not only from tbe constltutional Government of Hacha. whlch stíll exlsted, but from those people who did not want to change thelr present system of life lnto the Soviet order Slovakia quite simply recorded that Dr. Benes did not represent their nation and had no right to conclude any agreement on her behalf. Such was the Statement of the Slovakian Government and analogous wlth lt was the oplnion of the Slovak National Council in London, as expressed in their open letter to Hls Majesty"s Secretarjof State for Foreign Affalrs. Anthony Eden (January, 1944). They stated: "lt ia against justice and against the spirit and letter of the Atlantic Charter to bind the Slovak people by iŕlternational treatiea concluded in their names and on thelr behalf by unauthorized negotiators whose chief aim is to get domination over Slovakla again. In view ôf alt these facts the Slovak people cannot feel themselves to be bound by the Treaty signed in Mosc!ow on December 12, 1943." · '  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dr. Beneš Sold Out to the Kremlin Description An account of the resource R. Umiastowski Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952 pp. 51-54 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Umiastowski, R. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/6036a6cfc57a8c6328882ea4fd8d79a3.pdf a232be884f6cf20bd4c5ec3d07a2e82a PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 45 DR. JOSF..PH TISO Priest, Teacher, President and National Hero of the Slovak Nation Dr. Joseph Tiso, war-time president of the Slovak Republic, was born October l3, 1887, in Veľká Bytča, Slovakia. After completing bis elementary training, he studied !n Zilina and Nitra, then completed bis theological studles in Vlenna. He was ordained priest in 1910 and a year later attalned the rlegree of Doctor of Theology. Fa.ther Tiso served as chaplain in Oščadnica, Rajec, and Bánovce. In 1914 he served in the army as field chaplain and in 1915 was i.amed spir.itual director of the seminary at Nitra and professor or religion at the college and high school there. In 1918 he was appoint· ed professor or theology. In 1921, he was honored by the Holy Father with the title of Monslgnor; this was a first in Slovak history. Msgr. Joseph Tiso was very active as an organizer· and writer. He was imprisoned twice by the government for "anti-state" activities, the general term for anything that did not coinclde wlth the political ideology of the government. While incarcerated Dr. Tlso translated several apologetic works· into Slovak. Father Tiso was truly a man of his people and for bis people. He strained every effort to elevate them spiritually and m?,terially. In 1924 Dr. Jaseph Tiso hecame pastor of the church at Bánovce and served the spiritual and temporal needs of the people there until he was imprisoned in 1945. As a member of Hlinka's People's Party, he wa.s elected to parliament in 1925 and in 1927 was appointed Min• ister of_ Hep.lt}I and · Physical Culture by the Masaryk ~eglme. Dr. T,iso was . instrumental In electing Dr. Beneš president of Czecho-Slovakia in 1935. The Slovaks had about enough of the Masa• ryk aind Beneš regimes at that time, but Dr. Tlso used bis oratorical skill to persuade -the .. lJlinka members of parliament to vole for bim. Without the 30 votes of the H linka People's Party Dr. Beneš never would have been elected Presldent. . . Dr. · 'ľlso. _vjsíted America .Qnly once; tb.at was in 1937 when he came as a member of a delegattori of the Society of St. Adalbert, Slo· vakia's greatest Catholic publishlng house. · When Slovakia was granteď autonomy on October 6, 1938, the Frague government named Dr. Tlso president of the autonomous Slovak government. The follov.ing year. when Czechoslovakla collapsed completely, the Slovak parliament declared the lndependence of Slovakia on March 14. T he parliament elected Dr. .Ťoseph T iso presidénľ of the independent Slovak Republic on October -26. 1939. Under Tiso's guldance Slovakia fared quite well even during the years. He saved wbatever he could for bis natlon. Even bis political enemles admit that. Wben tbe wlld Red armles were rushlng toward Bratislava, Dr. Joseph TJso and the Slovak Government with· rlrew to Kremsmiinster, Austria, where they formally surrendered to the U. S. Army. Al the insistence of the provisional Czecho-Slovak ,1ľar �46 SLOVAKIA government, the U. S. Department of State ordered the U. S. Army authorities in Austria to surrender Tlso and his group to the CzechoSlovak War Crimes Commlsslon. In November 1945 Dr. Tlso and members of the Slovak government were delivered to Czecho-Slovak authorities as war criminals, though their status was never lnvesti· gated by the U. S. authorities. From Pra.g ue Dr. Tiso and several of hls group were sent to Bra• tislava to stand tria! before the Natlonal Court The tria! began December 2, 1946, and ended March 14, 1947. Sentence was pronounced by the Court on Aplil 15, and Father Tiso, reciting the rosary out loud, was Jed to the gallows at 5: 30 a. m. on April 19, 1947; he was pronounced dead seven mlnutes Jater. SJovaks the world over agree wlth Father Tiso's aged mother: Dr. Tlso died a martyr for the cause of his people and his Church. • • • ;}IJHIIIIIIIIUll ttlllUlltltllll l lllllllll llllllllllllllllllllllllUIIIHIUII IIIIIIIIIIIIUI IIIUhl lllllll llllUOttlllflllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllflllllHIIIHIIIUIIIIIIIIIUI UIUIUtl. PRESIDENT TISO'S LAST MESSAGE TO ms PEOPLE " In the spirit of the sacrlfice I am about. to make, 1 aend thl• message to the Slovak natlon : " In harmony and un lson pursue alway,, everywhere and In every respect the great principle: FOR GOD AND F-OR THE NATION. I=== _ ::}f;:~~i'.:I~~~.:~;: : : ~.:=;:~•::~~:::;.:~: I===_ "That precept I have ,erved all my llfe and, therefore, 1 '=- != 1 1 ~ ;:;ľi:he;t ~y:f afi:,.:;,. a~~ :h::~:n:: :o:~,.::~~n~:co::~:~,! bolshevism, against which our nation must in all ponlble way, :::•::..:<;:•~;::,:~:: :,:~• ,:~:;:: of 1t, Chri,tlan cha~oto•, '=- 1 "A• 1 beg you to remember me In your praye,.., so do I pro. _ Br atislava, April 18 , 1947, 3 a. m. 1 ~~:~_0[;:t:f:;: : i~}~~};,~f!J~:;.:.1;.:-t: 1 DR. JOSEPH TISO. ~ (ltl1111111UIIIIIHU lllllllllltlllUIIIIIIUUIIIIIIIUIIIIIIIIUIIIIINUlllllUlMIIIUIIIIIIIIUIIUIIIIIUHI IIIIIIUll111111111111111111UUl'11WIIIIIIIUIIHUIUlfUUIHIIIIIHfUl l~ � SLOVAKIA 45 DR. JOSF..PH TISO Priest, Teacher, President and National Hero of the Slovak Nation Dr. Joseph Tiso, war-time president of the Slovak Republic, was born October l3, 1887, in Veľká Bytča, Slovakia. After completing bis elementary training, he studied !n Zilina and Nitra, then completed bis theological studles in Vlenna. He was ordained priest in 1910 and a year later attalned the rlegree of Doctor of Theology. Fa.ther Tiso served as chaplain in Oščadnica, Rajec, and Bánovce. In 1914 he served in the army as field chaplain and in 1915 was i.amed spir.itual director of the seminary at Nitra and professor or religion at the college and high school there. In 1918 he was appoint· ed professor or theology. In 1921, he was honored by the Holy Father with the title of Monslgnor; this was a first in Slovak history. Msgr. Joseph Tiso was very active as an organizer· and writer. He was imprisoned twice by the government for "anti-state" activities, the general term for anything that did not coinclde wlth the political ideology of the government. While incarcerated Dr. Tlso translated several apologetic works· into Slovak. Father Tiso was truly a man of his people and for bis people. He strained every effort to elevate them spiritually and m?,terially. In 1924 Dr. Jaseph Tiso hecame pastor of the church at Bánovce and served the spiritual and temporal needs of the people there until he was imprisoned in 1945. As a member of Hlinka's People's Party, he wa.s elected to parliament in 1925 and in 1927 was appointed Min• ister of_ Hep.lt}I and · Physical Culture by the Masaryk ~eglme. Dr. T,iso was . instrumental In electing Dr. Beneš president of Czecho-Slovakia in 1935. The Slovaks had about enough of the Masa• ryk aind Beneš regimes at that time, but Dr. Tlso used bis oratorical skill to persuade -the .. lJlinka members of parliament to vole for bim. Without the 30 votes of the H linka People's Party Dr. Beneš never would have been elected Presldent. . . Dr. · 'ľlso. _vjsíted America .Qnly once; tb.at was in 1937 when he came as a member of a delegattori of the Society of St. Adalbert, Slo· vakia's greatest Catholic publishlng house. · When Slovakia was granteď autonomy on October 6, 1938, the Frague government named Dr. Tlso president of the autonomous Slovak government. The follov.ing year. when Czechoslovakla collapsed completely, the Slovak parliament declared the lndependence of Slovakia on March 14. T he parliament elected Dr. .Ťoseph T iso presidénľ of the independent Slovak Republic on October -26. 1939. Under Tiso's guldance Slovakia fared quite well even during the years. He saved wbatever he could for bis natlon. Even bis political enemles admit that. Wben tbe wlld Red armles were rushlng toward Bratislava, Dr. Joseph TJso and the Slovak Government with· rlrew to Kremsmiinster, Austria, where they formally surrendered to the U. S. Army. Al the insistence of the provisional Czecho-Slovak ,1ľar �46 SLOVAKIA government, the U. S. Department of State ordered the U. S. Army authorities in Austria to surrender Tlso and his group to the CzechoSlovak War Crimes Commlsslon. In November 1945 Dr. Tlso and members of the Slovak government were delivered to Czecho-Slovak authorities as war criminals, though their status was never lnvesti· gated by the U. S. authorities. From Pra.g ue Dr. Tiso and several of hls group were sent to Bra• tislava to stand tria! before the Natlonal Court The tria! began December 2, 1946, and ended March 14, 1947. Sentence was pronounced by the Court on Aplil 15, and Father Tiso, reciting the rosary out loud, was Jed to the gallows at 5: 30 a. m. on April 19, 1947; he was pronounced dead seven mlnutes Jater. SJovaks the world over agree wlth Father Tiso's aged mother: Dr. Tlso died a martyr for the cause of his people and his Church. • • • ;}IJHIIIIIIIIUll ttlllUlltltllll l lllllllll llllllllllllllllllllllllUIIIHIUII IIIIIIIIIIIIUI IIIUhl lllllll llllUOttlllflllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllflllllHIIIHIIIUIIIIIIIIIUI UIUIUtl. PRESIDENT TISO'S LAST MESSAGE TO ms PEOPLE " In the spirit of the sacrlfice I am about. to make, 1 aend thl• message to the Slovak natlon : " In harmony and un lson pursue alway,, everywhere and In every respect the great principle: FOR GOD AND F-OR THE NATION. I=== _ ::}f;:~~i'.:I~~~.:~;: : : ~.:=;:~•::~~:::;.:~: I===_ "That precept I have ,erved all my llfe and, therefore, 1 '=- != 1 1 ~ ;:;ľi:he;t ~y:f afi:,.:;,. a~~ :h::~:n:: :o:~,.::~~n~:co::~:~,! bolshevism, against which our nation must in all ponlble way, :::•::..:<;:•~;::,:~:: :,:~• ,:~:;:: of 1t, Chri,tlan cha~oto•, '=- 1 "A• 1 beg you to remember me In your praye,.., so do I pro. _ Br atislava, April 18 , 1947, 3 a. m. 1 ~~:~_0[;:t:f:;: : i~}~~};,~f!J~:;.:.1;.:-t: 1 DR. JOSEPH TISO. ~ (ltl1111111UIIIIIHU lllllllllltlllUIIIIIIUUIIIIIIIUIIIIIIIIUIIIIINUlllllUlMIIIUIIIIIIIIUIIUIIIIIUHI IIIIIIUll111111111111111111UUl'11WIIIIIIIUIIHUIUlfUUIHIIIIIHfUl l~ � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 45 DR. JOSF..PH TISO Priest, Teacher, President and National Hero of the Slovak Nation Dr. Joseph Tiso, war-time president of the Slovak Republic, was born October l3, 1887, in Veľká Bytča, Slovakia. After completing bis elementary training, he studied !n Zilina and Nitra, then completed bis theological studles in Vlenna. He was ordained priest in 1910 and a year later attalned the rlegree of Doctor of Theology. Fa.ther Tiso served as chaplain in Oščadnica, Rajec, and Bánovce. In 1914 he served in the army as field chaplain and in 1915 was i.amed spir.itual director of the seminary at Nitra and professor or religion at the college and high school there. In 1918 he was appoint· ed professor or theology. In 1921, he was honored by the Holy Father with the title of Monslgnor; this was a first in Slovak history. Msgr. Joseph Tiso was very active as an organizer· and writer. He was imprisoned twice by the government for "anti-state" activities, the general term for anything that did not coinclde wlth the political ideology of the government. While incarcerated Dr. Tlso translated several apologetic works· into Slovak. Father Tiso was truly a man of his people and for bis people. He strained every effort to elevate them spiritually and m?,terially. In 1924 Dr. Jaseph Tiso hecame pastor of the church at Bánovce and served the spiritual and temporal needs of the people there until he was imprisoned in 1945. As a member of Hlinka's People's Party, he wa.s elected to parliament in 1925 and in 1927 was appointed Min• ister of_ Hep.lt}I and · Physical Culture by the Masaryk ~eglme. Dr. T,iso was . instrumental In electing Dr. Beneš president of Czecho-Slovakia in 1935. The Slovaks had about enough of the Masa• ryk aind Beneš regimes at that time, but Dr. Tlso used bis oratorical skill to persuade -the .. lJlinka members of parliament to vole for bim. Without the 30 votes of the H linka People's Party Dr. Beneš never would have been elected Presldent. . . Dr. · 'ľlso. _vjsíted America .Qnly once; tb.at was in 1937 when he came as a member of a delegattori of the Society of St. Adalbert, Slo· vakia's greatest Catholic publishlng house. · When Slovakia was granteď autonomy on October 6, 1938, the Frague government named Dr. Tlso president of the autonomous Slovak government. The follov.ing year. when Czechoslovakla collapsed completely, the Slovak parliament declared the lndependence of Slovakia on March 14. T he parliament elected Dr. .Ťoseph T iso presidénľ of the independent Slovak Republic on October -26. 1939. Under Tiso's guldance Slovakia fared quite well even during the years. He saved wbatever he could for bis natlon. Even bis political enemles admit that. Wben tbe wlld Red armles were rushlng toward Bratislava, Dr. Joseph TJso and the Slovak Government with· rlrew to Kremsmiinster, Austria, where they formally surrendered to the U. S. Army. Al the insistence of the provisional Czecho-Slovak ,1ľar 46 SLOVAKIA government, the U. S. Department of State ordered the U. S. Army authorities in Austria to surrender Tlso and his group to the CzechoSlovak War Crimes Commlsslon. In November 1945 Dr. Tlso and members of the Slovak government were delivered to Czecho-Slovak authorities as war criminals, though their status was never lnvesti· gated by the U. S. authorities. From Pra.g ue Dr. Tiso and several of hls group were sent to Bra• tislava to stand tria! before the Natlonal Court The tria! began December 2, 1946, and ended March 14, 1947. Sentence was pronounced by the Court on Aplil 15, and Father Tiso, reciting the rosary out loud, was Jed to the gallows at 5: 30 a. m. on April 19, 1947; he was pronounced dead seven mlnutes Jater. SJovaks the world over agree wlth Father Tiso's aged mother: Dr. Tlso died a martyr for the cause of his people and his Church. • Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dr. Joseph Tiso Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952 pp. 45-46 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/f6ae8ca91a79ec7fce08f88c521a2e71.pdf 9c9c0537daff002f613c92fa6496f927 PDF Text Text 62 SLOVAKIA EDWARD BENEš - STALIN'S STOOGE DR. MICHAEL Z IB R IN Even if we could hear recordings of all the telephone convel'Sat.lons whioh took place in Prague in 1948 and see all tbe stenograpbl<: protocols of tbe secret conferences of Beneš, Zenkl and Zorin, or tbose of tbe Czech and Slovak Politburo, many o! us even then would not have a clear picture of how the Communist putsch of February 1948 could have happened in the Czecho-Slovak Republic. But tbe fact is that the Commumst putsch of February 1948 did not happen accidentally. And it did not •happen because Deneš had deceived the people of bis country, or because the Mlnisters resigned prematurely and wiťhout agreement. The fact is that the February 1mtsoh of 1948 has old roots. The victory of the Communist,s was the truit of a Iong, systematlc and relentless activity of the Moscow •Reds and, we can say, the characterle.ss Ieaders-hlp of "CzeC'hoslovak" politicians and thelr old connections with Moscow and the Communists. lt is said tbat Moscow seldom undertakes anytbing which lt cannot s urely and suc cessfu11y finish, i.e., it will not start anyťhlng unless everytbing ls fully planned and prepared to guarantee success. Time has always worked in favor of the men of the Kremlin. And so, when tbe "-CzeC'hoslovak" Ministers lost their heads and resigned, Moscow gave the word and Stalin's general manager in Czecho-Slovakia, ZORIN. leaped into ac tlon. Gottwald and bis companions had no trouble at au In taking over the Government of Czecho-Slovakla. Looking into the memoirs and wrltings of Dr. Edward Beneš and Winston Churchill, we flnd that President Beneš betrayed the so· ca1led anti-Stalin cons plracy of Marshal Tuchačevský and Rlkov in 1937. The betrayal destroyed more than 5000 army offlcers and lntellectuals who opposed Communlsm and wa,nted to put an end to lt. Beneš writes about the affair in his Memoirs on pages 33-34, and on page 231 he admlts that it was he who had betrayed what was 'b elng planned agalnst Stalln to the Soviet ambassador in Prague, Alexander Alexandrovský, Commissar of the hated OGPU, which later became the NKV.O. Churchill also wrote about the episode in bis book. Des-crlblng political events of World War II, Churchill reproaohes Beneš for bis betrayal of Tu'kaohevský, saylng that thereby Beneš became the servant of Moscow and the NKVD. During practically every conversat!on with Beneš, Ohurchill returned to the theme of Tukachevský and reminded bim that he had been taken in by an agent of the NKVíD and was doing the blddlng of Moscow. With Tukachevský fell not only the 18 who were convicted, but also about 5000 Russlan officers, offlclals and lntellectuals. And they were destroyed only because they wanted to do in 1936 what Stalin, Molotov and Litvínov dld in 1939, tha:t is make a temporary treaty wlth Betilin. After that ·betrayal in 1937, Dr. Edward Beneš became the lnstrument and agent of ťhe NKVD and served that agency because he was completely in thelr ,bands. Right there and then was prepared the way for all the shameful a cts whloh wrote finis to the "regulated democracy" of Dr. Beneš. The followers of Dr. EdwaTd Beneš, enjoy- �SLOVAKIA ing politlical asylum in free America and other democratic countries, do not llke to talk about thls matter, but even that is quite under· standable. From thM ,moment in 1937, w,hen Dr. Edward Beneš - according to the report of his own ambassador in Berlin, Dr. Mastný - gave the report of Tukachevský's betrayal to ambassador Alexandrovský in Pr,ague, he ceased to be a free man and the Calvary of the servant of Moscow and the NKVD actually began. ·when we consider what Dr. Beneš did from lhat moment on, we see that he did everything against the will of the western democracies who already had been shedding their blood several yoars Wben Beneä's Soviet friend consldered the war with Nazi Germany as a private af• fair of the capitallst world. In bis book ".Six Years in Exile," Dr. Edward Beneš expressed surprise that 'his former coNeagues in Parls did not want to receive him and acted qulte coolly toward him. Of course, Beneš was not sur• prised, but he only pretended to be. He knew that his former Paris friends were well aware of the fact that 'he had sold out to the Communist NKVD. His political friends - such as Gabriel P-a.ux, the French Ambassador in Vienna from 1933 to 1939, described the actions of Beneš as "symptoms of a loyal adherence of Dr. Beneš to hiJ Slav communist brot,her." We recall that Beneš traveled to Moscow in 1943 agalnst the wlshes of Eden, Churchill and other statesmen. There he approved the sell-out of Ruthenia and cleared the road to Czecho-Slovakla for Lhe Soviet Union. This he dtd wlthout any regard to the will of the peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia and Moravia. Nay, even without the fuU consent of the "Provislon-al Czechos-Jovak Government" In London. The peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia ,Moravia and nuthenia certainly had noMrlng to do with it. I recall the speeches of October and November, 1943, in the chamber of the "Czechoslovak State Council" in London. They were made not only by the admirers of the Kremlln, but also by the socalled civH politiclans who were blinded by Moscow. Among them were L auschman, Dr. Uhl!r and Paul Macháček. They strongly approved the journey to Moscow and insisted on going along with Communist Valo's proposition even if it meant bhe 1oss of asyrium in England and the good will of the allies. Beneš simply had to go to Moscow, they said, because the ",hlg,her lnterests of our nations" demanded it. When Beneš returned from hls trip to Moscow, he brought the request to Mikolajczyk and the Poles that they renounce a large part of Poland to the Soviets. If any one s•h ould quest:!on the truth of my statements, I am ready and willing at all limes to produce the reports of the "Czechoslovak State Council," the speech&<J of Lauschman and Uhlíf, and even lleneš's speech In its entirely after he returned from Moscow. They tell us clearly why the Communist putsch of February 1948 took place so smoothly. Beneš played bis game of politics not only within the lim!ts of the State, but also acted as advlser to ~he Poles. Later, as related by Gabriel Pam,, he even acted as adviser to bis 'Rumanlan fr!end, Ml· nlster l\faniu, who ended his life In a Communist jail. lt was Beneš who counselled Maniu to discard bis policy of reserve toward the �SLOVAK.IA Communists and •trust bbem, because, he sald, the Soviet guarantees were good. In the same manner lt was that Beneš spoke to Iran!an state.s.men and even to FrankUn D. Roosev&lt. Th!s !s a.II confírmed by the articles whloh appeared in the September 1948 and March 1949 lssues of the REVUE DE PARIS. There can be no doubt In any impartňal observer's mlnd that Beneš dld promote Stalln's stock wherever he went. THE SELL-OUT OF RUTHENIA After the first World War, the victorious nations acceded to the demands made by the people of Ruthenla (Sub-Carpatho-Russia) to annex Ruthenla to CzechoiSiovakla as an autonomous uru.t. Thls was accomplls-hed by the St. Germalne agreement, whlch was concluded September 10, 1919. The Ruthenes inslsted on parting wlth the Magyars and being lncluded in a Slovanic polltlcal formatlon, such as Czecho<Slovakla. Durlng the second World War, when the powers aga.in r~ognized the existence of Czecho-Slovakia, they did so In toto as far as lts boundaries were concerned, l.e., wlth Rutbenla lncluded. The Unlted States of North America never withdrew thelr recognition of the Czecho-'Slovak Republic, s o lt was not nece-ssary for the U. S. to renew thelr recognltion. Beneš wa.s well aware of that fact and governed himselt accord· mgly. He nominated Dr. Clbere, a fo11mer agrarian and Magya.T Com• mun.lst who could not even sign his name In Ruthenlan, to represent Ruthenla in the Czecho~lovak State Councll. After HiNer attacked Sov'Jet Russla In 1941, the bolshevlks In Prague turned thelr eml>assy over to Dr. Fierlinger and declared solemnly that 1:hey never recognized the Munloh Pact and that CzechoSlovakia must be restored in toto, i.e., as it exlsted before Munlch. Of course, they dld not mean that, but lt was good propaganda. Ruthenla was the topic of several dlscus.slons In London. When Francis Nemec was sent to Ruthenia !nstead of Dr. Juraj Slávik, the awl began to show from the sack. Nemec was not g!ven a cordlal receptlon Jn Ruthenla at all. The lnhabitants every-;vhere were slgn!ng petltJons, sponsored by the communist Petruščák, whioh stated that the Ruthenlans no longer ex!sted and t hat there were only Sub-Carpath!an Ukralnians in Ruthenia w·h o yearned to be embraced by the!r great mother, UkraJnia. A.fter many Iong squabble.s, Nemec flnally got a message through to Beneš in London through General Pika. 'Ilhe telegrams that Beneä sent throug,h Flerllnger were never seen by Nemec, because Flerlln• ger already then was Stalln's envoy and never a patrlotlc c:ltizen of bis own state. lt 1s slgn!ficant, therefore, bhat desplte these experl· ences thls same traltor Flerlinger was named, several months later, as the premier by Beneš. Nemec was In a very trying po.sitlon. When he wanted to be connected with London, he had to ask for perm!ssion to do so from t he Chlef of bhe Russian Staff so that he could trave1 to Moscow, where with the help of the radlo connectlon of General Pika, who was the Ohief of the Mllitary M.lsslon, Nemec could teli Beneš how matters were going and keep bim informed on Flerllnger. The latter was dolng rlght well. He stlll 1s a minister In the Prague Government, but General Pika was killed by the Communlsts. �SLOVA.Kl.A 66 When Nemec returned to Ruthenla, Bene§ sent him several new a!des as advisors, among them also Dr. Fedor Hodža and Dr. Cibere. The l a tter, however, was picked up by the NKVD as soon as he landed in Ruthenla. Later Nemec was joined by other members of Lettrlch's Slovak Natlonal Councll, but that did not lmprove matters. In J anuary, 1945, Husäk and Novomeský told the non-Communlst representatlves of the Councll that Ruthenla was deflnltely lost and that lt was tlme they realized 1t. He said the same thlng to the Czech members of the London delegatlon who wanted to install the !ega! order whlch was worked out in London on the basls of "contlnu1ty ot the ·Republlc," that is the flrst ConstltutJ.on, and accordlng to the hapless proclamation of the London Czeoh Government of June 30, 1944, whlch procla:imed a unlted "Czechoslovak" nation and state. At that tlme the Communists had asked the Slovak non-Communists whether lt would not be more profitable to support the idea of a Slovak SovJet Republlc so that the Slovaks could govern thelr own terrltory rather than adhere to the "Czeohoslovak" .ldeology whlch denied the existence of the Slovak natlon. They added that such a Slovak Soviet Republlc cou1d be promoted wlthout difficulty, because the Slovak State still exlsted. Husák and Novomeský, however, dld not get anywhere wlth thelr proposal. The Slovak non-COmmunists turned lt down, declarlng that lt was contrary to the Chrlstmas Agreement of December 1943, as well as the agreement which Ursfny concluded wlth Dr. Beneš In October, 1944, when he acted In the name of the Slovak National Council. When Husák and Novomeský falled to promote the idea of a S lovak Soviet Republlc in London, they lmmedlately contacted and ordered their followers in Slovakla to present the proposal to Presldent Joseph Tfao and the Slovak Government. But Tlso and the Slovak Government would not hear about !t. Husák and Novomeský fa,Jled In thelr mission. Several months later, wlth many Slovaks in emigratlon, Clement!s took up the tune, but he also got nowhere. Today all the leading Reds of Slovakia are awaJting trlal for failing in their misslon. Clement!s has already paid with hls llfe. Ruthenia was lost. Beneš's deJegation had to go to Trebišov and after that things went ratber smootlbly. Flerllnger made tbe proposltions and Beneš accepted them. When he was returnlng from Moscow jn March 1945, Beneš could no looger enter Ruthenla. In fact he renounced lt solemnly on several occaslons. FinaJly, Bene§ had an agreement prepared whioh Flerllnger slgned for the Czechoslovak Government with great solemnity in the Kremlln on June 29, 1945. No one, outside the Communlsts, agreed wlth thls act of Beneš. No law, however, could contaln or restraln Bene§. He acted dlctatorially at any Ume tbat it beoefltted him. On August 24, 1945, witbout even consultlng the Parllament, Bene§ lssued bis presidentlal decree No. 4, concludlng the pact between the USSR and the CSR. Thls decree was the basls !or assigning new borders to Slovakia In the East. In October, 1946, everythlng legalized on the basis or foregolog decrees was publlshed In the Collection of Laws and Regulations. �56 SLOVAKlA 'l\he text of lhe above-mentioned agreement is interesting, as well as slgnificant. lt beglns with the words: " . . . being c0rtaln that the provjsional National Assembly of the Czechoslovak •Republlc ehall concur with this agreement . . ." Beneš dld not wait. He and John Masaryk and Vlado Clementis decided matters without Parliament. Jv,; good prophets, they knew that Parliament wou1d certainly approve the agreement! Since Ruthenia was not a very big gulp, Beneš did not stop there, but became even more generous. On June 2, 1945, he lssued decree No. 8; whereby a number of homes in the most beautiful sectlon of Bubenec - in the modern sectlon of Prague - were donated to the Russian Communist State to commemorate, he said, t he great sacrmces the nations of the USSR had made on the altar of liberation of humanity. Well, jt is a fact that the bolshevik armies to a great extent did Uber.ate Slovakia from a great many things the Slovaks could use themselves, but it certainly was not ethical or democratic to sign over whole streets to them without even consulting the natiou about it. Only dictators act like that. And Beneš was a dictator by the grace of Moscow, even if only a temporary one. Besides this generous gesture, several weeks later Beneš showed bis appreciation to tbe so-called "llberator" of Prague, Marshal Konev, by ~iving him several very beautiful villas wmch were con• tiscated from the good cltizens of Prague. From these villas Konev has a beautiful view of Prague. They are occupied by the Commun!st gestapo which was sent to Prague from Moscow to pian the enslavement and destruction of humanity and Christianlty In Europe. Such is the fruit of Beneš's actlvity - bis collaboration with the men of the Ifremlin and the hated NKVD. IN THE MAST ER'S FOOTSTEPS What Jed to the defeat of democracy and to so easy a victory of Communism in Czecho'8lovakia in February 1948, that !s a theme that wrn be expounded In as many books and dlssertations as there are vlews on that subject. Consequently dates and events wlll be multiplied. However, lt must remain lndisputably true that the date of June 25, 1945, ls a sad one, lndeed. On that f-ateful day the Czech socialist parties represented by Dr. Peter Zenkl, F'ierlinger and Gottwald, got together and w.illingly concluded an agreement whereby tbe "Na;tiona,J Front of tbe Worklng People" was formed. Slnce no one threatened the soclalists, lt was not clear agalnst whom the National Front was established. It is botb !nteresting and slgnificant ,that not a single Slovak attended lhat meeting and that among those who called it were Dr. Peter Zenkl, Dr. Hubert Ripka and other leaders of Dr. Benes' old National Socialist Party - tbe very same people wbo today are telling the American public and the world that they always bated the Reds and thrut tbe Red.s ousted them from Government. But the truth is somethlng else again. The fact 1s that both 7.enkl and Ripka welcomed tbe Communisls, sought their favor, and wanted to win political prestige w!th lhe help of the Reds at the expense of the other polltical partles. Of course, today we know tbat they failed. The same thing happened to them that had ba<ppened �SLOVAKIA 67 and is still happening to all those who try to collaborate with the Communists: The Communists exploit them for what they are worth, and then s1w allow them up or get rid of them. The "National Front of the Worklng People" created a "Centra! Coordinating Committee," In which every a.ffiliated party had an equal number of representatives. This commlrtee had the task of coordinating the work of the socialist parties. The socialist bloc prepared the ground for the various actlv!ties which led to the suppression of politlcal and reli~ious freedom and were the first steps taken toward a sociall11t dictatorship. The Czech Socialists and Communists agreed that the Agraria:n Party would be suppressed, the Catbolic Eagle organization outla,wed and fäat Catholic youth, as such, would not be allowed to organize. Together .they worked out a pian whereby the non-Communist peasant votes would be done away with and, at the same time, how tbese ľOtes, together with the Commuruist-controlled peasant unions, would be brought lnto the Communist Party. They also created and later legalized the Communist trade organizatlons, then the non-political Federation of Farmers and the United Youth Organization - au of which were supposed to be formed by the joint particlpatlon of all parties, but actually served only to communize Czecho,Slovakia trom the time they began to functlon. Therefore, lt is not true that Zenkl, Rlpka, and Vilem, and other Social Democrats opposed Communist hegemony from the beginning, but the truth is that from the moment they accepted the so-called " Košice Agreement," they were always subordinate to and In the train of the Communlst Party and willingly continued that way not only on Russlan soil, or In Russian-occupied Košice, but a!so in "lib erated" Pl'ague. Even the "Joint Declaration" to the nation of June 28, 1945, 1s indisputable proof of the fact that they wanted to get into government with the help of the Communists even at the expense of democracy, Christlanity and freedom. This is a sound lesson for all who would collaborate with Communists. AU such people are digging their own graves, because Communism recognizes no agreements, concessions or compromises, and sw.allows up all who collaborate with it. This was made quite clear in the case of Husák, Clementis and Novomeský. They were exploited by the men of the Kremlin as long as they were needed to install Communist dictatorship over the Slovak people. But once that task was accomplished, they were discarded. In like manner the Commull'ists dumped Zenkl and Ripka, and thelr companions, and replaced them with Dr. Neuman, Ing. Šlechta and others; but even the latter will wlnd up the same way as Clement!s and his companions dld. So will also those non--Communists in Bratislava who even today try to collaborate with the Reds. But not all will be lucky enough to escape Red "justlce." Zenkl, Rlpka and thelr eompa:nions pose as martyrs of Communist injustlce as they bask in the sunshine of Amerlcan freedom, but the fact 1s that they were a substantia! part of the "National Front of the Working People" and, tberefore, helped to install the reign of Communist lnjustice in Czecho-Slovakia in 1945 . • • • � 62 SLOVAKIA EDWARD BENEš - STALIN'S STOOGE DR. MICHAEL Z IB R IN Even if we could hear recordings of all the telephone convel'Sat.lons whioh took place in Prague in 1948 and see all tbe stenograpbl<: protocols of tbe secret conferences of Beneš, Zenkl and Zorin, or tbose of tbe Czech and Slovak Politburo, many o! us even then would not have a clear picture of how the Communist putsch of February 1948 could have happened in the Czecho-Slovak Republic. But tbe fact is that the Commumst putsch of February 1948 did not happen accidentally. And it did not •happen because Deneš had deceived the people of bis country, or because the Mlnisters resigned prematurely and wiťhout agreement. The fact is that the February 1mtsoh of 1948 has old roots. The victory of the Communist,s was the truit of a Iong, systematlc and relentless activity of the Moscow •Reds and, we can say, the characterle.ss Ieaders-hlp of "CzeC'hoslovak" politicians and thelr old connections with Moscow and the Communists. lt is said tbat Moscow seldom undertakes anytbing which lt cannot s urely and suc cessfu11y finish, i.e., it will not start anyťhlng unless everytbing ls fully planned and prepared to guarantee success. Time has always worked in favor of the men of the Kremlin. And so, when tbe "-CzeC'hoslovak" Ministers lost their heads and resigned, Moscow gave the word and Stalin's general manager in Czecho-Slovakia, ZORIN. leaped into ac tlon. Gottwald and bis companions had no trouble at au In taking over the Government of Czecho-Slovakla. Looking into the memoirs and wrltings of Dr. Edward Beneš and Winston Churchill, we flnd that President Beneš betrayed the so· ca1led anti-Stalin cons plracy of Marshal Tuchačevský and Rlkov in 1937. The betrayal destroyed more than 5000 army offlcers and lntellectuals who opposed Communlsm and wa,nted to put an end to lt. Beneš writes about the affair in his Memoirs on pages 33-34, and on page 231 he admlts that it was he who had betrayed what was 'b elng planned agalnst Stalln to the Soviet ambassador in Prague, Alexander Alexandrovský, Commissar of the hated OGPU, which later became the NKV.O. Churchill also wrote about the episode in bis book. Des-crlblng political events of World War II, Churchill reproaohes Beneš for bis betrayal of Tu'kaohevský, saylng that thereby Beneš became the servant of Moscow and the NKVD. During practically every conversat!on with Beneš, Ohurchill returned to the theme of Tukachevský and reminded bim that he had been taken in by an agent of the NKVíD and was doing the blddlng of Moscow. With Tukachevský fell not only the 18 who were convicted, but also about 5000 Russlan officers, offlclals and lntellectuals. And they were destroyed only because they wanted to do in 1936 what Stalin, Molotov and Litvínov dld in 1939, tha:t is make a temporary treaty wlth Betilin. After that ·betrayal in 1937, Dr. Edward Beneš became the lnstrument and agent of ťhe NKVD and served that agency because he was completely in thelr ,bands. Right there and then was prepared the way for all the shameful a cts whloh wrote finis to the "regulated democracy" of Dr. Beneš. The followers of Dr. EdwaTd Beneš, enjoy- �SLOVAKIA ing politlical asylum in free America and other democratic countries, do not llke to talk about thls matter, but even that is quite under· standable. From thM ,moment in 1937, w,hen Dr. Edward Beneš - according to the report of his own ambassador in Berlin, Dr. Mastný - gave the report of Tukachevský's betrayal to ambassador Alexandrovský in Pr,ague, he ceased to be a free man and the Calvary of the servant of Moscow and the NKVD actually began. ·when we consider what Dr. Beneš did from lhat moment on, we see that he did everything against the will of the western democracies who already had been shedding their blood several yoars Wben Beneä's Soviet friend consldered the war with Nazi Germany as a private af• fair of the capitallst world. In bis book ".Six Years in Exile," Dr. Edward Beneš expressed surprise that 'his former coNeagues in Parls did not want to receive him and acted qulte coolly toward him. Of course, Beneš was not sur• prised, but he only pretended to be. He knew that his former Paris friends were well aware of the fact that 'he had sold out to the Communist NKVD. His political friends - such as Gabriel P-a.ux, the French Ambassador in Vienna from 1933 to 1939, described the actions of Beneš as "symptoms of a loyal adherence of Dr. Beneš to hiJ Slav communist brot,her." We recall that Beneš traveled to Moscow in 1943 agalnst the wlshes of Eden, Churchill and other statesmen. There he approved the sell-out of Ruthenia and cleared the road to Czecho-Slovakla for Lhe Soviet Union. This he dtd wlthout any regard to the will of the peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia and Moravia. Nay, even without the fuU consent of the "Provislon-al Czechos-Jovak Government" In London. The peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia ,Moravia and nuthenia certainly had noMrlng to do with it. I recall the speeches of October and November, 1943, in the chamber of the "Czechoslovak State Council" in London. They were made not only by the admirers of the Kremlln, but also by the socalled civH politiclans who were blinded by Moscow. Among them were L auschman, Dr. Uhl!r and Paul Macháček. They strongly approved the journey to Moscow and insisted on going along with Communist Valo's proposition even if it meant bhe 1oss of asyrium in England and the good will of the allies. Beneš simply had to go to Moscow, they said, because the ",hlg,her lnterests of our nations" demanded it. When Beneš returned from hls trip to Moscow, he brought the request to Mikolajczyk and the Poles that they renounce a large part of Poland to the Soviets. If any one s•h ould quest:!on the truth of my statements, I am ready and willing at all limes to produce the reports of the "Czechoslovak State Council," the speech&<J of Lauschman and Uhlíf, and even lleneš's speech In its entirely after he returned from Moscow. They tell us clearly why the Communist putsch of February 1948 took place so smoothly. Beneš played bis game of politics not only within the lim!ts of the State, but also acted as advlser to ~he Poles. Later, as related by Gabriel Pam,, he even acted as adviser to bis 'Rumanlan fr!end, Ml· nlster l\faniu, who ended his life In a Communist jail. lt was Beneš who counselled Maniu to discard bis policy of reserve toward the �SLOVAK.IA Communists and •trust bbem, because, he sald, the Soviet guarantees were good. In the same manner lt was that Beneš spoke to Iran!an state.s.men and even to FrankUn D. Roosev&lt. Th!s !s a.II confírmed by the articles whloh appeared in the September 1948 and March 1949 lssues of the REVUE DE PARIS. There can be no doubt In any impartňal observer's mlnd that Beneš dld promote Stalln's stock wherever he went. THE SELL-OUT OF RUTHENIA After the first World War, the victorious nations acceded to the demands made by the people of Ruthenla (Sub-Carpatho-Russia) to annex Ruthenla to CzechoiSiovakla as an autonomous uru.t. Thls was accomplls-hed by the St. Germalne agreement, whlch was concluded September 10, 1919. The Ruthenes inslsted on parting wlth the Magyars and being lncluded in a Slovanic polltlcal formatlon, such as Czecho<Slovakla. Durlng the second World War, when the powers aga.in r~ognized the existence of Czecho-Slovakia, they did so In toto as far as lts boundaries were concerned, l.e., wlth Rutbenla lncluded. The Unlted States of North America never withdrew thelr recognition of the Czecho-'Slovak Republic, s o lt was not nece-ssary for the U. S. to renew thelr recognltion. Beneš wa.s well aware of that fact and governed himselt accord· mgly. He nominated Dr. Clbere, a fo11mer agrarian and Magya.T Com• mun.lst who could not even sign his name In Ruthenlan, to represent Ruthenla in the Czecho~lovak State Councll. After HiNer attacked Sov'Jet Russla In 1941, the bolshevlks In Prague turned thelr eml>assy over to Dr. Fierlinger and declared solemnly that 1:hey never recognized the Munloh Pact and that CzechoSlovakia must be restored in toto, i.e., as it exlsted before Munlch. Of course, they dld not mean that, but lt was good propaganda. Ruthenla was the topic of several dlscus.slons In London. When Francis Nemec was sent to Ruthenia !nstead of Dr. Juraj Slávik, the awl began to show from the sack. Nemec was not g!ven a cordlal receptlon Jn Ruthenla at all. The lnhabitants every-;vhere were slgn!ng petltJons, sponsored by the communist Petruščák, whioh stated that the Ruthenlans no longer ex!sted and t hat there were only Sub-Carpath!an Ukralnians in Ruthenia w·h o yearned to be embraced by the!r great mother, UkraJnia. A.fter many Iong squabble.s, Nemec flnally got a message through to Beneš in London through General Pika. 'Ilhe telegrams that Beneä sent throug,h Flerllnger were never seen by Nemec, because Flerlln• ger already then was Stalln's envoy and never a patrlotlc c:ltizen of bis own state. lt 1s slgn!ficant, therefore, bhat desplte these experl· ences thls same traltor Flerlinger was named, several months later, as the premier by Beneš. Nemec was In a very trying po.sitlon. When he wanted to be connected with London, he had to ask for perm!ssion to do so from t he Chlef of bhe Russian Staff so that he could trave1 to Moscow, where with the help of the radlo connectlon of General Pika, who was the Ohief of the Mllitary M.lsslon, Nemec could teli Beneš how matters were going and keep bim informed on Flerllnger. The latter was dolng rlght well. He stlll 1s a minister In the Prague Government, but General Pika was killed by the Communlsts. �SLOVA.Kl.A 66 When Nemec returned to Ruthenla, Bene§ sent him several new a!des as advisors, among them also Dr. Fedor Hodža and Dr. Cibere. The l a tter, however, was picked up by the NKVD as soon as he landed in Ruthenla. Later Nemec was joined by other members of Lettrlch's Slovak Natlonal Councll, but that did not lmprove matters. In J anuary, 1945, Husäk and Novomeský told the non-Communlst representatlves of the Councll that Ruthenla was deflnltely lost and that lt was tlme they realized 1t. He said the same thlng to the Czech members of the London delegatlon who wanted to install the !ega! order whlch was worked out in London on the basls of "contlnu1ty ot the ·Republlc," that is the flrst ConstltutJ.on, and accordlng to the hapless proclamation of the London Czeoh Government of June 30, 1944, whlch procla:imed a unlted "Czechoslovak" nation and state. At that tlme the Communists had asked the Slovak non-Communists whether lt would not be more profitable to support the idea of a Slovak SovJet Republlc so that the Slovaks could govern thelr own terrltory rather than adhere to the "Czeohoslovak" .ldeology whlch denied the existence of the Slovak natlon. They added that such a Slovak Soviet Republlc cou1d be promoted wlthout difficulty, because the Slovak State still exlsted. Husák and Novomeský, however, dld not get anywhere wlth thelr proposal. The Slovak non-COmmunists turned lt down, declarlng that lt was contrary to the Chrlstmas Agreement of December 1943, as well as the agreement which Ursfny concluded wlth Dr. Beneš In October, 1944, when he acted In the name of the Slovak National Council. When Husák and Novomeský falled to promote the idea of a S lovak Soviet Republlc in London, they lmmedlately contacted and ordered their followers in Slovakla to present the proposal to Presldent Joseph Tfao and the Slovak Government. But Tlso and the Slovak Government would not hear about !t. Husák and Novomeský fa,Jled In thelr mission. Several months later, wlth many Slovaks in emigratlon, Clement!s took up the tune, but he also got nowhere. Today all the leading Reds of Slovakia are awaJting trlal for failing in their misslon. Clement!s has already paid with hls llfe. Ruthenia was lost. Beneš's deJegation had to go to Trebišov and after that things went ratber smootlbly. Flerllnger made tbe proposltions and Beneš accepted them. When he was returnlng from Moscow jn March 1945, Beneš could no looger enter Ruthenla. In fact he renounced lt solemnly on several occaslons. FinaJly, Bene§ had an agreement prepared whioh Flerllnger slgned for the Czechoslovak Government with great solemnity in the Kremlln on June 29, 1945. No one, outside the Communlsts, agreed wlth thls act of Beneš. No law, however, could contaln or restraln Bene§. He acted dlctatorially at any Ume tbat it beoefltted him. On August 24, 1945, witbout even consultlng the Parllament, Bene§ lssued bis presidentlal decree No. 4, concludlng the pact between the USSR and the CSR. Thls decree was the basls !or assigning new borders to Slovakia In the East. In October, 1946, everythlng legalized on the basis or foregolog decrees was publlshed In the Collection of Laws and Regulations. �56 SLOVAKlA 'l\he text of lhe above-mentioned agreement is interesting, as well as slgnificant. lt beglns with the words: " . . . being c0rtaln that the provjsional National Assembly of the Czechoslovak •Republlc ehall concur with this agreement . . ." Beneš dld not wait. He and John Masaryk and Vlado Clementis decided matters without Parliament. Jv,; good prophets, they knew that Parliament wou1d certainly approve the agreement! Since Ruthenia was not a very big gulp, Beneš did not stop there, but became even more generous. On June 2, 1945, he lssued decree No. 8; whereby a number of homes in the most beautiful sectlon of Bubenec - in the modern sectlon of Prague - were donated to the Russian Communist State to commemorate, he said, t he great sacrmces the nations of the USSR had made on the altar of liberation of humanity. Well, jt is a fact that the bolshevik armies to a great extent did Uber.ate Slovakia from a great many things the Slovaks could use themselves, but it certainly was not ethical or democratic to sign over whole streets to them without even consulting the natiou about it. Only dictators act like that. And Beneš was a dictator by the grace of Moscow, even if only a temporary one. Besides this generous gesture, several weeks later Beneš showed bis appreciation to tbe so-called "llberator" of Prague, Marshal Konev, by ~iving him several very beautiful villas wmch were con• tiscated from the good cltizens of Prague. From these villas Konev has a beautiful view of Prague. They are occupied by the Commun!st gestapo which was sent to Prague from Moscow to pian the enslavement and destruction of humanity and Christianlty In Europe. Such is the fruit of Beneš's actlvity - bis collaboration with the men of the Ifremlin and the hated NKVD. IN THE MAST ER'S FOOTSTEPS What Jed to the defeat of democracy and to so easy a victory of Communism in Czecho'8lovakia in February 1948, that !s a theme that wrn be expounded In as many books and dlssertations as there are vlews on that subject. Consequently dates and events wlll be multiplied. However, lt must remain lndisputably true that the date of June 25, 1945, ls a sad one, lndeed. On that f-ateful day the Czech socialist parties represented by Dr. Peter Zenkl, F'ierlinger and Gottwald, got together and w.illingly concluded an agreement whereby tbe "Na;tiona,J Front of tbe Worklng People" was formed. Slnce no one threatened the soclalists, lt was not clear agalnst whom the National Front was established. It is botb !nteresting and slgnificant ,that not a single Slovak attended lhat meeting and that among those who called it were Dr. Peter Zenkl, Dr. Hubert Ripka and other leaders of Dr. Benes' old National Socialist Party - tbe very same people wbo today are telling the American public and the world that they always bated the Reds and thrut tbe Red.s ousted them from Government. But the truth is somethlng else again. The fact 1s that both 7.enkl and Ripka welcomed tbe Communisls, sought their favor, and wanted to win political prestige w!th lhe help of the Reds at the expense of the other polltical partles. Of course, today we know tbat they failed. The same thing happened to them that had ba<ppened �SLOVAKIA 67 and is still happening to all those who try to collaborate with the Communists: The Communists exploit them for what they are worth, and then s1w allow them up or get rid of them. The "National Front of the Worklng People" created a "Centra! Coordinating Committee," In which every a.ffiliated party had an equal number of representatives. This commlrtee had the task of coordinating the work of the socialist parties. The socialist bloc prepared the ground for the various actlv!ties which led to the suppression of politlcal and reli~ious freedom and were the first steps taken toward a sociall11t dictatorship. The Czech Socialists and Communists agreed that the Agraria:n Party would be suppressed, the Catbolic Eagle organization outla,wed and fäat Catholic youth, as such, would not be allowed to organize. Together .they worked out a pian whereby the non-Communist peasant votes would be done away with and, at the same time, how tbese ľOtes, together with the Commuruist-controlled peasant unions, would be brought lnto the Communist Party. They also created and later legalized the Communist trade organizatlons, then the non-political Federation of Farmers and the United Youth Organization - au of which were supposed to be formed by the joint particlpatlon of all parties, but actually served only to communize Czecho,Slovakia trom the time they began to functlon. Therefore, lt is not true that Zenkl, Rlpka, and Vilem, and other Social Democrats opposed Communist hegemony from the beginning, but the truth is that from the moment they accepted the so-called " Košice Agreement," they were always subordinate to and In the train of the Communlst Party and willingly continued that way not only on Russlan soil, or In Russian-occupied Košice, but a!so in "lib erated" Pl'ague. Even the "Joint Declaration" to the nation of June 28, 1945, 1s indisputable proof of the fact that they wanted to get into government with the help of the Communists even at the expense of democracy, Christlanity and freedom. This is a sound lesson for all who would collaborate with Communists. AU such people are digging their own graves, because Communism recognizes no agreements, concessions or compromises, and sw.allows up all who collaborate with it. This was made quite clear in the case of Husák, Clementis and Novomeský. They were exploited by the men of the Kremlin as long as they were needed to install Communist dictatorship over the Slovak people. But once that task was accomplished, they were discarded. In like manner the Commull'ists dumped Zenkl and Ripka, and thelr companions, and replaced them with Dr. Neuman, Ing. Šlechta and others; but even the latter will wlnd up the same way as Clement!s and his companions dld. So will also those non--Communists in Bratislava who even today try to collaborate with the Reds. But not all will be lucky enough to escape Red "justlce." Zenkl, Rlpka and thelr eompa:nions pose as martyrs of Communist injustlce as they bask in the sunshine of Amerlcan freedom, but the fact 1s that they were a substantia! part of the "National Front of the Working People" and, tberefore, helped to install the reign of Communist lnjustice in Czecho-Slovakia in 1945 . • • • � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 62 SLOVAKIA EDWARD BENEš - STALIN'S STOOGE DR. MICHAEL Z IB R IN Even if we could hear recordings of all the telephone convel'Sat.lons whioh took place in Prague in 1948 and see all tbe stenograpbl<: protocols of tbe secret conferences of Beneš, Zenkl and Zorin, or tbose of tbe Czech and Slovak Politburo, many o! us even then would not have a clear picture of how the Communist putsch of February 1948 could have happened in the Czecho-Slovak Republic. But tbe fact is that the Commumst putsch of February 1948 did not happen accidentally. And it did not •happen because Deneš had deceived the people of bis country, or because the Mlnisters resigned prematurely and wiťhout agreement. The fact is that the February 1mtsoh of 1948 has old roots. The victory of the Communist,s was the truit of a Iong, systematlc and relentless activity of the Moscow •Reds and, we can say, the characterle.ss Ieaders-hlp of "CzeC'hoslovak" politicians and thelr old connections with Moscow and the Communists. lt is said tbat Moscow seldom undertakes anytbing which lt cannot s urely and suc cessfu11y finish, i.e., it will not start anyťhlng unless everytbing ls fully planned and prepared to guarantee success. Time has always worked in favor of the men of the Kremlin. And so, when tbe "-CzeC'hoslovak" Ministers lost their heads and resigned, Moscow gave the word and Stalin's general manager in Czecho-Slovakia, ZORIN. leaped into ac tlon. Gottwald and bis companions had no trouble at au In taking over the Government of Czecho-Slovakla. Looking into the memoirs and wrltings of Dr. Edward Beneš and Winston Churchill, we flnd that President Beneš betrayed the so· ca1led anti-Stalin cons plracy of Marshal Tuchačevský and Rlkov in 1937. The betrayal destroyed more than 5000 army offlcers and lntellectuals who opposed Communlsm and wa,nted to put an end to lt. Beneš writes about the affair in his Memoirs on pages 33-34, and on page 231 he admlts that it was he who had betrayed what was 'b elng planned agalnst Stalln to the Soviet ambassador in Prague, Alexander Alexandrovský, Commissar of the hated OGPU, which later became the NKV.O. Churchill also wrote about the episode in bis book. Des-crlblng political events of World War II, Churchill reproaohes Beneš for bis betrayal of Tu'kaohevský, saylng that thereby Beneš became the servant of Moscow and the NKVD. During practically every conversat!on with Beneš, Ohurchill returned to the theme of Tukachevský and reminded bim that he had been taken in by an agent of the NKVíD and was doing the blddlng of Moscow. With Tukachevský fell not only the 18 who were convicted, but also about 5000 Russlan officers, offlclals and lntellectuals. And they were destroyed only because they wanted to do in 1936 what Stalin, Molotov and Litvínov dld in 1939, tha:t is make a temporary treaty wlth Betilin. After that ·betrayal in 1937, Dr. Edward Beneš became the lnstrument and agent of ťhe NKVD and served that agency because he was completely in thelr ,bands. Right there and then was prepared the way for all the shameful a cts whloh wrote finis to the "regulated democracy" of Dr. Beneš. The followers of Dr. EdwaTd Beneš, enjoy- SLOVAKIA ing politlical asylum in free America and other democratic countries, do not llke to talk about thls matter, but even that is quite under· standable. From thM ,moment in 1937, w,hen Dr. Edward Beneš - according to the report of his own ambassador in Berlin, Dr. Mastný - gave the report of Tukachevský's betrayal to ambassador Alexandrovský in Pr,ague, he ceased to be a free man and the Calvary of the servant of Moscow and the NKVD actually began. ·when we consider what Dr. Beneš did from lhat moment on, we see that he did everything against the will of the western democracies who already had been shedding their blood several yoars Wben Beneä's Soviet friend consldered the war with Nazi Germany as a private af• fair of the capitallst world. In bis book ".Six Years in Exile," Dr. Edward Beneš expressed surprise that 'his former coNeagues in Parls did not want to receive him and acted qulte coolly toward him. Of course, Beneš was not sur• prised, but he only pretended to be. He knew that his former Paris friends were well aware of the fact that 'he had sold out to the Communist NKVD. His political friends - such as Gabriel P-a.ux, the French Ambassador in Vienna from 1933 to 1939, described the actions of Beneš as "symptoms of a loyal adherence of Dr. Beneš to hiJ Slav communist brot,her." We recall that Beneš traveled to Moscow in 1943 agalnst the wlshes of Eden, Churchill and other statesmen. There he approved the sell-out of Ruthenia and cleared the road to Czecho-Slovakla for Lhe Soviet Union. This he dtd wlthout any regard to the will of the peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia and Moravia. Nay, even without the fuU consent of the "Provislon-al Czechos-Jovak Government" In London. The peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia ,Moravia and nuthenia certainly had noMrlng to do with it. I recall the speeches of October and November, 1943, in the chamber of the "Czechoslovak State Council" in London. They were made not only by the admirers of the Kremlln, but also by the socalled civH politiclans who were blinded by Moscow. Among them were L auschman, Dr. Uhl!r and Paul Macháček. They strongly approved the journey to Moscow and insisted on going along with Communist Valo's proposition even if it meant bhe 1oss of asyrium in England and the good will of the allies. Beneš simply had to go to Moscow, they said, because the ",hlg,her lnterests of our nations" demanded it. When Beneš returned from hls trip to Moscow, he brought the request to Mikolajczyk and the Poles that they renounce a large part of Poland to the Soviets. If any one s•h ould quest:!on the truth of my statements, I am ready and willing at all limes to produce the reports of the "Czechoslovak State Council," the speech&<J of Lauschman and Uhlíf, and even lleneš's speech In its entirely after he returned from Moscow. They tell us clearly why the Communist putsch of February 1948 took place so smoothly. Beneš played bis game of politics not only within the lim!ts of the State, but also acted as advlser to ~he Poles. Later, as related by Gabriel Pam,, he even acted as adviser to bis 'Rumanlan fr!end, Ml· nlster l\faniu, who ended his life In a Communist jail. lt was Beneš who counselled Maniu to discard bis policy of reserve toward the SLOVAK.IA Communists and •trust bbem, because, he sald, the Soviet guarantees were good. In the same manner lt was that Beneš spoke to Iran!an state.s.men and even to FrankUn D. Roosev&lt. Th!s !s a.II confírmed by the articles whloh appeared in the September 1948 and March 1949 lssues of the REVUE DE PARIS. There can be no doubt In any impartňal observer's mlnd that Beneš dld promote Stalln's stock wherever he went. THE SELL-OUT OF RUTHENIA After the first World War, the victorious nations acceded to the demands made by the people of Ruthenla (Sub-Carpatho-Russia) to annex Ruthenla to CzechoiSiovakla as an autonomous uru.t. Thls was accomplls-hed by the St. Germalne agreement, whlch was concluded September 10, 1919. The Ruthenes inslsted on parting wlth the Magyars and being lncluded in a Slovanic polltlcal formatlon, such as Czecho<Slovakla. Durlng the second World War, when the powers aga.in r~ognized the existence of Czecho-Slovakia, they did so In toto as far as lts boundaries were concerned, l.e., wlth Rutbenla lncluded. The Unlted States of North America never withdrew thelr recognition of the Czecho-'Slovak Republic, s o lt was not nece-ssary for the U. S. to renew thelr recognltion. Beneš wa.s well aware of that fact and governed himselt accord· mgly. He nominated Dr. Clbere, a fo11mer agrarian and Magya.T Com• mun.lst who could not even sign his name In Ruthenlan, to represent Ruthenla in the Czecho~lovak State Councll. After HiNer attacked Sov'Jet Russla In 1941, the bolshevlks In Prague turned thelr eml>assy over to Dr. Fierlinger and declared solemnly that 1:hey never recognized the Munloh Pact and that CzechoSlovakia must be restored in toto, i.e., as it exlsted before Munlch. Of course, they dld not mean that, but lt was good propaganda. Ruthenla was the topic of several dlscus.slons In London. When Francis Nemec was sent to Ruthenia !nstead of Dr. Juraj Slávik, the awl began to show from the sack. Nemec was not g!ven a cordlal receptlon Jn Ruthenla at all. The lnhabitants every-;vhere were slgn!ng petltJons, sponsored by the communist Petruščák, whioh stated that the Ruthenlans no longer ex!sted and t hat there were only Sub-Carpath!an Ukralnians in Ruthenia w·h o yearned to be embraced by the!r great mother, UkraJnia. A.fter many Iong squabble.s, Nemec flnally got a message through to Beneš in London through General Pika. 'Ilhe telegrams that Beneä sent throug,h Flerllnger were never seen by Nemec, because Flerlln• ger already then was Stalln's envoy and never a patrlotlc c:ltizen of bis own state. lt 1s slgn!ficant, therefore, bhat desplte these experl· ences thls same traltor Flerlinger was named, several months later, as the premier by Beneš. Nemec was In a very trying po.sitlon. When he wanted to be connected with London, he had to ask for perm!ssion to do so from t he Chlef of bhe Russian Staff so that he could trave1 to Moscow, where with the help of the radlo connectlon of General Pika, who was the Ohief of the Mllitary M.lsslon, Nemec could teli Beneš how matters were going and keep bim informed on Flerllnger. The latter was dolng rlght well. He stlll 1s a minister In the Prague Government, but General Pika was killed by the Communlsts. SLOVA.Kl.A 66 When Nemec returned to Ruthenla, Bene§ sent him several new a!des as advisors, among them also Dr. Fedor Hodža and Dr. Cibere. The l a tter, however, was picked up by the NKVD as soon as he landed in Ruthenla. Later Nemec was joined by other members of Lettrlch's Slovak Natlonal Councll, but that did not lmprove matters. In J anuary, 1945, Husäk and Novomeský told the non-Communlst representatlves of the Councll that Ruthenla was deflnltely lost and that lt was tlme they realized 1t. He said the same thlng to the Czech members of the London delegatlon who wanted to install the !ega! order whlch was worked out in London on the basls of "contlnu1ty ot the ·Republlc," that is the flrst ConstltutJ.on, and accordlng to the hapless proclamation of the London Czeoh Government of June 30, 1944, whlch procla:imed a unlted "Czechoslovak" nation and state. At that tlme the Communists had asked the Slovak non-Communists whether lt would not be more profitable to support the idea of a Slovak SovJet Republlc so that the Slovaks could govern thelr own terrltory rather than adhere to the "Czeohoslovak" .ldeology whlch denied the existence of the Slovak natlon. They added that such a Slovak Soviet Republlc cou1d be promoted wlthout difficulty, because the Slovak State still exlsted. Husák and Novomeský, however, dld not get anywhere wlth thelr proposal. The Slovak non-COmmunists turned lt down, declarlng that lt was contrary to the Chrlstmas Agreement of December 1943, as well as the agreement which Ursfny concluded wlth Dr. Beneš In October, 1944, when he acted In the name of the Slovak National Council. When Husák and Novomeský falled to promote the idea of a S lovak Soviet Republlc in London, they lmmedlately contacted and ordered their followers in Slovakla to present the proposal to Presldent Joseph Tfao and the Slovak Government. But Tlso and the Slovak Government would not hear about !t. Husák and Novomeský fa,Jled In thelr mission. Several months later, wlth many Slovaks in emigratlon, Clement!s took up the tune, but he also got nowhere. Today all the leading Reds of Slovakia are awaJting trlal for failing in their misslon. Clement!s has already paid with hls llfe. Ruthenia was lost. Beneš's deJegation had to go to Trebišov and after that things went ratber smootlbly. Flerllnger made tbe proposltions and Beneš accepted them. When he was returnlng from Moscow jn March 1945, Beneš could no looger enter Ruthenla. In fact he renounced lt solemnly on several occaslons. FinaJly, Bene§ had an agreement prepared whioh Flerllnger slgned for the Czechoslovak Government with great solemnity in the Kremlln on June 29, 1945. No one, outside the Communlsts, agreed wlth thls act of Beneš. No law, however, could contaln or restraln Bene§. He acted dlctatorially at any Ume tbat it beoefltted him. On August 24, 1945, witbout even consultlng the Parllament, Bene§ lssued bis presidentlal decree No. 4, concludlng the pact between the USSR and the CSR. Thls decree was the basls !or assigning new borders to Slovakia In the East. In October, 1946, everythlng legalized on the basis or foregolog decrees was publlshed In the Collection of Laws and Regulations. 56 SLOVAKlA 'l\he text of lhe above-mentioned agreement is interesting, as well as slgnificant. lt beglns with the words: " . . . being c0rtaln that the provjsional National Assembly of the Czechoslovak •Republlc ehall concur with this agreement . . ." Beneš dld not wait. He and John Masaryk and Vlado Clementis decided matters without Parliament. Jv,; good prophets, they knew that Parliament wou1d certainly approve the agreement! Since Ruthenia was not a very big gulp, Beneš did not stop there, but became even more generous. On June 2, 1945, he lssued decree No. 8; whereby a number of homes in the most beautiful sectlon of Bubenec - in the modern sectlon of Prague - were donated to the Russian Communist State to commemorate, he said, t he great sacrmces the nations of the USSR had made on the altar of liberation of humanity. Well, jt is a fact that the bolshevik armies to a great extent did Uber.ate Slovakia from a great many things the Slovaks could use themselves, but it certainly was not ethical or democratic to sign over whole streets to them without even consulting the natiou about it. Only dictators act like that. And Beneš was a dictator by the grace of Moscow, even if only a temporary one. Besides this generous gesture, several weeks later Beneš showed bis appreciation to tbe so-called "llberator" of Prague, Marshal Konev, by ~iving him several very beautiful villas wmch were con• tiscated from the good cltizens of Prague. From these villas Konev has a beautiful view of Prague. They are occupied by the Commun!st gestapo which was sent to Prague from Moscow to pian the enslavement and destruction of humanity and Christianlty In Europe. Such is the fruit of Beneš's actlvity - bis collaboration with the men of the Ifremlin and the hated NKVD. IN THE MAST ER'S FOOTSTEPS What Jed to the defeat of democracy and to so easy a victory of Communism in Czecho'8lovakia in February 1948, that !s a theme that wrn be expounded In as many books and dlssertations as there are vlews on that subject. Consequently dates and events wlll be multiplied. However, lt must remain lndisputably true that the date of June 25, 1945, ls a sad one, lndeed. On that f-ateful day the Czech socialist parties represented by Dr. Peter Zenkl, F'ierlinger and Gottwald, got together and w.illingly concluded an agreement whereby tbe "Na;tiona,J Front of tbe Worklng People" was formed. Slnce no one threatened the soclalists, lt was not clear agalnst whom the National Front was established. It is botb !nteresting and slgnificant ,that not a single Slovak attended lhat meeting and that among those who called it were Dr. Peter Zenkl, Dr. Hubert Ripka and other leaders of Dr. Benes' old National Socialist Party - tbe very same people wbo today are telling the American public and the world that they always bated the Reds and thrut tbe Red.s ousted them from Government. But the truth is somethlng else again. The fact 1s that both 7.enkl and Ripka welcomed tbe Communisls, sought their favor, and wanted to win political prestige w!th lhe help of the Reds at the expense of the other polltical partles. Of course, today we know tbat they failed. The same thing happened to them that had ba<ppened SLOVAKIA 67 and is still happening to all those who try to collaborate with the Communists: The Communists exploit them for what they are worth, and then s1w allow them up or get rid of them. The "National Front of the Worklng People" created a "Centra! Coordinating Committee," In which every a.ffiliated party had an equal number of representatives. This commlrtee had the task of coordinating the work of the socialist parties. The socialist bloc prepared the ground for the various actlv!ties which led to the suppression of politlcal and reli~ious freedom and were the first steps taken toward a sociall11t dictatorship. The Czech Socialists and Communists agreed that the Agraria:n Party would be suppressed, the Catbolic Eagle organization outla,wed and fäat Catholic youth, as such, would not be allowed to organize. Together .they worked out a pian whereby the non-Communist peasant votes would be done away with and, at the same time, how tbese ľOtes, together with the Commuruist-controlled peasant unions, would be brought lnto the Communist Party. They also created and later legalized the Communist trade organizatlons, then the non-political Federation of Farmers and the United Youth Organization - au of which were supposed to be formed by the joint particlpatlon of all parties, but actually served only to communize Czecho,Slovakia trom the time they began to functlon. Therefore, lt is not true that Zenkl, Rlpka, and Vilem, and other Social Democrats opposed Communist hegemony from the beginning, but the truth is that from the moment they accepted the so-called " Košice Agreement," they were always subordinate to and In the train of the Communlst Party and willingly continued that way not only on Russlan soil, or In Russian-occupied Košice, but a!so in "lib erated" Pl'ague. Even the "Joint Declaration" to the nation of June 28, 1945, 1s indisputable proof of the fact that they wanted to get into government with the help of the Communists even at the expense of democracy, Christlanity and freedom. This is a sound lesson for all who would collaborate with Communists. AU such people are digging their own graves, because Communism recognizes no agreements, concessions or compromises, and sw.allows up all who collaborate with it. This was made quite clear in the case of Husák, Clementis and Novomeský. They were exploited by the men of the Kremlin as long as they were needed to install Communist dictatorship over the Slovak people. But once that task was accomplished, they were discarded. In like manner the Commull'ists dumped Zenkl and Ripka, and thelr companions, and replaced them with Dr. Neuman, Ing. Šlechta and others; but even the latter will wlnd up the same way as Clement!s and his companions dld. So will also those non--Communists in Bratislava who even today try to collaborate with the Reds. But not all will be lucky enough to escape Red "justlce." Zenkl, Rlpka and thelr eompa:nions pose as martyrs of Communist injustlce as they bask in the sunshine of Amerlcan freedom, but the fact 1s that they were a substantia! part of the "National Front of the Working People" and, tberefore, helped to install the reign of Communist lnjustice in Czecho-Slovakia in 1945 . • • •  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Edward Beneš - Stalin's Stooge Description An account of the resource Dr. Michael Zibrin Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952 pp. 52-57 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Zibrín, Michal, 1899-1968 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/ca848c11db1831c3dea9d219fc406d38.pdf 05ebb1620f2736aac93f4f27d4224040 PDF Text Text 60 SLOVAKIA will see to it that Bentt Czechoslovaks are replaced only by Beneš Czechoslovaks ! Summarlly said, there is nothlng new In the Czechoslovak sky. We are not at all surprlsl•d by the behavlor of the hard-bolled adherents or Czechoslovak centraliem. But we are very mucb surprlsed with the Slovak servants renderlnr. them Jip servlce. Rudolph Fraštackf, a BeneA Czechoslovak, recently rťturned from a European trip and told trlends that among the most recent Slovak escapees he dld not !Ind a slngle one who stands for Cze1.hoslovakism. Slnce these !atest escapees interpret the sentiments ot 1.he Slovaks at horne, we can safely say that in Slovakia, regardless of thelr reli gious or previous political divisiona, the Slovaks almoat to ,1 man are againat the reatoration of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovaks are In a bllnd alley, because they dld not b elieve In slgns of the tlmes. Freedom 1s the watchword, the everlastlng h ope and the ultlmate goal <•f all nations of the earth - lncluding the S lovak nation. FOR DR. STEPHEN OSUSKY'S BENEFIT DR. PETER SKALENICKÝ The more new refugees arrive from Slovakia, so all the more and repeatedly do they confirm the fa<:t that our policy, based in our stand of Slovak independence, is correct. Even these new escapees, often former adberents of former CzechoslovQk political parties, confinn the fact that the Slovak nation not only yearns for lts own independence, but also tbat in Slovakia today no one believes tbat it will be possible to renew the Czechoslovak Republic. Nay, the people at horne do not b elieve tbat responsible people in exile can be found wbo would work against Slovak independence. It ls something natural. Certainly, a nation wh!cb once has had its own state and bas tasted of the advantages of its own independence will never surrender it, and it can be deprived of it only by force and violence. We can look upon tbe origln of the Slovak Republic in any manner that we will, but no one can deny, nor can any one erase from Slovak hlstory tbe actuallty that the Slovaks did have thelr own state from 1939 to 1945, that tbey did bave their own president and tbeir own government, and that Slovakia dirl _appear on the map of Europe as an Independent political unit. It is often said that the Slovak Republic was a satelllte state. Even under sucb circumstances, it was comparatively more than tbe Slovaks had during the first Czecboslovak Republic, or after 1945. 'ľbe president of Slovakla and the government always had more power tban the president of the Slovak National Council (Lettrich) and the commissars had after 1945. tbat ls during the period wben tbe Czecboslovak Republic was already_ supposed to he a federative state. And even thougb tbe cluration of the Slovak State falls into the perlod of war, Swiss newsmen told tbe world that the Slovak Republic was an oasis of consolidated peace and welfare. Tbat was because the Slovaks decided tbeir own affairs In tbelr country. The president of the Slovak IRepublic coulcl grant reprieves to those sen- �SLOVAKIA 61 tenced to death; and he g ranted it in all cases. It serves and it shall continue to serve to the honor of the Slovak President and the Slovak Republic for all times that during its duration no one was e:xecuted in Slovakia by Slovak authorities. But what can be said about the period after 1945? Let us take a concrete case, that of Dr. Joseph Tiso, President of Slovakia. The Slovak Democratic Party, supported by the Catholics in the 1946 elections because they bel!eved tbat, among other things, it would prevent the execution or the Slovak President, did not even have the power to save bis life. Even in that case it was Beneš who had to decide, and declde he did - as he always had done before against Slovakia, on the recommendation of the Czech ministers who again wanted to come to Slovakia as liberators. The perlod from the Banská Bystrica insurrection (August 1944) is and shall remain a sad chapter in Slovak history. Tbis debacle ls the joint property of tbe Communists and the Lettricb Democrats. In the name of the revolution against Naziism they liquidated Slovak independence; in the name of democracy they vied with each other in attesting loyalty to Stalin and the Soviet Union; and in the namt o( humanity tbey built gallows. Today tbe communlsts In Czecboslovakia celebrate this revolution not because it was democratic, but because it was communistic. ll is well, however, that tbe Lettrichites, too, without reservatlons c-laimed and stlll claim it as their own, because thereby before bistory they assume the responsibili,ty for lhe liquidalion of Slovak independence, for lbe mass graves wilb hundreds of corpses, for the bloody verdicts of the People's Courts, for the thousands of citizens who langulshed in jails for long months, nay even years, without belng given a hearing or a tria!, for the torture-chambers of the STB (Securlty l:'ollce), for confiscatlng the property of persons who were not even given a tria! in Court, [or tbe arbitrary looting of churches and schools, for the revengeful police investigations and terror in the whole nation. Tbose are the marks of the politics of the people's• democratic rulers of Slovakia, the symbols of the freedom of the gallows a ccording to which Slovak and world history shall know them. The politlcian might, perbaps, pass over these matters with a heavy sigh In the interest of some agreement, the judge, however, must call a crime a crime, and the historian must record [acts on the pages or history. Today Slovakia has new generations, trained in the spirit or independence - generations wbo are suffering in jails and concentration camps at home. Many of them already have fa!len, but from thelr blood ls bom a new [orce and a new determination for those llving who shall never desert their nation and shall never surrender the right to thelr own lndependence. And abroad, in emigration, Slovakia has hundreds of young people who studied there and thousands of others who are going tbrougb the valuable school of Life. Let them be wheresoever they may, they s hall never s urrender the right to Slovak independence. During twenty years of the Czechoslovak Republlc, Slovaks only in isolated cases rould go abroad to study. Today the people's-<lemocratic regime has afforded them this advantage: they had to flee their homeland before its terror. And the �SLOVAKIA ideals, the bearers of which are especially these young generations, prove to us clearly that thls 1s the cbaln of natural evolutlon of Slovak revolutiona.ry efforts from the tlme of Štúr down to our present limes. We know that Louls Štúr proclaimed Slovak independence al• ready in 1848. Tbe Slovak parliament only sanctioned th!s revolutíonary act of Štúr's in 1939 and thus real!zed what Štúr's generatlon did not have enough strengtb to effect. We are often mistaken by the outslde imperialistlc pressure wbicb hastened the politlcal development of Slovakia. This, bowever, cannot be taken as a denial of the matteľ. If that were so, then tbe nation at home would not yearn !or, and tbe overwhelming majority of Slovak exlles would not work for, Slovak independence. Every nation has a na,tural am.bition to create its own bistory in its own state and, represented by its own state. as an independent factor lt wants to contribule to t he increase ot the cultural values of all hu manity. Tbe Slovaks demand thelr independence because they are ·a natlon with t.heir own bisto ry, language and cult ure, and because they are com• manded to do so by charity to themselves and by a healthy mind. Why there is not a Single natlon in the world tbat would not want to be Independent. Enslavement of one's own nation can be tbe deslre or vengeful, self-seeking, mentally warped and confused lndlv!duals. Let us look upon the matter from whatever standpolnt, Czechoslovak• ism is and shall always remain an expression of nationa\ and persona! inferiority. Let it not be a surprise, then, if we turn our attentlon loday to Dr. Stephen Osuský, the foremost Slovak among a very small group ot people who sl!IJ hold to the Czechoslovak conceptlon. We do t h at because we want to believe that Mr. Osuský wil\ not lend bis name to lmpede t.he efforts of the Slovak nation. For some time now we are gettíng report.s that the political group of Dr. Lettrich wants to solve the present crlsis of the Czechoslovak foreign reslstance wlth the aid of tbe person of Dr. Osuský, who is supposed to become president of the Council ot Free Czechoslovak!a. Dr. Osuský is not famlliar with tbe Slovak politlcal sltuation at horne, because he bas been away from Slovakia for many years. And yet some people, wbo have become accustomed to serve the Czechs in the in terest of their persona) careers, want to use Dr. Osuský to decelve the western world by claiming that Slovaks are for th e Czechoslovak Republic. These people have already gone so far as to pian a Czecbo-Slovak federation w!th Dr. Stepben Osuský as its first president. They want to explolt the situatlon, because they are reck• oning with a strong pressure on Czech ex!led factors on account ot the problem of the Sudeten Germans whicb especially today, wben negotlatlons are in progress to conclude a peace treaty wlt-h western Germany, ls gaining polltlcal !mportance. It !s believed that Germany, as an im portant factor of lnternatlona!· politics wh!cb sball have extraordlnary slgnificance for the defense ot Europe, shall lnslst on t he exclusion from the ex!led governments, whlch shall arise in tlme, of all those wbo willingly cooperated with Moscow, wbo with their pol!cies Jed their nations into the present situation and are a!so responslble for the brutal expulsion of millions of Germans from thelr anclent homelands. �SLOVAKIA 63 Th!s concerns especially the Czech politicians in exile, who are the bearers of Beneš's old pol!cy, wh!ch always was pro-Soviet and as such evoked many politlcal contentions and dltferences in Europe. The Germans may not want to intervene In the polltlcal affalrs of centra! European nations, but it is natural that they will want to have the nationality questlons in this sector solved at last to the full satisfactlon of the indivídua! natlons. And Germany, as an important European factor, has the full rlght to present these questions to the lnternatlonal forum. Such a development is undoubtedly presupp0$ed even by some people of Lettrich's faction who want to get something for themselves out of the situation, and Dr. Osuský !s supposed to help them in this. The representati ves of sever al families, reallzing their weakness In the naiton, still want to take possession or Slovakla so that they could gain rule there wlth the help of the Czechs. Once in power, they flgure that they wlll be able to proclaim the representatives of the idea of Slovak lndependence as enemles of the Czechoslovak Republic and so prevent their return to Slovakla so they themselves mlght rule without oppos!tlon. But these gentleman are grossty mistaken. The idea of Slovak independence cannot be ltilled and sllenced even by the liquidatlon of the representatlves of Slovak independence. They still can mlslead and deceive the western world for a Ume, but they cannot decelve the Slovak nation any more. If Dr. Osuský wants to have a correct appraisal about the mlnd of the Slovak natlon, Jet h!m come to the meet!ngs of Slovak emigrants in Canada or In the USA, or Jet him visit the European DP camps. Th!s pollcy of Lettrich's people, alas, cannot be called anything but bllnd. Are these people really so non-critlcal that they cannot see the!r own m!stakes and errors? It seems that mora Ii ty and responslb!llty have been excluded completely trom thelr policy. People who created or helped to prepare the bloodiest regime In our hl story, do such people want to return again as Jlberators? Their consclence 1s probably so dead to the reproac·h es and crímes which the natlon shall one time put before them because they are concerned only wlth thelr careers and the regalning of their Jost propertles. Or do they think that their crimes shall not be subject to crltlclsm and judgment? Where crimes have been committed, there must be sought the crim!nal. The people who conducted the politlcs of the Slovak Republlc were placed on tria! by them after 1945, and they certainly did not cause the nation any such suffering as !t 1s golng through slnce 1945. To give these people to the nation as llberators would be as paradoxlcal as if, after conv!ctlng tbe innocent Rudolph Beran, Beneš would have become the leader of tbe Czech Agrarlan Party. These are welghty facts, and very weighty from the standpoint of history and polltics. We present them to Dr. Osuský to conslder whether he wants to Identity himself wlth Lettrlch's polltlcs and represent bis followers before the world and the natlon. It depends entlrely on hlm whether he sball succumb to these people or whether he shall let the decislon in hls own hands. We remlnd that Slovak history is belng made even in emlgration. And there are only two possiblllties: on the side of Š.túr and Hlinka, that is on the slde or tbose who belleved in the Independent future of the Slovak nat!on, �64 SLOVAKIA or on tbe opposlte side - on t he side of the enemies of Slovak inde• pendence. To deny a nat.ion lts right to independence means to deny it even the right of individuality. lťs something llke when Lettricb and Slávik speak aibout democracy, but protest that an opportunlty be given the Slovaks to declde by a democratic expression of will whether tbey want to live in their own state or wlth tbe Czechs In a Czechoslovak Republic. It is clear proof that they fear the will of the nation and want to force their own conceptlon on the nation. Woe, however, to the politician, wbo is afraid of the expression of bis own natlon! The Czechoslovaks often say wishfully that the West wlll not recognize the right of the Slovaks to independence. To this we can only remark thait here the wish is the father of the thought. U all Slovaks today would stand on the correot Slov.ak side and not in the servlces of aliens, this silly question would not have to be brought up at all, because Slovak independence is above all else a matter ot life and death wlth the Slovaks. The Slovaks do not threaten any one wlth it; and it is not an expression of some form ot imperlalism, but an expression of natural rlght. And the Slovaks shall see thls right recognized and respected just because it is natural and democratic and !s, therefore in line with the 1'rinciples expressed in the A tlantic Chaflter by President Roosevel,t and Winston Churchill, as well as in the interest of a unlted Europe, wh ere every nation, large and small, is supposed to be united into a European associatlon as an independent unit. Only a policy which will guarantee all nations equal freedom shall bring Euro))e the long awaited just and lasting peace and weltare. The Slovaks attained autonomy October 6, 1938, witbout the help of people ot the Lettricb type and just so will they attain even the renewal ot their democratic independence. We are thlnklng realist!cally and we are aware of the fact that we are a small nation. But even a small nation has a rlght to live and to live in such an arrangement which best serves its interests. In 1918 we said that our Magyar marriage was unsuccessful and we had to part; and in 1938 we said the same thing about our Czechoslovak marriage. What was natu11al always prevailed. A natural right by which we want to convince the world about the thlnking of the Slovaks is also the plebiscite. Slávik and Lettrich are against a plebiscite, that is against the democratic rig,h t of the Slovaks to determine their own future. It now depends on Dr. Stephen Osuský whether he shall join the one or tbe other side. The Slovaks shall reach their goal, but it depends on Dr. Osuský whether they shall do so with bis help or without lt. • • • W H O SAID IT? WHO SAID IT ? "No polltical party In Slovak•, has taken as sharp a stand against bolshevism as our party. W e are convinced that the antl-communlst movement must be suported b y the whole of Europe, the entlre cultural and Chrlstlan world. At the Ume the Red Army invaded Poland, we defended the Idea that Czecho• Slovakla must hurry to help the Poles wlth weapons In h and and f!ght agalnst bolshevlsm." - (Andrew Hlinka, SLOVÁK, 11-18-30). � 60 SLOVAKIA will see to it that Bentt Czechoslovaks are replaced only by Beneš Czechoslovaks ! Summarlly said, there is nothlng new In the Czechoslovak sky. We are not at all surprlsl•d by the behavlor of the hard-bolled adherents or Czechoslovak centraliem. But we are very mucb surprlsed with the Slovak servants renderlnr. them Jip servlce. Rudolph Fraštackf, a BeneA Czechoslovak, recently rťturned from a European trip and told trlends that among the most recent Slovak escapees he dld not !Ind a slngle one who stands for Cze1.hoslovakism. Slnce these !atest escapees interpret the sentiments ot 1.he Slovaks at horne, we can safely say that in Slovakia, regardless of thelr reli gious or previous political divisiona, the Slovaks almoat to ,1 man are againat the reatoration of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovaks are In a bllnd alley, because they dld not b elieve In slgns of the tlmes. Freedom 1s the watchword, the everlastlng h ope and the ultlmate goal <•f all nations of the earth - lncluding the S lovak nation. FOR DR. STEPHEN OSUSKY'S BENEFIT DR. PETER SKALENICKÝ The more new refugees arrive from Slovakia, so all the more and repeatedly do they confirm the fa<:t that our policy, based in our stand of Slovak independence, is correct. Even these new escapees, often former adberents of former CzechoslovQk political parties, confinn the fact that the Slovak nation not only yearns for lts own independence, but also tbat in Slovakia today no one believes tbat it will be possible to renew the Czechoslovak Republic. Nay, the people at horne do not b elieve tbat responsible people in exile can be found wbo would work against Slovak independence. It ls something natural. Certainly, a nation wh!cb once has had its own state and bas tasted of the advantages of its own independence will never surrender it, and it can be deprived of it only by force and violence. We can look upon tbe origln of the Slovak Republic in any manner that we will, but no one can deny, nor can any one erase from Slovak hlstory tbe actuallty that the Slovaks did have thelr own state from 1939 to 1945, that tbey did bave their own president and tbeir own government, and that Slovakia dirl _appear on the map of Europe as an Independent political unit. It is often said that the Slovak Republic was a satelllte state. Even under sucb circumstances, it was comparatively more than tbe Slovaks had during the first Czecboslovak Republic, or after 1945. 'ľbe president of Slovakla and the government always had more power tban the president of the Slovak National Council (Lettrich) and the commissars had after 1945. tbat ls during the period wben tbe Czecboslovak Republic was already_ supposed to he a federative state. And even thougb tbe cluration of the Slovak State falls into the perlod of war, Swiss newsmen told tbe world that the Slovak Republic was an oasis of consolidated peace and welfare. Tbat was because the Slovaks decided tbeir own affairs In tbelr country. The president of the Slovak IRepublic coulcl grant reprieves to those sen- �SLOVAKIA 61 tenced to death; and he g ranted it in all cases. It serves and it shall continue to serve to the honor of the Slovak President and the Slovak Republic for all times that during its duration no one was e:xecuted in Slovakia by Slovak authorities. But what can be said about the period after 1945? Let us take a concrete case, that of Dr. Joseph Tiso, President of Slovakia. The Slovak Democratic Party, supported by the Catholics in the 1946 elections because they bel!eved tbat, among other things, it would prevent the execution or the Slovak President, did not even have the power to save bis life. Even in that case it was Beneš who had to decide, and declde he did - as he always had done before against Slovakia, on the recommendation of the Czech ministers who again wanted to come to Slovakia as liberators. The perlod from the Banská Bystrica insurrection (August 1944) is and shall remain a sad chapter in Slovak history. Tbis debacle ls the joint property of tbe Communists and the Lettricb Democrats. In the name of the revolution against Naziism they liquidated Slovak independence; in the name of democracy they vied with each other in attesting loyalty to Stalin and the Soviet Union; and in the namt o( humanity tbey built gallows. Today tbe communlsts In Czecboslovakia celebrate this revolution not because it was democratic, but because it was communistic. ll is well, however, that tbe Lettrichites, too, without reservatlons c-laimed and stlll claim it as their own, because thereby before bistory they assume the responsibili,ty for lhe liquidalion of Slovak independence, for lbe mass graves wilb hundreds of corpses, for the bloody verdicts of the People's Courts, for the thousands of citizens who langulshed in jails for long months, nay even years, without belng given a hearing or a tria!, for the torture-chambers of the STB (Securlty l:'ollce), for confiscatlng the property of persons who were not even given a tria! in Court, [or tbe arbitrary looting of churches and schools, for the revengeful police investigations and terror in the whole nation. Tbose are the marks of the politics of the people's• democratic rulers of Slovakia, the symbols of the freedom of the gallows a ccording to which Slovak and world history shall know them. The politlcian might, perbaps, pass over these matters with a heavy sigh In the interest of some agreement, the judge, however, must call a crime a crime, and the historian must record [acts on the pages or history. Today Slovakia has new generations, trained in the spirit or independence - generations wbo are suffering in jails and concentration camps at home. Many of them already have fa!len, but from thelr blood ls bom a new [orce and a new determination for those llving who shall never desert their nation and shall never surrender the right to thelr own lndependence. And abroad, in emigration, Slovakia has hundreds of young people who studied there and thousands of others who are going tbrougb the valuable school of Life. Let them be wheresoever they may, they s hall never s urrender the right to Slovak independence. During twenty years of the Czechoslovak Republlc, Slovaks only in isolated cases rould go abroad to study. Today the people's-<lemocratic regime has afforded them this advantage: they had to flee their homeland before its terror. And the �SLOVAKIA ideals, the bearers of which are especially these young generations, prove to us clearly that thls 1s the cbaln of natural evolutlon of Slovak revolutiona.ry efforts from the tlme of Štúr down to our present limes. We know that Louls Štúr proclaimed Slovak independence al• ready in 1848. Tbe Slovak parliament only sanctioned th!s revolutíonary act of Štúr's in 1939 and thus real!zed what Štúr's generatlon did not have enough strengtb to effect. We are often mistaken by the outslde imperialistlc pressure wbicb hastened the politlcal development of Slovakia. This, bowever, cannot be taken as a denial of the matteľ. If that were so, then tbe nation at home would not yearn !or, and tbe overwhelming majority of Slovak exlles would not work for, Slovak independence. Every nation has a na,tural am.bition to create its own bistory in its own state and, represented by its own state. as an independent factor lt wants to contribule to t he increase ot the cultural values of all hu manity. Tbe Slovaks demand thelr independence because they are ·a natlon with t.heir own bisto ry, language and cult ure, and because they are com• manded to do so by charity to themselves and by a healthy mind. Why there is not a Single natlon in the world tbat would not want to be Independent. Enslavement of one's own nation can be tbe deslre or vengeful, self-seeking, mentally warped and confused lndlv!duals. Let us look upon the matter from whatever standpolnt, Czechoslovak• ism is and shall always remain an expression of nationa\ and persona! inferiority. Let it not be a surprise, then, if we turn our attentlon loday to Dr. Stephen Osuský, the foremost Slovak among a very small group ot people who sl!IJ hold to the Czechoslovak conceptlon. We do t h at because we want to believe that Mr. Osuský wil\ not lend bis name to lmpede t.he efforts of the Slovak nation. For some time now we are gettíng report.s that the political group of Dr. Lettrich wants to solve the present crlsis of the Czechoslovak foreign reslstance wlth the aid of tbe person of Dr. Osuský, who is supposed to become president of the Council ot Free Czechoslovak!a. Dr. Osuský is not famlliar with tbe Slovak politlcal sltuation at horne, because he bas been away from Slovakia for many years. And yet some people, wbo have become accustomed to serve the Czechs in the in terest of their persona) careers, want to use Dr. Osuský to decelve the western world by claiming that Slovaks are for th e Czechoslovak Republic. These people have already gone so far as to pian a Czecbo-Slovak federation w!th Dr. Stepben Osuský as its first president. They want to explolt the situatlon, because they are reck• oning with a strong pressure on Czech ex!led factors on account ot the problem of the Sudeten Germans whicb especially today, wben negotlatlons are in progress to conclude a peace treaty wlt-h western Germany, ls gaining polltlcal !mportance. It !s believed that Germany, as an im portant factor of lnternatlona!· politics wh!cb sball have extraordlnary slgnificance for the defense ot Europe, shall lnslst on t he exclusion from the ex!led governments, whlch shall arise in tlme, of all those wbo willingly cooperated with Moscow, wbo with their pol!cies Jed their nations into the present situation and are a!so responslble for the brutal expulsion of millions of Germans from thelr anclent homelands. �SLOVAKIA 63 Th!s concerns especially the Czech politicians in exile, who are the bearers of Beneš's old pol!cy, wh!ch always was pro-Soviet and as such evoked many politlcal contentions and dltferences in Europe. The Germans may not want to intervene In the polltlcal affalrs of centra! European nations, but it is natural that they will want to have the nationality questlons in this sector solved at last to the full satisfactlon of the indivídua! natlons. And Germany, as an important European factor, has the full rlght to present these questions to the lnternatlonal forum. Such a development is undoubtedly presupp0$ed even by some people of Lettrich's faction who want to get something for themselves out of the situation, and Dr. Osuský !s supposed to help them in this. The representati ves of sever al families, reallzing their weakness In the naiton, still want to take possession or Slovakla so that they could gain rule there wlth the help of the Czechs. Once in power, they flgure that they wlll be able to proclaim the representatives of the idea of Slovak lndependence as enemles of the Czechoslovak Republic and so prevent their return to Slovakla so they themselves mlght rule without oppos!tlon. But these gentleman are grossty mistaken. The idea of Slovak independence cannot be ltilled and sllenced even by the liquidatlon of the representatlves of Slovak independence. They still can mlslead and deceive the western world for a Ume, but they cannot decelve the Slovak nation any more. If Dr. Osuský wants to have a correct appraisal about the mlnd of the Slovak natlon, Jet h!m come to the meet!ngs of Slovak emigrants in Canada or In the USA, or Jet him visit the European DP camps. Th!s pollcy of Lettrich's people, alas, cannot be called anything but bllnd. Are these people really so non-critlcal that they cannot see the!r own m!stakes and errors? It seems that mora Ii ty and responslb!llty have been excluded completely trom thelr policy. People who created or helped to prepare the bloodiest regime In our hl story, do such people want to return again as Jlberators? Their consclence 1s probably so dead to the reproac·h es and crímes which the natlon shall one time put before them because they are concerned only wlth thelr careers and the regalning of their Jost propertles. Or do they think that their crimes shall not be subject to crltlclsm and judgment? Where crimes have been committed, there must be sought the crim!nal. The people who conducted the politlcs of the Slovak Republlc were placed on tria! by them after 1945, and they certainly did not cause the nation any such suffering as !t 1s golng through slnce 1945. To give these people to the nation as llberators would be as paradoxlcal as if, after conv!ctlng tbe innocent Rudolph Beran, Beneš would have become the leader of tbe Czech Agrarlan Party. These are welghty facts, and very weighty from the standpoint of history and polltics. We present them to Dr. Osuský to conslder whether he wants to Identity himself wlth Lettrlch's polltlcs and represent bis followers before the world and the natlon. It depends entlrely on hlm whether he sball succumb to these people or whether he shall let the decislon in hls own hands. We remlnd that Slovak history is belng made even in emlgration. And there are only two possiblllties: on the side of Š.túr and Hlinka, that is on the slde or tbose who belleved in the Independent future of the Slovak nat!on, �64 SLOVAKIA or on tbe opposlte side - on t he side of the enemies of Slovak inde• pendence. To deny a nat.ion lts right to independence means to deny it even the right of individuality. lťs something llke when Lettricb and Slávik speak aibout democracy, but protest that an opportunlty be given the Slovaks to declde by a democratic expression of will whether tbey want to live in their own state or wlth tbe Czechs In a Czechoslovak Republic. It is clear proof that they fear the will of the nation and want to force their own conceptlon on the nation. Woe, however, to the politician, wbo is afraid of the expression of bis own natlon! The Czechoslovaks often say wishfully that the West wlll not recognize the right of the Slovaks to independence. To this we can only remark thait here the wish is the father of the thought. U all Slovaks today would stand on the correot Slov.ak side and not in the servlces of aliens, this silly question would not have to be brought up at all, because Slovak independence is above all else a matter ot life and death wlth the Slovaks. The Slovaks do not threaten any one wlth it; and it is not an expression of some form ot imperlalism, but an expression of natural rlght. And the Slovaks shall see thls right recognized and respected just because it is natural and democratic and !s, therefore in line with the 1'rinciples expressed in the A tlantic Chaflter by President Roosevel,t and Winston Churchill, as well as in the interest of a unlted Europe, wh ere every nation, large and small, is supposed to be united into a European associatlon as an independent unit. Only a policy which will guarantee all nations equal freedom shall bring Euro))e the long awaited just and lasting peace and weltare. The Slovaks attained autonomy October 6, 1938, witbout the help of people ot the Lettricb type and just so will they attain even the renewal ot their democratic independence. We are thlnklng realist!cally and we are aware of the fact that we are a small nation. But even a small nation has a rlght to live and to live in such an arrangement which best serves its interests. In 1918 we said that our Magyar marriage was unsuccessful and we had to part; and in 1938 we said the same thing about our Czechoslovak marriage. What was natu11al always prevailed. A natural right by which we want to convince the world about the thlnking of the Slovaks is also the plebiscite. Slávik and Lettrich are against a plebiscite, that is against the democratic rig,h t of the Slovaks to determine their own future. It now depends on Dr. Stephen Osuský whether he shall join the one or tbe other side. The Slovaks shall reach their goal, but it depends on Dr. Osuský whether they shall do so with bis help or without lt. • • • W H O SAID IT? WHO SAID IT ? "No polltical party In Slovak•, has taken as sharp a stand against bolshevism as our party. W e are convinced that the antl-communlst movement must be suported b y the whole of Europe, the entlre cultural and Chrlstlan world. At the Ume the Red Army invaded Poland, we defended the Idea that Czecho• Slovakla must hurry to help the Poles wlth weapons In h and and f!ght agalnst bolshevlsm." - (Andrew Hlinka, SLOVÁK, 11-18-30). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 60 SLOVAKIA will see to it that Bentt Czechoslovaks are replaced only by Beneš Czechoslovaks ! Summarlly said, there is nothlng new In the Czechoslovak sky. We are not at all surprlsl•d by the behavlor of the hard-bolled adherents or Czechoslovak centraliem. But we are very mucb surprlsed with the Slovak servants renderlnr. them Jip servlce. Rudolph Fraštackf, a BeneA Czechoslovak, recently rťturned from a European trip and told trlends that among the most recent Slovak escapees he dld not !Ind a slngle one who stands for Cze1.hoslovakism. Slnce these !atest escapees interpret the sentiments ot 1.he Slovaks at horne, we can safely say that in Slovakia, regardless of thelr reli gious or previous political divisiona, the Slovaks almoat to ,1 man are againat the reatoration of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovaks are In a bllnd alley, because they dld not b elieve In slgns of the tlmes. Freedom 1s the watchword, the everlastlng h ope and the ultlmate goal <•f all nations of the earth - lncluding the S lovak nation. FOR DR. STEPHEN OSUSKY'S BENEFIT DR. PETER SKALENICKÝ The more new refugees arrive from Slovakia, so all the more and repeatedly do they confirm the fa<:t that our policy, based in our stand of Slovak independence, is correct. Even these new escapees, often former adberents of former CzechoslovQk political parties, confinn the fact that the Slovak nation not only yearns for lts own independence, but also tbat in Slovakia today no one believes tbat it will be possible to renew the Czechoslovak Republic. Nay, the people at horne do not b elieve tbat responsible people in exile can be found wbo would work against Slovak independence. It ls something natural. Certainly, a nation wh!cb once has had its own state and bas tasted of the advantages of its own independence will never surrender it, and it can be deprived of it only by force and violence. We can look upon tbe origln of the Slovak Republic in any manner that we will, but no one can deny, nor can any one erase from Slovak hlstory tbe actuallty that the Slovaks did have thelr own state from 1939 to 1945, that tbey did bave their own president and tbeir own government, and that Slovakia dirl _appear on the map of Europe as an Independent political unit. It is often said that the Slovak Republic was a satelllte state. Even under sucb circumstances, it was comparatively more than tbe Slovaks had during the first Czecboslovak Republic, or after 1945. 'ľbe president of Slovakla and the government always had more power tban the president of the Slovak National Council (Lettrich) and the commissars had after 1945. tbat ls during the period wben tbe Czecboslovak Republic was already_ supposed to he a federative state. And even thougb tbe cluration of the Slovak State falls into the perlod of war, Swiss newsmen told tbe world that the Slovak Republic was an oasis of consolidated peace and welfare. Tbat was because the Slovaks decided tbeir own affairs In tbelr country. The president of the Slovak IRepublic coulcl grant reprieves to those sen- SLOVAKIA 61 tenced to death; and he g ranted it in all cases. It serves and it shall continue to serve to the honor of the Slovak President and the Slovak Republic for all times that during its duration no one was e:xecuted in Slovakia by Slovak authorities. But what can be said about the period after 1945? Let us take a concrete case, that of Dr. Joseph Tiso, President of Slovakia. The Slovak Democratic Party, supported by the Catholics in the 1946 elections because they bel!eved tbat, among other things, it would prevent the execution or the Slovak President, did not even have the power to save bis life. Even in that case it was Beneš who had to decide, and declde he did - as he always had done before against Slovakia, on the recommendation of the Czech ministers who again wanted to come to Slovakia as liberators. The perlod from the Banská Bystrica insurrection (August 1944) is and shall remain a sad chapter in Slovak history. Tbis debacle ls the joint property of tbe Communists and the Lettricb Democrats. In the name of the revolution against Naziism they liquidated Slovak independence; in the name of democracy they vied with each other in attesting loyalty to Stalin and the Soviet Union; and in the namt o( humanity tbey built gallows. Today tbe communlsts In Czecboslovakia celebrate this revolution not because it was democratic, but because it was communistic. ll is well, however, that tbe Lettrichites, too, without reservatlons c-laimed and stlll claim it as their own, because thereby before bistory they assume the responsibili,ty for lhe liquidalion of Slovak independence, for lbe mass graves wilb hundreds of corpses, for the bloody verdicts of the People's Courts, for the thousands of citizens who langulshed in jails for long months, nay even years, without belng given a hearing or a tria!, for the torture-chambers of the STB (Securlty l:'ollce), for confiscatlng the property of persons who were not even given a tria! in Court, [or tbe arbitrary looting of churches and schools, for the revengeful police investigations and terror in the whole nation. Tbose are the marks of the politics of the people's• democratic rulers of Slovakia, the symbols of the freedom of the gallows a ccording to which Slovak and world history shall know them. The politlcian might, perbaps, pass over these matters with a heavy sigh In the interest of some agreement, the judge, however, must call a crime a crime, and the historian must record [acts on the pages or history. Today Slovakia has new generations, trained in the spirit or independence - generations wbo are suffering in jails and concentration camps at home. Many of them already have fa!len, but from thelr blood ls bom a new [orce and a new determination for those llving who shall never desert their nation and shall never surrender the right to thelr own lndependence. And abroad, in emigration, Slovakia has hundreds of young people who studied there and thousands of others who are going tbrougb the valuable school of Life. Let them be wheresoever they may, they s hall never s urrender the right to Slovak independence. During twenty years of the Czechoslovak Republlc, Slovaks only in isolated cases rould go abroad to study. Today the people's-<lemocratic regime has afforded them this advantage: they had to flee their homeland before its terror. And the SLOVAKIA ideals, the bearers of which are especially these young generations, prove to us clearly that thls 1s the cbaln of natural evolutlon of Slovak revolutiona.ry efforts from the tlme of Štúr down to our present limes. We know that Louls Štúr proclaimed Slovak independence al• ready in 1848. Tbe Slovak parliament only sanctioned th!s revolutíonary act of Štúr's in 1939 and thus real!zed what Štúr's generatlon did not have enough strengtb to effect. We are often mistaken by the outslde imperialistlc pressure wbicb hastened the politlcal development of Slovakia. This, bowever, cannot be taken as a denial of the matteľ. If that were so, then tbe nation at home would not yearn !or, and tbe overwhelming majority of Slovak exlles would not work for, Slovak independence. Every nation has a na,tural am.bition to create its own bistory in its own state and, represented by its own state. as an independent factor lt wants to contribule to t he increase ot the cultural values of all hu manity. Tbe Slovaks demand thelr independence because they are ·a natlon with t.heir own bisto ry, language and cult ure, and because they are com• manded to do so by charity to themselves and by a healthy mind. Why there is not a Single natlon in the world tbat would not want to be Independent. Enslavement of one's own nation can be tbe deslre or vengeful, self-seeking, mentally warped and confused lndlv!duals. Let us look upon the matter from whatever standpolnt, Czechoslovak• ism is and shall always remain an expression of nationa\ and persona! inferiority. Let it not be a surprise, then, if we turn our attentlon loday to Dr. Stephen Osuský, the foremost Slovak among a very small group ot people who sl!IJ hold to the Czechoslovak conceptlon. We do t h at because we want to believe that Mr. Osuský wil\ not lend bis name to lmpede t.he efforts of the Slovak nation. For some time now we are gettíng report.s that the political group of Dr. Lettrich wants to solve the present crlsis of the Czechoslovak foreign reslstance wlth the aid of tbe person of Dr. Osuský, who is supposed to become president of the Council ot Free Czechoslovak!a. Dr. Osuský is not famlliar with tbe Slovak politlcal sltuation at horne, because he bas been away from Slovakia for many years. And yet some people, wbo have become accustomed to serve the Czechs in the in terest of their persona) careers, want to use Dr. Osuský to decelve the western world by claiming that Slovaks are for th e Czechoslovak Republic. These people have already gone so far as to pian a Czecbo-Slovak federation w!th Dr. Stepben Osuský as its first president. They want to explolt the situatlon, because they are reck• oning with a strong pressure on Czech ex!led factors on account ot the problem of the Sudeten Germans whicb especially today, wben negotlatlons are in progress to conclude a peace treaty wlt-h western Germany, ls gaining polltlcal !mportance. It !s believed that Germany, as an im portant factor of lnternatlona!· politics wh!cb sball have extraordlnary slgnificance for the defense ot Europe, shall lnslst on t he exclusion from the ex!led governments, whlch shall arise in tlme, of all those wbo willingly cooperated with Moscow, wbo with their pol!cies Jed their nations into the present situation and are a!so responslble for the brutal expulsion of millions of Germans from thelr anclent homelands. SLOVAKIA 63 Th!s concerns especially the Czech politicians in exile, who are the bearers of Beneš's old pol!cy, wh!ch always was pro-Soviet and as such evoked many politlcal contentions and dltferences in Europe. The Germans may not want to intervene In the polltlcal affalrs of centra! European nations, but it is natural that they will want to have the nationality questlons in this sector solved at last to the full satisfactlon of the indivídua! natlons. And Germany, as an important European factor, has the full rlght to present these questions to the lnternatlonal forum. Such a development is undoubtedly presupp0$ed even by some people of Lettrich's faction who want to get something for themselves out of the situation, and Dr. Osuský !s supposed to help them in this. The representati ves of sever al families, reallzing their weakness In the naiton, still want to take possession or Slovakla so that they could gain rule there wlth the help of the Czechs. Once in power, they flgure that they wlll be able to proclaim the representatives of the idea of Slovak lndependence as enemles of the Czechoslovak Republic and so prevent their return to Slovakla so they themselves mlght rule without oppos!tlon. But these gentleman are grossty mistaken. The idea of Slovak independence cannot be ltilled and sllenced even by the liquidatlon of the representatlves of Slovak independence. They still can mlslead and deceive the western world for a Ume, but they cannot decelve the Slovak nation any more. If Dr. Osuský wants to have a correct appraisal about the mlnd of the Slovak natlon, Jet h!m come to the meet!ngs of Slovak emigrants in Canada or In the USA, or Jet him visit the European DP camps. Th!s pollcy of Lettrich's people, alas, cannot be called anything but bllnd. Are these people really so non-critlcal that they cannot see the!r own m!stakes and errors? It seems that mora Ii ty and responslb!llty have been excluded completely trom thelr policy. People who created or helped to prepare the bloodiest regime In our hl story, do such people want to return again as Jlberators? Their consclence 1s probably so dead to the reproac·h es and crímes which the natlon shall one time put before them because they are concerned only wlth thelr careers and the regalning of their Jost propertles. Or do they think that their crimes shall not be subject to crltlclsm and judgment? Where crimes have been committed, there must be sought the crim!nal. The people who conducted the politlcs of the Slovak Republlc were placed on tria! by them after 1945, and they certainly did not cause the nation any such suffering as !t 1s golng through slnce 1945. To give these people to the nation as llberators would be as paradoxlcal as if, after conv!ctlng tbe innocent Rudolph Beran, Beneš would have become the leader of tbe Czech Agrarlan Party. These are welghty facts, and very weighty from the standpoint of history and polltics. We present them to Dr. Osuský to conslder whether he wants to Identity himself wlth Lettrlch's polltlcs and represent bis followers before the world and the natlon. It depends entlrely on hlm whether he sball succumb to these people or whether he shall let the decislon in hls own hands. We remlnd that Slovak history is belng made even in emlgration. And there are only two possiblllties: on the side of Š.túr and Hlinka, that is on the slde or tbose who belleved in the Independent future of the Slovak nat!on, 64 SLOVAKIA or on tbe opposlte side - on t he side of the enemies of Slovak inde• pendence. To deny a nat.ion lts right to independence means to deny it even the right of individuality. lťs something llke when Lettricb and Slávik speak aibout democracy, but protest that an opportunlty be given the Slovaks to declde by a democratic expression of will whether tbey want to live in their own state or wlth tbe Czechs In a Czechoslovak Republic. It is clear proof that they fear the will of the nation and want to force their own conceptlon on the nation. Woe, however, to the politician, wbo is afraid of the expression of bis own natlon! The Czechoslovaks often say wishfully that the West wlll not recognize the right of the Slovaks to independence. To this we can only remark thait here the wish is the father of the thought. U all Slovaks today would stand on the correot Slov.ak side and not in the servlces of aliens, this silly question would not have to be brought up at all, because Slovak independence is above all else a matter ot life and death wlth the Slovaks. The Slovaks do not threaten any one wlth it; and it is not an expression of some form ot imperlalism, but an expression of natural rlght. And the Slovaks shall see thls right recognized and respected just because it is natural and democratic and !s, therefore in line with the 1'rinciples expressed in the A tlantic Chaflter by President Roosevel,t and Winston Churchill, as well as in the interest of a unlted Europe, wh ere every nation, large and small, is supposed to be united into a European associatlon as an independent unit. Only a policy which will guarantee all nations equal freedom shall bring Euro))e the long awaited just and lasting peace and weltare. The Slovaks attained autonomy October 6, 1938, witbout the help of people ot the Lettricb type and just so will they attain even the renewal ot their democratic independence. We are thlnklng realist!cally and we are aware of the fact that we are a small nation. But even a small nation has a rlght to live and to live in such an arrangement which best serves its interests. In 1918 we said that our Magyar marriage was unsuccessful and we had to part; and in 1938 we said the same thing about our Czechoslovak marriage. What was natu11al always prevailed. A natural right by which we want to convince the world about the thlnking of the Slovaks is also the plebiscite. Slávik and Lettrich are against a plebiscite, that is against the democratic rig,h t of the Slovaks to determine their own future. It now depends on Dr. Stephen Osuský whether he shall join the one or tbe other side. The Slovaks shall reach their goal, but it depends on Dr. Osuský whether they shall do so with bis help or without lt. • • • W H O SAID IT? WHO SAID IT ? "No polltical party In Slovak•, has taken as sharp a stand against bolshevism as our party. W e are convinced that the antl-communlst movement must be suported b y the whole of Europe, the entlre cultural and Chrlstlan world. At the Ume the Red Army invaded Poland, we defended the Idea that Czecho• Slovakla must hurry to help the Poles wlth weapons In h and and f!ght agalnst bolshevlsm." - (Andrew Hlinka, SLOVÁK, 11-18-30).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource For Dr. Stephen Osusky's Benefit Description An account of the resource Dr. Peter Skalenický Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952 pp. 60-64 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Skalenický, Peter Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/d2f1074990e473eae739664a31c6a0d8.pdf f041675c17e416258fa64db1b4bc60ee PDF Text Text �SLOVAK.I A is publishecl periodically by the S lonlk Lcaguc of America, a cultui-al and ciYic fedeľati on of Americans of S lovak descent. 'ľhc chief pnrpose of S LOVAKl A is to pľomote a bettcľ nnderstanding and appreciation of the S lovak n ation and its long shngglc for freeclom and ii 1depenclence. As Ameľic·ans, mcmbers of the Slovak Leagnc o:f Ameľica fiľmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all nations, has an inheľent and Gocl-given ľight to freeclorn and independence. 'J 'he,v aľe cleclicated to the cause of the Ameľi<:an way of life, Slovak freeclom ,mel world peace a:1cl are cletermined to oppose the plag-nc of Communism and all othrľ tota litaľi an political systems. Subsc·ľiptio:1 to SloYaki a $1.00 per year in thr F. S . A. - $2.00 else\\·her e. Sencl subscri ptions to : S LO V AKIA Box 150 Mi clcllctown, Pa. --------------------------------Printed in the U. S. A. JEDNOTA PRESS Middletown, Pa. � �SLOVAK.I A is publishecl periodically by the S lonlk Lcaguc of America, a cultui-al and ciYic fedeľati on of Americans of S lovak descent. 'ľhc chief pnrpose of S LOVAKl A is to pľomote a bettcľ nnderstanding and appreciation of the S lovak n ation and its long shngglc for freeclom and ii 1depenclence. As Ameľic·ans, mcmbers of the Slovak Leagnc o:f Ameľica fiľmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all nations, has an inheľent and Gocl-given ľight to freeclorn and independence. 'J 'he,v aľe cleclicated to the cause of the Ameľi<:an way of life, Slovak freeclom ,mel world peace a:1cl are cletermined to oppose the plag-nc of Communism and all othrľ tota litaľi an political systems. Subsc·ľiptio:1 to SloYaki a $1.00 per year in thr F. S . A. - $2.00 else\\·her e. Sencl subscri ptions to : S LO V AKIA Box 150 Mi clcllctown, Pa. --------------------------------Printed in the U. S. A. JEDNOTA PRESS Middletown, Pa. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/51cbb0acbe81cc1074aad64f2bda6191.pdf 3cb71a143f67bad10f423d4eccf3d1ef PDF Text Text �A I' SLOVAKl A is publishetl periodi<:ally by the Slornk Lcag-ue of _\merica, a cultural aml ťiYit ľecleľatio11 of Arneľ­ ic:ans of Sloqtk des<:ent. 'ľhť ľhieľ purpose oľ 8 LOYAK1A is to pľomotť a bcttcľ unclerstancling and a ppľľc-intio11 oľ the ~loYak 11atio11 and its long; :-;tľllg-glť f'oľ ťľeedom and independe11ec. As Arneľic·am;, 1nembPľs of the 3loY.d-: L eague oľ .\ 111eľ i <.:a fiľlnl _Y belieYe that the f-;lornk natio11, just as nll 11atiorn,, has mi inherť11t a11d Gocl-giYe11 right to freeclom and indepenclence. The:v a ľť declieated to thť rnnsť oť the Ameľiean \\'H,Y of' hfe, HloYak fľeedorn nnd \\'Oľld peac·e and are clctcnn.incd to oppose tlw plague of C'ommunisrn and al \ otheľ totnlitaľiai1 politic·nl systems. _\.C'Hľ Subs('ľiption to Slon1kia $1.00 peľ in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewheľť. Sen cl subscľi1itio11s to: SL O Y AK I ~\ Box 150 Middlcto\\'n, Pa. --------------------------------Printed in the U. S. A. JEDNOTA PRESS Middletown, Pa. � �A I' SLOVAKl A is publishetl periodi<:ally by the Slornk Lcag-ue of _\merica, a cultural aml ťiYit ľecleľatio11 of Arneľ­ ic:ans of Sloqtk des<:ent. 'ľhť ľhieľ purpose oľ 8 LOYAK1A is to pľomotť a bcttcľ unclerstancling and a ppľľc-intio11 oľ the ~loYak 11atio11 and its long; :-;tľllg-glť f'oľ ťľeedom and independe11ec. As Arneľic·am;, 1nembPľs of the 3loY.d-: L eague oľ .\ 111eľ i <.:a fiľlnl _Y belieYe that the f-;lornk natio11, just as nll 11atiorn,, has mi inherť11t a11d Gocl-giYe11 right to freeclom and indepenclence. The:v a ľť declieated to thť rnnsť oť the Ameľiean \\'H,Y of' hfe, HloYak fľeedorn nnd \\'Oľld peac·e and are clctcnn.incd to oppose tlw plague of C'ommunisrn and al \ otheľ totnlitaľiai1 politic·nl systems. _\.C'Hľ Subs('ľiption to Slon1kia $1.00 peľ in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewheľť. Sen cl subscľi1itio11s to: SL O Y AK I ~\ Box 150 Middlcto\\'n, Pa. --------------------------------Printed in the U. S. A. JEDNOTA PRESS Middletown, Pa. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/4c7f3780847a7cdbce96718eb7a6328c.pdf 5f17683da3998d3f9912c3a122735e3e PDF Text Text �S LU \ľ AKl A is publisbcd periodica lly by the Slovak League of Arneľica, a eultural and civie federation of Amer1eans of Slovak de::;cent. 1'he chief puľpose of 8 LOV AKl A 1s to promote a better understanding and appreciation oľ thc Slovak nation an d its long shuggle ľoľ Íľeedorn and in dependence. As Arneľicans, memhcľs of the Blovak L eaguc oľ ..\merica firmly bch eve that thc Slon.1k nation, just as all nations, has an inhcrent and Gocl-given right to ľľeedom and independence. 'ľhey ,ne clccli<:atcd to the cause of the Amcrie;an wa)' of life, Slovak freedom and world peac-e a11cl are determ:ined to oppose the plague of C01m11unisrn and all othrľ totnlitaľia11 political systems. yeaľ Subsniption to SloYakia $1.00 peľ in the U. S. J\. - $2.00 elsewhere. 8end subscriptions to: S L OVAKIA Box 150 Micl<lletown, Pa. Printed in t he U. S. A. JEDNOTA P RESS Middletown, Pa. � �S LU \ľ AKl A is publisbcd periodica lly by the Slovak League of Arneľica, a eultural and civie federation of Amer1eans of Slovak de::;cent. 1'he chief puľpose of 8 LOV AKl A 1s to promote a better understanding and appreciation oľ thc Slovak nation an d its long shuggle ľoľ Íľeedorn and in dependence. As Arneľicans, memhcľs of the Blovak L eaguc oľ ..\merica firmly bch eve that thc Slon.1k nation, just as all nations, has an inhcrent and Gocl-given right to ľľeedom and independence. 'ľhey ,ne clccli<:atcd to the cause of the Amcrie;an wa)' of life, Slovak freedom and world peac-e a11cl are determ:ined to oppose the plague of C01m11unisrn and all othrľ totnlitaľia11 political systems. yeaľ Subsniption to SloYakia $1.00 peľ in the U. S. J\. - $2.00 elsewhere. 8end subscriptions to: S L OVAKIA Box 150 Micl<lletown, Pa. Printed in t he U. S. A. JEDNOTA P RESS Middletown, Pa. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/9300c821ed15a55b939dcfcb0256c321.pdf 77429f714a8fae10074b53a07fbd9aa0 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA ·uow FREE lS RADIO FREE EUROPE? BY KURT GLASSER 1- THE VOICE OF F REEDOM IN DOUBLE TAL K In the southeast corner of the English Garden, Munich's Centra! Park, a h andsome new building is being erected. This building, paid for by the voluntary contrlbutlons of millions of American citizens, will house the executive offices and studios of RADIO FREE EUROPE. Medium-wave broadcasts in Czech and Slovak have been started on an lllh•hour schedule, and are beamed eastward by a directional antenna. There are also brief s hort-wave programs in Hungarian, Rumanian and Bulgarian; medium-wave programs in lhese languages are to follow later. Radio Free Europe is a private American station. lt is owned by the National Committee for a Free Europe, and supported through the Crusade for Freedom campaign. 'I'he response to the dramatic '·HELP LLFT THE IRON CURTAIN" posters is gratlfying. Presumably the donors are gratified to thlnk that their dollars are helping to fight Communism. They would not be quite so gratif!ed if they knew what was happening wlth some of their money. Q€neral Lucius D. Clay and other prlncipal figures in the National Committee for a Free Europe are, 1 believe, personally beyond reproach. It would not occur to any norma! journalist to write "m udraking" articles on any activity sponsored by them. lt never occurred to me to criticize RFE until l arrlved In Munich in 1951 and begaµ resear<:h on problems affecting iron-curtain refugees in Western Germany. Quite by accident I sturobled on the fol· Io wing facts: 1. The principal Czechs and Slovaks associated with the National Committee and those employed by Rad io Free Europe are not· - as is commonly supposed - fighters against Communism. Quite on the contrary, they fellow-traveled with the Communists from at least 1939 to 1948, helped them to power, and even today follow a Communist-sponsored propaga.nda line. 2. These individuals belong to an organization which has systematically betrayed members of the democratic underground in Czecho-Slovakia by tipping them off to Dictator Gottwa lďs secret police. 3. A number of Radio Free Europe staff members are either Communist agents or have criminal records. 4. Radlo Free Europe's Czech-Slovak program is helping Stalin by sabotaging international understanding and promoting rivalry and hatred between European peoples. WHY CZECHO-SLOVAKIA COLLAP SED The Czech exile organization associated with the National Committee is the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," beaded by Dr. Peter Zenkl, formerly vice-Premler under Gottwald. This organization, known among exiles as the Benes party, has the inside track in determining who geta jobs in Radio Free Europe and what polic)' the station shall follow. To understand what thls means politically, we �shall have to trace briefly the history of Czecho-Slovakla slnce World War 1. If the American staff óf the National Commlttee had studied this hlstory more critlcally than it evidently dld, it would not bave been duped by Czech fellow-travelers. To begin wltb, there is no "Czechoslovak ian" people, except as one has been dellberately created by the propaganda of the Czech natlonallst partles. The Czecbs and the Slovaks are two dlstinct natlons, witb languages as dlfferent as German and Dutch. T hey can, wltb some effort, understand each o tber and read each other's newspapers. At the end of World War I, when the old Austro-H ungarlan monarchy was collapsing, most Slovaks favored an Independent Slo-vakia. Tbey consented, however, to jolning wlth the Czech s on the 8trengtb of the so-called Pittsburgh Agreement, signed in 1918 by Presldent Thomas Masaryk of Czecbo·Slovakia. This agreement provtded for full equality between Ci:echs and Slovaks and a substantial measure of autonomy for Slovakia within t he framework ot Czecho-Slovakia. The Pittsburgh Agreement was never carried out. Instead, tbe Czech Government maintained centrallzed rule from Prague and discrlminated systematlcally against tbe Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans (who are really German-speaking Austrians). In 1925 Masaryk justlfied tbe denial of Slovak autonomy by stating that tbe Pitts· burgh Agreement was slmply a recommendatioo of American Czechs and Slovaks and, tberefore, not blnding. Only Czech civil servants got tbe best jobs, and tbe Government, first under :'lfasaryk and later under Benes, did ali lt could to promote Czech nationalism and culture al tbe expense of the non-Czech peoples of the Republjc. Tbe result was tbat both the Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans, not to mentlon some 250,000 Hungarians, became increaslngly anxious to "get out !rom under." Tbls fact was made abundantly clear in Lord ;Runciman'5: 1938 report to the Britlsh Government. The Czecho-Slovak Government had not neglected to operate .a ťontinuous, high-pressure public relations campaign io tbe United States and otber western countrles When Hitler demanded cesslon of the Sudetenland in September 1938, the sympatbies of the western world were wholly wltb Czecho-Slovakla, wbich was pictured as an island of peaceful democracy In the sea of fascism. 'l'be fact of the matter was that the country was well along the road to civil war. If Brltain and France had backed tbe Prague Government and had Czecho-Slovakla t ried to figbt, \t is practically certaln tbat the Slovaks, Sudeten Germans and Hungarians would have refused to cooperate. At · the beight of the Munlch crisis, Professor Cernak, Slovak s pokesman in the Prague cabinet, presented Benes wlth an ultimatum demanding agreement to Slovak autonomy wltbln 24 hours, otherwise he would leave bis post in the government. Reluctantly Prague agreed to grant autonomy on October 6, 1938. However, after Munich, in March 1939, the Prague Government deposed Slovak Prime Minister 'l'iso, occupied Bratislava with Czech armed forces and installed a new governmenľ In Slovakia. lt was this interventlon which gave Hitler tbe excuse to march lnto Prague. lt must be admitted that the Slovak Republlc came int~ existence �SLOVAKIA witb Hitler's belp. But tbis did not make it a Nazi state any more t han German aid to Finland corrupted tbe lnstitutlons of· tbaľcoimtry. BENES BECOMES A TOOL OF STALIN · It is understandable tbat Benes sbould have turned to Stalin for support after "tlie Municb debacle. Brltaln and France had, as h e felt, let bim down. The only power wlilch could restore Czecho-Slovakia was Soviet Russia and, it may be added, the only way in which Czechoslovakia with its pre-war boundaries can be held together today is by sheer force. In any case, the "Czechoslovakian Liberat!on Move· ment," wbich was started in Paris and moved to London in 1940. was based from the beginnlng on the pr!ncipie of constant and close collaboratlon with the Soviet Union. As Dr. Peter Zenk l, whose influence today over Radio Free Europe is apparent from the posttion he holds, sald in a speech to th e Temporary :-.ationat Assembly in );ovember 1945: " The nationa lly conscious Czechs and Slovaks have no doubt that in thelr own interest, as well as ín lnľernational interests, perma~ent collaboration with the USSR is neceua ry. Never without the USSR, never against the USSR, always on its side!" The collaboration between the Benes party and the Sovi_ets ' ~ontinued even during the strained relations between the USSR and the Western powers whicb, lasted from September 1939 unt!I Hltler's atiack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. As H ubert Ripka, Beneš' ~Iinister of Informatlon in the LoI)don "Czecboslovak Democratic Government," explained in bis book "East and West" (London, 1944): "Since, in the new situation, it was impossible to collaborate officia lly with the Soviet Union, we ... did nothing whlch might pre. judice or prevent the renewal of cooperatlon at the earliest possible • moment; l need only recall how strongly our attltude contrasted wlth that of .many others during the Soviet-Finnish War. Moreover, even in that period, there was no lnterruption of the personal contacts and exohange of information between ourselves and important Soviet representatives in London, Paria, Washington and elsewhere." The Provisional Czecboslovakian Government, which was ·ftnanced by the British, introduced Jarge ·numbers of "democratic Czechoslovakian refugees," who were in reality Soviet agents. One of t•hese, L.udwig Freund, joined the staff oť the Communist "Daily Worker" at B ritlsh Government expense. Others, such as Messrs. Bieheller, Ohrenstein, Klinger and Steín (none- of whom were Czechs or Slovaks) Joined the staff of the Britlsh Broadcasting Company and prepared t he speeches for the "non-Communist" members of the Czech governme nt. Here ts a s ample of this propaganda: " ... the Ruuian Novemb·er Revolution not only increaaed the strength of the Ruasian Soviet State, it also ralaed to greater heights than ever before the standard of civilization, culture and living, of the wide ma11es of the Soviet peoples.... Bolshevism is a supér.national ideal, an eternal ideal, a human ideal, an ideal whlch has klndled the minds of the noblest of men from the time of Piato and through the· Christian era, through the Freneh Revolution and untll today.: : . Juat as the French Revolution strovť to realize the idea! · of equality." (B. B. C. program of·,November 7, 1942, speech by Mr. Ri1>lfä). · �SLOVAKIA 28 Tbis Mr. Ripka is anotber leadlng f!gure in the "Council of Free Czecboslovakia," wbich has played a leadlng role in tbe selection of Czech and Slovak personnel for Radio Free Europe Benes and bis friends also introduced a number of Commun!st .igents into the U nited States (also disguised as democratic Czecho• Slovak!an refugees) , sneh as the Soviet employee Bension Batt wbo publlshed tbe Czech paper New Y orkské Li sty and a Hungarian Communist Desider Benau, who edited the Slovak paper ("Czechoslôvak daily") called New Y or k ský Denník. Benau is now editor of a Communist dally in Slovakia. In 1941 the KremUn decided that the Benes organization was worthy of recognition as the official Czecho,Slovak government, and iJ1 1943 Benes went to Moscow and formally concl uded an agreement with Stalin. I am not informed as to tbe details or this agreement. but apparently lt provided that the Sovlets and not tbe United States s hould occupy Czecho0Slovakia as well as indicating wbat part!es s hould be allowed after the war. Needless to say, the dominating role of .the Communist Party was assured. II - THE F A K E D E MOCRACY - 1945-1948 As the war drew to a c lose, in late 1944 and early 1945, the Benes Government moved in a body from London to Kosice and then Prague, with a long stop-over In Moscow. While in the Soviet capital, the "Czechoslovak" politicians received exact instructions as to wbat they· were to do wben tbey got horne. Stalin did not want to alarm t be Western Allles by setting up an outright Communist government in P rague while tbe bulk of the Gls and Tommies were stm in Ger• many. lt was therefore decided to use the sy'stem of "bloc politics" (compulsory coalition of several parties) wbich is in vogue in the Soviet Zone of Germany and which General Eisenhower had rejected for the U. S. Zone "since it !s incompatible w!th the traditional American idea of political activity and effective political l!fe in a democratic sense" (New York Times, October 17. 1945). Only the fol lowing part!es were permitted: 1. Communist Part y ; 2. National Socialist (Benes) Party ; 3. Social Democratic (Socialist) Party; 4. The Czec h Cleri ca l Party (Srameťs "Česká Lldová Strana." ). The Agrarian Party and the Small Tradesmen's Party, which had existed b efore tbe war, were forbidden, slnce tbey refused to collaborate with tbe Communists. George Str!brny was sentenced to life imprisonment and Rudolpb Beran (no relation to tbe archbishop) was sentenced to 20 years in 1946 for attempting to organlze "unauthorized" polltlcal parties. Slnce the Soviets were not sure bow the Social Democratic Party would bebave (in Germany it is strongly anti-Communist) tbey suppJied this party with new leaders from Moscow. who elected the Communist Zapotorky as head of the United Czech Trade Unions. To make sure nothing would go wrong, some 200.000 c~ech and Slovak citizens wbo had given evidence of bP.lng anti-Communist were ex<'luded from the 1946 elections on one pretext or another. To cap tbe cllmax, tbe Communist leader Klement Gottwal<l. who had been r arefully groomed In Moscow for the job, was elected Prime Minister. As for the Slovaks, the Sovlets seemed for a time to support Slovak autonomy an<l then cbange<l th~ir minds Tn any case, thP, �iLOVAKIA Slovaks were not a sked what they thought about the matter. Mr. F. A . Voight, the editor of the London magazine "Nlneteenth Century and After," described thc situation in th e following terms: 1-'Czechoslovakia is today a vassal state in a procesa of dissolution. Of the three administratíve areas which compose it, one, Car. patho-Ukraine, has been annexed by the Soviet Union. The second, Slovakia, is independent from Prague but not from Moscow. The quarrel between Czechs and Slovaks seems to be irreconcilable. One has the impression that the Czechoslovak state is today a fiction and that it will never again be a reality. For if one should remove the Russian overlordship, the Czechs could only recover power over the Slovaks by force of arms. And in this undertaking they would cer. tainly be defeated, for they have not a single friend in centra! Europe, whereas the S lova ks have many.... Even in Bohemia and Moravia the central government has but little authority. lt ia a pliable tool of the Russian supervision, with little will of its own. Dr. Benes is the victim of the politics which he has followed for so long." - And this was written not in 1948, bu t appeared in November 1945! ~embers of the Benes group in exile try to pretend that they entered the government In 1945 on the theory that the four parties would operate on a "live and let live" basis. This is straigh t mythology. In the first place, n o non-Communist politicians in their right minds would get together and elect a Communlst prime minister. Secondly, the non--Communlst parties had no polltlcal programs of t heir own. All parties had accepted a common program, the so-called Kosice Program of 1945, named after the city in which it was adopted. '!'he Kosice Program had been prepared in advance by t he Communists and included tbe complete s oclalization of industry ·and agricul• ture, as well as many of tbe ot her measure!< taken slnce 1948 by the Gottwald government. In other w ords, the complete commun!zation of the country had been prepared in advance with t he active collaboration of the Benes party. These collaborators included Hubert Ripka, Peter Zenkl, John Papanek, J. Stransky, Ferdinand Peroutka and a number of others . who are today connected, directly or indirectly, with the National Committee for a Free Europe and with Radio F ree Europe. Most of these National Fronters are enjoying the protection of the United States today; a large number have been provided with jobs on research pro. jects paid for by the Crus ade for Freedom or by the State Department. From the point of view of long-range international politics, the most significant thing which h appened during the period of fake democracy was the expulsion of almost three million Sudeten Germans. Some of t hese people h ad been Nazis. What the post-war Czech government, with the active encouragement of the Soviets, did was to deport the entire German-speaking minortly, regardless of their po. litical attitudes. P eople whose ancestors had lived in the border areas of Bohemla for almost a thousand years we re forced overnight t o leave tbeir horne.s and property and were shlpped in frelght cars to varlous points in Germa ny. Not content with exproprlatlng the Sudetens, an art!on wlthout precedent or justlficatlon In lnternatlonal law, the �ao SLOVAKI.A Commun ist partlsans, with the explicit appro val of Benes and his frien<!s, tortured and -murdered tens of t housands, !ncluding m any Sudetens with antl-Nazi records. Thjs is a hlstorlcal fact, however little lt may be_ k nown in th e Un lted S tates. T he expulslon :was so tho rÓugl;l_ . that. _numbers of n on-Germ an J ews were .deported, slm ply bec,a.u.se .t hey had lndicated "German'.' as thel r Janguage in t he Jast cen's us: slnce Ylddish was . 110.t recognized by. t he . Czech s t atistical authorťties. · · "-T.he Czechs," wrote Mr. Voight, · " have developed the most violent nationallsm. They have adopted a racial doctrine akin to H itler's (with · the difference that the Slava instead ot the .Germans are the Herrenvolk') and _their methods are hard ly difterent trom those of the Fascísts. They ·have; in truth, become Slavic Nazis." The -power behind tll.e expulsions was . r evealed recently In t he Prague Communist paper Rude Pravo (1951, No. 63), wbich edltorial ized as follows: "Thrl>ugh the historical victo ry of the Soviet Union it was possible to i-eorganize our country so as to banish once and for all the dangers stemming from unsolved natlonality problems and from the i;editious propaganda which threatened our first republic. lt ia impossible to overestimate the · historic importance of the fact that a fter a history of a thousand years the expulsion of the Germans has guar anteed the safety of our Fatherland as never before. Our peoples owe undying thanks to Comrade Stalin, who advocated this soluti9n in Potsdam and fought it through against the resistance of the Western powers." . The expulsion o f the Sude ten Germans created a political powder barrel compared to which the Pollsh Corridor before World W a r II was a medium•slzed lady cracker. Germany, whlch lost a large part ot its food-produc!ng terrltory and is populated to the bursting po int, v.iii never wlllingly accept tbe exile ot the Sudet ens. Czecho-Slovakla. on t he ot her ha nd, can hold on to t he Sudetenland on ly so long as she is backed by s uperior military rorce - th a1 of S oviet Russla. The way out of tbe dllemma would be for t he Czechs to make an agreeruent witb the Sudeten Germans pe rmitting them to come back. T hi!I is, ho.wever, exactly what Stalin does not want, slnce a Czech state at peace wlt h Germany and stable wlth ln itself would no longer depend on Russia n support to keep it in existence. F or this reason, Stalln's Czech puppets dld and continue to do every th ing to prevent a s ettlement of the Sudeten problem. The broadcasts of Radio Free Europe conform exactly to this Stalinist pollcý. The Kremlin's pollcy or m alntainlng hatred a t white b eat between the Czech s and the Germans was expounded by Otto Graf, now a member or the political statf of Radlo Free Europe in Munlch, as follows: "lf, in conn~tion with Ge rmans in Czechoslovakia, the -queation of the humanitarian tradltion of the Czech people ia raiaed, then the question is raised in the wrong place. lf lt were aimply that we didn'.t WANT to live wlth the Germans, the question might be justlfled. The fact is, we CAN'T live .wlth them." - ( Svet Prace, Vol. 1, No. 11, September 20, 1945, page 3). Ceskosloven1ke Noviny, the organ of th e Councll or Free CzechoSlovakla, tbe U. S. orga nization of Benes' followers which su ppllee the �SLOVAKIA 31 intelJectual leadershlp for Radlo Free · Europe, put the matter even more blunlly. How's thls for Ch rislian. Brotherhood? : "The Czechoalovak ian emigration knowa well that the new world Ôrder ia only poaaible on the baaia of the equality of all peoples in Eur!)pe. But at the eame time it hear,1 clearly the voice of t~. people a t home, which uttera thia apontaneoua .wi1h: Never to have , to eat at the aame table wlth German1, ever to have to pray_ I!" ·tti.e aame church with them." - (Artlcle by Duben, No. 24, Page 8), Fortunately not all Czech.s are ready to a.ccept Stalln's gospl!l .or liatred. An oppositlon group b eaded by General Prchala, the only Czech general who ever opposed Hitler on the battlefleld, has slgned a compact with the Sudetep GerD)an rep;-esentatio n In Munlch. Thls <:ompact. concluded on August 4, 1950, provldes that arter the Jlberatlon oťCzecho-Slovakla the Sudeten Germans shall be !ree to return to their homes. Therearter both natións shali enjoy equal rights under a federatlve štate.· General Prchala and bis followers i.ilso believed In ~elf-determln ation ·ror the Slovaks. ' ·.• · The policy or the Prchala group, the Czech Natlonal Commlttee, 1s so senslble that tbe Benes party bas not bePn able to thlnk. of a.ny rational argument agalnst it. So they follow the tbreadworn tactlcs or <lenounclng Prchala and his followers as rascists. And wba.t does the American management of Radlo Free Europe clo about the problem or the Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans? lt refuses to discuss lt. As Mr. Grltfith, polJUcal advlser to Mr. J ackson, stated I!) a press conference held on AprlJ 30, 1951: "Men of good will cannot a·IJow them1elve1 to be distracted in attempting · now to answer queations whlch cannot be answered now." Mr. Jackson backed bim up by saying: "The problem of Czech1 and Slovaka in Germany (sic) ·w ill not be diacu11ed on the air on thi1 transmitter." A llttle l:.ter in the conference the followlng interchange took place: "Queslion: Do you have at present the cooperatlon of all tbe main Czech and Slovak political tactlons among the emlgrants? " Mr. Jackson: Oh yes, the answer is yes." Mr. Jackson was evldently mlslnformed. •Radlo Free Europe does not have the cooperatlon of the Czech Nat1011al Commlttee, whlch has as regiatered members some 3,000 of the 12,000-odd Czechs no-w ' llvlng in Germany as well as a sizable memhershl p In Great Brltaln„ Canada, AustraJla, eti;. ~or does lt have the good wlll of the Slovak ~a.~lonjll Councll Abroad, the largest and most conslstently antl-Commun lst organlzatlon of exiled Slovaks .,..... or any representativ e group of Slovak patrlots. The Americans ln chacge or Radio Free Europe may think they are belng neutra!. ActuallY, they are exhlblllng partlsanship or the most vlclous sort, that sort whlch refuses to come out In the open and show lts cards. The resull ls that Radlo Free Europe 1s llkely to antagonlze more people than lt pleases, Jncludlng exaclly those groups which tbe United States should be courtlng as allles In lts struggle against world Communlsm, By following the Benes line and then " refuslng to discuss," the station la by impllcatlon condonlng :Czech ult.a-11atlonll]ism and the b rutal -expuls lon of milllons of -:reNgees. T.bere ls ,iothing tbat Stalin couJd like better. •, �32 SLOVAKIA I II - HOW TO RUN AN ANTI-COMMUNIST UNDERGROUND WITH COMMUNIST AGENTS On February 21, 1948, the "non-Communist" members of Gottcabinet resigned. To analyze just what h a ppened in t he "Gottwald Putsch" would be an involved historical job which I do not wan t to undertake here. Two points, however, a re signif icant: walďs 1. M inisters Ripka, Zen kl , Papanek and Stransky and others who n ow run the Council of F r ee Czechoslovakia and whose policies dominate the Czech program of Radio F ree Europe m ade not even a show ot resistance to the Communist g rab for power. Minister Zenkl spent the whole week-end ot the Putsch at a country house-party comfortably removed trom the scene of operations. 2. The fact that the Kremlin did not consider these gentlemen necessary any more in their previous positions does not of itself make them any less Communist fellow-travelers than they wer e before. lf Stal in should fire Molotoff, wou l d he be any less of a Bolshevi k ? N ot necessari ly. tThe Czech exile V. L. Borln writes ("Against the H angman," London, 1951, page 14) that he th inks t he real reason for th e "reorganization of 1948" was not to consolidate Communist power, since the Communists already had all the power they needed, but to make h!ghpower politlcians available for a razzle·dazzle job designed to confuse the United States and Britain. T h is t hesis is h ard to prove or disprove. lt is, nevertheless, lnteresting that most of the Benes g roup, including all the ministe11s and many "smal\ fry," left Czecho-Slovakia without the sligh test lnterference from the Government. The retiring dignitaries, escorted by several Communist agents traveling incognito, fellow-traveled to the United States Zone of Germany, wbere they announced themsel ves as "democrats" who had tought the good fight and as m artyrs of democracy. Tbey were met witb open arms (and with financial support) by the U. S. authorities, particuarly by certain former Czechs who h ad emigrated earlier and become U. S. citizens, A short whlle later the grou p was assembled in New York, where lt proceeded to promote the American Fund for Czecboslovak Refugees, l ne. (1775 Broadway), roping in such respect• able sponsors as Elleanor Roosevelt, Senator H erb ert Lehman, Dorothy 'ľhompson, etc., etc. Don't blam e these good people too hastily: the American publ ic was so hopel essly misinformed about what had really 1-appened in Czecho,Slovakia that to help the "poor refugees" seemed the natural and human thing to do. In order to be taken seriously, an exile organizatlon has to have an underground movement in the same country. So th e exiled Benes party organized an underground, the principal menib ers of whlch had been selected before Messrs. Zenkl, Ripka and Stransky had ever left Czecho,Slovakla. That it "vas possible to organize an underground at all was due to the fact that tbe Benes party, on the middle and loweľ levels, lncluded a number of people who were sincere democrats ancl an ti-Communists. If you want an effective underground in a dictatorshlp country you have t o pick leaders who are unknown politically. Instead, Ripka, Zenkl and .Stransky picked Mrs. M ilada Horakova, National Socialist (Benes) Party member or Parliament and known anti-Communist; Josef Ne- �SLOVAKIA 33 staval, Jawyer, member of NSP Centra! Executive Committee; Misa Frana Zem inova, First Vice-Chairman of the NSP; Jiri Hej da, econo• mist, member of the State Economic Council. Of the foregoing, all except Hejda were under observation by the Communist Secret Police, a fact which Ripka and his friends must have known if they were not poli tical idiots. In addi tion to these leaders. a set of liaison officers were appointed who were equally suspect, including Zenkľs brother Hudolf and the secretaries of Benes and Ripka. On the first anniversary of Benes' death the exiles asked their friends to mail protests to the U. S. Embassy in Prague. Although these letlers were anonymous, they did serve to tip off the Communlst secret police as to the location of resistance centers. Radio Free Europe is now conducting a similar "give-away" program. Exlled Czechs and Slovaks ,vrite in about themselves and persona) news is broadcast under a "nickname" but with mention of the localities in which the families llve. Several exiles have pointed out to the writer that this procedure is sufficient, in smaller towns, to provide the secret police with very useful information. As a center for making contacts wlth members of the underground in Czecho-Slovakia, Ripka and his friends established an operational headquarters in Frankfurt under the direction of a certain Gen eral Mor avec, formerly hea.d of the "Czecboslovakian Jntelligence Service" in London. This operational Headquarters was and is a key position in the whole structure of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia's under· ground. Jt was and ls tbe German sending and receivlng station for couriers coming back and forth from Czecho-Slovakia. Jts connection with Radlo Free Europe will be discussed in the last chapter. I have heard Moravec described as a well-meaning man without too much political sense. His staff, however, includes or included the following individuals: 1. As principal deputy, D r. Schenk. As a police officlal of Brunn (Brno), Dr. Schenk asslsted In the arranging of the famous Brunn Death March on Corpus Christi Day, 1945, in which tbe entire Ger• man population of that city was forced to march 60 kilometers to the Austrian border. Tbose who straggled were beaten to death. At night the Germans were locked in cement barracks to which Soviet soldiers were admitted for the purpose of raping the women. Between 2000 and 3000 Germans died before the march was over. In 1948 Dr. Schenk, as a "democratic exile," got a job screening refugees for the JRO, where he had the reputation of approvlng only Benes supporters for asslstance. H e then went to work in Moraveťs office where he 1,till is, according to the !atest lnformatlon. 2. M ih ula, a courier between Frankfurt and Prague. Hls travels ceased abruptly in February 1951 when the United States Court ln Hegensburg sentenced bim to 7 years imprisonment as a Communist s py. 3. Rudolf Sima, courier for Moravec and shnultaneously member of the S'I'B (Czech Secret Police). He was recently arrested In Stuttgart and is now in U. S. custody. 4 Schn eeberger, occasional inmate of tbe Valka "Foreigners' Camp" near Nurn-berg. The frequency and overtness with which th!s gentleman crosses tbe borcler has given rise there to the general opinlon �SLOVAKIA 34 that he is also an STB man . .At the time of this writing he was at Jarge in the U. S. Zone of Germany. 5. Satran, well known to emigres as a Prague underworld chai-acter and one-tíme proprietor of "The Spider," a dive used extensively for the exchange of stolen goods. Convictions are reported ·for deallng in stolen goods, pandering and cheating at cards. H e has recently gone to work for Radlo Free Europe but bis Whereaboutli is --strictly secret." 6. Vera Chovancova, Moravec's secretary and girl-friend of a cerLain Marian, W'ho is know.n to be an STB agent. Mornvec also had couriers who were not membe1:s of the Czech 8TB, ho-wever, these dlsappeared at a discouraging rate whlle crossing 1he border, for reasons that are not bard to guess. To meet the prob• lem caused by t.he ensuing persorinel shortage. Moravec's offtce sent letters by the conductors on the Orient Express, which carries through cars from Prague to Ostende. Anyone who knows anything about dictatorships knows that conductors on international traina are alwaya agenta of the secret police. The result of Moravec's efficient operations was that when Gott· walp's .-Communists held their famous espionag~ trials, the state prosecutor had a f-a~rly complete file of all th~--correspondence sent or received by the defendants. Significantly en.o ugh, the record of the trial contained no mention of Moravec or his headquarters, nor did the prosecution introduce a letter which Ne11taval had written, aaking that Ripka be dropped from the organizatio11 for Communlat _c olla. boration. Mrs. Horakova was sentenced to death, Nestaval and H ejda to life imprisonment and slxty-eight year old Miss Zeminova to twenty years at bard Jabor. Wlth this operaťiôn, the democratlc resl11tance in Czechoslovakia, insofar as · lt existed in the Benes party, was effectively liquidated. IV - AMERICA'S LAT.EST PROBLEM CHILO In the selectlon of personnel to pian and carry out its Czech broadcasting problem, the National Commlttee for a Free Europ e relied heavlly on the advice of the CollÍlcll for Free Czechoslovakla. !<'or a whlle, in early 1951, the org_ahizatlon spllt on the quesUon of who was a fellow-traveler, but slnce then, as I understand it, things have tieen happlly patched up. •· ·• The he~d of the entire Czech g·ro~p in ~uni~h is Ferdinand Peroutka, formerly propaganda director of the Natlonal Socialist Party and editor of the newspaper Oi,esek (Today) in Prague. Slnce Mr. Peroutka is responsible for puttlng together a program for w hlch Ámericans are pay!ng and which - in spite of the prlvate ausplces of Radlo Free Europe - 1s frequently taken as representing .Americall pol!cy and opln!on, it is important to know what klnd of democr,acy ~fr. Peroutka advocates. Here are some of his opinions, taken from his book "Talť ·nebo tak" (So or So), published in Prague in 1947: "N ever in history was Russia so mighty, never were the forcea of socialiam so colosaaly forged together. This ls a new hiitorical epoch. Nevertheless some people think in a stick-in-the-ltlUd ' fashion. lt has not yet been possible to convince everyone of the neceísity: of the overthrów'·of 'capitalism_._, __., ( Page 8). �SLOVAKIA 36 "Already in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries it became clear that whoever d.oes not want socialism small must take. it big. You people, who today pr aise this or t hat virtue of capitalism, tell me, how have yo u s olved the social problem . .." ( Page 9. Transla. tor's note : By t he use of. "sma ll" and "big" Mr. Peroutka would seem to identlfy himself with th e Bolshevlkl or "big" socialista, as op. posed to the Mens hevikl or "small" socialista.) " Along the road on which the Russian Revolution passed, there lie the rotting remains of t he unfulfilled pr ophecies of its enemies. This (the revolution: tr.) is a historical impulse a s g reat as the Reformation or the Fre nch Revolutlon, perhaps as gr eat as Christianity•. " ( Page 33) "In our situation resistance against the great work of s ocialízation - open or secret - can only be considered as reaction. In this respect w e need have no doubt who are the reactionaries." ( Page 141 ) '.'Many t lmes we have said, that in this land only one develop. ment is possible, to socialism. Have our activities helped this develop. ment? Or have we obstructed it ? ... lt is necessary for everyone to be able to say proudly : 1 was there, 1 hel ped!" ( Pages 170.171) Mr . Peroutka is backed up by two experts in dialectical materlali~m. Dr. Ziak and Dr. (Berger) Bellak. Dr. Zlak ls the editor of an intelleetual magazlne called Tribuna which 1s forb idden In F rance and ano ther called "Reality" which is forbidden in Switzerland. Unfortunately I have not been able to peruse these journals as I do not r_e ad Czech, but I am told that their basic thesis !s the need for t he party masses to sub mlt to Jeadershlp by the elite cadre. Bellak was formerly a Communist Party functionary in Slovakia under the name of Berger. H e puts out a German-language sheet called "MH!tant Democra cy'" which few Germans read because it takes Stalin's anti• German line. Some of the staff members are left-wing sociallsts, such as J osef Kodicek, who helped put out pro..Sovlet propaganda over BBC durln g the war, and Ma,rtin K vetko. who partlclp ated in a Communist-sponsored uprising In 1S!ovakia in August 1944. Pavel Tlgrld (formerly Schonfeld), Peroutka's asslstant, was for mer editor o f a magazlne called "Lift Culture" and has admltted openly havlng collaborated wlth th e Communists. Some of the lesser personnel are rather interestlng, such as Eva Fischl, daugh ter of the present Czech Communist amb assad or to Eastern Germ any, and Mesdames Kamlerova and Lisa. nov a who were speclalists in inclting riots against the German management of Camp Valka and who ostentatiously exhibited a plcture of Stalln In their room. There is a Mr. Stein, who is reported to be a Communist functionary from the Prague reglon. I do not k now whether he is tbe same Stein whom the Comm unlsts planted with BBC during tbe war. A FEW POl.lCY HEADACHES Tbe fact tbat the Natlonal Commlttee for a Free Europe gave the Benes party free relgn In personnel and pollcy matters for tbe Czech program of Radlo Free Europe h as ralsed a number of thorny problems. Some of these affeet only the station a.od tbe Commlttee. Other~ involved th e basic forelgn relatlons of tbe Unlted States. �36 SLOVAKIA To begin with, the broadcasts have evoked a very mixed reaction. Since the Slovaks in the Benes group {the renegade Slovaks) are those who have accepted tbe premise of a unitary Czecho-Slovak state, .iud since this attitude tends to color the political commentaries, the pro· gram is automatically distasteful to tbe overwhelming majority of patrlotlc Slovaks who are definitely anti-Commun!st. As one Slovak leader put it to me: "they speak our language but they do not apeak our thoughts." So far as the Czechs are concerned, the political orientatiou of the program is likely to appeal only to those who favor the Benes policy of ad vanced socialism bordering on Communism. These people won't find too much wrong with tbe Gottwalcl regime anyway. T he program holds out little hope for the Czech citizen who wants a positive pian for getting away from socialism and Soviet domination. In other words, it simply is not a clear-cut anti-Communist program. 'ľhe most that can be said about it is that it is an antl-the-particulargroup-of-Oommunists-who-Olappen-to-be-running-Czechoslovakia-at-lthe-moment program. It is doubtful whether Americans intended to put their money into financing sguabbles between rival groups of Communists and near-Communists. Another problem is essentially a technical one. The mission of the station requires that it have a good source of news from inside Czecho•Slovakia. At the present Ume, Radio Free Europe is trying to use the Moravec office as a source. Slnce, however, Moravec's only reliable agents {in the sense of getting there and back ) are also agents o( the Communist serret police, •Radio Free Europe is getting only such news as the Gottwald government cares to give it, which isn't too much. The other horn of this rlilemma is that if Radio Free Europe tries to set up its own couriers, the Communists within the Moravec outfit and within its O\ľll set-up can easily arrange for their liguida· tion. At the moment, the station is buying information from whomever will give it, and paying fan cy prices. The result is that enterprising Czechs are cooking up the most amazing stories; and the staff has no way of checking whether these stories are true or not. Even the collection of news material ad boc has run !nto diffiC'ulties. The individual ass!gned to collect news from the inmates ot Camp Valka, one Yaroslav Dvoracek, the leader of the Benes group in the camp is - to break the monotony - not a Communist nor even a fellow-traveler. He is a former member of the Czech Fasc ist Party of General Gayda. Unfortunately Mr. Dvoracck's activities were rudely interrupted on April 18, 1951 by the police. He was in jail, while I was there, awaiting trial on rharges of misappropriating CARE packages and clotbing sent by American friends to the Sokol or camp alhletic organization. On the Political side, the most immediate problem is that the anti-<Sudeten tendencies of Radio Free Europe's Czech-Slovak program are getting the Germans mad as hornets. There have already been !leveral protests by German refugee groups and a formal interpellation in the Bavarian parliament_ It was reported that plans for a formal protest to the United States by the Centra) German Government at I~nn were being consiclered. When I was in New York in March, I attempted to dlscuss tbe problem of German public relations wlth of- �S LOVAKIA 37 ficials of the National Committee and was told, in effect, that since Radlo Free Europe would not broadcast in Germau no such problem wa.s anticipated. The station is, bowever, located in Germany. There are plenty of Sudeten Germans who can understand Czech and .they teli other G.ermans what they hear. Tbere is a public relations problem. If it gets m uch worse the Unit.ed States Government may find it necessary .to do something about it. N EEDED - A GOOD CLEANUP Before going further, I would like to point out that the criticisms ir, this report have been directed solely at the Czech and Slovak actlvities of Radio Free Europe. Nothing said here is intended to refer to any of the other programs, about which I am not informed. It would be too bad if the present fizzle in the Czech and Slovak program oť Radio Free Europe should cause people to ťeel the whole idea s hould be dropped. The pian is a splendid one if carried out properly. Whwt is needed is a thorough housecleaning in which all Communists and fellow-travelers are definitely and permanently f!red. Administration and program planning should be in the hands of Ameri· cans, who should lay down the political pollcy. Personnel investigations should be made by political analysts who know their h!story and are experts in comparative ideologies. In the case of the Czech program, the cleanup won't be easy since it involves the uprooting of a jungle of misinformation, prejudices and vested interests planted by Czech and "Czecho-Slovak" fellow-travelers over a number of years. The bistory of this crypto-Communist inf!uence on the State Department, American universities and the public in general is a wbole subject in itself, which would probably take a Congressional investlgation to unravel. • • • WHO SAID IT ? "There is one tbing we can express and interpret in full. It is the sincere, deep hearty and infinite gratitu'de of all Czechs and Slovaks to the Soviet Union, to its people, its army and its skipper, Generalissimo Stalin, for everything that they have so far done and are stm doing for us. It is the unfalsified, unselfisb and pure feeling of friend• ship and sympathy that we bave for this great, for us so intimate and n eighborly a country. It is the pure joy from the joys of the successes and the progress of the USSR, it 1s the unshatterable hope that Slovanism in its new form will safeguard for itself and for the world a deserved peace, in which all nations antl states shall live their own Jives, freely, without fears, democratlcally and In dignity, in agreement, welfare and happiness. In this spirit from our souls we greet the jubileeing USSR, we congratulate it from our hearts for the results attained ln peace and war. We wish that it keep on prospering, flourishing and growing mighty unto its own greatness, but also unto the welfare of all mankind. Long live the Soviet Union and may its Soviet chief and skipper, J. V. Stalin, in full health live to see many more of its joyous jubilees." - Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, ČAS, 11-7-47. � SLOVAKIA ·uow FREE lS RADIO FREE EUROPE? BY KURT GLASSER 1- THE VOICE OF F REEDOM IN DOUBLE TAL K In the southeast corner of the English Garden, Munich's Centra! Park, a h andsome new building is being erected. This building, paid for by the voluntary contrlbutlons of millions of American citizens, will house the executive offices and studios of RADIO FREE EUROPE. Medium-wave broadcasts in Czech and Slovak have been started on an lllh•hour schedule, and are beamed eastward by a directional antenna. There are also brief s hort-wave programs in Hungarian, Rumanian and Bulgarian; medium-wave programs in lhese languages are to follow later. Radio Free Europe is a private American station. lt is owned by the National Committee for a Free Europe, and supported through the Crusade for Freedom campaign. 'I'he response to the dramatic '·HELP LLFT THE IRON CURTAIN" posters is gratlfying. Presumably the donors are gratified to thlnk that their dollars are helping to fight Communism. They would not be quite so gratif!ed if they knew what was happening wlth some of their money. Q€neral Lucius D. Clay and other prlncipal figures in the National Committee for a Free Europe are, 1 believe, personally beyond reproach. It would not occur to any norma! journalist to write "m udraking" articles on any activity sponsored by them. lt never occurred to me to criticize RFE until l arrlved In Munich in 1951 and begaµ resear<:h on problems affecting iron-curtain refugees in Western Germany. Quite by accident I sturobled on the fol· Io wing facts: 1. The principal Czechs and Slovaks associated with the National Committee and those employed by Rad io Free Europe are not· - as is commonly supposed - fighters against Communism. Quite on the contrary, they fellow-traveled with the Communists from at least 1939 to 1948, helped them to power, and even today follow a Communist-sponsored propaga.nda line. 2. These individuals belong to an organization which has systematically betrayed members of the democratic underground in Czecho-Slovakia by tipping them off to Dictator Gottwa lďs secret police. 3. A number of Radio Free Europe staff members are either Communist agents or have criminal records. 4. Radlo Free Europe's Czech-Slovak program is helping Stalin by sabotaging international understanding and promoting rivalry and hatred between European peoples. WHY CZECHO-SLOVAKIA COLLAP SED The Czech exile organization associated with the National Committee is the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," beaded by Dr. Peter Zenkl, formerly vice-Premler under Gottwald. This organization, known among exiles as the Benes party, has the inside track in determining who geta jobs in Radio Free Europe and what polic)' the station shall follow. To understand what thls means politically, we �shall have to trace briefly the history of Czecho-Slovakla slnce World War 1. If the American staff óf the National Commlttee had studied this hlstory more critlcally than it evidently dld, it would not bave been duped by Czech fellow-travelers. To begin wltb, there is no "Czechoslovak ian" people, except as one has been dellberately created by the propaganda of the Czech natlonallst partles. The Czecbs and the Slovaks are two dlstinct natlons, witb languages as dlfferent as German and Dutch. T hey can, wltb some effort, understand each o tber and read each other's newspapers. At the end of World War I, when the old Austro-H ungarlan monarchy was collapsing, most Slovaks favored an Independent Slo-vakia. Tbey consented, however, to jolning wlth the Czech s on the 8trengtb of the so-called Pittsburgh Agreement, signed in 1918 by Presldent Thomas Masaryk of Czecbo·Slovakia. This agreement provtded for full equality between Ci:echs and Slovaks and a substantial measure of autonomy for Slovakia within t he framework ot Czecho-Slovakia. The Pittsburgh Agreement was never carried out. Instead, tbe Czech Government maintained centrallzed rule from Prague and discrlminated systematlcally against tbe Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans (who are really German-speaking Austrians). In 1925 Masaryk justlfied tbe denial of Slovak autonomy by stating that tbe Pitts· burgh Agreement was slmply a recommendatioo of American Czechs and Slovaks and, tberefore, not blnding. Only Czech civil servants got tbe best jobs, and tbe Government, first under :'lfasaryk and later under Benes, did ali lt could to promote Czech nationalism and culture al tbe expense of the non-Czech peoples of the Republjc. Tbe result was tbat both the Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans, not to mentlon some 250,000 Hungarians, became increaslngly anxious to "get out !rom under." Tbls fact was made abundantly clear in Lord ;Runciman'5: 1938 report to the Britlsh Government. The Czecho-Slovak Government had not neglected to operate .a ťontinuous, high-pressure public relations campaign io tbe United States and otber western countrles When Hitler demanded cesslon of the Sudetenland in September 1938, the sympatbies of the western world were wholly wltb Czecho-Slovakla, wbich was pictured as an island of peaceful democracy In the sea of fascism. 'l'be fact of the matter was that the country was well along the road to civil war. If Brltain and France had backed tbe Prague Government and had Czecho-Slovakla t ried to figbt, \t is practically certaln tbat the Slovaks, Sudeten Germans and Hungarians would have refused to cooperate. At · the beight of the Munlch crisis, Professor Cernak, Slovak s pokesman in the Prague cabinet, presented Benes wlth an ultimatum demanding agreement to Slovak autonomy wltbln 24 hours, otherwise he would leave bis post in the government. Reluctantly Prague agreed to grant autonomy on October 6, 1938. However, after Munich, in March 1939, the Prague Government deposed Slovak Prime Minister 'l'iso, occupied Bratislava with Czech armed forces and installed a new governmenľ In Slovakia. lt was this interventlon which gave Hitler tbe excuse to march lnto Prague. lt must be admitted that the Slovak Republlc came int~ existence �SLOVAKIA witb Hitler's belp. But tbis did not make it a Nazi state any more t han German aid to Finland corrupted tbe lnstitutlons of· tbaľcoimtry. BENES BECOMES A TOOL OF STALIN · It is understandable tbat Benes sbould have turned to Stalin for support after "tlie Municb debacle. Brltaln and France had, as h e felt, let bim down. The only power wlilch could restore Czecho-Slovakia was Soviet Russia and, it may be added, the only way in which Czechoslovakia with its pre-war boundaries can be held together today is by sheer force. In any case, the "Czechoslovakian Liberat!on Move· ment," wbich was started in Paris and moved to London in 1940. was based from the beginnlng on the pr!ncipie of constant and close collaboratlon with the Soviet Union. As Dr. Peter Zenk l, whose influence today over Radio Free Europe is apparent from the posttion he holds, sald in a speech to th e Temporary :-.ationat Assembly in );ovember 1945: " The nationa lly conscious Czechs and Slovaks have no doubt that in thelr own interest, as well as ín lnľernational interests, perma~ent collaboration with the USSR is neceua ry. Never without the USSR, never against the USSR, always on its side!" The collaboration between the Benes party and the Sovi_ets ' ~ontinued even during the strained relations between the USSR and the Western powers whicb, lasted from September 1939 unt!I Hltler's atiack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. As H ubert Ripka, Beneš' ~Iinister of Informatlon in the LoI)don "Czecboslovak Democratic Government," explained in bis book "East and West" (London, 1944): "Since, in the new situation, it was impossible to collaborate officia lly with the Soviet Union, we ... did nothing whlch might pre. judice or prevent the renewal of cooperatlon at the earliest possible • moment; l need only recall how strongly our attltude contrasted wlth that of .many others during the Soviet-Finnish War. Moreover, even in that period, there was no lnterruption of the personal contacts and exohange of information between ourselves and important Soviet representatives in London, Paria, Washington and elsewhere." The Provisional Czecboslovakian Government, which was ·ftnanced by the British, introduced Jarge ·numbers of "democratic Czechoslovakian refugees," who were in reality Soviet agents. One of t•hese, L.udwig Freund, joined the staff oť the Communist "Daily Worker" at B ritlsh Government expense. Others, such as Messrs. Bieheller, Ohrenstein, Klinger and Steín (none- of whom were Czechs or Slovaks) Joined the staff of the Britlsh Broadcasting Company and prepared t he speeches for the "non-Communist" members of the Czech governme nt. Here ts a s ample of this propaganda: " ... the Ruuian Novemb·er Revolution not only increaaed the strength of the Ruasian Soviet State, it also ralaed to greater heights than ever before the standard of civilization, culture and living, of the wide ma11es of the Soviet peoples.... Bolshevism is a supér.national ideal, an eternal ideal, a human ideal, an ideal whlch has klndled the minds of the noblest of men from the time of Piato and through the· Christian era, through the Freneh Revolution and untll today.: : . Juat as the French Revolution strovť to realize the idea! · of equality." (B. B. C. program of·,November 7, 1942, speech by Mr. Ri1>lfä). · �SLOVAKIA 28 Tbis Mr. Ripka is anotber leadlng f!gure in the "Council of Free Czecboslovakia," wbich has played a leadlng role in tbe selection of Czech and Slovak personnel for Radio Free Europe Benes and bis friends also introduced a number of Commun!st .igents into the U nited States (also disguised as democratic Czecho• Slovak!an refugees) , sneh as the Soviet employee Bension Batt wbo publlshed tbe Czech paper New Y orkské Li sty and a Hungarian Communist Desider Benau, who edited the Slovak paper ("Czechoslôvak daily") called New Y or k ský Denník. Benau is now editor of a Communist dally in Slovakia. In 1941 the KremUn decided that the Benes organization was worthy of recognition as the official Czecho,Slovak government, and iJ1 1943 Benes went to Moscow and formally concl uded an agreement with Stalin. I am not informed as to tbe details or this agreement. but apparently lt provided that the Sovlets and not tbe United States s hould occupy Czecho0Slovakia as well as indicating wbat part!es s hould be allowed after the war. Needless to say, the dominating role of .the Communist Party was assured. II - THE F A K E D E MOCRACY - 1945-1948 As the war drew to a c lose, in late 1944 and early 1945, the Benes Government moved in a body from London to Kosice and then Prague, with a long stop-over In Moscow. While in the Soviet capital, the "Czechoslovak" politicians received exact instructions as to wbat they· were to do wben tbey got horne. Stalin did not want to alarm t be Western Allles by setting up an outright Communist government in P rague while tbe bulk of the Gls and Tommies were stm in Ger• many. lt was therefore decided to use the sy'stem of "bloc politics" (compulsory coalition of several parties) wbich is in vogue in the Soviet Zone of Germany and which General Eisenhower had rejected for the U. S. Zone "since it !s incompatible w!th the traditional American idea of political activity and effective political l!fe in a democratic sense" (New York Times, October 17. 1945). Only the fol lowing part!es were permitted: 1. Communist Part y ; 2. National Socialist (Benes) Party ; 3. Social Democratic (Socialist) Party; 4. The Czec h Cleri ca l Party (Srameťs "Česká Lldová Strana." ). The Agrarian Party and the Small Tradesmen's Party, which had existed b efore tbe war, were forbidden, slnce tbey refused to collaborate with tbe Communists. George Str!brny was sentenced to life imprisonment and Rudolpb Beran (no relation to tbe archbishop) was sentenced to 20 years in 1946 for attempting to organlze "unauthorized" polltlcal parties. Slnce the Soviets were not sure bow the Social Democratic Party would bebave (in Germany it is strongly anti-Communist) tbey suppJied this party with new leaders from Moscow. who elected the Communist Zapotorky as head of the United Czech Trade Unions. To make sure nothing would go wrong, some 200.000 c~ech and Slovak citizens wbo had given evidence of bP.lng anti-Communist were ex<'luded from the 1946 elections on one pretext or another. To cap tbe cllmax, tbe Communist leader Klement Gottwal<l. who had been r arefully groomed In Moscow for the job, was elected Prime Minister. As for the Slovaks, the Sovlets seemed for a time to support Slovak autonomy an<l then cbange<l th~ir minds Tn any case, thP, �iLOVAKIA Slovaks were not a sked what they thought about the matter. Mr. F. A . Voight, the editor of the London magazine "Nlneteenth Century and After," described thc situation in th e following terms: 1-'Czechoslovakia is today a vassal state in a procesa of dissolution. Of the three administratíve areas which compose it, one, Car. patho-Ukraine, has been annexed by the Soviet Union. The second, Slovakia, is independent from Prague but not from Moscow. The quarrel between Czechs and Slovaks seems to be irreconcilable. One has the impression that the Czechoslovak state is today a fiction and that it will never again be a reality. For if one should remove the Russian overlordship, the Czechs could only recover power over the Slovaks by force of arms. And in this undertaking they would cer. tainly be defeated, for they have not a single friend in centra! Europe, whereas the S lova ks have many.... Even in Bohemia and Moravia the central government has but little authority. lt ia a pliable tool of the Russian supervision, with little will of its own. Dr. Benes is the victim of the politics which he has followed for so long." - And this was written not in 1948, bu t appeared in November 1945! ~embers of the Benes group in exile try to pretend that they entered the government In 1945 on the theory that the four parties would operate on a "live and let live" basis. This is straigh t mythology. In the first place, n o non-Communist politicians in their right minds would get together and elect a Communlst prime minister. Secondly, the non--Communlst parties had no polltlcal programs of t heir own. All parties had accepted a common program, the so-called Kosice Program of 1945, named after the city in which it was adopted. '!'he Kosice Program had been prepared in advance by t he Communists and included tbe complete s oclalization of industry ·and agricul• ture, as well as many of tbe ot her measure!< taken slnce 1948 by the Gottwald government. In other w ords, the complete commun!zation of the country had been prepared in advance with t he active collaboration of the Benes party. These collaborators included Hubert Ripka, Peter Zenkl, John Papanek, J. Stransky, Ferdinand Peroutka and a number of others . who are today connected, directly or indirectly, with the National Committee for a Free Europe and with Radio F ree Europe. Most of these National Fronters are enjoying the protection of the United States today; a large number have been provided with jobs on research pro. jects paid for by the Crus ade for Freedom or by the State Department. From the point of view of long-range international politics, the most significant thing which h appened during the period of fake democracy was the expulsion of almost three million Sudeten Germans. Some of t hese people h ad been Nazis. What the post-war Czech government, with the active encouragement of the Soviets, did was to deport the entire German-speaking minortly, regardless of their po. litical attitudes. P eople whose ancestors had lived in the border areas of Bohemla for almost a thousand years we re forced overnight t o leave tbeir horne.s and property and were shlpped in frelght cars to varlous points in Germa ny. Not content with exproprlatlng the Sudetens, an art!on wlthout precedent or justlficatlon In lnternatlonal law, the �ao SLOVAKI.A Commun ist partlsans, with the explicit appro val of Benes and his frien<!s, tortured and -murdered tens of t housands, !ncluding m any Sudetens with antl-Nazi records. Thjs is a hlstorlcal fact, however little lt may be_ k nown in th e Un lted S tates. T he expulslon :was so tho rÓugl;l_ . that. _numbers of n on-Germ an J ews were .deported, slm ply bec,a.u.se .t hey had lndicated "German'.' as thel r Janguage in t he Jast cen's us: slnce Ylddish was . 110.t recognized by. t he . Czech s t atistical authorťties. · · "-T.he Czechs," wrote Mr. Voight, · " have developed the most violent nationallsm. They have adopted a racial doctrine akin to H itler's (with · the difference that the Slava instead ot the .Germans are the Herrenvolk') and _their methods are hard ly difterent trom those of the Fascísts. They ·have; in truth, become Slavic Nazis." The -power behind tll.e expulsions was . r evealed recently In t he Prague Communist paper Rude Pravo (1951, No. 63), wbich edltorial ized as follows: "Thrl>ugh the historical victo ry of the Soviet Union it was possible to i-eorganize our country so as to banish once and for all the dangers stemming from unsolved natlonality problems and from the i;editious propaganda which threatened our first republic. lt ia impossible to overestimate the · historic importance of the fact that a fter a history of a thousand years the expulsion of the Germans has guar anteed the safety of our Fatherland as never before. Our peoples owe undying thanks to Comrade Stalin, who advocated this soluti9n in Potsdam and fought it through against the resistance of the Western powers." . The expulsion o f the Sude ten Germans created a political powder barrel compared to which the Pollsh Corridor before World W a r II was a medium•slzed lady cracker. Germany, whlch lost a large part ot its food-produc!ng terrltory and is populated to the bursting po int, v.iii never wlllingly accept tbe exile ot the Sudet ens. Czecho-Slovakla. on t he ot her ha nd, can hold on to t he Sudetenland on ly so long as she is backed by s uperior military rorce - th a1 of S oviet Russla. The way out of tbe dllemma would be for t he Czechs to make an agreeruent witb the Sudeten Germans pe rmitting them to come back. T hi!I is, ho.wever, exactly what Stalin does not want, slnce a Czech state at peace wlt h Germany and stable wlth ln itself would no longer depend on Russia n support to keep it in existence. F or this reason, Stalln's Czech puppets dld and continue to do every th ing to prevent a s ettlement of the Sudeten problem. The broadcasts of Radio Free Europe conform exactly to this Stalinist pollcý. The Kremlin's pollcy or m alntainlng hatred a t white b eat between the Czech s and the Germans was expounded by Otto Graf, now a member or the political statf of Radlo Free Europe in Munlch, as follows: "lf, in conn~tion with Ge rmans in Czechoslovakia, the -queation of the humanitarian tradltion of the Czech people ia raiaed, then the question is raised in the wrong place. lf lt were aimply that we didn'.t WANT to live wlth the Germans, the question might be justlfled. The fact is, we CAN'T live .wlth them." - ( Svet Prace, Vol. 1, No. 11, September 20, 1945, page 3). Ceskosloven1ke Noviny, the organ of th e Councll or Free CzechoSlovakla, tbe U. S. orga nization of Benes' followers which su ppllee the �SLOVAKIA 31 intelJectual leadershlp for Radlo Free · Europe, put the matter even more blunlly. How's thls for Ch rislian. Brotherhood? : "The Czechoalovak ian emigration knowa well that the new world Ôrder ia only poaaible on the baaia of the equality of all peoples in Eur!)pe. But at the eame time it hear,1 clearly the voice of t~. people a t home, which uttera thia apontaneoua .wi1h: Never to have , to eat at the aame table wlth German1, ever to have to pray_ I!" ·tti.e aame church with them." - (Artlcle by Duben, No. 24, Page 8), Fortunately not all Czech.s are ready to a.ccept Stalln's gospl!l .or liatred. An oppositlon group b eaded by General Prchala, the only Czech general who ever opposed Hitler on the battlefleld, has slgned a compact with the Sudetep GerD)an rep;-esentatio n In Munlch. Thls <:ompact. concluded on August 4, 1950, provldes that arter the Jlberatlon oťCzecho-Slovakla the Sudeten Germans shall be !ree to return to their homes. Therearter both natións shali enjoy equal rights under a federatlve štate.· General Prchala and bis followers i.ilso believed In ~elf-determln ation ·ror the Slovaks. ' ·.• · The policy or the Prchala group, the Czech Natlonal Commlttee, 1s so senslble that tbe Benes party bas not bePn able to thlnk. of a.ny rational argument agalnst it. So they follow the tbreadworn tactlcs or <lenounclng Prchala and his followers as rascists. And wba.t does the American management of Radlo Free Europe clo about the problem or the Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans? lt refuses to discuss lt. As Mr. Grltfith, polJUcal advlser to Mr. J ackson, stated I!) a press conference held on AprlJ 30, 1951: "Men of good will cannot a·IJow them1elve1 to be distracted in attempting · now to answer queations whlch cannot be answered now." Mr. Jackson backed bim up by saying: "The problem of Czech1 and Slovaka in Germany (sic) ·w ill not be diacu11ed on the air on thi1 transmitter." A llttle l:.ter in the conference the followlng interchange took place: "Queslion: Do you have at present the cooperatlon of all tbe main Czech and Slovak political tactlons among the emlgrants? " Mr. Jackson: Oh yes, the answer is yes." Mr. Jackson was evldently mlslnformed. •Radlo Free Europe does not have the cooperatlon of the Czech Nat1011al Commlttee, whlch has as regiatered members some 3,000 of the 12,000-odd Czechs no-w ' llvlng in Germany as well as a sizable memhershl p In Great Brltaln„ Canada, AustraJla, eti;. ~or does lt have the good wlll of the Slovak ~a.~lonjll Councll Abroad, the largest and most conslstently antl-Commun lst organlzatlon of exiled Slovaks .,..... or any representativ e group of Slovak patrlots. The Americans ln chacge or Radio Free Europe may think they are belng neutra!. ActuallY, they are exhlblllng partlsanship or the most vlclous sort, that sort whlch refuses to come out In the open and show lts cards. The resull ls that Radlo Free Europe 1s llkely to antagonlze more people than lt pleases, Jncludlng exaclly those groups which tbe United States should be courtlng as allles In lts struggle against world Communlsm, By following the Benes line and then " refuslng to discuss," the station la by impllcatlon condonlng :Czech ult.a-11atlonll]ism and the b rutal -expuls lon of milllons of -:reNgees. T.bere ls ,iothing tbat Stalin couJd like better. •, �32 SLOVAKIA I II - HOW TO RUN AN ANTI-COMMUNIST UNDERGROUND WITH COMMUNIST AGENTS On February 21, 1948, the "non-Communist" members of Gottcabinet resigned. To analyze just what h a ppened in t he "Gottwald Putsch" would be an involved historical job which I do not wan t to undertake here. Two points, however, a re signif icant: walďs 1. M inisters Ripka, Zen kl , Papanek and Stransky and others who n ow run the Council of F r ee Czechoslovakia and whose policies dominate the Czech program of Radio F ree Europe m ade not even a show ot resistance to the Communist g rab for power. Minister Zenkl spent the whole week-end ot the Putsch at a country house-party comfortably removed trom the scene of operations. 2. The fact that the Kremlin did not consider these gentlemen necessary any more in their previous positions does not of itself make them any less Communist fellow-travelers than they wer e before. lf Stal in should fire Molotoff, wou l d he be any less of a Bolshevi k ? N ot necessari ly. tThe Czech exile V. L. Borln writes ("Against the H angman," London, 1951, page 14) that he th inks t he real reason for th e "reorganization of 1948" was not to consolidate Communist power, since the Communists already had all the power they needed, but to make h!ghpower politlcians available for a razzle·dazzle job designed to confuse the United States and Britain. T h is t hesis is h ard to prove or disprove. lt is, nevertheless, lnteresting that most of the Benes g roup, including all the ministe11s and many "smal\ fry," left Czecho-Slovakia without the sligh test lnterference from the Government. The retiring dignitaries, escorted by several Communist agents traveling incognito, fellow-traveled to the United States Zone of Germany, wbere they announced themsel ves as "democrats" who had tought the good fight and as m artyrs of democracy. Tbey were met witb open arms (and with financial support) by the U. S. authorities, particuarly by certain former Czechs who h ad emigrated earlier and become U. S. citizens, A short whlle later the grou p was assembled in New York, where lt proceeded to promote the American Fund for Czecboslovak Refugees, l ne. (1775 Broadway), roping in such respect• able sponsors as Elleanor Roosevelt, Senator H erb ert Lehman, Dorothy 'ľhompson, etc., etc. Don't blam e these good people too hastily: the American publ ic was so hopel essly misinformed about what had really 1-appened in Czecho,Slovakia that to help the "poor refugees" seemed the natural and human thing to do. In order to be taken seriously, an exile organizatlon has to have an underground movement in the same country. So th e exiled Benes party organized an underground, the principal menib ers of whlch had been selected before Messrs. Zenkl, Ripka and Stransky had ever left Czecho,Slovakla. That it "vas possible to organize an underground at all was due to the fact that tbe Benes party, on the middle and loweľ levels, lncluded a number of people who were sincere democrats ancl an ti-Communists. If you want an effective underground in a dictatorshlp country you have t o pick leaders who are unknown politically. Instead, Ripka, Zenkl and .Stransky picked Mrs. M ilada Horakova, National Socialist (Benes) Party member or Parliament and known anti-Communist; Josef Ne- �SLOVAKIA 33 staval, Jawyer, member of NSP Centra! Executive Committee; Misa Frana Zem inova, First Vice-Chairman of the NSP; Jiri Hej da, econo• mist, member of the State Economic Council. Of the foregoing, all except Hejda were under observation by the Communist Secret Police, a fact which Ripka and his friends must have known if they were not poli tical idiots. In addi tion to these leaders. a set of liaison officers were appointed who were equally suspect, including Zenkľs brother Hudolf and the secretaries of Benes and Ripka. On the first anniversary of Benes' death the exiles asked their friends to mail protests to the U. S. Embassy in Prague. Although these letlers were anonymous, they did serve to tip off the Communlst secret police as to the location of resistance centers. Radio Free Europe is now conducting a similar "give-away" program. Exlled Czechs and Slovaks ,vrite in about themselves and persona) news is broadcast under a "nickname" but with mention of the localities in which the families llve. Several exiles have pointed out to the writer that this procedure is sufficient, in smaller towns, to provide the secret police with very useful information. As a center for making contacts wlth members of the underground in Czecho-Slovakia, Ripka and his friends established an operational headquarters in Frankfurt under the direction of a certain Gen eral Mor avec, formerly hea.d of the "Czecboslovakian Jntelligence Service" in London. This operational Headquarters was and is a key position in the whole structure of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia's under· ground. Jt was and ls tbe German sending and receivlng station for couriers coming back and forth from Czecho-Slovakia. Jts connection with Radlo Free Europe will be discussed in the last chapter. I have heard Moravec described as a well-meaning man without too much political sense. His staff, however, includes or included the following individuals: 1. As principal deputy, D r. Schenk. As a police officlal of Brunn (Brno), Dr. Schenk asslsted In the arranging of the famous Brunn Death March on Corpus Christi Day, 1945, in which tbe entire Ger• man population of that city was forced to march 60 kilometers to the Austrian border. Tbose who straggled were beaten to death. At night the Germans were locked in cement barracks to which Soviet soldiers were admitted for the purpose of raping the women. Between 2000 and 3000 Germans died before the march was over. In 1948 Dr. Schenk, as a "democratic exile," got a job screening refugees for the JRO, where he had the reputation of approvlng only Benes supporters for asslstance. H e then went to work in Moraveťs office where he 1,till is, according to the !atest lnformatlon. 2. M ih ula, a courier between Frankfurt and Prague. Hls travels ceased abruptly in February 1951 when the United States Court ln Hegensburg sentenced bim to 7 years imprisonment as a Communist s py. 3. Rudolf Sima, courier for Moravec and shnultaneously member of the S'I'B (Czech Secret Police). He was recently arrested In Stuttgart and is now in U. S. custody. 4 Schn eeberger, occasional inmate of tbe Valka "Foreigners' Camp" near Nurn-berg. The frequency and overtness with which th!s gentleman crosses tbe borcler has given rise there to the general opinlon �SLOVAKIA 34 that he is also an STB man . .At the time of this writing he was at Jarge in the U. S. Zone of Germany. 5. Satran, well known to emigres as a Prague underworld chai-acter and one-tíme proprietor of "The Spider," a dive used extensively for the exchange of stolen goods. Convictions are reported ·for deallng in stolen goods, pandering and cheating at cards. H e has recently gone to work for Radlo Free Europe but bis Whereaboutli is --strictly secret." 6. Vera Chovancova, Moravec's secretary and girl-friend of a cerLain Marian, W'ho is know.n to be an STB agent. Mornvec also had couriers who were not membe1:s of the Czech 8TB, ho-wever, these dlsappeared at a discouraging rate whlle crossing 1he border, for reasons that are not bard to guess. To meet the prob• lem caused by t.he ensuing persorinel shortage. Moravec's offtce sent letters by the conductors on the Orient Express, which carries through cars from Prague to Ostende. Anyone who knows anything about dictatorships knows that conductors on international traina are alwaya agenta of the secret police. The result of Moravec's efficient operations was that when Gott· walp's .-Communists held their famous espionag~ trials, the state prosecutor had a f-a~rly complete file of all th~--correspondence sent or received by the defendants. Significantly en.o ugh, the record of the trial contained no mention of Moravec or his headquarters, nor did the prosecution introduce a letter which Ne11taval had written, aaking that Ripka be dropped from the organizatio11 for Communlat _c olla. boration. Mrs. Horakova was sentenced to death, Nestaval and H ejda to life imprisonment and slxty-eight year old Miss Zeminova to twenty years at bard Jabor. Wlth this operaťiôn, the democratlc resl11tance in Czechoslovakia, insofar as · lt existed in the Benes party, was effectively liquidated. IV - AMERICA'S LAT.EST PROBLEM CHILO In the selectlon of personnel to pian and carry out its Czech broadcasting problem, the National Commlttee for a Free Europ e relied heavlly on the advice of the CollÍlcll for Free Czechoslovakla. !<'or a whlle, in early 1951, the org_ahizatlon spllt on the quesUon of who was a fellow-traveler, but slnce then, as I understand it, things have tieen happlly patched up. •· ·• The he~d of the entire Czech g·ro~p in ~uni~h is Ferdinand Peroutka, formerly propaganda director of the Natlonal Socialist Party and editor of the newspaper Oi,esek (Today) in Prague. Slnce Mr. Peroutka is responsible for puttlng together a program for w hlch Ámericans are pay!ng and which - in spite of the prlvate ausplces of Radlo Free Europe - 1s frequently taken as representing .Americall pol!cy and opln!on, it is important to know what klnd of democr,acy ~fr. Peroutka advocates. Here are some of his opinions, taken from his book "Talť ·nebo tak" (So or So), published in Prague in 1947: "N ever in history was Russia so mighty, never were the forcea of socialiam so colosaaly forged together. This ls a new hiitorical epoch. Nevertheless some people think in a stick-in-the-ltlUd ' fashion. lt has not yet been possible to convince everyone of the neceísity: of the overthrów'·of 'capitalism_._, __., ( Page 8). �SLOVAKIA 36 "Already in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries it became clear that whoever d.oes not want socialism small must take. it big. You people, who today pr aise this or t hat virtue of capitalism, tell me, how have yo u s olved the social problem . .." ( Page 9. Transla. tor's note : By t he use of. "sma ll" and "big" Mr. Peroutka would seem to identlfy himself with th e Bolshevlkl or "big" socialista, as op. posed to the Mens hevikl or "small" socialista.) " Along the road on which the Russian Revolution passed, there lie the rotting remains of t he unfulfilled pr ophecies of its enemies. This (the revolution: tr.) is a historical impulse a s g reat as the Reformation or the Fre nch Revolutlon, perhaps as gr eat as Christianity•. " ( Page 33) "In our situation resistance against the great work of s ocialízation - open or secret - can only be considered as reaction. In this respect w e need have no doubt who are the reactionaries." ( Page 141 ) '.'Many t lmes we have said, that in this land only one develop. ment is possible, to socialism. Have our activities helped this develop. ment? Or have we obstructed it ? ... lt is necessary for everyone to be able to say proudly : 1 was there, 1 hel ped!" ( Pages 170.171) Mr . Peroutka is backed up by two experts in dialectical materlali~m. Dr. Ziak and Dr. (Berger) Bellak. Dr. Zlak ls the editor of an intelleetual magazlne called Tribuna which 1s forb idden In F rance and ano ther called "Reality" which is forbidden in Switzerland. Unfortunately I have not been able to peruse these journals as I do not r_e ad Czech, but I am told that their basic thesis !s the need for t he party masses to sub mlt to Jeadershlp by the elite cadre. Bellak was formerly a Communist Party functionary in Slovakia under the name of Berger. H e puts out a German-language sheet called "MH!tant Democra cy'" which few Germans read because it takes Stalin's anti• German line. Some of the staff members are left-wing sociallsts, such as J osef Kodicek, who helped put out pro..Sovlet propaganda over BBC durln g the war, and Ma,rtin K vetko. who partlclp ated in a Communist-sponsored uprising In 1S!ovakia in August 1944. Pavel Tlgrld (formerly Schonfeld), Peroutka's asslstant, was for mer editor o f a magazlne called "Lift Culture" and has admltted openly havlng collaborated wlth th e Communists. Some of the lesser personnel are rather interestlng, such as Eva Fischl, daugh ter of the present Czech Communist amb assad or to Eastern Germ any, and Mesdames Kamlerova and Lisa. nov a who were speclalists in inclting riots against the German management of Camp Valka and who ostentatiously exhibited a plcture of Stalln In their room. There is a Mr. Stein, who is reported to be a Communist functionary from the Prague reglon. I do not k now whether he is tbe same Stein whom the Comm unlsts planted with BBC during tbe war. A FEW POl.lCY HEADACHES Tbe fact tbat the Natlonal Commlttee for a Free Europe gave the Benes party free relgn In personnel and pollcy matters for tbe Czech program of Radlo Free Europe h as ralsed a number of thorny problems. Some of these affeet only the station a.od tbe Commlttee. Other~ involved th e basic forelgn relatlons of tbe Unlted States. �36 SLOVAKIA To begin with, the broadcasts have evoked a very mixed reaction. Since the Slovaks in the Benes group {the renegade Slovaks) are those who have accepted tbe premise of a unitary Czecho-Slovak state, .iud since this attitude tends to color the political commentaries, the pro· gram is automatically distasteful to tbe overwhelming majority of patrlotlc Slovaks who are definitely anti-Commun!st. As one Slovak leader put it to me: "they speak our language but they do not apeak our thoughts." So far as the Czechs are concerned, the political orientatiou of the program is likely to appeal only to those who favor the Benes policy of ad vanced socialism bordering on Communism. These people won't find too much wrong with tbe Gottwalcl regime anyway. T he program holds out little hope for the Czech citizen who wants a positive pian for getting away from socialism and Soviet domination. In other words, it simply is not a clear-cut anti-Communist program. 'ľhe most that can be said about it is that it is an antl-the-particulargroup-of-Oommunists-who-Olappen-to-be-running-Czechoslovakia-at-lthe-moment program. It is doubtful whether Americans intended to put their money into financing sguabbles between rival groups of Communists and near-Communists. Another problem is essentially a technical one. The mission of the station requires that it have a good source of news from inside Czecho•Slovakia. At the present Ume, Radio Free Europe is trying to use the Moravec office as a source. Slnce, however, Moravec's only reliable agents {in the sense of getting there and back ) are also agents o( the Communist serret police, •Radio Free Europe is getting only such news as the Gottwald government cares to give it, which isn't too much. The other horn of this rlilemma is that if Radio Free Europe tries to set up its own couriers, the Communists within the Moravec outfit and within its O\ľll set-up can easily arrange for their liguida· tion. At the moment, the station is buying information from whomever will give it, and paying fan cy prices. The result is that enterprising Czechs are cooking up the most amazing stories; and the staff has no way of checking whether these stories are true or not. Even the collection of news material ad boc has run !nto diffiC'ulties. The individual ass!gned to collect news from the inmates ot Camp Valka, one Yaroslav Dvoracek, the leader of the Benes group in the camp is - to break the monotony - not a Communist nor even a fellow-traveler. He is a former member of the Czech Fasc ist Party of General Gayda. Unfortunately Mr. Dvoracck's activities were rudely interrupted on April 18, 1951 by the police. He was in jail, while I was there, awaiting trial on rharges of misappropriating CARE packages and clotbing sent by American friends to the Sokol or camp alhletic organization. On the Political side, the most immediate problem is that the anti-<Sudeten tendencies of Radio Free Europe's Czech-Slovak program are getting the Germans mad as hornets. There have already been !leveral protests by German refugee groups and a formal interpellation in the Bavarian parliament_ It was reported that plans for a formal protest to the United States by the Centra) German Government at I~nn were being consiclered. When I was in New York in March, I attempted to dlscuss tbe problem of German public relations wlth of- �S LOVAKIA 37 ficials of the National Committee and was told, in effect, that since Radlo Free Europe would not broadcast in Germau no such problem wa.s anticipated. The station is, bowever, located in Germany. There are plenty of Sudeten Germans who can understand Czech and .they teli other G.ermans what they hear. Tbere is a public relations problem. If it gets m uch worse the Unit.ed States Government may find it necessary .to do something about it. N EEDED - A GOOD CLEANUP Before going further, I would like to point out that the criticisms ir, this report have been directed solely at the Czech and Slovak actlvities of Radio Free Europe. Nothing said here is intended to refer to any of the other programs, about which I am not informed. It would be too bad if the present fizzle in the Czech and Slovak program oť Radio Free Europe should cause people to ťeel the whole idea s hould be dropped. The pian is a splendid one if carried out properly. Whwt is needed is a thorough housecleaning in which all Communists and fellow-travelers are definitely and permanently f!red. Administration and program planning should be in the hands of Ameri· cans, who should lay down the political pollcy. Personnel investigations should be made by political analysts who know their h!story and are experts in comparative ideologies. In the case of the Czech program, the cleanup won't be easy since it involves the uprooting of a jungle of misinformation, prejudices and vested interests planted by Czech and "Czecho-Slovak" fellow-travelers over a number of years. The bistory of this crypto-Communist inf!uence on the State Department, American universities and the public in general is a wbole subject in itself, which would probably take a Congressional investlgation to unravel. • • • WHO SAID IT ? "There is one tbing we can express and interpret in full. It is the sincere, deep hearty and infinite gratitu'de of all Czechs and Slovaks to the Soviet Union, to its people, its army and its skipper, Generalissimo Stalin, for everything that they have so far done and are stm doing for us. It is the unfalsified, unselfisb and pure feeling of friend• ship and sympathy that we bave for this great, for us so intimate and n eighborly a country. It is the pure joy from the joys of the successes and the progress of the USSR, it 1s the unshatterable hope that Slovanism in its new form will safeguard for itself and for the world a deserved peace, in which all nations antl states shall live their own Jives, freely, without fears, democratlcally and In dignity, in agreement, welfare and happiness. In this spirit from our souls we greet the jubileeing USSR, we congratulate it from our hearts for the results attained ln peace and war. We wish that it keep on prospering, flourishing and growing mighty unto its own greatness, but also unto the welfare of all mankind. Long live the Soviet Union and may its Soviet chief and skipper, J. V. Stalin, in full health live to see many more of its joyous jubilees." - Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, ČAS, 11-7-47. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA ·uow FREE lS RADIO FREE EUROPE? BY KURT GLASSER 1- THE VOICE OF F REEDOM IN DOUBLE TAL K In the southeast corner of the English Garden, Munich's Centra! Park, a h andsome new building is being erected. This building, paid for by the voluntary contrlbutlons of millions of American citizens, will house the executive offices and studios of RADIO FREE EUROPE. Medium-wave broadcasts in Czech and Slovak have been started on an lllh•hour schedule, and are beamed eastward by a directional antenna. There are also brief s hort-wave programs in Hungarian, Rumanian and Bulgarian; medium-wave programs in lhese languages are to follow later. Radio Free Europe is a private American station. lt is owned by the National Committee for a Free Europe, and supported through the Crusade for Freedom campaign. 'I'he response to the dramatic '·HELP LLFT THE IRON CURTAIN" posters is gratlfying. Presumably the donors are gratified to thlnk that their dollars are helping to fight Communism. They would not be quite so gratif!ed if they knew what was happening wlth some of their money. Q€neral Lucius D. Clay and other prlncipal figures in the National Committee for a Free Europe are, 1 believe, personally beyond reproach. It would not occur to any norma! journalist to write "m udraking" articles on any activity sponsored by them. lt never occurred to me to criticize RFE until l arrlved In Munich in 1951 and begaµ resear<:h on problems affecting iron-curtain refugees in Western Germany. Quite by accident I sturobled on the fol· Io wing facts: 1. The principal Czechs and Slovaks associated with the National Committee and those employed by Rad io Free Europe are not· - as is commonly supposed - fighters against Communism. Quite on the contrary, they fellow-traveled with the Communists from at least 1939 to 1948, helped them to power, and even today follow a Communist-sponsored propaga.nda line. 2. These individuals belong to an organization which has systematically betrayed members of the democratic underground in Czecho-Slovakia by tipping them off to Dictator Gottwa lďs secret police. 3. A number of Radio Free Europe staff members are either Communist agents or have criminal records. 4. Radlo Free Europe's Czech-Slovak program is helping Stalin by sabotaging international understanding and promoting rivalry and hatred between European peoples. WHY CZECHO-SLOVAKIA COLLAP SED The Czech exile organization associated with the National Committee is the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," beaded by Dr. Peter Zenkl, formerly vice-Premler under Gottwald. This organization, known among exiles as the Benes party, has the inside track in determining who geta jobs in Radio Free Europe and what polic)' the station shall follow. To understand what thls means politically, we shall have to trace briefly the history of Czecho-Slovakla slnce World War 1. If the American staff óf the National Commlttee had studied this hlstory more critlcally than it evidently dld, it would not bave been duped by Czech fellow-travelers. To begin wltb, there is no "Czechoslovak ian" people, except as one has been dellberately created by the propaganda of the Czech natlonallst partles. The Czecbs and the Slovaks are two dlstinct natlons, witb languages as dlfferent as German and Dutch. T hey can, wltb some effort, understand each o tber and read each other's newspapers. At the end of World War I, when the old Austro-H ungarlan monarchy was collapsing, most Slovaks favored an Independent Slo-vakia. Tbey consented, however, to jolning wlth the Czech s on the 8trengtb of the so-called Pittsburgh Agreement, signed in 1918 by Presldent Thomas Masaryk of Czecbo·Slovakia. This agreement provtded for full equality between Ci:echs and Slovaks and a substantial measure of autonomy for Slovakia within t he framework ot Czecho-Slovakia. The Pittsburgh Agreement was never carried out. Instead, tbe Czech Government maintained centrallzed rule from Prague and discrlminated systematlcally against tbe Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans (who are really German-speaking Austrians). In 1925 Masaryk justlfied tbe denial of Slovak autonomy by stating that tbe Pitts· burgh Agreement was slmply a recommendatioo of American Czechs and Slovaks and, tberefore, not blnding. Only Czech civil servants got tbe best jobs, and tbe Government, first under :'lfasaryk and later under Benes, did ali lt could to promote Czech nationalism and culture al tbe expense of the non-Czech peoples of the Republjc. Tbe result was tbat both the Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans, not to mentlon some 250,000 Hungarians, became increaslngly anxious to "get out !rom under." Tbls fact was made abundantly clear in Lord ;Runciman'5: 1938 report to the Britlsh Government. The Czecho-Slovak Government had not neglected to operate .a ťontinuous, high-pressure public relations campaign io tbe United States and otber western countrles When Hitler demanded cesslon of the Sudetenland in September 1938, the sympatbies of the western world were wholly wltb Czecho-Slovakla, wbich was pictured as an island of peaceful democracy In the sea of fascism. 'l'be fact of the matter was that the country was well along the road to civil war. If Brltain and France had backed tbe Prague Government and had Czecho-Slovakla t ried to figbt, \t is practically certaln tbat the Slovaks, Sudeten Germans and Hungarians would have refused to cooperate. At · the beight of the Munlch crisis, Professor Cernak, Slovak s pokesman in the Prague cabinet, presented Benes wlth an ultimatum demanding agreement to Slovak autonomy wltbln 24 hours, otherwise he would leave bis post in the government. Reluctantly Prague agreed to grant autonomy on October 6, 1938. However, after Munich, in March 1939, the Prague Government deposed Slovak Prime Minister 'l'iso, occupied Bratislava with Czech armed forces and installed a new governmenľ In Slovakia. lt was this interventlon which gave Hitler tbe excuse to march lnto Prague. lt must be admitted that the Slovak Republlc came int~ existence SLOVAKIA witb Hitler's belp. But tbis did not make it a Nazi state any more t han German aid to Finland corrupted tbe lnstitutlons of· tbaľcoimtry. BENES BECOMES A TOOL OF STALIN · It is understandable tbat Benes sbould have turned to Stalin for support after "tlie Municb debacle. Brltaln and France had, as h e felt, let bim down. The only power wlilch could restore Czecho-Slovakia was Soviet Russia and, it may be added, the only way in which Czechoslovakia with its pre-war boundaries can be held together today is by sheer force. In any case, the "Czechoslovakian Liberat!on Move· ment," wbich was started in Paris and moved to London in 1940. was based from the beginnlng on the pr!ncipie of constant and close collaboratlon with the Soviet Union. As Dr. Peter Zenk l, whose influence today over Radio Free Europe is apparent from the posttion he holds, sald in a speech to th e Temporary :-.ationat Assembly in );ovember 1945: " The nationa lly conscious Czechs and Slovaks have no doubt that in thelr own interest, as well as ín lnľernational interests, perma~ent collaboration with the USSR is neceua ry. Never without the USSR, never against the USSR, always on its side!" The collaboration between the Benes party and the Sovi_ets ' ~ontinued even during the strained relations between the USSR and the Western powers whicb, lasted from September 1939 unt!I Hltler's atiack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. As H ubert Ripka, Beneš' ~Iinister of Informatlon in the LoI)don "Czecboslovak Democratic Government," explained in bis book "East and West" (London, 1944): "Since, in the new situation, it was impossible to collaborate officia lly with the Soviet Union, we ... did nothing whlch might pre. judice or prevent the renewal of cooperatlon at the earliest possible • moment; l need only recall how strongly our attltude contrasted wlth that of .many others during the Soviet-Finnish War. Moreover, even in that period, there was no lnterruption of the personal contacts and exohange of information between ourselves and important Soviet representatives in London, Paria, Washington and elsewhere." The Provisional Czecboslovakian Government, which was ·ftnanced by the British, introduced Jarge ·numbers of "democratic Czechoslovakian refugees," who were in reality Soviet agents. One of t•hese, L.udwig Freund, joined the staff oť the Communist "Daily Worker" at B ritlsh Government expense. Others, such as Messrs. Bieheller, Ohrenstein, Klinger and Steín (none- of whom were Czechs or Slovaks) Joined the staff of the Britlsh Broadcasting Company and prepared t he speeches for the "non-Communist" members of the Czech governme nt. Here ts a s ample of this propaganda: " ... the Ruuian Novemb·er Revolution not only increaaed the strength of the Ruasian Soviet State, it also ralaed to greater heights than ever before the standard of civilization, culture and living, of the wide ma11es of the Soviet peoples.... Bolshevism is a supér.national ideal, an eternal ideal, a human ideal, an ideal whlch has klndled the minds of the noblest of men from the time of Piato and through the· Christian era, through the Freneh Revolution and untll today.: : . Juat as the French Revolution strovť to realize the idea! · of equality." (B. B. C. program of·,November 7, 1942, speech by Mr. Ri1>lfä). · SLOVAKIA 28 Tbis Mr. Ripka is anotber leadlng f!gure in the "Council of Free Czecboslovakia," wbich has played a leadlng role in tbe selection of Czech and Slovak personnel for Radio Free Europe Benes and bis friends also introduced a number of Commun!st .igents into the U nited States (also disguised as democratic Czecho• Slovak!an refugees) , sneh as the Soviet employee Bension Batt wbo publlshed tbe Czech paper New Y orkské Li sty and a Hungarian Communist Desider Benau, who edited the Slovak paper ("Czechoslôvak daily") called New Y or k ský Denník. Benau is now editor of a Communist dally in Slovakia. In 1941 the KremUn decided that the Benes organization was worthy of recognition as the official Czecho,Slovak government, and iJ1 1943 Benes went to Moscow and formally concl uded an agreement with Stalin. I am not informed as to tbe details or this agreement. but apparently lt provided that the Sovlets and not tbe United States s hould occupy Czecho0Slovakia as well as indicating wbat part!es s hould be allowed after the war. Needless to say, the dominating role of .the Communist Party was assured. II - THE F A K E D E MOCRACY - 1945-1948 As the war drew to a c lose, in late 1944 and early 1945, the Benes Government moved in a body from London to Kosice and then Prague, with a long stop-over In Moscow. While in the Soviet capital, the "Czechoslovak" politicians received exact instructions as to wbat they· were to do wben tbey got horne. Stalin did not want to alarm t be Western Allles by setting up an outright Communist government in P rague while tbe bulk of the Gls and Tommies were stm in Ger• many. lt was therefore decided to use the sy'stem of "bloc politics" (compulsory coalition of several parties) wbich is in vogue in the Soviet Zone of Germany and which General Eisenhower had rejected for the U. S. Zone "since it !s incompatible w!th the traditional American idea of political activity and effective political l!fe in a democratic sense" (New York Times, October 17. 1945). Only the fol lowing part!es were permitted: 1. Communist Part y ; 2. National Socialist (Benes) Party ; 3. Social Democratic (Socialist) Party; 4. The Czec h Cleri ca l Party (Srameťs "Česká Lldová Strana." ). The Agrarian Party and the Small Tradesmen's Party, which had existed b efore tbe war, were forbidden, slnce tbey refused to collaborate with tbe Communists. George Str!brny was sentenced to life imprisonment and Rudolpb Beran (no relation to tbe archbishop) was sentenced to 20 years in 1946 for attempting to organlze "unauthorized" polltlcal parties. Slnce the Soviets were not sure bow the Social Democratic Party would bebave (in Germany it is strongly anti-Communist) tbey suppJied this party with new leaders from Moscow. who elected the Communist Zapotorky as head of the United Czech Trade Unions. To make sure nothing would go wrong, some 200.000 c~ech and Slovak citizens wbo had given evidence of bP.lng anti-Communist were ex<'luded from the 1946 elections on one pretext or another. To cap tbe cllmax, tbe Communist leader Klement Gottwal<l. who had been r arefully groomed In Moscow for the job, was elected Prime Minister. As for the Slovaks, the Sovlets seemed for a time to support Slovak autonomy an<l then cbange<l th~ir minds Tn any case, thP, iLOVAKIA Slovaks were not a sked what they thought about the matter. Mr. F. A . Voight, the editor of the London magazine "Nlneteenth Century and After," described thc situation in th e following terms: 1-'Czechoslovakia is today a vassal state in a procesa of dissolution. Of the three administratíve areas which compose it, one, Car. patho-Ukraine, has been annexed by the Soviet Union. The second, Slovakia, is independent from Prague but not from Moscow. The quarrel between Czechs and Slovaks seems to be irreconcilable. One has the impression that the Czechoslovak state is today a fiction and that it will never again be a reality. For if one should remove the Russian overlordship, the Czechs could only recover power over the Slovaks by force of arms. And in this undertaking they would cer. tainly be defeated, for they have not a single friend in centra! Europe, whereas the S lova ks have many.... Even in Bohemia and Moravia the central government has but little authority. lt ia a pliable tool of the Russian supervision, with little will of its own. Dr. Benes is the victim of the politics which he has followed for so long." - And this was written not in 1948, bu t appeared in November 1945! ~embers of the Benes group in exile try to pretend that they entered the government In 1945 on the theory that the four parties would operate on a "live and let live" basis. This is straigh t mythology. In the first place, n o non-Communist politicians in their right minds would get together and elect a Communlst prime minister. Secondly, the non--Communlst parties had no polltlcal programs of t heir own. All parties had accepted a common program, the so-called Kosice Program of 1945, named after the city in which it was adopted. '!'he Kosice Program had been prepared in advance by t he Communists and included tbe complete s oclalization of industry ·and agricul• ture, as well as many of tbe ot her measure!< taken slnce 1948 by the Gottwald government. In other w ords, the complete commun!zation of the country had been prepared in advance with t he active collaboration of the Benes party. These collaborators included Hubert Ripka, Peter Zenkl, John Papanek, J. Stransky, Ferdinand Peroutka and a number of others . who are today connected, directly or indirectly, with the National Committee for a Free Europe and with Radio F ree Europe. Most of these National Fronters are enjoying the protection of the United States today; a large number have been provided with jobs on research pro. jects paid for by the Crus ade for Freedom or by the State Department. From the point of view of long-range international politics, the most significant thing which h appened during the period of fake democracy was the expulsion of almost three million Sudeten Germans. Some of t hese people h ad been Nazis. What the post-war Czech government, with the active encouragement of the Soviets, did was to deport the entire German-speaking minortly, regardless of their po. litical attitudes. P eople whose ancestors had lived in the border areas of Bohemla for almost a thousand years we re forced overnight t o leave tbeir horne.s and property and were shlpped in frelght cars to varlous points in Germa ny. Not content with exproprlatlng the Sudetens, an art!on wlthout precedent or justlficatlon In lnternatlonal law, the ao SLOVAKI.A Commun ist partlsans, with the explicit appro val of Benes and his frien<!s, tortured and -murdered tens of t housands, !ncluding m any Sudetens with antl-Nazi records. Thjs is a hlstorlcal fact, however little lt may be_ k nown in th e Un lted S tates. T he expulslon :was so tho rÓugl;l_ . that. _numbers of n on-Germ an J ews were .deported, slm ply bec,a.u.se .t hey had lndicated "German'.' as thel r Janguage in t he Jast cen's us: slnce Ylddish was . 110.t recognized by. t he . Czech s t atistical authorťties. · · "-T.he Czechs," wrote Mr. Voight, · " have developed the most violent nationallsm. They have adopted a racial doctrine akin to H itler's (with · the difference that the Slava instead ot the .Germans are the Herrenvolk') and _their methods are hard ly difterent trom those of the Fascísts. They ·have; in truth, become Slavic Nazis." The -power behind tll.e expulsions was . r evealed recently In t he Prague Communist paper Rude Pravo (1951, No. 63), wbich edltorial ized as follows: "Thrl>ugh the historical victo ry of the Soviet Union it was possible to i-eorganize our country so as to banish once and for all the dangers stemming from unsolved natlonality problems and from the i;editious propaganda which threatened our first republic. lt ia impossible to overestimate the · historic importance of the fact that a fter a history of a thousand years the expulsion of the Germans has guar anteed the safety of our Fatherland as never before. Our peoples owe undying thanks to Comrade Stalin, who advocated this soluti9n in Potsdam and fought it through against the resistance of the Western powers." . The expulsion o f the Sude ten Germans created a political powder barrel compared to which the Pollsh Corridor before World W a r II was a medium•slzed lady cracker. Germany, whlch lost a large part ot its food-produc!ng terrltory and is populated to the bursting po int, v.iii never wlllingly accept tbe exile ot the Sudet ens. Czecho-Slovakla. on t he ot her ha nd, can hold on to t he Sudetenland on ly so long as she is backed by s uperior military rorce - th a1 of S oviet Russla. The way out of tbe dllemma would be for t he Czechs to make an agreeruent witb the Sudeten Germans pe rmitting them to come back. T hi!I is, ho.wever, exactly what Stalin does not want, slnce a Czech state at peace wlt h Germany and stable wlth ln itself would no longer depend on Russia n support to keep it in existence. F or this reason, Stalln's Czech puppets dld and continue to do every th ing to prevent a s ettlement of the Sudeten problem. The broadcasts of Radio Free Europe conform exactly to this Stalinist pollcý. The Kremlin's pollcy or m alntainlng hatred a t white b eat between the Czech s and the Germans was expounded by Otto Graf, now a member or the political statf of Radlo Free Europe in Munlch, as follows: "lf, in conn~tion with Ge rmans in Czechoslovakia, the -queation of the humanitarian tradltion of the Czech people ia raiaed, then the question is raised in the wrong place. lf lt were aimply that we didn'.t WANT to live wlth the Germans, the question might be justlfled. The fact is, we CAN'T live .wlth them." - ( Svet Prace, Vol. 1, No. 11, September 20, 1945, page 3). Ceskosloven1ke Noviny, the organ of th e Councll or Free CzechoSlovakla, tbe U. S. orga nization of Benes' followers which su ppllee the SLOVAKIA 31 intelJectual leadershlp for Radlo Free · Europe, put the matter even more blunlly. How's thls for Ch rislian. Brotherhood? : "The Czechoalovak ian emigration knowa well that the new world Ôrder ia only poaaible on the baaia of the equality of all peoples in Eur!)pe. But at the eame time it hear,1 clearly the voice of t~. people a t home, which uttera thia apontaneoua .wi1h: Never to have , to eat at the aame table wlth German1, ever to have to pray_ I!" ·tti.e aame church with them." - (Artlcle by Duben, No. 24, Page 8), Fortunately not all Czech.s are ready to a.ccept Stalln's gospl!l .or liatred. An oppositlon group b eaded by General Prchala, the only Czech general who ever opposed Hitler on the battlefleld, has slgned a compact with the Sudetep GerD)an rep;-esentatio n In Munlch. Thls <:ompact. concluded on August 4, 1950, provldes that arter the Jlberatlon oťCzecho-Slovakla the Sudeten Germans shall be !ree to return to their homes. Therearter both natións shali enjoy equal rights under a federatlve štate.· General Prchala and bis followers i.ilso believed In ~elf-determln ation ·ror the Slovaks. ' ·.• · The policy or the Prchala group, the Czech Natlonal Commlttee, 1s so senslble that tbe Benes party bas not bePn able to thlnk. of a.ny rational argument agalnst it. So they follow the tbreadworn tactlcs or <lenounclng Prchala and his followers as rascists. And wba.t does the American management of Radlo Free Europe clo about the problem or the Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans? lt refuses to discuss lt. As Mr. Grltfith, polJUcal advlser to Mr. J ackson, stated I!) a press conference held on AprlJ 30, 1951: "Men of good will cannot a·IJow them1elve1 to be distracted in attempting · now to answer queations whlch cannot be answered now." Mr. Jackson backed bim up by saying: "The problem of Czech1 and Slovaka in Germany (sic) ·w ill not be diacu11ed on the air on thi1 transmitter." A llttle l:.ter in the conference the followlng interchange took place: "Queslion: Do you have at present the cooperatlon of all tbe main Czech and Slovak political tactlons among the emlgrants? " Mr. Jackson: Oh yes, the answer is yes." Mr. Jackson was evldently mlslnformed. •Radlo Free Europe does not have the cooperatlon of the Czech Nat1011al Commlttee, whlch has as regiatered members some 3,000 of the 12,000-odd Czechs no-w ' llvlng in Germany as well as a sizable memhershl p In Great Brltaln„ Canada, AustraJla, eti;. ~or does lt have the good wlll of the Slovak ~a.~lonjll Councll Abroad, the largest and most conslstently antl-Commun lst organlzatlon of exiled Slovaks .,..... or any representativ e group of Slovak patrlots. The Americans ln chacge or Radio Free Europe may think they are belng neutra!. ActuallY, they are exhlblllng partlsanship or the most vlclous sort, that sort whlch refuses to come out In the open and show lts cards. The resull ls that Radlo Free Europe 1s llkely to antagonlze more people than lt pleases, Jncludlng exaclly those groups which tbe United States should be courtlng as allles In lts struggle against world Communlsm, By following the Benes line and then " refuslng to discuss," the station la by impllcatlon condonlng :Czech ult.a-11atlonll]ism and the b rutal -expuls lon of milllons of -:reNgees. T.bere ls ,iothing tbat Stalin couJd like better. •, 32 SLOVAKIA I II - HOW TO RUN AN ANTI-COMMUNIST UNDERGROUND WITH COMMUNIST AGENTS On February 21, 1948, the "non-Communist" members of Gottcabinet resigned. To analyze just what h a ppened in t he "Gottwald Putsch" would be an involved historical job which I do not wan t to undertake here. Two points, however, a re signif icant: walďs 1. M inisters Ripka, Zen kl , Papanek and Stransky and others who n ow run the Council of F r ee Czechoslovakia and whose policies dominate the Czech program of Radio F ree Europe m ade not even a show ot resistance to the Communist g rab for power. Minister Zenkl spent the whole week-end ot the Putsch at a country house-party comfortably removed trom the scene of operations. 2. The fact that the Kremlin did not consider these gentlemen necessary any more in their previous positions does not of itself make them any less Communist fellow-travelers than they wer e before. lf Stal in should fire Molotoff, wou l d he be any less of a Bolshevi k ? N ot necessari ly. tThe Czech exile V. L. Borln writes ("Against the H angman," London, 1951, page 14) that he th inks t he real reason for th e "reorganization of 1948" was not to consolidate Communist power, since the Communists already had all the power they needed, but to make h!ghpower politlcians available for a razzle·dazzle job designed to confuse the United States and Britain. T h is t hesis is h ard to prove or disprove. lt is, nevertheless, lnteresting that most of the Benes g roup, including all the ministe11s and many "smal\ fry," left Czecho-Slovakia without the sligh test lnterference from the Government. The retiring dignitaries, escorted by several Communist agents traveling incognito, fellow-traveled to the United States Zone of Germany, wbere they announced themsel ves as "democrats" who had tought the good fight and as m artyrs of democracy. Tbey were met witb open arms (and with financial support) by the U. S. authorities, particuarly by certain former Czechs who h ad emigrated earlier and become U. S. citizens, A short whlle later the grou p was assembled in New York, where lt proceeded to promote the American Fund for Czecboslovak Refugees, l ne. (1775 Broadway), roping in such respect• able sponsors as Elleanor Roosevelt, Senator H erb ert Lehman, Dorothy 'ľhompson, etc., etc. Don't blam e these good people too hastily: the American publ ic was so hopel essly misinformed about what had really 1-appened in Czecho,Slovakia that to help the "poor refugees" seemed the natural and human thing to do. In order to be taken seriously, an exile organizatlon has to have an underground movement in the same country. So th e exiled Benes party organized an underground, the principal menib ers of whlch had been selected before Messrs. Zenkl, Ripka and Stransky had ever left Czecho,Slovakla. That it "vas possible to organize an underground at all was due to the fact that tbe Benes party, on the middle and loweľ levels, lncluded a number of people who were sincere democrats ancl an ti-Communists. If you want an effective underground in a dictatorshlp country you have t o pick leaders who are unknown politically. Instead, Ripka, Zenkl and .Stransky picked Mrs. M ilada Horakova, National Socialist (Benes) Party member or Parliament and known anti-Communist; Josef Ne- SLOVAKIA 33 staval, Jawyer, member of NSP Centra! Executive Committee; Misa Frana Zem inova, First Vice-Chairman of the NSP; Jiri Hej da, econo• mist, member of the State Economic Council. Of the foregoing, all except Hejda were under observation by the Communist Secret Police, a fact which Ripka and his friends must have known if they were not poli tical idiots. In addi tion to these leaders. a set of liaison officers were appointed who were equally suspect, including Zenkľs brother Hudolf and the secretaries of Benes and Ripka. On the first anniversary of Benes' death the exiles asked their friends to mail protests to the U. S. Embassy in Prague. Although these letlers were anonymous, they did serve to tip off the Communlst secret police as to the location of resistance centers. Radio Free Europe is now conducting a similar "give-away" program. Exlled Czechs and Slovaks ,vrite in about themselves and persona) news is broadcast under a "nickname" but with mention of the localities in which the families llve. Several exiles have pointed out to the writer that this procedure is sufficient, in smaller towns, to provide the secret police with very useful information. As a center for making contacts wlth members of the underground in Czecho-Slovakia, Ripka and his friends established an operational headquarters in Frankfurt under the direction of a certain Gen eral Mor avec, formerly hea.d of the "Czecboslovakian Jntelligence Service" in London. This operational Headquarters was and is a key position in the whole structure of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia's under· ground. Jt was and ls tbe German sending and receivlng station for couriers coming back and forth from Czecho-Slovakia. Jts connection with Radlo Free Europe will be discussed in the last chapter. I have heard Moravec described as a well-meaning man without too much political sense. His staff, however, includes or included the following individuals: 1. As principal deputy, D r. Schenk. As a police officlal of Brunn (Brno), Dr. Schenk asslsted In the arranging of the famous Brunn Death March on Corpus Christi Day, 1945, in which tbe entire Ger• man population of that city was forced to march 60 kilometers to the Austrian border. Tbose who straggled were beaten to death. At night the Germans were locked in cement barracks to which Soviet soldiers were admitted for the purpose of raping the women. Between 2000 and 3000 Germans died before the march was over. In 1948 Dr. Schenk, as a "democratic exile," got a job screening refugees for the JRO, where he had the reputation of approvlng only Benes supporters for asslstance. H e then went to work in Moraveťs office where he 1,till is, according to the !atest lnformatlon. 2. M ih ula, a courier between Frankfurt and Prague. Hls travels ceased abruptly in February 1951 when the United States Court ln Hegensburg sentenced bim to 7 years imprisonment as a Communist s py. 3. Rudolf Sima, courier for Moravec and shnultaneously member of the S'I'B (Czech Secret Police). He was recently arrested In Stuttgart and is now in U. S. custody. 4 Schn eeberger, occasional inmate of tbe Valka "Foreigners' Camp" near Nurn-berg. The frequency and overtness with which th!s gentleman crosses tbe borcler has given rise there to the general opinlon SLOVAKIA 34 that he is also an STB man . .At the time of this writing he was at Jarge in the U. S. Zone of Germany. 5. Satran, well known to emigres as a Prague underworld chai-acter and one-tíme proprietor of "The Spider," a dive used extensively for the exchange of stolen goods. Convictions are reported ·for deallng in stolen goods, pandering and cheating at cards. H e has recently gone to work for Radlo Free Europe but bis Whereaboutli is --strictly secret." 6. Vera Chovancova, Moravec's secretary and girl-friend of a cerLain Marian, W'ho is know.n to be an STB agent. Mornvec also had couriers who were not membe1:s of the Czech 8TB, ho-wever, these dlsappeared at a discouraging rate whlle crossing 1he border, for reasons that are not bard to guess. To meet the prob• lem caused by t.he ensuing persorinel shortage. Moravec's offtce sent letters by the conductors on the Orient Express, which carries through cars from Prague to Ostende. Anyone who knows anything about dictatorships knows that conductors on international traina are alwaya agenta of the secret police. The result of Moravec's efficient operations was that when Gott· walp's .-Communists held their famous espionag~ trials, the state prosecutor had a f-a~rly complete file of all th~--correspondence sent or received by the defendants. Significantly en.o ugh, the record of the trial contained no mention of Moravec or his headquarters, nor did the prosecution introduce a letter which Ne11taval had written, aaking that Ripka be dropped from the organizatio11 for Communlat _c olla. boration. Mrs. Horakova was sentenced to death, Nestaval and H ejda to life imprisonment and slxty-eight year old Miss Zeminova to twenty years at bard Jabor. Wlth this operaťiôn, the democratlc resl11tance in Czechoslovakia, insofar as · lt existed in the Benes party, was effectively liquidated. IV - AMERICA'S LAT.EST PROBLEM CHILO In the selectlon of personnel to pian and carry out its Czech broadcasting problem, the National Commlttee for a Free Europ e relied heavlly on the advice of the CollÍlcll for Free Czechoslovakla. !<'or a whlle, in early 1951, the org_ahizatlon spllt on the quesUon of who was a fellow-traveler, but slnce then, as I understand it, things have tieen happlly patched up. •· ·• The he~d of the entire Czech g·ro~p in ~uni~h is Ferdinand Peroutka, formerly propaganda director of the Natlonal Socialist Party and editor of the newspaper Oi,esek (Today) in Prague. Slnce Mr. Peroutka is responsible for puttlng together a program for w hlch Ámericans are pay!ng and which - in spite of the prlvate ausplces of Radlo Free Europe - 1s frequently taken as representing .Americall pol!cy and opln!on, it is important to know what klnd of democr,acy ~fr. Peroutka advocates. Here are some of his opinions, taken from his book "Talť ·nebo tak" (So or So), published in Prague in 1947: "N ever in history was Russia so mighty, never were the forcea of socialiam so colosaaly forged together. This ls a new hiitorical epoch. Nevertheless some people think in a stick-in-the-ltlUd ' fashion. lt has not yet been possible to convince everyone of the neceísity: of the overthrów'·of 'capitalism_._, __., ( Page 8). SLOVAKIA 36 "Already in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries it became clear that whoever d.oes not want socialism small must take. it big. You people, who today pr aise this or t hat virtue of capitalism, tell me, how have yo u s olved the social problem . .." ( Page 9. Transla. tor's note : By t he use of. "sma ll" and "big" Mr. Peroutka would seem to identlfy himself with th e Bolshevlkl or "big" socialista, as op. posed to the Mens hevikl or "small" socialista.) " Along the road on which the Russian Revolution passed, there lie the rotting remains of t he unfulfilled pr ophecies of its enemies. This (the revolution: tr.) is a historical impulse a s g reat as the Reformation or the Fre nch Revolutlon, perhaps as gr eat as Christianity•. " ( Page 33) "In our situation resistance against the great work of s ocialízation - open or secret - can only be considered as reaction. In this respect w e need have no doubt who are the reactionaries." ( Page 141 ) '.'Many t lmes we have said, that in this land only one develop. ment is possible, to socialism. Have our activities helped this develop. ment? Or have we obstructed it ? ... lt is necessary for everyone to be able to say proudly : 1 was there, 1 hel ped!" ( Pages 170.171) Mr . Peroutka is backed up by two experts in dialectical materlali~m. Dr. Ziak and Dr. (Berger) Bellak. Dr. Zlak ls the editor of an intelleetual magazlne called Tribuna which 1s forb idden In F rance and ano ther called "Reality" which is forbidden in Switzerland. Unfortunately I have not been able to peruse these journals as I do not r_e ad Czech, but I am told that their basic thesis !s the need for t he party masses to sub mlt to Jeadershlp by the elite cadre. Bellak was formerly a Communist Party functionary in Slovakia under the name of Berger. H e puts out a German-language sheet called "MH!tant Democra cy'" which few Germans read because it takes Stalin's anti• German line. Some of the staff members are left-wing sociallsts, such as J osef Kodicek, who helped put out pro..Sovlet propaganda over BBC durln g the war, and Ma,rtin K vetko. who partlclp ated in a Communist-sponsored uprising In 1S!ovakia in August 1944. Pavel Tlgrld (formerly Schonfeld), Peroutka's asslstant, was for mer editor o f a magazlne called "Lift Culture" and has admltted openly havlng collaborated wlth th e Communists. Some of the lesser personnel are rather interestlng, such as Eva Fischl, daugh ter of the present Czech Communist amb assad or to Eastern Germ any, and Mesdames Kamlerova and Lisa. nov a who were speclalists in inclting riots against the German management of Camp Valka and who ostentatiously exhibited a plcture of Stalln In their room. There is a Mr. Stein, who is reported to be a Communist functionary from the Prague reglon. I do not k now whether he is tbe same Stein whom the Comm unlsts planted with BBC during tbe war. A FEW POl.lCY HEADACHES Tbe fact tbat the Natlonal Commlttee for a Free Europe gave the Benes party free relgn In personnel and pollcy matters for tbe Czech program of Radlo Free Europe h as ralsed a number of thorny problems. Some of these affeet only the station a.od tbe Commlttee. Other~ involved th e basic forelgn relatlons of tbe Unlted States. 36 SLOVAKIA To begin with, the broadcasts have evoked a very mixed reaction. Since the Slovaks in the Benes group {the renegade Slovaks) are those who have accepted tbe premise of a unitary Czecho-Slovak state, .iud since this attitude tends to color the political commentaries, the pro· gram is automatically distasteful to tbe overwhelming majority of patrlotlc Slovaks who are definitely anti-Commun!st. As one Slovak leader put it to me: "they speak our language but they do not apeak our thoughts." So far as the Czechs are concerned, the political orientatiou of the program is likely to appeal only to those who favor the Benes policy of ad vanced socialism bordering on Communism. These people won't find too much wrong with tbe Gottwalcl regime anyway. T he program holds out little hope for the Czech citizen who wants a positive pian for getting away from socialism and Soviet domination. In other words, it simply is not a clear-cut anti-Communist program. 'ľhe most that can be said about it is that it is an antl-the-particulargroup-of-Oommunists-who-Olappen-to-be-running-Czechoslovakia-at-lthe-moment program. It is doubtful whether Americans intended to put their money into financing sguabbles between rival groups of Communists and near-Communists. Another problem is essentially a technical one. The mission of the station requires that it have a good source of news from inside Czecho•Slovakia. At the present Ume, Radio Free Europe is trying to use the Moravec office as a source. Slnce, however, Moravec's only reliable agents {in the sense of getting there and back ) are also agents o( the Communist serret police, •Radio Free Europe is getting only such news as the Gottwald government cares to give it, which isn't too much. The other horn of this rlilemma is that if Radio Free Europe tries to set up its own couriers, the Communists within the Moravec outfit and within its O\ľll set-up can easily arrange for their liguida· tion. At the moment, the station is buying information from whomever will give it, and paying fan cy prices. The result is that enterprising Czechs are cooking up the most amazing stories; and the staff has no way of checking whether these stories are true or not. Even the collection of news material ad boc has run !nto diffiC'ulties. The individual ass!gned to collect news from the inmates ot Camp Valka, one Yaroslav Dvoracek, the leader of the Benes group in the camp is - to break the monotony - not a Communist nor even a fellow-traveler. He is a former member of the Czech Fasc ist Party of General Gayda. Unfortunately Mr. Dvoracck's activities were rudely interrupted on April 18, 1951 by the police. He was in jail, while I was there, awaiting trial on rharges of misappropriating CARE packages and clotbing sent by American friends to the Sokol or camp alhletic organization. On the Political side, the most immediate problem is that the anti-<Sudeten tendencies of Radio Free Europe's Czech-Slovak program are getting the Germans mad as hornets. There have already been !leveral protests by German refugee groups and a formal interpellation in the Bavarian parliament_ It was reported that plans for a formal protest to the United States by the Centra) German Government at I~nn were being consiclered. When I was in New York in March, I attempted to dlscuss tbe problem of German public relations wlth of- S LOVAKIA 37 ficials of the National Committee and was told, in effect, that since Radlo Free Europe would not broadcast in Germau no such problem wa.s anticipated. The station is, bowever, located in Germany. There are plenty of Sudeten Germans who can understand Czech and .they teli other G.ermans what they hear. Tbere is a public relations problem. If it gets m uch worse the Unit.ed States Government may find it necessary .to do something about it. N EEDED - A GOOD CLEANUP Before going further, I would like to point out that the criticisms ir, this report have been directed solely at the Czech and Slovak actlvities of Radio Free Europe. Nothing said here is intended to refer to any of the other programs, about which I am not informed. It would be too bad if the present fizzle in the Czech and Slovak program oť Radio Free Europe should cause people to ťeel the whole idea s hould be dropped. The pian is a splendid one if carried out properly. Whwt is needed is a thorough housecleaning in which all Communists and fellow-travelers are definitely and permanently f!red. Administration and program planning should be in the hands of Ameri· cans, who should lay down the political pollcy. Personnel investigations should be made by political analysts who know their h!story and are experts in comparative ideologies. In the case of the Czech program, the cleanup won't be easy since it involves the uprooting of a jungle of misinformation, prejudices and vested interests planted by Czech and "Czecho-Slovak" fellow-travelers over a number of years. The bistory of this crypto-Communist inf!uence on the State Department, American universities and the public in general is a wbole subject in itself, which would probably take a Congressional investlgation to unravel. • • • WHO SAID IT ? "There is one tbing we can express and interpret in full. It is the sincere, deep hearty and infinite gratitu'de of all Czechs and Slovaks to the Soviet Union, to its people, its army and its skipper, Generalissimo Stalin, for everything that they have so far done and are stm doing for us. It is the unfalsified, unselfisb and pure feeling of friend• ship and sympathy that we bave for this great, for us so intimate and n eighborly a country. It is the pure joy from the joys of the successes and the progress of the USSR, it 1s the unshatterable hope that Slovanism in its new form will safeguard for itself and for the world a deserved peace, in which all nations antl states shall live their own Jives, freely, without fears, democratlcally and In dignity, in agreement, welfare and happiness. In this spirit from our souls we greet the jubileeing USSR, we congratulate it from our hearts for the results attained ln peace and war. We wish that it keep on prospering, flourishing and growing mighty unto its own greatness, but also unto the welfare of all mankind. Long live the Soviet Union and may its Soviet chief and skipper, J. V. Stalin, in full health live to see many more of its joyous jubilees." - Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, ČAS, 11-7-47.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource How Free is Radio Free Europe? Description An account of the resource Kurt Glasser Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952 pp. 25-37 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Glaser, Kurt, 1914-1993 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/575fd74b2c0220cb32780f0e819fc80c.pdf 372740dc44a33c68193f09f3b6423935 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA HOW TIIE CZECHS DECEIVED US CONST A NTIN E ČU L EN "Why do you not believe that old mistakes will not be repeated in the Czechoslovak Republlc?" I was asked by a Czech Slovak (a Czeehoslovak! ). "Because," I answer,,d, "only a donkey trlps twice on tbe same stone. And we Slovaks have already been deceived twice by Czech promiaes. One deceptlon was labeled the Pittsburgh Pact, and tbe second the Košice Agreement." "But you must belleve," said the Beneš Slovak, " just Jike a drowning man clinging to a straw." "Believe? But whom? The old decelvers? Here's a Jetter from a young Slovak who, In 1944, was one of those who believed the ~echs more than he dld hls brother Slovaks. After 1945," he wrltes, "many of my friends went to Prague to work in the mlnistrles. They worked in the Mlnistry of Foreign Trade, where Ripka was boss. When they wanted to execute some document, they had to steal it. In P rague they were willlng to employ Slovaks and, in cases, even elevate them, but they did not want them to work for Slovakia and make decisions and have influence on the trend of events and development of Slovakla." That young Slovak, an exile today, recently reminded me tbat I was right when I told bim, during the years of the Slovak Republlc, that the Czechs did not learn anything, or did they forget anythlng. At one Ume I collected a list of Czech promises very dillgently. Slnce 1919 I have recorded qulte a number or them. The first promlse sounded llke this: We Czechs are going to Slovakia only to help you out; when the Slovaks have capable people or their own, we w!ll ret•trn horne and let them manage their own arfalrs. Statlstics, however, show that there were less Slovaks in centra! offices in 1938, than there were in 1936. The schools in Slovakla, run by the Czechs, dld put out a lot of scholarly people, but !t seems that these schools were not as excellent as the Czech schools. Otherwlse someone mlght be able to say that this 1s just au anti-Czech argument to show that the Czechs used to send their worst professors to Slovakla, slnce they could not turn out, for example, anybody for the Jeading poslt!on in the Presidenťs office, in Parliament and in the varlous minlstries. The fact that out of 150 Generals only one was Slovak could be au argument that the Slovaks are a terribly peace-loving natlon and that the Czechs were all Žlžkas and warrlors. At the beginnlng of 1919, the offlclal Czech Press Bureau (ÔTK) had this joyful report propagated In Amer!ca: "The Slovak language shall be introduced as a required subject In the middle schools In Bohemia and Moravla. At the Prague philosophical facuJty it already has lts own seminary; it shall have a lecturer and the lectures on Slovak l!terature shall 'be ín Slovak. "Literary and scientlfic societles are prepar!ng to arrange coursel!I in Slovak for their members and for the general public. A Slovak dictionary and a Slovak comparat!ve . grammar are being publlshed. A review hlstory or literature wlll follow. �SLOV AK1A "A council of foremost Slovaks here or technical expert& on the Slovak language, because the Minlstry of Schools and Natlonal Enlightenment wills it, are preparing plans and school books for Slovakia, which shall be placed before natlve Slovak experta and, after agreement and approval, shall be published speedlly and passed out to ouľ students. "Professors from all sides are answering our call to teach in the first complete Slovak gymnasimn in Skalica; they are perfectlng themselves in Slovak and, as soon as circumstances allow, they shall actively undertake teaching work. And after the first middle school, there shall be in other parts of our country a second, a third and a fourth. "Already today the Slovak language is at horne in our entire State. A former Clnderella has now become the most-liked chlld of the entire Czechoslovak society" (NÁRODNt NOVINY, Jan. 16, 1919). Well, what flnally happened? The Slovak language was uot lntroduced into Czech schools, nay they stlfled it even in Slovak schools. In Bohemia the Czecn language was taught, but in Slovakla only the Czech brand of Slovak, that is the so-called "Czechoslovak" language. A Slovak dictionary and grammar were not being published at that time at all, nor were they being pre· pared. The dictlonary was prepared later by Professor Tvrdt, a Slovak professor, who could not flnd a teaching position in Slovakia. Slovak text)><loks were not approved by Slovaks, "but by Czechs in Pragúe. They _dld not like to approve textbooks prepared by Slovaks, because books afforded the Czechs a nice income. As late as 1938, practtcally all. textbooks of technical schools and a large percentage of the other schools in Slovakia were in Czech. At the Skalica gymnazlum, where Slovak professors flocked in such numbers already in 1919, there were, in 19~8, 15% Slovak professors and 85% Czech. lndeed, iu 1938, the Slovak language was not "at horne" even at the Universlty of Bratislava, or in barr acks, tbe schools and offlces. In 1988, 80% of the leading official pos itions in Slovakia were in Czech hands and the majority of Czechs offlciated in Czech. And in Prague, in the centra! offlces, where the destluy of Slovakia was being decided, there were three Slovaks out of 200 officials. In a word, in 1919 the Czech Press Bureau wanted Americans of Slovak descent to relax their vigilance. In the meantime, the Czech parliament, witb a Czech majority, passed a Iaw, according to which the Slovak nation vauished as such and, follo.wiug U1e Magyar pattern, instead of a unitary Hungarian natlon, we had a unltary Czechoslovak nation, with the Czechoslovak language as the otflcial language, the State language. Whosoever wishes can believe new Czech promises. The Slovakl!I cannot and must not, because the Czechs are determlned to destroy the Slovak nation. A wlse and cautious person wlll not believe them, b&caúse the people doing the promlsing today are the pupils or Masaryk'a scbool and that school really excelled in deception. The "master" cheated to s uch an extent that he denled his own slgnature on the· document which was called the Pittsburgh Pact. The Slovak natlon has matured to sllch an extent that lt does not believe the Czechs. It shall belleve them, but with caution, only when t he Morava river shall again be thelr bouudary. � SLOVAKIA HOW TIIE CZECHS DECEIVED US CONST A NTIN E ČU L EN "Why do you not believe that old mistakes will not be repeated in the Czechoslovak Republlc?" I was asked by a Czech Slovak (a Czeehoslovak! ). "Because," I answer,,d, "only a donkey trlps twice on tbe same stone. And we Slovaks have already been deceived twice by Czech promiaes. One deceptlon was labeled the Pittsburgh Pact, and tbe second the Košice Agreement." "But you must belleve," said the Beneš Slovak, " just Jike a drowning man clinging to a straw." "Believe? But whom? The old decelvers? Here's a Jetter from a young Slovak who, In 1944, was one of those who believed the ~echs more than he dld hls brother Slovaks. After 1945," he wrltes, "many of my friends went to Prague to work in the mlnistrles. They worked in the Mlnistry of Foreign Trade, where Ripka was boss. When they wanted to execute some document, they had to steal it. In P rague they were willlng to employ Slovaks and, in cases, even elevate them, but they did not want them to work for Slovakia and make decisions and have influence on the trend of events and development of Slovakla." That young Slovak, an exile today, recently reminded me tbat I was right when I told bim, during the years of the Slovak Republlc, that the Czechs did not learn anything, or did they forget anythlng. At one Ume I collected a list of Czech promises very dillgently. Slnce 1919 I have recorded qulte a number or them. The first promlse sounded llke this: We Czechs are going to Slovakia only to help you out; when the Slovaks have capable people or their own, we w!ll ret•trn horne and let them manage their own arfalrs. Statlstics, however, show that there were less Slovaks in centra! offices in 1938, than there were in 1936. The schools in Slovakla, run by the Czechs, dld put out a lot of scholarly people, but !t seems that these schools were not as excellent as the Czech schools. Otherwlse someone mlght be able to say that this 1s just au anti-Czech argument to show that the Czechs used to send their worst professors to Slovakla, slnce they could not turn out, for example, anybody for the Jeading poslt!on in the Presidenťs office, in Parliament and in the varlous minlstries. The fact that out of 150 Generals only one was Slovak could be au argument that the Slovaks are a terribly peace-loving natlon and that the Czechs were all Žlžkas and warrlors. At the beginnlng of 1919, the offlclal Czech Press Bureau (ÔTK) had this joyful report propagated In Amer!ca: "The Slovak language shall be introduced as a required subject In the middle schools In Bohemia and Moravla. At the Prague philosophical facuJty it already has lts own seminary; it shall have a lecturer and the lectures on Slovak l!terature shall 'be ín Slovak. "Literary and scientlfic societles are prepar!ng to arrange coursel!I in Slovak for their members and for the general public. A Slovak dictionary and a Slovak comparat!ve . grammar are being publlshed. A review hlstory or literature wlll follow. �SLOV AK1A "A council of foremost Slovaks here or technical expert& on the Slovak language, because the Minlstry of Schools and Natlonal Enlightenment wills it, are preparing plans and school books for Slovakia, which shall be placed before natlve Slovak experta and, after agreement and approval, shall be published speedlly and passed out to ouľ students. "Professors from all sides are answering our call to teach in the first complete Slovak gymnasimn in Skalica; they are perfectlng themselves in Slovak and, as soon as circumstances allow, they shall actively undertake teaching work. And after the first middle school, there shall be in other parts of our country a second, a third and a fourth. "Already today the Slovak language is at horne in our entire State. A former Clnderella has now become the most-liked chlld of the entire Czechoslovak society" (NÁRODNt NOVINY, Jan. 16, 1919). Well, what flnally happened? The Slovak language was uot lntroduced into Czech schools, nay they stlfled it even in Slovak schools. In Bohemia the Czecn language was taught, but in Slovakla only the Czech brand of Slovak, that is the so-called "Czechoslovak" language. A Slovak dictionary and grammar were not being published at that time at all, nor were they being pre· pared. The dictlonary was prepared later by Professor Tvrdt, a Slovak professor, who could not flnd a teaching position in Slovakia. Slovak text)><loks were not approved by Slovaks, "but by Czechs in Pragúe. They _dld not like to approve textbooks prepared by Slovaks, because books afforded the Czechs a nice income. As late as 1938, practtcally all. textbooks of technical schools and a large percentage of the other schools in Slovakia were in Czech. At the Skalica gymnazlum, where Slovak professors flocked in such numbers already in 1919, there were, in 19~8, 15% Slovak professors and 85% Czech. lndeed, iu 1938, the Slovak language was not "at horne" even at the Universlty of Bratislava, or in barr acks, tbe schools and offlces. In 1988, 80% of the leading official pos itions in Slovakia were in Czech hands and the majority of Czechs offlciated in Czech. And in Prague, in the centra! offlces, where the destluy of Slovakia was being decided, there were three Slovaks out of 200 officials. In a word, in 1919 the Czech Press Bureau wanted Americans of Slovak descent to relax their vigilance. In the meantime, the Czech parliament, witb a Czech majority, passed a Iaw, according to which the Slovak nation vauished as such and, follo.wiug U1e Magyar pattern, instead of a unitary Hungarian natlon, we had a unltary Czechoslovak nation, with the Czechoslovak language as the otflcial language, the State language. Whosoever wishes can believe new Czech promises. The Slovakl!I cannot and must not, because the Czechs are determlned to destroy the Slovak nation. A wlse and cautious person wlll not believe them, b&caúse the people doing the promlsing today are the pupils or Masaryk'a scbool and that school really excelled in deception. The "master" cheated to s uch an extent that he denled his own slgnature on the· document which was called the Pittsburgh Pact. The Slovak natlon has matured to sllch an extent that lt does not believe the Czechs. It shall belleve them, but with caution, only when t he Morava river shall again be thelr bouudary. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA HOW TIIE CZECHS DECEIVED US CONST A NTIN E ČU L EN "Why do you not believe that old mistakes will not be repeated in the Czechoslovak Republlc?" I was asked by a Czech Slovak (a Czeehoslovak! ). "Because," I answer,,d, "only a donkey trlps twice on tbe same stone. And we Slovaks have already been deceived twice by Czech promiaes. One deceptlon was labeled the Pittsburgh Pact, and tbe second the Košice Agreement." "But you must belleve," said the Beneš Slovak, " just Jike a drowning man clinging to a straw." "Believe? But whom? The old decelvers? Here's a Jetter from a young Slovak who, In 1944, was one of those who believed the ~echs more than he dld hls brother Slovaks. After 1945," he wrltes, "many of my friends went to Prague to work in the mlnistrles. They worked in the Mlnistry of Foreign Trade, where Ripka was boss. When they wanted to execute some document, they had to steal it. In P rague they were willlng to employ Slovaks and, in cases, even elevate them, but they did not want them to work for Slovakia and make decisions and have influence on the trend of events and development of Slovakla." That young Slovak, an exile today, recently reminded me tbat I was right when I told bim, during the years of the Slovak Republlc, that the Czechs did not learn anything, or did they forget anythlng. At one Ume I collected a list of Czech promises very dillgently. Slnce 1919 I have recorded qulte a number or them. The first promlse sounded llke this: We Czechs are going to Slovakia only to help you out; when the Slovaks have capable people or their own, we w!ll ret•trn horne and let them manage their own arfalrs. Statlstics, however, show that there were less Slovaks in centra! offices in 1938, than there were in 1936. The schools in Slovakla, run by the Czechs, dld put out a lot of scholarly people, but !t seems that these schools were not as excellent as the Czech schools. Otherwlse someone mlght be able to say that this 1s just au anti-Czech argument to show that the Czechs used to send their worst professors to Slovakla, slnce they could not turn out, for example, anybody for the Jeading poslt!on in the Presidenťs office, in Parliament and in the varlous minlstries. The fact that out of 150 Generals only one was Slovak could be au argument that the Slovaks are a terribly peace-loving natlon and that the Czechs were all Žlžkas and warrlors. At the beginnlng of 1919, the offlclal Czech Press Bureau (ÔTK) had this joyful report propagated In Amer!ca: "The Slovak language shall be introduced as a required subject In the middle schools In Bohemia and Moravla. At the Prague philosophical facuJty it already has lts own seminary; it shall have a lecturer and the lectures on Slovak l!terature shall 'be ín Slovak. "Literary and scientlfic societles are prepar!ng to arrange coursel!I in Slovak for their members and for the general public. A Slovak dictionary and a Slovak comparat!ve . grammar are being publlshed. A review hlstory or literature wlll follow. SLOV AK1A "A council of foremost Slovaks here or technical expert& on the Slovak language, because the Minlstry of Schools and Natlonal Enlightenment wills it, are preparing plans and school books for Slovakia, which shall be placed before natlve Slovak experta and, after agreement and approval, shall be published speedlly and passed out to ouľ students. "Professors from all sides are answering our call to teach in the first complete Slovak gymnasimn in Skalica; they are perfectlng themselves in Slovak and, as soon as circumstances allow, they shall actively undertake teaching work. And after the first middle school, there shall be in other parts of our country a second, a third and a fourth. "Already today the Slovak language is at horne in our entire State. A former Clnderella has now become the most-liked chlld of the entire Czechoslovak society" (NÁRODNt NOVINY, Jan. 16, 1919). Well, what flnally happened? The Slovak language was uot lntroduced into Czech schools, nay they stlfled it even in Slovak schools. In Bohemia the Czecn language was taught, but in Slovakla only the Czech brand of Slovak, that is the so-called "Czechoslovak" language. A Slovak dictionary and grammar were not being published at that time at all, nor were they being pre· pared. The dictlonary was prepared later by Professor Tvrdt, a Slovak professor, who could not flnd a teaching position in Slovakia. Slovak text)><loks were not approved by Slovaks, "but by Czechs in Pragúe. They _dld not like to approve textbooks prepared by Slovaks, because books afforded the Czechs a nice income. As late as 1938, practtcally all. textbooks of technical schools and a large percentage of the other schools in Slovakia were in Czech. At the Skalica gymnazlum, where Slovak professors flocked in such numbers already in 1919, there were, in 19~8, 15% Slovak professors and 85% Czech. lndeed, iu 1938, the Slovak language was not "at horne" even at the Universlty of Bratislava, or in barr acks, tbe schools and offlces. In 1988, 80% of the leading official pos itions in Slovakia were in Czech hands and the majority of Czechs offlciated in Czech. And in Prague, in the centra! offlces, where the destluy of Slovakia was being decided, there were three Slovaks out of 200 officials. In a word, in 1919 the Czech Press Bureau wanted Americans of Slovak descent to relax their vigilance. In the meantime, the Czech parliament, witb a Czech majority, passed a Iaw, according to which the Slovak nation vauished as such and, follo.wiug U1e Magyar pattern, instead of a unitary Hungarian natlon, we had a unltary Czechoslovak nation, with the Czechoslovak language as the otflcial language, the State language. Whosoever wishes can believe new Czech promises. The Slovakl!I cannot and must not, because the Czechs are determlned to destroy the Slovak nation. A wlse and cautious person wlll not believe them, b&caúse the people doing the promlsing today are the pupils or Masaryk'a scbool and that school really excelled in deception. The "master" cheated to s uch an extent that he denled his own slgnature on the· document which was called the Pittsburgh Pact. The Slovak natlon has matured to sllch an extent that lt does not believe the Czechs. It shall belleve them, but with caution, only when t he Morava river shall again be thelr bouudary.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource How the Czechs Deceived Us Description An account of the resource Constantine Čulen Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952 pp. 42-43 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Čulen, Konštantín, 1904-1964 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/8a07f8a0f63768f3250f2df46d174473.pdf 2ae7e0bca944237820e30c44ff57c0f7 PDF Text Text SLOVAKÍA Z5 1 WAS IN SWVAKJA Edward L. Delaney Many Slovaks in America, especially those horn in this country, have but a limited knowledge of their parents' or grandparents' !and. As for the millions of Americans who have no klnsbip with Slovak!a, the word is merely the latter half of Czecho-Slovakia, which had been impressed upon their consclousness by the propaganda bureaus ot tbe late Edward BAnes and bis predecessor Thomas Masaryk. One will search long In those propaganda papers for any paragraphs conveying the impresslon that the Slovaks are the political, cultural or industria! equals o! the Czechs. Perhaps one reason that the Czech rather than the Slovak part of the hyphenated name has been given greater publicity !s that the capital, Prague, is predomlnantly Czech and the majority or visitors from other parta of the world seldom get beyond that city. There is no denying that the Prague of pre-1945 days did possess an individua.l atmosphere and charm for those who are interested In the architectural treasures and historlcal landmarks of Europe's older ci ties. · It was this writer's good fortune to have vis!ted or reslded Cor extended periods in several ot the other European capitals before visiting Prague. Many months later I was afforded the opportunity for a stay of two years in Slovakia. At that Ume the synthetic CzechoSlovakia had ceased to exist. Following nine hundred years or struggling fot; independence, the Republic of Slovakla was establlshed and the people could say that they had attained somethlng approximating tbeir goal. Tbe evening of my arrival in Bratislava, capital of tbe new State, a Professor Doba! called on me at the Carlton Hotel. He lnformed me that he was connected with the State propaganda bureau and that their attache, Streiznic, at tbe Berlin Legatľon, had telegraphed that l was arrlvlng. Foreign correspondents and writers were sought out by them and efforts made to present their country In the best light. An appolntment was made ror me to meet bis cbief, Tido J. Gaspar. Tido J., as I soon learned, was the most photographed man in Slovakia. No news reel was complete witbout bim smiling or band· shaking 'bi~ way into the center of the picture. He was the official greeter An actor with the wbole country as bis stage. In bis !apel, winter or summer, was always a gardenia, a full bloom rose or a cluster of flowers In season. His attire was patterned on tbe rigorously correct Unes 'Óf New York's ófficial greeter, Grover Whalen. In fact one got the lmpresslon that T!do J. Gaspat may bave met or studied tbe life-and-times of Grover Wbalen or the late Jimmy Walker, the most popular mayor New York ever had. for he was their counterpart in Centra! Europe. What can I do for you ?" · he asked after we had exchanged the usua,I formalities of visitor and host. "Nothlng," I informed bim, except to suggest what would be In• teresting · for me from a scen!c as well as a hlstor!cal point ot �26 SLOVAKIA view. That appealed to him. The alert and competent young men or his travel department la!d out an !tlnerary for me whlch covered the pr!ncipal c!tles and !ncluded a short stay in the justly famed H!gh Tatra resorts of the Carpath!an Mounta!ns. Bratislava was at that tlme the Mecca for all who, by any maneuvering, could arrange to go there. World War II was in the early stages. Food restrictions and rationing had been !mposed on a large part of Western and Centra! Europe. A long bridge over the Danube connects Bratislava with Austrla, across which rolls the rail and motor traff!c to Vlenna some s!xty miles away. But !t ls no longer the Vienna of Johann Strauss and Franz Lehar music with food and rink to be enjoyed in lelsurely comfort. Even in those early days of the war all Au.stria and Germany were areas of dismal faces and unappetlzing meals. Bratislava - which many still referred to as Pressburg - was the magnet that drew vlsitors from all Centra! Europe. For in Slovakia was to be had food and rink, muslc and laughter w!thout let, stay, or hindrance. With the exception of the adjoining country of Hungary, no other part of Centra! Europe enjoyed the essentials and many of the luxuries of life, as did the people of Slovakla before the period when Stalin's hordes swarmed over the country like a swarm of locusts and literally laid lt to waste. In most of the propaganda that emanated from various sources in Europe and was eagerly snapped up and exaggerated by the sinlster influences in this country, the impression was conveyed that Germany syphoned off the food resources of Slovakia long before thelr armies actually occupled the country late in the year 1944. Even at the risk of being charged with attempting to mitigate the sins of the Nazi Reglme. I assert that, in those days it was regarded as rare good fortune if one could get lnto the Slovak paradise and there obtain a good meat wlth whatever was desired in the way of w!nes, spirits or liquors, all at prices which, even in those tlmes were reasonabl!l. Until the severe winter of 1944-45, citrus fruits, such as lemons and oranges from Italy or Spain, might he had in the public markets. Such delicacies had been off the markets in Austria and Germany for nearly five years. In addition to al! dairy products, poultry, beef, pork, sugar, <>onfectionery and tobacco wares were obta!nable in Slovak!a with but slight restrlctlons on the amount of certaln items that mlgbt be pur• chased. Also clotbing. s boes and dress materlals were to be had. At tbat time the shops of Austrla and Germany were bare of goods. Just over the Danube from Bratislava the sbops were emoty. Such stores as the Woolworth cbain were barren. Shelves and tables of empty cartons or a single item - usually a wooden toy or some article of glass. Rows of the same useless article. Nothing was to be found that contalned metal, cotton, rubber wool, s!lk - all of which materials were needed for the war supplies. After observing those empty shops in Vienna, Munich, Berlin. Frankfurt and Cologne, it was as a fairyland to enter business establlshments of the same type In Slovakia and f!nrl most anything one might expect to see in shops beyond the warrlng zone. �SLOVAKIA 27 The people or Slovakia knew they were enjoylng a verltable heaven of plenty as compared to thelr neighbors. T heir new status as an independent country began in the spring of 1939. Only a few rersons, whether in the cities. towns or villages, did not realize that they were the envy of people in their neighborlng states. Slovak inde• pendence and self-determinatlon was paying them divldends even in the material advantages they could see and understand. Small wonder that their political leaders were popular and their policles approved. Therefore it was not surprlsing that the majority of the people had only words or praise for President Joseph Tiso and the other of!icials of their young republic. What many dld not reallze was that Germany was syphonlng off thelr surplus or agrlcultural and manufactured products. In exchange the Slovaks dld recelve some goods, such as tools, machinery, electrical equipment and rallway supph es, but for the most part they got only promises to pay in such materials. The debt owing by Germany was increasing with staggerlng amounts each month. But the majority of the people enjoyed thelr temporary prosperity with scant worry about the future. Although there was little doubt in their minds as early as 1942, that the Axls Powers were doomed to defeat, they held to the hope that by somf! political magic they would escape the horrors of war and the pf!nalties to follow. In those days of the Republlc of Slovakla, it was a country or contrasts. Evidences of its centuries old clvilizatlon and customs were to be observed alongside products that were as up to the minute as tomorrow's newspaper. For example: the express tralns making daily trips to and from the high Tatra resorts were powered by Diesel electrlc locomotives, with Jounge. dining and observation cars comparable to those of other European railway systems. But in the country, through which the deluxe traln sped smoothly, one observed also the prlmltlve ox carts on winding dlrt roads. Oxen pulled the ploys and harrows In the fields. Moreover, the branch railway lines that wound around or over the mountains and dipped down into fertile valleys offered the traveler what comfort he might get from a bard wooden bench In a dlmly llgh ted coach behlnd a wood burnlng steam engine of the type used In the western mountain country of the Unlted States seventy-five years ago. Stepping from the modern express on the High Tatra run, to the minlature traln that huffed and puffed its way to Banska Stiavnica was like bridging a gap of t.hree quarters of a century. It chanced that my arrival in Banska Stiavnica synchronized with a heavy snow storm. After plodding through darkness and deep snow for what seemed to be a mlie, the youth. who had dragged my luggage on a sled. ushered me through the portals of a buildlng that had al\ the appearances of an old Roman ruln. It was old and the Romans had probably been there. but lt was not ruined and from the durable manner in which stone and mortar were put into buildings In those middle ages, it will not be in rulns for another few centuries. Tens of thousands of shoes or sandals had worn deep grooves In the stone door step. E lectrlc llghts replaced the candles or oil tapers that had _Iighted the way for guests who came there in other �SLQVAKIA 28 centuries, but that was a bout all the concesslon that had been made to the lJ!Odern world. The building, so l learned from the Sudeten German woman who operated it, was over three hundred years old. The cold room to which I was asslgned boasted a bed whlch was less than three centuries old, but it was about the only modem plece In the antique setting. Although appreciat!ng the charm of archltectural treasures and old Jandmarks, there are limes when one misses the creature comforts that are affored in our modern hotels and homes. Tbat was one of tbose times. But the warmlng effect of a "slivovica" and gobs or excellently roasted goose, i,olisbed off with another potent drink, served to banlsh the fear of \Vaking in that three hundred year old room to find tbat I was frozen to death. Oddly enough one seldom heard about the precious metals that were once part of Slovakia's contrlbutlon to the worlďs wealth. Much of the old currency and art objects in the Hungarian empire and Centra! Europe were made from gold and silver ores that were mined at Kremnica and near Banska Stiavnica. But witb tbe increaslng costs of production and the relatlvely cbeap prlce or the metal during tbe quarter of a century before tbe birth of the Republlc of Slovakia, those -mines had been practically abondoned. World War II altered tbe situation. Centra) Europe was cut off (rom tbe silver producing countries of North and South America. Mining of that metal was steppe<l up. The silver sm.iths of Slovakia again plied thelr trade and many articles of thelr handlwork appeared in the sbops. Througb the perfidlous acts of the signers of the agreements at Teheran and Yalta, Stalin's minions. the Communist confiscators, have no doubt taken possession of tbose sources of wealth. Whatever treasure ts taken from them now, finds its way into the coffers ot the Communists instead of belng rashioned into articles for the use ot people or for objects of art in the churcbes or Cbrist. Like other In• dustries, whicb were created or resulted after tbe establishment of the Republic or Slovakia. tbe mines or Stiavnica are servlng the needs of Stalin. Political charlatans. such as Edward Benes, who were lauded by tbe American press and propagandists. sold tbe Slovaks lnto bondage for less than the thirty pieces o! sllver, wbich was the prlce of J udas for betraying bis Master. Tbey wanted and for a Ume e njoyed persona) aggrandizement and polltlcal power as puppets of tbelr Moscow master. They silenťed any murmur of protest tbat mlgbt have been raised by the people who for nine bundred years had struggled for indepen?.encei · · S LO V A K IA - V ICTI M OF TE.H ERAN A N D Y A LTA Tbe Centra! European satellites around the Soviet star are often to as. being of Slavic origin. Some omnisctent ones give that as one reason why Stalin had little dlfflculty In merging them into tbe Red. orbít. Slovakia, as we know, was one or tbe countrie!\ sold lnto bondage at Teheran and Yalta - tbe completlon or the betrayal belng seen when Eduarq Benes returned in 1945 as puppet president of tbe socalled Czecho-Slovakia and for two years or so made grotesque referŕed �i LOVAKIA efforts to disguise tbe fact tbat Stalin, and not Benes or Klement Gottwahl, was tbe supreme belng In their capltal al Prague. Etbnologlcally lt is not lncorrect to group tbe peoples ot Russla. Poland, Czecboslovakia, Ukralnla, Bulgarla and Yugoslaľia into a Pan-Slav classlflcation. Tbe vast majority of the peoples In lhe socalled Slav nations bas llttle in common witb tbe Russa!ns. In past generations tbere was a bond of Cbristian religion wb!cb ran tbrough all tbe Slav countries, eitber tbe Ortbodox Greek-Russian Cburcb or, in tbe case of Slovakia, Poland, Croatia. lbe Roman Catbollc Cburcb. Tbe rise or atbelstlc Communlsm In Russla was t be deatb knell of Chrlstlanity tbere, bence a splltting wedge was d riven between most of the Balkan and Centra! European countries and t be great Slav domain of tbe Soviet. Slovakla, Poland and Croatla bave been predominantly Roman Catbollc for centuries. Only a small percentage are adherents ot tbe Ortbodox Cburcb. Hence, any contention tbat tbere is a racia! and religlous afflnity among the Slav peoples, wblcb simplifled tb elr enslavement by Moscow, 1s lacklng In support. F urthermore, lt is leaktng out tbrougb cracks and crinks In the Iro!l Curtaln that Stalln ls flnd· ing more tban a llttle dltficulty In merglng the Slovaks lnto bis godless domain. Wben for over eleven centuries a people, sucb as tbe Slovaks wbo bave prayed to God and H is Son, tbe Cbrlst, lt ls not llkely tbat tbe delty of tbe Kremlin can soon purge t belr mlnds or tbe OnA Supreme Being. THE SLOVAK$ ARE CELTS? Also - lf we were to accept the oplnlon of a learned professor it was my good fortune to meet in Banska Bystrica - tbere ls no RACIAL kinshlp between tbe Slovaks and tbe Russians. The Slovaks are not Slavs, asserted tbat student of blstory, but on the contrary ' they are Celts. A professor Doba! In Bratislava had given me a note ót lntroductlon to tbe curator of tbe museum In Banska Bysttica. It de· veloped tbat tbe gentleman knew more about the bistory ot manklnd tban Gl bbons, H. G. Wells, or any ot tbose wbo bave wtltten. 'Welgbty tomes on tbe origin or man, etc. ' 1• Tbls Slovak scbolar, well along In yt>ars, bad ·been lnstrúctor In a unlversity al Constantlnople (before it was called Istanbul) also in Budapest. His speclalty was Sanskrit Arabic, tbe Hebrew language and otber writings on tbe earlíest hlstory or manklnd. "You are Irisb," he said to me, after we had dlsposed of a slivovica and coffee, "and the Irlsh are Celts. A characteristlc ot tbe l rlsb is black halr with blue eyes. Tbat 1s observed among our people here In Slovakla." President Tiso, 1 have already mentioned had black bair and blue eyes. If the professor ,vas endeavorlng to make me feel a racia! kinshlp wlth the Slovaks - the Celtlsh background - he certatnly supported hls oplnion wlth more arguments than black and b lue for hair and eyes. lt was a lengthy thesls he expounded on tbe !:'Ubject, but the glst or lt was that au the people or Europe stem from the origlnal tn h abitants llvlng in tbe region around the Medlterranean, the Jordah, tbe �30 SLOVAKIA Hed and the Dead Sea. The garden of Paradise is supposed to have been in that general part of the Near East. The Celts - as part of the early human family of whlch we have any history, so the professor asserted - were brawny, pioneer lads, pagans in those days, of course, who hunted and explored and pushed their way westward. Some of them got as far as the western s hores of Europe, which we now know as the coast of Brittany in France. From there they launched boats and set up their cabeens in Ireland and Scotland, wbere they are today. Some of those early Ce!ts, acco rding to this student of the subject, decided tha,t the area just west of the Carpathian Mountalns - which is Slovakia - was a pretty good part of the earth to stake out for t heir children and grandchildren for generations to come. So there they stayed. Like the other Celts who went on to I reland, they were converted to Christ!anlty well over a thousand years ago and bave remained steadfast in their faith ever slnce, just as have the fightin' lrish. That, the Banska Bystrica gentleman lnformed me. is another evidence of the kinship, the similarlty in character and traditions. He then escorted me to a conical plie of stones towerlng four stories high, in which were kept many relics and articles that had been dug from the ground in Slovakia over th e past generations. There were cooking utensils, ornaments of solid gold and silver, bits of clothing, crude instruments for killing, such as tbe crusaders of the middle ages carried, and many other articles. Oddly enough, 1 had seen articles almost identically the same in the museum of Dublin, Ireland, on one of my visits there. Those in the Dublin museum had been unearthed in tbe peat bogs and fields of Ireland. The professor had a point there. The traces of clvllization, which we have found, do have similarity. The old gentleman then took me to his home and into the b asement or cellar under it. There were stacks of musty manuscripts, some on tbe oldest known kind of parchment. The signs and symbols on tbey were just hierog!yphics to me, but to that scholar they told stories and epics of hlstory wbich had been written in the mlddle ages. Whether or not tbe Slovaks are Celts and kin ot the Irish and Scots, instead of the Russians, I shall not attempt to prove. But that was the contention of one learned Slovak in Banska Bystrica. S LOV AKIA U NDER THE REDS Of course, now that the Communisl<i are in Slovakia, and Moscow is to be regarded as the fountain head of all culture and wisdom, it is likely that any reference to tbe Cbristian Celts as being remotely related to the Slovaks will be purged trom the people's minds and records. It would be interesting to know what the Communlsts have done to the sbrlne, the mausoleum of Fatber Andrej H linka In Ruzomberok, at wbich I had knelt in prayer a day or so before going to Banska Bystrica. It was Father Hlinka who, by bis zeal, tireless energy and strength of cbaracter, had brought about the political unity and solidarity wh!ch made possi ble tbe creation of the Slovak Republic. Al· thougb lt was short Jlved, it did demonstrate to the world that a �SLOVAKIA 31 Slovak state is feasible and may again be upon the maps of Europe. It would be incorrect to assert that everyone in the Slovak Repub• Ile, durlng the stx years of its exlstence, was enthuslastlcally 01>tlmistic as to lts future in the assembly of nations comprlsíng the European continent. In this connection, it shoula be mentioned, tbat tbe greatly_ publicized pian or proposal said to bave been urged by General Dwight Eisenhower, !or a United States of Europe, may be dlsmissed as wlshful thinking. Such a "United States" could not possibly function at thls stage of world history when half of Europe is free and half s lave, half Christlan and half under the ruthless dominatlon of pagan dictators. Until the situation 1s altered and Communism ls banished from Europe, there can be no lasting unity. To even dlscuss the matter be· fore that 1s accomplished, is utterly Cutile. A SLOVAK TEXAS RANGER SPEAKS HIS MIND A well-to-do industrialist in Bratislava pointed out to me about 1942 what was to be the fate of Slovakla and Europe in the postwar period. He iS not a Slovak but one who resided in Slovakla when it was part oľ the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. then under the gov· ernment of Czechoslovakia and remained to carry on under tbe Re· 1mblic, as did many of Hungarlan, Czecb, Austrian or German natlonality. All enjoyed equ al rights. As be may still be living there, it would be wrong to mentlon bis name, because reprisals might be inflicted on bim, should these words be brought to the attentlon of Red spies in tbis country. On my lnitial visit to bis home, the first objects that met my eyes were a western saddle and a Wlnchester rifle In a regulatlon leather holster. Very much American. Then I got tbe story. He had been a Texas Ranger in bis younger days! There were notches in bis leg from slugs of desperados, several of wbom he had killed in bis encounters wltb tbem along the borders of the Rio Grande. Speaklng five languages fluently and knowing thl! contlnent of Europe thorougbly, his opinions on the current and impending eventa were wor• thy of attentlon "Wbat a misfortune 'Teddy' Roosevelt isn't in the White House today," he said shortly after we met. "Things would be dlfferent. Tbe way lt appears now, Europe is being delivered stralgbt lnto chaos and Communism. You know what that means? I do. Durlng the bloody reign of terror under tbat so-and-so (expressive Texas Ranger term) Bela Kun, I witnessed enough of lt. I was !nterpreter before some ot the committees in Budapest and stared that 'so-and-so' In the eye many a tlme. ľd bave kllled bim if I got the chance, and he knew lt. What is the intention of Franklln Roosevelt? To dellver us over t<_> the Reds aga in?" It was necE>ssary to first destroy the forces or Hitler, I pointed out and then . . . "Then what? Thaťs tbe quest!on. True enougb the Nazl yoke on the German people must be broken and they be brought back to belp in the scheme of thlngs. But you mark my worda, Stalln is the only one who ia winning anything in thia war. He'a not winning it elther. lťs being given to him. Unless bis henchmen are thrown out of t.he �32 SLOVAKIA Balkans, the Baltic states, Poland and all the other spots he will take over soon; the whole of Europe and western civllizatlon wlll go back• ward tor ~ century or so." "You are not so badly off here in Slovakia at present," I ventured to say. "NQnsense. Our freedom here is but temporary, and so 1s the pros• períty, Fooľs gold. You know what tbat 1s? A flasb In the pan, a mi· rage. Can't make this country self-sufficient. It bas to be bltcbed on t& some other part of Europe. Always has been. Tbe Germans deve!• oped it at one period of bistory. It was part of tbe Hapsburg Man· archy, tben the neglected half of Czecho·Slovakla. It wlll be taken over by the Reds after the war - see if ľm not rlght. Could make it a self·determining state, if the otber European powers, supported by America, demanded it. But tbey won't, unless great pressure ls brougbt on the influences now in Washington, London and Paris. But ľm not leaving here. Sure, ľm what tbey cal\ a capitallst, an enemy of the Reds. rve gat that Wincbester and two Colt plstols. Wben they're empty the Reds can take wbaťs left. I won't know mucb about it tben." That was one man's opinion of wbat was transplring in Slovakia anct Centra! Europe at tbat time and wbat he thought tbe future beld far tbem. He was not always so explosive in bis observatlons. but in tbe two years and more I knew bim I learned to respect his estimate of the Europeao scene. though at times I may not have entlrPIY agreed with bim. But was be not right as regards the sell-out of Christianity in Cen· tral Europe? Was he not correct In bis predictlon that only Stalln was wiooing t he war and that bis greatest aldes were then oot In '.\toscow. but In London and Washington? In these days when we art! exhorted to strlve and save and struggle to rescue Europe and ourselves rrom the menace of Communlst cont.rol, let us reflect on tbe facts or tbose who - wltb wbat appears to bave been pre-determlnation - consigned Slovak:a and otber Christian nations to perdition. MEETING PRESIDENT TISO At a dinner party in Bratislava l flrst met Joseph Mracna, formerly Consul far Czecboslovakia in New York. lt developed, wben comparlng notes, t hat we had both salled from New York on the same day in Oecembr 1939. He on tbe Vulcania bound far Llsbon. wbile my voyage was on tbe Excalibur witb Genoa as my destinatlon. Mracna and bis wlfe, who was Viennese. were very pro-American an.d longed far the tlme when they migbt return to tbe Unitd States wher-e he ·had many frlends and acqualntaoces, several of whom were also my friends. Although born In Slovakia, Mracna had spent tbe greater part of bis life in other countries. He attended unlversities in Vienna and Par!s, following wb!ch he had been occup!ed In forelgn countrles even before becoming the Czecboslovakian Consul In New York. He was, at the time I knew him, a member of tbe Foreign Office of the new Sl_ovak .Republlc wbere hls experience and knowledge of affalrs in .several other countries was most usefuL I asked !f he could arrange an audience for me with the Pres!dent. He said he could; and did. �SLOVAKIA 33 When I arr!ved at the presldentlal palace at the time ap polnted for my a udlence, Ka rol Murin, persona) secretary for the Preslden t, cautioned me aga!nst detaining him too long and also mentioned that it would be inappropriate to questlon him on matters of foreign a nd domestlc policy. Mracna, it seems, had lnferred that !t was more of a persona) and human interest chat that I desired with the P res!den t, whlch was correct, but r was also most eager to interview bim on politlcal issues - domestic and foreign. Monsignor J oseph Tiso. or Pres!dent Tiso as he was then, rad!a ted those qua lities so often observed in the successful pol!tlc!an. An!mation, vigor, affability and the obvious desire to make frlends and please people, withont Jettlng it appear as a veneer to mask h!s real thoughts. He greeted me with a hearty llandshake and. after Karol Murin left us. he Jed the way to the corner of bis study in the palace. He was in perfect health, but a physical dlrector would undoubtedly have prescribed more exercise to guard agalnst overwelght whlch ls often the worry of those nearing the half-century mark. His black ha!r was but sparsely sprinkled wlth grey and a radiant tr!nkle llgh ted bis dark blue eyes. Slnce my knowledge of the Slovak language was limited to some dozen or more words and he spoke very little Engllsh, our interview was carried on in German. My openlng remark was that he had established history by belng the first Catholic priest to be the head of a sovere!gn state. "Oh, no," he replied, "there was Selpel in the former Austrian government." Monsi'gnor Seipel, 1 reminded bim, was prime minister but not president. "There was Richelieu." He, too, as l called to bis attention, was prime minister whiJe Louis of France was king. So it seemed that my reference to history was correct. After some minutes or general conversatlon I said that I had been cautioned not to question bim on matters of state, but that I would like to do so. "Please do. Any questions you ask, l'll try to answer the m." WHAT ABOUT POLICIES? Then 1 was free to touch on several topics that lnterested me and most anyone else who had any knowledge of the happen!ngs !nside Central Europe during these days. "It is true that your pol!cies are dictated by Germany?" '"No," he lnsfsted. "In forelgn matters our policies are formu• lated so that tbey do not conflict with those of the Axls Powers. Slnce we are within their orblt lt would be sulcidal to strongly oppose them. But in domestlc matters we form our own pollcles whlch, In many instances, do not coincide wlth those of Germany. German terr!tory as you know is just across the Danube. Only a bridge between us but it !s a long bridge." He smiled when he realized that. I grasvoo his none too subtle meaning. �34 SLOVAKIA "Some of your critics," I then said, "declare that you - and by that I mean the Slovak Republic - are subject to instructions from the Vatican." "The usual charge of the uninformed," he replied. "l have no connection with the Vatican, except through the diplomatic channels, the same as other countries to which the Vatican City has accredited representation. (T here was a Vatlcan diplomatic official resident in Bratislava.) Any communications affecting the religious affairs of our people would be transmitted through the bishops. I am not a bishop. In my capacity as president I have no counection with Rome, other than I have polnted out." All rellgious denominations were accorded the same right of worship, he pointed out. The largest Protestant group was the Lutheran Evangelical, of which Rev. Martin Razus was the accepted leader and who was not only cooperating with bim politically, but they were personal friends. In the eastern part of the state were also many Orthodox or Greek Catholics. AGAIN WITH THE CZECHS ? Was lt likely, l asked, that the Slovaks and Czechs would again llilite in a government after tbe war? That questinon did not receive a direct answer. He remlnded me that trom the very inception of the Czecho-Slovakian government, there had been dlscrimintalon against tbe Slovaks. The autonomy, which had been promlsed, had been denied them. Those who protested and agitated for Slovak rights, such as Hlinka and hlmself, were imprisoned. Something like nine months he had spent in a Czech jail for protestlng the injustices that were lnflicted on t he Slovak people and demanding that their rights be recognized. Later he had been Minister of Health in the Prague cabinet. The Slovaks. he assured me, de· s ired to live in peace and harmony wlth the Czechs, the Poles, the Hungarlans and the Germans, but they a lso believed they were entltled to the "self-determlnation" that had been loudly proclaimed and was said to be the lnalienable right even of all small nations. They were now, for the first Ume in hlstory, an independent country. The problems facing them were many and varied. President Tiso referred wlth considerable pleasure to hls vislt in the Unlted States in 1937. He expressed the wish that the thousands of Slovaks in Canada and the United States be informed of the prospects for bette rment which he felt was due their people through the enactment of the programs of development then under way. NEED OF TEACHERS AND TECHNICIANS Thelr greatest problem, he said, was in finding men and women for the jobs that had been created. "We need technlcians, instructors in t he schools and universities and speciallsts for industria! projects. Our hlgh schools are over-crowded. Students want education and want to get ahead, but we lack sufflcient teachers. Tbe same in many businesses. We bope to meet these needs in tlme." He made the remark that, although s peclallsts and technlclans were urgently needed. he boped tbey would not bave to rely too much on the Germans. Tbat and otber comments indicated hls disllke for �SLOVAKIA 36 tbe small army of German engineers and tecbnicians wbo had come into the country to aid In its development. THE SLOVAKS AND THE RUSSIANS There had been a small token Slovak force sent against the Soviet soon after the outbreak of the German-Soviet hostillties in 1941, but they were withdrawn and tbe men, for the most part, were work· Ing in various industries that contributed products for the war effort. l pointed out to the President that they and tbe Russians were Slavs and was it not consistent that they be on tbe side of tbeir blood brotbers? Tbere was a pause and bis face became very earnest. "Quite true, We are blood brothers. But when tbose blood brotbers are Bolsheviks and Communlsts," doubling his flst and pounding on the table in front of bim Tiso said, ''then we'll fight to tbe last man." Presldent Tiso, like the martyred Draja Mlhailovitcb of Yugosla• vla, Archbisbop Stepinac and Mindszenty of Budapest, did not hesitate to take a firm and defiant stand against the greatest menace Christian civlllzation was then facing - and is still facing today. But because he and tbose other courageous ones were not deceived by tbe propaganda, the pious platitudes and spurious pollcies of tbe Western Powers as regards tbe Soviet, he was marked for sacrifice. The Washington State Department, at tbe bebest of Stalln's puppets, actually delivered bim to tortures and to death. Deny it tbougb they would llke to do today - when Christian leaders llke J osepb Tiso are neetled to weld Central Europe into a strong bastion against the Communlst horde - the bald trutb remains that In 1945 our State Department, as a supine and subserv!ent tool of Stalin. cons!gned T!so and tbe Slovaks t_o Red domination and extermination. Regardless of all arguments to the contrary, Josepb Tiso was slncerely desirous of helping his people - the long oppressed country that for nine hundred years had kept the fires or Chrlstlanlty alive in Centra! Europe. How long those fires will smoulder under the ruth· less domination of Communist destroyers of religion and clvllizatlon, is a grave question. Wbether it was mistaken judgment for tbe Slovaks to accept the assistance of Germany, to achieve the measure of independence they enjoyed, is a matter of oplnion. There was no war in progress wben the Slovak Republlc was born and none was imminent. Tbey revolted against obvlous injustices of tbe Prague Government. The Czech majority could bave compromised and settled tbeir dlfferences. Tbey did not. Wben tbe interna] revolt came. Hitler took advantage of tbe situatlon and proffered bis migbt against outslde aggresslon. Slovakla accepted tbe offer. If Josepb Tiso was a traltor to bis country, then tbe same can be said of Eamon de Valera in Ireland, Mabatma Gbandi in India. or the gallant Marsball Mannerheim in brave little Flnland. AII were patriots fighting for tbeir people. All were persecuted, smeared and discredited, but tbeir names will live in tbe blstories yet to be wrltten. �36 SLOVAKlA TI SO HAD A SENSE OF H UMOR After furtber lengtby dlscussion of varlous toplcs, I was about to depart when Karol Murin came to Inform tbe President tbat tbe Finance Minister was waitlng to see bim. Tlso accompanled me lnto a vast room looklng out across a walled garden in wbicb he sald líe took dally walks. Little dld l know tben tbat, over two year.s later, he would be taking many long walks togetber in another walled enclosure and resume our discussions on tbe worlďs affairs. But tbat is another story. Tbe air of tbe room was cbilly. - A tbougbt occurred to me. "Your Excellency," I said, ·•some persons told me tbat you a re always very seriouJ and earnest. But tbere's a twlnkle ot mirtb In your eyes at times and I bave an Idea tbat there's conslderable humor In you." "Perbaps," he smlled. "Would lt be appropriate If I gave you a little present?" "Wbat, · for instance·?" "I tbougbt tbat in tbese cold days of winter, just for mediclnal purposes, of course, you migbt appreciate a half dozen bottles ot gflod Canadlan whisky." Tlso chuckled and bis eyes lígbted witb the mirth I had noted there before. "ľll be glad to get lt," be' ~'aid. · The half dozen bottles were duly delivered fróm a source In "Bra tislava wbere I knew it was obtainable. Later on Karol Murin ask-ečl me to call again at tbe palace, wben I was given the compllments ot the Presldent and a token of bis appreciation for the whisky. It lš a wonder!ully embroidered table c loth, one of the finest specimens ot Slovak rieedlework that could posslbly be found. It is today my most treasur-ed possession. Very recently a letter came to me trom Karol Murin who ls now a resident of Canada. He informed me that my friend Joseph Mracna, whom I got to know very well in tbe two years following our meeting, had been murdered by the Commnnists. The Slovak patriot, Monslgnor Joseph Tlso, was delivered to Benes and bi.s Red Government by. the United States autborlties to be exterminated, because he was the arch enemy of Communism. Jn 1946, the year when· that assistance to Communist deslgns was. rendered by our offlclals, lt was polltlcally unwise to declare one's 'undying opposition to the forces or antl-God even then seeklng our destruction. Presldent Tiso pald tbe supreme penalty for bis devotion to bis God and bis country. COMES MY TURN TO BE I NVESTIGATED Tbe Carlton Hotel, in Bratislava, where I had reslded for months, was a meeting place for German military officers, legation attaches and couriers, coming and going all the tíme. A physician llving in the hotel, wbom I had called on a tlme or two for professlonal services, informed· me tbat someone at the German Legatlon had quizzed bim about me. The pbyslcian was Slovak, bis wife Hungarlan, enougb to assure me they were not sympathetic to the German otflcials. "That American 1s no frlend ot Germany," the legation omclal sald to the physician. ·'Whaťs he dolng here and why is he permitted to stay ?" �SLOVAKIA 37 Just what the doctor said to dlvert suspicion, I do not know, but within a few days the local police inspectors came to question me a bout my stay in the country, my source ot income, what 1 was doing, and so on. My replles were vague, but apparently satlsfactory for the Slovak police. But it caused me considerable worry. Pressure mlght be brought to bear which would send me across that bridge into German territory. That I must escape at all costs. Again I sought out Joseph Mracna In the Foreign Office. We bad talked frankly before and I knew I could trust hlm. My permit to remaln in Slo· vakia was about to expire and also my passport. Would they deport me? Mracna conferred wlth the proper authoritles, then lnformed me that if I did not become a "public charge·• - that !s, if I had assets on which to live - they . would give me sanctuary. I -would not be detported even at the expiration of permits or passports. I assured him that my persona! assets were sufficient to maintaln me for an extended period. 1 GO TO PIESTAN Y At the suggestion of Mracna, I arranged to live in Piestany, a health resort about sixty mlles from Bratislava which !s famed for its hot baths. It was far enough from the capltal that the German mllitary officlals or Gestapo agents wer not prowling around. Al· though the Republic malntalned its own police and defense force, judiciary, customs and ·immigration officials - no one arrlving or departing without tbeir sanction - there seemed to be a tacit agreement that the German military and legation oftlcials could come there for extended holidays. They came malnly [or food and drink, which weré almost non-existent in Germany and Austria at that tlme. Piestany is world famed. The baths - mud and hÓt pools - are beneficial for those wlth rheumatlsm, arthritls and other ills. Before the war there were visitors from as far away as India, Africa and l;loth North and South America. The two largest hotels - one on an island of the Vah River, and on which are the hot springs had been taken over and operated by the Interior Department ot the Slovak State. Soon after I went there as a voluntary "internee," Piestany became tbe headquart.ers of many involuntary internees of the Slovak Government. First to arrive were twenty-six - including the children - ot the !talian dlplomatlc corps in Bratislava. The !talian Minister, Cortese. had declared his allegiance to the antl-Mussolini, or Badoglio government, which jolned forces with the Western Allies. Naturally, he and bis entlre staff who shared his sympathles were anathema to the Germans. With the setting up of the Fascist forces in Northern Haly, pressure was brought to bear on Slovakia to deport the anti Fascists to the northern part of Italy which was still occupied by Germany and cooperating with it. TISO, TH E H U MAN ITARIAN But. contrary to generally circulated statements that President Tiso was a puppet ot Germany, he deflnitely refused to llsten to the suggestlons or demands of the Germans. nor wonld he consent to the Itallan Legatlon staff belng interned In Germany, which was a �38 SLOVAK.IA later idea of the Germans. So wlthin six weeks or my taking up residence in the Grand Royal Hotel in Piestany as a lone "internee," twenty-slx Italians moved in together with two attaches of the Slovak Foreign Offlce a.s guardians or "watchers." Two of the arrivals were Count Giovanni Revedin and his Amerlcan-born wife with whom I had become acquainted previously. The question was put to the Countess and the Foreign omce "guardians" "Are internees being held incommunicado?" The answer was no. I was not restralned from associating with them. In ternment in Piestany was not so onerous for them, because, unofflcially, Slovakia was more pro-Allied than pro-Axis. It is doubt· ful if any of the Allied countries were as considerate of interned subjects of an "enemy" nation as Slovakla was for those ot the !talian Diplomatlc corps, now no longer officially welcome. Later on arrived some from the Rumanian and Bnlgarian legations also. They were quartered at the governmenťs expense in one of the country's best hotels, permitted to retain their motor cars. though restricted in the use of them. If, however, any member of the corps found it necessary to go to Bratislava. some slxty miles distant, the Foreign Office representative granted permlssion. Usuaiiy lt was for a trip there and return the same day. Otherwise they were free - as was the case wlth myself - to roam all about the countryside, to nearby villages, to go flshing, bathing In the splendld pool in summer or in the Vah River and getting what relaxation they might need by attending the Jocal movie theatres, uslng tbe s kating rinks in wlnter and the tennis courts In summer. Slnce they were cut off from their sources of income, the Slovak government advanced them a small amonnt of spending money at regular intervals, pald hospital bills for those who required sneh hospitalizatlon, and very large fees for speciallsts who performed operatlons on some members or the group. It was convenient for me that friends with diplomatic immunity were there. The manuscrlpts on which I was then working would have ticketed me into one of the Nazi concentration camps had they fallen into their hands. Bnt Count Revedin as well as members of the Minister's family kept them in their possession - safe from search and seizure. Another who had taken ,;anctuary there was Siegfried Geyer, a dramatlst well known in Germany, Austria and Hungary, whose plays had been performed in Switzerland, Sweden, London and New York. One of his comedles, "Candle Light," was presented in Londoo where it ran for a year. Later it was brought to New York. where lt had some success. then was purchased by Warner Brothers and filmed, as were other of bis plays. TISO NOT AN ANTI-SEMITE The purge or J ews In Austria forced GPyer to flee into Slovakia where he was given presidential permission to remain. That same permission was granted to others I knew personally. One of them was an official of the Slovak travel bureau and another was an engineer for the resort and bealth department who resided wlth bis wlfe in Piestany and whom I vlsited many Limes. Another was a physician attached to tbe government hospital. Hence the base accusatlons of �SLOVAKIA 39 anti-Sem!tism that were hurled against Tiso - when the Reds de• manded his death - were false and easily proven to be noth!ng but falsehoods. Siegfried Geyer and I were work!ng daily on some manuscrlpts. Through underground communication I had been warned that milltary forces were to occupy the country. Two nights later the w!fe or a Slovak cabinet minister came to inform me that in a few hours the Germans would be in Piestany. Geyer was with me at the time. He felt that it was h!s death knell. It was two weeks or more before any action was taken toward deportation of the Jews. On the night of September 8, 1944, Geyer Jeft me, saying that we would meet at eleven in the morning. I never saw bim again. Through an acquaintance I learned that he wa s picked off the street the morning after leaving me and was carted away in a blue motor van. Three others of my acquaintances vanished the same day. For years they had found sanctuary and In many instances exceptional employment in the Slovak Republic, and this is asserted in direct contradiction of generally circulated propaganda by pressure groups that President Tiso and bis cablnet members aided in tbe extermlnation of the J ews. WAR COMES TO S LOVAK I A - GERMANS TAKE OVER In the sixteen months of my residence tbere, before the German occupation I had observed growing resentment against their powerful nelghbor. Now it became more bitter though the people were prudent enough not to make any outward sign of it. A pigmy does not force a quarrel with a giant. Tbe !talian diplomatic internees merited the attentlon of the German occupatlon officials. First tbeir motor cars were lmpounded. Then they were moved to tbe other hotel an an island In the Vah River, the two bridges a cross the river being circled with barricades and sentries posted at eacb end. A curfew edict went lnto effect and miles of barbed wire barriers were thrown around the city. Trenches and embankments were dug on tbree sides of tbe city, fleld telephones and power cables being strung along the streets and far into the country side. Tbls front was to be held at all costs - so lt was said. Slovakla now began to realize that all war fronts were closing in on ber. For over five years tbey had boped and prayed that this destructlon would not be vislted on them. But now it was at tbelr door. Tbe morning following the German occupatlon I went to tbe office of Inspector Vavro of tbe Slovak police. Prevlously wben my twelve month residence permit had exp!red I had sougbt bim. He merely sm!led at my fears. "Are you loslng any sleep over lt?" he asked. "Go away from here. l've forgotten you're in Piestany." An "enemy" subject, wbicb technically I was, could not bope for greater consideratlon. But now Vavro was no longer in complete autbority. His advice. however, was tbe same as before. "Didn't I teli you long ago that l've forgotten that you are here?" he said. "Return to your bouse and stay out of sight for a wb!le. My report witb your name on lt bas been conveniently misla!d. It will be some tiroe before tbe Germans tlncl :,ou." �40 SLOVAKlA Tbree days later men visited me, saying that tbey were wlth tbe German State Police. Tbere was tbe usual routine question!ng. Identlfication papers; occupation; slnce wbat date and wby was I residing' In the country? Wbat ls contained In the luggage and what !s in the mass of manuscripts, papers, etc.? Joseph Mracna had given me a letter to be sbown at just such times. It came lnto view and served to substantlate my statement tbat tbe Slovak autborities were acquainted with the contents of my bulging brief case. After a tborougb searcb of the place in whlch tbey found no radio, camera, weapons, photograpbs or otber susplcious appearing articles, the three men departed. Tension tbrougboul the country was becoming more noticable. Reports ŕlltering through from the eastern boundaries of the country were terrlfying. The Germans, being forced westward, forced all the villagers to evacuate ·with them' - or be shot. Their houses were burned. But before doing so they were stripped of everythlng In the way of metal. Door hinges, locks, farm machinery, tools and lmplements were taken away. Long convoys of half starved and bedraggled evacuees from the eastern slde of Slovakla and also from Hungary woved westward by wagon and on foot. Sometimes for eight or ten hours at a time those wretched and homeless people were coming at snalľs pace over t he. pHls, through the fringe of Piestany, and then vanished over the western horizon. " LIBERATION" BY THE REDS But even worse fate awaited those who eluded the German evacuation decrees. The Red "liberators" advancing into the eastern areas of Slovakia confiscated what might have been overlooked by the Germans. They roundetl up and deported children; no one seemed to know wbere. It was rumored they were sent to Russia. So between the plague of Germany, and the terrorlsts of the Soviet, poor llttle Slovakla had little to choose. They were caught between two enemies. Pressure was brought to bear on tbe Slovak government to hand the interned diplomats over to Germany. I took a message for them to tbe Swlss Consulate In Bratislava, for transmission to the outside world. It was hoped that if publicity was given their pllght in the Swiss and other neutra! papers, it would have some reaction, and also become known to the Allied authorlties. The messages and reports in Switzerland did perhaps seŕve to alter the announced lntention of the Germans to dellver the Ital!ans lnto the hands of the Mussolini faction in North Italy, who mlght have shot them as traltors. Instead they were sent first to Vienna and then to Sllesia. Amerlcan flyers who made forced landings or were shot down over Slovakia were taken in hand by the Slovak authorities. Tbose who requlred bospitalization were given tbe best the capltal atrorded - whlch was excellent. Karol Murin told me on · one of my vlslts to the Palace that, on instructions trom Presldent Tlso, he and bis wlfe s ougbt out the Amerlcan prlsoiiers in the hospltals to see that nothlng was left undone for tbeir comfort. Even bouquets of flowers were sent to brighten tbelr rooms. ··· ~- ' �SLÔVlinA 41 What a contrast trom the shameful treatment that was accorded Pres!dent Tiso, Karol Murin and members of their cab!net when they voluntarlly sought sanctuary In the American zone of occupatlon. More on this will follow. The Germans ended all the consideration and special attention that was given war prisoners. The German military officials took them, as well as many Slovaks, despite protests from the President and Foreign Minister, Stephen Tiso. Again it was a case of the pigmy and the giant. Might was right. The story of tbe gbastly occupation and betrayal will be told later. THE BEGINNI N G OF THE END On New Year's Eve of 1945 I was wltb frlends In Piestany. 'ľbe forbidden {by the Germans) broadcasts of tbe London radlo w1:,re turned on for the latest news in Czecb, German and Englisb. Also that evening Adolf Hitler broadcast a brlef greeting to der Deutscber Volk - hls "friends." Some of the llsteners insisted that lt was not Hitler's voice. Otbers expressed the opinion tbat lt was "der Fubrer" but a very mucb changed volce. It was generally believed tbat the attempted assassination of six montbs previously had left some per• manent impaiľment. During tbe iatter part of 1944 motlon pictures of him - wblcb was unusual - were always taken at a distance and tbere was a no ticeable awkwardness of one arm. It was rumored that he sustained other injuries. The London radlo gave lengthy discussions on tbe plaos for the liberation and rehabilitation of Centra! Europe. We assumed that there was complete accord among the Allied Powers and that tbe views and oplnlons expressed represented tbose of tbe United States. The piana were thoae of the Red dominated group of Edwa rd Benes and foreto ld th e diaaster t hat was inevitab le. Anyone with even the most meagre knowledge of European history knew that the rulers of the Kremlin hoped to dominate and absorb all tbe S lav people. Therefore, it was alarmlng for the people in Centra! Europe to observe the manner in whlch the Allled Powers permitted the Soviet to occupy the Balkans, move up into Hungary and tben sweep lnto Slovakla. As my friends In Piestany and Bratislava pointed out re. peatedly, the Allied Powers, and particularly America, should have re• membered what bappened in the Ilaltlc states, In Flnland and in Poland. It was tbe pattern of Red absorb tion and complete control, once they planted foot on the soil o f a country. The only exceptlon was that of Spalo - the slngle country where the Communlsts ~uf• fered milltary defeat. Offlcial Washington, let us remem ber also, was cooperatlve with the Communist terrorists in Spain at that Ume - regardless of the denials that some or the hierarchy of the e lect now wish to read lnto the record. Moscow's deslgns in Spain, in the Baltic states, In the Balkans and no w in Centra! Europe were so obvious as the Pyramlds on the Sahara. The milltary o ccupatlon was but the prelude to permanen t lncorpo ration lnto the Red orblt. After the Red army occupied Budapest, whlch for centurles had been a bastlon of Chrlstlanlty against the antl-Christlan forces on the East, it left only Bratislava as the lmportant city of the Danube between Budapest and Vienna. Mlllions of kronen In materials and mil• �42 SLOVAK.IA lions of man-power hours were expended on the defenses. The Eastern Front, lt seemed, would soon be in our front yards. When the day and night booming of artlllery began to be hear d in Piestany, many felt it wise to move westward. A famlly I knew In Bratislava had obtalned a motor truck and fuel two precious thlngs - intending to flee into southern Bavaria. By phone from Piestany I arranged to share space in the Bavaria-bound truck. But when l arrived there by train trom Piestany the truck had a\ready left. Now, where to go or what to do? Huge artlllery pieces were being wheeled through the str eets westward. German milltary supplies in motor cars and wagons trundled westward. Cattle and horses were being driven in the directlon of Vienna. It is doubtful if they got far along that road before the Hed army captured and butchered them. OFF TO PRAGUE An acquaintance advised me to Jeave for Prague as rall transport was still operating in that direction. When I inquired about visa or permit to enter the ·'Protectorate" and officiaľs secretary informed me that "tbe bars are down; you may go anywhere you can obtain transportation." At tbe railway station J got a ticket for Prague. A train was scbeduled to leave that evening about six. Tbe station was a seething mad-house. Pandemonium, orrlerly confusion, bundreds of terrorstricken people with bundreds of bags. bundles and babies trying to get somewbere - anywbere. In tbe black-out, long after slx o'clock, tbere was an air-raid warning. Police herded people into a vast underground shelter that had been tunnelled into a rocky bili aero.ss the railway tracks. MorP .:onfusion, anxiety and wondering if we would ever get out of the stricken city. The train - scheduled for six o'clock - left in tbe thickening blackness of the night about eleven. People were packed in to suffocation. At a town called Cuty. on thP. Crontier, l transferred to anotber train tbat landed me in Brno, now Czechoslovakia, about eight in the morning. After snatching four hours sleep at the Grand Hotel, I contrived to board (without the special military permit) an express train which landed me in Prague about mldnight. All train service into Slovakia ended tbe morning after I de• parted. Had J delayed a few hours longer tbe Reds would have inc luded me in their spreading net of "liberation." Even the most unobservant person must bave sensed the uneasiness of the Germans then in Prague. Czechs and the evacuees from Slovakia, Hungary and Poland knew it was but a matter of weeks or days when the American and British forces would be in Berlin. Tb'at meant the end of the war. but what then? Every day motor trucks and cars of all kinds were being loacled with bousehold goods, cats, dogs, bird cages, German women and children. Then at evening they rolled off into the darkness. Branche.• of trees or other <'amouflaging uas used to disguise the vebicles as much as possible. They dld not chance mass movements or evacuees in dayl!gbt llours. �SLOVAKIA 43 REVOLUTION AND REVENGE Friday evening, May Fourtb, marked tbe beglnning ot tbe uprising against six long years ot German dictatorsbip. A mysterious and ominous atmospbere pervaded Prague. Crowds began convergmg in Wenselplatz - as it was then called_ For wbat? No one seemed to know. Sometbing was to bappen. A revolution was in tbe making. Little by little tbings occurred. Men, women and boys began defacing German words on tbe fronts of business establ!shments. Tbey commenced to alter tbe street signs - - which were in dual language - Czecb and German_ Tbe electric trams were halted by tbe crowd Then matters became more serious. Sirens screamed, military cars pushed througb tbe crowds, commands were barked over t.he loud speakers in the s quare. Small armoured tanks rolled into view. A plstol shot, a woman's scream, crowds surging back against tbe walls and the rattle of machlne guns Four days and nigbts tbe battle continued. The Prague raáio remained in Czech hands and was their greatest asset. Pleas from it were directed to the American forces, said to be thirty, tben twenty, tben ten miles away. Professor Matousek, director of tbe station, would beg in broken English for tbem to hurry. The Stars and Stripes waved from the top;, of buildings and in many windows. An enthusiastic welcome would be glven tbeir liberators. The question asked by hundreds was: '·When do you think tbe Americans wíll get here?" Little did they know then that they would never arrive_ That Prague and the Czechs, together with the millions of Slovaks, had b een sold down-river by Eduard Benes in a secret deal entered into with Stalin. A deal that had the benediction of Franklin D. Roosevelt who was even then loudly prating about saving the Western World from the Nazi destroyers of Christianity, only to be consigned to the Soviet, the greatest destroyers and enemies of Christian civilization since the Cruclfixion. THE SAD AWAKENING On the sixth day of the revolution in which bundreds or !!ves and millions in property was destroyed. General Vlassoff's troopers were s linking along the shattered fronts of buildings in Wenzelspaltz. These were the Russians, mostly from the Ukraine, who had first been equipped by the Germans to fight thP Communists. Now they turned on the Germans and were belping to drive tbem out of Prague. The thought came to me at the time: what will be tbe fate or these pol!tlcal pawns? They followed tbeir leader, General VlassofI against the Bolshevik terrorists, then they remainecl witb him when he turned agalnst the Germans. Would tbe Allied nations give them sanctuary and a cbance to live• They did not. General Vlassoff was dellvered to the Moscow '"liberators" just as was President Tiso and bis cabinet. After a mock tria! that followed the pattern of al! Red trlals. Vlassoff was put before a firing squad. But what ls the fate of tbe simple l{ussian farmeťs boy hundreds of them - wbo wore a uniform an carried a rifle, or drove a team of horses pulling a wagon Joad of supplles to aid In the war for tbe West? Any number or t.hem were hquldated and others are �SLOV~ .I A 110w slaves In Slberia. Not being articulate their story is never heard. And who delivered them to death or slavery? The same ones wbo dellvered the Slovaks to the Communlsts at Teheran and Yalta. By the end of the sixth or seventh day there came into the n1lnds or the beleagured people of Prague as well as the hundreds or Slovak, Pollsh and Hungarian evacuees, the susplclon that the Amerlcans were not coming. When for days the Amer!can rorces did not advance a step, but on the contrary moved away trom the city, they knew that something or a Mach!avelian nature had taken place behind the scenes. That they had been sold !nto bondage. All the p!ous words and pretty promlses that had been inade about guaranteeing their liberatlon - were just so many empty words. It became obvlous that political tricksters had ordained in secret conferences that Czecho-Slovakia was to be handed lnto the Red orbit. It was agaínst every tenet of their beliefs. part!cularly the Slovaks, who were avowed and m!l!tant foes or the Communist ideology and who w!th thelr then presldent, Joseph Tlso, had said they would t!ght to the !ast man. Now they realized that they were being conslgned to Red dominat!on. After another day of intermittent bombing and shell fire those of us In Prague heard a jubilant news announcer on the London radlo assure us that "the war in Europe !s over." That same inaccurate statement came from the American operated radlo stations In Germany and France and synchronized. ironlcally enough, with the staccato barking of machlne guns that raked Wenzelsplatz and the occasional deep toned thunder of an aerlal bomb or German shell that ~xploded somewhere too near ror comfort. For the people of Czecho-Slovakia the war was not over. We knew in tbe promises of the Western Powers, had been abandoned to t.he then that the Czechs and Slovaks. also the Hungarlans. the Poles and the other people of Chrlstian nations. who had placed thelr fatth benign brutallties and tyranny of Joseph Stalin. Innuences In Washington hari labored zealously to airl the Kremli n's effort for worldwide destruct!on of Chrl.stlan civllizatlon. and the Slovaks were another pawn In the game. Proof or that innuence and c!tations or those. who were lnstrumental In lntlict!ng that ruln on Centra! :E;urope. bave already been written tnto the publi<' records. Slovakia had enjoyed a measure of freedom only to have lt snatched away anrl her peopl~ consigned to oppression, spollatlon and deportation. far more ghastly than any they had endured in past bistory. But rbeir falth in God and their delermlnation to flght on has 1emalned. • • • WHO SAID IT? - "We are children or freedom. We cannot be s afe except in an environment of freedom. We belleve in freedom as fundamentally as we belleve anythlng In thls world. We belleve In it far everyone In our country. And we don't restrict thls belie! to freedom for ourselves. We belleve that all people in the world are entltled to as much freedom, to develop in thelr own way, as we want ourselves." - (Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, Aprll 22, 1950). � SLOVAKÍA Z5 1 WAS IN SWVAKJA Edward L. Delaney Many Slovaks in America, especially those horn in this country, have but a limited knowledge of their parents' or grandparents' !and. As for the millions of Americans who have no klnsbip with Slovak!a, the word is merely the latter half of Czecho-Slovakia, which had been impressed upon their consclousness by the propaganda bureaus ot tbe late Edward BAnes and bis predecessor Thomas Masaryk. One will search long In those propaganda papers for any paragraphs conveying the impresslon that the Slovaks are the political, cultural or industria! equals o! the Czechs. Perhaps one reason that the Czech rather than the Slovak part of the hyphenated name has been given greater publicity !s that the capital, Prague, is predomlnantly Czech and the majority or visitors from other parta of the world seldom get beyond that city. There is no denying that the Prague of pre-1945 days did possess an individua.l atmosphere and charm for those who are interested In the architectural treasures and historlcal landmarks of Europe's older ci ties. · It was this writer's good fortune to have vis!ted or reslded Cor extended periods in several ot the other European capitals before visiting Prague. Many months later I was afforded the opportunity for a stay of two years in Slovakia. At that Ume the synthetic CzechoSlovakia had ceased to exist. Following nine hundred years or struggling fot; independence, the Republic of Slovakla was establlshed and the people could say that they had attained somethlng approximating tbeir goal. Tbe evening of my arrival in Bratislava, capital of tbe new State, a Professor Doba! called on me at the Carlton Hotel. He lnformed me that he was connected with the State propaganda bureau and that their attache, Streiznic, at tbe Berlin Legatľon, had telegraphed that l was arrlvlng. Foreign correspondents and writers were sought out by them and efforts made to present their country In the best light. An appolntment was made ror me to meet bis cbief, Tido J. Gaspar. Tido J., as I soon learned, was the most photographed man in Slovakia. No news reel was complete witbout bim smiling or band· shaking 'bi~ way into the center of the picture. He was the official greeter An actor with the wbole country as bis stage. In bis !apel, winter or summer, was always a gardenia, a full bloom rose or a cluster of flowers In season. His attire was patterned on tbe rigorously correct Unes 'Óf New York's ófficial greeter, Grover Whalen. In fact one got the lmpresslon that T!do J. Gaspat may bave met or studied tbe life-and-times of Grover Wbalen or the late Jimmy Walker, the most popular mayor New York ever had. for he was their counterpart in Centra! Europe. What can I do for you ?" · he asked after we had exchanged the usua,I formalities of visitor and host. "Nothlng," I informed bim, except to suggest what would be In• teresting · for me from a scen!c as well as a hlstor!cal point ot �26 SLOVAKIA view. That appealed to him. The alert and competent young men or his travel department la!d out an !tlnerary for me whlch covered the pr!ncipal c!tles and !ncluded a short stay in the justly famed H!gh Tatra resorts of the Carpath!an Mounta!ns. Bratislava was at that tlme the Mecca for all who, by any maneuvering, could arrange to go there. World War II was in the early stages. Food restrictions and rationing had been !mposed on a large part of Western and Centra! Europe. A long bridge over the Danube connects Bratislava with Austrla, across which rolls the rail and motor traff!c to Vlenna some s!xty miles away. But !t ls no longer the Vienna of Johann Strauss and Franz Lehar music with food and rink to be enjoyed in lelsurely comfort. Even in those early days of the war all Au.stria and Germany were areas of dismal faces and unappetlzing meals. Bratislava - which many still referred to as Pressburg - was the magnet that drew vlsitors from all Centra! Europe. For in Slovakia was to be had food and rink, muslc and laughter w!thout let, stay, or hindrance. With the exception of the adjoining country of Hungary, no other part of Centra! Europe enjoyed the essentials and many of the luxuries of life, as did the people of Slovakla before the period when Stalin's hordes swarmed over the country like a swarm of locusts and literally laid lt to waste. In most of the propaganda that emanated from various sources in Europe and was eagerly snapped up and exaggerated by the sinlster influences in this country, the impression was conveyed that Germany syphoned off the food resources of Slovakia long before thelr armies actually occupled the country late in the year 1944. Even at the risk of being charged with attempting to mitigate the sins of the Nazi Reglme. I assert that, in those days it was regarded as rare good fortune if one could get lnto the Slovak paradise and there obtain a good meat wlth whatever was desired in the way of w!nes, spirits or liquors, all at prices which, even in those tlmes were reasonabl!l. Until the severe winter of 1944-45, citrus fruits, such as lemons and oranges from Italy or Spain, might he had in the public markets. Such delicacies had been off the markets in Austria and Germany for nearly five years. In addition to al! dairy products, poultry, beef, pork, sugar, <>onfectionery and tobacco wares were obta!nable in Slovak!a with but slight restrlctlons on the amount of certaln items that mlgbt be pur• chased. Also clotbing. s boes and dress materlals were to be had. At tbat time the shops of Austrla and Germany were bare of goods. Just over the Danube from Bratislava the sbops were emoty. Such stores as the Woolworth cbain were barren. Shelves and tables of empty cartons or a single item - usually a wooden toy or some article of glass. Rows of the same useless article. Nothing was to be found that contalned metal, cotton, rubber wool, s!lk - all of which materials were needed for the war supplies. After observing those empty shops in Vienna, Munich, Berlin. Frankfurt and Cologne, it was as a fairyland to enter business establlshments of the same type In Slovakia and f!nrl most anything one might expect to see in shops beyond the warrlng zone. �SLOVAKIA 27 The people or Slovakia knew they were enjoylng a verltable heaven of plenty as compared to thelr neighbors. T heir new status as an independent country began in the spring of 1939. Only a few rersons, whether in the cities. towns or villages, did not realize that they were the envy of people in their neighborlng states. Slovak inde• pendence and self-determinatlon was paying them divldends even in the material advantages they could see and understand. Small wonder that their political leaders were popular and their policles approved. Therefore it was not surprlsing that the majority of the people had only words or praise for President Joseph Tiso and the other of!icials of their young republic. What many dld not reallze was that Germany was syphonlng off thelr surplus or agrlcultural and manufactured products. In exchange the Slovaks dld recelve some goods, such as tools, machinery, electrical equipment and rallway supph es, but for the most part they got only promises to pay in such materials. The debt owing by Germany was increasing with staggerlng amounts each month. But the majority of the people enjoyed thelr temporary prosperity with scant worry about the future. Although there was little doubt in their minds as early as 1942, that the Axls Powers were doomed to defeat, they held to the hope that by somf! political magic they would escape the horrors of war and the pf!nalties to follow. In those days of the Republlc of Slovakla, it was a country or contrasts. Evidences of its centuries old clvilizatlon and customs were to be observed alongside products that were as up to the minute as tomorrow's newspaper. For example: the express tralns making daily trips to and from the high Tatra resorts were powered by Diesel electrlc locomotives, with Jounge. dining and observation cars comparable to those of other European railway systems. But in the country, through which the deluxe traln sped smoothly, one observed also the prlmltlve ox carts on winding dlrt roads. Oxen pulled the ploys and harrows In the fields. Moreover, the branch railway lines that wound around or over the mountains and dipped down into fertile valleys offered the traveler what comfort he might get from a bard wooden bench In a dlmly llgh ted coach behlnd a wood burnlng steam engine of the type used In the western mountain country of the Unlted States seventy-five years ago. Stepping from the modern express on the High Tatra run, to the minlature traln that huffed and puffed its way to Banska Stiavnica was like bridging a gap of t.hree quarters of a century. It chanced that my arrival in Banska Stiavnica synchronized with a heavy snow storm. After plodding through darkness and deep snow for what seemed to be a mlie, the youth. who had dragged my luggage on a sled. ushered me through the portals of a buildlng that had al\ the appearances of an old Roman ruln. It was old and the Romans had probably been there. but lt was not ruined and from the durable manner in which stone and mortar were put into buildings In those middle ages, it will not be in rulns for another few centuries. Tens of thousands of shoes or sandals had worn deep grooves In the stone door step. E lectrlc llghts replaced the candles or oil tapers that had _Iighted the way for guests who came there in other �SLQVAKIA 28 centuries, but that was a bout all the concesslon that had been made to the lJ!Odern world. The building, so l learned from the Sudeten German woman who operated it, was over three hundred years old. The cold room to which I was asslgned boasted a bed whlch was less than three centuries old, but it was about the only modem plece In the antique setting. Although appreciat!ng the charm of archltectural treasures and old Jandmarks, there are limes when one misses the creature comforts that are affored in our modern hotels and homes. Tbat was one of tbose times. But the warmlng effect of a "slivovica" and gobs or excellently roasted goose, i,olisbed off with another potent drink, served to banlsh the fear of \Vaking in that three hundred year old room to find tbat I was frozen to death. Oddly enough one seldom heard about the precious metals that were once part of Slovakia's contrlbutlon to the worlďs wealth. Much of the old currency and art objects in the Hungarian empire and Centra! Europe were made from gold and silver ores that were mined at Kremnica and near Banska Stiavnica. But witb tbe increaslng costs of production and the relatlvely cbeap prlce or the metal during tbe quarter of a century before tbe birth of the Republlc of Slovakia, those -mines had been practically abondoned. World War II altered tbe situation. Centra) Europe was cut off (rom tbe silver producing countries of North and South America. Mining of that metal was steppe<l up. The silver sm.iths of Slovakia again plied thelr trade and many articles of thelr handlwork appeared in the sbops. Througb the perfidlous acts of the signers of the agreements at Teheran and Yalta, Stalin's minions. the Communist confiscators, have no doubt taken possession of tbose sources of wealth. Whatever treasure ts taken from them now, finds its way into the coffers ot the Communists instead of belng rashioned into articles for the use ot people or for objects of art in the churcbes or Cbrist. Like other In• dustries, whicb were created or resulted after tbe establishment of the Republic or Slovakia. tbe mines or Stiavnica are servlng the needs of Stalin. Political charlatans. such as Edward Benes, who were lauded by tbe American press and propagandists. sold tbe Slovaks lnto bondage for less than the thirty pieces o! sllver, wbich was the prlce of J udas for betraying bis Master. Tbey wanted and for a Ume e njoyed persona) aggrandizement and polltlcal power as puppets of tbelr Moscow master. They silenťed any murmur of protest tbat mlgbt have been raised by the people who for nine bundred years had struggled for indepen?.encei · · S LO V A K IA - V ICTI M OF TE.H ERAN A N D Y A LTA Tbe Centra! European satellites around the Soviet star are often to as. being of Slavic origin. Some omnisctent ones give that as one reason why Stalin had little dlfflculty In merging them into tbe Red. orbít. Slovakia, as we know, was one or tbe countrie!\ sold lnto bondage at Teheran and Yalta - tbe completlon or the betrayal belng seen when Eduarq Benes returned in 1945 as puppet president of tbe socalled Czecho-Slovakia and for two years or so made grotesque referŕed �i LOVAKIA efforts to disguise tbe fact tbat Stalin, and not Benes or Klement Gottwahl, was tbe supreme belng In their capltal al Prague. Etbnologlcally lt is not lncorrect to group tbe peoples ot Russla. Poland, Czecboslovakia, Ukralnla, Bulgarla and Yugoslaľia into a Pan-Slav classlflcation. Tbe vast majority of the peoples In lhe socalled Slav nations bas llttle in common witb tbe Russa!ns. In past generations tbere was a bond of Cbristian religion wb!cb ran tbrough all tbe Slav countries, eitber tbe Ortbodox Greek-Russian Cburcb or, in tbe case of Slovakia, Poland, Croatia. lbe Roman Catbollc Cburcb. Tbe rise or atbelstlc Communlsm In Russla was t be deatb knell of Chrlstlanity tbere, bence a splltting wedge was d riven between most of the Balkan and Centra! European countries and t be great Slav domain of tbe Soviet. Slovakla, Poland and Croatla bave been predominantly Roman Catbollc for centuries. Only a small percentage are adherents ot tbe Ortbodox Cburcb. Hence, any contention tbat tbere is a racia! and religlous afflnity among the Slav peoples, wblcb simplifled tb elr enslavement by Moscow, 1s lacklng In support. F urthermore, lt is leaktng out tbrougb cracks and crinks In the Iro!l Curtaln that Stalln ls flnd· ing more tban a llttle dltficulty In merglng the Slovaks lnto bis godless domain. Wben for over eleven centuries a people, sucb as tbe Slovaks wbo bave prayed to God and H is Son, tbe Cbrlst, lt ls not llkely tbat tbe delty of tbe Kremlin can soon purge t belr mlnds or tbe OnA Supreme Being. THE SLOVAK$ ARE CELTS? Also - lf we were to accept the oplnlon of a learned professor it was my good fortune to meet in Banska Bystrica - tbere ls no RACIAL kinshlp between tbe Slovaks and tbe Russians. The Slovaks are not Slavs, asserted tbat student of blstory, but on the contrary ' they are Celts. A professor Doba! In Bratislava had given me a note ót lntroductlon to tbe curator of tbe museum In Banska Bysttica. It de· veloped tbat tbe gentleman knew more about the bistory ot manklnd tban Gl bbons, H. G. Wells, or any ot tbose wbo bave wtltten. 'Welgbty tomes on tbe origin or man, etc. ' 1• Tbls Slovak scbolar, well along In yt>ars, bad ·been lnstrúctor In a unlversity al Constantlnople (before it was called Istanbul) also in Budapest. His speclalty was Sanskrit Arabic, tbe Hebrew language and otber writings on tbe earlíest hlstory or manklnd. "You are Irisb," he said to me, after we had dlsposed of a slivovica and coffee, "and the Irlsh are Celts. A characteristlc ot tbe l rlsb is black halr with blue eyes. Tbat 1s observed among our people here In Slovakla." President Tiso, 1 have already mentioned had black bair and blue eyes. If the professor ,vas endeavorlng to make me feel a racia! kinshlp wlth the Slovaks - the Celtlsh background - he certatnly supported hls oplnion wlth more arguments than black and b lue for hair and eyes. lt was a lengthy thesls he expounded on tbe !:'Ubject, but the glst or lt was that au the people or Europe stem from the origlnal tn h abitants llvlng in tbe region around the Medlterranean, the Jordah, tbe �30 SLOVAKIA Hed and the Dead Sea. The garden of Paradise is supposed to have been in that general part of the Near East. The Celts - as part of the early human family of whlch we have any history, so the professor asserted - were brawny, pioneer lads, pagans in those days, of course, who hunted and explored and pushed their way westward. Some of them got as far as the western s hores of Europe, which we now know as the coast of Brittany in France. From there they launched boats and set up their cabeens in Ireland and Scotland, wbere they are today. Some of those early Ce!ts, acco rding to this student of the subject, decided tha,t the area just west of the Carpathian Mountalns - which is Slovakia - was a pretty good part of the earth to stake out for t heir children and grandchildren for generations to come. So there they stayed. Like the other Celts who went on to I reland, they were converted to Christ!anlty well over a thousand years ago and bave remained steadfast in their faith ever slnce, just as have the fightin' lrish. That, the Banska Bystrica gentleman lnformed me. is another evidence of the kinship, the similarlty in character and traditions. He then escorted me to a conical plie of stones towerlng four stories high, in which were kept many relics and articles that had been dug from the ground in Slovakia over th e past generations. There were cooking utensils, ornaments of solid gold and silver, bits of clothing, crude instruments for killing, such as tbe crusaders of the middle ages carried, and many other articles. Oddly enough, 1 had seen articles almost identically the same in the museum of Dublin, Ireland, on one of my visits there. Those in the Dublin museum had been unearthed in tbe peat bogs and fields of Ireland. The professor had a point there. The traces of clvllization, which we have found, do have similarity. The old gentleman then took me to his home and into the b asement or cellar under it. There were stacks of musty manuscripts, some on tbe oldest known kind of parchment. The signs and symbols on tbey were just hierog!yphics to me, but to that scholar they told stories and epics of hlstory wbich had been written in the mlddle ages. Whether or not tbe Slovaks are Celts and kin ot the Irish and Scots, instead of the Russians, I shall not attempt to prove. But that was the contention of one learned Slovak in Banska Bystrica. S LOV AKIA U NDER THE REDS Of course, now that the Communisl<i are in Slovakia, and Moscow is to be regarded as the fountain head of all culture and wisdom, it is likely that any reference to tbe Cbristian Celts as being remotely related to the Slovaks will be purged trom the people's minds and records. It would be interesting to know what the Communlsts have done to the sbrlne, the mausoleum of Fatber Andrej H linka In Ruzomberok, at wbich I had knelt in prayer a day or so before going to Banska Bystrica. It was Father Hlinka who, by bis zeal, tireless energy and strength of cbaracter, had brought about the political unity and solidarity wh!ch made possi ble tbe creation of the Slovak Republic. Al· thougb lt was short Jlved, it did demonstrate to the world that a �SLOVAKIA 31 Slovak state is feasible and may again be upon the maps of Europe. It would be incorrect to assert that everyone in the Slovak Repub• Ile, durlng the stx years of its exlstence, was enthuslastlcally 01>tlmistic as to lts future in the assembly of nations comprlsíng the European continent. In this connection, it shoula be mentioned, tbat tbe greatly_ publicized pian or proposal said to bave been urged by General Dwight Eisenhower, !or a United States of Europe, may be dlsmissed as wlshful thinking. Such a "United States" could not possibly function at thls stage of world history when half of Europe is free and half s lave, half Christlan and half under the ruthless dominatlon of pagan dictators. Until the situation 1s altered and Communism ls banished from Europe, there can be no lasting unity. To even dlscuss the matter be· fore that 1s accomplished, is utterly Cutile. A SLOVAK TEXAS RANGER SPEAKS HIS MIND A well-to-do industrialist in Bratislava pointed out to me about 1942 what was to be the fate of Slovakla and Europe in the postwar period. He iS not a Slovak but one who resided in Slovakla when it was part oľ the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. then under the gov· ernment of Czechoslovakia and remained to carry on under tbe Re· 1mblic, as did many of Hungarlan, Czecb, Austrian or German natlonality. All enjoyed equ al rights. As be may still be living there, it would be wrong to mentlon bis name, because reprisals might be inflicted on bim, should these words be brought to the attentlon of Red spies in tbis country. On my lnitial visit to bis home, the first objects that met my eyes were a western saddle and a Wlnchester rifle In a regulatlon leather holster. Very much American. Then I got tbe story. He had been a Texas Ranger in bis younger days! There were notches in bis leg from slugs of desperados, several of wbom he had killed in bis encounters wltb tbem along the borders of the Rio Grande. Speaklng five languages fluently and knowing thl! contlnent of Europe thorougbly, his opinions on the current and impending eventa were wor• thy of attentlon "Wbat a misfortune 'Teddy' Roosevelt isn't in the White House today," he said shortly after we met. "Things would be dlfferent. Tbe way lt appears now, Europe is being delivered stralgbt lnto chaos and Communism. You know what that means? I do. Durlng the bloody reign of terror under tbat so-and-so (expressive Texas Ranger term) Bela Kun, I witnessed enough of lt. I was !nterpreter before some ot the committees in Budapest and stared that 'so-and-so' In the eye many a tlme. ľd bave kllled bim if I got the chance, and he knew lt. What is the intention of Franklln Roosevelt? To dellver us over t<_> the Reds aga in?" It was necE>ssary to first destroy the forces or Hitler, I pointed out and then . . . "Then what? Thaťs tbe quest!on. True enougb the Nazl yoke on the German people must be broken and they be brought back to belp in the scheme of thlngs. But you mark my worda, Stalln is the only one who ia winning anything in thia war. He'a not winning it elther. lťs being given to him. Unless bis henchmen are thrown out of t.he �32 SLOVAKIA Balkans, the Baltic states, Poland and all the other spots he will take over soon; the whole of Europe and western civllizatlon wlll go back• ward tor ~ century or so." "You are not so badly off here in Slovakia at present," I ventured to say. "NQnsense. Our freedom here is but temporary, and so 1s the pros• períty, Fooľs gold. You know what tbat 1s? A flasb In the pan, a mi· rage. Can't make this country self-sufficient. It bas to be bltcbed on t& some other part of Europe. Always has been. Tbe Germans deve!• oped it at one period of bistory. It was part of tbe Hapsburg Man· archy, tben the neglected half of Czecho·Slovakla. It wlll be taken over by the Reds after the war - see if ľm not rlght. Could make it a self·determining state, if the otber European powers, supported by America, demanded it. But tbey won't, unless great pressure ls brougbt on the influences now in Washington, London and Paris. But ľm not leaving here. Sure, ľm what tbey cal\ a capitallst, an enemy of the Reds. rve gat that Wincbester and two Colt plstols. Wben they're empty the Reds can take wbaťs left. I won't know mucb about it tben." That was one man's opinion of wbat was transplring in Slovakia anct Centra! Europe at tbat time and wbat he thought tbe future beld far tbem. He was not always so explosive in bis observatlons. but in tbe two years and more I knew bim I learned to respect his estimate of the Europeao scene. though at times I may not have entlrPIY agreed with bim. But was be not right as regards the sell-out of Christianity in Cen· tral Europe? Was he not correct In bis predictlon that only Stalln was wiooing t he war and that bis greatest aldes were then oot In '.\toscow. but In London and Washington? In these days when we art! exhorted to strlve and save and struggle to rescue Europe and ourselves rrom the menace of Communlst cont.rol, let us reflect on tbe facts or tbose who - wltb wbat appears to bave been pre-determlnation - consigned Slovak:a and otber Christian nations to perdition. MEETING PRESIDENT TISO At a dinner party in Bratislava l flrst met Joseph Mracna, formerly Consul far Czecboslovakia in New York. lt developed, wben comparlng notes, t hat we had both salled from New York on the same day in Oecembr 1939. He on tbe Vulcania bound far Llsbon. wbile my voyage was on tbe Excalibur witb Genoa as my destinatlon. Mracna and bis wlfe, who was Viennese. were very pro-American an.d longed far the tlme when they migbt return to tbe Unitd States wher-e he ·had many frlends and acqualntaoces, several of whom were also my friends. Although born In Slovakia, Mracna had spent tbe greater part of bis life in other countries. He attended unlversities in Vienna and Par!s, following wb!ch he had been occup!ed In forelgn countrles even before becoming the Czecboslovakian Consul In New York. He was, at the time I knew him, a member of tbe Foreign Office of the new Sl_ovak .Republlc wbere hls experience and knowledge of affalrs in .several other countries was most usefuL I asked !f he could arrange an audience for me with the Pres!dent. He said he could; and did. �SLOVAKIA 33 When I arr!ved at the presldentlal palace at the time ap polnted for my a udlence, Ka rol Murin, persona) secretary for the Preslden t, cautioned me aga!nst detaining him too long and also mentioned that it would be inappropriate to questlon him on matters of foreign a nd domestlc policy. Mracna, it seems, had lnferred that !t was more of a persona) and human interest chat that I desired with the P res!den t, whlch was correct, but r was also most eager to interview bim on politlcal issues - domestic and foreign. Monsignor J oseph Tiso. or Pres!dent Tiso as he was then, rad!a ted those qua lities so often observed in the successful pol!tlc!an. An!mation, vigor, affability and the obvious desire to make frlends and please people, withont Jettlng it appear as a veneer to mask h!s real thoughts. He greeted me with a hearty llandshake and. after Karol Murin left us. he Jed the way to the corner of bis study in the palace. He was in perfect health, but a physical dlrector would undoubtedly have prescribed more exercise to guard agalnst overwelght whlch ls often the worry of those nearing the half-century mark. His black ha!r was but sparsely sprinkled wlth grey and a radiant tr!nkle llgh ted bis dark blue eyes. Slnce my knowledge of the Slovak language was limited to some dozen or more words and he spoke very little Engllsh, our interview was carried on in German. My openlng remark was that he had established history by belng the first Catholic priest to be the head of a sovere!gn state. "Oh, no," he replied, "there was Selpel in the former Austrian government." Monsi'gnor Seipel, 1 reminded bim, was prime minister but not president. "There was Richelieu." He, too, as l called to bis attention, was prime minister whiJe Louis of France was king. So it seemed that my reference to history was correct. After some minutes or general conversatlon I said that I had been cautioned not to question bim on matters of state, but that I would like to do so. "Please do. Any questions you ask, l'll try to answer the m." WHAT ABOUT POLICIES? Then 1 was free to touch on several topics that lnterested me and most anyone else who had any knowledge of the happen!ngs !nside Central Europe during these days. "It is true that your pol!cies are dictated by Germany?" '"No," he lnsfsted. "In forelgn matters our policies are formu• lated so that tbey do not conflict with those of the Axls Powers. Slnce we are within their orblt lt would be sulcidal to strongly oppose them. But in domestlc matters we form our own pollcles whlch, In many instances, do not coincide wlth those of Germany. German terr!tory as you know is just across the Danube. Only a bridge between us but it !s a long bridge." He smiled when he realized that. I grasvoo his none too subtle meaning. �34 SLOVAKIA "Some of your critics," I then said, "declare that you - and by that I mean the Slovak Republic - are subject to instructions from the Vatican." "The usual charge of the uninformed," he replied. "l have no connection with the Vatican, except through the diplomatic channels, the same as other countries to which the Vatican City has accredited representation. (T here was a Vatlcan diplomatic official resident in Bratislava.) Any communications affecting the religious affairs of our people would be transmitted through the bishops. I am not a bishop. In my capacity as president I have no counection with Rome, other than I have polnted out." All rellgious denominations were accorded the same right of worship, he pointed out. The largest Protestant group was the Lutheran Evangelical, of which Rev. Martin Razus was the accepted leader and who was not only cooperating with bim politically, but they were personal friends. In the eastern part of the state were also many Orthodox or Greek Catholics. AGAIN WITH THE CZECHS ? Was lt likely, l asked, that the Slovaks and Czechs would again llilite in a government after tbe war? That questinon did not receive a direct answer. He remlnded me that trom the very inception of the Czecho-Slovakian government, there had been dlscrimintalon against tbe Slovaks. The autonomy, which had been promlsed, had been denied them. Those who protested and agitated for Slovak rights, such as Hlinka and hlmself, were imprisoned. Something like nine months he had spent in a Czech jail for protestlng the injustices that were lnflicted on t he Slovak people and demanding that their rights be recognized. Later he had been Minister of Health in the Prague cabinet. The Slovaks. he assured me, de· s ired to live in peace and harmony wlth the Czechs, the Poles, the Hungarlans and the Germans, but they a lso believed they were entltled to the "self-determlnation" that had been loudly proclaimed and was said to be the lnalienable right even of all small nations. They were now, for the first Ume in hlstory, an independent country. The problems facing them were many and varied. President Tiso referred wlth considerable pleasure to hls vislt in the Unlted States in 1937. He expressed the wish that the thousands of Slovaks in Canada and the United States be informed of the prospects for bette rment which he felt was due their people through the enactment of the programs of development then under way. NEED OF TEACHERS AND TECHNICIANS Thelr greatest problem, he said, was in finding men and women for the jobs that had been created. "We need technlcians, instructors in t he schools and universities and speciallsts for industria! projects. Our hlgh schools are over-crowded. Students want education and want to get ahead, but we lack sufflcient teachers. Tbe same in many businesses. We bope to meet these needs in tlme." He made the remark that, although s peclallsts and technlclans were urgently needed. he boped tbey would not bave to rely too much on the Germans. Tbat and otber comments indicated hls disllke for �SLOVAKIA 36 tbe small army of German engineers and tecbnicians wbo had come into the country to aid In its development. THE SLOVAKS AND THE RUSSIANS There had been a small token Slovak force sent against the Soviet soon after the outbreak of the German-Soviet hostillties in 1941, but they were withdrawn and tbe men, for the most part, were work· Ing in various industries that contributed products for the war effort. l pointed out to the President that they and tbe Russians were Slavs and was it not consistent that they be on tbe side of tbeir blood brotbers? Tbere was a pause and bis face became very earnest. "Quite true, We are blood brothers. But when tbose blood brotbers are Bolsheviks and Communlsts," doubling his flst and pounding on the table in front of bim Tiso said, ''then we'll fight to tbe last man." Presldent Tiso, like the martyred Draja Mlhailovitcb of Yugosla• vla, Archbisbop Stepinac and Mindszenty of Budapest, did not hesitate to take a firm and defiant stand against the greatest menace Christian civlllzation was then facing - and is still facing today. But because he and tbose other courageous ones were not deceived by tbe propaganda, the pious platitudes and spurious pollcies of tbe Western Powers as regards tbe Soviet, he was marked for sacrifice. The Washington State Department, at tbe bebest of Stalln's puppets, actually delivered bim to tortures and to death. Deny it tbougb they would llke to do today - when Christian leaders llke J osepb Tiso are neetled to weld Central Europe into a strong bastion against the Communlst horde - the bald trutb remains that In 1945 our State Department, as a supine and subserv!ent tool of Stalin. cons!gned T!so and tbe Slovaks t_o Red domination and extermination. Regardless of all arguments to the contrary, Josepb Tiso was slncerely desirous of helping his people - the long oppressed country that for nine hundred years had kept the fires or Chrlstlanlty alive in Centra! Europe. How long those fires will smoulder under the ruth· less domination of Communist destroyers of religion and clvllizatlon, is a grave question. Wbether it was mistaken judgment for tbe Slovaks to accept the assistance of Germany, to achieve the measure of independence they enjoyed, is a matter of oplnion. There was no war in progress wben the Slovak Republlc was born and none was imminent. Tbey revolted against obvlous injustices of tbe Prague Government. The Czech majority could bave compromised and settled tbeir dlfferences. Tbey did not. Wben tbe interna] revolt came. Hitler took advantage of tbe situatlon and proffered bis migbt against outslde aggresslon. Slovakla accepted tbe offer. If Josepb Tiso was a traltor to bis country, then tbe same can be said of Eamon de Valera in Ireland, Mabatma Gbandi in India. or the gallant Marsball Mannerheim in brave little Flnland. AII were patriots fighting for tbeir people. All were persecuted, smeared and discredited, but tbeir names will live in tbe blstories yet to be wrltten. �36 SLOVAKlA TI SO HAD A SENSE OF H UMOR After furtber lengtby dlscussion of varlous toplcs, I was about to depart when Karol Murin came to Inform tbe President tbat tbe Finance Minister was waitlng to see bim. Tlso accompanled me lnto a vast room looklng out across a walled garden in wbicb he sald líe took dally walks. Little dld l know tben tbat, over two year.s later, he would be taking many long walks togetber in another walled enclosure and resume our discussions on tbe worlďs affairs. But tbat is another story. Tbe air of tbe room was cbilly. - A tbougbt occurred to me. "Your Excellency," I said, ·•some persons told me tbat you a re always very seriouJ and earnest. But tbere's a twlnkle ot mirtb In your eyes at times and I bave an Idea tbat there's conslderable humor In you." "Perbaps," he smlled. "Would lt be appropriate If I gave you a little present?" "Wbat, · for instance·?" "I tbougbt tbat in tbese cold days of winter, just for mediclnal purposes, of course, you migbt appreciate a half dozen bottles ot gflod Canadlan whisky." Tlso chuckled and bis eyes lígbted witb the mirth I had noted there before. "ľll be glad to get lt," be' ~'aid. · The half dozen bottles were duly delivered fróm a source In "Bra tislava wbere I knew it was obtainable. Later on Karol Murin ask-ečl me to call again at tbe palace, wben I was given the compllments ot the Presldent and a token of bis appreciation for the whisky. It lš a wonder!ully embroidered table c loth, one of the finest specimens ot Slovak rieedlework that could posslbly be found. It is today my most treasur-ed possession. Very recently a letter came to me trom Karol Murin who ls now a resident of Canada. He informed me that my friend Joseph Mracna, whom I got to know very well in tbe two years following our meeting, had been murdered by the Commnnists. The Slovak patriot, Monslgnor Joseph Tlso, was delivered to Benes and bi.s Red Government by. the United States autborlties to be exterminated, because he was the arch enemy of Communism. Jn 1946, the year when· that assistance to Communist deslgns was. rendered by our offlclals, lt was polltlcally unwise to declare one's 'undying opposition to the forces or antl-God even then seeklng our destruction. Presldent Tiso pald tbe supreme penalty for bis devotion to bis God and bis country. COMES MY TURN TO BE I NVESTIGATED Tbe Carlton Hotel, in Bratislava, where I had reslded for months, was a meeting place for German military officers, legation attaches and couriers, coming and going all the tíme. A physician llving in the hotel, wbom I had called on a tlme or two for professlonal services, informed· me tbat someone at the German Legatlon had quizzed bim about me. The pbyslcian was Slovak, bis wife Hungarlan, enougb to assure me they were not sympathetic to the German otflcials. "That American 1s no frlend ot Germany," the legation omclal sald to the physician. ·'Whaťs he dolng here and why is he permitted to stay ?" �SLOVAKIA 37 Just what the doctor said to dlvert suspicion, I do not know, but within a few days the local police inspectors came to question me a bout my stay in the country, my source ot income, what 1 was doing, and so on. My replles were vague, but apparently satlsfactory for the Slovak police. But it caused me considerable worry. Pressure mlght be brought to bear which would send me across that bridge into German territory. That I must escape at all costs. Again I sought out Joseph Mracna In the Foreign Office. We bad talked frankly before and I knew I could trust hlm. My permit to remaln in Slo· vakia was about to expire and also my passport. Would they deport me? Mracna conferred wlth the proper authoritles, then lnformed me that if I did not become a "public charge·• - that !s, if I had assets on which to live - they . would give me sanctuary. I -would not be detported even at the expiration of permits or passports. I assured him that my persona! assets were sufficient to maintaln me for an extended period. 1 GO TO PIESTAN Y At the suggestion of Mracna, I arranged to live in Piestany, a health resort about sixty mlles from Bratislava which !s famed for its hot baths. It was far enough from the capltal that the German mllitary officlals or Gestapo agents wer not prowling around. Al· though the Republic malntalned its own police and defense force, judiciary, customs and ·immigration officials - no one arrlving or departing without tbeir sanction - there seemed to be a tacit agreement that the German military and legation oftlcials could come there for extended holidays. They came malnly [or food and drink, which weré almost non-existent in Germany and Austria at that tlme. Piestany is world famed. The baths - mud and hÓt pools - are beneficial for those wlth rheumatlsm, arthritls and other ills. Before the war there were visitors from as far away as India, Africa and l;loth North and South America. The two largest hotels - one on an island of the Vah River, and on which are the hot springs had been taken over and operated by the Interior Department ot the Slovak State. Soon after I went there as a voluntary "internee," Piestany became tbe headquart.ers of many involuntary internees of the Slovak Government. First to arrive were twenty-six - including the children - ot the !talian dlplomatlc corps in Bratislava. The !talian Minister, Cortese. had declared his allegiance to the antl-Mussolini, or Badoglio government, which jolned forces with the Western Allies. Naturally, he and bis entlre staff who shared his sympathles were anathema to the Germans. With the setting up of the Fascist forces in Northern Haly, pressure was brought to bear on Slovakia to deport the anti Fascists to the northern part of Italy which was still occupied by Germany and cooperating with it. TISO, TH E H U MAN ITARIAN But. contrary to generally circulated statements that President Tiso was a puppet ot Germany, he deflnitely refused to llsten to the suggestlons or demands of the Germans. nor wonld he consent to the Itallan Legatlon staff belng interned In Germany, which was a �38 SLOVAK.IA later idea of the Germans. So wlthin six weeks or my taking up residence in the Grand Royal Hotel in Piestany as a lone "internee," twenty-slx Italians moved in together with two attaches of the Slovak Foreign Offlce a.s guardians or "watchers." Two of the arrivals were Count Giovanni Revedin and his Amerlcan-born wife with whom I had become acquainted previously. The question was put to the Countess and the Foreign omce "guardians" "Are internees being held incommunicado?" The answer was no. I was not restralned from associating with them. In ternment in Piestany was not so onerous for them, because, unofflcially, Slovakia was more pro-Allied than pro-Axis. It is doubt· ful if any of the Allied countries were as considerate of interned subjects of an "enemy" nation as Slovakla was for those ot the !talian Diplomatlc corps, now no longer officially welcome. Later on arrived some from the Rumanian and Bnlgarian legations also. They were quartered at the governmenťs expense in one of the country's best hotels, permitted to retain their motor cars. though restricted in the use of them. If, however, any member of the corps found it necessary to go to Bratislava. some slxty miles distant, the Foreign Office representative granted permlssion. Usuaiiy lt was for a trip there and return the same day. Otherwise they were free - as was the case wlth myself - to roam all about the countryside, to nearby villages, to go flshing, bathing In the splendld pool in summer or in the Vah River and getting what relaxation they might need by attending the Jocal movie theatres, uslng tbe s kating rinks in wlnter and the tennis courts In summer. Slnce they were cut off from their sources of income, the Slovak government advanced them a small amonnt of spending money at regular intervals, pald hospital bills for those who required sneh hospitalizatlon, and very large fees for speciallsts who performed operatlons on some members or the group. It was convenient for me that friends with diplomatic immunity were there. The manuscrlpts on which I was then working would have ticketed me into one of the Nazi concentration camps had they fallen into their hands. Bnt Count Revedin as well as members of the Minister's family kept them in their possession - safe from search and seizure. Another who had taken ,;anctuary there was Siegfried Geyer, a dramatlst well known in Germany, Austria and Hungary, whose plays had been performed in Switzerland, Sweden, London and New York. One of his comedles, "Candle Light," was presented in Londoo where it ran for a year. Later it was brought to New York. where lt had some success. then was purchased by Warner Brothers and filmed, as were other of bis plays. TISO NOT AN ANTI-SEMITE The purge or J ews In Austria forced GPyer to flee into Slovakia where he was given presidential permission to remain. That same permission was granted to others I knew personally. One of them was an official of the Slovak travel bureau and another was an engineer for the resort and bealth department who resided wlth bis wlfe in Piestany and whom I vlsited many Limes. Another was a physician attached to tbe government hospital. Hence the base accusatlons of �SLOVAKIA 39 anti-Sem!tism that were hurled against Tiso - when the Reds de• manded his death - were false and easily proven to be noth!ng but falsehoods. Siegfried Geyer and I were work!ng daily on some manuscrlpts. Through underground communication I had been warned that milltary forces were to occupy the country. Two nights later the w!fe or a Slovak cabinet minister came to inform me that in a few hours the Germans would be in Piestany. Geyer was with me at the time. He felt that it was h!s death knell. It was two weeks or more before any action was taken toward deportation of the Jews. On the night of September 8, 1944, Geyer Jeft me, saying that we would meet at eleven in the morning. I never saw bim again. Through an acquaintance I learned that he wa s picked off the street the morning after leaving me and was carted away in a blue motor van. Three others of my acquaintances vanished the same day. For years they had found sanctuary and In many instances exceptional employment in the Slovak Republic, and this is asserted in direct contradiction of generally circulated propaganda by pressure groups that President Tiso and bis cablnet members aided in tbe extermlnation of the J ews. WAR COMES TO S LOVAK I A - GERMANS TAKE OVER In the sixteen months of my residence tbere, before the German occupation I had observed growing resentment against their powerful nelghbor. Now it became more bitter though the people were prudent enough not to make any outward sign of it. A pigmy does not force a quarrel with a giant. Tbe !talian diplomatic internees merited the attentlon of the German occupatlon officials. First tbeir motor cars were lmpounded. Then they were moved to tbe other hotel an an island In the Vah River, the two bridges a cross the river being circled with barricades and sentries posted at eacb end. A curfew edict went lnto effect and miles of barbed wire barriers were thrown around the city. Trenches and embankments were dug on tbree sides of tbe city, fleld telephones and power cables being strung along the streets and far into the country side. Tbls front was to be held at all costs - so lt was said. Slovakla now began to realize that all war fronts were closing in on ber. For over five years tbey had boped and prayed that this destructlon would not be vislted on them. But now it was at tbelr door. Tbe morning following the German occupatlon I went to tbe office of Inspector Vavro of tbe Slovak police. Prevlously wben my twelve month residence permit had exp!red I had sougbt bim. He merely sm!led at my fears. "Are you loslng any sleep over lt?" he asked. "Go away from here. l've forgotten you're in Piestany." An "enemy" subject, wbicb technically I was, could not bope for greater consideratlon. But now Vavro was no longer in complete autbority. His advice. however, was tbe same as before. "Didn't I teli you long ago that l've forgotten that you are here?" he said. "Return to your bouse and stay out of sight for a wb!le. My report witb your name on lt bas been conveniently misla!d. It will be some tiroe before tbe Germans tlncl :,ou." �40 SLOVAKlA Tbree days later men visited me, saying that tbey were wlth tbe German State Police. Tbere was tbe usual routine question!ng. Identlfication papers; occupation; slnce wbat date and wby was I residing' In the country? Wbat ls contained In the luggage and what !s in the mass of manuscripts, papers, etc.? Joseph Mracna had given me a letter to be sbown at just such times. It came lnto view and served to substantlate my statement tbat tbe Slovak autborities were acquainted with the contents of my bulging brief case. After a tborougb searcb of the place in whlch tbey found no radio, camera, weapons, photograpbs or otber susplcious appearing articles, the three men departed. Tension tbrougboul the country was becoming more noticable. Reports ŕlltering through from the eastern boundaries of the country were terrlfying. The Germans, being forced westward, forced all the villagers to evacuate ·with them' - or be shot. Their houses were burned. But before doing so they were stripped of everythlng In the way of metal. Door hinges, locks, farm machinery, tools and lmplements were taken away. Long convoys of half starved and bedraggled evacuees from the eastern slde of Slovakla and also from Hungary woved westward by wagon and on foot. Sometimes for eight or ten hours at a time those wretched and homeless people were coming at snalľs pace over t he. pHls, through the fringe of Piestany, and then vanished over the western horizon. " LIBERATION" BY THE REDS But even worse fate awaited those who eluded the German evacuation decrees. The Red "liberators" advancing into the eastern areas of Slovakia confiscated what might have been overlooked by the Germans. They roundetl up and deported children; no one seemed to know wbere. It was rumored they were sent to Russia. So between the plague of Germany, and the terrorlsts of the Soviet, poor llttle Slovakla had little to choose. They were caught between two enemies. Pressure was brought to bear on tbe Slovak government to hand the interned diplomats over to Germany. I took a message for them to tbe Swlss Consulate In Bratislava, for transmission to the outside world. It was hoped that if publicity was given their pllght in the Swiss and other neutra! papers, it would have some reaction, and also become known to the Allied authorlties. The messages and reports in Switzerland did perhaps seŕve to alter the announced lntention of the Germans to dellver the Ital!ans lnto the hands of the Mussolini faction in North Italy, who mlght have shot them as traltors. Instead they were sent first to Vienna and then to Sllesia. Amerlcan flyers who made forced landings or were shot down over Slovakia were taken in hand by the Slovak authorities. Tbose who requlred bospitalization were given tbe best the capltal atrorded - whlch was excellent. Karol Murin told me on · one of my vlslts to the Palace that, on instructions trom Presldent Tlso, he and bis wlfe s ougbt out the Amerlcan prlsoiiers in the hospltals to see that nothlng was left undone for tbeir comfort. Even bouquets of flowers were sent to brighten tbelr rooms. ··· ~- ' �SLÔVlinA 41 What a contrast trom the shameful treatment that was accorded Pres!dent Tiso, Karol Murin and members of their cab!net when they voluntarlly sought sanctuary In the American zone of occupatlon. More on this will follow. The Germans ended all the consideration and special attention that was given war prisoners. The German military officials took them, as well as many Slovaks, despite protests from the President and Foreign Minister, Stephen Tiso. Again it was a case of the pigmy and the giant. Might was right. The story of tbe gbastly occupation and betrayal will be told later. THE BEGINNI N G OF THE END On New Year's Eve of 1945 I was wltb frlends In Piestany. 'ľbe forbidden {by the Germans) broadcasts of tbe London radlo w1:,re turned on for the latest news in Czecb, German and Englisb. Also that evening Adolf Hitler broadcast a brlef greeting to der Deutscber Volk - hls "friends." Some of the llsteners insisted that lt was not Hitler's voice. Otbers expressed the opinion tbat lt was "der Fubrer" but a very mucb changed volce. It was generally believed tbat the attempted assassination of six montbs previously had left some per• manent impaiľment. During tbe iatter part of 1944 motlon pictures of him - wblcb was unusual - were always taken at a distance and tbere was a no ticeable awkwardness of one arm. It was rumored that he sustained other injuries. The London radlo gave lengthy discussions on tbe plaos for the liberation and rehabilitation of Centra! Europe. We assumed that there was complete accord among the Allied Powers and that tbe views and oplnlons expressed represented tbose of tbe United States. The piana were thoae of the Red dominated group of Edwa rd Benes and foreto ld th e diaaster t hat was inevitab le. Anyone with even the most meagre knowledge of European history knew that the rulers of the Kremlin hoped to dominate and absorb all tbe S lav people. Therefore, it was alarmlng for the people in Centra! Europe to observe the manner in whlch the Allled Powers permitted the Soviet to occupy the Balkans, move up into Hungary and tben sweep lnto Slovakla. As my friends In Piestany and Bratislava pointed out re. peatedly, the Allied Powers, and particularly America, should have re• membered what bappened in the Ilaltlc states, In Flnland and in Poland. It was tbe pattern of Red absorb tion and complete control, once they planted foot on the soil o f a country. The only exceptlon was that of Spalo - the slngle country where the Communlsts ~uf• fered milltary defeat. Offlcial Washington, let us remem ber also, was cooperatlve with the Communist terrorists in Spain at that Ume - regardless of the denials that some or the hierarchy of the e lect now wish to read lnto the record. Moscow's deslgns in Spain, in the Baltic states, In the Balkans and no w in Centra! Europe were so obvious as the Pyramlds on the Sahara. The milltary o ccupatlon was but the prelude to permanen t lncorpo ration lnto the Red orblt. After the Red army occupied Budapest, whlch for centurles had been a bastlon of Chrlstlanlty against the antl-Christlan forces on the East, it left only Bratislava as the lmportant city of the Danube between Budapest and Vienna. Mlllions of kronen In materials and mil• �42 SLOVAK.IA lions of man-power hours were expended on the defenses. The Eastern Front, lt seemed, would soon be in our front yards. When the day and night booming of artlllery began to be hear d in Piestany, many felt it wise to move westward. A famlly I knew In Bratislava had obtalned a motor truck and fuel two precious thlngs - intending to flee into southern Bavaria. By phone from Piestany I arranged to share space in the Bavaria-bound truck. But when l arrived there by train trom Piestany the truck had a\ready left. Now, where to go or what to do? Huge artlllery pieces were being wheeled through the str eets westward. German milltary supplies in motor cars and wagons trundled westward. Cattle and horses were being driven in the directlon of Vienna. It is doubtful if they got far along that road before the Hed army captured and butchered them. OFF TO PRAGUE An acquaintance advised me to Jeave for Prague as rall transport was still operating in that direction. When I inquired about visa or permit to enter the ·'Protectorate" and officiaľs secretary informed me that "tbe bars are down; you may go anywhere you can obtain transportation." At tbe railway station J got a ticket for Prague. A train was scbeduled to leave that evening about six. Tbe station was a seething mad-house. Pandemonium, orrlerly confusion, bundreds of terrorstricken people with bundreds of bags. bundles and babies trying to get somewbere - anywbere. In tbe black-out, long after slx o'clock, tbere was an air-raid warning. Police herded people into a vast underground shelter that had been tunnelled into a rocky bili aero.ss the railway tracks. MorP .:onfusion, anxiety and wondering if we would ever get out of the stricken city. The train - scheduled for six o'clock - left in tbe thickening blackness of the night about eleven. People were packed in to suffocation. At a town called Cuty. on thP. Crontier, l transferred to anotber train tbat landed me in Brno, now Czechoslovakia, about eight in the morning. After snatching four hours sleep at the Grand Hotel, I contrived to board (without the special military permit) an express train which landed me in Prague about mldnight. All train service into Slovakia ended tbe morning after I de• parted. Had J delayed a few hours longer tbe Reds would have inc luded me in their spreading net of "liberation." Even the most unobservant person must bave sensed the uneasiness of the Germans then in Prague. Czechs and the evacuees from Slovakia, Hungary and Poland knew it was but a matter of weeks or days when the American and British forces would be in Berlin. Tb'at meant the end of the war. but what then? Every day motor trucks and cars of all kinds were being loacled with bousehold goods, cats, dogs, bird cages, German women and children. Then at evening they rolled off into the darkness. Branche.• of trees or other <'amouflaging uas used to disguise the vebicles as much as possible. They dld not chance mass movements or evacuees in dayl!gbt llours. �SLOVAKIA 43 REVOLUTION AND REVENGE Friday evening, May Fourtb, marked tbe beglnning ot tbe uprising against six long years ot German dictatorsbip. A mysterious and ominous atmospbere pervaded Prague. Crowds began convergmg in Wenselplatz - as it was then called_ For wbat? No one seemed to know. Sometbing was to bappen. A revolution was in tbe making. Little by little tbings occurred. Men, women and boys began defacing German words on tbe fronts of business establ!shments. Tbey commenced to alter tbe street signs - - which were in dual language - Czecb and German_ Tbe electric trams were halted by tbe crowd Then matters became more serious. Sirens screamed, military cars pushed througb tbe crowds, commands were barked over t.he loud speakers in the s quare. Small armoured tanks rolled into view. A plstol shot, a woman's scream, crowds surging back against tbe walls and the rattle of machlne guns Four days and nigbts tbe battle continued. The Prague raáio remained in Czech hands and was their greatest asset. Pleas from it were directed to the American forces, said to be thirty, tben twenty, tben ten miles away. Professor Matousek, director of tbe station, would beg in broken English for tbem to hurry. The Stars and Stripes waved from the top;, of buildings and in many windows. An enthusiastic welcome would be glven tbeir liberators. The question asked by hundreds was: '·When do you think tbe Americans wíll get here?" Little did they know then that they would never arrive_ That Prague and the Czechs, together with the millions of Slovaks, had b een sold down-river by Eduard Benes in a secret deal entered into with Stalin. A deal that had the benediction of Franklin D. Roosevelt who was even then loudly prating about saving the Western World from the Nazi destroyers of Christianity, only to be consigned to the Soviet, the greatest destroyers and enemies of Christian civilization since the Cruclfixion. THE SAD AWAKENING On the sixth day of the revolution in which bundreds or !!ves and millions in property was destroyed. General Vlassoff's troopers were s linking along the shattered fronts of buildings in Wenzelspaltz. These were the Russians, mostly from the Ukraine, who had first been equipped by the Germans to fight thP Communists. Now they turned on the Germans and were belping to drive tbem out of Prague. The thought came to me at the time: what will be tbe fate or these pol!tlcal pawns? They followed tbeir leader, General VlassofI against the Bolshevik terrorists, then they remainecl witb him when he turned agalnst the Germans. Would tbe Allied nations give them sanctuary and a cbance to live• They did not. General Vlassoff was dellvered to the Moscow '"liberators" just as was President Tiso and bis cabinet. After a mock tria! that followed the pattern of al! Red trlals. Vlassoff was put before a firing squad. But what ls the fate of tbe simple l{ussian farmeťs boy hundreds of them - wbo wore a uniform an carried a rifle, or drove a team of horses pulling a wagon Joad of supplles to aid In the war for tbe West? Any number or t.hem were hquldated and others are �SLOV~ .I A 110w slaves In Slberia. Not being articulate their story is never heard. And who delivered them to death or slavery? The same ones wbo dellvered the Slovaks to the Communlsts at Teheran and Yalta. By the end of the sixth or seventh day there came into the n1lnds or the beleagured people of Prague as well as the hundreds or Slovak, Pollsh and Hungarian evacuees, the susplclon that the Amerlcans were not coming. When for days the Amer!can rorces did not advance a step, but on the contrary moved away trom the city, they knew that something or a Mach!avelian nature had taken place behind the scenes. That they had been sold !nto bondage. All the p!ous words and pretty promlses that had been inade about guaranteeing their liberatlon - were just so many empty words. It became obvlous that political tricksters had ordained in secret conferences that Czecho-Slovakia was to be handed lnto the Red orbit. It was agaínst every tenet of their beliefs. part!cularly the Slovaks, who were avowed and m!l!tant foes or the Communist ideology and who w!th thelr then presldent, Joseph Tlso, had said they would t!ght to the !ast man. Now they realized that they were being conslgned to Red dominat!on. After another day of intermittent bombing and shell fire those of us In Prague heard a jubilant news announcer on the London radlo assure us that "the war in Europe !s over." That same inaccurate statement came from the American operated radlo stations In Germany and France and synchronized. ironlcally enough, with the staccato barking of machlne guns that raked Wenzelsplatz and the occasional deep toned thunder of an aerlal bomb or German shell that ~xploded somewhere too near ror comfort. For the people of Czecho-Slovakia the war was not over. We knew in tbe promises of the Western Powers, had been abandoned to t.he then that the Czechs and Slovaks. also the Hungarlans. the Poles and the other people of Chrlstian nations. who had placed thelr fatth benign brutallties and tyranny of Joseph Stalin. Innuences In Washington hari labored zealously to airl the Kremli n's effort for worldwide destruct!on of Chrl.stlan civllizatlon. and the Slovaks were another pawn In the game. Proof or that innuence and c!tations or those. who were lnstrumental In lntlict!ng that ruln on Centra! :E;urope. bave already been written tnto the publi<' records. Slovakia had enjoyed a measure of freedom only to have lt snatched away anrl her peopl~ consigned to oppression, spollatlon and deportation. far more ghastly than any they had endured in past bistory. But rbeir falth in God and their delermlnation to flght on has 1emalned. • • • WHO SAID IT? - "We are children or freedom. We cannot be s afe except in an environment of freedom. We belleve in freedom as fundamentally as we belleve anythlng In thls world. We belleve In it far everyone In our country. And we don't restrict thls belie! to freedom for ourselves. We belleve that all people in the world are entltled to as much freedom, to develop in thelr own way, as we want ourselves." - (Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, Aprll 22, 1950). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKÍA Z5 1 WAS IN SWVAKJA Edward L. Delaney Many Slovaks in America, especially those horn in this country, have but a limited knowledge of their parents' or grandparents' !and. As for the millions of Americans who have no klnsbip with Slovak!a, the word is merely the latter half of Czecho-Slovakia, which had been impressed upon their consclousness by the propaganda bureaus ot tbe late Edward BAnes and bis predecessor Thomas Masaryk. One will search long In those propaganda papers for any paragraphs conveying the impresslon that the Slovaks are the political, cultural or industria! equals o! the Czechs. Perhaps one reason that the Czech rather than the Slovak part of the hyphenated name has been given greater publicity !s that the capital, Prague, is predomlnantly Czech and the majority or visitors from other parta of the world seldom get beyond that city. There is no denying that the Prague of pre-1945 days did possess an individua.l atmosphere and charm for those who are interested In the architectural treasures and historlcal landmarks of Europe's older ci ties. · It was this writer's good fortune to have vis!ted or reslded Cor extended periods in several ot the other European capitals before visiting Prague. Many months later I was afforded the opportunity for a stay of two years in Slovakia. At that Ume the synthetic CzechoSlovakia had ceased to exist. Following nine hundred years or struggling fot; independence, the Republic of Slovakla was establlshed and the people could say that they had attained somethlng approximating tbeir goal. Tbe evening of my arrival in Bratislava, capital of tbe new State, a Professor Doba! called on me at the Carlton Hotel. He lnformed me that he was connected with the State propaganda bureau and that their attache, Streiznic, at tbe Berlin Legatľon, had telegraphed that l was arrlvlng. Foreign correspondents and writers were sought out by them and efforts made to present their country In the best light. An appolntment was made ror me to meet bis cbief, Tido J. Gaspar. Tido J., as I soon learned, was the most photographed man in Slovakia. No news reel was complete witbout bim smiling or band· shaking 'bi~ way into the center of the picture. He was the official greeter An actor with the wbole country as bis stage. In bis !apel, winter or summer, was always a gardenia, a full bloom rose or a cluster of flowers In season. His attire was patterned on tbe rigorously correct Unes 'Óf New York's ófficial greeter, Grover Whalen. In fact one got the lmpresslon that T!do J. Gaspat may bave met or studied tbe life-and-times of Grover Wbalen or the late Jimmy Walker, the most popular mayor New York ever had. for he was their counterpart in Centra! Europe. What can I do for you ?" · he asked after we had exchanged the usua,I formalities of visitor and host. "Nothlng," I informed bim, except to suggest what would be In• teresting · for me from a scen!c as well as a hlstor!cal point ot 26 SLOVAKIA view. That appealed to him. The alert and competent young men or his travel department la!d out an !tlnerary for me whlch covered the pr!ncipal c!tles and !ncluded a short stay in the justly famed H!gh Tatra resorts of the Carpath!an Mounta!ns. Bratislava was at that tlme the Mecca for all who, by any maneuvering, could arrange to go there. World War II was in the early stages. Food restrictions and rationing had been !mposed on a large part of Western and Centra! Europe. A long bridge over the Danube connects Bratislava with Austrla, across which rolls the rail and motor traff!c to Vlenna some s!xty miles away. But !t ls no longer the Vienna of Johann Strauss and Franz Lehar music with food and rink to be enjoyed in lelsurely comfort. Even in those early days of the war all Au.stria and Germany were areas of dismal faces and unappetlzing meals. Bratislava - which many still referred to as Pressburg - was the magnet that drew vlsitors from all Centra! Europe. For in Slovakia was to be had food and rink, muslc and laughter w!thout let, stay, or hindrance. With the exception of the adjoining country of Hungary, no other part of Centra! Europe enjoyed the essentials and many of the luxuries of life, as did the people of Slovakla before the period when Stalin's hordes swarmed over the country like a swarm of locusts and literally laid lt to waste. In most of the propaganda that emanated from various sources in Europe and was eagerly snapped up and exaggerated by the sinlster influences in this country, the impression was conveyed that Germany syphoned off the food resources of Slovakia long before thelr armies actually occupled the country late in the year 1944. Even at the risk of being charged with attempting to mitigate the sins of the Nazi Reglme. I assert that, in those days it was regarded as rare good fortune if one could get lnto the Slovak paradise and there obtain a good meat wlth whatever was desired in the way of w!nes, spirits or liquors, all at prices which, even in those tlmes were reasonabl!l. Until the severe winter of 1944-45, citrus fruits, such as lemons and oranges from Italy or Spain, might he had in the public markets. Such delicacies had been off the markets in Austria and Germany for nearly five years. In addition to al! dairy products, poultry, beef, pork, sugar, <>onfectionery and tobacco wares were obta!nable in Slovak!a with but slight restrlctlons on the amount of certaln items that mlgbt be pur• chased. Also clotbing. s boes and dress materlals were to be had. At tbat time the shops of Austrla and Germany were bare of goods. Just over the Danube from Bratislava the sbops were emoty. Such stores as the Woolworth cbain were barren. Shelves and tables of empty cartons or a single item - usually a wooden toy or some article of glass. Rows of the same useless article. Nothing was to be found that contalned metal, cotton, rubber wool, s!lk - all of which materials were needed for the war supplies. After observing those empty shops in Vienna, Munich, Berlin. Frankfurt and Cologne, it was as a fairyland to enter business establlshments of the same type In Slovakia and f!nrl most anything one might expect to see in shops beyond the warrlng zone. SLOVAKIA 27 The people or Slovakia knew they were enjoylng a verltable heaven of plenty as compared to thelr neighbors. T heir new status as an independent country began in the spring of 1939. Only a few rersons, whether in the cities. towns or villages, did not realize that they were the envy of people in their neighborlng states. Slovak inde• pendence and self-determinatlon was paying them divldends even in the material advantages they could see and understand. Small wonder that their political leaders were popular and their policles approved. Therefore it was not surprlsing that the majority of the people had only words or praise for President Joseph Tiso and the other of!icials of their young republic. What many dld not reallze was that Germany was syphonlng off thelr surplus or agrlcultural and manufactured products. In exchange the Slovaks dld recelve some goods, such as tools, machinery, electrical equipment and rallway supph es, but for the most part they got only promises to pay in such materials. The debt owing by Germany was increasing with staggerlng amounts each month. But the majority of the people enjoyed thelr temporary prosperity with scant worry about the future. Although there was little doubt in their minds as early as 1942, that the Axls Powers were doomed to defeat, they held to the hope that by somf! political magic they would escape the horrors of war and the pf!nalties to follow. In those days of the Republlc of Slovakla, it was a country or contrasts. Evidences of its centuries old clvilizatlon and customs were to be observed alongside products that were as up to the minute as tomorrow's newspaper. For example: the express tralns making daily trips to and from the high Tatra resorts were powered by Diesel electrlc locomotives, with Jounge. dining and observation cars comparable to those of other European railway systems. But in the country, through which the deluxe traln sped smoothly, one observed also the prlmltlve ox carts on winding dlrt roads. Oxen pulled the ploys and harrows In the fields. Moreover, the branch railway lines that wound around or over the mountains and dipped down into fertile valleys offered the traveler what comfort he might get from a bard wooden bench In a dlmly llgh ted coach behlnd a wood burnlng steam engine of the type used In the western mountain country of the Unlted States seventy-five years ago. Stepping from the modern express on the High Tatra run, to the minlature traln that huffed and puffed its way to Banska Stiavnica was like bridging a gap of t.hree quarters of a century. It chanced that my arrival in Banska Stiavnica synchronized with a heavy snow storm. After plodding through darkness and deep snow for what seemed to be a mlie, the youth. who had dragged my luggage on a sled. ushered me through the portals of a buildlng that had al\ the appearances of an old Roman ruln. It was old and the Romans had probably been there. but lt was not ruined and from the durable manner in which stone and mortar were put into buildings In those middle ages, it will not be in rulns for another few centuries. Tens of thousands of shoes or sandals had worn deep grooves In the stone door step. E lectrlc llghts replaced the candles or oil tapers that had _Iighted the way for guests who came there in other SLQVAKIA 28 centuries, but that was a bout all the concesslon that had been made to the lJ!Odern world. The building, so l learned from the Sudeten German woman who operated it, was over three hundred years old. The cold room to which I was asslgned boasted a bed whlch was less than three centuries old, but it was about the only modem plece In the antique setting. Although appreciat!ng the charm of archltectural treasures and old Jandmarks, there are limes when one misses the creature comforts that are affored in our modern hotels and homes. Tbat was one of tbose times. But the warmlng effect of a "slivovica" and gobs or excellently roasted goose, i,olisbed off with another potent drink, served to banlsh the fear of \Vaking in that three hundred year old room to find tbat I was frozen to death. Oddly enough one seldom heard about the precious metals that were once part of Slovakia's contrlbutlon to the worlďs wealth. Much of the old currency and art objects in the Hungarian empire and Centra! Europe were made from gold and silver ores that were mined at Kremnica and near Banska Stiavnica. But witb tbe increaslng costs of production and the relatlvely cbeap prlce or the metal during tbe quarter of a century before tbe birth of the Republlc of Slovakia, those -mines had been practically abondoned. World War II altered tbe situation. Centra) Europe was cut off (rom tbe silver producing countries of North and South America. Mining of that metal was steppe<l up. The silver sm.iths of Slovakia again plied thelr trade and many articles of thelr handlwork appeared in the sbops. Througb the perfidlous acts of the signers of the agreements at Teheran and Yalta, Stalin's minions. the Communist confiscators, have no doubt taken possession of tbose sources of wealth. Whatever treasure ts taken from them now, finds its way into the coffers ot the Communists instead of belng rashioned into articles for the use ot people or for objects of art in the churcbes or Cbrist. Like other In• dustries, whicb were created or resulted after tbe establishment of the Republic or Slovakia. tbe mines or Stiavnica are servlng the needs of Stalin. Political charlatans. such as Edward Benes, who were lauded by tbe American press and propagandists. sold tbe Slovaks lnto bondage for less than the thirty pieces o! sllver, wbich was the prlce of J udas for betraying bis Master. Tbey wanted and for a Ume e njoyed persona) aggrandizement and polltlcal power as puppets of tbelr Moscow master. They silenťed any murmur of protest tbat mlgbt have been raised by the people who for nine bundred years had struggled for indepen?.encei · · S LO V A K IA - V ICTI M OF TE.H ERAN A N D Y A LTA Tbe Centra! European satellites around the Soviet star are often to as. being of Slavic origin. Some omnisctent ones give that as one reason why Stalin had little dlfflculty In merging them into tbe Red. orbít. Slovakia, as we know, was one or tbe countrie!\ sold lnto bondage at Teheran and Yalta - tbe completlon or the betrayal belng seen when Eduarq Benes returned in 1945 as puppet president of tbe socalled Czecho-Slovakia and for two years or so made grotesque referŕed i LOVAKIA efforts to disguise tbe fact tbat Stalin, and not Benes or Klement Gottwahl, was tbe supreme belng In their capltal al Prague. Etbnologlcally lt is not lncorrect to group tbe peoples ot Russla. Poland, Czecboslovakia, Ukralnla, Bulgarla and Yugoslaľia into a Pan-Slav classlflcation. Tbe vast majority of the peoples In lhe socalled Slav nations bas llttle in common witb tbe Russa!ns. In past generations tbere was a bond of Cbristian religion wb!cb ran tbrough all tbe Slav countries, eitber tbe Ortbodox Greek-Russian Cburcb or, in tbe case of Slovakia, Poland, Croatia. lbe Roman Catbollc Cburcb. Tbe rise or atbelstlc Communlsm In Russla was t be deatb knell of Chrlstlanity tbere, bence a splltting wedge was d riven between most of the Balkan and Centra! European countries and t be great Slav domain of tbe Soviet. Slovakla, Poland and Croatla bave been predominantly Roman Catbollc for centuries. Only a small percentage are adherents ot tbe Ortbodox Cburcb. Hence, any contention tbat tbere is a racia! and religlous afflnity among the Slav peoples, wblcb simplifled tb elr enslavement by Moscow, 1s lacklng In support. F urthermore, lt is leaktng out tbrougb cracks and crinks In the Iro!l Curtaln that Stalln ls flnd· ing more tban a llttle dltficulty In merglng the Slovaks lnto bis godless domain. Wben for over eleven centuries a people, sucb as tbe Slovaks wbo bave prayed to God and H is Son, tbe Cbrlst, lt ls not llkely tbat tbe delty of tbe Kremlin can soon purge t belr mlnds or tbe OnA Supreme Being. THE SLOVAK$ ARE CELTS? Also - lf we were to accept the oplnlon of a learned professor it was my good fortune to meet in Banska Bystrica - tbere ls no RACIAL kinshlp between tbe Slovaks and tbe Russians. The Slovaks are not Slavs, asserted tbat student of blstory, but on the contrary ' they are Celts. A professor Doba! In Bratislava had given me a note ót lntroductlon to tbe curator of tbe museum In Banska Bysttica. It de· veloped tbat tbe gentleman knew more about the bistory ot manklnd tban Gl bbons, H. G. Wells, or any ot tbose wbo bave wtltten. 'Welgbty tomes on tbe origin or man, etc. ' 1• Tbls Slovak scbolar, well along In yt>ars, bad ·been lnstrúctor In a unlversity al Constantlnople (before it was called Istanbul) also in Budapest. His speclalty was Sanskrit Arabic, tbe Hebrew language and otber writings on tbe earlíest hlstory or manklnd. "You are Irisb," he said to me, after we had dlsposed of a slivovica and coffee, "and the Irlsh are Celts. A characteristlc ot tbe l rlsb is black halr with blue eyes. Tbat 1s observed among our people here In Slovakla." President Tiso, 1 have already mentioned had black bair and blue eyes. If the professor ,vas endeavorlng to make me feel a racia! kinshlp wlth the Slovaks - the Celtlsh background - he certatnly supported hls oplnion wlth more arguments than black and b lue for hair and eyes. lt was a lengthy thesls he expounded on tbe !:'Ubject, but the glst or lt was that au the people or Europe stem from the origlnal tn h abitants llvlng in tbe region around the Medlterranean, the Jordah, tbe 30 SLOVAKIA Hed and the Dead Sea. The garden of Paradise is supposed to have been in that general part of the Near East. The Celts - as part of the early human family of whlch we have any history, so the professor asserted - were brawny, pioneer lads, pagans in those days, of course, who hunted and explored and pushed their way westward. Some of them got as far as the western s hores of Europe, which we now know as the coast of Brittany in France. From there they launched boats and set up their cabeens in Ireland and Scotland, wbere they are today. Some of those early Ce!ts, acco rding to this student of the subject, decided tha,t the area just west of the Carpathian Mountalns - which is Slovakia - was a pretty good part of the earth to stake out for t heir children and grandchildren for generations to come. So there they stayed. Like the other Celts who went on to I reland, they were converted to Christ!anlty well over a thousand years ago and bave remained steadfast in their faith ever slnce, just as have the fightin' lrish. That, the Banska Bystrica gentleman lnformed me. is another evidence of the kinship, the similarlty in character and traditions. He then escorted me to a conical plie of stones towerlng four stories high, in which were kept many relics and articles that had been dug from the ground in Slovakia over th e past generations. There were cooking utensils, ornaments of solid gold and silver, bits of clothing, crude instruments for killing, such as tbe crusaders of the middle ages carried, and many other articles. Oddly enough, 1 had seen articles almost identically the same in the museum of Dublin, Ireland, on one of my visits there. Those in the Dublin museum had been unearthed in tbe peat bogs and fields of Ireland. The professor had a point there. The traces of clvllization, which we have found, do have similarity. The old gentleman then took me to his home and into the b asement or cellar under it. There were stacks of musty manuscripts, some on tbe oldest known kind of parchment. The signs and symbols on tbey were just hierog!yphics to me, but to that scholar they told stories and epics of hlstory wbich had been written in the mlddle ages. Whether or not tbe Slovaks are Celts and kin ot the Irish and Scots, instead of the Russians, I shall not attempt to prove. But that was the contention of one learned Slovak in Banska Bystrica. S LOV AKIA U NDER THE REDS Of course, now that the Communisl<i are in Slovakia, and Moscow is to be regarded as the fountain head of all culture and wisdom, it is likely that any reference to tbe Cbristian Celts as being remotely related to the Slovaks will be purged trom the people's minds and records. It would be interesting to know what the Communlsts have done to the sbrlne, the mausoleum of Fatber Andrej H linka In Ruzomberok, at wbich I had knelt in prayer a day or so before going to Banska Bystrica. It was Father Hlinka who, by bis zeal, tireless energy and strength of cbaracter, had brought about the political unity and solidarity wh!ch made possi ble tbe creation of the Slovak Republic. Al· thougb lt was short Jlved, it did demonstrate to the world that a SLOVAKIA 31 Slovak state is feasible and may again be upon the maps of Europe. It would be incorrect to assert that everyone in the Slovak Repub• Ile, durlng the stx years of its exlstence, was enthuslastlcally 01>tlmistic as to lts future in the assembly of nations comprlsíng the European continent. In this connection, it shoula be mentioned, tbat tbe greatly_ publicized pian or proposal said to bave been urged by General Dwight Eisenhower, !or a United States of Europe, may be dlsmissed as wlshful thinking. Such a "United States" could not possibly function at thls stage of world history when half of Europe is free and half s lave, half Christlan and half under the ruthless dominatlon of pagan dictators. Until the situation 1s altered and Communism ls banished from Europe, there can be no lasting unity. To even dlscuss the matter be· fore that 1s accomplished, is utterly Cutile. A SLOVAK TEXAS RANGER SPEAKS HIS MIND A well-to-do industrialist in Bratislava pointed out to me about 1942 what was to be the fate of Slovakla and Europe in the postwar period. He iS not a Slovak but one who resided in Slovakla when it was part oľ the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. then under the gov· ernment of Czechoslovakia and remained to carry on under tbe Re· 1mblic, as did many of Hungarlan, Czecb, Austrian or German natlonality. All enjoyed equ al rights. As be may still be living there, it would be wrong to mentlon bis name, because reprisals might be inflicted on bim, should these words be brought to the attentlon of Red spies in tbis country. On my lnitial visit to bis home, the first objects that met my eyes were a western saddle and a Wlnchester rifle In a regulatlon leather holster. Very much American. Then I got tbe story. He had been a Texas Ranger in bis younger days! There were notches in bis leg from slugs of desperados, several of wbom he had killed in bis encounters wltb tbem along the borders of the Rio Grande. Speaklng five languages fluently and knowing thl! contlnent of Europe thorougbly, his opinions on the current and impending eventa were wor• thy of attentlon "Wbat a misfortune 'Teddy' Roosevelt isn't in the White House today," he said shortly after we met. "Things would be dlfferent. Tbe way lt appears now, Europe is being delivered stralgbt lnto chaos and Communism. You know what that means? I do. Durlng the bloody reign of terror under tbat so-and-so (expressive Texas Ranger term) Bela Kun, I witnessed enough of lt. I was !nterpreter before some ot the committees in Budapest and stared that 'so-and-so' In the eye many a tlme. ľd bave kllled bim if I got the chance, and he knew lt. What is the intention of Franklln Roosevelt? To dellver us over t<_> the Reds aga in?" It was necE>ssary to first destroy the forces or Hitler, I pointed out and then . . . "Then what? Thaťs tbe quest!on. True enougb the Nazl yoke on the German people must be broken and they be brought back to belp in the scheme of thlngs. But you mark my worda, Stalln is the only one who ia winning anything in thia war. He'a not winning it elther. lťs being given to him. Unless bis henchmen are thrown out of t.he 32 SLOVAKIA Balkans, the Baltic states, Poland and all the other spots he will take over soon; the whole of Europe and western civllizatlon wlll go back• ward tor ~ century or so." "You are not so badly off here in Slovakia at present," I ventured to say. "NQnsense. Our freedom here is but temporary, and so 1s the pros• períty, Fooľs gold. You know what tbat 1s? A flasb In the pan, a mi· rage. Can't make this country self-sufficient. It bas to be bltcbed on t& some other part of Europe. Always has been. Tbe Germans deve!• oped it at one period of bistory. It was part of tbe Hapsburg Man· archy, tben the neglected half of Czecho·Slovakla. It wlll be taken over by the Reds after the war - see if ľm not rlght. Could make it a self·determining state, if the otber European powers, supported by America, demanded it. But tbey won't, unless great pressure ls brougbt on the influences now in Washington, London and Paris. But ľm not leaving here. Sure, ľm what tbey cal\ a capitallst, an enemy of the Reds. rve gat that Wincbester and two Colt plstols. Wben they're empty the Reds can take wbaťs left. I won't know mucb about it tben." That was one man's opinion of wbat was transplring in Slovakia anct Centra! Europe at tbat time and wbat he thought tbe future beld far tbem. He was not always so explosive in bis observatlons. but in tbe two years and more I knew bim I learned to respect his estimate of the Europeao scene. though at times I may not have entlrPIY agreed with bim. But was be not right as regards the sell-out of Christianity in Cen· tral Europe? Was he not correct In bis predictlon that only Stalln was wiooing t he war and that bis greatest aldes were then oot In '.\toscow. but In London and Washington? In these days when we art! exhorted to strlve and save and struggle to rescue Europe and ourselves rrom the menace of Communlst cont.rol, let us reflect on tbe facts or tbose who - wltb wbat appears to bave been pre-determlnation - consigned Slovak:a and otber Christian nations to perdition. MEETING PRESIDENT TISO At a dinner party in Bratislava l flrst met Joseph Mracna, formerly Consul far Czecboslovakia in New York. lt developed, wben comparlng notes, t hat we had both salled from New York on the same day in Oecembr 1939. He on tbe Vulcania bound far Llsbon. wbile my voyage was on tbe Excalibur witb Genoa as my destinatlon. Mracna and bis wlfe, who was Viennese. were very pro-American an.d longed far the tlme when they migbt return to tbe Unitd States wher-e he ·had many frlends and acqualntaoces, several of whom were also my friends. Although born In Slovakia, Mracna had spent tbe greater part of bis life in other countries. He attended unlversities in Vienna and Par!s, following wb!ch he had been occup!ed In forelgn countrles even before becoming the Czecboslovakian Consul In New York. He was, at the time I knew him, a member of tbe Foreign Office of the new Sl_ovak .Republlc wbere hls experience and knowledge of affalrs in .several other countries was most usefuL I asked !f he could arrange an audience for me with the Pres!dent. He said he could; and did. SLOVAKIA 33 When I arr!ved at the presldentlal palace at the time ap polnted for my a udlence, Ka rol Murin, persona) secretary for the Preslden t, cautioned me aga!nst detaining him too long and also mentioned that it would be inappropriate to questlon him on matters of foreign a nd domestlc policy. Mracna, it seems, had lnferred that !t was more of a persona) and human interest chat that I desired with the P res!den t, whlch was correct, but r was also most eager to interview bim on politlcal issues - domestic and foreign. Monsignor J oseph Tiso. or Pres!dent Tiso as he was then, rad!a ted those qua lities so often observed in the successful pol!tlc!an. An!mation, vigor, affability and the obvious desire to make frlends and please people, withont Jettlng it appear as a veneer to mask h!s real thoughts. He greeted me with a hearty llandshake and. after Karol Murin left us. he Jed the way to the corner of bis study in the palace. He was in perfect health, but a physical dlrector would undoubtedly have prescribed more exercise to guard agalnst overwelght whlch ls often the worry of those nearing the half-century mark. His black ha!r was but sparsely sprinkled wlth grey and a radiant tr!nkle llgh ted bis dark blue eyes. Slnce my knowledge of the Slovak language was limited to some dozen or more words and he spoke very little Engllsh, our interview was carried on in German. My openlng remark was that he had established history by belng the first Catholic priest to be the head of a sovere!gn state. "Oh, no," he replied, "there was Selpel in the former Austrian government." Monsi'gnor Seipel, 1 reminded bim, was prime minister but not president. "There was Richelieu." He, too, as l called to bis attention, was prime minister whiJe Louis of France was king. So it seemed that my reference to history was correct. After some minutes or general conversatlon I said that I had been cautioned not to question bim on matters of state, but that I would like to do so. "Please do. Any questions you ask, l'll try to answer the m." WHAT ABOUT POLICIES? Then 1 was free to touch on several topics that lnterested me and most anyone else who had any knowledge of the happen!ngs !nside Central Europe during these days. "It is true that your pol!cies are dictated by Germany?" '"No," he lnsfsted. "In forelgn matters our policies are formu• lated so that tbey do not conflict with those of the Axls Powers. Slnce we are within their orblt lt would be sulcidal to strongly oppose them. But in domestlc matters we form our own pollcles whlch, In many instances, do not coincide wlth those of Germany. German terr!tory as you know is just across the Danube. Only a bridge between us but it !s a long bridge." He smiled when he realized that. I grasvoo his none too subtle meaning. 34 SLOVAKIA "Some of your critics," I then said, "declare that you - and by that I mean the Slovak Republic - are subject to instructions from the Vatican." "The usual charge of the uninformed," he replied. "l have no connection with the Vatican, except through the diplomatic channels, the same as other countries to which the Vatican City has accredited representation. (T here was a Vatlcan diplomatic official resident in Bratislava.) Any communications affecting the religious affairs of our people would be transmitted through the bishops. I am not a bishop. In my capacity as president I have no counection with Rome, other than I have polnted out." All rellgious denominations were accorded the same right of worship, he pointed out. The largest Protestant group was the Lutheran Evangelical, of which Rev. Martin Razus was the accepted leader and who was not only cooperating with bim politically, but they were personal friends. In the eastern part of the state were also many Orthodox or Greek Catholics. AGAIN WITH THE CZECHS ? Was lt likely, l asked, that the Slovaks and Czechs would again llilite in a government after tbe war? That questinon did not receive a direct answer. He remlnded me that trom the very inception of the Czecho-Slovakian government, there had been dlscrimintalon against tbe Slovaks. The autonomy, which had been promlsed, had been denied them. Those who protested and agitated for Slovak rights, such as Hlinka and hlmself, were imprisoned. Something like nine months he had spent in a Czech jail for protestlng the injustices that were lnflicted on t he Slovak people and demanding that their rights be recognized. Later he had been Minister of Health in the Prague cabinet. The Slovaks. he assured me, de· s ired to live in peace and harmony wlth the Czechs, the Poles, the Hungarlans and the Germans, but they a lso believed they were entltled to the "self-determlnation" that had been loudly proclaimed and was said to be the lnalienable right even of all small nations. They were now, for the first Ume in hlstory, an independent country. The problems facing them were many and varied. President Tiso referred wlth considerable pleasure to hls vislt in the Unlted States in 1937. He expressed the wish that the thousands of Slovaks in Canada and the United States be informed of the prospects for bette rment which he felt was due their people through the enactment of the programs of development then under way. NEED OF TEACHERS AND TECHNICIANS Thelr greatest problem, he said, was in finding men and women for the jobs that had been created. "We need technlcians, instructors in t he schools and universities and speciallsts for industria! projects. Our hlgh schools are over-crowded. Students want education and want to get ahead, but we lack sufflcient teachers. Tbe same in many businesses. We bope to meet these needs in tlme." He made the remark that, although s peclallsts and technlclans were urgently needed. he boped tbey would not bave to rely too much on the Germans. Tbat and otber comments indicated hls disllke for SLOVAKIA 36 tbe small army of German engineers and tecbnicians wbo had come into the country to aid In its development. THE SLOVAKS AND THE RUSSIANS There had been a small token Slovak force sent against the Soviet soon after the outbreak of the German-Soviet hostillties in 1941, but they were withdrawn and tbe men, for the most part, were work· Ing in various industries that contributed products for the war effort. l pointed out to the President that they and tbe Russians were Slavs and was it not consistent that they be on tbe side of tbeir blood brotbers? Tbere was a pause and bis face became very earnest. "Quite true, We are blood brothers. But when tbose blood brotbers are Bolsheviks and Communlsts," doubling his flst and pounding on the table in front of bim Tiso said, ''then we'll fight to tbe last man." Presldent Tiso, like the martyred Draja Mlhailovitcb of Yugosla• vla, Archbisbop Stepinac and Mindszenty of Budapest, did not hesitate to take a firm and defiant stand against the greatest menace Christian civlllzation was then facing - and is still facing today. But because he and tbose other courageous ones were not deceived by tbe propaganda, the pious platitudes and spurious pollcies of tbe Western Powers as regards tbe Soviet, he was marked for sacrifice. The Washington State Department, at tbe bebest of Stalln's puppets, actually delivered bim to tortures and to death. Deny it tbougb they would llke to do today - when Christian leaders llke J osepb Tiso are neetled to weld Central Europe into a strong bastion against the Communlst horde - the bald trutb remains that In 1945 our State Department, as a supine and subserv!ent tool of Stalin. cons!gned T!so and tbe Slovaks t_o Red domination and extermination. Regardless of all arguments to the contrary, Josepb Tiso was slncerely desirous of helping his people - the long oppressed country that for nine hundred years had kept the fires or Chrlstlanlty alive in Centra! Europe. How long those fires will smoulder under the ruth· less domination of Communist destroyers of religion and clvllizatlon, is a grave question. Wbether it was mistaken judgment for tbe Slovaks to accept the assistance of Germany, to achieve the measure of independence they enjoyed, is a matter of oplnion. There was no war in progress wben the Slovak Republlc was born and none was imminent. Tbey revolted against obvlous injustices of tbe Prague Government. The Czech majority could bave compromised and settled tbeir dlfferences. Tbey did not. Wben tbe interna] revolt came. Hitler took advantage of tbe situatlon and proffered bis migbt against outslde aggresslon. Slovakla accepted tbe offer. If Josepb Tiso was a traltor to bis country, then tbe same can be said of Eamon de Valera in Ireland, Mabatma Gbandi in India. or the gallant Marsball Mannerheim in brave little Flnland. AII were patriots fighting for tbeir people. All were persecuted, smeared and discredited, but tbeir names will live in tbe blstories yet to be wrltten. 36 SLOVAKlA TI SO HAD A SENSE OF H UMOR After furtber lengtby dlscussion of varlous toplcs, I was about to depart when Karol Murin came to Inform tbe President tbat tbe Finance Minister was waitlng to see bim. Tlso accompanled me lnto a vast room looklng out across a walled garden in wbicb he sald líe took dally walks. Little dld l know tben tbat, over two year.s later, he would be taking many long walks togetber in another walled enclosure and resume our discussions on tbe worlďs affairs. But tbat is another story. Tbe air of tbe room was cbilly. - A tbougbt occurred to me. "Your Excellency," I said, ·•some persons told me tbat you a re always very seriouJ and earnest. But tbere's a twlnkle ot mirtb In your eyes at times and I bave an Idea tbat there's conslderable humor In you." "Perbaps," he smlled. "Would lt be appropriate If I gave you a little present?" "Wbat, · for instance·?" "I tbougbt tbat in tbese cold days of winter, just for mediclnal purposes, of course, you migbt appreciate a half dozen bottles ot gflod Canadlan whisky." Tlso chuckled and bis eyes lígbted witb the mirth I had noted there before. "ľll be glad to get lt," be' ~'aid. · The half dozen bottles were duly delivered fróm a source In "Bra tislava wbere I knew it was obtainable. Later on Karol Murin ask-ečl me to call again at tbe palace, wben I was given the compllments ot the Presldent and a token of bis appreciation for the whisky. It lš a wonder!ully embroidered table c loth, one of the finest specimens ot Slovak rieedlework that could posslbly be found. It is today my most treasur-ed possession. Very recently a letter came to me trom Karol Murin who ls now a resident of Canada. He informed me that my friend Joseph Mracna, whom I got to know very well in tbe two years following our meeting, had been murdered by the Commnnists. The Slovak patriot, Monslgnor Joseph Tlso, was delivered to Benes and bi.s Red Government by. the United States autborlties to be exterminated, because he was the arch enemy of Communism. Jn 1946, the year when· that assistance to Communist deslgns was. rendered by our offlclals, lt was polltlcally unwise to declare one's 'undying opposition to the forces or antl-God even then seeklng our destruction. Presldent Tiso pald tbe supreme penalty for bis devotion to bis God and bis country. COMES MY TURN TO BE I NVESTIGATED Tbe Carlton Hotel, in Bratislava, where I had reslded for months, was a meeting place for German military officers, legation attaches and couriers, coming and going all the tíme. A physician llving in the hotel, wbom I had called on a tlme or two for professlonal services, informed· me tbat someone at the German Legatlon had quizzed bim about me. The pbyslcian was Slovak, bis wife Hungarlan, enougb to assure me they were not sympathetic to the German otflcials. "That American 1s no frlend ot Germany," the legation omclal sald to the physician. ·'Whaťs he dolng here and why is he permitted to stay ?" SLOVAKIA 37 Just what the doctor said to dlvert suspicion, I do not know, but within a few days the local police inspectors came to question me a bout my stay in the country, my source ot income, what 1 was doing, and so on. My replles were vague, but apparently satlsfactory for the Slovak police. But it caused me considerable worry. Pressure mlght be brought to bear which would send me across that bridge into German territory. That I must escape at all costs. Again I sought out Joseph Mracna In the Foreign Office. We bad talked frankly before and I knew I could trust hlm. My permit to remaln in Slo· vakia was about to expire and also my passport. Would they deport me? Mracna conferred wlth the proper authoritles, then lnformed me that if I did not become a "public charge·• - that !s, if I had assets on which to live - they . would give me sanctuary. I -would not be detported even at the expiration of permits or passports. I assured him that my persona! assets were sufficient to maintaln me for an extended period. 1 GO TO PIESTAN Y At the suggestion of Mracna, I arranged to live in Piestany, a health resort about sixty mlles from Bratislava which !s famed for its hot baths. It was far enough from the capltal that the German mllitary officlals or Gestapo agents wer not prowling around. Al· though the Republic malntalned its own police and defense force, judiciary, customs and ·immigration officials - no one arrlving or departing without tbeir sanction - there seemed to be a tacit agreement that the German military and legation oftlcials could come there for extended holidays. They came malnly [or food and drink, which weré almost non-existent in Germany and Austria at that tlme. Piestany is world famed. The baths - mud and hÓt pools - are beneficial for those wlth rheumatlsm, arthritls and other ills. Before the war there were visitors from as far away as India, Africa and l;loth North and South America. The two largest hotels - one on an island of the Vah River, and on which are the hot springs had been taken over and operated by the Interior Department ot the Slovak State. Soon after I went there as a voluntary "internee," Piestany became tbe headquart.ers of many involuntary internees of the Slovak Government. First to arrive were twenty-six - including the children - ot the !talian dlplomatlc corps in Bratislava. The !talian Minister, Cortese. had declared his allegiance to the antl-Mussolini, or Badoglio government, which jolned forces with the Western Allies. Naturally, he and bis entlre staff who shared his sympathles were anathema to the Germans. With the setting up of the Fascist forces in Northern Haly, pressure was brought to bear on Slovakia to deport the anti Fascists to the northern part of Italy which was still occupied by Germany and cooperating with it. TISO, TH E H U MAN ITARIAN But. contrary to generally circulated statements that President Tiso was a puppet ot Germany, he deflnitely refused to llsten to the suggestlons or demands of the Germans. nor wonld he consent to the Itallan Legatlon staff belng interned In Germany, which was a 38 SLOVAK.IA later idea of the Germans. So wlthin six weeks or my taking up residence in the Grand Royal Hotel in Piestany as a lone "internee," twenty-slx Italians moved in together with two attaches of the Slovak Foreign Offlce a.s guardians or "watchers." Two of the arrivals were Count Giovanni Revedin and his Amerlcan-born wife with whom I had become acquainted previously. The question was put to the Countess and the Foreign omce "guardians" "Are internees being held incommunicado?" The answer was no. I was not restralned from associating with them. In ternment in Piestany was not so onerous for them, because, unofflcially, Slovakia was more pro-Allied than pro-Axis. It is doubt· ful if any of the Allied countries were as considerate of interned subjects of an "enemy" nation as Slovakla was for those ot the !talian Diplomatlc corps, now no longer officially welcome. Later on arrived some from the Rumanian and Bnlgarian legations also. They were quartered at the governmenťs expense in one of the country's best hotels, permitted to retain their motor cars. though restricted in the use of them. If, however, any member of the corps found it necessary to go to Bratislava. some slxty miles distant, the Foreign Office representative granted permlssion. Usuaiiy lt was for a trip there and return the same day. Otherwise they were free - as was the case wlth myself - to roam all about the countryside, to nearby villages, to go flshing, bathing In the splendld pool in summer or in the Vah River and getting what relaxation they might need by attending the Jocal movie theatres, uslng tbe s kating rinks in wlnter and the tennis courts In summer. Slnce they were cut off from their sources of income, the Slovak government advanced them a small amonnt of spending money at regular intervals, pald hospital bills for those who required sneh hospitalizatlon, and very large fees for speciallsts who performed operatlons on some members or the group. It was convenient for me that friends with diplomatic immunity were there. The manuscrlpts on which I was then working would have ticketed me into one of the Nazi concentration camps had they fallen into their hands. Bnt Count Revedin as well as members of the Minister's family kept them in their possession - safe from search and seizure. Another who had taken ,;anctuary there was Siegfried Geyer, a dramatlst well known in Germany, Austria and Hungary, whose plays had been performed in Switzerland, Sweden, London and New York. One of his comedles, "Candle Light," was presented in Londoo where it ran for a year. Later it was brought to New York. where lt had some success. then was purchased by Warner Brothers and filmed, as were other of bis plays. TISO NOT AN ANTI-SEMITE The purge or J ews In Austria forced GPyer to flee into Slovakia where he was given presidential permission to remain. That same permission was granted to others I knew personally. One of them was an official of the Slovak travel bureau and another was an engineer for the resort and bealth department who resided wlth bis wlfe in Piestany and whom I vlsited many Limes. Another was a physician attached to tbe government hospital. Hence the base accusatlons of SLOVAKIA 39 anti-Sem!tism that were hurled against Tiso - when the Reds de• manded his death - were false and easily proven to be noth!ng but falsehoods. Siegfried Geyer and I were work!ng daily on some manuscrlpts. Through underground communication I had been warned that milltary forces were to occupy the country. Two nights later the w!fe or a Slovak cabinet minister came to inform me that in a few hours the Germans would be in Piestany. Geyer was with me at the time. He felt that it was h!s death knell. It was two weeks or more before any action was taken toward deportation of the Jews. On the night of September 8, 1944, Geyer Jeft me, saying that we would meet at eleven in the morning. I never saw bim again. Through an acquaintance I learned that he wa s picked off the street the morning after leaving me and was carted away in a blue motor van. Three others of my acquaintances vanished the same day. For years they had found sanctuary and In many instances exceptional employment in the Slovak Republic, and this is asserted in direct contradiction of generally circulated propaganda by pressure groups that President Tiso and bis cablnet members aided in tbe extermlnation of the J ews. WAR COMES TO S LOVAK I A - GERMANS TAKE OVER In the sixteen months of my residence tbere, before the German occupation I had observed growing resentment against their powerful nelghbor. Now it became more bitter though the people were prudent enough not to make any outward sign of it. A pigmy does not force a quarrel with a giant. Tbe !talian diplomatic internees merited the attentlon of the German occupatlon officials. First tbeir motor cars were lmpounded. Then they were moved to tbe other hotel an an island In the Vah River, the two bridges a cross the river being circled with barricades and sentries posted at eacb end. A curfew edict went lnto effect and miles of barbed wire barriers were thrown around the city. Trenches and embankments were dug on tbree sides of tbe city, fleld telephones and power cables being strung along the streets and far into the country side. Tbls front was to be held at all costs - so lt was said. Slovakla now began to realize that all war fronts were closing in on ber. For over five years tbey had boped and prayed that this destructlon would not be vislted on them. But now it was at tbelr door. Tbe morning following the German occupatlon I went to tbe office of Inspector Vavro of tbe Slovak police. Prevlously wben my twelve month residence permit had exp!red I had sougbt bim. He merely sm!led at my fears. "Are you loslng any sleep over lt?" he asked. "Go away from here. l've forgotten you're in Piestany." An "enemy" subject, wbicb technically I was, could not bope for greater consideratlon. But now Vavro was no longer in complete autbority. His advice. however, was tbe same as before. "Didn't I teli you long ago that l've forgotten that you are here?" he said. "Return to your bouse and stay out of sight for a wb!le. My report witb your name on lt bas been conveniently misla!d. It will be some tiroe before tbe Germans tlncl :,ou." 40 SLOVAKlA Tbree days later men visited me, saying that tbey were wlth tbe German State Police. Tbere was tbe usual routine question!ng. Identlfication papers; occupation; slnce wbat date and wby was I residing' In the country? Wbat ls contained In the luggage and what !s in the mass of manuscripts, papers, etc.? Joseph Mracna had given me a letter to be sbown at just such times. It came lnto view and served to substantlate my statement tbat tbe Slovak autborities were acquainted with the contents of my bulging brief case. After a tborougb searcb of the place in whlch tbey found no radio, camera, weapons, photograpbs or otber susplcious appearing articles, the three men departed. Tension tbrougboul the country was becoming more noticable. Reports ŕlltering through from the eastern boundaries of the country were terrlfying. The Germans, being forced westward, forced all the villagers to evacuate ·with them' - or be shot. Their houses were burned. But before doing so they were stripped of everythlng In the way of metal. Door hinges, locks, farm machinery, tools and lmplements were taken away. Long convoys of half starved and bedraggled evacuees from the eastern slde of Slovakla and also from Hungary woved westward by wagon and on foot. Sometimes for eight or ten hours at a time those wretched and homeless people were coming at snalľs pace over t he. pHls, through the fringe of Piestany, and then vanished over the western horizon. " LIBERATION" BY THE REDS But even worse fate awaited those who eluded the German evacuation decrees. The Red "liberators" advancing into the eastern areas of Slovakia confiscated what might have been overlooked by the Germans. They roundetl up and deported children; no one seemed to know wbere. It was rumored they were sent to Russia. So between the plague of Germany, and the terrorlsts of the Soviet, poor llttle Slovakla had little to choose. They were caught between two enemies. Pressure was brought to bear on tbe Slovak government to hand the interned diplomats over to Germany. I took a message for them to tbe Swlss Consulate In Bratislava, for transmission to the outside world. It was hoped that if publicity was given their pllght in the Swiss and other neutra! papers, it would have some reaction, and also become known to the Allied authorlties. The messages and reports in Switzerland did perhaps seŕve to alter the announced lntention of the Germans to dellver the Ital!ans lnto the hands of the Mussolini faction in North Italy, who mlght have shot them as traltors. Instead they were sent first to Vienna and then to Sllesia. Amerlcan flyers who made forced landings or were shot down over Slovakia were taken in hand by the Slovak authorities. Tbose who requlred bospitalization were given tbe best the capltal atrorded - whlch was excellent. Karol Murin told me on · one of my vlslts to the Palace that, on instructions trom Presldent Tlso, he and bis wlfe s ougbt out the Amerlcan prlsoiiers in the hospltals to see that nothlng was left undone for tbeir comfort. Even bouquets of flowers were sent to brighten tbelr rooms. ··· ~- ' SLÔVlinA 41 What a contrast trom the shameful treatment that was accorded Pres!dent Tiso, Karol Murin and members of their cab!net when they voluntarlly sought sanctuary In the American zone of occupatlon. More on this will follow. The Germans ended all the consideration and special attention that was given war prisoners. The German military officials took them, as well as many Slovaks, despite protests from the President and Foreign Minister, Stephen Tiso. Again it was a case of the pigmy and the giant. Might was right. The story of tbe gbastly occupation and betrayal will be told later. THE BEGINNI N G OF THE END On New Year's Eve of 1945 I was wltb frlends In Piestany. 'ľbe forbidden {by the Germans) broadcasts of tbe London radlo w1:,re turned on for the latest news in Czecb, German and Englisb. Also that evening Adolf Hitler broadcast a brlef greeting to der Deutscber Volk - hls "friends." Some of the llsteners insisted that lt was not Hitler's voice. Otbers expressed the opinion tbat lt was "der Fubrer" but a very mucb changed volce. It was generally believed tbat the attempted assassination of six montbs previously had left some per• manent impaiľment. During tbe iatter part of 1944 motlon pictures of him - wblcb was unusual - were always taken at a distance and tbere was a no ticeable awkwardness of one arm. It was rumored that he sustained other injuries. The London radlo gave lengthy discussions on tbe plaos for the liberation and rehabilitation of Centra! Europe. We assumed that there was complete accord among the Allied Powers and that tbe views and oplnlons expressed represented tbose of tbe United States. The piana were thoae of the Red dominated group of Edwa rd Benes and foreto ld th e diaaster t hat was inevitab le. Anyone with even the most meagre knowledge of European history knew that the rulers of the Kremlin hoped to dominate and absorb all tbe S lav people. Therefore, it was alarmlng for the people in Centra! Europe to observe the manner in whlch the Allled Powers permitted the Soviet to occupy the Balkans, move up into Hungary and tben sweep lnto Slovakla. As my friends In Piestany and Bratislava pointed out re. peatedly, the Allied Powers, and particularly America, should have re• membered what bappened in the Ilaltlc states, In Flnland and in Poland. It was tbe pattern of Red absorb tion and complete control, once they planted foot on the soil o f a country. The only exceptlon was that of Spalo - the slngle country where the Communlsts ~uf• fered milltary defeat. Offlcial Washington, let us remem ber also, was cooperatlve with the Communist terrorists in Spain at that Ume - regardless of the denials that some or the hierarchy of the e lect now wish to read lnto the record. Moscow's deslgns in Spain, in the Baltic states, In the Balkans and no w in Centra! Europe were so obvious as the Pyramlds on the Sahara. The milltary o ccupatlon was but the prelude to permanen t lncorpo ration lnto the Red orblt. After the Red army occupied Budapest, whlch for centurles had been a bastlon of Chrlstlanlty against the antl-Christlan forces on the East, it left only Bratislava as the lmportant city of the Danube between Budapest and Vienna. Mlllions of kronen In materials and mil• 42 SLOVAK.IA lions of man-power hours were expended on the defenses. The Eastern Front, lt seemed, would soon be in our front yards. When the day and night booming of artlllery began to be hear d in Piestany, many felt it wise to move westward. A famlly I knew In Bratislava had obtalned a motor truck and fuel two precious thlngs - intending to flee into southern Bavaria. By phone from Piestany I arranged to share space in the Bavaria-bound truck. But when l arrived there by train trom Piestany the truck had a\ready left. Now, where to go or what to do? Huge artlllery pieces were being wheeled through the str eets westward. German milltary supplies in motor cars and wagons trundled westward. Cattle and horses were being driven in the directlon of Vienna. It is doubtful if they got far along that road before the Hed army captured and butchered them. OFF TO PRAGUE An acquaintance advised me to Jeave for Prague as rall transport was still operating in that direction. When I inquired about visa or permit to enter the ·'Protectorate" and officiaľs secretary informed me that "tbe bars are down; you may go anywhere you can obtain transportation." At tbe railway station J got a ticket for Prague. A train was scbeduled to leave that evening about six. Tbe station was a seething mad-house. Pandemonium, orrlerly confusion, bundreds of terrorstricken people with bundreds of bags. bundles and babies trying to get somewbere - anywbere. In tbe black-out, long after slx o'clock, tbere was an air-raid warning. Police herded people into a vast underground shelter that had been tunnelled into a rocky bili aero.ss the railway tracks. MorP .:onfusion, anxiety and wondering if we would ever get out of the stricken city. The train - scheduled for six o'clock - left in tbe thickening blackness of the night about eleven. People were packed in to suffocation. At a town called Cuty. on thP. Crontier, l transferred to anotber train tbat landed me in Brno, now Czechoslovakia, about eight in the morning. After snatching four hours sleep at the Grand Hotel, I contrived to board (without the special military permit) an express train which landed me in Prague about mldnight. All train service into Slovakia ended tbe morning after I de• parted. Had J delayed a few hours longer tbe Reds would have inc luded me in their spreading net of "liberation." Even the most unobservant person must bave sensed the uneasiness of the Germans then in Prague. Czechs and the evacuees from Slovakia, Hungary and Poland knew it was but a matter of weeks or days when the American and British forces would be in Berlin. Tb'at meant the end of the war. but what then? Every day motor trucks and cars of all kinds were being loacled with bousehold goods, cats, dogs, bird cages, German women and children. Then at evening they rolled off into the darkness. Branche.• of trees or other <'amouflaging uas used to disguise the vebicles as much as possible. They dld not chance mass movements or evacuees in dayl!gbt llours. SLOVAKIA 43 REVOLUTION AND REVENGE Friday evening, May Fourtb, marked tbe beglnning ot tbe uprising against six long years ot German dictatorsbip. A mysterious and ominous atmospbere pervaded Prague. Crowds began convergmg in Wenselplatz - as it was then called_ For wbat? No one seemed to know. Sometbing was to bappen. A revolution was in tbe making. Little by little tbings occurred. Men, women and boys began defacing German words on tbe fronts of business establ!shments. Tbey commenced to alter tbe street signs - - which were in dual language - Czecb and German_ Tbe electric trams were halted by tbe crowd Then matters became more serious. Sirens screamed, military cars pushed througb tbe crowds, commands were barked over t.he loud speakers in the s quare. Small armoured tanks rolled into view. A plstol shot, a woman's scream, crowds surging back against tbe walls and the rattle of machlne guns Four days and nigbts tbe battle continued. The Prague raáio remained in Czech hands and was their greatest asset. Pleas from it were directed to the American forces, said to be thirty, tben twenty, tben ten miles away. Professor Matousek, director of tbe station, would beg in broken English for tbem to hurry. The Stars and Stripes waved from the top;, of buildings and in many windows. An enthusiastic welcome would be glven tbeir liberators. The question asked by hundreds was: '·When do you think tbe Americans wíll get here?" Little did they know then that they would never arrive_ That Prague and the Czechs, together with the millions of Slovaks, had b een sold down-river by Eduard Benes in a secret deal entered into with Stalin. A deal that had the benediction of Franklin D. Roosevelt who was even then loudly prating about saving the Western World from the Nazi destroyers of Christianity, only to be consigned to the Soviet, the greatest destroyers and enemies of Christian civilization since the Cruclfixion. THE SAD AWAKENING On the sixth day of the revolution in which bundreds or !!ves and millions in property was destroyed. General Vlassoff's troopers were s linking along the shattered fronts of buildings in Wenzelspaltz. These were the Russians, mostly from the Ukraine, who had first been equipped by the Germans to fight thP Communists. Now they turned on the Germans and were belping to drive tbem out of Prague. The thought came to me at the time: what will be tbe fate or these pol!tlcal pawns? They followed tbeir leader, General VlassofI against the Bolshevik terrorists, then they remainecl witb him when he turned agalnst the Germans. Would tbe Allied nations give them sanctuary and a cbance to live• They did not. General Vlassoff was dellvered to the Moscow '"liberators" just as was President Tiso and bis cabinet. After a mock tria! that followed the pattern of al! Red trlals. Vlassoff was put before a firing squad. But what ls the fate of tbe simple l{ussian farmeťs boy hundreds of them - wbo wore a uniform an carried a rifle, or drove a team of horses pulling a wagon Joad of supplles to aid In the war for tbe West? Any number or t.hem were hquldated and others are SLOV~ .I A 110w slaves In Slberia. Not being articulate their story is never heard. And who delivered them to death or slavery? The same ones wbo dellvered the Slovaks to the Communlsts at Teheran and Yalta. By the end of the sixth or seventh day there came into the n1lnds or the beleagured people of Prague as well as the hundreds or Slovak, Pollsh and Hungarian evacuees, the susplclon that the Amerlcans were not coming. When for days the Amer!can rorces did not advance a step, but on the contrary moved away trom the city, they knew that something or a Mach!avelian nature had taken place behind the scenes. That they had been sold !nto bondage. All the p!ous words and pretty promlses that had been inade about guaranteeing their liberatlon - were just so many empty words. It became obvlous that political tricksters had ordained in secret conferences that Czecho-Slovakia was to be handed lnto the Red orbit. It was agaínst every tenet of their beliefs. part!cularly the Slovaks, who were avowed and m!l!tant foes or the Communist ideology and who w!th thelr then presldent, Joseph Tlso, had said they would t!ght to the !ast man. Now they realized that they were being conslgned to Red dominat!on. After another day of intermittent bombing and shell fire those of us In Prague heard a jubilant news announcer on the London radlo assure us that "the war in Europe !s over." That same inaccurate statement came from the American operated radlo stations In Germany and France and synchronized. ironlcally enough, with the staccato barking of machlne guns that raked Wenzelsplatz and the occasional deep toned thunder of an aerlal bomb or German shell that ~xploded somewhere too near ror comfort. For the people of Czecho-Slovakia the war was not over. We knew in tbe promises of the Western Powers, had been abandoned to t.he then that the Czechs and Slovaks. also the Hungarlans. the Poles and the other people of Chrlstian nations. who had placed thelr fatth benign brutallties and tyranny of Joseph Stalin. Innuences In Washington hari labored zealously to airl the Kremli n's effort for worldwide destruct!on of Chrl.stlan civllizatlon. and the Slovaks were another pawn In the game. Proof or that innuence and c!tations or those. who were lnstrumental In lntlict!ng that ruln on Centra! :E;urope. bave already been written tnto the publi<' records. Slovakia had enjoyed a measure of freedom only to have lt snatched away anrl her peopl~ consigned to oppression, spollatlon and deportation. far more ghastly than any they had endured in past bistory. But rbeir falth in God and their delermlnation to flght on has 1emalned. • • • WHO SAID IT? - "We are children or freedom. We cannot be s afe except in an environment of freedom. We belleve in freedom as fundamentally as we belleve anythlng In thls world. We belleve In it far everyone In our country. And we don't restrict thls belie! to freedom for ourselves. We belleve that all people in the world are entltled to as much freedom, to develop in thelr own way, as we want ourselves." - (Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, Aprll 22, 1950).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource I Was in Slovakia Description An account of the resource Edward L. Delaney Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952 pp. 25-44 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Delaney, Edward L. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/6db964469e40c6a82c1dc4ccd8616824.pdf 60da0c84711338aeaf96dbd2056f4382 PDF Text Text 6Z SLOVAKIA INDEPENDENT SLOVAKJA SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DFSTBOYED BLUNDERING POLICIES RESPONSIBLE FOR TERRIBLE PLIGHT OF SLOVAKS AND OTHER IRON CURTAIN COUNTRIES.... TRUE REPRESENTATIVES OF SLOVAK NATION SHOULD BE HEARD AND RECOGNIZED. (Speech of the Hon. Charles J. Kersten, Delivered at the Conference of Americans of Slovak descent sponsored by the Slovak League of Amerlca, Mal 23, 1952, Hotel Washington, Washington, D. C.) The Slovak League of America, a civte and cultural organlzatlon rounded In 1907 by Americans of Slovak descent, has made some fine contributlons to the Amerlcan way of llfe. And so have the Slovak organlzatlons afflllated with it. I am perfectly satisfied that the people in the League and the organizations affiliated with it are God· fearlng people, loyal citizens of the United States of Amerlca, who are ready and wllling to make any sacrlflce for the welfare and securlty ot our Country. I appreciate the fact that Americans or Slovak de· scent are interested in the fate of the nation from wbich they are de· s.cended, because lt is only natural that they should be. The terrible plight of the Slovak nation today - just as that or other nations of Centra! and Eastern Europe who had b een "Uber· ated" in 1945 - - is In a Jarge measure due to the blunderlng, undemocratic policies adopted and prosecuted and the secret agreements conC'luded by men of so-called democratlc governments. Our Government. or more correctly the present Admlnistratlon In Washington, cannot escape its measure of responsibillty for the inhumanlties suffered by the natlons behlnd the Iron Curtaln And slnce the present Admlnlstration in Washington bas lnltlated a campaign of truth to offset the vlcious campaign of lies of the Soviet Union, let us be- honest wltb ourselves and the rest of lhe world and admlt that it was morally wrong and contrary to every democratlc and Chrlstian pr!nc!ple to surrender the Slovaks and the other peoples of Centra! and Eastern E urope to the men of the Kremlln. Representatlves of thf' Slovak League ot Ameriťa made many trips to Washington to vlslt p_eople in the present Adminlstration· and teli them the truth about the Slovak nation. about the righteous struggle or the Slovak people for freedom and lndependence. .EMdently lt avalled them nothlng. Desplte the claim or our State Department that the Unltec\ States bas never opposed the aspiratlons of any p eople In Europe to determlne by thelr own free choice t he state or form or political organlzatlon under whlcb tbey wlsbed to live. tbe fact ls that tbe presi>nt Adminlstratlon never recognlzec\ or respected the rlght of self-<leterm!natlon fn the case of tbe Slovak peoole. If lt dld, tbf' inc\ependent Republic of Slovakia. establlsbed by tbe Slovak people tbrongh thf'ir duly elerte<l representatlves on Mar<'h 14. 1939, woulrl not bave bf'en wantonly destroyec\ in 1945 with tbe belp of our Administratlon! The Slovak Republiť was recognized by 27 variou~ government~. inclnding t he governments or Oreat Rritain Rnc\ the Soviet Union. Why wRs lt not recognized by the Government or thf' tlnitec\ Stalf's �SLOVAKIA 63 oť America? Il was not recognized, because F. D. Roosevelt and hLs Administratlon believed Dr. Edward Benes, the leader of the Czech 1\ational Soclalists and reslgned presldent o-f Czecho•Slovakía, who was violently opposed to Slovak treeJom and lndependence. And the present Administratlon stlll tavors the followers of Benes, many of wbom were members of Gottwalďs regime and, therefore, collabo• rated with the Reds in the Prague Government. Birds of a featber flock togetber! No matter what the circumstances uncler wblcb the Slovaks galned their independence, tbe Republic of Slovakia never s hould have been destroyed agalnst the will of the Slovak people. Tbe rigbt of political asylum has always been regarded as soma. lbing sacred by the people of the United States. Why was this rlght violated by our Administration in the case of Dr. Joseph Tiso, pre• s ldent of the Slovak Republic? Did our State Department do the human t hlng, did lt act in accordance wlth Christian and democratlc prln• ciples when lt ordered our Army to surrender Tiso to hls political e nemies - and certaln death? Tbe S lovak L eague of America, repres enting the overwhelmlng majority of organlzed Amerlcans of Slovak d escelllt, protested strongly against the order, but this again availed lt nothing. Then it requested tbe present occupant of the Whlte House to protes t against the banging of Tiso, but even this decent thlng he refused to do. Slnce the calamity of 1945, the present Adminlstratlon has eon• s istently ignored the just demands of Americans of Slovak descent to grant a hearing to Slovak patrjots, the true representatlves of the Hlovak natlon. But it did glve ear and ald to tbe Slovak renegades and others from Czecho-:Slovakla wbo a.lways were and stm are op· posed to Slovak freedom and independence. You can tind them in the VOICE OF AMERICA and other government agencles; and these Slovak renegades and enemles of Slovak freedom and independence, mind you. are being paid witb your money, wltb the money of Ameri• can taxpayers. It 1s hlgh tlme that people In government and the general public of the United States reallze at long last something that the Czechs and Slovaks tbemselves have known for centuries, that 1s, that the Czec hs never were. are not. and do not want to be Slovaks - and the Slovaks never were, are not, and do not want to be Czechs. Thls bas been clearly demons trated by the two natlons especlally durlng the past 34 years . that 1s slnce the establishment of Czecho-Slovakia. Why, tben, s hould t he present Adminlstratlon. or any administratlon for that matter, inslst that the Slovak n a tlon and the terrltory it has inhabited for the past 1500 years must contlnue to be explolted by another nation? Such a pollcy certainly !s not \Jl acco1d w!tb our beliefs and !s absolutely oppos ed and contrary to all Chrlstian and democ- ratic princlples. In short lt ls immoral and crlmlnal. You, my fellow•clt!zens, and your organlzatlons have been sl!ghted and !nsulted for many years by people In Government who are sup• posed to represent you. Your people In Slovakia In all their h!story have never suffered more than they have slnce thelr "llberatlon" by Benes and the Red armles In 1945. or course, it never should have happened, just as it should not have happened to the Poles, the Pkralnlans, Llthuanlans, Estonlans. Latvlans. and many others. But �64 SLOVAKlA the tact is that it did. All because ot tbe blundering polic!es ot govern ments, inctudlng our own. The Slovaks have ever opposed Commun!sm: and tbey strongly reslst lt today. Slovakia should not have been wantonly destroyed. because it could have served us in good stead today on the slde or the democratic world. It i.s in tbe interest or Amerlca tba1 all natlon!< or the earth, !nclnding the Slovak nation, bave the rigbt to setrcletermination and, it tbey so deslre, to he (ree and independent lt ls io tbe interests or justice and peace that even the Slovak natlon be rree to cboose the form of government under whlcb it shall live, so t hat tbe Slovaks, too, might enjoy t he blesslngs o! a government or tbeir own people, by their own people, and for their own people. My dear people, durlng the past two decades tbe people In Ameriran Government - and I mean speci!!cally our admlnlstratlons have wandered rar trom the straight and narrow path of rlghteousness. the road marked out by our ConstitutiÔn and the Ten Corumandments. You can help rlght the s ituation in November. For tbe sake or America and tor the sake or the nation you are descended r•·om, see to it tbat you do! • • • WHO SAI D IT? \ ' " T he -days of Soviet Ruuia's exc:lusion from Europe's affairs are w e r and, let us hope, will never return. It has not been an ea.sy task to bring tbree great powers into collaboration and to the point o! presentlng a common war front against the common German enemy. ílut In London, Washington, and Moscow. there are leaders who are hOld in enterprise, broad in thelr range of perceptlon, supported ny powerful opinion, and eager to face every change that ma.y help ,,s to banlsh the specter of war from our contlne nt. .. . We are In a :·..rtain .sense, a link between Europe and the East. We can never be ,nly western or only eastern. Nothing now will prevent the Soviet llnlon !rom playlng its part as a great oower In Europe'c. _atfa.irs. Aut this c:ertainly does mean that the Soviet t..,.,lon intends .o áom in-• ~te Europe. lt was not for such a purpose that Marahal Stalln met i>resident Rooaevelt and Churc:hill in Tehe ral' ' - (Edward Bene§, London, 2-29-44 ). • "We believe that freedom and t h e indepe,.,Je.-c. • of the Czechoslovak Republic: ar e guaranteed by the alllance w,t• t'le great U n ion of Soviet Socialist Rep ,blics and the rest of the Slovan ie natlona who, flnally, found themselves and established an a!lsoclatlon ot Slovanlc blood. This is our unalterable belier. enrooterl in ouŕ mlnd!I an d hearts; it is not t he re11ult of a temporary world cons tellatlon, but tbe result of the historic mission of the Slovanic natlons. Just as our loyalty to the Republic 1s not to be abandoned in good or bar! tima11. jusť so rto we comprehenrl also onr loyalty to our 11:reat ally. a.nd varlous idi>ologies cannot itland in the way ot that loyalty." - (Ing. ·K. Fllo, l)Pputy of Lettrlcb's Demn,..ratic Party, in the P rágue Paŕ­ ·liamen1. 'H'ťo rrling to ČAS of Deci>mber 16,. 19-47.) � 6Z SLOVAKIA INDEPENDENT SLOVAKJA SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DFSTBOYED BLUNDERING POLICIES RESPONSIBLE FOR TERRIBLE PLIGHT OF SLOVAKS AND OTHER IRON CURTAIN COUNTRIES.... TRUE REPRESENTATIVES OF SLOVAK NATION SHOULD BE HEARD AND RECOGNIZED. (Speech of the Hon. Charles J. Kersten, Delivered at the Conference of Americans of Slovak descent sponsored by the Slovak League of Amerlca, Mal 23, 1952, Hotel Washington, Washington, D. C.) The Slovak League of America, a civte and cultural organlzatlon rounded In 1907 by Americans of Slovak descent, has made some fine contributlons to the Amerlcan way of llfe. And so have the Slovak organlzatlons afflllated with it. I am perfectly satisfied that the people in the League and the organizations affiliated with it are God· fearlng people, loyal citizens of the United States of Amerlca, who are ready and wllling to make any sacrlflce for the welfare and securlty ot our Country. I appreciate the fact that Americans or Slovak de· scent are interested in the fate of the nation from wbich they are de· s.cended, because lt is only natural that they should be. The terrible plight of the Slovak nation today - just as that or other nations of Centra! and Eastern Europe who had b een "Uber· ated" in 1945 - - is In a Jarge measure due to the blunderlng, undemocratic policies adopted and prosecuted and the secret agreements conC'luded by men of so-called democratlc governments. Our Government. or more correctly the present Admlnistratlon In Washington, cannot escape its measure of responsibillty for the inhumanlties suffered by the natlons behlnd the Iron Curtaln And slnce the present Admlnlstration in Washington bas lnltlated a campaign of truth to offset the vlcious campaign of lies of the Soviet Union, let us be- honest wltb ourselves and the rest of lhe world and admlt that it was morally wrong and contrary to every democratlc and Chrlstian pr!nc!ple to surrender the Slovaks and the other peoples of Centra! and Eastern E urope to the men of the Kremlln. Representatlves of thf' Slovak League ot Ameriťa made many trips to Washington to vlslt p_eople in the present Adminlstration· and teli them the truth about the Slovak nation. about the righteous struggle or the Slovak people for freedom and lndependence. .EMdently lt avalled them nothlng. Desplte the claim or our State Department that the Unltec\ States bas never opposed the aspiratlons of any p eople In Europe to determlne by thelr own free choice t he state or form or political organlzatlon under whlcb tbey wlsbed to live. tbe fact ls that tbe presi>nt Adminlstratlon never recognlzec\ or respected the rlght of self-<leterm!natlon fn the case of tbe Slovak peoole. If lt dld, tbf' inc\ependent Republic of Slovakia. establlsbed by tbe Slovak people tbrongh thf'ir duly elerte<l representatlves on Mar<'h 14. 1939, woulrl not bave bf'en wantonly destroyec\ in 1945 with tbe belp of our Administratlon! The Slovak Republiť was recognized by 27 variou~ government~. inclnding t he governments or Oreat Rritain Rnc\ the Soviet Union. Why wRs lt not recognized by the Government or thf' tlnitec\ Stalf's �SLOVAKIA 63 oť America? Il was not recognized, because F. D. Roosevelt and hLs Administratlon believed Dr. Edward Benes, the leader of the Czech 1\ational Soclalists and reslgned presldent o-f Czecho•Slovakía, who was violently opposed to Slovak treeJom and lndependence. And the present Administratlon stlll tavors the followers of Benes, many of wbom were members of Gottwalďs regime and, therefore, collabo• rated with the Reds in the Prague Government. Birds of a featber flock togetber! No matter what the circumstances uncler wblcb the Slovaks galned their independence, tbe Republic of Slovakia never s hould have been destroyed agalnst the will of the Slovak people. Tbe rigbt of political asylum has always been regarded as soma. lbing sacred by the people of the United States. Why was this rlght violated by our Administration in the case of Dr. Joseph Tiso, pre• s ldent of the Slovak Republic? Did our State Department do the human t hlng, did lt act in accordance wlth Christian and democratlc prln• ciples when lt ordered our Army to surrender Tiso to hls political e nemies - and certaln death? Tbe S lovak L eague of America, repres enting the overwhelmlng majority of organlzed Amerlcans of Slovak d escelllt, protested strongly against the order, but this again availed lt nothing. Then it requested tbe present occupant of the Whlte House to protes t against the banging of Tiso, but even this decent thlng he refused to do. Slnce the calamity of 1945, the present Adminlstratlon has eon• s istently ignored the just demands of Americans of Slovak descent to grant a hearing to Slovak patrjots, the true representatlves of the Hlovak natlon. But it did glve ear and ald to tbe Slovak renegades and others from Czecho-:Slovakla wbo a.lways were and stm are op· posed to Slovak freedom and independence. You can tind them in the VOICE OF AMERICA and other government agencles; and these Slovak renegades and enemles of Slovak freedom and independence, mind you. are being paid witb your money, wltb the money of Ameri• can taxpayers. It 1s hlgh tlme that people In government and the general public of the United States reallze at long last something that the Czechs and Slovaks tbemselves have known for centuries, that 1s, that the Czec hs never were. are not. and do not want to be Slovaks - and the Slovaks never were, are not, and do not want to be Czechs. Thls bas been clearly demons trated by the two natlons especlally durlng the past 34 years . that 1s slnce the establishment of Czecho-Slovakia. Why, tben, s hould t he present Adminlstratlon. or any administratlon for that matter, inslst that the Slovak n a tlon and the terrltory it has inhabited for the past 1500 years must contlnue to be explolted by another nation? Such a pollcy certainly !s not \Jl acco1d w!tb our beliefs and !s absolutely oppos ed and contrary to all Chrlstian and democ- ratic princlples. In short lt ls immoral and crlmlnal. You, my fellow•clt!zens, and your organlzatlons have been sl!ghted and !nsulted for many years by people In Government who are sup• posed to represent you. Your people In Slovakia In all their h!story have never suffered more than they have slnce thelr "llberatlon" by Benes and the Red armles In 1945. or course, it never should have happened, just as it should not have happened to the Poles, the Pkralnlans, Llthuanlans, Estonlans. Latvlans. and many others. But �64 SLOVAKlA the tact is that it did. All because ot tbe blundering polic!es ot govern ments, inctudlng our own. The Slovaks have ever opposed Commun!sm: and tbey strongly reslst lt today. Slovakia should not have been wantonly destroyed. because it could have served us in good stead today on the slde or the democratic world. It i.s in tbe interest or Amerlca tba1 all natlon!< or the earth, !nclnding the Slovak nation, bave the rigbt to setrcletermination and, it tbey so deslre, to he (ree and independent lt ls io tbe interests or justice and peace that even the Slovak natlon be rree to cboose the form of government under whlcb it shall live, so t hat tbe Slovaks, too, might enjoy t he blesslngs o! a government or tbeir own people, by their own people, and for their own people. My dear people, durlng the past two decades tbe people In Ameriran Government - and I mean speci!!cally our admlnlstratlons have wandered rar trom the straight and narrow path of rlghteousness. the road marked out by our ConstitutiÔn and the Ten Corumandments. You can help rlght the s ituation in November. For tbe sake or America and tor the sake or the nation you are descended r•·om, see to it tbat you do! • • • WHO SAI D IT? \ ' " T he -days of Soviet Ruuia's exc:lusion from Europe's affairs are w e r and, let us hope, will never return. It has not been an ea.sy task to bring tbree great powers into collaboration and to the point o! presentlng a common war front against the common German enemy. ílut In London, Washington, and Moscow. there are leaders who are hOld in enterprise, broad in thelr range of perceptlon, supported ny powerful opinion, and eager to face every change that ma.y help ,,s to banlsh the specter of war from our contlne nt. .. . We are In a :·..rtain .sense, a link between Europe and the East. We can never be ,nly western or only eastern. Nothing now will prevent the Soviet llnlon !rom playlng its part as a great oower In Europe'c. _atfa.irs. Aut this c:ertainly does mean that the Soviet t..,.,lon intends .o áom in-• ~te Europe. lt was not for such a purpose that Marahal Stalln met i>resident Rooaevelt and Churc:hill in Tehe ral' ' - (Edward Bene§, London, 2-29-44 ). • "We believe that freedom and t h e indepe,.,Je.-c. • of the Czechoslovak Republic: ar e guaranteed by the alllance w,t• t'le great U n ion of Soviet Socialist Rep ,blics and the rest of the Slovan ie natlona who, flnally, found themselves and established an a!lsoclatlon ot Slovanlc blood. This is our unalterable belier. enrooterl in ouŕ mlnd!I an d hearts; it is not t he re11ult of a temporary world cons tellatlon, but tbe result of the historic mission of the Slovanic natlons. Just as our loyalty to the Republic 1s not to be abandoned in good or bar! tima11. jusť so rto we comprehenrl also onr loyalty to our 11:reat ally. a.nd varlous idi>ologies cannot itland in the way ot that loyalty." - (Ing. ·K. Fllo, l)Pputy of Lettrlcb's Demn,..ratic Party, in the P rágue Paŕ­ ·liamen1. 'H'ťo rrling to ČAS of Deci>mber 16,. 19-47.) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 6Z SLOVAKIA INDEPENDENT SLOVAKJA SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DFSTBOYED BLUNDERING POLICIES RESPONSIBLE FOR TERRIBLE PLIGHT OF SLOVAKS AND OTHER IRON CURTAIN COUNTRIES.... TRUE REPRESENTATIVES OF SLOVAK NATION SHOULD BE HEARD AND RECOGNIZED. (Speech of the Hon. Charles J. Kersten, Delivered at the Conference of Americans of Slovak descent sponsored by the Slovak League of Amerlca, Mal 23, 1952, Hotel Washington, Washington, D. C.) The Slovak League of America, a civte and cultural organlzatlon rounded In 1907 by Americans of Slovak descent, has made some fine contributlons to the Amerlcan way of llfe. And so have the Slovak organlzatlons afflllated with it. I am perfectly satisfied that the people in the League and the organizations affiliated with it are God· fearlng people, loyal citizens of the United States of Amerlca, who are ready and wllling to make any sacrlflce for the welfare and securlty ot our Country. I appreciate the fact that Americans or Slovak de· scent are interested in the fate of the nation from wbich they are de· s.cended, because lt is only natural that they should be. The terrible plight of the Slovak nation today - just as that or other nations of Centra! and Eastern Europe who had b een "Uber· ated" in 1945 - - is In a Jarge measure due to the blunderlng, undemocratic policies adopted and prosecuted and the secret agreements conC'luded by men of so-called democratlc governments. Our Government. or more correctly the present Admlnistratlon In Washington, cannot escape its measure of responsibillty for the inhumanlties suffered by the natlons behlnd the Iron Curtaln And slnce the present Admlnlstration in Washington bas lnltlated a campaign of truth to offset the vlcious campaign of lies of the Soviet Union, let us be- honest wltb ourselves and the rest of lhe world and admlt that it was morally wrong and contrary to every democratlc and Chrlstian pr!nc!ple to surrender the Slovaks and the other peoples of Centra! and Eastern E urope to the men of the Kremlln. Representatlves of thf' Slovak League ot Ameriťa made many trips to Washington to vlslt p_eople in the present Adminlstration· and teli them the truth about the Slovak nation. about the righteous struggle or the Slovak people for freedom and lndependence. .EMdently lt avalled them nothlng. Desplte the claim or our State Department that the Unltec\ States bas never opposed the aspiratlons of any p eople In Europe to determlne by thelr own free choice t he state or form or political organlzatlon under whlcb tbey wlsbed to live. tbe fact ls that tbe presi>nt Adminlstratlon never recognlzec\ or respected the rlght of self-<leterm!natlon fn the case of tbe Slovak peoole. If lt dld, tbf' inc\ependent Republic of Slovakia. establlsbed by tbe Slovak people tbrongh thf'ir duly elerte<l representatlves on Mar<'h 14. 1939, woulrl not bave bf'en wantonly destroyec\ in 1945 with tbe belp of our Administratlon! The Slovak Republiť was recognized by 27 variou~ government~. inclnding t he governments or Oreat Rritain Rnc\ the Soviet Union. Why wRs lt not recognized by the Government or thf' tlnitec\ Stalf's SLOVAKIA 63 oť America? Il was not recognized, because F. D. Roosevelt and hLs Administratlon believed Dr. Edward Benes, the leader of the Czech 1\ational Soclalists and reslgned presldent o-f Czecho•Slovakía, who was violently opposed to Slovak treeJom and lndependence. And the present Administratlon stlll tavors the followers of Benes, many of wbom were members of Gottwalďs regime and, therefore, collabo• rated with the Reds in the Prague Government. Birds of a featber flock togetber! No matter what the circumstances uncler wblcb the Slovaks galned their independence, tbe Republic of Slovakia never s hould have been destroyed agalnst the will of the Slovak people. Tbe rigbt of political asylum has always been regarded as soma. lbing sacred by the people of the United States. Why was this rlght violated by our Administration in the case of Dr. Joseph Tiso, pre• s ldent of the Slovak Republic? Did our State Department do the human t hlng, did lt act in accordance wlth Christian and democratlc prln• ciples when lt ordered our Army to surrender Tiso to hls political e nemies - and certaln death? Tbe S lovak L eague of America, repres enting the overwhelmlng majority of organlzed Amerlcans of Slovak d escelllt, protested strongly against the order, but this again availed lt nothing. Then it requested tbe present occupant of the Whlte House to protes t against the banging of Tiso, but even this decent thlng he refused to do. Slnce the calamity of 1945, the present Adminlstratlon has eon• s istently ignored the just demands of Americans of Slovak descent to grant a hearing to Slovak patrjots, the true representatlves of the Hlovak natlon. But it did glve ear and ald to tbe Slovak renegades and others from Czecho-:Slovakla wbo a.lways were and stm are op· posed to Slovak freedom and independence. You can tind them in the VOICE OF AMERICA and other government agencles; and these Slovak renegades and enemles of Slovak freedom and independence, mind you. are being paid witb your money, wltb the money of Ameri• can taxpayers. It 1s hlgh tlme that people In government and the general public of the United States reallze at long last something that the Czechs and Slovaks tbemselves have known for centuries, that 1s, that the Czec hs never were. are not. and do not want to be Slovaks - and the Slovaks never were, are not, and do not want to be Czechs. Thls bas been clearly demons trated by the two natlons especlally durlng the past 34 years . that 1s slnce the establishment of Czecho-Slovakia. Why, tben, s hould t he present Adminlstratlon. or any administratlon for that matter, inslst that the Slovak n a tlon and the terrltory it has inhabited for the past 1500 years must contlnue to be explolted by another nation? Such a pollcy certainly !s not \Jl acco1d w!tb our beliefs and !s absolutely oppos ed and contrary to all Chrlstian and democ- ratic princlples. In short lt ls immoral and crlmlnal. You, my fellow•clt!zens, and your organlzatlons have been sl!ghted and !nsulted for many years by people In Government who are sup• posed to represent you. Your people In Slovakia In all their h!story have never suffered more than they have slnce thelr "llberatlon" by Benes and the Red armles In 1945. or course, it never should have happened, just as it should not have happened to the Poles, the Pkralnlans, Llthuanlans, Estonlans. Latvlans. and many others. But 64 SLOVAKlA the tact is that it did. All because ot tbe blundering polic!es ot govern ments, inctudlng our own. The Slovaks have ever opposed Commun!sm: and tbey strongly reslst lt today. Slovakia should not have been wantonly destroyed. because it could have served us in good stead today on the slde or the democratic world. It i.s in tbe interest or Amerlca tba1 all natlon!< or the earth, !nclnding the Slovak nation, bave the rigbt to setrcletermination and, it tbey so deslre, to he (ree and independent lt ls io tbe interests or justice and peace that even the Slovak natlon be rree to cboose the form of government under whlcb it shall live, so t hat tbe Slovaks, too, might enjoy t he blesslngs o! a government or tbeir own people, by their own people, and for their own people. My dear people, durlng the past two decades tbe people In Ameriran Government - and I mean speci!!cally our admlnlstratlons have wandered rar trom the straight and narrow path of rlghteousness. the road marked out by our ConstitutiÔn and the Ten Corumandments. You can help rlght the s ituation in November. For tbe sake or America and tor the sake or the nation you are descended r•·om, see to it tbat you do! • • • WHO SAI D IT? \ ' " T he -days of Soviet Ruuia's exc:lusion from Europe's affairs are w e r and, let us hope, will never return. It has not been an ea.sy task to bring tbree great powers into collaboration and to the point o! presentlng a common war front against the common German enemy. ílut In London, Washington, and Moscow. there are leaders who are hOld in enterprise, broad in thelr range of perceptlon, supported ny powerful opinion, and eager to face every change that ma.y help ,,s to banlsh the specter of war from our contlne nt. .. . We are In a :·..rtain .sense, a link between Europe and the East. We can never be ,nly western or only eastern. Nothing now will prevent the Soviet llnlon !rom playlng its part as a great oower In Europe'c. _atfa.irs. Aut this c:ertainly does mean that the Soviet t..,.,lon intends .o áom in-• ~te Europe. lt was not for such a purpose that Marahal Stalln met i>resident Rooaevelt and Churc:hill in Tehe ral' ' - (Edward Bene§, London, 2-29-44 ). • "We believe that freedom and t h e indepe,.,Je.-c. • of the Czechoslovak Republic: ar e guaranteed by the alllance w,t• t'le great U n ion of Soviet Socialist Rep ,blics and the rest of the Slovan ie natlona who, flnally, found themselves and established an a!lsoclatlon ot Slovanlc blood. This is our unalterable belier. enrooterl in ouŕ mlnd!I an d hearts; it is not t he re11ult of a temporary world cons tellatlon, but tbe result of the historic mission of the Slovanic natlons. Just as our loyalty to the Republic 1s not to be abandoned in good or bar! tima11. jusť so rto we comprehenrl also onr loyalty to our 11:reat ally. a.nd varlous idi>ologies cannot itland in the way ot that loyalty." - (Ing. ·K. Fllo, l)Pputy of Lettrlcb's Demn,..ratic Party, in the P rágue Paŕ­ ·liamen1. 'H'ťo rrling to ČAS of Deci>mber 16,. 19-47.)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Independent Slovakia Should Not Have Been Destroyed Description An account of the resource Hon. Charles J. Kersten Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952 pp. 62-64 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kersten, Charles J., 1902-1972 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/73ed61a7432b837fbbfd88aed839943e.pdf a139e2a752f4a4675e186a5ee6b6a376 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA ~2 ----------------------------JANO.ŠIK - THE SWVAK ROBIN HOOD IVAN HOUDEK Much has been written about Juro (George) Jánošik, the les.der of the Slovak mountaln boys, w,bo has b&come the greatest Jegendary hero in Slovakia country, and undouMedly much more wtll still be written about hlm In hls natlve !and where hls name ls an insplration to both the old and the young. lt ls rather approprlate <to recall, at thls tlme, the &Xploits of bis so-called rebel against society in his day, for Jánošík ls the symbol ot a people's just indignatlon agadnst lnjustlce and oppresslon, as well as a symbol of hope of ultimate vlctory of jusit.lce and ot truth. The sources from which we were able to draw a reillable character sketch of thls remarkable man are twofold: the offlcial r&cords of his tria!, and the numerous folk songs, storles, and lege,ndary accounts of his explolt.s. The forwer are ne,cess,ar!ly dry, the latter rich and varled. Th ese sources represent people, of confllctlng vlews: the one class feared and hated the hold youth as its enemy; the other loved and immol'tallz&d hlm as a natlonal hero. lt is a dlfficult task to reconclle these wldely dlvergent points of vlew and, yet, these sources, whlch glve us two dlfferent plctures of hlm, are not re,ally contradlctory, but rather complement each other. The orlglnal Lartln,Slovak judlclal documents were kept In a ~peclall file In the coun,ty archlve,s of the Liptov Dis.trlct records, in St. Mlkulal'i, the county seait. Unfortunately, these disappeared rather mysterlously In the second half of the last century. Duplicates of these documents, howe,ver, have been preserved and thelr contents were flrst publlclzed by Gaspar Fejerpataky in tb.e Vlastenský Kalendár (1831-1832). These are a faithful copy of the authentlc record known as F assio Janossikiana, dated 1713. In 1880, Paul Dobšinský publ!shed hls vlews in the Prostonarodné Obyčaje (National Customs) In tbe Slovak Museum's publlcatlon ot <that year Muf. sl. spol.; VIIl,Podtatranský Juro J ánoiik). Paul Sochaň's Zbojnik Juro J ánoifk, published Jn 1924, 1s a good source ot inform-atlon and from lt and the other contemporary records and Jegendary accounts whlch have been handed down for gene,rablons, we are able to reconstruct most of the scenes of the Ume and re-enact the events In the Ufe of thls popular hero, so that they may be consldered to be truly hl.storlcal, not merely legendary. Both sources glve Ťarchová In Trenčfn County as hls blrthplace, where he wa,s born about 1688. But research has lndlcated tbat Jánoillk was actually born on a small farm In the bighlands In tbe vlclnlty of that hamlet, and the, spot today ls marked by a small, dllapldated hut wlth the number "676" on lt. It stands between two llnden trees In a place caaled Janošov, whlch boasts of a populatlon of 17 persona, most ot wbom bea.r the name Jánošlk. Jánošfk was s tm a chlld when the revolutlon under Rakoczy II (1703-1711) took place,, but he jolned the lnsurgents, whose motto, "Pro Llberate," was emblazoned on thelr banner. Later, he jolned the lmperlal army and was sent to Bytča Castle as a guard, where he met �SLOVAKIA 43 one of the Emperor's prisoners, an adventurous brigand and soldler of fortune, Thom-as Uhorčik. Thls fateful acqualntance proved to be the turning-point of bis life. Rakoczy's iJHaited rebellion was purt down In 1711, and the youthful Jánošlk returned horne after belng ransomed out of the army by his paren,t s. Tradltion has it that he bocame an outlaw and a highiw,ayman because his father was flogged to death by the lord of the manor when he refused to leave the deathbed of bis wlfe in order to work in the fields of hls master. This fatal flogg·i ng took place in Ťarohová, at the vlllage bridge, aocording to one account, and at the castle In Teplice in Žilina, according to another report. The judic-lal documents, however, merely record ,the fact that Uhorčlk, who had escaped from prlsón, had come to Ťarchová and had persuaded J ánošlk to join his robber b and in the forest. As a background to the future of Jänošlk, lt may be well t o r&call that social conditions in Slovakla at the tlme were, perhaps, at their worst. The Revdlution had falled, but many a peasanťs son was unw!Hlng to bow down under the yoke of a feudal system after tastlng freedom as a sold,ier of fortune. Conditions among the peasants in the klngdoon of Rungary after t,he death of the liberal monarch, "Mathias th e J ust," became steadily worse until they became unbearable. The peasants' revolt under George Doža in Tran.sylv ania and in the Dolná. valley was cruelly stamped out by lihe nobffllty, and the lot of the peasants was vlrtual ~lavery. Although t!he rlght to emigrate was restored to the peasantry, In view of the fact that the people were subject to burdensome taxatlon and many restrlctlons, their status by the end of the seventeenth century had grown worse, so that In reality the nobility had assumed the .rlght of life and death over its subjects. The Slovaks, especially, beoame the vlctims of a cunnlng and unscrupulous no)>llirty whtc'h en.;;Javed them. Frequent cla.ss struggles, wars. and plagues added to the mlsfortunes of the Slovak people. Many areas were reduced to poverty-stI'icken regfons where extreme mlsery and want prevalled. Northern Slovakia which had, perhaps, suffered the most in these trying <limes, became the horne of the discontented, the dise ouraged, and the desperate. These men organized rob'ber banda and preyed on t!he surroundlng countryside from th eir mountain hideouts. Tbomas Uborčik was a member of one of these bands as early as 1704. J ánošfk became a member in 1711, after taking tbe briganďs pledge and sealing bis oath w.! th bis blood. Hls explolts soon won hlm far-reaching fame not only In hls own country, but also in Moravla, P dland, Hungary and Silesla. After belng elected chleftiain, the youthful bandlt extended the zone of bis operatlons from tbe eastern count!es of Liptov, Spiš, Orava, Turiec Tekov, Malohont, and Šariš to Zvolen, Trenčln, and Nitra, and even crossed lnto Mora.vla, SHesla, Poland and Hungary. Hls comrades were, accord!ng to bis own ·a dmlsslon: Tihomas lJhorčlk (•Uhrlk); Paul Gašparec-Mlynarčlk from Rakov; Barte, the sbepherd from Predmier; "Red" Ondraš from D1há; Plavčlk from Dunajov; Gábor trom Valkov; Juro Turlak (Hun<:aga or Hunčlk); Kubo Chlastiak trom Otožnlc; J urlak, Sato ra, Gavel, and aeveral Poles. Not a few secret accompllces, llke J uro and Kubo štukovec In Kräsna, furnlsbed hlm wlth suppl!es and informatlon. �f4 SLOVAKIA Folk stories about this interesting outlaw are, undoubtedly, gullty of several anachroni.sms. They list the following as Ms associatss: Uhorčik, Gajdošík-Mlynárčik, Surovec, Hrajnoha, Adamčik, llčík (the chief scout), Garaj, Postavčík, Tarke, Mucha, Durica. Most of these, however, were not even Jánošik's contemporaries. F or lnstance, James Surovec, from Rovný In Trenčin, who terrorized Orava, Trenčín, and Pohroni&, wa.s not born untH 1715, two years after Jánošik's death, and he himself was executed fn 1740. Hrajnoba, the famous dancer from Nitra, lived in the middle of the 18th century and wai; broken on the wheel in !lbe Smolen Castle. In 1878 Hrajnoha's treasure was unearthed by some laborers who were buildíng a highway 1:ear Nadaš. Adamčfk was a notorious bandit in Moravia, and Ilčik lived in Trenčin. Garaj must have preceded Jánoš!k, because a brook ls mentioned by that name in the judlclal documents covering the tria! of Slovakia's most famous outlaw. Some of J ánošik's asso ciates are, perhaps, p.roducts of Lhe popular imaginatlon. A triangular area, known as the K ing's Plateau, lies on a hlgh point overlooking the countles of Liptov, the Hron area and Malohont, near Hochwald, or Hovald, at a spot known as the "Tall Plne," directly above the road runnlng from Liptov to Spiš. This region was at one time covered with a thick forest, which was the hiding place of robber gangs in every century. Q.ueen Maria T,h eresa destroyed th!s picturesque rendezvous of the hlghwaymen by havlng the forest cut down by royal proclamatlon. But in J ánošík's time, thls area was the favorite h:rnnt of brigands, and lt was there that Lord Jáu Radvanský, whlle on bis way to tbe funeral of the former revolutionary general. Petrcx:zy, was robbed by tbe Slovak Robin Hood. Lord Paul Revay, Lady Schardon, and Lord Ladlslaus Zmeškal were also held up in t hls region by Jánošík's merry band. Lord Skalka fell into their hands, as dld Sipoš trom Žilina, some hO'rse dealers from the same town, ~everal wine merchants, and many others. Some of the booty was given to the poor and needy. Henc e, the story c irculated that Jánošik robbed 1he rich to give to tbe poor. This is not quite In keeping with the facts, for h!s comrades preyed upon the lower classe.s as well as on the wealthy nobillty. The jewels 1aken from Lord Skalka were dlstrfäuted among the young ladies In Ťa-rcbová. Romantic tales, which bave little historical basis, however, h ave become a part of the Jánošik saga in Slovakia. The authentic documents do not even allude to most of t,he feats attributed to Slovakla's legendary hero. At bis trlal, Jánošik admltted that he often raided the sheepfolds of the lords of the manor, that some of tbe shepherds, elther trom ľear of friendsbip, cooperated in these robberies and tben accompanled bim to celebra.te at the "Black Ant" In Klenovce, owned by tbe lnn-keeper, Martin Mravec, or at the "Wbite Horse" in Dunajov, and sometlmes at the "Blne Star" In Krásna, or tbe "Golden Eagle" in Ťarcbová. Winter tlme fonnd the moun,taln boys seeklng employment In tbe nearby bomesteads b ecanse the snow would bave betrayed thelr footprlnts leadlng to their 'bldlng-places, deep In the plne forests of Klng's Plateau. Tbus, Jánošík served as a farmhand ln tbe wlnter of 1712-1713 at Kovatlčik's and Ondrejčik's In Kokava. In tbe .~pring they bastened to tbeir mountaln rendezvous at tbe foot of the Tall Pine. �SLOVAKIA 45 Jánošík's romantic career as Slovak!a's Robin Hood W'3.S a short one, Jastlng Jess tban two years. Although he escaped after his flrst ťapture at Klooovce in the autumn of 1712, he was caught in tbe summer of tbe next year. The commissioner at Malohont had granted him an amnesty after he had been confined in Jakoffy Ca.stle in Hrachov, but aMer tbe county po'l!ce of Liptov arrested bim he neveT regained bis rreedom. No ofriclal record glves us the exact details of bis final capture; but, accordlng to tradition, Jánošik was apprebended elther b&eause of the treachery of one of his band, namely, Gajdošík, who had given away t he secret of bis ch!eťs gigant!c strength (the mag-ic belt), or because of the treachery of J ánošik's rormer sw&etheart, w·ho ,!ost her heart to the Police Captaln Joseph Lehotský, when he came to ber father's inn, the Golden Goose, in searcb of the renowned outlaw. The scene of bis arrest, in the flr&t version, was said to have been In the Little Mountain Inn in Polhora, Zvolen County, between Brru:no and Tisovec. At any rate, t he famed outlaw was taken in chalns to Liptov, where he was lodged in Vranov Castle, bui1lt by Franei11 Palugyay. There, In a dark celi, Jánoš!k was chained to the wall to await his tria! and death. Jánošik was aHowed to plead bis case. He pleaded gullty to c·ertain charges of robbery, but denied havlng committed crlmes attributed to him. Some or the acts he was accused of were perpetrat&d whlle he was In prison. Thus, he denied having anything to do with the robbery of a priest from Orava, or the hold-up or Vitko from Sllesia, the murder of the blacksmlth's son in Dobrovce, the robblng of the Galusovecs, the looting of churches in Hungary, PO'land, Slles!a, or Moravia, where the sacrilegious robbeľl! are alleged to have nailed the sacred hosts to a tree in order to determine whether blood would flow from them when ahots were flred into the.m. He was also accused of having freed one of bis band as he was ll!bout to be hanged in Žilina. It ls notewor.thy that the county sheriff, John L itlský, and !he mayor of the town of Osčadn!ce were suspected or being overly friendly w!th Jánošik. To au the charges of which he was ra,sely accused the stoutllea!'ted robber-chieftain simply pleaded innocent. Attempts to prove that he was in collusion wi,th other notorious brlgands in Slovakla, Poland, and Hungary were unsuccessful. Wben he was accused of having sbot a priest from Domanlže, 4t was proved that two or bis associates, Tu ria k and PJavčlk, had comml tted this dastardly crime in bis absence. No crime, other .than robbery, was p.roved against JáJ!lošlk, w,bo never killed anyone. But in those days a !Jhief, as well as a murderer, might be hanged. Legendary accounts of tbe tria:! picture Jánošík as remaining silent about the ldenUty of bis comrades, but the officlal records indlcate that he gave the Court a list of ťbelr names, but refused to reveal their whereabouts. As to the burled treasure, he told bis llsteners that it was hidden in a Jarge fir <tree opposlte an oak on whioh a hand was carved lndlcatlng the exact locatlon of the flr tree, In the glade where the road winds down {rom Jablonka to Klenovce. Lord Ska\ka's jewels he had hidden In the mountalns of Handlov, althougb legends have it they were bestowed on the matdens of the village of Ťarcbová. �SLOVAKIA. Jánošik was tried by the county court of Liptov, presided over by the vice-commissioner, Ladts laus Okol!csany•I, on March 16-17, 1713, in the county courthouse of St. Mlkulaš In Liptov. The other members of the court were the magl.strates of the four dlstrict-s ot Liptov county, namely, John and AndTew Rády, Andrew Andreanský, and Matthew Joob. The oftlclal prosecutor was Alexander Cemlcký, and the attorney for the defense was Balthasar Palugyay. The d&fense p leaded guilty to the charges of robbery and asked the clemency of the Cour,t. Moreover, Jánošík promLsed to glve up bis former way of llfe .and wlshed to become once a.gain a 0aw-abldlng cLtlzen. The prosecutlon, however, demanued tihe hig,hest penalty and succeeded in exactlng a two-fold sentence from the Court, so that the "doubledeallng" prisoner mlght !lrst pay the penalty for bis lighter crlmes by belng tortured on the rack, and then by belng hanged on the gallows to forfeit hls llfe for bis graver transgress1ons. T hls was in accordance witJb the laws o! the TripaTtitum ot 1515, 1625, and 1655. The death sentence was carrled out on March 17 or 18, 1713, before a vast assembly of people, on the executlon grounds of St. Mfäulaš, on the Váh near the Paludzký bridge. There the young robber-chleftaln was hanged on the gaHows, and bis llteless body was buried beneath lt as the custom of thatl. ttme. Äccordlng ,to the popular legends, Jánošík, though welgbed down by bis heavy shackles, danced the "hajduc hy" (a llvely folk da.nce) four tlmes aTound the gal!ows, just before bis death. Another legendary story tells or a courler who came dlrectly from the Emperor with hls lmperlal pardon, ,but lt was too late, for the darlng you.th, who h-ad prom.lsed to recrult four reglment.q of soldlers for the Emperor, was aAready hanglng on the rack. H e refused the amnesty wtth the words, "Now tha,t you have roasted me, you might as well devour me." He ls said to have dled after belng suspended by hls rib on the rack for three days. All natme seemed to go lnto mouring for this yout:h, whose mel'lry songs once resounded through the glen. The babbl!ng brooks became sllent, ťhe anlmals In the forest ceased their act!vity momentarlly in silent trlbute to their departed hero. A sudden hush came over all, and bis many trlends, far and near, were overcome by sorrow at bis passing. An annual penalty was lmposed on Liptov by the Emperor for havlng sentenced Jánošík to death, and, untll ~ecent times, four measures of gold ducats were pald to the lmperillll treasury each year. That is the story In legendary accounts. The people belleved in Jánošík's nobillty of character. It ls sald that hls body was buried In a crypt of the church of St. Mikulaš, where it lles In state of comp]ete preservation awaltlng the day when a new Jánošik wlll arise and strlke down the oppressors of hls poople. Many years a1!ter thls sad event, lt was reported thatl. whlle some youngsters were p.laylng nea,r the town of Hajasov, one of the boys play,f ully l!fle'd the corner of a nearby hut and hld hls cap underneath. 'Ilhls feat or amazing strength reached -the eaTs of the nobMity, ,viho qulckly remov.ed thls new performer, whom they consldered another Jánošlk. Jánošik's execution was the slgnal for the authorities to capture all the remalnlng outla,ws stm at large in Slovakla. Emerich Kublny, The reglstrar of Liptov, was sent to Malohont wltb warra,nts to arrest �SLOVAKIA au suspec.ts. In Apr!l, Uhorčik, alias M.a.rtin Mravec, was captured at St. Mlkulaš, where he had marrled and seltled down as a tavern• keeper, lhe proprletor of llhe Gray Failcon. He was given a hasty trlal and condemned to d1e on the rack. An lmperiaI decree was issued by whlch bhe county magistrates would be held r-esponslble in the future for all banditry In thelr areas, and on April 17, 1713, the assembly at Liptov approved of the motlon to round up the outlaws. The imperlal marshal, John Palty, arrived to enforce the emperor's ln&tructlons. Authentlc documents, w'ith the record of Jánošlk's apprehenslon .and ,tria!, make b.lm out to be an ordlnary hlghwayman, simllar to hundreds of •bis klnd who roamed about the country and terrorlzed the gentry. He was consldered to be a da,ngerous chaTacter, as were the others of hla notorlous professlon. Neveiitheless, the fa,ct that hls name has become an lllustrlous one In the Jegendary songs e.nd storles of h1s people, la In sharp contrast wlth the oi'ficlal p!cture or thls colorful, albelt lawless, personallty. The questlon arlses, why ·has he, alone, maintalued bis posltlon as an !dol ot the Slovak natlon? Obviously, he must have been dltferent from all bis companions and con.temporarles, both In vice and vlrtue. Although lihe aura of glory and honor that surrounds bis memory ls no doubt the result, in some measure, of th-e people's rich lmaglnatlon, yet, bis deeds durlng bis llfe are a,n argument In favor of some · outstan.dlng quallties in hls makeup. We cannot account for h1s tremendous popularity among the people, nor can we explain why bis name Ls a symbol ot vlntue rather than vice, UDJ!ess we attrlbute vlrluous qua!itles to t his youth who so fired the lmagination of the old and the young that he has become the Jmmortal hero of bis natlve !and. ·T he areas known as th'e "Queen's Meadow, Warm Sprlngs," and many other regions In tre Pohron and Malohont dl.strlcts, aboun.d even today In folk songs, ballads, and storles of bis explolts ln be· half of the poor and lhe oppres.sed. We can safely conclude that the offlclal records suppressed muoh of the truth in regard to Jánošik's aotual personallty and deeds. Slnce he was the self-constltuted champlon of the 01>pressed everywhere, one can understand why bis name should be slmp4y put on the 11st as an ordina1-y cť.iminal by the oppressors, who used thelr power to llquldate all fäose who were dangerous rebels agalnst thelr form of soclety. But despite thelr precautlons, Jánošlk's name, for almost two and a half centurles, has been the symbol of hope and courage to bis people. Unllke other parts ot the Austrlan Emplre, which revoJ.ted trom time to tlme (Magyar, Romanian, Croatlan and Serblan outbreaks occurred lntermlttently ln 1514, 1569, 1'571, 1635, 1655, 1784, etc.), the Slovaks revolted oilliy once. Thls uprlslng happened In the Potlsle reglon when a rumor was spread througbout Eastern Slovakla that the nobility had polsoned their wells. It turned out, however, that the cause ot wldespread death w.a,s actually the chlorea epldemic of that year, 1631. Historloal facts make it evldent that the S!ovaks were a patient peoplil who would not rise In rebelllon In defense of thelr Jlfe as a natlon. Passlv& endurance and reslstance under the merclless system ot polltlcal oppression was, however, aC'companled by the actlve revolt �48 SLOVAKIA of the more hlghly spirited Slovak youths, who rebelled against the existing order of things by tak!ng the law lnto their own hands, and ,by retlring lnto -the.lr mountain strongholds from which they emerged at nigbt to rígbt tbe wrongs inflicted on tbeir people. Tbey pa.id for their daring and coul'age by their lives, sooner or later. But t heir sprit kept alive 1'he spark of freedom and the love of justice in the bearts of tbe Slovak.s. They wer e, to be sure, common felons and blackguards among tbe forest bigbwaymen, but Jánošík was not one of them. He was the true embodiment of bis age, wild and untamed but not ignoble and ruthless, not savage and unrestralned, b ut gallant, generous, honest, and ·honorable with his people. T he first at:tiempts to trace the popular series of Slovak poem s, ballads, songs, and legends were made in the early l&tb century. T~b lic published a poem entltled "J ánoší k, lyptovský loupežník" (J ánošik the Robber of Liptov) in his collection called Slovenšti ve ršovc i (Vol. II, 1809). Ján Konár discovered several poems a bout S lovak h ighwaymen and published them in bis Národné Zpievanky (National Ballads) in 1834 and 1835. Slovak news-buHetins a nd almanacs contained poems and folk stories about Jánošik. The Časopis a Sborní k Muzeál nej Slovens kej Spo ločnosti (The Periodical and Almanac of the Slovak Museum Association) also published a number of works on J ánošik, based largely on early manuscrip,ts found in the museums in Liptov and Ružomberok. The Matica Slovenská (Slovak Institute) planned to continue its splendid task of collecting these old publica,!Jions, wihich are rich in folklore. By bhe m iddle of the l as.t century, the last of the outlaws in Slovakia had disappeared, but the stories of their daring exploits contlnued to interes.t the common people because of their highly imaginatlve appea,i. J ánošik's fame is preserved for the ages in the many poems that have been a distinct contribution to his nation's literature. The following poems have immortalized bis memory: Paul Šafarik's "Jáno. šík" in the S laveni pac holu S lovanských 1814; Absolon Meško's " Pieseň Jánošíková," 1842, (S lovenské Pohrady, 1897, sqq.); Michal Hodž.a's poem in the Mator; Sáva Pepkin-Medňanský's "J á nošík" in bis Poezi, Vol II ; Ján Botto's "Piese: J á nošíková" in Zpevy, 1847, and "Sm rť J ánošíková" in Lipa; Samo Chalupk a's " Likavský Väzeň" In the Orol, 1846, "Na K ráľovej Holí," 1862, and "Ju nak," 1860; August Lojko's "Jánoš íkov Stol" and " Jánoší ková Podkova"; J akub Graich• mann's " Horní Chla pc i' in the Sokol, 1861); William P auliny-Toth's " Jánoš ík s mi lou"; Ján ČaJák's "Já noší k" in the Oro l, 1870. a nd " J á nošíková Náhrada," 1875; J onas Záborský's "Smrť J á nošíková" In the S lov. Po h ľady, 1894. Paul Beblavý wrote an interesting his.torlcal story about bim in the S lov. Pohrady, 1889; Augustus Marschal-Petrovský, a long no ve!, J á nošík, Kapi t á n Ho rských Chlapcov, In 1901. Samo Zdyobavský wrote a play, J ánošík; J ona:s Zaborský, a drama, Jánošíková Večera ; Michal Skačkanský, a tragedy, J á nošík, 1880; Ľud. Kubaný, a play, Ho rní Chlapci ; Júr Mahen, a moving lragedy, Jánošík, 1910; Frances Svoboda-Goldman, a histoi,ical drama: J ohn P orod, a play, J á noliik, 1928, etc. Other articles and historlcal .•tudles about bim were written by ,the followlng: Gaspar Fejérpal11ky In Vlaste nský Kal endár, 1831: Stephen Hýroš In his Zá mok Ly ka va, 1876; Pavel Dobšinský ln Prostonárod né obyčaje, 1880; Rudolph Pokorný's Z potulek po �SLOVAKIA 49 Slovensku, 1883; Ján Bobula's Jánošík, 1863; K. Salva-Cebradskťs Jánošík; Julius Botto in bis article "Leopold I and Francis Rákoczi II" ln the Slov. Pohrady, 1904 mentions Jánoš í; Carl Kálaľs Slováci a Slovensko, 1905, and bis Na Krásnem Slovensku, 1903; Oarl Dúbravský's Jánošík, 1911; Gregor Uram·Podtatranský's "Juro Jánošík in the S bor. Muz. Slov. Sp. VIII, 1908; J aroslav Tuma's "Jánoší k," in 1911, Naše Slovensko; Michal Jiránek's " Zbojníci" in Slov. Čitanka, 1911; Samo Czambeľs "Jánošík" in Páričkov's Ružomberský Ka lendár, 1913; Joseph Škultety's Jánošíková Doba" in Slov. Pohrady, 1913; Jgnac Gessay in the A!Lmanac of the Slovák v Amerike; Pavel Sochaň's "Zbojník Juro Jánoší k," 1924. Ján L. Bella put Botto's poem "Svadba Jánošíková" to music for solo, with piano accompan.lment and oches- tr-ation. Vitezslav Novák also composed an orginaJ musical score on the subject called "Jánošík," which is to be found in Mladí, op. 55. Almost without exception the foregoing works pre.sented Jánošík as bhe idol of bis people, as por,trayed in bhe folk songs and ballads which have become a rich heritage of the Slovak nation. In some he is a patriot, in others a young t,beologian who has been Jed away from bis hlgb calling by the cruel circumstamces of bis tlme, ,vthile in all of them, with one exception, he ls depicted as a knightly hig,h• wayman who ls devoted to bis poor, oppressed poople. The one exception is Pavel Sochaň, who endeavors to debunk all the Iegendary glory surrounding the name o! Jánošík by basing bis Zbojník Juro Jánošík, akým bol v Skutočnosti (The Reail Jánošik) entirely on the cas~ records found in the County Court House of Liptov. But this is, perha,ps, the passing fancy of the times, to smash all the traditional ldols of bbe past, and Sochaň is one of tbls class of modern iconoclasts. Despite his efforts and those of others to defame the character of tlhe l~gendary heroes of yesterday, the fact remains that Jánoš!k has been an influence in popular Slovak poetry, llterature, and drama, and his name is imperisbable in tbe history of bis people. Botto's poems, alone, would make bis fame immortaJ. Not only did Slovak and Czech wrlters devote their talent.s to the singing o! •bis praises, but we find that the Polisb autbor, Przerwa-Tetmajer, wrote a whole ser.les of ballads about bim, as well as a beautlful, touobingľ poem about bis deatb. His collection of fables, folk stori~. folk songs, and poems ( Báje z Tatier) was very popular in bis n,a tive Poland. Vlad. Hnatjuk, ťhe famous Ukralnian etbnographer, wrote a treatise on Jánošík in 1889, and included numerous Slovakian songs about this national figure in bis collection of Russian, Slovak, Moravjan, and Polisb folklore. Jánoš!k has been the frequent subject of creatlve are in bis native country. Tbus, his likeness appears on glassware, prlmitive palntings, pottery, etc., in wbicb he and his gay mountain Iads are shown dres.sed in green blouses, red and wbite breecbes, shlny black boots, gally colored hats wlťb feathers in tbem, wďde walsbbands ricbly studded with gold, silver, and precious stones, and armed with muskets and hatcbets (valašky). J ánošik always has the place of honor as tbe leader, while Surovec is sbown brandishlng bis valaška; Hrajnoba shoots off tbe tip of a tall plne as he Ieaps high lnto the air in a playful mood; and Gajdošik plays h!s bagpipes, wbile tbe others dance to bis mountain music. Tbe Slovak art!sts, Mikulaš Aleš, :\fartln Benka, and Ján Alexy, have made palntlngs of J ánoli!k. Tbe �liO sculptor Franta Uprka made a number of fJgures of Jánošlk and his companions, the best of them being hls sculpture of the entlre group gathered around a bontlre on the mountalntop near the Tall Fine. l,'. Fulla executed a gorgeous linoleum design of the group. Vla.dyslav Skovzylaš, a Polls'h artist, ma.de several exqulsite wood carvings of these T atra mountaineers of Jong ago. Among them are one ot Jánošlk, alone, another of Jánošík and hls sweetheart, one of his profile, and a fourth of b.is men on the march. Jánošlk's buried treasure has engaged the popular lmaginat!on everywhere in Slovakia for centuries. The probable hlding places most frequently mentloned are: Kozia Skala, located In the šutov valiey in Turiec; Jánoiíkoá Pivnica, a cavern near Balna In tbe valley of Nemecká Lupča; Biela Skala in the Suchá Valley near Liptov; and Zemský Kľúč. Belopotecký's Mss., 1835, now in t'he Liptov Museum in Ružoml>erok, refers to all these places, besldes Pod Jedlou near Trnovec in Liptov, the Baránec Meadow near St. Andrew's in Liptov county, and many others. Pavel Sochaň's "Jánošíkové Poklady" in the Slov. Pohra.dy, 1922-23, and Ján Poroďs "Poklad a iné povesti z okolia Bytče" also conta.in clues to lhe secret hlding places of gold, silver and gems. Numerous al'tlcles have appeared in the off-lclal publlcatlons of the Sborník Muz. Sl. Spol. in recent years under the title of "Jánošíkov Poklad. Emo Bohúň wrote a fantastlc novel on the subject. The following places have been named after the famous outaaw: Jánošíková Kolkáreň (JáJnošlk's Bowling Alley) located In Liptov; Jánošíkové Husle (Jánošik's F\iddle) in Malé Smrekovice; Jánošíková Jaskyňa (Jánošilťs Cave) in the Prosiecká valley; Jánošíkov Stôl (Jánošlk's Table) In Važec; Jánošíkové Sedlo (Jánošlk's Sa.ddle) in the Queen's Meadow; Jánošíková Stupa (Jánošík's Footprlnt) in !;he Gadierská valley, In Turiec; Jánošíková Stolica (Jánošlk's County in the v;ratná valley Ťarchová; Jánošíková Skala (Jánošlk'c Rock) at L1šenlk, near Polhora, Zvolen county; Jánošíkov Chodník (Jánošlk's Path) and Jánoš íková Jaskyňa (Jánošík's Cave) near Tisovce; Jánošíková Podkova (Jánošík's Horseshoe) in the Rimavská valley under Zlamenečin Hill; 81lld Jánošíkov Skok (Jánošlk's Leap) at Dunajec. These and many otber names wlll preserve the name of Jánošík even ir all poems and stories about hlm dlsappear. Jánošlk'.s hat 1s in the Liptov museum in Ružomberok. lt 1s ma.de of clot1h rlohly embroidered with gold Jace and decorated with mussel shells, and is higb and cyllndrical in shape. Hls hatchet ls now in the natlonal museum at Budapest, whlle his plpe 1s in the Slovak Instltute's collection. Th~ famous belt, whlch had been given hlm by a fairy and was sald to have glvsn the Slovak hero preternatural powers, is now in t,he Slovak Nat1ooal Museum In St. Martln's in Turiec. A cane and tJwo ancient plctures or 'h ls band depicted on glass are there a lso. Two plctures or him are In the collectlon of the Moravian Natural Museum In Brno. The Liptov Museum at Ružomberok has a photograph of hls halrchet, a copy of the paintlngs Iu Brno, a copy ot the orlginal court records ot t,he tria! of Jánošík, several palntlngs by Fulla and Skoczylaša, and a large number of llterary works. In Rovno, Joseph Buchčar !s the proud po~essor ot an artlstlc leather belt, flllgreed lengthwise wltn goose qullls, w'hicb was found In his old mlll Jn the course ot some repairs. Although lt is sald that thls belonged to Jáno1 �SLOV.A.KU. 61 šik, it was more proba.bly the properly of Jánošík's lieutenant, Surovec, as Rovno was Suroveťs horne town. The Tatranský Museum has six old Polish g!ass likenesses of Jánošlk and hls merry men, similar to the glassware in St. Martin's in Turiec. One, however, shows the outlaiws oarrying a bag of ducats, another has the picture ot his sweetheart. The collection there contains four pistols, ten knives, four powder hom_s, and a bag in whlch the robbers used to carry thelr stolen ducats. Beneath the paintlngs of t?hese colorful personalitles of Slovak folklore there !s a brief explanation of the lnitlatlon of new members to the ro'bber gangs. 'l'hey were required to prove the:ir prowess In ,<,hooting oiif the tip of a tree with a pistol, or cuttlng lt otf wlth a throw of the hatchet, by drinldng a bottle of brandy, and then by performlng the d!fflcult "Robber's Dance." The lnitiat!on took p!ace in the evenlng around thelr bonflre. Eaoh outlaw was armed to the teeth wlth a hatohet in hls b elt, a brace of pistols, and a musket. Of course, there was the powder horn, the wlde oell, the knapsack, a Hussar's hat, and the bni:ghtly colored shirt and trousers to m ake up the rest of the1r accoutrement. Jánošiťs breeohes were said to have been red and w,hite In color. It seems lncredible, in view of Jánošlk'.s fame, that no monument stiands to honor his memory, or bhat no plaque marks bis birthplace. But he llves in the hearts of •h is people, hence needs no image of iron or stone to remind them of his life and his deeds. No other record t:Xists of the merry mountain boys who had been Jánošílťs companions. Mo.st probabtly they disbanded and under assumed names followed peaceful and honorable professions until the end of thelr lives. Uhorčik, however, was cau~ht and executed; and "Red" Ondraš disappeared In the vlclnlty of Tešlnka whlle Jánošik was stlll at Iarge. 'l1he woodlands grew silent and peaceful wlth the passlng of Jánošík from the scene. 'l'he songs of hls merry men were silenced forever, and the fores ts were left undisturbed for the deer, bear, fox, and wlld boar as they went about unchallenged. And hlgh o'erhead, an eagle on swift and silent wings surveyed the glen far below, abandoned and cheerless, for tbe ,happy throng of Jánošik's youths ba.d dlspersed, and their ohlef was dead. - (Slovenské Pohrady, V. XLV. Nos. 1-2, 1929). • • • WHO SAID IT ? "The Czechs bave been at all times all too rea.dy to look on most Slovaks as Magyarones and potentlal traltors, and have employed battallons of censors, police agents, and other customary Instruments of unpopu!ar Governments, wblcb always end by maklng the sltuation worse than hefore. Neltber the pollcy of Prague nor the attltude of the Czech offlclals In Slovakla was al• ways elther wlse or tactful. Tbe Czech Soclallsts. wbo played such a large part in the Government or tlle flrst years, incorporated all those Czech characterlstlcs most obnoxlous to the Slovaks. They were crude, tbey were 111-mannered, tbey were aggresslvely egalitarlan, and they were almost fanatlcally antl-clerlcal, seelng in the churches In Slovakla a two-fold enemy. i<ocial and natlonal." - (C. A. Macartney: H UNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS; 1937, London). � SLOVAKIA ~2 ----------------------------JANO.ŠIK - THE SWVAK ROBIN HOOD IVAN HOUDEK Much has been written about Juro (George) Jánošik, the les.der of the Slovak mountaln boys, w,bo has b&come the greatest Jegendary hero in Slovakia country, and undouMedly much more wtll still be written about hlm In hls natlve !and where hls name ls an insplration to both the old and the young. lt ls rather approprlate <to recall, at thls tlme, the &Xploits of bis so-called rebel against society in his day, for Jánošík ls the symbol ot a people's just indignatlon agadnst lnjustlce and oppresslon, as well as a symbol of hope of ultimate vlctory of jusit.lce and ot truth. The sources from which we were able to draw a reillable character sketch of thls remarkable man are twofold: the offlcial r&cords of his tria!, and the numerous folk songs, storles, and lege,ndary accounts of his explolt.s. The forwer are ne,cess,ar!ly dry, the latter rich and varled. Th ese sources represent people, of confllctlng vlews: the one class feared and hated the hold youth as its enemy; the other loved and immol'tallz&d hlm as a natlonal hero. lt is a dlfficult task to reconclle these wldely dlvergent points of vlew and, yet, these sources, whlch glve us two dlfferent plctures of hlm, are not re,ally contradlctory, but rather complement each other. The orlglnal Lartln,Slovak judlclal documents were kept In a ~peclall file In the coun,ty archlve,s of the Liptov Dis.trlct records, in St. Mlkulal'i, the county seait. Unfortunately, these disappeared rather mysterlously In the second half of the last century. Duplicates of these documents, howe,ver, have been preserved and thelr contents were flrst publlclzed by Gaspar Fejerpataky in tb.e Vlastenský Kalendár (1831-1832). These are a faithful copy of the authentlc record known as F assio Janossikiana, dated 1713. In 1880, Paul Dobšinský publ!shed hls vlews in the Prostonarodné Obyčaje (National Customs) In tbe Slovak Museum's publlcatlon ot <that year Muf. sl. spol.; VIIl,Podtatranský Juro J ánoiik). Paul Sochaň's Zbojnik Juro J ánoifk, published Jn 1924, 1s a good source ot inform-atlon and from lt and the other contemporary records and Jegendary accounts whlch have been handed down for gene,rablons, we are able to reconstruct most of the scenes of the Ume and re-enact the events In the Ufe of thls popular hero, so that they may be consldered to be truly hl.storlcal, not merely legendary. Both sources glve Ťarchová In Trenčfn County as hls blrthplace, where he wa,s born about 1688. But research has lndlcated tbat Jánoillk was actually born on a small farm In the bighlands In tbe vlclnlty of that hamlet, and the, spot today ls marked by a small, dllapldated hut wlth the number "676" on lt. It stands between two llnden trees In a place caaled Janošov, whlch boasts of a populatlon of 17 persona, most ot wbom bea.r the name Jánošlk. Jánošfk was s tm a chlld when the revolutlon under Rakoczy II (1703-1711) took place,, but he jolned the lnsurgents, whose motto, "Pro Llberate," was emblazoned on thelr banner. Later, he jolned the lmperlal army and was sent to Bytča Castle as a guard, where he met �SLOVAKIA 43 one of the Emperor's prisoners, an adventurous brigand and soldler of fortune, Thom-as Uhorčik. Thls fateful acqualntance proved to be the turning-point of bis life. Rakoczy's iJHaited rebellion was purt down In 1711, and the youthful Jánošlk returned horne after belng ransomed out of the army by his paren,t s. Tradltion has it that he bocame an outlaw and a highiw,ayman because his father was flogged to death by the lord of the manor when he refused to leave the deathbed of bis wlfe in order to work in the fields of hls master. This fatal flogg·i ng took place in Ťarohová, at the vlllage bridge, aocording to one account, and at the castle In Teplice in Žilina, according to another report. The judic-lal documents, however, merely record ,the fact that Uhorčlk, who had escaped from prlsón, had come to Ťarchová and had persuaded J ánošlk to join his robber b and in the forest. As a background to the future of Jänošlk, lt may be well t o r&call that social conditions in Slovakla at the tlme were, perhaps, at their worst. The Revdlution had falled, but many a peasanťs son was unw!Hlng to bow down under the yoke of a feudal system after tastlng freedom as a sold,ier of fortune. Conditions among the peasants in the klngdoon of Rungary after t,he death of the liberal monarch, "Mathias th e J ust," became steadily worse until they became unbearable. The peasants' revolt under George Doža in Tran.sylv ania and in the Dolná. valley was cruelly stamped out by lihe nobffllty, and the lot of the peasants was vlrtual ~lavery. Although t!he rlght to emigrate was restored to the peasantry, In view of the fact that the people were subject to burdensome taxatlon and many restrlctlons, their status by the end of the seventeenth century had grown worse, so that In reality the nobility had assumed the .rlght of life and death over its subjects. The Slovaks, especially, beoame the vlctims of a cunnlng and unscrupulous no)>llirty whtc'h en.;;Javed them. Frequent cla.ss struggles, wars. and plagues added to the mlsfortunes of the Slovak people. Many areas were reduced to poverty-stI'icken regfons where extreme mlsery and want prevalled. Northern Slovakia which had, perhaps, suffered the most in these trying <limes, became the horne of the discontented, the dise ouraged, and the desperate. These men organized rob'ber banda and preyed on t!he surroundlng countryside from th eir mountain hideouts. Tbomas Uborčik was a member of one of these bands as early as 1704. J ánošfk became a member in 1711, after taking tbe briganďs pledge and sealing bis oath w.! th bis blood. Hls explolts soon won hlm far-reaching fame not only In hls own country, but also in Moravla, P dland, Hungary and Silesla. After belng elected chleftiain, the youthful bandlt extended the zone of bis operatlons from tbe eastern count!es of Liptov, Spiš, Orava, Turiec Tekov, Malohont, and Šariš to Zvolen, Trenčln, and Nitra, and even crossed lnto Mora.vla, SHesla, Poland and Hungary. Hls comrades were, accord!ng to bis own ·a dmlsslon: Tihomas lJhorčlk (•Uhrlk); Paul Gašparec-Mlynarčlk from Rakov; Barte, the sbepherd from Predmier; "Red" Ondraš from D1há; Plavčlk from Dunajov; Gábor trom Valkov; Juro Turlak (Hun<:aga or Hunčlk); Kubo Chlastiak trom Otožnlc; J urlak, Sato ra, Gavel, and aeveral Poles. Not a few secret accompllces, llke J uro and Kubo štukovec In Kräsna, furnlsbed hlm wlth suppl!es and informatlon. �f4 SLOVAKIA Folk stories about this interesting outlaw are, undoubtedly, gullty of several anachroni.sms. They list the following as Ms associatss: Uhorčik, Gajdošík-Mlynárčik, Surovec, Hrajnoha, Adamčik, llčík (the chief scout), Garaj, Postavčík, Tarke, Mucha, Durica. Most of these, however, were not even Jánošik's contemporaries. F or lnstance, James Surovec, from Rovný In Trenčin, who terrorized Orava, Trenčín, and Pohroni&, wa.s not born untH 1715, two years after Jánošik's death, and he himself was executed fn 1740. Hrajnoba, the famous dancer from Nitra, lived in the middle of the 18th century and wai; broken on the wheel in !lbe Smolen Castle. In 1878 Hrajnoha's treasure was unearthed by some laborers who were buildíng a highway 1:ear Nadaš. Adamčfk was a notorious bandit in Moravia, and Ilčik lived in Trenčin. Garaj must have preceded Jánoš!k, because a brook ls mentioned by that name in the judlclal documents covering the tria! of Slovakia's most famous outlaw. Some of J ánošik's asso ciates are, perhaps, p.roducts of Lhe popular imaginatlon. A triangular area, known as the K ing's Plateau, lies on a hlgh point overlooking the countles of Liptov, the Hron area and Malohont, near Hochwald, or Hovald, at a spot known as the "Tall Plne," directly above the road runnlng from Liptov to Spiš. This region was at one time covered with a thick forest, which was the hiding place of robber gangs in every century. Q.ueen Maria T,h eresa destroyed th!s picturesque rendezvous of the hlghwaymen by havlng the forest cut down by royal proclamatlon. But in J ánošík's time, thls area was the favorite h:rnnt of brigands, and lt was there that Lord Jáu Radvanský, whlle on bis way to tbe funeral of the former revolutionary general. Petrcx:zy, was robbed by tbe Slovak Robin Hood. Lord Paul Revay, Lady Schardon, and Lord Ladlslaus Zmeškal were also held up in t hls region by Jánošík's merry band. Lord Skalka fell into their hands, as dld Sipoš trom Žilina, some hO'rse dealers from the same town, ~everal wine merchants, and many others. Some of the booty was given to the poor and needy. Henc e, the story c irculated that Jánošik robbed 1he rich to give to tbe poor. This is not quite In keeping with the facts, for h!s comrades preyed upon the lower classe.s as well as on the wealthy nobillty. The jewels 1aken from Lord Skalka were dlstrfäuted among the young ladies In Ťa-rcbová. Romantic tales, which bave little historical basis, however, h ave become a part of the Jánošik saga in Slovakia. The authentic documents do not even allude to most of t,he feats attributed to Slovakla's legendary hero. At bis trlal, Jánošik admltted that he often raided the sheepfolds of the lords of the manor, that some of tbe shepherds, elther trom ľear of friendsbip, cooperated in these robberies and tben accompanled bim to celebra.te at the "Black Ant" In Klenovce, owned by tbe lnn-keeper, Martin Mravec, or at the "Wbite Horse" in Dunajov, and sometlmes at the "Blne Star" In Krásna, or tbe "Golden Eagle" in Ťarcbová. Winter tlme fonnd the moun,taln boys seeklng employment In tbe nearby bomesteads b ecanse the snow would bave betrayed thelr footprlnts leadlng to their 'bldlng-places, deep In the plne forests of Klng's Plateau. Tbus, Jánošík served as a farmhand ln tbe wlnter of 1712-1713 at Kovatlčik's and Ondrejčik's In Kokava. In tbe .~pring they bastened to tbeir mountaln rendezvous at tbe foot of the Tall Pine. �SLOVAKIA 45 Jánošík's romantic career as Slovak!a's Robin Hood W'3.S a short one, Jastlng Jess tban two years. Although he escaped after his flrst ťapture at Klooovce in the autumn of 1712, he was caught in tbe summer of tbe next year. The commissioner at Malohont had granted him an amnesty after he had been confined in Jakoffy Ca.stle in Hrachov, but aMer tbe county po'l!ce of Liptov arrested bim he neveT regained bis rreedom. No ofriclal record glves us the exact details of bis final capture; but, accordlng to tradition, Jánošik was apprebended elther b&eause of the treachery of one of his band, namely, Gajdošík, who had given away t he secret of bis ch!eťs gigant!c strength (the mag-ic belt), or because of the treachery of J ánošik's rormer sw&etheart, w·ho ,!ost her heart to the Police Captaln Joseph Lehotský, when he came to ber father's inn, the Golden Goose, in searcb of the renowned outlaw. The scene of bis arrest, in the flr&t version, was said to have been In the Little Mountain Inn in Polhora, Zvolen County, between Brru:no and Tisovec. At any rate, t he famed outlaw was taken in chalns to Liptov, where he was lodged in Vranov Castle, bui1lt by Franei11 Palugyay. There, In a dark celi, Jánoš!k was chained to the wall to await his tria! and death. Jánošik was aHowed to plead bis case. He pleaded gullty to c·ertain charges of robbery, but denied havlng committed crlmes attributed to him. Some or the acts he was accused of were perpetrat&d whlle he was In prison. Thus, he denied having anything to do with the robbery of a priest from Orava, or the hold-up or Vitko from Sllesia, the murder of the blacksmlth's son in Dobrovce, the robblng of the Galusovecs, the looting of churches in Hungary, PO'land, Slles!a, or Moravia, where the sacrilegious robbeľl! are alleged to have nailed the sacred hosts to a tree in order to determine whether blood would flow from them when ahots were flred into the.m. He was also accused of having freed one of bis band as he was ll!bout to be hanged in Žilina. It ls notewor.thy that the county sheriff, John L itlský, and !he mayor of the town of Osčadn!ce were suspected or being overly friendly w!th Jánošik. To au the charges of which he was ra,sely accused the stoutllea!'ted robber-chieftain simply pleaded innocent. Attempts to prove that he was in collusion wi,th other notorious brlgands in Slovakla, Poland, and Hungary were unsuccessful. Wben he was accused of having sbot a priest from Domanlže, 4t was proved that two or bis associates, Tu ria k and PJavčlk, had comml tted this dastardly crime in bis absence. No crime, other .than robbery, was p.roved against JáJ!lošlk, w,bo never killed anyone. But in those days a !Jhief, as well as a murderer, might be hanged. Legendary accounts of tbe tria:! picture Jánošík as remaining silent about the ldenUty of bis comrades, but the officlal records indlcate that he gave the Court a list of ťbelr names, but refused to reveal their whereabouts. As to the burled treasure, he told bis llsteners that it was hidden in a Jarge fir <tree opposlte an oak on whioh a hand was carved lndlcatlng the exact locatlon of the flr tree, In the glade where the road winds down {rom Jablonka to Klenovce. Lord Ska\ka's jewels he had hidden In the mountalns of Handlov, althougb legends have it they were bestowed on the matdens of the village of Ťarcbová. �SLOVAKIA. Jánošik was tried by the county court of Liptov, presided over by the vice-commissioner, Ladts laus Okol!csany•I, on March 16-17, 1713, in the county courthouse of St. Mlkulaš In Liptov. The other members of the court were the magl.strates of the four dlstrict-s ot Liptov county, namely, John and AndTew Rády, Andrew Andreanský, and Matthew Joob. The oftlclal prosecutor was Alexander Cemlcký, and the attorney for the defense was Balthasar Palugyay. The d&fense p leaded guilty to the charges of robbery and asked the clemency of the Cour,t. Moreover, Jánošík promLsed to glve up bis former way of llfe .and wlshed to become once a.gain a 0aw-abldlng cLtlzen. The prosecutlon, however, demanued tihe hig,hest penalty and succeeded in exactlng a two-fold sentence from the Court, so that the "doubledeallng" prisoner mlght !lrst pay the penalty for bis lighter crlmes by belng tortured on the rack, and then by belng hanged on the gallows to forfeit hls llfe for bis graver transgress1ons. T hls was in accordance witJb the laws o! the TripaTtitum ot 1515, 1625, and 1655. The death sentence was carrled out on March 17 or 18, 1713, before a vast assembly of people, on the executlon grounds of St. Mfäulaš, on the Váh near the Paludzký bridge. There the young robber-chleftaln was hanged on the gaHows, and bis llteless body was buried beneath lt as the custom of thatl. ttme. Äccordlng ,to the popular legends, Jánošík, though welgbed down by bis heavy shackles, danced the "hajduc hy" (a llvely folk da.nce) four tlmes aTound the gal!ows, just before bis death. Another legendary story tells or a courler who came dlrectly from the Emperor with hls lmperlal pardon, ,but lt was too late, for the darlng you.th, who h-ad prom.lsed to recrult four reglment.q of soldlers for the Emperor, was aAready hanglng on the rack. H e refused the amnesty wtth the words, "Now tha,t you have roasted me, you might as well devour me." He ls said to have dled after belng suspended by hls rib on the rack for three days. All natme seemed to go lnto mouring for this yout:h, whose mel'lry songs once resounded through the glen. The babbl!ng brooks became sllent, ťhe anlmals In the forest ceased their act!vity momentarlly in silent trlbute to their departed hero. A sudden hush came over all, and bis many trlends, far and near, were overcome by sorrow at bis passing. An annual penalty was lmposed on Liptov by the Emperor for havlng sentenced Jánošík to death, and, untll ~ecent times, four measures of gold ducats were pald to the lmperillll treasury each year. That is the story In legendary accounts. The people belleved in Jánošík's nobillty of character. It ls sald that hls body was buried In a crypt of the church of St. Mikulaš, where it lles In state of comp]ete preservation awaltlng the day when a new Jánošik wlll arise and strlke down the oppressors of hls poople. Many years a1!ter thls sad event, lt was reported thatl. whlle some youngsters were p.laylng nea,r the town of Hajasov, one of the boys play,f ully l!fle'd the corner of a nearby hut and hld hls cap underneath. 'Ilhls feat or amazing strength reached -the eaTs of the nobMity, ,viho qulckly remov.ed thls new performer, whom they consldered another Jánošlk. Jánošik's execution was the slgnal for the authorities to capture all the remalnlng outla,ws stm at large in Slovakla. Emerich Kublny, The reglstrar of Liptov, was sent to Malohont wltb warra,nts to arrest �SLOVAKIA au suspec.ts. In Apr!l, Uhorčik, alias M.a.rtin Mravec, was captured at St. Mlkulaš, where he had marrled and seltled down as a tavern• keeper, lhe proprletor of llhe Gray Failcon. He was given a hasty trlal and condemned to d1e on the rack. An lmperiaI decree was issued by whlch bhe county magistrates would be held r-esponslble in the future for all banditry In thelr areas, and on April 17, 1713, the assembly at Liptov approved of the motlon to round up the outlaws. The imperlal marshal, John Palty, arrived to enforce the emperor's ln&tructlons. Authentlc documents, w'ith the record of Jánošlk's apprehenslon .and ,tria!, make b.lm out to be an ordlnary hlghwayman, simllar to hundreds of •bis klnd who roamed about the country and terrorlzed the gentry. He was consldered to be a da,ngerous chaTacter, as were the others of hla notorlous professlon. Neveiitheless, the fa,ct that hls name has become an lllustrlous one In the Jegendary songs e.nd storles of h1s people, la In sharp contrast wlth the oi'ficlal p!cture or thls colorful, albelt lawless, personallty. The questlon arlses, why ·has he, alone, maintalued bis posltlon as an !dol ot the Slovak natlon? Obviously, he must have been dltferent from all bis companions and con.temporarles, both In vice and vlrtue. Although lihe aura of glory and honor that surrounds bis memory ls no doubt the result, in some measure, of th-e people's rich lmaglnatlon, yet, bis deeds durlng bis llfe are a,n argument In favor of some · outstan.dlng quallties in hls makeup. We cannot account for h1s tremendous popularity among the people, nor can we explain why bis name Ls a symbol ot vlntue rather than vice, UDJ!ess we attrlbute vlrluous qua!itles to t his youth who so fired the lmagination of the old and the young that he has become the Jmmortal hero of bis natlve !and. ·T he areas known as th'e "Queen's Meadow, Warm Sprlngs," and many other regions In tre Pohron and Malohont dl.strlcts, aboun.d even today In folk songs, ballads, and storles of bis explolts ln be· half of the poor and lhe oppres.sed. We can safely conclude that the offlclal records suppressed muoh of the truth in regard to Jánošik's aotual personallty and deeds. Slnce he was the self-constltuted champlon of the 01>pressed everywhere, one can understand why bis name should be slmp4y put on the 11st as an ordina1-y cť.iminal by the oppressors, who used thelr power to llquldate all fäose who were dangerous rebels agalnst thelr form of soclety. But despite thelr precautlons, Jánošlk's name, for almost two and a half centurles, has been the symbol of hope and courage to bis people. Unllke other parts ot the Austrlan Emplre, which revoJ.ted trom time to tlme (Magyar, Romanian, Croatlan and Serblan outbreaks occurred lntermlttently ln 1514, 1569, 1'571, 1635, 1655, 1784, etc.), the Slovaks revolted oilliy once. Thls uprlslng happened In the Potlsle reglon when a rumor was spread througbout Eastern Slovakla that the nobility had polsoned their wells. It turned out, however, that the cause ot wldespread death w.a,s actually the chlorea epldemic of that year, 1631. Historloal facts make it evldent that the S!ovaks were a patient peoplil who would not rise In rebelllon In defense of thelr Jlfe as a natlon. Passlv& endurance and reslstance under the merclless system ot polltlcal oppression was, however, aC'companled by the actlve revolt �48 SLOVAKIA of the more hlghly spirited Slovak youths, who rebelled against the existing order of things by tak!ng the law lnto their own hands, and ,by retlring lnto -the.lr mountain strongholds from which they emerged at nigbt to rígbt tbe wrongs inflicted on tbeir people. Tbey pa.id for their daring and coul'age by their lives, sooner or later. But t heir sprit kept alive 1'he spark of freedom and the love of justice in the bearts of tbe Slovak.s. They wer e, to be sure, common felons and blackguards among tbe forest bigbwaymen, but Jánošík was not one of them. He was the true embodiment of bis age, wild and untamed but not ignoble and ruthless, not savage and unrestralned, b ut gallant, generous, honest, and ·honorable with his people. T he first at:tiempts to trace the popular series of Slovak poem s, ballads, songs, and legends were made in the early l&tb century. T~b lic published a poem entltled "J ánoší k, lyptovský loupežník" (J ánošik the Robber of Liptov) in his collection called Slovenšti ve ršovc i (Vol. II, 1809). Ján Konár discovered several poems a bout S lovak h ighwaymen and published them in bis Národné Zpievanky (National Ballads) in 1834 and 1835. Slovak news-buHetins a nd almanacs contained poems and folk stories about Jánošik. The Časopis a Sborní k Muzeál nej Slovens kej Spo ločnosti (The Periodical and Almanac of the Slovak Museum Association) also published a number of works on J ánošik, based largely on early manuscrip,ts found in the museums in Liptov and Ružomberok. The Matica Slovenská (Slovak Institute) planned to continue its splendid task of collecting these old publica,!Jions, wihich are rich in folklore. By bhe m iddle of the l as.t century, the last of the outlaws in Slovakia had disappeared, but the stories of their daring exploits contlnued to interes.t the common people because of their highly imaginatlve appea,i. J ánošik's fame is preserved for the ages in the many poems that have been a distinct contribution to his nation's literature. The following poems have immortalized bis memory: Paul Šafarik's "Jáno. šík" in the S laveni pac holu S lovanských 1814; Absolon Meško's " Pieseň Jánošíková," 1842, (S lovenské Pohrady, 1897, sqq.); Michal Hodž.a's poem in the Mator; Sáva Pepkin-Medňanský's "J á nošík" in bis Poezi, Vol II ; Ján Botto's "Piese: J á nošíková" in Zpevy, 1847, and "Sm rť J ánošíková" in Lipa; Samo Chalupk a's " Likavský Väzeň" In the Orol, 1846, "Na K ráľovej Holí," 1862, and "Ju nak," 1860; August Lojko's "Jánoš íkov Stol" and " Jánoší ková Podkova"; J akub Graich• mann's " Horní Chla pc i' in the Sokol, 1861); William P auliny-Toth's " Jánoš ík s mi lou"; Ján ČaJák's "Já noší k" in the Oro l, 1870. a nd " J á nošíková Náhrada," 1875; J onas Záborský's "Smrť J á nošíková" In the S lov. Po h ľady, 1894. Paul Beblavý wrote an interesting his.torlcal story about bim in the S lov. Pohrady, 1889; Augustus Marschal-Petrovský, a long no ve!, J á nošík, Kapi t á n Ho rských Chlapcov, In 1901. Samo Zdyobavský wrote a play, J ánošík; J ona:s Zaborský, a drama, Jánošíková Večera ; Michal Skačkanský, a tragedy, J á nošík, 1880; Ľud. Kubaný, a play, Ho rní Chlapci ; Júr Mahen, a moving lragedy, Jánošík, 1910; Frances Svoboda-Goldman, a histoi,ical drama: J ohn P orod, a play, J á noliik, 1928, etc. Other articles and historlcal .•tudles about bim were written by ,the followlng: Gaspar Fejérpal11ky In Vlaste nský Kal endár, 1831: Stephen Hýroš In his Zá mok Ly ka va, 1876; Pavel Dobšinský ln Prostonárod né obyčaje, 1880; Rudolph Pokorný's Z potulek po �SLOVAKIA 49 Slovensku, 1883; Ján Bobula's Jánošík, 1863; K. Salva-Cebradskťs Jánošík; Julius Botto in bis article "Leopold I and Francis Rákoczi II" ln the Slov. Pohrady, 1904 mentions Jánoš í; Carl Kálaľs Slováci a Slovensko, 1905, and bis Na Krásnem Slovensku, 1903; Oarl Dúbravský's Jánošík, 1911; Gregor Uram·Podtatranský's "Juro Jánošík in the S bor. Muz. Slov. Sp. VIII, 1908; J aroslav Tuma's "Jánoší k," in 1911, Naše Slovensko; Michal Jiránek's " Zbojníci" in Slov. Čitanka, 1911; Samo Czambeľs "Jánošík" in Páričkov's Ružomberský Ka lendár, 1913; Joseph Škultety's Jánošíková Doba" in Slov. Pohrady, 1913; Jgnac Gessay in the A!Lmanac of the Slovák v Amerike; Pavel Sochaň's "Zbojník Juro Jánoší k," 1924. Ján L. Bella put Botto's poem "Svadba Jánošíková" to music for solo, with piano accompan.lment and oches- tr-ation. Vitezslav Novák also composed an orginaJ musical score on the subject called "Jánošík," which is to be found in Mladí, op. 55. Almost without exception the foregoing works pre.sented Jánošík as bhe idol of bis people, as por,trayed in bhe folk songs and ballads which have become a rich heritage of the Slovak nation. In some he is a patriot, in others a young t,beologian who has been Jed away from bis hlgb calling by the cruel circumstamces of bis tlme, ,vthile in all of them, with one exception, he ls depicted as a knightly hig,h• wayman who ls devoted to bis poor, oppressed poople. The one exception is Pavel Sochaň, who endeavors to debunk all the Iegendary glory surrounding the name o! Jánošík by basing bis Zbojník Juro Jánošík, akým bol v Skutočnosti (The Reail Jánošik) entirely on the cas~ records found in the County Court House of Liptov. But this is, perha,ps, the passing fancy of the times, to smash all the traditional ldols of bbe past, and Sochaň is one of tbls class of modern iconoclasts. Despite his efforts and those of others to defame the character of tlhe l~gendary heroes of yesterday, the fact remains that Jánoš!k has been an influence in popular Slovak poetry, llterature, and drama, and his name is imperisbable in tbe history of bis people. Botto's poems, alone, would make bis fame immortaJ. Not only did Slovak and Czech wrlters devote their talent.s to the singing o! •bis praises, but we find that the Polisb autbor, Przerwa-Tetmajer, wrote a whole ser.les of ballads about bim, as well as a beautlful, touobingľ poem about bis deatb. His collection of fables, folk stori~. folk songs, and poems ( Báje z Tatier) was very popular in bis n,a tive Poland. Vlad. Hnatjuk, ťhe famous Ukralnian etbnographer, wrote a treatise on Jánošík in 1889, and included numerous Slovakian songs about this national figure in bis collection of Russian, Slovak, Moravjan, and Polisb folklore. Jánoš!k has been the frequent subject of creatlve are in bis native country. Tbus, his likeness appears on glassware, prlmitive palntings, pottery, etc., in wbicb he and his gay mountain Iads are shown dres.sed in green blouses, red and wbite breecbes, shlny black boots, gally colored hats wlťb feathers in tbem, wďde walsbbands ricbly studded with gold, silver, and precious stones, and armed with muskets and hatcbets (valašky). J ánošik always has the place of honor as tbe leader, while Surovec is sbown brandishlng bis valaška; Hrajnoba shoots off tbe tip of a tall plne as he Ieaps high lnto the air in a playful mood; and Gajdošik plays h!s bagpipes, wbile tbe others dance to bis mountain music. Tbe Slovak art!sts, Mikulaš Aleš, :\fartln Benka, and Ján Alexy, have made palntlngs of J ánoli!k. Tbe �liO sculptor Franta Uprka made a number of fJgures of Jánošlk and his companions, the best of them being hls sculpture of the entlre group gathered around a bontlre on the mountalntop near the Tall Fine. l,'. Fulla executed a gorgeous linoleum design of the group. Vla.dyslav Skovzylaš, a Polls'h artist, ma.de several exqulsite wood carvings of these T atra mountaineers of Jong ago. Among them are one ot Jánošlk, alone, another of Jánošík and hls sweetheart, one of his profile, and a fourth of b.is men on the march. Jánošlk's buried treasure has engaged the popular lmaginat!on everywhere in Slovakia for centuries. The probable hlding places most frequently mentloned are: Kozia Skala, located In the šutov valiey in Turiec; Jánoiíkoá Pivnica, a cavern near Balna In tbe valley of Nemecká Lupča; Biela Skala in the Suchá Valley near Liptov; and Zemský Kľúč. Belopotecký's Mss., 1835, now in t'he Liptov Museum in Ružoml>erok, refers to all these places, besldes Pod Jedlou near Trnovec in Liptov, the Baránec Meadow near St. Andrew's in Liptov county, and many others. Pavel Sochaň's "Jánošíkové Poklady" in the Slov. Pohra.dy, 1922-23, and Ján Poroďs "Poklad a iné povesti z okolia Bytče" also conta.in clues to lhe secret hlding places of gold, silver and gems. Numerous al'tlcles have appeared in the off-lclal publlcatlons of the Sborník Muz. Sl. Spol. in recent years under the title of "Jánošíkov Poklad. Emo Bohúň wrote a fantastlc novel on the subject. The following places have been named after the famous outaaw: Jánošíková Kolkáreň (JáJnošlk's Bowling Alley) located In Liptov; Jánošíkové Husle (Jánošik's F\iddle) in Malé Smrekovice; Jánošíková Jaskyňa (Jánošilťs Cave) in the Prosiecká valley; Jánošíkov Stôl (Jánošlk's Table) In Važec; Jánošíkové Sedlo (Jánošlk's Sa.ddle) in the Queen's Meadow; Jánošíková Stupa (Jánošík's Footprlnt) in !;he Gadierská valley, In Turiec; Jánošíková Stolica (Jánošlk's County in the v;ratná valley Ťarchová; Jánošíková Skala (Jánošlk'c Rock) at L1šenlk, near Polhora, Zvolen county; Jánošíkov Chodník (Jánošlk's Path) and Jánoš íková Jaskyňa (Jánošík's Cave) near Tisovce; Jánošíková Podkova (Jánošík's Horseshoe) in the Rimavská valley under Zlamenečin Hill; 81lld Jánošíkov Skok (Jánošlk's Leap) at Dunajec. These and many otber names wlll preserve the name of Jánošík even ir all poems and stories about hlm dlsappear. Jánošlk'.s hat 1s in the Liptov museum in Ružomberok. lt 1s ma.de of clot1h rlohly embroidered with gold Jace and decorated with mussel shells, and is higb and cyllndrical in shape. Hls hatchet ls now in the natlonal museum at Budapest, whlle his plpe 1s in the Slovak Instltute's collection. Th~ famous belt, whlch had been given hlm by a fairy and was sald to have glvsn the Slovak hero preternatural powers, is now in t,he Slovak Nat1ooal Museum In St. Martln's in Turiec. A cane and tJwo ancient plctures or 'h ls band depicted on glass are there a lso. Two plctures or him are In the collectlon of the Moravian Natural Museum In Brno. The Liptov Museum at Ružomberok has a photograph of hls halrchet, a copy of the paintlngs Iu Brno, a copy ot the orlginal court records ot t,he tria! of Jánošík, several palntlngs by Fulla and Skoczylaša, and a large number of llterary works. In Rovno, Joseph Buchčar !s the proud po~essor ot an artlstlc leather belt, flllgreed lengthwise wltn goose qullls, w'hicb was found In his old mlll Jn the course ot some repairs. Although lt is sald that thls belonged to Jáno1 �SLOV.A.KU. 61 šik, it was more proba.bly the properly of Jánošík's lieutenant, Surovec, as Rovno was Suroveťs horne town. The Tatranský Museum has six old Polish g!ass likenesses of Jánošlk and hls merry men, similar to the glassware in St. Martin's in Turiec. One, however, shows the outlaiws oarrying a bag of ducats, another has the picture ot his sweetheart. The collection there contains four pistols, ten knives, four powder hom_s, and a bag in whlch the robbers used to carry thelr stolen ducats. Beneath the paintlngs of t?hese colorful personalitles of Slovak folklore there !s a brief explanation of the lnitlatlon of new members to the ro'bber gangs. 'l'hey were required to prove the:ir prowess In ,<,hooting oiif the tip of a tree with a pistol, or cuttlng lt otf wlth a throw of the hatchet, by drinldng a bottle of brandy, and then by performlng the d!fflcult "Robber's Dance." The lnitiat!on took p!ace in the evenlng around thelr bonflre. Eaoh outlaw was armed to the teeth wlth a hatohet in hls b elt, a brace of pistols, and a musket. Of course, there was the powder horn, the wlde oell, the knapsack, a Hussar's hat, and the bni:ghtly colored shirt and trousers to m ake up the rest of the1r accoutrement. Jánošiťs breeohes were said to have been red and w,hite In color. It seems lncredible, in view of Jánošlk'.s fame, that no monument stiands to honor his memory, or bhat no plaque marks bis birthplace. But he llves in the hearts of •h is people, hence needs no image of iron or stone to remind them of his life and his deeds. No other record t:Xists of the merry mountain boys who had been Jánošílťs companions. Mo.st probabtly they disbanded and under assumed names followed peaceful and honorable professions until the end of thelr lives. Uhorčik, however, was cau~ht and executed; and "Red" Ondraš disappeared In the vlclnlty of Tešlnka whlle Jánošik was stlll at Iarge. 'l1he woodlands grew silent and peaceful wlth the passlng of Jánošík from the scene. 'l'he songs of hls merry men were silenced forever, and the fores ts were left undisturbed for the deer, bear, fox, and wlld boar as they went about unchallenged. And hlgh o'erhead, an eagle on swift and silent wings surveyed the glen far below, abandoned and cheerless, for tbe ,happy throng of Jánošik's youths ba.d dlspersed, and their ohlef was dead. - (Slovenské Pohrady, V. XLV. Nos. 1-2, 1929). • • • WHO SAID IT ? "The Czechs bave been at all times all too rea.dy to look on most Slovaks as Magyarones and potentlal traltors, and have employed battallons of censors, police agents, and other customary Instruments of unpopu!ar Governments, wblcb always end by maklng the sltuation worse than hefore. Neltber the pollcy of Prague nor the attltude of the Czech offlclals In Slovakla was al• ways elther wlse or tactful. Tbe Czech Soclallsts. wbo played such a large part in the Government or tlle flrst years, incorporated all those Czech characterlstlcs most obnoxlous to the Slovaks. They were crude, tbey were 111-mannered, tbey were aggresslvely egalitarlan, and they were almost fanatlcally antl-clerlcal, seelng in the churches In Slovakla a two-fold enemy. i<ocial and natlonal." - (C. A. Macartney: H UNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS; 1937, London). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA ~2 ----------------------------JANO.ŠIK - THE SWVAK ROBIN HOOD IVAN HOUDEK Much has been written about Juro (George) Jánošik, the les.der of the Slovak mountaln boys, w,bo has b&come the greatest Jegendary hero in Slovakia country, and undouMedly much more wtll still be written about hlm In hls natlve !and where hls name ls an insplration to both the old and the young. lt ls rather approprlate <to recall, at thls tlme, the &Xploits of bis so-called rebel against society in his day, for Jánošík ls the symbol ot a people's just indignatlon agadnst lnjustlce and oppresslon, as well as a symbol of hope of ultimate vlctory of jusit.lce and ot truth. The sources from which we were able to draw a reillable character sketch of thls remarkable man are twofold: the offlcial r&cords of his tria!, and the numerous folk songs, storles, and lege,ndary accounts of his explolt.s. The forwer are ne,cess,ar!ly dry, the latter rich and varled. Th ese sources represent people, of confllctlng vlews: the one class feared and hated the hold youth as its enemy; the other loved and immol'tallz&d hlm as a natlonal hero. lt is a dlfficult task to reconclle these wldely dlvergent points of vlew and, yet, these sources, whlch glve us two dlfferent plctures of hlm, are not re,ally contradlctory, but rather complement each other. The orlglnal Lartln,Slovak judlclal documents were kept In a ~peclall file In the coun,ty archlve,s of the Liptov Dis.trlct records, in St. Mlkulal'i, the county seait. Unfortunately, these disappeared rather mysterlously In the second half of the last century. Duplicates of these documents, howe,ver, have been preserved and thelr contents were flrst publlclzed by Gaspar Fejerpataky in tb.e Vlastenský Kalendár (1831-1832). These are a faithful copy of the authentlc record known as F assio Janossikiana, dated 1713. In 1880, Paul Dobšinský publ!shed hls vlews in the Prostonarodné Obyčaje (National Customs) In tbe Slovak Museum's publlcatlon ot <that year Muf. sl. spol.; VIIl,Podtatranský Juro J ánoiik). Paul Sochaň's Zbojnik Juro J ánoifk, published Jn 1924, 1s a good source ot inform-atlon and from lt and the other contemporary records and Jegendary accounts whlch have been handed down for gene,rablons, we are able to reconstruct most of the scenes of the Ume and re-enact the events In the Ufe of thls popular hero, so that they may be consldered to be truly hl.storlcal, not merely legendary. Both sources glve Ťarchová In Trenčfn County as hls blrthplace, where he wa,s born about 1688. But research has lndlcated tbat Jánoillk was actually born on a small farm In the bighlands In tbe vlclnlty of that hamlet, and the, spot today ls marked by a small, dllapldated hut wlth the number "676" on lt. It stands between two llnden trees In a place caaled Janošov, whlch boasts of a populatlon of 17 persona, most ot wbom bea.r the name Jánošlk. Jánošfk was s tm a chlld when the revolutlon under Rakoczy II (1703-1711) took place,, but he jolned the lnsurgents, whose motto, "Pro Llberate," was emblazoned on thelr banner. Later, he jolned the lmperlal army and was sent to Bytča Castle as a guard, where he met SLOVAKIA 43 one of the Emperor's prisoners, an adventurous brigand and soldler of fortune, Thom-as Uhorčik. Thls fateful acqualntance proved to be the turning-point of bis life. Rakoczy's iJHaited rebellion was purt down In 1711, and the youthful Jánošlk returned horne after belng ransomed out of the army by his paren,t s. Tradltion has it that he bocame an outlaw and a highiw,ayman because his father was flogged to death by the lord of the manor when he refused to leave the deathbed of bis wlfe in order to work in the fields of hls master. This fatal flogg·i ng took place in Ťarohová, at the vlllage bridge, aocording to one account, and at the castle In Teplice in Žilina, according to another report. The judic-lal documents, however, merely record ,the fact that Uhorčlk, who had escaped from prlsón, had come to Ťarchová and had persuaded J ánošlk to join his robber b and in the forest. As a background to the future of Jänošlk, lt may be well t o r&call that social conditions in Slovakla at the tlme were, perhaps, at their worst. The Revdlution had falled, but many a peasanťs son was unw!Hlng to bow down under the yoke of a feudal system after tastlng freedom as a sold,ier of fortune. Conditions among the peasants in the klngdoon of Rungary after t,he death of the liberal monarch, "Mathias th e J ust," became steadily worse until they became unbearable. The peasants' revolt under George Doža in Tran.sylv ania and in the Dolná. valley was cruelly stamped out by lihe nobffllty, and the lot of the peasants was vlrtual ~lavery. Although t!he rlght to emigrate was restored to the peasantry, In view of the fact that the people were subject to burdensome taxatlon and many restrlctlons, their status by the end of the seventeenth century had grown worse, so that In reality the nobility had assumed the .rlght of life and death over its subjects. The Slovaks, especially, beoame the vlctims of a cunnlng and unscrupulous no)>llirty whtc'h en.;;Javed them. Frequent cla.ss struggles, wars. and plagues added to the mlsfortunes of the Slovak people. Many areas were reduced to poverty-stI'icken regfons where extreme mlsery and want prevalled. Northern Slovakia which had, perhaps, suffered the most in these trying <limes, became the horne of the discontented, the dise ouraged, and the desperate. These men organized rob'ber banda and preyed on t!he surroundlng countryside from th eir mountain hideouts. Tbomas Uborčik was a member of one of these bands as early as 1704. J ánošfk became a member in 1711, after taking tbe briganďs pledge and sealing bis oath w.! th bis blood. Hls explolts soon won hlm far-reaching fame not only In hls own country, but also in Moravla, P dland, Hungary and Silesla. After belng elected chleftiain, the youthful bandlt extended the zone of bis operatlons from tbe eastern count!es of Liptov, Spiš, Orava, Turiec Tekov, Malohont, and Šariš to Zvolen, Trenčln, and Nitra, and even crossed lnto Mora.vla, SHesla, Poland and Hungary. Hls comrades were, accord!ng to bis own ·a dmlsslon: Tihomas lJhorčlk (•Uhrlk); Paul Gašparec-Mlynarčlk from Rakov; Barte, the sbepherd from Predmier; "Red" Ondraš from D1há; Plavčlk from Dunajov; Gábor trom Valkov; Juro Turlak (Hun<:aga or Hunčlk); Kubo Chlastiak trom Otožnlc; J urlak, Sato ra, Gavel, and aeveral Poles. Not a few secret accompllces, llke J uro and Kubo štukovec In Kräsna, furnlsbed hlm wlth suppl!es and informatlon. f4 SLOVAKIA Folk stories about this interesting outlaw are, undoubtedly, gullty of several anachroni.sms. They list the following as Ms associatss: Uhorčik, Gajdošík-Mlynárčik, Surovec, Hrajnoha, Adamčik, llčík (the chief scout), Garaj, Postavčík, Tarke, Mucha, Durica. Most of these, however, were not even Jánošik's contemporaries. F or lnstance, James Surovec, from Rovný In Trenčin, who terrorized Orava, Trenčín, and Pohroni&, wa.s not born untH 1715, two years after Jánošik's death, and he himself was executed fn 1740. Hrajnoba, the famous dancer from Nitra, lived in the middle of the 18th century and wai; broken on the wheel in !lbe Smolen Castle. In 1878 Hrajnoha's treasure was unearthed by some laborers who were buildíng a highway 1:ear Nadaš. Adamčfk was a notorious bandit in Moravia, and Ilčik lived in Trenčin. Garaj must have preceded Jánoš!k, because a brook ls mentioned by that name in the judlclal documents covering the tria! of Slovakia's most famous outlaw. Some of J ánošik's asso ciates are, perhaps, p.roducts of Lhe popular imaginatlon. A triangular area, known as the K ing's Plateau, lies on a hlgh point overlooking the countles of Liptov, the Hron area and Malohont, near Hochwald, or Hovald, at a spot known as the "Tall Plne," directly above the road runnlng from Liptov to Spiš. This region was at one time covered with a thick forest, which was the hiding place of robber gangs in every century. Q.ueen Maria T,h eresa destroyed th!s picturesque rendezvous of the hlghwaymen by havlng the forest cut down by royal proclamatlon. But in J ánošík's time, thls area was the favorite h:rnnt of brigands, and lt was there that Lord Jáu Radvanský, whlle on bis way to tbe funeral of the former revolutionary general. Petrcx:zy, was robbed by tbe Slovak Robin Hood. Lord Paul Revay, Lady Schardon, and Lord Ladlslaus Zmeškal were also held up in t hls region by Jánošík's merry band. Lord Skalka fell into their hands, as dld Sipoš trom Žilina, some hO'rse dealers from the same town, ~everal wine merchants, and many others. Some of the booty was given to the poor and needy. Henc e, the story c irculated that Jánošik robbed 1he rich to give to tbe poor. This is not quite In keeping with the facts, for h!s comrades preyed upon the lower classe.s as well as on the wealthy nobillty. The jewels 1aken from Lord Skalka were dlstrfäuted among the young ladies In Ťa-rcbová. Romantic tales, which bave little historical basis, however, h ave become a part of the Jánošik saga in Slovakia. The authentic documents do not even allude to most of t,he feats attributed to Slovakla's legendary hero. At bis trlal, Jánošik admltted that he often raided the sheepfolds of the lords of the manor, that some of tbe shepherds, elther trom ľear of friendsbip, cooperated in these robberies and tben accompanled bim to celebra.te at the "Black Ant" In Klenovce, owned by tbe lnn-keeper, Martin Mravec, or at the "Wbite Horse" in Dunajov, and sometlmes at the "Blne Star" In Krásna, or tbe "Golden Eagle" in Ťarcbová. Winter tlme fonnd the moun,taln boys seeklng employment In tbe nearby bomesteads b ecanse the snow would bave betrayed thelr footprlnts leadlng to their 'bldlng-places, deep In the plne forests of Klng's Plateau. Tbus, Jánošík served as a farmhand ln tbe wlnter of 1712-1713 at Kovatlčik's and Ondrejčik's In Kokava. In tbe .~pring they bastened to tbeir mountaln rendezvous at tbe foot of the Tall Pine. SLOVAKIA 45 Jánošík's romantic career as Slovak!a's Robin Hood W'3.S a short one, Jastlng Jess tban two years. Although he escaped after his flrst ťapture at Klooovce in the autumn of 1712, he was caught in tbe summer of tbe next year. The commissioner at Malohont had granted him an amnesty after he had been confined in Jakoffy Ca.stle in Hrachov, but aMer tbe county po'l!ce of Liptov arrested bim he neveT regained bis rreedom. No ofriclal record glves us the exact details of bis final capture; but, accordlng to tradition, Jánošik was apprebended elther b&eause of the treachery of one of his band, namely, Gajdošík, who had given away t he secret of bis ch!eťs gigant!c strength (the mag-ic belt), or because of the treachery of J ánošik's rormer sw&etheart, w·ho ,!ost her heart to the Police Captaln Joseph Lehotský, when he came to ber father's inn, the Golden Goose, in searcb of the renowned outlaw. The scene of bis arrest, in the flr&t version, was said to have been In the Little Mountain Inn in Polhora, Zvolen County, between Brru:no and Tisovec. At any rate, t he famed outlaw was taken in chalns to Liptov, where he was lodged in Vranov Castle, bui1lt by Franei11 Palugyay. There, In a dark celi, Jánoš!k was chained to the wall to await his tria! and death. Jánošik was aHowed to plead bis case. He pleaded gullty to c·ertain charges of robbery, but denied havlng committed crlmes attributed to him. Some or the acts he was accused of were perpetrat&d whlle he was In prison. Thus, he denied having anything to do with the robbery of a priest from Orava, or the hold-up or Vitko from Sllesia, the murder of the blacksmlth's son in Dobrovce, the robblng of the Galusovecs, the looting of churches in Hungary, PO'land, Slles!a, or Moravia, where the sacrilegious robbeľl! are alleged to have nailed the sacred hosts to a tree in order to determine whether blood would flow from them when ahots were flred into the.m. He was also accused of having freed one of bis band as he was ll!bout to be hanged in Žilina. It ls notewor.thy that the county sheriff, John L itlský, and !he mayor of the town of Osčadn!ce were suspected or being overly friendly w!th Jánošik. To au the charges of which he was ra,sely accused the stoutllea!'ted robber-chieftain simply pleaded innocent. Attempts to prove that he was in collusion wi,th other notorious brlgands in Slovakla, Poland, and Hungary were unsuccessful. Wben he was accused of having sbot a priest from Domanlže, 4t was proved that two or bis associates, Tu ria k and PJavčlk, had comml tted this dastardly crime in bis absence. No crime, other .than robbery, was p.roved against JáJ!lošlk, w,bo never killed anyone. But in those days a !Jhief, as well as a murderer, might be hanged. Legendary accounts of tbe tria:! picture Jánošík as remaining silent about the ldenUty of bis comrades, but the officlal records indlcate that he gave the Court a list of ťbelr names, but refused to reveal their whereabouts. As to the burled treasure, he told bis llsteners that it was hidden in a Jarge fir <tree opposlte an oak on whioh a hand was carved lndlcatlng the exact locatlon of the flr tree, In the glade where the road winds down {rom Jablonka to Klenovce. Lord Ska\ka's jewels he had hidden In the mountalns of Handlov, althougb legends have it they were bestowed on the matdens of the village of Ťarcbová. SLOVAKIA. Jánošik was tried by the county court of Liptov, presided over by the vice-commissioner, Ladts laus Okol!csany•I, on March 16-17, 1713, in the county courthouse of St. Mlkulaš In Liptov. The other members of the court were the magl.strates of the four dlstrict-s ot Liptov county, namely, John and AndTew Rády, Andrew Andreanský, and Matthew Joob. The oftlclal prosecutor was Alexander Cemlcký, and the attorney for the defense was Balthasar Palugyay. The d&fense p leaded guilty to the charges of robbery and asked the clemency of the Cour,t. Moreover, Jánošík promLsed to glve up bis former way of llfe .and wlshed to become once a.gain a 0aw-abldlng cLtlzen. The prosecutlon, however, demanued tihe hig,hest penalty and succeeded in exactlng a two-fold sentence from the Court, so that the "doubledeallng" prisoner mlght !lrst pay the penalty for bis lighter crlmes by belng tortured on the rack, and then by belng hanged on the gallows to forfeit hls llfe for bis graver transgress1ons. T hls was in accordance witJb the laws o! the TripaTtitum ot 1515, 1625, and 1655. The death sentence was carrled out on March 17 or 18, 1713, before a vast assembly of people, on the executlon grounds of St. Mfäulaš, on the Váh near the Paludzký bridge. There the young robber-chleftaln was hanged on the gaHows, and bis llteless body was buried beneath lt as the custom of thatl. ttme. Äccordlng ,to the popular legends, Jánošík, though welgbed down by bis heavy shackles, danced the "hajduc hy" (a llvely folk da.nce) four tlmes aTound the gal!ows, just before bis death. Another legendary story tells or a courler who came dlrectly from the Emperor with hls lmperlal pardon, ,but lt was too late, for the darlng you.th, who h-ad prom.lsed to recrult four reglment.q of soldlers for the Emperor, was aAready hanglng on the rack. H e refused the amnesty wtth the words, "Now tha,t you have roasted me, you might as well devour me." He ls said to have dled after belng suspended by hls rib on the rack for three days. All natme seemed to go lnto mouring for this yout:h, whose mel'lry songs once resounded through the glen. The babbl!ng brooks became sllent, ťhe anlmals In the forest ceased their act!vity momentarlly in silent trlbute to their departed hero. A sudden hush came over all, and bis many trlends, far and near, were overcome by sorrow at bis passing. An annual penalty was lmposed on Liptov by the Emperor for havlng sentenced Jánošík to death, and, untll ~ecent times, four measures of gold ducats were pald to the lmperillll treasury each year. That is the story In legendary accounts. The people belleved in Jánošík's nobillty of character. It ls sald that hls body was buried In a crypt of the church of St. Mikulaš, where it lles In state of comp]ete preservation awaltlng the day when a new Jánošik wlll arise and strlke down the oppressors of hls poople. Many years a1!ter thls sad event, lt was reported thatl. whlle some youngsters were p.laylng nea,r the town of Hajasov, one of the boys play,f ully l!fle'd the corner of a nearby hut and hld hls cap underneath. 'Ilhls feat or amazing strength reached -the eaTs of the nobMity, ,viho qulckly remov.ed thls new performer, whom they consldered another Jánošlk. Jánošik's execution was the slgnal for the authorities to capture all the remalnlng outla,ws stm at large in Slovakla. Emerich Kublny, The reglstrar of Liptov, was sent to Malohont wltb warra,nts to arrest SLOVAKIA au suspec.ts. In Apr!l, Uhorčik, alias M.a.rtin Mravec, was captured at St. Mlkulaš, where he had marrled and seltled down as a tavern• keeper, lhe proprletor of llhe Gray Failcon. He was given a hasty trlal and condemned to d1e on the rack. An lmperiaI decree was issued by whlch bhe county magistrates would be held r-esponslble in the future for all banditry In thelr areas, and on April 17, 1713, the assembly at Liptov approved of the motlon to round up the outlaws. The imperlal marshal, John Palty, arrived to enforce the emperor's ln&tructlons. Authentlc documents, w'ith the record of Jánošlk's apprehenslon .and ,tria!, make b.lm out to be an ordlnary hlghwayman, simllar to hundreds of •bis klnd who roamed about the country and terrorlzed the gentry. He was consldered to be a da,ngerous chaTacter, as were the others of hla notorlous professlon. Neveiitheless, the fa,ct that hls name has become an lllustrlous one In the Jegendary songs e.nd storles of h1s people, la In sharp contrast wlth the oi'ficlal p!cture or thls colorful, albelt lawless, personallty. The questlon arlses, why ·has he, alone, maintalued bis posltlon as an !dol ot the Slovak natlon? Obviously, he must have been dltferent from all bis companions and con.temporarles, both In vice and vlrtue. Although lihe aura of glory and honor that surrounds bis memory ls no doubt the result, in some measure, of th-e people's rich lmaglnatlon, yet, bis deeds durlng bis llfe are a,n argument In favor of some · outstan.dlng quallties in hls makeup. We cannot account for h1s tremendous popularity among the people, nor can we explain why bis name Ls a symbol ot vlntue rather than vice, UDJ!ess we attrlbute vlrluous qua!itles to t his youth who so fired the lmagination of the old and the young that he has become the Jmmortal hero of bis natlve !and. ·T he areas known as th'e "Queen's Meadow, Warm Sprlngs," and many other regions In tre Pohron and Malohont dl.strlcts, aboun.d even today In folk songs, ballads, and storles of bis explolts ln be· half of the poor and lhe oppres.sed. We can safely conclude that the offlclal records suppressed muoh of the truth in regard to Jánošik's aotual personallty and deeds. Slnce he was the self-constltuted champlon of the 01>pressed everywhere, one can understand why bis name should be slmp4y put on the 11st as an ordina1-y cť.iminal by the oppressors, who used thelr power to llquldate all fäose who were dangerous rebels agalnst thelr form of soclety. But despite thelr precautlons, Jánošlk's name, for almost two and a half centurles, has been the symbol of hope and courage to bis people. Unllke other parts ot the Austrlan Emplre, which revoJ.ted trom time to tlme (Magyar, Romanian, Croatlan and Serblan outbreaks occurred lntermlttently ln 1514, 1569, 1'571, 1635, 1655, 1784, etc.), the Slovaks revolted oilliy once. Thls uprlslng happened In the Potlsle reglon when a rumor was spread througbout Eastern Slovakla that the nobility had polsoned their wells. It turned out, however, that the cause ot wldespread death w.a,s actually the chlorea epldemic of that year, 1631. Historloal facts make it evldent that the S!ovaks were a patient peoplil who would not rise In rebelllon In defense of thelr Jlfe as a natlon. Passlv& endurance and reslstance under the merclless system ot polltlcal oppression was, however, aC'companled by the actlve revolt 48 SLOVAKIA of the more hlghly spirited Slovak youths, who rebelled against the existing order of things by tak!ng the law lnto their own hands, and ,by retlring lnto -the.lr mountain strongholds from which they emerged at nigbt to rígbt tbe wrongs inflicted on tbeir people. Tbey pa.id for their daring and coul'age by their lives, sooner or later. But t heir sprit kept alive 1'he spark of freedom and the love of justice in the bearts of tbe Slovak.s. They wer e, to be sure, common felons and blackguards among tbe forest bigbwaymen, but Jánošík was not one of them. He was the true embodiment of bis age, wild and untamed but not ignoble and ruthless, not savage and unrestralned, b ut gallant, generous, honest, and ·honorable with his people. T he first at:tiempts to trace the popular series of Slovak poem s, ballads, songs, and legends were made in the early l&tb century. T~b lic published a poem entltled "J ánoší k, lyptovský loupežník" (J ánošik the Robber of Liptov) in his collection called Slovenšti ve ršovc i (Vol. II, 1809). Ján Konár discovered several poems a bout S lovak h ighwaymen and published them in bis Národné Zpievanky (National Ballads) in 1834 and 1835. Slovak news-buHetins a nd almanacs contained poems and folk stories about Jánošik. The Časopis a Sborní k Muzeál nej Slovens kej Spo ločnosti (The Periodical and Almanac of the Slovak Museum Association) also published a number of works on J ánošik, based largely on early manuscrip,ts found in the museums in Liptov and Ružomberok. The Matica Slovenská (Slovak Institute) planned to continue its splendid task of collecting these old publica,!Jions, wihich are rich in folklore. By bhe m iddle of the l as.t century, the last of the outlaws in Slovakia had disappeared, but the stories of their daring exploits contlnued to interes.t the common people because of their highly imaginatlve appea,i. J ánošik's fame is preserved for the ages in the many poems that have been a distinct contribution to his nation's literature. The following poems have immortalized bis memory: Paul Šafarik's "Jáno. šík" in the S laveni pac holu S lovanských 1814; Absolon Meško's " Pieseň Jánošíková," 1842, (S lovenské Pohrady, 1897, sqq.); Michal Hodž.a's poem in the Mator; Sáva Pepkin-Medňanský's "J á nošík" in bis Poezi, Vol II ; Ján Botto's "Piese: J á nošíková" in Zpevy, 1847, and "Sm rť J ánošíková" in Lipa; Samo Chalupk a's " Likavský Väzeň" In the Orol, 1846, "Na K ráľovej Holí," 1862, and "Ju nak," 1860; August Lojko's "Jánoš íkov Stol" and " Jánoší ková Podkova"; J akub Graich• mann's " Horní Chla pc i' in the Sokol, 1861); William P auliny-Toth's " Jánoš ík s mi lou"; Ján ČaJák's "Já noší k" in the Oro l, 1870. a nd " J á nošíková Náhrada," 1875; J onas Záborský's "Smrť J á nošíková" In the S lov. Po h ľady, 1894. Paul Beblavý wrote an interesting his.torlcal story about bim in the S lov. Pohrady, 1889; Augustus Marschal-Petrovský, a long no ve!, J á nošík, Kapi t á n Ho rských Chlapcov, In 1901. Samo Zdyobavský wrote a play, J ánošík; J ona:s Zaborský, a drama, Jánošíková Večera ; Michal Skačkanský, a tragedy, J á nošík, 1880; Ľud. Kubaný, a play, Ho rní Chlapci ; Júr Mahen, a moving lragedy, Jánošík, 1910; Frances Svoboda-Goldman, a histoi,ical drama: J ohn P orod, a play, J á noliik, 1928, etc. Other articles and historlcal .•tudles about bim were written by ,the followlng: Gaspar Fejérpal11ky In Vlaste nský Kal endár, 1831: Stephen Hýroš In his Zá mok Ly ka va, 1876; Pavel Dobšinský ln Prostonárod né obyčaje, 1880; Rudolph Pokorný's Z potulek po SLOVAKIA 49 Slovensku, 1883; Ján Bobula's Jánošík, 1863; K. Salva-Cebradskťs Jánošík; Julius Botto in bis article "Leopold I and Francis Rákoczi II" ln the Slov. Pohrady, 1904 mentions Jánoš í; Carl Kálaľs Slováci a Slovensko, 1905, and bis Na Krásnem Slovensku, 1903; Oarl Dúbravský's Jánošík, 1911; Gregor Uram·Podtatranský's "Juro Jánošík in the S bor. Muz. Slov. Sp. VIII, 1908; J aroslav Tuma's "Jánoší k," in 1911, Naše Slovensko; Michal Jiránek's " Zbojníci" in Slov. Čitanka, 1911; Samo Czambeľs "Jánošík" in Páričkov's Ružomberský Ka lendár, 1913; Joseph Škultety's Jánošíková Doba" in Slov. Pohrady, 1913; Jgnac Gessay in the A!Lmanac of the Slovák v Amerike; Pavel Sochaň's "Zbojník Juro Jánoší k," 1924. Ján L. Bella put Botto's poem "Svadba Jánošíková" to music for solo, with piano accompan.lment and oches- tr-ation. Vitezslav Novák also composed an orginaJ musical score on the subject called "Jánošík," which is to be found in Mladí, op. 55. Almost without exception the foregoing works pre.sented Jánošík as bhe idol of bis people, as por,trayed in bhe folk songs and ballads which have become a rich heritage of the Slovak nation. In some he is a patriot, in others a young t,beologian who has been Jed away from bis hlgb calling by the cruel circumstamces of bis tlme, ,vthile in all of them, with one exception, he ls depicted as a knightly hig,h• wayman who ls devoted to bis poor, oppressed poople. The one exception is Pavel Sochaň, who endeavors to debunk all the Iegendary glory surrounding the name o! Jánošík by basing bis Zbojník Juro Jánošík, akým bol v Skutočnosti (The Reail Jánošik) entirely on the cas~ records found in the County Court House of Liptov. But this is, perha,ps, the passing fancy of the times, to smash all the traditional ldols of bbe past, and Sochaň is one of tbls class of modern iconoclasts. Despite his efforts and those of others to defame the character of tlhe l~gendary heroes of yesterday, the fact remains that Jánoš!k has been an influence in popular Slovak poetry, llterature, and drama, and his name is imperisbable in tbe history of bis people. Botto's poems, alone, would make bis fame immortaJ. Not only did Slovak and Czech wrlters devote their talent.s to the singing o! •bis praises, but we find that the Polisb autbor, Przerwa-Tetmajer, wrote a whole ser.les of ballads about bim, as well as a beautlful, touobingľ poem about bis deatb. His collection of fables, folk stori~. folk songs, and poems ( Báje z Tatier) was very popular in bis n,a tive Poland. Vlad. Hnatjuk, ťhe famous Ukralnian etbnographer, wrote a treatise on Jánošík in 1889, and included numerous Slovakian songs about this national figure in bis collection of Russian, Slovak, Moravjan, and Polisb folklore. Jánoš!k has been the frequent subject of creatlve are in bis native country. Tbus, his likeness appears on glassware, prlmitive palntings, pottery, etc., in wbicb he and his gay mountain Iads are shown dres.sed in green blouses, red and wbite breecbes, shlny black boots, gally colored hats wlťb feathers in tbem, wďde walsbbands ricbly studded with gold, silver, and precious stones, and armed with muskets and hatcbets (valašky). J ánošik always has the place of honor as tbe leader, while Surovec is sbown brandishlng bis valaška; Hrajnoba shoots off tbe tip of a tall plne as he Ieaps high lnto the air in a playful mood; and Gajdošik plays h!s bagpipes, wbile tbe others dance to bis mountain music. Tbe Slovak art!sts, Mikulaš Aleš, :\fartln Benka, and Ján Alexy, have made palntlngs of J ánoli!k. Tbe liO sculptor Franta Uprka made a number of fJgures of Jánošlk and his companions, the best of them being hls sculpture of the entlre group gathered around a bontlre on the mountalntop near the Tall Fine. l,'. Fulla executed a gorgeous linoleum design of the group. Vla.dyslav Skovzylaš, a Polls'h artist, ma.de several exqulsite wood carvings of these T atra mountaineers of Jong ago. Among them are one ot Jánošlk, alone, another of Jánošík and hls sweetheart, one of his profile, and a fourth of b.is men on the march. Jánošlk's buried treasure has engaged the popular lmaginat!on everywhere in Slovakia for centuries. The probable hlding places most frequently mentloned are: Kozia Skala, located In the šutov valiey in Turiec; Jánoiíkoá Pivnica, a cavern near Balna In tbe valley of Nemecká Lupča; Biela Skala in the Suchá Valley near Liptov; and Zemský Kľúč. Belopotecký's Mss., 1835, now in t'he Liptov Museum in Ružoml>erok, refers to all these places, besldes Pod Jedlou near Trnovec in Liptov, the Baránec Meadow near St. Andrew's in Liptov county, and many others. Pavel Sochaň's "Jánošíkové Poklady" in the Slov. Pohra.dy, 1922-23, and Ján Poroďs "Poklad a iné povesti z okolia Bytče" also conta.in clues to lhe secret hlding places of gold, silver and gems. Numerous al'tlcles have appeared in the off-lclal publlcatlons of the Sborník Muz. Sl. Spol. in recent years under the title of "Jánošíkov Poklad. Emo Bohúň wrote a fantastlc novel on the subject. The following places have been named after the famous outaaw: Jánošíková Kolkáreň (JáJnošlk's Bowling Alley) located In Liptov; Jánošíkové Husle (Jánošik's F\iddle) in Malé Smrekovice; Jánošíková Jaskyňa (Jánošilťs Cave) in the Prosiecká valley; Jánošíkov Stôl (Jánošlk's Table) In Važec; Jánošíkové Sedlo (Jánošlk's Sa.ddle) in the Queen's Meadow; Jánošíková Stupa (Jánošík's Footprlnt) in !;he Gadierská valley, In Turiec; Jánošíková Stolica (Jánošlk's County in the v;ratná valley Ťarchová; Jánošíková Skala (Jánošlk'c Rock) at L1šenlk, near Polhora, Zvolen county; Jánošíkov Chodník (Jánošlk's Path) and Jánoš íková Jaskyňa (Jánošík's Cave) near Tisovce; Jánošíková Podkova (Jánošík's Horseshoe) in the Rimavská valley under Zlamenečin Hill; 81lld Jánošíkov Skok (Jánošlk's Leap) at Dunajec. These and many otber names wlll preserve the name of Jánošík even ir all poems and stories about hlm dlsappear. Jánošlk'.s hat 1s in the Liptov museum in Ružomberok. lt 1s ma.de of clot1h rlohly embroidered with gold Jace and decorated with mussel shells, and is higb and cyllndrical in shape. Hls hatchet ls now in the natlonal museum at Budapest, whlle his plpe 1s in the Slovak Instltute's collection. Th~ famous belt, whlch had been given hlm by a fairy and was sald to have glvsn the Slovak hero preternatural powers, is now in t,he Slovak Nat1ooal Museum In St. Martln's in Turiec. A cane and tJwo ancient plctures or 'h ls band depicted on glass are there a lso. Two plctures or him are In the collectlon of the Moravian Natural Museum In Brno. The Liptov Museum at Ružomberok has a photograph of hls halrchet, a copy of the paintlngs Iu Brno, a copy ot the orlginal court records ot t,he tria! of Jánošík, several palntlngs by Fulla and Skoczylaša, and a large number of llterary works. In Rovno, Joseph Buchčar !s the proud po~essor ot an artlstlc leather belt, flllgreed lengthwise wltn goose qullls, w'hicb was found In his old mlll Jn the course ot some repairs. Although lt is sald that thls belonged to Jáno1 SLOV.A.KU. 61 šik, it was more proba.bly the properly of Jánošík's lieutenant, Surovec, as Rovno was Suroveťs horne town. The Tatranský Museum has six old Polish g!ass likenesses of Jánošlk and hls merry men, similar to the glassware in St. Martin's in Turiec. One, however, shows the outlaiws oarrying a bag of ducats, another has the picture ot his sweetheart. The collection there contains four pistols, ten knives, four powder hom_s, and a bag in whlch the robbers used to carry thelr stolen ducats. Beneath the paintlngs of t?hese colorful personalitles of Slovak folklore there !s a brief explanation of the lnitlatlon of new members to the ro'bber gangs. 'l'hey were required to prove the:ir prowess In ,<,hooting oiif the tip of a tree with a pistol, or cuttlng lt otf wlth a throw of the hatchet, by drinldng a bottle of brandy, and then by performlng the d!fflcult "Robber's Dance." The lnitiat!on took p!ace in the evenlng around thelr bonflre. Eaoh outlaw was armed to the teeth wlth a hatohet in hls b elt, a brace of pistols, and a musket. Of course, there was the powder horn, the wlde oell, the knapsack, a Hussar's hat, and the bni:ghtly colored shirt and trousers to m ake up the rest of the1r accoutrement. Jánošiťs breeohes were said to have been red and w,hite In color. It seems lncredible, in view of Jánošlk'.s fame, that no monument stiands to honor his memory, or bhat no plaque marks bis birthplace. But he llves in the hearts of •h is people, hence needs no image of iron or stone to remind them of his life and his deeds. No other record t:Xists of the merry mountain boys who had been Jánošílťs companions. Mo.st probabtly they disbanded and under assumed names followed peaceful and honorable professions until the end of thelr lives. Uhorčik, however, was cau~ht and executed; and "Red" Ondraš disappeared In the vlclnlty of Tešlnka whlle Jánošik was stlll at Iarge. 'l1he woodlands grew silent and peaceful wlth the passlng of Jánošík from the scene. 'l'he songs of hls merry men were silenced forever, and the fores ts were left undisturbed for the deer, bear, fox, and wlld boar as they went about unchallenged. And hlgh o'erhead, an eagle on swift and silent wings surveyed the glen far below, abandoned and cheerless, for tbe ,happy throng of Jánošik's youths ba.d dlspersed, and their ohlef was dead. - (Slovenské Pohrady, V. XLV. Nos. 1-2, 1929). • • • WHO SAID IT ? "The Czechs bave been at all times all too rea.dy to look on most Slovaks as Magyarones and potentlal traltors, and have employed battallons of censors, police agents, and other customary Instruments of unpopu!ar Governments, wblcb always end by maklng the sltuation worse than hefore. Neltber the pollcy of Prague nor the attltude of the Czech offlclals In Slovakla was al• ways elther wlse or tactful. Tbe Czech Soclallsts. wbo played such a large part in the Government or tlle flrst years, incorporated all those Czech characterlstlcs most obnoxlous to the Slovaks. They were crude, tbey were 111-mannered, tbey were aggresslvely egalitarlan, and they were almost fanatlcally antl-clerlcal, seelng in the churches In Slovakla a two-fold enemy. i<ocial and natlonal." - (C. A. Macartney: H UNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS; 1937, London).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Jánošík - The Slovak Robin Hood Description An account of the resource Ivan Houdek Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952 pp. 42-51 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Houdek, Ivan Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/445e73f92086848920fa0e59b230ac7f.pdf 95ca621af0286949d3bcf9d53f14cadb PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 49 NO AGRE EMENT WJTH 'rHE CZECHS D R. JO SEPH KIR SCHBAU M 'ťhe group of Czech emlgres, which still has on its program the -ene wal of the Versailles organlzation of Centra! Europe and thereby .ilso holdiag its overrule over Slovakia, recently declared to the lnternatlonal public that the Czechs have come to an agreement wlth the -Slovaks on a joint polltlcal program. AU such statements are in conflict wlth the truth. To make it ring true, the statement was made to tbe American press by a Czech politlcian of Slovak orlgin, Dr. Juraj Slá.vlk, and In other lands tbe same announcement was made by persona who date their political careers from 1945 - when they were unexpectedly pusbed to the top by a wave of collaboration wlth the Communists and then in 1948 under suspicious circumstances came to tbe western world. In the ínterest of truth and decency, it ls necessary that this willful and consclous deceptlon of the interuational public be exposed, because in polillcs the princi ple "do not resist evil" does not hold and sllence does not remove responsibility. W HO CA M E T O AN A GREE M E N T ? From in[orme.:1 places reports have become public that an agreemen t ot a fraction of Czech emigres, beaded by Dr. Peter Zenkl. was reached with a still sma11er and politlca11y more insignificant group ot Slovak emigres, headed by Dr. Joseph Letlrich and Dr. John Pa-pá.nek. This was painted up as an "agreement ot the Ctechs a•1:1 Slovaks." Actually such an agreement does not exist. The statement that such au egreement was concluded had w other purpose, according to informed persons, than lo get furt.ber financial aid from The Natlonal Committee for a Free Europe and tbtc prorongatlon of visitors' vlza from American authorlties. Tbis was polnted out very clearly by a former deputy of the Slovak Democratic Party, Dr. Michael Zibrin, who is very well acquainted with the persons and the condltions in the camp of the so-called "CZECHO· SLOVAK" emlgratlon because of his long collaboratlon wlth thestpeople In the Prague parliament and also in exile. But even if tbese tractions of Czech and Slovak emigres did conclude an agreement ancl succeecled in getting Dr. Stephen Osu,iky to head the Centra) Committee, to designate this as an "agreement ol the Czechs and Slovaks" with a claim to speak ln the name of the Czech and Slovak nations, is at best an attempt to deceive the international public. After an, the right to conclude polltical agreements, whlch would be. binding on Czechs and Slovaks a.l!ke, is not had by Dr. Zenkľs g:roup and is not Pven had by the several S lovak emigres. who are wandering about the western world defending the idea of ::i Czeehoslovak state, because they do not represent the free will or the Slovak nation, but only themselves, or as Colonel Miksche so aptly put it la.st November in the World Review: "The few Slovak „:nigrants wanderlng about tbe West and advocatlng the Idea of a ;r;echoslovak State do not represent the free wlll of the Slovak people; · hey do not represent anythlng but thernselves," �óO SLOVAKIA. Tbere are several thousands of each group of emlgres - Slovak and Ozecb - whicb are represented by varlous politlcal partles and polltical tendencies of the Czech and Slovak natlons. Without error and deceptlon lt 1s imposslble to prove by any mathema.tlcal rules that the Zenkl and the Lettrlch groups really represent the ma,Jority of polltlcal representa.tlves in the Czech and the ,Slovak emlgratlon, and so much the less such a politlca.l representa.tion whlch would reflect at least to a marked degree the polltica.l efforts and interests of the Slovaks. At the same tlme the adherents of these groups are without exceptlon morally and politlcally disquallfled not only In the eyes of the Slova.ks, but even in the eyes of the Czechs. They are "the men who brought Communism to Czechoalovakia, who are responaible for the plight of the Czec h and S lovak natlons" and, there. fore, "people are very annoyed whe n they hear of emigré pollciea and the Czech Rada ( Counci l) in America" (Intelllgence Digest, May, 1952). TH E PROBLEM OF THE EXISTENCE OF CZECHO-SLOVAKIA At the quest1on of any kind of agreement of Czech and Slovak emigrant groups regarding the contlnued exlstence of Czecho,Siova.kia after the liberation of Centra! Europe we must, however, Jook !rom another angle. Does the exlstence of the State, which was "an art!• !lcial product of a peace conference - a child of propaganda - and 50 per cent of whose inhabitants was In oppositlon against its existence" (World Review), have any polltlcal motivatlon? Over 80 per cent of the Slovak emigratlon, and certainly no less of the inhabitants of Slovakia, wlll answer in the negatlve under any and all condltlons. "The Slovak people are today at least to the extent of 80 per cent fanatlcally antt-<:zech," states Colonel Miksche. And even on the Czech side today, lt 1s not only the group around General Lev P rchala, but even Prof. Bohdan Chudoba, C-01. Miksche and - lf we can belleve the NEW YORKSKÝ DENNÍK, which ls the most fana.tlcal supporter of the renewal of Czecho-Slovakla - even many members of the Councll of F\ree Czechoslovakla place a question mark after the problem ot the future of the Czecho-.Slovak Republic. Not so long ago nelther Dr. Stephen Osuský, nor Dr. Stránsky did not deny In their wrltten ma.ni· festatlons that Centra! Europe needs a dlfferent organlzation than that given it by the Versailles statute. Wlth the Versallles statute, however, loglcally must fall also the Czecho-Slovak State, whlch was the creation and piliar of the Versallles organlzatlon In the Danuhe Basin. THE SLOVAK CONCEPTION OF DANUBE COOPERATION No matter hpw much Czecb or other groups mlght deslre it, there can be no talk a.bout any klnd of an agreement between the Czechs and the Slova.ks In regard to the future of both natlons In the Czecho-Slovak State. For the overwhelml_ng majority ot the Slovak natlon, the Czechoslovak State was a definlte evolutionary station, after whlch the present Slovak generatlon has deflnltely pla.ced a perlod. It ls flnlshed buslness. And that not only because Czech polltlcs was unjust and shortslgbted towa.rd the Slova.ks In ma.ny respects, but above all else because the Slovaks know that the Czecbs ťannot guarantee thelr future. The contemporary Slovak generatlon �SLOVAKIA 61 belleves that economic prosperity and national security can better be sa;fei uarded only in t he broader framework of a Centro-E uropean confederatlon composed of eth nic member States and by Slovak lndepende nce. This conceptlon has already been presented in detail on dlfferent occasions -b y Slovak polltlcal represenetatlves; 1t was prompted not on ly by Slovak lnterests, but also by the hlstorical development or t he Danub e Basin, lts natural geopolltical Jaws an d European lnterests. lf the Czech emigratlon accepts t his basis, certalnly t here shall be no opposition trom the Slovaks to conclude a federal agreement even wlth the Czech natlon, e ven though tbe Slovaks bave thus far a sad experience with three political agreements, concluded with Czech politlclans in -the past 35 years. "Pacta sunt servanda" !s somethlng unkn5>wn In Czech polltics as far as the Slovaks are concerned. Any other solution of t he Slovak question than that noted here would have to be forc ed on the Slovak nation. How Jong would 1t last, however, in the nelghborhood of Germany and Russla, an d in face of th'e oppositlon of not only th e Slovaks, but also tbe rest of the nat ions of t he Danube Basin of which not a single one deslres a renewal of the Versal))es order? In accord with the truth, therefore, it can be said in regard to the n ew attempt of the Czec h amigration to decelve t he lnternatlona l public with pronouncements about an agreemen t between the Czechs and the Slovaks, that "to t a lk about the reatoration of Czec hoelovakia ·n·owadays ia p lai n nonsense" {World Review) . • • • DR. BENES SOLD OUT TO TIIE KREMLJN R. UMIASTOWSKI (The following is an extract from the book " POLANiD, RUSSIA \ ND OREAT BRITAIN 1941- 1945" - a study of evidence - by R Umiastowski, which was published in November 1946 by Hollls and Carter, London. The author shows that Benes coJlaborated wlth tbe Stalinmen even against P oland.) • * • * T he results of the Moscow and Teheran Conferences and the s ubs'equent resolutions concerning the territorial changes about to be e ffected, were not pub llshed and only filtered slowly through the Press. It was a few months before it became generaJly known for 1nstance, that after the war Europe - not only Germany, but a\1 Europe (except, perhaps, the few neutrals on ber outskirts) - was to come under the occupation of the three Great Powers The Russians were to stay in Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia and In Germany as far as the rlver Oder, or perhaps the Elbe; the Americans would occupy navaria, Wurtemburg and Saxony and the British the remalnder of Germany. It could not be clearer -· Poland after the war was to be in the hands of the Kremlin. The secret agreements at Moscow a1td Teheran were explained by the subsequent policy of the Powers, or rather by tbe policy of t he .SO;v,iets, As prevlously mentioned, the details o! the dec•is ions were still � SLOVAKIA 49 NO AGRE EMENT WJTH 'rHE CZECHS D R. JO SEPH KIR SCHBAU M 'ťhe group of Czech emlgres, which still has on its program the -ene wal of the Versailles organlzation of Centra! Europe and thereby .ilso holdiag its overrule over Slovakia, recently declared to the lnternatlonal public that the Czechs have come to an agreement wlth the -Slovaks on a joint polltlcal program. AU such statements are in conflict wlth the truth. To make it ring true, the statement was made to tbe American press by a Czech politlcian of Slovak orlgin, Dr. Juraj Slá.vlk, and In other lands tbe same announcement was made by persona who date their political careers from 1945 - when they were unexpectedly pusbed to the top by a wave of collaboration wlth the Communists and then in 1948 under suspicious circumstances came to tbe western world. In the ínterest of truth and decency, it ls necessary that this willful and consclous deceptlon of the interuational public be exposed, because in polillcs the princi ple "do not resist evil" does not hold and sllence does not remove responsibility. W HO CA M E T O AN A GREE M E N T ? From in[orme.:1 places reports have become public that an agreemen t ot a fraction of Czech emigres, beaded by Dr. Peter Zenkl. was reached with a still sma11er and politlca11y more insignificant group ot Slovak emigres, headed by Dr. Joseph Letlrich and Dr. John Pa-pá.nek. This was painted up as an "agreement ot the Ctechs a•1:1 Slovaks." Actually such an agreement does not exist. The statement that such au egreement was concluded had w other purpose, according to informed persons, than lo get furt.ber financial aid from The Natlonal Committee for a Free Europe and tbtc prorongatlon of visitors' vlza from American authorlties. Tbis was polnted out very clearly by a former deputy of the Slovak Democratic Party, Dr. Michael Zibrin, who is very well acquainted with the persons and the condltions in the camp of the so-called "CZECHO· SLOVAK" emlgratlon because of his long collaboratlon wlth thestpeople In the Prague parliament and also in exile. But even if tbese tractions of Czech and Slovak emigres did conclude an agreement ancl succeecled in getting Dr. Stephen Osu,iky to head the Centra) Committee, to designate this as an "agreement ol the Czechs and Slovaks" with a claim to speak ln the name of the Czech and Slovak nations, is at best an attempt to deceive the international public. After an, the right to conclude polltical agreements, whlch would be. binding on Czechs and Slovaks a.l!ke, is not had by Dr. Zenkľs g:roup and is not Pven had by the several S lovak emigres. who are wandering about the western world defending the idea of ::i Czeehoslovak state, because they do not represent the free will or the Slovak nation, but only themselves, or as Colonel Miksche so aptly put it la.st November in the World Review: "The few Slovak „:nigrants wanderlng about tbe West and advocatlng the Idea of a ;r;echoslovak State do not represent the free wlll of the Slovak people; · hey do not represent anythlng but thernselves," �óO SLOVAKIA. Tbere are several thousands of each group of emlgres - Slovak and Ozecb - whicb are represented by varlous politlcal partles and polltical tendencies of the Czech and Slovak natlons. Without error and deceptlon lt 1s imposslble to prove by any mathema.tlcal rules that the Zenkl and the Lettrlch groups really represent the ma,Jority of polltlcal representa.tlves in the Czech and the ,Slovak emlgratlon, and so much the less such a politlca.l representa.tion whlch would reflect at least to a marked degree the polltica.l efforts and interests of the Slovaks. At the same tlme the adherents of these groups are without exceptlon morally and politlcally disquallfled not only In the eyes of the Slova.ks, but even in the eyes of the Czechs. They are "the men who brought Communism to Czechoalovakia, who are responaible for the plight of the Czec h and S lovak natlons" and, there. fore, "people are very annoyed whe n they hear of emigré pollciea and the Czech Rada ( Counci l) in America" (Intelllgence Digest, May, 1952). TH E PROBLEM OF THE EXISTENCE OF CZECHO-SLOVAKIA At the quest1on of any kind of agreement of Czech and Slovak emigrant groups regarding the contlnued exlstence of Czecho,Siova.kia after the liberation of Centra! Europe we must, however, Jook !rom another angle. Does the exlstence of the State, which was "an art!• !lcial product of a peace conference - a child of propaganda - and 50 per cent of whose inhabitants was In oppositlon against its existence" (World Review), have any polltlcal motivatlon? Over 80 per cent of the Slovak emigratlon, and certainly no less of the inhabitants of Slovakia, wlll answer in the negatlve under any and all condltlons. "The Slovak people are today at least to the extent of 80 per cent fanatlcally antt-<:zech," states Colonel Miksche. And even on the Czech side today, lt 1s not only the group around General Lev P rchala, but even Prof. Bohdan Chudoba, C-01. Miksche and - lf we can belleve the NEW YORKSKÝ DENNÍK, which ls the most fana.tlcal supporter of the renewal of Czecho-Slovakla - even many members of the Councll of F\ree Czechoslovakla place a question mark after the problem ot the future of the Czecho-.Slovak Republic. Not so long ago nelther Dr. Stephen Osuský, nor Dr. Stránsky did not deny In their wrltten ma.ni· festatlons that Centra! Europe needs a dlfferent organlzation than that given it by the Versailles statute. Wlth the Versallles statute, however, loglcally must fall also the Czecho-Slovak State, whlch was the creation and piliar of the Versallles organlzatlon In the Danuhe Basin. THE SLOVAK CONCEPTION OF DANUBE COOPERATION No matter hpw much Czecb or other groups mlght deslre it, there can be no talk a.bout any klnd of an agreement between the Czechs and the Slova.ks In regard to the future of both natlons In the Czecho-Slovak State. For the overwhelml_ng majority ot the Slovak natlon, the Czechoslovak State was a definlte evolutionary station, after whlch the present Slovak generatlon has deflnltely pla.ced a perlod. It ls flnlshed buslness. And that not only because Czech polltlcs was unjust and shortslgbted towa.rd the Slova.ks In ma.ny respects, but above all else because the Slovaks know that the Czecbs ťannot guarantee thelr future. The contemporary Slovak generatlon �SLOVAKIA 61 belleves that economic prosperity and national security can better be sa;fei uarded only in t he broader framework of a Centro-E uropean confederatlon composed of eth nic member States and by Slovak lndepende nce. This conceptlon has already been presented in detail on dlfferent occasions -b y Slovak polltlcal represenetatlves; 1t was prompted not on ly by Slovak lnterests, but also by the hlstorical development or t he Danub e Basin, lts natural geopolltical Jaws an d European lnterests. lf the Czech emigratlon accepts t his basis, certalnly t here shall be no opposition trom the Slovaks to conclude a federal agreement even wlth the Czech natlon, e ven though tbe Slovaks bave thus far a sad experience with three political agreements, concluded with Czech politlclans in -the past 35 years. "Pacta sunt servanda" !s somethlng unkn5>wn In Czech polltics as far as the Slovaks are concerned. Any other solution of t he Slovak question than that noted here would have to be forc ed on the Slovak nation. How Jong would 1t last, however, in the nelghborhood of Germany and Russla, an d in face of th'e oppositlon of not only th e Slovaks, but also tbe rest of the nat ions of t he Danube Basin of which not a single one deslres a renewal of the Versal))es order? In accord with the truth, therefore, it can be said in regard to the n ew attempt of the Czec h amigration to decelve t he lnternatlona l public with pronouncements about an agreemen t between the Czechs and the Slovaks, that "to t a lk about the reatoration of Czec hoelovakia ·n·owadays ia p lai n nonsense" {World Review) . • • • DR. BENES SOLD OUT TO TIIE KREMLJN R. UMIASTOWSKI (The following is an extract from the book " POLANiD, RUSSIA \ ND OREAT BRITAIN 1941- 1945" - a study of evidence - by R Umiastowski, which was published in November 1946 by Hollls and Carter, London. The author shows that Benes coJlaborated wlth tbe Stalinmen even against P oland.) • * • * T he results of the Moscow and Teheran Conferences and the s ubs'equent resolutions concerning the territorial changes about to be e ffected, were not pub llshed and only filtered slowly through the Press. It was a few months before it became generaJly known for 1nstance, that after the war Europe - not only Germany, but a\1 Europe (except, perhaps, the few neutrals on ber outskirts) - was to come under the occupation of the three Great Powers The Russians were to stay in Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia and In Germany as far as the rlver Oder, or perhaps the Elbe; the Americans would occupy navaria, Wurtemburg and Saxony and the British the remalnder of Germany. It could not be clearer -· Poland after the war was to be in the hands of the Kremlin. The secret agreements at Moscow a1td Teheran were explained by the subsequent policy of the Powers, or rather by tbe policy of t he .SO;v,iets, As prevlously mentioned, the details o! the dec•is ions were still � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 49 NO AGRE EMENT WJTH 'rHE CZECHS D R. JO SEPH KIR SCHBAU M 'ťhe group of Czech emlgres, which still has on its program the -ene wal of the Versailles organlzation of Centra! Europe and thereby .ilso holdiag its overrule over Slovakia, recently declared to the lnternatlonal public that the Czechs have come to an agreement wlth the -Slovaks on a joint polltlcal program. AU such statements are in conflict wlth the truth. To make it ring true, the statement was made to tbe American press by a Czech politlcian of Slovak orlgin, Dr. Juraj Slá.vlk, and In other lands tbe same announcement was made by persona who date their political careers from 1945 - when they were unexpectedly pusbed to the top by a wave of collaboration wlth the Communists and then in 1948 under suspicious circumstances came to tbe western world. In the ínterest of truth and decency, it ls necessary that this willful and consclous deceptlon of the interuational public be exposed, because in polillcs the princi ple "do not resist evil" does not hold and sllence does not remove responsibility. W HO CA M E T O AN A GREE M E N T ? From in[orme.:1 places reports have become public that an agreemen t ot a fraction of Czech emigres, beaded by Dr. Peter Zenkl. was reached with a still sma11er and politlca11y more insignificant group ot Slovak emigres, headed by Dr. Joseph Letlrich and Dr. John Pa-pá.nek. This was painted up as an "agreement ot the Ctechs a•1:1 Slovaks." Actually such an agreement does not exist. The statement that such au egreement was concluded had w other purpose, according to informed persons, than lo get furt.ber financial aid from The Natlonal Committee for a Free Europe and tbtc prorongatlon of visitors' vlza from American authorlties. Tbis was polnted out very clearly by a former deputy of the Slovak Democratic Party, Dr. Michael Zibrin, who is very well acquainted with the persons and the condltions in the camp of the so-called "CZECHO· SLOVAK" emlgratlon because of his long collaboratlon wlth thestpeople In the Prague parliament and also in exile. But even if tbese tractions of Czech and Slovak emigres did conclude an agreement ancl succeecled in getting Dr. Stephen Osu,iky to head the Centra) Committee, to designate this as an "agreement ol the Czechs and Slovaks" with a claim to speak ln the name of the Czech and Slovak nations, is at best an attempt to deceive the international public. After an, the right to conclude polltical agreements, whlch would be. binding on Czechs and Slovaks a.l!ke, is not had by Dr. Zenkľs g:roup and is not Pven had by the several S lovak emigres. who are wandering about the western world defending the idea of ::i Czeehoslovak state, because they do not represent the free will or the Slovak nation, but only themselves, or as Colonel Miksche so aptly put it la.st November in the World Review: "The few Slovak „:nigrants wanderlng about tbe West and advocatlng the Idea of a ;r;echoslovak State do not represent the free wlll of the Slovak people; · hey do not represent anythlng but thernselves," óO SLOVAKIA. Tbere are several thousands of each group of emlgres - Slovak and Ozecb - whicb are represented by varlous politlcal partles and polltical tendencies of the Czech and Slovak natlons. Without error and deceptlon lt 1s imposslble to prove by any mathema.tlcal rules that the Zenkl and the Lettrlch groups really represent the ma,Jority of polltlcal representa.tlves in the Czech and the ,Slovak emlgratlon, and so much the less such a politlca.l representa.tion whlch would reflect at least to a marked degree the polltica.l efforts and interests of the Slovaks. At the same tlme the adherents of these groups are without exceptlon morally and politlcally disquallfled not only In the eyes of the Slova.ks, but even in the eyes of the Czechs. They are "the men who brought Communism to Czechoalovakia, who are responaible for the plight of the Czec h and S lovak natlons" and, there. fore, "people are very annoyed whe n they hear of emigré pollciea and the Czech Rada ( Counci l) in America" (Intelllgence Digest, May, 1952). TH E PROBLEM OF THE EXISTENCE OF CZECHO-SLOVAKIA At the quest1on of any kind of agreement of Czech and Slovak emigrant groups regarding the contlnued exlstence of Czecho,Siova.kia after the liberation of Centra! Europe we must, however, Jook !rom another angle. Does the exlstence of the State, which was "an art!• !lcial product of a peace conference - a child of propaganda - and 50 per cent of whose inhabitants was In oppositlon against its existence" (World Review), have any polltlcal motivatlon? Over 80 per cent of the Slovak emigratlon, and certainly no less of the inhabitants of Slovakia, wlll answer in the negatlve under any and all condltlons. "The Slovak people are today at least to the extent of 80 per cent fanatlcally antt-<:zech," states Colonel Miksche. And even on the Czech side today, lt 1s not only the group around General Lev P rchala, but even Prof. Bohdan Chudoba, C-01. Miksche and - lf we can belleve the NEW YORKSKÝ DENNÍK, which ls the most fana.tlcal supporter of the renewal of Czecho-Slovakla - even many members of the Councll of F\ree Czechoslovakla place a question mark after the problem ot the future of the Czecho-.Slovak Republic. Not so long ago nelther Dr. Stephen Osuský, nor Dr. Stránsky did not deny In their wrltten ma.ni· festatlons that Centra! Europe needs a dlfferent organlzation than that given it by the Versailles statute. Wlth the Versallles statute, however, loglcally must fall also the Czecho-Slovak State, whlch was the creation and piliar of the Versallles organlzatlon In the Danuhe Basin. THE SLOVAK CONCEPTION OF DANUBE COOPERATION No matter hpw much Czecb or other groups mlght deslre it, there can be no talk a.bout any klnd of an agreement between the Czechs and the Slova.ks In regard to the future of both natlons In the Czecho-Slovak State. For the overwhelml_ng majority ot the Slovak natlon, the Czechoslovak State was a definlte evolutionary station, after whlch the present Slovak generatlon has deflnltely pla.ced a perlod. It ls flnlshed buslness. And that not only because Czech polltlcs was unjust and shortslgbted towa.rd the Slova.ks In ma.ny respects, but above all else because the Slovaks know that the Czecbs ťannot guarantee thelr future. The contemporary Slovak generatlon SLOVAKIA 61 belleves that economic prosperity and national security can better be sa;fei uarded only in t he broader framework of a Centro-E uropean confederatlon composed of eth nic member States and by Slovak lndepende nce. This conceptlon has already been presented in detail on dlfferent occasions -b y Slovak polltlcal represenetatlves; 1t was prompted not on ly by Slovak lnterests, but also by the hlstorical development or t he Danub e Basin, lts natural geopolltical Jaws an d European lnterests. lf the Czech emigratlon accepts t his basis, certalnly t here shall be no opposition trom the Slovaks to conclude a federal agreement even wlth the Czech natlon, e ven though tbe Slovaks bave thus far a sad experience with three political agreements, concluded with Czech politlclans in -the past 35 years. "Pacta sunt servanda" !s somethlng unkn5>wn In Czech polltics as far as the Slovaks are concerned. Any other solution of t he Slovak question than that noted here would have to be forc ed on the Slovak nation. How Jong would 1t last, however, in the nelghborhood of Germany and Russla, an d in face of th'e oppositlon of not only th e Slovaks, but also tbe rest of the nat ions of t he Danube Basin of which not a single one deslres a renewal of the Versal))es order? In accord with the truth, therefore, it can be said in regard to the n ew attempt of the Czec h amigration to decelve t he lnternatlona l public with pronouncements about an agreemen t between the Czechs and the Slovaks, that "to t a lk about the reatoration of Czec hoelovakia ·n·owadays ia p lai n nonsense" {World Review) . • • • DR. BENES SOLD OUT TO TIIE KREMLJN R. UMIASTOWSKI (The following is an extract from the book " POLANiD, RUSSIA \ ND OREAT BRITAIN 1941- 1945" - a study of evidence - by R Umiastowski, which was published in November 1946 by Hollls and Carter, London. The author shows that Benes coJlaborated wlth tbe Stalinmen even against P oland.) • * • * T he results of the Moscow and Teheran Conferences and the s ubs'equent resolutions concerning the territorial changes about to be e ffected, were not pub llshed and only filtered slowly through the Press. It was a few months before it became generaJly known for 1nstance, that after the war Europe - not only Germany, but a\1 Europe (except, perhaps, the few neutrals on ber outskirts) - was to come under the occupation of the three Great Powers The Russians were to stay in Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia and In Germany as far as the rlver Oder, or perhaps the Elbe; the Americans would occupy navaria, Wurtemburg and Saxony and the British the remalnder of Germany. It could not be clearer -· Poland after the war was to be in the hands of the Kremlin. The secret agreements at Moscow a1td Teheran were explained by the subsequent policy of the Powers, or rather by tbe policy of t he .SO;v,iets, As prevlously mentioned, the details o! the dec•is ions were still  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource No Agreement with the Czechs Description An account of the resource Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952 pp. 49-51 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/9239fef5d8ab6eb3b2433e8a2957d812.pdf 084956448e2ce672b0e4c5192a28a424 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA SLOVAKIA - 13 WINTER WONDERLAND If you have never been in Slovakia in the winter, you stm have somefälng to Jive for. Under present conditlon·s , when freedom and independence are suppressed by the Communist system, you will not be able to see the "Winter Wonderland" that Slovakia really !s, but you mlg-ht consider visiting the !and of the Slovaks at some future time when the plague of Communism has been dispeHed. Winter, in all its sparkling and majestlc sp1endor, presents to every !over of nature ťhe best opportunity of seeing and fully enjoying the natural beautles of S.Jovakia. The coUliltry, because of its mountainous regions, ls especially suiitable for wlnter sports, partlcularly skíing. But you need not be sportsmindeid to enjoy Slovakla In the winter. The sheer beauty of nature in Slovakia in the wlnter wm enohant you, unburden and refresh your soul, and give added zest for livlng. You may not want to participa:te in winter sports In Slovakia, bwt the ·happy sight of others enjoyi-ng themselves wiH soothe your tired nerves and give you a sa,tlsfactíon never before known to you. 'ľhe Slovak mountains, as I once knew them, are unsurpassed for t heir winter charm. Accompany me, lf you wlll, on an imaglnary trip to them. Let us sliart out into the Small Carpathians (Malé Karpaty), W'hich extend from ,the confluence of the Danube and Morava rJvers to the Myjava. 'l'hey divide the Váh plai'll from the Moravian plain a.nd are covered wlth Jeafy and parUy evergreen trees and many fores,t meadows. Their moderate slopes offer good skiing. At l!he southwestern end, above the vlllage of Devin, there 1s the Dev!nska Kobyla, (The Mare of Devin), the peak or whlch 1719 feet above sea level. Near the city of Modra, there lies the summer resort of Harmónia, open a-lso In wlnter, with many comfo1,table hotels with hot and cold runnlng water and good restaurants. In t he mountalns, about two and one-half mi,Jes from Harmónia, on the so-called Sands (Piesky) stand two huts: it:he Zochova hut (1443 fet up), and only three mlnutes from it is the other one. Near the highest point or the mountain highway Jeading from Pezinok to Pernek is Országh's hut (1750 feet up) on Ba:ba (Grandmother) near Pezinok. The best sk·ling in the Little Carpathians is near Smolenice, where there are plenity of grassy hills and forest roeadows. The White Carpathians ( Biele Karpaty) stretch trom Myjava along t he Slovak-Moravian border to the mountain of Makyta, where they meet the J avorn!ky. They are covered wlth dense foresrts; only thelr wide southern part is Jess wooded and good for skiing. The most impoi,ta.nt centre is the Holuby hut (3226 feet) on the Javorina. It is best approached on foot from the railway station of Stará Turá, or from the bus stop Kvetná, on the line Nové Mesto nad Váhom l'.aerský Brod. Otherwise you may get to it from the Moravian side by car from Uherský Brod. Opposite the Whlte Carpathians, on the other side of the Váh valley, are the Inovec Mounta!ns, through which passes the railway from Trenč!n to Topoľčany. They, too, are densely wooded and have good skiing grounds. Out of the t.hree tourist huts whlch were here, only the Trenč!n Munic!pal Hut (1500 feet) under Sharp Peak (Ostrý �14 SLOVAKIA Vrch ) at Soblanov remains. The shortest way up 1s from the station Soblanov following -the blue tourist mark, or trom Trenčin followlng the red. Contlnuing, t!he Javornlky, whlch have huts both on the Slovak and Moravian slde, are the Western Beskyds, the southern parts of which are called th-e Jeseníky. Here there are many wooded and bare hills which are wonderful grounds for both the weakest and best sklers. Thelr Jocation on the borders of Slovakla and Moravla brings them many visitors from both sides. The numerous vllla,ges of the Upper Kysuca reglon offer many possibilltles for accommodationa both in the hotels as well as In private homes (Makov, Tunovka, Raková, Čadca). The best known centers are: Bumbálka Hut, MakovPotok Hut and the summer resoi,t Tešinský, which are open In winter. On the roa.d from Veľká •Bytča to Makov 1s Satinka Hut. All these huts are near Makov and the bo.rder and have ldeaJ grounds for skllng. Beyond the Jablunkov Pass, near Cadca, the Beskyds continue on as the Western Beskyds and form the border between Slovakía and Poland. Wooded sectlons mlngled wlth bare ones form Idea) skllng terra.in, w,h ere down-bili ru.os six mlles long are not at aH rare. Near the sta11lon at Serafinov lh-ere is a fine hotel, the surroundings of wh1ch are suitable for skilng. From the station In Cadca or Oščad­ nica, tbere is a good approach to the hut on Rača ( 4020 feet). The Bysitr.lcká Vall-ey up to Erdťidka and the whole of tbe Oravská Magura, near Námestovo, is a flrst class skiing ground with only one draiwback. it ls bard to appr<>ach. Otherwise the Orava region 1s one of the most popular ski terralns and has good posslbHitles of approach from tbe ra.llway Žilina-Košice, and also trom tbe ra.!lway Kraľovany./Suchá Hora. From the gorge of the Strečno rise the migbty bills of tbe mountaln range called Small Fatra ( Malá Fatra), whlch 1s covered mostly w.lth coniferous trees. Mountain meadows and grassy valleys, as well as tbe bare peaks of Stoh and Chleb, are the most popular places of northwestern Slovakia. The ldeal surroundlngs of the hut on Chleb (4660 feet) may be approached trom the station of Strečno, Šútovo, Kraľova.ny and Párnica. The hut there has been re1>alred and can accomodate 60 persona. It 1s the s,tarting point for tours on the Fatranský K11lváň, Chleb, Rozsut-ec and to the valley where Ištvä.nová lles. Martinské hole (The Plalns of St. Martin) are the southern range of tbe Lirttle Fatra, extending l'.rom the gorge of Strečno southwards to the vaney of Zliechov, near Ôlčmany. Thelr slopes are mostly wooded, but in the hills are plenty of meadows connected with one another all the way down to the valleys. On the surrounding mountain meadows tbere 1s wonderful skiing wlth Jong downhlll runs and marvelous views of the far surroundings - the Hlgh Taitras, the Whit-e and Little Ca'fl)athlans, Beskyds, Radhošť, the Ore mountans and the Inovec and Nitra MounWns. In the Martinské mountalns there is a hut 4100 feet above sea level. The best way to approach it 1s from Turčiansky Svätý Mafltln along several marked roads. Opposite t:he Martinské hole Ile the Great Fatra Mountains, wblch have quit-e a di!ferent character. They -stretch from the valley of the T>iver Váh to the rlver Hron: and thelr northern part ls cut by the valley ot Lubochňa. The wlde ridges of Ostredok, Rakytov and Krlžná �SLOVAKIA 15 are suitable for skiing, In the norvhern part of the Gre,at Fatra, there are ideal grounds for wlnter sports on th& Smrekovica. The best aPproach to the 4330 foot-high Smrekovica 1s from the station Podsuchá on the rallroad Ružomberok-Korytnica. The unusually hlgh and long lasting snow in the deep coniferous woods attract.s thou:sands of visltors to Smrekovica. Many stay ln Ružomberok where there ar& good accommodatlons and a tower for ski-jump like on the Smrekovica. The southern pa11t of the Grea,t Fatra is called Mountalns of Kremnica ( Kremnické hory), where there are plenty of houses for tourists. The cen,t~ of thls region is Kremnica which has several hot~Is. a tourist n.ight shelter near the station and many private accommod.aitlons. It is ,the s·tarting point for the Skalka hut. Contlnuing along the Great Fatra and the Mountains of Kremnica, on the other side of the river Hron, ·between the ratlway ZvolenLevice and Zvolen-Šahy, are the Mountains of Štiavnica ( Štiavnické hory), w1th Sitno a,s their •highest pea.lc. This region wlth its evergreen trees and large meadows, Jong ridges and slopes, is ideal for winter sports. The center of this region is Banská Štiavnica. The most visited plaoe, however, is the hut of Andrej Kmeť on Sitno (3330 feet up). from where one has a beautiful vlew as far as the Danube Plaln and the High Tatras. Below the Sitno, next to Lake Počuvadlo, ,are the Kállay sanatorium and the boarding house Anna, which offer good accommodations for guests. The mountains of Štiavnica have great suppl1es of ore and are called the Slovak Ore Mountains (Slovenské rudohorie). They stretch from the river Hron and the mountains of Štiavnica to Rožňava. The northern part is more or less connected and has several w:lde hllls, trom which there run long ridges in the form of rays, between which are deep valleys. The southwestern part is very prlmitive and has a tourist hut on the Javor (2722 fem), to whlch the best approa,ch !s from the statlons Podkriváň, or Píla pod Javorom, on the ra.ilway !lne Zvolen-Lučenec. The hut on Trsti (3722 feet) may be approached from Pila, near Tisovec, or directly from Tisovec. To the east from Oravská Magura one finds the Stag Mountains ( Roháče) , which have a high mountain character and resemble the Tatras. Sklers vis,it mostly the Smutná and Látaná valleys, as well as the Iong slopes of Rakoň, Volovec, Úplaz, or go even a.s far as Osobitá. Snow usually remains untll sprlng and lt is nothlng unusual to find s klers here even at Easter. Sklers sometlmes go from Rohäče to the valleys ot Račková or Žiar, wblch belong to the group of mountains called the Tatras of Liptov ( Liptovské Tatry), because of their idea! skilng terraln. Wlth their Iong slopes and mighty peaks they complete the Hlgh Tatras to which they really belong. The lo.nges,t and wldest mountaln range in Slovakla are <the Low Tatras (Nízke Tatry), which extend from the highway Banská Bystrica-Ružomberok to the •highway Telgart-Poprad. North of them flows the river Váh, south the rlver Hron. Only ,the lower part.s are covered wlth forests, the rest 1s bare so that a skler may undertake a one-day tour from Prašivá in the west to Ďumbier and Kráľova hoľa In the east wlthout much fatigue. The helght and breadth of the range affords long descents on both sides trom he!ghts of 200-4000 feet up. Not far from Banská Bystrica �16 SLOVAKlA 1s the winter sports center, the Sport hotel Donovaly (3330 feet) w!th Idea! surroundings, woods and meadows. The hotel !s filrs.t cla.ss and is sure to app&a.l to every guest. From this place there leads a romantlc trail to Korytnica., above whlch rlse the mighty rldges of Prašivá and Latiborská Hoľa. At a helght of 6460 feet is sltuated štefán.ik's hut beneaith the Ďumbier. The highest peaks are Chopok, to wh!ch a ski-lil\t wa.s built (6680 feet) from the valley of Demänová nea.r Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš, and Ďumbier (6820 feet) where snow remains tlll Jate sprjng. From the station Kráľova Lehota there 1s a highway wh!oh crosses the Low Tatra range on its way to Podbrezová. lit passes through the villages of Malužiná and Vyšná Boca and reaches the mountain Sport hotel at the lovely hut on čertovioa (4210 feet), which is surrounded by evergreen trees and mountain meadows. Among the numerous Slovak mountains the High Tatras (Vysoké Tatry) are the most vlsited by lovers of winrter sports. lt !s mostily because of their high mountain altitude, long las-ting snow, good accommodations, technical equipment and varled terrain. The startlng polnts to the Hlgh Tatras are the railway staUons Štrba and PopradTatry on the Košice-Bohumln raiJway line. From Štrba there runs a good road to the high cllmatlc spa Štrbské Pleso (Tarn of Štrba, 4500 feet) where there are accomodatlons for 400-500 persons (Hotels Hviezdoslav, Solisko, Kmvä.ň, Móry, boarding bouses Jánošik, Marina, Poleka, Iskra and chalets of the Slovak Touris.ts', and Skiers' Olub). Beyond t>he tarn there are the FUTkotská, Mlynická and Mengušovská valleys, to wbdch -the sklers come from the ridge of Solisko and Patria. Tbe slope of Solisko -is preferred, because there is a skl-lif,t there for sklers to a heigbt of 6260 feet. In the Mengušov va.Jley under steep Osterva there 1s a hut at Popradské Pleso ('l'arn of Poprad) with accommodatlons for 150 guests. In late sprjng and even on summer days it 1s posslble to ski under the Saddle Váhy, near the hut under the Rysy (7600 feet), whlch ls open In summer only. Another center is Stary Smokovec, where about 1000 persons can be accommodated in hotels and boaroing houses ({}rand Hotel, Hoepfner, Palace, etc.). Skllng grounds are on the slopes of Slavkov's Peak and In the lovely Studenovodská (Cold Water) valley, or in the Great or Little Cold Valleys. There ls a funicular rallway runnlng to the Športhotel Hrebienok from which goes a toboggan slide and ski run. At the end of the Great Cold Valley there are wonderful skllng grounds near the :Obojn!cka hut (6400 feet) . In the Llttle Cold Valley there are two •huts: at the beglnning of the valley ls the hut Zamkovský (5200 feet), and at the upper end Lles the Téry hut (6730 feet) on the F'ive Spiš Lakes. In tbe surroundings there are lovely sk!lng grounds for good sklers. A popular skllng center is Tatranská. Lomnica., wbich 1s connected wlth Poprad by both electrlc and steam railways. It ls 3000 feet high, has healtby cllmate and good skllng places. There are good accomodatlons In the hotels and boardlng houses wbere 1000-1200 persons may be housed (Grand Hotel Praha, Hotel Lomnica, Ehern, Payer, Spišský ilom, Hubertus, Javorina, Božena, etc.). From beyond the Grand Hotel tb-ere ran a cable railway to the Lomnický št!t (Lomnica Peak, 8780 feet), now runnolng to the station Skalnaté Pleso (Rocky Lake. 5480 feet) only. Above and below the hut there are some of the best skUng places on tbe Saddle of Lomnica. In the Dead Garden (Mŕtva záhrad- �SLOVAKIA 17 ka), the slopes of Svišťovka, or the skiing and bob sleigh raclng track. From the nearby Tatranské Matliary we approach huts which also have good skding grounds in their surroundings. They are as follows: the hut at Šalivový Prameň, tbe hut at Zelené Pleso (Green Lake) and the hut of Kežmarok, near the Biele plesá (White Lake's); the last one already Jies In t-he Belan Tatra. Not far away from Tatranské. Lomnica is situated the village Ždiar, famous for the fine costumes of its peasants. It has bus con.nections witb Tatranská Lomnica, Skiers may find good possibilities on the slopes of the Belan Tatra, near Javorina, or in the well known Wbite Water V,alley (Blelovodská dolina). Beyond the lowlands of Kežmarok tbere rise the Hi!Js of Levoča ( Levočské vrchy )J w•h ich are not very high but have good conditions for skiing and a hut, the Hut of Levoča under Javorina (4560 feet), best reached from Levoča. In the diroction of Prešov there is good skiing on the Branisko (3900 feet). The Slovak paradlise (Slovenský raj) also has its charm of frozen water-falls in winter, but few possibilities for skilng. Only the vicinitioo of Dobšiná, Krompachy and Gelnica have better terrains. Accomodation.s are found in the hut at tbe Ice Caves of Dobšiná. · Eastern Slovaklia (Východné Slovensko) has many good grounds, but the possibilities of accomodations are rare because many huts and lodging houses were destroyed. Tbe best skiing near Košice ls on Bankov, and at the hut Jahodná (2160 feet), where there are t\vo towers fo.r ski-jumping. The HUls of Slaná are alllo vislted bocause of their skiing terl1aJ!ns. Slovakla, endowed by nature wlth streams and lakes, mountains and valleys, with its modern and ancient structures and quaint vilJages, ls a !and of wondrous beauty and charm In all seasons, but In the winter it really ls a wonderland. • • • WHO SAID IT? "Tbe Slovak people h·ave ahvays shown a wlllingness to be a part of any federalized state, a readiness to cooperate with the other peoples in lt. ~heir history conclusively proves tha1: a natlon can be happy In such an order as long as it eujoys basic freedom. On the other hand, the history of the Slovak people also conclusively demonstrates that, not having this freedom, no natlon, even the smallest, wlll permit ltself to be pushed around by even lts racia! bloodbrother, wi.thout either openly fighting or (what 1s worse) plantlng the seeds of revolt that eventually brlng forth some terrlble harvest. The conclusion seems evident that the most benevolent and the best: inten.tioned domination wlll probably not be accepted by any natlon as a sub.stitute for self-rule." - {Congressman Daniel J. F!ood, Jan. ·1, 1946) . . • • • "Czech public opinion may be excused for not realizing that the sltuation In Slovakia at the close of 1923 !s radlcally 'dlfferent · from tba,t of the first year of the Revolutlon. And yet the bigher búreaucracy tends to act on the assumptlon that nothing has changed, •and ostrich-like to lgnore tbe keen and growing resentment in Slovakia and the urgent need !or measures to allay lt." - (R,· W. Seton Wat, son: "THE NEW SLOVAKIA," 1924). .. , .; � SLOVAKIA SLOVAKIA - 13 WINTER WONDERLAND If you have never been in Slovakia in the winter, you stm have somefälng to Jive for. Under present conditlon·s , when freedom and independence are suppressed by the Communist system, you will not be able to see the "Winter Wonderland" that Slovakia really !s, but you mlg-ht consider visiting the !and of the Slovaks at some future time when the plague of Communism has been dispeHed. Winter, in all its sparkling and majestlc sp1endor, presents to every !over of nature ťhe best opportunity of seeing and fully enjoying the natural beautles of S.Jovakia. The coUliltry, because of its mountainous regions, ls especially suiitable for wlnter sports, partlcularly skíing. But you need not be sportsmindeid to enjoy Slovakla In the winter. The sheer beauty of nature in Slovakia in the wlnter wm enohant you, unburden and refresh your soul, and give added zest for livlng. You may not want to participa:te in winter sports In Slovakia, bwt the ·happy sight of others enjoyi-ng themselves wiH soothe your tired nerves and give you a sa,tlsfactíon never before known to you. 'ľhe Slovak mountains, as I once knew them, are unsurpassed for t heir winter charm. Accompany me, lf you wlll, on an imaglnary trip to them. Let us sliart out into the Small Carpathians (Malé Karpaty), W'hich extend from ,the confluence of the Danube and Morava rJvers to the Myjava. 'l'hey divide the Váh plai'll from the Moravian plain a.nd are covered wlth Jeafy and parUy evergreen trees and many fores,t meadows. Their moderate slopes offer good skiing. At l!he southwestern end, above the vlllage of Devin, there 1s the Dev!nska Kobyla, (The Mare of Devin), the peak or whlch 1719 feet above sea level. Near the city of Modra, there lies the summer resort of Harmónia, open a-lso In wlnter, with many comfo1,table hotels with hot and cold runnlng water and good restaurants. In t he mountalns, about two and one-half mi,Jes from Harmónia, on the so-called Sands (Piesky) stand two huts: it:he Zochova hut (1443 fet up), and only three mlnutes from it is the other one. Near the highest point or the mountain highway Jeading from Pezinok to Pernek is Országh's hut (1750 feet up) on Ba:ba (Grandmother) near Pezinok. The best sk·ling in the Little Carpathians is near Smolenice, where there are plenity of grassy hills and forest roeadows. The White Carpathians ( Biele Karpaty) stretch trom Myjava along t he Slovak-Moravian border to the mountain of Makyta, where they meet the J avorn!ky. They are covered wlth dense foresrts; only thelr wide southern part is Jess wooded and good for skiing. The most impoi,ta.nt centre is the Holuby hut (3226 feet) on the Javorina. It is best approached on foot from the railway station of Stará Turá, or from the bus stop Kvetná, on the line Nové Mesto nad Váhom l'.aerský Brod. Otherwise you may get to it from the Moravian side by car from Uherský Brod. Opposite the Whlte Carpathians, on the other side of the Váh valley, are the Inovec Mounta!ns, through which passes the railway from Trenč!n to Topoľčany. They, too, are densely wooded and have good skiing grounds. Out of the t.hree tourist huts whlch were here, only the Trenč!n Munic!pal Hut (1500 feet) under Sharp Peak (Ostrý �14 SLOVAKIA Vrch ) at Soblanov remains. The shortest way up 1s from the station Soblanov following -the blue tourist mark, or trom Trenčin followlng the red. Contlnuing, t!he Javornlky, whlch have huts both on the Slovak and Moravian slde, are the Western Beskyds, the southern parts of which are called th-e Jeseníky. Here there are many wooded and bare hills which are wonderful grounds for both the weakest and best sklers. Thelr Jocation on the borders of Slovakla and Moravla brings them many visitors from both sides. The numerous vllla,ges of the Upper Kysuca reglon offer many possibilltles for accommodationa both in the hotels as well as In private homes (Makov, Tunovka, Raková, Čadca). The best known centers are: Bumbálka Hut, MakovPotok Hut and the summer resoi,t Tešinský, which are open In winter. On the roa.d from Veľká •Bytča to Makov 1s Satinka Hut. All these huts are near Makov and the bo.rder and have ldeaJ grounds for skllng. Beyond the Jablunkov Pass, near Cadca, the Beskyds continue on as the Western Beskyds and form the border between Slovakía and Poland. Wooded sectlons mlngled wlth bare ones form Idea) skllng terra.in, w,h ere down-bili ru.os six mlles long are not at aH rare. Near the sta11lon at Serafinov lh-ere is a fine hotel, the surroundings of wh1ch are suitable for skilng. From the station In Cadca or Oščad­ nica, tbere is a good approach to the hut on Rača ( 4020 feet). The Bysitr.lcká Vall-ey up to Erdťidka and the whole of tbe Oravská Magura, near Námestovo, is a flrst class skiing ground with only one draiwback. it ls bard to appr<>ach. Otherwise the Orava region 1s one of the most popular ski terralns and has good posslbHitles of approach from tbe ra.llway Žilina-Košice, and also trom tbe ra.!lway Kraľovany./Suchá Hora. From the gorge of the Strečno rise the migbty bills of tbe mountaln range called Small Fatra ( Malá Fatra), whlch 1s covered mostly w.lth coniferous trees. Mountain meadows and grassy valleys, as well as tbe bare peaks of Stoh and Chleb, are the most popular places of northwestern Slovakia. The ldeal surroundlngs of the hut on Chleb (4660 feet) may be approached trom the station of Strečno, Šútovo, Kraľova.ny and Párnica. The hut there has been re1>alred and can accomodate 60 persona. It 1s the s,tarting point for tours on the Fatranský K11lváň, Chleb, Rozsut-ec and to the valley where Ištvä.nová lles. Martinské hole (The Plalns of St. Martin) are the southern range of tbe Lirttle Fatra, extending l'.rom the gorge of Strečno southwards to the vaney of Zliechov, near Ôlčmany. Thelr slopes are mostly wooded, but in the hills are plenty of meadows connected with one another all the way down to the valleys. On the surrounding mountain meadows tbere 1s wonderful skiing wlth Jong downhlll runs and marvelous views of the far surroundings - the Hlgh Taitras, the Whit-e and Little Ca'fl)athlans, Beskyds, Radhošť, the Ore mountans and the Inovec and Nitra MounWns. In the Martinské mountalns there is a hut 4100 feet above sea level. The best way to approach it 1s from Turčiansky Svätý Mafltln along several marked roads. Opposite t:he Martinské hole Ile the Great Fatra Mountains, wblch have quit-e a di!ferent character. They -stretch from the valley of the T>iver Váh to the rlver Hron: and thelr northern part ls cut by the valley ot Lubochňa. The wlde ridges of Ostredok, Rakytov and Krlžná �SLOVAKIA 15 are suitable for skiing, In the norvhern part of the Gre,at Fatra, there are ideal grounds for wlnter sports on th& Smrekovica. The best aPproach to the 4330 foot-high Smrekovica 1s from the station Podsuchá on the rallroad Ružomberok-Korytnica. The unusually hlgh and long lasting snow in the deep coniferous woods attract.s thou:sands of visltors to Smrekovica. Many stay ln Ružomberok where there ar& good accommodatlons and a tower for ski-jump like on the Smrekovica. The southern pa11t of the Grea,t Fatra is called Mountalns of Kremnica ( Kremnické hory), where there are plenty of houses for tourists. The cen,t~ of thls region is Kremnica which has several hot~Is. a tourist n.ight shelter near the station and many private accommod.aitlons. It is ,the s·tarting point for the Skalka hut. Contlnuing along the Great Fatra and the Mountains of Kremnica, on the other side of the river Hron, ·between the ratlway ZvolenLevice and Zvolen-Šahy, are the Mountains of Štiavnica ( Štiavnické hory), w1th Sitno a,s their •highest pea.lc. This region wlth its evergreen trees and large meadows, Jong ridges and slopes, is ideal for winter sports. The center of this region is Banská Štiavnica. The most visited plaoe, however, is the hut of Andrej Kmeť on Sitno (3330 feet up). from where one has a beautiful vlew as far as the Danube Plaln and the High Tatras. Below the Sitno, next to Lake Počuvadlo, ,are the Kállay sanatorium and the boarding house Anna, which offer good accommodations for guests. The mountains of Štiavnica have great suppl1es of ore and are called the Slovak Ore Mountains (Slovenské rudohorie). They stretch from the river Hron and the mountains of Štiavnica to Rožňava. The northern part is more or less connected and has several w:lde hllls, trom which there run long ridges in the form of rays, between which are deep valleys. The southwestern part is very prlmitive and has a tourist hut on the Javor (2722 fem), to whlch the best approa,ch !s from the statlons Podkriváň, or Píla pod Javorom, on the ra.ilway !lne Zvolen-Lučenec. The hut on Trsti (3722 feet) may be approached from Pila, near Tisovec, or directly from Tisovec. To the east from Oravská Magura one finds the Stag Mountains ( Roháče) , which have a high mountain character and resemble the Tatras. Sklers vis,it mostly the Smutná and Látaná valleys, as well as the Iong slopes of Rakoň, Volovec, Úplaz, or go even a.s far as Osobitá. Snow usually remains untll sprlng and lt is nothlng unusual to find s klers here even at Easter. Sklers sometlmes go from Rohäče to the valleys ot Račková or Žiar, wblch belong to the group of mountains called the Tatras of Liptov ( Liptovské Tatry), because of their idea! skilng terraln. Wlth their Iong slopes and mighty peaks they complete the Hlgh Tatras to which they really belong. The lo.nges,t and wldest mountaln range in Slovakla are <the Low Tatras (Nízke Tatry), which extend from the highway Banská Bystrica-Ružomberok to the •highway Telgart-Poprad. North of them flows the river Váh, south the rlver Hron. Only ,the lower part.s are covered wlth forests, the rest 1s bare so that a skler may undertake a one-day tour from Prašivá in the west to Ďumbier and Kráľova hoľa In the east wlthout much fatigue. The helght and breadth of the range affords long descents on both sides trom he!ghts of 200-4000 feet up. Not far from Banská Bystrica �16 SLOVAKlA 1s the winter sports center, the Sport hotel Donovaly (3330 feet) w!th Idea! surroundings, woods and meadows. The hotel !s filrs.t cla.ss and is sure to app&a.l to every guest. From this place there leads a romantlc trail to Korytnica., above whlch rlse the mighty rldges of Prašivá and Latiborská Hoľa. At a helght of 6460 feet is sltuated štefán.ik's hut beneaith the Ďumbier. The highest peaks are Chopok, to wh!ch a ski-lil\t wa.s built (6680 feet) from the valley of Demänová nea.r Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš, and Ďumbier (6820 feet) where snow remains tlll Jate sprjng. From the station Kráľova Lehota there 1s a highway wh!oh crosses the Low Tatra range on its way to Podbrezová. lit passes through the villages of Malužiná and Vyšná Boca and reaches the mountain Sport hotel at the lovely hut on čertovioa (4210 feet), which is surrounded by evergreen trees and mountain meadows. Among the numerous Slovak mountains the High Tatras (Vysoké Tatry) are the most vlsited by lovers of winrter sports. lt !s mostily because of their high mountain altitude, long las-ting snow, good accommodations, technical equipment and varled terrain. The startlng polnts to the Hlgh Tatras are the railway staUons Štrba and PopradTatry on the Košice-Bohumln raiJway line. From Štrba there runs a good road to the high cllmatlc spa Štrbské Pleso (Tarn of Štrba, 4500 feet) where there are accomodatlons for 400-500 persons (Hotels Hviezdoslav, Solisko, Kmvä.ň, Móry, boarding bouses Jánošik, Marina, Poleka, Iskra and chalets of the Slovak Touris.ts', and Skiers' Olub). Beyond t>he tarn there are the FUTkotská, Mlynická and Mengušovská valleys, to wbdch -the sklers come from the ridge of Solisko and Patria. Tbe slope of Solisko -is preferred, because there is a skl-lif,t there for sklers to a heigbt of 6260 feet. In the Mengušov va.Jley under steep Osterva there 1s a hut at Popradské Pleso ('l'arn of Poprad) with accommodatlons for 150 guests. In late sprjng and even on summer days it 1s posslble to ski under the Saddle Váhy, near the hut under the Rysy (7600 feet), whlch ls open In summer only. Another center is Stary Smokovec, where about 1000 persons can be accommodated in hotels and boaroing houses ({}rand Hotel, Hoepfner, Palace, etc.). Skllng grounds are on the slopes of Slavkov's Peak and In the lovely Studenovodská (Cold Water) valley, or in the Great or Little Cold Valleys. There ls a funicular rallway runnlng to the Športhotel Hrebienok from which goes a toboggan slide and ski run. At the end of the Great Cold Valley there are wonderful skllng grounds near the :Obojn!cka hut (6400 feet) . In the Llttle Cold Valley there are two •huts: at the beglnning of the valley ls the hut Zamkovský (5200 feet), and at the upper end Lles the Téry hut (6730 feet) on the F'ive Spiš Lakes. In tbe surroundings there are lovely sk!lng grounds for good sklers. A popular skllng center is Tatranská. Lomnica., wbich 1s connected wlth Poprad by both electrlc and steam railways. It ls 3000 feet high, has healtby cllmate and good skllng places. There are good accomodatlons In the hotels and boardlng houses wbere 1000-1200 persons may be housed (Grand Hotel Praha, Hotel Lomnica, Ehern, Payer, Spišský ilom, Hubertus, Javorina, Božena, etc.). From beyond the Grand Hotel tb-ere ran a cable railway to the Lomnický št!t (Lomnica Peak, 8780 feet), now runnolng to the station Skalnaté Pleso (Rocky Lake. 5480 feet) only. Above and below the hut there are some of the best skUng places on tbe Saddle of Lomnica. In the Dead Garden (Mŕtva záhrad- �SLOVAKIA 17 ka), the slopes of Svišťovka, or the skiing and bob sleigh raclng track. From the nearby Tatranské Matliary we approach huts which also have good skding grounds in their surroundings. They are as follows: the hut at Šalivový Prameň, tbe hut at Zelené Pleso (Green Lake) and the hut of Kežmarok, near the Biele plesá (White Lake's); the last one already Jies In t-he Belan Tatra. Not far away from Tatranské. Lomnica is situated the village Ždiar, famous for the fine costumes of its peasants. It has bus con.nections witb Tatranská Lomnica, Skiers may find good possibilities on the slopes of the Belan Tatra, near Javorina, or in the well known Wbite Water V,alley (Blelovodská dolina). Beyond the lowlands of Kežmarok tbere rise the Hi!Js of Levoča ( Levočské vrchy )J w•h ich are not very high but have good conditions for skiing and a hut, the Hut of Levoča under Javorina (4560 feet), best reached from Levoča. In the diroction of Prešov there is good skiing on the Branisko (3900 feet). The Slovak paradlise (Slovenský raj) also has its charm of frozen water-falls in winter, but few possibilities for skilng. Only the vicinitioo of Dobšiná, Krompachy and Gelnica have better terrains. Accomodation.s are found in the hut at tbe Ice Caves of Dobšiná. · Eastern Slovaklia (Východné Slovensko) has many good grounds, but the possibilities of accomodations are rare because many huts and lodging houses were destroyed. Tbe best skiing near Košice ls on Bankov, and at the hut Jahodná (2160 feet), where there are t\vo towers fo.r ski-jumping. The HUls of Slaná are alllo vislted bocause of their skiing terl1aJ!ns. Slovakla, endowed by nature wlth streams and lakes, mountains and valleys, with its modern and ancient structures and quaint vilJages, ls a !and of wondrous beauty and charm In all seasons, but In the winter it really ls a wonderland. • • • WHO SAID IT? "Tbe Slovak people h·ave ahvays shown a wlllingness to be a part of any federalized state, a readiness to cooperate with the other peoples in lt. ~heir history conclusively proves tha1: a natlon can be happy In such an order as long as it eujoys basic freedom. On the other hand, the history of the Slovak people also conclusively demonstrates that, not having this freedom, no natlon, even the smallest, wlll permit ltself to be pushed around by even lts racia! bloodbrother, wi.thout either openly fighting or (what 1s worse) plantlng the seeds of revolt that eventually brlng forth some terrlble harvest. The conclusion seems evident that the most benevolent and the best: inten.tioned domination wlll probably not be accepted by any natlon as a sub.stitute for self-rule." - {Congressman Daniel J. F!ood, Jan. ·1, 1946) . . • • • "Czech public opinion may be excused for not realizing that the sltuation In Slovakia at the close of 1923 !s radlcally 'dlfferent · from tba,t of the first year of the Revolutlon. And yet the bigher búreaucracy tends to act on the assumptlon that nothing has changed, •and ostrich-like to lgnore tbe keen and growing resentment in Slovakia and the urgent need !or measures to allay lt." - (R,· W. Seton Wat, son: "THE NEW SLOVAKIA," 1924). .. , .; � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA SLOVAKIA - 13 WINTER WONDERLAND If you have never been in Slovakia in the winter, you stm have somefälng to Jive for. Under present conditlon·s , when freedom and independence are suppressed by the Communist system, you will not be able to see the "Winter Wonderland" that Slovakia really !s, but you mlg-ht consider visiting the !and of the Slovaks at some future time when the plague of Communism has been dispeHed. Winter, in all its sparkling and majestlc sp1endor, presents to every !over of nature ťhe best opportunity of seeing and fully enjoying the natural beautles of S.Jovakia. The coUliltry, because of its mountainous regions, ls especially suiitable for wlnter sports, partlcularly skíing. But you need not be sportsmindeid to enjoy Slovakla In the winter. The sheer beauty of nature in Slovakia in the wlnter wm enohant you, unburden and refresh your soul, and give added zest for livlng. You may not want to participa:te in winter sports In Slovakia, bwt the ·happy sight of others enjoyi-ng themselves wiH soothe your tired nerves and give you a sa,tlsfactíon never before known to you. 'ľhe Slovak mountains, as I once knew them, are unsurpassed for t heir winter charm. Accompany me, lf you wlll, on an imaglnary trip to them. Let us sliart out into the Small Carpathians (Malé Karpaty), W'hich extend from ,the confluence of the Danube and Morava rJvers to the Myjava. 'l'hey divide the Váh plai'll from the Moravian plain a.nd are covered wlth Jeafy and parUy evergreen trees and many fores,t meadows. Their moderate slopes offer good skiing. At l!he southwestern end, above the vlllage of Devin, there 1s the Dev!nska Kobyla, (The Mare of Devin), the peak or whlch 1719 feet above sea level. Near the city of Modra, there lies the summer resort of Harmónia, open a-lso In wlnter, with many comfo1,table hotels with hot and cold runnlng water and good restaurants. In t he mountalns, about two and one-half mi,Jes from Harmónia, on the so-called Sands (Piesky) stand two huts: it:he Zochova hut (1443 fet up), and only three mlnutes from it is the other one. Near the highest point or the mountain highway Jeading from Pezinok to Pernek is Országh's hut (1750 feet up) on Ba:ba (Grandmother) near Pezinok. The best sk·ling in the Little Carpathians is near Smolenice, where there are plenity of grassy hills and forest roeadows. The White Carpathians ( Biele Karpaty) stretch trom Myjava along t he Slovak-Moravian border to the mountain of Makyta, where they meet the J avorn!ky. They are covered wlth dense foresrts; only thelr wide southern part is Jess wooded and good for skiing. The most impoi,ta.nt centre is the Holuby hut (3226 feet) on the Javorina. It is best approached on foot from the railway station of Stará Turá, or from the bus stop Kvetná, on the line Nové Mesto nad Váhom l'.aerský Brod. Otherwise you may get to it from the Moravian side by car from Uherský Brod. Opposite the Whlte Carpathians, on the other side of the Váh valley, are the Inovec Mounta!ns, through which passes the railway from Trenč!n to Topoľčany. They, too, are densely wooded and have good skiing grounds. Out of the t.hree tourist huts whlch were here, only the Trenč!n Munic!pal Hut (1500 feet) under Sharp Peak (Ostrý 14 SLOVAKIA Vrch ) at Soblanov remains. The shortest way up 1s from the station Soblanov following -the blue tourist mark, or trom Trenčin followlng the red. Contlnuing, t!he Javornlky, whlch have huts both on the Slovak and Moravian slde, are the Western Beskyds, the southern parts of which are called th-e Jeseníky. Here there are many wooded and bare hills which are wonderful grounds for both the weakest and best sklers. Thelr Jocation on the borders of Slovakla and Moravla brings them many visitors from both sides. The numerous vllla,ges of the Upper Kysuca reglon offer many possibilltles for accommodationa both in the hotels as well as In private homes (Makov, Tunovka, Raková, Čadca). The best known centers are: Bumbálka Hut, MakovPotok Hut and the summer resoi,t Tešinský, which are open In winter. On the roa.d from Veľká •Bytča to Makov 1s Satinka Hut. All these huts are near Makov and the bo.rder and have ldeaJ grounds for skllng. Beyond the Jablunkov Pass, near Cadca, the Beskyds continue on as the Western Beskyds and form the border between Slovakía and Poland. Wooded sectlons mlngled wlth bare ones form Idea) skllng terra.in, w,h ere down-bili ru.os six mlles long are not at aH rare. Near the sta11lon at Serafinov lh-ere is a fine hotel, the surroundings of wh1ch are suitable for skilng. From the station In Cadca or Oščad­ nica, tbere is a good approach to the hut on Rača ( 4020 feet). The Bysitr.lcká Vall-ey up to Erdťidka and the whole of tbe Oravská Magura, near Námestovo, is a flrst class skiing ground with only one draiwback. it ls bard to appr<>ach. Otherwise the Orava region 1s one of the most popular ski terralns and has good posslbHitles of approach from tbe ra.llway Žilina-Košice, and also trom tbe ra.!lway Kraľovany./Suchá Hora. From the gorge of the Strečno rise the migbty bills of tbe mountaln range called Small Fatra ( Malá Fatra), whlch 1s covered mostly w.lth coniferous trees. Mountain meadows and grassy valleys, as well as tbe bare peaks of Stoh and Chleb, are the most popular places of northwestern Slovakia. The ldeal surroundlngs of the hut on Chleb (4660 feet) may be approached trom the station of Strečno, Šútovo, Kraľova.ny and Párnica. The hut there has been re1>alred and can accomodate 60 persona. It 1s the s,tarting point for tours on the Fatranský K11lváň, Chleb, Rozsut-ec and to the valley where Ištvä.nová lles. Martinské hole (The Plalns of St. Martin) are the southern range of tbe Lirttle Fatra, extending l'.rom the gorge of Strečno southwards to the vaney of Zliechov, near Ôlčmany. Thelr slopes are mostly wooded, but in the hills are plenty of meadows connected with one another all the way down to the valleys. On the surrounding mountain meadows tbere 1s wonderful skiing wlth Jong downhlll runs and marvelous views of the far surroundings - the Hlgh Taitras, the Whit-e and Little Ca'fl)athlans, Beskyds, Radhošť, the Ore mountans and the Inovec and Nitra MounWns. In the Martinské mountalns there is a hut 4100 feet above sea level. The best way to approach it 1s from Turčiansky Svätý Mafltln along several marked roads. Opposite t:he Martinské hole Ile the Great Fatra Mountains, wblch have quit-e a di!ferent character. They -stretch from the valley of the T>iver Váh to the rlver Hron: and thelr northern part ls cut by the valley ot Lubochňa. The wlde ridges of Ostredok, Rakytov and Krlžná SLOVAKIA 15 are suitable for skiing, In the norvhern part of the Gre,at Fatra, there are ideal grounds for wlnter sports on th& Smrekovica. The best aPproach to the 4330 foot-high Smrekovica 1s from the station Podsuchá on the rallroad Ružomberok-Korytnica. The unusually hlgh and long lasting snow in the deep coniferous woods attract.s thou:sands of visltors to Smrekovica. Many stay ln Ružomberok where there ar& good accommodatlons and a tower for ski-jump like on the Smrekovica. The southern pa11t of the Grea,t Fatra is called Mountalns of Kremnica ( Kremnické hory), where there are plenty of houses for tourists. The cen,t~ of thls region is Kremnica which has several hot~Is. a tourist n.ight shelter near the station and many private accommod.aitlons. It is ,the s·tarting point for the Skalka hut. Contlnuing along the Great Fatra and the Mountains of Kremnica, on the other side of the river Hron, ·between the ratlway ZvolenLevice and Zvolen-Šahy, are the Mountains of Štiavnica ( Štiavnické hory), w1th Sitno a,s their •highest pea.lc. This region wlth its evergreen trees and large meadows, Jong ridges and slopes, is ideal for winter sports. The center of this region is Banská Štiavnica. The most visited plaoe, however, is the hut of Andrej Kmeť on Sitno (3330 feet up). from where one has a beautiful vlew as far as the Danube Plaln and the High Tatras. Below the Sitno, next to Lake Počuvadlo, ,are the Kállay sanatorium and the boarding house Anna, which offer good accommodations for guests. The mountains of Štiavnica have great suppl1es of ore and are called the Slovak Ore Mountains (Slovenské rudohorie). They stretch from the river Hron and the mountains of Štiavnica to Rožňava. The northern part is more or less connected and has several w:lde hllls, trom which there run long ridges in the form of rays, between which are deep valleys. The southwestern part is very prlmitive and has a tourist hut on the Javor (2722 fem), to whlch the best approa,ch !s from the statlons Podkriváň, or Píla pod Javorom, on the ra.ilway !lne Zvolen-Lučenec. The hut on Trsti (3722 feet) may be approached from Pila, near Tisovec, or directly from Tisovec. To the east from Oravská Magura one finds the Stag Mountains ( Roháče) , which have a high mountain character and resemble the Tatras. Sklers vis,it mostly the Smutná and Látaná valleys, as well as the Iong slopes of Rakoň, Volovec, Úplaz, or go even a.s far as Osobitá. Snow usually remains untll sprlng and lt is nothlng unusual to find s klers here even at Easter. Sklers sometlmes go from Rohäče to the valleys ot Račková or Žiar, wblch belong to the group of mountains called the Tatras of Liptov ( Liptovské Tatry), because of their idea! skilng terraln. Wlth their Iong slopes and mighty peaks they complete the Hlgh Tatras to which they really belong. The lo.nges,t and wldest mountaln range in Slovakla are <the Low Tatras (Nízke Tatry), which extend from the highway Banská Bystrica-Ružomberok to the •highway Telgart-Poprad. North of them flows the river Váh, south the rlver Hron. Only ,the lower part.s are covered wlth forests, the rest 1s bare so that a skler may undertake a one-day tour from Prašivá in the west to Ďumbier and Kráľova hoľa In the east wlthout much fatigue. The helght and breadth of the range affords long descents on both sides trom he!ghts of 200-4000 feet up. Not far from Banská Bystrica 16 SLOVAKlA 1s the winter sports center, the Sport hotel Donovaly (3330 feet) w!th Idea! surroundings, woods and meadows. The hotel !s filrs.t cla.ss and is sure to app&a.l to every guest. From this place there leads a romantlc trail to Korytnica., above whlch rlse the mighty rldges of Prašivá and Latiborská Hoľa. At a helght of 6460 feet is sltuated štefán.ik's hut beneaith the Ďumbier. The highest peaks are Chopok, to wh!ch a ski-lil\t wa.s built (6680 feet) from the valley of Demänová nea.r Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš, and Ďumbier (6820 feet) where snow remains tlll Jate sprjng. From the station Kráľova Lehota there 1s a highway wh!oh crosses the Low Tatra range on its way to Podbrezová. lit passes through the villages of Malužiná and Vyšná Boca and reaches the mountain Sport hotel at the lovely hut on čertovioa (4210 feet), which is surrounded by evergreen trees and mountain meadows. Among the numerous Slovak mountains the High Tatras (Vysoké Tatry) are the most vlsited by lovers of winrter sports. lt !s mostily because of their high mountain altitude, long las-ting snow, good accommodations, technical equipment and varled terrain. The startlng polnts to the Hlgh Tatras are the railway staUons Štrba and PopradTatry on the Košice-Bohumln raiJway line. From Štrba there runs a good road to the high cllmatlc spa Štrbské Pleso (Tarn of Štrba, 4500 feet) where there are accomodatlons for 400-500 persons (Hotels Hviezdoslav, Solisko, Kmvä.ň, Móry, boarding bouses Jánošik, Marina, Poleka, Iskra and chalets of the Slovak Touris.ts', and Skiers' Olub). Beyond t>he tarn there are the FUTkotská, Mlynická and Mengušovská valleys, to wbdch -the sklers come from the ridge of Solisko and Patria. Tbe slope of Solisko -is preferred, because there is a skl-lif,t there for sklers to a heigbt of 6260 feet. In the Mengušov va.Jley under steep Osterva there 1s a hut at Popradské Pleso ('l'arn of Poprad) with accommodatlons for 150 guests. In late sprjng and even on summer days it 1s posslble to ski under the Saddle Váhy, near the hut under the Rysy (7600 feet), whlch ls open In summer only. Another center is Stary Smokovec, where about 1000 persons can be accommodated in hotels and boaroing houses ({}rand Hotel, Hoepfner, Palace, etc.). Skllng grounds are on the slopes of Slavkov's Peak and In the lovely Studenovodská (Cold Water) valley, or in the Great or Little Cold Valleys. There ls a funicular rallway runnlng to the Športhotel Hrebienok from which goes a toboggan slide and ski run. At the end of the Great Cold Valley there are wonderful skllng grounds near the :Obojn!cka hut (6400 feet) . In the Llttle Cold Valley there are two •huts: at the beglnning of the valley ls the hut Zamkovský (5200 feet), and at the upper end Lles the Téry hut (6730 feet) on the F'ive Spiš Lakes. In tbe surroundings there are lovely sk!lng grounds for good sklers. A popular skllng center is Tatranská. Lomnica., wbich 1s connected wlth Poprad by both electrlc and steam railways. It ls 3000 feet high, has healtby cllmate and good skllng places. There are good accomodatlons In the hotels and boardlng houses wbere 1000-1200 persons may be housed (Grand Hotel Praha, Hotel Lomnica, Ehern, Payer, Spišský ilom, Hubertus, Javorina, Božena, etc.). From beyond the Grand Hotel tb-ere ran a cable railway to the Lomnický št!t (Lomnica Peak, 8780 feet), now runnolng to the station Skalnaté Pleso (Rocky Lake. 5480 feet) only. Above and below the hut there are some of the best skUng places on tbe Saddle of Lomnica. In the Dead Garden (Mŕtva záhrad- SLOVAKIA 17 ka), the slopes of Svišťovka, or the skiing and bob sleigh raclng track. From the nearby Tatranské Matliary we approach huts which also have good skding grounds in their surroundings. They are as follows: the hut at Šalivový Prameň, tbe hut at Zelené Pleso (Green Lake) and the hut of Kežmarok, near the Biele plesá (White Lake's); the last one already Jies In t-he Belan Tatra. Not far away from Tatranské. Lomnica is situated the village Ždiar, famous for the fine costumes of its peasants. It has bus con.nections witb Tatranská Lomnica, Skiers may find good possibilities on the slopes of the Belan Tatra, near Javorina, or in the well known Wbite Water V,alley (Blelovodská dolina). Beyond the lowlands of Kežmarok tbere rise the Hi!Js of Levoča ( Levočské vrchy )J w•h ich are not very high but have good conditions for skiing and a hut, the Hut of Levoča under Javorina (4560 feet), best reached from Levoča. In the diroction of Prešov there is good skiing on the Branisko (3900 feet). The Slovak paradlise (Slovenský raj) also has its charm of frozen water-falls in winter, but few possibilities for skilng. Only the vicinitioo of Dobšiná, Krompachy and Gelnica have better terrains. Accomodation.s are found in the hut at tbe Ice Caves of Dobšiná. · Eastern Slovaklia (Východné Slovensko) has many good grounds, but the possibilities of accomodations are rare because many huts and lodging houses were destroyed. Tbe best skiing near Košice ls on Bankov, and at the hut Jahodná (2160 feet), where there are t\vo towers fo.r ski-jumping. The HUls of Slaná are alllo vislted bocause of their skiing terl1aJ!ns. Slovakla, endowed by nature wlth streams and lakes, mountains and valleys, with its modern and ancient structures and quaint vilJages, ls a !and of wondrous beauty and charm In all seasons, but In the winter it really ls a wonderland. • • • WHO SAID IT? "Tbe Slovak people h·ave ahvays shown a wlllingness to be a part of any federalized state, a readiness to cooperate with the other peoples in lt. ~heir history conclusively proves tha1: a natlon can be happy In such an order as long as it eujoys basic freedom. On the other hand, the history of the Slovak people also conclusively demonstrates that, not having this freedom, no natlon, even the smallest, wlll permit ltself to be pushed around by even lts racia! bloodbrother, wi.thout either openly fighting or (what 1s worse) plantlng the seeds of revolt that eventually brlng forth some terrlble harvest. The conclusion seems evident that the most benevolent and the best: inten.tioned domination wlll probably not be accepted by any natlon as a sub.stitute for self-rule." - {Congressman Daniel J. F!ood, Jan. ·1, 1946) . . • • • "Czech public opinion may be excused for not realizing that the sltuation In Slovakia at the close of 1923 !s radlcally 'dlfferent · from tba,t of the first year of the Revolutlon. And yet the bigher búreaucracy tends to act on the assumptlon that nothing has changed, •and ostrich-like to lgnore tbe keen and growing resentment in Slovakia and the urgent need !or measures to allay lt." - (R,· W. Seton Wat, son: "THE NEW SLOVAKIA," 1924). .. , .;  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovakia - Winter Wonderland Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952 pp. 13-17 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/6744e6aad7468419ac2624101a85e953.pdf 37c8e65feb163eb93b316fe90cf05207 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 69 THE BLIND ALLEY OF TIIE CZECHOSLOVAKS BY: THE INFORMER The leading personalities ot the Council of Free Czechoslovakla In Canada had a special meeting last October in Toronto. The sesslon concerned itself wlth three burning questlons: 1. Amerlcan semi-offlclal places and factors ot the Natlonal Committee tor a Free Europe have agaln threatened to shut off au mora! and flnanclal aid it the feuding Czechoslovaks, i. e. the so-called "seventeen" members ot Dr. Osuský" and the "thirteen" ot Dr. Zenkl, do not flnd a common platform of cooperatlon and, as far as possible, a broa:der and a more effective Slovak representation in this framework. It was decided that the Toronto branch would appeal to the leading personalitles of the Councll In the USA to lssue a joint manifesto wlth the Zenkl group on October 28, the Czechoslovak Independence Day. In a word: another ma.neuver to deceive the Amerlcans who glve them bread. (As far as is known, no joint manlfesto was issued on October 28th.) 2. Czechoslovak leaders of both factions were also told that the U. S. factors concerned would welcome a move by them to flnd a platform for coming to an understandlng wlth the Sudeten Germans. Thts is all tbe more necessary, because the Allies are ready to sign a separate peace wlth Western Germany and accept it lnto the allled defense alliance. Thls point caused those present, especlally the Czech members, to qulver. And they bave reason to tremble. The Sudeten Germans will remember for a long tlme who expelled them from their anclent homeland. And the Beneš Czechs know that a strong group of antlBeneš ·Czechs, their adversarles, have already come to an understanding wlth the Sudeten Germans, slgnlng an agreement ot triendshlp wtth them, subject to certain condltlons whlch are not acceptable to the Beneš Czechs. And even if the latter would promlse to rlght the devastating damage and injustice done to the Sudeten Germans, lt would avail them nothlng, because the Germans know that the Beneš Czechs, together with the Czech Reds, are responsible for thelr expulslon from the Sudetenland of Bobemla. 3. The National Committee for a F ree Europe has been severely criticized for the type of lts "Free Gzechoslovakia" broadcasts in Munlcb. Protests against the strlctly "pro-Czech" stand of the Munlch Radlo Free Europe bave come from the Bavarian Federal Government, the German Government in Bonn, tbe antt-Beneš groups in Europe, England and the USA, and representatlves of the overwhelmlng majority of Slovaks In Europe, England, France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Canada and the USA. Tbe Beneš Czecho~lovaks are aware of all thls, hence thelr dilem ma. 'I'helr Czechosl wak s hlp ls sin king and they are exerting all -their strength to save lt. Peroutka, suppo sedly the dlrector of the "Czecbo slovak Unit" of RFE, of late is not as wild as he used to be. He was told to tone dL•wn a bit and replace several people in the Czechoslovak Unit of tb,\ NCFE broadcasts - at Jeast those who are overly burdened with communlst collaboration. Of course, Peroutka �60 SLOVAKIA will see to it that Bentt Czechoslovaks are replaced only by Beneš Czechoslovaks ! Summarlly said, there is nothlng new In the Czechoslovak sky. We are not at all surprlsl•d by the behavlor of the hard-bolled adherents or Czechoslovak centraliem. But we are very mucb surprlsed with the Slovak servants renderlnr. them Jip servlce. Rudolph Fraštackf, a BeneA Czechoslovak, recently rťturned from a European trip and told trlends that among the most recent Slovak escapees he dld not !Ind a slngle one who stands for Cze1.hoslovakism. Slnce these !atest escapees interpret the sentiments ot 1.he Slovaks at horne, we can safely say that in Slovakia, regardless of thelr reli gious or previous political divisiona, the Slovaks almoat to ,1 man are againat the reatoration of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovaks are In a bllnd alley, because they dld not b elieve In slgns of the tlmes. Freedom 1s the watchword, the everlastlng h ope and the ultlmate goal <•f all nations of the earth - lncluding the S lovak nation. FOR DR. STEPHEN OSUSKY'S BENEFIT DR. PETER SKALENICKÝ The more new refugees arrive from Slovakia, so all the more and repeatedly do they confirm the fa<:t that our policy, based in our stand of Slovak independence, is correct. Even these new escapees, often former adberents of former CzechoslovQk political parties, confinn the fact that the Slovak nation not only yearns for lts own independence, but also tbat in Slovakia today no one believes tbat it will be possible to renew the Czechoslovak Republic. Nay, the people at horne do not b elieve tbat responsible people in exile can be found wbo would work against Slovak independence. It ls something natural. Certainly, a nation wh!cb once has had its own state and bas tasted of the advantages of its own independence will never surrender it, and it can be deprived of it only by force and violence. We can look upon tbe origln of the Slovak Republic in any manner that we will, but no one can deny, nor can any one erase from Slovak hlstory tbe actuallty that the Slovaks did have thelr own state from 1939 to 1945, that tbey did bave their own president and tbeir own government, and that Slovakia dirl _appear on the map of Europe as an Independent political unit. It is often said that the Slovak Republic was a satelllte state. Even under sucb circumstances, it was comparatively more than tbe Slovaks had during the first Czecboslovak Republic, or after 1945. 'ľbe president of Slovakla and the government always had more power tban the president of the Slovak National Council (Lettrich) and the commissars had after 1945. tbat ls during the period wben tbe Czecboslovak Republic was already_ supposed to he a federative state. And even thougb tbe cluration of the Slovak State falls into the perlod of war, Swiss newsmen told tbe world that the Slovak Republic was an oasis of consolidated peace and welfare. Tbat was because the Slovaks decided tbeir own affairs In tbelr country. The president of the Slovak IRepublic coulcl grant reprieves to those sen- � SLOVAKIA 69 THE BLIND ALLEY OF TIIE CZECHOSLOVAKS BY: THE INFORMER The leading personalities ot the Council of Free Czechoslovakla In Canada had a special meeting last October in Toronto. The sesslon concerned itself wlth three burning questlons: 1. Amerlcan semi-offlclal places and factors ot the Natlonal Committee tor a Free Europe have agaln threatened to shut off au mora! and flnanclal aid it the feuding Czechoslovaks, i. e. the so-called "seventeen" members ot Dr. Osuský" and the "thirteen" ot Dr. Zenkl, do not flnd a common platform of cooperatlon and, as far as possible, a broa:der and a more effective Slovak representation in this framework. It was decided that the Toronto branch would appeal to the leading personalitles of the Councll In the USA to lssue a joint manifesto wlth the Zenkl group on October 28, the Czechoslovak Independence Day. In a word: another ma.neuver to deceive the Amerlcans who glve them bread. (As far as is known, no joint manlfesto was issued on October 28th.) 2. Czechoslovak leaders of both factions were also told that the U. S. factors concerned would welcome a move by them to flnd a platform for coming to an understandlng wlth the Sudeten Germans. Thts is all tbe more necessary, because the Allies are ready to sign a separate peace wlth Western Germany and accept it lnto the allled defense alliance. Thls point caused those present, especlally the Czech members, to qulver. And they bave reason to tremble. The Sudeten Germans will remember for a long tlme who expelled them from their anclent homeland. And the Beneš Czechs know that a strong group of antlBeneš ·Czechs, their adversarles, have already come to an understanding wlth the Sudeten Germans, slgnlng an agreement ot triendshlp wtth them, subject to certain condltlons whlch are not acceptable to the Beneš Czechs. And even if the latter would promlse to rlght the devastating damage and injustice done to the Sudeten Germans, lt would avail them nothlng, because the Germans know that the Beneš Czechs, together with the Czech Reds, are responsible for thelr expulslon from the Sudetenland of Bobemla. 3. The National Committee for a F ree Europe has been severely criticized for the type of lts "Free Gzechoslovakia" broadcasts in Munlcb. Protests against the strlctly "pro-Czech" stand of the Munlch Radlo Free Europe bave come from the Bavarian Federal Government, the German Government in Bonn, tbe antt-Beneš groups in Europe, England and the USA, and representatlves of the overwhelmlng majority of Slovaks In Europe, England, France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Canada and the USA. Tbe Beneš Czecho~lovaks are aware of all thls, hence thelr dilem ma. 'I'helr Czechosl wak s hlp ls sin king and they are exerting all -their strength to save lt. Peroutka, suppo sedly the dlrector of the "Czecbo slovak Unit" of RFE, of late is not as wild as he used to be. He was told to tone dL•wn a bit and replace several people in the Czechoslovak Unit of tb,\ NCFE broadcasts - at Jeast those who are overly burdened with communlst collaboration. Of course, Peroutka �60 SLOVAKIA will see to it that Bentt Czechoslovaks are replaced only by Beneš Czechoslovaks ! Summarlly said, there is nothlng new In the Czechoslovak sky. We are not at all surprlsl•d by the behavlor of the hard-bolled adherents or Czechoslovak centraliem. But we are very mucb surprlsed with the Slovak servants renderlnr. them Jip servlce. Rudolph Fraštackf, a BeneA Czechoslovak, recently rťturned from a European trip and told trlends that among the most recent Slovak escapees he dld not !Ind a slngle one who stands for Cze1.hoslovakism. Slnce these !atest escapees interpret the sentiments ot 1.he Slovaks at horne, we can safely say that in Slovakia, regardless of thelr reli gious or previous political divisiona, the Slovaks almoat to ,1 man are againat the reatoration of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovaks are In a bllnd alley, because they dld not b elieve In slgns of the tlmes. Freedom 1s the watchword, the everlastlng h ope and the ultlmate goal <•f all nations of the earth - lncluding the S lovak nation. FOR DR. STEPHEN OSUSKY'S BENEFIT DR. PETER SKALENICKÝ The more new refugees arrive from Slovakia, so all the more and repeatedly do they confirm the fa<:t that our policy, based in our stand of Slovak independence, is correct. Even these new escapees, often former adberents of former CzechoslovQk political parties, confinn the fact that the Slovak nation not only yearns for lts own independence, but also tbat in Slovakia today no one believes tbat it will be possible to renew the Czechoslovak Republic. Nay, the people at horne do not b elieve tbat responsible people in exile can be found wbo would work against Slovak independence. It ls something natural. Certainly, a nation wh!cb once has had its own state and bas tasted of the advantages of its own independence will never surrender it, and it can be deprived of it only by force and violence. We can look upon tbe origln of the Slovak Republic in any manner that we will, but no one can deny, nor can any one erase from Slovak hlstory tbe actuallty that the Slovaks did have thelr own state from 1939 to 1945, that tbey did bave their own president and tbeir own government, and that Slovakia dirl _appear on the map of Europe as an Independent political unit. It is often said that the Slovak Republic was a satelllte state. Even under sucb circumstances, it was comparatively more than tbe Slovaks had during the first Czecboslovak Republic, or after 1945. 'ľbe president of Slovakla and the government always had more power tban the president of the Slovak National Council (Lettrich) and the commissars had after 1945. tbat ls during the period wben tbe Czecboslovak Republic was already_ supposed to he a federative state. And even thougb tbe cluration of the Slovak State falls into the perlod of war, Swiss newsmen told tbe world that the Slovak Republic was an oasis of consolidated peace and welfare. Tbat was because the Slovaks decided tbeir own affairs In tbelr country. The president of the Slovak IRepublic coulcl grant reprieves to those sen- � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 69 THE BLIND ALLEY OF TIIE CZECHOSLOVAKS BY: THE INFORMER The leading personalities ot the Council of Free Czechoslovakla In Canada had a special meeting last October in Toronto. The sesslon concerned itself wlth three burning questlons: 1. Amerlcan semi-offlclal places and factors ot the Natlonal Committee tor a Free Europe have agaln threatened to shut off au mora! and flnanclal aid it the feuding Czechoslovaks, i. e. the so-called "seventeen" members ot Dr. Osuský" and the "thirteen" ot Dr. Zenkl, do not flnd a common platform of cooperatlon and, as far as possible, a broa:der and a more effective Slovak representation in this framework. It was decided that the Toronto branch would appeal to the leading personalitles of the Councll In the USA to lssue a joint manifesto wlth the Zenkl group on October 28, the Czechoslovak Independence Day. In a word: another ma.neuver to deceive the Amerlcans who glve them bread. (As far as is known, no joint manlfesto was issued on October 28th.) 2. Czechoslovak leaders of both factions were also told that the U. S. factors concerned would welcome a move by them to flnd a platform for coming to an understandlng wlth the Sudeten Germans. Thts is all tbe more necessary, because the Allies are ready to sign a separate peace wlth Western Germany and accept it lnto the allled defense alliance. Thls point caused those present, especlally the Czech members, to qulver. And they bave reason to tremble. The Sudeten Germans will remember for a long tlme who expelled them from their anclent homeland. And the Beneš Czechs know that a strong group of antlBeneš ·Czechs, their adversarles, have already come to an understanding wlth the Sudeten Germans, slgnlng an agreement ot triendshlp wtth them, subject to certain condltlons whlch are not acceptable to the Beneš Czechs. And even if the latter would promlse to rlght the devastating damage and injustice done to the Sudeten Germans, lt would avail them nothlng, because the Germans know that the Beneš Czechs, together with the Czech Reds, are responsible for thelr expulslon from the Sudetenland of Bobemla. 3. The National Committee for a F ree Europe has been severely criticized for the type of lts "Free Gzechoslovakia" broadcasts in Munlcb. Protests against the strlctly "pro-Czech" stand of the Munlch Radlo Free Europe bave come from the Bavarian Federal Government, the German Government in Bonn, tbe antt-Beneš groups in Europe, England and the USA, and representatlves of the overwhelmlng majority of Slovaks In Europe, England, France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Canada and the USA. Tbe Beneš Czecho~lovaks are aware of all thls, hence thelr dilem ma. 'I'helr Czechosl wak s hlp ls sin king and they are exerting all -their strength to save lt. Peroutka, suppo sedly the dlrector of the "Czecbo slovak Unit" of RFE, of late is not as wild as he used to be. He was told to tone dL•wn a bit and replace several people in the Czechoslovak Unit of tb,\ NCFE broadcasts - at Jeast those who are overly burdened with communlst collaboration. Of course, Peroutka 60 SLOVAKIA will see to it that Bentt Czechoslovaks are replaced only by Beneš Czechoslovaks ! Summarlly said, there is nothlng new In the Czechoslovak sky. We are not at all surprlsl•d by the behavlor of the hard-bolled adherents or Czechoslovak centraliem. But we are very mucb surprlsed with the Slovak servants renderlnr. them Jip servlce. Rudolph Fraštackf, a BeneA Czechoslovak, recently rťturned from a European trip and told trlends that among the most recent Slovak escapees he dld not !Ind a slngle one who stands for Cze1.hoslovakism. Slnce these !atest escapees interpret the sentiments ot 1.he Slovaks at horne, we can safely say that in Slovakia, regardless of thelr reli gious or previous political divisiona, the Slovaks almoat to ,1 man are againat the reatoration of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovaks are In a bllnd alley, because they dld not b elieve In slgns of the tlmes. Freedom 1s the watchword, the everlastlng h ope and the ultlmate goal <•f all nations of the earth - lncluding the S lovak nation. FOR DR. STEPHEN OSUSKY'S BENEFIT DR. PETER SKALENICKÝ The more new refugees arrive from Slovakia, so all the more and repeatedly do they confirm the fa<:t that our policy, based in our stand of Slovak independence, is correct. Even these new escapees, often former adberents of former CzechoslovQk political parties, confinn the fact that the Slovak nation not only yearns for lts own independence, but also tbat in Slovakia today no one believes tbat it will be possible to renew the Czechoslovak Republic. Nay, the people at horne do not b elieve tbat responsible people in exile can be found wbo would work against Slovak independence. It ls something natural. Certainly, a nation wh!cb once has had its own state and bas tasted of the advantages of its own independence will never surrender it, and it can be deprived of it only by force and violence. We can look upon tbe origln of the Slovak Republic in any manner that we will, but no one can deny, nor can any one erase from Slovak hlstory tbe actuallty that the Slovaks did have thelr own state from 1939 to 1945, that tbey did bave their own president and tbeir own government, and that Slovakia dirl _appear on the map of Europe as an Independent political unit. It is often said that the Slovak Republic was a satelllte state. Even under sucb circumstances, it was comparatively more than tbe Slovaks had during the first Czecboslovak Republic, or after 1945. 'ľbe president of Slovakla and the government always had more power tban the president of the Slovak National Council (Lettrich) and the commissars had after 1945. tbat ls during the period wben tbe Czecboslovak Republic was already_ supposed to he a federative state. And even thougb tbe cluration of the Slovak State falls into the perlod of war, Swiss newsmen told tbe world that the Slovak Republic was an oasis of consolidated peace and welfare. Tbat was because the Slovaks decided tbeir own affairs In tbelr country. The president of the Slovak IRepublic coulcl grant reprieves to those sen-  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Blind Alley of the Czechoslovaks Description An account of the resource By: The Informer Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952 pp. 59-60 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/3a30f0930fb14252cce15b5ae15d325c.pdf 67b79a93269b6588ade3875e6c82c94e PDF Text Text AUGUST, 1952 SLOVAKIA THE CASE OF DR. JOSEPH TISO B Y DR. M ICHAEL ZIBRIN F rom a legal standpo111t. the case of Dľ. Joseph Tlso may be di"ided into two parts, the first part taking place in the American Zone of Germany, and the second part in the National Court or Bratislava, the capltal of Slovakia. 1 was a witness at the Nuremberg T rials, where I had taken copious notes. There 1 met people in Czecho-Slovak uniforms who had Slo vak and Czech-souncling names, but spoke with a strong Magyar and German accent. Tbey were neither Czech nor Slovak by origin. One army captain could not even speak Czech correctly. These people were under Major Ečer, a Ieft·"' inger, wbo had borrowed the title or " General." His department boasted that it had tracked down Hr . .tosepb Tiso. President of the independent State of Slovakia and, later, alao the entire Goveľllment of the Slovak Republic. Ečer and bis group were sent to Germany by the Provislonal ľzecho-Slovak Government of Dr. J ohn Šrámek (the premier), but rbey were in contact more with Dr. Hubert Ripka or directly witb Dr. l~dward Beneš than they were with Šrámek. Formally, they were to <"Oncern themselves w!th Cze<"ho-Slovak refugees as a I enatriation c-ominission and also follow the Nuremberg Trials against war criminals. Tbey had a department for eve•·yth lng; and experts In every de1,artment. Of course. Ečer's outfit had at it~ disposal huge sum., of money to tr ack down the members of the Government of the Slovak Republlc, and especially P resident Tiso. When Beneš returned to l'rague. Ečer recelved his instructlons directly from bim. NO POLITICAL ASYLUM FOR TI SO After Presldent Tlso and thP Slovak Government !1ad fJeJ Sloľakia in Apríl, 1945. tbey sought ref11ge in Kremsmiinster Tbe Iast .,.et>k ot Aprll, Dr. Joseph Tlso set 0 111. for Mnnich to Carclinal Faul•11 1>er's residence, but was delayed two days in bis jOtl''D';!Y, oecause Munlch was occupied by the Aroeri()an Army by April 30. 194á. It was th•1~ t hat Dr. Josepb Tlso became senarated trom his Government and had a bsolutely no contact with 1I. That explains wby l:!•3 signature ;5 mil'~lng on the "Surrender No•t>·' of May 8. 1945, wbirh w1s b anded !o fi 0 1eral Walton H. Walker or thf' Amerlcan Army in J< .. 0 .nsmiinst.er. .\.r!C'0rd,ng to a report In the "STARS AN D ST R!"~:S" at that ••mP when Dr. J osepb Tiso C'Onld not reach l\funich. h .. •·"!tire.i to a umall monastery in Bavaria, wbere he remainerl until mi!irnry unlls Jlicked bim up for questloning and then Jed hlm off to 111 "itnerican roncentration renter. Tlso reroained in the roncentra• :on r 11 mp ror Quite some Ume. He was questionecl not only by Amerlcan •·1thoritles. but also by Ečer's soldlers until, finally. he was surren,➔ ..red by t)Je lT. S. ·Army to Ečer and taken to Prague In November 194u, This. in short, relates to the first part ot Tii;o's case, h :, we čan­ not pass it over so llgbtly. because hls brief account éontalns many tpgal lncons'ÍRtencies. náy even illegalltles, and is contrar y to every·thing whtch has heretofore or therellfter taken place anywbere· irÍrPtnlltion-ally aťrordlng to AmeriC'an Law �2 SLOVAKIA As soon as the Slovak Government of Dr. Stephen Tlso, a co usin ol Dr. Joseph Tiso, in the name of all t he refugees fľom S lovakia, handed over to the representative of the American Army the note given below and subjected itself to its commands, at that moment the status of all escapees and, therefore, even that of the leading Slovak politlcos, should have been considered according to international practices and American la,ws, where the right of asylum, except in this one case, had never before been vlolated, at least not as far as I can recollect. The "Surrender Note" of the Slovak Government to the Ameri• cau Army read as tollows: GOVERNMENT IN EXILE AT KREMSM0NSTER, AUSTRIA SLOVAKIAN To Lieuteuant General Walton H. Walker of the U. S. Army For the Commanding General XX Corps of the U. S. Army On behalf of the S lovakia n Government In exile at Krems• miinster, Austria, I, Dr. Štefan Tiso, as Prime Minister thereof, . do submit myself, the members of my Government, our famílied and our governmental policy completely to the Comm anding General of the XX Corps of the Third Army of the United State:1. W e submit ourselves for such disposltion as may b e wise and ordered by the Allied High Comand. We beg full protectlon of the Armies of the United States in whose homeland are living about one-thlrd of our natlon and accept the democratic prlnciples of the people, for the people and by the people. W e take the liberty on this occasion to beg for protection for the entire Slov,ak colony whlch was forced to leave its country and is now iu Kremsmiinster, Austria, also for a ll our couu• trymen who live in territories occupled by the Allied forces. Kremsmiinster, 1fay 8, 1945. (Seal of the Prime Ministry) Dr. Štefan Tiso, Premier. Or. Mikuláš Pružinský, Mlnister of Financa. Medricky, Minister of Agrlculture. Kočiš, Minister of Education. T. J. Gašpar, Deputy. W. O. Collier, Brig. Gen. U. S. Army. T. O. Curtls, Col. G. S. C. Davld W. Allard, Capt. Inf. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE STARTS TISO ON ROAD TO GALLOWS True it is that all the Allies met in London as a joint International Commisslon to discuss the punishment of "War Crininals." Dr. Ečer was the Czecho·Slovak member of this Commlssion. It is also true that certain directives were agreed tiPOn for the surrender of war crlminals to indlvidual states on whose terrltorles the gullty or accused were supposed to have committed war crimes. Offlcial �SLOVAKIA 3 clocuments o( the Supreme Command o( the United Armies are supposed to tel1 ns jnst how many times such surrenders were effected, the negotiations that took pla<'e. as well as the decision reached ln each <'ase. Copies of these documenL~ were sent automatically to the Nuremberg Court to ascertain whether the persons to be surrenderecl to indivldual states ,vere needed or not at any bearings of the Court. or wbether the Court itself intended to try tbe lndividuals in questlon. 1 checked over these documents quite thoroughly but failed to flnd ?.nything of the sort relating to Dr. Joseph Tiso, or the Government of Dr. Stephen Tiso. I am, therefore, inclined to believe tbe whispered reports which circulated in Nuremberg át that tíme both among the Allies and the members of Ečer's commisslon tbat the surrender ot Dr. Joseph Tlso was not in accord with accepted legal precepts or p1,actices and that some violations of accepted laws and practlces had occurred in Tiso's case. On June 25th, and agaln on J une 27, 1945, the Czecho-Slovak Hadio clalmed that Dr. Joseph Tiso and, later, even ibe Slovak Government, were taken into custody by American authorities. Reports had it tbat they were transportecl to Pilsen. But the reports were false. Americans of Slovak descent were lntensely interested in the tate of Tiso and Slovakia. They requested their State Department not to surrender Tiso and the members of the Slovak Government to nenes• "Provisional Czechoslovak Government," because that certainly wo111<1 mean death for Tiso. But thls availed them nothing, Al the insistence of Benes' Government. the U. S. Department of State ordered the U. S. authoritles In Austrla to surrender Tiso and bis group to Benes' "Czechos lovak War Crimes Commisslon" wlthout even lnvestigating their statns as is evidenced from a letter of Actlng Secretary DEAN ACHESO~. written August 30, 19H. and published ln the "JEDNOTA" {Middlelown, Pa.) '.\{arch 5, 1947. Tbe letter read: "Since detalls concerning the surrender of Dr. Stephen Tiso and members of his Government are not available to the Department of State, a copy of your letlf'r has been transmittecl to the W ar Department together \ľith a request that the Secretary of War <'Ommunicate \ľl th you dlrectly on this particular matter. "A totJal of flfteen high officials af the former Slovak Government weľe arrested by the Unlted States Army at varions limes during tbe montbs of May and June. 1945. . . . "The arrest of these individuals and their rel ease to the CzechoSlovak Government was in conformity with United States policy re. garding the disposition of United Nations' nationals who cÓllaborated with or assisted the enemy. The policy is to apprehend such coJlat.orators as may be founcl within the jnrisdictión of tTnited States milltary authorities. to notify the respertive United Nations' Governments of such apprehension, and to hold such persons pending the clecision of the respective government~ as to their <lis_posltlon unless they are to de detained as war criminals or for other reasons. In view of ~bis policy, the Department of State, in October, 1945, informed the Commandíng General of thc Uníted States Forces, European �SLOVAKJA T.beater, that the fifteen individuala in hia cuatody who had been membera of ·· the collaborationiat Slovak Government ahould be re• leaaed to the appropriate Czechoalovak authoritiea. They were handed over in November, 1945. . . . From Acbeson's letter it ls quite evldent that Benes' "Provision,u Czechoslovak Government" was included among the "United Natlon,ľ t:overnments." All Benes had to do 1, as label any citlzen of Czecho· Slovakia a "collaborator'' and the U. S. State Department, "in r.011 · tormity with United States policy" pursued at tbat tlme, delivered He11es' politicdl opponents to Ečer witbout even investlgating tbe cbll,rges of collaboration. American tradltions went down tbe draln. 'ľbe rigbt of political asylum, always regarded as something sacred by tbe people of tbe Unlted States was violated in the case of Tlso and the Slovak Government. Benes. it seems, could get away with everyt,blng, because he knew the right people. Tbe ract that he 1 esigned as president and left his country wheu it faced a grave r-risis aud tben congratulated bi~ successor, wbo was elected coasti· tutlonally, meant nuthing to the U. S. State Department. But. it meant certain death to many patriotic Slovaks and untolll sufferings to many t housands more. It !s quite certain that negotiations were tied u1> several t lme!I. because the Engllsh were reluctant to agree tbat 'ľi so be surrendered to Ečer at a tíme when Prague had alreally announcect his deliveraiLce to Ečer. No matter how tb.e events of that time were distorted, the ract remalns that an unexpected telepbone call from the airport was rec·eived during a session of tbe Prague Parliament, reportlng that Dr. Joseph Tiso was brought to Prague. Shortly thereafter, Minister Ko· pecký gleefully displayed a pboto taken at tbe Prague airport which showed bow Tiso was being led under heavy guard with bands bound by a cbain and a loc-k. All the Communlsl papers and eveu tbe organ of Šrámek's Czec-h Populist Party, LlDOVÁ DEMOKRACIA (People's IJemocracy), displayed the picture promlnently. . Shortly aftE>r bis arrlval in Pragne, Tl~o was transported to Bratislava. wbere one wing of the Jail was em.ptied to take care of bim and bis ľOmpan!ons Tbey werE> guarded not by ordlnary jail guards. bm by !',elect. members of tbe Nationality Securlty Ouard. EV ERYTHING SET AGAINST TISO Investigation of • Tiso began at onre. But not according to accepted practice and, bence. wbole month~ pasRed witbout a regular preparation to review tht: case of Dr Tlso. As ROOn as Tiso was, placed in the jail or the Federal Co11rt. bis case. arcording to the laws in force at that time. belonged before the National Conrt and the lnves1:gation had to be made by the procurators or prosecutlng attorneys or tbe Natlonal Court. The prosecuting attornP.vs assigned to prosecute '.ľiso and his group were: Dr. George Šujan. Dr. l{lgan and Dr. Ra§la. Since each prosecutor waR assigned particular persons to prosecute. the whole investlgatlon suffered from a taek of unity ancl wa.s casual; hence, lt could malte little headway. Secondly, tbe prosecutlon. it seems. could not or dld not wan t to flnd any wltnesses besldes those who were arreste,I. �Sl,OVAKIA 5 And, thirdly, the Prague State Court constautly kept sendlng c1emands to have Dr. Tiso tPstiľy Iu varlous cases which were tried there. T lso was beard as a w1tness, and theše hearings took up much of tbe .tlme of the inveseigating organs. And so, for techoical reasons, as well as polltical efforts to oostpone Dr. Tlso's trial, the case of Dr. Tiso was not even ready up 10 the electlons or May, 1946, and, hence, could not even get started before tbat time. as the Communlsts had reckoned that it would. They exerted tremendous pressure to have the trial begln before the elections. but there were so many compllcatlons that it was imposslble to do so. After the electlons wblť'h the Slovak Democratic Party had won so decisively and In which tn<> promis,i of sparing Tiso's llfe plaýéd such a prominent role, it appeared for a time that Dr. Joseph Tlso would get a fair tria!. There is a great dlfference between a court and a court When a person appears in court, there can be doubts and objectlons as to bis personallty and morallty. The C'ourt exlsts for tbe purpose of removing such doubts; when that happens , the accused person Ie morally rehabl»tated. Very grave charges were made agalnst Tls o not only In the emigratlon. of Dr. Beneš, but also on the podlum of the Prague parllament. l3ut there al"o were promises and guarantees that t he worst would not happen. 'rhe beginning of 1946 was s igniflcant for its polltical ferment. witb pressure on the Slovak Democratlc Party. and the pressure or Dr. Beneš and the Prague Government on the supreme rlgbts or a soverelgn nation. These rlghts. it was thought. the Slovak NaUonal Coun<'ll, beaded by Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, had been assured by the socalled Košie.e Agreement of March 2. 1945. Tberefore, whatever t.he representatlves of tbe Slovak Natlonal C'ouncll had willingly ylelded to the Benešltt>s and the Zenklltes must be evaluated in terms of the infltu•nce these concesslons had on the fate of Dr. Joseph Tlso. If -w e woul<I glauce over t he resolutlons ot the Slovak National ('ounc il of March 2. 1945. wbere that body stressed the plcture ot Hate llte as it visuallzed it, t hen there !s llttle dlfference between 1hat co.n<'eption and the Slovak State as lt actually was. And lf the a:c<'epted princlples and resolutions had been adhered to and not devlated trom after t he electlons, In whlch the Slovak Democratlc Party had beaten t he Commnnlsts cleclslvely, Dr. Tlso unquestlonably would bave been allve today. From Aprll to June, 1943. Šrám ek's provislonal Czecho-Slovak Government In T,ondon was preparing the St.ate Act. whicb was pro<'lalmed' ón Jnne 30, 1943. It was plalnly evldent that thls act tbreat: Pned Tis6 and the entlre body of the Slovak Government. On March 2, 1945, the Slovak Natlonal Council clemanded In the very tlrst paragraph of the KošlcP Agreement that the new government of Czecho-Slovakla decJare that it does not identity itselt wlth tbe proclamatlon or June 30, 1943, of the Czecho-Slovak Government in I..ondon. �6 SLOVAKIA BE N EŠ H A S HIS WAY Shortly after arrivin~ in Prague, Dr. Edward Ileneš formally betray~d · Ruthenia to the U .,S.S.R., and, being recognized by Stalin, felt that he \ľas firmly in the saddle again. Alrea.dy on June 22, 1945, be demanded that the Slovaks relinqulsh what they had voted for on ?>farch 2, 1945. Dr. Beneš disregarded the wishes of tbe Slovak majority and begau to push bis own exponents to the forefront - Slávik. Hečka, etc. but when this dld not go well for bim, he turned to Dr. Vavro Šrobár •and Dr. Vladimír Clementis and several other more compliant persons wbo were willing to repudlate everything tbat Beneš had to promise in Moscow and Košice. Clementis was a leading Communist In Slovakia, while Dr. Šrobár, whom Beneš had named Financa Minister against the will off tbe entire Slovak Nalional Councll, was the foremost proponent of Beneš's National Socialism among the Slovaks. Confrontea w1th the promises he had made and the note wlllcb he had seut to the Slovak National Council trom London by means or Ursíny and Novomeský, Dr. Beneš sald that these were forced out ot him, just as the Pittsburgh Pact of 1918 had been forced on Masaryk. And, he aclded, tbat "everything was not in order even in MosBeneš remonstrated and demonstrated that an absolutely indeJJendent Slovakia was out of the question, that the threat of Russia was ever present, and that after Rutheuia, Slovakia woulcl surely be next in line for absorption by the USSR. The dlscussions and debates finally ended with the first. Prague Treaty of June 2, 1945. whiC'h cleflned the ľunctions of the various ministries, the matters 011 wbicb only the Prague Government could rule, and the matters that ,ľere s11ppose<1 to belong to the competency of tbe Slovak Natlonal Council. It is rathe r amusing that the seventh article of tbat Prague Agreement stated that tbe seat of he Supreme Court would -be in Hrntislava. That seat is still in Prague as it always had been. DEMOCRATS W IN E L ECTION S, B U T L OS E EVERYT HI N G Agreement or no agreement. Dr. 13eneš and bis Goľernment did what they pleased. Llfe in the state went according to the Prague Agreement more or less untll April 1946 - a month before the flrst JJOSt-war parliamentary elections. Then beli itself broke loose • The Slovak Democratic Party was attacked furiously by all Czech partles, being incited by Beneš, as well as the Communists. Despite this, ho,i,·ever. notbing can justify tbose "ho concluded tbe Prague Agreement of June 22, 1945. Even though the Freedom Party came into being at that Ume with money supplied by Šrobár, Beneš ancl thP Communists, or wa.« organized by Široký, and the concessions, made at a tíme when the Communists strongly demanded thE' tria! of Dr. Joseph Tlso, may in ~ome way be justified, there is no one who can teli me that Lettrlch was in any ,ľay justified to renounce the right to gra.nt amnesty. The man who did that knew well that Tiso was in the custody oľ the Fecleral Court in Bratislava and that he was surrendered from Slovak juriscliction ·into the hands of Beneš and the Czechs who hated him fanatically and undivldedly. ····· �SLOVAKIA 7 Iu Article 1 of the second Prague Agreement there is a section O, which speaks about clemency and states: "The President of tbe Republic grants mercy even in Slovakia and that also in matters which belong before the People's Courts and the National Court - on the motion of the Commissloner of Justice, who presents lt to the Government through the Officers of tbe Slovak NaUonal Council; the Government then returns the motion to tbe Ofticers of tbe Slovak National Council, if it has objections against it from the standpoint of all-state interests. bnt otherwise presents it to the President of the Republlc." When Dr. Lettriťh together with John Ursiny presented this agreement to the officers of the Democratic Party for approval and later a lso, when they explained it, expressly gave assurances that before signing this agreement they had dellberated with Dr. Beneš and that he ha.cl deflnltely promised and assured them that he would grant mercy to Dr. Tiso and they could safely transfer the power ot amnesty to bim. It is interesling, however, that nothing about tbis assurance ls D1entioned either in Dr. Kvetko's book, whlch was published in Bratislava in 1947, or in the article of Dr. Lettrich which descrlbes the case or Dr. Tiso. In bis articles Dr. Lettrich refers to the assurance of Dr. Beneš of September 1946 in Topoľčianky, where Beneš expressly promised that he would grant mercy to 'ľiso and added: "By my declsion I shall not cause any complications in Slovakia." In evaluating the truth and the proclamations of Beneš we must admit that in June, 1945, both presidents of the Slovak National Counc!I - Schmldtke, as well as Lettrich - had expressed themselves very sharply against Tlso in offlclal manifestations, when they already knew that Dr. Tlso was under arrest in Bavaria slnce June 9, 1945. We must not forget tbat the Premier at that time was Fierlinger who had attacked Tlso very sharply, and aJ.so the Democratic Party for standing back of Tiso. Per· 5onal expressions of Beneš, sneh as "Tiso wi ll hang," were known •o Lettrich and also to Ursiny. And that is more reason why they ;,honld have considered well whether they could believe Beneš, slnce they themselves had sald on various occasions, relating from their own P.Xperiences, that Beneš cannot be believed and especially not when be was concerned with the problem of savlng or destroying an enemy which he hated so insanely as he dld Dr. Joseph Tlso. As soon as the second Prague Agreement went into effect, Tiso c-ould have been saved only before the Court, if the Court would have rendered any other verdict but that of death. Despite the fact that Tiso's fate was sealed In such a way, we must not · end this chapter after the second Prague Agreement, because, in my oplnion, it is just at such limes that people prove best whether they possess character and a spina! column. L ETTRICH'S PRE-E LECTION PROMISES I know that many „people pleaded with :Beneš to grant clemency to· TiS-O even before the tria! was lnitlated. Beneš promlsed everybody ·that he would. But despite Beneš's promlse, leadlng polltlclans o! the Rlov1tk Democratlc Party should not have believed bim. if they thougbt �8 SLOVAKIA seriously and bonorably about tbe promises the Party had giveo tbe representatives of the Catbolic wing. Io Aprll 1946, the ,econd Prague agreemeot wa.s not tbe ooly iigreement made; an agreement was also concluded witb tb.e so-called <..:atbolic wing of tbe Democratic Party, wbicb was actlng more lndel'endeotly, and foť quite a Ume it was not known wbetber or not lt would bolt tbe Democratlc Party and join wltb tbe Freedom Party. Tbis so-called Catbolic agreement of tbe Democratlc Party was attacked viciously not only by tbe Communists, but also by tbe Beaeš Czechs. One of tbe main polnts of this agreement, even tbougb lt was oot expressed in writing, was that Tiso's life would be spared. In tbe May, 1946 elections, the Communists suftered a territlc l;teing, tbe Democratlc Party taking 62 per cent of the total vote cast iu Slovakia. So. everybody, especially tbose who voted for tbe Democratlc Party candidates, thought that the Party would keep lts pro mise to save the life of Dr. Tiso. The <..:ommunists and various representatives of tbe Trade Uuions, ho" ever. kept poundlng the tables all summer in 1946 to instltute the tria! of Tiso. It was clear that the matter could not bé delayed ľor long. Suddenly in the second half or October, 1946, without the Tiso matter stralghtened out, Dr. Lettrlch embarked on a visit to tbe llnlted States. Lettrlch claims that before his departure he had come to ao uoclerstandlng witb Pollák and Cvinček, Vice-Presidents of tbe Slovak ,\ .'atlonal Council, tbat the matter would not be asslgned to the Natio nal Court oefore h1s return home. Cvinček, however, denled that Lettrlcb had ,ald anything of the sort. But even 1t if was the trutn, !r is a very weak and slok alibi. Dr. Lettrloh was aware of the fa.cc , na· whlle he 1\!'aS preslrlent of the Slovak Natlonal Councll, tbe Com• •nunists got i.ny one tbey wanted on the Councll of Commissloners. Aud he knew that tbe most important minlstry, the Mlnlstry of tbe lnterlor, did not go to a member of the strongest party, but, lt was said, to a 11on-party man, Beneš's man, a servant of the Communlsts, tó General Ferjenčik. Tbe signature of Dr. Lettrich is on Ferjenčik's deoree. Arter tbese experiences could Lettr!ch belleve that Cvinček and Pollák would be able to hold the )lne w!thout hlm, when he hlmseU adm!ts in hls artlcle that Milan Pollák was uncertaln, tick.le and for tbe executlon of Dr. Tiso? · · The fact ls that after the departure ot Dr. Lettrlch, the case ot Dr. Tlso was presented to the National Court, and tbe presldent of the court senate became the feared Dr. Igor Da.xner, And here I see for Uié second Ume the sealed will of Dr. Beneš to bang Tlso at all costs. And for the second tlme I see Tlso's fate sealed with the a.s· slsiance of the representatlves of the Slovak Democratlc Party despite the promises and obllgatlons to tbe eleotorate. " I W tL L HANG OR. T ISO!" · Wben Dr. Daxner was allowed to become tbe presiding judge, 1Íolbfog good could be expected. All the assumptlons in thls regard XJaxner manitested by hls behavlor long before the tria! -and proved lt afterward. ·: . �SLOVAKIA 9 The day before the date of the main hearing was set, I myselt waé convinced of thls when I tried to help to remove Daxner. The Communiste, however, were so firmly anchored in the Slovak NaUonal Council that Dr. Daxner was approved as preslding judge of the National Court wlthout any dltflculty. On November 18, 1946, the National Court was supposed to eonvene an"d,determine the term of the maln hearing, begin the trlal anil present the decument ot charges agalnst Tiso. The previous day, when I had gone to Dr. Daxner to ask for a permanent admlttance pass to tbe tria!, Dr. Daxner began to argue and tried to persuade me to go along wlbh ševčik and Pollák, and not with the "popullsts and separatlsts." He asked me to follow the tria! of Dr.l Tlso and use my lnfluence In the Democratlc Party so that lt would not ldentlfy Itself wlth Dr. Tlso and would not make any dlfflculties for Da.xner. When I retueed, he banged bis flst on the table and screamed: "You are doing wrong. The Communiata will devour you, tear you to piecea, and I will hang Dr. Tiao!"1 tried to quiet bim ciown and cautioned him 'that a judge should not talk that way and that lt also was against the law for a judge to express his opinion so resolutely against the accused. But Daxner oniy grew more exclted, banged the table agaln and agaln and yelled: " Do whatever you want to, but I shall hang him !" I related the incident to Andrew Cvlnček, addlng that I was williog to teit:fy to it a.t any th:p.e. I reminded hlm that I knew Daxner well. I knew that Daxner WltS a paralytlc, a sadlst and a person of very bad mora! and · spirltual qualitles. I also told hlm that I did not belleve that Beneš would grant amnesty to Dr. Tlso. I refused to talk about the matter before the body o! o!ficers of tbe Democratlc Party, because ševčik and Pollák were among them, and · r knew definitely that they were betraylng our matters to the Communlsts. In fact I knew that ševčík was a paid agent ot tbe )JKVD (secret police). Thereupon the offlcers or the Party named a five-member commlttee to hear my story. Urslny, Cvlnček and Dr. Pietor reallzed the gravity of the situatlon and promlsed to try to do somethlng in Prague before December 2, the date when the hearings in the case or Dr. Tiso were to be concluded. THE M OCK TRIAL BEGINS But, alas, nothing happened. On December 2, 1946, Dr. Daxner opened the tria! with Dr. Joseph Tlso before the Natlonal Court in Bratislav-a. The trial took place in the jury room. The prosecutlon was represented by Dr. Rigan, Dr. Šujan anu Dr. Rašla. Dr. Tlso ,via.s defended by Dr. Grečo and Dr. Ža!Íkay. That is how a correspondenťs repor.t would read. And tbat is jus t about how the reports of the Slovak Press Bureau lookec\. But the truth 1s altogether differenl Tlso's frlends and bis famlly had engaged the servlces of a very respectable counsellor, Dr. Lojek, to defend Tiso. However, as soon as D"r. Lojek presented the full authorlzatlon or Dr. Joseph Tlso, he was ordered to appear before the poliťe, who began to inVesfigate hlm. They as ked why he wanted to defend Tlso, who dlscussed the defe nse wlth htm, how much he was pald, and other Jess sensLble Queatlons. What Lojek actually went tbrough ls known only to bim and the �10 SLOVAKIA police. The fact is that he gave up the defense o[ Tiso, and there was nothing else for T!so to do but ask the court to provide defense counsels. This incident, !( everythiug else Iu the tria! against Tiso would be iu order, ra!sed a reasou.ab!e doubt that the tria! would be just and in order. At the same time it made people th!nk and assume that the tria! would be carried on according to some agreement, that it would be a forma! process and. therefore, could not be just and fair. In a word that everyth!ng was cut and drled and Tiso's fate was sealed. I do not press the faet that Dr. Daxner was the presiding judge, but for the sake of the truth I must remlnd that attempts were made to remove Daxner before lhe tria! started. Of course, the tria! wa.,; prepared and no one could degress from the prepared program or could successfully take exception to it. Besides Daxner, there were six attendant justices, one a judge by profession, and tbree attendant justices as a reserve, in case one or the other attendant justices would drop out or get sick. It is a universal custom, that against such a court - whether it be called a senate or a jury - the accused, the prosecutor and the defense have the rlght to testify whether a certain person is accepta ble to them or not, and, also to state wbat objections they might entertain against any person of lhe jury or court. Likewise the principle holds universaJJy that when one is proposed as a wltness he cannot be in tbe same tria! also as an attendant or part of the court, and much less so as the presid!ng judge of the court. Slnce the Slovak Democratic Party could uot remove Daxner, tbe defense attomeys tried to replace bim as was their right to do. In the first place they objected because Daxner was incarcerated during the Slovak Republic and, later, had expressed himself on various occasions that all the accused must be hanged and, therefore, it was evldent that he was prejudiced. According to all pena! laws. prejudlce 1s an excluding circumstance. Then they proposed to have Dr. Daxner as a witness to testify that after Da.·rner was freed from jail, Dr. Tlso had allowed bim to take over hls judgeshlp again. Alexander Mach wanted Daxner to testify that it was only by the grace of Mach that Daxner was freed from prison on the basis of the false med!cal testimony and a false X•Ray picture. Daxner simply admltted Mach's statement and proclaimed that bis testimony was no longer needed. As far as prejudice was concerned. he sa!d that the objection was not proper, because he sald he was objeetive, and imediately ordered the tria! to begin. AL L OBJECTION S OVE RRU L ED According to every Jaw. objections cannot be overruled by a •judge against whom they are made. This is a fundamental princlple of pena! procedure. But laws were no gulde for Daxner. He had only one gulde: to condude the process as speE!dily a.s poss!ble and render the verdict he had promlsed bis bosses. When the defense counsels saw that they were gett!ng nowhere, they began to tackle the matter from a Jegal standpoint. They ob- �SLOVAKIA ll jected that the court was not made up properly, and that the de<:rees of lhe Slovak ::-l'ational Council about people's courts were not valid and, finally, that Dr. Tiso was not surrendered properly by the American occupation authorltles, as prescribed in accepted 1nter· natlonal regulations, but that Tiso was forcefully transported lnto Czecho-Slovakia without the knowledge of the four powers concerned, or only with the knowledge of one of those powers. The defense sald that if Tiso was a war crlmlnal, then bis surrender should have been determined by t he Internatlonal Tribunal in :-.1Uremberg. U he was not a war crimlnal, and the American General In command in Kremsmlinster May 8, 1945, accepted the capitulatlon or the Government of Dr. Stephen Tiso, then, in that case, all members of that Government, and so much more the Presldent, have the rlght the right of asylum, thls belng based on the following arguments: l. According to the Atlantlc Charter, i!IS\ted by the Presldent or llle United States and the Engllsh Prime Minister, every nation has the · right to choose the form of government under which it shall live· and to its own statehood; 2. the head of such a state was not subject to the legislative power of a foreign state for pena! acts, which may have been committed during the existence of and on the territory of such a State; 3. the Slovak State was recognized by some 27 States, including Great Britaln, with which it had diplomatlc rela· tions; also with the Soviet Union: 4. neither Great Drltain nor France agreed to the surrender of Dr. Tiso and, therefore, Dr. Tlso should be returned to Altčitting, in Bavaria, wbere on Jtme 9, 1945. he was arrested by American Military Police. 'l"hls contention o[ the defense still holds today. I myself can eonflrm that Britaln and France never agreed to the surrender of Dr. Tiso. According to the International Agreement oť J anuary 13, 1942, eoncluded in London, which refers to the Atlantlc Charter and the proclama.tion of Roosevelt and Churchill of October 25, 1941, lliternatlonii:lly only those criminals were to be surrendered who had undertaken, besides mllitary acts, such attacks against clvillzed populntions whlch were considered criminal among clvilized natlons. Tiso was not accused of such a crime. Furthermore, others who could be surrendered were those·,, who as occup,tnts, or representatives of occupants, committed or allowed to be committed punishable acts against the clvillan popu!a:tion. · Tiso was not accused of ,any such punlsha.ble acts by the In· habitants of the ló Slovak vlllages which were taken by the Slovak Hepubllc from the Polish territory. If, however, he or bis subordinates had commltted a pena! act on Pollsh terrltory, then, accordlng to the agreement above, Dr. Tiso could be accused only by the Poles and tried II! Warsaw. . Na.turally, Dr. Daxner repucliated any and all such objectlons and announced that bis court was competent to try Dr. Tlso. Then the tleťense counsels requested that the tria! take place before a regular and not before a revolutionary national court, because all the preferred pena! acts were commltted before the two decrees of 1945 ot tbe Slovak National Councll were effective. The defense clalmed that only Cor pena! acts commltted after the issuance of some pena! form ,vas 1-t posslble to carry ·on a pena! procedure arcording to sucb a norm. �12 SLOVAKIA even though penal sanctions remain according to some Jater norm. The pena! procedure itself, however, should be carrled on according to thé norma! penal oťder. Even Tlso hlmself declared that he dld not recognlze the decree of the Slovak National Court, by whlch the socalled National Court and the People's Courts were establlshed, because he was under arrest trom June 9, 1945, and, therefore, could not have committed any pena! act against the regulations lssued by the Slovak National Councll. We la.wyers had debated whole hours before the Tiso tria! · about these very weighty Jegal problems and then even durlng the trial, but Daxner repudiated them in a s ingle moment by banglng on the table and screaming: "I . repudiate all objections. ľll take care of all pena! procedures here!" And that is how the tria) against Tiso began. Up to that tíme, the tria) room was fllled wlth Slovak and Czech reporters and forelgn observers, but after that moment all who were not resldents of Bratislava left the proceedlngs, because they reallzed that the fate of Tlso was sealed and only a mock tria) was to be staged. During the two hours, which I have thus f.ar desctibed, Daxner several tlmes howled llke a jackall, banged on the table and threat• ened Dr. ~abkay, and even Dr. Kšinan, who defended Mach, tbat he would tbrow tbem out of the court room. The whole procedure was recorded on sound tape and tbat evenlng the newsmen wbo _gave a report. about the trial, p•ayed this portion of the recorded tape, wblch was falthfully recorded. The popula.tlon of Slovakl-a bega.n to sound off because of Da.xner's conduct. Tbe Democratic Party and lts representatlv01, were the target of bitter and viclous attacks; the people inslsted that the Party keep lts promlses. It began to be generally sald that Tiso's verdict was already settled and that what• ever Da.xner was doing was only a comedy. Desplte the fact that tbi!I was true, thls process nevertheless. brought out some hlstorical trutbs which we shall need In the future and whicb without tbi.B trial would not have come to l!ght. Wh~n Dr. Žabkay rose to bis feet on March 6th and said only t.hree words - "Prosim, aby bolo ..." ("l beg, in order that lt be") he was lnterrupted by Daxner who jumped to bis feet and barked: "Tbe court overrules tbat!" When Žabkay protested and explained that the court could not overrule something which he had not al! yet aaid, Dr. Daxner bellowed: "But I tel1 you tbat the court does over• rule lt!" THE W I TNESSES The wltnesses who testified in the Tlso tria) might be ·p laced in three categories: . • l, The Catholic clergymen toward whom I)axner acted . arro· gantly. I thtnk tbat it was on account or tbem that Dr. Tiso decided tQ (!Pl!&k In h!s own defen$e, They were Archblshop Charles Kmefko and BJshop Michael Bm;alka. From the leg.al standpo!nt, I regarded it as the greatest tnsult When Dr.. Daxner announced in the name of the Court that , he woul<l �SLOVAKIA 13 not swear ln tbese witnesses. Ordinarily, according to prevalling la.ws in Europe, the court does not swear in a wltness when there are reasons why it does not want to believe hlm. That 1s, In Europe a witness is first heard and then the court determlnes whether he ah!Wi be sworn io or not. Daxner's conduct was openly provocatlve and in· s ulting to disbonor such a serlous, aged man, as was Dr. Kmetko, wbo was respected by all decent Slovaks regar-dless of thelr rellgious beliefs. It is sigo1ficant that at tbe time Dr. Kmeťko was teslfylng, the Czech Catholic clergymen had several deliberatlons and lssued memoranda and reports, but displayed practically no open interest in what was happening In Slovakia. Not even Archbishop Joseph Beran, the Czech Primate, could find anything to say in tbe interest of the honor of the Catholic priesthood of Slovakia representéd by Pr, KmeCko. Tbe Czech clergymen followed Beran's example and. failed to ralse their volces and to rally tbe Catholic Czechs !n defense ot Justlce and righteousness. 2. In· the second category belonged the Slovak members of Gottwa.lďs government, namely, Ursiny and Lichner. Daxner talked to Ursíny as thóuugh he were an underling. From flve meters away Daxner greeted htm: "Why we, Mr. VlcePreinler of the Government, know each otber well, because we or• ganlzed the underground together." - Ursíny broke out lnto a broad s mlle and said nothing, though he should bave said: You, Mr. presidlng judge, were nowhere and did nothing, unless you were in some tavern, Sir, and there I, John Ursíny, did not go. Otberwise Ursíny did not say anything substantial, except that 'ľiso did not want bim in the Slovak Government. nor in the Peasant Banks, and that he was In the concentratlon camp at Illava for three days, but was not beaten there and was fed well. Daxner exploited Ursiny, however, by using general expres11ions, s·uch as, "Why we know that ... Why we did that together ... Why that does not have to be explained to us." Of course, the Communist press immediately glorified Daxner as a great hero of the underground movement, to whose actlvlty_ UT· Ríny hlmself had attested. Minlste.r .Tohn Lichner, however. ,v,as a witness of another type. Daxner did not welcome bim with a smile or a greetlng, but with the questlon: "You were a minister of Dr. Tiso's Government?" - He -then asked Lichner whether he traveled and delivered speeches in a uniform of tbe (Hlinka) Guard and why Tiso later dlsmlseed hlm. ' .Licbner expla!ned as best he could, but it must have been evident even to hlm tbat Daxner was not even remotely lnterestjid. 3. The third group of witnesses was the most interestlng. I be· ·11evé I can· characterize thls group properly, because I had wltnessed t hé N'uremberg trlals. There I saw ield Marshal von Paulus go before the :rrtternational Trlbunal, and in Bratislava I saw General Ferdin,and Čatld!ľ go béfore the National Cou-rt. Both men had much in common Both were soldlers, generals; thelr appearance In court w.as .a -surprlse; and both appeared a.t a time when lt. was opportune for tbe. Commun!sta and einbárrasslng for the defense. · In Nuremberg, ·Goerlng read romances and detectlve storles and generally was not lnterested In the tria!. When, to hls great surprlse, �14 SLOVAKTA the American Police brought Paulus, the heroic "defender" of Stalingrad, into the court room, Goering for a moment took off bis glasses, looked around, llstened and then said to the leading personaJities of the German General Staff: "'Fhis is hopeless ! this is swinishness ! " Should I repeat only thls sentence In reference to Čatloš, I would help the reader of these lines, because the result wlll be the same. Paulus entered the Nuremberg court room slowly with a oautious step; he was attired in an elegant dark blue sult, a starc-hed whJte s hirt, as if it was out of porcelain. He spoke slowly and pretended to be deaf; bis eyes were glassy, his frame strlkingly numb, and hli< eyes up1ifted almost straight to the heavens. The same could be s-ald for Čatloš. He, too, was dressed In a dark blue suit and was about twice as deaf as Paulus; but bis eyes, s tance were the same - just as if twlns appeared on two different stages. Paulus saw nothing but evil in everythlng that Hitler dld. Čatloš tried to prove to Tiso that he knew about all thlngs - the posslble and the impossible - because he, Čatloš, reported to bim on everything every morning ,at nine o'clock. Tlso smiled ironically and saíd: "To report, report he did, but whether he told me everything, I do not know." The fact is, according to what Čatloš said, that Čatloš sbould have sat in Tiso's place; for those acts Čatloš and not Tiso should have answered. It is interesting that bctb generals stuck to the orders or MosťOW, that they preferred to be deaf and more deaf, so tbey could speak slowly and thus have time to think thlngs over. Both held up faiľly well the first several hours, but then both slipped up a bit. Paulus was taken back to Moscow, and Catloš to the Rratislava jail. Later Catloš was taken to Prague, where Czéťh mllltary correspondents questloned him. I had not met Paulus before and, hence, did not know bim. But I knew Čatloš from my cbildhood days, and the last time I saw ·hlm was In September, 1939, in Prešov. The Catloš, who seven years later ťame to the court room of Dr. Daxner, seemed to be about twenty years older and bis mind compared wlth that or a tbird grader and not that of a general. I am wllling to testlfy under oath even today that the Catloš who sat before Daxner was not the master of his own wlll, tbat he was a broken man actlng under pressure of some one else. Catloš definitely was not a.ťtlng as a norma! person. Another such wltness was Dr. Martin Sokol, former Premier or the Slovak Parliament. The first day he acted as Catloš did; ma.ny t!mes he made it aggravating for Tiso; h e was stupified, deaf and gazed toward tbec eiling. On the second day Sokol reacted differently; as lf the Slovak environment began to affect bim and the lnjections were Joslng tbelr force (here I remind tbat the expression "!njectlons" was used by Dr. Tiso when answerlng ča.tloš); his answers took on a Slovak color and he talked clearly and lntelligently abotu the confllcts between Dr. Joseph Tlso and Dr. Vojtech Tuka. Dr. Sokol conld not revoke everytbing he had saia, but on the seťond day Dr. Sokol definitely appeared wlth bis old smlle in tbe lE>ft ťorner of bis month. nespite thlfl, bowever. the characteristic lnfluen('e.'! of Rmislan indodrinatlon were planlly evldent. This was �SLOVAKIA 15 intluences also by the thlrd par:ticipant of the Moscow school, D1. John Spišiak, the former ambassador of the Slovak Republic in Budapest. Were I to repeat how Spišiak appeared and what he said, I would only be repeating what I had said about Paulus. It was the same school, the very same school wlthout regard to the fact where the s tudents dld the answerlng, whether In Athens, Budapest, Bratislava, or Prague. Then there was a special group, a group of German origin, who al one tlme or auother were actlve in Slovakia. As a Slovak, or as a defense couusel of Slovak orlgin, I would never rely on thelr testi• mony. I was very glad, nay even proud, that Dr. Tlso never appealed to the testimony of these Germans. We can thank Dr. Tlso that we do not have disputes s uch as the Czechs have among themselves over what answers of Ludin are correct and which are false. K. H. Frank, Hitler's man in Prague, signed a different protocol every hour before his death. According to one, Krajina was the leader of the Czech reslstance and, according to another, Dr. J . Krajina, the future secretary-general of Zenkľs party, was the greatest collaborator with the Germans . We Slovaks do not have such differences. And for that we can be thankful to Dr. Tlso, who never concerned himself with German testlmony. Defense speeches refuted the propriety of the court and demanded that Dr. Tiso be returned to the American occupation authoritles in Germany. They pointed out that if Tiso had acted in the manner of Daxner, Da.xner would today be a natlonal corpse and not the presldlng judge of the Natlonal Coun. The defense counsels further polnted out that General Kristin, :VIinister Široký and Minister Ďuriš - who were sentenced to dle. but were saved by Tlso - would have Jong been dead, if Tiso had followed Daxner's example. The defense demonstrated that it was not true, as the prosecu· tion stated, that America, Great Britain and France were at war with Slovakla, but conversely officers of the Slovak Army played tennis with Amerlcan flyers, because every one regarded them not as enemles, but as interned persons of a forelgn state. T H E V ERDICT : " DEATH" - A S FORECAST On the 18th of March, 1947, the Court adjourned to prepare the verdlct. Suddenly, llke a bolt out of clear sky, the report came at 10 P. M. on Apríl 14, 1947, when the officers of the Democratlc Party were in session, that Dr. Daxner had designated the next day, April 15, 1947, as the day he would render the verdict. The Ume was set for 9:0 OA. M. AU of us turned pale, because none of us had expected it. Of course, the Communists were not surprised at all, because they knew l'verything that Daxner was going to do. On Aprll 15, 1947 at 9:30 A. M. the rea.ding of the verdict be· gan; it lasted until 9 P. M. We had expected almost anything to happen. However, that a judge would subordinate hlmself or become subservient to a political party - that no lawyer, no senstble man expected to happen. lt was a s urprise for everybody. �16 SLOVAKIA After the verdict was rendered, the third pbase of the Dr, Tlso ca se began - the final chapter: the fight for amnesty. After the judge rendered the verdict of death on the gallows for Tiso,. Daxner asked the condemned Tiso whether he would request the Court for clemency. Tlso measured DaxneT carefully and said slowly: "I do ask for clemency on mora! grounds." Dr. Žabkay, the defense attorney, presented the Court the rea· sons why Tlso sbould receive mercy and asked tbe Court that Dr. Josepb Tiso's request be placed before tbe proper authorities without delay. Dr. Rigan, State Prosecutor, stated: "1 bave no objections against a favorable executlon or tbe request of Dr. Tiso for mercy." However, all the more disgraceful is wnat continued to take place In the secret sesslon of tbe Court Senate which, accordlng to Jaw, was supposed to consider the request or the condemned man and take a definite stand on it. Generally when the verdict rendered is not unanimous, that 1s wben al! the attendant justices do not vote for the same punishment, then amnesty 1s recommended, and the condemned man usually gets a 30-year or a lite sentence in prison. Tbe verdlct in Tiso's case was not unanimou11; in some things it was 5-2 and in others again 4-3 against Tiso. Here, then, were all t he prerequ!sltes for the Senate to recommend mercy for Tiso. But Da.'<ner, tbe presiding judge, by a Jong and violent procedure, prevailed in bis demand that tbe request of Dr. Tiso be not consldered, but handed over to the Commissar of Justice, Dr. Ivan Štefä.nlk, so that he mi~ht put it before the National Court. F ROM CAIPHAS TO PILATE - TO HE ROD Everything had to be done speedily, because only 48 bours remained <to study and debate the amnesty <1Ue0<tion, and during that time tbe matter had to pass through the Commlss-ary, tbe Slovak National Council, the Government and, finally, the matter could be resolved only by tbe presldent of the Czecbo-Slovak Re-public, Dr. Edward Beneš. Wednesd·ay mornlng, April 16, 1947, the Communi&ts began to demonstrate; deputations o( partisans and polltical prisoners began to pour toto the offlce of tbe S lovak National Councll, and it was feared that the Communists would start some disturbances and riots. The Commlssar delivered the documenl,; in the morning at 9: 00 A. M. to tbe President of !,he 'Slovak National Council, Dr. Joseph Let· trich, and requested that he not only take care of the documents at once, bll't at the same Ume that he place a recommendatlon for the request o! clemency. As s oon as Dr. štefánik prepared the necessary motlon. the officers of ,the 'SNC assembled a bit before 11: 00 A. M. to coni,ider the request of Dr. Joseph Tiso. . The two Communist members of this of!iclal body, Schmldtke and Dr. Horväth, did not attend the sesslon and notiffed the SNC that they \O'OUld Mt -attend lt. The request witb all documents, therefore, was to be consldered by three members of the Slovak Democratlc Party: Dr. Lettrich. Ml· lan Pollák 11nd Canon Msgr. ,Andrew Cvlnček. This tbreesome decided �SLOVAKIA 17 that all the documents or Dr. 'ľiso, as well as the motlon or the Commissar and the request of Dr. Tiso, as prepared by Dr. Žabkay, shall be ceded to the Go\'ernment WľťHOUT COM:\1ENT or recommendation; also that they would immediately inform the Government by phone of their declslon and that they are sending their blghest officer, Dr. Martinček, by auto to Prague so that the documents might get tbere as soon as possible. If the president of the SNC had not made tbe so-called second agreement in Prague on Aprll 11, 1946, thereby surrendering its right to grant amnesty, tbe !ate or Dr. Tlso could have been de• ided with final validity by tbe tbree above-mentlooed members of tbe SNC. According to tbe new Jegal order, tbat is according to the fatal Prague agreement, it was obligatory on tbe motion of the Commissar for Justice to place documents before the Government. The latter then returns tbe recommendation to tbe praesldlum of tbe SNC i( it bas any objections to it from tbe standpoint of State lnterests; otherwlse it places it before the president of tbe Republic . That was the way tbe Jaw read. Tbe commissar did place tbe documents witb the opinion that amnesty be granted, but the praesidium of the SNC did not even do as muc b as the Commissar; witbout backing Tiso it surrendered al! documents and Tiso into tbe hands or tbe Government and Dr. Beneš. 'ľhis ls all tbat the Slovak National Councll said: "The doc uments, in the intent of agreement No. 2, art. 1, par. B, are being ceded to the presidency of the Government in Prague, April 17, 1947." Tbat is all and notbing more. Actually the three Democ rats, members or tbe Executlve or the SNC - of whom only Dr. Lettricb is alive today - did not even say a word in Tiso's bebalf; and none of them did anything about lt. 'ľhe people who criticized the way Dr. Lettrich acted, are stlll reproaching him for it today. On t he other band, the Government and l:leneš began to to wash their Judas' hands and said: well, how could we grant mercy, wben the Slovaks themselves -- even when no Communlsts were present, when only representatives of the Democratic Party were present, like Lettrich, Cvinček and Pollák - could not agree upon a word of recommendation? Of course, as far as the Government and Beneš are concerned. tbey knew better, even if such a senseless alibi partially was supported by the impossible stand of the SNC. But Dr. Lettrich never will be able to justlfy bis actlon before :rnyone in tbe world; and he must not be angry when the Slovaks and the Czechs claím that he is guilty for Tiso not getting clemency. For the sake or objectivity, I shall quote a few paragraphs from Lettriclťs hanclwritten report about those moments: "On April 17. 1947, when the praesidium of the SNC was assembllng, the situation was very difficult. Tbe Communists tbreate ned w-ith strikes and riots; the Oommissar of Jnstice dld not present a recommendatlon to grant mercy; and the request could hardly wln in the praes idíum of the SNC. That 1s to say, tbe praesidlum of the SNC had 5 members: three for the Democratic Party and two for the Slovak Communlst Party. One of the representatlves of the Democratíc Party was nnrertain: elther he would have voted against grantlng �18 SLO~A.KIA mercy or he would have ábstáined from voting. In both cases a ·majority was not assured for clemency: This was a delicate situation. It was necessary to flnd a way out. The idea was to get a recommendatlon !rom the Commissars for clemency and so forestall a posslble negatíve declsion of the praesidium o[ the SNC and outride au ominous, open politicaJ crisis, which could have had unforeseen consequences. "After dellberating the matter with political co-workers and after discussing it with the Communist members of the praesidium of the SNC, lt was decided that the SNC would return Tiso's request for mercy to the Commissar· or Justice; Commissar Dr. šte[ánik would complement lt with a positive recommendation for grantlng clemency and then would send · i t 'to · the praesidlum of the SNC. The latter would then agree that the Commissar's recommendati0)1, for granting mercy be placed before the Government with t he request to ·present it to the Pľesident for me1:itorious judgment." LETTRICH CANNOT ESCAPE BLAME FOR TISO'S DEATH - . Betwe~n my account and the h:µid-written account of Lettrlch there is the difference : I. clai~ that štefánik hlmself brought the documents to the praesidiuµi , 'ôt. the SNC and there immediately made the recommendation fo r clemency, whereupon the praesidium went into session at once. Almost to t he last moment before the praesldium began lts ses·s ion, I was in the same room in which thé meeting was to také place and I know definitely that Dr. Štefánik hád the documents with bim and that one of the secretaries - either Lettrich's Dr. Haviar, or Cvinček's Dr. Bystrický ·_ announced that the <.:ommunist members would not come to the meeting. When Dr. Lettricb knew that the Coinmunist members would be i.bsent, did he still fear that Milan Pollák alone would outvote bim? Wby did he not at least move a finger to indicate in some way that he would try to fulflll what he had promised bis constituents and wh'<tt it was his mora! duly to fulfill? He knew that the overwhelming majority or the population of Slovakia demanded everythlng possible be done to-save the life of Dr. Joseph Tiso. After the decision of the praesidium, I asked Cvinček why he agreed to such a solutlon. He expressly referred to Lettrich, who explained to him tbat according to Article 1, par. B of the Prague Document, the p'residency of the SN€ only' pre!lents• 'documents, but does not have to give its opinion about them, and ·that in law the right of opinion for the praesidium, of .the SNC doeS'·not exist. . I remember that · several members of the praesidium. of the Democratlc Party strongly crltlcized the prodeedings; óne · of, 'them, Dr. Emanuel Bohm, Js. In the U.S.A,, and ..,anotb,er,., Ing. K-orneJ . Filo is in France. Bohui made rep1w\<w,es1 ,~herejlS, li'ilo- in.sisted that everything wlthln the pow!lr_o! ,all,?f us, ou!íp,t ~.o b~,.~one sp ,that Ppague would grant c lemencr to ,Tiso. And .,he himself . 11oq ;~veral.,.o th~r ľri~n~s at. once cal)~d ' thelr_ tr\ends In Pragu_e; h1(?rixie.<;1_', thé1ii'.;ap,out the mistake tha.t wa~., made :an.d req\lested their lnteryenJlpq, w.!th, indivldual mlnis~ers. ~t' was_ t~ps ~hjl;~_.:prtina, Š,ráme,k°,J~</,.. oteers 'ťere <:alled. . . , , , , ,. When the _ge~?.ral. public ,;a_rq~iJ a~ou~ the maúer: .,tbe ó9yei-nment, ·:áeneš, nay _e_x~n ~ettrich, _rec~iv(ld ),i..u_ndredii pf lelegrams from Bratislava a.lone. · · f �SLOVAKIA 19 The Ministers of the Democratic Party w.e re then already in Prague. Every one of them received telephone requests from us private and offlclal - to correct the mlstake. But all were pessimistlc, dominated by an "oh, whaľs the use" attltnde. For example, Dr. Johu Ursíny said by phone and two days Jater publicly stated that Zenkľs answer. after talking to bim over an hour was: - "For our voters it is impossible for us to vote for mercy for T iso and for us it is unprofitable." Zenkl repeated this also to other Ministers, w ho intervened for Tiso and, finally, he gave the same answer even to Dr. John Šrámek. BENEŠ'S ALIBI: THE SLOVAK$ DID IT The greatest surprise waa when our Ministers ascertained that even John Maaaryk would vote to reject the plea for mercy. 'rhis was one of J án Masaryk's most despicable deeds; I know not how 11 months later he alibied thls sin In the otber world. E ven individ,ľal church councils and superiors of various religlous bodies intervened in Prague in behalf of Tiso. On the other hand, the Trade Organizations, Jed by Dezider Benau, ·and other Communist organlzations includlng local units of industria! unions, demanded the execution of the verdict. The situation was tense, lndeed. The performance of the praes ldlnm of the SNC was condemned by every one. Tbus, for example, t he :p}lÁVO LIDU, organ of the Social Uemocrats, in a long article blamed the Slovaks for everylhing and in bold-faced letters sald: " It seemed that the SNC took a neutra) stand on the question and, tberefore, there was no reason for tne Prague govern ment to recommend to the Presirtent of the Republic to change everytbing in the verdict of the Slovak court. . . . Dr. Lettricb, president of the SNC and chairman of the Slovak De mocratic Party, has almost a two-1hlrds majority in Slovakla. And yet up to Wednesday he did not decide wh ether he should recommend to the Government to grant cle mency to Tiso." In the US A Czech Cathollc newsman Anthony Jandáček, wrote: " The bl.a.me for the execution of tbe verdlct of death rest!\ with sevoral weaklings, who did not oppose the Communist demand and, as official representatlves of the SNC. di d not even manage as mucb as to recommend to t he Presldent of the Republic to grant clemency." Furthermore. Jandáček ·said : "Dr. J oseph Lettrich shall once have a dlfflcult problem and task to explain why he was a weakllng and wby he did ,not recommend m ercy." The Amerlcan correspondent (NCWC) John l\lauthner similarly C'baracterlzed the whole procedure agalnst Dr. Tiso and especially the behavlor of the presidenC'y of the SNC. A. Ross. another American <'Orrespondent and hundrecls of others also expressed themsel\'es Rimilarly. Even before the Government renderecl a decision and Dr. Edwanl Deneš could express himself on the matter, the welghtle!!l step in behalf of Tlso was made. Archbisho o Xaverio Ritter. the Papal Jnter.nunclo In Prague. vislted Dr. Beneš. Despite Rltter's ardent JJ)ea for Tiso. Denell fulfilled what he had planned long ago and somet hing that several gentlemen attempted to Jegalize for bim. �20 SLOVAKJA The documents were not as yet in Prague, but the Government was called together at 5:00 P. M., because it thought that by that time they would certainly arrive. When they diel not arrive by 5: 00 P. M., Gottwald forced a vote which was not for the benefit of Ti5o. The Czech Populists and the Slovak Democrats voted for c lemency, while the others were for execution. We learned about this decision or the Government a few minutes after it was macle and, therefore, the praesidium of the Democratic Party m et again at the residence of Dr. Lettrich. Every one phoned to whom he could; even Lettrich attempted to get Beneš, hut could no t ľontact him. That certainly wa.5 strange, ·because at other times he could contact him in a matter or two minutes. At that fatal moment he could not reach Beneš. So telegrams were sent instead. An American correspondent for the NCCW characterized tbose telegrams thus: "The popularity of Dr. Lettrich quickly diminished, because in the whole question of Dr. Tiso he washed his hands and hesitated to personally request mercy for Tiso. Lettrich waited until Tiso was dead and then immediately he sent a telegraphic protest against the execution." In the USA we must recall and note that members of the GovernU\ent knew that the Communists were forcing the execution of Dr. Tiso, because they wanted to weaken t he Democratic Party. The Comruunists failed to weaken the DP in May, 1946, by forming the Freedom Party, so they sought to wreck it by forcing Tiso's execution. Every minister in Prague knew that very well and, without exception, every one was visited several limes and informed about this by some Slovak politician in Prague. These ministers, however, i.,referred to belp tbe Comnrnnfsts break np the anti-Communist ranks in Slovakia tban to vote clemency for Tiso. And today these same Czech politici ans are enjoying life in Washington, D. C.; among them are Zenkl, Ripka, Stránsky, and Mayer. As tar as I am concerned all these confirmed their collaboration with Communism when they voted to reject Tiso's plea for clemency. Tbe sbort session of the ministerial council was interrupted once for a sbort tíme, wben Ursíny and Šrámek requested the National Socialists to at least abstain from voting on the Tiso plea. Zenkl. howpver, would hear none of it. Tbe Government presented the motion to reject mercy, even tbough the court documents of Dr. Tiso were not even in Prague at the time, and Dr. Beneš, also witbout even looking at the documents, complied witb the motion and rejected the request for mercy as early as Wednesday, tbat is Apríl 16th. The rejection was announeed by tf'letype by Beneš's cbancery to the police station of Ferjenčík's cffice in the late night hours. However. wp had Beneš's decision by phone from Prague much earlier. BENEŠ WAS THE LAW It is interesting that Beneš, rejecting amnesty, diel not make usf' of the means prescribed by law and did not a.nnounce his decisfon by returning the documents through ttle praesidium of tbe SNC wbich would tben hand them over to tbe Commissar of Justice. Why did Beneš do that? Diel he not belleve tbem? �SLOVAKIA 21 No. When Beneš rejected Tlso's request, the documents as yet were not in Prague and therefore he could not stamp the customary formula "nelze vyhoveli" (cannot be granted) on them. But he was interested in the execution taking place already Friday morning and, therefore, through bis servants, Ferjenčík's per· sonal office and Ferjenčik' s police, already on \Vednesrlay night, several hours after the decision of the Government, he notified Bratislava about bis decision and told them to be ready to go through with everything he had o rdered. Tbe Chief of Police announced this to Dr. L ettri<·h at midnight, and the State machinery at Bratislava began preparations for the execution, which no one could now stop according to law or regula· tions. On the morning of the second day, wben Dr. Daxner visited Tiso in bis ·celi to inform bim in tbe presence of hls counsellors that Beneš rejected the plea for mercy, the documents were not In Bratislava. AII were still in P rague and it was only about an hour later that the Presidenťs office placed the seal of the •Republic on them and the ;,ignalure of the Chief ef the Chancery. Tbe documents were not on hand when the Government made its clecision, or when the President macle bis clecision, or when Tiso was lnformed about the mat ter in bis cell by Daxner. Everything was done by telegrams. Wben Daxner lett Tiso's cell, Tiso's sister came to vtsit htm, then bis Jegal counsellors. wbile ever at bis slde was a Capuchln priest. At that ttm e tbere still were several sesslons and it was wbtspered in secret just what migbt yet be done in Tiso's bebalf. •TISO LOYA L TO GOD AND NATION TO T H E E N D Tiso. however, dlel not want to bear about any indication; very s harply he repeatecl what he had demonstratecl several limes during the trial: he was not concerned about his life. because if he. must make the sacrifice, he will do so proudly, but by no word or act would he change wbat he diel or saicl -as the Presiclent of Slovakia. This was also well known at tbat time and so it was with anxiety t hat the last ho·urs of Dr. Tiso were followed to see how all this woulcl thuncler over excitecl Slovakia. To the last moment Tiso was nnbroken, manly, just as he was before in the Court in macl Daxner's presence. wben he clefended bis truth and many limes crossed the interests of bis defense, who wanted to help bim. But Tlso never once in bis tria! clenied or revoked anything tbat he had proclaimed at any ti me. From his defense speech one sentence resonn<ied for hours in the E-ars of every llstener: "And if I were agaín placed by Provldence in a pos ition to deC"icle, I would decide, on tbe whole, tbe same way as I did In the past." Witb this sentence Dr. Tiso rejected even tbe Jast extenuating <·i rcumsta.nce. For tbe historian. Dr. Tiso even in the last moments of bis life gave the fundamental sketch and the greatest proof of his manliness. determination and steadfastness for everything that he had preached and done. �JJ SLOVAKIA Two hours before bis execution he wrote bis final l egať'y it\ bis own hand, in which he demanded the nation to be barmonious and unite<I In the prosecution of the great princi ple "For God and for :s;ation" In every regard and at all times. His !lnal sentences, wriHen in tbe jail of tbe Federal Court are most serious sentences and the greatest proof of Tiso's personality. The next day "ČAS" was supposed to explain at length wby Tiso was denied clemency. Ferjenčíťs police, however, confiscated that issue, and tbe Slova.ks found out officially from the Communist ''PRAVDA" and the -broadcast of April 18th -- a report conslstlng of a single sentence - tbat the execution had taken place. TISO MORE DANGEROUS DEAD THAN ALIVE Tiso was dead. Ileneš's servants had done t heir work. -but tbe questton still remains unanswered: Why did the praestdium of the Slovak National Council refuse to surrender the corpse of Dr. Joseph 'ľlso so that it might be buried according to the rttes of the Catholiľ Church? Between the tíme lhat clemency was denied and the execution there passed some 40 hours and no directives \ľere given - at least not publicly - as to what disposition was to be made of the body or Tiso. After tbe execution, wben the defense counsellors asked for · tlie body in the name of Tlso's family, the request was telegraphed to I'rague. It was only then that Prague. as well a!< the Bratislava factors, became aware of the mistake they had made by not granting cle· mency_ A certain Prague politlco characterlzed the situation with the cxpression: "lt seems that the cleacl Tiso is golng to be mo;e dangerous than the live one." l felt the same way about the matter. and so did quite . a few or my frlends whÓ intervened prlvately in the interest of Tiso. And ,ľe. felt that way long before the executlon. · Prague deli-berated at length and found it hard to reuder a deci• sion in the matter of the disposition of the body of Dr. Tiso. Already then reports were heard in Prague that ,the bitter silence of the Slo, ak people might have serious consequences for the future. No one wanted to be held responsible for imythlng. 1t was useless to sene! the matter to Prague because, accordlng to the law, the Natlonal Court had the rlght to decide the disposition of the body of Tlso, as it had clone in several instances previously. Everybody was afrairl of the con!<equences and no one was willing to guarantee that peace woul<I be r,reserved. Ftnally, by telegram Prague agreed with Dr. Daxner and Dr. Ferjenčík that Daxner shall suTrender tbe body not to the Tiso family , but to Ferjenčík, who in turn shall have the body bmied secret\y. Ferjenčik's police covered the casket and hauled it to St. Martin's ťemetery on Racišdorfská Road. where three graves had been dug. Tbe prlest brought in by the police. after identlfying tbe body, performed a quiet burial. Ferjenčik and his people were not successful in keepln~ tbe matter secret, because universlty student!I were near the scene during the whole eplsode and, tberefore. for a tíme it was known wbere Dr. Tlso ,vas burled. :. =•: �SLOVAKIA 23 For several hours the students clashed with the police near tbe grave of Tiso, and despite tbe fact tbat the police questioned tbem and ascertained who they were, the students showered Tiso's grave with flowers and wreaths. The second and following days, the police constantly guarded St. Martin's cemetery, People were beaten and jailed, because they tried to get near Tiso's grave under variou3 pretexts. Some students were expellecl from Svoraclov and others even from hlgh schools. WHO KILLED TI SO ? Tbe Czech press immediately began tbe process of washing hands and placing the whole responsibility for tbe execution of Tiso on the Slovaks, especially on Dr. J osepb Lettrich, president of the Slovak NationaJ Council and head of tbe Slovak Democratic Party. It was plalnly evident that Prague was nervous. The Communists were happy, and the Freedom Party maliciously reproached the Democrats. be· ,. c-ause they did not save the life of Tiso. The fact remains that ·an overwbelmingly majority of the Catholic voters wbic h supported the Democr.atic Party wa.s not fooled by tb.e overtures of the Freedom Party, because it knew that its member·s were the servant.-s of the Communists. But this electorate did let it be known that it was terribly disappointed and that it lost falth 1·1 tbe leadership of the Slovak Democratic Party and absolutely all confi<lence in Prague. Prague felt generally that the Slovaks would neve'r ngain want to live togethei, witb tbe Czec hs in a common state. And 'ľlso's execution did not make the Slovaks flock to the Communists or even into the ranks of tbe servants of Beneš, as were the members of the Freedom Party, and so much tbe less to the Social Democrats. The Slovaks regarded tbe decision of the minlsterlal council, as well as the declsion of Beneš as a step that was neitber statelike nor diplomatlc, but rather as a blunder which would WTe<.'k the State. F.:verybody became suspicious of the members of the praesidium o[ tbe Slovak National Council, when they dld not support an amnesty ;ind did not exact it, but acted like weaklings and s pineless men, violating· the- promlse given the electorate. Undoubtedly all those involved began to feel that way also. }!ut lt was too late. U nity of resistance against Communism was being lost. and after Tiso's execution the Communists were coercing the Government and, later, even Beneš hlmself, to commit more blunders and make more concessions to them. The integrity of the State was s haken so badly that the Government one day unanimously voted to accept the invitation to tbe Marshall pian, and three days Jater, under pressure of tbe Communists, repudlated lts clecision just as unanimously. It was a Government wlthout government. 'I'he Communlst.'I did whatever they wanted wlth lt. Tbe mlnlsters lost th elr backbone, some bowed to Beneš and others to the Communlsts; tbelr uprootecl consciences persecuted tbem for their sbameful votlng in the Tlso case. N O ~SCAPE FROM PUNISHMENT Wben Dr. Beneš began to fall pbyslcally and bis spiritual condi• tion worsened, all ascrlbed it to bis unfortunate decision of denying <'lemenc-y to 'ľiso. �24 SLOVAKIA Beneš, the Zenklites (followers or Dr. Zenkl) and tbe . Communists tbought that witb the extorted execution of Tiso they would sbake only t be Slovak Democratic Party. But they were sadly mistaken. Wlth the execution of Tiso they shook the entire State to its foundations. The curse of those who shall not forget April 18, 1947, broke all connections which were stm preventlng the downfall of the CzechoSlovak St.ate. The lost faith of the Slovak people could not be regained. And when the supports of a united Slovakia were uprooted, the Communists realized their pian altogether smootbly, accorcllng to the plans and orders of the Moscow Politburo. I clo not want to believe tbat any one would want to ascribe to Dr. Tiso that he would avenge himself beyond the grave, but when in March, 1948, - less than a year after bis execution - John Masaryk committed sufoide, a large part of the people pointed to the hand oť justice for his shameful voting on April 16, 1947. When the Communists played around witb Beneš like a puppet for a while, and he was practically under house arrest and shortly thereafter died, qulte a few people recalled those to whom he had denied clemency ancl who had suffered so much during bis regime. In Slovakia every one recalled April 18, 1947. And even if not maliciously, but at least confirmed in the faith that none of the guilty would escape justice, every one saw the hane! of Providence, Who deals out justly and does not let Himself be carried away or frightened. TISO' S STATURE GROWS WITH YEARS Dr. Tiso made the greatest sacritice that any human can make. He acted bravely and hono1,ably. This made a great impression on every one. But the shameful, cowardly behavior whether of Slovaks or Czechs, whether of the people of Prague or Bratislava, who had anything to do with bis amnesty, elevated the dead Tiso to a national hero and martyr, who is mentioned reverently in Slovakia even by those who previously were agalnst bim. Immature political factors, Jed by anger and hatred, had attained tbe opposite of what tbey had desired. They diel not divide but a'?tually united tbe Slovaks as they were never before united. And they showed them a new road for the future, whicb even today is full of sufferings, but eventually sball mean salvation and a free life for the nation of Tiso. Those. were the motives and thought:; which Jed me to ,vrite this dissertatlon, so that I could point out tbe tmth and expla!n, wben the persons ·involved are free again. After the events of February, 1948, lt was reported that the Commun!sts removed the body of Tiso from its grave and had !t cremated in Brno, Moravia. I recelved the report from Bratislava in 1948, but it remains unconfirmed. Let the tmth be whatever it may, the Gloriola, Faitb and Mytb of Dr. Joseph Tiso - despite all the evil deeds and designs of bis and our enem!es - shall always remain so sublime th at no malignities oť the Communists or the Beneš followel'S s hall ever dim them and they sball nev& Iose their lustre as long as a single Slovak shall live beneath the Tatras. � AUGUST, 1952 SLOVAKIA THE CASE OF DR. JOSEPH TISO B Y DR. M ICHAEL ZIBRIN F rom a legal standpo111t. the case of Dľ. Joseph Tlso may be di"ided into two parts, the first part taking place in the American Zone of Germany, and the second part in the National Court or Bratislava, the capltal of Slovakia. 1 was a witness at the Nuremberg T rials, where I had taken copious notes. There 1 met people in Czecho-Slovak uniforms who had Slo vak and Czech-souncling names, but spoke with a strong Magyar and German accent. Tbey were neither Czech nor Slovak by origin. One army captain could not even speak Czech correctly. These people were under Major Ečer, a Ieft·"' inger, wbo had borrowed the title or " General." His department boasted that it had tracked down Hr . .tosepb Tiso. President of the independent State of Slovakia and, later, alao the entire Goveľllment of the Slovak Republic. Ečer and bis group were sent to Germany by the Provislonal ľzecho-Slovak Government of Dr. J ohn Šrámek (the premier), but rbey were in contact more with Dr. Hubert Ripka or directly witb Dr. l~dward Beneš than they were with Šrámek. Formally, they were to <"Oncern themselves w!th Cze<"ho-Slovak refugees as a I enatriation c-ominission and also follow the Nuremberg Trials against war criminals. Tbey had a department for eve•·yth lng; and experts In every de1,artment. Of course. Ečer's outfit had at it~ disposal huge sum., of money to tr ack down the members of the Government of the Slovak Republlc, and especially P resident Tiso. When Beneš returned to l'rague. Ečer recelved his instructlons directly from bim. NO POLITICAL ASYLUM FOR TI SO After Presldent Tlso and thP Slovak Government !1ad fJeJ Sloľakia in Apríl, 1945. tbey sought ref11ge in Kremsmiinster Tbe Iast .,.et>k ot Aprll, Dr. Joseph Tlso set 0 111. for Mnnich to Carclinal Faul•11 1>er's residence, but was delayed two days in bis jOtl''D';!Y, oecause Munlch was occupied by the Aroeri()an Army by April 30. 194á. It was th•1~ t hat Dr. Josepb Tlso became senarated trom his Government and had a bsolutely no contact with 1I. That explains wby l:!•3 signature ;5 mil'~lng on the "Surrender No•t>·' of May 8. 1945, wbirh w1s b anded !o fi 0 1eral Walton H. Walker or thf' Amerlcan Army in J< .. 0 .nsmiinst.er. .\.r!C'0rd,ng to a report In the "STARS AN D ST R!"~:S" at that ••mP when Dr. J osepb Tiso C'Onld not reach l\funich. h .. •·"!tire.i to a umall monastery in Bavaria, wbere he remainerl until mi!irnry unlls Jlicked bim up for questloning and then Jed hlm off to 111 "itnerican roncentration renter. Tlso reroained in the roncentra• :on r 11 mp ror Quite some Ume. He was questionecl not only by Amerlcan •·1thoritles. but also by Ečer's soldlers until, finally. he was surren,➔ ..red by t)Je lT. S. ·Army to Ečer and taken to Prague In November 194u, This. in short, relates to the first part ot Tii;o's case, h :, we čan­ not pass it over so llgbtly. because hls brief account éontalns many tpgal lncons'ÍRtencies. náy even illegalltles, and is contrar y to every·thing whtch has heretofore or therellfter taken place anywbere· irÍrPtnlltion-ally aťrordlng to AmeriC'an Law �2 SLOVAKIA As soon as the Slovak Government of Dr. Stephen Tlso, a co usin ol Dr. Joseph Tiso, in the name of all t he refugees fľom S lovakia, handed over to the representative of the American Army the note given below and subjected itself to its commands, at that moment the status of all escapees and, therefore, even that of the leading Slovak politlcos, should have been considered according to international practices and American la,ws, where the right of asylum, except in this one case, had never before been vlolated, at least not as far as I can recollect. The "Surrender Note" of the Slovak Government to the Ameri• cau Army read as tollows: GOVERNMENT IN EXILE AT KREMSM0NSTER, AUSTRIA SLOVAKIAN To Lieuteuant General Walton H. Walker of the U. S. Army For the Commanding General XX Corps of the U. S. Army On behalf of the S lovakia n Government In exile at Krems• miinster, Austria, I, Dr. Štefan Tiso, as Prime Minister thereof, . do submit myself, the members of my Government, our famílied and our governmental policy completely to the Comm anding General of the XX Corps of the Third Army of the United State:1. W e submit ourselves for such disposltion as may b e wise and ordered by the Allied High Comand. We beg full protectlon of the Armies of the United States in whose homeland are living about one-thlrd of our natlon and accept the democratic prlnciples of the people, for the people and by the people. W e take the liberty on this occasion to beg for protection for the entire Slov,ak colony whlch was forced to leave its country and is now iu Kremsmiinster, Austria, also for a ll our couu• trymen who live in territories occupled by the Allied forces. Kremsmiinster, 1fay 8, 1945. (Seal of the Prime Ministry) Dr. Štefan Tiso, Premier. Or. Mikuláš Pružinský, Mlnister of Financa. Medricky, Minister of Agrlculture. Kočiš, Minister of Education. T. J. Gašpar, Deputy. W. O. Collier, Brig. Gen. U. S. Army. T. O. Curtls, Col. G. S. C. Davld W. Allard, Capt. Inf. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE STARTS TISO ON ROAD TO GALLOWS True it is that all the Allies met in London as a joint International Commisslon to discuss the punishment of "War Crininals." Dr. Ečer was the Czecho·Slovak member of this Commlssion. It is also true that certain directives were agreed tiPOn for the surrender of war crlminals to indlvidual states on whose terrltorles the gullty or accused were supposed to have committed war crimes. Offlcial �SLOVAKIA 3 clocuments o( the Supreme Command o( the United Armies are supposed to tel1 ns jnst how many times such surrenders were effected, the negotiations that took pla<'e. as well as the decision reached ln each <'ase. Copies of these documenL~ were sent automatically to the Nuremberg Court to ascertain whether the persons to be surrenderecl to indivldual states ,vere needed or not at any bearings of the Court. or wbether the Court itself intended to try tbe lndividuals in questlon. 1 checked over these documents quite thoroughly but failed to flnd ?.nything of the sort relating to Dr. Joseph Tiso, or the Government of Dr. Stephen Tiso. I am, therefore, inclined to believe tbe whispered reports which circulated in Nuremberg át that tíme both among the Allies and the members of Ečer's commisslon tbat the surrender ot Dr. Joseph Tlso was not in accord with accepted legal precepts or p1,actices and that some violations of accepted laws and practlces had occurred in Tiso's case. On June 25th, and agaln on J une 27, 1945, the Czecho-Slovak Hadio clalmed that Dr. Joseph Tiso and, later, even ibe Slovak Government, were taken into custody by American authorities. Reports had it tbat they were transportecl to Pilsen. But the reports were false. Americans of Slovak descent were lntensely interested in the tate of Tiso and Slovakia. They requested their State Department not to surrender Tiso and the members of the Slovak Government to nenes• "Provisional Czechoslovak Government," because that certainly wo111<1 mean death for Tiso. But thls availed them nothing, Al the insistence of Benes' Government. the U. S. Department of State ordered the U. S. authoritles In Austrla to surrender Tiso and bis group to Benes' "Czechos lovak War Crimes Commisslon" wlthout even lnvestigating their statns as is evidenced from a letter of Actlng Secretary DEAN ACHESO~. written August 30, 19H. and published ln the "JEDNOTA" {Middlelown, Pa.) '.\{arch 5, 1947. Tbe letter read: "Since detalls concerning the surrender of Dr. Stephen Tiso and members of his Government are not available to the Department of State, a copy of your letlf'r has been transmittecl to the W ar Department together \ľith a request that the Secretary of War <'Ommunicate \ľl th you dlrectly on this particular matter. "A totJal of flfteen high officials af the former Slovak Government weľe arrested by the Unlted States Army at varions limes during tbe montbs of May and June. 1945. . . . "The arrest of these individuals and their rel ease to the CzechoSlovak Government was in conformity with United States policy re. garding the disposition of United Nations' nationals who cÓllaborated with or assisted the enemy. The policy is to apprehend such coJlat.orators as may be founcl within the jnrisdictión of tTnited States milltary authorities. to notify the respertive United Nations' Governments of such apprehension, and to hold such persons pending the clecision of the respective government~ as to their <lis_posltlon unless they are to de detained as war criminals or for other reasons. In view of ~bis policy, the Department of State, in October, 1945, informed the Commandíng General of thc Uníted States Forces, European �SLOVAKJA T.beater, that the fifteen individuala in hia cuatody who had been membera of ·· the collaborationiat Slovak Government ahould be re• leaaed to the appropriate Czechoalovak authoritiea. They were handed over in November, 1945. . . . From Acbeson's letter it ls quite evldent that Benes' "Provision,u Czechoslovak Government" was included among the "United Natlon,ľ t:overnments." All Benes had to do 1, as label any citlzen of Czecho· Slovakia a "collaborator'' and the U. S. State Department, "in r.011 · tormity with United States policy" pursued at tbat tlme, delivered He11es' politicdl opponents to Ečer witbout even investlgating tbe cbll,rges of collaboration. American tradltions went down tbe draln. 'ľbe rigbt of political asylum, always regarded as something sacred by tbe people of tbe Unlted States was violated in the case of Tlso and the Slovak Government. Benes. it seems, could get away with everyt,blng, because he knew the right people. Tbe ract that he 1 esigned as president and left his country wheu it faced a grave r-risis aud tben congratulated bi~ successor, wbo was elected coasti· tutlonally, meant nuthing to the U. S. State Department. But. it meant certain death to many patriotic Slovaks and untolll sufferings to many t housands more. It !s quite certain that negotiations were tied u1> several t lme!I. because the Engllsh were reluctant to agree tbat 'ľi so be surrendered to Ečer at a tíme when Prague had alreally announcect his deliveraiLce to Ečer. No matter how tb.e events of that time were distorted, the ract remalns that an unexpected telepbone call from the airport was rec·eived during a session of tbe Prague Parliament, reportlng that Dr. Joseph Tiso was brought to Prague. Shortly thereafter, Minister Ko· pecký gleefully displayed a pboto taken at tbe Prague airport which showed bow Tiso was being led under heavy guard with bands bound by a cbain and a loc-k. All the Communlsl papers and eveu tbe organ of Šrámek's Czec-h Populist Party, LlDOVÁ DEMOKRACIA (People's IJemocracy), displayed the picture promlnently. . Shortly aftE>r bis arrlval in Pragne, Tl~o was transported to Bratislava. wbere one wing of the Jail was em.ptied to take care of bim and bis ľOmpan!ons Tbey werE> guarded not by ordlnary jail guards. bm by !',elect. members of tbe Nationality Securlty Ouard. EV ERYTHING SET AGAINST TISO Investigation of • Tiso began at onre. But not according to accepted practice and, bence. wbole month~ pasRed witbout a regular preparation to review tht: case of Dr Tlso. As ROOn as Tiso was, placed in the jail or the Federal Co11rt. bis case. arcording to the laws in force at that time. belonged before the National Conrt and the lnves1:gation had to be made by the procurators or prosecutlng attorneys or tbe Natlonal Court. The prosecuting attornP.vs assigned to prosecute '.ľiso and his group were: Dr. George Šujan. Dr. l{lgan and Dr. Ra§la. Since each prosecutor waR assigned particular persons to prosecute. the whole investlgatlon suffered from a taek of unity ancl wa.s casual; hence, lt could malte little headway. Secondly, tbe prosecutlon. it seems. could not or dld not wan t to flnd any wltnesses besldes those who were arreste,I. �Sl,OVAKIA 5 And, thirdly, the Prague State Court constautly kept sendlng c1emands to have Dr. Tiso tPstiľy Iu varlous cases which were tried there. T lso was beard as a w1tness, and theše hearings took up much of tbe .tlme of the inveseigating organs. And so, for techoical reasons, as well as polltical efforts to oostpone Dr. Tlso's trial, the case of Dr. Tiso was not even ready up 10 the electlons or May, 1946, and, hence, could not even get started before tbat time. as the Communlsts had reckoned that it would. They exerted tremendous pressure to have the trial begln before the elections. but there were so many compllcatlons that it was imposslble to do so. After the electlons wblť'h the Slovak Democratic Party had won so decisively and In which tn<> promis,i of sparing Tiso's llfe plaýéd such a prominent role, it appeared for a time that Dr. Joseph Tlso would get a fair tria!. There is a great dlfference between a court and a court When a person appears in court, there can be doubts and objectlons as to bis personallty and morallty. The C'ourt exlsts for tbe purpose of removing such doubts; when that happens , the accused person Ie morally rehabl»tated. Very grave charges were made agalnst Tls o not only In the emigratlon. of Dr. Beneš, but also on the podlum of the Prague parllament. l3ut there al"o were promises and guarantees that t he worst would not happen. 'rhe beginning of 1946 was s igniflcant for its polltical ferment. witb pressure on the Slovak Democratlc Party. and the pressure or Dr. Beneš and the Prague Government on the supreme rlgbts or a soverelgn nation. These rlghts. it was thought. the Slovak NaUonal Coun<'ll, beaded by Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, had been assured by the socalled Košie.e Agreement of March 2. 1945. Tberefore, whatever t.he representatlves of tbe Slovak Natlonal C'ouncll had willingly ylelded to the Benešltt>s and the Zenklltes must be evaluated in terms of the infltu•nce these concesslons had on the fate of Dr. Joseph Tlso. If -w e woul<I glauce over t he resolutlons ot the Slovak National ('ounc il of March 2. 1945. wbere that body stressed the plcture ot Hate llte as it visuallzed it, t hen there !s llttle dlfference between 1hat co.n<'eption and the Slovak State as lt actually was. And lf the a:c<'epted princlples and resolutions had been adhered to and not devlated trom after t he electlons, In whlch the Slovak Democratlc Party had beaten t he Commnnlsts cleclslvely, Dr. Tlso unquestlonably would bave been allve today. From Aprll to June, 1943. Šrám ek's provislonal Czecho-Slovak Government In T,ondon was preparing the St.ate Act. whicb was pro<'lalmed' ón Jnne 30, 1943. It was plalnly evldent that thls act tbreat: Pned Tis6 and the entlre body of the Slovak Government. On March 2, 1945, the Slovak Natlonal Council clemanded In the very tlrst paragraph of the KošlcP Agreement that the new government of Czecho-Slovakla decJare that it does not identity itselt wlth tbe proclamatlon or June 30, 1943, of the Czecho-Slovak Government in I..ondon. �6 SLOVAKIA BE N EŠ H A S HIS WAY Shortly after arrivin~ in Prague, Dr. Edward Ileneš formally betray~d · Ruthenia to the U .,S.S.R., and, being recognized by Stalin, felt that he \ľas firmly in the saddle again. Alrea.dy on June 22, 1945, be demanded that the Slovaks relinqulsh what they had voted for on ?>farch 2, 1945. Dr. Beneš disregarded the wishes of tbe Slovak majority and begau to push bis own exponents to the forefront - Slávik. Hečka, etc. but when this dld not go well for bim, he turned to Dr. Vavro Šrobár •and Dr. Vladimír Clementis and several other more compliant persons wbo were willing to repudlate everything tbat Beneš had to promise in Moscow and Košice. Clementis was a leading Communist In Slovakia, while Dr. Šrobár, whom Beneš had named Financa Minister against the will off tbe entire Slovak Nalional Councll, was the foremost proponent of Beneš's National Socialism among the Slovaks. Confrontea w1th the promises he had made and the note wlllcb he had seut to the Slovak National Council trom London by means or Ursíny and Novomeský, Dr. Beneš sald that these were forced out ot him, just as the Pittsburgh Pact of 1918 had been forced on Masaryk. And, he aclded, tbat "everything was not in order even in MosBeneš remonstrated and demonstrated that an absolutely indeJJendent Slovakia was out of the question, that the threat of Russia was ever present, and that after Rutheuia, Slovakia woulcl surely be next in line for absorption by the USSR. The dlscussions and debates finally ended with the first. Prague Treaty of June 2, 1945. whiC'h cleflned the ľunctions of the various ministries, the matters 011 wbicb only the Prague Government could rule, and the matters that ,ľere s11ppose<1 to belong to the competency of tbe Slovak Natlonal Council. It is rathe r amusing that the seventh article of tbat Prague Agreement stated that tbe seat of he Supreme Court would -be in Hrntislava. That seat is still in Prague as it always had been. DEMOCRATS W IN E L ECTION S, B U T L OS E EVERYT HI N G Agreement or no agreement. Dr. 13eneš and bis Goľernment did what they pleased. Llfe in the state went according to the Prague Agreement more or less untll April 1946 - a month before the flrst JJOSt-war parliamentary elections. Then beli itself broke loose • The Slovak Democratic Party was attacked furiously by all Czech partles, being incited by Beneš, as well as the Communists. Despite this, ho,i,·ever. notbing can justify tbose "ho concluded tbe Prague Agreement of June 22, 1945. Even though the Freedom Party came into being at that Ume with money supplied by Šrobár, Beneš ancl thP Communists, or wa.« organized by Široký, and the concessions, made at a tíme when the Communists strongly demanded thE' tria! of Dr. Joseph Tlso, may in ~ome way be justified, there is no one who can teli me that Lettrlch was in any ,ľay justified to renounce the right to gra.nt amnesty. The man who did that knew well that Tiso was in the custody oľ the Fecleral Court in Bratislava and that he was surrendered from Slovak juriscliction ·into the hands of Beneš and the Czechs who hated him fanatically and undivldedly. ····· �SLOVAKIA 7 Iu Article 1 of the second Prague Agreement there is a section O, which speaks about clemency and states: "The President of tbe Republic grants mercy even in Slovakia and that also in matters which belong before the People's Courts and the National Court - on the motion of the Commissloner of Justice, who presents lt to the Government through the Officers of tbe Slovak NaUonal Council; the Government then returns the motion to tbe Ofticers of tbe Slovak National Council, if it has objections against it from the standpoint of all-state interests. bnt otherwise presents it to the President of the Republlc." When Dr. Lettriťh together with John Ursiny presented this agreement to the officers of the Democratic Party for approval and later a lso, when they explained it, expressly gave assurances that before signing this agreement they had dellberated with Dr. Beneš and that he ha.cl deflnltely promised and assured them that he would grant mercy to Dr. Tiso and they could safely transfer the power ot amnesty to bim. It is interesling, however, that nothing about tbis assurance ls D1entioned either in Dr. Kvetko's book, whlch was published in Bratislava in 1947, or in the article of Dr. Lettrich which descrlbes the case or Dr. Tiso. In bis articles Dr. Lettrich refers to the assurance of Dr. Beneš of September 1946 in Topoľčianky, where Beneš expressly promised that he would grant mercy to 'ľiso and added: "By my declsion I shall not cause any complications in Slovakia." In evaluating the truth and the proclamations of Beneš we must admit that in June, 1945, both presidents of the Slovak National Counc!I - Schmldtke, as well as Lettrich - had expressed themselves very sharply against Tlso in offlclal manifestations, when they already knew that Dr. Tlso was under arrest in Bavaria slnce June 9, 1945. We must not forget tbat the Premier at that time was Fierlinger who had attacked Tlso very sharply, and aJ.so the Democratic Party for standing back of Tiso. Per· 5onal expressions of Beneš, sneh as "Tiso wi ll hang," were known •o Lettrich and also to Ursiny. And that is more reason why they ;,honld have considered well whether they could believe Beneš, slnce they themselves had sald on various occasions, relating from their own P.Xperiences, that Beneš cannot be believed and especially not when be was concerned with the problem of savlng or destroying an enemy which he hated so insanely as he dld Dr. Joseph Tlso. As soon as the second Prague Agreement went into effect, Tiso c-ould have been saved only before the Court, if the Court would have rendered any other verdict but that of death. Despite the fact that Tiso's fate was sealed In such a way, we must not · end this chapter after the second Prague Agreement, because, in my oplnion, it is just at such limes that people prove best whether they possess character and a spina! column. L ETTRICH'S PRE-E LECTION PROMISES I know that many „people pleaded with :Beneš to grant clemency to· TiS-O even before the tria! was lnitlated. Beneš promlsed everybody ·that he would. But despite Beneš's promlse, leadlng polltlclans o! the Rlov1tk Democratlc Party should not have believed bim. if they thougbt �8 SLOVAKIA seriously and bonorably about tbe promises the Party had giveo tbe representatives of the Catbolic wing. Io Aprll 1946, the ,econd Prague agreemeot wa.s not tbe ooly iigreement made; an agreement was also concluded witb tb.e so-called <..:atbolic wing of tbe Democratic Party, wbicb was actlng more lndel'endeotly, and foť quite a Ume it was not known wbetber or not lt would bolt tbe Democratlc Party and join wltb tbe Freedom Party. Tbis so-called Catbolic agreement of tbe Democratlc Party was attacked viciously not only by tbe Communists, but also by tbe Beaeš Czechs. One of tbe main polnts of this agreement, even tbougb lt was oot expressed in writing, was that Tiso's life would be spared. In tbe May, 1946 elections, the Communists suftered a territlc l;teing, tbe Democratlc Party taking 62 per cent of the total vote cast iu Slovakia. So. everybody, especially tbose who voted for tbe Democratlc Party candidates, thought that the Party would keep lts pro mise to save the life of Dr. Tiso. The <..:ommunists and various representatives of tbe Trade Uuions, ho" ever. kept poundlng the tables all summer in 1946 to instltute the tria! of Tiso. It was clear that the matter could not bé delayed ľor long. Suddenly in the second half or October, 1946, without the Tiso matter stralghtened out, Dr. Lettrlch embarked on a visit to tbe llnlted States. Lettrlch claims that before his departure he had come to ao uoclerstandlng witb Pollák and Cvinček, Vice-Presidents of tbe Slovak ,\ .'atlonal Council, tbat the matter would not be asslgned to the Natio nal Court oefore h1s return home. Cvinček, however, denled that Lettrlcb had ,ald anything of the sort. But even 1t if was the trutn, !r is a very weak and slok alibi. Dr. Lettrloh was aware of the fa.cc , na· whlle he 1\!'aS preslrlent of the Slovak Natlonal Councll, tbe Com• •nunists got i.ny one tbey wanted on the Councll of Commissloners. Aud he knew that tbe most important minlstry, the Mlnlstry of tbe lnterlor, did not go to a member of the strongest party, but, lt was said, to a 11on-party man, Beneš's man, a servant of the Communlsts, tó General Ferjenčik. Tbe signature of Dr. Lettrich is on Ferjenčik's deoree. Arter tbese experiences could Lettr!ch belleve that Cvinček and Pollák would be able to hold the )lne w!thout hlm, when he hlmseU adm!ts in hls artlcle that Milan Pollák was uncertaln, tick.le and for tbe executlon of Dr. Tiso? · · The fact ls that after the departure ot Dr. Lettrlch, the case ot Dr. Tlso was presented to the National Court, and tbe presldent of the court senate became the feared Dr. Igor Da.xner, And here I see for Uié second Ume the sealed will of Dr. Beneš to bang Tlso at all costs. And for the second tlme I see Tlso's fate sealed with the a.s· slsiance of the representatlves of the Slovak Democratlc Party despite the promises and obllgatlons to tbe eleotorate. " I W tL L HANG OR. T ISO!" · Wben Dr. Daxner was allowed to become tbe presiding judge, 1Íolbfog good could be expected. All the assumptlons in thls regard XJaxner manitested by hls behavlor long before the tria! -and proved lt afterward. ·: . �SLOVAKIA 9 The day before the date of the main hearing was set, I myselt waé convinced of thls when I tried to help to remove Daxner. The Communiste, however, were so firmly anchored in the Slovak NaUonal Council that Dr. Daxner was approved as preslding judge of the National Court wlthout any dltflculty. On November 18, 1946, the National Court was supposed to eonvene an"d,determine the term of the maln hearing, begin the trlal anil present the decument ot charges agalnst Tiso. The previous day, when I had gone to Dr. Daxner to ask for a permanent admlttance pass to tbe tria!, Dr. Daxner began to argue and tried to persuade me to go along wlbh ševčik and Pollák, and not with the "popullsts and separatlsts." He asked me to follow the tria! of Dr.l Tlso and use my lnfluence In the Democratlc Party so that lt would not ldentlfy Itself wlth Dr. Tlso and would not make any dlfflculties for Da.xner. When I retueed, he banged bis flst on the table and screamed: "You are doing wrong. The Communiata will devour you, tear you to piecea, and I will hang Dr. Tiao!"1 tried to quiet bim ciown and cautioned him 'that a judge should not talk that way and that lt also was against the law for a judge to express his opinion so resolutely against the accused. But Daxner oniy grew more exclted, banged the table agaln and agaln and yelled: " Do whatever you want to, but I shall hang him !" I related the incident to Andrew Cvlnček, addlng that I was williog to teit:fy to it a.t any th:p.e. I reminded hlm that I knew Daxner well. I knew that Daxner WltS a paralytlc, a sadlst and a person of very bad mora! and · spirltual qualitles. I also told hlm that I did not belleve that Beneš would grant amnesty to Dr. Tlso. I refused to talk about the matter before the body o! o!ficers of tbe Democratlc Party, because ševčik and Pollák were among them, and · r knew definitely that they were betraylng our matters to the Communlsts. In fact I knew that ševčík was a paid agent ot tbe )JKVD (secret police). Thereupon the offlcers or the Party named a five-member commlttee to hear my story. Urslny, Cvlnček and Dr. Pietor reallzed the gravity of the situatlon and promlsed to try to do somethlng in Prague before December 2, the date when the hearings in the case or Dr. Tiso were to be concluded. THE M OCK TRIAL BEGINS But, alas, nothing happened. On December 2, 1946, Dr. Daxner opened the tria! with Dr. Joseph Tlso before the Natlonal Court in Bratislav-a. The trial took place in the jury room. The prosecutlon was represented by Dr. Rigan, Dr. Šujan anu Dr. Rašla. Dr. Tlso ,via.s defended by Dr. Grečo and Dr. Ža!Íkay. That is how a correspondenťs repor.t would read. And tbat is jus t about how the reports of the Slovak Press Bureau lookec\. But the truth 1s altogether differenl Tlso's frlends and bis famlly had engaged the servlces of a very respectable counsellor, Dr. Lojek, to defend Tiso. However, as soon as D"r. Lojek presented the full authorlzatlon or Dr. Joseph Tlso, he was ordered to appear before the poliťe, who began to inVesfigate hlm. They as ked why he wanted to defend Tlso, who dlscussed the defe nse wlth htm, how much he was pald, and other Jess sensLble Queatlons. What Lojek actually went tbrough ls known only to bim and the �10 SLOVAKIA police. The fact is that he gave up the defense o[ Tiso, and there was nothing else for T!so to do but ask the court to provide defense counsels. This incident, !( everythiug else Iu the tria! against Tiso would be iu order, ra!sed a reasou.ab!e doubt that the tria! would be just and in order. At the same time it made people th!nk and assume that the tria! would be carried on according to some agreement, that it would be a forma! process and. therefore, could not be just and fair. In a word that everyth!ng was cut and drled and Tiso's fate was sealed. I do not press the faet that Dr. Daxner was the presiding judge, but for the sake of the truth I must remlnd that attempts were made to remove Daxner before lhe tria! started. Of course, the tria! wa.,; prepared and no one could degress from the prepared program or could successfully take exception to it. Besides Daxner, there were six attendant justices, one a judge by profession, and tbree attendant justices as a reserve, in case one or the other attendant justices would drop out or get sick. It is a universal custom, that against such a court - whether it be called a senate or a jury - the accused, the prosecutor and the defense have the rlght to testify whether a certain person is accepta ble to them or not, and, also to state wbat objections they might entertain against any person of lhe jury or court. Likewise the principle holds universaJJy that when one is proposed as a wltness he cannot be in tbe same tria! also as an attendant or part of the court, and much less so as the presid!ng judge of the court. Slnce the Slovak Democratic Party could uot remove Daxner, tbe defense attomeys tried to replace bim as was their right to do. In the first place they objected because Daxner was incarcerated during the Slovak Republic and, later, had expressed himself on various occasions that all the accused must be hanged and, therefore, it was evldent that he was prejudiced. According to all pena! laws. prejudlce 1s an excluding circumstance. Then they proposed to have Dr. Daxner as a witness to testify that after Da.·rner was freed from jail, Dr. Tlso had allowed bim to take over hls judgeshlp again. Alexander Mach wanted Daxner to testify that it was only by the grace of Mach that Daxner was freed from prison on the basis of the false med!cal testimony and a false X•Ray picture. Daxner simply admltted Mach's statement and proclaimed that bis testimony was no longer needed. As far as prejudice was concerned. he sa!d that the objection was not proper, because he sald he was objeetive, and imediately ordered the tria! to begin. AL L OBJECTION S OVE RRU L ED According to every Jaw. objections cannot be overruled by a •judge against whom they are made. This is a fundamental princlple of pena! procedure. But laws were no gulde for Daxner. He had only one gulde: to condude the process as speE!dily a.s poss!ble and render the verdict he had promlsed bis bosses. When the defense counsels saw that they were gett!ng nowhere, they began to tackle the matter from a Jegal standpoint. They ob- �SLOVAKIA ll jected that the court was not made up properly, and that the de<:rees of lhe Slovak ::-l'ational Council about people's courts were not valid and, finally, that Dr. Tiso was not surrendered properly by the American occupation authorltles, as prescribed in accepted 1nter· natlonal regulations, but that Tiso was forcefully transported lnto Czecho-Slovakia without the knowledge of the four powers concerned, or only with the knowledge of one of those powers. The defense sald that if Tiso was a war crlmlnal, then bis surrender should have been determined by t he Internatlonal Tribunal in :-.1Uremberg. U he was not a war crimlnal, and the American General In command in Kremsmlinster May 8, 1945, accepted the capitulatlon or the Government of Dr. Stephen Tiso, then, in that case, all members of that Government, and so much more the Presldent, have the rlght the right of asylum, thls belng based on the following arguments: l. According to the Atlantlc Charter, i!IS\ted by the Presldent or llle United States and the Engllsh Prime Minister, every nation has the · right to choose the form of government under which it shall live· and to its own statehood; 2. the head of such a state was not subject to the legislative power of a foreign state for pena! acts, which may have been committed during the existence of and on the territory of such a State; 3. the Slovak State was recognized by some 27 States, including Great Britaln, with which it had diplomatlc rela· tions; also with the Soviet Union: 4. neither Great Drltain nor France agreed to the surrender of Dr. Tiso and, therefore, Dr. Tlso should be returned to Altčitting, in Bavaria, wbere on Jtme 9, 1945. he was arrested by American Military Police. 'l"hls contention o[ the defense still holds today. I myself can eonflrm that Britaln and France never agreed to the surrender of Dr. Tiso. According to the International Agreement oť J anuary 13, 1942, eoncluded in London, which refers to the Atlantlc Charter and the proclama.tion of Roosevelt and Churchill of October 25, 1941, lliternatlonii:lly only those criminals were to be surrendered who had undertaken, besides mllitary acts, such attacks against clvillzed populntions whlch were considered criminal among clvilized natlons. Tiso was not accused of such a crime. Furthermore, others who could be surrendered were those·,, who as occup,tnts, or representatives of occupants, committed or allowed to be committed punishable acts against the clvillan popu!a:tion. · Tiso was not accused of ,any such punlsha.ble acts by the In· habitants of the ló Slovak vlllages which were taken by the Slovak Hepubllc from the Polish territory. If, however, he or bis subordinates had commltted a pena! act on Pollsh terrltory, then, accordlng to the agreement above, Dr. Tiso could be accused only by the Poles and tried II! Warsaw. . Na.turally, Dr. Daxner repucliated any and all such objectlons and announced that bis court was competent to try Dr. Tlso. Then the tleťense counsels requested that the tria! take place before a regular and not before a revolutionary national court, because all the preferred pena! acts were commltted before the two decrees of 1945 ot tbe Slovak National Councll were effective. The defense clalmed that only Cor pena! acts commltted after the issuance of some pena! form ,vas 1-t posslble to carry ·on a pena! procedure arcording to sucb a norm. �12 SLOVAKIA even though penal sanctions remain according to some Jater norm. The pena! procedure itself, however, should be carrled on according to thé norma! penal oťder. Even Tlso hlmself declared that he dld not recognlze the decree of the Slovak National Court, by whlch the socalled National Court and the People's Courts were establlshed, because he was under arrest trom June 9, 1945, and, therefore, could not have committed any pena! act against the regulations lssued by the Slovak National Councll. We la.wyers had debated whole hours before the Tiso tria! · about these very weighty Jegal problems and then even durlng the trial, but Daxner repudiated them in a s ingle moment by banglng on the table and screaming: "I . repudiate all objections. ľll take care of all pena! procedures here!" And that is how the tria) against Tiso began. Up to that tíme, the tria) room was fllled wlth Slovak and Czech reporters and forelgn observers, but after that moment all who were not resldents of Bratislava left the proceedlngs, because they reallzed that the fate of Tlso was sealed and only a mock tria) was to be staged. During the two hours, which I have thus f.ar desctibed, Daxner several tlmes howled llke a jackall, banged on the table and threat• ened Dr. ~abkay, and even Dr. Kšinan, who defended Mach, tbat he would tbrow tbem out of the court room. The whole procedure was recorded on sound tape and tbat evenlng the newsmen wbo _gave a report. about the trial, p•ayed this portion of the recorded tape, wblch was falthfully recorded. The popula.tlon of Slovakl-a bega.n to sound off because of Da.xner's conduct. Tbe Democratic Party and lts representatlv01, were the target of bitter and viclous attacks; the people inslsted that the Party keep lts promlses. It began to be generally sald that Tiso's verdict was already settled and that what• ever Da.xner was doing was only a comedy. Desplte the fact that tbi!I was true, thls process nevertheless. brought out some hlstorical trutbs which we shall need In the future and whicb without tbi.B trial would not have come to l!ght. Wh~n Dr. Žabkay rose to bis feet on March 6th and said only t.hree words - "Prosim, aby bolo ..." ("l beg, in order that lt be") he was lnterrupted by Daxner who jumped to bis feet and barked: "Tbe court overrules tbat!" When Žabkay protested and explained that the court could not overrule something which he had not al! yet aaid, Dr. Daxner bellowed: "But I tel1 you tbat the court does over• rule lt!" THE W I TNESSES The wltnesses who testified in the Tlso tria) might be ·p laced in three categories: . • l, The Catholic clergymen toward whom I)axner acted . arro· gantly. I thtnk tbat it was on account or tbem that Dr. Tiso decided tQ (!Pl!&k In h!s own defen$e, They were Archblshop Charles Kmefko and BJshop Michael Bm;alka. From the leg.al standpo!nt, I regarded it as the greatest tnsult When Dr.. Daxner announced in the name of the Court that , he woul<l �SLOVAKIA 13 not swear ln tbese witnesses. Ordinarily, according to prevalling la.ws in Europe, the court does not swear in a wltness when there are reasons why it does not want to believe hlm. That 1s, In Europe a witness is first heard and then the court determlnes whether he ah!Wi be sworn io or not. Daxner's conduct was openly provocatlve and in· s ulting to disbonor such a serlous, aged man, as was Dr. Kmetko, wbo was respected by all decent Slovaks regar-dless of thelr rellgious beliefs. It is sigo1ficant that at tbe time Dr. Kmeťko was teslfylng, the Czech Catholic clergymen had several deliberatlons and lssued memoranda and reports, but displayed practically no open interest in what was happening In Slovakia. Not even Archbishop Joseph Beran, the Czech Primate, could find anything to say in tbe interest of the honor of the Catholic priesthood of Slovakia representéd by Pr, KmeCko. Tbe Czech clergymen followed Beran's example and. failed to ralse their volces and to rally tbe Catholic Czechs !n defense ot Justlce and righteousness. 2. In· the second category belonged the Slovak members of Gottwa.lďs government, namely, Ursiny and Lichner. Daxner talked to Ursíny as thóuugh he were an underling. From flve meters away Daxner greeted htm: "Why we, Mr. VlcePreinler of the Government, know each otber well, because we or• ganlzed the underground together." - Ursíny broke out lnto a broad s mlle and said nothing, though he should bave said: You, Mr. presidlng judge, were nowhere and did nothing, unless you were in some tavern, Sir, and there I, John Ursíny, did not go. Otberwise Ursíny did not say anything substantial, except that 'ľiso did not want bim in the Slovak Government. nor in the Peasant Banks, and that he was In the concentratlon camp at Illava for three days, but was not beaten there and was fed well. Daxner exploited Ursiny, however, by using general expres11ions, s·uch as, "Why we know that ... Why we did that together ... Why that does not have to be explained to us." Of course, the Communist press immediately glorified Daxner as a great hero of the underground movement, to whose actlvlty_ UT· Ríny hlmself had attested. Minlste.r .Tohn Lichner, however. ,v,as a witness of another type. Daxner did not welcome bim with a smile or a greetlng, but with the questlon: "You were a minister of Dr. Tiso's Government?" - He -then asked Lichner whether he traveled and delivered speeches in a uniform of tbe (Hlinka) Guard and why Tiso later dlsmlseed hlm. ' .Licbner expla!ned as best he could, but it must have been evident even to hlm tbat Daxner was not even remotely lnterestjid. 3. The third group of witnesses was the most interestlng. I be· ·11evé I can· characterize thls group properly, because I had wltnessed t hé N'uremberg trlals. There I saw ield Marshal von Paulus go before the :rrtternational Trlbunal, and in Bratislava I saw General Ferdin,and Čatld!ľ go béfore the National Cou-rt. Both men had much in common Both were soldlers, generals; thelr appearance In court w.as .a -surprlse; and both appeared a.t a time when lt. was opportune for tbe. Commun!sta and einbárrasslng for the defense. · In Nuremberg, ·Goerlng read romances and detectlve storles and generally was not lnterested In the tria!. When, to hls great surprlse, �14 SLOVAKTA the American Police brought Paulus, the heroic "defender" of Stalingrad, into the court room, Goering for a moment took off bis glasses, looked around, llstened and then said to the leading personaJities of the German General Staff: "'Fhis is hopeless ! this is swinishness ! " Should I repeat only thls sentence In reference to Čatloš, I would help the reader of these lines, because the result wlll be the same. Paulus entered the Nuremberg court room slowly with a oautious step; he was attired in an elegant dark blue sult, a starc-hed whJte s hirt, as if it was out of porcelain. He spoke slowly and pretended to be deaf; bis eyes were glassy, his frame strlkingly numb, and hli< eyes up1ifted almost straight to the heavens. The same could be s-ald for Čatloš. He, too, was dressed In a dark blue suit and was about twice as deaf as Paulus; but bis eyes, s tance were the same - just as if twlns appeared on two different stages. Paulus saw nothing but evil in everythlng that Hitler dld. Čatloš tried to prove to Tiso that he knew about all thlngs - the posslble and the impossible - because he, Čatloš, reported to bim on everything every morning ,at nine o'clock. Tlso smiled ironically and saíd: "To report, report he did, but whether he told me everything, I do not know." The fact is, according to what Čatloš said, that Čatloš sbould have sat in Tiso's place; for those acts Čatloš and not Tiso should have answered. It is interesting that bctb generals stuck to the orders or MosťOW, that they preferred to be deaf and more deaf, so tbey could speak slowly and thus have time to think thlngs over. Both held up faiľly well the first several hours, but then both slipped up a bit. Paulus was taken back to Moscow, and Catloš to the Rratislava jail. Later Catloš was taken to Prague, where Czéťh mllltary correspondents questloned him. I had not met Paulus before and, hence, did not know bim. But I knew Čatloš from my cbildhood days, and the last time I saw ·hlm was In September, 1939, in Prešov. The Catloš, who seven years later ťame to the court room of Dr. Daxner, seemed to be about twenty years older and bis mind compared wlth that or a tbird grader and not that of a general. I am wllling to testlfy under oath even today that the Catloš who sat before Daxner was not the master of his own wlll, tbat he was a broken man actlng under pressure of some one else. Catloš definitely was not a.ťtlng as a norma! person. Another such wltness was Dr. Martin Sokol, former Premier or the Slovak Parliament. The first day he acted as Catloš did; ma.ny t!mes he made it aggravating for Tiso; h e was stupified, deaf and gazed toward tbec eiling. On the second day Sokol reacted differently; as lf the Slovak environment began to affect bim and the lnjections were Joslng tbelr force (here I remind tbat the expression "!njectlons" was used by Dr. Tiso when answerlng ča.tloš); his answers took on a Slovak color and he talked clearly and lntelligently abotu the confllcts between Dr. Joseph Tlso and Dr. Vojtech Tuka. Dr. Sokol conld not revoke everytbing he had saia, but on the seťond day Dr. Sokol definitely appeared wlth bis old smlle in tbe lE>ft ťorner of bis month. nespite thlfl, bowever. the characteristic lnfluen('e.'! of Rmislan indodrinatlon were planlly evldent. This was �SLOVAKIA 15 intluences also by the thlrd par:ticipant of the Moscow school, D1. John Spišiak, the former ambassador of the Slovak Republic in Budapest. Were I to repeat how Spišiak appeared and what he said, I would only be repeating what I had said about Paulus. It was the same school, the very same school wlthout regard to the fact where the s tudents dld the answerlng, whether In Athens, Budapest, Bratislava, or Prague. Then there was a special group, a group of German origin, who al one tlme or auother were actlve in Slovakia. As a Slovak, or as a defense couusel of Slovak orlgin, I would never rely on thelr testi• mony. I was very glad, nay even proud, that Dr. Tlso never appealed to the testimony of these Germans. We can thank Dr. Tlso that we do not have disputes s uch as the Czechs have among themselves over what answers of Ludin are correct and which are false. K. H. Frank, Hitler's man in Prague, signed a different protocol every hour before his death. According to one, Krajina was the leader of the Czech reslstance and, according to another, Dr. J . Krajina, the future secretary-general of Zenkľs party, was the greatest collaborator with the Germans . We Slovaks do not have such differences. And for that we can be thankful to Dr. Tlso, who never concerned himself with German testlmony. Defense speeches refuted the propriety of the court and demanded that Dr. Tiso be returned to the American occupation authoritles in Germany. They pointed out that if Tiso had acted in the manner of Daxner, Da.xner would today be a natlonal corpse and not the presldlng judge of the Natlonal Coun. The defense counsels further polnted out that General Kristin, :VIinister Široký and Minister Ďuriš - who were sentenced to dle. but were saved by Tlso - would have Jong been dead, if Tiso had followed Daxner's example. The defense demonstrated that it was not true, as the prosecu· tion stated, that America, Great Britain and France were at war with Slovakla, but conversely officers of the Slovak Army played tennis with Amerlcan flyers, because every one regarded them not as enemles, but as interned persons of a forelgn state. T H E V ERDICT : " DEATH" - A S FORECAST On the 18th of March, 1947, the Court adjourned to prepare the verdlct. Suddenly, llke a bolt out of clear sky, the report came at 10 P. M. on Apríl 14, 1947, when the officers of the Democratlc Party were in session, that Dr. Daxner had designated the next day, April 15, 1947, as the day he would render the verdict. The Ume was set for 9:0 OA. M. AU of us turned pale, because none of us had expected it. Of course, the Communists were not surprised at all, because they knew l'verything that Daxner was going to do. On Aprll 15, 1947 at 9:30 A. M. the rea.ding of the verdict be· gan; it lasted until 9 P. M. We had expected almost anything to happen. However, that a judge would subordinate hlmself or become subservient to a political party - that no lawyer, no senstble man expected to happen. lt was a s urprise for everybody. �16 SLOVAKIA After the verdict was rendered, the third pbase of the Dr, Tlso ca se began - the final chapter: the fight for amnesty. After the judge rendered the verdict of death on the gallows for Tiso,. Daxner asked the condemned Tiso whether he would request the Court for clemency. Tlso measured DaxneT carefully and said slowly: "I do ask for clemency on mora! grounds." Dr. Žabkay, the defense attorney, presented the Court the rea· sons why Tlso sbould receive mercy and asked tbe Court that Dr. Josepb Tiso's request be placed before tbe proper authorities without delay. Dr. Rigan, State Prosecutor, stated: "1 bave no objections against a favorable executlon or tbe request of Dr. Tiso for mercy." However, all the more disgraceful is wnat continued to take place In the secret sesslon of tbe Court Senate which, accordlng to Jaw, was supposed to consider the request or the condemned man and take a definite stand on it. Generally when the verdict rendered is not unanimous, that 1s wben al! the attendant justices do not vote for the same punishment, then amnesty 1s recommended, and the condemned man usually gets a 30-year or a lite sentence in prison. Tbe verdlct in Tiso's case was not unanimou11; in some things it was 5-2 and in others again 4-3 against Tiso. Here, then, were all t he prerequ!sltes for the Senate to recommend mercy for Tiso. But Da.'<ner, tbe presiding judge, by a Jong and violent procedure, prevailed in bis demand that tbe request of Dr. Tiso be not consldered, but handed over to the Commissar of Justice, Dr. Ivan Štefä.nlk, so that he mi~ht put it before the National Court. F ROM CAIPHAS TO PILATE - TO HE ROD Everything had to be done speedily, because only 48 bours remained <to study and debate the amnesty <1Ue0<tion, and during that time tbe matter had to pass through the Commlss-ary, tbe Slovak National Council, the Government and, finally, the matter could be resolved only by tbe presldent of the Czecbo-Slovak Re-public, Dr. Edward Beneš. Wednesd·ay mornlng, April 16, 1947, the Communi&ts began to demonstrate; deputations o( partisans and polltical prisoners began to pour toto the offlce of tbe S lovak National Councll, and it was feared that the Communists would start some disturbances and riots. The Commlssar delivered the documenl,; in the morning at 9: 00 A. M. to tbe President of !,he 'Slovak National Council, Dr. Joseph Let· trich, and requested that he not only take care of the documents at once, bll't at the same Ume that he place a recommendatlon for the request o! clemency. As s oon as Dr. štefánik prepared the necessary motlon. the officers of ,the 'SNC assembled a bit before 11: 00 A. M. to coni,ider the request of Dr. Joseph Tiso. . The two Communist members of this of!iclal body, Schmldtke and Dr. Horväth, did not attend the sesslon and notiffed the SNC that they \O'OUld Mt -attend lt. The request witb all documents, therefore, was to be consldered by three members of the Slovak Democratlc Party: Dr. Lettrich. Ml· lan Pollák 11nd Canon Msgr. ,Andrew Cvlnček. This tbreesome decided �SLOVAKIA 17 that all the documents or Dr. 'ľiso, as well as the motlon or the Commissar and the request of Dr. Tiso, as prepared by Dr. Žabkay, shall be ceded to the Go\'ernment WľťHOUT COM:\1ENT or recommendation; also that they would immediately inform the Government by phone of their declslon and that they are sending their blghest officer, Dr. Martinček, by auto to Prague so that the documents might get tbere as soon as possible. If the president of the SNC had not made tbe so-called second agreement in Prague on Aprll 11, 1946, thereby surrendering its right to grant amnesty, tbe !ate or Dr. Tlso could have been de• ided with final validity by tbe tbree above-mentlooed members of tbe SNC. According to tbe new Jegal order, tbat is according to the fatal Prague agreement, it was obligatory on tbe motion of the Commissar for Justice to place documents before the Government. The latter then returns tbe recommendation to tbe praesldlum of tbe SNC i( it bas any objections to it from tbe standpoint of State lnterests; otherwlse it places it before the president of tbe Republic . That was the way tbe Jaw read. Tbe commissar did place tbe documents witb the opinion that amnesty be granted, but the praesidium of the SNC did not even do as muc b as the Commissar; witbout backing Tiso it surrendered al! documents and Tiso into tbe hands or tbe Government and Dr. Beneš. 'ľhis ls all tbat the Slovak National Councll said: "The doc uments, in the intent of agreement No. 2, art. 1, par. B, are being ceded to the presidency of the Government in Prague, April 17, 1947." Tbat is all and notbing more. Actually the three Democ rats, members or tbe Executlve or the SNC - of whom only Dr. Lettricb is alive today - did not even say a word in Tiso's bebalf; and none of them did anything about lt. 'ľhe people who criticized the way Dr. Lettrich acted, are stlll reproaching him for it today. On t he other band, the Government and l:leneš began to to wash their Judas' hands and said: well, how could we grant mercy, wben the Slovaks themselves -- even when no Communlsts were present, when only representatives of the Democratic Party were present, like Lettrich, Cvinček and Pollák - could not agree upon a word of recommendation? Of course, as far as the Government and Beneš are concerned. tbey knew better, even if such a senseless alibi partially was supported by the impossible stand of the SNC. But Dr. Lettrich never will be able to justlfy bis actlon before :rnyone in tbe world; and he must not be angry when the Slovaks and the Czechs claím that he is guilty for Tiso not getting clemency. For the sake or objectivity, I shall quote a few paragraphs from Lettriclťs hanclwritten report about those moments: "On April 17. 1947, when the praesidium of the SNC was assembllng, the situation was very difficult. Tbe Communists tbreate ned w-ith strikes and riots; the Oommissar of Jnstice dld not present a recommendatlon to grant mercy; and the request could hardly wln in the praes idíum of the SNC. That 1s to say, tbe praesidlum of the SNC had 5 members: three for the Democratic Party and two for the Slovak Communlst Party. One of the representatlves of the Democratíc Party was nnrertain: elther he would have voted against grantlng �18 SLO~A.KIA mercy or he would have ábstáined from voting. In both cases a ·majority was not assured for clemency: This was a delicate situation. It was necessary to flnd a way out. The idea was to get a recommendatlon !rom the Commissars for clemency and so forestall a posslble negatíve declsion of the praesidium o[ the SNC and outride au ominous, open politicaJ crisis, which could have had unforeseen consequences. "After dellberating the matter with political co-workers and after discussing it with the Communist members of the praesidium of the SNC, lt was decided that the SNC would return Tiso's request for mercy to the Commissar· or Justice; Commissar Dr. šte[ánik would complement lt with a positive recommendation for grantlng clemency and then would send · i t 'to · the praesidlum of the SNC. The latter would then agree that the Commissar's recommendati0)1, for granting mercy be placed before the Government with t he request to ·present it to the Pľesident for me1:itorious judgment." LETTRICH CANNOT ESCAPE BLAME FOR TISO'S DEATH - . Betwe~n my account and the h:µid-written account of Lettrlch there is the difference : I. clai~ that štefánik hlmself brought the documents to the praesidiuµi , 'ôt. the SNC and there immediately made the recommendation fo r clemency, whereupon the praesidium went into session at once. Almost to t he last moment before the praesldium began lts ses·s ion, I was in the same room in which thé meeting was to také place and I know definitely that Dr. Štefánik hád the documents with bim and that one of the secretaries - either Lettrich's Dr. Haviar, or Cvinček's Dr. Bystrický ·_ announced that the <.:ommunist members would not come to the meeting. When Dr. Lettricb knew that the Coinmunist members would be i.bsent, did he still fear that Milan Pollák alone would outvote bim? Wby did he not at least move a finger to indicate in some way that he would try to fulflll what he had promised bis constituents and wh'<tt it was his mora! duly to fulfill? He knew that the overwhelming majority or the population of Slovakia demanded everythlng possible be done to-save the life of Dr. Joseph Tiso. After the decision of the praesidium, I asked Cvinček why he agreed to such a solutlon. He expressly referred to Lettrich, who explained to him tbat according to Article 1, par. B of the Prague Document, the p'residency of the SN€ only' pre!lents• 'documents, but does not have to give its opinion about them, and ·that in law the right of opinion for the praesidium, of .the SNC doeS'·not exist. . I remember that · several members of the praesidium. of the Democratlc Party strongly crltlcized the prodeedings; óne · of, 'them, Dr. Emanuel Bohm, Js. In the U.S.A,, and ..,anotb,er,., Ing. K-orneJ . Filo is in France. Bohui made rep1w\<w,es1 ,~herejlS, li'ilo- in.sisted that everything wlthln the pow!lr_o! ,all,?f us, ou!íp,t ~.o b~,.~one sp ,that Ppague would grant c lemencr to ,Tiso. And .,he himself . 11oq ;~veral.,.o th~r ľri~n~s at. once cal)~d ' thelr_ tr\ends In Pragu_e; h1(?rixie.<;1_', thé1ii'.;ap,out the mistake tha.t wa~., made :an.d req\lested their lnteryenJlpq, w.!th, indivldual mlnis~ers. ~t' was_ t~ps ~hjl;~_.:prtina, Š,ráme,k°,J~</,.. oteers 'ťere <:alled. . . , , , , ,. When the _ge~?.ral. public ,;a_rq~iJ a~ou~ the maúer: .,tbe ó9yei-nment, ·:áeneš, nay _e_x~n ~ettrich, _rec~iv(ld ),i..u_ndredii pf lelegrams from Bratislava a.lone. · · f �SLOVAKIA 19 The Ministers of the Democratic Party w.e re then already in Prague. Every one of them received telephone requests from us private and offlclal - to correct the mlstake. But all were pessimistlc, dominated by an "oh, whaľs the use" attltnde. For example, Dr. Johu Ursíny said by phone and two days Jater publicly stated that Zenkľs answer. after talking to bim over an hour was: - "For our voters it is impossible for us to vote for mercy for T iso and for us it is unprofitable." Zenkl repeated this also to other Ministers, w ho intervened for Tiso and, finally, he gave the same answer even to Dr. John Šrámek. BENEŠ'S ALIBI: THE SLOVAK$ DID IT The greatest surprise waa when our Ministers ascertained that even John Maaaryk would vote to reject the plea for mercy. 'rhis was one of J án Masaryk's most despicable deeds; I know not how 11 months later he alibied thls sin In the otber world. E ven individ,ľal church councils and superiors of various religlous bodies intervened in Prague in behalf of Tiso. On the other hand, the Trade Organizations, Jed by Dezider Benau, ·and other Communist organlzations includlng local units of industria! unions, demanded the execution of the verdict. The situation was tense, lndeed. The performance of the praes ldlnm of the SNC was condemned by every one. Tbus, for example, t he :p}lÁVO LIDU, organ of the Social Uemocrats, in a long article blamed the Slovaks for everylhing and in bold-faced letters sald: " It seemed that the SNC took a neutra) stand on the question and, tberefore, there was no reason for tne Prague govern ment to recommend to the Presirtent of the Republic to change everytbing in the verdict of the Slovak court. . . . Dr. Lettricb, president of the SNC and chairman of the Slovak De mocratic Party, has almost a two-1hlrds majority in Slovakla. And yet up to Wednesday he did not decide wh ether he should recommend to the Government to grant cle mency to Tiso." In the US A Czech Cathollc newsman Anthony Jandáček, wrote: " The bl.a.me for the execution of tbe verdlct of death rest!\ with sevoral weaklings, who did not oppose the Communist demand and, as official representatlves of the SNC. di d not even manage as mucb as to recommend to t he Presldent of the Republic to grant clemency." Furthermore. Jandáček ·said : "Dr. J oseph Lettrich shall once have a dlfflcult problem and task to explain why he was a weakllng and wby he did ,not recommend m ercy." The Amerlcan correspondent (NCWC) John l\lauthner similarly C'baracterlzed the whole procedure agalnst Dr. Tiso and especially the behavlor of the presidenC'y of the SNC. A. Ross. another American <'Orrespondent and hundrecls of others also expressed themsel\'es Rimilarly. Even before the Government renderecl a decision and Dr. Edwanl Deneš could express himself on the matter, the welghtle!!l step in behalf of Tlso was made. Archbisho o Xaverio Ritter. the Papal Jnter.nunclo In Prague. vislted Dr. Beneš. Despite Rltter's ardent JJ)ea for Tiso. Denell fulfilled what he had planned long ago and somet hing that several gentlemen attempted to Jegalize for bim. �20 SLOVAKJA The documents were not as yet in Prague, but the Government was called together at 5:00 P. M., because it thought that by that time they would certainly arrive. When they diel not arrive by 5: 00 P. M., Gottwald forced a vote which was not for the benefit of Ti5o. The Czech Populists and the Slovak Democrats voted for c lemency, while the others were for execution. We learned about this decision or the Government a few minutes after it was macle and, therefore, the praesidium of the Democratic Party m et again at the residence of Dr. Lettrich. Every one phoned to whom he could; even Lettrich attempted to get Beneš, hut could no t ľontact him. That certainly wa.5 strange, ·because at other times he could contact him in a matter or two minutes. At that fatal moment he could not reach Beneš. So telegrams were sent instead. An American correspondent for the NCCW characterized tbose telegrams thus: "The popularity of Dr. Lettrich quickly diminished, because in the whole question of Dr. Tiso he washed his hands and hesitated to personally request mercy for Tiso. Lettrich waited until Tiso was dead and then immediately he sent a telegraphic protest against the execution." In the USA we must recall and note that members of the GovernU\ent knew that the Communists were forcing the execution of Dr. Tiso, because they wanted to weaken t he Democratic Party. The Comruunists failed to weaken the DP in May, 1946, by forming the Freedom Party, so they sought to wreck it by forcing Tiso's execution. Every minister in Prague knew that very well and, without exception, every one was visited several limes and informed about this by some Slovak politician in Prague. These ministers, however, i.,referred to belp tbe Comnrnnfsts break np the anti-Communist ranks in Slovakia tban to vote clemency for Tiso. And today these same Czech politici ans are enjoying life in Washington, D. C.; among them are Zenkl, Ripka, Stránsky, and Mayer. As tar as I am concerned all these confirmed their collaboration with Communism when they voted to reject Tiso's plea for clemency. Tbe sbort session of the ministerial council was interrupted once for a sbort tíme, wben Ursíny and Šrámek requested the National Socialists to at least abstain from voting on the Tiso plea. Zenkl. howpver, would hear none of it. Tbe Government presented the motion to reject mercy, even tbough the court documents of Dr. Tiso were not even in Prague at the time, and Dr. Beneš, also witbout even looking at the documents, complied witb the motion and rejected the request for mercy as early as Wednesday, tbat is Apríl 16th. The rejection was announeed by tf'letype by Beneš's cbancery to the police station of Ferjenčík's cffice in the late night hours. However. wp had Beneš's decision by phone from Prague much earlier. BENEŠ WAS THE LAW It is interesting that Beneš, rejecting amnesty, diel not make usf' of the means prescribed by law and did not a.nnounce his decisfon by returning the documents through ttle praesidium of tbe SNC wbich would tben hand them over to tbe Commissar of Justice. Why did Beneš do that? Diel he not belleve tbem? �SLOVAKIA 21 No. When Beneš rejected Tlso's request, the documents as yet were not in Prague and therefore he could not stamp the customary formula "nelze vyhoveli" (cannot be granted) on them. But he was interested in the execution taking place already Friday morning and, therefore, through bis servants, Ferjenčík's per· sonal office and Ferjenčik' s police, already on \Vednesrlay night, several hours after the decision of the Government, he notified Bratislava about bis decision and told them to be ready to go through with everything he had o rdered. Tbe Chief of Police announced this to Dr. L ettri<·h at midnight, and the State machinery at Bratislava began preparations for the execution, which no one could now stop according to law or regula· tions. On the morning of the second day, wben Dr. Daxner visited Tiso in bis ·celi to inform bim in tbe presence of hls counsellors that Beneš rejected the plea for mercy, the documents were not In Bratislava. AII were still in P rague and it was only about an hour later that the Presidenťs office placed the seal of the •Republic on them and the ;,ignalure of the Chief ef the Chancery. Tbe documents were not on hand when the Government made its clecision, or when the President macle bis clecision, or when Tiso was lnformed about the mat ter in bis cell by Daxner. Everything was done by telegrams. Wben Daxner lett Tiso's cell, Tiso's sister came to vtsit htm, then bis Jegal counsellors. wbile ever at bis slde was a Capuchln priest. At that ttm e tbere still were several sesslons and it was wbtspered in secret just what migbt yet be done in Tiso's bebalf. •TISO LOYA L TO GOD AND NATION TO T H E E N D Tiso. however, dlel not want to bear about any indication; very s harply he repeatecl what he had demonstratecl several limes during the trial: he was not concerned about his life. because if he. must make the sacrifice, he will do so proudly, but by no word or act would he change wbat he diel or saicl -as the Presiclent of Slovakia. This was also well known at tbat time and so it was with anxiety t hat the last ho·urs of Dr. Tiso were followed to see how all this woulcl thuncler over excitecl Slovakia. To the last moment Tiso was nnbroken, manly, just as he was before in the Court in macl Daxner's presence. wben he clefended bis truth and many limes crossed the interests of bis defense, who wanted to help bim. But Tlso never once in bis tria! clenied or revoked anything tbat he had proclaimed at any ti me. From his defense speech one sentence resonn<ied for hours in the E-ars of every llstener: "And if I were agaín placed by Provldence in a pos ition to deC"icle, I would decide, on tbe whole, tbe same way as I did In the past." Witb this sentence Dr. Tiso rejected even tbe Jast extenuating <·i rcumsta.nce. For tbe historian. Dr. Tiso even in the last moments of bis life gave the fundamental sketch and the greatest proof of his manliness. determination and steadfastness for everything that he had preached and done. �JJ SLOVAKIA Two hours before bis execution he wrote bis final l egať'y it\ bis own hand, in which he demanded the nation to be barmonious and unite<I In the prosecution of the great princi ple "For God and for :s;ation" In every regard and at all times. His !lnal sentences, wriHen in tbe jail of tbe Federal Court are most serious sentences and the greatest proof of Tiso's personality. The next day "ČAS" was supposed to explain at length wby Tiso was denied clemency. Ferjenčíťs police, however, confiscated that issue, and tbe Slova.ks found out officially from the Communist ''PRAVDA" and the -broadcast of April 18th -- a report conslstlng of a single sentence - tbat the execution had taken place. TISO MORE DANGEROUS DEAD THAN ALIVE Tiso was dead. Ileneš's servants had done t heir work. -but tbe questton still remains unanswered: Why did the praestdium of the Slovak National Council refuse to surrender the corpse of Dr. Joseph 'ľlso so that it might be buried according to the rttes of the Catholiľ Church? Between the tíme lhat clemency was denied and the execution there passed some 40 hours and no directives \ľere given - at least not publicly - as to what disposition was to be made of the body or Tiso. After tbe execution, wben the defense counsellors asked for · tlie body in the name of Tlso's family, the request was telegraphed to I'rague. It was only then that Prague. as well a!< the Bratislava factors, became aware of the mistake they had made by not granting cle· mency_ A certain Prague politlco characterlzed the situation with the cxpression: "lt seems that the cleacl Tiso is golng to be mo;e dangerous than the live one." l felt the same way about the matter. and so did quite . a few or my frlends whÓ intervened prlvately in the interest of Tiso. And ,ľe. felt that way long before the executlon. · Prague deli-berated at length and found it hard to reuder a deci• sion in the matter of the disposition of the body of Dr. Tiso. Already then reports were heard in Prague that ,the bitter silence of the Slo, ak people might have serious consequences for the future. No one wanted to be held responsible for imythlng. 1t was useless to sene! the matter to Prague because, accordlng to the law, the Natlonal Court had the rlght to decide the disposition of the body of Tlso, as it had clone in several instances previously. Everybody was afrairl of the con!<equences and no one was willing to guarantee that peace woul<I be r,reserved. Ftnally, by telegram Prague agreed with Dr. Daxner and Dr. Ferjenčík that Daxner shall suTrender tbe body not to the Tiso family , but to Ferjenčík, who in turn shall have the body bmied secret\y. Ferjenčik's police covered the casket and hauled it to St. Martin's ťemetery on Racišdorfská Road. where three graves had been dug. Tbe prlest brought in by the police. after identlfying tbe body, performed a quiet burial. Ferjenčik and his people were not successful in keepln~ tbe matter secret, because universlty student!I were near the scene during the whole eplsode and, tberefore. for a tíme it was known wbere Dr. Tlso ,vas burled. :. =•: �SLOVAKIA 23 For several hours the students clashed with the police near tbe grave of Tiso, and despite tbe fact tbat the police questioned tbem and ascertained who they were, the students showered Tiso's grave with flowers and wreaths. The second and following days, the police constantly guarded St. Martin's cemetery, People were beaten and jailed, because they tried to get near Tiso's grave under variou3 pretexts. Some students were expellecl from Svoraclov and others even from hlgh schools. WHO KILLED TI SO ? Tbe Czech press immediately began tbe process of washing hands and placing the whole responsibility for tbe execution of Tiso on the Slovaks, especially on Dr. J osepb Lettrich, president of the Slovak NationaJ Council and head of tbe Slovak Democratic Party. It was plalnly evident that Prague was nervous. The Communists were happy, and the Freedom Party maliciously reproached the Democrats. be· ,. c-ause they did not save the life of Tiso. The fact remains that ·an overwbelmingly majority of the Catholic voters wbic h supported the Democr.atic Party wa.s not fooled by tb.e overtures of the Freedom Party, because it knew that its member·s were the servant.-s of the Communists. But this electorate did let it be known that it was terribly disappointed and that it lost falth 1·1 tbe leadership of the Slovak Democratic Party and absolutely all confi<lence in Prague. Prague felt generally that the Slovaks would neve'r ngain want to live togethei, witb tbe Czec hs in a common state. And 'ľlso's execution did not make the Slovaks flock to the Communists or even into the ranks of tbe servants of Beneš, as were the members of the Freedom Party, and so much tbe less to the Social Democrats. The Slovaks regarded tbe decision of the minlsterlal council, as well as the declsion of Beneš as a step that was neitber statelike nor diplomatlc, but rather as a blunder which would WTe<.'k the State. F.:verybody became suspicious of the members of the praesidium o[ tbe Slovak National Council, when they dld not support an amnesty ;ind did not exact it, but acted like weaklings and s pineless men, violating· the- promlse given the electorate. Undoubtedly all those involved began to feel that way also. }!ut lt was too late. U nity of resistance against Communism was being lost. and after Tiso's execution the Communists were coercing the Government and, later, even Beneš hlmself, to commit more blunders and make more concessions to them. The integrity of the State was s haken so badly that the Government one day unanimously voted to accept the invitation to tbe Marshall pian, and three days Jater, under pressure of tbe Communists, repudlated lts clecision just as unanimously. It was a Government wlthout government. 'I'he Communlst.'I did whatever they wanted wlth lt. Tbe mlnlsters lost th elr backbone, some bowed to Beneš and others to the Communlsts; tbelr uprootecl consciences persecuted tbem for their sbameful votlng in the Tlso case. N O ~SCAPE FROM PUNISHMENT Wben Dr. Beneš began to fall pbyslcally and bis spiritual condi• tion worsened, all ascrlbed it to bis unfortunate decision of denying <'lemenc-y to 'ľiso. �24 SLOVAKIA Beneš, the Zenklites (followers or Dr. Zenkl) and tbe . Communists tbought that witb the extorted execution of Tiso they would sbake only t be Slovak Democratic Party. But they were sadly mistaken. Wlth the execution of Tiso they shook the entire State to its foundations. The curse of those who shall not forget April 18, 1947, broke all connections which were stm preventlng the downfall of the CzechoSlovak St.ate. The lost faith of the Slovak people could not be regained. And when the supports of a united Slovakia were uprooted, the Communists realized their pian altogether smootbly, accorcllng to the plans and orders of the Moscow Politburo. I clo not want to believe tbat any one would want to ascribe to Dr. Tiso that he would avenge himself beyond the grave, but when in March, 1948, - less than a year after bis execution - John Masaryk committed sufoide, a large part of the people pointed to the hand oť justice for his shameful voting on April 16, 1947. When the Communists played around witb Beneš like a puppet for a while, and he was practically under house arrest and shortly thereafter died, qulte a few people recalled those to whom he had denied clemency ancl who had suffered so much during bis regime. In Slovakia every one recalled April 18, 1947. And even if not maliciously, but at least confirmed in the faith that none of the guilty would escape justice, every one saw the hane! of Providence, Who deals out justly and does not let Himself be carried away or frightened. TISO' S STATURE GROWS WITH YEARS Dr. Tiso made the greatest sacritice that any human can make. He acted bravely and hono1,ably. This made a great impression on every one. But the shameful, cowardly behavior whether of Slovaks or Czechs, whether of the people of Prague or Bratislava, who had anything to do with bis amnesty, elevated the dead Tiso to a national hero and martyr, who is mentioned reverently in Slovakia even by those who previously were agalnst bim. Immature political factors, Jed by anger and hatred, had attained tbe opposite of what tbey had desired. They diel not divide but a'?tually united tbe Slovaks as they were never before united. And they showed them a new road for the future, whicb even today is full of sufferings, but eventually sball mean salvation and a free life for the nation of Tiso. Those. were the motives and thought:; which Jed me to ,vrite this dissertatlon, so that I could point out tbe tmth and expla!n, wben the persons ·involved are free again. After the events of February, 1948, lt was reported that the Commun!sts removed the body of Tiso from its grave and had !t cremated in Brno, Moravia. I recelved the report from Bratislava in 1948, but it remains unconfirmed. Let the tmth be whatever it may, the Gloriola, Faitb and Mytb of Dr. Joseph Tiso - despite all the evil deeds and designs of bis and our enem!es - shall always remain so sublime th at no malignities oť the Communists or the Beneš followel'S s hall ever dim them and they sball nev& Iose their lustre as long as a single Slovak shall live beneath the Tatras. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document AUGUST, 1952 SLOVAKIA THE CASE OF DR. JOSEPH TISO B Y DR. M ICHAEL ZIBRIN F rom a legal standpo111t. the case of Dľ. Joseph Tlso may be di"ided into two parts, the first part taking place in the American Zone of Germany, and the second part in the National Court or Bratislava, the capltal of Slovakia. 1 was a witness at the Nuremberg T rials, where I had taken copious notes. There 1 met people in Czecho-Slovak uniforms who had Slo vak and Czech-souncling names, but spoke with a strong Magyar and German accent. Tbey were neither Czech nor Slovak by origin. One army captain could not even speak Czech correctly. These people were under Major Ečer, a Ieft·"' inger, wbo had borrowed the title or " General." His department boasted that it had tracked down Hr . .tosepb Tiso. President of the independent State of Slovakia and, later, alao the entire Goveľllment of the Slovak Republic. Ečer and bis group were sent to Germany by the Provislonal ľzecho-Slovak Government of Dr. J ohn Šrámek (the premier), but rbey were in contact more with Dr. Hubert Ripka or directly witb Dr. l~dward Beneš than they were with Šrámek. Formally, they were to <"Oncern themselves w!th Cze<"ho-Slovak refugees as a I enatriation c-ominission and also follow the Nuremberg Trials against war criminals. Tbey had a department for eve•·yth lng; and experts In every de1,artment. Of course. Ečer's outfit had at it~ disposal huge sum., of money to tr ack down the members of the Government of the Slovak Republlc, and especially P resident Tiso. When Beneš returned to l'rague. Ečer recelved his instructlons directly from bim. NO POLITICAL ASYLUM FOR TI SO After Presldent Tlso and thP Slovak Government !1ad fJeJ Sloľakia in Apríl, 1945. tbey sought ref11ge in Kremsmiinster Tbe Iast .,.et>k ot Aprll, Dr. Joseph Tlso set 0 111. for Mnnich to Carclinal Faul•11 1>er's residence, but was delayed two days in bis jOtl''D';!Y, oecause Munlch was occupied by the Aroeri()an Army by April 30. 194á. It was th•1~ t hat Dr. Josepb Tlso became senarated trom his Government and had a bsolutely no contact with 1I. That explains wby l:!•3 signature ;5 mil'~lng on the "Surrender No•t>·' of May 8. 1945, wbirh w1s b anded !o fi 0 1eral Walton H. Walker or thf' Amerlcan Army in J< .. 0 .nsmiinst.er. .\.r!C'0rd,ng to a report In the "STARS AN D ST R!"~:S" at that ••mP when Dr. J osepb Tiso C'Onld not reach l\funich. h .. •·"!tire.i to a umall monastery in Bavaria, wbere he remainerl until mi!irnry unlls Jlicked bim up for questloning and then Jed hlm off to 111 "itnerican roncentration renter. Tlso reroained in the roncentra• :on r 11 mp ror Quite some Ume. He was questionecl not only by Amerlcan •·1thoritles. but also by Ečer's soldlers until, finally. he was surren,➔ ..red by t)Je lT. S. ·Army to Ečer and taken to Prague In November 194u, This. in short, relates to the first part ot Tii;o's case, h :, we čan­ not pass it over so llgbtly. because hls brief account éontalns many tpgal lncons'ÍRtencies. náy even illegalltles, and is contrar y to every·thing whtch has heretofore or therellfter taken place anywbere· irÍrPtnlltion-ally aťrordlng to AmeriC'an Law 2 SLOVAKIA As soon as the Slovak Government of Dr. Stephen Tlso, a co usin ol Dr. Joseph Tiso, in the name of all t he refugees fľom S lovakia, handed over to the representative of the American Army the note given below and subjected itself to its commands, at that moment the status of all escapees and, therefore, even that of the leading Slovak politlcos, should have been considered according to international practices and American la,ws, where the right of asylum, except in this one case, had never before been vlolated, at least not as far as I can recollect. The "Surrender Note" of the Slovak Government to the Ameri• cau Army read as tollows: GOVERNMENT IN EXILE AT KREMSM0NSTER, AUSTRIA SLOVAKIAN To Lieuteuant General Walton H. Walker of the U. S. Army For the Commanding General XX Corps of the U. S. Army On behalf of the S lovakia n Government In exile at Krems• miinster, Austria, I, Dr. Štefan Tiso, as Prime Minister thereof, . do submit myself, the members of my Government, our famílied and our governmental policy completely to the Comm anding General of the XX Corps of the Third Army of the United State:1. W e submit ourselves for such disposltion as may b e wise and ordered by the Allied High Comand. We beg full protectlon of the Armies of the United States in whose homeland are living about one-thlrd of our natlon and accept the democratic prlnciples of the people, for the people and by the people. W e take the liberty on this occasion to beg for protection for the entire Slov,ak colony whlch was forced to leave its country and is now iu Kremsmiinster, Austria, also for a ll our couu• trymen who live in territories occupled by the Allied forces. Kremsmiinster, 1fay 8, 1945. (Seal of the Prime Ministry) Dr. Štefan Tiso, Premier. Or. Mikuláš Pružinský, Mlnister of Financa. Medricky, Minister of Agrlculture. Kočiš, Minister of Education. T. J. Gašpar, Deputy. W. O. Collier, Brig. Gen. U. S. Army. T. O. Curtls, Col. G. S. C. Davld W. Allard, Capt. Inf. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE STARTS TISO ON ROAD TO GALLOWS True it is that all the Allies met in London as a joint International Commisslon to discuss the punishment of "War Crininals." Dr. Ečer was the Czecho·Slovak member of this Commlssion. It is also true that certain directives were agreed tiPOn for the surrender of war crlminals to indlvidual states on whose terrltorles the gullty or accused were supposed to have committed war crimes. Offlcial SLOVAKIA 3 clocuments o( the Supreme Command o( the United Armies are supposed to tel1 ns jnst how many times such surrenders were effected, the negotiations that took pla<'e. as well as the decision reached ln each <'ase. Copies of these documenL~ were sent automatically to the Nuremberg Court to ascertain whether the persons to be surrenderecl to indivldual states ,vere needed or not at any bearings of the Court. or wbether the Court itself intended to try tbe lndividuals in questlon. 1 checked over these documents quite thoroughly but failed to flnd ?.nything of the sort relating to Dr. Joseph Tiso, or the Government of Dr. Stephen Tiso. I am, therefore, inclined to believe tbe whispered reports which circulated in Nuremberg át that tíme both among the Allies and the members of Ečer's commisslon tbat the surrender ot Dr. Joseph Tlso was not in accord with accepted legal precepts or p1,actices and that some violations of accepted laws and practlces had occurred in Tiso's case. On June 25th, and agaln on J une 27, 1945, the Czecho-Slovak Hadio clalmed that Dr. Joseph Tiso and, later, even ibe Slovak Government, were taken into custody by American authorities. Reports had it tbat they were transportecl to Pilsen. But the reports were false. Americans of Slovak descent were lntensely interested in the tate of Tiso and Slovakia. They requested their State Department not to surrender Tiso and the members of the Slovak Government to nenes• "Provisional Czechoslovak Government," because that certainly wo111<1 mean death for Tiso. But thls availed them nothing, Al the insistence of Benes' Government. the U. S. Department of State ordered the U. S. authoritles In Austrla to surrender Tiso and bis group to Benes' "Czechos lovak War Crimes Commisslon" wlthout even lnvestigating their statns as is evidenced from a letter of Actlng Secretary DEAN ACHESO~. written August 30, 19H. and published ln the "JEDNOTA" {Middlelown, Pa.) '.\{arch 5, 1947. Tbe letter read: "Since detalls concerning the surrender of Dr. Stephen Tiso and members of his Government are not available to the Department of State, a copy of your letlf'r has been transmittecl to the W ar Department together \ľith a request that the Secretary of War <'Ommunicate \ľl th you dlrectly on this particular matter. "A totJal of flfteen high officials af the former Slovak Government weľe arrested by the Unlted States Army at varions limes during tbe montbs of May and June. 1945. . . . "The arrest of these individuals and their rel ease to the CzechoSlovak Government was in conformity with United States policy re. garding the disposition of United Nations' nationals who cÓllaborated with or assisted the enemy. The policy is to apprehend such coJlat.orators as may be founcl within the jnrisdictión of tTnited States milltary authorities. to notify the respertive United Nations' Governments of such apprehension, and to hold such persons pending the clecision of the respective government~ as to their <lis_posltlon unless they are to de detained as war criminals or for other reasons. In view of ~bis policy, the Department of State, in October, 1945, informed the Commandíng General of thc Uníted States Forces, European SLOVAKJA T.beater, that the fifteen individuala in hia cuatody who had been membera of ·· the collaborationiat Slovak Government ahould be re• leaaed to the appropriate Czechoalovak authoritiea. They were handed over in November, 1945. . . . From Acbeson's letter it ls quite evldent that Benes' "Provision,u Czechoslovak Government" was included among the "United Natlon,ľ t:overnments." All Benes had to do 1, as label any citlzen of Czecho· Slovakia a "collaborator'' and the U. S. State Department, "in r.011 · tormity with United States policy" pursued at tbat tlme, delivered He11es' politicdl opponents to Ečer witbout even investlgating tbe cbll,rges of collaboration. American tradltions went down tbe draln. 'ľbe rigbt of political asylum, always regarded as something sacred by tbe people of tbe Unlted States was violated in the case of Tlso and the Slovak Government. Benes. it seems, could get away with everyt,blng, because he knew the right people. Tbe ract that he 1 esigned as president and left his country wheu it faced a grave r-risis aud tben congratulated bi~ successor, wbo was elected coasti· tutlonally, meant nuthing to the U. S. State Department. But. it meant certain death to many patriotic Slovaks and untolll sufferings to many t housands more. It !s quite certain that negotiations were tied u1> several t lme!I. because the Engllsh were reluctant to agree tbat 'ľi so be surrendered to Ečer at a tíme when Prague had alreally announcect his deliveraiLce to Ečer. No matter how tb.e events of that time were distorted, the ract remalns that an unexpected telepbone call from the airport was rec·eived during a session of tbe Prague Parliament, reportlng that Dr. Joseph Tiso was brought to Prague. Shortly thereafter, Minister Ko· pecký gleefully displayed a pboto taken at tbe Prague airport which showed bow Tiso was being led under heavy guard with bands bound by a cbain and a loc-k. All the Communlsl papers and eveu tbe organ of Šrámek's Czec-h Populist Party, LlDOVÁ DEMOKRACIA (People's IJemocracy), displayed the picture promlnently. . Shortly aftE>r bis arrlval in Pragne, Tl~o was transported to Bratislava. wbere one wing of the Jail was em.ptied to take care of bim and bis ľOmpan!ons Tbey werE> guarded not by ordlnary jail guards. bm by !',elect. members of tbe Nationality Securlty Ouard. EV ERYTHING SET AGAINST TISO Investigation of • Tiso began at onre. But not according to accepted practice and, bence. wbole month~ pasRed witbout a regular preparation to review tht: case of Dr Tlso. As ROOn as Tiso was, placed in the jail or the Federal Co11rt. bis case. arcording to the laws in force at that time. belonged before the National Conrt and the lnves1:gation had to be made by the procurators or prosecutlng attorneys or tbe Natlonal Court. The prosecuting attornP.vs assigned to prosecute '.ľiso and his group were: Dr. George Šujan. Dr. l{lgan and Dr. Ra§la. Since each prosecutor waR assigned particular persons to prosecute. the whole investlgatlon suffered from a taek of unity ancl wa.s casual; hence, lt could malte little headway. Secondly, tbe prosecutlon. it seems. could not or dld not wan t to flnd any wltnesses besldes those who were arreste,I. Sl,OVAKIA 5 And, thirdly, the Prague State Court constautly kept sendlng c1emands to have Dr. Tiso tPstiľy Iu varlous cases which were tried there. T lso was beard as a w1tness, and theše hearings took up much of tbe .tlme of the inveseigating organs. And so, for techoical reasons, as well as polltical efforts to oostpone Dr. Tlso's trial, the case of Dr. Tiso was not even ready up 10 the electlons or May, 1946, and, hence, could not even get started before tbat time. as the Communlsts had reckoned that it would. They exerted tremendous pressure to have the trial begln before the elections. but there were so many compllcatlons that it was imposslble to do so. After the electlons wblť'h the Slovak Democratic Party had won so decisively and In which tn<> promis,i of sparing Tiso's llfe plaýéd such a prominent role, it appeared for a time that Dr. Joseph Tlso would get a fair tria!. There is a great dlfference between a court and a court When a person appears in court, there can be doubts and objectlons as to bis personallty and morallty. The C'ourt exlsts for tbe purpose of removing such doubts; when that happens , the accused person Ie morally rehabl»tated. Very grave charges were made agalnst Tls o not only In the emigratlon. of Dr. Beneš, but also on the podlum of the Prague parllament. l3ut there al"o were promises and guarantees that t he worst would not happen. 'rhe beginning of 1946 was s igniflcant for its polltical ferment. witb pressure on the Slovak Democratlc Party. and the pressure or Dr. Beneš and the Prague Government on the supreme rlgbts or a soverelgn nation. These rlghts. it was thought. the Slovak NaUonal Coun<'ll, beaded by Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, had been assured by the socalled Košie.e Agreement of March 2. 1945. Tberefore, whatever t.he representatlves of tbe Slovak Natlonal C'ouncll had willingly ylelded to the Benešltt>s and the Zenklltes must be evaluated in terms of the infltu•nce these concesslons had on the fate of Dr. Joseph Tlso. If -w e woul<I glauce over t he resolutlons ot the Slovak National ('ounc il of March 2. 1945. wbere that body stressed the plcture ot Hate llte as it visuallzed it, t hen there !s llttle dlfference between 1hat co.n<'eption and the Slovak State as lt actually was. And lf the a:c<'epted princlples and resolutions had been adhered to and not devlated trom after t he electlons, In whlch the Slovak Democratlc Party had beaten t he Commnnlsts cleclslvely, Dr. Tlso unquestlonably would bave been allve today. From Aprll to June, 1943. Šrám ek's provislonal Czecho-Slovak Government In T,ondon was preparing the St.ate Act. whicb was pro<'lalmed' ón Jnne 30, 1943. It was plalnly evldent that thls act tbreat: Pned Tis6 and the entlre body of the Slovak Government. On March 2, 1945, the Slovak Natlonal Council clemanded In the very tlrst paragraph of the KošlcP Agreement that the new government of Czecho-Slovakla decJare that it does not identity itselt wlth tbe proclamatlon or June 30, 1943, of the Czecho-Slovak Government in I..ondon. 6 SLOVAKIA BE N EŠ H A S HIS WAY Shortly after arrivin~ in Prague, Dr. Edward Ileneš formally betray~d · Ruthenia to the U .,S.S.R., and, being recognized by Stalin, felt that he \ľas firmly in the saddle again. Alrea.dy on June 22, 1945, be demanded that the Slovaks relinqulsh what they had voted for on ?>farch 2, 1945. Dr. Beneš disregarded the wishes of tbe Slovak majority and begau to push bis own exponents to the forefront - Slávik. Hečka, etc. but when this dld not go well for bim, he turned to Dr. Vavro Šrobár •and Dr. Vladimír Clementis and several other more compliant persons wbo were willing to repudlate everything tbat Beneš had to promise in Moscow and Košice. Clementis was a leading Communist In Slovakia, while Dr. Šrobár, whom Beneš had named Financa Minister against the will off tbe entire Slovak Nalional Councll, was the foremost proponent of Beneš's National Socialism among the Slovaks. Confrontea w1th the promises he had made and the note wlllcb he had seut to the Slovak National Council trom London by means or Ursíny and Novomeský, Dr. Beneš sald that these were forced out ot him, just as the Pittsburgh Pact of 1918 had been forced on Masaryk. And, he aclded, tbat "everything was not in order even in MosBeneš remonstrated and demonstrated that an absolutely indeJJendent Slovakia was out of the question, that the threat of Russia was ever present, and that after Rutheuia, Slovakia woulcl surely be next in line for absorption by the USSR. The dlscussions and debates finally ended with the first. Prague Treaty of June 2, 1945. whiC'h cleflned the ľunctions of the various ministries, the matters 011 wbicb only the Prague Government could rule, and the matters that ,ľere s11ppose<1 to belong to the competency of tbe Slovak Natlonal Council. It is rathe r amusing that the seventh article of tbat Prague Agreement stated that tbe seat of he Supreme Court would -be in Hrntislava. That seat is still in Prague as it always had been. DEMOCRATS W IN E L ECTION S, B U T L OS E EVERYT HI N G Agreement or no agreement. Dr. 13eneš and bis Goľernment did what they pleased. Llfe in the state went according to the Prague Agreement more or less untll April 1946 - a month before the flrst JJOSt-war parliamentary elections. Then beli itself broke loose • The Slovak Democratic Party was attacked furiously by all Czech partles, being incited by Beneš, as well as the Communists. Despite this, ho,i,·ever. notbing can justify tbose "ho concluded tbe Prague Agreement of June 22, 1945. Even though the Freedom Party came into being at that Ume with money supplied by Šrobár, Beneš ancl thP Communists, or wa.« organized by Široký, and the concessions, made at a tíme when the Communists strongly demanded thE' tria! of Dr. Joseph Tlso, may in ~ome way be justified, there is no one who can teli me that Lettrlch was in any ,ľay justified to renounce the right to gra.nt amnesty. The man who did that knew well that Tiso was in the custody oľ the Fecleral Court in Bratislava and that he was surrendered from Slovak juriscliction ·into the hands of Beneš and the Czechs who hated him fanatically and undivldedly. ····· SLOVAKIA 7 Iu Article 1 of the second Prague Agreement there is a section O, which speaks about clemency and states: "The President of tbe Republic grants mercy even in Slovakia and that also in matters which belong before the People's Courts and the National Court - on the motion of the Commissloner of Justice, who presents lt to the Government through the Officers of tbe Slovak NaUonal Council; the Government then returns the motion to tbe Ofticers of tbe Slovak National Council, if it has objections against it from the standpoint of all-state interests. bnt otherwise presents it to the President of the Republlc." When Dr. Lettriťh together with John Ursiny presented this agreement to the officers of the Democratic Party for approval and later a lso, when they explained it, expressly gave assurances that before signing this agreement they had dellberated with Dr. Beneš and that he ha.cl deflnltely promised and assured them that he would grant mercy to Dr. Tiso and they could safely transfer the power ot amnesty to bim. It is interesling, however, that nothing about tbis assurance ls D1entioned either in Dr. Kvetko's book, whlch was published in Bratislava in 1947, or in the article of Dr. Lettrich which descrlbes the case or Dr. Tiso. In bis articles Dr. Lettrich refers to the assurance of Dr. Beneš of September 1946 in Topoľčianky, where Beneš expressly promised that he would grant mercy to 'ľiso and added: "By my declsion I shall not cause any complications in Slovakia." In evaluating the truth and the proclamations of Beneš we must admit that in June, 1945, both presidents of the Slovak National Counc!I - Schmldtke, as well as Lettrich - had expressed themselves very sharply against Tlso in offlclal manifestations, when they already knew that Dr. Tlso was under arrest in Bavaria slnce June 9, 1945. We must not forget tbat the Premier at that time was Fierlinger who had attacked Tlso very sharply, and aJ.so the Democratic Party for standing back of Tiso. Per· 5onal expressions of Beneš, sneh as "Tiso wi ll hang," were known •o Lettrich and also to Ursiny. And that is more reason why they ;,honld have considered well whether they could believe Beneš, slnce they themselves had sald on various occasions, relating from their own P.Xperiences, that Beneš cannot be believed and especially not when be was concerned with the problem of savlng or destroying an enemy which he hated so insanely as he dld Dr. Joseph Tlso. As soon as the second Prague Agreement went into effect, Tiso c-ould have been saved only before the Court, if the Court would have rendered any other verdict but that of death. Despite the fact that Tiso's fate was sealed In such a way, we must not · end this chapter after the second Prague Agreement, because, in my oplnion, it is just at such limes that people prove best whether they possess character and a spina! column. L ETTRICH'S PRE-E LECTION PROMISES I know that many „people pleaded with :Beneš to grant clemency to· TiS-O even before the tria! was lnitlated. Beneš promlsed everybody ·that he would. But despite Beneš's promlse, leadlng polltlclans o! the Rlov1tk Democratlc Party should not have believed bim. if they thougbt 8 SLOVAKIA seriously and bonorably about tbe promises the Party had giveo tbe representatives of the Catbolic wing. Io Aprll 1946, the ,econd Prague agreemeot wa.s not tbe ooly iigreement made; an agreement was also concluded witb tb.e so-called <..:atbolic wing of tbe Democratic Party, wbicb was actlng more lndel'endeotly, and foť quite a Ume it was not known wbetber or not lt would bolt tbe Democratlc Party and join wltb tbe Freedom Party. Tbis so-called Catbolic agreement of tbe Democratlc Party was attacked viciously not only by tbe Communists, but also by tbe Beaeš Czechs. One of tbe main polnts of this agreement, even tbougb lt was oot expressed in writing, was that Tiso's life would be spared. In tbe May, 1946 elections, the Communists suftered a territlc l;teing, tbe Democratlc Party taking 62 per cent of the total vote cast iu Slovakia. So. everybody, especially tbose who voted for tbe Democratlc Party candidates, thought that the Party would keep lts pro mise to save the life of Dr. Tiso. The <..:ommunists and various representatives of tbe Trade Uuions, ho" ever. kept poundlng the tables all summer in 1946 to instltute the tria! of Tiso. It was clear that the matter could not bé delayed ľor long. Suddenly in the second half or October, 1946, without the Tiso matter stralghtened out, Dr. Lettrlch embarked on a visit to tbe llnlted States. Lettrlch claims that before his departure he had come to ao uoclerstandlng witb Pollák and Cvinček, Vice-Presidents of tbe Slovak ,\ .'atlonal Council, tbat the matter would not be asslgned to the Natio nal Court oefore h1s return home. Cvinček, however, denled that Lettrlcb had ,ald anything of the sort. But even 1t if was the trutn, !r is a very weak and slok alibi. Dr. Lettrloh was aware of the fa.cc , na· whlle he 1\!'aS preslrlent of the Slovak Natlonal Councll, tbe Com• •nunists got i.ny one tbey wanted on the Councll of Commissloners. Aud he knew that tbe most important minlstry, the Mlnlstry of tbe lnterlor, did not go to a member of the strongest party, but, lt was said, to a 11on-party man, Beneš's man, a servant of the Communlsts, tó General Ferjenčik. Tbe signature of Dr. Lettrich is on Ferjenčik's deoree. Arter tbese experiences could Lettr!ch belleve that Cvinček and Pollák would be able to hold the )lne w!thout hlm, when he hlmseU adm!ts in hls artlcle that Milan Pollák was uncertaln, tick.le and for tbe executlon of Dr. Tiso? · · The fact ls that after the departure ot Dr. Lettrlch, the case ot Dr. Tlso was presented to the National Court, and tbe presldent of the court senate became the feared Dr. Igor Da.xner, And here I see for Uié second Ume the sealed will of Dr. Beneš to bang Tlso at all costs. And for the second tlme I see Tlso's fate sealed with the a.s· slsiance of the representatlves of the Slovak Democratlc Party despite the promises and obllgatlons to tbe eleotorate. " I W tL L HANG OR. T ISO!" · Wben Dr. Daxner was allowed to become tbe presiding judge, 1Íolbfog good could be expected. All the assumptlons in thls regard XJaxner manitested by hls behavlor long before the tria! -and proved lt afterward. ·: . SLOVAKIA 9 The day before the date of the main hearing was set, I myselt waé convinced of thls when I tried to help to remove Daxner. The Communiste, however, were so firmly anchored in the Slovak NaUonal Council that Dr. Daxner was approved as preslding judge of the National Court wlthout any dltflculty. On November 18, 1946, the National Court was supposed to eonvene an"d,determine the term of the maln hearing, begin the trlal anil present the decument ot charges agalnst Tiso. The previous day, when I had gone to Dr. Daxner to ask for a permanent admlttance pass to tbe tria!, Dr. Daxner began to argue and tried to persuade me to go along wlbh ševčik and Pollák, and not with the "popullsts and separatlsts." He asked me to follow the tria! of Dr.l Tlso and use my lnfluence In the Democratlc Party so that lt would not ldentlfy Itself wlth Dr. Tlso and would not make any dlfflculties for Da.xner. When I retueed, he banged bis flst on the table and screamed: "You are doing wrong. The Communiata will devour you, tear you to piecea, and I will hang Dr. Tiao!"1 tried to quiet bim ciown and cautioned him 'that a judge should not talk that way and that lt also was against the law for a judge to express his opinion so resolutely against the accused. But Daxner oniy grew more exclted, banged the table agaln and agaln and yelled: " Do whatever you want to, but I shall hang him !" I related the incident to Andrew Cvlnček, addlng that I was williog to teit:fy to it a.t any th:p.e. I reminded hlm that I knew Daxner well. I knew that Daxner WltS a paralytlc, a sadlst and a person of very bad mora! and · spirltual qualitles. I also told hlm that I did not belleve that Beneš would grant amnesty to Dr. Tlso. I refused to talk about the matter before the body o! o!ficers of tbe Democratlc Party, because ševčik and Pollák were among them, and · r knew definitely that they were betraylng our matters to the Communlsts. In fact I knew that ševčík was a paid agent ot tbe )JKVD (secret police). Thereupon the offlcers or the Party named a five-member commlttee to hear my story. Urslny, Cvlnček and Dr. Pietor reallzed the gravity of the situatlon and promlsed to try to do somethlng in Prague before December 2, the date when the hearings in the case or Dr. Tiso were to be concluded. THE M OCK TRIAL BEGINS But, alas, nothing happened. On December 2, 1946, Dr. Daxner opened the tria! with Dr. Joseph Tlso before the Natlonal Court in Bratislav-a. The trial took place in the jury room. The prosecutlon was represented by Dr. Rigan, Dr. Šujan anu Dr. Rašla. Dr. Tlso ,via.s defended by Dr. Grečo and Dr. Ža!Íkay. That is how a correspondenťs repor.t would read. And tbat is jus t about how the reports of the Slovak Press Bureau lookec\. But the truth 1s altogether differenl Tlso's frlends and bis famlly had engaged the servlces of a very respectable counsellor, Dr. Lojek, to defend Tiso. However, as soon as D"r. Lojek presented the full authorlzatlon or Dr. Joseph Tlso, he was ordered to appear before the poliťe, who began to inVesfigate hlm. They as ked why he wanted to defend Tlso, who dlscussed the defe nse wlth htm, how much he was pald, and other Jess sensLble Queatlons. What Lojek actually went tbrough ls known only to bim and the 10 SLOVAKIA police. The fact is that he gave up the defense o[ Tiso, and there was nothing else for T!so to do but ask the court to provide defense counsels. This incident, !( everythiug else Iu the tria! against Tiso would be iu order, ra!sed a reasou.ab!e doubt that the tria! would be just and in order. At the same time it made people th!nk and assume that the tria! would be carried on according to some agreement, that it would be a forma! process and. therefore, could not be just and fair. In a word that everyth!ng was cut and drled and Tiso's fate was sealed. I do not press the faet that Dr. Daxner was the presiding judge, but for the sake of the truth I must remlnd that attempts were made to remove Daxner before lhe tria! started. Of course, the tria! wa.,; prepared and no one could degress from the prepared program or could successfully take exception to it. Besides Daxner, there were six attendant justices, one a judge by profession, and tbree attendant justices as a reserve, in case one or the other attendant justices would drop out or get sick. It is a universal custom, that against such a court - whether it be called a senate or a jury - the accused, the prosecutor and the defense have the rlght to testify whether a certain person is accepta ble to them or not, and, also to state wbat objections they might entertain against any person of lhe jury or court. Likewise the principle holds universaJJy that when one is proposed as a wltness he cannot be in tbe same tria! also as an attendant or part of the court, and much less so as the presid!ng judge of the court. Slnce the Slovak Democratic Party could uot remove Daxner, tbe defense attomeys tried to replace bim as was their right to do. In the first place they objected because Daxner was incarcerated during the Slovak Republic and, later, had expressed himself on various occasions that all the accused must be hanged and, therefore, it was evldent that he was prejudiced. According to all pena! laws. prejudlce 1s an excluding circumstance. Then they proposed to have Dr. Daxner as a witness to testify that after Da.·rner was freed from jail, Dr. Tlso had allowed bim to take over hls judgeshlp again. Alexander Mach wanted Daxner to testify that it was only by the grace of Mach that Daxner was freed from prison on the basis of the false med!cal testimony and a false X•Ray picture. Daxner simply admltted Mach's statement and proclaimed that bis testimony was no longer needed. As far as prejudice was concerned. he sa!d that the objection was not proper, because he sald he was objeetive, and imediately ordered the tria! to begin. AL L OBJECTION S OVE RRU L ED According to every Jaw. objections cannot be overruled by a •judge against whom they are made. This is a fundamental princlple of pena! procedure. But laws were no gulde for Daxner. He had only one gulde: to condude the process as speE!dily a.s poss!ble and render the verdict he had promlsed bis bosses. When the defense counsels saw that they were gett!ng nowhere, they began to tackle the matter from a Jegal standpoint. They ob- SLOVAKIA ll jected that the court was not made up properly, and that the de<:rees of lhe Slovak ::-l'ational Council about people's courts were not valid and, finally, that Dr. Tiso was not surrendered properly by the American occupation authorltles, as prescribed in accepted 1nter· natlonal regulations, but that Tiso was forcefully transported lnto Czecho-Slovakia without the knowledge of the four powers concerned, or only with the knowledge of one of those powers. The defense sald that if Tiso was a war crlmlnal, then bis surrender should have been determined by t he Internatlonal Tribunal in :-.1Uremberg. U he was not a war crimlnal, and the American General In command in Kremsmlinster May 8, 1945, accepted the capitulatlon or the Government of Dr. Stephen Tiso, then, in that case, all members of that Government, and so much more the Presldent, have the rlght the right of asylum, thls belng based on the following arguments: l. According to the Atlantlc Charter, i!IS\ted by the Presldent or llle United States and the Engllsh Prime Minister, every nation has the · right to choose the form of government under which it shall live· and to its own statehood; 2. the head of such a state was not subject to the legislative power of a foreign state for pena! acts, which may have been committed during the existence of and on the territory of such a State; 3. the Slovak State was recognized by some 27 States, including Great Britaln, with which it had diplomatlc rela· tions; also with the Soviet Union: 4. neither Great Drltain nor France agreed to the surrender of Dr. Tiso and, therefore, Dr. Tlso should be returned to Altčitting, in Bavaria, wbere on Jtme 9, 1945. he was arrested by American Military Police. 'l"hls contention o[ the defense still holds today. I myself can eonflrm that Britaln and France never agreed to the surrender of Dr. Tiso. According to the International Agreement oť J anuary 13, 1942, eoncluded in London, which refers to the Atlantlc Charter and the proclama.tion of Roosevelt and Churchill of October 25, 1941, lliternatlonii:lly only those criminals were to be surrendered who had undertaken, besides mllitary acts, such attacks against clvillzed populntions whlch were considered criminal among clvilized natlons. Tiso was not accused of such a crime. Furthermore, others who could be surrendered were those·,, who as occup,tnts, or representatives of occupants, committed or allowed to be committed punishable acts against the clvillan popu!a:tion. · Tiso was not accused of ,any such punlsha.ble acts by the In· habitants of the ló Slovak vlllages which were taken by the Slovak Hepubllc from the Polish territory. If, however, he or bis subordinates had commltted a pena! act on Pollsh terrltory, then, accordlng to the agreement above, Dr. Tiso could be accused only by the Poles and tried II! Warsaw. . Na.turally, Dr. Daxner repucliated any and all such objectlons and announced that bis court was competent to try Dr. Tlso. Then the tleťense counsels requested that the tria! take place before a regular and not before a revolutionary national court, because all the preferred pena! acts were commltted before the two decrees of 1945 ot tbe Slovak National Councll were effective. The defense clalmed that only Cor pena! acts commltted after the issuance of some pena! form ,vas 1-t posslble to carry ·on a pena! procedure arcording to sucb a norm. 12 SLOVAKIA even though penal sanctions remain according to some Jater norm. The pena! procedure itself, however, should be carrled on according to thé norma! penal oťder. Even Tlso hlmself declared that he dld not recognlze the decree of the Slovak National Court, by whlch the socalled National Court and the People's Courts were establlshed, because he was under arrest trom June 9, 1945, and, therefore, could not have committed any pena! act against the regulations lssued by the Slovak National Councll. We la.wyers had debated whole hours before the Tiso tria! · about these very weighty Jegal problems and then even durlng the trial, but Daxner repudiated them in a s ingle moment by banglng on the table and screaming: "I . repudiate all objections. ľll take care of all pena! procedures here!" And that is how the tria) against Tiso began. Up to that tíme, the tria) room was fllled wlth Slovak and Czech reporters and forelgn observers, but after that moment all who were not resldents of Bratislava left the proceedlngs, because they reallzed that the fate of Tlso was sealed and only a mock tria) was to be staged. During the two hours, which I have thus f.ar desctibed, Daxner several tlmes howled llke a jackall, banged on the table and threat• ened Dr. ~abkay, and even Dr. Kšinan, who defended Mach, tbat he would tbrow tbem out of the court room. The whole procedure was recorded on sound tape and tbat evenlng the newsmen wbo _gave a report. about the trial, p•ayed this portion of the recorded tape, wblch was falthfully recorded. The popula.tlon of Slovakl-a bega.n to sound off because of Da.xner's conduct. Tbe Democratic Party and lts representatlv01, were the target of bitter and viclous attacks; the people inslsted that the Party keep lts promlses. It began to be generally sald that Tiso's verdict was already settled and that what• ever Da.xner was doing was only a comedy. Desplte the fact that tbi!I was true, thls process nevertheless. brought out some hlstorical trutbs which we shall need In the future and whicb without tbi.B trial would not have come to l!ght. Wh~n Dr. Žabkay rose to bis feet on March 6th and said only t.hree words - "Prosim, aby bolo ..." ("l beg, in order that lt be") he was lnterrupted by Daxner who jumped to bis feet and barked: "Tbe court overrules tbat!" When Žabkay protested and explained that the court could not overrule something which he had not al! yet aaid, Dr. Daxner bellowed: "But I tel1 you tbat the court does over• rule lt!" THE W I TNESSES The wltnesses who testified in the Tlso tria) might be ·p laced in three categories: . • l, The Catholic clergymen toward whom I)axner acted . arro· gantly. I thtnk tbat it was on account or tbem that Dr. Tiso decided tQ (!Pl!&k In h!s own defen$e, They were Archblshop Charles Kmefko and BJshop Michael Bm;alka. From the leg.al standpo!nt, I regarded it as the greatest tnsult When Dr.. Daxner announced in the name of the Court that , he woul<l SLOVAKIA 13 not swear ln tbese witnesses. Ordinarily, according to prevalling la.ws in Europe, the court does not swear in a wltness when there are reasons why it does not want to believe hlm. That 1s, In Europe a witness is first heard and then the court determlnes whether he ah!Wi be sworn io or not. Daxner's conduct was openly provocatlve and in· s ulting to disbonor such a serlous, aged man, as was Dr. Kmetko, wbo was respected by all decent Slovaks regar-dless of thelr rellgious beliefs. It is sigo1ficant that at tbe time Dr. Kmeťko was teslfylng, the Czech Catholic clergymen had several deliberatlons and lssued memoranda and reports, but displayed practically no open interest in what was happening In Slovakia. Not even Archbishop Joseph Beran, the Czech Primate, could find anything to say in tbe interest of the honor of the Catholic priesthood of Slovakia representéd by Pr, KmeCko. Tbe Czech clergymen followed Beran's example and. failed to ralse their volces and to rally tbe Catholic Czechs !n defense ot Justlce and righteousness. 2. In· the second category belonged the Slovak members of Gottwa.lďs government, namely, Ursiny and Lichner. Daxner talked to Ursíny as thóuugh he were an underling. From flve meters away Daxner greeted htm: "Why we, Mr. VlcePreinler of the Government, know each otber well, because we or• ganlzed the underground together." - Ursíny broke out lnto a broad s mlle and said nothing, though he should bave said: You, Mr. presidlng judge, were nowhere and did nothing, unless you were in some tavern, Sir, and there I, John Ursíny, did not go. Otberwise Ursíny did not say anything substantial, except that 'ľiso did not want bim in the Slovak Government. nor in the Peasant Banks, and that he was In the concentratlon camp at Illava for three days, but was not beaten there and was fed well. Daxner exploited Ursiny, however, by using general expres11ions, s·uch as, "Why we know that ... Why we did that together ... Why that does not have to be explained to us." Of course, the Communist press immediately glorified Daxner as a great hero of the underground movement, to whose actlvlty_ UT· Ríny hlmself had attested. Minlste.r .Tohn Lichner, however. ,v,as a witness of another type. Daxner did not welcome bim with a smile or a greetlng, but with the questlon: "You were a minister of Dr. Tiso's Government?" - He -then asked Lichner whether he traveled and delivered speeches in a uniform of tbe (Hlinka) Guard and why Tiso later dlsmlseed hlm. ' .Licbner expla!ned as best he could, but it must have been evident even to hlm tbat Daxner was not even remotely lnterestjid. 3. The third group of witnesses was the most interestlng. I be· ·11evé I can· characterize thls group properly, because I had wltnessed t hé N'uremberg trlals. There I saw ield Marshal von Paulus go before the :rrtternational Trlbunal, and in Bratislava I saw General Ferdin,and Čatld!ľ go béfore the National Cou-rt. Both men had much in common Both were soldlers, generals; thelr appearance In court w.as .a -surprlse; and both appeared a.t a time when lt. was opportune for tbe. Commun!sta and einbárrasslng for the defense. · In Nuremberg, ·Goerlng read romances and detectlve storles and generally was not lnterested In the tria!. When, to hls great surprlse, 14 SLOVAKTA the American Police brought Paulus, the heroic "defender" of Stalingrad, into the court room, Goering for a moment took off bis glasses, looked around, llstened and then said to the leading personaJities of the German General Staff: "'Fhis is hopeless ! this is swinishness ! " Should I repeat only thls sentence In reference to Čatloš, I would help the reader of these lines, because the result wlll be the same. Paulus entered the Nuremberg court room slowly with a oautious step; he was attired in an elegant dark blue sult, a starc-hed whJte s hirt, as if it was out of porcelain. He spoke slowly and pretended to be deaf; bis eyes were glassy, his frame strlkingly numb, and hli< eyes up1ifted almost straight to the heavens. The same could be s-ald for Čatloš. He, too, was dressed In a dark blue suit and was about twice as deaf as Paulus; but bis eyes, s tance were the same - just as if twlns appeared on two different stages. Paulus saw nothing but evil in everythlng that Hitler dld. Čatloš tried to prove to Tiso that he knew about all thlngs - the posslble and the impossible - because he, Čatloš, reported to bim on everything every morning ,at nine o'clock. Tlso smiled ironically and saíd: "To report, report he did, but whether he told me everything, I do not know." The fact is, according to what Čatloš said, that Čatloš sbould have sat in Tiso's place; for those acts Čatloš and not Tiso should have answered. It is interesting that bctb generals stuck to the orders or MosťOW, that they preferred to be deaf and more deaf, so tbey could speak slowly and thus have time to think thlngs over. Both held up faiľly well the first several hours, but then both slipped up a bit. Paulus was taken back to Moscow, and Catloš to the Rratislava jail. Later Catloš was taken to Prague, where Czéťh mllltary correspondents questloned him. I had not met Paulus before and, hence, did not know bim. But I knew Čatloš from my cbildhood days, and the last time I saw ·hlm was In September, 1939, in Prešov. The Catloš, who seven years later ťame to the court room of Dr. Daxner, seemed to be about twenty years older and bis mind compared wlth that or a tbird grader and not that of a general. I am wllling to testlfy under oath even today that the Catloš who sat before Daxner was not the master of his own wlll, tbat he was a broken man actlng under pressure of some one else. Catloš definitely was not a.ťtlng as a norma! person. Another such wltness was Dr. Martin Sokol, former Premier or the Slovak Parliament. The first day he acted as Catloš did; ma.ny t!mes he made it aggravating for Tiso; h e was stupified, deaf and gazed toward tbec eiling. On the second day Sokol reacted differently; as lf the Slovak environment began to affect bim and the lnjections were Joslng tbelr force (here I remind tbat the expression "!njectlons" was used by Dr. Tiso when answerlng ča.tloš); his answers took on a Slovak color and he talked clearly and lntelligently abotu the confllcts between Dr. Joseph Tlso and Dr. Vojtech Tuka. Dr. Sokol conld not revoke everytbing he had saia, but on the seťond day Dr. Sokol definitely appeared wlth bis old smlle in tbe lE>ft ťorner of bis month. nespite thlfl, bowever. the characteristic lnfluen('e.'! of Rmislan indodrinatlon were planlly evldent. This was SLOVAKIA 15 intluences also by the thlrd par:ticipant of the Moscow school, D1. John Spišiak, the former ambassador of the Slovak Republic in Budapest. Were I to repeat how Spišiak appeared and what he said, I would only be repeating what I had said about Paulus. It was the same school, the very same school wlthout regard to the fact where the s tudents dld the answerlng, whether In Athens, Budapest, Bratislava, or Prague. Then there was a special group, a group of German origin, who al one tlme or auother were actlve in Slovakia. As a Slovak, or as a defense couusel of Slovak orlgin, I would never rely on thelr testi• mony. I was very glad, nay even proud, that Dr. Tlso never appealed to the testimony of these Germans. We can thank Dr. Tlso that we do not have disputes s uch as the Czechs have among themselves over what answers of Ludin are correct and which are false. K. H. Frank, Hitler's man in Prague, signed a different protocol every hour before his death. According to one, Krajina was the leader of the Czech reslstance and, according to another, Dr. J . Krajina, the future secretary-general of Zenkľs party, was the greatest collaborator with the Germans . We Slovaks do not have such differences. And for that we can be thankful to Dr. Tlso, who never concerned himself with German testlmony. Defense speeches refuted the propriety of the court and demanded that Dr. Tiso be returned to the American occupation authoritles in Germany. They pointed out that if Tiso had acted in the manner of Daxner, Da.xner would today be a natlonal corpse and not the presldlng judge of the Natlonal Coun. The defense counsels further polnted out that General Kristin, :VIinister Široký and Minister Ďuriš - who were sentenced to dle. but were saved by Tlso - would have Jong been dead, if Tiso had followed Daxner's example. The defense demonstrated that it was not true, as the prosecu· tion stated, that America, Great Britain and France were at war with Slovakla, but conversely officers of the Slovak Army played tennis with Amerlcan flyers, because every one regarded them not as enemles, but as interned persons of a forelgn state. T H E V ERDICT : " DEATH" - A S FORECAST On the 18th of March, 1947, the Court adjourned to prepare the verdlct. Suddenly, llke a bolt out of clear sky, the report came at 10 P. M. on Apríl 14, 1947, when the officers of the Democratlc Party were in session, that Dr. Daxner had designated the next day, April 15, 1947, as the day he would render the verdict. The Ume was set for 9:0 OA. M. AU of us turned pale, because none of us had expected it. Of course, the Communists were not surprised at all, because they knew l'verything that Daxner was going to do. On Aprll 15, 1947 at 9:30 A. M. the rea.ding of the verdict be· gan; it lasted until 9 P. M. We had expected almost anything to happen. However, that a judge would subordinate hlmself or become subservient to a political party - that no lawyer, no senstble man expected to happen. lt was a s urprise for everybody. 16 SLOVAKIA After the verdict was rendered, the third pbase of the Dr, Tlso ca se began - the final chapter: the fight for amnesty. After the judge rendered the verdict of death on the gallows for Tiso,. Daxner asked the condemned Tiso whether he would request the Court for clemency. Tlso measured DaxneT carefully and said slowly: "I do ask for clemency on mora! grounds." Dr. Žabkay, the defense attorney, presented the Court the rea· sons why Tlso sbould receive mercy and asked tbe Court that Dr. Josepb Tiso's request be placed before tbe proper authorities without delay. Dr. Rigan, State Prosecutor, stated: "1 bave no objections against a favorable executlon or tbe request of Dr. Tiso for mercy." However, all the more disgraceful is wnat continued to take place In the secret sesslon of tbe Court Senate which, accordlng to Jaw, was supposed to consider the request or the condemned man and take a definite stand on it. Generally when the verdict rendered is not unanimous, that 1s wben al! the attendant justices do not vote for the same punishment, then amnesty 1s recommended, and the condemned man usually gets a 30-year or a lite sentence in prison. Tbe verdlct in Tiso's case was not unanimou11; in some things it was 5-2 and in others again 4-3 against Tiso. Here, then, were all t he prerequ!sltes for the Senate to recommend mercy for Tiso. But Da.'<ner, tbe presiding judge, by a Jong and violent procedure, prevailed in bis demand that tbe request of Dr. Tiso be not consldered, but handed over to the Commissar of Justice, Dr. Ivan Štefä.nlk, so that he mi~ht put it before the National Court. F ROM CAIPHAS TO PILATE - TO HE ROD Everything had to be done speedily, because only 48 bours remained <to study and debate the amnesty <1Ue0<tion, and during that time tbe matter had to pass through the Commlss-ary, tbe Slovak National Council, the Government and, finally, the matter could be resolved only by tbe presldent of the Czecbo-Slovak Re-public, Dr. Edward Beneš. Wednesd·ay mornlng, April 16, 1947, the Communi&ts began to demonstrate; deputations o( partisans and polltical prisoners began to pour toto the offlce of tbe S lovak National Councll, and it was feared that the Communists would start some disturbances and riots. The Commlssar delivered the documenl,; in the morning at 9: 00 A. M. to tbe President of !,he 'Slovak National Council, Dr. Joseph Let· trich, and requested that he not only take care of the documents at once, bll't at the same Ume that he place a recommendatlon for the request o! clemency. As s oon as Dr. štefánik prepared the necessary motlon. the officers of ,the 'SNC assembled a bit before 11: 00 A. M. to coni,ider the request of Dr. Joseph Tiso. . The two Communist members of this of!iclal body, Schmldtke and Dr. Horväth, did not attend the sesslon and notiffed the SNC that they \O'OUld Mt -attend lt. The request witb all documents, therefore, was to be consldered by three members of the Slovak Democratlc Party: Dr. Lettrich. Ml· lan Pollák 11nd Canon Msgr. ,Andrew Cvlnček. This tbreesome decided SLOVAKIA 17 that all the documents or Dr. 'ľiso, as well as the motlon or the Commissar and the request of Dr. Tiso, as prepared by Dr. Žabkay, shall be ceded to the Go\'ernment WľťHOUT COM:\1ENT or recommendation; also that they would immediately inform the Government by phone of their declslon and that they are sending their blghest officer, Dr. Martinček, by auto to Prague so that the documents might get tbere as soon as possible. If the president of the SNC had not made tbe so-called second agreement in Prague on Aprll 11, 1946, thereby surrendering its right to grant amnesty, tbe !ate or Dr. Tlso could have been de• ided with final validity by tbe tbree above-mentlooed members of tbe SNC. According to tbe new Jegal order, tbat is according to the fatal Prague agreement, it was obligatory on tbe motion of the Commissar for Justice to place documents before the Government. The latter then returns tbe recommendation to tbe praesldlum of tbe SNC i( it bas any objections to it from tbe standpoint of State lnterests; otherwlse it places it before the president of tbe Republic . That was the way tbe Jaw read. Tbe commissar did place tbe documents witb the opinion that amnesty be granted, but the praesidium of the SNC did not even do as muc b as the Commissar; witbout backing Tiso it surrendered al! documents and Tiso into tbe hands or tbe Government and Dr. Beneš. 'ľhis ls all tbat the Slovak National Councll said: "The doc uments, in the intent of agreement No. 2, art. 1, par. B, are being ceded to the presidency of the Government in Prague, April 17, 1947." Tbat is all and notbing more. Actually the three Democ rats, members or tbe Executlve or the SNC - of whom only Dr. Lettricb is alive today - did not even say a word in Tiso's bebalf; and none of them did anything about lt. 'ľhe people who criticized the way Dr. Lettrich acted, are stlll reproaching him for it today. On t he other band, the Government and l:leneš began to to wash their Judas' hands and said: well, how could we grant mercy, wben the Slovaks themselves -- even when no Communlsts were present, when only representatives of the Democratic Party were present, like Lettrich, Cvinček and Pollák - could not agree upon a word of recommendation? Of course, as far as the Government and Beneš are concerned. tbey knew better, even if such a senseless alibi partially was supported by the impossible stand of the SNC. But Dr. Lettrich never will be able to justlfy bis actlon before :rnyone in tbe world; and he must not be angry when the Slovaks and the Czechs claím that he is guilty for Tiso not getting clemency. For the sake or objectivity, I shall quote a few paragraphs from Lettriclťs hanclwritten report about those moments: "On April 17. 1947, when the praesidium of the SNC was assembllng, the situation was very difficult. Tbe Communists tbreate ned w-ith strikes and riots; the Oommissar of Jnstice dld not present a recommendatlon to grant mercy; and the request could hardly wln in the praes idíum of the SNC. That 1s to say, tbe praesidlum of the SNC had 5 members: three for the Democratic Party and two for the Slovak Communlst Party. One of the representatlves of the Democratíc Party was nnrertain: elther he would have voted against grantlng 18 SLO~A.KIA mercy or he would have ábstáined from voting. In both cases a ·majority was not assured for clemency: This was a delicate situation. It was necessary to flnd a way out. The idea was to get a recommendatlon !rom the Commissars for clemency and so forestall a posslble negatíve declsion of the praesidium o[ the SNC and outride au ominous, open politicaJ crisis, which could have had unforeseen consequences. "After dellberating the matter with political co-workers and after discussing it with the Communist members of the praesidium of the SNC, lt was decided that the SNC would return Tiso's request for mercy to the Commissar· or Justice; Commissar Dr. šte[ánik would complement lt with a positive recommendation for grantlng clemency and then would send · i t 'to · the praesidlum of the SNC. The latter would then agree that the Commissar's recommendati0)1, for granting mercy be placed before the Government with t he request to ·present it to the Pľesident for me1:itorious judgment." LETTRICH CANNOT ESCAPE BLAME FOR TISO'S DEATH - . Betwe~n my account and the h:µid-written account of Lettrlch there is the difference : I. clai~ that štefánik hlmself brought the documents to the praesidiuµi , 'ôt. the SNC and there immediately made the recommendation fo r clemency, whereupon the praesidium went into session at once. Almost to t he last moment before the praesldium began lts ses·s ion, I was in the same room in which thé meeting was to také place and I know definitely that Dr. Štefánik hád the documents with bim and that one of the secretaries - either Lettrich's Dr. Haviar, or Cvinček's Dr. Bystrický ·_ announced that the <.:ommunist members would not come to the meeting. When Dr. Lettricb knew that the Coinmunist members would be i.bsent, did he still fear that Milan Pollák alone would outvote bim? Wby did he not at least move a finger to indicate in some way that he would try to fulflll what he had promised bis constituents and wh'<tt it was his mora! duly to fulfill? He knew that the overwhelming majority or the population of Slovakia demanded everythlng possible be done to-save the life of Dr. Joseph Tiso. After the decision of the praesidium, I asked Cvinček why he agreed to such a solutlon. He expressly referred to Lettrich, who explained to him tbat according to Article 1, par. B of the Prague Document, the p'residency of the SN€ only' pre!lents• 'documents, but does not have to give its opinion about them, and ·that in law the right of opinion for the praesidium, of .the SNC doeS'·not exist. . I remember that · several members of the praesidium. of the Democratlc Party strongly crltlcized the prodeedings; óne · of, 'them, Dr. Emanuel Bohm, Js. In the U.S.A,, and ..,anotb,er,., Ing. K-orneJ . Filo is in France. Bohui made rep1w\<w,es1 ,~herejlS, li'ilo- in.sisted that everything wlthln the pow!lr_o! ,all,?f us, ou!íp,t ~.o b~,.~one sp ,that Ppague would grant c lemencr to ,Tiso. And .,he himself . 11oq ;~veral.,.o th~r ľri~n~s at. once cal)~d ' thelr_ tr\ends In Pragu_e; h1(?rixie.<;1_', thé1ii'.;ap,out the mistake tha.t wa~., made :an.d req\lested their lnteryenJlpq, w.!th, indivldual mlnis~ers. ~t' was_ t~ps ~hjl;~_.:prtina, Š,ráme,k°,J~</,.. oteers 'ťere <:alled. . . , , , , ,. When the _ge~?.ral. public ,;a_rq~iJ a~ou~ the maúer: .,tbe ó9yei-nment, ·:áeneš, nay _e_x~n ~ettrich, _rec~iv(ld ),i..u_ndredii pf lelegrams from Bratislava a.lone. · · f SLOVAKIA 19 The Ministers of the Democratic Party w.e re then already in Prague. Every one of them received telephone requests from us private and offlclal - to correct the mlstake. But all were pessimistlc, dominated by an "oh, whaľs the use" attltnde. For example, Dr. Johu Ursíny said by phone and two days Jater publicly stated that Zenkľs answer. after talking to bim over an hour was: - "For our voters it is impossible for us to vote for mercy for T iso and for us it is unprofitable." Zenkl repeated this also to other Ministers, w ho intervened for Tiso and, finally, he gave the same answer even to Dr. John Šrámek. BENEŠ'S ALIBI: THE SLOVAK$ DID IT The greatest surprise waa when our Ministers ascertained that even John Maaaryk would vote to reject the plea for mercy. 'rhis was one of J án Masaryk's most despicable deeds; I know not how 11 months later he alibied thls sin In the otber world. E ven individ,ľal church councils and superiors of various religlous bodies intervened in Prague in behalf of Tiso. On the other hand, the Trade Organizations, Jed by Dezider Benau, ·and other Communist organlzations includlng local units of industria! unions, demanded the execution of the verdict. The situation was tense, lndeed. The performance of the praes ldlnm of the SNC was condemned by every one. Tbus, for example, t he :p}lÁVO LIDU, organ of the Social Uemocrats, in a long article blamed the Slovaks for everylhing and in bold-faced letters sald: " It seemed that the SNC took a neutra) stand on the question and, tberefore, there was no reason for tne Prague govern ment to recommend to the Presirtent of the Republic to change everytbing in the verdict of the Slovak court. . . . Dr. Lettricb, president of the SNC and chairman of the Slovak De mocratic Party, has almost a two-1hlrds majority in Slovakla. And yet up to Wednesday he did not decide wh ether he should recommend to the Government to grant cle mency to Tiso." In the US A Czech Cathollc newsman Anthony Jandáček, wrote: " The bl.a.me for the execution of tbe verdlct of death rest!\ with sevoral weaklings, who did not oppose the Communist demand and, as official representatlves of the SNC. di d not even manage as mucb as to recommend to t he Presldent of the Republic to grant clemency." Furthermore. Jandáček ·said : "Dr. J oseph Lettrich shall once have a dlfflcult problem and task to explain why he was a weakllng and wby he did ,not recommend m ercy." The Amerlcan correspondent (NCWC) John l\lauthner similarly C'baracterlzed the whole procedure agalnst Dr. Tiso and especially the behavlor of the presidenC'y of the SNC. A. Ross. another American <'Orrespondent and hundrecls of others also expressed themsel\'es Rimilarly. Even before the Government renderecl a decision and Dr. Edwanl Deneš could express himself on the matter, the welghtle!!l step in behalf of Tlso was made. Archbisho o Xaverio Ritter. the Papal Jnter.nunclo In Prague. vislted Dr. Beneš. Despite Rltter's ardent JJ)ea for Tiso. Denell fulfilled what he had planned long ago and somet hing that several gentlemen attempted to Jegalize for bim. 20 SLOVAKJA The documents were not as yet in Prague, but the Government was called together at 5:00 P. M., because it thought that by that time they would certainly arrive. When they diel not arrive by 5: 00 P. M., Gottwald forced a vote which was not for the benefit of Ti5o. The Czech Populists and the Slovak Democrats voted for c lemency, while the others were for execution. We learned about this decision or the Government a few minutes after it was macle and, therefore, the praesidium of the Democratic Party m et again at the residence of Dr. Lettrich. Every one phoned to whom he could; even Lettrich attempted to get Beneš, hut could no t ľontact him. That certainly wa.5 strange, ·because at other times he could contact him in a matter or two minutes. At that fatal moment he could not reach Beneš. So telegrams were sent instead. An American correspondent for the NCCW characterized tbose telegrams thus: "The popularity of Dr. Lettrich quickly diminished, because in the whole question of Dr. Tiso he washed his hands and hesitated to personally request mercy for Tiso. Lettrich waited until Tiso was dead and then immediately he sent a telegraphic protest against the execution." In the USA we must recall and note that members of the GovernU\ent knew that the Communists were forcing the execution of Dr. Tiso, because they wanted to weaken t he Democratic Party. The Comruunists failed to weaken the DP in May, 1946, by forming the Freedom Party, so they sought to wreck it by forcing Tiso's execution. Every minister in Prague knew that very well and, without exception, every one was visited several limes and informed about this by some Slovak politician in Prague. These ministers, however, i.,referred to belp tbe Comnrnnfsts break np the anti-Communist ranks in Slovakia tban to vote clemency for Tiso. And today these same Czech politici ans are enjoying life in Washington, D. C.; among them are Zenkl, Ripka, Stránsky, and Mayer. As tar as I am concerned all these confirmed their collaboration with Communism when they voted to reject Tiso's plea for clemency. Tbe sbort session of the ministerial council was interrupted once for a sbort tíme, wben Ursíny and Šrámek requested the National Socialists to at least abstain from voting on the Tiso plea. Zenkl. howpver, would hear none of it. Tbe Government presented the motion to reject mercy, even tbough the court documents of Dr. Tiso were not even in Prague at the time, and Dr. Beneš, also witbout even looking at the documents, complied witb the motion and rejected the request for mercy as early as Wednesday, tbat is Apríl 16th. The rejection was announeed by tf'letype by Beneš's cbancery to the police station of Ferjenčík's cffice in the late night hours. However. wp had Beneš's decision by phone from Prague much earlier. BENEŠ WAS THE LAW It is interesting that Beneš, rejecting amnesty, diel not make usf' of the means prescribed by law and did not a.nnounce his decisfon by returning the documents through ttle praesidium of tbe SNC wbich would tben hand them over to tbe Commissar of Justice. Why did Beneš do that? Diel he not belleve tbem? SLOVAKIA 21 No. When Beneš rejected Tlso's request, the documents as yet were not in Prague and therefore he could not stamp the customary formula "nelze vyhoveli" (cannot be granted) on them. But he was interested in the execution taking place already Friday morning and, therefore, through bis servants, Ferjenčík's per· sonal office and Ferjenčik' s police, already on \Vednesrlay night, several hours after the decision of the Government, he notified Bratislava about bis decision and told them to be ready to go through with everything he had o rdered. Tbe Chief of Police announced this to Dr. L ettri<·h at midnight, and the State machinery at Bratislava began preparations for the execution, which no one could now stop according to law or regula· tions. On the morning of the second day, wben Dr. Daxner visited Tiso in bis ·celi to inform bim in tbe presence of hls counsellors that Beneš rejected the plea for mercy, the documents were not In Bratislava. AII were still in P rague and it was only about an hour later that the Presidenťs office placed the seal of the •Republic on them and the ;,ignalure of the Chief ef the Chancery. Tbe documents were not on hand when the Government made its clecision, or when the President macle bis clecision, or when Tiso was lnformed about the mat ter in bis cell by Daxner. Everything was done by telegrams. Wben Daxner lett Tiso's cell, Tiso's sister came to vtsit htm, then bis Jegal counsellors. wbile ever at bis slde was a Capuchln priest. At that ttm e tbere still were several sesslons and it was wbtspered in secret just what migbt yet be done in Tiso's bebalf. •TISO LOYA L TO GOD AND NATION TO T H E E N D Tiso. however, dlel not want to bear about any indication; very s harply he repeatecl what he had demonstratecl several limes during the trial: he was not concerned about his life. because if he. must make the sacrifice, he will do so proudly, but by no word or act would he change wbat he diel or saicl -as the Presiclent of Slovakia. This was also well known at tbat time and so it was with anxiety t hat the last ho·urs of Dr. Tiso were followed to see how all this woulcl thuncler over excitecl Slovakia. To the last moment Tiso was nnbroken, manly, just as he was before in the Court in macl Daxner's presence. wben he clefended bis truth and many limes crossed the interests of bis defense, who wanted to help bim. But Tlso never once in bis tria! clenied or revoked anything tbat he had proclaimed at any ti me. From his defense speech one sentence resonn<ied for hours in the E-ars of every llstener: "And if I were agaín placed by Provldence in a pos ition to deC"icle, I would decide, on tbe whole, tbe same way as I did In the past." Witb this sentence Dr. Tiso rejected even tbe Jast extenuating <·i rcumsta.nce. For tbe historian. Dr. Tiso even in the last moments of bis life gave the fundamental sketch and the greatest proof of his manliness. determination and steadfastness for everything that he had preached and done. JJ SLOVAKIA Two hours before bis execution he wrote bis final l egať'y it\ bis own hand, in which he demanded the nation to be barmonious and unite<I In the prosecution of the great princi ple "For God and for :s;ation" In every regard and at all times. His !lnal sentences, wriHen in tbe jail of tbe Federal Court are most serious sentences and the greatest proof of Tiso's personality. The next day "ČAS" was supposed to explain at length wby Tiso was denied clemency. Ferjenčíťs police, however, confiscated that issue, and tbe Slova.ks found out officially from the Communist ''PRAVDA" and the -broadcast of April 18th -- a report conslstlng of a single sentence - tbat the execution had taken place. TISO MORE DANGEROUS DEAD THAN ALIVE Tiso was dead. Ileneš's servants had done t heir work. -but tbe questton still remains unanswered: Why did the praestdium of the Slovak National Council refuse to surrender the corpse of Dr. Joseph 'ľlso so that it might be buried according to the rttes of the Catholiľ Church? Between the tíme lhat clemency was denied and the execution there passed some 40 hours and no directives \ľere given - at least not publicly - as to what disposition was to be made of the body or Tiso. After tbe execution, wben the defense counsellors asked for · tlie body in the name of Tlso's family, the request was telegraphed to I'rague. It was only then that Prague. as well a!< the Bratislava factors, became aware of the mistake they had made by not granting cle· mency_ A certain Prague politlco characterlzed the situation with the cxpression: "lt seems that the cleacl Tiso is golng to be mo;e dangerous than the live one." l felt the same way about the matter. and so did quite . a few or my frlends whÓ intervened prlvately in the interest of Tiso. And ,ľe. felt that way long before the executlon. · Prague deli-berated at length and found it hard to reuder a deci• sion in the matter of the disposition of the body of Dr. Tiso. Already then reports were heard in Prague that ,the bitter silence of the Slo, ak people might have serious consequences for the future. No one wanted to be held responsible for imythlng. 1t was useless to sene! the matter to Prague because, accordlng to the law, the Natlonal Court had the rlght to decide the disposition of the body of Tlso, as it had clone in several instances previously. Everybody was afrairl of the con!<equences and no one was willing to guarantee that peace woul<I be r,reserved. Ftnally, by telegram Prague agreed with Dr. Daxner and Dr. Ferjenčík that Daxner shall suTrender tbe body not to the Tiso family , but to Ferjenčík, who in turn shall have the body bmied secret\y. Ferjenčik's police covered the casket and hauled it to St. Martin's ťemetery on Racišdorfská Road. where three graves had been dug. Tbe prlest brought in by the police. after identlfying tbe body, performed a quiet burial. Ferjenčik and his people were not successful in keepln~ tbe matter secret, because universlty student!I were near the scene during the whole eplsode and, tberefore. for a tíme it was known wbere Dr. Tlso ,vas burled. :. =•: SLOVAKIA 23 For several hours the students clashed with the police near tbe grave of Tiso, and despite tbe fact tbat the police questioned tbem and ascertained who they were, the students showered Tiso's grave with flowers and wreaths. The second and following days, the police constantly guarded St. Martin's cemetery, People were beaten and jailed, because they tried to get near Tiso's grave under variou3 pretexts. Some students were expellecl from Svoraclov and others even from hlgh schools. WHO KILLED TI SO ? Tbe Czech press immediately began tbe process of washing hands and placing the whole responsibility for tbe execution of Tiso on the Slovaks, especially on Dr. J osepb Lettrich, president of the Slovak NationaJ Council and head of tbe Slovak Democratic Party. It was plalnly evident that Prague was nervous. The Communists were happy, and the Freedom Party maliciously reproached the Democrats. be· ,. c-ause they did not save the life of Tiso. The fact remains that ·an overwbelmingly majority of the Catholic voters wbic h supported the Democr.atic Party wa.s not fooled by tb.e overtures of the Freedom Party, because it knew that its member·s were the servant.-s of the Communists. But this electorate did let it be known that it was terribly disappointed and that it lost falth 1·1 tbe leadership of the Slovak Democratic Party and absolutely all confi<lence in Prague. Prague felt generally that the Slovaks would neve'r ngain want to live togethei, witb tbe Czec hs in a common state. And 'ľlso's execution did not make the Slovaks flock to the Communists or even into the ranks of tbe servants of Beneš, as were the members of the Freedom Party, and so much tbe less to the Social Democrats. The Slovaks regarded tbe decision of the minlsterlal council, as well as the declsion of Beneš as a step that was neitber statelike nor diplomatlc, but rather as a blunder which would WTe<.'k the State. F.:verybody became suspicious of the members of the praesidium o[ tbe Slovak National Council, when they dld not support an amnesty ;ind did not exact it, but acted like weaklings and s pineless men, violating· the- promlse given the electorate. Undoubtedly all those involved began to feel that way also. }!ut lt was too late. U nity of resistance against Communism was being lost. and after Tiso's execution the Communists were coercing the Government and, later, even Beneš hlmself, to commit more blunders and make more concessions to them. The integrity of the State was s haken so badly that the Government one day unanimously voted to accept the invitation to tbe Marshall pian, and three days Jater, under pressure of tbe Communists, repudlated lts clecision just as unanimously. It was a Government wlthout government. 'I'he Communlst.'I did whatever they wanted wlth lt. Tbe mlnlsters lost th elr backbone, some bowed to Beneš and others to the Communlsts; tbelr uprootecl consciences persecuted tbem for their sbameful votlng in the Tlso case. N O ~SCAPE FROM PUNISHMENT Wben Dr. Beneš began to fall pbyslcally and bis spiritual condi• tion worsened, all ascrlbed it to bis unfortunate decision of denying <'lemenc-y to 'ľiso. 24 SLOVAKIA Beneš, the Zenklites (followers or Dr. Zenkl) and tbe . Communists tbought that witb the extorted execution of Tiso they would sbake only t be Slovak Democratic Party. But they were sadly mistaken. Wlth the execution of Tiso they shook the entire State to its foundations. The curse of those who shall not forget April 18, 1947, broke all connections which were stm preventlng the downfall of the CzechoSlovak St.ate. The lost faith of the Slovak people could not be regained. And when the supports of a united Slovakia were uprooted, the Communists realized their pian altogether smootbly, accorcllng to the plans and orders of the Moscow Politburo. I clo not want to believe tbat any one would want to ascribe to Dr. Tiso that he would avenge himself beyond the grave, but when in March, 1948, - less than a year after bis execution - John Masaryk committed sufoide, a large part of the people pointed to the hand oť justice for his shameful voting on April 16, 1947. When the Communists played around witb Beneš like a puppet for a while, and he was practically under house arrest and shortly thereafter died, qulte a few people recalled those to whom he had denied clemency ancl who had suffered so much during bis regime. In Slovakia every one recalled April 18, 1947. And even if not maliciously, but at least confirmed in the faith that none of the guilty would escape justice, every one saw the hane! of Providence, Who deals out justly and does not let Himself be carried away or frightened. TISO' S STATURE GROWS WITH YEARS Dr. Tiso made the greatest sacritice that any human can make. He acted bravely and hono1,ably. This made a great impression on every one. But the shameful, cowardly behavior whether of Slovaks or Czechs, whether of the people of Prague or Bratislava, who had anything to do with bis amnesty, elevated the dead Tiso to a national hero and martyr, who is mentioned reverently in Slovakia even by those who previously were agalnst bim. Immature political factors, Jed by anger and hatred, had attained tbe opposite of what tbey had desired. They diel not divide but a'?tually united tbe Slovaks as they were never before united. And they showed them a new road for the future, whicb even today is full of sufferings, but eventually sball mean salvation and a free life for the nation of Tiso. Those. were the motives and thought:; which Jed me to ,vrite this dissertatlon, so that I could point out tbe tmth and expla!n, wben the persons ·involved are free again. After the events of February, 1948, lt was reported that the Commun!sts removed the body of Tiso from its grave and had !t cremated in Brno, Moravia. I recelved the report from Bratislava in 1948, but it remains unconfirmed. Let the tmth be whatever it may, the Gloriola, Faitb and Mytb of Dr. Joseph Tiso - despite all the evil deeds and designs of bis and our enem!es - shall always remain so sublime th at no malignities oť the Communists or the Beneš followel'S s hall ever dim them and they sball nev& Iose their lustre as long as a single Slovak shall live beneath the Tatras.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Case of Dr. Joseph Tiso Description An account of the resource Dr. Michael Zibrin Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952 pp. 1-24 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Zibrín, Michal, 1899-1968 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/4faeb77e99e69680a9f2152513c74572.pdf 58bc32caec09d426b05f6f702ff94fcc PDF Text Text 20 SLOVAKIA The Spirit of THE 00Ni8'.l1ITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC DR. JOHN F . GLE IMAN In the spring of 1939, when the young Slova)( RepubUc found itself before the difficult ta.sk of writing its Constitution, the crisis in Europe, caused by conflicting ideologicaJ trends, was ne,aring its cllmax. Democratic Liberalism, after a fruitful exlstence of 150 years ln ,Europe, was being a:ttacked from all sides, not only by the totalltarian currents of Communism, Fa.scism and Nazlsm, but also by other philosophi<:al, religious, economical and politlcal systems. In that apocatlyptical confusion of ideologles, the Committee a11p0tinted by the Assembly of the Slovak Republlc labored on the draft of cthe ConstiWtion Document. While i,t was thus occupied, natlonal aggref!Sion.s {rom the East, South, West and North, appeared ominously on the ltorizon, threatening with destruotion the healthy offshoot of the life of the Slovak State. Even if the enVtlronment of that rneological ferment and frightful international sltuation effected peoples deeply, the work or the Constitution Committee - desplte its compromising tenor - is, nevertheless, a clear reflectlon of the unity of thought and sentlme-nt of the Slovak people. In oppressed peoples there naturally develops not only a feeling of solldarJty, but also a profound religious llfe. Actu_a lly, the most slgnifloant trait of Slovak tradition is the Christian world-ou tlook of the natlon; that 1s true of both the Catholic majori ty and éhe Lutheran minority of the Slovak nation. But the tradition o! democratic freedoms also remained vary much alive. Along with Christian tradltion, these ideas, too, were the moving forces of Slovak polltics s-lnce the tbirties of the past century. Christian tra:dition and the Idea of democratic freedoms were the defensive bulwark, by which the currents of totalltarian ideologles were repulsed and which to a certaln extent unlfied politlical thinking in Slovakia. On!y thus could lt happen that, in the midst of aggressive totalitarlan ldeologies, whlch deflnltely dld suppress the principles of democratic liberaldsm, the Constltutlonal Law No. 185 of 1939 was approved by the Assembly of the Slovak Republic. Thls law adopted practically t-he whole system of democratic-liberaJistic Constltutlons of the 18th and 19th centurles. Only thus could lt happen that Slovakla - wedged In from the rlght and rhe left between Godless bolshevism and antl-Chrlstian neo-paganlfsm - brought forth a Constitutlon saturated with the Christlan spirit and especlally with the principles of the socia:! encycllcals of the Holy See. LIBERA LISTIC-DEMOC RATIC ELEMEN T $ ~he Constltution of the United States of America from 1788 and the Constrltutlion of the French Revolution became the models of the rlemocratlc-liberalistic consti'tutions of the 19bh century European States. They were the first to incorporate into constitutional norms the prlnclples of the great thlnkers of mod~rn democracy - Locke, Montesquleu and Rosseau: the right of determlnatlon of the majority of the people, the idea of equality before the law and the guarantees of lndlvidual freedoms. These, in Ume, became the great documenb! of human rights. �SLOVAKIA 21 The Constitution of the Slovak Republic contalns alil the fundamental principles of these models. The constitutional intention to organize a State on the tested prlncipies of democrat.ic freedoms 1s documented by the very name of the State itself: "The Slovak Re-public." At a t.ime when dictators were in power in the surrounding totalitarlan States, the Slovak Constitution consistently validates the democratic principle of the right of determination of t.he majority In the elect,lon of t he president of the Repulfäc and the deputies of parliament, ,i n the decisions of parliament, the State Council, the Government and self-admlnistraiti-ng bodies. At a tíme when the USSR culminated the Iiquldatlon of lts so-called bourgeols cla.ss, whiC'h was outlawed, and in Germany the Nuremberg antl<Sem,l tic Ja,ws were compleUng their work, the Slovak Assembly dld not hesitate to accept a Constitution founded on the idea of equality of ail cltizens without regard to orlgin, nationality and religion. And just so, at a time when executlve power of government of the totalitarian super-States had atta:lned complete preponderancee in the management of the State, th Slovak Constltution codified without reservations a system outllned by Locke and culminated by Montesquieu, a system of legal and free government, depending on the division of State po.w er into the Iegislative, executive and judicial branches. T·h e centra! •leglslative power received its construction accord!ng to the pri'nci!)'les of Locke. Its bearer became the Assembly of the Slovak RepubUc. That centra! power in the State the Constitutlon executed also with the rest of the postulates of iiberal-democratic constitutions: with immunity and incompatibility of the members of the iegislature (Assembly), elected in general, direct, free and secret elections and wi,th the competency of elect!ng a president, establishing a budget and mhlitary duty, of permitting taxes and acceptlng international agreements. .According to t-he principles of Montesquieu, the Constitution subordinated executive power to legislatíve power and codified tbe responsibi,Jity of the president and the government to parliament. It regula.ted the activlty of lhe President, tbe Government and the State Council accordrlng to tested republican models. It followed democratic principles also by acknowledg!ng the direct participation of the clt.izenry in the State management tbrough the self-administ·ratlons of regions and profe.ssions. The lmmortail prtnolple of Monrtesquteu regarcting the independence of the judiciary also was fully validated in tbe Constitution. Complete separatlon of the judiciary from t.he executive power, as well as the principle tbat no one shall be deprived of bis own lawful judge, was also estarblisbed by law. Tbe lndependence of the judges was safeguarded by the codification of the princlple of non-transferabUity of judges and their lncompatlblllty wlth other pald functions, as weJJ as by expre.'3s!ng tbe princlple tbat a judge i~ bound only by Jaw and has the right to explore the validity of i;:overnmental regulations and whether Jaws were pronerly proclaimed. The Constitutlon did not lack the customary safeguards of freedom. Parag11aph 81 sald: "All lnhabltants, regardless or thE>lr orig'in. natlonaility, religion and calllng, enjoy the protec-tion of life. freedom an<l nroperty." Desides thls general prlnciple, lt guaranteed special prlnciple<i, such as: persona) freedom, domestic peace, secrecy of the mails, the right or �22 SLOVAKIA assembly and organization, freedom of the press and expresslon of opln1ons, freedom of rellgion, scientlfic research and arts, and the right of the nationali'Ues to use t.heir own language in pub41c llre and in the schools. Finally, with the sentence - "No one shall be punished for conduct whlch does not violate the legal pena! norm and tor w,h ich the penalty was not aforehand deflned by laiw or legal norm" - it adopted the classlcall princlple of the freedom of man "nulla poena, nullum crlmen sine lege," whlch is the foundatlon of legal oroer in a lawful State. CHRISTIAN- DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS When the shady sides of llberallstlc capitallsm unfettered the social struggles, the ideology of Marxlsm about permanent cla.ss war· fare arose and spread. Proclalmlng the lnevitabllllty of world revolutlon and t he dlct.atorship of the proletariat, t-he e!lminatlon of the burgeois class, the a:bolltion of pr!v,ate ownershi'p, a,nd collective economy of com munlties, thls ldeology threatened the entilre structure of Christlan civilizatlon wHh destruction. That is why already in the second half of the pas.t century Christlan thlnkers, especially the Cathollc Bis-hops Ketteler and Mermlllod, as well as Protel!tant pastor Constantine Frantz, sought posslbll!Ues of mltigating social opposltes and then by un-proJetarlatlzlng the proleteriat to destroy class differences completely. In the main, the papal encycllcals, beginrung with HERUM NOVARUIM (1890), tbrough QUADRAGESIMO ANNO (1931), all the way to MYS'l'IOI CORPORIS (1913), created a system, whicb - by the prlnciple of personalllsm, wlth emphasls on the social function of the famlly and wlth the buildlng of aut.onomous professional organlzatlons, wants to solve acute social problems, restrlct the stlIDlng interference of over-dlmensioned State power into every sectlon ot soclety and pl'lvate llfe, and, thus, rescue Chrlstlan soclety. It !s natural that the Slovak Republlc, being overwhelmlngly Ca,thollc, attempted to experiment with t.his system and Incorporated at least some of lts prlnclp'.les lnto its own Constltutlon. Thus lt was that regulatlons arose whi'c h protected especla,lly the family, and ln the spirit of these princlples also the worker, bis work and WQges, whereby strlkes - as somethlng outlived of the era of c:lass warfare - were forbidden. In the spirit of the encycllcals, the Con.stltution deflned the obligatlons of clrlzens - whlch are both splrltual and physical work - to fulflll the rtasks of thelr calllng, to help public organs perform the funotlons required by law and the authorltles and, flnaJly, the obllgatory care of the parents for the educatlon and trainlng of thelr chlldren. The regulatlon In paragraph 79 - "Ownershlp has a social functlon and blnds the owner to deal wlth tt In the lnterest or the general welfare" - i~ the basls of the encycllca:l QUADRAGESIMO ANNO and the socia,! wr!tlngs of Pope Plus XII. The most penetratlng social reform, whlch the Constltutlon took over from the encycllcal QUADRAGESI>MO ANNO, was the framewo rk ln-stltutlon of self•ad· mlnisitered States, pla.cing accordlng to ,thelr ca111ng all cltlzens wlth• out exceptlon lnto s1x professions or states: agrlcU!ture, industry, trade-commerce, banking, the free proresslons, and public employees. T,he Munlch Pact or Great BrlWn and France with Germany and Jtaly In Septem/ber, 1938, factually surrendered Centra! Europe to �SLOVAKIA 23 tbe power of Hitler and MussollnL No one kn&w at tbat tlme ju,at when the furies of war would be unleasbed and what fate would befaJl Slovakla. In tbat bopeJess sl<tuation, all tbe Slovak clvic partles unlted w-ltb tbe Hlinka Slovak Peoples' Par,t.y to form the Party of Natlonal Unity In October, 1938. Hlstorlcal objectlvlty tells us to state that this bardJy would bave happened lf it were not for stlf!Lng pressure from all s!des. The Constltutlon codHled thls Party as the only representative o! the polltlcai will of the Slovak natlon. Thls fact undoubtedly s.hows sharply the belpless determlnatlon of a small natlon, which in its fatal danger was forced to make thls compromise with tbe giganttlc aggressor, wben h:ls stee1 columns omlnously waited on lts borders. Desplte this fact, bowever, the Constitution dld not accept the to<tall· tar!an pr!nclple of one party, beoause lt aJ.Jowed separate partie.s for the natlonalitles. In later years, under l'be pressure of tae totalltarian super-States and the war, tbls Constltutlon could not valldate ltself wlthout partlcular blndrances, but from the perspectlve of the f!rst decade, tbe Slovak Constltut!onal Document ltself In lts entlrety actualJy appears to us as a work of prľ:nclples, the prlnclples of democratic freedoms and tbe princlples of Cbrlstlan democracy. lt was tbe collective work of tbe spirit of the Slovak natlon that formed the State. And as sucb, it wlll pass on into history. • • • WHO SAID IT7 THE CZECHOSLOVAK WAY. "Dr. Beneš, tbe Czecboslovak Presldent, must be a tborn In tbe nesb of tbose wbo contend tbat Russia wlll deal only wlth puppets In nelghborlng countr~es of Eastern Europe. Benei ia no puppet. He ls no Communlst. Hls pol!tlcal pbllosopby ls ibased on the llberal democracy of tbe West. Vet no one is aurpriaed because hla good frlend, Stalln, has Just concluded a new agreement with hlm, provlding for entry of the Czechoalovak ad minlstration in Dr. Benei' homeland in the wake of the Red Army at the earllest posaible time. That ia exactly what we'd expect, for re latlona between Dr. Benei' government and that of the Soviet Union are a lo ng-atanding model of cordiality. "Tbe fact, of course, is tbat Dr. Bene!i ls a flrst-rate statesman, one of the best In tbe world. As such, he knows that a bright future for hia country ia out of the queat lon un leH lt has the good wlll of the USS R. He and bis countrymen also remember that 'Russla dld not desert tbem in the black era of Munlch. Today he bas Czechoslovakla wltb bim In tbe 20-year mutual asslstance treaty wlth Russla. "Tbe consequence ls tbat Russla respects the lndependence of lts good nelghbor. Dr. Bene!i, accordlngly, ls free not only to pian confldently for the future of bis own !and but to serve Europe and all the Unlted Natlons as an outstandlng leader for collect!ve securlty. Tbat is the Benei way, the Czechoslovak way, based upon tbe prlnclples of independence and lnterdependence. It sbould be studled as an example by tbe leaders of all countrles In Eastern Europe - and by Amerlcan frlends of tliose countrles." - (THE CIDCAGO SUN 1944). • � 20 SLOVAKIA The Spirit of THE 00Ni8'.l1ITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC DR. JOHN F . GLE IMAN In the spring of 1939, when the young Slova)( RepubUc found itself before the difficult ta.sk of writing its Constitution, the crisis in Europe, caused by conflicting ideologicaJ trends, was ne,aring its cllmax. Democratic Liberalism, after a fruitful exlstence of 150 years ln ,Europe, was being a:ttacked from all sides, not only by the totalltarian currents of Communism, Fa.scism and Nazlsm, but also by other philosophi<:al, religious, economical and politlcal systems. In that apocatlyptical confusion of ideologles, the Committee a11p0tinted by the Assembly of the Slovak Republlc labored on the draft of cthe ConstiWtion Document. While i,t was thus occupied, natlonal aggref!Sion.s {rom the East, South, West and North, appeared ominously on the ltorizon, threatening with destruotion the healthy offshoot of the life of the Slovak State. Even if the enVtlronment of that rneological ferment and frightful international sltuation effected peoples deeply, the work or the Constitution Committee - desplte its compromising tenor - is, nevertheless, a clear reflectlon of the unity of thought and sentlme-nt of the Slovak people. In oppressed peoples there naturally develops not only a feeling of solldarJty, but also a profound religious llfe. Actu_a lly, the most slgnifloant trait of Slovak tradition is the Christian world-ou tlook of the natlon; that 1s true of both the Catholic majori ty and éhe Lutheran minority of the Slovak nation. But the tradition o! democratic freedoms also remained vary much alive. Along with Christian tradltion, these ideas, too, were the moving forces of Slovak polltics s-lnce the tbirties of the past century. Christian tra:dition and the Idea of democratic freedoms were the defensive bulwark, by which the currents of totalltarian ideologles were repulsed and which to a certaln extent unlfied politlical thinking in Slovakia. On!y thus could lt happen that, in the midst of aggressive totalitarlan ldeologies, whlch deflnltely dld suppress the principles of democratic liberaldsm, the Constltutlonal Law No. 185 of 1939 was approved by the Assembly of the Slovak Republic. Thls law adopted practically t-he whole system of democratic-liberaJistic Constltutlons of the 18th and 19th centurles. Only thus could lt happen that Slovakla - wedged In from the rlght and rhe left between Godless bolshevism and antl-Chrlstian neo-paganlfsm - brought forth a Constitutlon saturated with the Christlan spirit and especlally with the principles of the socia:! encycllcals of the Holy See. LIBERA LISTIC-DEMOC RATIC ELEMEN T $ ~he Constltution of the United States of America from 1788 and the Constrltutlion of the French Revolution became the models of the rlemocratlc-liberalistic consti'tutions of the 19bh century European States. They were the first to incorporate into constitutional norms the prlnclples of the great thlnkers of mod~rn democracy - Locke, Montesquleu and Rosseau: the right of determlnatlon of the majority of the people, the idea of equality before the law and the guarantees of lndlvidual freedoms. These, in Ume, became the great documenb! of human rights. �SLOVAKIA 21 The Constitution of the Slovak Republic contalns alil the fundamental principles of these models. The constitutional intention to organize a State on the tested prlncipies of democrat.ic freedoms 1s documented by the very name of the State itself: "The Slovak Re-public." At a t.ime when dictators were in power in the surrounding totalitarlan States, the Slovak Constitution consistently validates the democratic principle of the right of determination of t.he majority In the elect,lon of t he president of the Repulfäc and the deputies of parliament, ,i n the decisions of parliament, the State Council, the Government and self-admlnistraiti-ng bodies. At a tíme when the USSR culminated the Iiquldatlon of lts so-called bourgeols cla.ss, whiC'h was outlawed, and in Germany the Nuremberg antl<Sem,l tic Ja,ws were compleUng their work, the Slovak Assembly dld not hesitate to accept a Constitution founded on the idea of equality of ail cltizens without regard to orlgin, nationality and religion. And just so, at a time when executlve power of government of the totalitarian super-States had atta:lned complete preponderancee in the management of the State, th Slovak Constltution codified without reservations a system outllned by Locke and culminated by Montesquieu, a system of legal and free government, depending on the division of State po.w er into the Iegislative, executive and judicial branches. T·h e centra! •leglslative power received its construction accord!ng to the pri'nci!)'les of Locke. Its bearer became the Assembly of the Slovak RepubUc. That centra! power in the State the Constitutlon executed also with the rest of the postulates of iiberal-democratic constitutions: with immunity and incompatibility of the members of the iegislature (Assembly), elected in general, direct, free and secret elections and wi,th the competency of elect!ng a president, establishing a budget and mhlitary duty, of permitting taxes and acceptlng international agreements. .According to t-he principles of Montesquieu, the Constitution subordinated executive power to legislatíve power and codified tbe responsibi,Jity of the president and the government to parliament. It regula.ted the activlty of lhe President, tbe Government and the State Council accordrlng to tested republican models. It followed democratic principles also by acknowledg!ng the direct participation of the clt.izenry in the State management tbrough the self-administ·ratlons of regions and profe.ssions. The lmmortail prtnolple of Monrtesquteu regarcting the independence of the judiciary also was fully validated in tbe Constitution. Complete separatlon of the judiciary from t.he executive power, as well as the principle tbat no one shall be deprived of bis own lawful judge, was also estarblisbed by law. Tbe lndependence of the judges was safeguarded by the codification of the princlple of non-transferabUity of judges and their lncompatlblllty wlth other pald functions, as weJJ as by expre.'3s!ng tbe princlple tbat a judge i~ bound only by Jaw and has the right to explore the validity of i;:overnmental regulations and whether Jaws were pronerly proclaimed. The Constitutlon did not lack the customary safeguards of freedom. Parag11aph 81 sald: "All lnhabltants, regardless or thE>lr orig'in. natlonaility, religion and calllng, enjoy the protec-tion of life. freedom an<l nroperty." Desides thls general prlnciple, lt guaranteed special prlnciple<i, such as: persona) freedom, domestic peace, secrecy of the mails, the right or �22 SLOVAKIA assembly and organization, freedom of the press and expresslon of opln1ons, freedom of rellgion, scientlfic research and arts, and the right of the nationali'Ues to use t.heir own language in pub41c llre and in the schools. Finally, with the sentence - "No one shall be punished for conduct whlch does not violate the legal pena! norm and tor w,h ich the penalty was not aforehand deflned by laiw or legal norm" - it adopted the classlcall princlple of the freedom of man "nulla poena, nullum crlmen sine lege," whlch is the foundatlon of legal oroer in a lawful State. CHRISTIAN- DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS When the shady sides of llberallstlc capitallsm unfettered the social struggles, the ideology of Marxlsm about permanent cla.ss war· fare arose and spread. Proclalmlng the lnevitabllllty of world revolutlon and t he dlct.atorship of the proletariat, t-he e!lminatlon of the burgeois class, the a:bolltion of pr!v,ate ownershi'p, a,nd collective economy of com munlties, thls ldeology threatened the entilre structure of Christlan civilizatlon wHh destruction. That is why already in the second half of the pas.t century Christlan thlnkers, especially the Cathollc Bis-hops Ketteler and Mermlllod, as well as Protel!tant pastor Constantine Frantz, sought posslbll!Ues of mltigating social opposltes and then by un-proJetarlatlzlng the proleteriat to destroy class differences completely. In the main, the papal encycllcals, beginrung with HERUM NOVARUIM (1890), tbrough QUADRAGESIMO ANNO (1931), all the way to MYS'l'IOI CORPORIS (1913), created a system, whicb - by the prlnciple of personalllsm, wlth emphasls on the social function of the famlly and wlth the buildlng of aut.onomous professional organlzatlons, wants to solve acute social problems, restrlct the stlIDlng interference of over-dlmensioned State power into every sectlon ot soclety and pl'lvate llfe, and, thus, rescue Chrlstlan soclety. It !s natural that the Slovak Republlc, being overwhelmlngly Ca,thollc, attempted to experiment with t.his system and Incorporated at least some of lts prlnclp'.les lnto its own Constltutlon. Thus lt was that regulatlons arose whi'c h protected especla,lly the family, and ln the spirit of these princlples also the worker, bis work and WQges, whereby strlkes - as somethlng outlived of the era of c:lass warfare - were forbidden. In the spirit of the encycllcals, the Con.stltution deflned the obligatlons of clrlzens - whlch are both splrltual and physical work - to fulflll the rtasks of thelr calllng, to help public organs perform the funotlons required by law and the authorltles and, flnaJly, the obllgatory care of the parents for the educatlon and trainlng of thelr chlldren. The regulatlon In paragraph 79 - "Ownershlp has a social functlon and blnds the owner to deal wlth tt In the lnterest or the general welfare" - i~ the basls of the encycllca:l QUADRAGESIMO ANNO and the socia,! wr!tlngs of Pope Plus XII. The most penetratlng social reform, whlch the Constltutlon took over from the encycllcal QUADRAGESI>MO ANNO, was the framewo rk ln-stltutlon of self•ad· mlnisitered States, pla.cing accordlng to ,thelr ca111ng all cltlzens wlth• out exceptlon lnto s1x professions or states: agrlcU!ture, industry, trade-commerce, banking, the free proresslons, and public employees. T,he Munlch Pact or Great BrlWn and France with Germany and Jtaly In Septem/ber, 1938, factually surrendered Centra! Europe to �SLOVAKIA 23 tbe power of Hitler and MussollnL No one kn&w at tbat tlme ju,at when the furies of war would be unleasbed and what fate would befaJl Slovakla. In tbat bopeJess sl<tuation, all tbe Slovak clvic partles unlted w-ltb tbe Hlinka Slovak Peoples' Par,t.y to form the Party of Natlonal Unity In October, 1938. Hlstorlcal objectlvlty tells us to state that this bardJy would bave happened lf it were not for stlf!Lng pressure from all s!des. The Constltutlon codHled thls Party as the only representative o! the polltlcai will of the Slovak natlon. Thls fact undoubtedly s.hows sharply the belpless determlnatlon of a small natlon, which in its fatal danger was forced to make thls compromise with tbe giganttlc aggressor, wben h:ls stee1 columns omlnously waited on lts borders. Desplte this fact, bowever, the Constitution dld not accept the to<tall· tar!an pr!nclple of one party, beoause lt aJ.Jowed separate partie.s for the natlonalitles. In later years, under l'be pressure of tae totalltarian super-States and the war, tbls Constltutlon could not valldate ltself wlthout partlcular blndrances, but from the perspectlve of the f!rst decade, tbe Slovak Constltut!onal Document ltself In lts entlrety actualJy appears to us as a work of prľ:nclples, the prlnclples of democratic freedoms and tbe princlples of Cbrlstlan democracy. lt was tbe collective work of tbe spirit of the Slovak natlon that formed the State. And as sucb, it wlll pass on into history. • • • WHO SAID IT7 THE CZECHOSLOVAK WAY. "Dr. Beneš, tbe Czecboslovak Presldent, must be a tborn In tbe nesb of tbose wbo contend tbat Russia wlll deal only wlth puppets In nelghborlng countr~es of Eastern Europe. Benei ia no puppet. He ls no Communlst. Hls pol!tlcal pbllosopby ls ibased on the llberal democracy of tbe West. Vet no one is aurpriaed because hla good frlend, Stalln, has Just concluded a new agreement with hlm, provlding for entry of the Czechoalovak ad minlstration in Dr. Benei' homeland in the wake of the Red Army at the earllest posaible time. That ia exactly what we'd expect, for re latlona between Dr. Benei' government and that of the Soviet Union are a lo ng-atanding model of cordiality. "Tbe fact, of course, is tbat Dr. Bene!i ls a flrst-rate statesman, one of the best In tbe world. As such, he knows that a bright future for hia country ia out of the queat lon un leH lt has the good wlll of the USS R. He and bis countrymen also remember that 'Russla dld not desert tbem in the black era of Munlch. Today he bas Czechoslovakla wltb bim In tbe 20-year mutual asslstance treaty wlth Russla. "Tbe consequence ls tbat Russla respects the lndependence of lts good nelghbor. Dr. Bene!i, accordlngly, ls free not only to pian confldently for the future of bis own !and but to serve Europe and all the Unlted Natlons as an outstandlng leader for collect!ve securlty. Tbat is the Benei way, the Czechoslovak way, based upon tbe prlnclples of independence and lnterdependence. It sbould be studled as an example by tbe leaders of all countrles In Eastern Europe - and by Amerlcan frlends of tliose countrles." - (THE CIDCAGO SUN 1944). • � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 20 SLOVAKIA The Spirit of THE 00Ni8'.l1ITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC DR. JOHN F . GLE IMAN In the spring of 1939, when the young Slova)( RepubUc found itself before the difficult ta.sk of writing its Constitution, the crisis in Europe, caused by conflicting ideologicaJ trends, was ne,aring its cllmax. Democratic Liberalism, after a fruitful exlstence of 150 years ln ,Europe, was being a:ttacked from all sides, not only by the totalltarian currents of Communism, Fa.scism and Nazlsm, but also by other philosophi<:al, religious, economical and politlcal systems. In that apocatlyptical confusion of ideologles, the Committee a11p0tinted by the Assembly of the Slovak Republlc labored on the draft of cthe ConstiWtion Document. While i,t was thus occupied, natlonal aggref!Sion.s {rom the East, South, West and North, appeared ominously on the ltorizon, threatening with destruotion the healthy offshoot of the life of the Slovak State. Even if the enVtlronment of that rneological ferment and frightful international sltuation effected peoples deeply, the work or the Constitution Committee - desplte its compromising tenor - is, nevertheless, a clear reflectlon of the unity of thought and sentlme-nt of the Slovak people. In oppressed peoples there naturally develops not only a feeling of solldarJty, but also a profound religious llfe. Actu_a lly, the most slgnifloant trait of Slovak tradition is the Christian world-ou tlook of the natlon; that 1s true of both the Catholic majori ty and éhe Lutheran minority of the Slovak nation. But the tradition o! democratic freedoms also remained vary much alive. Along with Christian tradltion, these ideas, too, were the moving forces of Slovak polltics s-lnce the tbirties of the past century. Christian tra:dition and the Idea of democratic freedoms were the defensive bulwark, by which the currents of totalltarian ideologles were repulsed and which to a certaln extent unlfied politlical thinking in Slovakia. On!y thus could lt happen that, in the midst of aggressive totalitarlan ldeologies, whlch deflnltely dld suppress the principles of democratic liberaldsm, the Constltutlonal Law No. 185 of 1939 was approved by the Assembly of the Slovak Republic. Thls law adopted practically t-he whole system of democratic-liberaJistic Constltutlons of the 18th and 19th centurles. Only thus could lt happen that Slovakla - wedged In from the rlght and rhe left between Godless bolshevism and antl-Chrlstian neo-paganlfsm - brought forth a Constitutlon saturated with the Christlan spirit and especlally with the principles of the socia:! encycllcals of the Holy See. LIBERA LISTIC-DEMOC RATIC ELEMEN T $ ~he Constltution of the United States of America from 1788 and the Constrltutlion of the French Revolution became the models of the rlemocratlc-liberalistic consti'tutions of the 19bh century European States. They were the first to incorporate into constitutional norms the prlnclples of the great thlnkers of mod~rn democracy - Locke, Montesquleu and Rosseau: the right of determlnatlon of the majority of the people, the idea of equality before the law and the guarantees of lndlvidual freedoms. These, in Ume, became the great documenb! of human rights. SLOVAKIA 21 The Constitution of the Slovak Republic contalns alil the fundamental principles of these models. The constitutional intention to organize a State on the tested prlncipies of democrat.ic freedoms 1s documented by the very name of the State itself: "The Slovak Re-public." At a t.ime when dictators were in power in the surrounding totalitarlan States, the Slovak Constitution consistently validates the democratic principle of the right of determination of t.he majority In the elect,lon of t he president of the Repulfäc and the deputies of parliament, ,i n the decisions of parliament, the State Council, the Government and self-admlnistraiti-ng bodies. At a tíme when the USSR culminated the Iiquldatlon of lts so-called bourgeols cla.ss, whiC'h was outlawed, and in Germany the Nuremberg antl<Sem,l tic Ja,ws were compleUng their work, the Slovak Assembly dld not hesitate to accept a Constitution founded on the idea of equality of ail cltizens without regard to orlgin, nationality and religion. And just so, at a time when executlve power of government of the totalitarian super-States had atta:lned complete preponderancee in the management of the State, th Slovak Constltution codified without reservations a system outllned by Locke and culminated by Montesquieu, a system of legal and free government, depending on the division of State po.w er into the Iegislative, executive and judicial branches. T·h e centra! •leglslative power received its construction accord!ng to the pri'nci!)'les of Locke. Its bearer became the Assembly of the Slovak RepubUc. That centra! power in the State the Constitutlon executed also with the rest of the postulates of iiberal-democratic constitutions: with immunity and incompatibility of the members of the iegislature (Assembly), elected in general, direct, free and secret elections and wi,th the competency of elect!ng a president, establishing a budget and mhlitary duty, of permitting taxes and acceptlng international agreements. .According to t-he principles of Montesquieu, the Constitution subordinated executive power to legislatíve power and codified tbe responsibi,Jity of the president and the government to parliament. It regula.ted the activlty of lhe President, tbe Government and the State Council accordrlng to tested republican models. It followed democratic principles also by acknowledg!ng the direct participation of the clt.izenry in the State management tbrough the self-administ·ratlons of regions and profe.ssions. The lmmortail prtnolple of Monrtesquteu regarcting the independence of the judiciary also was fully validated in tbe Constitution. Complete separatlon of the judiciary from t.he executive power, as well as the principle tbat no one shall be deprived of bis own lawful judge, was also estarblisbed by law. Tbe lndependence of the judges was safeguarded by the codification of the princlple of non-transferabUity of judges and their lncompatlblllty wlth other pald functions, as weJJ as by expre.'3s!ng tbe princlple tbat a judge i~ bound only by Jaw and has the right to explore the validity of i;:overnmental regulations and whether Jaws were pronerly proclaimed. The Constitutlon did not lack the customary safeguards of freedom. Parag11aph 81 sald: "All lnhabltants, regardless or thE>lr orig'in. natlonaility, religion and calllng, enjoy the protec-tion of life. freedom an<l nroperty." Desides thls general prlnciple, lt guaranteed special prlnciple<i, such as: persona) freedom, domestic peace, secrecy of the mails, the right or 22 SLOVAKIA assembly and organization, freedom of the press and expresslon of opln1ons, freedom of rellgion, scientlfic research and arts, and the right of the nationali'Ues to use t.heir own language in pub41c llre and in the schools. Finally, with the sentence - "No one shall be punished for conduct whlch does not violate the legal pena! norm and tor w,h ich the penalty was not aforehand deflned by laiw or legal norm" - it adopted the classlcall princlple of the freedom of man "nulla poena, nullum crlmen sine lege," whlch is the foundatlon of legal oroer in a lawful State. CHRISTIAN- DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS When the shady sides of llberallstlc capitallsm unfettered the social struggles, the ideology of Marxlsm about permanent cla.ss war· fare arose and spread. Proclalmlng the lnevitabllllty of world revolutlon and t he dlct.atorship of the proletariat, t-he e!lminatlon of the burgeois class, the a:bolltion of pr!v,ate ownershi'p, a,nd collective economy of com munlties, thls ldeology threatened the entilre structure of Christlan civilizatlon wHh destruction. That is why already in the second half of the pas.t century Christlan thlnkers, especially the Cathollc Bis-hops Ketteler and Mermlllod, as well as Protel!tant pastor Constantine Frantz, sought posslbll!Ues of mltigating social opposltes and then by un-proJetarlatlzlng the proleteriat to destroy class differences completely. In the main, the papal encycllcals, beginrung with HERUM NOVARUIM (1890), tbrough QUADRAGESIMO ANNO (1931), all the way to MYS'l'IOI CORPORIS (1913), created a system, whicb - by the prlnciple of personalllsm, wlth emphasls on the social function of the famlly and wlth the buildlng of aut.onomous professional organlzatlons, wants to solve acute social problems, restrlct the stlIDlng interference of over-dlmensioned State power into every sectlon ot soclety and pl'lvate llfe, and, thus, rescue Chrlstlan soclety. It !s natural that the Slovak Republlc, being overwhelmlngly Ca,thollc, attempted to experiment with t.his system and Incorporated at least some of lts prlnclp'.les lnto its own Constltutlon. Thus lt was that regulatlons arose whi'c h protected especla,lly the family, and ln the spirit of these princlples also the worker, bis work and WQges, whereby strlkes - as somethlng outlived of the era of c:lass warfare - were forbidden. In the spirit of the encycllcals, the Con.stltution deflned the obligatlons of clrlzens - whlch are both splrltual and physical work - to fulflll the rtasks of thelr calllng, to help public organs perform the funotlons required by law and the authorltles and, flnaJly, the obllgatory care of the parents for the educatlon and trainlng of thelr chlldren. The regulatlon In paragraph 79 - "Ownershlp has a social functlon and blnds the owner to deal wlth tt In the lnterest or the general welfare" - i~ the basls of the encycllca:l QUADRAGESIMO ANNO and the socia,! wr!tlngs of Pope Plus XII. The most penetratlng social reform, whlch the Constltutlon took over from the encycllcal QUADRAGESI>MO ANNO, was the framewo rk ln-stltutlon of self•ad· mlnisitered States, pla.cing accordlng to ,thelr ca111ng all cltlzens wlth• out exceptlon lnto s1x professions or states: agrlcU!ture, industry, trade-commerce, banking, the free proresslons, and public employees. T,he Munlch Pact or Great BrlWn and France with Germany and Jtaly In Septem/ber, 1938, factually surrendered Centra! Europe to SLOVAKIA 23 tbe power of Hitler and MussollnL No one kn&w at tbat tlme ju,at when the furies of war would be unleasbed and what fate would befaJl Slovakla. In tbat bopeJess sl<tuation, all tbe Slovak clvic partles unlted w-ltb tbe Hlinka Slovak Peoples' Par,t.y to form the Party of Natlonal Unity In October, 1938. Hlstorlcal objectlvlty tells us to state that this bardJy would bave happened lf it were not for stlf!Lng pressure from all s!des. The Constltutlon codHled thls Party as the only representative o! the polltlcai will of the Slovak natlon. Thls fact undoubtedly s.hows sharply the belpless determlnatlon of a small natlon, which in its fatal danger was forced to make thls compromise with tbe giganttlc aggressor, wben h:ls stee1 columns omlnously waited on lts borders. Desplte this fact, bowever, the Constitution dld not accept the to<tall· tar!an pr!nclple of one party, beoause lt aJ.Jowed separate partie.s for the natlonalitles. In later years, under l'be pressure of tae totalltarian super-States and the war, tbls Constltutlon could not valldate ltself wlthout partlcular blndrances, but from the perspectlve of the f!rst decade, tbe Slovak Constltut!onal Document ltself In lts entlrety actualJy appears to us as a work of prľ:nclples, the prlnclples of democratic freedoms and tbe princlples of Cbrlstlan democracy. lt was tbe collective work of tbe spirit of the Slovak natlon that formed the State. And as sucb, it wlll pass on into history. • • • WHO SAID IT7 THE CZECHOSLOVAK WAY. "Dr. Beneš, tbe Czecboslovak Presldent, must be a tborn In tbe nesb of tbose wbo contend tbat Russia wlll deal only wlth puppets In nelghborlng countr~es of Eastern Europe. Benei ia no puppet. He ls no Communlst. Hls pol!tlcal pbllosopby ls ibased on the llberal democracy of tbe West. Vet no one is aurpriaed because hla good frlend, Stalln, has Just concluded a new agreement with hlm, provlding for entry of the Czechoalovak ad minlstration in Dr. Benei' homeland in the wake of the Red Army at the earllest posaible time. That ia exactly what we'd expect, for re latlona between Dr. Benei' government and that of the Soviet Union are a lo ng-atanding model of cordiality. "Tbe fact, of course, is tbat Dr. Bene!i ls a flrst-rate statesman, one of the best In tbe world. As such, he knows that a bright future for hia country ia out of the queat lon un leH lt has the good wlll of the USS R. He and bis countrymen also remember that 'Russla dld not desert tbem in the black era of Munlch. Today he bas Czechoslovakla wltb bim In tbe 20-year mutual asslstance treaty wlth Russla. "Tbe consequence ls tbat Russla respects the lndependence of lts good nelghbor. Dr. Bene!i, accordlngly, ls free not only to pian confldently for the future of bis own !and but to serve Europe and all the Unlted Natlons as an outstandlng leader for collect!ve securlty. Tbat is the Benei way, the Czechoslovak way, based upon tbe prlnclples of independence and lnterdependence. It sbould be studled as an example by tbe leaders of all countrles In Eastern Europe - and by Amerlcan frlends of tliose countrles." - (THE CIDCAGO SUN 1944). •  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Constitution of the Slovak Republic Description An account of the resource Dr. John F. Gleiman Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952 pp. 20-23 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Gleiman, John F. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/f841e2bddb560de426f2a8cd936a6f02.pdf e149e9d1fae319afac2fbbe288f8448e PDF Text Text 38 SLOVA.KIA THE DIPLOl\lATIC SERVICE OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC DR. JOSEPH MIKUŠ Considering lhe circumstances under whlch the Slovak Sta.te originaled in post-Munich Europe, as well as lhe circumstances under whic:h lt existed and then came to a dramatic, though traglc end in 19•15, Slovak cliplomacy certainly had a most clifficult task to perforrn. Even though the Slovak diplomatic corps was iiware of the fact that the natlonal principle, whlch had given llfe to the Slovak Republlc, was a rnodern and progressive concept, nevertheless, at every step it had to contend wlth lhe prejudlces wblch preva.iled in certaln States of Europe, namely: tbe role playecl by ~rmany when the Slovak State originated and the relations - both foreigu and polltical - of Slovakia ,vith the German Reic:h as formulated in tbe so-called "Sc:hutzvertrag" (Treaty of Prolection). The first task of Slovak cliplomacy was to gain for the Slovak Hepublic as wide an internationa.l .recognilion a.s posslble. We wanted not only our nelghbors in Central Europe, but also the States in the most distant corners of the world, to take notice o( our color on the map or Europe. That was tbe acUvity whlch Slovak e mbassies in the neutra! States (Switzerland, the Vatlcan and Spain) were c·alled on to develop. This actlvlty was characterized by visits, memoraJ1da and notes. Only the war prevented the Slovak diplomatlc corps from completely consolidating the positlon of the Slovak State. ilut even then we must note that twenty-seven States diel recogl)ize tbe Slovak Republlc and had diplomatic or consular contacts with it. Among tbem, besldes tbe European States, were also Aslatic and South American States. Slovakia was, therefore, recognized not only by the States of the German-ItaliaJ1-Japanese coalltion, but also by several neutra.! States and some of the States of the Allled Bloc, among wbich, in the western hemispbere, were Costa Hica and J<,cuador. Not many people grasped the meaning of dlplomacy for the Slovak State. lt was often sald tbat we were a small State, thať events would run their course regardless whether our forelgn servlce wa.s' \\"eak or strong. Even Forelgn Mlnisler Tuka a nd his de,puty Polyák held to tbis v1ew. And it was for that reason that the budget ot the Foreign Ministry was alwa.ys so small. Embassles and consulates were established only In the States and clties which were considered more slgnlficant for us. The Slovak Republlc had embassies in Budapest, Warsaw, Moscow, Berlin, Bucharest, Sophla; In tbe Vatlcan and the Qulrlnal; Berne, Madrid, Helsinki, Belgrade and later, Zagreb. There were General Consulates in Vienna, MUan, Stockholm, London, and Prague. Furthermore, there were several honorary consulates in foreign lands, as well as repatriatlon commlsslons in Paris and Brus!<els. At limes the competency of a slngle embassy extended over the territory or several States. The embassy in Berlin, for example, was deslgna.ted also for Denmark and the lla.ltlc States. The embassy in Madrid had to take care of practlcally the whole or Soutb America and also serve as a connecting llnk wltb the Slovaks in North America. �BLOVAKlA 39 k was regrettable tbat for the narrow-mindedness of tbe ló'oreign Minister himself the Slovak forelgn service could not develop to the extent reo.ulred by Slovak national interests. lf we would bave established in embassy in Ecuador, for example, tbe embassy probably would have ci>ntinued to exh1t just as the P.mbassies of the Baltic States did in London and Washington. Slovak diplomacy, ot' course. belped in the economic field also. Even thougb the frozen economy of the States of war-torn Europe did not make thls task any easier, nevertheless tbe Slovak Republic attained quite an intensified circulation of economic relations in other States, whether considered on the basis of excha.nge paymenLs, or compensation of products, or by overrating in clearing, etc. Slovak diplomacy did its work well along these lines, even tbougb freQuently it had to compete wlt.h di,plomac ies of States wltb a long tradition and great experiences. Slovak products, trademarked "1\lade in Slovakia," were banled by trains over Europe and by shlps acToss the Mediterranean Sea. The i1tablllzation of Slovak exchange was due largely to Slovak foreign trade; it attavied the greMest degree of stability of practically all exchanges of the Centra! European Slates. But we did not lag behind even in the field of cultuľe. A cultural attaché functioned in every embassy. These men saw to it that Slovakia became known in the States to which they were sent. They made contacts with the press, radlo, universitles, etc. Slovak lectures were arranged at tbe universities of Leipzig, Rome, Na.ples. and Vien-na. Some legatlon offices issued information bulletin-s about Slovakla. Such bulletin-s were publisbed regularly by the em• bassies in Berne, Madrid and the General Consulate . In Stockholm. Slovak books also found their way into foreign lands through the e mbassies. Thus, tbe only objective books about Slovakia in the Parls libraries are those published by the Association for Slovak!I in Foreign Lands from the time of the Slovak State. Slovak dlplomatic personnel also publlsbed severaJ books in foreign \anguages about Slovakia and its people. Thus, the foreigner wbo '!tudies the Slovak question today ;_-, no longer dependent on the tendencious books of Czech and Magyar authors. From the cultural standpoint. significant was the reality that many Slovak artists could be schooled in foreign lands. AJso many more students than ever before were able to study at forelgn universities, eitber as excbange students or at thelr own ex,pense. Many students lived and studied not only in Vienna, Berlin, and J..,eipzig, but aJso in Switzerland, Italy and Spai!l. Toward tbe end of the war, the Slovak diplomatic corps suc<·essfully performed some signlficant acts of a bumanitarian characler. For example, Ing. Mračna, Chief of the pol!tical section of the Ministry of Foreign Affalrs. defended many American and French soldiers who escaped to Slovakia from German prison camps. And ~o it was that we were successful unto the very end of the war in keeping in Slovakia, in the luxurious confines of the Royal Hotel In Piešťany, the ltalian and Rumanian dlplomats who deserted Mu~solinl and Antonescu. lt must be emphasized that lhe Slovak diplomatic corps represented. the most independent group of the admlnlstratlon of tb e �tO SLOVA.KLA Slovak State. Since the Germans recognized Slovakia as an ·independent State, the diplomatlc corps conducted itself abroad in a manner befitting the foreign service of an independent State. Slovak representatlves abroad were not controJled by aliens and acted toward German representatives in much the same manner as they did toward the representatives of other States. Because Slovak foreign servlce often was not in line with the regulations of the "Schutzver· trag" it was suspected in the eyese of German dlplomacy. For example, the embassy of the Slovak Republic at the Quirinal in Rome had contacts with the British ambassador there In the winter of 1939 and the sprlng of 1940, when England already was at war with Germany. We were lnterested In gettlng Brazllian wool for Slovakia. To bring the wool In by ship from overseas we needed permission from the English authoritles, a so--called "navycert." and we requested one at the Englieh embassy. Quite understandably, the „equest evoked certain fears regarding the final dispositlon of sneh an impoiitant war material. "Will the prepared wool be used in Slovakia, or is it destined for Germany?" we were asked. ,S o that our request might be considered, we had to produce proof with an explanatlon of our political and economic relations with Germany. Two memoranda resulted in which, along with Ambassador Zvrškovec, we showed that though we had a definite poIi tical relationship with Germany, yet the Slovak State was not at al! at war with the Allies and, from the standpoint of commercial po\icy, was completely independent, actlng politically as a neutra! State. It was self-evident, that we did this with Dr. Zvrškovec wlth the knowledge of the Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Ferdinand Ďurčanský. Later, when coples oť both these documents got into the hands of the German ambassador in Rome, Von Mackensen, through a member of the Slovak Embassy, and then into the hands of von Ribbentrop, Slovak diplomacy was subject to lts first purge. Presldent Tiso and several members of his Government were called to Salzburg, where on July 29, 1940, tbey had to answer to Hitler for these "undisciplined" acts or U1e Slovak diplomatic corps. "Den Zigeuner, den will ich nicht mehr sehen ! " (this Gypsy I do not want to see any more), Hltler screamed angrlly polntlng to Ďurčan-ský as Tlso was about to preeent bis Ministers. That ls how Ďurčanský was purged and, later, Zvrškovec. And that spelled the end for the free foreign pollcy of the Slovak State. During Tuka's minlstry, and with bis complicity, the ministrles in Bratislava were occupjed by German "beraterl'' (advlsors). But the Slovak embassies in foreign Jands acted quite independently in most cases even after that; not only towards Germany, but even towards Tuka himself. Whlle Tuka proclalmed voclferously that the Slovak Republic "lives and dles with the German Reloh," the Slovak dlplomatlc corps was fully aware or the fact that the Slovak nation wanted to Jive along with Germany or wlthout it, and wlth or wlthout Tnka. Our lnterest was to have Slovakla remain as Jong as posslble outside the domaln of the main military events, out or actual war. Tuka's declaration ot war against Russla in 1941 was regarded as a serlous po\itical mistake by the Slovak foreign service. Tuka failed as a palitician and as a lawyer. Slovak diplomaťy. except for a �SLOVAKIA few exceptlons, was noted for its independence of opinion and action and for its objective reports. lt certainly deserved a better F'oreign Minister; his lack of judgment and foresight was fatal not only for himself, but, alas, even for rthe Slovak State. Along with this uncritlcal tendency, which overestimated Germany and the slgnificance of the "protection" guaranteed the Slovak State by it, the tendency to whlch only one or two members of the Slovak foreign servlce subscribed, >the unity of the Slovak diplomatic corps was also threatened by another tendency: the Czechoslovak tendency. To this category belonged Dr. Szathmáry, Ing. Országh, Ing. Géza Krno and Dr. Raklíányi. For these men the Slovak State was just an episode. Durlng the war they tried to make contact wlth Beneš to offer him their services. Today we know that Ing. Országh, who came to Madrid in May, 1943,. as the chief of the Slovak trade delegation to negotiate a trade agreement, brought some significant material, which he later sent to London. This "Czechoslovak" tendency was responsible for the chicanery wbich the officials of tbe Slovak foreign ministry later had to suffer during tbe so-called "screening" in Bratislava. In its substantial majority, however, tbe Slovak diplomatic corps remained loyal to the concept of tbe independent Slovak State even when lt was jailed for renderlng its service to that State. It is comforting that the most significant factors of the Slovak foreign service are today in foreign lands. and among them: Karol Sidor, Dr. Ferdinand Ďurčanský, Francis Tlso, Dr. Josepb Cieker, Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum, Dr. Galvánek, Dr. Bečko, Dr. Kaššovič, Dr. Pisko, Dr. števek, Dr. A. Grébert, Dr. Blyska, Dr. Ďatelinka, etc. All these men witb the rest of the Slovak emigration are fully aware of wbat the concept of an independent Slovak State means to their natlon today under Communlst rule. Thls concept of the Slovak State could bave been overshadowed by a temporary eclipse of the universal in,ternational constellation only because of the disproportlonate role which the frightened democracies reserved for Russia in Centra! and Eastern Europe at the conferences of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam. And the Slovak State perished only because the principles of tbe Atlantic Charter and tbe rigbt of nations to selfdetermlnation were completely ignored. But the idea is definitely roorted in tbe blood and marrow of the Slovak nation wblch insists on havlng its own democratlc and independent Staite. Slovak diplomats, therefore, in free foreign lands wlll not let up in their labors until independent Slovakia once again takes its rigbtful place on the map of Europe - preferably a federated Europe. • • • "In the West some indivlduals assert that we are in the hands of the Soviets, yet the Governments look at tblngs differently. We are the Allies of the U.S.S.R. and we shall always remain faithful to the Soviets. We are friends of the West and we shall remain frlends. In flrm alllance witb the U.S.S.R. we are proceedlng and shall proceed our own way." (Dr. Edward Beneš, Prague Broadcast, October 9, 1945). WHO SAID IT? - � 38 SLOVA.KIA THE DIPLOl\lATIC SERVICE OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC DR. JOSEPH MIKUŠ Considering lhe circumstances under whlch the Slovak Sta.te originaled in post-Munich Europe, as well as lhe circumstances under whic:h lt existed and then came to a dramatic, though traglc end in 19•15, Slovak cliplomacy certainly had a most clifficult task to perforrn. Even though the Slovak diplomatic corps was iiware of the fact that the natlonal principle, whlch had given llfe to the Slovak Republlc, was a rnodern and progressive concept, nevertheless, at every step it had to contend wlth lhe prejudlces wblch preva.iled in certaln States of Europe, namely: tbe role playecl by ~rmany when the Slovak State originated and the relations - both foreigu and polltical - of Slovakia ,vith the German Reic:h as formulated in tbe so-called "Sc:hutzvertrag" (Treaty of Prolection). The first task of Slovak cliplomacy was to gain for the Slovak Hepublic as wide an internationa.l .recognilion a.s posslble. We wanted not only our nelghbors in Central Europe, but also the States in the most distant corners of the world, to take notice o( our color on the map or Europe. That was tbe acUvity whlch Slovak e mbassies in the neutra! States (Switzerland, the Vatlcan and Spain) were c·alled on to develop. This actlvlty was characterized by visits, memoraJ1da and notes. Only the war prevented the Slovak diplomatlc corps from completely consolidating the positlon of the Slovak State. ilut even then we must note that twenty-seven States diel recogl)ize tbe Slovak Republlc and had diplomatic or consular contacts with it. Among tbem, besldes tbe European States, were also Aslatic and South American States. Slovakia was, therefore, recognized not only by the States of the German-ItaliaJ1-Japanese coalltion, but also by several neutra.! States and some of the States of the Allled Bloc, among wbich, in the western hemispbere, were Costa Hica and J<,cuador. Not many people grasped the meaning of dlplomacy for the Slovak State. lt was often sald tbat we were a small State, thať events would run their course regardless whether our forelgn servlce wa.s' \\"eak or strong. Even Forelgn Mlnisler Tuka a nd his de,puty Polyák held to tbis v1ew. And it was for that reason that the budget ot the Foreign Ministry was alwa.ys so small. Embassles and consulates were established only In the States and clties which were considered more slgnlficant for us. The Slovak Republlc had embassies in Budapest, Warsaw, Moscow, Berlin, Bucharest, Sophla; In tbe Vatlcan and the Qulrlnal; Berne, Madrid, Helsinki, Belgrade and later, Zagreb. There were General Consulates in Vienna, MUan, Stockholm, London, and Prague. Furthermore, there were several honorary consulates in foreign lands, as well as repatriatlon commlsslons in Paris and Brus!<els. At limes the competency of a slngle embassy extended over the territory or several States. The embassy in Berlin, for example, was deslgna.ted also for Denmark and the lla.ltlc States. The embassy in Madrid had to take care of practlcally the whole or Soutb America and also serve as a connecting llnk wltb the Slovaks in North America. �BLOVAKlA 39 k was regrettable tbat for the narrow-mindedness of tbe ló'oreign Minister himself the Slovak forelgn service could not develop to the extent reo.ulred by Slovak national interests. lf we would bave established in embassy in Ecuador, for example, tbe embassy probably would have ci>ntinued to exh1t just as the P.mbassies of the Baltic States did in London and Washington. Slovak diplomacy, ot' course. belped in the economic field also. Even thougb the frozen economy of the States of war-torn Europe did not make thls task any easier, nevertheless tbe Slovak Republic attained quite an intensified circulation of economic relations in other States, whether considered on the basis of excha.nge paymenLs, or compensation of products, or by overrating in clearing, etc. Slovak diplomacy did its work well along these lines, even tbougb freQuently it had to compete wlt.h di,plomac ies of States wltb a long tradition and great experiences. Slovak products, trademarked "1\lade in Slovakia," were banled by trains over Europe and by shlps acToss the Mediterranean Sea. The i1tablllzation of Slovak exchange was due largely to Slovak foreign trade; it attavied the greMest degree of stability of practically all exchanges of the Centra! European Slates. But we did not lag behind even in the field of cultuľe. A cultural attaché functioned in every embassy. These men saw to it that Slovakia became known in the States to which they were sent. They made contacts with the press, radlo, universitles, etc. Slovak lectures were arranged at tbe universities of Leipzig, Rome, Na.ples. and Vien-na. Some legatlon offices issued information bulletin-s about Slovakla. Such bulletin-s were publisbed regularly by the em• bassies in Berne, Madrid and the General Consulate . In Stockholm. Slovak books also found their way into foreign lands through the e mbassies. Thus, tbe only objective books about Slovakia in the Parls libraries are those published by the Association for Slovak!I in Foreign Lands from the time of the Slovak State. Slovak dlplomatic personnel also publlsbed severaJ books in foreign \anguages about Slovakia and its people. Thus, the foreigner wbo '!tudies the Slovak question today ;_-, no longer dependent on the tendencious books of Czech and Magyar authors. From the cultural standpoint. significant was the reality that many Slovak artists could be schooled in foreign lands. AJso many more students than ever before were able to study at forelgn universities, eitber as excbange students or at thelr own ex,pense. Many students lived and studied not only in Vienna, Berlin, and J..,eipzig, but aJso in Switzerland, Italy and Spai!l. Toward tbe end of the war, the Slovak diplomatic corps suc<·essfully performed some signlficant acts of a bumanitarian characler. For example, Ing. Mračna, Chief of the pol!tical section of the Ministry of Foreign Affalrs. defended many American and French soldiers who escaped to Slovakia from German prison camps. And ~o it was that we were successful unto the very end of the war in keeping in Slovakia, in the luxurious confines of the Royal Hotel In Piešťany, the ltalian and Rumanian dlplomats who deserted Mu~solinl and Antonescu. lt must be emphasized that lhe Slovak diplomatic corps represented. the most independent group of the admlnlstratlon of tb e �tO SLOVA.KLA Slovak State. Since the Germans recognized Slovakia as an ·independent State, the diplomatlc corps conducted itself abroad in a manner befitting the foreign service of an independent State. Slovak representatlves abroad were not controJled by aliens and acted toward German representatives in much the same manner as they did toward the representatives of other States. Because Slovak foreign servlce often was not in line with the regulations of the "Schutzver· trag" it was suspected in the eyese of German dlplomacy. For example, the embassy of the Slovak Republic at the Quirinal in Rome had contacts with the British ambassador there In the winter of 1939 and the sprlng of 1940, when England already was at war with Germany. We were lnterested In gettlng Brazllian wool for Slovakia. To bring the wool In by ship from overseas we needed permission from the English authoritles, a so--called "navycert." and we requested one at the Englieh embassy. Quite understandably, the „equest evoked certain fears regarding the final dispositlon of sneh an impoiitant war material. "Will the prepared wool be used in Slovakia, or is it destined for Germany?" we were asked. ,S o that our request might be considered, we had to produce proof with an explanatlon of our political and economic relations with Germany. Two memoranda resulted in which, along with Ambassador Zvrškovec, we showed that though we had a definite poIi tical relationship with Germany, yet the Slovak State was not at al! at war with the Allies and, from the standpoint of commercial po\icy, was completely independent, actlng politically as a neutra! State. It was self-evident, that we did this with Dr. Zvrškovec wlth the knowledge of the Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Ferdinand Ďurčanský. Later, when coples oť both these documents got into the hands of the German ambassador in Rome, Von Mackensen, through a member of the Slovak Embassy, and then into the hands of von Ribbentrop, Slovak diplomacy was subject to lts first purge. Presldent Tiso and several members of his Government were called to Salzburg, where on July 29, 1940, tbey had to answer to Hitler for these "undisciplined" acts or U1e Slovak diplomatic corps. "Den Zigeuner, den will ich nicht mehr sehen ! " (this Gypsy I do not want to see any more), Hltler screamed angrlly polntlng to Ďurčan-ský as Tlso was about to preeent bis Ministers. That ls how Ďurčanský was purged and, later, Zvrškovec. And that spelled the end for the free foreign pollcy of the Slovak State. During Tuka's minlstry, and with bis complicity, the ministrles in Bratislava were occupjed by German "beraterl'' (advlsors). But the Slovak embassies in foreign Jands acted quite independently in most cases even after that; not only towards Germany, but even towards Tuka himself. Whlle Tuka proclalmed voclferously that the Slovak Republic "lives and dles with the German Reloh," the Slovak dlplomatlc corps was fully aware or the fact that the Slovak nation wanted to Jive along with Germany or wlthout it, and wlth or wlthout Tnka. Our lnterest was to have Slovakla remain as Jong as posslble outside the domaln of the main military events, out or actual war. Tuka's declaration ot war against Russla in 1941 was regarded as a serlous po\itical mistake by the Slovak foreign service. Tuka failed as a palitician and as a lawyer. Slovak diplomaťy. except for a �SLOVAKIA few exceptlons, was noted for its independence of opinion and action and for its objective reports. lt certainly deserved a better F'oreign Minister; his lack of judgment and foresight was fatal not only for himself, but, alas, even for rthe Slovak State. Along with this uncritlcal tendency, which overestimated Germany and the slgnificance of the "protection" guaranteed the Slovak State by it, the tendency to whlch only one or two members of the Slovak foreign servlce subscribed, >the unity of the Slovak diplomatic corps was also threatened by another tendency: the Czechoslovak tendency. To this category belonged Dr. Szathmáry, Ing. Országh, Ing. Géza Krno and Dr. Raklíányi. For these men the Slovak State was just an episode. Durlng the war they tried to make contact wlth Beneš to offer him their services. Today we know that Ing. Országh, who came to Madrid in May, 1943,. as the chief of the Slovak trade delegation to negotiate a trade agreement, brought some significant material, which he later sent to London. This "Czechoslovak" tendency was responsible for the chicanery wbich the officials of tbe Slovak foreign ministry later had to suffer during tbe so-called "screening" in Bratislava. In its substantial majority, however, tbe Slovak diplomatic corps remained loyal to the concept of tbe independent Slovak State even when lt was jailed for renderlng its service to that State. It is comforting that the most significant factors of the Slovak foreign service are today in foreign lands. and among them: Karol Sidor, Dr. Ferdinand Ďurčanský, Francis Tlso, Dr. Josepb Cieker, Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum, Dr. Galvánek, Dr. Bečko, Dr. Kaššovič, Dr. Pisko, Dr. števek, Dr. A. Grébert, Dr. Blyska, Dr. Ďatelinka, etc. All these men witb the rest of the Slovak emigration are fully aware of wbat the concept of an independent Slovak State means to their natlon today under Communlst rule. Thls concept of the Slovak State could bave been overshadowed by a temporary eclipse of the universal in,ternational constellation only because of the disproportlonate role which the frightened democracies reserved for Russia in Centra! and Eastern Europe at the conferences of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam. And the Slovak State perished only because the principles of tbe Atlantic Charter and tbe rigbt of nations to selfdetermlnation were completely ignored. But the idea is definitely roorted in tbe blood and marrow of the Slovak nation wblch insists on havlng its own democratlc and independent Staite. Slovak diplomats, therefore, in free foreign lands wlll not let up in their labors until independent Slovakia once again takes its rigbtful place on the map of Europe - preferably a federated Europe. • • • "In the West some indivlduals assert that we are in the hands of the Soviets, yet the Governments look at tblngs differently. We are the Allies of the U.S.S.R. and we shall always remain faithful to the Soviets. We are friends of the West and we shall remain frlends. In flrm alllance witb the U.S.S.R. we are proceedlng and shall proceed our own way." (Dr. Edward Beneš, Prague Broadcast, October 9, 1945). WHO SAID IT? - � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 38 SLOVA.KIA THE DIPLOl\lATIC SERVICE OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC DR. JOSEPH MIKUŠ Considering lhe circumstances under whlch the Slovak Sta.te originaled in post-Munich Europe, as well as lhe circumstances under whic:h lt existed and then came to a dramatic, though traglc end in 19•15, Slovak cliplomacy certainly had a most clifficult task to perforrn. Even though the Slovak diplomatic corps was iiware of the fact that the natlonal principle, whlch had given llfe to the Slovak Republlc, was a rnodern and progressive concept, nevertheless, at every step it had to contend wlth lhe prejudlces wblch preva.iled in certaln States of Europe, namely: tbe role playecl by ~rmany when the Slovak State originated and the relations - both foreigu and polltical - of Slovakia ,vith the German Reic:h as formulated in tbe so-called "Sc:hutzvertrag" (Treaty of Prolection). The first task of Slovak cliplomacy was to gain for the Slovak Hepublic as wide an internationa.l .recognilion a.s posslble. We wanted not only our nelghbors in Central Europe, but also the States in the most distant corners of the world, to take notice o( our color on the map or Europe. That was tbe acUvity whlch Slovak e mbassies in the neutra! States (Switzerland, the Vatlcan and Spain) were c·alled on to develop. This actlvlty was characterized by visits, memoraJ1da and notes. Only the war prevented the Slovak diplomatlc corps from completely consolidating the positlon of the Slovak State. ilut even then we must note that twenty-seven States diel recogl)ize tbe Slovak Republlc and had diplomatic or consular contacts with it. Among tbem, besldes tbe European States, were also Aslatic and South American States. Slovakia was, therefore, recognized not only by the States of the German-ItaliaJ1-Japanese coalltion, but also by several neutra.! States and some of the States of the Allled Bloc, among wbich, in the western hemispbere, were Costa Hica and J<,cuador. Not many people grasped the meaning of dlplomacy for the Slovak State. lt was often sald tbat we were a small State, thať events would run their course regardless whether our forelgn servlce wa.s' \\"eak or strong. Even Forelgn Mlnisler Tuka a nd his de,puty Polyák held to tbis v1ew. And it was for that reason that the budget ot the Foreign Ministry was alwa.ys so small. Embassles and consulates were established only In the States and clties which were considered more slgnlficant for us. The Slovak Republlc had embassies in Budapest, Warsaw, Moscow, Berlin, Bucharest, Sophla; In tbe Vatlcan and the Qulrlnal; Berne, Madrid, Helsinki, Belgrade and later, Zagreb. There were General Consulates in Vienna, MUan, Stockholm, London, and Prague. Furthermore, there were several honorary consulates in foreign lands, as well as repatriatlon commlsslons in Paris and Brus!<els. At limes the competency of a slngle embassy extended over the territory or several States. The embassy in Berlin, for example, was deslgna.ted also for Denmark and the lla.ltlc States. The embassy in Madrid had to take care of practlcally the whole or Soutb America and also serve as a connecting llnk wltb the Slovaks in North America. BLOVAKlA 39 k was regrettable tbat for the narrow-mindedness of tbe ló'oreign Minister himself the Slovak forelgn service could not develop to the extent reo.ulred by Slovak national interests. lf we would bave established in embassy in Ecuador, for example, tbe embassy probably would have ci>ntinued to exh1t just as the P.mbassies of the Baltic States did in London and Washington. Slovak diplomacy, ot' course. belped in the economic field also. Even thougb the frozen economy of the States of war-torn Europe did not make thls task any easier, nevertheless tbe Slovak Republic attained quite an intensified circulation of economic relations in other States, whether considered on the basis of excha.nge paymenLs, or compensation of products, or by overrating in clearing, etc. Slovak diplomacy did its work well along these lines, even tbougb freQuently it had to compete wlt.h di,plomac ies of States wltb a long tradition and great experiences. Slovak products, trademarked "1\lade in Slovakia," were banled by trains over Europe and by shlps acToss the Mediterranean Sea. The i1tablllzation of Slovak exchange was due largely to Slovak foreign trade; it attavied the greMest degree of stability of practically all exchanges of the Centra! European Slates. But we did not lag behind even in the field of cultuľe. A cultural attaché functioned in every embassy. These men saw to it that Slovakia became known in the States to which they were sent. They made contacts with the press, radlo, universitles, etc. Slovak lectures were arranged at tbe universities of Leipzig, Rome, Na.ples. and Vien-na. Some legatlon offices issued information bulletin-s about Slovakla. Such bulletin-s were publisbed regularly by the em• bassies in Berne, Madrid and the General Consulate . In Stockholm. Slovak books also found their way into foreign lands through the e mbassies. Thus, tbe only objective books about Slovakia in the Parls libraries are those published by the Association for Slovak!I in Foreign Lands from the time of the Slovak State. Slovak dlplomatic personnel also publlsbed severaJ books in foreign \anguages about Slovakia and its people. Thus, the foreigner wbo '!tudies the Slovak question today ;_-, no longer dependent on the tendencious books of Czech and Magyar authors. From the cultural standpoint. significant was the reality that many Slovak artists could be schooled in foreign lands. AJso many more students than ever before were able to study at forelgn universities, eitber as excbange students or at thelr own ex,pense. Many students lived and studied not only in Vienna, Berlin, and J..,eipzig, but aJso in Switzerland, Italy and Spai!l. Toward tbe end of the war, the Slovak diplomatic corps suc<·essfully performed some signlficant acts of a bumanitarian characler. For example, Ing. Mračna, Chief of the pol!tical section of the Ministry of Foreign Affalrs. defended many American and French soldiers who escaped to Slovakia from German prison camps. And ~o it was that we were successful unto the very end of the war in keeping in Slovakia, in the luxurious confines of the Royal Hotel In Piešťany, the ltalian and Rumanian dlplomats who deserted Mu~solinl and Antonescu. lt must be emphasized that lhe Slovak diplomatic corps represented. the most independent group of the admlnlstratlon of tb e tO SLOVA.KLA Slovak State. Since the Germans recognized Slovakia as an ·independent State, the diplomatlc corps conducted itself abroad in a manner befitting the foreign service of an independent State. Slovak representatlves abroad were not controJled by aliens and acted toward German representatives in much the same manner as they did toward the representatives of other States. Because Slovak foreign servlce often was not in line with the regulations of the "Schutzver· trag" it was suspected in the eyese of German dlplomacy. For example, the embassy of the Slovak Republic at the Quirinal in Rome had contacts with the British ambassador there In the winter of 1939 and the sprlng of 1940, when England already was at war with Germany. We were lnterested In gettlng Brazllian wool for Slovakia. To bring the wool In by ship from overseas we needed permission from the English authoritles, a so--called "navycert." and we requested one at the Englieh embassy. Quite understandably, the „equest evoked certain fears regarding the final dispositlon of sneh an impoiitant war material. "Will the prepared wool be used in Slovakia, or is it destined for Germany?" we were asked. ,S o that our request might be considered, we had to produce proof with an explanatlon of our political and economic relations with Germany. Two memoranda resulted in which, along with Ambassador Zvrškovec, we showed that though we had a definite poIi tical relationship with Germany, yet the Slovak State was not at al! at war with the Allies and, from the standpoint of commercial po\icy, was completely independent, actlng politically as a neutra! State. It was self-evident, that we did this with Dr. Zvrškovec wlth the knowledge of the Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Ferdinand Ďurčanský. Later, when coples oť both these documents got into the hands of the German ambassador in Rome, Von Mackensen, through a member of the Slovak Embassy, and then into the hands of von Ribbentrop, Slovak diplomacy was subject to lts first purge. Presldent Tiso and several members of his Government were called to Salzburg, where on July 29, 1940, tbey had to answer to Hitler for these "undisciplined" acts or U1e Slovak diplomatic corps. "Den Zigeuner, den will ich nicht mehr sehen ! " (this Gypsy I do not want to see any more), Hltler screamed angrlly polntlng to Ďurčan-ský as Tlso was about to preeent bis Ministers. That ls how Ďurčanský was purged and, later, Zvrškovec. And that spelled the end for the free foreign pollcy of the Slovak State. During Tuka's minlstry, and with bis complicity, the ministrles in Bratislava were occupjed by German "beraterl'' (advlsors). But the Slovak embassies in foreign Jands acted quite independently in most cases even after that; not only towards Germany, but even towards Tuka himself. Whlle Tuka proclalmed voclferously that the Slovak Republic "lives and dles with the German Reloh," the Slovak dlplomatlc corps was fully aware or the fact that the Slovak nation wanted to Jive along with Germany or wlthout it, and wlth or wlthout Tnka. Our lnterest was to have Slovakla remain as Jong as posslble outside the domaln of the main military events, out or actual war. Tuka's declaration ot war against Russla in 1941 was regarded as a serlous po\itical mistake by the Slovak foreign service. Tuka failed as a palitician and as a lawyer. Slovak diplomaťy. except for a SLOVAKIA few exceptlons, was noted for its independence of opinion and action and for its objective reports. lt certainly deserved a better F'oreign Minister; his lack of judgment and foresight was fatal not only for himself, but, alas, even for rthe Slovak State. Along with this uncritlcal tendency, which overestimated Germany and the slgnificance of the "protection" guaranteed the Slovak State by it, the tendency to whlch only one or two members of the Slovak foreign servlce subscribed, >the unity of the Slovak diplomatic corps was also threatened by another tendency: the Czechoslovak tendency. To this category belonged Dr. Szathmáry, Ing. Országh, Ing. Géza Krno and Dr. Raklíányi. For these men the Slovak State was just an episode. Durlng the war they tried to make contact wlth Beneš to offer him their services. Today we know that Ing. Országh, who came to Madrid in May, 1943,. as the chief of the Slovak trade delegation to negotiate a trade agreement, brought some significant material, which he later sent to London. This "Czechoslovak" tendency was responsible for the chicanery wbich the officials of tbe Slovak foreign ministry later had to suffer during tbe so-called "screening" in Bratislava. In its substantial majority, however, tbe Slovak diplomatic corps remained loyal to the concept of tbe independent Slovak State even when lt was jailed for renderlng its service to that State. It is comforting that the most significant factors of the Slovak foreign service are today in foreign lands. and among them: Karol Sidor, Dr. Ferdinand Ďurčanský, Francis Tlso, Dr. Josepb Cieker, Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum, Dr. Galvánek, Dr. Bečko, Dr. Kaššovič, Dr. Pisko, Dr. števek, Dr. A. Grébert, Dr. Blyska, Dr. Ďatelinka, etc. All these men witb the rest of the Slovak emigration are fully aware of wbat the concept of an independent Slovak State means to their natlon today under Communlst rule. Thls concept of the Slovak State could bave been overshadowed by a temporary eclipse of the universal in,ternational constellation only because of the disproportlonate role which the frightened democracies reserved for Russia in Centra! and Eastern Europe at the conferences of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam. And the Slovak State perished only because the principles of tbe Atlantic Charter and tbe rigbt of nations to selfdetermlnation were completely ignored. But the idea is definitely roorted in tbe blood and marrow of the Slovak nation wblch insists on havlng its own democratlc and independent Staite. Slovak diplomats, therefore, in free foreign lands wlll not let up in their labors until independent Slovakia once again takes its rigbtful place on the map of Europe - preferably a federated Europe. • • • "In the West some indivlduals assert that we are in the hands of the Soviets, yet the Governments look at tblngs differently. We are the Allies of the U.S.S.R. and we shall always remain faithful to the Soviets. We are friends of the West and we shall remain frlends. In flrm alllance witb the U.S.S.R. we are proceedlng and shall proceed our own way." (Dr. Edward Beneš, Prague Broadcast, October 9, 1945). WHO SAID IT? -  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Diplomatic Service of the Slovak Republic Description An account of the resource Dr. Joseph Mikuš Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952 pp. 38-41 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Mikuš, Joseph A., 1909-2005 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/29af679117eb1a8f94f9279572e14640.pdf f2fa8623d117cb324497ad5972796b06 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 17 THE FEDERATION OF THE DANUBE Lieut. Colonel F. O. Miksche {Colonel Mlksche, fairly well known as a polltico-strate g!c writer, was appolnted Czech Mllltary Attache In Paris after the war. He was recaJled to Czecho-Slova kla by tbe Communists, but soon a!terward.8 escaped and acted as advlser on Centra! European affairs to the Chiet of tbe French General Staf!. H e ls now .seconded trom the French Army to tbe Portuguese Hlgher Statf College. TblS dlssertatlon was publlshed In the "WORLD REVIEW," London, Nov. 1961.) • • • • Europe ls today Jlvlng under the constant menace of a new war, the outbreak ot whlch would appear to be only a question ot tíme. The catastropbe. can ba-ppen tomorrow, or In a year or two, or perhaps later. Tbere can be no doubt tbat In the past many great mistakes bave been made. Passlons have galned the upper hand over cool retlectlons. Only too often propaganda was tbe basls ot offlclal pollcy, wlth attractive slogans coverlng the actlons ot statesmen. In our Ume there ls no sufflclent differentatlon between Utopia and reality, party and State policy, journallsm and diplomacy. In May, 1951, the composltlon and pollcy of the National Commlttes, brougbt into exlstence by tbe USA, was the subject of a debate In tbe Brltlsh Parllament. ~1ajor Legge Bourke, M.P., sald: " I think there i• a very great danger, and we ought to face · i\, that thi• type of warfare - the cold war - will fall lnto the handa of those who were dlscredited in days gone by and who are di1credited now in the countries concerned. This must not be Just a refugee organization. There could be nothing more fata l to the Chri1tian and Western cause than for it to be thought in the countrles behind the Iron Curtain that all this propaganda ia being done to restore the old and discredited regimes. We must produce 1omethlng better than that." Wbereupon Mr. Kennetb Younger, Minister of State, gave the tollowing answer: " I think the Hon. Member la right when he sald we had to be on our· g'uard ·against allowing this thing to develop into an uncoordinated series of efforts by groups of discr edited refugees." - Hansard, Vol. 487, No. 106.) lt does not seem as yet as tbough the lt'ree European Movement had any deflnite target, hence the prevalllng confuslon. Talk about freedom and democracy does not constltute a real polltlcal program. These words !end themselves to lnterpretaUon s which vary wlth tbe wlshes or needs ot the speaker. But what are the political aims of the West? A rett.irn to the Versailles status quo or a United Europe ? In tbe last analysls, public oplnlon 1s only an artlficfar · produ<!t of propaganda. Tbe- enslaved peoples behlnd the Iron · CUrta!n Tfsten anxiously to wbat the West has to say to them, and lhelr publté' oplnlon ls naturally built upon what tbey hear most a.bout. Tberefore, wben W estern ·propaganda talks or the Vetsallles Order, tbls appeaťs to- be what lhe West wa:nts, wlth the Jnglcal effect thá.t Eutope woulď agaln revert to the Quarrelsome atmosphere which rharärt:er1zed ťhe �18 SLOVAKIA period between the two wars, and which was the main cause of the second one. In the first enthusiasm over being liberated from Bolshe• vism, anything would be accepted, but thlngs look diMerent when the first flush is over; and it is then that the difflculties of the past would appear once more. • • • In its traditional form (that is to say before 1918) Europe eon· slsted of three clearly-defined, geo-political parts: East, Centr11l, and West Europe. It was the Centre's important task to maintain tbe bal• ance between East and West. Tbis Centre h~s always acted as a bul· wark against inva.<,ions threatening from the East - Stav, Mongol or Turkish people. Even German antagonism against tbe West could not a lter tbe bistoric role role of Centra! Europe, altbough t h is fact does not seem to have been borne sufficiehtly in mind by t hose in whose power lt was to make political de cisions after the First and Second World Wars. The unity of the Danubian nations was dissolved in 1918. In 1945 Germany was compelled by her "unconditional s uri-ender" to withdraw from the European Concert, with the ľesult that the balance of power on the Continent was fiually destroyed. Thus Centra! Europe has ceased to exist as a factor of power-policy. Europe now consists of two geo-political parts only - East and West; and as the East has absorbed the gľeater portion of Centra! Europe, thus weakening the West, Europe's destiny now depends greatly on American help. Was the realization of tbis position which led to the Atlantic Pact an effort to restore with Amerlcas' assistance the equilibrium which s he could not achieve by herself? The consolidatlon of Centra! Europe, by which I mean the cre· ation of a strong centre in the heart of the Continent, remains one of the basic conditlons of European sta•b ility. It is a mistake to tmderestimate the real natlonal character of RU\Ssian pollcy, i.e., Panslav• ism. Thls !act could hardly be altered even by the complete destruction of Communism. Russia's daily increase in population is approximately 8,000, so that in 49 years, i.e., in the year 2,000, she will have some 500 million inhabitants, whereas, in comparison, the population of Western Europe is stationary. It is difficult to see how, uncler tbls enormous pressure from the East. Europe (England included) can continue to exist without the hard core of a consolldated centre. It would also be unwise to count too much on "pan-Europe." Tbe proceedings in Straisbourg have shown only too clearly how far we are from realizing the idea; to build upon it would be nothing less than to base Europe's political organization on somethlng which does not exist, and is not likely to clo so for a very long tíme. The Federaliza• tion of Europe cannot be achieved at one stroke, but only gradually, step by ste.p . It is necessary, first of all, to group together jnto Reglonal Federations those entltles which are economlcally and culturally COllllPlementary to each other, and already have s ome tradition ot common background. Such a grouping of several natlons, possesslng lclentlcal economic lnterests, geographical and cultural characterlstics, 1s a workable propositlon in the D anube Basin, whlch could thus become the core of crystalization in a progressive development of Centra] Europe. �SLOVAKIA 19 In the past, no great statesman ever que.stioned the need for unity of the Danu,be Basin as a primary condition of European stability. "The Austrian monarchy 1s a combination of ill-assorted States. Such a power is necessarily weak, but she is an adequate bulwark against the barbarians, and a necessary one. In the future the Habs· burg Empire will stand with its back towards Europe and its front to the East, thus protecting Western civilizat!on from the aggression of Russia." - (Talleyrand on October 17, 1805, to Napoleon, before the battle of Austerlltz). 'What sbould be put in tbat space in Europe wbicb is occupied by the Austrian State from Tyrol to tbe Bukovina? New formations in that area would be of a permanently revolutionary cbaracter." - (Bismark in 1868). "If Austria did not exist, s be would have t o be invented." (Palacky Frantisek, Czecb bistorian, in 1862, generally considered in llobemia as lhe "Father of the Czech natlon," but unfortunately less known in the West than T. G. Masa.ryk). " In America, as elsewhere, it was bard to convince people that it would be necessary to break up Austrla-Hungary. Austria was generally looked up as a counterpoise to Germany, as a necessary organization of small peoples and odds and ends of peoples, and as a safeguard against balkanization. I feared tbat we migbt acbieve notbing if tbe war ended quickly. lf it were protracted, we might bave more Ume for propaganda." - (Prof. T. G. Masa.ryk: "Tbe Making of a State," Alien and Unwin, London, 1929). Tbe centrifugal force of extreme nationalism destroyed in 1918 wbat was about to develop, not by brutal revolution by by peaceful evolutlon, into a great Centra! European Commonwealth. It destroyed tben wbat we would now so much like to build up aga.In, under mucb less favo'!'ruble circumstances. Tbe practical mlsery caused to •a ll peoples by this nationalism was mucb greater than t:he tbeoretlcal bappiness lt was supposed to give tbem. An enormous decadence bas overcome during tbe last thirty years, tbis once so civilized part of Europe. Tbe declsion to spllt up tbe unity of the Danublan nat!ons was neitber bumane nor progresslve. Tbe United Sta.les seems prepared to support the federalization of Centra! Europe, but at tbe same Ume we bave tbe impression that such important factors as tradition, common cultural standards, etc., are not gettlng tbe attent!on tbey deserve. Jf tbe various National Committees were formed in tbe hope that they would be able to proäuce something sensible, we sball bave to wa!t a long time. To recogn!ze them as governments would be tantamount to the recognition of tbe disorder brougbt into exlstence by tbe Versailles Treaty. A new Cen1.ral Europe cannot be created by a few fanatical nationalhsts, hut only by men wbo represent not only tbe lnt.erests of thelr own small tribes, hut wbo also regarcl the problem as a wbole from a supernational angle, and are no longer under the disturhing influence of their political pa.'\t. While I am clealing with the subject of Centra! Europe, I should like to add tbat it woulcl be a mlstake to set up a federatlon of that area on too big a scale. Large entitles, stretcbing from the Baltic t<' t he Black and Adria.tie Seas, coulcl harclly have the inner cobesion �20 SLOVAKIA which would be so necessary in a future Europe. lt would • be difficult to bring all the different nations inhabitlng this region under one common denom!nator into a federation with no real historic or economic background. There are reasons to believe that this idea !s proposed by. the Poles. Poland will have many difficult!es in the future with Germany on account of the Oder frontier. with the Balts over Vllna and with the U-krainians over East Galicia. These ambitions of some Polish exiles are not justif,ied historlcally, ethnographically or morally. As far ai, we in the Danube Basin are concerned, they only interest us to the extent that we do not wish to be drawn into the quarrels which would be una11oidable if the Danubian countries were to gp into a federatlon _,vjth · the · Pole!I.. As a matter of fact, tbe Danube Basin has very llttle in common wHh Poland either economically or culturally. That country lies north of the Carpathlans, and even during the Halbsburg monarcby the Polísh provinces led an almos.t isolated existence. · · There are other important reasons. A Centra! European Federation embracing Poland could hardly count on Austria also being a member. It is time that the West understood that Austrla, as fashioned in 1918, cannot remain independent for economic reasons. H, therefore, Austria were to rema!n on ber own, an Anschluss with Germany would sooner or later be inevitable. And lf the Germans get to Vlenna again, the wbole polltical order of the Danube Basin will be thrown to the winds and Germany's pressure on the whole South• east of Europe, especially the Balkan peninsula and Rumanla, wlll be inevitable. Such a development could eventually be a seriously disturblng factor in the cooperation between Germany and tbe West, especlally in Franco-German relations, a danger which can only be averted if Austrfa is made an !ntegral part of a Dannbe federation. THÉ PROBLEM OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA It is possible that Czecbs, Anstrians, Hungarians and Slovaks might come· to an underStanding amongst themselves on a reasonable basls, especially as for centuries they were · leá.ding· a common existence, but on·ty on conditlon that the Weat no -longer éling1 to the idea of the Czechoalovakian State. Czee.boslovakia does not fit !nto the- frame,~wk . of the Danublan Basin, no matter how much one may try. Even to create it, terrlto1,ies from al! the neighborlng nations had to be incorporated, with the result that In 193tl that ,country comprised: 7.1 millions Czechs, 3.0 mlllions Slovaks. 3.5 millions Germans, 0.8 millions Hnngarians, 0.4 mlllions Ukrainians, 0.2 millions Po,l(l&; total 15 millions. ·,And as ''from 1925 or thereaibouts, the Slovaks lived In latent ~ntagonism ·tówards the Czechs, it is hardly an exaggeratiton to say that 50 pe1•;~nt o'f Czechoslovakia's inhabitants were in opposltion to t.be State. 'Th'en, · again, there is the qulte unnatural geographical sbape of tha:t ·cotmtry. wbich stretches a-bout 700 miles rlght across the Danub!-a-n Basin and !s at places only 70 miles wide. In the meantime, in 1946, the 3.5 mllllons Sudeten Germans. who lived in Bohemia slnce the thirteenth century and at the Versailles conference had valnly pleaded tor selt-determination, were rejected in a most lnhuman fashion. It ls difficult to see how ~orne n!ne mil• lion refugees. who are at present in Western Germany. will be aseimil· �SLPVAKIA 21 ated within the next few decades, whilst their former countries, tµe Sudetenlan d and East Prussia demain practically deserted. C.zechoslovakia was the artiflclal product of a peace conference a child of propaganda - whilst Austria and Hungary were her victims. Through the partition of the Danube Monarchy in 1918, Czechoslovakla lnherited 65 per cent of the industries which formerly belonged to an Empire of 54 m!llions and which had been mosUy founded with Vlennese capltal. It was principally to this favorable economic position that thls new State owed its reputation. On the other hand, does not this fact prove tbat the Ozech provinces of the former Danublan E mpire were by no means so much exploited by Vienna as was maintained at the Versa!lles Conference? To talk about the reatoratlon of Czechoslovakia nowadaya ia plairi nonsense. The Slovaks who at all times were opposed to Prague, will never forget that their rightly or wrongly revered leader, Msgr. Tiso, was condemned by a Czechoslovakian Court and that Benes, in spite of the intervention of the Vatica,,, confirmed his death sentence. By so doing, Benes really signed the death warrant of the Czechosľovak Republic. This action created an unbridgeable gulf between Slov.Íks· and Czechs. The few Slovak emigranta wandering about the Weit, advocating the idea of a Czechoslovak State, no not represent the free will of the Slovak people, who are today at least to the extent of 80 per cent fanatically anti-Czech. And without the Slovaks there can be· no Czechoslovakia. •.. , The · fact that propaganda made Masaryk play the role of a l)r0· phet does not alter ailyt:hing. We should not forget· that Czechos lova• kla durlng ber whole existence was hut an internatnonal calamity, and that any policy based on false hlstorical foundations can only bring_ new misfortunes. Why, therefore, cllng to ideas wbich in the past have been proved erroneous. which were one or the maln causes of World War II, and the practical exlstence of wbich only lasted. for lwenty years, a mere moment in the life of nations? It remalns to be seen whether the \Vest inten<ls to support the arnbitlons of a few emigrants, who for years have lost contact with their own natlons and do not ·reptesent a·n ytbing but tbem.selves. However that may be, -""~e sbould no t forget that in Centra! Europe there are only eight million Czechs, a distinct minority compared with seven million Austrians. elght million Hungarians and three million Slov::iks. · lt is rather surprising that free European ·propaganda is· still eulo. gizing Masaryk. This· must strike a ll Austrians, Hungarians, and SIÔ~vaks as béing very strange. Of course, for many Czech politicians íť is easier to create 'political capital out of the Masaryk legend than to take up an entirely new line. Would it, however, not be adviaab le discreetly to do away with thls myth and not dtipe.n d, for propa11anda purposes, on names which before history bear the ht-avy responsibility of disrupting the unity of the Danube peoples'! • • • The s olution of the Danube problem ánd, In a broader sense. tbat of Centra! Eurore. lie!I ln a correct blending of the various peoples within a Fecleration. Only thu!I C'an the Slav peoples of Centra! Europe be prevented from again falUng viC'tim~ to Pans lavist ideology, ancl the Austrians and H ungarlans to that of Pan-Germa.n-i sm. Such a policy alone can restore the interna! equlllbrlum in the Danube Basin an cl �22 SLOVAKIA convert it once more into a constructive factor in European polltics. From a practical point of view the1-e appears to be only one possibillty of establishing a Centra) European Federation, and that would be to group together the countries Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, Hungary, Slovakla into a sort of Danubian Switzerland. For this purpose, Czechoslovakia would first bave to be split up into ber historical, i.e.. natural parts. Bohemia and Moravia on one side, Slovakia on the other. We can only repeat that neither Austria nor Hungary wlll res'ign itself indefinitely to the existence of C1.echoslovakia, to wbich even the Slovaks are opposed. The position would be dififerent in the case of Bohemia - Moravia being separated from Slovakia. Sucb a Federation would consist of four autonomous coun tries: Austria, Bobemia-Moravla, Hungary and ,sJovakia. Tbe presence of the Czechs and Slovaks is a guarantee tbat tbe Federatlon could not turn proGerman; that of the Austrians and Hungarians that she cannot become pro-iR-ussian. Of course, even the constitution of such a polltical organlzatlon would prove to bave its difficul-ties. The Allied powers would have to invest Austria with a more important status than what she has held so far. In spite of the occupat!on, Austria is still the only remaining free Danubian country, and the development or Vienna could have a great influence on the future shaping of the whole Danube Basin. For instance, there are even today half as many Czechs living in Vienna as in Prague, and they are the trne bearers of the tradition which, until not very long ago, has linked Bohemia wlth Austria. Austria is today one of the most important advanced posts or tbe West in Centra! Europe. She wlll only be able to carry on the fight agaínst Bolshevism if the world is willíng to offer her a more just deal tban that to which she has been condemned by the Versam es Treaty. Instead of putting too much faith in a few desperate emigrants, would it not be better for the Western Powers to make Vienna the basis of their future Danube policy? The Czech and Slovak problems ought to be dealt with separately. The oft-repeated argument, that Czechoslovkia's partition into her natural components would cause an even greater dislocation in the Danube Basin fails to convince, if one realizes that such a partition is the essential prerequisite of the creation of a large political entity. The restoration of the unity of the Danube Basin does not hlnder the eventual Federation of the whoie of Europe; on the contrary, it can make it only easier. From whichever angle one regards the problem, the establishment of a Danube Federation appears to be the first constructive step to be taken in the future political reorganization of Centra! Europe. Perhaps it may appear stran~e that all tbis should have been wrltten by a Czech. However, a political action can only be judgoo by its results, and these generally only appear durlng the lifetime of the next gen1:!ľation. I! regarded in thls llght, lt !s clear that Masaryk's "liberatlon" Jed to the " balkanizat!on" of Centra.) Europe, and that wha.t the Versailles Treaty has created wa<i lncomparably worse than what had existed before. One can say with a clear conscience: only bad Czechs can be Czechoslovakians. � SLOVAKIA 17 THE FEDERATION OF THE DANUBE Lieut. Colonel F. O. Miksche {Colonel Mlksche, fairly well known as a polltico-strate g!c writer, was appolnted Czech Mllltary Attache In Paris after the war. He was recaJled to Czecho-Slova kla by tbe Communists, but soon a!terward.8 escaped and acted as advlser on Centra! European affairs to the Chiet of tbe French General Staf!. H e ls now .seconded trom the French Army to tbe Portuguese Hlgher Statf College. TblS dlssertatlon was publlshed In the "WORLD REVIEW," London, Nov. 1961.) • • • • Europe ls today Jlvlng under the constant menace of a new war, the outbreak ot whlch would appear to be only a question ot tíme. The catastropbe. can ba-ppen tomorrow, or In a year or two, or perhaps later. Tbere can be no doubt tbat In the past many great mistakes bave been made. Passlons have galned the upper hand over cool retlectlons. Only too often propaganda was tbe basls ot offlclal pollcy, wlth attractive slogans coverlng the actlons ot statesmen. In our Ume there ls no sufflclent differentatlon between Utopia and reality, party and State policy, journallsm and diplomacy. In May, 1951, the composltlon and pollcy of the National Commlttes, brougbt into exlstence by tbe USA, was the subject of a debate In tbe Brltlsh Parllament. ~1ajor Legge Bourke, M.P., sald: " I think there i• a very great danger, and we ought to face · i\, that thi• type of warfare - the cold war - will fall lnto the handa of those who were dlscredited in days gone by and who are di1credited now in the countries concerned. This must not be Just a refugee organization. There could be nothing more fata l to the Chri1tian and Western cause than for it to be thought in the countrles behind the Iron Curtain that all this propaganda ia being done to restore the old and discredited regimes. We must produce 1omethlng better than that." Wbereupon Mr. Kennetb Younger, Minister of State, gave the tollowing answer: " I think the Hon. Member la right when he sald we had to be on our· g'uard ·against allowing this thing to develop into an uncoordinated series of efforts by groups of discr edited refugees." - Hansard, Vol. 487, No. 106.) lt does not seem as yet as tbough the lt'ree European Movement had any deflnite target, hence the prevalllng confuslon. Talk about freedom and democracy does not constltute a real polltlcal program. These words !end themselves to lnterpretaUon s which vary wlth tbe wlshes or needs ot the speaker. But what are the political aims of the West? A rett.irn to the Versailles status quo or a United Europe ? In tbe last analysls, public oplnlon 1s only an artlficfar · produ<!t of propaganda. Tbe- enslaved peoples behlnd the Iron · CUrta!n Tfsten anxiously to wbat the West has to say to them, and lhelr publté' oplnlon ls naturally built upon what tbey hear most a.bout. Tberefore, wben W estern ·propaganda talks or the Vetsallles Order, tbls appeaťs to- be what lhe West wa:nts, wlth the Jnglcal effect thá.t Eutope woulď agaln revert to the Quarrelsome atmosphere which rharärt:er1zed ťhe �18 SLOVAKIA period between the two wars, and which was the main cause of the second one. In the first enthusiasm over being liberated from Bolshe• vism, anything would be accepted, but thlngs look diMerent when the first flush is over; and it is then that the difflculties of the past would appear once more. • • • In its traditional form (that is to say before 1918) Europe eon· slsted of three clearly-defined, geo-political parts: East, Centr11l, and West Europe. It was the Centre's important task to maintain tbe bal• ance between East and West. Tbis Centre h~s always acted as a bul· wark against inva.<,ions threatening from the East - Stav, Mongol or Turkish people. Even German antagonism against tbe West could not a lter tbe bistoric role role of Centra! Europe, altbough t h is fact does not seem to have been borne sufficiehtly in mind by t hose in whose power lt was to make political de cisions after the First and Second World Wars. The unity of the Danubian nations was dissolved in 1918. In 1945 Germany was compelled by her "unconditional s uri-ender" to withdraw from the European Concert, with the ľesult that the balance of power on the Continent was fiually destroyed. Thus Centra! Europe has ceased to exist as a factor of power-policy. Europe now consists of two geo-political parts only - East and West; and as the East has absorbed the gľeater portion of Centra! Europe, thus weakening the West, Europe's destiny now depends greatly on American help. Was the realization of tbis position which led to the Atlantic Pact an effort to restore with Amerlcas' assistance the equilibrium which s he could not achieve by herself? The consolidatlon of Centra! Europe, by which I mean the cre· ation of a strong centre in the heart of the Continent, remains one of the basic conditlons of European sta•b ility. It is a mistake to tmderestimate the real natlonal character of RU\Ssian pollcy, i.e., Panslav• ism. Thls !act could hardly be altered even by the complete destruction of Communism. Russia's daily increase in population is approximately 8,000, so that in 49 years, i.e., in the year 2,000, she will have some 500 million inhabitants, whereas, in comparison, the population of Western Europe is stationary. It is difficult to see how, uncler tbls enormous pressure from the East. Europe (England included) can continue to exist without the hard core of a consolldated centre. It would also be unwise to count too much on "pan-Europe." Tbe proceedings in Straisbourg have shown only too clearly how far we are from realizing the idea; to build upon it would be nothing less than to base Europe's political organization on somethlng which does not exist, and is not likely to clo so for a very long tíme. The Federaliza• tion of Europe cannot be achieved at one stroke, but only gradually, step by ste.p . It is necessary, first of all, to group together jnto Reglonal Federations those entltles which are economlcally and culturally COllllPlementary to each other, and already have s ome tradition ot common background. Such a grouping of several natlons, possesslng lclentlcal economic lnterests, geographical and cultural characterlstics, 1s a workable propositlon in the D anube Basin, whlch could thus become the core of crystalization in a progressive development of Centra] Europe. �SLOVAKIA 19 In the past, no great statesman ever que.stioned the need for unity of the Danu,be Basin as a primary condition of European stability. "The Austrian monarchy 1s a combination of ill-assorted States. Such a power is necessarily weak, but she is an adequate bulwark against the barbarians, and a necessary one. In the future the Habs· burg Empire will stand with its back towards Europe and its front to the East, thus protecting Western civilizat!on from the aggression of Russia." - (Talleyrand on October 17, 1805, to Napoleon, before the battle of Austerlltz). 'What sbould be put in tbat space in Europe wbicb is occupied by the Austrian State from Tyrol to tbe Bukovina? New formations in that area would be of a permanently revolutionary cbaracter." - (Bismark in 1868). "If Austria did not exist, s be would have t o be invented." (Palacky Frantisek, Czecb bistorian, in 1862, generally considered in llobemia as lhe "Father of the Czech natlon," but unfortunately less known in the West than T. G. Masa.ryk). " In America, as elsewhere, it was bard to convince people that it would be necessary to break up Austrla-Hungary. Austria was generally looked up as a counterpoise to Germany, as a necessary organization of small peoples and odds and ends of peoples, and as a safeguard against balkanization. I feared tbat we migbt acbieve notbing if tbe war ended quickly. lf it were protracted, we might bave more Ume for propaganda." - (Prof. T. G. Masa.ryk: "Tbe Making of a State," Alien and Unwin, London, 1929). Tbe centrifugal force of extreme nationalism destroyed in 1918 wbat was about to develop, not by brutal revolution by by peaceful evolutlon, into a great Centra! European Commonwealth. It destroyed tben wbat we would now so much like to build up aga.In, under mucb less favo'!'ruble circumstances. Tbe practical mlsery caused to •a ll peoples by this nationalism was mucb greater than t:he tbeoretlcal bappiness lt was supposed to give tbem. An enormous decadence bas overcome during tbe last thirty years, tbis once so civilized part of Europe. Tbe declsion to spllt up tbe unity of the Danublan nat!ons was neitber bumane nor progresslve. Tbe United Sta.les seems prepared to support the federalization of Centra! Europe, but at tbe same Ume we bave tbe impression that such important factors as tradition, common cultural standards, etc., are not gettlng tbe attent!on tbey deserve. Jf tbe various National Committees were formed in tbe hope that they would be able to proäuce something sensible, we sball bave to wa!t a long time. To recogn!ze them as governments would be tantamount to the recognition of tbe disorder brougbt into exlstence by tbe Versailles Treaty. A new Cen1.ral Europe cannot be created by a few fanatical nationalhsts, hut only by men wbo represent not only tbe lnt.erests of thelr own small tribes, hut wbo also regarcl the problem as a wbole from a supernational angle, and are no longer under the disturhing influence of their political pa.'\t. While I am clealing with the subject of Centra! Europe, I should like to add tbat it woulcl be a mlstake to set up a federatlon of that area on too big a scale. Large entitles, stretcbing from the Baltic t<' t he Black and Adria.tie Seas, coulcl harclly have the inner cobesion �20 SLOVAKIA which would be so necessary in a future Europe. lt would • be difficult to bring all the different nations inhabitlng this region under one common denom!nator into a federation with no real historic or economic background. There are reasons to believe that this idea !s proposed by. the Poles. Poland will have many difficult!es in the future with Germany on account of the Oder frontier. with the Balts over Vllna and with the U-krainians over East Galicia. These ambitions of some Polish exiles are not justif,ied historlcally, ethnographically or morally. As far ai, we in the Danube Basin are concerned, they only interest us to the extent that we do not wish to be drawn into the quarrels which would be una11oidable if the Danubian countries were to gp into a federatlon _,vjth · the · Pole!I.. As a matter of fact, tbe Danube Basin has very llttle in common wHh Poland either economically or culturally. That country lies north of the Carpathlans, and even during the Halbsburg monarcby the Polísh provinces led an almos.t isolated existence. · · There are other important reasons. A Centra! European Federation embracing Poland could hardly count on Austria also being a member. It is time that the West understood that Austrla, as fashioned in 1918, cannot remain independent for economic reasons. H, therefore, Austria were to rema!n on ber own, an Anschluss with Germany would sooner or later be inevitable. And lf the Germans get to Vlenna again, the wbole polltical order of the Danube Basin will be thrown to the winds and Germany's pressure on the whole South• east of Europe, especially the Balkan peninsula and Rumanla, wlll be inevitable. Such a development could eventually be a seriously disturblng factor in the cooperation between Germany and tbe West, especlally in Franco-German relations, a danger which can only be averted if Austrfa is made an !ntegral part of a Dannbe federation. THÉ PROBLEM OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA It is possible that Czecbs, Anstrians, Hungarians and Slovaks might come· to an underStanding amongst themselves on a reasonable basls, especially as for centuries they were · leá.ding· a common existence, but on·ty on conditlon that the Weat no -longer éling1 to the idea of the Czechoalovakian State. Czee.boslovakia does not fit !nto the- frame,~wk . of the Danublan Basin, no matter how much one may try. Even to create it, terrlto1,ies from al! the neighborlng nations had to be incorporated, with the result that In 193tl that ,country comprised: 7.1 millions Czechs, 3.0 mlllions Slovaks. 3.5 millions Germans, 0.8 millions Hnngarians, 0.4 mlllions Ukrainians, 0.2 millions Po,l(l&; total 15 millions. ·,And as ''from 1925 or thereaibouts, the Slovaks lived In latent ~ntagonism ·tówards the Czechs, it is hardly an exaggeratiton to say that 50 pe1•;~nt o'f Czechoslovakia's inhabitants were in opposltion to t.be State. 'Th'en, · again, there is the qulte unnatural geographical sbape of tha:t ·cotmtry. wbich stretches a-bout 700 miles rlght across the Danub!-a-n Basin and !s at places only 70 miles wide. In the meantime, in 1946, the 3.5 mllllons Sudeten Germans. who lived in Bohemia slnce the thirteenth century and at the Versailles conference had valnly pleaded tor selt-determination, were rejected in a most lnhuman fashion. It ls difficult to see how ~orne n!ne mil• lion refugees. who are at present in Western Germany. will be aseimil· �SLPVAKIA 21 ated within the next few decades, whilst their former countries, tµe Sudetenlan d and East Prussia demain practically deserted. C.zechoslovakia was the artiflclal product of a peace conference a child of propaganda - whilst Austria and Hungary were her victims. Through the partition of the Danube Monarchy in 1918, Czechoslovakla lnherited 65 per cent of the industries which formerly belonged to an Empire of 54 m!llions and which had been mosUy founded with Vlennese capltal. It was principally to this favorable economic position that thls new State owed its reputation. On the other hand, does not this fact prove tbat the Ozech provinces of the former Danublan E mpire were by no means so much exploited by Vienna as was maintained at the Versa!lles Conference? To talk about the reatoratlon of Czechoslovakia nowadaya ia plairi nonsense. The Slovaks who at all times were opposed to Prague, will never forget that their rightly or wrongly revered leader, Msgr. Tiso, was condemned by a Czechoslovakian Court and that Benes, in spite of the intervention of the Vatica,,, confirmed his death sentence. By so doing, Benes really signed the death warrant of the Czechosľovak Republic. This action created an unbridgeable gulf between Slov.Íks· and Czechs. The few Slovak emigranta wandering about the Weit, advocating the idea of a Czechoslovak State, no not represent the free will of the Slovak people, who are today at least to the extent of 80 per cent fanatically anti-Czech. And without the Slovaks there can be· no Czechoslovakia. •.. , The · fact that propaganda made Masaryk play the role of a l)r0· phet does not alter ailyt:hing. We should not forget· that Czechos lova• kla durlng ber whole existence was hut an internatnonal calamity, and that any policy based on false hlstorical foundations can only bring_ new misfortunes. Why, therefore, cllng to ideas wbich in the past have been proved erroneous. which were one or the maln causes of World War II, and the practical exlstence of wbich only lasted. for lwenty years, a mere moment in the life of nations? It remalns to be seen whether the \Vest inten<ls to support the arnbitlons of a few emigrants, who for years have lost contact with their own natlons and do not ·reptesent a·n ytbing but tbem.selves. However that may be, -""~e sbould no t forget that in Centra! Europe there are only eight million Czechs, a distinct minority compared with seven million Austrians. elght million Hungarians and three million Slov::iks. · lt is rather surprising that free European ·propaganda is· still eulo. gizing Masaryk. This· must strike a ll Austrians, Hungarians, and SIÔ~vaks as béing very strange. Of course, for many Czech politicians íť is easier to create 'political capital out of the Masaryk legend than to take up an entirely new line. Would it, however, not be adviaab le discreetly to do away with thls myth and not dtipe.n d, for propa11anda purposes, on names which before history bear the ht-avy responsibility of disrupting the unity of the Danube peoples'! • • • The s olution of the Danube problem ánd, In a broader sense. tbat of Centra! Eurore. lie!I ln a correct blending of the various peoples within a Fecleration. Only thu!I C'an the Slav peoples of Centra! Europe be prevented from again falUng viC'tim~ to Pans lavist ideology, ancl the Austrians and H ungarlans to that of Pan-Germa.n-i sm. Such a policy alone can restore the interna! equlllbrlum in the Danube Basin an cl �22 SLOVAKIA convert it once more into a constructive factor in European polltics. From a practical point of view the1-e appears to be only one possibillty of establishing a Centra) European Federation, and that would be to group together the countries Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, Hungary, Slovakla into a sort of Danubian Switzerland. For this purpose, Czechoslovakia would first bave to be split up into ber historical, i.e.. natural parts. Bohemia and Moravia on one side, Slovakia on the other. We can only repeat that neither Austria nor Hungary wlll res'ign itself indefinitely to the existence of C1.echoslovakia, to wbich even the Slovaks are opposed. The position would be dififerent in the case of Bohemia - Moravia being separated from Slovakia. Sucb a Federation would consist of four autonomous coun tries: Austria, Bobemia-Moravla, Hungary and ,sJovakia. Tbe presence of the Czechs and Slovaks is a guarantee tbat tbe Federatlon could not turn proGerman; that of the Austrians and Hungarians that she cannot become pro-iR-ussian. Of course, even the constitution of such a polltical organlzatlon would prove to bave its difficul-ties. The Allied powers would have to invest Austria with a more important status than what she has held so far. In spite of the occupat!on, Austria is still the only remaining free Danubian country, and the development or Vienna could have a great influence on the future shaping of the whole Danube Basin. For instance, there are even today half as many Czechs living in Vienna as in Prague, and they are the trne bearers of the tradition which, until not very long ago, has linked Bohemia wlth Austria. Austria is today one of the most important advanced posts or tbe West in Centra! Europe. She wlll only be able to carry on the fight agaínst Bolshevism if the world is willíng to offer her a more just deal tban that to which she has been condemned by the Versam es Treaty. Instead of putting too much faith in a few desperate emigrants, would it not be better for the Western Powers to make Vienna the basis of their future Danube policy? The Czech and Slovak problems ought to be dealt with separately. The oft-repeated argument, that Czechoslovkia's partition into her natural components would cause an even greater dislocation in the Danube Basin fails to convince, if one realizes that such a partition is the essential prerequisite of the creation of a large political entity. The restoration of the unity of the Danube Basin does not hlnder the eventual Federation of the whoie of Europe; on the contrary, it can make it only easier. From whichever angle one regards the problem, the establishment of a Danube Federation appears to be the first constructive step to be taken in the future political reorganization of Centra! Europe. Perhaps it may appear stran~e that all tbis should have been wrltten by a Czech. However, a political action can only be judgoo by its results, and these generally only appear durlng the lifetime of the next gen1:!ľation. I! regarded in thls llght, lt !s clear that Masaryk's "liberatlon" Jed to the " balkanizat!on" of Centra.) Europe, and that wha.t the Versailles Treaty has created wa<i lncomparably worse than what had existed before. One can say with a clear conscience: only bad Czechs can be Czechoslovakians. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 17 THE FEDERATION OF THE DANUBE Lieut. Colonel F. O. Miksche {Colonel Mlksche, fairly well known as a polltico-strate g!c writer, was appolnted Czech Mllltary Attache In Paris after the war. He was recaJled to Czecho-Slova kla by tbe Communists, but soon a!terward.8 escaped and acted as advlser on Centra! European affairs to the Chiet of tbe French General Staf!. H e ls now .seconded trom the French Army to tbe Portuguese Hlgher Statf College. TblS dlssertatlon was publlshed In the "WORLD REVIEW," London, Nov. 1961.) • • • • Europe ls today Jlvlng under the constant menace of a new war, the outbreak ot whlch would appear to be only a question ot tíme. The catastropbe. can ba-ppen tomorrow, or In a year or two, or perhaps later. Tbere can be no doubt tbat In the past many great mistakes bave been made. Passlons have galned the upper hand over cool retlectlons. Only too often propaganda was tbe basls ot offlclal pollcy, wlth attractive slogans coverlng the actlons ot statesmen. In our Ume there ls no sufflclent differentatlon between Utopia and reality, party and State policy, journallsm and diplomacy. In May, 1951, the composltlon and pollcy of the National Commlttes, brougbt into exlstence by tbe USA, was the subject of a debate In tbe Brltlsh Parllament. ~1ajor Legge Bourke, M.P., sald: " I think there i• a very great danger, and we ought to face · i\, that thi• type of warfare - the cold war - will fall lnto the handa of those who were dlscredited in days gone by and who are di1credited now in the countries concerned. This must not be Just a refugee organization. There could be nothing more fata l to the Chri1tian and Western cause than for it to be thought in the countrles behind the Iron Curtain that all this propaganda ia being done to restore the old and discredited regimes. We must produce 1omethlng better than that." Wbereupon Mr. Kennetb Younger, Minister of State, gave the tollowing answer: " I think the Hon. Member la right when he sald we had to be on our· g'uard ·against allowing this thing to develop into an uncoordinated series of efforts by groups of discr edited refugees." - Hansard, Vol. 487, No. 106.) lt does not seem as yet as tbough the lt'ree European Movement had any deflnite target, hence the prevalllng confuslon. Talk about freedom and democracy does not constltute a real polltlcal program. These words !end themselves to lnterpretaUon s which vary wlth tbe wlshes or needs ot the speaker. But what are the political aims of the West? A rett.irn to the Versailles status quo or a United Europe ? In tbe last analysls, public oplnlon 1s only an artlficfar · produ<!t of propaganda. Tbe- enslaved peoples behlnd the Iron · CUrta!n Tfsten anxiously to wbat the West has to say to them, and lhelr publté' oplnlon ls naturally built upon what tbey hear most a.bout. Tberefore, wben W estern ·propaganda talks or the Vetsallles Order, tbls appeaťs to- be what lhe West wa:nts, wlth the Jnglcal effect thá.t Eutope woulď agaln revert to the Quarrelsome atmosphere which rharärt:er1zed ťhe 18 SLOVAKIA period between the two wars, and which was the main cause of the second one. In the first enthusiasm over being liberated from Bolshe• vism, anything would be accepted, but thlngs look diMerent when the first flush is over; and it is then that the difflculties of the past would appear once more. • • • In its traditional form (that is to say before 1918) Europe eon· slsted of three clearly-defined, geo-political parts: East, Centr11l, and West Europe. It was the Centre's important task to maintain tbe bal• ance between East and West. Tbis Centre h~s always acted as a bul· wark against inva.<,ions threatening from the East - Stav, Mongol or Turkish people. Even German antagonism against tbe West could not a lter tbe bistoric role role of Centra! Europe, altbough t h is fact does not seem to have been borne sufficiehtly in mind by t hose in whose power lt was to make political de cisions after the First and Second World Wars. The unity of the Danubian nations was dissolved in 1918. In 1945 Germany was compelled by her "unconditional s uri-ender" to withdraw from the European Concert, with the ľesult that the balance of power on the Continent was fiually destroyed. Thus Centra! Europe has ceased to exist as a factor of power-policy. Europe now consists of two geo-political parts only - East and West; and as the East has absorbed the gľeater portion of Centra! Europe, thus weakening the West, Europe's destiny now depends greatly on American help. Was the realization of tbis position which led to the Atlantic Pact an effort to restore with Amerlcas' assistance the equilibrium which s he could not achieve by herself? The consolidatlon of Centra! Europe, by which I mean the cre· ation of a strong centre in the heart of the Continent, remains one of the basic conditlons of European sta•b ility. It is a mistake to tmderestimate the real natlonal character of RU\Ssian pollcy, i.e., Panslav• ism. Thls !act could hardly be altered even by the complete destruction of Communism. Russia's daily increase in population is approximately 8,000, so that in 49 years, i.e., in the year 2,000, she will have some 500 million inhabitants, whereas, in comparison, the population of Western Europe is stationary. It is difficult to see how, uncler tbls enormous pressure from the East. Europe (England included) can continue to exist without the hard core of a consolldated centre. It would also be unwise to count too much on "pan-Europe." Tbe proceedings in Straisbourg have shown only too clearly how far we are from realizing the idea; to build upon it would be nothing less than to base Europe's political organization on somethlng which does not exist, and is not likely to clo so for a very long tíme. The Federaliza• tion of Europe cannot be achieved at one stroke, but only gradually, step by ste.p . It is necessary, first of all, to group together jnto Reglonal Federations those entltles which are economlcally and culturally COllllPlementary to each other, and already have s ome tradition ot common background. Such a grouping of several natlons, possesslng lclentlcal economic lnterests, geographical and cultural characterlstics, 1s a workable propositlon in the D anube Basin, whlch could thus become the core of crystalization in a progressive development of Centra] Europe. SLOVAKIA 19 In the past, no great statesman ever que.stioned the need for unity of the Danu,be Basin as a primary condition of European stability. "The Austrian monarchy 1s a combination of ill-assorted States. Such a power is necessarily weak, but she is an adequate bulwark against the barbarians, and a necessary one. In the future the Habs· burg Empire will stand with its back towards Europe and its front to the East, thus protecting Western civilizat!on from the aggression of Russia." - (Talleyrand on October 17, 1805, to Napoleon, before the battle of Austerlltz). 'What sbould be put in tbat space in Europe wbicb is occupied by the Austrian State from Tyrol to tbe Bukovina? New formations in that area would be of a permanently revolutionary cbaracter." - (Bismark in 1868). "If Austria did not exist, s be would have t o be invented." (Palacky Frantisek, Czecb bistorian, in 1862, generally considered in llobemia as lhe "Father of the Czech natlon," but unfortunately less known in the West than T. G. Masa.ryk). " In America, as elsewhere, it was bard to convince people that it would be necessary to break up Austrla-Hungary. Austria was generally looked up as a counterpoise to Germany, as a necessary organization of small peoples and odds and ends of peoples, and as a safeguard against balkanization. I feared tbat we migbt acbieve notbing if tbe war ended quickly. lf it were protracted, we might bave more Ume for propaganda." - (Prof. T. G. Masa.ryk: "Tbe Making of a State," Alien and Unwin, London, 1929). Tbe centrifugal force of extreme nationalism destroyed in 1918 wbat was about to develop, not by brutal revolution by by peaceful evolutlon, into a great Centra! European Commonwealth. It destroyed tben wbat we would now so much like to build up aga.In, under mucb less favo'!'ruble circumstances. Tbe practical mlsery caused to •a ll peoples by this nationalism was mucb greater than t:he tbeoretlcal bappiness lt was supposed to give tbem. An enormous decadence bas overcome during tbe last thirty years, tbis once so civilized part of Europe. Tbe declsion to spllt up tbe unity of the Danublan nat!ons was neitber bumane nor progresslve. Tbe United Sta.les seems prepared to support the federalization of Centra! Europe, but at tbe same Ume we bave tbe impression that such important factors as tradition, common cultural standards, etc., are not gettlng tbe attent!on tbey deserve. Jf tbe various National Committees were formed in tbe hope that they would be able to proäuce something sensible, we sball bave to wa!t a long time. To recogn!ze them as governments would be tantamount to the recognition of tbe disorder brougbt into exlstence by tbe Versailles Treaty. A new Cen1.ral Europe cannot be created by a few fanatical nationalhsts, hut only by men wbo represent not only tbe lnt.erests of thelr own small tribes, hut wbo also regarcl the problem as a wbole from a supernational angle, and are no longer under the disturhing influence of their political pa.'\t. While I am clealing with the subject of Centra! Europe, I should like to add tbat it woulcl be a mlstake to set up a federatlon of that area on too big a scale. Large entitles, stretcbing from the Baltic t<' t he Black and Adria.tie Seas, coulcl harclly have the inner cobesion 20 SLOVAKIA which would be so necessary in a future Europe. lt would • be difficult to bring all the different nations inhabitlng this region under one common denom!nator into a federation with no real historic or economic background. There are reasons to believe that this idea !s proposed by. the Poles. Poland will have many difficult!es in the future with Germany on account of the Oder frontier. with the Balts over Vllna and with the U-krainians over East Galicia. These ambitions of some Polish exiles are not justif,ied historlcally, ethnographically or morally. As far ai, we in the Danube Basin are concerned, they only interest us to the extent that we do not wish to be drawn into the quarrels which would be una11oidable if the Danubian countries were to gp into a federatlon _,vjth · the · Pole!I.. As a matter of fact, tbe Danube Basin has very llttle in common wHh Poland either economically or culturally. That country lies north of the Carpathlans, and even during the Halbsburg monarcby the Polísh provinces led an almos.t isolated existence. · · There are other important reasons. A Centra! European Federation embracing Poland could hardly count on Austria also being a member. It is time that the West understood that Austrla, as fashioned in 1918, cannot remain independent for economic reasons. H, therefore, Austria were to rema!n on ber own, an Anschluss with Germany would sooner or later be inevitable. And lf the Germans get to Vlenna again, the wbole polltical order of the Danube Basin will be thrown to the winds and Germany's pressure on the whole South• east of Europe, especially the Balkan peninsula and Rumanla, wlll be inevitable. Such a development could eventually be a seriously disturblng factor in the cooperation between Germany and tbe West, especlally in Franco-German relations, a danger which can only be averted if Austrfa is made an !ntegral part of a Dannbe federation. THÉ PROBLEM OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA It is possible that Czecbs, Anstrians, Hungarians and Slovaks might come· to an underStanding amongst themselves on a reasonable basls, especially as for centuries they were · leá.ding· a common existence, but on·ty on conditlon that the Weat no -longer éling1 to the idea of the Czechoalovakian State. Czee.boslovakia does not fit !nto the- frame,~wk . of the Danublan Basin, no matter how much one may try. Even to create it, terrlto1,ies from al! the neighborlng nations had to be incorporated, with the result that In 193tl that ,country comprised: 7.1 millions Czechs, 3.0 mlllions Slovaks. 3.5 millions Germans, 0.8 millions Hnngarians, 0.4 mlllions Ukrainians, 0.2 millions Po,l(l&; total 15 millions. ·,And as ''from 1925 or thereaibouts, the Slovaks lived In latent ~ntagonism ·tówards the Czechs, it is hardly an exaggeratiton to say that 50 pe1•;~nt o'f Czechoslovakia's inhabitants were in opposltion to t.be State. 'Th'en, · again, there is the qulte unnatural geographical sbape of tha:t ·cotmtry. wbich stretches a-bout 700 miles rlght across the Danub!-a-n Basin and !s at places only 70 miles wide. In the meantime, in 1946, the 3.5 mllllons Sudeten Germans. who lived in Bohemia slnce the thirteenth century and at the Versailles conference had valnly pleaded tor selt-determination, were rejected in a most lnhuman fashion. It ls difficult to see how ~orne n!ne mil• lion refugees. who are at present in Western Germany. will be aseimil· SLPVAKIA 21 ated within the next few decades, whilst their former countries, tµe Sudetenlan d and East Prussia demain practically deserted. C.zechoslovakia was the artiflclal product of a peace conference a child of propaganda - whilst Austria and Hungary were her victims. Through the partition of the Danube Monarchy in 1918, Czechoslovakla lnherited 65 per cent of the industries which formerly belonged to an Empire of 54 m!llions and which had been mosUy founded with Vlennese capltal. It was principally to this favorable economic position that thls new State owed its reputation. On the other hand, does not this fact prove tbat the Ozech provinces of the former Danublan E mpire were by no means so much exploited by Vienna as was maintained at the Versa!lles Conference? To talk about the reatoratlon of Czechoslovakia nowadaya ia plairi nonsense. The Slovaks who at all times were opposed to Prague, will never forget that their rightly or wrongly revered leader, Msgr. Tiso, was condemned by a Czechoslovakian Court and that Benes, in spite of the intervention of the Vatica,,, confirmed his death sentence. By so doing, Benes really signed the death warrant of the Czechosľovak Republic. This action created an unbridgeable gulf between Slov.Íks· and Czechs. The few Slovak emigranta wandering about the Weit, advocating the idea of a Czechoslovak State, no not represent the free will of the Slovak people, who are today at least to the extent of 80 per cent fanatically anti-Czech. And without the Slovaks there can be· no Czechoslovakia. •.. , The · fact that propaganda made Masaryk play the role of a l)r0· phet does not alter ailyt:hing. We should not forget· that Czechos lova• kla durlng ber whole existence was hut an internatnonal calamity, and that any policy based on false hlstorical foundations can only bring_ new misfortunes. Why, therefore, cllng to ideas wbich in the past have been proved erroneous. which were one or the maln causes of World War II, and the practical exlstence of wbich only lasted. for lwenty years, a mere moment in the life of nations? It remalns to be seen whether the \Vest inten<ls to support the arnbitlons of a few emigrants, who for years have lost contact with their own natlons and do not ·reptesent a·n ytbing but tbem.selves. However that may be, -""~e sbould no t forget that in Centra! Europe there are only eight million Czechs, a distinct minority compared with seven million Austrians. elght million Hungarians and three million Slov::iks. · lt is rather surprising that free European ·propaganda is· still eulo. gizing Masaryk. This· must strike a ll Austrians, Hungarians, and SIÔ~vaks as béing very strange. Of course, for many Czech politicians íť is easier to create 'political capital out of the Masaryk legend than to take up an entirely new line. Would it, however, not be adviaab le discreetly to do away with thls myth and not dtipe.n d, for propa11anda purposes, on names which before history bear the ht-avy responsibility of disrupting the unity of the Danube peoples'! • • • The s olution of the Danube problem ánd, In a broader sense. tbat of Centra! Eurore. lie!I ln a correct blending of the various peoples within a Fecleration. Only thu!I C'an the Slav peoples of Centra! Europe be prevented from again falUng viC'tim~ to Pans lavist ideology, ancl the Austrians and H ungarlans to that of Pan-Germa.n-i sm. Such a policy alone can restore the interna! equlllbrlum in the Danube Basin an cl 22 SLOVAKIA convert it once more into a constructive factor in European polltics. From a practical point of view the1-e appears to be only one possibillty of establishing a Centra) European Federation, and that would be to group together the countries Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, Hungary, Slovakla into a sort of Danubian Switzerland. For this purpose, Czechoslovakia would first bave to be split up into ber historical, i.e.. natural parts. Bohemia and Moravia on one side, Slovakia on the other. We can only repeat that neither Austria nor Hungary wlll res'ign itself indefinitely to the existence of C1.echoslovakia, to wbich even the Slovaks are opposed. The position would be dififerent in the case of Bohemia - Moravia being separated from Slovakia. Sucb a Federation would consist of four autonomous coun tries: Austria, Bobemia-Moravla, Hungary and ,sJovakia. Tbe presence of the Czechs and Slovaks is a guarantee tbat tbe Federatlon could not turn proGerman; that of the Austrians and Hungarians that she cannot become pro-iR-ussian. Of course, even the constitution of such a polltical organlzatlon would prove to bave its difficul-ties. The Allied powers would have to invest Austria with a more important status than what she has held so far. In spite of the occupat!on, Austria is still the only remaining free Danubian country, and the development or Vienna could have a great influence on the future shaping of the whole Danube Basin. For instance, there are even today half as many Czechs living in Vienna as in Prague, and they are the trne bearers of the tradition which, until not very long ago, has linked Bohemia wlth Austria. Austria is today one of the most important advanced posts or tbe West in Centra! Europe. She wlll only be able to carry on the fight agaínst Bolshevism if the world is willíng to offer her a more just deal tban that to which she has been condemned by the Versam es Treaty. Instead of putting too much faith in a few desperate emigrants, would it not be better for the Western Powers to make Vienna the basis of their future Danube policy? The Czech and Slovak problems ought to be dealt with separately. The oft-repeated argument, that Czechoslovkia's partition into her natural components would cause an even greater dislocation in the Danube Basin fails to convince, if one realizes that such a partition is the essential prerequisite of the creation of a large political entity. The restoration of the unity of the Danube Basin does not hlnder the eventual Federation of the whoie of Europe; on the contrary, it can make it only easier. From whichever angle one regards the problem, the establishment of a Danube Federation appears to be the first constructive step to be taken in the future political reorganization of Centra! Europe. Perhaps it may appear stran~e that all tbis should have been wrltten by a Czech. However, a political action can only be judgoo by its results, and these generally only appear durlng the lifetime of the next gen1:!ľation. I! regarded in thls llght, lt !s clear that Masaryk's "liberatlon" Jed to the " balkanizat!on" of Centra.) Europe, and that wha.t the Versailles Treaty has created wa<i lncomparably worse than what had existed before. One can say with a clear conscience: only bad Czechs can be Czechoslovakians.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Federation of the Danube Description An account of the resource Lieut. Colonel F. O. Miksche Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952 pp. 17-22 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Miksche, Ferdinand Otto, 1905-1992 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/1a59f5ef3d2e8febb2330f47e4e94be7.pdf e8f42dd6667bf6fe8b19186d469d7024 PDF Text Text S LOVAKIA: 69 THE FIGHT FOR DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL EOROPE D R. J OSEPH KI RSCH BAUM By the menits o! some pollllcal iustitutlons of the United States, of which U1e best known !s the National Commlttee for a Free Europe, there began, over a year ago a large and costly campa!gn in the interest of democracy In centra! and eastern Europe, which up to that línie had beeu domlnated by Moscow and the communi&t regimes instailed by it. The action certainly is most welcome, because .it means not only the streng,thening of the political forces ,vai!ch are flghting in th.e individual coun,trles behind the Iron Curtaín, in the shadow ot the gallows and con centration camps, a herolc flght for the freedom and democratic future of the!r own natlons, but also it is supJiosed to brlng the concepts of the democratic way of life into tl)e souls of nations which thus far have always lived under regimes as sulted the great power that ruled over the eastern pa,·t of Europe - never, bowever, under a real democratic regime. "Dad admlnistratlon and ignorant al)d irresponsible ruling c lass," aľc-ordlng to Hngh Seton-Watson, "finally destroyed aJI hope of real Democracy in Eastern Europe between t he wars ..." (Eastern l:urope Between the Wars. pg. 154, 265-266). Let u.s allow. however, that the oplnion of Seton-Watson is a bil loo severe, even then the sad fact remalns that the natlons of cent ra! and eastern Europe were not given the opportunity to live under a rule of democratic regimes long enough so that at Jeast in one generatlon democratic principles could take root and give rise to democratic- traditions. Attempts to install democratic reglmes after the first World War ended in a very s bort time In dictatorships e!ther of ~roups or of indlviduals (Polanc\ in 1926, YugosJavla in 1929, and later, but before World War II. ·Rumanla. Bulgaria and Au.stria). In Czechoslovakia, which formally preserved a democratlc facade, but in fact was in a very large measure a democracy "only for tbe Cze<'hs," as Robert Ingrim state<l in bis book "After Hitler Stalin ?" - or as Dr. Milan Hodža admitted more delicately In bis book "Federallon In Centra! Europe": "it also had a substantial share of errors." De mocracy, therefore, has only a few traditions in ea.s,tern Europe, but the ground is, nevertbeless, favorable for it, inasmuch as the social structure and spirituaJ tradltlons of the centra! Europeil.n nations rest on principles that are favorable to democracy. Tbe success of the efforts of the West, and especially the success of t.he action wbich ls belng unfolded by the National Committee for' a Frée :E::urope which appar-ently aims to gain the centra) European na,tions for democracy and the fight for it, depends, nevertheless, on the fulfillment of rertain basic ps ycbological s upposltions, wbicb are: l. Every nation of centra) and east Europe must be addressed in its own tongue and In the spirit or lts tradlllons and its mentality; 2. The campaign for democrary must not be misused for tbe renovation of such politiral formatlons wbiťb the majority of its inhabitants do not <lesire. �60 SLOV.AKIA 3. The centra) ·European natlons should not be addressed by persons, who, rightly or not. are regarded in the eyes of the lnd1vidu1'1 centra) European natlons as responsible for their traglc sltuatlon beeause ot thelr colla.boration with communi.sm. 4. These natlons must see a ehanrt> or real demotracy and real freedom in their countries. The fulfillment or these condltlons for the success oi th~ ca.mpa.ign for democracy in centra! Europe is demandAd not only tn capture the good will of the centra! Europea.n natlons. hut ·,lt!C cor reasons whicb are deeply rooted 1n the views and con·:lctlons of tbe ind!Vidua.1 natlons of central and eastern Europe: In thelr polltlcal a.spira.t!ons and also In no small mea.s ure in thelr hlstorical remtnlscences and resentments. ?.fany of the central European nations throughout whole generations often fought bloody battles to preserve thelr national ldentitles and tbelr languages and. 1berefore, the questlon of "wbo speaks to them In wha.t la.nguage" la a.II the more sensltlve wlth them than po)jtical circles of the West, often only superfl-cially and tendenciously a.C(luainted with the problems or eastern Europe, can real1ze. Regardless of the fa.cl whether a.ny one agrees with this or not, lt remalns an lndlsputable fact that natlonallsm today ls evldently more than ever before the most powerful pol!tical force In eastern Europe and is more lnslstently striVing tor priority before historlcal conslderatlons which have been reduced to absurdity by new events. Furthermore, there ls also the fact t hat for every central European natlon the cllmax ot lts polltical a.splrations is poHtlcal lndependence and equality, also that these natlons are convln<1ed tbat ft is only on the basls of democracy that they can claim equality and lndependence. To gain tbe centra) European nations for the fight agafnst the enemy - who on tbe Jeast expressfon of reslstance answers with gallows, bnllell!, jails and deportations - politlcal reallsm therefore demands that the feellngs and thoughts of the centra! European natlons be respeeted and that they be convlnced about tbe fulflllment of thelr natlonal asolrations In a manner which they can un<reratand. To speak or the lndivldual natlons of centra! Europé In a language whlch necessarily remlnrls them of an unhappy past, to speak to them about democra.cy by means of people, who in a large measure caused the present tragic sltuation In the indlvidual centra! European countries and are at the same representatives of reglmes and state formatlon.c: wbtch evoke only resentments, cannot be regarded as an a.ct elther polltlcally wlse or leadlng to su~ess. Sucb a campaign could evoke In the centra! European natlons the Idea that lt lt< concerned only with the restoratlon of reglmes and formatlons which exlsted In centra! Europe be!ore the communlst aggresslon and whlcb, in a large measure, were neither democratlc nor deslrable. The cboiťe of representatlvea of the varlous nattons la unfortnnate. In the case of the Czech and Slovak representatlves especla.lly, lt has been most unfortunate. Tbey are not the cholce of the peoples <1oncerned, hence cannot truly represent them. Thelr past ls tafnted wlth Jack of political honor, lmperial1stic deslgns al)d collaboratlon w1tb commtmism. To present sneh people as "representatlves" ot the!r �SLOVAKIA 11 rt>s~ i vé ná.tions means a s.ad lack ' of knowledge or just plain .deception. It certainly 1s not wise or tactful tl> place before the mlcrol)'hone indivlduals who, after t be " liberatiôn" or -1945, collaborated as fellowtravelers with the Soviet occupation forces in the countrles b.ehlnd t he .iron Curtain and helped to break the mora! resis tance of theľr peoples. To dľe ánd. expose oneselr to the danger of gallows and concentration camps certainly cannot be expected under such circumstanees trom .centra! European nations, even though we speak to them about di--mocracy for which they c rave. The great idea of democratic freedoms; respec t {or the human pers on and individual lights sounds lronica.l when it lssues from the mouths of people who together witb t he communis ts voted tbP. laws to establish concentration camps, suppressed f~eedoro of tbe press, retreated cowardly to communlst aggression for fear of losing their own careers or property, and also had a part in other c rimes of post-war reglmes in the states of eastern Europe. The campaign for democ racy in central ancl eastern Europe can be s uécess rut only if 1t s hall not use and feature people who com11romised with collaboration with communism. hut shall eogage representativés without chauvinistic and imperialistic tendencies who are figbting for s uch a democ ratlc order in centra! Europe, In whicb every ,,ation would enjoy equality and frE'ellOm and also wouid have safe,:uarded its own se ,·nrity from outs ide at tacks . • • • WHO SAID IT? " And wha t could the Czech s expect from the ir imperiaJists, from tbe followe rs of tbe late Beneš? Should t hey risk their lives for another Government cons tituted abroa d •- an exiled Government whlch. in 1945, in collaboratlon wlth the Bolsheviks, murdered thousands of Czec hs on tbe pretext that they we re Nazi collaborators? Should the s ame people. installed once more by a forelgn power, massacre more t housands of Czechs as Bolsbevik collaborators? Should the Czech■ rise up and die for Mr. Ripka, who, during the war, told them from London that Ruaaian Bolshevism ia a continuance of Christianity? ... Amerlcans se11ing de mocracy in this way are doing ve ry bad bus iness." - {The Czech "PRAVDA.'" - London. June 1951) . • "We Slovak s and Czecbs also want to add our bit of joy to this great holiday of the USSR. . . . In honor oť the USSR our flags wave on our homes and In bis hea rt every Joyal cltizen or the Czecho,:iovak Republi c loves to remember our closest e astern neighbor. our frielld and loyal ally to whom we a re bound with deepť.st gratltude.. . . And, flnally, we are aware of the fact that it was the soldier of the USS R who de facto liberated us on our territory. The chairman of the Constltutional National Assembly, Mr. David, in bis speech on the ocťasion of the great hollday of the USSR quoted the words or Joseph Holeček. tbe Czecb writer. that "a Czech will actually be free onty when the RuHian soldier walk■ through the street■ of Prague." {Cbarles Hu§ek. Editor of CAS, the otriclal organ or L e ttrlch's Democratlc Party, November 7, 1947.) � S LOVAKIA: 69 THE FIGHT FOR DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL EOROPE D R. J OSEPH KI RSCH BAUM By the menits o! some pollllcal iustitutlons of the United States, of which U1e best known !s the National Commlttee for a Free Europe, there began, over a year ago a large and costly campa!gn in the interest of democracy In centra! and eastern Europe, which up to that línie had beeu domlnated by Moscow and the communi&t regimes instailed by it. The action certainly is most welcome, because .it means not only the streng,thening of the political forces ,vai!ch are flghting in th.e individual coun,trles behind the Iron Curtaín, in the shadow ot the gallows and con centration camps, a herolc flght for the freedom and democratic future of the!r own natlons, but also it is supJiosed to brlng the concepts of the democratic way of life into tl)e souls of nations which thus far have always lived under regimes as sulted the great power that ruled over the eastern pa,·t of Europe - never, bowever, under a real democratic regime. "Dad admlnistratlon and ignorant al)d irresponsible ruling c lass," aľc-ordlng to Hngh Seton-Watson, "finally destroyed aJI hope of real Democracy in Eastern Europe between t he wars ..." (Eastern l:urope Between the Wars. pg. 154, 265-266). Let u.s allow. however, that the oplnion of Seton-Watson is a bil loo severe, even then the sad fact remalns that the natlons of cent ra! and eastern Europe were not given the opportunity to live under a rule of democratic regimes long enough so that at Jeast in one generatlon democratic principles could take root and give rise to democratic- traditions. Attempts to install democratic reglmes after the first World War ended in a very s bort time In dictatorships e!ther of ~roups or of indlviduals (Polanc\ in 1926, YugosJavla in 1929, and later, but before World War II. ·Rumanla. Bulgaria and Au.stria). In Czechoslovakia, which formally preserved a democratlc facade, but in fact was in a very large measure a democracy "only for tbe Cze<'hs," as Robert Ingrim state<l in bis book "After Hitler Stalin ?" - or as Dr. Milan Hodža admitted more delicately In bis book "Federallon In Centra! Europe": "it also had a substantial share of errors." De mocracy, therefore, has only a few traditions in ea.s,tern Europe, but the ground is, nevertbeless, favorable for it, inasmuch as the social structure and spirituaJ tradltlons of the centra! Europeil.n nations rest on principles that are favorable to democracy. Tbe success of the efforts of the West, and especially the success of t.he action wbich ls belng unfolded by the National Committee for' a Frée :E::urope which appar-ently aims to gain the centra) European na,tions for democracy and the fight for it, depends, nevertheless, on the fulfillment of rertain basic ps ycbological s upposltions, wbicb are: l. Every nation of centra) and east Europe must be addressed in its own tongue and In the spirit or lts tradlllons and its mentality; 2. The campaign for democrary must not be misused for tbe renovation of such politiral formatlons wbiťb the majority of its inhabitants do not <lesire. �60 SLOV.AKIA 3. The centra) ·European natlons should not be addressed by persons, who, rightly or not. are regarded in the eyes of the lnd1vidu1'1 centra) European natlons as responsible for their traglc sltuatlon beeause ot thelr colla.boration with communi.sm. 4. These natlons must see a ehanrt> or real demotracy and real freedom in their countries. The fulfillment or these condltlons for the success oi th~ ca.mpa.ign for democracy in centra! Europe is demandAd not only tn capture the good will of the centra! Europea.n natlons. hut ·,lt!C cor reasons whicb are deeply rooted 1n the views and con·:lctlons of tbe ind!Vidua.1 natlons of central and eastern Europe: In thelr polltlcal a.spira.t!ons and also In no small mea.s ure in thelr hlstorical remtnlscences and resentments. ?.fany of the central European nations throughout whole generations often fought bloody battles to preserve thelr national ldentitles and tbelr languages and. 1berefore, the questlon of "wbo speaks to them In wha.t la.nguage" la a.II the more sensltlve wlth them than po)jtical circles of the West, often only superfl-cially and tendenciously a.C(luainted with the problems or eastern Europe, can real1ze. Regardless of the fa.cl whether a.ny one agrees with this or not, lt remalns an lndlsputable fact that natlonallsm today ls evldently more than ever before the most powerful pol!tical force In eastern Europe and is more lnslstently striVing tor priority before historlcal conslderatlons which have been reduced to absurdity by new events. Furthermore, there ls also the fact t hat for every central European natlon the cllmax ot lts polltical a.splrations is poHtlcal lndependence and equality, also that these natlons are convln<1ed tbat ft is only on the basls of democracy that they can claim equality and lndependence. To gain tbe centra) European nations for the fight agafnst the enemy - who on tbe Jeast expressfon of reslstance answers with gallows, bnllell!, jails and deportations - politlcal reallsm therefore demands that the feellngs and thoughts of the centra! European natlons be respeeted and that they be convlnced about tbe fulflllment of thelr natlonal asolrations In a manner which they can un<reratand. To speak or the lndivldual natlons of centra! Europé In a language whlch necessarily remlnrls them of an unhappy past, to speak to them about democra.cy by means of people, who in a large measure caused the present tragic sltuation In the indlvidual centra! European countries and are at the same representatives of reglmes and state formatlon.c: wbtch evoke only resentments, cannot be regarded as an a.ct elther polltlcally wlse or leadlng to su~ess. Sucb a campaign could evoke In the centra! European natlons the Idea that lt lt< concerned only with the restoratlon of reglmes and formatlons which exlsted In centra! Europe be!ore the communlst aggresslon and whlcb, in a large measure, were neither democratlc nor deslrable. The cboiťe of representatlvea of the varlous nattons la unfortnnate. In the case of the Czech and Slovak representatlves especla.lly, lt has been most unfortunate. Tbey are not the cholce of the peoples <1oncerned, hence cannot truly represent them. Thelr past ls tafnted wlth Jack of political honor, lmperial1stic deslgns al)d collaboratlon w1tb commtmism. To present sneh people as "representatlves" ot the!r �SLOVAKIA 11 rt>s~ i vé ná.tions means a s.ad lack ' of knowledge or just plain .deception. It certainly 1s not wise or tactful tl> place before the mlcrol)'hone indivlduals who, after t be " liberatiôn" or -1945, collaborated as fellowtravelers with the Soviet occupation forces in the countrles b.ehlnd t he .iron Curtain and helped to break the mora! resis tance of theľr peoples. To dľe ánd. expose oneselr to the danger of gallows and concentration camps certainly cannot be expected under such circumstanees trom .centra! European nations, even though we speak to them about di--mocracy for which they c rave. The great idea of democratic freedoms; respec t {or the human pers on and individual lights sounds lronica.l when it lssues from the mouths of people who together witb t he communis ts voted tbP. laws to establish concentration camps, suppressed f~eedoro of tbe press, retreated cowardly to communlst aggression for fear of losing their own careers or property, and also had a part in other c rimes of post-war reglmes in the states of eastern Europe. The campaign for democ racy in central ancl eastern Europe can be s uécess rut only if 1t s hall not use and feature people who com11romised with collaboration with communism. hut shall eogage representativés without chauvinistic and imperialistic tendencies who are figbting for s uch a democ ratlc order in centra! Europe, In whicb every ,,ation would enjoy equality and frE'ellOm and also wouid have safe,:uarded its own se ,·nrity from outs ide at tacks . • • • WHO SAID IT? " And wha t could the Czech s expect from the ir imperiaJists, from tbe followe rs of tbe late Beneš? Should t hey risk their lives for another Government cons tituted abroa d •- an exiled Government whlch. in 1945, in collaboratlon wlth the Bolsheviks, murdered thousands of Czec hs on tbe pretext that they we re Nazi collaborators? Should the s ame people. installed once more by a forelgn power, massacre more t housands of Czechs as Bolsbevik collaborators? Should the Czech■ rise up and die for Mr. Ripka, who, during the war, told them from London that Ruaaian Bolshevism ia a continuance of Christianity? ... Amerlcans se11ing de mocracy in this way are doing ve ry bad bus iness." - {The Czech "PRAVDA.'" - London. June 1951) . • "We Slovak s and Czecbs also want to add our bit of joy to this great holiday of the USSR. . . . In honor oť the USSR our flags wave on our homes and In bis hea rt every Joyal cltizen or the Czecho,:iovak Republi c loves to remember our closest e astern neighbor. our frielld and loyal ally to whom we a re bound with deepť.st gratltude.. . . And, flnally, we are aware of the fact that it was the soldier of the USS R who de facto liberated us on our territory. The chairman of the Constltutional National Assembly, Mr. David, in bis speech on the ocťasion of the great hollday of the USSR quoted the words or Joseph Holeček. tbe Czecb writer. that "a Czech will actually be free onty when the RuHian soldier walk■ through the street■ of Prague." {Cbarles Hu§ek. Editor of CAS, the otriclal organ or L e ttrlch's Democratlc Party, November 7, 1947.) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document S LOVAKIA: 69 THE FIGHT FOR DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL EOROPE D R. J OSEPH KI RSCH BAUM By the menits o! some pollllcal iustitutlons of the United States, of which U1e best known !s the National Commlttee for a Free Europe, there began, over a year ago a large and costly campa!gn in the interest of democracy In centra! and eastern Europe, which up to that línie had beeu domlnated by Moscow and the communi&t regimes instailed by it. The action certainly is most welcome, because .it means not only the streng,thening of the political forces ,vai!ch are flghting in th.e individual coun,trles behind the Iron Curtaín, in the shadow ot the gallows and con centration camps, a herolc flght for the freedom and democratic future of the!r own natlons, but also it is supJiosed to brlng the concepts of the democratic way of life into tl)e souls of nations which thus far have always lived under regimes as sulted the great power that ruled over the eastern pa,·t of Europe - never, bowever, under a real democratic regime. "Dad admlnistratlon and ignorant al)d irresponsible ruling c lass," aľc-ordlng to Hngh Seton-Watson, "finally destroyed aJI hope of real Democracy in Eastern Europe between t he wars ..." (Eastern l:urope Between the Wars. pg. 154, 265-266). Let u.s allow. however, that the oplnion of Seton-Watson is a bil loo severe, even then the sad fact remalns that the natlons of cent ra! and eastern Europe were not given the opportunity to live under a rule of democratic regimes long enough so that at Jeast in one generatlon democratic principles could take root and give rise to democratic- traditions. Attempts to install democratic reglmes after the first World War ended in a very s bort time In dictatorships e!ther of ~roups or of indlviduals (Polanc\ in 1926, YugosJavla in 1929, and later, but before World War II. ·Rumanla. Bulgaria and Au.stria). In Czechoslovakia, which formally preserved a democratlc facade, but in fact was in a very large measure a democracy "only for tbe Cze<'hs," as Robert Ingrim state<l in bis book "After Hitler Stalin ?" - or as Dr. Milan Hodža admitted more delicately In bis book "Federallon In Centra! Europe": "it also had a substantial share of errors." De mocracy, therefore, has only a few traditions in ea.s,tern Europe, but the ground is, nevertbeless, favorable for it, inasmuch as the social structure and spirituaJ tradltlons of the centra! Europeil.n nations rest on principles that are favorable to democracy. Tbe success of the efforts of the West, and especially the success of t.he action wbich ls belng unfolded by the National Committee for' a Frée :E::urope which appar-ently aims to gain the centra) European na,tions for democracy and the fight for it, depends, nevertheless, on the fulfillment of rertain basic ps ycbological s upposltions, wbicb are: l. Every nation of centra) and east Europe must be addressed in its own tongue and In the spirit or lts tradlllons and its mentality; 2. The campaign for democrary must not be misused for tbe renovation of such politiral formatlons wbiťb the majority of its inhabitants do not <lesire. 60 SLOV.AKIA 3. The centra) ·European natlons should not be addressed by persons, who, rightly or not. are regarded in the eyes of the lnd1vidu1'1 centra) European natlons as responsible for their traglc sltuatlon beeause ot thelr colla.boration with communi.sm. 4. These natlons must see a ehanrt> or real demotracy and real freedom in their countries. The fulfillment or these condltlons for the success oi th~ ca.mpa.ign for democracy in centra! Europe is demandAd not only tn capture the good will of the centra! Europea.n natlons. hut ·,lt!C cor reasons whicb are deeply rooted 1n the views and con·:lctlons of tbe ind!Vidua.1 natlons of central and eastern Europe: In thelr polltlcal a.spira.t!ons and also In no small mea.s ure in thelr hlstorical remtnlscences and resentments. ?.fany of the central European nations throughout whole generations often fought bloody battles to preserve thelr national ldentitles and tbelr languages and. 1berefore, the questlon of "wbo speaks to them In wha.t la.nguage" la a.II the more sensltlve wlth them than po)jtical circles of the West, often only superfl-cially and tendenciously a.C(luainted with the problems or eastern Europe, can real1ze. Regardless of the fa.cl whether a.ny one agrees with this or not, lt remalns an lndlsputable fact that natlonallsm today ls evldently more than ever before the most powerful pol!tical force In eastern Europe and is more lnslstently striVing tor priority before historlcal conslderatlons which have been reduced to absurdity by new events. Furthermore, there ls also the fact t hat for every central European natlon the cllmax ot lts polltical a.splrations is poHtlcal lndependence and equality, also that these natlons are convln<1ed tbat ft is only on the basls of democracy that they can claim equality and lndependence. To gain tbe centra) European nations for the fight agafnst the enemy - who on tbe Jeast expressfon of reslstance answers with gallows, bnllell!, jails and deportations - politlcal reallsm therefore demands that the feellngs and thoughts of the centra! European natlons be respeeted and that they be convlnced about tbe fulflllment of thelr natlonal asolrations In a manner which they can un<reratand. To speak or the lndivldual natlons of centra! Europé In a language whlch necessarily remlnrls them of an unhappy past, to speak to them about democra.cy by means of people, who in a large measure caused the present tragic sltuation In the indlvidual centra! European countries and are at the same representatives of reglmes and state formatlon.c: wbtch evoke only resentments, cannot be regarded as an a.ct elther polltlcally wlse or leadlng to su~ess. Sucb a campaign could evoke In the centra! European natlons the Idea that lt lt< concerned only with the restoratlon of reglmes and formatlons which exlsted In centra! Europe be!ore the communlst aggresslon and whlcb, in a large measure, were neither democratlc nor deslrable. The cboiťe of representatlvea of the varlous nattons la unfortnnate. In the case of the Czech and Slovak representatlves especla.lly, lt has been most unfortunate. Tbey are not the cholce of the peoples <1oncerned, hence cannot truly represent them. Thelr past ls tafnted wlth Jack of political honor, lmperial1stic deslgns al)d collaboratlon w1tb commtmism. To present sneh people as "representatlves" ot the!r SLOVAKIA 11 rt>s~ i vé ná.tions means a s.ad lack ' of knowledge or just plain .deception. It certainly 1s not wise or tactful tl> place before the mlcrol)'hone indivlduals who, after t be " liberatiôn" or -1945, collaborated as fellowtravelers with the Soviet occupation forces in the countrles b.ehlnd t he .iron Curtain and helped to break the mora! resis tance of theľr peoples. To dľe ánd. expose oneselr to the danger of gallows and concentration camps certainly cannot be expected under such circumstanees trom .centra! European nations, even though we speak to them about di--mocracy for which they c rave. The great idea of democratic freedoms; respec t {or the human pers on and individual lights sounds lronica.l when it lssues from the mouths of people who together witb t he communis ts voted tbP. laws to establish concentration camps, suppressed f~eedoro of tbe press, retreated cowardly to communlst aggression for fear of losing their own careers or property, and also had a part in other c rimes of post-war reglmes in the states of eastern Europe. The campaign for democ racy in central ancl eastern Europe can be s uécess rut only if 1t s hall not use and feature people who com11romised with collaboration with communism. hut shall eogage representativés without chauvinistic and imperialistic tendencies who are figbting for s uch a democ ratlc order in centra! Europe, In whicb every ,,ation would enjoy equality and frE'ellOm and also wouid have safe,:uarded its own se ,·nrity from outs ide at tacks . • • • WHO SAID IT? " And wha t could the Czech s expect from the ir imperiaJists, from tbe followe rs of tbe late Beneš? Should t hey risk their lives for another Government cons tituted abroa d •- an exiled Government whlch. in 1945, in collaboratlon wlth the Bolsheviks, murdered thousands of Czec hs on tbe pretext that they we re Nazi collaborators? Should the s ame people. installed once more by a forelgn power, massacre more t housands of Czechs as Bolsbevik collaborators? Should the Czech■ rise up and die for Mr. Ripka, who, during the war, told them from London that Ruaaian Bolshevism ia a continuance of Christianity? ... Amerlcans se11ing de mocracy in this way are doing ve ry bad bus iness." - {The Czech "PRAVDA.'" - London. June 1951) . • "We Slovak s and Czecbs also want to add our bit of joy to this great holiday of the USSR. . . . In honor oť the USSR our flags wave on our homes and In bis hea rt every Joyal cltizen or the Czecho,:iovak Republi c loves to remember our closest e astern neighbor. our frielld and loyal ally to whom we a re bound with deepť.st gratltude.. . . And, flnally, we are aware of the fact that it was the soldier of the USS R who de facto liberated us on our territory. The chairman of the Constltutional National Assembly, Mr. David, in bis speech on the ocťasion of the great hollday of the USSR quoted the words or Joseph Holeček. tbe Czecb writer. that "a Czech will actually be free onty when the RuHian soldier walk■ through the street■ of Prague." {Cbarles Hu§ek. Editor of CAS, the otriclal organ or L e ttrlch's Democratlc Party, November 7, 1947.)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Fight for Democracy in Central Europe Description An account of the resource Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952 pp. 59-61 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/bf790366e4f46ef61e114e865e4a60e8.pdf 6d8b53718545dade60db6cc05e04f709 PDF Text Text MARCH, 1952. SLOVAKIA 1 THE FIRST PRESIDENT OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC Dr. Joseph Cieker From the very beginning of its history the Slovak nation endeavored to attain a full natlonal and political life. From the standpoint of history, the substance of the development of the Slovaks has not changed. Not all natlons developed in the same manner. Many nations lived in such an environment and under such conditions that their norma! life was not hindered by serious obstacles and they <;ould, therefore, develop to state and national perfectlon more rapidJy t han the nations which, on the road of their development, met with many obstacles - some of which were insurmountable. More than one nation spent its blood in wars and disappeared from the history of Europe. We Slovaks, too, frequently found ourselves exhausted by wars, and at times it appeared to us we might not be strong enough to overcome the obstacles thrust in our path by foreigners and also renegades from our own ranks. Despite the extreme material and biological losses, the Slovak nation, nevertheless, successfully won a place of equality among the nations of Europe and the world and proved its maturity in its own independent Slovak State. In the development of the Slovak nation, there existed a constant continuity even though many falled to see it and some even denied it. Loyal Slovak sons, who were entrusted wlth the responsible task of leadership In Slovak national and political life, believed In this contlnuity of the Slovak spirit wbich glistened so brightly ln real expression on the throne of the first Slovak rulers and then on the chair of the first President of the Slovak Republlc. The elderly Archbishop of Nitra, Dr. Char.les Kmeťko, gave testimony of tbis continuity of the hlstorical evolution of tbe Slovak natíon when, looking at Presldent Dr. .Joseph Tiso in the Bratislava National Court, he said: "This man was, after Svätopluk, our second bead." Austrian emperors and Hungarian klngs were not "our heads" or rulers because of the free will of the Slovak nation. But nelther was T. G. Masaryk, nor Dr. Edward Beneš; nor is Clement Gottwald the "head" of the Slovak nation. From the standpoint of this historical continuity, "our head" can be, and shall be able to be, only the man who shall be placed on the empty chalr of the president of tbe Slovak Republic by the will of the people and in the intent of the national and Ohristian traditions of the Slovak people. How extremely difficult was the road travelled by the Slovak nation - from the times of Svätopluk all the way to Dr. Joseph Tlso - was clearly demonstrated when counter forces tried to destroy the work of the Slovak spirit, es,pecially when they removed in crimlnal fashion the representatlves and Jiving expresslons of the Slovak will from the leadership of Slovak national and politlcal life. The more concrete the form of realizing Slovak aims, the more cruelly all alien and anti-Slovak forces intervened. That is why the work of the Slovak State, wben it proved itself to be on a European and world level, evoked so much concentrated crlmlnality and revenge from the enemies of Slovak independence, the likes of wblch not a single clvilized and cultured nation had ever seen. �2 SLOVAKIA The anti-Slovak forces were symbolized by one of the most des-picalble phenomena of the Czech nation and of contemporary European history, Dr. Edward Beneš. Knowlng that they could not be a ble to destroy the blessed achievements of S lovak vlctory - the Slovak Republíc - they dld not hesitate to ask the help of the criminal forces of the anti-European and anti-Cbristian conspiracy whicb was organized and led by the Kremlln. At the moment of the bistorlcal duel, there remained on the side of the Slovak Republic only the falthful Slovak race and its sons, who were determined and prepared to die as martyrs for the rights of the Slovak nation. Against the Slovak 1Republic was the world public, which had been charmed by the falsehoods and frauds of Dr. Ed· ward Beneš. Thirsting for Slovak blood, designated wlth Cain's mark on their forehads, armed wlth all the means of Soviet justice and prot0i)ted by the military, political and police might of the Soviet Union, the wards of Dr. Edward Beneš-of Czech and Slovak originset out wlth a vengeance against the Joya.l sons of the Slovak nation who were armed only with prayerbooks and the Jegal code of the Christian world-outlook. At the same Ume few people In Europe and in the world comprehended the extent of the treason, the victim of which was the Christian Slovak natlon and the Jegal expression of its will - the Slovak State. Very few people in Europe and in the world realized the im· mensity of the treason of Dr. Edward Beneš, his Czech polítical companions and the individuals of Slovak origin who had united with them in crlme. This anti-Slovak consplracy, which was the beginning of the anti-European and anti-Christlan consplracy of internationa.l Communism, was determlned to destroy the Slovak Republlc, the expression of right and justice. But the means valld up to that tíme did not suffice for the conspirators, so they acted according to the new laws, which were created by the philosophy of violence and Communist crime. To destroy the Slovak State, this conspiratorial, anti-Slovak assoclatlon needed the entire apparatus of terror whlch was used and legallzed by the Soviet system. The Slovak nation succumbed to thls vlolence and temporarily was deprlved of its own State. "After Svätopluk our second head" the President of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso - was indicted, tried, convlcted and executed according to the manner of the Communlst system. Fully aware of thls historical crime and with the consent of hls own Government and full co-responsiblllty of his own executive organs on the territory of the Slovak State, which according to thelr own admission "ruled themselves," Dr. Edward Beneš intervened In the bloodiest manner in thls hlstorlcal development of tbe Slovak natlon, tbereby deflnltely intending to sever the lndestructlble contlnulty of the Slovak spirit. On tbis hlstorical background, there comes before tbe eyes of the contemporary Slovak generation and tbe eyes of contemporary Europe and the world the human and politlcal protile of tbe President of the Slovak Republlc, Joseph Tiso. From tbe Slovak view·point, as well as that of universal history, the greatness of his martyr's death has attained such a degree, that it has placed the figme of Joseph Tlso among the bravest, the noblest and morally perfect expresslons of human effort !or good, for justice, and for right and freedom. His phy- �SLOVAKIA a sical appearance is today crowned with a legendary halo, wbicb to date no member of tbe Slovak natlon bas attained. Every Slovak son and daugbter was acquainted wltb Tiso, because Tiso as priest, as politician, as man, and even as president, was in daily contact wlth Slovak life. And thougb tbe martyr's deatb ba.s enbanced the political and human profile of Joseph Tiso over any otber, as well as the degree of pel'fectlon of the Slov3k spirit atta1ned from a moral, religious, national, polltlcal and world vlewpoint, bis immortal and live presence bas become tbe most su:bstantlal part of the tbinking of the Slovak man today and shall be a constant stimulator of bis· spirit. Tbe more tragic and dark the background from wbicb appears tbe clean and bright pbenomenon of tbe personality of Josepb Tlso, tbe more impassable tbe aibyss between tbe Slovak nation and tbe conspirators against its freedom. Tbe martyr's deatb of Joseph T iso and its glorification cannot be and shall not b e separated from this background, in which - in a union sealed with a treaty or treason, blood and crime - moves a bout and shall eternally appear tbe repulsive face of Dr. Edward Beneš, marked wlth the spittle of revenge, on wbich no artist and no propaganda procedure s hall be able to elicit a smile of a clean conscience. On this bistorlcal b ackground, worthy of Dante's interno, in an equal mora! ugliness sball eternally find tbemselves the individuals, wbo consldered it an honor to besmirch their consciences ,ľitb tbe biood of Slovak sons and whose only vietory is tbe temporary destruction of Slovak independence. These men, being branded wltb tbe mark of Communlsm, bave followed thelr master, Edward Beneš, on the stage of Slovak tragedy, The present Slovak tragedy has attained sucb dlmenslons that not only the intellectual groups of a Slovak generatlon, but even tbe wbole Slovak natlon collectively have been affected by lt. Never b efore in the history of tbe Slovak people did it happen tbat every Slovak man, woman and child were the llvlng partlcipants of the mora! and material destruction caused by tbe conspirators against Slovak statebood. Even if we can comprebend the revenge of Edward Beneš and bis Czecb companlons on the Slovak Nation as an interventlon of negatíve forces in the Divine plans, we cannot understancl, and so much the less excuse, the actlve partlc!patlon in it of tbe lndlvlduals of Slovak origin, wbo renderecl servlce to aliens and consplred agalnst the life of the nation t hey are clescended from. The terrible contrast between the reality of the Slovak State and tbe "acquisitlons of tbe glorious national insurrectlon." which was insplrecl by foreign interests, led by Slovak renegades and climaxed by total communlstlc terror is, and forever shall be, the final sketcher of the political and human profile of ťhe personlflei- of Slovak State lndependence, J oseph Tiso, and the mora! and political degeneracy of those who are In a run measure responsible for the present servlle position of the Slovak nation. From the viewpoint of historical perspective. not only the Slovak 11atlon, but even the whole world sees today the immensity of the sacrifice of a son, loyal to God and nation, was able to make and, on tbe other hand, tbe immenslty of the treason and the consequences emanating from the gullt of those who, silencing wlthin themselv~ the outcry of conscience, rejected from their declsions and acts the law of God and th e Jaw of the natlon. �4 SLOVAKIA To make the human and political profile of tbe president of tbe Slovak Republic more expressive, no Slovak needs any syntbetic beautifying mediums, because bis pbysical and spiritua,l features were tbe work of tbe Hands of God and tbe bealtby, religious environment of tbe Slovak nation. On thls face glowed tbe fire of tbe servant of God and nation to tbe very last moment of bis eartbly life. Josepb Tiso was not a complicated, but a clear, clean and transparent pbenomenon; just as uncomplicated, clear, clean and transparent as has been tbe natural cbaracter of tbe Slovak person for generations. Slovak bistory will not bave to searcb for reasons for tbe !ega! connection of the Slovak acts, which form a segment of tbe life of tbe Slovak State, because these acts were explained by the crystal-clear deeds of President Tiso himself. On August 16, 1938, when J oseph Tiso was partlng with the deceased Andrew Hlinka on the Ružomberok Square in the name or the whole Slovak nation, his words sound<ld like the eternal voice of the Slovak spirit, which when silenced on the li,ps of one, are heard by the living nation on the lips of another. This uninterrupted thread of Slovak evo\utlon was handed over to Joseph Tiso by Andrew Hlinka. ' Never was Andrew Hlinka so great in life, as his death has shown bim to be," said Tlso over the casket of the spiritual soverelgn of the Slovak peopl e. "Andrew Hlinka was great during bis lifetime, because he dedicated his liťe to a great idea-and he appeared great a t death, because hls death, attestlng faitbful service to his great idea to the very end, places bim in the gallery of the spiritual heroes of the Slovak nation. The idea of an independent Slovak natlon was the source of bis boundless love for the Slovak natíon, which led and took on higb tbe life of Andrew Hlinka. As a result of bis being elevated to the priestbood of the New Testament, his love for hls people received a special blessing and intensity: by becoming a servant of Christ, he became tbe servant of a grandiose idea - whlch in relation to patriotism meant that he became the servant of an idea, offerlng himself and all bis possessions on the altar of tbat same idea. "Hlinka, priest and patriot, lived in the deep conviction that he was not serving a trivial idea, a superflcial thing, but a cause tbat had deep roots in a 1000-year-old pa.st and in the Christian order of the life of bis nation in the present. In this bigher consecration, bis patriotism did not mean only persona! fancy and momentary satisfaction, but it meant dedicating and sacriflclng bis wbole being - constantly and unreservedly, un'Ceaslngly and tirelessly - because even in bis patriotism he felt that he was a prlest of God who was making a sacriflce - a full-time and lifetime sacrifice in the sense of bis full-time and lifetime priestly character. That is why bis work for bis Slovak people was a figbt - not a struggle for power and glory, but a sacred fight always in the defense of tbe most sacred values, so dear to all members of our nation: our national rigbts, po\itica\ rights, cultural and economic rights. As it bebooves a person dedi· cated to tbe service of an idea, bis fight was an ideological fight. The great Idea of a Divine Order was connected with the idea of a distinct Slovak nation to feed the two-win~ed flame which filled bis mind and bis heart and governed bis whole life. Ideally inflamed, Hlinka waged this sacred fight under difficult circumstances; he �SLOVAKIA 6 fought against overwhelming odds. Yet never did he retreat trom anyone or anything, because he did not doubt tbe naturalness of the right of bis own people to its own life; and he believed in the future of bis nation, because it held fast to the space allotted it by God in the family of otber nations. He bore within himself the conviction of a chosen leader of his people with whom he lived in the most intimate union, along with whom he fought in the land of the Pharaohs, and whom he was to lead into the promised land." It was thus that Tiso described the political and human profile of Andrew Hlinka. And in this profile of the spiritual sovereign of the Slovak nation, Andrew Hlinka, in substance were also found all the traits of the human and political features of Joseph Tiso. The physical person was not the same, but what was substantial, splritual and eternal remained - as proof of the continuity of Slovak life. All the cbaracteristics which adorned the priestly and polltlcal personality or Andrew Hlinka, also adorned bis successor in the management of the destinies of the Slovak people, Dr..Joseph Tiso. Service to God and nation. however, exacted from Joseph Tiso the maximum that a person possibly could give. What Joseph Tiso said at the final parting with Andrew Hlinka was not only so many beautiful words, but a great and heroic act, which attalned its perfect expresslon in the existenee of the Slovak Republic during his presldency - one that was confirmed before the Slovak natlon and before the whole cultured and civilized world with bis martyr's death. We can thank Divine Providencť' and the living continuity of the Slovak spirit that during the most decisive phase of Slovak and world bistory, the Slovak nation decided of it~ own free will to place in the chair of Svätopluk a man of the people who ťarried In hls heart and soul the spark of consecration which was given the Slovak natlon as a dowry at the dawn of its history. That is why the political and human work of Joseph Tiso attainecl such a mora! ancl historical value, the value of which will be recognized even if only one member of the Slovak nation remains on earth. Joseph Tiso did not get on the throne of Slovak rulers by the coincidence of subordinate circumstances, because even the realization of state independence was not the result of an accident. Just as state independence was the ripe fruit on the tree of life of Slovak gnerations, just so its visible head was the mature offspring of Slovak ideological, mora) and spiritual development. Even lf Joseph Tiso personally as a man would not have wanted to be the president of the Slovak Republic, he simply had to be, because at the tlme of the proclamation of Slovak independence he was the acknowledged ruler of the collective will of the Slovak people. Just as 'ľiso dld not seek the oHlce of president as man and priest, just so he hearkened to the voice of the Slovak genle and accepted the presidency from the qualified representatlves of the nation as a supreme obllgatlon - a duty which he performed faithfully and well to the very last moment of his life.. Jf Joseph Tiso devoted hlmself to tbe national service or the Slovak cause, then he diel so in full responsibílity of hls historlc missión. That is why he did not hesitate even for a moment In the face of seduction and vlolence. The presldent of the Slovak Republlc could not recant or even betray anything. That is why Josepb Tlso, after �6 SLOVAKIA acceptlng the office of Pľesident with so much self-immolation, stirred the whole Slovak nation iuto a building effoľt; that is why he defended before a non-Slovak court the work of tbe Slovak RepubJic with such dignity; and that is why, being fully aware that he pertormed his duties as well as he could, Tlso could bless bis [aithful people even from the shadow of the gallows. The human accomplisbments of tbe president of tbe Slovak Republic were destined not only by bis priestly character, but also by tbe whole character of a son of the Slovak nation, who never strayed from Slovak and Cbristian trad!tions. No matter how hard the nonSlovak and non-Cbristian court tried, it could not prove that Joseph Tiso wa.s gu!lty of acts tbat ran counter to natural and Slovak laws, or were contrary to mora! law. Tbat is why tbe Slova:k nat!on regarded the conviction and execution of .Josepb Tiso as a dellberate, prnmeditated and executed crime. And lt s ball regard it so for all time. The political work of tbe President of the Slovak Republic, serving the welfare o f tbe entire Slovak nation, created such conditions for tbe Slovak natlon so that it could wltbin the framework of !ts state boundaries prove its capabllity to live and so that in its international relationsbip it could gain recognition. Joseph Tiso, placed on the throne of an independent Slovak ruler, did not play the politics of Moscow, Berlin, Dudapest, Paris, London, or Washington, but worked the policy of Bratisla va, the cap!tal city 9f tbe independent State of Slovakia. He worked that pol!cy under ihe given pol!tlcal, geographical and internat!onal circumstances; and he had to work it in sucb a way so that the interests of the Slovak natlon and its State were safeguarded as well as possilble in tbis play of opposing forces. Josepb Tiso could not consplre against the work of Slovak hlstory and. therefore, no otber conception except the pnrely Slovak and state conception could be acceptable for him as well as tbe entlre Slovak nation. He did not regard the existence of the Slovak State as a debatable question. Just as the Slovak nation existed, so the Slovak State also had to exist. " This standpoint - which was not only bis, but tbe whole Slovak nation's as well - was incompatible with the view beld by Dr. Edward Beneš and dictated by him to his lackeys - the renegades of Slovak descent on the territory of t he Slovak State - first from London, then from Moscow and finally from Prague. · Joseph Tiso was so deeply convinced about the propriety of bis llecisions as President tha.t he did not hesitate to state before the nonSlovak and non-Cbristian court which was trying bim: "If in the fLÍture it were g!ven to me to concern myself wlth politics, under such circumstances as obtained in 1919-1945, I would follow the same polic!es that I did at that Ume." Looklng over the picture of the human and political profile of tbe f!rst President of tbe Slovak Republic, wbo already today appears in tbe halo of a martyr in the eyes of Europe and the world, we cannot help but be convinced that Joseph Tlso preceded t he development of European and un!versal realities of today, so tbat he could indicate the return of those eternal, mora! and polltlcal values. wbich in today'$ change or the world order have, as lt were, temporarily g!ven place and reign to the forces of the human peripbery �SLOVAKIA 7 which is guided by the Iaw of the jungle. His profile appears on the background of this shocking tragedy, wbich 1s not only natlonal, but European as welJ. The Chrlstlan and natlonal values, whlch Joseph Tlso personified In a form thus far unattalned by any Slovak, were and are being torn out of the body of the Slovak natlon, and In their place was and is being forced the criminal phllosophy and morality or Godless Communism. On the European and world stage the equllibrium o! mora! and polltical order was vlolated, and the declared and proven criminallty of Communism was accepted as the equivalent com• ponent of the hnman struggle for a better tomorow. Using sneh unChristian and unhistorical yardstlcks, the human and politlcal pro• file of the President of the Slovak Republic was regarded as sometbing that does not fall into tbe accepted norms of chaos, wbich was tbe result of tbe aggressiveness and perfidiousness of the CommunLstlc system and of the cowardice and appeasement of a world, whlch, of course, did say that it is llving in Christian and democrat!c forms, but was in fact, willlng to lend itself to a suicidal experiment in an alliance witb Communlsm. That !s why the voice of Joseph Tiso was silenced - the voice which defended truth and Christian morality, tbe freedom ot tbe Slovak people and its State; tbe volce that cried out agalnst Communlsm and for European and Christian cultnre. During tbe reign ot pol!tlcaJ and moral chaos, which was instaJJed totally in Slovakia and partially In tbe rest of Europe, the voice of the just confessor of universal moral principles was a volce crying In tbe wilderness. Al that Ume the crimlnal morality of tbe non-Slovak and non-Cbrlstian court In Bratis lava was accepted as tbe norma! form of justice. It took a long tlme for the West to become sat!ated wlth thls unnatural concublnage with the Soviet system and finally declde to defend wbat Communlsm did not as yet have t!me to conquer. Edward Beneš, his people and the renegades of Slovak origin joined witb them, taking advantage of the moral and politlcal chaos of the world and using the norms of communlstlc lies and deceptlon, wanted to present the pol!t!cal and human profile of Joseph Tiso in s uch a way as to evoke averslon. They succeeded in thls, but only temporarily. As long as the world accepted Stalln as the representatlve ot the most perfect democracy, whlle Dimltrov was a model of nobility, as long as Tito was an angel of justlce, wh!le Rákos! was recognlzed as a norm ot tolerance, as long as Anna Pauker, Palmlro Togl!atti, M:aurlce Tborez and Wllliam Pleck were the hope of European brotherhood, and whlle Edward Beneš, Clement Gottwald and thelr companlone qualified as bu!lders of the brldge between the West and the East - the Presldent ot the Slovak Republ!c, Dr. Joseph Tlso, was a phenomenon who slmply dld not belong in Europe. And Joseph Tlso and the Slovak nation did not want a martyr for the falth ot Christ, for a Christian and just Europe and for the Slovak Republic to belong to the gallery of these representatlves ot dera!led Europe. The unreal conception about the posslbility or normal cohabltation of two irreconcilable world outlooks - the Communlst and the Chrlstian - was bullt on deceptlon and violence, on the basis of a philosophy or falsehood and crime, on cowardlce and apostasy. On the basls ot this unnatural concept!on, it was allowed, with the concurrence of the cultured and civilized world, to lead the head of the �8 SLOVAKIA Slovak State to the gallows despite the fact that he was a priest of the Catholic Church who never violated Her doctrines or Her ia,ws; and despite the fact that Tiso was a man of spotless life and a patriot of the highest level; and despite the fact that Tiso was the freely and democratically elected head of a recognized and orderly European State. Over Joseph Tiso, under whose government no one was executed, the verdict of death was dictated by Edward Beneš, a foreigner by blood and spirit in the eyes of the Slovaks, who perpetrated so much damage on Slovak life and property that as long as a Slovak s hall be a Slovak, the mere mentlon of Beneš's name will always inspire mora! repugnance and eternal condemnation. J oseph Tiso - who conducted himself in accordance to the existing cons<titutional and controlllng institutions, as well as the highest authority of God, that Divine Law and Catholic doctrine which he professed and upheld from childhood a11 the way up to the gallows was tried and convicted by Edward Beneš who - even though he had at hand a "freely" elected parliament ready to do his vengeful bidding - Jistened to and was guided by no one except Stalin and himself. Beneš listened only to himself and hls own voice, which was slngularly full of hatred for everything Slovak, and obeyed an unChristian and undemocratic instinct, which in the last years of his life, was centered entirely against the freedom and state independence of the Slovak nation. Individuals devoid of all morals wanted to teach the gospel to a noble, Catholic priest; w ealthy and corrupt men lec tured him a bout Christian soclology; Godless and faithless people with catechisms in their bloody hands tried bim; the destroyers and plu nderers of the national wealth of the Slovak people tried to show him how he should have defended Slovakia; the perpetrators o.f communist terror dared to speak about principles of Democracy and Christianity; cowards, who never had the courage to raise their voices in defense of Slovak interests, were presented to bim as roodels of heroism; the allies of Communism told bim about the "acquisition of the glo· rious insurrections;" traitors of tbe Slovak race tried to teacb hlm patriotism; the grave diggers of Slovak independence tried to convince hlm of the advantages of subordination of the Slovak nation within the framework of cobabitation with the Czechs. On such negative princ lples, drawn from Communist doctrines, they created the profile of Joseph Tlso. In the conflict with this pollUcal and moral underworld, wbich occupled the !and of the Slovaks and also prepared to enthrone its own government and its own principles in the rest of Europe, Joseph Tiso stood tbere before the Communist tribunal as a milestone on the threshold of two ages. The gallows erected in the courtyard of the Bratislava prison, on wbich the great S lovak, Christian, European beart of the first President of the Slovak Republic ceased beating - that is the symbol of the conflict for wblch Communism and its allies were preparing. It is the symbol of the determination shown by a man of European and world outlook, wbo foresaw not only the extent of his own sacrifice, but also its mora! lmportance at a Ume, when Europe and the world - returnlng to the trnditional Chrlstlan norms - would �SLOVAK.IA 9 weigb justly the mora! and political values not only of lndivlduals, but also of nations. Looking at the human and political profile of the President ot the Slovak Republic from this historical vantage point, it can be said that the Slovak nation, whích succumbed in the brutal conflict tor its own statehood in the Europe of yesterday and today - in which Beneš, and the Communist and pro-Communist alliance helping bim, had all the say about Slovakia - shall wln its just !Ight for the renewal of Slovak statehood in the Europe of tomorrow, where people of determin ation, goodness, noblesse, Christlan morali ty - Jike J oseph Tiso will appear on the stage o! European history. • • • WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO "The execution of Msgr. Joseph Tiso was a judicial murder and it is also a political murder. One can c riticize the polltics of the late Msgr. Joseph Tiso, disagree with it and fight against it wltb all of one's strength, but, according to my deep conviction, a man should not be murdered for his political activity which was in accord with the conviction of his nation and for which he had a motive in the development of political events durlng the flrst and second CzechoSlovak Republlcs and in the course followed by lts presidents and governments. It is a down-right travesty of justice that a Slovak, elected President of the Slovak Republic by a majority of the Slovak nation, be executed by the government of a self-appolnted presldent of the present 'Czechoslovak Republic,' who, accordlng to the laws of the First Republic, himself should first be tried and condemned." - Kare! Lochner, former Czecho-Slovak Consul, London, England, April 1947. • • • "American Slovak Catholic women were horrified at the igno· minious death of Monsignor Joseph Tiso. Greatly resent the ignoring of our plea and petition sent by cablegram to President Edward Be• neš and others from our Annual Board Meeting held F®ruary 27, 1947, at Bridgeport, Connecticut, in behalf of our entire membership of 75,000 women and children. The wrath of the entire membership centers itself upon the leaders of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. We hail )lonsignor Tiso as a martyr, dying for the cause of bis people." - Susan Matuscak, Secretary First Catholic Slovak Ladles Union, Cleveland, Ohio. • • • • • • "Tbe Czech governmeRt of presldent Edward Beneš sacrificed an opportunity of easing the tension between the Czechs and the Slovaks when it executed the Rev. Joseph Tiso." - Osservatore Romano, Yatican City, Haly. " The execution of Dr. Josepb Tiso, who loved bis people and served tbem conscientiously throughout bis life, wil\ undoubted\y inspire thousands of his brethren to contlnue the fight for the !nherent and God-given rights of tbe Slovak nation." - John Sabol, Secretary l•'irst Cathollc Slovak Union, Cleveland, Ohio. � MARCH, 1952. SLOVAKIA 1 THE FIRST PRESIDENT OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC Dr. Joseph Cieker From the very beginning of its history the Slovak nation endeavored to attain a full natlonal and political life. From the standpoint of history, the substance of the development of the Slovaks has not changed. Not all natlons developed in the same manner. Many nations lived in such an environment and under such conditions that their norma! life was not hindered by serious obstacles and they <;ould, therefore, develop to state and national perfectlon more rapidJy t han the nations which, on the road of their development, met with many obstacles - some of which were insurmountable. More than one nation spent its blood in wars and disappeared from the history of Europe. We Slovaks, too, frequently found ourselves exhausted by wars, and at times it appeared to us we might not be strong enough to overcome the obstacles thrust in our path by foreigners and also renegades from our own ranks. Despite the extreme material and biological losses, the Slovak nation, nevertheless, successfully won a place of equality among the nations of Europe and the world and proved its maturity in its own independent Slovak State. In the development of the Slovak nation, there existed a constant continuity even though many falled to see it and some even denied it. Loyal Slovak sons, who were entrusted wlth the responsible task of leadership In Slovak national and political life, believed In this contlnuity of the Slovak spirit wbich glistened so brightly ln real expression on the throne of the first Slovak rulers and then on the chair of the first President of the Slovak Republlc. The elderly Archbishop of Nitra, Dr. Char.les Kmeťko, gave testimony of tbis continuity of the hlstorical evolution of tbe Slovak natíon when, looking at Presldent Dr. .Joseph Tiso in the Bratislava National Court, he said: "This man was, after Svätopluk, our second bead." Austrian emperors and Hungarian klngs were not "our heads" or rulers because of the free will of the Slovak nation. But nelther was T. G. Masaryk, nor Dr. Edward Beneš; nor is Clement Gottwald the "head" of the Slovak nation. From the standpoint of this historical continuity, "our head" can be, and shall be able to be, only the man who shall be placed on the empty chalr of the president of tbe Slovak Republic by the will of the people and in the intent of the national and Ohristian traditions of the Slovak people. How extremely difficult was the road travelled by the Slovak nation - from the times of Svätopluk all the way to Dr. Joseph Tlso - was clearly demonstrated when counter forces tried to destroy the work of the Slovak spirit, es,pecially when they removed in crimlnal fashion the representatlves and Jiving expresslons of the Slovak will from the leadership of Slovak national and politlcal life. The more concrete the form of realizing Slovak aims, the more cruelly all alien and anti-Slovak forces intervened. That is why the work of the Slovak State, wben it proved itself to be on a European and world level, evoked so much concentrated crlmlnality and revenge from the enemies of Slovak independence, the likes of wblch not a single clvilized and cultured nation had ever seen. �2 SLOVAKIA The anti-Slovak forces were symbolized by one of the most des-picalble phenomena of the Czech nation and of contemporary European history, Dr. Edward Beneš. Knowlng that they could not be a ble to destroy the blessed achievements of S lovak vlctory - the Slovak Republíc - they dld not hesitate to ask the help of the criminal forces of the anti-European and anti-Cbristian conspiracy whicb was organized and led by the Kremlln. At the moment of the bistorlcal duel, there remained on the side of the Slovak Republic only the falthful Slovak race and its sons, who were determined and prepared to die as martyrs for the rights of the Slovak nation. Against the Slovak 1Republic was the world public, which had been charmed by the falsehoods and frauds of Dr. Ed· ward Beneš. Thirsting for Slovak blood, designated wlth Cain's mark on their forehads, armed wlth all the means of Soviet justice and prot0i)ted by the military, political and police might of the Soviet Union, the wards of Dr. Edward Beneš-of Czech and Slovak originset out wlth a vengeance against the Joya.l sons of the Slovak nation who were armed only with prayerbooks and the Jegal code of the Christian world-outlook. At the same Ume few people In Europe and in the world comprehended the extent of the treason, the victim of which was the Christian Slovak natlon and the Jegal expression of its will - the Slovak State. Very few people in Europe and in the world realized the im· mensity of the treason of Dr. Edward Beneš, his Czech polítical companions and the individuals of Slovak origin who had united with them in crlme. This anti-Slovak consplracy, which was the beginning of the anti-European and anti-Christlan consplracy of internationa.l Communism, was determlned to destroy the Slovak Republlc, the expression of right and justice. But the means valld up to that tíme did not suffice for the conspirators, so they acted according to the new laws, which were created by the philosophy of violence and Communist crime. To destroy the Slovak State, this conspiratorial, anti-Slovak assoclatlon needed the entire apparatus of terror whlch was used and legallzed by the Soviet system. The Slovak nation succumbed to thls vlolence and temporarily was deprlved of its own State. "After Svätopluk our second head" the President of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso - was indicted, tried, convlcted and executed according to the manner of the Communlst system. Fully aware of thls historical crime and with the consent of hls own Government and full co-responsiblllty of his own executive organs on the territory of the Slovak State, which according to thelr own admission "ruled themselves," Dr. Edward Beneš intervened In the bloodiest manner in thls hlstorlcal development of tbe Slovak natlon, tbereby deflnltely intending to sever the lndestructlble contlnulty of the Slovak spirit. On tbis hlstorical background, there comes before tbe eyes of the contemporary Slovak generation and tbe eyes of contemporary Europe and the world the human and politlcal protile of tbe President of the Slovak Republlc, Joseph Tiso. From tbe Slovak view·point, as well as that of universal history, the greatness of his martyr's death has attained such a degree, that it has placed the figme of Joseph Tlso among the bravest, the noblest and morally perfect expresslons of human effort !or good, for justice, and for right and freedom. His phy- �SLOVAKIA a sical appearance is today crowned with a legendary halo, wbicb to date no member of tbe Slovak natlon bas attained. Every Slovak son and daugbter was acquainted wltb Tiso, because Tiso as priest, as politician, as man, and even as president, was in daily contact wlth Slovak life. And thougb tbe martyr's deatb ba.s enbanced the political and human profile of Joseph Tiso over any otber, as well as the degree of pel'fectlon of the Slov3k spirit atta1ned from a moral, religious, national, polltlcal and world vlewpoint, bis immortal and live presence bas become tbe most su:bstantlal part of the tbinking of the Slovak man today and shall be a constant stimulator of bis· spirit. Tbe more tragic and dark the background from wbicb appears tbe clean and bright pbenomenon of tbe personality of Josepb Tlso, tbe more impassable tbe aibyss between tbe Slovak nation and tbe conspirators against its freedom. Tbe martyr's deatb of Joseph T iso and its glorification cannot be and shall not b e separated from this background, in which - in a union sealed with a treaty or treason, blood and crime - moves a bout and shall eternally appear tbe repulsive face of Dr. Edward Beneš, marked wlth the spittle of revenge, on wbich no artist and no propaganda procedure s hall be able to elicit a smile of a clean conscience. On this bistorlcal b ackground, worthy of Dante's interno, in an equal mora! ugliness sball eternally find tbemselves the individuals, wbo consldered it an honor to besmirch their consciences ,ľitb tbe biood of Slovak sons and whose only vietory is tbe temporary destruction of Slovak independence. These men, being branded wltb tbe mark of Communlsm, bave followed thelr master, Edward Beneš, on the stage of Slovak tragedy, The present Slovak tragedy has attained sucb dlmenslons that not only the intellectual groups of a Slovak generatlon, but even tbe wbole Slovak natlon collectively have been affected by lt. Never b efore in the history of tbe Slovak people did it happen tbat every Slovak man, woman and child were the llvlng partlcipants of the mora! and material destruction caused by tbe conspirators against Slovak statebood. Even if we can comprebend the revenge of Edward Beneš and bis Czecb companlons on the Slovak Nation as an interventlon of negatíve forces in the Divine plans, we cannot understancl, and so much the less excuse, the actlve partlc!patlon in it of tbe lndlvlduals of Slovak origin, wbo renderecl servlce to aliens and consplred agalnst the life of the nation t hey are clescended from. The terrible contrast between the reality of the Slovak State and tbe "acquisitlons of tbe glorious national insurrectlon." which was insplrecl by foreign interests, led by Slovak renegades and climaxed by total communlstlc terror is, and forever shall be, the final sketcher of the political and human profile of ťhe personlflei- of Slovak State lndependence, J oseph Tiso, and the mora! and political degeneracy of those who are In a run measure responsible for the present servlle position of the Slovak nation. From the viewpoint of historical perspective. not only the Slovak 11atlon, but even the whole world sees today the immensity of the sacrifice of a son, loyal to God and nation, was able to make and, on tbe other hand, tbe immenslty of the treason and the consequences emanating from the gullt of those who, silencing wlthin themselv~ the outcry of conscience, rejected from their declsions and acts the law of God and th e Jaw of the natlon. �4 SLOVAKIA To make the human and political profile of tbe president of tbe Slovak Republic more expressive, no Slovak needs any syntbetic beautifying mediums, because bis pbysical and spiritua,l features were tbe work of tbe Hands of God and tbe bealtby, religious environment of tbe Slovak nation. On thls face glowed tbe fire of tbe servant of God and nation to tbe very last moment of bis eartbly life. Josepb Tiso was not a complicated, but a clear, clean and transparent pbenomenon; just as uncomplicated, clear, clean and transparent as has been tbe natural cbaracter of tbe Slovak person for generations. Slovak bistory will not bave to searcb for reasons for tbe !ega! connection of the Slovak acts, which form a segment of tbe life of tbe Slovak State, because these acts were explained by the crystal-clear deeds of President Tiso himself. On August 16, 1938, when J oseph Tiso was partlng with the deceased Andrew Hlinka on the Ružomberok Square in the name or the whole Slovak nation, his words sound<ld like the eternal voice of the Slovak spirit, which when silenced on the li,ps of one, are heard by the living nation on the lips of another. This uninterrupted thread of Slovak evo\utlon was handed over to Joseph Tiso by Andrew Hlinka. ' Never was Andrew Hlinka so great in life, as his death has shown bim to be," said Tlso over the casket of the spiritual soverelgn of the Slovak peopl e. "Andrew Hlinka was great during bis lifetime, because he dedicated his liťe to a great idea-and he appeared great a t death, because hls death, attestlng faitbful service to his great idea to the very end, places bim in the gallery of the spiritual heroes of the Slovak nation. The idea of an independent Slovak natlon was the source of bis boundless love for the Slovak natíon, which led and took on higb tbe life of Andrew Hlinka. As a result of bis being elevated to the priestbood of the New Testament, his love for hls people received a special blessing and intensity: by becoming a servant of Christ, he became tbe servant of a grandiose idea - whlch in relation to patriotism meant that he became the servant of an idea, offerlng himself and all bis possessions on the altar of tbat same idea. "Hlinka, priest and patriot, lived in the deep conviction that he was not serving a trivial idea, a superflcial thing, but a cause tbat had deep roots in a 1000-year-old pa.st and in the Christian order of the life of bis nation in the present. In this bigher consecration, bis patriotism did not mean only persona! fancy and momentary satisfaction, but it meant dedicating and sacriflclng bis wbole being - constantly and unreservedly, un'Ceaslngly and tirelessly - because even in bis patriotism he felt that he was a prlest of God who was making a sacriflce - a full-time and lifetime sacrifice in the sense of bis full-time and lifetime priestly character. That is why bis work for bis Slovak people was a figbt - not a struggle for power and glory, but a sacred fight always in the defense of tbe most sacred values, so dear to all members of our nation: our national rigbts, po\itica\ rights, cultural and economic rights. As it bebooves a person dedi· cated to tbe service of an idea, bis fight was an ideological fight. The great Idea of a Divine Order was connected with the idea of a distinct Slovak nation to feed the two-win~ed flame which filled bis mind and bis heart and governed bis whole life. Ideally inflamed, Hlinka waged this sacred fight under difficult circumstances; he �SLOVAKIA 6 fought against overwhelming odds. Yet never did he retreat trom anyone or anything, because he did not doubt tbe naturalness of the right of bis own people to its own life; and he believed in the future of bis nation, because it held fast to the space allotted it by God in the family of otber nations. He bore within himself the conviction of a chosen leader of his people with whom he lived in the most intimate union, along with whom he fought in the land of the Pharaohs, and whom he was to lead into the promised land." It was thus that Tiso described the political and human profile of Andrew Hlinka. And in this profile of the spiritual sovereign of the Slovak nation, Andrew Hlinka, in substance were also found all the traits of the human and political features of Joseph Tiso. The physical person was not the same, but what was substantial, splritual and eternal remained - as proof of the continuity of Slovak life. All the cbaracteristics which adorned the priestly and polltlcal personality or Andrew Hlinka, also adorned bis successor in the management of the destinies of the Slovak people, Dr..Joseph Tiso. Service to God and nation. however, exacted from Joseph Tiso the maximum that a person possibly could give. What Joseph Tiso said at the final parting with Andrew Hlinka was not only so many beautiful words, but a great and heroic act, which attalned its perfect expresslon in the existenee of the Slovak Republic during his presldency - one that was confirmed before the Slovak natlon and before the whole cultured and civilized world with bis martyr's death. We can thank Divine Providencť' and the living continuity of the Slovak spirit that during the most decisive phase of Slovak and world bistory, the Slovak nation decided of it~ own free will to place in the chair of Svätopluk a man of the people who ťarried In hls heart and soul the spark of consecration which was given the Slovak natlon as a dowry at the dawn of its history. That is why the political and human work of Joseph Tiso attainecl such a mora! ancl historical value, the value of which will be recognized even if only one member of the Slovak nation remains on earth. Joseph Tiso did not get on the throne of Slovak rulers by the coincidence of subordinate circumstances, because even the realization of state independence was not the result of an accident. Just as state independence was the ripe fruit on the tree of life of Slovak gnerations, just so its visible head was the mature offspring of Slovak ideological, mora) and spiritual development. Even lf Joseph Tiso personally as a man would not have wanted to be the president of the Slovak Republic, he simply had to be, because at the tlme of the proclamation of Slovak independence he was the acknowledged ruler of the collective will of the Slovak people. Just as 'ľiso dld not seek the oHlce of president as man and priest, just so he hearkened to the voice of the Slovak genle and accepted the presidency from the qualified representatlves of the nation as a supreme obllgatlon - a duty which he performed faithfully and well to the very last moment of his life.. Jf Joseph Tiso devoted hlmself to tbe national service or the Slovak cause, then he diel so in full responsibílity of hls historlc missión. That is why he did not hesitate even for a moment In the face of seduction and vlolence. The presldent of the Slovak Republlc could not recant or even betray anything. That is why Josepb Tlso, after �6 SLOVAKIA acceptlng the office of Pľesident with so much self-immolation, stirred the whole Slovak nation iuto a building effoľt; that is why he defended before a non-Slovak court the work of tbe Slovak RepubJic with such dignity; and that is why, being fully aware that he pertormed his duties as well as he could, Tlso could bless bis [aithful people even from the shadow of the gallows. The human accomplisbments of tbe president of tbe Slovak Republic were destined not only by bis priestly character, but also by tbe whole character of a son of the Slovak nation, who never strayed from Slovak and Cbristian trad!tions. No matter how hard the nonSlovak and non-Cbristian court tried, it could not prove that Joseph Tiso wa.s gu!lty of acts tbat ran counter to natural and Slovak laws, or were contrary to mora! law. Tbat is why tbe Slova:k nat!on regarded the conviction and execution of .Josepb Tiso as a dellberate, prnmeditated and executed crime. And lt s ball regard it so for all time. The political work of tbe President of the Slovak Republic, serving the welfare o f tbe entire Slovak nation, created such conditions for tbe Slovak natlon so that it could wltbin the framework of !ts state boundaries prove its capabllity to live and so that in its international relationsbip it could gain recognition. Joseph Tiso, placed on the throne of an independent Slovak ruler, did not play the politics of Moscow, Berlin, Dudapest, Paris, London, or Washington, but worked the policy of Bratisla va, the cap!tal city 9f tbe independent State of Slovakia. He worked that pol!cy under ihe given pol!tlcal, geographical and internat!onal circumstances; and he had to work it in sucb a way so that the interests of the Slovak natlon and its State were safeguarded as well as possilble in tbis play of opposing forces. Josepb Tiso could not consplre against the work of Slovak hlstory and. therefore, no otber conception except the pnrely Slovak and state conception could be acceptable for him as well as tbe entlre Slovak nation. He did not regard the existence of the Slovak State as a debatable question. Just as the Slovak nation existed, so the Slovak State also had to exist. " This standpoint - which was not only bis, but tbe whole Slovak nation's as well - was incompatible with the view beld by Dr. Edward Beneš and dictated by him to his lackeys - the renegades of Slovak descent on the territory of t he Slovak State - first from London, then from Moscow and finally from Prague. · Joseph Tiso was so deeply convinced about the propriety of bis llecisions as President tha.t he did not hesitate to state before the nonSlovak and non-Cbristian court which was trying bim: "If in the fLÍture it were g!ven to me to concern myself wlth politics, under such circumstances as obtained in 1919-1945, I would follow the same polic!es that I did at that Ume." Looklng over the picture of the human and political profile of tbe f!rst President of tbe Slovak Republic, wbo already today appears in tbe halo of a martyr in the eyes of Europe and the world, we cannot help but be convinced that Joseph Tlso preceded t he development of European and un!versal realities of today, so tbat he could indicate the return of those eternal, mora! and polltlcal values. wbich in today'$ change or the world order have, as lt were, temporarily g!ven place and reign to the forces of the human peripbery �SLOVAKIA 7 which is guided by the Iaw of the jungle. His profile appears on the background of this shocking tragedy, wbich 1s not only natlonal, but European as welJ. The Chrlstlan and natlonal values, whlch Joseph Tlso personified In a form thus far unattalned by any Slovak, were and are being torn out of the body of the Slovak natlon, and In their place was and is being forced the criminal phllosophy and morality or Godless Communism. On the European and world stage the equllibrium o! mora! and polltical order was vlolated, and the declared and proven criminallty of Communism was accepted as the equivalent com• ponent of the hnman struggle for a better tomorow. Using sneh unChristian and unhistorical yardstlcks, the human and politlcal pro• file of the President of the Slovak Republic was regarded as sometbing that does not fall into tbe accepted norms of chaos, wbich was tbe result of tbe aggressiveness and perfidiousness of the CommunLstlc system and of the cowardice and appeasement of a world, whlch, of course, did say that it is llving in Christian and democrat!c forms, but was in fact, willlng to lend itself to a suicidal experiment in an alliance witb Communlsm. That !s why the voice of Joseph Tiso was silenced - the voice which defended truth and Christian morality, tbe freedom ot tbe Slovak people and its State; tbe volce that cried out agalnst Communlsm and for European and Christian cultnre. During tbe reign ot pol!tlcaJ and moral chaos, which was instaJJed totally in Slovakia and partially In tbe rest of Europe, the voice of the just confessor of universal moral principles was a volce crying In tbe wilderness. Al that Ume the crimlnal morality of tbe non-Slovak and non-Cbrlstian court In Bratis lava was accepted as tbe norma! form of justice. It took a long tlme for the West to become sat!ated wlth thls unnatural concublnage with the Soviet system and finally declde to defend wbat Communlsm did not as yet have t!me to conquer. Edward Beneš, his people and the renegades of Slovak origin joined witb them, taking advantage of the moral and politlcal chaos of the world and using the norms of communlstlc lies and deceptlon, wanted to present the pol!t!cal and human profile of Joseph Tiso in s uch a way as to evoke averslon. They succeeded in thls, but only temporarily. As long as the world accepted Stalln as the representatlve ot the most perfect democracy, whlle Dimltrov was a model of nobility, as long as Tito was an angel of justlce, wh!le Rákos! was recognlzed as a norm ot tolerance, as long as Anna Pauker, Palmlro Togl!atti, M:aurlce Tborez and Wllliam Pleck were the hope of European brotherhood, and whlle Edward Beneš, Clement Gottwald and thelr companlone qualified as bu!lders of the brldge between the West and the East - the Presldent ot the Slovak Republ!c, Dr. Joseph Tlso, was a phenomenon who slmply dld not belong in Europe. And Joseph Tlso and the Slovak nation did not want a martyr for the falth ot Christ, for a Christian and just Europe and for the Slovak Republic to belong to the gallery of these representatlves ot dera!led Europe. The unreal conception about the posslbility or normal cohabltation of two irreconcilable world outlooks - the Communlst and the Chrlstian - was bullt on deceptlon and violence, on the basis of a philosophy or falsehood and crime, on cowardlce and apostasy. On the basls ot this unnatural concept!on, it was allowed, with the concurrence of the cultured and civilized world, to lead the head of the �8 SLOVAKIA Slovak State to the gallows despite the fact that he was a priest of the Catholic Church who never violated Her doctrines or Her ia,ws; and despite the fact that Tiso was a man of spotless life and a patriot of the highest level; and despite the fact that Tiso was the freely and democratically elected head of a recognized and orderly European State. Over Joseph Tiso, under whose government no one was executed, the verdict of death was dictated by Edward Beneš, a foreigner by blood and spirit in the eyes of the Slovaks, who perpetrated so much damage on Slovak life and property that as long as a Slovak s hall be a Slovak, the mere mentlon of Beneš's name will always inspire mora! repugnance and eternal condemnation. J oseph Tiso - who conducted himself in accordance to the existing cons<titutional and controlllng institutions, as well as the highest authority of God, that Divine Law and Catholic doctrine which he professed and upheld from childhood a11 the way up to the gallows was tried and convicted by Edward Beneš who - even though he had at hand a "freely" elected parliament ready to do his vengeful bidding - Jistened to and was guided by no one except Stalin and himself. Beneš listened only to himself and hls own voice, which was slngularly full of hatred for everything Slovak, and obeyed an unChristian and undemocratic instinct, which in the last years of his life, was centered entirely against the freedom and state independence of the Slovak nation. Individuals devoid of all morals wanted to teach the gospel to a noble, Catholic priest; w ealthy and corrupt men lec tured him a bout Christian soclology; Godless and faithless people with catechisms in their bloody hands tried bim; the destroyers and plu nderers of the national wealth of the Slovak people tried to show him how he should have defended Slovakia; the perpetrators o.f communist terror dared to speak about principles of Democracy and Christianity; cowards, who never had the courage to raise their voices in defense of Slovak interests, were presented to bim as roodels of heroism; the allies of Communism told bim about the "acquisition of the glo· rious insurrections;" traitors of tbe Slovak race tried to teacb hlm patriotism; the grave diggers of Slovak independence tried to convince hlm of the advantages of subordination of the Slovak nation within the framework of cobabitation with the Czechs. On such negative princ lples, drawn from Communist doctrines, they created the profile of Joseph Tlso. In the conflict with this pollUcal and moral underworld, wbich occupled the !and of the Slovaks and also prepared to enthrone its own government and its own principles in the rest of Europe, Joseph Tiso stood tbere before the Communist tribunal as a milestone on the threshold of two ages. The gallows erected in the courtyard of the Bratislava prison, on wbich the great S lovak, Christian, European beart of the first President of the Slovak Republic ceased beating - that is the symbol of the conflict for wblch Communism and its allies were preparing. It is the symbol of the determination shown by a man of European and world outlook, wbo foresaw not only the extent of his own sacrifice, but also its mora! lmportance at a Ume, when Europe and the world - returnlng to the trnditional Chrlstlan norms - would �SLOVAK.IA 9 weigb justly the mora! and political values not only of lndivlduals, but also of nations. Looking at the human and political profile of the President ot the Slovak Republic from this historical vantage point, it can be said that the Slovak nation, whích succumbed in the brutal conflict tor its own statehood in the Europe of yesterday and today - in which Beneš, and the Communist and pro-Communist alliance helping bim, had all the say about Slovakia - shall wln its just !Ight for the renewal of Slovak statehood in the Europe of tomorrow, where people of determin ation, goodness, noblesse, Christlan morali ty - Jike J oseph Tiso will appear on the stage o! European history. • • • WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO "The execution of Msgr. Joseph Tiso was a judicial murder and it is also a political murder. One can c riticize the polltics of the late Msgr. Joseph Tiso, disagree with it and fight against it wltb all of one's strength, but, according to my deep conviction, a man should not be murdered for his political activity which was in accord with the conviction of his nation and for which he had a motive in the development of political events durlng the flrst and second CzechoSlovak Republlcs and in the course followed by lts presidents and governments. It is a down-right travesty of justice that a Slovak, elected President of the Slovak Republic by a majority of the Slovak nation, be executed by the government of a self-appolnted presldent of the present 'Czechoslovak Republic,' who, accordlng to the laws of the First Republic, himself should first be tried and condemned." - Kare! Lochner, former Czecho-Slovak Consul, London, England, April 1947. • • • "American Slovak Catholic women were horrified at the igno· minious death of Monsignor Joseph Tiso. Greatly resent the ignoring of our plea and petition sent by cablegram to President Edward Be• neš and others from our Annual Board Meeting held F®ruary 27, 1947, at Bridgeport, Connecticut, in behalf of our entire membership of 75,000 women and children. The wrath of the entire membership centers itself upon the leaders of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. We hail )lonsignor Tiso as a martyr, dying for the cause of bis people." - Susan Matuscak, Secretary First Catholic Slovak Ladles Union, Cleveland, Ohio. • • • • • • "Tbe Czech governmeRt of presldent Edward Beneš sacrificed an opportunity of easing the tension between the Czechs and the Slovaks when it executed the Rev. Joseph Tiso." - Osservatore Romano, Yatican City, Haly. " The execution of Dr. Josepb Tiso, who loved bis people and served tbem conscientiously throughout bis life, wil\ undoubted\y inspire thousands of his brethren to contlnue the fight for the !nherent and God-given rights of tbe Slovak nation." - John Sabol, Secretary l•'irst Cathollc Slovak Union, Cleveland, Ohio. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document MARCH, 1952. SLOVAKIA 1 THE FIRST PRESIDENT OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC Dr. Joseph Cieker From the very beginning of its history the Slovak nation endeavored to attain a full natlonal and political life. From the standpoint of history, the substance of the development of the Slovaks has not changed. Not all natlons developed in the same manner. Many nations lived in such an environment and under such conditions that their norma! life was not hindered by serious obstacles and they <;ould, therefore, develop to state and national perfectlon more rapidJy t han the nations which, on the road of their development, met with many obstacles - some of which were insurmountable. More than one nation spent its blood in wars and disappeared from the history of Europe. We Slovaks, too, frequently found ourselves exhausted by wars, and at times it appeared to us we might not be strong enough to overcome the obstacles thrust in our path by foreigners and also renegades from our own ranks. Despite the extreme material and biological losses, the Slovak nation, nevertheless, successfully won a place of equality among the nations of Europe and the world and proved its maturity in its own independent Slovak State. In the development of the Slovak nation, there existed a constant continuity even though many falled to see it and some even denied it. Loyal Slovak sons, who were entrusted wlth the responsible task of leadership In Slovak national and political life, believed In this contlnuity of the Slovak spirit wbich glistened so brightly ln real expression on the throne of the first Slovak rulers and then on the chair of the first President of the Slovak Republlc. The elderly Archbishop of Nitra, Dr. Char.les Kmeťko, gave testimony of tbis continuity of the hlstorical evolution of tbe Slovak natíon when, looking at Presldent Dr. .Joseph Tiso in the Bratislava National Court, he said: "This man was, after Svätopluk, our second bead." Austrian emperors and Hungarian klngs were not "our heads" or rulers because of the free will of the Slovak nation. But nelther was T. G. Masaryk, nor Dr. Edward Beneš; nor is Clement Gottwald the "head" of the Slovak nation. From the standpoint of this historical continuity, "our head" can be, and shall be able to be, only the man who shall be placed on the empty chalr of the president of tbe Slovak Republic by the will of the people and in the intent of the national and Ohristian traditions of the Slovak people. How extremely difficult was the road travelled by the Slovak nation - from the times of Svätopluk all the way to Dr. Joseph Tlso - was clearly demonstrated when counter forces tried to destroy the work of the Slovak spirit, es,pecially when they removed in crimlnal fashion the representatlves and Jiving expresslons of the Slovak will from the leadership of Slovak national and politlcal life. The more concrete the form of realizing Slovak aims, the more cruelly all alien and anti-Slovak forces intervened. That is why the work of the Slovak State, wben it proved itself to be on a European and world level, evoked so much concentrated crlmlnality and revenge from the enemies of Slovak independence, the likes of wblch not a single clvilized and cultured nation had ever seen. 2 SLOVAKIA The anti-Slovak forces were symbolized by one of the most des-picalble phenomena of the Czech nation and of contemporary European history, Dr. Edward Beneš. Knowlng that they could not be a ble to destroy the blessed achievements of S lovak vlctory - the Slovak Republíc - they dld not hesitate to ask the help of the criminal forces of the anti-European and anti-Cbristian conspiracy whicb was organized and led by the Kremlln. At the moment of the bistorlcal duel, there remained on the side of the Slovak Republic only the falthful Slovak race and its sons, who were determined and prepared to die as martyrs for the rights of the Slovak nation. Against the Slovak 1Republic was the world public, which had been charmed by the falsehoods and frauds of Dr. Ed· ward Beneš. Thirsting for Slovak blood, designated wlth Cain's mark on their forehads, armed wlth all the means of Soviet justice and prot0i)ted by the military, political and police might of the Soviet Union, the wards of Dr. Edward Beneš-of Czech and Slovak originset out wlth a vengeance against the Joya.l sons of the Slovak nation who were armed only with prayerbooks and the Jegal code of the Christian world-outlook. At the same Ume few people In Europe and in the world comprehended the extent of the treason, the victim of which was the Christian Slovak natlon and the Jegal expression of its will - the Slovak State. Very few people in Europe and in the world realized the im· mensity of the treason of Dr. Edward Beneš, his Czech polítical companions and the individuals of Slovak origin who had united with them in crlme. This anti-Slovak consplracy, which was the beginning of the anti-European and anti-Christlan consplracy of internationa.l Communism, was determlned to destroy the Slovak Republlc, the expression of right and justice. But the means valld up to that tíme did not suffice for the conspirators, so they acted according to the new laws, which were created by the philosophy of violence and Communist crime. To destroy the Slovak State, this conspiratorial, anti-Slovak assoclatlon needed the entire apparatus of terror whlch was used and legallzed by the Soviet system. The Slovak nation succumbed to thls vlolence and temporarily was deprlved of its own State. "After Svätopluk our second head" the President of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso - was indicted, tried, convlcted and executed according to the manner of the Communlst system. Fully aware of thls historical crime and with the consent of hls own Government and full co-responsiblllty of his own executive organs on the territory of the Slovak State, which according to thelr own admission "ruled themselves," Dr. Edward Beneš intervened In the bloodiest manner in thls hlstorlcal development of tbe Slovak natlon, tbereby deflnltely intending to sever the lndestructlble contlnulty of the Slovak spirit. On tbis hlstorical background, there comes before tbe eyes of the contemporary Slovak generation and tbe eyes of contemporary Europe and the world the human and politlcal protile of tbe President of the Slovak Republlc, Joseph Tiso. From tbe Slovak view·point, as well as that of universal history, the greatness of his martyr's death has attained such a degree, that it has placed the figme of Joseph Tlso among the bravest, the noblest and morally perfect expresslons of human effort !or good, for justice, and for right and freedom. His phy- SLOVAKIA a sical appearance is today crowned with a legendary halo, wbicb to date no member of tbe Slovak natlon bas attained. Every Slovak son and daugbter was acquainted wltb Tiso, because Tiso as priest, as politician, as man, and even as president, was in daily contact wlth Slovak life. And thougb tbe martyr's deatb ba.s enbanced the political and human profile of Joseph Tiso over any otber, as well as the degree of pel'fectlon of the Slov3k spirit atta1ned from a moral, religious, national, polltlcal and world vlewpoint, bis immortal and live presence bas become tbe most su:bstantlal part of the tbinking of the Slovak man today and shall be a constant stimulator of bis· spirit. Tbe more tragic and dark the background from wbicb appears tbe clean and bright pbenomenon of tbe personality of Josepb Tlso, tbe more impassable tbe aibyss between tbe Slovak nation and tbe conspirators against its freedom. Tbe martyr's deatb of Joseph T iso and its glorification cannot be and shall not b e separated from this background, in which - in a union sealed with a treaty or treason, blood and crime - moves a bout and shall eternally appear tbe repulsive face of Dr. Edward Beneš, marked wlth the spittle of revenge, on wbich no artist and no propaganda procedure s hall be able to elicit a smile of a clean conscience. On this bistorlcal b ackground, worthy of Dante's interno, in an equal mora! ugliness sball eternally find tbemselves the individuals, wbo consldered it an honor to besmirch their consciences ,ľitb tbe biood of Slovak sons and whose only vietory is tbe temporary destruction of Slovak independence. These men, being branded wltb tbe mark of Communlsm, bave followed thelr master, Edward Beneš, on the stage of Slovak tragedy, The present Slovak tragedy has attained sucb dlmenslons that not only the intellectual groups of a Slovak generatlon, but even tbe wbole Slovak natlon collectively have been affected by lt. Never b efore in the history of tbe Slovak people did it happen tbat every Slovak man, woman and child were the llvlng partlcipants of the mora! and material destruction caused by tbe conspirators against Slovak statebood. Even if we can comprebend the revenge of Edward Beneš and bis Czecb companlons on the Slovak Nation as an interventlon of negatíve forces in the Divine plans, we cannot understancl, and so much the less excuse, the actlve partlc!patlon in it of tbe lndlvlduals of Slovak origin, wbo renderecl servlce to aliens and consplred agalnst the life of the nation t hey are clescended from. The terrible contrast between the reality of the Slovak State and tbe "acquisitlons of tbe glorious national insurrectlon." which was insplrecl by foreign interests, led by Slovak renegades and climaxed by total communlstlc terror is, and forever shall be, the final sketcher of the political and human profile of ťhe personlflei- of Slovak State lndependence, J oseph Tiso, and the mora! and political degeneracy of those who are In a run measure responsible for the present servlle position of the Slovak nation. From the viewpoint of historical perspective. not only the Slovak 11atlon, but even the whole world sees today the immensity of the sacrifice of a son, loyal to God and nation, was able to make and, on tbe other hand, tbe immenslty of the treason and the consequences emanating from the gullt of those who, silencing wlthin themselv~ the outcry of conscience, rejected from their declsions and acts the law of God and th e Jaw of the natlon. 4 SLOVAKIA To make the human and political profile of tbe president of tbe Slovak Republic more expressive, no Slovak needs any syntbetic beautifying mediums, because bis pbysical and spiritua,l features were tbe work of tbe Hands of God and tbe bealtby, religious environment of tbe Slovak nation. On thls face glowed tbe fire of tbe servant of God and nation to tbe very last moment of bis eartbly life. Josepb Tiso was not a complicated, but a clear, clean and transparent pbenomenon; just as uncomplicated, clear, clean and transparent as has been tbe natural cbaracter of tbe Slovak person for generations. Slovak bistory will not bave to searcb for reasons for tbe !ega! connection of the Slovak acts, which form a segment of tbe life of tbe Slovak State, because these acts were explained by the crystal-clear deeds of President Tiso himself. On August 16, 1938, when J oseph Tiso was partlng with the deceased Andrew Hlinka on the Ružomberok Square in the name or the whole Slovak nation, his words sound<ld like the eternal voice of the Slovak spirit, which when silenced on the li,ps of one, are heard by the living nation on the lips of another. This uninterrupted thread of Slovak evo\utlon was handed over to Joseph Tiso by Andrew Hlinka. ' Never was Andrew Hlinka so great in life, as his death has shown bim to be," said Tlso over the casket of the spiritual soverelgn of the Slovak peopl e. "Andrew Hlinka was great during bis lifetime, because he dedicated his liťe to a great idea-and he appeared great a t death, because hls death, attestlng faitbful service to his great idea to the very end, places bim in the gallery of the spiritual heroes of the Slovak nation. The idea of an independent Slovak natlon was the source of bis boundless love for the Slovak natíon, which led and took on higb tbe life of Andrew Hlinka. As a result of bis being elevated to the priestbood of the New Testament, his love for hls people received a special blessing and intensity: by becoming a servant of Christ, he became tbe servant of a grandiose idea - whlch in relation to patriotism meant that he became the servant of an idea, offerlng himself and all bis possessions on the altar of tbat same idea. "Hlinka, priest and patriot, lived in the deep conviction that he was not serving a trivial idea, a superflcial thing, but a cause tbat had deep roots in a 1000-year-old pa.st and in the Christian order of the life of bis nation in the present. In this bigher consecration, bis patriotism did not mean only persona! fancy and momentary satisfaction, but it meant dedicating and sacriflclng bis wbole being - constantly and unreservedly, un'Ceaslngly and tirelessly - because even in bis patriotism he felt that he was a prlest of God who was making a sacriflce - a full-time and lifetime sacrifice in the sense of bis full-time and lifetime priestly character. That is why bis work for bis Slovak people was a figbt - not a struggle for power and glory, but a sacred fight always in the defense of tbe most sacred values, so dear to all members of our nation: our national rigbts, po\itica\ rights, cultural and economic rights. As it bebooves a person dedi· cated to tbe service of an idea, bis fight was an ideological fight. The great Idea of a Divine Order was connected with the idea of a distinct Slovak nation to feed the two-win~ed flame which filled bis mind and bis heart and governed bis whole life. Ideally inflamed, Hlinka waged this sacred fight under difficult circumstances; he SLOVAKIA 6 fought against overwhelming odds. Yet never did he retreat trom anyone or anything, because he did not doubt tbe naturalness of the right of bis own people to its own life; and he believed in the future of bis nation, because it held fast to the space allotted it by God in the family of otber nations. He bore within himself the conviction of a chosen leader of his people with whom he lived in the most intimate union, along with whom he fought in the land of the Pharaohs, and whom he was to lead into the promised land." It was thus that Tiso described the political and human profile of Andrew Hlinka. And in this profile of the spiritual sovereign of the Slovak nation, Andrew Hlinka, in substance were also found all the traits of the human and political features of Joseph Tiso. The physical person was not the same, but what was substantial, splritual and eternal remained - as proof of the continuity of Slovak life. All the cbaracteristics which adorned the priestly and polltlcal personality or Andrew Hlinka, also adorned bis successor in the management of the destinies of the Slovak people, Dr..Joseph Tiso. Service to God and nation. however, exacted from Joseph Tiso the maximum that a person possibly could give. What Joseph Tiso said at the final parting with Andrew Hlinka was not only so many beautiful words, but a great and heroic act, which attalned its perfect expresslon in the existenee of the Slovak Republic during his presldency - one that was confirmed before the Slovak natlon and before the whole cultured and civilized world with bis martyr's death. We can thank Divine Providencť' and the living continuity of the Slovak spirit that during the most decisive phase of Slovak and world bistory, the Slovak nation decided of it~ own free will to place in the chair of Svätopluk a man of the people who ťarried In hls heart and soul the spark of consecration which was given the Slovak natlon as a dowry at the dawn of its history. That is why the political and human work of Joseph Tiso attainecl such a mora! ancl historical value, the value of which will be recognized even if only one member of the Slovak nation remains on earth. Joseph Tiso did not get on the throne of Slovak rulers by the coincidence of subordinate circumstances, because even the realization of state independence was not the result of an accident. Just as state independence was the ripe fruit on the tree of life of Slovak gnerations, just so its visible head was the mature offspring of Slovak ideological, mora) and spiritual development. Even lf Joseph Tiso personally as a man would not have wanted to be the president of the Slovak Republic, he simply had to be, because at the tlme of the proclamation of Slovak independence he was the acknowledged ruler of the collective will of the Slovak people. Just as 'ľiso dld not seek the oHlce of president as man and priest, just so he hearkened to the voice of the Slovak genle and accepted the presidency from the qualified representatlves of the nation as a supreme obllgatlon - a duty which he performed faithfully and well to the very last moment of his life.. Jf Joseph Tiso devoted hlmself to tbe national service or the Slovak cause, then he diel so in full responsibílity of hls historlc missión. That is why he did not hesitate even for a moment In the face of seduction and vlolence. The presldent of the Slovak Republlc could not recant or even betray anything. That is why Josepb Tlso, after 6 SLOVAKIA acceptlng the office of Pľesident with so much self-immolation, stirred the whole Slovak nation iuto a building effoľt; that is why he defended before a non-Slovak court the work of tbe Slovak RepubJic with such dignity; and that is why, being fully aware that he pertormed his duties as well as he could, Tlso could bless bis [aithful people even from the shadow of the gallows. The human accomplisbments of tbe president of tbe Slovak Republic were destined not only by bis priestly character, but also by tbe whole character of a son of the Slovak nation, who never strayed from Slovak and Cbristian trad!tions. No matter how hard the nonSlovak and non-Cbristian court tried, it could not prove that Joseph Tiso wa.s gu!lty of acts tbat ran counter to natural and Slovak laws, or were contrary to mora! law. Tbat is why tbe Slova:k nat!on regarded the conviction and execution of .Josepb Tiso as a dellberate, prnmeditated and executed crime. And lt s ball regard it so for all time. The political work of tbe President of the Slovak Republic, serving the welfare o f tbe entire Slovak nation, created such conditions for tbe Slovak natlon so that it could wltbin the framework of !ts state boundaries prove its capabllity to live and so that in its international relationsbip it could gain recognition. Joseph Tiso, placed on the throne of an independent Slovak ruler, did not play the politics of Moscow, Berlin, Dudapest, Paris, London, or Washington, but worked the policy of Bratisla va, the cap!tal city 9f tbe independent State of Slovakia. He worked that pol!cy under ihe given pol!tlcal, geographical and internat!onal circumstances; and he had to work it in sucb a way so that the interests of the Slovak natlon and its State were safeguarded as well as possilble in tbis play of opposing forces. Josepb Tiso could not consplre against the work of Slovak hlstory and. therefore, no otber conception except the pnrely Slovak and state conception could be acceptable for him as well as tbe entlre Slovak nation. He did not regard the existence of the Slovak State as a debatable question. Just as the Slovak nation existed, so the Slovak State also had to exist. " This standpoint - which was not only bis, but tbe whole Slovak nation's as well - was incompatible with the view beld by Dr. Edward Beneš and dictated by him to his lackeys - the renegades of Slovak descent on the territory of t he Slovak State - first from London, then from Moscow and finally from Prague. · Joseph Tiso was so deeply convinced about the propriety of bis llecisions as President tha.t he did not hesitate to state before the nonSlovak and non-Cbristian court which was trying bim: "If in the fLÍture it were g!ven to me to concern myself wlth politics, under such circumstances as obtained in 1919-1945, I would follow the same polic!es that I did at that Ume." Looklng over the picture of the human and political profile of tbe f!rst President of tbe Slovak Republic, wbo already today appears in tbe halo of a martyr in the eyes of Europe and the world, we cannot help but be convinced that Joseph Tlso preceded t he development of European and un!versal realities of today, so tbat he could indicate the return of those eternal, mora! and polltlcal values. wbich in today'$ change or the world order have, as lt were, temporarily g!ven place and reign to the forces of the human peripbery SLOVAKIA 7 which is guided by the Iaw of the jungle. His profile appears on the background of this shocking tragedy, wbich 1s not only natlonal, but European as welJ. The Chrlstlan and natlonal values, whlch Joseph Tlso personified In a form thus far unattalned by any Slovak, were and are being torn out of the body of the Slovak natlon, and In their place was and is being forced the criminal phllosophy and morality or Godless Communism. On the European and world stage the equllibrium o! mora! and polltical order was vlolated, and the declared and proven criminallty of Communism was accepted as the equivalent com• ponent of the hnman struggle for a better tomorow. Using sneh unChristian and unhistorical yardstlcks, the human and politlcal pro• file of the President of the Slovak Republic was regarded as sometbing that does not fall into tbe accepted norms of chaos, wbich was tbe result of tbe aggressiveness and perfidiousness of the CommunLstlc system and of the cowardice and appeasement of a world, whlch, of course, did say that it is llving in Christian and democrat!c forms, but was in fact, willlng to lend itself to a suicidal experiment in an alliance witb Communlsm. That !s why the voice of Joseph Tiso was silenced - the voice which defended truth and Christian morality, tbe freedom ot tbe Slovak people and its State; tbe volce that cried out agalnst Communlsm and for European and Christian cultnre. During tbe reign ot pol!tlcaJ and moral chaos, which was instaJJed totally in Slovakia and partially In tbe rest of Europe, the voice of the just confessor of universal moral principles was a volce crying In tbe wilderness. Al that Ume the crimlnal morality of tbe non-Slovak and non-Cbrlstian court In Bratis lava was accepted as tbe norma! form of justice. It took a long tlme for the West to become sat!ated wlth thls unnatural concublnage with the Soviet system and finally declde to defend wbat Communlsm did not as yet have t!me to conquer. Edward Beneš, his people and the renegades of Slovak origin joined witb them, taking advantage of the moral and politlcal chaos of the world and using the norms of communlstlc lies and deceptlon, wanted to present the pol!t!cal and human profile of Joseph Tiso in s uch a way as to evoke averslon. They succeeded in thls, but only temporarily. As long as the world accepted Stalln as the representatlve ot the most perfect democracy, whlle Dimltrov was a model of nobility, as long as Tito was an angel of justlce, wh!le Rákos! was recognlzed as a norm ot tolerance, as long as Anna Pauker, Palmlro Togl!atti, M:aurlce Tborez and Wllliam Pleck were the hope of European brotherhood, and whlle Edward Beneš, Clement Gottwald and thelr companlone qualified as bu!lders of the brldge between the West and the East - the Presldent ot the Slovak Republ!c, Dr. Joseph Tlso, was a phenomenon who slmply dld not belong in Europe. And Joseph Tlso and the Slovak nation did not want a martyr for the falth ot Christ, for a Christian and just Europe and for the Slovak Republic to belong to the gallery of these representatlves ot dera!led Europe. The unreal conception about the posslbility or normal cohabltation of two irreconcilable world outlooks - the Communlst and the Chrlstian - was bullt on deceptlon and violence, on the basis of a philosophy or falsehood and crime, on cowardlce and apostasy. On the basls ot this unnatural concept!on, it was allowed, with the concurrence of the cultured and civilized world, to lead the head of the 8 SLOVAKIA Slovak State to the gallows despite the fact that he was a priest of the Catholic Church who never violated Her doctrines or Her ia,ws; and despite the fact that Tiso was a man of spotless life and a patriot of the highest level; and despite the fact that Tiso was the freely and democratically elected head of a recognized and orderly European State. Over Joseph Tiso, under whose government no one was executed, the verdict of death was dictated by Edward Beneš, a foreigner by blood and spirit in the eyes of the Slovaks, who perpetrated so much damage on Slovak life and property that as long as a Slovak s hall be a Slovak, the mere mentlon of Beneš's name will always inspire mora! repugnance and eternal condemnation. J oseph Tiso - who conducted himself in accordance to the existing cons<titutional and controlllng institutions, as well as the highest authority of God, that Divine Law and Catholic doctrine which he professed and upheld from childhood a11 the way up to the gallows was tried and convicted by Edward Beneš who - even though he had at hand a "freely" elected parliament ready to do his vengeful bidding - Jistened to and was guided by no one except Stalin and himself. Beneš listened only to himself and hls own voice, which was slngularly full of hatred for everything Slovak, and obeyed an unChristian and undemocratic instinct, which in the last years of his life, was centered entirely against the freedom and state independence of the Slovak nation. Individuals devoid of all morals wanted to teach the gospel to a noble, Catholic priest; w ealthy and corrupt men lec tured him a bout Christian soclology; Godless and faithless people with catechisms in their bloody hands tried bim; the destroyers and plu nderers of the national wealth of the Slovak people tried to show him how he should have defended Slovakia; the perpetrators o.f communist terror dared to speak about principles of Democracy and Christianity; cowards, who never had the courage to raise their voices in defense of Slovak interests, were presented to bim as roodels of heroism; the allies of Communism told bim about the "acquisition of the glo· rious insurrections;" traitors of tbe Slovak race tried to teacb hlm patriotism; the grave diggers of Slovak independence tried to convince hlm of the advantages of subordination of the Slovak nation within the framework of cobabitation with the Czechs. On such negative princ lples, drawn from Communist doctrines, they created the profile of Joseph Tlso. In the conflict with this pollUcal and moral underworld, wbich occupled the !and of the Slovaks and also prepared to enthrone its own government and its own principles in the rest of Europe, Joseph Tiso stood tbere before the Communist tribunal as a milestone on the threshold of two ages. The gallows erected in the courtyard of the Bratislava prison, on wbich the great S lovak, Christian, European beart of the first President of the Slovak Republic ceased beating - that is the symbol of the conflict for wblch Communism and its allies were preparing. It is the symbol of the determination shown by a man of European and world outlook, wbo foresaw not only the extent of his own sacrifice, but also its mora! lmportance at a Ume, when Europe and the world - returnlng to the trnditional Chrlstlan norms - would SLOVAK.IA 9 weigb justly the mora! and political values not only of lndivlduals, but also of nations. Looking at the human and political profile of the President ot the Slovak Republic from this historical vantage point, it can be said that the Slovak nation, whích succumbed in the brutal conflict tor its own statehood in the Europe of yesterday and today - in which Beneš, and the Communist and pro-Communist alliance helping bim, had all the say about Slovakia - shall wln its just !Ight for the renewal of Slovak statehood in the Europe of tomorrow, where people of determin ation, goodness, noblesse, Christlan morali ty - Jike J oseph Tiso will appear on the stage o! European history. • • • WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO "The execution of Msgr. Joseph Tiso was a judicial murder and it is also a political murder. One can c riticize the polltics of the late Msgr. Joseph Tiso, disagree with it and fight against it wltb all of one's strength, but, according to my deep conviction, a man should not be murdered for his political activity which was in accord with the conviction of his nation and for which he had a motive in the development of political events durlng the flrst and second CzechoSlovak Republlcs and in the course followed by lts presidents and governments. It is a down-right travesty of justice that a Slovak, elected President of the Slovak Republic by a majority of the Slovak nation, be executed by the government of a self-appolnted presldent of the present 'Czechoslovak Republic,' who, accordlng to the laws of the First Republic, himself should first be tried and condemned." - Kare! Lochner, former Czecho-Slovak Consul, London, England, April 1947. • • • "American Slovak Catholic women were horrified at the igno· minious death of Monsignor Joseph Tiso. Greatly resent the ignoring of our plea and petition sent by cablegram to President Edward Be• neš and others from our Annual Board Meeting held F®ruary 27, 1947, at Bridgeport, Connecticut, in behalf of our entire membership of 75,000 women and children. The wrath of the entire membership centers itself upon the leaders of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. We hail )lonsignor Tiso as a martyr, dying for the cause of bis people." - Susan Matuscak, Secretary First Catholic Slovak Ladles Union, Cleveland, Ohio. • • • • • • "Tbe Czech governmeRt of presldent Edward Beneš sacrificed an opportunity of easing the tension between the Czechs and the Slovaks when it executed the Rev. Joseph Tiso." - Osservatore Romano, Yatican City, Haly. " The execution of Dr. Josepb Tiso, who loved bis people and served tbem conscientiously throughout bis life, wil\ undoubted\y inspire thousands of his brethren to contlnue the fight for the !nherent and God-given rights of tbe Slovak nation." - John Sabol, Secretary l•'irst Cathollc Slovak Union, Cleveland, Ohio.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The First President of the Slovak Republic Description An account of the resource Dr. Joseph Cieker Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952 pp. 1-9 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Cieker, Jozef, 1907-1969 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/4cf23d1de317242aa7b3b53d9845a1ba.pdf 5ae41e4c22c3723c5c58f0fff39e3903 PDF Text Text 28 SLOVAKIA mE PURGE IN PRAGUE JOSEPH A. MIKUŠ Two very prominent Communis,t personalities were executed recently in Prague: Karel Slansky, former Seeretary General of the Czech Communist Party, and Vladimír C lementis, former Forelgn Minister of Czecho-Slovakia. To Central-European observers probably the grealtest a,urprjse of the Prague purge tria! was the faot that two different "deviationisms" were tried and convicted by the same court a.'t one and the same Ume: the "Zionism" or the Jewish group, headed by Slansky, and the ",Slovak nationalism" of Clementis. This may appear as the same kind of crime ~rom an external and purely Jegalistic view or Communist "justice," bu:t politioally there Js a clear distinction between the two "deviaitionisms." Three years ago Slansky and Clementis were regarded as antagonistic personalities in the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia. At that time Slansky w-as an lmportant leader of "proletarlan internationalism," the accepted Communi-st concept of international colJaboration. For a long tíme he was considered as "a man of Moscow." But being an lntellectual, he was obsessed wlth the very dangerous ambltlon of trylng to overshadow "the man from the people," Mr. Gdttwald. Slansky was, therefore, the victim of a persona! rivalry with Gottwald in their struggle for power. As Secretary General of the Czech Communlst Party, Slansky thought he could play the role of Stalln in Czecho-61ovakla, while for Gdttwald it would be sufficient to play the role of Shvernlk. Now, at the brlal, this rlvalry had to be ťonsidered and expresseed in terms of criminal law. Slnce the Soviet Union bad to change its aVtltude toward Israel, consldering the Ara:b world of more lmportance on the po!itical chessboard, lt was eai!y to construct the crlme of Slansky as a colluslon wlth a foreign power agalnst -the interests of the Czecho-'Slovak State. The story of Clementls !s a different one. In the eyes of Moscow, his Communist record slnce 1939 w,as not good; 1t did not conform wifä Stalinlst pollcy. At .fäat time, you wlll recall, he expresseď Mmself agaln1>t the Rlbbentrop•Molotov Pact. At the end of Worlcl War II, even though he was a member of the Benes Government In London, Clementis preferred not to return to Prague via Moscow. And Moscow remembered. So did Gottwald. Molotov was cool toward Clementis at 11.he Peace Conference In Parls in 1946. Durlng a dlplomatlc receptlon, Mr. Molotov went fi.rst to exchange greetlngs with Mr. Hajdu, then only a member of the Czech0-'Slovak delegatlon, and only 'then approached Mr. Clementls, the Under.Secretary of State and Actlng Chief of the delegatlon. After the death of Jan Masaryk, Clementls became Minister of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Slansky, Secretary General of the Communist Party, together with three Under-Seoretarles in the Ministry or Foreign Affalra - Vavro Hajdu, Arthur London and Friedrich Gemlnder consplred against hlm. While -a ttending the UNO General A.ssemb!y sess!ons in New York, in 1949, as Chief of the Czecho-Slovak �iLOVAKIA 29 delegation, Clementls lost control of hls Ministry a:t home. Under the direction of Wllllam Siroky, then Vice-Premler, Hajdu, London and Geminder took over the controls of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and from that Ume on Mr. Clementis became their potential cal}tive. In November, 1949, rumors began to circulate in the world press that Mr. Clemen,us was not dispos ed to return to Czecho-Slovakia any more. But then Mr. Gottwald sent Mrs. Clementls by plane to New York to convince her husband that everythlng was in order and he could fully depend on the Presldenťs trust and protection. Mir. Clementis gave in to the pleadings of his wife and returned to Prague aibout the middle or December, 1949. There he wa.s greeted at the former Wilson Station by Mr. Slroky and the consplring Under-sSecretaries. Four months Iater, on Marc-h 14, 1950, Olementis was obliged ·to resign bis office "voluntair!ly" and a year later, in February 1951, he was lncarcerated. As far as intern,a l politics is concerned, Mr. Clementis wa.s partisan to a federative reform in Czecho-Slovakia and stood for certain nat:ional liberties in bis na:tive Slovakla. Clemel'lJtis, therefore became a victlm both of the "StallnL~m" of Moscow and the centralism of Prague. The next purge tria! is supposed to take place in a short time in Bratislava, capital of Slovakia, against a group of "Titoist" devia tion:lsts, among whom we may flnd: Gustav H usak, former Chief of the autonomous Government of Slovakla, Karol Schmidke, former president of the autonomous Parliament In Bratislava, Ladislav "Novomesky, former Minister of Educa:tion ln tbe Slov,ak autonomous Government, Daniel Okaly, b.rother-Jn-law of Clementis and former Minister of Interlor ln Slov-akia, Ivan Horvat, former M!nlsier Plenipotentiary in Budapest, and otbers. • • • WHO SAI D IT ? "The Czech People's Party regards the transfer of Germans as a historical success, lndeed, whlch with its slgnlficance falls In line immediatly next to the successful conclusion of the treaty with the USSR. . . , For thls success we are obllgated to Šrámek's government with great gratltude. . . . We were interested in gettlng rld of t he Germans as speedily as possible. Allow me on this occaslon to mentlon a pol!tician, who alongslde of President Beneš and Monsignor Šrámek had a signiflcant share in this plan of transfer. lt was Mr. Minister Dr. Rlpka (applause). Slnce the Autumn of 1938 I have been bis intimate fellow-worker. . . Ripka worked on the transfer of Germans, because he regarded the war that had erupted at that Ume as a really historlcal opportunity to clean our !and of burdensome German ballast ... AU the groups of the National Front at the end of 1943 even fully agreed wlth thls line and, therefore, the trans fer of the Germans ls also the result of the joint effort of all the groups and partles of the Natlonal Front. We shall exclude no one from thls success even though lt !s true that, e.g., the Communist Party in 1939- 1941 did not have so unanlmous and so uncompromlslngly Slovanic a conceptlon of the matter as lt ha.s today." - (Dr. Ivo Ducháček in the Prague Provis1onal Natlonal Assembly, March 8, 1946. He ls now supposed to be the "big wheel" in the Czechoslovak Divlslon of the VOICE OF AMERICA). � 28 SLOVAKIA mE PURGE IN PRAGUE JOSEPH A. MIKUŠ Two very prominent Communis,t personalities were executed recently in Prague: Karel Slansky, former Seeretary General of the Czech Communist Party, and Vladimír C lementis, former Forelgn Minister of Czecho-Slovakia. To Central-European observers probably the grealtest a,urprjse of the Prague purge tria! was the faot that two different "deviationisms" were tried and convicted by the same court a.'t one and the same Ume: the "Zionism" or the Jewish group, headed by Slansky, and the ",Slovak nationalism" of Clementis. This may appear as the same kind of crime ~rom an external and purely Jegalistic view or Communist "justice," bu:t politioally there Js a clear distinction between the two "deviaitionisms." Three years ago Slansky and Clementis were regarded as antagonistic personalities in the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia. At that time Slansky w-as an lmportant leader of "proletarlan internationalism," the accepted Communi-st concept of international colJaboration. For a long tíme he was considered as "a man of Moscow." But being an lntellectual, he was obsessed wlth the very dangerous ambltlon of trylng to overshadow "the man from the people," Mr. Gdttwald. Slansky was, therefore, the victim of a persona! rivalry with Gottwald in their struggle for power. As Secretary General of the Czech Communlst Party, Slansky thought he could play the role of Stalln in Czecho-61ovakla, while for Gdttwald it would be sufficient to play the role of Shvernlk. Now, at the brlal, this rlvalry had to be ťonsidered and expresseed in terms of criminal law. Slnce the Soviet Union bad to change its aVtltude toward Israel, consldering the Ara:b world of more lmportance on the po!itical chessboard, lt was eai!y to construct the crlme of Slansky as a colluslon wlth a foreign power agalnst -the interests of the Czecho-'Slovak State. The story of Clementls !s a different one. In the eyes of Moscow, his Communist record slnce 1939 w,as not good; 1t did not conform wifä Stalinlst pollcy. At .fäat time, you wlll recall, he expresseď Mmself agaln1>t the Rlbbentrop•Molotov Pact. At the end of Worlcl War II, even though he was a member of the Benes Government In London, Clementis preferred not to return to Prague via Moscow. And Moscow remembered. So did Gottwald. Molotov was cool toward Clementis at 11.he Peace Conference In Parls in 1946. Durlng a dlplomatlc receptlon, Mr. Molotov went fi.rst to exchange greetlngs with Mr. Hajdu, then only a member of the Czech0-'Slovak delegatlon, and only 'then approached Mr. Clementls, the Under.Secretary of State and Actlng Chief of the delegatlon. After the death of Jan Masaryk, Clementls became Minister of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Slansky, Secretary General of the Communist Party, together with three Under-Seoretarles in the Ministry or Foreign Affalra - Vavro Hajdu, Arthur London and Friedrich Gemlnder consplred against hlm. While -a ttending the UNO General A.ssemb!y sess!ons in New York, in 1949, as Chief of the Czecho-Slovak �iLOVAKIA 29 delegation, Clementls lost control of hls Ministry a:t home. Under the direction of Wllllam Siroky, then Vice-Premler, Hajdu, London and Geminder took over the controls of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and from that Ume on Mr. Clementis became their potential cal}tive. In November, 1949, rumors began to circulate in the world press that Mr. Clemen,us was not dispos ed to return to Czecho-Slovakia any more. But then Mr. Gottwald sent Mrs. Clementls by plane to New York to convince her husband that everythlng was in order and he could fully depend on the Presldenťs trust and protection. Mir. Clementis gave in to the pleadings of his wife and returned to Prague aibout the middle or December, 1949. There he wa.s greeted at the former Wilson Station by Mr. Slroky and the consplring Under-sSecretaries. Four months Iater, on Marc-h 14, 1950, Olementis was obliged ·to resign bis office "voluntair!ly" and a year later, in February 1951, he was lncarcerated. As far as intern,a l politics is concerned, Mr. Clementis wa.s partisan to a federative reform in Czecho-Slovakia and stood for certain nat:ional liberties in bis na:tive Slovakla. Clemel'lJtis, therefore became a victlm both of the "StallnL~m" of Moscow and the centralism of Prague. The next purge tria! is supposed to take place in a short time in Bratislava, capital of Slovakia, against a group of "Titoist" devia tion:lsts, among whom we may flnd: Gustav H usak, former Chief of the autonomous Government of Slovakla, Karol Schmidke, former president of the autonomous Parliament In Bratislava, Ladislav "Novomesky, former Minister of Educa:tion ln tbe Slov,ak autonomous Government, Daniel Okaly, b.rother-Jn-law of Clementis and former Minister of Interlor ln Slov-akia, Ivan Horvat, former M!nlsier Plenipotentiary in Budapest, and otbers. • • • WHO SAI D IT ? "The Czech People's Party regards the transfer of Germans as a historical success, lndeed, whlch with its slgnlficance falls In line immediatly next to the successful conclusion of the treaty with the USSR. . . , For thls success we are obllgated to Šrámek's government with great gratltude. . . . We were interested in gettlng rld of t he Germans as speedily as possible. Allow me on this occaslon to mentlon a pol!tician, who alongslde of President Beneš and Monsignor Šrámek had a signiflcant share in this plan of transfer. lt was Mr. Minister Dr. Rlpka (applause). Slnce the Autumn of 1938 I have been bis intimate fellow-worker. . . Ripka worked on the transfer of Germans, because he regarded the war that had erupted at that Ume as a really historlcal opportunity to clean our !and of burdensome German ballast ... AU the groups of the National Front at the end of 1943 even fully agreed wlth thls line and, therefore, the trans fer of the Germans ls also the result of the joint effort of all the groups and partles of the Natlonal Front. We shall exclude no one from thls success even though lt !s true that, e.g., the Communist Party in 1939- 1941 did not have so unanlmous and so uncompromlslngly Slovanic a conceptlon of the matter as lt ha.s today." - (Dr. Ivo Ducháček in the Prague Provis1onal Natlonal Assembly, March 8, 1946. He ls now supposed to be the "big wheel" in the Czechoslovak Divlslon of the VOICE OF AMERICA). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 28 SLOVAKIA mE PURGE IN PRAGUE JOSEPH A. MIKUŠ Two very prominent Communis,t personalities were executed recently in Prague: Karel Slansky, former Seeretary General of the Czech Communist Party, and Vladimír C lementis, former Forelgn Minister of Czecho-Slovakia. To Central-European observers probably the grealtest a,urprjse of the Prague purge tria! was the faot that two different "deviationisms" were tried and convicted by the same court a.'t one and the same Ume: the "Zionism" or the Jewish group, headed by Slansky, and the ",Slovak nationalism" of Clementis. This may appear as the same kind of crime ~rom an external and purely Jegalistic view or Communist "justice," bu:t politioally there Js a clear distinction between the two "deviaitionisms." Three years ago Slansky and Clementis were regarded as antagonistic personalities in the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia. At that time Slansky w-as an lmportant leader of "proletarlan internationalism," the accepted Communi-st concept of international colJaboration. For a long tíme he was considered as "a man of Moscow." But being an lntellectual, he was obsessed wlth the very dangerous ambltlon of trylng to overshadow "the man from the people," Mr. Gdttwald. Slansky was, therefore, the victim of a persona! rivalry with Gottwald in their struggle for power. As Secretary General of the Czech Communlst Party, Slansky thought he could play the role of Stalln in Czecho-61ovakla, while for Gdttwald it would be sufficient to play the role of Shvernlk. Now, at the brlal, this rlvalry had to be ťonsidered and expresseed in terms of criminal law. Slnce the Soviet Union bad to change its aVtltude toward Israel, consldering the Ara:b world of more lmportance on the po!itical chessboard, lt was eai!y to construct the crlme of Slansky as a colluslon wlth a foreign power agalnst -the interests of the Czecho-'Slovak State. The story of Clementls !s a different one. In the eyes of Moscow, his Communist record slnce 1939 w,as not good; 1t did not conform wifä Stalinlst pollcy. At .fäat time, you wlll recall, he expresseď Mmself agaln1>t the Rlbbentrop•Molotov Pact. At the end of Worlcl War II, even though he was a member of the Benes Government In London, Clementis preferred not to return to Prague via Moscow. And Moscow remembered. So did Gottwald. Molotov was cool toward Clementis at 11.he Peace Conference In Parls in 1946. Durlng a dlplomatlc receptlon, Mr. Molotov went fi.rst to exchange greetlngs with Mr. Hajdu, then only a member of the Czech0-'Slovak delegatlon, and only 'then approached Mr. Clementls, the Under.Secretary of State and Actlng Chief of the delegatlon. After the death of Jan Masaryk, Clementls became Minister of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Slansky, Secretary General of the Communist Party, together with three Under-Seoretarles in the Ministry or Foreign Affalra - Vavro Hajdu, Arthur London and Friedrich Gemlnder consplred against hlm. While -a ttending the UNO General A.ssemb!y sess!ons in New York, in 1949, as Chief of the Czecho-Slovak iLOVAKIA 29 delegation, Clementls lost control of hls Ministry a:t home. Under the direction of Wllllam Siroky, then Vice-Premler, Hajdu, London and Geminder took over the controls of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and from that Ume on Mr. Clementis became their potential cal}tive. In November, 1949, rumors began to circulate in the world press that Mr. Clemen,us was not dispos ed to return to Czecho-Slovakia any more. But then Mr. Gottwald sent Mrs. Clementls by plane to New York to convince her husband that everythlng was in order and he could fully depend on the Presldenťs trust and protection. Mir. Clementis gave in to the pleadings of his wife and returned to Prague aibout the middle or December, 1949. There he wa.s greeted at the former Wilson Station by Mr. Slroky and the consplring Under-sSecretaries. Four months Iater, on Marc-h 14, 1950, Olementis was obliged ·to resign bis office "voluntair!ly" and a year later, in February 1951, he was lncarcerated. As far as intern,a l politics is concerned, Mr. Clementis wa.s partisan to a federative reform in Czecho-Slovakia and stood for certain nat:ional liberties in bis na:tive Slovakla. Clemel'lJtis, therefore became a victlm both of the "StallnL~m" of Moscow and the centralism of Prague. The next purge tria! is supposed to take place in a short time in Bratislava, capital of Slovakia, against a group of "Titoist" devia tion:lsts, among whom we may flnd: Gustav H usak, former Chief of the autonomous Government of Slovakla, Karol Schmidke, former president of the autonomous Parliament In Bratislava, Ladislav "Novomesky, former Minister of Educa:tion ln tbe Slov,ak autonomous Government, Daniel Okaly, b.rother-Jn-law of Clementis and former Minister of Interlor ln Slov-akia, Ivan Horvat, former M!nlsier Plenipotentiary in Budapest, and otbers. • • • WHO SAI D IT ? "The Czech People's Party regards the transfer of Germans as a historical success, lndeed, whlch with its slgnlficance falls In line immediatly next to the successful conclusion of the treaty with the USSR. . . , For thls success we are obllgated to Šrámek's government with great gratltude. . . . We were interested in gettlng rld of t he Germans as speedily as possible. Allow me on this occaslon to mentlon a pol!tician, who alongslde of President Beneš and Monsignor Šrámek had a signiflcant share in this plan of transfer. lt was Mr. Minister Dr. Rlpka (applause). Slnce the Autumn of 1938 I have been bis intimate fellow-worker. . . Ripka worked on the transfer of Germans, because he regarded the war that had erupted at that Ume as a really historlcal opportunity to clean our !and of burdensome German ballast ... AU the groups of the National Front at the end of 1943 even fully agreed wlth thls line and, therefore, the trans fer of the Germans ls also the result of the joint effort of all the groups and partles of the Natlonal Front. We shall exclude no one from thls success even though lt !s true that, e.g., the Communist Party in 1939- 1941 did not have so unanlmous and so uncompromlslngly Slovanic a conceptlon of the matter as lt ha.s today." - (Dr. Ivo Ducháček in the Prague Provis1onal Natlonal Assembly, March 8, 1946. He ls now supposed to be the "big wheel" in the Czechoslovak Divlslon of the VOICE OF AMERICA).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Purge in Prague Description An account of the resource Joseph A. Mikuš Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952 pp. 28-29 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Mikuš, Joseph A., 1909-2005 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/fbdef89074b2bc4b98bdc86f97c61bc3.pdf cca5aaa530f7aff178cddb1cf114da18 PDF Text Text S LOVAKIA 66 TIIE SECBET FUNDS OF BENE.S' INTELLIGENCE SERVICE The Archives of t he Intelllgence Department of any Foreign Office have never been accessible to any free Citizen, who is the s ource of power in a free state. Not even a M.P., a representative or the people and a law-maker, can see them. Such a department is a secret room in whlch the power-conjurors preserve the secrets of their tricks. Twice in our lieftime this alchemisťs kitchen has been opened to the public. In 1917 the Russian Bolsheviks published the secret documents of the tzarist Foreign Office, and in 1943 lhe Nazis published all the documents relatlng to the secret funds of the Czechoslovakian Foreign Office which, for twenty years, had as its chief medicine-man, the late Edward Benes. In both cases the documenus were publlshed for propaganda reasons by those who had come to power, but the action traine!l a spotlight on the fundamentals of forelgn policy. H e who has once had the opportunlty to see into lhe secret rooms of foreign pollcy must for ever after be an enemy of ~o-called sovereign states and an advocate of a European Federatlon or Nations whlch alone could eliminate the cancer of corruption whose workings are carefuly concealed in the Intelligence Departments of Foreign Offices. Had tbere been 30 million Czecbs, Europe would long ago bave belonged to them, because they are an incredibly diligent people, and one of the most diligent among tbem was thelr Foreign Secretary. Benes had no political conception wbatever, but he was a flrst• class traveler in principles and, had bis means not been so limited, he could have purcbased at least the whole of the democratic world. But, fortunately for the world, tbere were only 8 mlllion Czechs, and Benes had neither t be means nor the Ume to bring hls buslness to a successful conclusion. But what he achieved is truly remarkable. After the Hapsbnrg monarchy had been dismembered and Vienna had become the capital of a small Austria with 7 million inhabitants, tbe Austrian natlonal press, whose previous market had been an Em· pire wi.th 52 million inhabltants, found itself in a difficult flnancial position. Czechoslovakian foreign policy was naturally much concerned with neighboring Austria, and Benes, therefore, througb mediators, bought the Austrian Press concern. VERNA, which published two Viennese dailies, "DER WIENER TAG" and "DIE STUNDE." The member of the Czechoslovaklan Forelgn Office responsible Cor this business was a certain OPLATKA who, in his report (o!ficial uumber 58.194/34) stated: "The morning paper 'Der Wlener T ag' is intended for people of the social democratic party and on various questions was often more radical than the official party presa. 'Die Stunde,' on the other hand, since we took it over, has followed not the social democratlc, but rather the bourgeois democratic line, attempting to realize a collaboration between Social Democrats and Christian Socialista." As we can see, Benes was a well-equipped salesman of prlnci11les, having l\farxist and Cbristian ideals stored in the same drawer or his desk. He coulťl serve any Austrian ac<'orcling to bis taste. But �66 SLQVAKIA whatever the Austrian believed, Mr. Benes was always behind tt. ln view of this, we can understand why, even today, some Austrlan social democrats are firmly convinced that Benes' followers are the only true representatlves ot Czechoslovakian democracy, whlle the editor of "Pravda" (London) is a !asclst. Obvlously, for the editor of "Pravda" was never In a posltion to sell the last cow ot a Slovaklan crofter for taxes he owed to the Czechoslovaklan state, or to invest, from the pockets of Czechoslovakian taxpayers, halt-a-million r•ounds sterling in the di11eminatlon of Marxist and Christian democrat ic ideas in Vlenna. Another country to which Benes turned bis enterprising, diligent Czech spirit was Yugoolavia. The G-Overnment In Yugoslavla had neither tlme nor money to spare for lts own press, slnce it was heavlly engaged In supporting the forelgn, and prlnclpally t he French, press. Therefore, Benes, comandlng much larger funds t han the lmpoverished Yugoslavian Forelgn Secretary, declded to flnance the progovernment press in Yugoslavla. He supported the Belgrade dally '·Politika" and many local papers. When Mr. So.skle, owner of the opposltion daily "Pravda" in Belgrade, had made certaln wbence the pro-government "Politika" received money, he wrote to Benes as follows: Belgrade, Ie 20-XII-1931. A Son Excellence, Monsieur Mlnlstre des Affaires Extrangeres, Eduard Benes, Prague. Excellence: A ľoccasion de ces grands tel.es de Noel je prends la liberté de de vous presenter tous mes mellleurs voeu.x de bonheur pour Vous et Votre chere Patrie. Aussi je Vous prie de voulolr blen me permettre Que je. vous rappelle a Votre gentllle promesse a propos de norte emprunt, pour leguel vous avalt donné Votre parole de Grand Am! que Vous voulez falre tous ce Qu'y est necessaire: qu'on relalse la "Pravda," QUl-en plein relaise et sans aucun exageration, a blen mérite de Votre pays fraternel. Cet emprunt, come j'avals ľhonneur a Vous en donnes des renselgnments precis, sera absolument assure par la hypotheque unlque sur toute la proprlété de la " Pravda" qul est évalue a D1nars 22,000,000 (vlngt deux mllllons dinars) . . ." Mr. Sosklc, In sendlng bis Chrlstmas greetlngs to Benes and hls dear motherland, humbly remarked t hat his paper always favored brotherly Czechoslovakia and that he needed 22 mllllon dlnars, on loan, of course, but on a "security" on which obvlously no one ln Belgrade was wllling to advance money. On the margin of thls le tter Benes noted: " I only sald that there might be a poMibi lity of aome a11i1tanee and already he wrltes t hat I promised him thle loan. Answer hi"' not to come to Prague." But Mr. Sosklc was terrlbly in love wlth Czechoslovakla and came In spite or Benes' refusal, and he flnally imcceeded In gettlng 50,000 �SLOVAKIA 67 Kc trom Benes, an assistance which was continually repeated. In this way the pres:: .~ Yugoslavia was for or against its own Govern,11ent. but always for .Benes. The French press looms large in this business. It needs a strong s tomach to read the reports of the Czechos\ovakian Embassy in France. In thls matter one of the moulders of French public opinton waa Profeaaor Fuscien Dominola. He waa secretary of the "lnatitut d'Etudea Slavea" and received 4,000 fra. a month from the CzechosJovakian Foreign Office, a good aalary In France at that time. But it was never enough for M. Dominois, who bombarded his benefactor ln Prague with demands for more money on the most ridicu\ous pretexr.a. tie ran up debts and, when pressed by hls creditors, asked l'rague to pay them. One such affair was dealt with in a letter trom Professqr Eiserua.nn, a Parlsian friend of Benes, to Mr. Hubert Ripka. Mr. Ripka occupled rather a speclal positlon, for he was entrusted with dellcate affalrs of J3enes ideology. So, In a lett~r written in German, Professor E:isemann - Editor of "Le Monde Slave" - wrote to Ripka about one or Dominois' affairs, about the shamelessness of bis colleague wbo worked not only for Czechoslovakla, but also for Yugoslavia and, in spite of various sources of income, ran up new debts and pressed tbe Czechs to pay them once more. This Ume the sum wa.s 20,000 frs. and the Czechs paid up once agaln. Dominols waa, of courae, not only for the Czechoalovaks and Yugoslavs. but also very much for the Rusalan Bolshevlka. There was nothing surprlsing in that. for Russ ia also is a slavonic country and the Profe:isor, the secretary of the "lo.stltut d'Etudes Slaves," was obviously j„voted to all the alavea who pald hls debts. The British chapter is rather a distingui:1bE,d one. Benes tried to make manifest in Great Britaln the klndnes~ o~ the Slavonlc nature. His ambassador here was Jan Masaryk, that klnd, jolly Slav and g reat dE:mocrat. He tried ~o help everywhere be rould. For instance, he suggested establishing the "Allan Leeper Funt!' to educate the daughter of the deceased Allan Leeper. ln a letter of 12th Feb ruary, 1935 (offlcial No. 1646 kab/35) it stated: "Allan Leeper (a brother or Ŕéx Leep'!r, ass!i;tant secretary to the Press Department of the Fore!gn Off1ce) was the beat, confidential friend (ani! 1 thtnk, schoolmate In Oxford) of Seton Watson . Ourlng the war he belped our ac• tlon by, memoranda wblch, altogether with Professor Seton Watson, he eiá.bora,ted ·'t or ~ Lord Grey and later for BaUour and prepared the cond!tlÓns for a favorable solutlon of the Czechoslovakia queation. He also prepared, with Seton Watson, the material ror a new arrangement in Centra! Europe for the British delegation to the Peace T reaty Conference. Since 1920 he was always at our diapoaal In lnformlng the British Government about Central Europe in our aenie." The Allan Leeper Fund was established. Jan Masaryk never troubled wlth detalled accounts of the small payments he made. Only for larger sums d!d he account and give an explanation. After the Munlch agreement Maaaryk reslgned and hla prace ·was taken by Mr. Lis!cky. He was a dlligent Czech offlélal who thought it bis duty to make a detalled list of all payments nrade by the Czechoslovakian Embassy in London in 1938. Hut lt is ratber a ,,,a.s �68 S LOVA:KIA large list to be published in such a small paper as " P ravda" (Lontlon). Benes' kindness was not conflned to Europe. The Czechoslovaklan Consul General in Sydney, Dr. Svetak, in a letter of 29th December, 1926, informed b is superiors how much he had paid to jou r nallsts trom various Australlan papers for not publishing statements unfavorab le to Masaryk and Benes. Normally journalists are paid for s omething they publish, but Benes also paid for silence. In a report dated 31st December, 1931, the Czec hoslovakian Consul General at Montreal, Mr. Moser, gave an account of the money he had paid for artic les favorable to Czechoslovakla in several Canadlan papers . AII the while, Benes malntained the best connections wlth So· viet Russia and at t he same time generously sup ported Russlan emlgr és and thelr anti-Soviet press. He did not sp end such a vast a mount of the Czechos lovakia n taxpayers' money •·- between a h a lf and a million pounds sterlíng every year - but he managed the spendln g In so economical and practical a way that the who le world became convinced that the best democracy and the greatest contemporary statesman were to b e found in Czechoslovakia. All this would be obvlous and natural to ardent individuallsts who e,onslder democracy from the point of view of their pr!vate interest. Ilut, unfortunat(lly, we are Jiving in this world together with Russian Bolsheviks. They can always do business with democratic indivlduals in the West, but W estern democrats cannot do business with lndlviduals of the Bolshev!k communlty, because there 1s a p enalty of death in Soviet countries for th e crime of turning poli tical prln ciples into pri vate buslness. - (Czech "PRAVDA" •- London - J une 1951) . • • • LETTRICH AND THE USSR. "Without the gigantic sacrlflces of the friendly USSR, especially its Red Ar my, wh!ch sh ed !ts blood on t he territory of the Republlc for six months, we would not have our freedom. The Czechoslovak. llepublic - and included in it free Slovakia - witbout regard to any and a ll d ifferences, never sball forget t hose sacrlfices of tbe Red Army, of tbe Soviet Union and tbe rest of the allied nations, and just as certalnly tbey shall no t forget the sacrlflces of t be Slovak natlonal insurrection. . . . From tbis convlncing experience it follows for u s. for the governmen t, for a ll pol!tlcal parties, and so also fo r the Democr atlc P arty, that our most self-evldent duty is to conslstently and lnexorably make polltics of frlendly understandlng and close cooper ation wlth a ll the vlctorious allied natlons, above all else, however, wlth our great neighbor - the largest Slovanic great power the USSR, and scrupulously avoid everything which eould In any manner hinder our efforts to attain these hlgh ldeals „ If we want to permanently hold on to our hard-earned freedom , an d state lndependence and guard agalnst possible -- future plots, we must de pend on the USSR, wbich fully respects our lndependence and h as no o tber demand on us than that we have a truly democratlc government, \ľhose poliC'y will not be In conrllct wlth Soviet interests, tha.t· we have order, in a word, that Cze<-hoslovakla be a strong and -eon• ~olidated State." - (Dr. J o!leph Lettrlch. ÔAS, 5-16-46). � S LOVAKIA 66 TIIE SECBET FUNDS OF BENE.S' INTELLIGENCE SERVICE The Archives of t he Intelllgence Department of any Foreign Office have never been accessible to any free Citizen, who is the s ource of power in a free state. Not even a M.P., a representative or the people and a law-maker, can see them. Such a department is a secret room in whlch the power-conjurors preserve the secrets of their tricks. Twice in our lieftime this alchemisťs kitchen has been opened to the public. In 1917 the Russian Bolsheviks published the secret documents of the tzarist Foreign Office, and in 1943 lhe Nazis published all the documents relatlng to the secret funds of the Czechoslovakian Foreign Office which, for twenty years, had as its chief medicine-man, the late Edward Benes. In both cases the documenus were publlshed for propaganda reasons by those who had come to power, but the action traine!l a spotlight on the fundamentals of forelgn policy. H e who has once had the opportunlty to see into lhe secret rooms of foreign pollcy must for ever after be an enemy of ~o-called sovereign states and an advocate of a European Federatlon or Nations whlch alone could eliminate the cancer of corruption whose workings are carefuly concealed in the Intelligence Departments of Foreign Offices. Had tbere been 30 million Czecbs, Europe would long ago bave belonged to them, because they are an incredibly diligent people, and one of the most diligent among tbem was thelr Foreign Secretary. Benes had no political conception wbatever, but he was a flrst• class traveler in principles and, had bis means not been so limited, he could have purcbased at least the whole of the democratic world. But, fortunately for the world, tbere were only 8 mlllion Czechs, and Benes had neither t be means nor the Ume to bring hls buslness to a successful conclusion. But what he achieved is truly remarkable. After the Hapsbnrg monarchy had been dismembered and Vienna had become the capital of a small Austria with 7 million inhabitants, tbe Austrian natlonal press, whose previous market had been an Em· pire wi.th 52 million inhabltants, found itself in a difficult flnancial position. Czechoslovakian foreign policy was naturally much concerned with neighboring Austria, and Benes, therefore, througb mediators, bought the Austrian Press concern. VERNA, which published two Viennese dailies, "DER WIENER TAG" and "DIE STUNDE." The member of the Czechoslovaklan Forelgn Office responsible Cor this business was a certain OPLATKA who, in his report (o!ficial uumber 58.194/34) stated: "The morning paper 'Der Wlener T ag' is intended for people of the social democratic party and on various questions was often more radical than the official party presa. 'Die Stunde,' on the other hand, since we took it over, has followed not the social democratlc, but rather the bourgeois democratic line, attempting to realize a collaboration between Social Democrats and Christian Socialista." As we can see, Benes was a well-equipped salesman of prlnci11les, having l\farxist and Cbristian ideals stored in the same drawer or his desk. He coulťl serve any Austrian ac<'orcling to bis taste. But �66 SLQVAKIA whatever the Austrian believed, Mr. Benes was always behind tt. ln view of this, we can understand why, even today, some Austrlan social democrats are firmly convinced that Benes' followers are the only true representatlves ot Czechoslovakian democracy, whlle the editor of "Pravda" (London) is a !asclst. Obvlously, for the editor of "Pravda" was never In a posltion to sell the last cow ot a Slovaklan crofter for taxes he owed to the Czechoslovaklan state, or to invest, from the pockets of Czechoslovakian taxpayers, halt-a-million r•ounds sterling in the di11eminatlon of Marxist and Christian democrat ic ideas in Vlenna. Another country to which Benes turned bis enterprising, diligent Czech spirit was Yugoolavia. The G-Overnment In Yugoslavla had neither tlme nor money to spare for lts own press, slnce it was heavlly engaged In supporting the forelgn, and prlnclpally t he French, press. Therefore, Benes, comandlng much larger funds t han the lmpoverished Yugoslavian Forelgn Secretary, declded to flnance the progovernment press in Yugoslavla. He supported the Belgrade dally '·Politika" and many local papers. When Mr. So.skle, owner of the opposltion daily "Pravda" in Belgrade, had made certaln wbence the pro-government "Politika" received money, he wrote to Benes as follows: Belgrade, Ie 20-XII-1931. A Son Excellence, Monsieur Mlnlstre des Affaires Extrangeres, Eduard Benes, Prague. Excellence: A ľoccasion de ces grands tel.es de Noel je prends la liberté de de vous presenter tous mes mellleurs voeu.x de bonheur pour Vous et Votre chere Patrie. Aussi je Vous prie de voulolr blen me permettre Que je. vous rappelle a Votre gentllle promesse a propos de norte emprunt, pour leguel vous avalt donné Votre parole de Grand Am! que Vous voulez falre tous ce Qu'y est necessaire: qu'on relalse la "Pravda," QUl-en plein relaise et sans aucun exageration, a blen mérite de Votre pays fraternel. Cet emprunt, come j'avals ľhonneur a Vous en donnes des renselgnments precis, sera absolument assure par la hypotheque unlque sur toute la proprlété de la " Pravda" qul est évalue a D1nars 22,000,000 (vlngt deux mllllons dinars) . . ." Mr. Sosklc, In sendlng bis Chrlstmas greetlngs to Benes and hls dear motherland, humbly remarked t hat his paper always favored brotherly Czechoslovakia and that he needed 22 mllllon dlnars, on loan, of course, but on a "security" on which obvlously no one ln Belgrade was wllling to advance money. On the margin of thls le tter Benes noted: " I only sald that there might be a poMibi lity of aome a11i1tanee and already he wrltes t hat I promised him thle loan. Answer hi"' not to come to Prague." But Mr. Sosklc was terrlbly in love wlth Czechoslovakla and came In spite or Benes' refusal, and he flnally imcceeded In gettlng 50,000 �SLOVAKIA 67 Kc trom Benes, an assistance which was continually repeated. In this way the pres:: .~ Yugoslavia was for or against its own Govern,11ent. but always for .Benes. The French press looms large in this business. It needs a strong s tomach to read the reports of the Czechos\ovakian Embassy in France. In thls matter one of the moulders of French public opinton waa Profeaaor Fuscien Dominola. He waa secretary of the "lnatitut d'Etudea Slavea" and received 4,000 fra. a month from the CzechosJovakian Foreign Office, a good aalary In France at that time. But it was never enough for M. Dominois, who bombarded his benefactor ln Prague with demands for more money on the most ridicu\ous pretexr.a. tie ran up debts and, when pressed by hls creditors, asked l'rague to pay them. One such affair was dealt with in a letter trom Professqr Eiserua.nn, a Parlsian friend of Benes, to Mr. Hubert Ripka. Mr. Ripka occupled rather a speclal positlon, for he was entrusted with dellcate affalrs of J3enes ideology. So, In a lett~r written in German, Professor E:isemann - Editor of "Le Monde Slave" - wrote to Ripka about one or Dominois' affairs, about the shamelessness of bis colleague wbo worked not only for Czechoslovakla, but also for Yugoslavia and, in spite of various sources of income, ran up new debts and pressed tbe Czechs to pay them once more. This Ume the sum wa.s 20,000 frs. and the Czechs paid up once agaln. Dominols waa, of courae, not only for the Czechoalovaks and Yugoslavs. but also very much for the Rusalan Bolshevlka. There was nothing surprlsing in that. for Russ ia also is a slavonic country and the Profe:isor, the secretary of the "lo.stltut d'Etudes Slaves," was obviously j„voted to all the alavea who pald hls debts. The British chapter is rather a distingui:1bE,d one. Benes tried to make manifest in Great Britaln the klndnes~ o~ the Slavonlc nature. His ambassador here was Jan Masaryk, that klnd, jolly Slav and g reat dE:mocrat. He tried ~o help everywhere be rould. For instance, he suggested establishing the "Allan Leeper Funt!' to educate the daughter of the deceased Allan Leeper. ln a letter of 12th Feb ruary, 1935 (offlcial No. 1646 kab/35) it stated: "Allan Leeper (a brother or Ŕéx Leep'!r, ass!i;tant secretary to the Press Department of the Fore!gn Off1ce) was the beat, confidential friend (ani! 1 thtnk, schoolmate In Oxford) of Seton Watson . Ourlng the war he belped our ac• tlon by, memoranda wblch, altogether with Professor Seton Watson, he eiá.bora,ted ·'t or ~ Lord Grey and later for BaUour and prepared the cond!tlÓns for a favorable solutlon of the Czechoslovakia queation. He also prepared, with Seton Watson, the material ror a new arrangement in Centra! Europe for the British delegation to the Peace T reaty Conference. Since 1920 he was always at our diapoaal In lnformlng the British Government about Central Europe in our aenie." The Allan Leeper Fund was established. Jan Masaryk never troubled wlth detalled accounts of the small payments he made. Only for larger sums d!d he account and give an explanation. After the Munlch agreement Maaaryk reslgned and hla prace ·was taken by Mr. Lis!cky. He was a dlligent Czech offlélal who thought it bis duty to make a detalled list of all payments nrade by the Czechoslovakian Embassy in London in 1938. Hut lt is ratber a ,,,a.s �68 S LOVA:KIA large list to be published in such a small paper as " P ravda" (Lontlon). Benes' kindness was not conflned to Europe. The Czechoslovaklan Consul General in Sydney, Dr. Svetak, in a letter of 29th December, 1926, informed b is superiors how much he had paid to jou r nallsts trom various Australlan papers for not publishing statements unfavorab le to Masaryk and Benes. Normally journalists are paid for s omething they publish, but Benes also paid for silence. In a report dated 31st December, 1931, the Czec hoslovakian Consul General at Montreal, Mr. Moser, gave an account of the money he had paid for artic les favorable to Czechoslovakla in several Canadlan papers . AII the while, Benes malntained the best connections wlth So· viet Russia and at t he same time generously sup ported Russlan emlgr és and thelr anti-Soviet press. He did not sp end such a vast a mount of the Czechos lovakia n taxpayers' money •·- between a h a lf and a million pounds sterlíng every year - but he managed the spendln g In so economical and practical a way that the who le world became convinced that the best democracy and the greatest contemporary statesman were to b e found in Czechoslovakia. All this would be obvlous and natural to ardent individuallsts who e,onslder democracy from the point of view of their pr!vate interest. Ilut, unfortunat(lly, we are Jiving in this world together with Russian Bolsheviks. They can always do business with democratic indivlduals in the West, but W estern democrats cannot do business with lndlviduals of the Bolshev!k communlty, because there 1s a p enalty of death in Soviet countries for th e crime of turning poli tical prln ciples into pri vate buslness. - (Czech "PRAVDA" •- London - J une 1951) . • • • LETTRICH AND THE USSR. "Without the gigantic sacrlflces of the friendly USSR, especially its Red Ar my, wh!ch sh ed !ts blood on t he territory of the Republlc for six months, we would not have our freedom. The Czechoslovak. llepublic - and included in it free Slovakia - witbout regard to any and a ll d ifferences, never sball forget t hose sacrlfices of tbe Red Army, of tbe Soviet Union and tbe rest of the allied nations, and just as certalnly tbey shall no t forget the sacrlflces of t be Slovak natlonal insurrection. . . . From tbis convlncing experience it follows for u s. for the governmen t, for a ll pol!tlcal parties, and so also fo r the Democr atlc P arty, that our most self-evldent duty is to conslstently and lnexorably make polltics of frlendly understandlng and close cooper ation wlth a ll the vlctorious allied natlons, above all else, however, wlth our great neighbor - the largest Slovanic great power the USSR, and scrupulously avoid everything which eould In any manner hinder our efforts to attain these hlgh ldeals „ If we want to permanently hold on to our hard-earned freedom , an d state lndependence and guard agalnst possible -- future plots, we must de pend on the USSR, wbich fully respects our lndependence and h as no o tber demand on us than that we have a truly democratlc government, \ľhose poliC'y will not be In conrllct wlth Soviet interests, tha.t· we have order, in a word, that Cze<-hoslovakla be a strong and -eon• ~olidated State." - (Dr. J o!leph Lettrlch. ÔAS, 5-16-46). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document S LOVAKIA 66 TIIE SECBET FUNDS OF BENE.S' INTELLIGENCE SERVICE The Archives of t he Intelllgence Department of any Foreign Office have never been accessible to any free Citizen, who is the s ource of power in a free state. Not even a M.P., a representative or the people and a law-maker, can see them. Such a department is a secret room in whlch the power-conjurors preserve the secrets of their tricks. Twice in our lieftime this alchemisťs kitchen has been opened to the public. In 1917 the Russian Bolsheviks published the secret documents of the tzarist Foreign Office, and in 1943 lhe Nazis published all the documents relatlng to the secret funds of the Czechoslovakian Foreign Office which, for twenty years, had as its chief medicine-man, the late Edward Benes. In both cases the documenus were publlshed for propaganda reasons by those who had come to power, but the action traine!l a spotlight on the fundamentals of forelgn policy. H e who has once had the opportunlty to see into lhe secret rooms of foreign pollcy must for ever after be an enemy of ~o-called sovereign states and an advocate of a European Federatlon or Nations whlch alone could eliminate the cancer of corruption whose workings are carefuly concealed in the Intelligence Departments of Foreign Offices. Had tbere been 30 million Czecbs, Europe would long ago bave belonged to them, because they are an incredibly diligent people, and one of the most diligent among tbem was thelr Foreign Secretary. Benes had no political conception wbatever, but he was a flrst• class traveler in principles and, had bis means not been so limited, he could have purcbased at least the whole of the democratic world. But, fortunately for the world, tbere were only 8 mlllion Czechs, and Benes had neither t be means nor the Ume to bring hls buslness to a successful conclusion. But what he achieved is truly remarkable. After the Hapsbnrg monarchy had been dismembered and Vienna had become the capital of a small Austria with 7 million inhabitants, tbe Austrian natlonal press, whose previous market had been an Em· pire wi.th 52 million inhabltants, found itself in a difficult flnancial position. Czechoslovakian foreign policy was naturally much concerned with neighboring Austria, and Benes, therefore, througb mediators, bought the Austrian Press concern. VERNA, which published two Viennese dailies, "DER WIENER TAG" and "DIE STUNDE." The member of the Czechoslovaklan Forelgn Office responsible Cor this business was a certain OPLATKA who, in his report (o!ficial uumber 58.194/34) stated: "The morning paper 'Der Wlener T ag' is intended for people of the social democratic party and on various questions was often more radical than the official party presa. 'Die Stunde,' on the other hand, since we took it over, has followed not the social democratlc, but rather the bourgeois democratic line, attempting to realize a collaboration between Social Democrats and Christian Socialista." As we can see, Benes was a well-equipped salesman of prlnci11les, having l\farxist and Cbristian ideals stored in the same drawer or his desk. He coulťl serve any Austrian ac<'orcling to bis taste. But 66 SLQVAKIA whatever the Austrian believed, Mr. Benes was always behind tt. ln view of this, we can understand why, even today, some Austrlan social democrats are firmly convinced that Benes' followers are the only true representatlves ot Czechoslovakian democracy, whlle the editor of "Pravda" (London) is a !asclst. Obvlously, for the editor of "Pravda" was never In a posltion to sell the last cow ot a Slovaklan crofter for taxes he owed to the Czechoslovaklan state, or to invest, from the pockets of Czechoslovakian taxpayers, halt-a-million r•ounds sterling in the di11eminatlon of Marxist and Christian democrat ic ideas in Vlenna. Another country to which Benes turned bis enterprising, diligent Czech spirit was Yugoolavia. The G-Overnment In Yugoslavla had neither tlme nor money to spare for lts own press, slnce it was heavlly engaged In supporting the forelgn, and prlnclpally t he French, press. Therefore, Benes, comandlng much larger funds t han the lmpoverished Yugoslavian Forelgn Secretary, declded to flnance the progovernment press in Yugoslavla. He supported the Belgrade dally '·Politika" and many local papers. When Mr. So.skle, owner of the opposltion daily "Pravda" in Belgrade, had made certaln wbence the pro-government "Politika" received money, he wrote to Benes as follows: Belgrade, Ie 20-XII-1931. A Son Excellence, Monsieur Mlnlstre des Affaires Extrangeres, Eduard Benes, Prague. Excellence: A ľoccasion de ces grands tel.es de Noel je prends la liberté de de vous presenter tous mes mellleurs voeu.x de bonheur pour Vous et Votre chere Patrie. Aussi je Vous prie de voulolr blen me permettre Que je. vous rappelle a Votre gentllle promesse a propos de norte emprunt, pour leguel vous avalt donné Votre parole de Grand Am! que Vous voulez falre tous ce Qu'y est necessaire: qu'on relalse la "Pravda," QUl-en plein relaise et sans aucun exageration, a blen mérite de Votre pays fraternel. Cet emprunt, come j'avals ľhonneur a Vous en donnes des renselgnments precis, sera absolument assure par la hypotheque unlque sur toute la proprlété de la " Pravda" qul est évalue a D1nars 22,000,000 (vlngt deux mllllons dinars) . . ." Mr. Sosklc, In sendlng bis Chrlstmas greetlngs to Benes and hls dear motherland, humbly remarked t hat his paper always favored brotherly Czechoslovakia and that he needed 22 mllllon dlnars, on loan, of course, but on a "security" on which obvlously no one ln Belgrade was wllling to advance money. On the margin of thls le tter Benes noted: " I only sald that there might be a poMibi lity of aome a11i1tanee and already he wrltes t hat I promised him thle loan. Answer hi"' not to come to Prague." But Mr. Sosklc was terrlbly in love wlth Czechoslovakla and came In spite or Benes' refusal, and he flnally imcceeded In gettlng 50,000 SLOVAKIA 67 Kc trom Benes, an assistance which was continually repeated. In this way the pres:: .~ Yugoslavia was for or against its own Govern,11ent. but always for .Benes. The French press looms large in this business. It needs a strong s tomach to read the reports of the Czechos\ovakian Embassy in France. In thls matter one of the moulders of French public opinton waa Profeaaor Fuscien Dominola. He waa secretary of the "lnatitut d'Etudea Slavea" and received 4,000 fra. a month from the CzechosJovakian Foreign Office, a good aalary In France at that time. But it was never enough for M. Dominois, who bombarded his benefactor ln Prague with demands for more money on the most ridicu\ous pretexr.a. tie ran up debts and, when pressed by hls creditors, asked l'rague to pay them. One such affair was dealt with in a letter trom Professqr Eiserua.nn, a Parlsian friend of Benes, to Mr. Hubert Ripka. Mr. Ripka occupled rather a speclal positlon, for he was entrusted with dellcate affalrs of J3enes ideology. So, In a lett~r written in German, Professor E:isemann - Editor of "Le Monde Slave" - wrote to Ripka about one or Dominois' affairs, about the shamelessness of bis colleague wbo worked not only for Czechoslovakla, but also for Yugoslavia and, in spite of various sources of income, ran up new debts and pressed tbe Czechs to pay them once more. This Ume the sum wa.s 20,000 frs. and the Czechs paid up once agaln. Dominols waa, of courae, not only for the Czechoalovaks and Yugoslavs. but also very much for the Rusalan Bolshevlka. There was nothing surprlsing in that. for Russ ia also is a slavonic country and the Profe:isor, the secretary of the "lo.stltut d'Etudes Slaves," was obviously j„voted to all the alavea who pald hls debts. The British chapter is rather a distingui:1bE,d one. Benes tried to make manifest in Great Britaln the klndnes~ o~ the Slavonlc nature. His ambassador here was Jan Masaryk, that klnd, jolly Slav and g reat dE:mocrat. He tried ~o help everywhere be rould. For instance, he suggested establishing the "Allan Leeper Funt!' to educate the daughter of the deceased Allan Leeper. ln a letter of 12th Feb ruary, 1935 (offlcial No. 1646 kab/35) it stated: "Allan Leeper (a brother or Ŕéx Leep'!r, ass!i;tant secretary to the Press Department of the Fore!gn Off1ce) was the beat, confidential friend (ani! 1 thtnk, schoolmate In Oxford) of Seton Watson . Ourlng the war he belped our ac• tlon by, memoranda wblch, altogether with Professor Seton Watson, he eiá.bora,ted ·'t or ~ Lord Grey and later for BaUour and prepared the cond!tlÓns for a favorable solutlon of the Czechoslovakia queation. He also prepared, with Seton Watson, the material ror a new arrangement in Centra! Europe for the British delegation to the Peace T reaty Conference. Since 1920 he was always at our diapoaal In lnformlng the British Government about Central Europe in our aenie." The Allan Leeper Fund was established. Jan Masaryk never troubled wlth detalled accounts of the small payments he made. Only for larger sums d!d he account and give an explanation. After the Munlch agreement Maaaryk reslgned and hla prace ·was taken by Mr. Lis!cky. He was a dlligent Czech offlélal who thought it bis duty to make a detalled list of all payments nrade by the Czechoslovakian Embassy in London in 1938. Hut lt is ratber a ,,,a.s 68 S LOVA:KIA large list to be published in such a small paper as " P ravda" (Lontlon). Benes' kindness was not conflned to Europe. The Czechoslovaklan Consul General in Sydney, Dr. Svetak, in a letter of 29th December, 1926, informed b is superiors how much he had paid to jou r nallsts trom various Australlan papers for not publishing statements unfavorab le to Masaryk and Benes. Normally journalists are paid for s omething they publish, but Benes also paid for silence. In a report dated 31st December, 1931, the Czec hoslovakian Consul General at Montreal, Mr. Moser, gave an account of the money he had paid for artic les favorable to Czechoslovakla in several Canadlan papers . AII the while, Benes malntained the best connections wlth So· viet Russia and at t he same time generously sup ported Russlan emlgr és and thelr anti-Soviet press. He did not sp end such a vast a mount of the Czechos lovakia n taxpayers' money •·- between a h a lf and a million pounds sterlíng every year - but he managed the spendln g In so economical and practical a way that the who le world became convinced that the best democracy and the greatest contemporary statesman were to b e found in Czechoslovakia. All this would be obvlous and natural to ardent individuallsts who e,onslder democracy from the point of view of their pr!vate interest. Ilut, unfortunat(lly, we are Jiving in this world together with Russian Bolsheviks. They can always do business with democratic indivlduals in the West, but W estern democrats cannot do business with lndlviduals of the Bolshev!k communlty, because there 1s a p enalty of death in Soviet countries for th e crime of turning poli tical prln ciples into pri vate buslness. - (Czech "PRAVDA" •- London - J une 1951) . • • • LETTRICH AND THE USSR. "Without the gigantic sacrlflces of the friendly USSR, especially its Red Ar my, wh!ch sh ed !ts blood on t he territory of the Republlc for six months, we would not have our freedom. The Czechoslovak. llepublic - and included in it free Slovakia - witbout regard to any and a ll d ifferences, never sball forget t hose sacrlfices of tbe Red Army, of tbe Soviet Union and tbe rest of the allied nations, and just as certalnly tbey shall no t forget the sacrlflces of t be Slovak natlonal insurrection. . . . From tbis convlncing experience it follows for u s. for the governmen t, for a ll pol!tlcal parties, and so also fo r the Democr atlc P arty, that our most self-evldent duty is to conslstently and lnexorably make polltics of frlendly understandlng and close cooper ation wlth a ll the vlctorious allied natlons, above all else, however, wlth our great neighbor - the largest Slovanic great power the USSR, and scrupulously avoid everything which eould In any manner hinder our efforts to attain these hlgh ldeals „ If we want to permanently hold on to our hard-earned freedom , an d state lndependence and guard agalnst possible -- future plots, we must de pend on the USSR, wbich fully respects our lndependence and h as no o tber demand on us than that we have a truly democratlc government, \ľhose poliC'y will not be In conrllct wlth Soviet interests, tha.t· we have order, in a word, that Cze<-hoslovakla be a strong and -eon• ~olidated State." - (Dr. J o!leph Lettrlch. ÔAS, 5-16-46).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Secret Funds of Benes' Intelligence Service Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952 pp. 55-58 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/d377e2402045defeb8c0365217471579.pdf 07ff1183ac8e8c98dd57469c932c6c68 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 33 THE SWVAK ASSEMBLY AND GOVERNMENT ľt !s very interesting to follow the developement of the Slovak national idea trom the oldest limes to the pre.sent. As one of the oldest expressions of Slovak nationalism, made in wr~ting, we must regard the foreword to the Catholic hymnal "Canthus Cathollci," pubJished in 1655, in whlch the author, the learned Jesuit Szôlôsi, with words of wonderment and love, calls the aittention of his readers to the first Slovak State, to Svätopluk and to Saints Cyril and Methodius. And since Szôlôsi's time, Slovak patriots have frequenrtly returned to this theme: Magin in 1728; George Papánek in 1780, in his history of Slovak ľtllers; George Sklenár In 1784, In his history of Great Moravia; in the "S'taré Noviny" (Old Newl',) in 1786. The period 1787-1792 is climaxed with the publlcation of the firs,t Slovak Grammar, the organization of the "Learned Guild" (Učené tovarišstvo), and the publication of Fándly's book, in which the author speaks warmly to the Slovaks and calls their a,ttention to the flrst Slov,ak State. In 1793 Fándly again publishes the history of Great Moravia, and in 1833 John Hollý publishes his famed epic "Svätopluk." This perlod, lasting over 130 years, is marked in learned books wlth a constant return to the theme of ťhe first Slovak State. At the end of this epoch, three years after Hollý's "Svätopluk" was published, on the Devin ramparts the young friends of Louis Štúr spoke from the rulns of Svä,topluk's stronghold, repeating everything that had t o that time appeared only in books. This is the •border line. With the book of a young follower of Štúr, Benjamiu Pravoslav Červenák, titled "Zrcadlo Slovenska" (Mirror of Slovakla), which Hurban publlshed in 1844, ends ,this epoch of returning to the past without a single chapter about what we want in the present and the future. We could s.ay, then, that Slovak patriots kept the flames of their nationalism burning for 150 years by returning to the past. However, they did not state clearly just how they pictured Slovak life of the future. In 1845, when Štúr began pu,biishing the first Slovak polltlcal newspaper, a change was gradually taking place in the thinking of the people. Slovaks began to talk about what should be done to preserve the Slovak nation, to increase 1-ts spiritual and material welf,are. They talked about concrete Slovak demands. In 1842, Dr. Paul Jozeffy placed a petition before the emperor, requesting that t he Slovak lan.guage be .the medium of teachlng !n Slovakla, of preaching in tbe cburches, and that cJrnrch records (vltal staitlstlcs) be kept in Slovak. Jozeffy's demands concerned only the linguistic questlon. But in 1848, the Slovaks went much farther. They proclaimed themselves independent from the Magyars. Mil'hael Milan Hodža, Loufs Štúr and Joseph Miloslav Hurban proclalmed the first Slovak Government, the Slovak National Council as the "supreme Slovak authorlty issulng out of the bosom of the natlon." That same year, In the historic demands known as the Nitra and Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš rlemands, the Slovaks pleaded ardently tor ~utonomy of the Slovak terrltory, whose laws would be passed by a Slovak parllament. �34 SLOVAKIA . Furthermor e, they demanded: Slovak schools, Slovak cour ts, Slovak as the offlclal language In SlovakJa, and teachlng In Slovak a t the Unlverslty. In every Slovak demand, trom May 10, 1848, and In every Slovak program the demand for a S lovak Parllament w,as predomlnan t. It had deep roots. To Brezová and Liptovský Svätý M.lkulä§ not even a hundred people came to the rally In 1848 to demand a Slovak parllament . In 1861, about 6000 Slovaks oam e together to demand a Natlonal Assembly for SlovakJa. The Plttsburgh manifesta:t lon of May 30, 1918, w as attend ed by some 30,000 people. But In 1938, on P ent.ecost Day (June 6th ), about 120,000 Slovaks gathered In Bratislava at a hlstorlc rally to commemor ate lhe twentleth annlversary of th e Plttsbugh P act . It was he re that lhe Slovak natlon saw the hlstorlc document whlch was proposed ,and slgned by T. G. Masazyk In 1918. The Plttsburgh Pact, whlch In fact guaranteed autonomy t o the Slovaks, was brought to Slovakla by a delega tlon of lhe Slovak League of Amerlca. T hese m anlfestation s show just how the concept of self-admlnistratlon in Slovakia grew In depth In the wlde masses of the naitlon. In 1848 lt wa.<i supported by a small group of Slovak hrtellectual s, but In 1938, in Bratislava, pract!cally the entlre Slovak natlon was back of it. In a contldenlla l report (T. 1370/33) to Pres.Ident M,asaryk , Dr. Schnleszl wrote: "Today a ll of S lovakla 1, for autonomy. Several pre.revolu. tlonary Slovak, are completely lnsignlflcan t for the splrltual life of the people. Moreover, if some were not bound by thelr paat, and other, by the ir public statu,, they, t oo, would be on the other • Ide o penly." The Slovak newspapen nan in Amerlca, Adalbert Tholt,Vel'koštlavnlcký, was not faml11ar w!th the correspondence of old Slovak leaders, and yet he evaluated the polltical demands of the Slovaks quite correctly. He stated that they were demands not only for a narrow autonomy, but lhat thelr content actually called for the Jndependence of Slovakia. It 1s interestlng t hat Tholt came to this concluslon even though he was not acqua!nted wlth the signlflcant quota. tion trom Šttlr's book "Slovanstv o a svet budtlcnostl " (Slavdom and the WOTld of lhe Future), which read: "So that we could occupy and take ove r the place whlch belong1 to u1 accordlng to our atrength a nd capabllltles , we must once and for a ll t lme f ree ourselvea from the unbearable y oke of foreignera a nd gain for ouraelvea state INDEPEND ENCE, bec auae a natlon that i• enslaved has ltl hand, t led and mu,t perlsh sooner or lat er." What crystal-clea x words! And Šttlr said them openly and fearlessly after the sad experlence s of 1848-49. Šttlr states clearly that the penalty awa!Ung the nat!on whlch wlll not flght for its state in dependence is death. After the natlonal rally of 1861, the flght at home in Slovakla weakened; there was not a slngle publ!c expression or demand voted on manlfestati onally which could compare to the demands of 1848 and 1861: In whlch .a demand was volced for a Slovak governmen t, or a Slovak parl!ament. In Slovakla a bard flght was fou ght t o preserve �SLOVAKIA 86 S lovak schools. But the flght for the inherent rlghts of the Slovak natlon was carrled over lnto America. The questlon was taken up by the Slovak press and became the subject of several hundred public manlfestatlons. Flnally lt matured wlth the "Memorandum of ťhe Slovak League," whlch to a certaln extent repeated the demands voiced In 1848 and 1861: autonomy for Slovakla, a separate Slovak Assembly or Dlet, Slovaklzatlon of the schools, Slovak courts, and the use of Slovak In public llfe. After thls foll<JW the agreements wlth representatives of the Czech natlon. The Cleveland ~reement, In 1915, In wlllch the Czechs agree to a federatlve form of the hopeful Czecho-Slovak Republlc, and then the memorable Plttsburgh Pact of May 30, 1918, in whlch again ls renewed the promlse that the Slovaks shall have thelr own Slov,ak admlnlstration, thelr own Slovak schools and courts, and, above all else, thelr own Slovak parliament or state leglslature. Even though Thomas Garrigue Masaryk underslgned thls agreement on May 30, 1918, and then agaln on the second day following bis electlon as Presldent of Czecho-Slovakia, he later dlsavowed it, declarlng it a falsehood and a mere scrap of paper. That ls how the Czechs kept thelr promlses. If we call the perlod from 1655 to 1845 as the perlod which turned to the past, then we can call 1:he perlod from 1845 to to 1918 a.s the perlod present!ng the program of the !uture. And thls 1s followed by a perlod of actlve fightlng for the recognltlon of prom!ses and agreements. A short artlcle does not allow us to take up in mlnute de• tal! every parliamentary expresslon, every motlon or proposal for autonomy, every public manlfestatlon; and every remlnder that promlses made durlng the war be kept and fulfilled. It remalns a sad reality, but the hlstorlcal truth nevertheless, that the Czechs dld not live up to thelr promlses any more after 1918, than they d1d after 1945. Tlle fate of every agreement wlth the Czechs was the same: ,all agreements wlth the Slova.ks were repudiated by the Czechs. The Czechs were w11llng to make concesslons only when they needed the Slovaks; later, they repudlated every agreement. Practlcally all Czech.s were the same In thls regard: T. G. Masaryk, the so-called reallst and humanlst; Ediward Beneií, t he so-called "democrat and statesman," and Monslgnor John Šrámek, the Cathollc prlest; Czech agrarlans, democrats, soclallsts, communlsts and fasclsts; Czech Cathollcs, Lutherans, Jews, Ta:bor· ltes, Husaltes, members of the "Czechoslovak Natlonal Church," Unl• tarlans and Baptista: all repudiated the promlses made to Slova.ks, all repudlated the lnberent and God-glven rlght of the Slovak natlon to freedom and state lndependence. No llttle wonder, then, t,bat the SlovalG cry out today: Don't belleve the Czech.s - no more agreements wlth the Czechs! Joseph P~kar, the Czech hlstorlan repudlated by Masaryk and Beneli, declared In hls Ume that the Slovak demands were moderate. Was lt not a terrible tragedy that these moderate and rlghtful demands were not reallzed in the Czeoho Slovak Republic? For twenty long year-s the Slovaks fouglrt not only for thelr own parllament, but also for t.he Slovaklzat!on of tbelr schools, especlally for addttlonal hlgher lnstltutlons of loo.rnlng. Many of the demands of 1848 and 0 �36 SLOVAKIA 1861 were still timely even ln 1938; and the demand for a Slovak parllament W&S the most imporllant. The Czechs, supported by Slovak Czechoslovaks (Slovaks ln the serVice of the Czechs: renegades), proclaimed that there was nothing more dangerous for the Slovaks than a Slovak parliament. V,avro Šro,b ár, one of the foremost "Czechoslovaks," wrote a letter to Americans of Slovak descent to "prove" that point. Of course, to do so he had to give incorrect or falsified statistios; ln fact, he outdid the Magyars in -that respect. šrobár used the false figures, 1 epresenting the various nationa.lities of the populatlon of Slovakia, to show that in a Slovak parliament the Slovaks themselves would be a minority, which the non-Slovak population - the Magyars, Jews and Germans - could outvote at any Ume. But he was not very convincing. During varlous negotiations wlth a P.r-ague Government, the Czech ministers promised: We shall glve you everything, but not a Slovak parliament. And -the Slovaks answered adamantly: We want nothing except a Slovak parliament, because with it we shall rea.lize al! the rest of our demands. Czech policy was incredibly short-sighted. Czech politicians and ministers would debate day.s on end In the Ministerlal Council to send Czech maLl-carriers and janitors to Slovakia to "help out" the Slovaks. .ánd they usually did even agalnst the will of the Slovak pul)lic and its representatlves In Government. Thls only convinced the Slovaks all ťhe more thai w:ithout thelr own State Legislature or Parliament, they would actually be only a subordinate colony of the Czech nation. Tbe more Prague opposed the Idea of a Slovak parliamen t, however, the more the Slovaks demanded lt. Th·a t was the situa:tlon up to October 6, 1938. Czech diplomacy and democracy created such a situation that the Czecho-Slovak Repul)ll<: collapsed wlth the first blow. Not a single shot was fired in its defense. In the annals of hlstory there is probably not a single case where a political state disappeared with less ado about it. In the fall of 1938 lt was c.Jear even to those In power in Prague that the Slovak demands of 1915-1918 must be fulfilled. Even Beneš bimself - who told the delegation of the Slovak League of Amerlca In 1938 that be was in principle agalnst t he Pittsburgh Pact only because of the one word "parllament" - began to see the llght. On October 4, 1938, that very same Beneš wrote a letter to Dr. Joseph Tiso - a letter overflowing wlth reverence and k!ndly feellng - in which we flnd: "The question of a parllament, designated by Mr. President in principle and onJy in the maln outlines and In proposltlons, requlres precise defln!tion and preclse legal formulatlon. The new Government, in agreement wlth the Slovaks, shall have to conclude the rest of this work as speedily as posslble." Beneš wrote the letter and correcled it tbree times, as was a.scertained In the archlves, but lt was slgned by. Dr. Schleszl. On October 4, Beneš had lt mailed, but that very day requested lt returned to hlm, because, under pressure from the generals, he declded to reslgn the Presldency of the Republic. But what dld Beneš have io propose about a Slovak parliament? Only thls: " It ls agreed that future acts of admlnistratlve reforms, if it shall be based on the county system, shall preserve the unlty �SLOVAKIA 37 of SloV'aJtia as a !and and that a union of the counties be reallzed withln the fmmework of the territorial parliament of Slovakia." True, thls proposition could not be seriously considered, because Beneš resigned his office and fled the country. The Pra~e ParHament fLnally voted the autonomy of Slovakia wit hout Beneš on 0 ctober 6, 1938. In December the first Slovak parliament•ary eJections were held, and In January, 1939, sixty-three deputies were seated in the flrst legislative ,assembly of Slovakia. Dr. Martin Sokol became t he first president of the Slovak Parliament. The dream of Slovak ,generatlons was at long last realized. The Slovak ParJiament, just as every ,human work, had lts shortcomings. But we must judge every mlstake in the light of the times in which it happened. The Slovak Legislature began to function in extraordinarily difficult tlmes, when the worud situation was extraordinarily tense and confusion reigned In Slov·a kia. Almost simultaneously with the Parliament, Slovak rule passed !nto the hands of the Slovak Government in 0ctober, 1938. State executive and leglslative power in Slovakia passed into Slovak hands. But the Ozechs were not satisfied wit h this status of affairs. It was difficult for th em to suffer the thought that the Slovaks would now decide about Slovak matters w-ithout Prague. They began to hinder development. 'I'he.y especially wanted to prove that their progno.stiootions about the Czeťhs ha-ving to pay for the Slovaks were true. The financial policy pursued was suoh that it forebo<le the prediction of Kramár, that 1s, that if the Slovaks gained autonomy, they wouid not be aJble to pay their state employees even three months. They refused to give money for Slovak !mports from the common fund, even though t he Slovaks contributed to it, because now, they said, Slovakia is no longer a money--creating part of the ·state. Events were climaxed wHh a new occupation of Slovakia and the unseatlng of fäe first Slovak Government in Marcl:t, 1939. When this happened, the recently executed Vladlmir Clementis, in London at that tilne, wrote: " . . . The unseatlng of Tlso's Government by Prague (better said: by Hácha, Beran and Chvalkovský - at the direction of Berlin) was negoti'ated polit!cally In a very bung,Jed manner, nay in a si-niiully awkward manner" ( Hnev Svätý, London, 1944, pg. 21). The result of this lntervention was tha.t Slovakia tore herself compl etely from the Czech lands, and the Parliament of Slove.kla by unan!mous vote, proclaimed the lndependence of the Slovak State on Maroh 14, 1939. Thus, Štúr',s wish of 1850 was realized in 1939. ,Shortly after the Parliament and government of autonomous Slovak!a oame into being, the enti-re apparatus of government legislat!ve and executive power - oame lnto Slovak hands. And just aibout that time we w!tnes.sed an interesting phenomenon. From 1940, after the events of the so-calle d '\Salzburg In,tervention," we noted a e hange in the relatlons between the Parllament Md the Government - which caused a serious tension and often threatened to explo<le lnto a sharp public conWct and wreck the whole structure of the State. Vojtech Tuka wanted to remodel Slovakia completely after the German model ; he was for NaUonal Soc!alism. 0f course, he ex- �38 SLOVAKIA pected to become the flrst cltlzen of the remodeled State. Tuka and bis followers began to lntrigue agalnst the Parllament, and the stM1ggle cllmaxed with Tuka's demand that Parliament vote Tuka fulJ authority, and that even In Constltut1onal mattera. In a word, Tuka wa.nted dlctatorlal powers. Accordlng to Tuka, the PaTllament was supposed to be only a representative body, whlch he would convoke once a year to hear some proclamatlon of hfs and then would solemnly and unanlmously approve everythlng he proposed. Tuka wanted a "rubber stamp" parllament whlch would say "so be lt" to everyth!ng he recommended, then go home and ref.raln from meddllng In the politlcs of the State. Charles Mmgaš, Chlef of Propaganda, speaklng In the name of the "leadershlp," deolared that only one or two persons of the "lea.dership" would be -a.ble to play polltics and, of course, he reckoned tha.t •he would be one of them. Accordlng to these promoters of Natlonal Soclallsm, lt w,as necessary to Temove two personalltlee from government: Dr. J oseph Tlso and Dr. Martin Sokol. President Tlso delegated Dr. Sokol to dellbemt e about these questlons. To the great surprlse of Dr. Tuka hlmself, Dr. Sokol declared that he fully agreed wlth Tuka's proposal that the Natlonal-Soclallstlc system should prevall in Slovakla. .And now, sald Dr. Sokol, slnce th1ngs are done In thls manner In the Reich - and here Sokol enumerated how varlous matters were transacted in Germany - we &hall do likewlse in Slovakla. In the fkst place, of course, cont:lnued Dr. Sokol, we know that In the Relch aJl State power rests In the hands of the head of the State - and that head 1s the Presldent. Dr. Tuka, lmmedlately realizlng that he was dlsarmed and In a bllnd alley, revoked hls proposal for a Natlonal Socla\lst!c Slevakla. He was fully 11.ware that under the ciTcumstances lt could happen that he would drop out of government completely, lf h1s proposal was adopted. But peace dld not ensue between Tuka, Mach and the ParHament. The deputles, who once sat in the Prague Parll,ament, often declared that the Prague Parllament could never have allowed such Independent action against the Government as the Bratislava Parl!amen.t dld durlng its mhole exlstence. lit often hapl)ened that the Government sent to Parllament a draft of a 1Mv for consideratlon and pas&age. When Parllament was thro~h with lt, the law approved was In most cases not based on the orlglnal dra~t. but was the opposJ te In lts effec,ts from what Tuka and Mach had lntended lt to be. There was no opposltlon ,to speak of In Parllament, but there was plenty of lt ag,alnst the Government. Thls had not onJy lts good, but bad polnts as well. Undoubtedly, lf -tlmes were normal, Tuka's government never would have held together. Tuka and Mach, who represented one tendency In the Government, had practlcally no support In Parllament. Later on, however, even the other mlnlsters could not have galned t-he majority, because, just as 'Iluka and Mach were reproached for belng too radlcal and subordlnated to the Germans. they, on the other hand, were reproached for belng too colorless. Aga.In it 1s true, that we could talk about the polltlcs or Dr. Tuka and Mach, but hardly that of Dr. Pruf.!nský, Frltz, St-a.no and Medrlcký. The latter were completely lnfluenced by "Czechoslovak" c lrcles. �SLOVAKIA 39 -Relatlons between the Government were not ldyllic. Tuka's !lret attempt to dlssolve Parllament ended lnglorlousJy. But he and hli! foJlowers dld not glve up easlly. When Tuka categorlcally demanded that he wanted a new Government formed, whlch would include only M-ach and Catioš !rom the exlstlng Government, he agaln wae de!eated. Tuka then demanded the Presldent to appoint Ciiarles Murga§ as Minister of Educatlon, John Farka§ as Finance Minister, and a new man to head the Minlstry of Justice. Tlso, however, remalned adamant; he repudlated Tuka's demands. Tlso inslsted en keeplng the iBame Government he had a!ter the Sal11Jburg events of July, 1940. After many rebuffs and bitter dlsappolntments, Tuka's spľrlt and energy began to wane. He was an old, slck man, obsessed with the thought that he should have been the !lrst man in the !and, because he had, he thought, suffered for the cause more than any one el.se. Hls aggre.sslveness gone, Tuk.a In later years was a minister in name only; he was seldom seen in hls offlce and was not In a posltion to make decislons. There was no change In government personnel until after Catloš's !llght to the putschJsts at the end of August, 1944. Catloš wa.s replaced by Stephen Haäšik; Tuka by Dr. Stephen Tlso, who also took over Frltz's post (Justlce and Forelgn Affalrs); Stano was replaced by Ing. Lednár, and .Sivák by Dr. Aladar Kočiš. Some people dld not flnd it difflcult to crltlclze the actlvlty of lndlvidual mlnlsters. When converslng wlth such bitter crltlcs, I cften asked the questlon: And what would you have done under the same clrcumstances? After a momenťs thought, the crltlcs usually an,swered that they probably would have done the same thlng, because there w-as a war on, German pressure dld exist, the sltuatlon was extraordlnary and, hence, strongly lntluenced everythlng the Government dld. Nevertheless, it remalns lnd1sputably true that as long as the Slovak Parllament and the Slovak Government ruled In Slovakia, the llvlng Standard of the Slovak people was hlgher than that of -a.ny nelghborlng country. Let people say w.hat they wlll about Sivák, the !act remalus that wblle he was Minister of Educatlon, more secondary schools arose tban ever before, more Slovak professors were appolnted to the unlversltles, and at least three tlmes as many students studled during the war than before or after ft. W e may crlt!clze T uka's act!ons, but the fact remalns that he did not seek reprlsals agalnst the false wltnesses, brlbed by Prague as -the Prague archlves dlsolosed, who helped to convlot bim to 15 years In prlson durlng the flrst CzechoSlovak Republlc. During the admlnlstratlon of Jullus Stano, more rallroad tracks, roads and buildings were bullt than ever before. The fact remalns that whlle Frltz was Minister of Justlce, and even after he was replaced, there was not a slngle offlclal executlon in Slovakia. Wben Medrický was in charge of Slovak economy, there was no ratlonlng of food and clothJng. And when Pružlnský was Mlnlster of Flnance, deposlts soared t o unbeard of belghts and the Slovak Koruna (Crown), one of the most prized means of exchange In the wbole of Europe, enjoyed the legend or the Tatra dollar. EvEm Catloš hlmself pursued a po llcy wbereby Slovakla contrlbuted as llttle as posslble to the tax of blood. �40 SLOVAKIA Alexander Mach mlght be blamed for almost anythlng and everytblng, but perhap.s no one man stood up so fearlessly against the German propaganda concerning the Germanlsm of the Habans, agalnst 1,he founcllng of German schools for Czecbs who s uddenly discovered tbat tbey had some German blood coursing In tbeir velns. And lt remains a fact that tbe Communlsts, even though their Party wias outlawed, suffered less in &Jovakla than elsewhere. It may sound strange, but it is true nevertheless, that Mach - thls most Germanophile Minister of the Interior - used to sit at a whlte table with Communist inte11ectuals, converse with them, ententain them, and, above all else, protect them. During the existence of the Slovak State, neither the Presldent nor the Mlnisters of State had to fear going among the people without a retinue of armed guards. The President never wanted a motorlzed police escort, in fact, could not even use one going to the altar, the pulpit, the baptlsmal font, or into the confesslonal. President Tiso was truly loved and esteemed by all the people of Slovakia. If his politicaJ enemies b e excepted, and tbey were only few in number, tben we must say t hat even they respected him. What a difference between Tiso and Beneš ! T,iso needed no protection wben he went out among tbe people, but Beneš and bis Communis.t-dominated regime had to have an army around tbem when they entered Slovakia after tbe war. About the Slovak Parllament we migbt say what the followers of Gbandi were wont to say: "Even the worst Indian Government 1s better for I ndia than the best Engllsh Government, because tbe English Government bas no business in India." Similarly, the Slovaks can express tbemselves about every Czech government. The past has shown definitely that a Czecho-Slovak government is in reality always a Czech government, regardless of whether it follows a rightls.t or Communist tendency. A Czec h-Slovak parliament always was and always will be a Czech parJ.iament, even lf lt contains several Slovak members. A nation whlcb bas matured does not want to be regulated or directed by laws t hat are promulgated by an alien parliament and then enforced by an alien government. That is so especially witb a nation wbicb has had lts own parliament and its own government. The Slovak nation had its own parliament and its own government from 1938- 1945, And tbe Slovaks stm wanted to rule themselves, thelr Slovak Republlc, after the war ended in 1945, but thelr will ,v,as violated, They were violently forced back into the political state which had explolted them for thirty years. Slovak ministers, as peopl e, could have a nd undoubtedly did have their faults, but one tbing cannot be denied tbem, the one lndlsputal>Je fact tbat tbey worked for the welfare of the entire Slovak nation as best they could under given circumstances, and the Slovak people never fared better under any otber government - before or slnce that time. In a word, tbe Slovak ministers governed well. Not one of tbem became wealthy through polltlcs; and they lived more modestily, more democratically than the present rulers of Slovakia, they cost the people less than tbe present commissloners. Tbe .same can be sald for the parUament. Tbe work of tbe Slovak Parliament undoubtedly had lts shortcomlngs. Circumstances and �SLOVAKIA events often tled the hands of the deputies, but we need not fear the criticism whlch history shall r&eord about the Slovak Parliament. After the war many deputies were tortured and some were k!lled. Most of them recelved an average of ten years in prison. It is good always to remember this, when some Czech In the world says that the Slovaks never had it so good as they had it under the Czechs before 1939 or after 1945. The fact remains that the Czechs in Prague oppressed and exploited the Slovaks before 1939 and, af,ter 1945 avenged -themselves by murdering Dr. Tiso and others, jaillng, persecuting and dispossessing thousands of others, and exlling tens of thousands of Slovaks to Siberla and other regions of the Soviet Union and its satellites. The Slovaks at home and everywhere in exile know tha.t they dld not sell out the Czech people to Moscow, but that Dr. Edward Beneš and hls followers sold out not only the Slovak nation, but the Czech peoI11e as we11, to the tyranny of ,t he hammer and sickJe. • • • WHO SAID IT? BENEŠ IN RETROSPECT: - "In an interview published In a London Sunday paper, REYNOLDS NEWS, on February 20, Presldent Beneš of Czechoslovakia, emphatically declared that he does not fear Russla's return to imperlalism under the pretext of a so-called Al!• Slav policy. The alliance and harmonious collaboratlon of the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia would deter Germany from provoking another world war. Such an agreement may, therefore, have a far• reaching slgnificance for the future peace of Europe as a whole. To the question as to whether the pact will not make Czechoslovakia too dependent on the Soviet Union, President Beneš r eplied that the pact represents the fundamental strengthening of Czechoslovakia's security a nd consolidates her independence. Friendshlp wlth Soviet Russla means a mutual collaboration. The Czechoslovakian people, as the most mature people politically in Europe, would never accept vassalage under any nation." - (News Flashes From Czechoslovakia, Chicago, Ill., March 20, 1944). • • • DR. HUBERT RIPKA:-'IMany siliy rumors and guesses ,have arlsen concerning a quarrel with the Soviet Union about Carpathian-Russia. Many conJectures have been made about our Governmental delegate, NE!mec. T hese are all nonsensical speculations ! The Soviet and Czechoslovak Governments are firmly resolved to proceed in all matters, now and in the future, strlctly accordlng to the Treaty. Governmental dele• gate NE!mec, wlth hls political advisors and the representatlves of the Slovak Natlonal Council, ls already in llberated eastern Slovakia and in a few days wlll start worklng in Košice, to organize a new free Ufe in llberated parts of Slovakla, accordlng to the government on relatlons between the Government delegate and the Slovak Natlonal Councll. President Beneš wlll also come soon to the llberated country, where, under hls leadershlp, a new Government authority wlll be created, based on the wlll of the llberated peoples. Be calm and falth· ful. Liberatlon 1s in slght." - (London Broadcast, January 29, 1945). � SLOVAKIA 33 THE SWVAK ASSEMBLY AND GOVERNMENT ľt !s very interesting to follow the developement of the Slovak national idea trom the oldest limes to the pre.sent. As one of the oldest expressions of Slovak nationalism, made in wr~ting, we must regard the foreword to the Catholic hymnal "Canthus Cathollci," pubJished in 1655, in whlch the author, the learned Jesuit Szôlôsi, with words of wonderment and love, calls the aittention of his readers to the first Slovak State, to Svätopluk and to Saints Cyril and Methodius. And since Szôlôsi's time, Slovak patriots have frequenrtly returned to this theme: Magin in 1728; George Papánek in 1780, in his history of Slovak ľtllers; George Sklenár In 1784, In his history of Great Moravia; in the "S'taré Noviny" (Old Newl',) in 1786. The period 1787-1792 is climaxed with the publlcation of the firs,t Slovak Grammar, the organization of the "Learned Guild" (Učené tovarišstvo), and the publication of Fándly's book, in which the author speaks warmly to the Slovaks and calls their a,ttention to the flrst Slov,ak State. In 1793 Fándly again publishes the history of Great Moravia, and in 1833 John Hollý publishes his famed epic "Svätopluk." This perlod, lasting over 130 years, is marked in learned books wlth a constant return to the theme of ťhe first Slovak State. At the end of this epoch, three years after Hollý's "Svätopluk" was published, on the Devin ramparts the young friends of Louis Štúr spoke from the rulns of Svä,topluk's stronghold, repeating everything that had t o that time appeared only in books. This is the •border line. With the book of a young follower of Štúr, Benjamiu Pravoslav Červenák, titled "Zrcadlo Slovenska" (Mirror of Slovakla), which Hurban publlshed in 1844, ends ,this epoch of returning to the past without a single chapter about what we want in the present and the future. We could s.ay, then, that Slovak patriots kept the flames of their nationalism burning for 150 years by returning to the past. However, they did not state clearly just how they pictured Slovak life of the future. In 1845, when Štúr began pu,biishing the first Slovak polltlcal newspaper, a change was gradually taking place in the thinking of the people. Slovaks began to talk about what should be done to preserve the Slovak nation, to increase 1-ts spiritual and material welf,are. They talked about concrete Slovak demands. In 1842, Dr. Paul Jozeffy placed a petition before the emperor, requesting that t he Slovak lan.guage be .the medium of teachlng !n Slovakla, of preaching in tbe cburches, and that cJrnrch records (vltal staitlstlcs) be kept in Slovak. Jozeffy's demands concerned only the linguistic questlon. But in 1848, the Slovaks went much farther. They proclaimed themselves independent from the Magyars. Mil'hael Milan Hodža, Loufs Štúr and Joseph Miloslav Hurban proclalmed the first Slovak Government, the Slovak National Council as the "supreme Slovak authorlty issulng out of the bosom of the natlon." That same year, In the historic demands known as the Nitra and Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš rlemands, the Slovaks pleaded ardently tor ~utonomy of the Slovak terrltory, whose laws would be passed by a Slovak parllament. �34 SLOVAKIA . Furthermor e, they demanded: Slovak schools, Slovak cour ts, Slovak as the offlclal language In SlovakJa, and teachlng In Slovak a t the Unlverslty. In every Slovak demand, trom May 10, 1848, and In every Slovak program the demand for a S lovak Parllament w,as predomlnan t. It had deep roots. To Brezová and Liptovský Svätý M.lkulä§ not even a hundred people came to the rally In 1848 to demand a Slovak parllament . In 1861, about 6000 Slovaks oam e together to demand a Natlonal Assembly for SlovakJa. The Plttsburgh manifesta:t lon of May 30, 1918, w as attend ed by some 30,000 people. But In 1938, on P ent.ecost Day (June 6th ), about 120,000 Slovaks gathered In Bratislava at a hlstorlc rally to commemor ate lhe twentleth annlversary of th e Plttsbugh P act . It was he re that lhe Slovak natlon saw the hlstorlc document whlch was proposed ,and slgned by T. G. Masazyk In 1918. The Plttsburgh Pact, whlch In fact guaranteed autonomy t o the Slovaks, was brought to Slovakla by a delega tlon of lhe Slovak League of Amerlca. T hese m anlfestation s show just how the concept of self-admlnistratlon in Slovakia grew In depth In the wlde masses of the naitlon. In 1848 lt wa.<i supported by a small group of Slovak hrtellectual s, but In 1938, in Bratislava, pract!cally the entlre Slovak natlon was back of it. In a contldenlla l report (T. 1370/33) to Pres.Ident M,asaryk , Dr. Schnleszl wrote: "Today a ll of S lovakla 1, for autonomy. Several pre.revolu. tlonary Slovak, are completely lnsignlflcan t for the splrltual life of the people. Moreover, if some were not bound by thelr paat, and other, by the ir public statu,, they, t oo, would be on the other • Ide o penly." The Slovak newspapen nan in Amerlca, Adalbert Tholt,Vel'koštlavnlcký, was not faml11ar w!th the correspondence of old Slovak leaders, and yet he evaluated the polltical demands of the Slovaks quite correctly. He stated that they were demands not only for a narrow autonomy, but lhat thelr content actually called for the Jndependence of Slovakia. It 1s interestlng t hat Tholt came to this concluslon even though he was not acqua!nted wlth the signlflcant quota. tion trom Šttlr's book "Slovanstv o a svet budtlcnostl " (Slavdom and the WOTld of lhe Future), which read: "So that we could occupy and take ove r the place whlch belong1 to u1 accordlng to our atrength a nd capabllltles , we must once and for a ll t lme f ree ourselvea from the unbearable y oke of foreignera a nd gain for ouraelvea state INDEPEND ENCE, bec auae a natlon that i• enslaved has ltl hand, t led and mu,t perlsh sooner or lat er." What crystal-clea x words! And Šttlr said them openly and fearlessly after the sad experlence s of 1848-49. Šttlr states clearly that the penalty awa!Ung the nat!on whlch wlll not flght for its state in dependence is death. After the natlonal rally of 1861, the flght at home in Slovakla weakened; there was not a slngle publ!c expression or demand voted on manlfestati onally which could compare to the demands of 1848 and 1861: In whlch .a demand was volced for a Slovak governmen t, or a Slovak parl!ament. In Slovakla a bard flght was fou ght t o preserve �SLOVAKIA 86 S lovak schools. But the flght for the inherent rlghts of the Slovak natlon was carrled over lnto America. The questlon was taken up by the Slovak press and became the subject of several hundred public manlfestatlons. Flnally lt matured wlth the "Memorandum of ťhe Slovak League," whlch to a certaln extent repeated the demands voiced In 1848 and 1861: autonomy for Slovakla, a separate Slovak Assembly or Dlet, Slovaklzatlon of the schools, Slovak courts, and the use of Slovak In public llfe. After thls foll<JW the agreements wlth representatives of the Czech natlon. The Cleveland ~reement, In 1915, In wlllch the Czechs agree to a federatlve form of the hopeful Czecho-Slovak Republlc, and then the memorable Plttsburgh Pact of May 30, 1918, in whlch again ls renewed the promlse that the Slovaks shall have thelr own Slov,ak admlnlstration, thelr own Slovak schools and courts, and, above all else, thelr own Slovak parliament or state leglslature. Even though Thomas Garrigue Masaryk underslgned thls agreement on May 30, 1918, and then agaln on the second day following bis electlon as Presldent of Czecho-Slovakia, he later dlsavowed it, declarlng it a falsehood and a mere scrap of paper. That ls how the Czechs kept thelr promlses. If we call the perlod from 1655 to 1845 as the perlod which turned to the past, then we can call 1:he perlod from 1845 to to 1918 a.s the perlod present!ng the program of the !uture. And thls 1s followed by a perlod of actlve fightlng for the recognltlon of prom!ses and agreements. A short artlcle does not allow us to take up in mlnute de• tal! every parliamentary expresslon, every motlon or proposal for autonomy, every public manlfestatlon; and every remlnder that promlses made durlng the war be kept and fulfilled. It remalns a sad reality, but the hlstorlcal truth nevertheless, that the Czechs dld not live up to thelr promlses any more after 1918, than they d1d after 1945. Tlle fate of every agreement wlth the Czechs was the same: ,all agreements wlth the Slova.ks were repudiated by the Czechs. The Czechs were w11llng to make concesslons only when they needed the Slovaks; later, they repudlated every agreement. Practlcally all Czech.s were the same In thls regard: T. G. Masaryk, the so-called reallst and humanlst; Ediward Beneií, t he so-called "democrat and statesman," and Monslgnor John Šrámek, the Cathollc prlest; Czech agrarlans, democrats, soclallsts, communlsts and fasclsts; Czech Cathollcs, Lutherans, Jews, Ta:bor· ltes, Husaltes, members of the "Czechoslovak Natlonal Church," Unl• tarlans and Baptista: all repudiated the promlses made to Slova.ks, all repudlated the lnberent and God-glven rlght of the Slovak natlon to freedom and state lndependence. No llttle wonder, then, t,bat the SlovalG cry out today: Don't belleve the Czech.s - no more agreements wlth the Czechs! Joseph P~kar, the Czech hlstorlan repudlated by Masaryk and Beneli, declared In hls Ume that the Slovak demands were moderate. Was lt not a terrible tragedy that these moderate and rlghtful demands were not reallzed in the Czeoho Slovak Republic? For twenty long year-s the Slovaks fouglrt not only for thelr own parllament, but also for t.he Slovaklzat!on of tbelr schools, especlally for addttlonal hlgher lnstltutlons of loo.rnlng. Many of the demands of 1848 and 0 �36 SLOVAKIA 1861 were still timely even ln 1938; and the demand for a Slovak parllament W&S the most imporllant. The Czechs, supported by Slovak Czechoslovaks (Slovaks ln the serVice of the Czechs: renegades), proclaimed that there was nothing more dangerous for the Slovaks than a Slovak parliament. V,avro Šro,b ár, one of the foremost "Czechoslovaks," wrote a letter to Americans of Slovak descent to "prove" that point. Of course, to do so he had to give incorrect or falsified statistios; ln fact, he outdid the Magyars in -that respect. šrobár used the false figures, 1 epresenting the various nationa.lities of the populatlon of Slovakia, to show that in a Slovak parliament the Slovaks themselves would be a minority, which the non-Slovak population - the Magyars, Jews and Germans - could outvote at any Ume. But he was not very convincing. During varlous negotiations wlth a P.r-ague Government, the Czech ministers promised: We shall glve you everything, but not a Slovak parliament. And -the Slovaks answered adamantly: We want nothing except a Slovak parliament, because with it we shall rea.lize al! the rest of our demands. Czech policy was incredibly short-sighted. Czech politicians and ministers would debate day.s on end In the Ministerlal Council to send Czech maLl-carriers and janitors to Slovakia to "help out" the Slovaks. .ánd they usually did even agalnst the will of the Slovak pul)lic and its representatlves In Government. Thls only convinced the Slovaks all ťhe more thai w:ithout thelr own State Legislature or Parliament, they would actually be only a subordinate colony of the Czech nation. Tbe more Prague opposed the Idea of a Slovak parliamen t, however, the more the Slovaks demanded lt. Th·a t was the situa:tlon up to October 6, 1938. Czech diplomacy and democracy created such a situation that the Czecho-Slovak Repul)ll<: collapsed wlth the first blow. Not a single shot was fired in its defense. In the annals of hlstory there is probably not a single case where a political state disappeared with less ado about it. In the fall of 1938 lt was c.Jear even to those In power in Prague that the Slovak demands of 1915-1918 must be fulfilled. Even Beneš bimself - who told the delegation of the Slovak League of Amerlca In 1938 that be was in principle agalnst t he Pittsburgh Pact only because of the one word "parllament" - began to see the llght. On October 4, 1938, that very same Beneš wrote a letter to Dr. Joseph Tiso - a letter overflowing wlth reverence and k!ndly feellng - in which we flnd: "The question of a parllament, designated by Mr. President in principle and onJy in the maln outlines and In proposltlons, requlres precise defln!tion and preclse legal formulatlon. The new Government, in agreement wlth the Slovaks, shall have to conclude the rest of this work as speedily as posslble." Beneš wrote the letter and correcled it tbree times, as was a.scertained In the archlves, but lt was slgned by. Dr. Schleszl. On October 4, Beneš had lt mailed, but that very day requested lt returned to hlm, because, under pressure from the generals, he declded to reslgn the Presldency of the Republic. But what dld Beneš have io propose about a Slovak parliament? Only thls: " It ls agreed that future acts of admlnistratlve reforms, if it shall be based on the county system, shall preserve the unlty �SLOVAKIA 37 of SloV'aJtia as a !and and that a union of the counties be reallzed withln the fmmework of the territorial parliament of Slovakia." True, thls proposition could not be seriously considered, because Beneš resigned his office and fled the country. The Pra~e ParHament fLnally voted the autonomy of Slovakia wit hout Beneš on 0 ctober 6, 1938. In December the first Slovak parliament•ary eJections were held, and In January, 1939, sixty-three deputies were seated in the flrst legislative ,assembly of Slovakia. Dr. Martin Sokol became t he first president of the Slovak Parliament. The dream of Slovak ,generatlons was at long last realized. The Slovak ParJiament, just as every ,human work, had lts shortcomings. But we must judge every mlstake in the light of the times in which it happened. The Slovak Legislature began to function in extraordinarily difficult tlmes, when the worud situation was extraordinarily tense and confusion reigned In Slov·a kia. Almost simultaneously with the Parliament, Slovak rule passed !nto the hands of the Slovak Government in 0ctober, 1938. State executive and leglslative power in Slovakia passed into Slovak hands. But the Ozechs were not satisfied wit h this status of affairs. It was difficult for th em to suffer the thought that the Slovaks would now decide about Slovak matters w-ithout Prague. They began to hinder development. 'I'he.y especially wanted to prove that their progno.stiootions about the Czeťhs ha-ving to pay for the Slovaks were true. The financial policy pursued was suoh that it forebo<le the prediction of Kramár, that 1s, that if the Slovaks gained autonomy, they wouid not be aJble to pay their state employees even three months. They refused to give money for Slovak !mports from the common fund, even though t he Slovaks contributed to it, because now, they said, Slovakia is no longer a money--creating part of the ·state. Events were climaxed wHh a new occupation of Slovakia and the unseatlng of fäe first Slovak Government in Marcl:t, 1939. When this happened, the recently executed Vladlmir Clementis, in London at that tilne, wrote: " . . . The unseatlng of Tlso's Government by Prague (better said: by Hácha, Beran and Chvalkovský - at the direction of Berlin) was negoti'ated polit!cally In a very bung,Jed manner, nay in a si-niiully awkward manner" ( Hnev Svätý, London, 1944, pg. 21). The result of this lntervention was tha.t Slovakia tore herself compl etely from the Czech lands, and the Parliament of Slove.kla by unan!mous vote, proclaimed the lndependence of the Slovak State on Maroh 14, 1939. Thus, Štúr',s wish of 1850 was realized in 1939. ,Shortly after the Parliament and government of autonomous Slovak!a oame into being, the enti-re apparatus of government legislat!ve and executive power - oame lnto Slovak hands. And just aibout that time we w!tnes.sed an interesting phenomenon. From 1940, after the events of the so-calle d '\Salzburg In,tervention," we noted a e hange in the relatlons between the Parllament Md the Government - which caused a serious tension and often threatened to explo<le lnto a sharp public conWct and wreck the whole structure of the State. Vojtech Tuka wanted to remodel Slovakia completely after the German model ; he was for NaUonal Soc!alism. 0f course, he ex- �38 SLOVAKIA pected to become the flrst cltlzen of the remodeled State. Tuka and bis followers began to lntrigue agalnst the Parllament, and the stM1ggle cllmaxed with Tuka's demand that Parliament vote Tuka fulJ authority, and that even In Constltut1onal mattera. In a word, Tuka wa.nted dlctatorlal powers. Accordlng to Tuka, the PaTllament was supposed to be only a representative body, whlch he would convoke once a year to hear some proclamatlon of hfs and then would solemnly and unanlmously approve everythlng he proposed. Tuka wanted a "rubber stamp" parllament whlch would say "so be lt" to everyth!ng he recommended, then go home and ref.raln from meddllng In the politlcs of the State. Charles Mmgaš, Chlef of Propaganda, speaklng In the name of the "leadershlp," deolared that only one or two persons of the "lea.dership" would be -a.ble to play polltics and, of course, he reckoned tha.t •he would be one of them. Accordlng to these promoters of Natlonal Soclallsm, lt w,as necessary to Temove two personalltlee from government: Dr. J oseph Tlso and Dr. Martin Sokol. President Tlso delegated Dr. Sokol to dellbemt e about these questlons. To the great surprlse of Dr. Tuka hlmself, Dr. Sokol declared that he fully agreed wlth Tuka's proposal that the Natlonal-Soclallstlc system should prevall in Slovakla. .And now, sald Dr. Sokol, slnce th1ngs are done In thls manner In the Reich - and here Sokol enumerated how varlous matters were transacted in Germany - we &hall do likewlse in Slovakla. In the fkst place, of course, cont:lnued Dr. Sokol, we know that In the Relch aJl State power rests In the hands of the head of the State - and that head 1s the Presldent. Dr. Tuka, lmmedlately realizlng that he was dlsarmed and In a bllnd alley, revoked hls proposal for a Natlonal Socla\lst!c Slevakla. He was fully 11.ware that under the ciTcumstances lt could happen that he would drop out of government completely, lf h1s proposal was adopted. But peace dld not ensue between Tuka, Mach and the ParHament. The deputles, who once sat in the Prague Parll,ament, often declared that the Prague Parllament could never have allowed such Independent action against the Government as the Bratislava Parl!amen.t dld durlng its mhole exlstence. lit often hapl)ened that the Government sent to Parllament a draft of a 1Mv for consideratlon and pas&age. When Parllament was thro~h with lt, the law approved was In most cases not based on the orlglnal dra~t. but was the opposJ te In lts effec,ts from what Tuka and Mach had lntended lt to be. There was no opposltlon ,to speak of In Parllament, but there was plenty of lt ag,alnst the Government. Thls had not onJy lts good, but bad polnts as well. Undoubtedly, lf -tlmes were normal, Tuka's government never would have held together. Tuka and Mach, who represented one tendency In the Government, had practlcally no support In Parllament. Later on, however, even the other mlnlsters could not have galned t-he majority, because, just as 'Iluka and Mach were reproached for belng too radlcal and subordlnated to the Germans. they, on the other hand, were reproached for belng too colorless. Aga.In it 1s true, that we could talk about the polltlcs or Dr. Tuka and Mach, but hardly that of Dr. Pruf.!nský, Frltz, St-a.no and Medrlcký. The latter were completely lnfluenced by "Czechoslovak" c lrcles. �SLOVAKIA 39 -Relatlons between the Government were not ldyllic. Tuka's !lret attempt to dlssolve Parllament ended lnglorlousJy. But he and hli! foJlowers dld not glve up easlly. When Tuka categorlcally demanded that he wanted a new Government formed, whlch would include only M-ach and Catioš !rom the exlstlng Government, he agaln wae de!eated. Tuka then demanded the Presldent to appoint Ciiarles Murga§ as Minister of Educatlon, John Farka§ as Finance Minister, and a new man to head the Minlstry of Justice. Tlso, however, remalned adamant; he repudlated Tuka's demands. Tlso inslsted en keeplng the iBame Government he had a!ter the Sal11Jburg events of July, 1940. After many rebuffs and bitter dlsappolntments, Tuka's spľrlt and energy began to wane. He was an old, slck man, obsessed with the thought that he should have been the !lrst man in the !and, because he had, he thought, suffered for the cause more than any one el.se. Hls aggre.sslveness gone, Tuk.a In later years was a minister in name only; he was seldom seen in hls offlce and was not In a posltion to make decislons. There was no change In government personnel until after Catloš's !llght to the putschJsts at the end of August, 1944. Catloš wa.s replaced by Stephen Haäšik; Tuka by Dr. Stephen Tlso, who also took over Frltz's post (Justlce and Forelgn Affalrs); Stano was replaced by Ing. Lednár, and .Sivák by Dr. Aladar Kočiš. Some people dld not flnd it difflcult to crltlclze the actlvlty of lndlvidual mlnlsters. When converslng wlth such bitter crltlcs, I cften asked the questlon: And what would you have done under the same clrcumstances? After a momenťs thought, the crltlcs usually an,swered that they probably would have done the same thlng, because there w-as a war on, German pressure dld exist, the sltuatlon was extraordlnary and, hence, strongly lntluenced everythlng the Government dld. Nevertheless, it remalns lnd1sputably true that as long as the Slovak Parllament and the Slovak Government ruled In Slovakia, the llvlng Standard of the Slovak people was hlgher than that of -a.ny nelghborlng country. Let people say w.hat they wlll about Sivák, the !act remalus that wblle he was Minister of Educatlon, more secondary schools arose tban ever before, more Slovak professors were appolnted to the unlversltles, and at least three tlmes as many students studled during the war than before or after ft. W e may crlt!clze T uka's act!ons, but the fact remalns that he did not seek reprlsals agalnst the false wltnesses, brlbed by Prague as -the Prague archlves dlsolosed, who helped to convlot bim to 15 years In prlson durlng the flrst CzechoSlovak Republlc. During the admlnlstratlon of Jullus Stano, more rallroad tracks, roads and buildings were bullt than ever before. The fact remalns that whlle Frltz was Minister of Justlce, and even after he was replaced, there was not a slngle offlclal executlon in Slovakia. Wben Medrický was in charge of Slovak economy, there was no ratlonlng of food and clothJng. And when Pružlnský was Mlnlster of Flnance, deposlts soared t o unbeard of belghts and the Slovak Koruna (Crown), one of the most prized means of exchange In the wbole of Europe, enjoyed the legend or the Tatra dollar. EvEm Catloš hlmself pursued a po llcy wbereby Slovakla contrlbuted as llttle as posslble to the tax of blood. �40 SLOVAKIA Alexander Mach mlght be blamed for almost anythlng and everytblng, but perhap.s no one man stood up so fearlessly against the German propaganda concerning the Germanlsm of the Habans, agalnst 1,he founcllng of German schools for Czecbs who s uddenly discovered tbat tbey had some German blood coursing In tbeir velns. And lt remains a fact that tbe Communlsts, even though their Party wias outlawed, suffered less in &Jovakla than elsewhere. It may sound strange, but it is true nevertheless, that Mach - thls most Germanophile Minister of the Interior - used to sit at a whlte table with Communist inte11ectuals, converse with them, ententain them, and, above all else, protect them. During the existence of the Slovak State, neither the Presldent nor the Mlnisters of State had to fear going among the people without a retinue of armed guards. The President never wanted a motorlzed police escort, in fact, could not even use one going to the altar, the pulpit, the baptlsmal font, or into the confesslonal. President Tiso was truly loved and esteemed by all the people of Slovakia. If his politicaJ enemies b e excepted, and tbey were only few in number, tben we must say t hat even they respected him. What a difference between Tiso and Beneš ! T,iso needed no protection wben he went out among tbe people, but Beneš and bis Communis.t-dominated regime had to have an army around tbem when they entered Slovakia after tbe war. About the Slovak Parllament we migbt say what the followers of Gbandi were wont to say: "Even the worst Indian Government 1s better for I ndia than the best Engllsh Government, because tbe English Government bas no business in India." Similarly, the Slovaks can express tbemselves about every Czech government. The past has shown definitely that a Czecho-Slovak government is in reality always a Czech government, regardless of whether it follows a rightls.t or Communist tendency. A Czec h-Slovak parliament always was and always will be a Czech parJ.iament, even lf lt contains several Slovak members. A nation whlcb bas matured does not want to be regulated or directed by laws t hat are promulgated by an alien parliament and then enforced by an alien government. That is so especially witb a nation wbicb has had lts own parliament and its own government. The Slovak nation had its own parliament and its own government from 1938- 1945, And tbe Slovaks stm wanted to rule themselves, thelr Slovak Republlc, after the war ended in 1945, but thelr will ,v,as violated, They were violently forced back into the political state which had explolted them for thirty years. Slovak ministers, as peopl e, could have a nd undoubtedly did have their faults, but one tbing cannot be denied tbem, the one lndlsputal>Je fact tbat tbey worked for the welfare of the entire Slovak nation as best they could under given circumstances, and the Slovak people never fared better under any otber government - before or slnce that time. In a word, tbe Slovak ministers governed well. Not one of tbem became wealthy through polltlcs; and they lived more modestily, more democratically than the present rulers of Slovakia, they cost the people less than tbe present commissloners. Tbe .same can be sald for the parUament. Tbe work of tbe Slovak Parliament undoubtedly had lts shortcomlngs. Circumstances and �SLOVAKIA events often tled the hands of the deputies, but we need not fear the criticism whlch history shall r&eord about the Slovak Parliament. After the war many deputies were tortured and some were k!lled. Most of them recelved an average of ten years in prison. It is good always to remember this, when some Czech In the world says that the Slovaks never had it so good as they had it under the Czechs before 1939 or after 1945. The fact remains that the Czechs in Prague oppressed and exploited the Slovaks before 1939 and, af,ter 1945 avenged -themselves by murdering Dr. Tiso and others, jaillng, persecuting and dispossessing thousands of others, and exlling tens of thousands of Slovaks to Siberla and other regions of the Soviet Union and its satellites. The Slovaks at home and everywhere in exile know tha.t they dld not sell out the Czech people to Moscow, but that Dr. Edward Beneš and hls followers sold out not only the Slovak nation, but the Czech peoI11e as we11, to the tyranny of ,t he hammer and sickJe. • • • WHO SAID IT? BENEŠ IN RETROSPECT: - "In an interview published In a London Sunday paper, REYNOLDS NEWS, on February 20, Presldent Beneš of Czechoslovakia, emphatically declared that he does not fear Russla's return to imperlalism under the pretext of a so-called Al!• Slav policy. The alliance and harmonious collaboratlon of the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia would deter Germany from provoking another world war. Such an agreement may, therefore, have a far• reaching slgnificance for the future peace of Europe as a whole. To the question as to whether the pact will not make Czechoslovakia too dependent on the Soviet Union, President Beneš r eplied that the pact represents the fundamental strengthening of Czechoslovakia's security a nd consolidates her independence. Friendshlp wlth Soviet Russla means a mutual collaboration. The Czechoslovakian people, as the most mature people politically in Europe, would never accept vassalage under any nation." - (News Flashes From Czechoslovakia, Chicago, Ill., March 20, 1944). • • • DR. HUBERT RIPKA:-'IMany siliy rumors and guesses ,have arlsen concerning a quarrel with the Soviet Union about Carpathian-Russia. Many conJectures have been made about our Governmental delegate, NE!mec. T hese are all nonsensical speculations ! The Soviet and Czechoslovak Governments are firmly resolved to proceed in all matters, now and in the future, strlctly accordlng to the Treaty. Governmental dele• gate NE!mec, wlth hls political advisors and the representatlves of the Slovak Natlonal Council, ls already in llberated eastern Slovakia and in a few days wlll start worklng in Košice, to organize a new free Ufe in llberated parts of Slovakla, accordlng to the government on relatlons between the Government delegate and the Slovak Natlonal Councll. President Beneš wlll also come soon to the llberated country, where, under hls leadershlp, a new Government authority wlll be created, based on the wlll of the llberated peoples. Be calm and falth· ful. Liberatlon 1s in slght." - (London Broadcast, January 29, 1945). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 33 THE SWVAK ASSEMBLY AND GOVERNMENT ľt !s very interesting to follow the developement of the Slovak national idea trom the oldest limes to the pre.sent. As one of the oldest expressions of Slovak nationalism, made in wr~ting, we must regard the foreword to the Catholic hymnal "Canthus Cathollci," pubJished in 1655, in whlch the author, the learned Jesuit Szôlôsi, with words of wonderment and love, calls the aittention of his readers to the first Slovak State, to Svätopluk and to Saints Cyril and Methodius. And since Szôlôsi's time, Slovak patriots have frequenrtly returned to this theme: Magin in 1728; George Papánek in 1780, in his history of Slovak ľtllers; George Sklenár In 1784, In his history of Great Moravia; in the "S'taré Noviny" (Old Newl',) in 1786. The period 1787-1792 is climaxed with the publlcation of the firs,t Slovak Grammar, the organization of the "Learned Guild" (Učené tovarišstvo), and the publication of Fándly's book, in which the author speaks warmly to the Slovaks and calls their a,ttention to the flrst Slov,ak State. In 1793 Fándly again publishes the history of Great Moravia, and in 1833 John Hollý publishes his famed epic "Svätopluk." This perlod, lasting over 130 years, is marked in learned books wlth a constant return to the theme of ťhe first Slovak State. At the end of this epoch, three years after Hollý's "Svätopluk" was published, on the Devin ramparts the young friends of Louis Štúr spoke from the rulns of Svä,topluk's stronghold, repeating everything that had t o that time appeared only in books. This is the •border line. With the book of a young follower of Štúr, Benjamiu Pravoslav Červenák, titled "Zrcadlo Slovenska" (Mirror of Slovakla), which Hurban publlshed in 1844, ends ,this epoch of returning to the past without a single chapter about what we want in the present and the future. We could s.ay, then, that Slovak patriots kept the flames of their nationalism burning for 150 years by returning to the past. However, they did not state clearly just how they pictured Slovak life of the future. In 1845, when Štúr began pu,biishing the first Slovak polltlcal newspaper, a change was gradually taking place in the thinking of the people. Slovaks began to talk about what should be done to preserve the Slovak nation, to increase 1-ts spiritual and material welf,are. They talked about concrete Slovak demands. In 1842, Dr. Paul Jozeffy placed a petition before the emperor, requesting that t he Slovak lan.guage be .the medium of teachlng !n Slovakla, of preaching in tbe cburches, and that cJrnrch records (vltal staitlstlcs) be kept in Slovak. Jozeffy's demands concerned only the linguistic questlon. But in 1848, the Slovaks went much farther. They proclaimed themselves independent from the Magyars. Mil'hael Milan Hodža, Loufs Štúr and Joseph Miloslav Hurban proclalmed the first Slovak Government, the Slovak National Council as the "supreme Slovak authorlty issulng out of the bosom of the natlon." That same year, In the historic demands known as the Nitra and Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš rlemands, the Slovaks pleaded ardently tor ~utonomy of the Slovak terrltory, whose laws would be passed by a Slovak parllament. 34 SLOVAKIA . Furthermor e, they demanded: Slovak schools, Slovak cour ts, Slovak as the offlclal language In SlovakJa, and teachlng In Slovak a t the Unlverslty. In every Slovak demand, trom May 10, 1848, and In every Slovak program the demand for a S lovak Parllament w,as predomlnan t. It had deep roots. To Brezová and Liptovský Svätý M.lkulä§ not even a hundred people came to the rally In 1848 to demand a Slovak parllament . In 1861, about 6000 Slovaks oam e together to demand a Natlonal Assembly for SlovakJa. The Plttsburgh manifesta:t lon of May 30, 1918, w as attend ed by some 30,000 people. But In 1938, on P ent.ecost Day (June 6th ), about 120,000 Slovaks gathered In Bratislava at a hlstorlc rally to commemor ate lhe twentleth annlversary of th e Plttsbugh P act . It was he re that lhe Slovak natlon saw the hlstorlc document whlch was proposed ,and slgned by T. G. Masazyk In 1918. The Plttsburgh Pact, whlch In fact guaranteed autonomy t o the Slovaks, was brought to Slovakla by a delega tlon of lhe Slovak League of Amerlca. T hese m anlfestation s show just how the concept of self-admlnistratlon in Slovakia grew In depth In the wlde masses of the naitlon. In 1848 lt wa.<i supported by a small group of Slovak hrtellectual s, but In 1938, in Bratislava, pract!cally the entlre Slovak natlon was back of it. In a contldenlla l report (T. 1370/33) to Pres.Ident M,asaryk , Dr. Schnleszl wrote: "Today a ll of S lovakla 1, for autonomy. Several pre.revolu. tlonary Slovak, are completely lnsignlflcan t for the splrltual life of the people. Moreover, if some were not bound by thelr paat, and other, by the ir public statu,, they, t oo, would be on the other • Ide o penly." The Slovak newspapen nan in Amerlca, Adalbert Tholt,Vel'koštlavnlcký, was not faml11ar w!th the correspondence of old Slovak leaders, and yet he evaluated the polltical demands of the Slovaks quite correctly. He stated that they were demands not only for a narrow autonomy, but lhat thelr content actually called for the Jndependence of Slovakia. It 1s interestlng t hat Tholt came to this concluslon even though he was not acqua!nted wlth the signlflcant quota. tion trom Šttlr's book "Slovanstv o a svet budtlcnostl " (Slavdom and the WOTld of lhe Future), which read: "So that we could occupy and take ove r the place whlch belong1 to u1 accordlng to our atrength a nd capabllltles , we must once and for a ll t lme f ree ourselvea from the unbearable y oke of foreignera a nd gain for ouraelvea state INDEPEND ENCE, bec auae a natlon that i• enslaved has ltl hand, t led and mu,t perlsh sooner or lat er." What crystal-clea x words! And Šttlr said them openly and fearlessly after the sad experlence s of 1848-49. Šttlr states clearly that the penalty awa!Ung the nat!on whlch wlll not flght for its state in dependence is death. After the natlonal rally of 1861, the flght at home in Slovakla weakened; there was not a slngle publ!c expression or demand voted on manlfestati onally which could compare to the demands of 1848 and 1861: In whlch .a demand was volced for a Slovak governmen t, or a Slovak parl!ament. In Slovakla a bard flght was fou ght t o preserve SLOVAKIA 86 S lovak schools. But the flght for the inherent rlghts of the Slovak natlon was carrled over lnto America. The questlon was taken up by the Slovak press and became the subject of several hundred public manlfestatlons. Flnally lt matured wlth the "Memorandum of ťhe Slovak League," whlch to a certaln extent repeated the demands voiced In 1848 and 1861: autonomy for Slovakla, a separate Slovak Assembly or Dlet, Slovaklzatlon of the schools, Slovak courts, and the use of Slovak In public llfe. After thls foll<JW the agreements wlth representatives of the Czech natlon. The Cleveland ~reement, In 1915, In wlllch the Czechs agree to a federatlve form of the hopeful Czecho-Slovak Republlc, and then the memorable Plttsburgh Pact of May 30, 1918, in whlch again ls renewed the promlse that the Slovaks shall have thelr own Slov,ak admlnlstration, thelr own Slovak schools and courts, and, above all else, thelr own Slovak parliament or state leglslature. Even though Thomas Garrigue Masaryk underslgned thls agreement on May 30, 1918, and then agaln on the second day following bis electlon as Presldent of Czecho-Slovakia, he later dlsavowed it, declarlng it a falsehood and a mere scrap of paper. That ls how the Czechs kept thelr promlses. If we call the perlod from 1655 to 1845 as the perlod which turned to the past, then we can call 1:he perlod from 1845 to to 1918 a.s the perlod present!ng the program of the !uture. And thls 1s followed by a perlod of actlve fightlng for the recognltlon of prom!ses and agreements. A short artlcle does not allow us to take up in mlnute de• tal! every parliamentary expresslon, every motlon or proposal for autonomy, every public manlfestatlon; and every remlnder that promlses made durlng the war be kept and fulfilled. It remalns a sad reality, but the hlstorlcal truth nevertheless, that the Czechs dld not live up to thelr promlses any more after 1918, than they d1d after 1945. Tlle fate of every agreement wlth the Czechs was the same: ,all agreements wlth the Slova.ks were repudiated by the Czechs. The Czechs were w11llng to make concesslons only when they needed the Slovaks; later, they repudlated every agreement. Practlcally all Czech.s were the same In thls regard: T. G. Masaryk, the so-called reallst and humanlst; Ediward Beneií, t he so-called "democrat and statesman," and Monslgnor John Šrámek, the Cathollc prlest; Czech agrarlans, democrats, soclallsts, communlsts and fasclsts; Czech Cathollcs, Lutherans, Jews, Ta:bor· ltes, Husaltes, members of the "Czechoslovak Natlonal Church," Unl• tarlans and Baptista: all repudiated the promlses made to Slova.ks, all repudlated the lnberent and God-glven rlght of the Slovak natlon to freedom and state lndependence. No llttle wonder, then, t,bat the SlovalG cry out today: Don't belleve the Czech.s - no more agreements wlth the Czechs! Joseph P~kar, the Czech hlstorlan repudlated by Masaryk and Beneli, declared In hls Ume that the Slovak demands were moderate. Was lt not a terrible tragedy that these moderate and rlghtful demands were not reallzed in the Czeoho Slovak Republic? For twenty long year-s the Slovaks fouglrt not only for thelr own parllament, but also for t.he Slovaklzat!on of tbelr schools, especlally for addttlonal hlgher lnstltutlons of loo.rnlng. Many of the demands of 1848 and 0 36 SLOVAKIA 1861 were still timely even ln 1938; and the demand for a Slovak parllament W&S the most imporllant. The Czechs, supported by Slovak Czechoslovaks (Slovaks ln the serVice of the Czechs: renegades), proclaimed that there was nothing more dangerous for the Slovaks than a Slovak parliament. V,avro Šro,b ár, one of the foremost "Czechoslovaks," wrote a letter to Americans of Slovak descent to "prove" that point. Of course, to do so he had to give incorrect or falsified statistios; ln fact, he outdid the Magyars in -that respect. šrobár used the false figures, 1 epresenting the various nationa.lities of the populatlon of Slovakia, to show that in a Slovak parliament the Slovaks themselves would be a minority, which the non-Slovak population - the Magyars, Jews and Germans - could outvote at any Ume. But he was not very convincing. During varlous negotiations wlth a P.r-ague Government, the Czech ministers promised: We shall glve you everything, but not a Slovak parliament. And -the Slovaks answered adamantly: We want nothing except a Slovak parliament, because with it we shall rea.lize al! the rest of our demands. Czech policy was incredibly short-sighted. Czech politicians and ministers would debate day.s on end In the Ministerlal Council to send Czech maLl-carriers and janitors to Slovakia to "help out" the Slovaks. .ánd they usually did even agalnst the will of the Slovak pul)lic and its representatlves In Government. Thls only convinced the Slovaks all ťhe more thai w:ithout thelr own State Legislature or Parliament, they would actually be only a subordinate colony of the Czech nation. Tbe more Prague opposed the Idea of a Slovak parliamen t, however, the more the Slovaks demanded lt. Th·a t was the situa:tlon up to October 6, 1938. Czech diplomacy and democracy created such a situation that the Czecho-Slovak Repul)ll<: collapsed wlth the first blow. Not a single shot was fired in its defense. In the annals of hlstory there is probably not a single case where a political state disappeared with less ado about it. In the fall of 1938 lt was c.Jear even to those In power in Prague that the Slovak demands of 1915-1918 must be fulfilled. Even Beneš bimself - who told the delegation of the Slovak League of Amerlca In 1938 that be was in principle agalnst t he Pittsburgh Pact only because of the one word "parllament" - began to see the llght. On October 4, 1938, that very same Beneš wrote a letter to Dr. Joseph Tiso - a letter overflowing wlth reverence and k!ndly feellng - in which we flnd: "The question of a parllament, designated by Mr. President in principle and onJy in the maln outlines and In proposltlons, requlres precise defln!tion and preclse legal formulatlon. The new Government, in agreement wlth the Slovaks, shall have to conclude the rest of this work as speedily as posslble." Beneš wrote the letter and correcled it tbree times, as was a.scertained In the archlves, but lt was slgned by. Dr. Schleszl. On October 4, Beneš had lt mailed, but that very day requested lt returned to hlm, because, under pressure from the generals, he declded to reslgn the Presldency of the Republic. But what dld Beneš have io propose about a Slovak parliament? Only thls: " It ls agreed that future acts of admlnistratlve reforms, if it shall be based on the county system, shall preserve the unlty SLOVAKIA 37 of SloV'aJtia as a !and and that a union of the counties be reallzed withln the fmmework of the territorial parliament of Slovakia." True, thls proposition could not be seriously considered, because Beneš resigned his office and fled the country. The Pra~e ParHament fLnally voted the autonomy of Slovakia wit hout Beneš on 0 ctober 6, 1938. In December the first Slovak parliament•ary eJections were held, and In January, 1939, sixty-three deputies were seated in the flrst legislative ,assembly of Slovakia. Dr. Martin Sokol became t he first president of the Slovak Parliament. The dream of Slovak ,generatlons was at long last realized. The Slovak ParJiament, just as every ,human work, had lts shortcomings. But we must judge every mlstake in the light of the times in which it happened. The Slovak Legislature began to function in extraordinarily difficult tlmes, when the worud situation was extraordinarily tense and confusion reigned In Slov·a kia. Almost simultaneously with the Parliament, Slovak rule passed !nto the hands of the Slovak Government in 0ctober, 1938. State executive and leglslative power in Slovakia passed into Slovak hands. But the Ozechs were not satisfied wit h this status of affairs. It was difficult for th em to suffer the thought that the Slovaks would now decide about Slovak matters w-ithout Prague. They began to hinder development. 'I'he.y especially wanted to prove that their progno.stiootions about the Czeťhs ha-ving to pay for the Slovaks were true. The financial policy pursued was suoh that it forebo<le the prediction of Kramár, that 1s, that if the Slovaks gained autonomy, they wouid not be aJble to pay their state employees even three months. They refused to give money for Slovak !mports from the common fund, even though t he Slovaks contributed to it, because now, they said, Slovakia is no longer a money--creating part of the ·state. Events were climaxed wHh a new occupation of Slovakia and the unseatlng of fäe first Slovak Government in Marcl:t, 1939. When this happened, the recently executed Vladlmir Clementis, in London at that tilne, wrote: " . . . The unseatlng of Tlso's Government by Prague (better said: by Hácha, Beran and Chvalkovský - at the direction of Berlin) was negoti'ated polit!cally In a very bung,Jed manner, nay in a si-niiully awkward manner" ( Hnev Svätý, London, 1944, pg. 21). The result of this lntervention was tha.t Slovakia tore herself compl etely from the Czech lands, and the Parliament of Slove.kla by unan!mous vote, proclaimed the lndependence of the Slovak State on Maroh 14, 1939. Thus, Štúr',s wish of 1850 was realized in 1939. ,Shortly after the Parliament and government of autonomous Slovak!a oame into being, the enti-re apparatus of government legislat!ve and executive power - oame lnto Slovak hands. And just aibout that time we w!tnes.sed an interesting phenomenon. From 1940, after the events of the so-calle d '\Salzburg In,tervention," we noted a e hange in the relatlons between the Parllament Md the Government - which caused a serious tension and often threatened to explo<le lnto a sharp public conWct and wreck the whole structure of the State. Vojtech Tuka wanted to remodel Slovakia completely after the German model ; he was for NaUonal Soc!alism. 0f course, he ex- 38 SLOVAKIA pected to become the flrst cltlzen of the remodeled State. Tuka and bis followers began to lntrigue agalnst the Parllament, and the stM1ggle cllmaxed with Tuka's demand that Parliament vote Tuka fulJ authority, and that even In Constltut1onal mattera. In a word, Tuka wa.nted dlctatorlal powers. Accordlng to Tuka, the PaTllament was supposed to be only a representative body, whlch he would convoke once a year to hear some proclamatlon of hfs and then would solemnly and unanlmously approve everythlng he proposed. Tuka wanted a "rubber stamp" parllament whlch would say "so be lt" to everyth!ng he recommended, then go home and ref.raln from meddllng In the politlcs of the State. Charles Mmgaš, Chlef of Propaganda, speaklng In the name of the "leadershlp," deolared that only one or two persons of the "lea.dership" would be -a.ble to play polltics and, of course, he reckoned tha.t •he would be one of them. Accordlng to these promoters of Natlonal Soclallsm, lt w,as necessary to Temove two personalltlee from government: Dr. J oseph Tlso and Dr. Martin Sokol. President Tlso delegated Dr. Sokol to dellbemt e about these questlons. To the great surprlse of Dr. Tuka hlmself, Dr. Sokol declared that he fully agreed wlth Tuka's proposal that the Natlonal-Soclallstlc system should prevall in Slovakla. .And now, sald Dr. Sokol, slnce th1ngs are done In thls manner In the Reich - and here Sokol enumerated how varlous matters were transacted in Germany - we &hall do likewlse in Slovakla. In the fkst place, of course, cont:lnued Dr. Sokol, we know that In the Relch aJl State power rests In the hands of the head of the State - and that head 1s the Presldent. Dr. Tuka, lmmedlately realizlng that he was dlsarmed and In a bllnd alley, revoked hls proposal for a Natlonal Socla\lst!c Slevakla. He was fully 11.ware that under the ciTcumstances lt could happen that he would drop out of government completely, lf h1s proposal was adopted. But peace dld not ensue between Tuka, Mach and the ParHament. The deputles, who once sat in the Prague Parll,ament, often declared that the Prague Parllament could never have allowed such Independent action against the Government as the Bratislava Parl!amen.t dld durlng its mhole exlstence. lit often hapl)ened that the Government sent to Parllament a draft of a 1Mv for consideratlon and pas&age. When Parllament was thro~h with lt, the law approved was In most cases not based on the orlglnal dra~t. but was the opposJ te In lts effec,ts from what Tuka and Mach had lntended lt to be. There was no opposltlon ,to speak of In Parllament, but there was plenty of lt ag,alnst the Government. Thls had not onJy lts good, but bad polnts as well. Undoubtedly, lf -tlmes were normal, Tuka's government never would have held together. Tuka and Mach, who represented one tendency In the Government, had practlcally no support In Parllament. Later on, however, even the other mlnlsters could not have galned t-he majority, because, just as 'Iluka and Mach were reproached for belng too radlcal and subordlnated to the Germans. they, on the other hand, were reproached for belng too colorless. Aga.In it 1s true, that we could talk about the polltlcs or Dr. Tuka and Mach, but hardly that of Dr. Pruf.!nský, Frltz, St-a.no and Medrlcký. The latter were completely lnfluenced by "Czechoslovak" c lrcles. SLOVAKIA 39 -Relatlons between the Government were not ldyllic. Tuka's !lret attempt to dlssolve Parllament ended lnglorlousJy. But he and hli! foJlowers dld not glve up easlly. When Tuka categorlcally demanded that he wanted a new Government formed, whlch would include only M-ach and Catioš !rom the exlstlng Government, he agaln wae de!eated. Tuka then demanded the Presldent to appoint Ciiarles Murga§ as Minister of Educatlon, John Farka§ as Finance Minister, and a new man to head the Minlstry of Justice. Tlso, however, remalned adamant; he repudlated Tuka's demands. Tlso inslsted en keeplng the iBame Government he had a!ter the Sal11Jburg events of July, 1940. After many rebuffs and bitter dlsappolntments, Tuka's spľrlt and energy began to wane. He was an old, slck man, obsessed with the thought that he should have been the !lrst man in the !and, because he had, he thought, suffered for the cause more than any one el.se. Hls aggre.sslveness gone, Tuk.a In later years was a minister in name only; he was seldom seen in hls offlce and was not In a posltion to make decislons. There was no change In government personnel until after Catloš's !llght to the putschJsts at the end of August, 1944. Catloš wa.s replaced by Stephen Haäšik; Tuka by Dr. Stephen Tlso, who also took over Frltz's post (Justlce and Forelgn Affalrs); Stano was replaced by Ing. Lednár, and .Sivák by Dr. Aladar Kočiš. Some people dld not flnd it difflcult to crltlclze the actlvlty of lndlvidual mlnlsters. When converslng wlth such bitter crltlcs, I cften asked the questlon: And what would you have done under the same clrcumstances? After a momenťs thought, the crltlcs usually an,swered that they probably would have done the same thlng, because there w-as a war on, German pressure dld exist, the sltuatlon was extraordlnary and, hence, strongly lntluenced everythlng the Government dld. Nevertheless, it remalns lnd1sputably true that as long as the Slovak Parllament and the Slovak Government ruled In Slovakia, the llvlng Standard of the Slovak people was hlgher than that of -a.ny nelghborlng country. Let people say w.hat they wlll about Sivák, the !act remalus that wblle he was Minister of Educatlon, more secondary schools arose tban ever before, more Slovak professors were appolnted to the unlversltles, and at least three tlmes as many students studled during the war than before or after ft. W e may crlt!clze T uka's act!ons, but the fact remalns that he did not seek reprlsals agalnst the false wltnesses, brlbed by Prague as -the Prague archlves dlsolosed, who helped to convlot bim to 15 years In prlson durlng the flrst CzechoSlovak Republlc. During the admlnlstratlon of Jullus Stano, more rallroad tracks, roads and buildings were bullt than ever before. The fact remalns that whlle Frltz was Minister of Justlce, and even after he was replaced, there was not a slngle offlclal executlon in Slovakia. Wben Medrický was in charge of Slovak economy, there was no ratlonlng of food and clothJng. And when Pružlnský was Mlnlster of Flnance, deposlts soared t o unbeard of belghts and the Slovak Koruna (Crown), one of the most prized means of exchange In the wbole of Europe, enjoyed the legend or the Tatra dollar. EvEm Catloš hlmself pursued a po llcy wbereby Slovakla contrlbuted as llttle as posslble to the tax of blood. 40 SLOVAKIA Alexander Mach mlght be blamed for almost anythlng and everytblng, but perhap.s no one man stood up so fearlessly against the German propaganda concerning the Germanlsm of the Habans, agalnst 1,he founcllng of German schools for Czecbs who s uddenly discovered tbat tbey had some German blood coursing In tbeir velns. And lt remains a fact that tbe Communlsts, even though their Party wias outlawed, suffered less in &Jovakla than elsewhere. It may sound strange, but it is true nevertheless, that Mach - thls most Germanophile Minister of the Interior - used to sit at a whlte table with Communist inte11ectuals, converse with them, ententain them, and, above all else, protect them. During the existence of the Slovak State, neither the Presldent nor the Mlnisters of State had to fear going among the people without a retinue of armed guards. The President never wanted a motorlzed police escort, in fact, could not even use one going to the altar, the pulpit, the baptlsmal font, or into the confesslonal. President Tiso was truly loved and esteemed by all the people of Slovakia. If his politicaJ enemies b e excepted, and tbey were only few in number, tben we must say t hat even they respected him. What a difference between Tiso and Beneš ! T,iso needed no protection wben he went out among tbe people, but Beneš and bis Communis.t-dominated regime had to have an army around tbem when they entered Slovakia after tbe war. About the Slovak Parllament we migbt say what the followers of Gbandi were wont to say: "Even the worst Indian Government 1s better for I ndia than the best Engllsh Government, because tbe English Government bas no business in India." Similarly, the Slovaks can express tbemselves about every Czech government. The past has shown definitely that a Czecho-Slovak government is in reality always a Czech government, regardless of whether it follows a rightls.t or Communist tendency. A Czec h-Slovak parliament always was and always will be a Czech parJ.iament, even lf lt contains several Slovak members. A nation whlcb bas matured does not want to be regulated or directed by laws t hat are promulgated by an alien parliament and then enforced by an alien government. That is so especially witb a nation wbicb has had lts own parliament and its own government. The Slovak nation had its own parliament and its own government from 1938- 1945, And tbe Slovaks stm wanted to rule themselves, thelr Slovak Republlc, after the war ended in 1945, but thelr will ,v,as violated, They were violently forced back into the political state which had explolted them for thirty years. Slovak ministers, as peopl e, could have a nd undoubtedly did have their faults, but one tbing cannot be denied tbem, the one lndlsputal>Je fact tbat tbey worked for the welfare of the entire Slovak nation as best they could under given circumstances, and the Slovak people never fared better under any otber government - before or slnce that time. In a word, tbe Slovak ministers governed well. Not one of tbem became wealthy through polltlcs; and they lived more modestily, more democratically than the present rulers of Slovakia, they cost the people less than tbe present commissloners. Tbe .same can be sald for the parUament. Tbe work of tbe Slovak Parliament undoubtedly had lts shortcomlngs. Circumstances and SLOVAKIA events often tled the hands of the deputies, but we need not fear the criticism whlch history shall r&eord about the Slovak Parliament. After the war many deputies were tortured and some were k!lled. Most of them recelved an average of ten years in prison. It is good always to remember this, when some Czech In the world says that the Slovaks never had it so good as they had it under the Czechs before 1939 or after 1945. The fact remains that the Czechs in Prague oppressed and exploited the Slovaks before 1939 and, af,ter 1945 avenged -themselves by murdering Dr. Tiso and others, jaillng, persecuting and dispossessing thousands of others, and exlling tens of thousands of Slovaks to Siberla and other regions of the Soviet Union and its satellites. The Slovaks at home and everywhere in exile know tha.t they dld not sell out the Czech people to Moscow, but that Dr. Edward Beneš and hls followers sold out not only the Slovak nation, but the Czech peoI11e as we11, to the tyranny of ,t he hammer and sickJe. • • • WHO SAID IT? BENEŠ IN RETROSPECT: - "In an interview published In a London Sunday paper, REYNOLDS NEWS, on February 20, Presldent Beneš of Czechoslovakia, emphatically declared that he does not fear Russla's return to imperlalism under the pretext of a so-called Al!• Slav policy. The alliance and harmonious collaboratlon of the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia would deter Germany from provoking another world war. Such an agreement may, therefore, have a far• reaching slgnificance for the future peace of Europe as a whole. To the question as to whether the pact will not make Czechoslovakia too dependent on the Soviet Union, President Beneš r eplied that the pact represents the fundamental strengthening of Czechoslovakia's security a nd consolidates her independence. Friendshlp wlth Soviet Russla means a mutual collaboration. The Czechoslovakian people, as the most mature people politically in Europe, would never accept vassalage under any nation." - (News Flashes From Czechoslovakia, Chicago, Ill., March 20, 1944). • • • DR. HUBERT RIPKA:-'IMany siliy rumors and guesses ,have arlsen concerning a quarrel with the Soviet Union about Carpathian-Russia. Many conJectures have been made about our Governmental delegate, NE!mec. T hese are all nonsensical speculations ! The Soviet and Czechoslovak Governments are firmly resolved to proceed in all matters, now and in the future, strlctly accordlng to the Treaty. Governmental dele• gate NE!mec, wlth hls political advisors and the representatlves of the Slovak Natlonal Council, ls already in llberated eastern Slovakia and in a few days wlll start worklng in Košice, to organize a new free Ufe in llberated parts of Slovakla, accordlng to the government on relatlons between the Government delegate and the Slovak Natlonal Councll. President Beneš wlll also come soon to the llberated country, where, under hls leadershlp, a new Government authority wlll be created, based on the wlll of the llberated peoples. Be calm and falth· ful. Liberatlon 1s in slght." - (London Broadcast, January 29, 1945).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Slovak Assembly and Government Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952 pp. 33-41 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/92ce057f19db82f9536d068c99a5b8da.pdf a434c2df13029e448a36faca66bab2c2 PDF Text Text 66 SLOVA.KIA THE SWVAKS AND THE BENE.š CZECHS JOSEPH ORAVSKÝ On November 14, 1945, Dr. Peter Zenkl, had qulte a speech in the Prague National Assembly. A stenographic record notes that he was accorded a thunderous applause when he said: "Never without the Soviet Union, never against the Soviet Union, alwaya aolidly with lt, side by aide." On December 18, 1943, after the signing ot the agreement ot "eternal friendship and post-was cooperation" between Prague and Moscow, Dr. Hubert Ripka proclaimed: " Having negotiated an allied agreement wlth the Soviet Union, we have accompllahed a good deed which we can rightfully be proud of. Thia treaty undoubtedly is one of the foundation stones of the aecurity, the prosperity and the atrength of the Republic." And later, this same Dr. Hubert Ripka, as Minister of Foreign Trade, in an interview with the editor of the NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE in October 1947, openly admitted that the strengtbening of economic contacts between the USSR and the Czechoslovak Republic "is not dictated by the communista," and added: "That la my policy." The well-known politlcian of Hradčany Castle, Ferdinand Peroutka, in bis Czech •book " Tak nebo tak," published in 1945 by F. Borovt in Prague, appraised the significance of the Bolshevik Revolutlon scientlfically and statesmen-like in this manner: "In 1917 there began a new epoch of mankind. We observe at every step that the Russian Revolutlon ia more than a single State, that it is a world outlook for which men are fighting in all places of the earth" (page 37). And a year later, writing in "DNEŠEK," June 11, 1946, the same Peroutka expressed bis feellng in this manner: " The Eaat, there la our liberator, our ally and our protection in the future . . . lf in England there still can be found factora, who show a bigoted hatred for the Soviet Union, then these cannot even be considered as our frienda." These enthusiastic expressions about the Soviet Union, which we have recalled, belong to men who determined and directed the foreign policy of Prague for a long number ot years, band in hand with thelr politlcal master, Dr. Edward Beneš. Their political master, whom they served so faithfully, became a vlctim of his own policy. But they remalned alive. Every judlcious person would suppose and rlgthfully expect that these glorifiers of the Soviet Union would spend the rest of the years, whlch stm separate them from the grave, in humllity and penance. If they flamed with love for everything that the Russian Revolutlon brought, then it would be wise of them not to walk in broad daylight in the free and democratic world with thelr love for the Soviet Union. And it would have .been proper and more like them tt, after living the honeymoon weeks in the embrace of communism, they dld not try to offer themselves as modest virglns for the crusade agalnst their old communistic love. To err ls human. And in politics people err frequently. But in the case ot these persona! and political friends of Beneš, we were and are not concerned with an error ot limited, temporary importance and extent. We were and are not concerned wlth the persona! error of an indlvldual, political factor, but wlth the fundamental error of world �SLOVAKIA 67 outlook of the whole political caste which, being led by Edward Beneii, determined and gave llfe to a whole polltlcal system. And thls system was not invented during the war and post•war years just for the sake of politlcal tactlcs. Long before World War II, this system was systematlc• ally fostered and practiced by Edward Beneš and bis lettlst companlons, and in 1946 it was introduced into the political and state structure only in all its conclusions. The planners and representatlves of this system regarded the incursion of the Soviet Union into Central Europe as their own victory. They could have no reservations for the Soviet Union in 1946, because they had none prior to that Ume. That is why t hey rejolced so spon• taneously with Edward Beneš over the advent of the Soviet system into Eurone; that is why they had no trouble in collaborating wlth the communists; and that is why they adapted themselves with such miraculous speed to everything Soviet. When we quoted the above statements of Zenkl, Peroutka and Ripka, we were not thinking about their persona!, human existence, but about the system which they embraced and promoted so vigorously. Whatever they did, they did not do in their names only, tbut also in the name of the system which reached deeply into practical llfe and whlch, after the victory of communism in Centra! Europe, was identlfled with lt in all fundamental questlons. We Siovaks could never see eye to eye with the policies of Edward Beneš and bis people and we rejected their system as a matter ot principle, because our views of the Soviet Union and communism clashed with theirs. It is a matter of historical record that the Slovaks are fightlng communism and communists for over a 100 years. An abyss separated and stm separates us as far as vlewpointa on t ha Soviet Union and communism are concerned. And we admit that we d!d not expect to see these Czech political heroes of Edward Beneš's system in the pol!tlcal arena again. When they d!d get into !t, we dld not reckon that they would meddle in the questlons that vitally effect the present and future of the Slovak nation. From our hearts we w!sh that the Lord God give the Czech nation good and honorable fighters aga!nst communlsm, that He endow it with discerning political leaders, who will lead it along the right path. But if the Czech natlon ls satisfied wlth the people, who so lm• pressively taught them to love the Soviet Union, well there is noth!ng we can do about it, because we do not want to meddle in fundamental questlons that concern the present and future of the Czech nation. That is, after au, the law ot democracy. But frankly and in the interest of truth, we must again recall to the rlghtlsts and to the leftists that we do not wish the noble, herolc and uncompromissing struggte of t he Slovak natlon against communlsm to be connected wlth them at any tlme or any place. We Slovaks cannot and do not want to degrade our anti·communist stand to the level of these people, no matter what the prtce. The Slovak natlon is s uffer!ng the consequences ot the brutal commun!st reality which the political system, represented by these people, has hung on the'lr necks. • They are the express!on of a certain morality which does not suff!ce for the mora! needs of the present ser!ous period and so much less suita the spiritual and character dlsposition of the Slovak natlon. The!r persona! acqualntances and fr!endsh!ps could open for them �68 SLOVAKIA the doors of politlcal asylum. Out of the magnanlmity of these acquaint• ances and frlendshlps they could be assured mlnisterlal penslons for Jlfe. That ls a questlon of philanthropy and of private r elatlons. But a responsible and serlous comprehension of the anti-communist stand, organlzatlons ot antl-communist propaganda and the psychological pre• paratlon of antl-communlst resistance, exclude any purpose to use them as an exclusive and of!lcial argument against communism. It wou!d be tragic, indeed, if in the historic evaluation of forces between Christianity and democracy, on the one hand, and communism on the other, there would not be avallable other moral and polltlcaUy more valuable personallties. The Slovak natlon wants to wage lts antl-communist fight to Unal victory. And it is convinced that the whole free and demociratic world also wants to finish this fight. 'I'he Slovak nation, therefore, rightfully expects that its uncompromlsing fight against communistlc and every other kind of slavery deserves recognltlon and polltical and moral appreciatlon. The Slovak nation, therefore, is not dependent on the anti-communlst substltute, composed of persona! and politlcal values wblch irretrievably belong to the past and to political asylum. We can get to the soul of every nation only by means of uprlghtness and a genulne recognition of moral and polltical responsibillty. • • • WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO "Dr. Tiso died a hero. The Nuremberg criminals died as crimin• als, regretting thelr crimes. Dr. Tiso had nothing to regret. Even iu the packed court, organized agalnst htm by communlst hatred, witness followed witness testlfying in Tiso's interest. A crlmlnal "as never loved. Dr. Tiso was loved by his people as no other man was ever loved in Slovakia. He was not a criminal. Even the sadistic 'Natlonaľ Court recommended mercy for Tiso. So did the Slovak 'National' Council. Tiso's Ufe depended only on one man ; h!s life was in the hands of Dr. Beneš . . . the 'humanisť and that 'great democrať . . . who 1s reportedly a can.dldate for the Nobel Peace Prize. Beneš can now rest satlsfied; he wanted blood and he got it. When Dr. Beneš refused Tiso's plea for mercy he became Tiso's judge and murderer. The blood of Tiso remains on bis hands." Ján Petrovič, Bratislava, Slovakia, April 1947. • • • • • • "The executlon of Monslgnor Tiso shall go down in hlstory as a great crime against the entire Slovak nation. His traglc death was a pol1tical murder for which the present communist-domlnated re· gime In Czechoslovakia is wholly responsible. But the memory of t he Slovak Republiťs war-time president is forever enshrined in the hearts of bis countrymen for he was truly the Father of b is Country." - Teachers of Slovak and Slovak History at Benedlctlne H!gh School, Cleveland, Ohio. • "Czech and Slovak Commun!sts demanded Dr. Tlso's head, and Dr. Edward Beneš obliged. It was plainly premed!tated murder." Pb,ilip James Anthony. " J edonta" Feature Wrlter. � 66 SLOVA.KIA THE SWVAKS AND THE BENE.š CZECHS JOSEPH ORAVSKÝ On November 14, 1945, Dr. Peter Zenkl, had qulte a speech in the Prague National Assembly. A stenographic record notes that he was accorded a thunderous applause when he said: "Never without the Soviet Union, never against the Soviet Union, alwaya aolidly with lt, side by aide." On December 18, 1943, after the signing ot the agreement ot "eternal friendship and post-was cooperation" between Prague and Moscow, Dr. Hubert Ripka proclaimed: " Having negotiated an allied agreement wlth the Soviet Union, we have accompllahed a good deed which we can rightfully be proud of. Thia treaty undoubtedly is one of the foundation stones of the aecurity, the prosperity and the atrength of the Republic." And later, this same Dr. Hubert Ripka, as Minister of Foreign Trade, in an interview with the editor of the NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE in October 1947, openly admitted that the strengtbening of economic contacts between the USSR and the Czechoslovak Republic "is not dictated by the communista," and added: "That la my policy." The well-known politlcian of Hradčany Castle, Ferdinand Peroutka, in bis Czech •book " Tak nebo tak," published in 1945 by F. Borovt in Prague, appraised the significance of the Bolshevik Revolutlon scientlfically and statesmen-like in this manner: "In 1917 there began a new epoch of mankind. We observe at every step that the Russian Revolutlon ia more than a single State, that it is a world outlook for which men are fighting in all places of the earth" (page 37). And a year later, writing in "DNEŠEK," June 11, 1946, the same Peroutka expressed bis feellng in this manner: " The Eaat, there la our liberator, our ally and our protection in the future . . . lf in England there still can be found factora, who show a bigoted hatred for the Soviet Union, then these cannot even be considered as our frienda." These enthusiastic expressions about the Soviet Union, which we have recalled, belong to men who determined and directed the foreign policy of Prague for a long number ot years, band in hand with thelr politlcal master, Dr. Edward Beneš. Their political master, whom they served so faithfully, became a vlctim of his own policy. But they remalned alive. Every judlcious person would suppose and rlgthfully expect that these glorifiers of the Soviet Union would spend the rest of the years, whlch stm separate them from the grave, in humllity and penance. If they flamed with love for everything that the Russian Revolutlon brought, then it would be wise of them not to walk in broad daylight in the free and democratic world with thelr love for the Soviet Union. And it would have .been proper and more like them tt, after living the honeymoon weeks in the embrace of communism, they dld not try to offer themselves as modest virglns for the crusade agalnst their old communistic love. To err ls human. And in politics people err frequently. But in the case ot these persona! and political friends of Beneš, we were and are not concerned with an error ot limited, temporary importance and extent. We were and are not concerned wlth the persona! error of an indlvldual, political factor, but wlth the fundamental error of world �SLOVAKIA 67 outlook of the whole political caste which, being led by Edward Beneii, determined and gave llfe to a whole polltlcal system. And thls system was not invented during the war and post•war years just for the sake of politlcal tactlcs. Long before World War II, this system was systematlc• ally fostered and practiced by Edward Beneš and bis lettlst companlons, and in 1946 it was introduced into the political and state structure only in all its conclusions. The planners and representatlves of this system regarded the incursion of the Soviet Union into Central Europe as their own victory. They could have no reservations for the Soviet Union in 1946, because they had none prior to that Ume. That is why t hey rejolced so spon• taneously with Edward Beneš over the advent of the Soviet system into Eurone; that is why they had no trouble in collaborating wlth the communists; and that is why they adapted themselves with such miraculous speed to everything Soviet. When we quoted the above statements of Zenkl, Peroutka and Ripka, we were not thinking about their persona!, human existence, but about the system which they embraced and promoted so vigorously. Whatever they did, they did not do in their names only, tbut also in the name of the system which reached deeply into practical llfe and whlch, after the victory of communism in Centra! Europe, was identlfled with lt in all fundamental questlons. We Siovaks could never see eye to eye with the policies of Edward Beneš and bis people and we rejected their system as a matter ot principle, because our views of the Soviet Union and communism clashed with theirs. It is a matter of historical record that the Slovaks are fightlng communism and communists for over a 100 years. An abyss separated and stm separates us as far as vlewpointa on t ha Soviet Union and communism are concerned. And we admit that we d!d not expect to see these Czech political heroes of Edward Beneš's system in the pol!tlcal arena again. When they d!d get into !t, we dld not reckon that they would meddle in the questlons that vitally effect the present and future of the Slovak nation. From our hearts we w!sh that the Lord God give the Czech nation good and honorable fighters aga!nst communlsm, that He endow it with discerning political leaders, who will lead it along the right path. But if the Czech natlon ls satisfied wlth the people, who so lm• pressively taught them to love the Soviet Union, well there is noth!ng we can do about it, because we do not want to meddle in fundamental questlons that concern the present and future of the Czech nation. That is, after au, the law ot democracy. But frankly and in the interest of truth, we must again recall to the rlghtlsts and to the leftists that we do not wish the noble, herolc and uncompromissing struggte of t he Slovak natlon against communlsm to be connected wlth them at any tlme or any place. We Slovaks cannot and do not want to degrade our anti·communist stand to the level of these people, no matter what the prtce. The Slovak natlon is s uffer!ng the consequences ot the brutal commun!st reality which the political system, represented by these people, has hung on the'lr necks. • They are the express!on of a certain morality which does not suff!ce for the mora! needs of the present ser!ous period and so much less suita the spiritual and character dlsposition of the Slovak natlon. The!r persona! acqualntances and fr!endsh!ps could open for them �68 SLOVAKIA the doors of politlcal asylum. Out of the magnanlmity of these acquaint• ances and frlendshlps they could be assured mlnisterlal penslons for Jlfe. That ls a questlon of philanthropy and of private r elatlons. But a responsible and serlous comprehension of the anti-communist stand, organlzatlons ot antl-communist propaganda and the psychological pre• paratlon of antl-communlst resistance, exclude any purpose to use them as an exclusive and of!lcial argument against communism. It wou!d be tragic, indeed, if in the historic evaluation of forces between Christianity and democracy, on the one hand, and communism on the other, there would not be avallable other moral and polltlcaUy more valuable personallties. The Slovak natlon wants to wage lts antl-communist fight to Unal victory. And it is convinced that the whole free and demociratic world also wants to finish this fight. 'I'he Slovak nation, therefore, rightfully expects that its uncompromlsing fight against communistlc and every other kind of slavery deserves recognltlon and polltical and moral appreciatlon. The Slovak nation, therefore, is not dependent on the anti-communlst substltute, composed of persona! and politlcal values wblch irretrievably belong to the past and to political asylum. We can get to the soul of every nation only by means of uprlghtness and a genulne recognition of moral and polltical responsibillty. • • • WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO "Dr. Tiso died a hero. The Nuremberg criminals died as crimin• als, regretting thelr crimes. Dr. Tiso had nothing to regret. Even iu the packed court, organized agalnst htm by communlst hatred, witness followed witness testlfying in Tiso's interest. A crlmlnal "as never loved. Dr. Tiso was loved by his people as no other man was ever loved in Slovakia. He was not a criminal. Even the sadistic 'Natlonaľ Court recommended mercy for Tiso. So did the Slovak 'National' Council. Tiso's Ufe depended only on one man ; h!s life was in the hands of Dr. Beneš . . . the 'humanisť and that 'great democrať . . . who 1s reportedly a can.dldate for the Nobel Peace Prize. Beneš can now rest satlsfied; he wanted blood and he got it. When Dr. Beneš refused Tiso's plea for mercy he became Tiso's judge and murderer. The blood of Tiso remains on bis hands." Ján Petrovič, Bratislava, Slovakia, April 1947. • • • • • • "The executlon of Monslgnor Tiso shall go down in hlstory as a great crime against the entire Slovak nation. His traglc death was a pol1tical murder for which the present communist-domlnated re· gime In Czechoslovakia is wholly responsible. But the memory of t he Slovak Republiťs war-time president is forever enshrined in the hearts of bis countrymen for he was truly the Father of b is Country." - Teachers of Slovak and Slovak History at Benedlctlne H!gh School, Cleveland, Ohio. • "Czech and Slovak Commun!sts demanded Dr. Tlso's head, and Dr. Edward Beneš obliged. It was plainly premed!tated murder." Pb,ilip James Anthony. " J edonta" Feature Wrlter. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 66 SLOVA.KIA THE SWVAKS AND THE BENE.š CZECHS JOSEPH ORAVSKÝ On November 14, 1945, Dr. Peter Zenkl, had qulte a speech in the Prague National Assembly. A stenographic record notes that he was accorded a thunderous applause when he said: "Never without the Soviet Union, never against the Soviet Union, alwaya aolidly with lt, side by aide." On December 18, 1943, after the signing ot the agreement ot "eternal friendship and post-was cooperation" between Prague and Moscow, Dr. Hubert Ripka proclaimed: " Having negotiated an allied agreement wlth the Soviet Union, we have accompllahed a good deed which we can rightfully be proud of. Thia treaty undoubtedly is one of the foundation stones of the aecurity, the prosperity and the atrength of the Republic." And later, this same Dr. Hubert Ripka, as Minister of Foreign Trade, in an interview with the editor of the NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE in October 1947, openly admitted that the strengtbening of economic contacts between the USSR and the Czechoslovak Republic "is not dictated by the communista," and added: "That la my policy." The well-known politlcian of Hradčany Castle, Ferdinand Peroutka, in bis Czech •book " Tak nebo tak," published in 1945 by F. Borovt in Prague, appraised the significance of the Bolshevik Revolutlon scientlfically and statesmen-like in this manner: "In 1917 there began a new epoch of mankind. We observe at every step that the Russian Revolutlon ia more than a single State, that it is a world outlook for which men are fighting in all places of the earth" (page 37). And a year later, writing in "DNEŠEK," June 11, 1946, the same Peroutka expressed bis feellng in this manner: " The Eaat, there la our liberator, our ally and our protection in the future . . . lf in England there still can be found factora, who show a bigoted hatred for the Soviet Union, then these cannot even be considered as our frienda." These enthusiastic expressions about the Soviet Union, which we have recalled, belong to men who determined and directed the foreign policy of Prague for a long number ot years, band in hand with thelr politlcal master, Dr. Edward Beneš. Their political master, whom they served so faithfully, became a vlctim of his own policy. But they remalned alive. Every judlcious person would suppose and rlgthfully expect that these glorifiers of the Soviet Union would spend the rest of the years, whlch stm separate them from the grave, in humllity and penance. If they flamed with love for everything that the Russian Revolutlon brought, then it would be wise of them not to walk in broad daylight in the free and democratic world with thelr love for the Soviet Union. And it would have .been proper and more like them tt, after living the honeymoon weeks in the embrace of communism, they dld not try to offer themselves as modest virglns for the crusade agalnst their old communistic love. To err ls human. And in politics people err frequently. But in the case ot these persona! and political friends of Beneš, we were and are not concerned with an error ot limited, temporary importance and extent. We were and are not concerned wlth the persona! error of an indlvldual, political factor, but wlth the fundamental error of world SLOVAKIA 67 outlook of the whole political caste which, being led by Edward Beneii, determined and gave llfe to a whole polltlcal system. And thls system was not invented during the war and post•war years just for the sake of politlcal tactlcs. Long before World War II, this system was systematlc• ally fostered and practiced by Edward Beneš and bis lettlst companlons, and in 1946 it was introduced into the political and state structure only in all its conclusions. The planners and representatlves of this system regarded the incursion of the Soviet Union into Central Europe as their own victory. They could have no reservations for the Soviet Union in 1946, because they had none prior to that Ume. That is why t hey rejolced so spon• taneously with Edward Beneš over the advent of the Soviet system into Eurone; that is why they had no trouble in collaborating wlth the communists; and that is why they adapted themselves with such miraculous speed to everything Soviet. When we quoted the above statements of Zenkl, Peroutka and Ripka, we were not thinking about their persona!, human existence, but about the system which they embraced and promoted so vigorously. Whatever they did, they did not do in their names only, tbut also in the name of the system which reached deeply into practical llfe and whlch, after the victory of communism in Centra! Europe, was identlfled with lt in all fundamental questlons. We Siovaks could never see eye to eye with the policies of Edward Beneš and bis people and we rejected their system as a matter ot principle, because our views of the Soviet Union and communism clashed with theirs. It is a matter of historical record that the Slovaks are fightlng communism and communists for over a 100 years. An abyss separated and stm separates us as far as vlewpointa on t ha Soviet Union and communism are concerned. And we admit that we d!d not expect to see these Czech political heroes of Edward Beneš's system in the pol!tlcal arena again. When they d!d get into !t, we dld not reckon that they would meddle in the questlons that vitally effect the present and future of the Slovak nation. From our hearts we w!sh that the Lord God give the Czech nation good and honorable fighters aga!nst communlsm, that He endow it with discerning political leaders, who will lead it along the right path. But if the Czech natlon ls satisfied wlth the people, who so lm• pressively taught them to love the Soviet Union, well there is noth!ng we can do about it, because we do not want to meddle in fundamental questlons that concern the present and future of the Czech nation. That is, after au, the law ot democracy. But frankly and in the interest of truth, we must again recall to the rlghtlsts and to the leftists that we do not wish the noble, herolc and uncompromissing struggte of t he Slovak natlon against communlsm to be connected wlth them at any tlme or any place. We Slovaks cannot and do not want to degrade our anti·communist stand to the level of these people, no matter what the prtce. The Slovak natlon is s uffer!ng the consequences ot the brutal commun!st reality which the political system, represented by these people, has hung on the'lr necks. • They are the express!on of a certain morality which does not suff!ce for the mora! needs of the present ser!ous period and so much less suita the spiritual and character dlsposition of the Slovak natlon. The!r persona! acqualntances and fr!endsh!ps could open for them 68 SLOVAKIA the doors of politlcal asylum. Out of the magnanlmity of these acquaint• ances and frlendshlps they could be assured mlnisterlal penslons for Jlfe. That ls a questlon of philanthropy and of private r elatlons. But a responsible and serlous comprehension of the anti-communist stand, organlzatlons ot antl-communist propaganda and the psychological pre• paratlon of antl-communlst resistance, exclude any purpose to use them as an exclusive and of!lcial argument against communism. It wou!d be tragic, indeed, if in the historic evaluation of forces between Christianity and democracy, on the one hand, and communism on the other, there would not be avallable other moral and polltlcaUy more valuable personallties. The Slovak natlon wants to wage lts antl-communist fight to Unal victory. And it is convinced that the whole free and demociratic world also wants to finish this fight. 'I'he Slovak nation, therefore, rightfully expects that its uncompromlsing fight against communistlc and every other kind of slavery deserves recognltlon and polltical and moral appreciatlon. The Slovak nation, therefore, is not dependent on the anti-communlst substltute, composed of persona! and politlcal values wblch irretrievably belong to the past and to political asylum. We can get to the soul of every nation only by means of uprlghtness and a genulne recognition of moral and polltical responsibillty. • • • WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO "Dr. Tiso died a hero. The Nuremberg criminals died as crimin• als, regretting thelr crimes. Dr. Tiso had nothing to regret. Even iu the packed court, organized agalnst htm by communlst hatred, witness followed witness testlfying in Tiso's interest. A crlmlnal "as never loved. Dr. Tiso was loved by his people as no other man was ever loved in Slovakia. He was not a criminal. Even the sadistic 'Natlonaľ Court recommended mercy for Tiso. So did the Slovak 'National' Council. Tiso's Ufe depended only on one man ; h!s life was in the hands of Dr. Beneš . . . the 'humanisť and that 'great democrať . . . who 1s reportedly a can.dldate for the Nobel Peace Prize. Beneš can now rest satlsfied; he wanted blood and he got it. When Dr. Beneš refused Tiso's plea for mercy he became Tiso's judge and murderer. The blood of Tiso remains on bis hands." Ján Petrovič, Bratislava, Slovakia, April 1947. • • • • • • "The executlon of Monslgnor Tiso shall go down in hlstory as a great crime against the entire Slovak nation. His traglc death was a pol1tical murder for which the present communist-domlnated re· gime In Czechoslovakia is wholly responsible. But the memory of t he Slovak Republiťs war-time president is forever enshrined in the hearts of bis countrymen for he was truly the Father of b is Country." - Teachers of Slovak and Slovak History at Benedlctlne H!gh School, Cleveland, Ohio. • "Czech and Slovak Commun!sts demanded Dr. Tlso's head, and Dr. Edward Beneš obliged. It was plainly premed!tated murder." Pb,ilip James Anthony. " J edonta" Feature Wrlter.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Slovaks and the Beneš Czechs Description An account of the resource Joseph Oravský Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952 pp. 56-58 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Oravský, Joseph Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/633239456f9942d65640c2f1d5618b0a.pdf e11fbcd5c8fa5b411ed329bd1daa0656 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA THE STORY OF THE TWO "KRNOS" DR. I VA N K RNO ( KE RNO), wbo retired as United Nations as• sistant secretary-general for legal affalrs on September 10, does not want to go bome to Czecho-Slovakia. He wlll seek asylum bere. Krno saJd as mucb September 29 on the "United or Not" television program. Now 61, Krno was a member of tbe "CZECH" (the papers bad tt, and bow rigbt tbey were!) diplomatic service smce 1918 and also served as aide to Or. Edward Beneš, wbo resigned tbe presldency and ned bis country in 1938 and tben returned behind Soviet bayonets In 1945 to become president again by tbe grace of Stalin. Krno, born a SLOVAK, chose to betray his own people and serve the Beneš Czechs - the Czech Socialists. It paid bim well. And Beneš and bis followers could always point to Krno and say: See, Slovaks also have representation. Just as they always did with Hodža, Lettrlch, Osuský, Papánek, Slávik, Gejza Krno and otbers. It was good wlndow dressing. Patr iotlc Slovaks, however, regarded the m as traitors a nd r enegades. They st ill do. And one can hardly blame tbem. because tbese so-called "Czechoslovaks" actually worked and are still working for the destruction of the national existence of tbe natlon they are descended from. Krno is one of tbe new breed of men created by the United Nations - an "1nternational civil servant." Interviewed on TV, Krno explained tbat tbe fate of bis country (Czecbo-Slovakla) proved in 1948 that "you can make no deals witb dictators." When asked why it took bim so long (over four yea rs!) to utter the obvious, Dr. Krno was rather embarrassed for a moment and then blurted: " I had to eon. form with UN staff regulations and to reserve my opinion." Wbat a confession for a UN assistant secretary-general to make! He was fully convinced, as he said, that "you can make no deals witb dictators," and yet he kept on trying to do just tbat! Boy, call Senator McCarran ! Not only to questlon Dr. Ivan Krno, but bis pals as well the otber "Czecboslovaks" (Beneš Socialists), wbo did not do badly as members and followers of the NATIONAL FRONT government In Czecho-Slovakia after 1945 - and who are not doing badly at all even now as heralded "democratic, anti-communist" refugees In tbe USA. But there is a story about anotber "Czecboslovak" Krno. GEJZA L K RNO, Gottwalďs former general-consul in Chicago, Ill., gave vent to bis "democratlc" feelings at a meeting in Chicago on August 27, 1952. Present were 107 Czecbs and 4 Slovaks. At tbls meeting, Dr. Josepb Černý. former Czecho·Slovak minister for the C2,ecb Agrarian Party, had the gumption to renounce the fiction or the "Czechoslovak" natlon, ethnically speaking, and stand up for the lnherent rigbt of the Slovak nation to its own existence and to declde freely lts own destlny. "T he Slovak nation shall decide its future lndependently and its decision will bind every judicious person," Or. Cerny sald. Krno dld not agree with Černý and. to the surprlse or 99 per cent ot those present, exploded · "We S lovaks, wh o st a nd beh ind the Czechoslovak Republic, Mr. Minister, cannot agree with you r pr inciples; a nd we are of the opinion that even if 90 per cent of the Slovaks would not want the Czechoslova k Republic, then we wo uld have to creat e such a situation which would force it upon t hem, just as we d id �SLOVAKIA 26 in 1944 at the time of the Slovak rebellion. The refore, the Council (of Free C:zechosclovakia) should pian its home coming in such a way so that it would have lts own mllitary force, occupy Slovak ia and dominate public opinion, and then we need not fear violence or shooting. Why, even in America the South fought against the North and, therefore, why should 1944 not be repeated once more in Slovakia ?" Quite a mouthful of "democracy" from a member of the "Counc!l or Free Czechoslovakia" who once served as Gottwalďs representaUve in Chicago and no w enjoys "political" asylum in the good old USA as a "democratlc, ant!•Communist" retugee! "WE SLOVAKS," sald Krno, as if he had any righ t to speak tor them, "we Slovaks" would torce Czechoslovakla upon 90 per cent of the Slovaks against thelr wlll! And that, ladles and gentleman, defines qulte accurately a "Czecho• slovak" and a "Beneš Czech". Gejza L. Krno 1s a model "Czecho.slovak" and a loyal "Beneš Czech" all in one package. Any wonder, then, that over 90 per cent ot the S lovaks are opposed to him or hls klnd? But there is more to the story. One of those present at that meeting noted what had taken place. The whole account was then glven to Dr. Michael Zibrin, former member of the Prague Parliament, who wrote about the Incident in the "JEDNOTA" - the most wldely read Slovak paper In the USA - on September 10. Dr. Zibrins reactlons to Krno's statement follow: " It this were the opinlon of Krno himselt, it would sumce Just to make a note of it. It would be a wa.ste ot time to debate much about bis nonsense. But Krno spoke in Chicago, where he once was the exponent of communist Prague and where, since that time, his residence serves as the meeting place when any one from the "Council of Free C:zechoslovakia" comes to Chicago to see certain 'Slovak men or Slovak women.' Krno ls a willing and genial host. He is generally regard. ed as the mouthpiece of Dr. Joseph Lettrich and likes to boast of the i,romises and assurances for the future made to him by the politlcal twins Lettrich•Zenkl. "After this claritlcatlon, ot course, we must Iook into the statement made by Krno, because to us it is abundantly clear that Krno'a mouth expressed the thoughts which were given expression at the conferences of Lettrich, Zenkl, Ferienčík and other men of power from the Council of Free C:zechoslovakia. Furthermore, lt 1s well known to us that at similar conferences. when those present did not s peak and pian so undiplomatically, the matter was reported generally in such a way that there would be some kind of election under an American occupation, and when the Americans assure liberation, then the S lovaks out of gratitude will accept the Ame rican concept, which is, they say, that of Lettrich and Zen kl. 'ľhls bitter pili, coated so nlcely, made every one smile and shake thelr heads. No one wanted to believe that Americans at some tuture time would want to violate the free will of a nation. $uch a thing !s not in the American nature and does not contorm with American democracy. "But Krno reveal ed eve n more when he blasted at Dr. Černý. He told us, in fact, that the members of the Council of Free C:zechoslovakia are reckoning wlth a 90 per ce nt majority of the S lovak nation which is for an independent solution excluding any conception of C:zechoslovak statehood. We know that such reports have come from Slovakia even to Lettrich and Slávik. vVe could even name tbe �H SLOVAKIA persons who brought those reports, but we do not want any one lnvestigated or tortured a second or even a third tlme, as it happened to martyr Johnny Hvasta. "Krno also revealed that hla companions and his poiitical representativea are not willing to reapect even a 90 per cent majority, but are planning to resort to the drastic and brutal methods, wh?ch prevailed in Slovakia during and after the 'rebellion' ot 1944, and tor whlch, in severai lnstances, the political representatives or Krno were responsible in the judgment of the natlon. Slovak emigranta .should take note of this and call it to the attentlon ot Amerlcan-Slovak socleties, which, In turn, should call lt to the attentlon of their own polit:ical representat!ves so they could know and see what klnd of democracy is planned in the heart of Centra! Europe for Amerlcan money. When our nat!on at horne learns about it, the loud speakers of Radlo Free Europe wlll not be able to outshout Krno's words, and wasted are the mllllons put into varlous "freedom" movements and lnst!tutlons, because thelr work. carrled on by euch people and ln• fluenced by their thoughts, helps Communlsm more than lt harms lt." Thls, then, ls the story of the two Krnos, who judased the holy cause of their own n,ation for a career. They are not sorry for ~he part they played In the exploltation and enslavement of the Slovak people. lf they are, they have not glven expresslon to any sorrow In any vlslble manuer. Of course, lf they were sorry, they would not be associated today wlth the enemles of Slovak freedom and lndependence, the Beneš Czechs. Gejza Krno and other Slovaks In the services of the Beneš Czechs believe that Zenkl-Ripka-LettMch stlll hold a "promise" or important functlons, if and when the Communlsts are ousted from power in Czecho-Slovakia. They believe that Amerlcan pollcy is in reality the pollcy of Zenkl and Lettrlch, l.e. of the "Councll of Free Czecboslovakia," and they have reason for that belief. They ask: Who gets to work in the VOICE OF AMERlCA, RADlO FREE EUH.OPE and other governmental and seml-governmental instltutlons? And answer: Only the Beneš Czechs, tbe followers ot Zenkl and Lettrlch. Want to get in on Amerlcan doliars? now and, later, to the pork barrel of Prague and Bratislava? lf you do, get In and pitch for the Beneš Czechs ! Remember UNRRA? Belng a man or prlnclple and a stubborn Slovak gets you nothlng, but ·b elng a Beneš Czech gets you everythlng ! 'l\hat 1s the maglc Zenkl and Lettrich are using today on all Czech and Slovak refugees to get them In line wlth the Beneš Czechs. Gejza Krno's argument is understandable. Zenkl and Lettrich Ilave a slmple pian. Czecho-Slovakia was glven to the Czechs on a platter in 1918; after !t collapsed in 1939. when no one, not even the Czechs rallled to save lt, lt was recreated In 1946 and handed over to Beneš and bis followers. Atter three short years or the Natlonal Front Government. In whlcb they were the majority, the Bene§ Czechs del! v Pred Czecho-Slovakla. lock, stock and barrel, to Gottwald and otber stooges ot the Kremlin. The transactlon took place smoothly, wlthout any apparent physlcal resistance. Now, lťs up to Amerlcans again to do their part: liberate Czecbo·Slovakla trom the Gottwaldmen and again band lt over to the Beneš Czechs. Krno has the word of Zenkl and LettMch tbat the pian cannot miss, because �SLOVAKIA 27 Zenkl and Lettrlch have the lnslde track In the U. S. State Department. Well, there 1s evidence aplenty that the Beneli Czechs got away wlth murder. but we do not want to belleve that thelr "slmple pian" wlll work. 'ľhere are a Jot of gulllble people In Amerlca, and some pecullar Americans in the State Deparament, but we honestly bel!eve that the Beneš Czechs sha.11 not prevail thls tlme. Americans ot Slovak descent wlll contlnne to demand the ouster of all un-Amerlcan, anti-Slovak, antl-democratlc and pro-Sovlet elements from all offlclal and seml-offlclal agencles ol government - and that includes the Beneli Czechs, thé so-called ''Czechoslovaks." represented among others by Zenkl, Lettrlch, Rlpka, Slávik and the two Krnos. Amerlcan princlples must not be surrendered for the polltlcal advantage ot forelgners who are In a large measure responslble for the Red enslavement ot thefr · own natlons. The blond of bundreds of thousa:ids ot our bonored dead crles out agalnst them. America stands for the lib eratlon of ALL natlons, lncludlng and not excluding the SLOVAK natlon. The Slovak nat!on bas an lnberent rlght to freedom and In• dependence, anytblng that Zenkl, Lettrlch and Gejza Krno mlght have to say to the contrary notwlthstandlng! • • • WHO SAID IT? "l do not believe there ls any danger that Rusala wlll swallow up Czechoslovakla, as some people thlnk. In fact, almost a year ago Russla and the Government ot Ozechoslovakla slgned, In Moscow, a treaty whlch can best be descrlbed as a treaty of frlendshlp and respect. In it, Czechoslovakla ia guaranteed freedom a nd independence. It remalns a soverelgn state, and the two countrles blnd themselves to respect each other's rlghts in every fleld. 1 belleve that t he RuHoCzechoslovak T reaty of December, 1943, should be the model of a ll treatles between all the peoples of Europe. I have no fears about Russla, but I thlnk that Jtussla 1s entltled to have her close nelghbors frlendly. None must ever be a pawn on the che.ssboard of Europe agaln. For-tunately, Czechoslovakia has always been frien dly toward Russia, and I am aure t h at in the future Czechoslovakia w ill maintai n t hat friendship and her ow n freedom and independence." Edward O. Tabor, a Beneš Czech, WWSW, Plttsburgh, Pa., 10-26-44). • • • "To n-a.tions in CzechÓlSJovakia the Americans are selllng democracy through so-called CZECHOSLOVAKS. They are the Czech imperlallsts who have been the bane of all the natlons In CzechoSlovakla slnce 1918. To whom do these gentlemen, the Zenkls and Peroutkas, wish to speak? To the Slovak• who, apar-t from a handful of Quislings, do not wish to have anything to do with Czecho-Slovakia and Czech domlnatlon? Not only natňona11st Slovaks, but also S1ovaklan communlsts wish to be rld of Prague. Of five S'lovaklan communlst leaders in 1945, four are today in prlson and expectlng trlal for natlonal devlatlons. Does Mr. Peroutka, w1th bis lavishly pald crew, wlsh to speak to Hungarlans w;ho were forcibly incorporated lnto Czecho-Slovakla in 1919? If not, then to whom? To Czechs? T hen he 1hould speak as a Czech a nd not as a Czecho1lovak." (The Czech "PRAVDA" - London - June 1951). � SLOVAKIA THE STORY OF THE TWO "KRNOS" DR. I VA N K RNO ( KE RNO), wbo retired as United Nations as• sistant secretary-general for legal affalrs on September 10, does not want to go bome to Czecho-Slovakia. He wlll seek asylum bere. Krno saJd as mucb September 29 on the "United or Not" television program. Now 61, Krno was a member of tbe "CZECH" (the papers bad tt, and bow rigbt tbey were!) diplomatic service smce 1918 and also served as aide to Or. Edward Beneš, wbo resigned tbe presldency and ned bis country in 1938 and tben returned behind Soviet bayonets In 1945 to become president again by tbe grace of Stalin. Krno, born a SLOVAK, chose to betray his own people and serve the Beneš Czechs - the Czech Socialists. It paid bim well. And Beneš and bis followers could always point to Krno and say: See, Slovaks also have representation. Just as they always did with Hodža, Lettrlch, Osuský, Papánek, Slávik, Gejza Krno and otbers. It was good wlndow dressing. Patr iotlc Slovaks, however, regarded the m as traitors a nd r enegades. They st ill do. And one can hardly blame tbem. because tbese so-called "Czechoslovaks" actually worked and are still working for the destruction of the national existence of tbe natlon they are descended from. Krno is one of tbe new breed of men created by the United Nations - an "1nternational civil servant." Interviewed on TV, Krno explained tbat tbe fate of bis country (Czecbo-Slovakla) proved in 1948 that "you can make no deals witb dictators." When asked why it took bim so long (over four yea rs!) to utter the obvious, Dr. Krno was rather embarrassed for a moment and then blurted: " I had to eon. form with UN staff regulations and to reserve my opinion." Wbat a confession for a UN assistant secretary-general to make! He was fully convinced, as he said, that "you can make no deals witb dictators," and yet he kept on trying to do just tbat! Boy, call Senator McCarran ! Not only to questlon Dr. Ivan Krno, but bis pals as well the otber "Czecboslovaks" (Beneš Socialists), wbo did not do badly as members and followers of the NATIONAL FRONT government In Czecho-Slovakia after 1945 - and who are not doing badly at all even now as heralded "democratic, anti-communist" refugees In tbe USA. But there is a story about anotber "Czecboslovak" Krno. GEJZA L K RNO, Gottwalďs former general-consul in Chicago, Ill., gave vent to bis "democratlc" feelings at a meeting in Chicago on August 27, 1952. Present were 107 Czecbs and 4 Slovaks. At tbls meeting, Dr. Josepb Černý. former Czecho·Slovak minister for the C2,ecb Agrarian Party, had the gumption to renounce the fiction or the "Czechoslovak" natlon, ethnically speaking, and stand up for the lnherent rigbt of the Slovak nation to its own existence and to declde freely lts own destlny. "T he Slovak nation shall decide its future lndependently and its decision will bind every judicious person," Or. Cerny sald. Krno dld not agree with Černý and. to the surprlse or 99 per cent ot those present, exploded · "We S lovaks, wh o st a nd beh ind the Czechoslovak Republic, Mr. Minister, cannot agree with you r pr inciples; a nd we are of the opinion that even if 90 per cent of the Slovaks would not want the Czechoslova k Republic, then we wo uld have to creat e such a situation which would force it upon t hem, just as we d id �SLOVAKIA 26 in 1944 at the time of the Slovak rebellion. The refore, the Council (of Free C:zechosclovakia) should pian its home coming in such a way so that it would have lts own mllitary force, occupy Slovak ia and dominate public opinion, and then we need not fear violence or shooting. Why, even in America the South fought against the North and, therefore, why should 1944 not be repeated once more in Slovakia ?" Quite a mouthful of "democracy" from a member of the "Counc!l or Free Czechoslovakia" who once served as Gottwalďs representaUve in Chicago and no w enjoys "political" asylum in the good old USA as a "democratlc, ant!•Communist" retugee! "WE SLOVAKS," sald Krno, as if he had any righ t to speak tor them, "we Slovaks" would torce Czechoslovakla upon 90 per cent of the Slovaks against thelr wlll! And that, ladles and gentleman, defines qulte accurately a "Czecho• slovak" and a "Beneš Czech". Gejza L. Krno 1s a model "Czecho.slovak" and a loyal "Beneš Czech" all in one package. Any wonder, then, that over 90 per cent ot the S lovaks are opposed to him or hls klnd? But there is more to the story. One of those present at that meeting noted what had taken place. The whole account was then glven to Dr. Michael Zibrin, former member of the Prague Parliament, who wrote about the Incident in the "JEDNOTA" - the most wldely read Slovak paper In the USA - on September 10. Dr. Zibrins reactlons to Krno's statement follow: " It this were the opinlon of Krno himselt, it would sumce Just to make a note of it. It would be a wa.ste ot time to debate much about bis nonsense. But Krno spoke in Chicago, where he once was the exponent of communist Prague and where, since that time, his residence serves as the meeting place when any one from the "Council of Free C:zechoslovakia" comes to Chicago to see certain 'Slovak men or Slovak women.' Krno ls a willing and genial host. He is generally regard. ed as the mouthpiece of Dr. Joseph Lettrich and likes to boast of the i,romises and assurances for the future made to him by the politlcal twins Lettrich•Zenkl. "After this claritlcatlon, ot course, we must Iook into the statement made by Krno, because to us it is abundantly clear that Krno'a mouth expressed the thoughts which were given expression at the conferences of Lettrich, Zenkl, Ferienčík and other men of power from the Council of Free C:zechoslovakia. Furthermore, lt 1s well known to us that at similar conferences. when those present did not s peak and pian so undiplomatically, the matter was reported generally in such a way that there would be some kind of election under an American occupation, and when the Americans assure liberation, then the S lovaks out of gratitude will accept the Ame rican concept, which is, they say, that of Lettrich and Zen kl. 'ľhls bitter pili, coated so nlcely, made every one smile and shake thelr heads. No one wanted to believe that Americans at some tuture time would want to violate the free will of a nation. $uch a thing !s not in the American nature and does not contorm with American democracy. "But Krno reveal ed eve n more when he blasted at Dr. Černý. He told us, in fact, that the members of the Council of Free C:zechoslovakia are reckoning wlth a 90 per ce nt majority of the S lovak nation which is for an independent solution excluding any conception of C:zechoslovak statehood. We know that such reports have come from Slovakia even to Lettrich and Slávik. vVe could even name tbe �H SLOVAKIA persons who brought those reports, but we do not want any one lnvestigated or tortured a second or even a third tlme, as it happened to martyr Johnny Hvasta. "Krno also revealed that hla companions and his poiitical representativea are not willing to reapect even a 90 per cent majority, but are planning to resort to the drastic and brutal methods, wh?ch prevailed in Slovakia during and after the 'rebellion' ot 1944, and tor whlch, in severai lnstances, the political representatives or Krno were responsible in the judgment of the natlon. Slovak emigranta .should take note of this and call it to the attentlon ot Amerlcan-Slovak socleties, which, In turn, should call lt to the attentlon of their own polit:ical representat!ves so they could know and see what klnd of democracy is planned in the heart of Centra! Europe for Amerlcan money. When our nat!on at horne learns about it, the loud speakers of Radlo Free Europe wlll not be able to outshout Krno's words, and wasted are the mllllons put into varlous "freedom" movements and lnst!tutlons, because thelr work. carrled on by euch people and ln• fluenced by their thoughts, helps Communlsm more than lt harms lt." Thls, then, ls the story of the two Krnos, who judased the holy cause of their own n,ation for a career. They are not sorry for ~he part they played In the exploltation and enslavement of the Slovak people. lf they are, they have not glven expresslon to any sorrow In any vlslble manuer. Of course, lf they were sorry, they would not be associated today wlth the enemles of Slovak freedom and lndependence, the Beneš Czechs. Gejza Krno and other Slovaks In the services of the Beneš Czechs believe that Zenkl-Ripka-LettMch stlll hold a "promise" or important functlons, if and when the Communlsts are ousted from power in Czecho-Slovakia. They believe that Amerlcan pollcy is in reality the pollcy of Zenkl and Lettrlch, l.e. of the "Councll of Free Czecboslovakia," and they have reason for that belief. They ask: Who gets to work in the VOICE OF AMERlCA, RADlO FREE EUH.OPE and other governmental and seml-governmental instltutlons? And answer: Only the Beneš Czechs, tbe followers ot Zenkl and Lettrlch. Want to get in on Amerlcan doliars? now and, later, to the pork barrel of Prague and Bratislava? lf you do, get In and pitch for the Beneš Czechs ! Remember UNRRA? Belng a man or prlnclple and a stubborn Slovak gets you nothlng, but ·b elng a Beneš Czech gets you everythlng ! 'l\hat 1s the maglc Zenkl and Lettrich are using today on all Czech and Slovak refugees to get them In line wlth the Beneš Czechs. Gejza Krno's argument is understandable. Zenkl and Lettrich Ilave a slmple pian. Czecho-Slovakia was glven to the Czechs on a platter in 1918; after !t collapsed in 1939. when no one, not even the Czechs rallled to save lt, lt was recreated In 1946 and handed over to Beneš and bis followers. Atter three short years or the Natlonal Front Government. In whlcb they were the majority, the Bene§ Czechs del! v Pred Czecho-Slovakla. lock, stock and barrel, to Gottwald and otber stooges ot the Kremlin. The transactlon took place smoothly, wlthout any apparent physlcal resistance. Now, lťs up to Amerlcans again to do their part: liberate Czecbo·Slovakla trom the Gottwaldmen and again band lt over to the Beneš Czechs. Krno has the word of Zenkl and LettMch tbat the pian cannot miss, because �SLOVAKIA 27 Zenkl and Lettrlch have the lnslde track In the U. S. State Department. Well, there 1s evidence aplenty that the Beneli Czechs got away wlth murder. but we do not want to belleve that thelr "slmple pian" wlll work. 'ľhere are a Jot of gulllble people In Amerlca, and some pecullar Americans in the State Deparament, but we honestly bel!eve that the Beneš Czechs sha.11 not prevail thls tlme. Americans ot Slovak descent wlll contlnne to demand the ouster of all un-Amerlcan, anti-Slovak, antl-democratlc and pro-Sovlet elements from all offlclal and seml-offlclal agencles ol government - and that includes the Beneli Czechs, thé so-called ''Czechoslovaks." represented among others by Zenkl, Lettrlch, Rlpka, Slávik and the two Krnos. Amerlcan princlples must not be surrendered for the polltlcal advantage ot forelgners who are In a large measure responslble for the Red enslavement ot thefr · own natlons. The blond of bundreds of thousa:ids ot our bonored dead crles out agalnst them. America stands for the lib eratlon of ALL natlons, lncludlng and not excluding the SLOVAK natlon. The Slovak nat!on bas an lnberent rlght to freedom and In• dependence, anytblng that Zenkl, Lettrlch and Gejza Krno mlght have to say to the contrary notwlthstandlng! • • • WHO SAID IT? "l do not believe there ls any danger that Rusala wlll swallow up Czechoslovakla, as some people thlnk. In fact, almost a year ago Russla and the Government ot Ozechoslovakla slgned, In Moscow, a treaty whlch can best be descrlbed as a treaty of frlendshlp and respect. In it, Czechoslovakla ia guaranteed freedom a nd independence. It remalns a soverelgn state, and the two countrles blnd themselves to respect each other's rlghts in every fleld. 1 belleve that t he RuHoCzechoslovak T reaty of December, 1943, should be the model of a ll treatles between all the peoples of Europe. I have no fears about Russla, but I thlnk that Jtussla 1s entltled to have her close nelghbors frlendly. None must ever be a pawn on the che.ssboard of Europe agaln. For-tunately, Czechoslovakia has always been frien dly toward Russia, and I am aure t h at in the future Czechoslovakia w ill maintai n t hat friendship and her ow n freedom and independence." Edward O. Tabor, a Beneš Czech, WWSW, Plttsburgh, Pa., 10-26-44). • • • "To n-a.tions in CzechÓlSJovakia the Americans are selllng democracy through so-called CZECHOSLOVAKS. They are the Czech imperlallsts who have been the bane of all the natlons In CzechoSlovakla slnce 1918. To whom do these gentlemen, the Zenkls and Peroutkas, wish to speak? To the Slovak• who, apar-t from a handful of Quislings, do not wish to have anything to do with Czecho-Slovakia and Czech domlnatlon? Not only natňona11st Slovaks, but also S1ovaklan communlsts wish to be rld of Prague. Of five S'lovaklan communlst leaders in 1945, four are today in prlson and expectlng trlal for natlonal devlatlons. Does Mr. Peroutka, w1th bis lavishly pald crew, wlsh to speak to Hungarlans w;ho were forcibly incorporated lnto Czecho-Slovakla in 1919? If not, then to whom? To Czechs? T hen he 1hould speak as a Czech a nd not as a Czecho1lovak." (The Czech "PRAVDA" - London - June 1951). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA THE STORY OF THE TWO "KRNOS" DR. I VA N K RNO ( KE RNO), wbo retired as United Nations as• sistant secretary-general for legal affalrs on September 10, does not want to go bome to Czecho-Slovakia. He wlll seek asylum bere. Krno saJd as mucb September 29 on the "United or Not" television program. Now 61, Krno was a member of tbe "CZECH" (the papers bad tt, and bow rigbt tbey were!) diplomatic service smce 1918 and also served as aide to Or. Edward Beneš, wbo resigned tbe presldency and ned bis country in 1938 and tben returned behind Soviet bayonets In 1945 to become president again by tbe grace of Stalin. Krno, born a SLOVAK, chose to betray his own people and serve the Beneš Czechs - the Czech Socialists. It paid bim well. And Beneš and bis followers could always point to Krno and say: See, Slovaks also have representation. Just as they always did with Hodža, Lettrlch, Osuský, Papánek, Slávik, Gejza Krno and otbers. It was good wlndow dressing. Patr iotlc Slovaks, however, regarded the m as traitors a nd r enegades. They st ill do. And one can hardly blame tbem. because tbese so-called "Czechoslovaks" actually worked and are still working for the destruction of the national existence of tbe natlon they are descended from. Krno is one of tbe new breed of men created by the United Nations - an "1nternational civil servant." Interviewed on TV, Krno explained tbat tbe fate of bis country (Czecbo-Slovakla) proved in 1948 that "you can make no deals witb dictators." When asked why it took bim so long (over four yea rs!) to utter the obvious, Dr. Krno was rather embarrassed for a moment and then blurted: " I had to eon. form with UN staff regulations and to reserve my opinion." Wbat a confession for a UN assistant secretary-general to make! He was fully convinced, as he said, that "you can make no deals witb dictators," and yet he kept on trying to do just tbat! Boy, call Senator McCarran ! Not only to questlon Dr. Ivan Krno, but bis pals as well the otber "Czecboslovaks" (Beneš Socialists), wbo did not do badly as members and followers of the NATIONAL FRONT government In Czecho-Slovakia after 1945 - and who are not doing badly at all even now as heralded "democratic, anti-communist" refugees In tbe USA. But there is a story about anotber "Czecboslovak" Krno. GEJZA L K RNO, Gottwalďs former general-consul in Chicago, Ill., gave vent to bis "democratlc" feelings at a meeting in Chicago on August 27, 1952. Present were 107 Czecbs and 4 Slovaks. At tbls meeting, Dr. Josepb Černý. former Czecho·Slovak minister for the C2,ecb Agrarian Party, had the gumption to renounce the fiction or the "Czechoslovak" natlon, ethnically speaking, and stand up for the lnherent rigbt of the Slovak nation to its own existence and to declde freely lts own destlny. "T he Slovak nation shall decide its future lndependently and its decision will bind every judicious person," Or. Cerny sald. Krno dld not agree with Černý and. to the surprlse or 99 per cent ot those present, exploded · "We S lovaks, wh o st a nd beh ind the Czechoslovak Republic, Mr. Minister, cannot agree with you r pr inciples; a nd we are of the opinion that even if 90 per cent of the Slovaks would not want the Czechoslova k Republic, then we wo uld have to creat e such a situation which would force it upon t hem, just as we d id SLOVAKIA 26 in 1944 at the time of the Slovak rebellion. The refore, the Council (of Free C:zechosclovakia) should pian its home coming in such a way so that it would have lts own mllitary force, occupy Slovak ia and dominate public opinion, and then we need not fear violence or shooting. Why, even in America the South fought against the North and, therefore, why should 1944 not be repeated once more in Slovakia ?" Quite a mouthful of "democracy" from a member of the "Counc!l or Free Czechoslovakia" who once served as Gottwalďs representaUve in Chicago and no w enjoys "political" asylum in the good old USA as a "democratlc, ant!•Communist" retugee! "WE SLOVAKS," sald Krno, as if he had any righ t to speak tor them, "we Slovaks" would torce Czechoslovakla upon 90 per cent of the Slovaks against thelr wlll! And that, ladles and gentleman, defines qulte accurately a "Czecho• slovak" and a "Beneš Czech". Gejza L. Krno 1s a model "Czecho.slovak" and a loyal "Beneš Czech" all in one package. Any wonder, then, that over 90 per cent ot the S lovaks are opposed to him or hls klnd? But there is more to the story. One of those present at that meeting noted what had taken place. The whole account was then glven to Dr. Michael Zibrin, former member of the Prague Parliament, who wrote about the Incident in the "JEDNOTA" - the most wldely read Slovak paper In the USA - on September 10. Dr. Zibrins reactlons to Krno's statement follow: " It this were the opinlon of Krno himselt, it would sumce Just to make a note of it. It would be a wa.ste ot time to debate much about bis nonsense. But Krno spoke in Chicago, where he once was the exponent of communist Prague and where, since that time, his residence serves as the meeting place when any one from the "Council of Free C:zechoslovakia" comes to Chicago to see certain 'Slovak men or Slovak women.' Krno ls a willing and genial host. He is generally regard. ed as the mouthpiece of Dr. Joseph Lettrich and likes to boast of the i,romises and assurances for the future made to him by the politlcal twins Lettrich•Zenkl. "After this claritlcatlon, ot course, we must Iook into the statement made by Krno, because to us it is abundantly clear that Krno'a mouth expressed the thoughts which were given expression at the conferences of Lettrich, Zenkl, Ferienčík and other men of power from the Council of Free C:zechoslovakia. Furthermore, lt 1s well known to us that at similar conferences. when those present did not s peak and pian so undiplomatically, the matter was reported generally in such a way that there would be some kind of election under an American occupation, and when the Americans assure liberation, then the S lovaks out of gratitude will accept the Ame rican concept, which is, they say, that of Lettrich and Zen kl. 'ľhls bitter pili, coated so nlcely, made every one smile and shake thelr heads. No one wanted to believe that Americans at some tuture time would want to violate the free will of a nation. $uch a thing !s not in the American nature and does not contorm with American democracy. "But Krno reveal ed eve n more when he blasted at Dr. Černý. He told us, in fact, that the members of the Council of Free C:zechoslovakia are reckoning wlth a 90 per ce nt majority of the S lovak nation which is for an independent solution excluding any conception of C:zechoslovak statehood. We know that such reports have come from Slovakia even to Lettrich and Slávik. vVe could even name tbe H SLOVAKIA persons who brought those reports, but we do not want any one lnvestigated or tortured a second or even a third tlme, as it happened to martyr Johnny Hvasta. "Krno also revealed that hla companions and his poiitical representativea are not willing to reapect even a 90 per cent majority, but are planning to resort to the drastic and brutal methods, wh?ch prevailed in Slovakia during and after the 'rebellion' ot 1944, and tor whlch, in severai lnstances, the political representatives or Krno were responsible in the judgment of the natlon. Slovak emigranta .should take note of this and call it to the attentlon ot Amerlcan-Slovak socleties, which, In turn, should call lt to the attentlon of their own polit:ical representat!ves so they could know and see what klnd of democracy is planned in the heart of Centra! Europe for Amerlcan money. When our nat!on at horne learns about it, the loud speakers of Radlo Free Europe wlll not be able to outshout Krno's words, and wasted are the mllllons put into varlous "freedom" movements and lnst!tutlons, because thelr work. carrled on by euch people and ln• fluenced by their thoughts, helps Communlsm more than lt harms lt." Thls, then, ls the story of the two Krnos, who judased the holy cause of their own n,ation for a career. They are not sorry for ~he part they played In the exploltation and enslavement of the Slovak people. lf they are, they have not glven expresslon to any sorrow In any vlslble manuer. Of course, lf they were sorry, they would not be associated today wlth the enemles of Slovak freedom and lndependence, the Beneš Czechs. Gejza Krno and other Slovaks In the services of the Beneš Czechs believe that Zenkl-Ripka-LettMch stlll hold a "promise" or important functlons, if and when the Communlsts are ousted from power in Czecho-Slovakia. They believe that Amerlcan pollcy is in reality the pollcy of Zenkl and Lettrlch, l.e. of the "Councll of Free Czecboslovakia," and they have reason for that belief. They ask: Who gets to work in the VOICE OF AMERlCA, RADlO FREE EUH.OPE and other governmental and seml-governmental instltutlons? And answer: Only the Beneš Czechs, tbe followers ot Zenkl and Lettrlch. Want to get in on Amerlcan doliars? now and, later, to the pork barrel of Prague and Bratislava? lf you do, get In and pitch for the Beneš Czechs ! Remember UNRRA? Belng a man or prlnclple and a stubborn Slovak gets you nothlng, but ·b elng a Beneš Czech gets you everythlng ! 'l\hat 1s the maglc Zenkl and Lettrich are using today on all Czech and Slovak refugees to get them In line wlth the Beneš Czechs. Gejza Krno's argument is understandable. Zenkl and Lettrich Ilave a slmple pian. Czecho-Slovakia was glven to the Czechs on a platter in 1918; after !t collapsed in 1939. when no one, not even the Czechs rallled to save lt, lt was recreated In 1946 and handed over to Beneš and bis followers. Atter three short years or the Natlonal Front Government. In whlcb they were the majority, the Bene§ Czechs del! v Pred Czecho-Slovakla. lock, stock and barrel, to Gottwald and otber stooges ot the Kremlin. The transactlon took place smoothly, wlthout any apparent physlcal resistance. Now, lťs up to Amerlcans again to do their part: liberate Czecbo·Slovakla trom the Gottwaldmen and again band lt over to the Beneš Czechs. Krno has the word of Zenkl and LettMch tbat the pian cannot miss, because SLOVAKIA 27 Zenkl and Lettrlch have the lnslde track In the U. S. State Department. Well, there 1s evidence aplenty that the Beneli Czechs got away wlth murder. but we do not want to belleve that thelr "slmple pian" wlll work. 'ľhere are a Jot of gulllble people In Amerlca, and some pecullar Americans in the State Deparament, but we honestly bel!eve that the Beneš Czechs sha.11 not prevail thls tlme. Americans ot Slovak descent wlll contlnne to demand the ouster of all un-Amerlcan, anti-Slovak, antl-democratlc and pro-Sovlet elements from all offlclal and seml-offlclal agencles ol government - and that includes the Beneli Czechs, thé so-called ''Czechoslovaks." represented among others by Zenkl, Lettrlch, Rlpka, Slávik and the two Krnos. Amerlcan princlples must not be surrendered for the polltlcal advantage ot forelgners who are In a large measure responslble for the Red enslavement ot thefr · own natlons. The blond of bundreds of thousa:ids ot our bonored dead crles out agalnst them. America stands for the lib eratlon of ALL natlons, lncludlng and not excluding the SLOVAK natlon. The Slovak nat!on bas an lnberent rlght to freedom and In• dependence, anytblng that Zenkl, Lettrlch and Gejza Krno mlght have to say to the contrary notwlthstandlng! • • • WHO SAID IT? "l do not believe there ls any danger that Rusala wlll swallow up Czechoslovakla, as some people thlnk. In fact, almost a year ago Russla and the Government ot Ozechoslovakla slgned, In Moscow, a treaty whlch can best be descrlbed as a treaty of frlendshlp and respect. In it, Czechoslovakla ia guaranteed freedom a nd independence. It remalns a soverelgn state, and the two countrles blnd themselves to respect each other's rlghts in every fleld. 1 belleve that t he RuHoCzechoslovak T reaty of December, 1943, should be the model of a ll treatles between all the peoples of Europe. I have no fears about Russla, but I thlnk that Jtussla 1s entltled to have her close nelghbors frlendly. None must ever be a pawn on the che.ssboard of Europe agaln. For-tunately, Czechoslovakia has always been frien dly toward Russia, and I am aure t h at in the future Czechoslovakia w ill maintai n t hat friendship and her ow n freedom and independence." Edward O. Tabor, a Beneš Czech, WWSW, Plttsburgh, Pa., 10-26-44). • • • "To n-a.tions in CzechÓlSJovakia the Americans are selllng democracy through so-called CZECHOSLOVAKS. They are the Czech imperlallsts who have been the bane of all the natlons In CzechoSlovakla slnce 1918. To whom do these gentlemen, the Zenkls and Peroutkas, wish to speak? To the Slovak• who, apar-t from a handful of Quislings, do not wish to have anything to do with Czecho-Slovakia and Czech domlnatlon? Not only natňona11st Slovaks, but also S1ovaklan communlsts wish to be rld of Prague. Of five S'lovaklan communlst leaders in 1945, four are today in prlson and expectlng trlal for natlonal devlatlons. Does Mr. Peroutka, w1th bis lavishly pald crew, wlsh to speak to Hungarlans w;ho were forcibly incorporated lnto Czecho-Slovakla in 1919? If not, then to whom? To Czechs? T hen he 1hould speak as a Czech a nd not as a Czecho1lovak." (The Czech "PRAVDA" - London - June 1951).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Story of the Two "Krnos" Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952 pp. 24-27 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/a26e78cce5aaaba26b6aa159393a855a.pdf 51bfe3ef9f258946af07a9a1b0deebc0 PDF Text Text 10 SLOVAKIA THE TRADITION OF SLOVAK STATEHOOD Marian Žiar In the contemporary great conflict of the free world agairuit thé ideology and forceful aggression of Commun!sm, we look upon the tradition of Slovak statehood trom two view·points. It 1s from these two viewpoints that our f!ght against Communism and for the renewal of Slovak statehood is waged. The Slovak nation at horne and the great majority of Slovak ex!les in the free world reject not only the Communist regime in Czecho-SJovakia, installed by and serving Moscow, but also the anti• Slovak ideology of ethnical and pollt!cal "Czechoslovaklsm," the standard•bearers of which are the very Czecho-Slovak politicians in exile, wbo installe<i the violent "people's democratlcal" regime in Slovakia after 194'5 and In 1948 cowardly surrendered power to the Communists. Just as the Slovak nat!on at horne is valiantly resist!ng the forceful pressure of Moscow and Prague Communism, so the great majority of Slovak ex.iles is supl)Ort!ng, in every way possi'ble, tbe effort of the free world against Communist aggression and totality and, in accord with tbe tradition of the Slovak nation, is flghtlng for the restorat!on of its statehood within the framework of a future federated Europe. Th!s fight of the Slovak ex!les is based not only on historical, but politlcal and practlcal consideratlons as well. Already at the beglnning of the n!nth century, the Slovaks had the!r own State, which the Byzant!ne Chronicler called Great Moravia, because it extended beyond both b anks of the Morava River. The nucleus of this State was the territory of western Slovak!a, and lts bullders were the Slovak rulers Mojmír, Rastislav, Svätopluk and Mojmír II. Already Jn the eightb century, the Slovaks were among the first in Centra! Europe to accept Christlan!ty and thereby also western Christian culture and civ!l!zat!on. Thls Slovak State Jasted untll 907, when it succumbed to the joint onslaugbt of the Magyars, Germans and ~ecbs. In old Hungary, Slovakia formed a separate pol!t!cal unit witb its own administrat!ve, military and financial autborlties. It was separated from the rest of Hungary by a customs boundary. In the fourteentb century, Slovak!a was an independent territory under the rule of Matúš Čák of Trenčín, wbo had bis own army, colned bis own money, and concluded agreements '\vlth allles independently. And in the fifteenth century, Slovakia was an Independent administratlve unit under Jobn Jiskra of Brandýs. After the terrlble Turks invaded Centra] Europe, Slovakia was completely separated !rom Magyar lands and was a klnd of independent State unit under the rule of tbe Haibsburgs. It remained so unt!l the end of the seventeenth century. At tbe beginning of tbe eighteenth century, when the Slovaks b e,. came increaslngly consclous natlonally, thelr desires agaln tended to thelr own lndependence. George Fándly cried out to the Slovaks at that t!me: "Slovaks, recall the times when our nation lived under �SLOVAKIA 11 kings of its own people." And the great Slovak poet, John Hollý, wrote beautiful epochs about Svätopluk ·'who founded the great kingdom or tbe Slovaks and became an lndepenrlent sovereigu." In the nineteenth century, the Slovaks were organizing their fight for the polltical rights of thelr nation. Louls Štúr, leader or that movement, Qrganized a milltary rebellion In 1848 to sever Slovak.ia from the Magyars and proclaimed the independence of Slovakia in Myjava on September 19, 1848. Even though thls mllitary revolution failed, the Slovaks kept on flghtlng politlcally against Magyarizat!on and the political pressure of Pešť. The Slovaks wanted to be an independent country under the H a bsburg rule.~ Vlenna, howevet; rejected the efforts of the Slovaks for a federat!on, even though 1:Cr-aus, Finance Minister of Austria, backed tbem. The result was that the solution or the important natlonality problems In Centra! Europe were side-tracked for over a half century, whlch was to the detriment not only of Vienna, but also the whole of Europe and the Central European nations. On June 7, 1861, Slovaks from all parts of t he country assembled at Turčiansky Svätý Martin and demanded that Slovakia be constituted as the Slovak area o f Upper Hungary. This was followed by the Spiš petition of 1868, the massacre Jn Černová in 1907, and the heroic struggle of Svetozar Hur:ban Vajanský, great Slovak patriot, publlsher and writer, wbo wrote in the NÁRODN:l!: NOVINY (The l'fatlonal News) in 1910: "To have one's own State is the supreme deslre of every nation." But the demands of the Slovaks went unheeded; the Magyars were stubborn and determined to keep the Slova,ks under their rule. When the first World War broke out in 1914, the Slovaks at ltome and rubroad p repared the ground .for the liberation of the Slovak nation. Es-pecially tbe Amerlcan Slovaks of wbom there was close to a n1illion. The latter clamored for Slovak independence in the SLOVENSK'{° DJDNNÍK (The Slovak Daily), published in Pltts,burgh, . on January 21, 1910. Tbelr action, carried on dnring World War I under the motto "For An Independent S lovakia," was expressed in th e Cleveland Agreement of October 22, 1915, wblch stated that the Slovaks and the Czecbs will live In a federated union of States with complete autonomy of Slovakia, that Slovakla would bave lts own parliaroent and its own State adminlstration. In a slmllar manner, th e Slovaks were guaranteed autonomy also by the Pittsburgb Pact, of l\lay 30, 1918, wbich was signed by T. G. Masaryk. It was on th e basis ot these suppositions that the Slovaks entered the Czecho-Slovak Republic in 1918. However, Czech politicians under the leadershlp of Edward Beneš created the fictitious ideotogy of an ethnical and polltlcal union of the so-called "Czechoslovak natlon," which meant in practlce the polltlcal hegemony of the Czechs over the Slovaks. Just as the Slovaks had to flght for their natural rlghts in Hungary, so they had to fight again for their politlcal rights in the Czecho-Slovak Republlc. The Slovak nation was denled the right to call ltself the Slovak nation in a State which was created by the joint efforts of the Czechs and Slovaks. American Slovaks alone had g!ven Masaryk almost a milllon dollars during the first World War for the Jfberat!on movement. Under the circumstances, therefore, the Slovak nation had only �12 SLOVAKIA one choice: to fight with all legal means for autonomy as a basis for the complete political independence of the Slovaks. By sens!ble and logical arguments it was not possible to convince the Czechs that the Slovaks, too, had a right to full political sovereignty on Slovak territory. It was not untll 1938, when the Re• public was threatened from the outs!de, that Beneš finally concurred with the idea that the Slovaks be granted autonomy. The development, however, was going forward speedily at that time. And under the given s!tuation, the Slovak parliamentar!ans on March 14, 1939, took the historicalJy s!gnlficant step, when they accepted the responsibility for the fate of t heir own natlon and proclaimed the independence o! Slovakia. From the democratic standpoint, formally it would be possible to censure almost anything about March 14, 1939, but historicalJy it meant and stlll means the day of renewal of Slovak lndependence, whlch is the desire and the goal of the Slovak nation. Even though at the present time national viewpoints are giving way to the broader perspective of a political federation ot the whole of Europe, or at least of Central Europe, nevertheless the real bas!s for every federation still remain the nations, whether large or small, wlth which and on whicb a new form of political society of Europe can be built. That ls why the tradition of Slovak statehood is for us a fundamental issue for every form of European political organizatlon. And with Chrlstlanity, deeply rooted in the soul of our people since the eighth century, thls is the only real basis for liberating Slovakla from the hegemony of Communlsm. • • • WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO "Monsignor Tiso's execution was a travesty o[ justice. The fact that he could have remained president of the Slovak nation if he had only bent bis knee to the communist tyrant makes bim a martyr to the cause of freedom and rellgion. Although the Slovaks have suffered much from their political appressors for centuries, thls is the greatest crime against them in their h!storic struggle for national freedom. His tragic deatb cannot help but inspire Slovaks for centurles to come to defend their God-given politlcal and religious rights." - Abbot Theodore Kojiš, O.S.B., Cleveland, Ohio. • • • • • • "Condemnation of Tiso to death was taken as an indication tbat the Beneš government has surrendered completely to Moscow. Also indicative of thls ls the fact that the Beneš regime, after piously professing friendllness to tbe Cathollc Church. has begun an effort to seize Catholic schools and establish a state monopoly." - CathoJic Universe BulJetin, Cleveland, Ohlo. "Edward Beneš, murderer of the freedom of tbe Slovak nation, killed a good man, a zealous priest of Christ, a loyal Slovak patriot. the flrst president of the Slovak Republic' elected by the Slovak nation. The crlme of murderer Bene!i ls worsll, uglier and more wicked than the crime of Cain." - Peter Prídavok, Presldent Slovak National Council, London, England, April 1947. � 10 SLOVAKIA THE TRADITION OF SLOVAK STATEHOOD Marian Žiar In the contemporary great conflict of the free world agairuit thé ideology and forceful aggression of Commun!sm, we look upon the tradition of Slovak statehood trom two view·points. It 1s from these two viewpoints that our f!ght against Communism and for the renewal of Slovak statehood is waged. The Slovak nation at horne and the great majority of Slovak ex!les in the free world reject not only the Communist regime in Czecho-SJovakia, installed by and serving Moscow, but also the anti• Slovak ideology of ethnical and pollt!cal "Czechoslovaklsm," the standard•bearers of which are the very Czecho-Slovak politicians in exile, wbo installe<i the violent "people's democratlcal" regime in Slovakia after 194'5 and In 1948 cowardly surrendered power to the Communists. Just as the Slovak nat!on at horne is valiantly resist!ng the forceful pressure of Moscow and Prague Communism, so the great majority of Slovak ex.iles is supl)Ort!ng, in every way possi'ble, tbe effort of the free world against Communist aggression and totality and, in accord with tbe tradition of the Slovak nation, is flghtlng for the restorat!on of its statehood within the framework of a future federated Europe. Th!s fight of the Slovak ex!les is based not only on historical, but politlcal and practlcal consideratlons as well. Already at the beglnning of the n!nth century, the Slovaks had the!r own State, which the Byzant!ne Chronicler called Great Moravia, because it extended beyond both b anks of the Morava River. The nucleus of this State was the territory of western Slovak!a, and lts bullders were the Slovak rulers Mojmír, Rastislav, Svätopluk and Mojmír II. Already Jn the eightb century, the Slovaks were among the first in Centra! Europe to accept Christlan!ty and thereby also western Christian culture and civ!l!zat!on. Thls Slovak State Jasted untll 907, when it succumbed to the joint onslaugbt of the Magyars, Germans and ~ecbs. In old Hungary, Slovakia formed a separate pol!t!cal unit witb its own administrat!ve, military and financial autborlties. It was separated from the rest of Hungary by a customs boundary. In the fourteentb century, Slovak!a was an independent territory under the rule of Matúš Čák of Trenčín, wbo had bis own army, colned bis own money, and concluded agreements '\vlth allles independently. And in the fifteenth century, Slovakia was an Independent administratlve unit under Jobn Jiskra of Brandýs. After the terrlble Turks invaded Centra] Europe, Slovakia was completely separated !rom Magyar lands and was a klnd of independent State unit under the rule of tbe Haibsburgs. It remained so unt!l the end of the seventeenth century. At tbe beginning of tbe eighteenth century, when the Slovaks b e,. came increaslngly consclous natlonally, thelr desires agaln tended to thelr own lndependence. George Fándly cried out to the Slovaks at that t!me: "Slovaks, recall the times when our nation lived under �SLOVAKIA 11 kings of its own people." And the great Slovak poet, John Hollý, wrote beautiful epochs about Svätopluk ·'who founded the great kingdom or tbe Slovaks and became an lndepenrlent sovereigu." In the nineteenth century, the Slovaks were organizing their fight for the polltical rights of thelr nation. Louls Štúr, leader or that movement, Qrganized a milltary rebellion In 1848 to sever Slovak.ia from the Magyars and proclaimed the independence of Slovakia in Myjava on September 19, 1848. Even though thls mllitary revolution failed, the Slovaks kept on flghtlng politlcally against Magyarizat!on and the political pressure of Pešť. The Slovaks wanted to be an independent country under the H a bsburg rule.~ Vlenna, howevet; rejected the efforts of the Slovaks for a federat!on, even though 1:Cr-aus, Finance Minister of Austria, backed tbem. The result was that the solution or the important natlonality problems In Centra! Europe were side-tracked for over a half century, whlch was to the detriment not only of Vienna, but also the whole of Europe and the Central European nations. On June 7, 1861, Slovaks from all parts of t he country assembled at Turčiansky Svätý Martin and demanded that Slovakia be constituted as the Slovak area o f Upper Hungary. This was followed by the Spiš petition of 1868, the massacre Jn Černová in 1907, and the heroic struggle of Svetozar Hur:ban Vajanský, great Slovak patriot, publlsher and writer, wbo wrote in the NÁRODN:l!: NOVINY (The l'fatlonal News) in 1910: "To have one's own State is the supreme deslre of every nation." But the demands of the Slovaks went unheeded; the Magyars were stubborn and determined to keep the Slova,ks under their rule. When the first World War broke out in 1914, the Slovaks at ltome and rubroad p repared the ground .for the liberation of the Slovak nation. Es-pecially tbe Amerlcan Slovaks of wbom there was close to a n1illion. The latter clamored for Slovak independence in the SLOVENSK'{° DJDNNÍK (The Slovak Daily), published in Pltts,burgh, . on January 21, 1910. Tbelr action, carried on dnring World War I under the motto "For An Independent S lovakia," was expressed in th e Cleveland Agreement of October 22, 1915, wblch stated that the Slovaks and the Czecbs will live In a federated union of States with complete autonomy of Slovakia, that Slovakla would bave lts own parliaroent and its own State adminlstration. In a slmllar manner, th e Slovaks were guaranteed autonomy also by the Pittsburgb Pact, of l\lay 30, 1918, wbich was signed by T. G. Masaryk. It was on th e basis ot these suppositions that the Slovaks entered the Czecho-Slovak Republic in 1918. However, Czech politicians under the leadershlp of Edward Beneš created the fictitious ideotogy of an ethnical and polltlcal union of the so-called "Czechoslovak natlon," which meant in practlce the polltlcal hegemony of the Czechs over the Slovaks. Just as the Slovaks had to flght for their natural rlghts in Hungary, so they had to fight again for their politlcal rights in the Czecho-Slovak Republlc. The Slovak nation was denled the right to call ltself the Slovak nation in a State which was created by the joint efforts of the Czechs and Slovaks. American Slovaks alone had g!ven Masaryk almost a milllon dollars during the first World War for the Jfberat!on movement. Under the circumstances, therefore, the Slovak nation had only �12 SLOVAKIA one choice: to fight with all legal means for autonomy as a basis for the complete political independence of the Slovaks. By sens!ble and logical arguments it was not possible to convince the Czechs that the Slovaks, too, had a right to full political sovereignty on Slovak territory. It was not untll 1938, when the Re• public was threatened from the outs!de, that Beneš finally concurred with the idea that the Slovaks be granted autonomy. The development, however, was going forward speedily at that time. And under the given s!tuation, the Slovak parliamentar!ans on March 14, 1939, took the historicalJy s!gnlficant step, when they accepted the responsibility for the fate of t heir own natlon and proclaimed the independence o! Slovakia. From the democratic standpoint, formally it would be possible to censure almost anything about March 14, 1939, but historicalJy it meant and stlll means the day of renewal of Slovak lndependence, whlch is the desire and the goal of the Slovak nation. Even though at the present time national viewpoints are giving way to the broader perspective of a political federation ot the whole of Europe, or at least of Central Europe, nevertheless the real bas!s for every federation still remain the nations, whether large or small, wlth which and on whicb a new form of political society of Europe can be built. That ls why the tradition of Slovak statehood is for us a fundamental issue for every form of European political organizatlon. And with Chrlstlanity, deeply rooted in the soul of our people since the eighth century, thls is the only real basis for liberating Slovakla from the hegemony of Communlsm. • • • WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO "Monsignor Tiso's execution was a travesty o[ justice. The fact that he could have remained president of the Slovak nation if he had only bent bis knee to the communist tyrant makes bim a martyr to the cause of freedom and rellgion. Although the Slovaks have suffered much from their political appressors for centuries, thls is the greatest crime against them in their h!storic struggle for national freedom. His tragic deatb cannot help but inspire Slovaks for centurles to come to defend their God-given politlcal and religious rights." - Abbot Theodore Kojiš, O.S.B., Cleveland, Ohio. • • • • • • "Condemnation of Tiso to death was taken as an indication tbat the Beneš government has surrendered completely to Moscow. Also indicative of thls ls the fact that the Beneš regime, after piously professing friendllness to tbe Cathollc Church. has begun an effort to seize Catholic schools and establish a state monopoly." - CathoJic Universe BulJetin, Cleveland, Ohlo. "Edward Beneš, murderer of the freedom of tbe Slovak nation, killed a good man, a zealous priest of Christ, a loyal Slovak patriot. the flrst president of the Slovak Republic' elected by the Slovak nation. The crlme of murderer Bene!i ls worsll, uglier and more wicked than the crime of Cain." - Peter Prídavok, Presldent Slovak National Council, London, England, April 1947. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 10 SLOVAKIA THE TRADITION OF SLOVAK STATEHOOD Marian Žiar In the contemporary great conflict of the free world agairuit thé ideology and forceful aggression of Commun!sm, we look upon the tradition of Slovak statehood trom two view·points. It 1s from these two viewpoints that our f!ght against Communism and for the renewal of Slovak statehood is waged. The Slovak nation at horne and the great majority of Slovak ex!les in the free world reject not only the Communist regime in Czecho-SJovakia, installed by and serving Moscow, but also the anti• Slovak ideology of ethnical and pollt!cal "Czechoslovaklsm," the standard•bearers of which are the very Czecho-Slovak politicians in exile, wbo installe<i the violent "people's democratlcal" regime in Slovakia after 194'5 and In 1948 cowardly surrendered power to the Communists. Just as the Slovak nat!on at horne is valiantly resist!ng the forceful pressure of Moscow and Prague Communism, so the great majority of Slovak ex.iles is supl)Ort!ng, in every way possi'ble, tbe effort of the free world against Communist aggression and totality and, in accord with tbe tradition of the Slovak nation, is flghtlng for the restorat!on of its statehood within the framework of a future federated Europe. Th!s fight of the Slovak ex!les is based not only on historical, but politlcal and practlcal consideratlons as well. Already at the beglnning of the n!nth century, the Slovaks had the!r own State, which the Byzant!ne Chronicler called Great Moravia, because it extended beyond both b anks of the Morava River. The nucleus of this State was the territory of western Slovak!a, and lts bullders were the Slovak rulers Mojmír, Rastislav, Svätopluk and Mojmír II. Already Jn the eightb century, the Slovaks were among the first in Centra! Europe to accept Christlan!ty and thereby also western Christian culture and civ!l!zat!on. Thls Slovak State Jasted untll 907, when it succumbed to the joint onslaugbt of the Magyars, Germans and ~ecbs. In old Hungary, Slovakia formed a separate pol!t!cal unit witb its own administrat!ve, military and financial autborlties. It was separated from the rest of Hungary by a customs boundary. In the fourteentb century, Slovak!a was an independent territory under the rule of Matúš Čák of Trenčín, wbo had bis own army, colned bis own money, and concluded agreements '\vlth allles independently. And in the fifteenth century, Slovakia was an Independent administratlve unit under Jobn Jiskra of Brandýs. After the terrlble Turks invaded Centra] Europe, Slovakia was completely separated !rom Magyar lands and was a klnd of independent State unit under the rule of tbe Haibsburgs. It remained so unt!l the end of the seventeenth century. At tbe beginning of tbe eighteenth century, when the Slovaks b e,. came increaslngly consclous natlonally, thelr desires agaln tended to thelr own lndependence. George Fándly cried out to the Slovaks at that t!me: "Slovaks, recall the times when our nation lived under SLOVAKIA 11 kings of its own people." And the great Slovak poet, John Hollý, wrote beautiful epochs about Svätopluk ·'who founded the great kingdom or tbe Slovaks and became an lndepenrlent sovereigu." In the nineteenth century, the Slovaks were organizing their fight for the polltical rights of thelr nation. Louls Štúr, leader or that movement, Qrganized a milltary rebellion In 1848 to sever Slovak.ia from the Magyars and proclaimed the independence of Slovakia in Myjava on September 19, 1848. Even though thls mllitary revolution failed, the Slovaks kept on flghtlng politlcally against Magyarizat!on and the political pressure of Pešť. The Slovaks wanted to be an independent country under the H a bsburg rule.~ Vlenna, howevet; rejected the efforts of the Slovaks for a federat!on, even though 1:Cr-aus, Finance Minister of Austria, backed tbem. The result was that the solution or the important natlonality problems In Centra! Europe were side-tracked for over a half century, whlch was to the detriment not only of Vienna, but also the whole of Europe and the Central European nations. On June 7, 1861, Slovaks from all parts of t he country assembled at Turčiansky Svätý Martin and demanded that Slovakia be constituted as the Slovak area o f Upper Hungary. This was followed by the Spiš petition of 1868, the massacre Jn Černová in 1907, and the heroic struggle of Svetozar Hur:ban Vajanský, great Slovak patriot, publlsher and writer, wbo wrote in the NÁRODN:l!: NOVINY (The l'fatlonal News) in 1910: "To have one's own State is the supreme deslre of every nation." But the demands of the Slovaks went unheeded; the Magyars were stubborn and determined to keep the Slova,ks under their rule. When the first World War broke out in 1914, the Slovaks at ltome and rubroad p repared the ground .for the liberation of the Slovak nation. Es-pecially tbe Amerlcan Slovaks of wbom there was close to a n1illion. The latter clamored for Slovak independence in the SLOVENSK'{° DJDNNÍK (The Slovak Daily), published in Pltts,burgh, . on January 21, 1910. Tbelr action, carried on dnring World War I under the motto "For An Independent S lovakia," was expressed in th e Cleveland Agreement of October 22, 1915, wblch stated that the Slovaks and the Czecbs will live In a federated union of States with complete autonomy of Slovakia, that Slovakla would bave lts own parliaroent and its own State adminlstration. In a slmllar manner, th e Slovaks were guaranteed autonomy also by the Pittsburgb Pact, of l\lay 30, 1918, wbich was signed by T. G. Masaryk. It was on th e basis ot these suppositions that the Slovaks entered the Czecho-Slovak Republic in 1918. However, Czech politicians under the leadershlp of Edward Beneš created the fictitious ideotogy of an ethnical and polltlcal union of the so-called "Czechoslovak natlon," which meant in practlce the polltlcal hegemony of the Czechs over the Slovaks. Just as the Slovaks had to flght for their natural rlghts in Hungary, so they had to fight again for their politlcal rights in the Czecho-Slovak Republlc. The Slovak nation was denled the right to call ltself the Slovak nation in a State which was created by the joint efforts of the Czechs and Slovaks. American Slovaks alone had g!ven Masaryk almost a milllon dollars during the first World War for the Jfberat!on movement. Under the circumstances, therefore, the Slovak nation had only 12 SLOVAKIA one choice: to fight with all legal means for autonomy as a basis for the complete political independence of the Slovaks. By sens!ble and logical arguments it was not possible to convince the Czechs that the Slovaks, too, had a right to full political sovereignty on Slovak territory. It was not untll 1938, when the Re• public was threatened from the outs!de, that Beneš finally concurred with the idea that the Slovaks be granted autonomy. The development, however, was going forward speedily at that time. And under the given s!tuation, the Slovak parliamentar!ans on March 14, 1939, took the historicalJy s!gnlficant step, when they accepted the responsibility for the fate of t heir own natlon and proclaimed the independence o! Slovakia. From the democratic standpoint, formally it would be possible to censure almost anything about March 14, 1939, but historicalJy it meant and stlll means the day of renewal of Slovak lndependence, whlch is the desire and the goal of the Slovak nation. Even though at the present time national viewpoints are giving way to the broader perspective of a political federation ot the whole of Europe, or at least of Central Europe, nevertheless the real bas!s for every federation still remain the nations, whether large or small, wlth which and on whicb a new form of political society of Europe can be built. That ls why the tradition of Slovak statehood is for us a fundamental issue for every form of European political organizatlon. And with Chrlstlanity, deeply rooted in the soul of our people since the eighth century, thls is the only real basis for liberating Slovakla from the hegemony of Communlsm. • • • WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO "Monsignor Tiso's execution was a travesty o[ justice. The fact that he could have remained president of the Slovak nation if he had only bent bis knee to the communist tyrant makes bim a martyr to the cause of freedom and rellgion. Although the Slovaks have suffered much from their political appressors for centuries, thls is the greatest crime against them in their h!storic struggle for national freedom. His tragic deatb cannot help but inspire Slovaks for centurles to come to defend their God-given politlcal and religious rights." - Abbot Theodore Kojiš, O.S.B., Cleveland, Ohio. • • • • • • "Condemnation of Tiso to death was taken as an indication tbat the Beneš government has surrendered completely to Moscow. Also indicative of thls ls the fact that the Beneš regime, after piously professing friendllness to tbe Cathollc Church. has begun an effort to seize Catholic schools and establish a state monopoly." - CathoJic Universe BulJetin, Cleveland, Ohlo. "Edward Beneš, murderer of the freedom of tbe Slovak nation, killed a good man, a zealous priest of Christ, a loyal Slovak patriot. the flrst president of the Slovak Republic' elected by the Slovak nation. The crlme of murderer Bene!i ls worsll, uglier and more wicked than the crime of Cain." - Peter Prídavok, Presldent Slovak National Council, London, England, April 1947.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Tradition of Slovak Statehood Description An account of the resource Marian Žiar Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952 pp. 10-12 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Žiar, Marian Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/5d874ab3ff3e920b5c4045f562f1bea1.pdf 069341f7fa513c43e52d7f06e07296cf PDF Text Text 30 SLOVA.KIA THEY WANTED TO BE FREE Enemles of Slovak independence and their servants claim that the proclamat!on of Slovak independence in 1939 was excluslvely the work of the Nazis, and the Slovaks, they say, did not want to be independent. At the end of May, 1952, there was publ!shed in Paris the d!ary ot Count John Szembek, who for many years was a State Secretary In the Pol!sh Mlnlstry of Forelgn Affairs. In his function as ViceMlnlster of Foreign Affairs he had the possib!llty of following at elose range Pollsh Foreign pollcy and to a certain extent even !nfluence lt. His "Diary," ,therefore, is an unusually valuable and worthy documentary work for European pol!tlcs and diplomatlc hlstory, as 1s emphaslzed In the introductlon of the book by Léon Noel, the former French ambassador to Warsow. For the Slovaks, thls book contains unusually valuable notes for assesslng Pol!sh-Slovak relatlonships, especlaJiy those of 1938-1939. Perhaps one of ,t he most interestlng ls the en1.ry about the conversatlon with Minister Karol Sidor. It ls one or the Jongest of his notes, oven though the book deals almost excluslvely with records of meetlngs with presldents, m!nlsters, ambassadora and other outstandlng public rtgures. The followlng passage, taken from Szembeťs "Dlary," refers to Sldor's vislts. ·, "OCTOBER 19, 1938" CONVERSATION WITH SIDOR "Today this SJov,ak representat!ve pald me a courtesy caJI. I assured h!m that we entertain the greatest aympathles for all the deslres of the Slovak natlon; I expressed the hope that bis country would !Ind a way af com!ng to some agreemenrt with the Magyars, •and I assured hlm that we are advlslng Budapest to proceed wlth moderation when formulatlng territorjal demands to the address of the Slovaks." · Furthermore, Szembek notes: "During the dinner whlch I gave in honor ot Sldor, and In whlch Arclszewsk1 and Kobylanskl particlpated, my guest descrlbed the situatlon in Slovakia. He told us that hls countrymen are endeavorlng to proclalm a completely Independent Slovak State, whlch, however, polltlcally, mllitarlly, as well aa from the cultural standpolnt would depend on Po!and and economlcally on Germany and Hungary. The Slovaks did not want to let In German and Magyar cultural lnfluences, but wished to place thelr country under some k.ind of polltlcal and m!Jlllary protectlon of Poland. Thls pro-Pol!&h oo'ientat!on is supportea by the entlre Slovak natlon. The natlon, however, 1s stunned - as he expres.sed lt - by the questlon of Pollsh demands regarding Spiš and Orava. Thls Ume Sldor spoke very cryfully. I answered that lf we were going to be concerned wlth 1md Independent Slovak State, thls questlon would no longer present 1my dlflcultles, because we woulld not present any terrltorial demands to Independent Slovakla and that OUT demands !or the adjustment of the border could not be regarded as unconditlonally necessary for the �SLOVA.KIA 31 norma! development of relatlon.s between Poland and Slovakla. The sltuatlon apparently would be dltferent, lf we had to present thls problem to the Czechoslovak State." In another part of the report, we read: "1 gave Sldor an audlence on October 20th. I asked hlm what lnstructions he had gotten kom hls own Government when he was leavlng !or Warsaw and what wa.s the actuall purpose of hls trip. He answered that the Slovak Government authorlzed bim to decla.re in Warsaw what Msgr. Tiso, as well as Papée (the Pollsh ambassador In Pra,gue), had already told us oarller, namely that tbe alm ot hls country 1s the creatlon of an independent Slovak State. I asked him to explaln to me what now was tbe 11tand ot the Slovak Government in regards to Prague. Sldor replled that hls country at present S'till forms a part of the Czechoslovak Republllc and that Slovak minister.s were members of the Czechoslovak Government, even though they do not actually take part In lts negotiations. Thus far only one minister pa11tlclpated in two ses• sions ot the Government. As far as questlons of forelgn affalrs are c oncerned, the Slovaks are pursulng thelr own policy, and thelr emissarles, who just a short time ago went to European oa.pitale, were sent there by the pres.ident or the Slovak Government, Tiso, and not by Prague. "I then asked Sidor the question what klnd of methods hls countrymen lntended to use to galn complete lndependence. According to him ('Sidor), Tiso intends to attaln his goal by legal means. It emanates from the following prlnciple: in the present sltuatlon, as a result of the chaos whlch relgns in the Republlc, and especlally because one half mllMon men of the Czech Army 1s garrisoned in Slovakla, which does not have an Independent army and whose Slovak soldlers are on tihe Czech borders (whlch presents a serlous :mpedlment to the deflnlte separatlon of Slovakla from Czechla, as Sldor underscored so empbatlca.lly), lt was not posslble to thlnk of uslng more radlcal method,s. Sldor pe rsonally would be willlng to use them and thlnks that lt mlght be usetul to us e what ls called t he 'Hlinka Guarď and the Natlonal Commlttees, which he d lrects. But In a spirit of loyalty, he obeya the Slovak Gove rnment. "Such ls the polltlcal program of Tls o, endeavorlng to adhere to legal methods: the electlon of a new presldent of tbe CzechosJovak Republlc !s supposed to take place not later tban October 28. The Slovaks are golng to demand the electlon ot a Catholic, who would guarantee a separatlon flrom Francophlle and Sovletophlle orlentatlon in Forelgn pollcy. ChvaJkovský 1s a candldate, and R llnka's Party !s golng to vote for him. Thls presldency, however, ls going to have only a temporary character and wrn end wlth a new adjustment of the Constitutlon. The new Constltutlon wlll create a federatlon, thanka to whlch Slovakla w111 attaln lte own parllament and a broad autonomy. From that moment on the Slovaks wlll negotlate wlth Pi,a,gue regardlng thelT demands. Sldor !s certaln that the Czeohs wlll never be able to flll them. The Slovak Parllament wlll lhen deflnitely proclatm the separation of Slovak.la from Czechla, as once bappened In the case of Sweden and Norway. Sldor thlnks th'at lt wlll be necessary t o watt two months before that point 1s reached. In the meantlme, the Slovak Government wlll complete its work ot decentrallzation and organlze Hs own police, gendarmery and �32 SLOVAK.IA army, whlch lt allready began to do. Int.ernal admlnistration already now !s in a large measure in Slovak hands. As far as finances are concerned, the Siovaks are taklng over all State properties on thelr terrltory. Tax incomes are already flowlng lnto Bratis,Java. The State Bank is already in the process of organlzation." So muoh for the Diary of the Polish Vice-Minister about bis conversation with Minister K. Sidor on October 20, 1938, therefore 14 days after the proclamation of Slovak autonomy in ~Uina and almost five months before the proclamation of the independence of Slovakia on March 14, 1939. This report proves that the Slovaks wanted to be independent long before Hitler offered to protect their independence. Furthermore, the Slovaks rejected unilateral German preponderance over the territory of Slovakia and would have preferred to replace it wilh a polilical and military protootion of Poland, cooperating only economically with the Germans and Magyars. Sidor was for Slovak independence. The development tended, emphasized by the intention of Tls o's Government, toward complete Slovak lndependence. Looking at lt from a historlcal perspectlve, German intervention in March, 1939, greatly harmed Slovak efforts for independence In substance. That is it cast a shadow of German interventlon on the actuality of the proc lamation of Sllovak independence, which hurt Slovak aspirations then and is damaging to them even today. Slovak development tended toward the idea! of Slovak independence. It is necessary to admit that, in the main and above all else, it was the fault of Czech imperiallsts, who unseated the Jega!I government of Tiso with a military putsch on March 9, 1939, and again installed Czech hegemony over Slovakia, which all served as a pretext for Hitler to lntervene into the development of the relationship of the Slovaks to the Czechs. Szembek's "Diary" also clearly shows that Czech imperlalists drove the Slovaks into cooperation with the national-socialistic Germany of Adolph Hitler. Their treatment of Slovak problems only hurried the day of Slovak independence. (JAS) . • • • WHO SAID lT?: - "In negotiating the treaty we have just slgned, I did not betray my country to Russia. The Czechoslovaks are very bad deceivers. We intend to live our own llfe in our own way, and we know that Russia wlll reapect our way of living... , And so, my frlends, you and we are going to contlnue our policy of collaboration, friendship, confidence In, and good falth towards Soviet Russia. 1 am never going to undertake anythlng and nelther are you, whlch could be in any way agalnst the lntereat of thia vitally necessary collaboratlon. There are stm people Jeft who are afrald of thls collaboratlon. So far, Soviet Russla more than proved herself at Stalingrad, at Sevastapol, and on the Don. . .. I know the Russlan way o! llvlng; 1 belleve In lt; and I admire lt. We have a great deal In common wlth Soviet Russla. . . . So, wlth you, 1 half Soviet RuHla as a great and eHentlally necesaary factor In the present and future fortunes of Europe." - (Jan Masaryk, Hotel Commodore, New York City, December 21, 1943). � 30 SLOVA.KIA THEY WANTED TO BE FREE Enemles of Slovak independence and their servants claim that the proclamat!on of Slovak independence in 1939 was excluslvely the work of the Nazis, and the Slovaks, they say, did not want to be independent. At the end of May, 1952, there was publ!shed in Paris the d!ary ot Count John Szembek, who for many years was a State Secretary In the Pol!sh Mlnlstry of Forelgn Affairs. In his function as ViceMlnlster of Foreign Affairs he had the possib!llty of following at elose range Pollsh Foreign pollcy and to a certain extent even !nfluence lt. His "Diary," ,therefore, is an unusually valuable and worthy documentary work for European pol!tlcs and diplomatlc hlstory, as 1s emphaslzed In the introductlon of the book by Léon Noel, the former French ambassador to Warsow. For the Slovaks, thls book contains unusually valuable notes for assesslng Pol!sh-Slovak relatlonships, especlaJiy those of 1938-1939. Perhaps one of ,t he most interestlng ls the en1.ry about the conversatlon with Minister Karol Sidor. It ls one or the Jongest of his notes, oven though the book deals almost excluslvely with records of meetlngs with presldents, m!nlsters, ambassadora and other outstandlng public rtgures. The followlng passage, taken from Szembeťs "Dlary," refers to Sldor's vislts. ·, "OCTOBER 19, 1938" CONVERSATION WITH SIDOR "Today this SJov,ak representat!ve pald me a courtesy caJI. I assured h!m that we entertain the greatest aympathles for all the deslres of the Slovak natlon; I expressed the hope that bis country would !Ind a way af com!ng to some agreemenrt with the Magyars, •and I assured hlm that we are advlslng Budapest to proceed wlth moderation when formulatlng territorjal demands to the address of the Slovaks." · Furthermore, Szembek notes: "During the dinner whlch I gave in honor ot Sldor, and In whlch Arclszewsk1 and Kobylanskl particlpated, my guest descrlbed the situatlon in Slovakia. He told us that hls countrymen are endeavorlng to proclalm a completely Independent Slovak State, whlch, however, polltlcally, mllitarlly, as well aa from the cultural standpolnt would depend on Po!and and economlcally on Germany and Hungary. The Slovaks did not want to let In German and Magyar cultural lnfluences, but wished to place thelr country under some k.ind of polltlcal and m!Jlllary protectlon of Poland. Thls pro-Pol!&h oo'ientat!on is supportea by the entlre Slovak natlon. The natlon, however, 1s stunned - as he expres.sed lt - by the questlon of Pollsh demands regarding Spiš and Orava. Thls Ume Sldor spoke very cryfully. I answered that lf we were going to be concerned wlth 1md Independent Slovak State, thls questlon would no longer present 1my dlflcultles, because we woulld not present any terrltorial demands to Independent Slovakla and that OUT demands !or the adjustment of the border could not be regarded as unconditlonally necessary for the �SLOVA.KIA 31 norma! development of relatlon.s between Poland and Slovakla. The sltuatlon apparently would be dltferent, lf we had to present thls problem to the Czechoslovak State." In another part of the report, we read: "1 gave Sldor an audlence on October 20th. I asked hlm what lnstructions he had gotten kom hls own Government when he was leavlng !or Warsaw and what wa.s the actuall purpose of hls trip. He answered that the Slovak Government authorlzed bim to decla.re in Warsaw what Msgr. Tiso, as well as Papée (the Pollsh ambassador In Pra,gue), had already told us oarller, namely that tbe alm ot hls country 1s the creatlon of an independent Slovak State. I asked him to explaln to me what now was tbe 11tand ot the Slovak Government in regards to Prague. Sldor replled that hls country at present S'till forms a part of the Czechoslovak Republllc and that Slovak minister.s were members of the Czechoslovak Government, even though they do not actually take part In lts negotiations. Thus far only one minister pa11tlclpated in two ses• sions ot the Government. As far as questlons of forelgn affalrs are c oncerned, the Slovaks are pursulng thelr own policy, and thelr emissarles, who just a short time ago went to European oa.pitale, were sent there by the pres.ident or the Slovak Government, Tiso, and not by Prague. "I then asked Sidor the question what klnd of methods hls countrymen lntended to use to galn complete lndependence. According to him ('Sidor), Tiso intends to attaln his goal by legal means. It emanates from the following prlnciple: in the present sltuatlon, as a result of the chaos whlch relgns in the Republlc, and especlally because one half mllMon men of the Czech Army 1s garrisoned in Slovakla, which does not have an Independent army and whose Slovak soldlers are on tihe Czech borders (whlch presents a serlous :mpedlment to the deflnlte separatlon of Slovakla from Czechla, as Sldor underscored so empbatlca.lly), lt was not posslble to thlnk of uslng more radlcal method,s. Sldor pe rsonally would be willlng to use them and thlnks that lt mlght be usetul to us e what ls called t he 'Hlinka Guarď and the Natlonal Commlttees, which he d lrects. But In a spirit of loyalty, he obeya the Slovak Gove rnment. "Such ls the polltlcal program of Tls o, endeavorlng to adhere to legal methods: the electlon of a new presldent of tbe CzechosJovak Republlc !s supposed to take place not later tban October 28. The Slovaks are golng to demand the electlon ot a Catholic, who would guarantee a separatlon flrom Francophlle and Sovletophlle orlentatlon in Forelgn pollcy. ChvaJkovský 1s a candldate, and R llnka's Party !s golng to vote for him. Thls presldency, however, ls going to have only a temporary character and wrn end wlth a new adjustment of the Constitutlon. The new Constltutlon wlll create a federatlon, thanka to whlch Slovakla w111 attaln lte own parllament and a broad autonomy. From that moment on the Slovaks wlll negotlate wlth Pi,a,gue regardlng thelT demands. Sldor !s certaln that the Czeohs wlll never be able to flll them. The Slovak Parllament wlll lhen deflnitely proclatm the separation of Slovak.la from Czechla, as once bappened In the case of Sweden and Norway. Sldor thlnks th'at lt wlll be necessary t o watt two months before that point 1s reached. In the meantlme, the Slovak Government wlll complete its work ot decentrallzation and organlze Hs own police, gendarmery and �32 SLOVAK.IA army, whlch lt allready began to do. Int.ernal admlnistration already now !s in a large measure in Slovak hands. As far as finances are concerned, the Siovaks are taklng over all State properties on thelr terrltory. Tax incomes are already flowlng lnto Bratis,Java. The State Bank is already in the process of organlzation." So muoh for the Diary of the Polish Vice-Minister about bis conversation with Minister K. Sidor on October 20, 1938, therefore 14 days after the proclamation of Slovak autonomy in ~Uina and almost five months before the proclamation of the independence of Slovakia on March 14, 1939. This report proves that the Slovaks wanted to be independent long before Hitler offered to protect their independence. Furthermore, the Slovaks rejected unilateral German preponderance over the territory of Slovakia and would have preferred to replace it wilh a polilical and military protootion of Poland, cooperating only economically with the Germans and Magyars. Sidor was for Slovak independence. The development tended, emphasized by the intention of Tls o's Government, toward complete Slovak lndependence. Looking at lt from a historlcal perspectlve, German intervention in March, 1939, greatly harmed Slovak efforts for independence In substance. That is it cast a shadow of German interventlon on the actuality of the proc lamation of Sllovak independence, which hurt Slovak aspirations then and is damaging to them even today. Slovak development tended toward the idea! of Slovak independence. It is necessary to admit that, in the main and above all else, it was the fault of Czech imperiallsts, who unseated the Jega!I government of Tiso with a military putsch on March 9, 1939, and again installed Czech hegemony over Slovakia, which all served as a pretext for Hitler to lntervene into the development of the relationship of the Slovaks to the Czechs. Szembek's "Diary" also clearly shows that Czech imperlalists drove the Slovaks into cooperation with the national-socialistic Germany of Adolph Hitler. Their treatment of Slovak problems only hurried the day of Slovak independence. (JAS) . • • • WHO SAID lT?: - "In negotiating the treaty we have just slgned, I did not betray my country to Russia. The Czechoslovaks are very bad deceivers. We intend to live our own llfe in our own way, and we know that Russia wlll reapect our way of living... , And so, my frlends, you and we are going to contlnue our policy of collaboration, friendship, confidence In, and good falth towards Soviet Russia. 1 am never going to undertake anythlng and nelther are you, whlch could be in any way agalnst the lntereat of thia vitally necessary collaboratlon. There are stm people Jeft who are afrald of thls collaboratlon. So far, Soviet Russla more than proved herself at Stalingrad, at Sevastapol, and on the Don. . .. I know the Russlan way o! llvlng; 1 belleve In lt; and I admire lt. We have a great deal In common wlth Soviet Russla. . . . So, wlth you, 1 half Soviet RuHla as a great and eHentlally necesaary factor In the present and future fortunes of Europe." - (Jan Masaryk, Hotel Commodore, New York City, December 21, 1943). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 30 SLOVA.KIA THEY WANTED TO BE FREE Enemles of Slovak independence and their servants claim that the proclamat!on of Slovak independence in 1939 was excluslvely the work of the Nazis, and the Slovaks, they say, did not want to be independent. At the end of May, 1952, there was publ!shed in Paris the d!ary ot Count John Szembek, who for many years was a State Secretary In the Pol!sh Mlnlstry of Forelgn Affairs. In his function as ViceMlnlster of Foreign Affairs he had the possib!llty of following at elose range Pollsh Foreign pollcy and to a certain extent even !nfluence lt. His "Diary," ,therefore, is an unusually valuable and worthy documentary work for European pol!tlcs and diplomatlc hlstory, as 1s emphaslzed In the introductlon of the book by Léon Noel, the former French ambassador to Warsow. For the Slovaks, thls book contains unusually valuable notes for assesslng Pol!sh-Slovak relatlonships, especlaJiy those of 1938-1939. Perhaps one of ,t he most interestlng ls the en1.ry about the conversatlon with Minister Karol Sidor. It ls one or the Jongest of his notes, oven though the book deals almost excluslvely with records of meetlngs with presldents, m!nlsters, ambassadora and other outstandlng public rtgures. The followlng passage, taken from Szembeťs "Dlary," refers to Sldor's vislts. ·, "OCTOBER 19, 1938" CONVERSATION WITH SIDOR "Today this SJov,ak representat!ve pald me a courtesy caJI. I assured h!m that we entertain the greatest aympathles for all the deslres of the Slovak natlon; I expressed the hope that bis country would !Ind a way af com!ng to some agreemenrt with the Magyars, •and I assured hlm that we are advlslng Budapest to proceed wlth moderation when formulatlng territorjal demands to the address of the Slovaks." · Furthermore, Szembek notes: "During the dinner whlch I gave in honor ot Sldor, and In whlch Arclszewsk1 and Kobylanskl particlpated, my guest descrlbed the situatlon in Slovakia. He told us that hls countrymen are endeavorlng to proclalm a completely Independent Slovak State, whlch, however, polltlcally, mllitarlly, as well aa from the cultural standpolnt would depend on Po!and and economlcally on Germany and Hungary. The Slovaks did not want to let In German and Magyar cultural lnfluences, but wished to place thelr country under some k.ind of polltlcal and m!Jlllary protectlon of Poland. Thls pro-Pol!&h oo'ientat!on is supportea by the entlre Slovak natlon. The natlon, however, 1s stunned - as he expres.sed lt - by the questlon of Pollsh demands regarding Spiš and Orava. Thls Ume Sldor spoke very cryfully. I answered that lf we were going to be concerned wlth 1md Independent Slovak State, thls questlon would no longer present 1my dlflcultles, because we woulld not present any terrltorial demands to Independent Slovakla and that OUT demands !or the adjustment of the border could not be regarded as unconditlonally necessary for the SLOVA.KIA 31 norma! development of relatlon.s between Poland and Slovakla. The sltuatlon apparently would be dltferent, lf we had to present thls problem to the Czechoslovak State." In another part of the report, we read: "1 gave Sldor an audlence on October 20th. I asked hlm what lnstructions he had gotten kom hls own Government when he was leavlng !or Warsaw and what wa.s the actuall purpose of hls trip. He answered that the Slovak Government authorlzed bim to decla.re in Warsaw what Msgr. Tiso, as well as Papée (the Pollsh ambassador In Pra,gue), had already told us oarller, namely that tbe alm ot hls country 1s the creatlon of an independent Slovak State. I asked him to explaln to me what now was tbe 11tand ot the Slovak Government in regards to Prague. Sldor replled that hls country at present S'till forms a part of the Czechoslovak Republllc and that Slovak minister.s were members of the Czechoslovak Government, even though they do not actually take part In lts negotiations. Thus far only one minister pa11tlclpated in two ses• sions ot the Government. As far as questlons of forelgn affalrs are c oncerned, the Slovaks are pursulng thelr own policy, and thelr emissarles, who just a short time ago went to European oa.pitale, were sent there by the pres.ident or the Slovak Government, Tiso, and not by Prague. "I then asked Sidor the question what klnd of methods hls countrymen lntended to use to galn complete lndependence. According to him ('Sidor), Tiso intends to attaln his goal by legal means. It emanates from the following prlnciple: in the present sltuatlon, as a result of the chaos whlch relgns in the Republlc, and especlally because one half mllMon men of the Czech Army 1s garrisoned in Slovakla, which does not have an Independent army and whose Slovak soldlers are on tihe Czech borders (whlch presents a serlous :mpedlment to the deflnlte separatlon of Slovakla from Czechla, as Sldor underscored so empbatlca.lly), lt was not posslble to thlnk of uslng more radlcal method,s. Sldor pe rsonally would be willlng to use them and thlnks that lt mlght be usetul to us e what ls called t he 'Hlinka Guarď and the Natlonal Commlttees, which he d lrects. But In a spirit of loyalty, he obeya the Slovak Gove rnment. "Such ls the polltlcal program of Tls o, endeavorlng to adhere to legal methods: the electlon of a new presldent of tbe CzechosJovak Republlc !s supposed to take place not later tban October 28. The Slovaks are golng to demand the electlon ot a Catholic, who would guarantee a separatlon flrom Francophlle and Sovletophlle orlentatlon in Forelgn pollcy. ChvaJkovský 1s a candldate, and R llnka's Party !s golng to vote for him. Thls presldency, however, ls going to have only a temporary character and wrn end wlth a new adjustment of the Constitutlon. The new Constltutlon wlll create a federatlon, thanka to whlch Slovakla w111 attaln lte own parllament and a broad autonomy. From that moment on the Slovaks wlll negotlate wlth Pi,a,gue regardlng thelT demands. Sldor !s certaln that the Czeohs wlll never be able to flll them. The Slovak Parllament wlll lhen deflnitely proclatm the separation of Slovak.la from Czechla, as once bappened In the case of Sweden and Norway. Sldor thlnks th'at lt wlll be necessary t o watt two months before that point 1s reached. In the meantlme, the Slovak Government wlll complete its work ot decentrallzation and organlze Hs own police, gendarmery and 32 SLOVAK.IA army, whlch lt allready began to do. Int.ernal admlnistration already now !s in a large measure in Slovak hands. As far as finances are concerned, the Siovaks are taklng over all State properties on thelr terrltory. Tax incomes are already flowlng lnto Bratis,Java. The State Bank is already in the process of organlzation." So muoh for the Diary of the Polish Vice-Minister about bis conversation with Minister K. Sidor on October 20, 1938, therefore 14 days after the proclamation of Slovak autonomy in ~Uina and almost five months before the proclamation of the independence of Slovakia on March 14, 1939. This report proves that the Slovaks wanted to be independent long before Hitler offered to protect their independence. Furthermore, the Slovaks rejected unilateral German preponderance over the territory of Slovakia and would have preferred to replace it wilh a polilical and military protootion of Poland, cooperating only economically with the Germans and Magyars. Sidor was for Slovak independence. The development tended, emphasized by the intention of Tls o's Government, toward complete Slovak lndependence. Looking at lt from a historlcal perspectlve, German intervention in March, 1939, greatly harmed Slovak efforts for independence In substance. That is it cast a shadow of German interventlon on the actuality of the proc lamation of Sllovak independence, which hurt Slovak aspirations then and is damaging to them even today. Slovak development tended toward the idea! of Slovak independence. It is necessary to admit that, in the main and above all else, it was the fault of Czech imperiallsts, who unseated the Jega!I government of Tiso with a military putsch on March 9, 1939, and again installed Czech hegemony over Slovakia, which all served as a pretext for Hitler to lntervene into the development of the relationship of the Slovaks to the Czechs. Szembek's "Diary" also clearly shows that Czech imperlalists drove the Slovaks into cooperation with the national-socialistic Germany of Adolph Hitler. Their treatment of Slovak problems only hurried the day of Slovak independence. (JAS) . • • • WHO SAID lT?: - "In negotiating the treaty we have just slgned, I did not betray my country to Russia. The Czechoslovaks are very bad deceivers. We intend to live our own llfe in our own way, and we know that Russia wlll reapect our way of living... , And so, my frlends, you and we are going to contlnue our policy of collaboration, friendship, confidence In, and good falth towards Soviet Russia. 1 am never going to undertake anythlng and nelther are you, whlch could be in any way agalnst the lntereat of thia vitally necessary collaboratlon. There are stm people Jeft who are afrald of thls collaboratlon. So far, Soviet Russla more than proved herself at Stalingrad, at Sevastapol, and on the Don. . .. I know the Russlan way o! llvlng; 1 belleve In lt; and I admire lt. We have a great deal In common wlth Soviet Russla. . . . So, wlth you, 1 half Soviet RuHla as a great and eHentlally necesaary factor In the present and future fortunes of Europe." - (Jan Masaryk, Hotel Commodore, New York City, December 21, 1943).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource They Wanted to Be Free Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952 pp. 30-32 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/601134ae37c577a6153dcabc2a4076a4.pdf 4f5b1bad0879a3d825ced9b77393b7c2 PDF Text Text SLOVA.KIA. 13 IN RETlROSPECT TISO ON THE GALWWS (From "EAST EUROPE," London, Apríl 30, 1947) The Western Powers fought the war for a number of principles, embodied in the Atlantic Charter, and not in order to enable one nation to dominate another. But in the post-war world, two tendencies are at work. In the West, neither Great Britain, the U. S. A. nor any other country look for territorial aggrandizement. Britain !s withdrawing from Egypt, Jraq, Trans-Jordanla, India and Burma; the NUEA has recognized the independence of the Philippines, Denmark that of Iceland, China. that of Korea, while France has accepted Syrian and Lebanese self-government. Thls process of decentralizatlon c haracteristic of the Western Democracies, is in complete contrast to the process of centralization which is going on in Soviet Russla and her Zone of lnfluence. In the flrst place, Russia berself has increased her territory by incorporating the Baltic States, Finnlsh Karelia, Eastern Poland, Ruthenia, Bessarabla, and part of the Bukovina. On behal! of tbe Georgian, Armenian and Azerba!jan Republics, she 1s claiming Turklsh and Persian territory. Although wide cultural rights are granted to the Soviet Republics, their administration is completely centralized and dependent on Moscow. Within the Sov.iet Zone, Russia is backing all the territorial claim~ of her satellites: of Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The most recent effect of this was the failure of the Foreign Ministers to agree on the Austrian Treaty, because Russia has ldentified herself with Yugoslav territorial demands on Austria. Czecho-Slovakla and Yugoslavia have reestablished thelr rule over Slovakia and Croatia respectlvely, both of which had been Independent between 1938 and 1945. These two trends form the background against which the Czech and Slovak controversy within t he reestablished Republic must be considered. lt illustrates the conflicts whic h the policy of centralization bas to overcome. On April 18th a secret radio transmitter, calling itself "The Voice of the Slovak Republic" broadcast a petition from the Slovak Action Committee. "The Slovak Republic was not the result of external intervention. Its creation called for no foreign support, nor was the approval or consent of Germany .':!ought or deemed necessary. No one can say, that, with the creation of the Slovak Republlc, the Germans overran and occupied the Czech lands, for tbe two events bore no relation to eacb otber. . . . (A simllar point of view is taken in tbe Soviet 'History of Diplomacy,' Vol. III, chapter 24, wbicb deals with the Anschluss and the partitlon of Czecho-Slovakia, compiled by Academician V. P. Potemkin, edition 1945. It holds Britain and France respons!ble for the disintegration of Czecho-Slovakia in 1938. - Ed.) The Slovak Republic was recognlzed by 27 Forelgn Powers in a very s hort Ume. Among them, states that were bound by treaty agalnst Germany - Poland, Brltaln, France, Yugoslavia, Belgium, Holland. the U. S. S. R., and so on - and also by states which, as t he war progressed, remalned neutra! Switzerland, the Vatlcan, Sweden. Spain and others. The Slovak Republic was not recognizecl by the U. S. A., but the reason for this may be found in propaganda directed �14 SLOVAKIA agalnst the Slovak Republic . . . . It !s unthinkable, therefore, that the acts of the representatives o[ t he Slovak Repub lic should b e judged by a court estaiblished by Czecho-Slovak!a, slnce Czecho-Slovak la is n ot the ir countr y. . . . Slovak r epresen tatlves could no t have com• mitted any acts of treason against the Czecho-Slovak Governm ent since they d!d n ot recognize Czecho·Slovak la as th e State to wh ich they belonged, or to which they owed allegiance. On the contrary, they looked upon Ozecho-Slovakla ae a S tate lnto whlch th e Slovak people had been propelled by foroo and dlplomatic lntrigue . .. . The proceedings of the <National Court in Bratislava against Preside nt T iso and other representatives of the S lovak Republic were not designed for the examlnation of war c rimes defined in Art ic le 6 of the Charter of lnternational Military Tribunal. In the Bratislava tria! not only were the persona of President Tiso and other Slovak representatives involved but also the politlca l concept, the idea of a Slova k independent state, and the self-determination of the S lova k nation as such .... Had Ru84ia become the protector of the Slovak state, under the presi• dency of Tiso, there wou ld be no c harge of treason today against the c hief of the Slovak Repub lic .... We c laim the reestab lis hment of a democratic and Christia n Slova k Republic." T hls broadca.!!t reveals the real confllct b etween Slovak and Czech ideas. Accordlng to the Slovaks, Czecho-Slovak legal contln\tlty has been lnterrupted, Independent Slovakia was a reality, and CzechoSlovak relations must be reestabllshed on a completely new basis. Accordlng to t he Czechs , Czecho-Slovakla's Iegal continuity has been s afeguarded, Iegally Independent Slovakla bas never exlsted, and lt v.as a purely ephemeral creation. The Czechs pass over in silence the fact that the third component of the 1918 'Republic, Car pathlan Ruthenia, was taken by Soviet Russia. On February 13, 1947, Presldent Benes dotted the i's and crossed the ťs of the Czech attitude. Speaking of relations between th e Czechs and Slovaks, he said: "Archblshop Dr. Kmetko said in the T lso !rial that the Slovaks would llke t o have thelr own state but accept tbe Czecbo-Slovak Republlc .b ecause there is no way of a chlevlng it. I reject such an argument categorlcally ; I sball never accept it. We could not survlve anotber crlsls In CzechoSlovak reations. After such a crisis there would no longer be a Czecbo. Slovak Repub llc, and Slovakla wou ld not be an independent state In any case; lt wou\d most probably fall lnto Soviet Russia.... The Czechs border on a Germany of seventy milllon people, therefore in t he future the Czechs must be neighbors of Soviet Russla. They could not in consequence accept an independent Slovak state as their ne ighbor. .. . There can be no alternatives today, nor any questlon of pian· ning a Central Euro pean Federatlon. T hese plans bave been dead ever slnce Soviet Russla becam e our nelghbor." The executlon of President Tiso was tbe dramatic consummation of President Benes' policy. Tiso was condemned and e xecuted not a s a war c riminal, but a s the symbol of Slova k ·indepe nde nce. As late as the autumn of 1946, dur ing his visit to Topolcany, Pr eaident Benes dec lared before the Councll of Slovak Commissars that Tiso must be hanged. When one of the Slova k Commissars remarked t hat Slovak public opinion would not stand fo r his e xecution, Benes r eplied, " Perhaps it wll l not stand for it, but it is absolutely necessary." �SLOVAKIA 16 This explains the appointment of Dr. Daxner as Presldent ot the Bratislava court, which tried Tiso. Daxner had sworn vengeance on Tiso for the "wrongs" inflicte<i by the Slovak natíonallsts. And yet, in 1935, Tiao waa reaponaible for the reelectlon of Benea aa Preaident of Czecho-Slovakia. The Slovak People's Party wanted to vote for Dr. Nemecz, the candidate for the Agrarians, but at the last moment Tiso convinced his party that Benes was a better choice trom a fore.ign political point of view. Mr. Sidor was the only member of the S)Rvak People's Party. w,bo abstained trom votlng. Posslbly Benes would have commuted the Tlso sentence, especially in view of Slovak public opinion, had he not had to consider the Russian attitude. It was expressed - aimong others - by Gundorov, t he Presi· dent of the All..Slav Committee in Moscow, who in the Slovak communis t daily " Pravda" demanded ruthless punlshment of the accused. Benea c hose to follow the Ruaaian line. After the occupation of Slovakla by the Soviet Army, Tiso sought refugé in the American Zone of Germany. In November 1945, the American M:ilitary Authoritles handed him over to the Czechs. As the Slovaks regarded this a b erach of the rlghts o! asylum, the Slovak League of America in th e U. S. A. made investigations as to who had authorized it. Neither the State Department, nor the General Staff were responsible for th!s extradition. Apparently the declslon had been taken by the local American commander, in response to the demand of the Czecho-Slovak Government. The Prague Government had place<i at the disposal of the President of the Czecho-Slovak War Crlmes Commission, General Ecer, the sum of 50 mllHon Kcs for the ·1nterception of political emigrés, mainly Slovaks. Flown to Bratislava, Tlso was paraded through the town wlth chains around his wri-sts, from whlch hung a large padlock. He was allowed to attend his father's funeral, but had to march ignominlously in handcuffs. Because of the constant demonstrations In hls favor he was sent letters, telegrams, flowers, food and so on - ·Tiso was transferred to th e prison in Brno and returned to Bratls'1ava only for his tria!. He waa not allowed to chooae hls defenae couael, who waa appoi nted by the Czec h authoritiea. Many of the witnesses gave evidence in his favor. The Archlblshop of Slovak.ia, Kmetko, who is highly res pected by the Czechs as well as the Slovaks, tesutled " Tlao acted and worked in the intereata of Slovakia, and waa never a traltor. Hia election aa Preaident of Slovakia waa the wlll of 90 per cent of the Slovaks at that time." Tis o himself pleaded not guilty. He malntalned that he did not c-ommit treason, and declared the responsJblllty for the fate of Czecho• Slovakla dld not rest witb Slov.akia, but wlth tbe 20 years of Czech domestlc and Coreign pollcy. "lf ·a od allowed me to carry out my policy agaln under simi[ar c.o ndltlona I would do exactly aa I have done," Tis o declared. .,. For th e trlal special security measures were taken In Slovak.la. Czech troops were brought In because the authoritles dld not trust the Slqvak troops. There were large-sc-ale demonstrations In favor ot T lso at Plestany and Puchov, and the Secret Police arrested many people, who were sent to Lalbor Camps. On Aprll 15th Tiso was condemned to death by banging. When asked whether he would a,p.peal for mercy, Tlso replled: "Yes - for �16 SLOVA.KIA mora! reasons." (According to Catholic doctrine a man must defend his llfe by all avallable means.) President Benes rejected Tiso's plea, and he was executed on April 18th. Apríl 18th may prove to be a fateful day in Czecho-Slovak relations. 1n the eyes of the devout Slovak people the hanging of a pri est is an unforgivable act. In the eyes of intelligent Slovaks abroad, it was a cri me against national fee li ngs. Benes' rejection of Tiso's plea for mercy is regarded not as the act of a democrat, but of a tyrant. The Slovaks say that thereby Benes has destroyed his own democratic legend. The unrest whicb was expected to follow Tiso's execution iu Slovakia was checked by very strong measures, but the atmospbere has become very tense and there is much talk of great political changes. Within tbe Democratic Party tbere is strife; tbe Slovak Catholics are expected to go over to the Freedom Party. On April 17th, Soviet opinion, which is tantamount to official iustructions, was thus expressed by the Moscow Radlo: "'On various occasions, and particularly recently the pro-Tiso and Hlinka Guard elements bave behaved witb growing impertinence and daring against the vi tal interests of tbeir own nation.... An ambiguous attitude has been adopted by some Democratic Party circles. Their press directly encourages tbe organizers of anti-Government action (This referred to tbe democratic daily, "Čas." - Ed.) A serious menace to democratic reconstruction in Slovakia arises from the influence or reactionary and fascist ele ments witbin the Democratic Party. Tbe Hlinka Guard, tbe followers of Sidor and Durčanský, undermine the State, cause anti• Czech, anti-Soviet and anti-Semitic provocations and attempts to smash the Czecbo-Slovak RepU1blic. A relentless purge of all fascists is called for, affecting not only the leaders, but their Joyal and still active followers." Opinions may vary about the tria! or Tiso, who was, after all, the protegé of the Germans. But the conception of justice and morality of the average person bas been put to a severe strain. Recent trials in East Europe appear to seek polltical vengeance not justice. This was exemplif'led in the trials of Archbishop Steplnac, or Mibailovitch and most scandalous of all, that of the 16 members of the Polish Underground Govel'hment. World public opinion must never cease to make a stand against injustice and falsehood. In the words of the Gospel, unlesa you go out and meet evil to combat it, evil will enter your house and destroy you." • • • WHO SAID IT? "The Czeehoslovak-Soviet Treaty rorms the BASIS ot our count ry's external securlty and fundamen,t al con trlbutlon to the un!flcatlon ot national forcei.. The alllance with the SOVIET and triendshlp wttb tbe West was w elcomed by ALL classes of tlhe Czechoslovak people In com<plete acoordance w!th thelr CONVICTIONS and wlth sin· cere joy. . . . Thanks to tbe treaty, Czechoslovakla's lnterests are re· celvlng e tfeetlve support" - (H ubert Rlpka, Minister of State, Broadcast on the annlversary or the Czecboslovak-Sovie-t Treaty, London. December H, 1944). � SLOVA.KIA. 13 IN RETlROSPECT TISO ON THE GALWWS (From "EAST EUROPE," London, Apríl 30, 1947) The Western Powers fought the war for a number of principles, embodied in the Atlantic Charter, and not in order to enable one nation to dominate another. But in the post-war world, two tendencies are at work. In the West, neither Great Britain, the U. S. A. nor any other country look for territorial aggrandizement. Britain !s withdrawing from Egypt, Jraq, Trans-Jordanla, India and Burma; the NUEA has recognized the independence of the Philippines, Denmark that of Iceland, China. that of Korea, while France has accepted Syrian and Lebanese self-government. Thls process of decentralizatlon c haracteristic of the Western Democracies, is in complete contrast to the process of centralization which is going on in Soviet Russla and her Zone of lnfluence. In the flrst place, Russia berself has increased her territory by incorporating the Baltic States, Finnlsh Karelia, Eastern Poland, Ruthenia, Bessarabla, and part of the Bukovina. On behal! of tbe Georgian, Armenian and Azerba!jan Republics, she 1s claiming Turklsh and Persian territory. Although wide cultural rights are granted to the Soviet Republics, their administration is completely centralized and dependent on Moscow. Within the Sov.iet Zone, Russia is backing all the territorial claim~ of her satellites: of Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The most recent effect of this was the failure of the Foreign Ministers to agree on the Austrian Treaty, because Russia has ldentified herself with Yugoslav territorial demands on Austria. Czecho-Slovakla and Yugoslavia have reestablished thelr rule over Slovakia and Croatia respectlvely, both of which had been Independent between 1938 and 1945. These two trends form the background against which the Czech and Slovak controversy within t he reestablished Republic must be considered. lt illustrates the conflicts whic h the policy of centralization bas to overcome. On April 18th a secret radio transmitter, calling itself "The Voice of the Slovak Republic" broadcast a petition from the Slovak Action Committee. "The Slovak Republic was not the result of external intervention. Its creation called for no foreign support, nor was the approval or consent of Germany .':!ought or deemed necessary. No one can say, that, with the creation of the Slovak Republlc, the Germans overran and occupied the Czech lands, for tbe two events bore no relation to eacb otber. . . . (A simllar point of view is taken in tbe Soviet 'History of Diplomacy,' Vol. III, chapter 24, wbicb deals with the Anschluss and the partitlon of Czecho-Slovakia, compiled by Academician V. P. Potemkin, edition 1945. It holds Britain and France respons!ble for the disintegration of Czecho-Slovakia in 1938. - Ed.) The Slovak Republic was recognlzed by 27 Forelgn Powers in a very s hort Ume. Among them, states that were bound by treaty agalnst Germany - Poland, Brltaln, France, Yugoslavia, Belgium, Holland. the U. S. S. R., and so on - and also by states which, as t he war progressed, remalned neutra! Switzerland, the Vatlcan, Sweden. Spain and others. The Slovak Republic was not recognizecl by the U. S. A., but the reason for this may be found in propaganda directed �14 SLOVAKIA agalnst the Slovak Republic . . . . It !s unthinkable, therefore, that the acts of the representatives o[ t he Slovak Repub lic should b e judged by a court estaiblished by Czecho-Slovak!a, slnce Czecho-Slovak la is n ot the ir countr y. . . . Slovak r epresen tatlves could no t have com• mitted any acts of treason against the Czecho-Slovak Governm ent since they d!d n ot recognize Czecho·Slovak la as th e State to wh ich they belonged, or to which they owed allegiance. On the contrary, they looked upon Ozecho-Slovakla ae a S tate lnto whlch th e Slovak people had been propelled by foroo and dlplomatic lntrigue . .. . The proceedings of the <National Court in Bratislava against Preside nt T iso and other representatives of the S lovak Republic were not designed for the examlnation of war c rimes defined in Art ic le 6 of the Charter of lnternational Military Tribunal. In the Bratislava tria! not only were the persona of President Tiso and other Slovak representatives involved but also the politlca l concept, the idea of a Slova k independent state, and the self-determination of the S lova k nation as such .... Had Ru84ia become the protector of the Slovak state, under the presi• dency of Tiso, there wou ld be no c harge of treason today against the c hief of the Slovak Repub lic .... We c laim the reestab lis hment of a democratic and Christia n Slova k Republic." T hls broadca.!!t reveals the real confllct b etween Slovak and Czech ideas. Accordlng to the Slovaks, Czecho-Slovak legal contln\tlty has been lnterrupted, Independent Slovakia was a reality, and CzechoSlovak relations must be reestabllshed on a completely new basis. Accordlng to t he Czechs , Czecho-Slovakla's Iegal continuity has been s afeguarded, Iegally Independent Slovakla bas never exlsted, and lt v.as a purely ephemeral creation. The Czechs pass over in silence the fact that the third component of the 1918 'Republic, Car pathlan Ruthenia, was taken by Soviet Russia. On February 13, 1947, Presldent Benes dotted the i's and crossed the ťs of the Czech attitude. Speaking of relations between th e Czechs and Slovaks, he said: "Archblshop Dr. Kmetko said in the T lso !rial that the Slovaks would llke t o have thelr own state but accept tbe Czecbo-Slovak Republlc .b ecause there is no way of a chlevlng it. I reject such an argument categorlcally ; I sball never accept it. We could not survlve anotber crlsls In CzechoSlovak reations. After such a crisis there would no longer be a Czecbo. Slovak Repub llc, and Slovakla wou ld not be an independent state In any case; lt wou\d most probably fall lnto Soviet Russia.... The Czechs border on a Germany of seventy milllon people, therefore in t he future the Czechs must be neighbors of Soviet Russla. They could not in consequence accept an independent Slovak state as their ne ighbor. .. . There can be no alternatives today, nor any questlon of pian· ning a Central Euro pean Federatlon. T hese plans bave been dead ever slnce Soviet Russla becam e our nelghbor." The executlon of President Tiso was tbe dramatic consummation of President Benes' policy. Tiso was condemned and e xecuted not a s a war c riminal, but a s the symbol of Slova k ·indepe nde nce. As late as the autumn of 1946, dur ing his visit to Topolcany, Pr eaident Benes dec lared before the Councll of Slovak Commissars that Tiso must be hanged. When one of the Slova k Commissars remarked t hat Slovak public opinion would not stand fo r his e xecution, Benes r eplied, " Perhaps it wll l not stand for it, but it is absolutely necessary." �SLOVAKIA 16 This explains the appointment of Dr. Daxner as Presldent ot the Bratislava court, which tried Tiso. Daxner had sworn vengeance on Tiso for the "wrongs" inflicte<i by the Slovak natíonallsts. And yet, in 1935, Tiao waa reaponaible for the reelectlon of Benea aa Preaident of Czecho-Slovakia. The Slovak People's Party wanted to vote for Dr. Nemecz, the candidate for the Agrarians, but at the last moment Tiso convinced his party that Benes was a better choice trom a fore.ign political point of view. Mr. Sidor was the only member of the S)Rvak People's Party. w,bo abstained trom votlng. Posslbly Benes would have commuted the Tlso sentence, especially in view of Slovak public opinion, had he not had to consider the Russian attitude. It was expressed - aimong others - by Gundorov, t he Presi· dent of the All..Slav Committee in Moscow, who in the Slovak communis t daily " Pravda" demanded ruthless punlshment of the accused. Benea c hose to follow the Ruaaian line. After the occupation of Slovakla by the Soviet Army, Tiso sought refugé in the American Zone of Germany. In November 1945, the American M:ilitary Authoritles handed him over to the Czechs. As the Slovaks regarded this a b erach of the rlghts o! asylum, the Slovak League of America in th e U. S. A. made investigations as to who had authorized it. Neither the State Department, nor the General Staff were responsible for th!s extradition. Apparently the declslon had been taken by the local American commander, in response to the demand of the Czecho-Slovak Government. The Prague Government had place<i at the disposal of the President of the Czecho-Slovak War Crlmes Commission, General Ecer, the sum of 50 mllHon Kcs for the ·1nterception of political emigrés, mainly Slovaks. Flown to Bratislava, Tlso was paraded through the town wlth chains around his wri-sts, from whlch hung a large padlock. He was allowed to attend his father's funeral, but had to march ignominlously in handcuffs. Because of the constant demonstrations In hls favor he was sent letters, telegrams, flowers, food and so on - ·Tiso was transferred to th e prison in Brno and returned to Bratls'1ava only for his tria!. He waa not allowed to chooae hls defenae couael, who waa appoi nted by the Czec h authoritiea. Many of the witnesses gave evidence in his favor. The Archlblshop of Slovak.ia, Kmetko, who is highly res pected by the Czechs as well as the Slovaks, tesutled " Tlao acted and worked in the intereata of Slovakia, and waa never a traltor. Hia election aa Preaident of Slovakia waa the wlll of 90 per cent of the Slovaks at that time." Tis o himself pleaded not guilty. He malntalned that he did not c-ommit treason, and declared the responsJblllty for the fate of Czecho• Slovakla dld not rest witb Slov.akia, but wlth tbe 20 years of Czech domestlc and Coreign pollcy. "lf ·a od allowed me to carry out my policy agaln under simi[ar c.o ndltlona I would do exactly aa I have done," Tis o declared. .,. For th e trlal special security measures were taken In Slovak.la. Czech troops were brought In because the authoritles dld not trust the Slqvak troops. There were large-sc-ale demonstrations In favor ot T lso at Plestany and Puchov, and the Secret Police arrested many people, who were sent to Lalbor Camps. On Aprll 15th Tiso was condemned to death by banging. When asked whether he would a,p.peal for mercy, Tlso replled: "Yes - for �16 SLOVA.KIA mora! reasons." (According to Catholic doctrine a man must defend his llfe by all avallable means.) President Benes rejected Tiso's plea, and he was executed on April 18th. Apríl 18th may prove to be a fateful day in Czecho-Slovak relations. 1n the eyes of the devout Slovak people the hanging of a pri est is an unforgivable act. In the eyes of intelligent Slovaks abroad, it was a cri me against national fee li ngs. Benes' rejection of Tiso's plea for mercy is regarded not as the act of a democrat, but of a tyrant. The Slovaks say that thereby Benes has destroyed his own democratic legend. The unrest whicb was expected to follow Tiso's execution iu Slovakia was checked by very strong measures, but the atmospbere has become very tense and there is much talk of great political changes. Within tbe Democratic Party tbere is strife; tbe Slovak Catholics are expected to go over to the Freedom Party. On April 17th, Soviet opinion, which is tantamount to official iustructions, was thus expressed by the Moscow Radlo: "'On various occasions, and particularly recently the pro-Tiso and Hlinka Guard elements bave behaved witb growing impertinence and daring against the vi tal interests of tbeir own nation.... An ambiguous attitude has been adopted by some Democratic Party circles. Their press directly encourages tbe organizers of anti-Government action (This referred to tbe democratic daily, "Čas." - Ed.) A serious menace to democratic reconstruction in Slovakia arises from the influence or reactionary and fascist ele ments witbin the Democratic Party. Tbe Hlinka Guard, tbe followers of Sidor and Durčanský, undermine the State, cause anti• Czech, anti-Soviet and anti-Semitic provocations and attempts to smash the Czecbo-Slovak RepU1blic. A relentless purge of all fascists is called for, affecting not only the leaders, but their Joyal and still active followers." Opinions may vary about the tria! or Tiso, who was, after all, the protegé of the Germans. But the conception of justice and morality of the average person bas been put to a severe strain. Recent trials in East Europe appear to seek polltical vengeance not justice. This was exemplif'led in the trials of Archbishop Steplnac, or Mibailovitch and most scandalous of all, that of the 16 members of the Polish Underground Govel'hment. World public opinion must never cease to make a stand against injustice and falsehood. In the words of the Gospel, unlesa you go out and meet evil to combat it, evil will enter your house and destroy you." • • • WHO SAID IT? "The Czeehoslovak-Soviet Treaty rorms the BASIS ot our count ry's external securlty and fundamen,t al con trlbutlon to the un!flcatlon ot national forcei.. The alllance with the SOVIET and triendshlp wttb tbe West was w elcomed by ALL classes of tlhe Czechoslovak people In com<plete acoordance w!th thelr CONVICTIONS and wlth sin· cere joy. . . . Thanks to tbe treaty, Czechoslovakla's lnterests are re· celvlng e tfeetlve support" - (H ubert Rlpka, Minister of State, Broadcast on the annlversary or the Czecboslovak-Sovie-t Treaty, London. December H, 1944). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVA.KIA. 13 IN RETlROSPECT TISO ON THE GALWWS (From "EAST EUROPE," London, Apríl 30, 1947) The Western Powers fought the war for a number of principles, embodied in the Atlantic Charter, and not in order to enable one nation to dominate another. But in the post-war world, two tendencies are at work. In the West, neither Great Britain, the U. S. A. nor any other country look for territorial aggrandizement. Britain !s withdrawing from Egypt, Jraq, Trans-Jordanla, India and Burma; the NUEA has recognized the independence of the Philippines, Denmark that of Iceland, China. that of Korea, while France has accepted Syrian and Lebanese self-government. Thls process of decentralizatlon c haracteristic of the Western Democracies, is in complete contrast to the process of centralization which is going on in Soviet Russla and her Zone of lnfluence. In the flrst place, Russia berself has increased her territory by incorporating the Baltic States, Finnlsh Karelia, Eastern Poland, Ruthenia, Bessarabla, and part of the Bukovina. On behal! of tbe Georgian, Armenian and Azerba!jan Republics, she 1s claiming Turklsh and Persian territory. Although wide cultural rights are granted to the Soviet Republics, their administration is completely centralized and dependent on Moscow. Within the Sov.iet Zone, Russia is backing all the territorial claim~ of her satellites: of Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The most recent effect of this was the failure of the Foreign Ministers to agree on the Austrian Treaty, because Russia has ldentified herself with Yugoslav territorial demands on Austria. Czecho-Slovakla and Yugoslavia have reestablished thelr rule over Slovakia and Croatia respectlvely, both of which had been Independent between 1938 and 1945. These two trends form the background against which the Czech and Slovak controversy within t he reestablished Republic must be considered. lt illustrates the conflicts whic h the policy of centralization bas to overcome. On April 18th a secret radio transmitter, calling itself "The Voice of the Slovak Republic" broadcast a petition from the Slovak Action Committee. "The Slovak Republic was not the result of external intervention. Its creation called for no foreign support, nor was the approval or consent of Germany .':!ought or deemed necessary. No one can say, that, with the creation of the Slovak Republlc, the Germans overran and occupied the Czech lands, for tbe two events bore no relation to eacb otber. . . . (A simllar point of view is taken in tbe Soviet 'History of Diplomacy,' Vol. III, chapter 24, wbicb deals with the Anschluss and the partitlon of Czecho-Slovakia, compiled by Academician V. P. Potemkin, edition 1945. It holds Britain and France respons!ble for the disintegration of Czecho-Slovakia in 1938. - Ed.) The Slovak Republic was recognlzed by 27 Forelgn Powers in a very s hort Ume. Among them, states that were bound by treaty agalnst Germany - Poland, Brltaln, France, Yugoslavia, Belgium, Holland. the U. S. S. R., and so on - and also by states which, as t he war progressed, remalned neutra! Switzerland, the Vatlcan, Sweden. Spain and others. The Slovak Republic was not recognizecl by the U. S. A., but the reason for this may be found in propaganda directed 14 SLOVAKIA agalnst the Slovak Republic . . . . It !s unthinkable, therefore, that the acts of the representatives o[ t he Slovak Repub lic should b e judged by a court estaiblished by Czecho-Slovak!a, slnce Czecho-Slovak la is n ot the ir countr y. . . . Slovak r epresen tatlves could no t have com• mitted any acts of treason against the Czecho-Slovak Governm ent since they d!d n ot recognize Czecho·Slovak la as th e State to wh ich they belonged, or to which they owed allegiance. On the contrary, they looked upon Ozecho-Slovakla ae a S tate lnto whlch th e Slovak people had been propelled by foroo and dlplomatic lntrigue . .. . The proceedings of the <National Court in Bratislava against Preside nt T iso and other representatives of the S lovak Republic were not designed for the examlnation of war c rimes defined in Art ic le 6 of the Charter of lnternational Military Tribunal. In the Bratislava tria! not only were the persona of President Tiso and other Slovak representatives involved but also the politlca l concept, the idea of a Slova k independent state, and the self-determination of the S lova k nation as such .... Had Ru84ia become the protector of the Slovak state, under the presi• dency of Tiso, there wou ld be no c harge of treason today against the c hief of the Slovak Repub lic .... We c laim the reestab lis hment of a democratic and Christia n Slova k Republic." T hls broadca.!!t reveals the real confllct b etween Slovak and Czech ideas. Accordlng to the Slovaks, Czecho-Slovak legal contln\tlty has been lnterrupted, Independent Slovakia was a reality, and CzechoSlovak relations must be reestabllshed on a completely new basis. Accordlng to t he Czechs , Czecho-Slovakla's Iegal continuity has been s afeguarded, Iegally Independent Slovakla bas never exlsted, and lt v.as a purely ephemeral creation. The Czechs pass over in silence the fact that the third component of the 1918 'Republic, Car pathlan Ruthenia, was taken by Soviet Russia. On February 13, 1947, Presldent Benes dotted the i's and crossed the ťs of the Czech attitude. Speaking of relations between th e Czechs and Slovaks, he said: "Archblshop Dr. Kmetko said in the T lso !rial that the Slovaks would llke t o have thelr own state but accept tbe Czecbo-Slovak Republlc .b ecause there is no way of a chlevlng it. I reject such an argument categorlcally ; I sball never accept it. We could not survlve anotber crlsls In CzechoSlovak reations. After such a crisis there would no longer be a Czecbo. Slovak Repub llc, and Slovakla wou ld not be an independent state In any case; lt wou\d most probably fall lnto Soviet Russia.... The Czechs border on a Germany of seventy milllon people, therefore in t he future the Czechs must be neighbors of Soviet Russla. They could not in consequence accept an independent Slovak state as their ne ighbor. .. . There can be no alternatives today, nor any questlon of pian· ning a Central Euro pean Federatlon. T hese plans bave been dead ever slnce Soviet Russla becam e our nelghbor." The executlon of President Tiso was tbe dramatic consummation of President Benes' policy. Tiso was condemned and e xecuted not a s a war c riminal, but a s the symbol of Slova k ·indepe nde nce. As late as the autumn of 1946, dur ing his visit to Topolcany, Pr eaident Benes dec lared before the Councll of Slovak Commissars that Tiso must be hanged. When one of the Slova k Commissars remarked t hat Slovak public opinion would not stand fo r his e xecution, Benes r eplied, " Perhaps it wll l not stand for it, but it is absolutely necessary." SLOVAKIA 16 This explains the appointment of Dr. Daxner as Presldent ot the Bratislava court, which tried Tiso. Daxner had sworn vengeance on Tiso for the "wrongs" inflicte<i by the Slovak natíonallsts. And yet, in 1935, Tiao waa reaponaible for the reelectlon of Benea aa Preaident of Czecho-Slovakia. The Slovak People's Party wanted to vote for Dr. Nemecz, the candidate for the Agrarians, but at the last moment Tiso convinced his party that Benes was a better choice trom a fore.ign political point of view. Mr. Sidor was the only member of the S)Rvak People's Party. w,bo abstained trom votlng. Posslbly Benes would have commuted the Tlso sentence, especially in view of Slovak public opinion, had he not had to consider the Russian attitude. It was expressed - aimong others - by Gundorov, t he Presi· dent of the All..Slav Committee in Moscow, who in the Slovak communis t daily " Pravda" demanded ruthless punlshment of the accused. Benea c hose to follow the Ruaaian line. After the occupation of Slovakla by the Soviet Army, Tiso sought refugé in the American Zone of Germany. In November 1945, the American M:ilitary Authoritles handed him over to the Czechs. As the Slovaks regarded this a b erach of the rlghts o! asylum, the Slovak League of America in th e U. S. A. made investigations as to who had authorized it. Neither the State Department, nor the General Staff were responsible for th!s extradition. Apparently the declslon had been taken by the local American commander, in response to the demand of the Czecho-Slovak Government. The Prague Government had place<i at the disposal of the President of the Czecho-Slovak War Crlmes Commission, General Ecer, the sum of 50 mllHon Kcs for the ·1nterception of political emigrés, mainly Slovaks. Flown to Bratislava, Tlso was paraded through the town wlth chains around his wri-sts, from whlch hung a large padlock. He was allowed to attend his father's funeral, but had to march ignominlously in handcuffs. Because of the constant demonstrations In hls favor he was sent letters, telegrams, flowers, food and so on - ·Tiso was transferred to th e prison in Brno and returned to Bratls'1ava only for his tria!. He waa not allowed to chooae hls defenae couael, who waa appoi nted by the Czec h authoritiea. Many of the witnesses gave evidence in his favor. The Archlblshop of Slovak.ia, Kmetko, who is highly res pected by the Czechs as well as the Slovaks, tesutled " Tlao acted and worked in the intereata of Slovakia, and waa never a traltor. Hia election aa Preaident of Slovakia waa the wlll of 90 per cent of the Slovaks at that time." Tis o himself pleaded not guilty. He malntalned that he did not c-ommit treason, and declared the responsJblllty for the fate of Czecho• Slovakla dld not rest witb Slov.akia, but wlth tbe 20 years of Czech domestlc and Coreign pollcy. "lf ·a od allowed me to carry out my policy agaln under simi[ar c.o ndltlona I would do exactly aa I have done," Tis o declared. .,. For th e trlal special security measures were taken In Slovak.la. Czech troops were brought In because the authoritles dld not trust the Slqvak troops. There were large-sc-ale demonstrations In favor ot T lso at Plestany and Puchov, and the Secret Police arrested many people, who were sent to Lalbor Camps. On Aprll 15th Tiso was condemned to death by banging. When asked whether he would a,p.peal for mercy, Tlso replled: "Yes - for 16 SLOVA.KIA mora! reasons." (According to Catholic doctrine a man must defend his llfe by all avallable means.) President Benes rejected Tiso's plea, and he was executed on April 18th. Apríl 18th may prove to be a fateful day in Czecho-Slovak relations. 1n the eyes of the devout Slovak people the hanging of a pri est is an unforgivable act. In the eyes of intelligent Slovaks abroad, it was a cri me against national fee li ngs. Benes' rejection of Tiso's plea for mercy is regarded not as the act of a democrat, but of a tyrant. The Slovaks say that thereby Benes has destroyed his own democratic legend. The unrest whicb was expected to follow Tiso's execution iu Slovakia was checked by very strong measures, but the atmospbere has become very tense and there is much talk of great political changes. Within tbe Democratic Party tbere is strife; tbe Slovak Catholics are expected to go over to the Freedom Party. On April 17th, Soviet opinion, which is tantamount to official iustructions, was thus expressed by the Moscow Radlo: "'On various occasions, and particularly recently the pro-Tiso and Hlinka Guard elements bave behaved witb growing impertinence and daring against the vi tal interests of tbeir own nation.... An ambiguous attitude has been adopted by some Democratic Party circles. Their press directly encourages tbe organizers of anti-Government action (This referred to tbe democratic daily, "Čas." - Ed.) A serious menace to democratic reconstruction in Slovakia arises from the influence or reactionary and fascist ele ments witbin the Democratic Party. Tbe Hlinka Guard, tbe followers of Sidor and Durčanský, undermine the State, cause anti• Czech, anti-Soviet and anti-Semitic provocations and attempts to smash the Czecbo-Slovak RepU1blic. A relentless purge of all fascists is called for, affecting not only the leaders, but their Joyal and still active followers." Opinions may vary about the tria! or Tiso, who was, after all, the protegé of the Germans. But the conception of justice and morality of the average person bas been put to a severe strain. Recent trials in East Europe appear to seek polltical vengeance not justice. This was exemplif'led in the trials of Archbishop Steplnac, or Mibailovitch and most scandalous of all, that of the 16 members of the Polish Underground Govel'hment. World public opinion must never cease to make a stand against injustice and falsehood. In the words of the Gospel, unlesa you go out and meet evil to combat it, evil will enter your house and destroy you." • • • WHO SAID IT? "The Czeehoslovak-Soviet Treaty rorms the BASIS ot our count ry's external securlty and fundamen,t al con trlbutlon to the un!flcatlon ot national forcei.. The alllance with the SOVIET and triendshlp wttb tbe West was w elcomed by ALL classes of tlhe Czechoslovak people In com<plete acoordance w!th thelr CONVICTIONS and wlth sin· cere joy. . . . Thanks to tbe treaty, Czechoslovakla's lnterests are re· celvlng e tfeetlve support" - (H ubert Rlpka, Minister of State, Broadcast on the annlversary or the Czecboslovak-Sovie-t Treaty, London. December H, 1944).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Tiso on the Gallows Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952 pp. 13-16 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/eb1d6340b2bbe1b294801953ebfa8501.pdf a085e310acd3ef0b5c8710012d6b1111 PDF Text Text 46 SLOVAKIA government, the U. S. Department of State ordered the U. S. Army authorities in Austria to surrender Tlso and his group to the CzechoSlovak War Crimes Commlsslon. In November 1945 Dr. Tlso and members of the Slovak government were delivered to Czecho-Slovak authorities as war criminals, though their status was never lnvesti· gated by the U. S. authorities. From Pra.g ue Dr. Tiso and several of hls group were sent to Bra• tislava to stand tria! before the Natlonal Court The tria! began December 2, 1946, and ended March 14, 1947. Sentence was pronounced by the Court on Aplil 15, and Father Tiso, reciting the rosary out loud, was Jed to the gallows at 5: 30 a. m. on April 19, 1947; he was pronounced dead seven mlnutes Jater. SJovaks the world over agree wlth Father Tiso's aged mother: Dr. Tlso died a martyr for the cause of his people and his Church. • • • ;}IJHIIIIIIIIUll ttlllUlltltllll l lllllllll llllllllllllllllllllllllUIIIHIUII IIIIIIIIIIIIUI IIIUhl lllllll llllUOttlllflllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllflllllHIIIHIIIUIIIIIIIIIUI UIUIUtl. PRESIDENT TISO'S LAST MESSAGE TO ms PEOPLE " In the spirit of the sacrlfice I am about. to make, 1 aend thl• message to the Slovak natlon : " In harmony and un lson pursue alway,, everywhere and In every respect the great principle: FOR GOD AND F-OR THE NATION. I=== _ ::}f;:~~i'.:I~~~.:~;: : : ~.:=;:~•::~~:::;.:~: I===_ "That precept I have ,erved all my llfe and, therefore, 1 '=- != 1 1 ~ ;:;ľi:he;t ~y:f afi:,.:;,. a~~ :h::~:n:: :o:~,.::~~n~:co::~:~,! bolshevism, against which our nation must in all ponlble way, :::•::..:<;:•~;::,:~:: :,:~• ,:~:;:: of 1t, Chri,tlan cha~oto•, '=- 1 "A• 1 beg you to remember me In your praye,.., so do I pro. _ Br atislava, April 18 , 1947, 3 a. m. 1 ~~:~_0[;:t:f:;: : i~}~~};,~f!J~:;.:.1;.:-t: 1 DR. JOSEPH TISO. ~ (ltl1111111UIIIIIHU lllllllllltlllUIIIIIIUUIIIIIIIUIIIIIIIIUIIIIINUlllllUlMIIIUIIIIIIIIUIIUIIIIIUHI IIIIIIUll111111111111111111UUl'11WIIIIIIIUIIHUIUlfUUIHIIIIIHfUl l~ � 46 SLOVAKIA government, the U. S. Department of State ordered the U. S. Army authorities in Austria to surrender Tlso and his group to the CzechoSlovak War Crimes Commlsslon. In November 1945 Dr. Tlso and members of the Slovak government were delivered to Czecho-Slovak authorities as war criminals, though their status was never lnvesti· gated by the U. S. authorities. From Pra.g ue Dr. Tiso and several of hls group were sent to Bra• tislava to stand tria! before the Natlonal Court The tria! began December 2, 1946, and ended March 14, 1947. Sentence was pronounced by the Court on Aplil 15, and Father Tiso, reciting the rosary out loud, was Jed to the gallows at 5: 30 a. m. on April 19, 1947; he was pronounced dead seven mlnutes Jater. SJovaks the world over agree wlth Father Tiso's aged mother: Dr. Tlso died a martyr for the cause of his people and his Church. • • • ;}IJHIIIIIIIIUll ttlllUlltltllll l lllllllll llllllllllllllllllllllllUIIIHIUII IIIIIIIIIIIIUI IIIUhl lllllll llllUOttlllflllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllflllllHIIIHIIIUIIIIIIIIIUI UIUIUtl. PRESIDENT TISO'S LAST MESSAGE TO ms PEOPLE " In the spirit of the sacrlfice I am about. to make, 1 aend thl• message to the Slovak natlon : " In harmony and un lson pursue alway,, everywhere and In every respect the great principle: FOR GOD AND F-OR THE NATION. I=== _ ::}f;:~~i'.:I~~~.:~;: : : ~.:=;:~•::~~:::;.:~: I===_ "That precept I have ,erved all my llfe and, therefore, 1 '=- != 1 1 ~ ;:;ľi:he;t ~y:f afi:,.:;,. a~~ :h::~:n:: :o:~,.::~~n~:co::~:~,! bolshevism, against which our nation must in all ponlble way, :::•::..:<;:•~;::,:~:: :,:~• ,:~:;:: of 1t, Chri,tlan cha~oto•, '=- 1 "A• 1 beg you to remember me In your praye,.., so do I pro. _ Br atislava, April 18 , 1947, 3 a. m. 1 ~~:~_0[;:t:f:;: : i~}~~};,~f!J~:;.:.1;.:-t: 1 DR. JOSEPH TISO. ~ (ltl1111111UIIIIIHU lllllllllltlllUIIIIIIUUIIIIIIIUIIIIIIIIUIIIIINUlllllUlMIIIUIIIIIIIIUIIUIIIIIUHI IIIIIIUll111111111111111111UUl'11WIIIIIIIUIIHUIUlfUUIHIIIIIHfUl l~ � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document PRESIDENT TISO'S LAST MESSAGE TO HIS PEOPLE In the spirit of the sacrifice I am about to make, I send this message to the Slovak nation: In harmony and unison pursue always, everywhere and in every respect the great principle: FOR GOD AND FOR THE NATION. THAT IS NOT ONLY THE UNEQUIVOCAL INTENT OF Slovak history, but also the explicit command of God, Who has made it the law of nature and has inculcated it into the soul of the nation and every one of its members. That precept I have served all my life and, therefore, I consider myself first of all a martyr of God’s law. Secondly, I feel that I am a martyr of the defense of Christianity against bolshevism, against which our nation must in all possible ways defend itself, not only in the spirit of its Christian character, but also in the interest of its future. As I beg you to remember me in your prayers, so do I promise to pray to God Almighty for you and supplicate that He bless the Slovak nation in its vital struggle for God and for the nation, so that the Slovak nation will always remain a faithful and devoted son of the Church of Christ. Bratislava, April 18, 1947, 3 a.m. DR. JOSEPH TISO. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Tiso's Last Message to His People Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952 p. 46 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Tiso, Jozef, 1887-1947 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/d30e6d7dd5f8d711753576fe2f105984.pdf e38c890cc26110e84f610292af06c7a2 PDF Text Text DECEMBEJIR, 1952 SLOVAKIA 1 What Led to the PROCLAMATION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC KAROL SIDOR ( Former Ambassador of Slovakia to the Vatican) Our greait Svetozár Hurban Vajanský once wrote the following encouraglng words: " . . . fear not the proximity of events and do not be afrald of too small a perspective. Our elders sinned grievously dn that respect. In folio form, they published the war of the divine Titan against the Jews; they wrote enormous volumes about America and Palestine; and hístories about the cavalry units of Cracow and water nymphs. But they left us practically nothing about themselves and about their times; that is, they ddd not leave us thelr views and opin!ons so tha.t we, their successors, now stand before a dark corner, a:bout wh-lch we know only that in lt our natlon breathed, worked, suffered, bied, sinned, performed good works, quarreled and harmoniously formed associatlons, hated and loved. We - the unfortunate heirs of indolent fathers - have nothing in our hands'" So that a similar verdlct be not rendered agalnst us in the (uture, we must wrlte about everything - about everything that we authoTed or at least were witnesses of, about everything we saw with our own eyes and heard with our own ears. Such a testimony, of course, cannot be anythlng but subjective. But after a gre.ater lapse of bime, future historians will be able to form from various such subjective testimonies an objectlve picture about the events and the people of that particular tlme. The question of Slovak s,tatehood was dealt w-ith in a speech dellvered on February 21, -1939, by the premier of the Slovak Government, Dr. Joseph Tiso, who said: "After a pause of a thousand years, after long years of fighting for its national rights, the Slovak natňon has its own government, its own paTUament, and is itself building its own state. Here on the floor of our own p.arliament, we -are buHding our own State, our own new State, our own Slovak State. The Slovak natlon is bullding its own State, which is the organ of its soveraignty, the executor of its will and the defender of its interests. Never again must it happen that the Slovak nation be pla.ced in oppos!tion to its own State. Being a Slovak patriot and an idea! nationalist means b~ng a Joyal buUder of the Slovak State. Love for the Slovak nat!on 1s demonstrated conc.retely by loyalty and devotlon to the Slovak State. We do not uphold ťhe State just for the sake of having a State, but because, and only as long as, the nation needs it." In these words Dr. Tiso lndicated only the road we were to travel in bullding our own Slovak State In the future. "Here on the floor of our own parliament we are buildlng our own State, our own new State, our own Slovak State" - that was the directive for tbe future. Wben Dr. Joseph 'I'lso delivered bis speech in tbe Slovak Assembly on February 21, 1939, he was well aware of the fact tha:t we s,till clid not have a Slovak State. There did exist an autonomous Slovak Government and a Slovak parliament, hut that was not enough to al- �2 SLOVAKIA low us to speak about the Slovak State aa an already &X.isting formatlon. There was still lacking the proclamation of the State, lts recognition by foreign powers, and we also lacked that which makes a Sbate a State: our own army and our own representatives in other countries. The Slova.ks who uoted the number of times the words "Slovak State" were mentioned dn Tiso's speech before the Slovak Parliament oould be completely satisfied. And the Slovaks were saitlsfied, but the Cz.echs became dlscontented. Czech dissatisfactiou was demonstrated not only •in newspapers, but also in the sessions of the Centra! Government in Prague. In the sessions of thait government, as a State Minister, I urged the Czechs to fulfill everything t hey had bound themselves to fulfill by para~raphs of the Constltutlional Document wh!ch was adopted in the P11ague Parliament on November 22, 1938. The Slovak Government had entrusted me to concern myself with common problems in Prague, <the question of foreign affairs, finances and the army. I made concrete the Slovak demands and requested the Centra! Government to take a stand on them, app.rove them and hasten the.i!r rool!zation. On Wednesday, Maroh 1, 1939, at four o'clock in the afternoon, the Counc!l of Ministers was in session in Pr.ague. Present were the Czechs: Rudolph Beran, the Premier of the Government, and m!ndsters Chvalkov.s'ký, Syrový, Kalfus, Havell~a. Krejči, and Fischer. The Slovaks were represented by Karol ,stdor, Stephen Haššík (for mllitary affalrs) and Dr. Alexander Hrnčár (for flnancial affairs). I pre-sented our demands in the military and financial departments. 'l'he first to reply was Premier Rudolph Beran. He said that two matters were involved: fundamental questions and partia! demands. 'ľhe entire Czeoll public, according to Beran, 1s condemning Tiso's speech in the Slovak Parllament in which he proclaimed that the Slovaks are building their ovm State, their own Slovak State, on the floor of parliament, and completely neglected to mention the Czech<rSlovak Republic even once. Beran demanded the Slovak Government to pubhloize its loyalty to the Czecho-Slovak Republic, otherwise it would not be possil:ile to act on the partia! demands which were presented to ,h !m by me. "We must elther come to an ~greement," said Beran, "or part." We cannot circumvent this question on tiptoes as we would a cotpse. We cannot deny that a dangerous s:ltuation e:x:ists, added Beran, 'because !t could overwhelm not only the Czech Government, but the Slovak Government as well. When I waa permitted to reply to Premier Beran, I said: "We are not going to publish any fundamental manifestations about our loyalty to the Czecho-Slovak Republic. The Czechs and the Slovaks have accepted the law ,a bout the autonomy of Slovak!a, and that law mus,t not be neglected by the Czeohs. The Slovak party is fultilling wihat is in that law, because we, too, voted for that law, -as we also voted for the joint State budget for the yeiar 1939. The Slova.k Government !s responsible for the State in Slovakia, and the Czech Government cannot have guardlanship over !t. That we should continually have to e:x:press ourselves for the Czecho•Slovak !te• public !s nauseous particula.rly to me, because even dul'ing the Flrst Republlc I did not have to keep glving testlmony of my loyalty to the State and, as far a~ I am <'Oncernerl, 1 am not wllllng to do so even �SLOVAKIA 3 now. During the life of the Flrst Republic, Slovaks In Government wanted to galn the trust of the Czechs and they s,tressed thei'ľ rellabllity iin such a manner that they never sald the words "Slovak" and "Slovakia" separately. but always added, when they sald Slovakia: and our beloved Czecho,Slovak 'Republic. And when tbey used tbe word "Slovaks," tbey lmmedlately added: and our derurly loved bretbrnn, t he Czecb.s. The bealtby reactlon to tbls unnatural status ls what is happening In Slovakla today, l.e. tbat only Slovakia and the Slovaks are stressed. We shall mentdon the Republlc ·a nd the Czechs only after tbe Republic and the Czecbs accept everythlng they have boun<l themselves to d-0 by the law pertalnlng <to the autonomy of Slovakla. I must say that slnce October 6~h nothlng has changed as far as the wlll of the Czechs is concerned." After I sald these words, a bitter debate followed. Most important were those spoken by Chvalkovský, Minister of Forelgn Af• fair;;. He said: "Whatever we have done thus far, we have not done well neither you, nor we. We stand before ,the questlon: Shall we stlll stay together, or shall we part. An EngHs,h st-ate&man once sa1d: a door must be either opened or closed. Every breeze cannot play ,vith lt. I was shocked by what Sldor has sald, that trom October &t-h nothlng has changed SlovakJa. Never in history did Slovakla have a Slov-ak Government. She has one slnce Ootober 6th, and that in ltself means tbat since October 6th much has changed In Slovakia. Slnce October 6th we ddd not have t!me enough to look eacb other in the eye. We had to worry about our relat!onsblp wlth our nelghbors, there were armies of tbree States on tbe terrltory ot the Republlc, and we could not resolve our interna) relatlons,blp speedlly. We, too, ha.ve a dlscon<tented mass of people, wbich 1s demanding tbat we correct the mlstakes of the past and avoid mlstakes In the present. I am not respons,ible for the past regime, but nelther ls Sldor. I am dolng wha.tever I can do. In the hlstory of forelgn mlnlsters, nowhere w!ll you find a minister who had received 27 ultimatums wlthln such a shoz,t time. Most of them are from the Magyars and the Poles decrylng the conduct of the Slovak and Ruthenlan Governments. Thus, it 1s very dlf~lcult for me to make order abroad, when these Governments, contrary to the Constituliona.1 Document, also lntervene in forelgn affalrs. Every week, with dispasslona.te perststence, I am Io Hltler's offlce seeklng recognitloo of Cz(lcbo-Slovakla's boundaries, and all I get ls an evaslve answer along wttb polntlng to tbe unsettled Interna) affairs of the State. The deputies trom Prague are saying that the question of ,the partlog of the Slovaks and tbe Czechs is only a matter of weeks, and at most one of montbs. The effe,ct abroad is tbat we are oot recognlzed as a subject of lnteroa.tlonal law, but only as an object. I demand that tbe Slovak Government state officlally that lt 1s for tbe Czecho·Slovak Republlc. It the Slovak Government decldes otherwise, we shall part. Tbe Czech nation shall not stand in the way of your procilalm1ng the lndependence or Slo• vakia. lt ls better lf this ha,ppens voluntarlly." Agalo I aoswered that the Slovak Government wlll not make any manlfestation of loyalty to the Czecho-Slovak Republlc as long as all the Slovak demands. emanatlng from the agreement between the Czechs and the Slovaks, are not fulfilled. �4 SLOVAKIA Premier Beran closed the J<ively meeting of the Mlnisterial Councll wlth the remark that the following week the plenum of the Centra! Government, of which the Slovak ministers headed by Dr. Tiso are also members, shaJI meet to definJtely resolve fundamental questlons and partia! programs, "since this could not be done through Sidor." The situation developed rapidly. I returned horne to Bratislava and requested the President of the Slovak Government, Dr. Joseph 'Nso, to call a joint meeting of the Slovak Government, the Executive Committee of the Slovak Assembly and the Executive Com mittee of Hllnka's Slovak Peoples Party. T hat meeting was held in Bratislava, on Monday, March 6, 1939. There I reported what had transpired thus (ar in Prague and requested that we clearly style the question of the Slovak State for ourselves and also decide on the manner of proclaimlng !t, because, according to my conviction, the situatlon in Prague was already such that we could no longer reckon with a new reconc!liation and further negotlation with the Czechs. After a lengthy <lebate, the stand unanimously accepted was given form by the president of the Slovak Government, Dr. Tlso, as follows: "To continue the bullding of the Slovak State in an evolutionary way and at this time not to proclaim tbe establishment immediately." That stand was proper and reasonable. Every natlon desires to have its own State, to build it in !ts own way. The Slovaks were building theirs on the floor of the Slovak Parliament and would proclaim lt when the Slovak deputies, the duly elected representatives of the Slovak nation, deemed !t proper to do so. Tbe followlng day, March 7, 1939, Dr. Artbur Seiss-Inquart came from Vlenna to pay me a "social call." Ht> told me tbat on this orcasion ·he would like to talk wlth Dr. Josepb Tlso. I called Dr. Tiso to my resldence, bence both or us were present durlng the conversat!on with Seiss-Jnquart. After a few social formalities, Selss-Jnquart turned to politics and remarked that the foreign sltuation was becomlng very dangerous lor the Slovak natlon. Adolph Hitler, he said, was ready to act severely against the entire Czech o-Slovak Hepublic. It is in the interest or the Slovaks not to become vlctlms along wlth the Czechs, but to save themselves by establish!ng thelr own Slovak State. T hereul)On, Dr. J osepb Tiso explalned wbat he had decided upon yesterday, tbat is, that we wanted to build the Slovak State ln an evolutlonary manner and dld not w"ish to proclaim lt rlght now. "To Slovak State independence," Dr. Joseph Tlso said, "we would like to come by a peaceful march toward our goal, pos$lbly by runn!ng toward it." "It is no longer enough," answered Seiss-Inquar t, "to march peacefully toward the goal, or even runn!ng loward lt. You must jump, because only by doing so will you attain your goal." The joint conference wlth the Czecbs was suppoaed to take place Marcb 9th. I had agreed witb prem!er Dr. Tlso that I would go to Prague afone and would let bim know by p-hone whether it would stlll be nec&SSary for bim and also tbe rest of the Slovak Jllllnlsters to come to P rague. �SLOVAKIA 5 I arrived in Prague in the evenlng of March 8th. I a.scertained how the situation there sharpened against the Slovak.s and, therefore, that same evenlng I phoned to Bratislava, telling Dr. Tiso to stay horne and not to come to Pmgue. On March 9, at 4 p. m., the Mlnlsterlal Councll held a meeting in Prague. Present with me were all three delegates of the Slova.k Government: Dr. Joseph Zvrškovec (,l<'ore!lgn Affail'S). Stephen Hašš[k, (Milltary Affairs). and Dr. Alexander Hrnčár (Financlal Af· fairs). At the staTt of tbe session, Premier Beran suddenly announced that a secret meeting of the Mlnisterial Council was ahout to take place ,and requested all three delegates of the Sloivak Government to leave the assembly room. I remalne·d •In the room with Minister Paul Teplánsky. In an angered tone Beran said that in all the embassies of Prague the exact time of the proclamation of the independent State of Slovakla was known and that only the Prague Government knew nothing about it. I replled t!hat such rumors were inundatlng the whole of Slovakia, hut that we had not come to Prague to establish the truth or ialsehood of such rumors. We had come to present the Slovak tlemands and have the Centra! Government accept and approve them. We must talk abou t the concrete matters; these the delegates of the Slovak Government have prepared and, therefore, I asked that they be lnvited to the conference. My request was heard. In an atmosphere that threatened to explode, the three delegates of the Slovak Government and I presented the Slovak demands. Delegate Stephen Raššlk was so overwrought that Beran had to remind bim to compose himself when he began to pound the groon table sharply with bis f,ist. Such a thlng, he sald, had never before happened in the MinisteriaJ Council. When the tension was highest, a messenger came from the foyer to teli me that Minister Dr. Havelka wanted me on °the r,hone. Dr. Havelka was an aide to President Rácha al the Hrad (Oastle). He requested me to come to the Hrad at once; President Rácha urgently wished to speak with me. I returned to the conference room and said to Stephen Haššík: "Here is my briefcase; take it horne with you if I do not return. Presldent Rácha has called for me, and I sense that lt may be nothing good.'' Informing Beran that I was summoned to the Castle. I left the .Ministerial Council a little before midnight. On the ground floor of the building a police officer told me that 1 was to be held. I protested against this S-O vociferously that the whole bll'ilding of the Ministerial Council resounded wlth my protest. :'dy delention, however, was soon explalned, and I hurried to the Castle. After greetlng Presldent Rácha with a "good evening," l protested to him against the violation of my congressional immunity. Rácha knew nothlng about it and palnfully grasped his head. He was an old, overworked man, hut an honest and good man. Catching his breath, he sa~d stutterlngly: "Several moments ago I performed a very unpleasant task. I dismissed the premier of the Slovak Government, Dr. Tiso, and three �6 SLOVAKIA other min.!sters from their posts. I had to do lt, because the consoli• dation of conditions in Slovakia demanded it." I looped trom my chair and replied: "Mr. Presldent, I cannot agree w'ith the step you have taken. I am jo!n!ng wlth the dls• missed ministers and, here and now, tender you my reslgnat!on. I have nothing more to do in Prague." The President wias quite moved as he stood up and begged me not to resign and not let myself be overcome by hasty anger. "With full knowledge of what may happen to me here in Prague for my statement," I said quietly and seriously, "l repeat that I do not agree with what you have done; I protest agalnst lt and hereby tender you my reslgnatlon. I am golng home to Slovakla on the very next traln." :Aresident Rácha mopped bis forehead and head wlth both hands and in a voice completely broken asked me agaln not to resign, because, he said, -it would result In lm.mense harm for Slovakia. "I have nothlng to add to what I have sald," I replled and began walking toward the door. The Presldent caught up W'ith me, grasped my arm, and pleaded that I tarry a bit longer. "Beran will soon be here," he said. And at that very moment, the door burst open and Beran walked In hurrjedly. Stlll standing near the door, I related to Beran what I had told Rácha: 1 was resign.!ng and going home. Rácha and Beran, bowever, entreated me to stay on. They were convinced, they sald, with regard to condltions In Sloviakia, that I was not doing the right úhlng. I gave in to them to the extent that I would announce my reslgnatlon to them from Bratislava after I had consulted with my frlends. As I lett the Presldenťs oftice, in the corridor I met Peter Pridavok, who at that Ume wa.s head of the press department of the Slovak Government, also Dr. Dobrovský, my secretary, and my aMe, Lt. Fratrič. With my three ~rlends I rode to my Prague resldence. In the mornlng of the next day, l\farch 10th, I asked to get c onnected wlth the edltorlal office of the SLOVÁK in Bratislava. No one answered there. Then I tried to get connected wlth the General Secretariate of the Rllnka Slovak People's Party, but no one answered even there. Finally, they connected me with the Government Building -in Bratislava. Dr. Karol Kllnovský, Chlef of the Securlty Service In Slovakia, ,ans,wered tbe phone. I dlctated a rePort to bim to publlsh In the SLOVÁK. to wít, that "Sldor wa3 placed before an accompllshed fact In Prague In the matter of the dlsmissal of the Slovak mlnlsters; he dld not agree with the dlsmissal and protested against it to Presldent Rácha." The report was then p\tbllshed in the SLOVÁK that very day, In the issue berurlng the datellne of March 11, 1939. At that time Dr. Kllnovský told me that Martlal Law was proclalmed in Slovakla without the knowledge of the Slovak Government. The Bratiislava offlces, edltorlal and secretarlal, as well as the offlces of the Hlinka Guard were occupled by the Czech Army and police. Over 250 Slovaks had been arrested, hundreds of offl· clals were suspended, many GHards were taken lnto Moravla and hundreds of Slovaks had fled to Vienna to avold arrest. Somethlng wlthin me snapped. I could not belleve tha.t Rácha �SLOVAil..lA 7 and Beran were as faithless as T. G. Masaryk and Bene!í and their adherents when it came to keeping agreements, solemn signatures and promises w!Jth the Slov.ak.s. I really respected Hácha and Beran and believed that whatever they would promlse and sign, they would aJso keep honorably and fulfill. But, Io and behold, they were overthrowlng the Slovak Governm~nt in Bratislava without the knowledge and behlnd the backs of the duly authorized representatlves of the Slovak Government and lts three delegates. Without the knowledge of the Slovak Government, they proclaímed Martlal Law in Slovakla, occupied the territory of autonomous Slovak1a with soldiers and gendarmes, arrested Slovak Deputies and hauled people to Moravia, wh!le they were telling• me that they were doing a very unpleasant duty in the "lnterest" ot Slovakia. Anti-Slovak elements In Slovalcta, encouraged by such mOO-'lures. ralsed tbeir beads on tbe streets and barked at tbe autonomlsts: "Now, we'll give you autonomy!" While I was thlnking about wbat was happening, the Czech Mln•lster Feierabend came to my resldence. He had a considerable understandlng for Slovak matters. He told me tbat Beran had flent him to teli me to vlslt Mm at once. "No!" I Teplled to Feierabend. "After yesterday'e events in Prague ano those that are happening In Slovakia now, I do not wlsh to speak wlth any one In Prague. Not even with you. or Beran." I remained in my resldence with my frlends. I wa!ted for Dr. Martin Sokol, president of the Slovak Assembly, who had suddenly been called to Prague, to flnlsh bis audience with Presldent Hácha. Wben he arrlved, I traveled wlth bim to Bt>atislava on the afternoon express. I arrlved In B!'atlslava at 9 P. M., March 10. A strong d!Vflslon ot the Hlinka Guard awalted me at the station; also a stronger one of the Czech army, Jed by a Colonel. Masses of people cllmbed aboard the engine and thousands upon thousands mllled around Nie s quare around the station. They sang maTches ot the Guard and acclalmed me voclferously. At the request ot the Czech Colonel, on the way to the edltorial offlce of the SLOVÁK, I stopped at the o!fice of the General Voyta, Commander of the National Army In Slo• vakla. He was a tough soJd.ier. But he saw the sltuatlon clearly and, lt seemed to me, dld not like lt at all. When I complalned that the army was shooting into the unarmed crowd In Bratislava, he replied that no one shot at the people, but a few salvos were fired into the aiT to frlghten them. Later, I ascertalned for myself that the Czech army In Bratislava really dld not shoot any one. Anthony Kopal, the only Slovak who was felled by a bullet, was shot by a Czecb gendarme. When I asked who had orderd the army and the tanks lnto the streets ot Branislava, Voyta told me that he personally was called to Prague by Syrový, Minister ot Natlonal Defense, who ordered bim to do so. I requested Voyta to free all prlsoners in Bratislava taken by bis men. Voyta replied that he would as soon as he found ou.t if· a.ny one was arrested in Bratislava.; and that he would notity me. Havlng appraised the sltuatlon at its source, I hurrled to my car and contlnued on my way to the SLOVÁK, whlle a masa ot 7000- �8 SLúVAKIA 8000 people, gathered about Voyta's office, cheered and sang robustly. When I arri ved at the SLOVÁK, I found the higher officials of the Hlinka Party, headed by Dr. Tis-0, already waiting for me. The entire executive body of the Assembly arrived and a lengthy deliberation began. Dr. Tiso, vice-president of the Party, presided at the session. He told about the situation that had developed in Bratislava, while Dr. Sokol and I related our experiences in Prague. I said that I would not go to Prague any more and requested that my resignatlon as State Minister be accepted by the conference. And forthwith, I proposed that the new Slovak Government be made up as follows: Dr. Joseph Tiso, president of the Slovak Government; Dr. Martin Sokol, Minister of Interior; Joseph Sivák, Minister of Education; Julius Stano, Minister of Transportation; Dr. Peter Zaťko, Minister of Agriculture; Dr. Alex Hrnčár, Minister of Finance, and Dr. Gejza Fritz, Minister of Jusbice. The conference decided - wit,h only one dissenting vote, my own - that I shoulct not resign, but continue in the office of State Minister. Dr. Joseph Tiso t hen announced that he could not assent to accept the office offered him. He stated that here he was not <:oncerned aboQt himself personally - all such thoughts must now be secondary - but that he did not want to place President Rácha int-0 an unpleasant situation: he did not want Rácha pressed today to name as president of the Slovak Government that Tiso, whom he had yesterday dism1ssed from that office. 'I\he situation 1s šerious - said Dr. Tiso - and we must not use the Slovak pľO'blem to enha,nce our persona! interests and prestige. Slovakia needs a government, Tiso concluded, so that greater confusion and chaos would not ensue. Thereupon, the conference authorized Dr. Martin Sokol to proceed as follows: If Dr. Joseph Tiso were not acceptable in Prague, then Karol Sidor should be proposed as president of the Slovak Government. The next day, Saturday, March 11, 1939, the praesidium of the Slovak Assembly, presented the names of the new Slovak Government to President Rácha in Prague. This had to be done, because paragraph V, Article 4, of the Constitution of November 22, 1938, demanded it. It states: The members of the autonomous Slovak Gov• ernment, forming a com-ponent part of the Centra! Government, shaII be apointed by the Pr-esiident of the Republic on the motion of the praesidium of the Assembly of Slovakia. President Dr. Emil Hácha approved the second alternatíve and r.amed the new Slovak Government with me as lts president. The other members of my government were: Sivák, Sokol, Stano, Zaťko, Rrnčár and Fritz. This, then, was the !ega! Slovak Government created according to the Constitutlonal Document which was valid at the tíme. The very day that the news carried the names of the men constituting the new Slovak Government, I had several German vlsltors: editor Goldbach, then Carbus; later that night, close to mldnight of March 11, Wr. William Kepler, special deputy of Adolph Hitler and Assistant Secrebary of State for Foreign Affalrs, Dr. Selss- �SLOVAKIA 9 Inquart, G-Overnor of Austria, and Joseph Biirckel, Austrian gauIeiter, who demanded that I 1mmediately proclaim the independence of the Slovak State by radlo either through the station in Bratislav•a or the one in Vienna. I replied that responsible factors of the Hlinka Party aind the Slovak Assembly had decided "to continue to build the Slovak State by an evolutionary process and not to proclaim its establishment right now." I explasined that I, too, was bound by that declslon and could not violate it without the assent of the Party and the Assembly. If lhe Assembly and the Party change thelr previous stand and on the floor of the .A;ssembly, now decide to P'ľOClaim an independent Slovak State "right now," I would comply wlth that changed attitude. My actions were governed, I said, not by expedl· ency or my persona! fancies, but by the policy of the nation according to the diirectives which I had from competent Slovak organs. I take my orders only from them, I concluded, and I will not execute the orders and commands given me by representatives of another natlon. Natura1'1y, the Germans were not satisfied with my answer. And they demonstrated their dissatisfaction in a very concrete fashion. On March 13, they vented thelr hatred of me by placlng a bomb under my horne in Bratislava to ktill me and my whole family. I thanked God that it was discovered in Ume and rendered harmless. Another bomb was placed under the Jesuit monastery in Brati!>lava where Dr. Joseph Tiso resided. That bomb actually exploded and caused quite a bit of damage to the walls and windows of the structure. No one, however, was killed. As soon as I took over the presidency of the Slovak Government all military regulations and orders, especla!ly the proclamation of Martial Law, were revoked and rendered invalid. The putsch of the Czech generals, ord8'l'ed by President Rácha and Premier Be1,an of the Centra! G-Overnment and executed by Syrový, Minister of NatiOJ1al Defense, was thus liquidated. I liberated Slovak prlsoners in Slovakia, returned all suspended persona to thelr jobs, and made certain mi!itary provisiions to pre-vent any new putsches. The orders provided for the placement of Slovak officers as supervlsors of the Slovak Government in all milltary formatlons which were headed !Jy Czeoh generals and colonels. Simultaneously, President Rácha and General Syrový ordered all commanders of the army in Slovakla not to undertake any ventures wlthout my knowlodge or wlthout the knowledge of the appointed Slovak offlcers. This provision of mine I considered most lmportant. It was thus that the Slovaks took over the command of the army in Slovakia before the proclamation of the independence of the Slovak State. That meant that the Slovaks took possession of one of the symbols of State sovereignty. How !mpo!'tant was this provision was demonstT,ated soon after the !ndependence of the Slovak State was proolaimed, when the Magyars a,ttacked the eastern borders of Slovakia, and our dlsciplined army, under the command of Lt. Colonel Augustine Malar, effectively resisted them. Without our mil!tary resistance, the Ma• gyars would have occupled the eastern area of Slovakla even beyond �10 SLOVAKIA Prešov, just as they had occupied the whole of Ruthenia. which offered no military reslstance. But even before the proclamation of the independence of the Slovak State, the knowledge that Slovak offlcers were in command of every m!llta.ry garrison In Slovakia evoked a remarkable satisfaction in the ranka of the Slovaks, who no longer had to fea.r that the barracks would agaln unload a host of soldiers who would fight agalnst the people and lts !nterests. On Monday, March 13, 1939, at 6:00 .A. M., Dr. Tiso arrlved in Bro.tňslava from Banovce to visit me. He told me that he had received an "lnv!tatlon" to vis!t Adolph Hitler in Berlin and asked me whether I would agree that he go. I answered h!m that I d!d, but wanted it approved by my whole government as well as the praesidlum of the Party and the A.ssembly. Thereupon, the Slovak Government, the praes!dium of the Assembly and the Party were called to meet In the offlce of the SLOVÁK. The conference lasted unb!l 12:30 P. M. The unanlmous decislon was: Dr. Joseph Tlso was to go to Berlin. After the conference. I issued the followlng off-icial statement for the Bratislava press and radlo: "We announce to the Slovak public that today, Monday morning, the praesldium of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party had a meeting in Bratislava. At thls meeting of the praesldlum of the Party, Dr. Joseph Tiso, former Presldent of the Slovak Government, announced that he had recefved au offlcial summons from the Relch Ohancellor, Adolph Hitler, to vis!t him at once In Berlin. The pra.esld<lum of the Party has acknowledged thls lnv!tation, and so has the Government of Karol Sldor. Consequently, Dr. Joseph Tiso crossed the border at Bratislava at noon today accompanled by the German Consul In Bratislava, deputy Stephen Danlhel and deputy Ing. Karmasin. The purpose of Dr. Joseph Tiso's trip to Berlin 1s a olarlfllcation of the present situat!on." In the instructions, which the conference gave to Dr. Joseph Tiso for hls trip to Berlin, he was told: to hear what Hitler had to say, but not to glve hlm any kind of blndlng statement; then to return to Brátlslava and report on h!s vlslt to competent Slovak factors and await the deflnite decislon of the Assembly, the Government and the Party. Dr. Joseph Tiso visited Rlbbentrop and Hitler in Berlin. After converslng w<lth them, he went to the Czecho-,Slovak embassy in llerlln, whence he phoned me and requested me to call the Slovak Assembly together. Thls telephon;, conversation took place with Tlso at 7: 30 P. M. on March 13, 1939. I lmmedlately got in touch with Presldent Hácha who, actlng in accord with Paragraph V of the ConB'titutlon of November 22, 1938, called a meeting of the Slovak Assembly on March 14, 1939. The Slovak Assembly, therefore, was convened Iegally, In the manner prescribed by the Const!tution of the Czecho-Slovak Republlc. Tuesday, March 14, 1939, at 9: 00 A. M. the Slovak Government, the praesldium of the Assembly and the Hlinka Party convened In the Government Buildlng at Bratislava. Dr. Joseph Tlso gave an exhaustlve report about hls trip to Berlin. The meeting approved h!s report enthus!ast!cally; he had done the task he was asked to do. After the meeting, the Slovak Assembly convened In 1ts quarters �SLOVAKIA 11 for the session oa.Ued by the President of the Republ1c, Dr. En:(11 Rácha. Thls memorable meetlng of the Slovak A.ssembly opened at 10: 57 A. M., March 14, 1939, by the Vlce-Presldent of the Assembly, Dr. Karol Mederly. After golng through the rormallties, Dr. Mederly, in accordance to Paragraph 37 of the order or business, moved that the remaining buslness or the Assembly be conMdential. Therefore, only Deput!es of the Assemb!y and members of the Slovak Government remained in the assembly ha.11. Of the 63 duly elected representatives of the Slovak Assembly, 57 were present at this hlstorical session of the Slovak leglslature. T·h e secret session began at 11:10 A. M. The flrst order or business was my spe,ech, in wbich I deplcted events as they had developed in Slova.kla and recounted a.II that my Government had accomplished withln so short a time. In my name and in the name or the other mJnisters, I announced the reslgnation of my government. I concluded my speech In this manner: " . . . in the name of the ent.ire Government I tender our resignatione to this solemn Assembly. At thls very moment, this my decision is being ma.de kno,w n also to the constitutional factor.s in Prague and, with this, I proclaim the bTief act!v!J.ty of my Government at an end. Sir Deputles, I I)Tay that you be unlted, selt-conscious and mutually trustworthy, because only thus shall we be able to get our Slovak nation out of the present dlfficult situation and establlsh order and stablllity and a solid front. I want to assure you, gentlemen, that I sha.11 support with my whole strength and will everythlng that you sha.11 decide. Long live the Slovak natlon! Long live free Slova.kla!" Dr. Joseph Tiso then presented an extenslve report on hls trip to Berlin. In hls introduct.ion, Dr. Tlso stated that he ma.de the trip to BerMn, because the conference of March 13th had declded that he do so. In Berlin, Dr. 1'1so told forelgn minister · Joachim von Rlbbentrop: " . . . by lnltlatlve we Slova.ks will never glve the lmpulse to liquidat-e tbe Czecho-.Slovak Republic. But !! we see that the course of events ls developlng in such a way that it m!ght be more beneflclal to us, we s-hall consider it our duty to choose a suitable tlme to separate (from the Czeohs). lf our people see that events are tending In a dlrectlon lndicatlng that the only w·ay out fs to make otrrselves independent, then every Slovak wlll tlghten bis belt, live more frugally, wflll know how to bear up even under lesseT advantages, and shall say to hlmself: under the glven clrcumstances, t here was natblng else we could do. Rlbbentrop fully recognlzed and understod our posltlon." Then Dr. Tlso told about hls vlsit wlth Adolph Hitler. The iatter told hlm directly that the Magya.rs were preparing to occupy t he whole of Slovak.ia at that Ume. "And you must declare yourself agaJ!ns.t lt," sa!d Hitler ... "and declare yourself wlth llghtn1ng speed. This declaratáon must be ma.de to proper factors so that they would know that t.he Slovak natlon has lts own State, its own territory and that, therefore, it must prevent any one from ma.king clalms to enter Slovak terrltory and to the Slovak populatlon. There 1s no Ume for waiting. Not days, but hours shall declde the lssue." �12 SLOVAKIA Dr. 'l'iso thought for a moment, repeated the decision of the conference of March 13th, and ad ded: "You will pardon me, if I cannot say anything else more concrete." In short, Dr. Tiso followed the directlves given by the representatives of the Slovak nation: to un<lertake no obligatiollll, to promise nothlng In Berlin. Dr. 'l'iso concluded his repoi,t to the Assembly with the words: "Here, before the Assembly, I place the dry material gatbered in Berlin durlng my visit tb ere, the report which you •b ave just bearo, and I beg you to ponder over it and then ren der a decision !" Dr. Joseph Tlso made no proposal either for separating from the Czechs or for proclaiming an independent Slovak State. After Tiso completed his report, Dr. Martin Sokol, pres1dent of the Slovak A:ssembly, recessed the session for a few mlnutes. Durlng the recess, tbe deputles considered and d1scussed what they had hearo. When the meeting was called to order again at 12: 06 P. M., Dr. Sokol said: "You have heard the manlfestatlon of t-he President of the Slovak Government, Karol Sidor, and tbe report of Mr. Deputy Dr. Joseph Tiso about !)!!s conversaitlon with •Reich Chancellor Adolph Hitler and Reich Minister of Forelgn Affaiirs von Ribbentrop. No~v we are suppose<l to decide by voting whether the Assembly of Slovakia is for an indepen-dent Slovak State or not. We shall declare our vote by arlsing. Those In favor of proolaiming the in<lependence of the Slovak State, please rise!" lt was 12:07 P. M., March 14, 1939, when all 57 members of bhe Slovak Assembly arose from their seats and, thus, unanimously voted for the establishment of t•h e independent State of Slovakia. Thereupon, Dr. Sokol announced: "I flnd that the Assembly of Slovakia, as the only competent organ of the polltlcal will of the sovereign Slovak nation, has decided in favor of an independent Slovak State." &tm standing, the depu,ties sang t-he Slovak hymn "Hej, Slováci" (Yeah, Ye Slovaks), wMch later became the National Anthem of the Slovak State. ľt was thus that the .independence of fäe Slovak State was proclaimed. After a thousand years the Slovaks again became masters of their !and and their destiny. The hidden yearning of the natlon for its own State had come to life. Even here the words of Svetozar Hurban Vajanský are applicable: "To ascribe characteristics to the masses of people which they do not possess would be folly, indeed. But to rouse and develop the chara.cteristlcs ,..,,hfoh the native mass does possess, even though they are hi<lden, thrut is our fatal obligrution." This "fatal obUgation" was performed by the Slovak Deputies who proclaimed the independence of the Slovak State of March 14, 1939. They -had awakened the desire that was hidden in the soul of the nation, brought it out lnto the open and made lt real. And from 1939 to 1945, that Mdden desire, translated lnto reality, grew and prospered in the heart of every self-conscious and loyal Slovak. No one on this earth shall ever be able to stifle or kill this holy yearning of the Slovak nation for a new and more lasting State of its own - an Independent Slovakia. • • • � DECEMBEJIR, 1952 SLOVAKIA 1 What Led to the PROCLAMATION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC KAROL SIDOR ( Former Ambassador of Slovakia to the Vatican) Our greait Svetozár Hurban Vajanský once wrote the following encouraglng words: " . . . fear not the proximity of events and do not be afrald of too small a perspective. Our elders sinned grievously dn that respect. In folio form, they published the war of the divine Titan against the Jews; they wrote enormous volumes about America and Palestine; and hístories about the cavalry units of Cracow and water nymphs. But they left us practically nothing about themselves and about their times; that is, they ddd not leave us thelr views and opin!ons so tha.t we, their successors, now stand before a dark corner, a:bout wh-lch we know only that in lt our natlon breathed, worked, suffered, bied, sinned, performed good works, quarreled and harmoniously formed associatlons, hated and loved. We - the unfortunate heirs of indolent fathers - have nothing in our hands'" So that a similar verdlct be not rendered agalnst us in the (uture, we must wrlte about everything - about everything that we authoTed or at least were witnesses of, about everything we saw with our own eyes and heard with our own ears. Such a testimony, of course, cannot be anythlng but subjective. But after a gre.ater lapse of bime, future historians will be able to form from various such subjective testimonies an objectlve picture about the events and the people of that particular tlme. The question of Slovak s,tatehood was dealt w-ith in a speech dellvered on February 21, -1939, by the premier of the Slovak Government, Dr. Joseph Tiso, who said: "After a pause of a thousand years, after long years of fighting for its national rights, the Slovak natňon has its own government, its own paTUament, and is itself building its own state. Here on the floor of our own p.arliament, we -are buHding our own State, our own new State, our own Slovak State. The Slovak natlon is bullding its own State, which is the organ of its soveraignty, the executor of its will and the defender of its interests. Never again must it happen that the Slovak nation be pla.ced in oppos!tion to its own State. Being a Slovak patriot and an idea! nationalist means b~ng a Joyal buUder of the Slovak State. Love for the Slovak nat!on 1s demonstrated conc.retely by loyalty and devotlon to the Slovak State. We do not uphold ťhe State just for the sake of having a State, but because, and only as long as, the nation needs it." In these words Dr. Tiso lndicated only the road we were to travel in bullding our own Slovak State In the future. "Here on the floor of our own parliament we are buildlng our own State, our own new State, our own Slovak State" - that was the directive for tbe future. Wben Dr. Joseph 'I'lso delivered bis speech in tbe Slovak Assembly on February 21, 1939, he was well aware of the fact tha:t we s,till clid not have a Slovak State. There did exist an autonomous Slovak Government and a Slovak parliament, hut that was not enough to al- �2 SLOVAKIA low us to speak about the Slovak State aa an already &X.isting formatlon. There was still lacking the proclamation of the State, lts recognition by foreign powers, and we also lacked that which makes a Sbate a State: our own army and our own representatives in other countries. The Slova.ks who uoted the number of times the words "Slovak State" were mentioned dn Tiso's speech before the Slovak Parliament oould be completely satisfied. And the Slovaks were saitlsfied, but the Cz.echs became dlscontented. Czech dissatisfactiou was demonstrated not only •in newspapers, but also in the sessions of the Centra! Government in Prague. In the sessions of thait government, as a State Minister, I urged the Czechs to fulfill everything t hey had bound themselves to fulfill by para~raphs of the Constltutlional Document wh!ch was adopted in the P11ague Parliament on November 22, 1938. The Slovak Government had entrusted me to concern myself with common problems in Prague, <the question of foreign affairs, finances and the army. I made concrete the Slovak demands and requested the Centra! Government to take a stand on them, app.rove them and hasten the.i!r rool!zation. On Wednesday, Maroh 1, 1939, at four o'clock in the afternoon, the Counc!l of Ministers was in session in Pr.ague. Present were the Czechs: Rudolph Beran, the Premier of the Government, and m!ndsters Chvalkov.s'ký, Syrový, Kalfus, Havell~a. Krejči, and Fischer. The Slovaks were represented by Karol ,stdor, Stephen Haššík (for mllitary affalrs) and Dr. Alexander Hrnčár (for flnancial affairs). I pre-sented our demands in the military and financial departments. 'l'he first to reply was Premier Rudolph Beran. He said that two matters were involved: fundamental questions and partia! demands. 'ľhe entire Czeoll public, according to Beran, 1s condemning Tiso's speech in the Slovak Parllament in which he proclaimed that the Slovaks are building their ovm State, their own Slovak State, on the floor of parliament, and completely neglected to mention the Czech<rSlovak Republic even once. Beran demanded the Slovak Government to pubhloize its loyalty to the Czecho-Slovak Republic, otherwise it would not be possil:ile to act on the partia! demands which were presented to ,h !m by me. "We must elther come to an ~greement," said Beran, "or part." We cannot circumvent this question on tiptoes as we would a cotpse. We cannot deny that a dangerous s:ltuation e:x:ists, added Beran, 'because !t could overwhelm not only the Czech Government, but the Slovak Government as well. When I waa permitted to reply to Premier Beran, I said: "We are not going to publish any fundamental manifestations about our loyalty to the Czecho-Slovak Republic. The Czechs and the Slovaks have accepted the law ,a bout the autonomy of Slovak!a, and that law mus,t not be neglected by the Czeohs. The Slovak party is fultilling wihat is in that law, because we, too, voted for that law, -as we also voted for the joint State budget for the yeiar 1939. The Slova.k Government !s responsible for the State in Slovakia, and the Czech Government cannot have guardlanship over !t. That we should continually have to e:x:press ourselves for the Czecho•Slovak !te• public !s nauseous particula.rly to me, because even dul'ing the Flrst Republlc I did not have to keep glving testlmony of my loyalty to the State and, as far a~ I am <'Oncernerl, 1 am not wllllng to do so even �SLOVAKIA 3 now. During the life of the Flrst Republic, Slovaks In Government wanted to galn the trust of the Czechs and they s,tressed thei'ľ rellabllity iin such a manner that they never sald the words "Slovak" and "Slovakia" separately. but always added, when they sald Slovakia: and our beloved Czecho,Slovak 'Republic. And when tbey used tbe word "Slovaks," tbey lmmedlately added: and our derurly loved bretbrnn, t he Czecb.s. The bealtby reactlon to tbls unnatural status ls what is happening In Slovakla today, l.e. tbat only Slovakia and the Slovaks are stressed. We shall mentdon the Republlc ·a nd the Czechs only after tbe Republic and the Czecbs accept everythlng they have boun<l themselves to d-0 by the law pertalnlng <to the autonomy of Slovakla. I must say that slnce October 6~h nothlng has changed as far as the wlll of the Czechs is concerned." After I sald these words, a bitter debate followed. Most important were those spoken by Chvalkovský, Minister of Forelgn Af• fair;;. He said: "Whatever we have done thus far, we have not done well neither you, nor we. We stand before ,the questlon: Shall we stlll stay together, or shall we part. An EngHs,h st-ate&man once sa1d: a door must be either opened or closed. Every breeze cannot play ,vith lt. I was shocked by what Sldor has sald, that trom October &t-h nothlng has changed SlovakJa. Never in history did Slovakla have a Slov-ak Government. She has one slnce Ootober 6th, and that in ltself means tbat since October 6th much has changed In Slovakia. Slnce October 6th we ddd not have t!me enough to look eacb other in the eye. We had to worry about our relat!onsblp wlth our nelghbors, there were armies of tbree States on tbe terrltory ot the Republlc, and we could not resolve our interna) relatlons,blp speedlly. We, too, ha.ve a dlscon<tented mass of people, wbich 1s demanding tbat we correct the mlstakes of the past and avoid mlstakes In the present. I am not respons,ible for the past regime, but nelther ls Sldor. I am dolng wha.tever I can do. In the hlstory of forelgn mlnlsters, nowhere w!ll you find a minister who had received 27 ultimatums wlthln such a shoz,t time. Most of them are from the Magyars and the Poles decrylng the conduct of the Slovak and Ruthenlan Governments. Thus, it 1s very dlf~lcult for me to make order abroad, when these Governments, contrary to the Constituliona.1 Document, also lntervene in forelgn affalrs. Every week, with dispasslona.te perststence, I am Io Hltler's offlce seeklng recognitloo of Cz(lcbo-Slovakla's boundaries, and all I get ls an evaslve answer along wttb polntlng to tbe unsettled Interna) affairs of the State. The deputies trom Prague are saying that the question of ,the partlog of the Slovaks and tbe Czechs is only a matter of weeks, and at most one of montbs. The effe,ct abroad is tbat we are oot recognlzed as a subject of lnteroa.tlonal law, but only as an object. I demand that tbe Slovak Government state officlally that lt 1s for tbe Czecho·Slovak Republlc. It the Slovak Government decldes otherwise, we shall part. Tbe Czech nation shall not stand in the way of your procilalm1ng the lndependence or Slo• vakia. lt ls better lf this ha,ppens voluntarlly." Agalo I aoswered that the Slovak Government wlll not make any manlfestation of loyalty to the Czecho-Slovak Republlc as long as all the Slovak demands. emanatlng from the agreement between the Czechs and the Slovaks, are not fulfilled. �4 SLOVAKIA Premier Beran closed the J<ively meeting of the Mlnisterial Councll wlth the remark that the following week the plenum of the Centra! Government, of which the Slovak ministers headed by Dr. Tiso are also members, shaJI meet to definJtely resolve fundamental questlons and partia! programs, "since this could not be done through Sidor." The situation developed rapidly. I returned horne to Bratislava and requested the President of the Slovak Government, Dr. Joseph 'Nso, to call a joint meeting of the Slovak Government, the Executive Committee of the Slovak Assembly and the Executive Com mittee of Hllnka's Slovak Peoples Party. T hat meeting was held in Bratislava, on Monday, March 6, 1939. There I reported what had transpired thus (ar in Prague and requested that we clearly style the question of the Slovak State for ourselves and also decide on the manner of proclaimlng !t, because, according to my conviction, the situatlon in Prague was already such that we could no longer reckon with a new reconc!liation and further negotlation with the Czechs. After a lengthy <lebate, the stand unanimously accepted was given form by the president of the Slovak Government, Dr. Tlso, as follows: "To continue the bullding of the Slovak State in an evolutionary way and at this time not to proclaim tbe establishment immediately." That stand was proper and reasonable. Every natlon desires to have its own State, to build it in !ts own way. The Slovaks were building theirs on the floor of the Slovak Parliament and would proclaim lt when the Slovak deputies, the duly elected representatives of the Slovak nation, deemed !t proper to do so. Tbe followlng day, March 7, 1939, Dr. Artbur Seiss-Inquart came from Vlenna to pay me a "social call." Ht> told me tbat on this orcasion ·he would like to talk wlth Dr. Josepb Tlso. I called Dr. Tiso to my resldence, bence both or us were present durlng the conversat!on with Seiss-Jnquart. After a few social formalities, Selss-Jnquart turned to politics and remarked that the foreign sltuation was becomlng very dangerous lor the Slovak natlon. Adolph Hitler, he said, was ready to act severely against the entire Czech o-Slovak Hepublic. It is in the interest or the Slovaks not to become vlctlms along wlth the Czechs, but to save themselves by establish!ng thelr own Slovak State. T hereul)On, Dr. J osepb Tiso explalned wbat he had decided upon yesterday, tbat is, that we wanted to build the Slovak State ln an evolutlonary manner and dld not w"ish to proclaim lt rlght now. "To Slovak State independence," Dr. Joseph Tlso said, "we would like to come by a peaceful march toward our goal, pos$lbly by runn!ng toward it." "It is no longer enough," answered Seiss-Inquar t, "to march peacefully toward the goal, or even runn!ng loward lt. You must jump, because only by doing so will you attain your goal." The joint conference wlth the Czecbs was suppoaed to take place Marcb 9th. I had agreed witb prem!er Dr. Tlso that I would go to Prague afone and would let bim know by p-hone whether it would stlll be nec&SSary for bim and also tbe rest of the Slovak Jllllnlsters to come to P rague. �SLOVAKIA 5 I arrived in Prague in the evenlng of March 8th. I a.scertained how the situation there sharpened against the Slovak.s and, therefore, that same evenlng I phoned to Bratislava, telling Dr. Tiso to stay horne and not to come to Pmgue. On March 9, at 4 p. m., the Mlnlsterlal Councll held a meeting in Prague. Present with me were all three delegates of the Slova.k Government: Dr. Joseph Zvrškovec (,l<'ore!lgn Affail'S). Stephen Hašš[k, (Milltary Affairs). and Dr. Alexander Hrnčár (Financlal Af· fairs). At the staTt of tbe session, Premier Beran suddenly announced that a secret meeting of the Mlnisterial Council was ahout to take place ,and requested all three delegates of the Sloivak Government to leave the assembly room. I remalne·d •In the room with Minister Paul Teplánsky. In an angered tone Beran said that in all the embassies of Prague the exact time of the proclamation of the independent State of Slovakla was known and that only the Prague Government knew nothing about it. I replled t!hat such rumors were inundatlng the whole of Slovakia, hut that we had not come to Prague to establish the truth or ialsehood of such rumors. We had come to present the Slovak tlemands and have the Centra! Government accept and approve them. We must talk abou t the concrete matters; these the delegates of the Slovak Government have prepared and, therefore, I asked that they be lnvited to the conference. My request was heard. In an atmosphere that threatened to explode, the three delegates of the Slovak Government and I presented the Slovak demands. Delegate Stephen Raššlk was so overwrought that Beran had to remind bim to compose himself when he began to pound the groon table sharply with bis f,ist. Such a thlng, he sald, had never before happened in the MinisteriaJ Council. When the tension was highest, a messenger came from the foyer to teli me that Minister Dr. Havelka wanted me on °the r,hone. Dr. Havelka was an aide to President Rácha al the Hrad (Oastle). He requested me to come to the Hrad at once; President Rácha urgently wished to speak with me. I returned to the conference room and said to Stephen Haššík: "Here is my briefcase; take it horne with you if I do not return. Presldent Rácha has called for me, and I sense that lt may be nothing good.'' Informing Beran that I was summoned to the Castle. I left the .Ministerial Council a little before midnight. On the ground floor of the building a police officer told me that 1 was to be held. I protested against this S-O vociferously that the whole bll'ilding of the Ministerial Council resounded wlth my protest. :'dy delention, however, was soon explalned, and I hurried to the Castle. After greetlng Presldent Rácha with a "good evening," l protested to him against the violation of my congressional immunity. Rácha knew nothlng about it and palnfully grasped his head. He was an old, overworked man, hut an honest and good man. Catching his breath, he sa~d stutterlngly: "Several moments ago I performed a very unpleasant task. I dismissed the premier of the Slovak Government, Dr. Tiso, and three �6 SLOVAKIA other min.!sters from their posts. I had to do lt, because the consoli• dation of conditions in Slovakia demanded it." I looped trom my chair and replied: "Mr. Presldent, I cannot agree w'ith the step you have taken. I am jo!n!ng wlth the dls• missed ministers and, here and now, tender you my reslgnat!on. I have nothing more to do in Prague." The President wias quite moved as he stood up and begged me not to resign and not let myself be overcome by hasty anger. "With full knowledge of what may happen to me here in Prague for my statement," I said quietly and seriously, "l repeat that I do not agree with what you have done; I protest agalnst lt and hereby tender you my reslgnatlon. I am golng home to Slovakla on the very next traln." :Aresident Rácha mopped bis forehead and head wlth both hands and in a voice completely broken asked me agaln not to resign, because, he said, -it would result In lm.mense harm for Slovakia. "I have nothlng to add to what I have sald," I replled and began walking toward the door. The Presldent caught up W'ith me, grasped my arm, and pleaded that I tarry a bit longer. "Beran will soon be here," he said. And at that very moment, the door burst open and Beran walked In hurrjedly. Stlll standing near the door, I related to Beran what I had told Rácha: 1 was resign.!ng and going home. Rácha and Beran, bowever, entreated me to stay on. They were convinced, they sald, with regard to condltions In Sloviakia, that I was not doing the right úhlng. I gave in to them to the extent that I would announce my reslgnatlon to them from Bratislava after I had consulted with my frlends. As I lett the Presldenťs oftice, in the corridor I met Peter Pridavok, who at that Ume wa.s head of the press department of the Slovak Government, also Dr. Dobrovský, my secretary, and my aMe, Lt. Fratrič. With my three ~rlends I rode to my Prague resldence. In the mornlng of the next day, l\farch 10th, I asked to get c onnected wlth the edltorlal office of the SLOVÁK in Bratislava. No one answered there. Then I tried to get connected wlth the General Secretariate of the Rllnka Slovak People's Party, but no one answered even there. Finally, they connected me with the Government Building -in Bratislava. Dr. Karol Kllnovský, Chlef of the Securlty Service In Slovakia, ,ans,wered tbe phone. I dlctated a rePort to bim to publlsh In the SLOVÁK. to wít, that "Sldor wa3 placed before an accompllshed fact In Prague In the matter of the dlsmissal of the Slovak mlnlsters; he dld not agree with the dlsmissal and protested against it to Presldent Rácha." The report was then p\tbllshed in the SLOVÁK that very day, In the issue berurlng the datellne of March 11, 1939. At that time Dr. Kllnovský told me that Martlal Law was proclalmed in Slovakla without the knowledge of the Slovak Government. The Bratiislava offlces, edltorlal and secretarlal, as well as the offlces of the Hlinka Guard were occupled by the Czech Army and police. Over 250 Slovaks had been arrested, hundreds of offl· clals were suspended, many GHards were taken lnto Moravla and hundreds of Slovaks had fled to Vienna to avold arrest. Somethlng wlthin me snapped. I could not belleve tha.t Rácha �SLOVAil..lA 7 and Beran were as faithless as T. G. Masaryk and Bene!í and their adherents when it came to keeping agreements, solemn signatures and promises w!Jth the Slov.ak.s. I really respected Hácha and Beran and believed that whatever they would promlse and sign, they would aJso keep honorably and fulfill. But, Io and behold, they were overthrowlng the Slovak Governm~nt in Bratislava without the knowledge and behlnd the backs of the duly authorized representatlves of the Slovak Government and lts three delegates. Without the knowledge of the Slovak Government, they proclaímed Martlal Law in Slovakla, occupied the territory of autonomous Slovak1a with soldiers and gendarmes, arrested Slovak Deputies and hauled people to Moravia, wh!le they were telling• me that they were doing a very unpleasant duty in the "lnterest" ot Slovakia. Anti-Slovak elements In Slovalcta, encouraged by such mOO-'lures. ralsed tbeir beads on tbe streets and barked at tbe autonomlsts: "Now, we'll give you autonomy!" While I was thlnking about wbat was happening, the Czech Mln•lster Feierabend came to my resldence. He had a considerable understandlng for Slovak matters. He told me tbat Beran had flent him to teli me to vlslt Mm at once. "No!" I Teplled to Feierabend. "After yesterday'e events in Prague ano those that are happening In Slovakia now, I do not wlsh to speak wlth any one In Prague. Not even with you. or Beran." I remained in my resldence with my frlends. I wa!ted for Dr. Martin Sokol, president of the Slovak Assembly, who had suddenly been called to Prague, to flnlsh bis audience with Presldent Hácha. Wben he arrlved, I traveled wlth bim to Bt>atislava on the afternoon express. I arrlved In B!'atlslava at 9 P. M., March 10. A strong d!Vflslon ot the Hlinka Guard awalted me at the station; also a stronger one of the Czech army, Jed by a Colonel. Masses of people cllmbed aboard the engine and thousands upon thousands mllled around Nie s quare around the station. They sang maTches ot the Guard and acclalmed me voclferously. At the request ot the Czech Colonel, on the way to the edltorial offlce of the SLOVÁK, I stopped at the o!fice of the General Voyta, Commander of the National Army In Slo• vakla. He was a tough soJd.ier. But he saw the sltuatlon clearly and, lt seemed to me, dld not like lt at all. When I complalned that the army was shooting into the unarmed crowd In Bratislava, he replied that no one shot at the people, but a few salvos were fired into the aiT to frlghten them. Later, I ascertalned for myself that the Czech army In Bratislava really dld not shoot any one. Anthony Kopal, the only Slovak who was felled by a bullet, was shot by a Czecb gendarme. When I asked who had orderd the army and the tanks lnto the streets ot Branislava, Voyta told me that he personally was called to Prague by Syrový, Minister ot Natlonal Defense, who ordered bim to do so. I requested Voyta to free all prlsoners in Bratislava taken by bis men. Voyta replied that he would as soon as he found ou.t if· a.ny one was arrested in Bratislava.; and that he would notity me. Havlng appraised the sltuatlon at its source, I hurrled to my car and contlnued on my way to the SLOVÁK, whlle a masa ot 7000- �8 SLúVAKIA 8000 people, gathered about Voyta's office, cheered and sang robustly. When I arri ved at the SLOVÁK, I found the higher officials of the Hlinka Party, headed by Dr. Tis-0, already waiting for me. The entire executive body of the Assembly arrived and a lengthy deliberation began. Dr. Tiso, vice-president of the Party, presided at the session. He told about the situation that had developed in Bratislava, while Dr. Sokol and I related our experiences in Prague. I said that I would not go to Prague any more and requested that my resignatlon as State Minister be accepted by the conference. And forthwith, I proposed that the new Slovak Government be made up as follows: Dr. Joseph Tiso, president of the Slovak Government; Dr. Martin Sokol, Minister of Interior; Joseph Sivák, Minister of Education; Julius Stano, Minister of Transportation; Dr. Peter Zaťko, Minister of Agriculture; Dr. Alex Hrnčár, Minister of Finance, and Dr. Gejza Fritz, Minister of Jusbice. The conference decided - wit,h only one dissenting vote, my own - that I shoulct not resign, but continue in the office of State Minister. Dr. Joseph Tiso t hen announced that he could not assent to accept the office offered him. He stated that here he was not <:oncerned aboQt himself personally - all such thoughts must now be secondary - but that he did not want to place President Rácha int-0 an unpleasant situation: he did not want Rácha pressed today to name as president of the Slovak Government that Tiso, whom he had yesterday dism1ssed from that office. 'I\he situation 1s šerious - said Dr. Tiso - and we must not use the Slovak pľO'blem to enha,nce our persona! interests and prestige. Slovakia needs a government, Tiso concluded, so that greater confusion and chaos would not ensue. Thereupon, the conference authorized Dr. Martin Sokol to proceed as follows: If Dr. Joseph Tiso were not acceptable in Prague, then Karol Sidor should be proposed as president of the Slovak Government. The next day, Saturday, March 11, 1939, the praesidium of the Slovak Assembly, presented the names of the new Slovak Government to President Rácha in Prague. This had to be done, because paragraph V, Article 4, of the Constitution of November 22, 1938, demanded it. It states: The members of the autonomous Slovak Gov• ernment, forming a com-ponent part of the Centra! Government, shaII be apointed by the Pr-esiident of the Republic on the motion of the praesidium of the Assembly of Slovakia. President Dr. Emil Hácha approved the second alternatíve and r.amed the new Slovak Government with me as lts president. The other members of my government were: Sivák, Sokol, Stano, Zaťko, Rrnčár and Fritz. This, then, was the !ega! Slovak Government created according to the Constitutlonal Document which was valid at the tíme. The very day that the news carried the names of the men constituting the new Slovak Government, I had several German vlsltors: editor Goldbach, then Carbus; later that night, close to mldnight of March 11, Wr. William Kepler, special deputy of Adolph Hitler and Assistant Secrebary of State for Foreign Affalrs, Dr. Selss- �SLOVAKIA 9 Inquart, G-Overnor of Austria, and Joseph Biirckel, Austrian gauIeiter, who demanded that I 1mmediately proclaim the independence of the Slovak State by radlo either through the station in Bratislav•a or the one in Vienna. I replied that responsible factors of the Hlinka Party aind the Slovak Assembly had decided "to continue to build the Slovak State by an evolutionary process and not to proclaim its establishment right now." I explasined that I, too, was bound by that declslon and could not violate it without the assent of the Party and the Assembly. If lhe Assembly and the Party change thelr previous stand and on the floor of the .A;ssembly, now decide to P'ľOClaim an independent Slovak State "right now," I would comply wlth that changed attitude. My actions were governed, I said, not by expedl· ency or my persona! fancies, but by the policy of the nation according to the diirectives which I had from competent Slovak organs. I take my orders only from them, I concluded, and I will not execute the orders and commands given me by representatives of another natlon. Natura1'1y, the Germans were not satisfied with my answer. And they demonstrated their dissatisfaction in a very concrete fashion. On March 13, they vented thelr hatred of me by placlng a bomb under my horne in Bratislava to ktill me and my whole family. I thanked God that it was discovered in Ume and rendered harmless. Another bomb was placed under the Jesuit monastery in Brati!>lava where Dr. Joseph Tiso resided. That bomb actually exploded and caused quite a bit of damage to the walls and windows of the structure. No one, however, was killed. As soon as I took over the presidency of the Slovak Government all military regulations and orders, especla!ly the proclamation of Martial Law, were revoked and rendered invalid. The putsch of the Czech generals, ord8'l'ed by President Rácha and Premier Be1,an of the Centra! G-Overnment and executed by Syrový, Minister of NatiOJ1al Defense, was thus liquidated. I liberated Slovak prlsoners in Slovakia, returned all suspended persona to thelr jobs, and made certain mi!itary provisiions to pre-vent any new putsches. The orders provided for the placement of Slovak officers as supervlsors of the Slovak Government in all milltary formatlons which were headed !Jy Czeoh generals and colonels. Simultaneously, President Rácha and General Syrový ordered all commanders of the army in Slovakla not to undertake any ventures wlthout my knowlodge or wlthout the knowledge of the appointed Slovak offlcers. This provision of mine I considered most lmportant. It was thus that the Slovaks took over the command of the army in Slovakia before the proclamation of the independence of the Slovak State. That meant that the Slovaks took possession of one of the symbols of State sovereignty. How !mpo!'tant was this provision was demonstT,ated soon after the !ndependence of the Slovak State was proolaimed, when the Magyars a,ttacked the eastern borders of Slovakia, and our dlsciplined army, under the command of Lt. Colonel Augustine Malar, effectively resisted them. Without our mil!tary resistance, the Ma• gyars would have occupled the eastern area of Slovakla even beyond �10 SLOVAKIA Prešov, just as they had occupied the whole of Ruthenia. which offered no military reslstance. But even before the proclamation of the independence of the Slovak State, the knowledge that Slovak offlcers were in command of every m!llta.ry garrison In Slovakia evoked a remarkable satisfaction in the ranka of the Slovaks, who no longer had to fea.r that the barracks would agaln unload a host of soldiers who would fight agalnst the people and lts !nterests. On Monday, March 13, 1939, at 6:00 .A. M., Dr. Tiso arrlved in Bro.tňslava from Banovce to visit me. He told me that he had received an "lnv!tatlon" to vis!t Adolph Hitler in Berlin and asked me whether I would agree that he go. I answered h!m that I d!d, but wanted it approved by my whole government as well as the praesidlum of the Party and the A.ssembly. Thereupon, the Slovak Government, the praes!dium of the Assembly and the Party were called to meet In the offlce of the SLOVÁK. The conference lasted unb!l 12:30 P. M. The unanlmous decislon was: Dr. Joseph Tlso was to go to Berlin. After the conference. I issued the followlng off-icial statement for the Bratislava press and radlo: "We announce to the Slovak public that today, Monday morning, the praesldium of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party had a meeting in Bratislava. At thls meeting of the praesldlum of the Party, Dr. Joseph Tiso, former Presldent of the Slovak Government, announced that he had recefved au offlcial summons from the Relch Ohancellor, Adolph Hitler, to vis!t him at once In Berlin. The pra.esld<lum of the Party has acknowledged thls lnv!tation, and so has the Government of Karol Sldor. Consequently, Dr. Joseph Tiso crossed the border at Bratislava at noon today accompanled by the German Consul In Bratislava, deputy Stephen Danlhel and deputy Ing. Karmasin. The purpose of Dr. Joseph Tiso's trip to Berlin 1s a olarlfllcation of the present situat!on." In the instructions, which the conference gave to Dr. Joseph Tiso for hls trip to Berlin, he was told: to hear what Hitler had to say, but not to glve hlm any kind of blndlng statement; then to return to Brátlslava and report on h!s vlslt to competent Slovak factors and await the deflnite decislon of the Assembly, the Government and the Party. Dr. Joseph Tiso visited Rlbbentrop and Hitler in Berlin. After converslng w<lth them, he went to the Czecho-,Slovak embassy in llerlln, whence he phoned me and requested me to call the Slovak Assembly together. Thls telephon;, conversation took place with Tlso at 7: 30 P. M. on March 13, 1939. I lmmedlately got in touch with Presldent Hácha who, actlng in accord with Paragraph V of the ConB'titutlon of November 22, 1938, called a meeting of the Slovak Assembly on March 14, 1939. The Slovak Assembly, therefore, was convened Iegally, In the manner prescribed by the Const!tution of the Czecho-Slovak Republlc. Tuesday, March 14, 1939, at 9: 00 A. M. the Slovak Government, the praesldium of the Assembly and the Hlinka Party convened In the Government Buildlng at Bratislava. Dr. Joseph Tlso gave an exhaustlve report about hls trip to Berlin. The meeting approved h!s report enthus!ast!cally; he had done the task he was asked to do. After the meeting, the Slovak Assembly convened In 1ts quarters �SLOVAKIA 11 for the session oa.Ued by the President of the Republ1c, Dr. En:(11 Rácha. Thls memorable meetlng of the Slovak A.ssembly opened at 10: 57 A. M., March 14, 1939, by the Vlce-Presldent of the Assembly, Dr. Karol Mederly. After golng through the rormallties, Dr. Mederly, in accordance to Paragraph 37 of the order or business, moved that the remaining buslness or the Assembly be conMdential. Therefore, only Deput!es of the Assemb!y and members of the Slovak Government remained in the assembly ha.11. Of the 63 duly elected representatives of the Slovak Assembly, 57 were present at this hlstorical session of the Slovak leglslature. T·h e secret session began at 11:10 A. M. The flrst order or business was my spe,ech, in wbich I deplcted events as they had developed in Slova.kla and recounted a.II that my Government had accomplished withln so short a time. In my name and in the name or the other mJnisters, I announced the reslgnation of my government. I concluded my speech In this manner: " . . . in the name of the ent.ire Government I tender our resignatione to this solemn Assembly. At thls very moment, this my decision is being ma.de kno,w n also to the constitutional factor.s in Prague and, with this, I proclaim the bTief act!v!J.ty of my Government at an end. Sir Deputles, I I)Tay that you be unlted, selt-conscious and mutually trustworthy, because only thus shall we be able to get our Slovak nation out of the present dlfficult situation and establlsh order and stablllity and a solid front. I want to assure you, gentlemen, that I sha.11 support with my whole strength and will everythlng that you sha.11 decide. Long live the Slovak natlon! Long live free Slova.kla!" Dr. Joseph Tiso then presented an extenslve report on hls trip to Berlin. In hls introduct.ion, Dr. Tlso stated that he ma.de the trip to BerMn, because the conference of March 13th had declded that he do so. In Berlin, Dr. 1'1so told forelgn minister · Joachim von Rlbbentrop: " . . . by lnltlatlve we Slova.ks will never glve the lmpulse to liquidat-e tbe Czecho-.Slovak Republic. But !! we see that the course of events ls developlng in such a way that it m!ght be more beneflclal to us, we s-hall consider it our duty to choose a suitable tlme to separate (from the Czeohs). lf our people see that events are tending In a dlrectlon lndicatlng that the only w·ay out fs to make otrrselves independent, then every Slovak wlll tlghten bis belt, live more frugally, wflll know how to bear up even under lesseT advantages, and shall say to hlmself: under the glven clrcumstances, t here was natblng else we could do. Rlbbentrop fully recognlzed and understod our posltlon." Then Dr. Tlso told about hls vlsit wlth Adolph Hitler. The iatter told hlm directly that the Magya.rs were preparing to occupy t he whole of Slovak.ia at that Ume. "And you must declare yourself agaJ!ns.t lt," sa!d Hitler ... "and declare yourself wlth llghtn1ng speed. This declaratáon must be ma.de to proper factors so that they would know that t.he Slovak natlon has lts own State, its own territory and that, therefore, it must prevent any one from ma.king clalms to enter Slovak terrltory and to the Slovak populatlon. There 1s no Ume for waiting. Not days, but hours shall declde the lssue." �12 SLOVAKIA Dr. 'l'iso thought for a moment, repeated the decision of the conference of March 13th, and ad ded: "You will pardon me, if I cannot say anything else more concrete." In short, Dr. Tiso followed the directlves given by the representatives of the Slovak nation: to un<lertake no obligatiollll, to promise nothlng In Berlin. Dr. 'l'iso concluded his repoi,t to the Assembly with the words: "Here, before the Assembly, I place the dry material gatbered in Berlin durlng my visit tb ere, the report which you •b ave just bearo, and I beg you to ponder over it and then ren der a decision !" Dr. Joseph Tlso made no proposal either for separating from the Czechs or for proclaiming an independent Slovak State. After Tiso completed his report, Dr. Martin Sokol, pres1dent of the Slovak A:ssembly, recessed the session for a few mlnutes. Durlng the recess, tbe deputles considered and d1scussed what they had hearo. When the meeting was called to order again at 12: 06 P. M., Dr. Sokol said: "You have heard the manlfestatlon of t-he President of the Slovak Government, Karol Sidor, and tbe report of Mr. Deputy Dr. Joseph Tiso about !)!!s conversaitlon with •Reich Chancellor Adolph Hitler and Reich Minister of Forelgn Affaiirs von Ribbentrop. No~v we are suppose<l to decide by voting whether the Assembly of Slovakia is for an indepen-dent Slovak State or not. We shall declare our vote by arlsing. Those In favor of proolaiming the in<lependence of the Slovak State, please rise!" lt was 12:07 P. M., March 14, 1939, when all 57 members of bhe Slovak Assembly arose from their seats and, thus, unanimously voted for the establishment of t•h e independent State of Slovakia. Thereupon, Dr. Sokol announced: "I flnd that the Assembly of Slovakia, as the only competent organ of the polltlcal will of the sovereign Slovak nation, has decided in favor of an independent Slovak State." &tm standing, the depu,ties sang t-he Slovak hymn "Hej, Slováci" (Yeah, Ye Slovaks), wMch later became the National Anthem of the Slovak State. ľt was thus that the .independence of fäe Slovak State was proclaimed. After a thousand years the Slovaks again became masters of their !and and their destiny. The hidden yearning of the natlon for its own State had come to life. Even here the words of Svetozar Hurban Vajanský are applicable: "To ascribe characteristics to the masses of people which they do not possess would be folly, indeed. But to rouse and develop the chara.cteristlcs ,..,,hfoh the native mass does possess, even though they are hi<lden, thrut is our fatal obligrution." This "fatal obUgation" was performed by the Slovak Deputies who proclaimed the independence of the Slovak State of March 14, 1939. They -had awakened the desire that was hidden in the soul of the nation, brought it out lnto the open and made lt real. And from 1939 to 1945, that Mdden desire, translated lnto reality, grew and prospered in the heart of every self-conscious and loyal Slovak. No one on this earth shall ever be able to stifle or kill this holy yearning of the Slovak nation for a new and more lasting State of its own - an Independent Slovakia. • • • � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document DECEMBEJIR, 1952 SLOVAKIA 1 What Led to the PROCLAMATION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC KAROL SIDOR ( Former Ambassador of Slovakia to the Vatican) Our greait Svetozár Hurban Vajanský once wrote the following encouraglng words: " . . . fear not the proximity of events and do not be afrald of too small a perspective. Our elders sinned grievously dn that respect. In folio form, they published the war of the divine Titan against the Jews; they wrote enormous volumes about America and Palestine; and hístories about the cavalry units of Cracow and water nymphs. But they left us practically nothing about themselves and about their times; that is, they ddd not leave us thelr views and opin!ons so tha.t we, their successors, now stand before a dark corner, a:bout wh-lch we know only that in lt our natlon breathed, worked, suffered, bied, sinned, performed good works, quarreled and harmoniously formed associatlons, hated and loved. We - the unfortunate heirs of indolent fathers - have nothing in our hands'" So that a similar verdlct be not rendered agalnst us in the (uture, we must wrlte about everything - about everything that we authoTed or at least were witnesses of, about everything we saw with our own eyes and heard with our own ears. Such a testimony, of course, cannot be anythlng but subjective. But after a gre.ater lapse of bime, future historians will be able to form from various such subjective testimonies an objectlve picture about the events and the people of that particular tlme. The question of Slovak s,tatehood was dealt w-ith in a speech dellvered on February 21, -1939, by the premier of the Slovak Government, Dr. Joseph Tiso, who said: "After a pause of a thousand years, after long years of fighting for its national rights, the Slovak natňon has its own government, its own paTUament, and is itself building its own state. Here on the floor of our own p.arliament, we -are buHding our own State, our own new State, our own Slovak State. The Slovak natlon is bullding its own State, which is the organ of its soveraignty, the executor of its will and the defender of its interests. Never again must it happen that the Slovak nation be pla.ced in oppos!tion to its own State. Being a Slovak patriot and an idea! nationalist means b~ng a Joyal buUder of the Slovak State. Love for the Slovak nat!on 1s demonstrated conc.retely by loyalty and devotlon to the Slovak State. We do not uphold ťhe State just for the sake of having a State, but because, and only as long as, the nation needs it." In these words Dr. Tiso lndicated only the road we were to travel in bullding our own Slovak State In the future. "Here on the floor of our own parliament we are buildlng our own State, our own new State, our own Slovak State" - that was the directive for tbe future. Wben Dr. Joseph 'I'lso delivered bis speech in tbe Slovak Assembly on February 21, 1939, he was well aware of the fact tha:t we s,till clid not have a Slovak State. There did exist an autonomous Slovak Government and a Slovak parliament, hut that was not enough to al- 2 SLOVAKIA low us to speak about the Slovak State aa an already &X.isting formatlon. There was still lacking the proclamation of the State, lts recognition by foreign powers, and we also lacked that which makes a Sbate a State: our own army and our own representatives in other countries. The Slova.ks who uoted the number of times the words "Slovak State" were mentioned dn Tiso's speech before the Slovak Parliament oould be completely satisfied. And the Slovaks were saitlsfied, but the Cz.echs became dlscontented. Czech dissatisfactiou was demonstrated not only •in newspapers, but also in the sessions of the Centra! Government in Prague. In the sessions of thait government, as a State Minister, I urged the Czechs to fulfill everything t hey had bound themselves to fulfill by para~raphs of the Constltutlional Document wh!ch was adopted in the P11ague Parliament on November 22, 1938. The Slovak Government had entrusted me to concern myself with common problems in Prague, <the question of foreign affairs, finances and the army. I made concrete the Slovak demands and requested the Centra! Government to take a stand on them, app.rove them and hasten the.i!r rool!zation. On Wednesday, Maroh 1, 1939, at four o'clock in the afternoon, the Counc!l of Ministers was in session in Pr.ague. Present were the Czechs: Rudolph Beran, the Premier of the Government, and m!ndsters Chvalkov.s'ký, Syrový, Kalfus, Havell~a. Krejči, and Fischer. The Slovaks were represented by Karol ,stdor, Stephen Haššík (for mllitary affalrs) and Dr. Alexander Hrnčár (for flnancial affairs). I pre-sented our demands in the military and financial departments. 'l'he first to reply was Premier Rudolph Beran. He said that two matters were involved: fundamental questions and partia! demands. 'ľhe entire Czeoll public, according to Beran, 1s condemning Tiso's speech in the Slovak Parllament in which he proclaimed that the Slovaks are building their ovm State, their own Slovak State, on the floor of parliament, and completely neglected to mention the Czech<rSlovak Republic even once. Beran demanded the Slovak Government to pubhloize its loyalty to the Czecho-Slovak Republic, otherwise it would not be possil:ile to act on the partia! demands which were presented to ,h !m by me. "We must elther come to an ~greement," said Beran, "or part." We cannot circumvent this question on tiptoes as we would a cotpse. We cannot deny that a dangerous s:ltuation e:x:ists, added Beran, 'because !t could overwhelm not only the Czech Government, but the Slovak Government as well. When I waa permitted to reply to Premier Beran, I said: "We are not going to publish any fundamental manifestations about our loyalty to the Czecho-Slovak Republic. The Czechs and the Slovaks have accepted the law ,a bout the autonomy of Slovak!a, and that law mus,t not be neglected by the Czeohs. The Slovak party is fultilling wihat is in that law, because we, too, voted for that law, -as we also voted for the joint State budget for the yeiar 1939. The Slova.k Government !s responsible for the State in Slovakia, and the Czech Government cannot have guardlanship over !t. That we should continually have to e:x:press ourselves for the Czecho•Slovak !te• public !s nauseous particula.rly to me, because even dul'ing the Flrst Republlc I did not have to keep glving testlmony of my loyalty to the State and, as far a~ I am <'Oncernerl, 1 am not wllllng to do so even SLOVAKIA 3 now. During the life of the Flrst Republic, Slovaks In Government wanted to galn the trust of the Czechs and they s,tressed thei'ľ rellabllity iin such a manner that they never sald the words "Slovak" and "Slovakia" separately. but always added, when they sald Slovakia: and our beloved Czecho,Slovak 'Republic. And when tbey used tbe word "Slovaks," tbey lmmedlately added: and our derurly loved bretbrnn, t he Czecb.s. The bealtby reactlon to tbls unnatural status ls what is happening In Slovakla today, l.e. tbat only Slovakia and the Slovaks are stressed. We shall mentdon the Republlc ·a nd the Czechs only after tbe Republic and the Czecbs accept everythlng they have boun<l themselves to d-0 by the law pertalnlng <to the autonomy of Slovakla. I must say that slnce October 6~h nothlng has changed as far as the wlll of the Czechs is concerned." After I sald these words, a bitter debate followed. Most important were those spoken by Chvalkovský, Minister of Forelgn Af• fair;;. He said: "Whatever we have done thus far, we have not done well neither you, nor we. We stand before ,the questlon: Shall we stlll stay together, or shall we part. An EngHs,h st-ate&man once sa1d: a door must be either opened or closed. Every breeze cannot play ,vith lt. I was shocked by what Sldor has sald, that trom October &t-h nothlng has changed SlovakJa. Never in history did Slovakla have a Slov-ak Government. She has one slnce Ootober 6th, and that in ltself means tbat since October 6th much has changed In Slovakia. Slnce October 6th we ddd not have t!me enough to look eacb other in the eye. We had to worry about our relat!onsblp wlth our nelghbors, there were armies of tbree States on tbe terrltory ot the Republlc, and we could not resolve our interna) relatlons,blp speedlly. We, too, ha.ve a dlscon<tented mass of people, wbich 1s demanding tbat we correct the mlstakes of the past and avoid mlstakes In the present. I am not respons,ible for the past regime, but nelther ls Sldor. I am dolng wha.tever I can do. In the hlstory of forelgn mlnlsters, nowhere w!ll you find a minister who had received 27 ultimatums wlthln such a shoz,t time. Most of them are from the Magyars and the Poles decrylng the conduct of the Slovak and Ruthenlan Governments. Thus, it 1s very dlf~lcult for me to make order abroad, when these Governments, contrary to the Constituliona.1 Document, also lntervene in forelgn affalrs. Every week, with dispasslona.te perststence, I am Io Hltler's offlce seeklng recognitloo of Cz(lcbo-Slovakla's boundaries, and all I get ls an evaslve answer along wttb polntlng to tbe unsettled Interna) affairs of the State. The deputies trom Prague are saying that the question of ,the partlog of the Slovaks and tbe Czechs is only a matter of weeks, and at most one of montbs. The effe,ct abroad is tbat we are oot recognlzed as a subject of lnteroa.tlonal law, but only as an object. I demand that tbe Slovak Government state officlally that lt 1s for tbe Czecho·Slovak Republlc. It the Slovak Government decldes otherwise, we shall part. Tbe Czech nation shall not stand in the way of your procilalm1ng the lndependence or Slo• vakia. lt ls better lf this ha,ppens voluntarlly." Agalo I aoswered that the Slovak Government wlll not make any manlfestation of loyalty to the Czecho-Slovak Republlc as long as all the Slovak demands. emanatlng from the agreement between the Czechs and the Slovaks, are not fulfilled. 4 SLOVAKIA Premier Beran closed the J<ively meeting of the Mlnisterial Councll wlth the remark that the following week the plenum of the Centra! Government, of which the Slovak ministers headed by Dr. Tiso are also members, shaJI meet to definJtely resolve fundamental questlons and partia! programs, "since this could not be done through Sidor." The situation developed rapidly. I returned horne to Bratislava and requested the President of the Slovak Government, Dr. Joseph 'Nso, to call a joint meeting of the Slovak Government, the Executive Committee of the Slovak Assembly and the Executive Com mittee of Hllnka's Slovak Peoples Party. T hat meeting was held in Bratislava, on Monday, March 6, 1939. There I reported what had transpired thus (ar in Prague and requested that we clearly style the question of the Slovak State for ourselves and also decide on the manner of proclaimlng !t, because, according to my conviction, the situatlon in Prague was already such that we could no longer reckon with a new reconc!liation and further negotlation with the Czechs. After a lengthy <lebate, the stand unanimously accepted was given form by the president of the Slovak Government, Dr. Tlso, as follows: "To continue the bullding of the Slovak State in an evolutionary way and at this time not to proclaim tbe establishment immediately." That stand was proper and reasonable. Every natlon desires to have its own State, to build it in !ts own way. The Slovaks were building theirs on the floor of the Slovak Parliament and would proclaim lt when the Slovak deputies, the duly elected representatives of the Slovak nation, deemed !t proper to do so. Tbe followlng day, March 7, 1939, Dr. Artbur Seiss-Inquart came from Vlenna to pay me a "social call." Ht> told me tbat on this orcasion ·he would like to talk wlth Dr. Josepb Tlso. I called Dr. Tiso to my resldence, bence both or us were present durlng the conversat!on with Seiss-Jnquart. After a few social formalities, Selss-Jnquart turned to politics and remarked that the foreign sltuation was becomlng very dangerous lor the Slovak natlon. Adolph Hitler, he said, was ready to act severely against the entire Czech o-Slovak Hepublic. It is in the interest or the Slovaks not to become vlctlms along wlth the Czechs, but to save themselves by establish!ng thelr own Slovak State. T hereul)On, Dr. J osepb Tiso explalned wbat he had decided upon yesterday, tbat is, that we wanted to build the Slovak State ln an evolutlonary manner and dld not w"ish to proclaim lt rlght now. "To Slovak State independence," Dr. Joseph Tlso said, "we would like to come by a peaceful march toward our goal, pos$lbly by runn!ng toward it." "It is no longer enough," answered Seiss-Inquar t, "to march peacefully toward the goal, or even runn!ng loward lt. You must jump, because only by doing so will you attain your goal." The joint conference wlth the Czecbs was suppoaed to take place Marcb 9th. I had agreed witb prem!er Dr. Tlso that I would go to Prague afone and would let bim know by p-hone whether it would stlll be nec&SSary for bim and also tbe rest of the Slovak Jllllnlsters to come to P rague. SLOVAKIA 5 I arrived in Prague in the evenlng of March 8th. I a.scertained how the situation there sharpened against the Slovak.s and, therefore, that same evenlng I phoned to Bratislava, telling Dr. Tiso to stay horne and not to come to Pmgue. On March 9, at 4 p. m., the Mlnlsterlal Councll held a meeting in Prague. Present with me were all three delegates of the Slova.k Government: Dr. Joseph Zvrškovec (,l<'ore!lgn Affail'S). Stephen Hašš[k, (Milltary Affairs). and Dr. Alexander Hrnčár (Financlal Af· fairs). At the staTt of tbe session, Premier Beran suddenly announced that a secret meeting of the Mlnisterial Council was ahout to take place ,and requested all three delegates of the Sloivak Government to leave the assembly room. I remalne·d •In the room with Minister Paul Teplánsky. In an angered tone Beran said that in all the embassies of Prague the exact time of the proclamation of the independent State of Slovakla was known and that only the Prague Government knew nothing about it. I replled t!hat such rumors were inundatlng the whole of Slovakia, hut that we had not come to Prague to establish the truth or ialsehood of such rumors. We had come to present the Slovak tlemands and have the Centra! Government accept and approve them. We must talk abou t the concrete matters; these the delegates of the Slovak Government have prepared and, therefore, I asked that they be lnvited to the conference. My request was heard. In an atmosphere that threatened to explode, the three delegates of the Slovak Government and I presented the Slovak demands. Delegate Stephen Raššlk was so overwrought that Beran had to remind bim to compose himself when he began to pound the groon table sharply with bis f,ist. Such a thlng, he sald, had never before happened in the MinisteriaJ Council. When the tension was highest, a messenger came from the foyer to teli me that Minister Dr. Havelka wanted me on °the r,hone. Dr. Havelka was an aide to President Rácha al the Hrad (Oastle). He requested me to come to the Hrad at once; President Rácha urgently wished to speak with me. I returned to the conference room and said to Stephen Haššík: "Here is my briefcase; take it horne with you if I do not return. Presldent Rácha has called for me, and I sense that lt may be nothing good.'' Informing Beran that I was summoned to the Castle. I left the .Ministerial Council a little before midnight. On the ground floor of the building a police officer told me that 1 was to be held. I protested against this S-O vociferously that the whole bll'ilding of the Ministerial Council resounded wlth my protest. :'dy delention, however, was soon explalned, and I hurried to the Castle. After greetlng Presldent Rácha with a "good evening," l protested to him against the violation of my congressional immunity. Rácha knew nothlng about it and palnfully grasped his head. He was an old, overworked man, hut an honest and good man. Catching his breath, he sa~d stutterlngly: "Several moments ago I performed a very unpleasant task. I dismissed the premier of the Slovak Government, Dr. Tiso, and three 6 SLOVAKIA other min.!sters from their posts. I had to do lt, because the consoli• dation of conditions in Slovakia demanded it." I looped trom my chair and replied: "Mr. Presldent, I cannot agree w'ith the step you have taken. I am jo!n!ng wlth the dls• missed ministers and, here and now, tender you my reslgnat!on. I have nothing more to do in Prague." The President wias quite moved as he stood up and begged me not to resign and not let myself be overcome by hasty anger. "With full knowledge of what may happen to me here in Prague for my statement," I said quietly and seriously, "l repeat that I do not agree with what you have done; I protest agalnst lt and hereby tender you my reslgnatlon. I am golng home to Slovakla on the very next traln." :Aresident Rácha mopped bis forehead and head wlth both hands and in a voice completely broken asked me agaln not to resign, because, he said, -it would result In lm.mense harm for Slovakia. "I have nothlng to add to what I have sald," I replled and began walking toward the door. The Presldent caught up W'ith me, grasped my arm, and pleaded that I tarry a bit longer. "Beran will soon be here," he said. And at that very moment, the door burst open and Beran walked In hurrjedly. Stlll standing near the door, I related to Beran what I had told Rácha: 1 was resign.!ng and going home. Rácha and Beran, bowever, entreated me to stay on. They were convinced, they sald, with regard to condltions In Sloviakia, that I was not doing the right úhlng. I gave in to them to the extent that I would announce my reslgnatlon to them from Bratislava after I had consulted with my frlends. As I lett the Presldenťs oftice, in the corridor I met Peter Pridavok, who at that Ume wa.s head of the press department of the Slovak Government, also Dr. Dobrovský, my secretary, and my aMe, Lt. Fratrič. With my three ~rlends I rode to my Prague resldence. In the mornlng of the next day, l\farch 10th, I asked to get c onnected wlth the edltorlal office of the SLOVÁK in Bratislava. No one answered there. Then I tried to get connected wlth the General Secretariate of the Rllnka Slovak People's Party, but no one answered even there. Finally, they connected me with the Government Building -in Bratislava. Dr. Karol Kllnovský, Chlef of the Securlty Service In Slovakia, ,ans,wered tbe phone. I dlctated a rePort to bim to publlsh In the SLOVÁK. to wít, that "Sldor wa3 placed before an accompllshed fact In Prague In the matter of the dlsmissal of the Slovak mlnlsters; he dld not agree with the dlsmissal and protested against it to Presldent Rácha." The report was then p\tbllshed in the SLOVÁK that very day, In the issue berurlng the datellne of March 11, 1939. At that time Dr. Kllnovský told me that Martlal Law was proclalmed in Slovakla without the knowledge of the Slovak Government. The Bratiislava offlces, edltorlal and secretarlal, as well as the offlces of the Hlinka Guard were occupled by the Czech Army and police. Over 250 Slovaks had been arrested, hundreds of offl· clals were suspended, many GHards were taken lnto Moravla and hundreds of Slovaks had fled to Vienna to avold arrest. Somethlng wlthin me snapped. I could not belleve tha.t Rácha SLOVAil..lA 7 and Beran were as faithless as T. G. Masaryk and Bene!í and their adherents when it came to keeping agreements, solemn signatures and promises w!Jth the Slov.ak.s. I really respected Hácha and Beran and believed that whatever they would promlse and sign, they would aJso keep honorably and fulfill. But, Io and behold, they were overthrowlng the Slovak Governm~nt in Bratislava without the knowledge and behlnd the backs of the duly authorized representatlves of the Slovak Government and lts three delegates. Without the knowledge of the Slovak Government, they proclaímed Martlal Law in Slovakla, occupied the territory of autonomous Slovak1a with soldiers and gendarmes, arrested Slovak Deputies and hauled people to Moravia, wh!le they were telling• me that they were doing a very unpleasant duty in the "lnterest" ot Slovakia. Anti-Slovak elements In Slovalcta, encouraged by such mOO-'lures. ralsed tbeir beads on tbe streets and barked at tbe autonomlsts: "Now, we'll give you autonomy!" While I was thlnking about wbat was happening, the Czech Mln•lster Feierabend came to my resldence. He had a considerable understandlng for Slovak matters. He told me tbat Beran had flent him to teli me to vlslt Mm at once. "No!" I Teplled to Feierabend. "After yesterday'e events in Prague ano those that are happening In Slovakia now, I do not wlsh to speak wlth any one In Prague. Not even with you. or Beran." I remained in my resldence with my frlends. I wa!ted for Dr. Martin Sokol, president of the Slovak Assembly, who had suddenly been called to Prague, to flnlsh bis audience with Presldent Hácha. Wben he arrlved, I traveled wlth bim to Bt>atislava on the afternoon express. I arrlved In B!'atlslava at 9 P. M., March 10. A strong d!Vflslon ot the Hlinka Guard awalted me at the station; also a stronger one of the Czech army, Jed by a Colonel. Masses of people cllmbed aboard the engine and thousands upon thousands mllled around Nie s quare around the station. They sang maTches ot the Guard and acclalmed me voclferously. At the request ot the Czech Colonel, on the way to the edltorial offlce of the SLOVÁK, I stopped at the o!fice of the General Voyta, Commander of the National Army In Slo• vakla. He was a tough soJd.ier. But he saw the sltuatlon clearly and, lt seemed to me, dld not like lt at all. When I complalned that the army was shooting into the unarmed crowd In Bratislava, he replied that no one shot at the people, but a few salvos were fired into the aiT to frlghten them. Later, I ascertalned for myself that the Czech army In Bratislava really dld not shoot any one. Anthony Kopal, the only Slovak who was felled by a bullet, was shot by a Czecb gendarme. When I asked who had orderd the army and the tanks lnto the streets ot Branislava, Voyta told me that he personally was called to Prague by Syrový, Minister ot Natlonal Defense, who ordered bim to do so. I requested Voyta to free all prlsoners in Bratislava taken by bis men. Voyta replied that he would as soon as he found ou.t if· a.ny one was arrested in Bratislava.; and that he would notity me. Havlng appraised the sltuatlon at its source, I hurrled to my car and contlnued on my way to the SLOVÁK, whlle a masa ot 7000- 8 SLúVAKIA 8000 people, gathered about Voyta's office, cheered and sang robustly. When I arri ved at the SLOVÁK, I found the higher officials of the Hlinka Party, headed by Dr. Tis-0, already waiting for me. The entire executive body of the Assembly arrived and a lengthy deliberation began. Dr. Tiso, vice-president of the Party, presided at the session. He told about the situation that had developed in Bratislava, while Dr. Sokol and I related our experiences in Prague. I said that I would not go to Prague any more and requested that my resignatlon as State Minister be accepted by the conference. And forthwith, I proposed that the new Slovak Government be made up as follows: Dr. Joseph Tiso, president of the Slovak Government; Dr. Martin Sokol, Minister of Interior; Joseph Sivák, Minister of Education; Julius Stano, Minister of Transportation; Dr. Peter Zaťko, Minister of Agriculture; Dr. Alex Hrnčár, Minister of Finance, and Dr. Gejza Fritz, Minister of Jusbice. The conference decided - wit,h only one dissenting vote, my own - that I shoulct not resign, but continue in the office of State Minister. Dr. Joseph Tiso t hen announced that he could not assent to accept the office offered him. He stated that here he was not <:oncerned aboQt himself personally - all such thoughts must now be secondary - but that he did not want to place President Rácha int-0 an unpleasant situation: he did not want Rácha pressed today to name as president of the Slovak Government that Tiso, whom he had yesterday dism1ssed from that office. 'I\he situation 1s šerious - said Dr. Tiso - and we must not use the Slovak pľO'blem to enha,nce our persona! interests and prestige. Slovakia needs a government, Tiso concluded, so that greater confusion and chaos would not ensue. Thereupon, the conference authorized Dr. Martin Sokol to proceed as follows: If Dr. Joseph Tiso were not acceptable in Prague, then Karol Sidor should be proposed as president of the Slovak Government. The next day, Saturday, March 11, 1939, the praesidium of the Slovak Assembly, presented the names of the new Slovak Government to President Rácha in Prague. This had to be done, because paragraph V, Article 4, of the Constitution of November 22, 1938, demanded it. It states: The members of the autonomous Slovak Gov• ernment, forming a com-ponent part of the Centra! Government, shaII be apointed by the Pr-esiident of the Republic on the motion of the praesidium of the Assembly of Slovakia. President Dr. Emil Hácha approved the second alternatíve and r.amed the new Slovak Government with me as lts president. The other members of my government were: Sivák, Sokol, Stano, Zaťko, Rrnčár and Fritz. This, then, was the !ega! Slovak Government created according to the Constitutlonal Document which was valid at the tíme. The very day that the news carried the names of the men constituting the new Slovak Government, I had several German vlsltors: editor Goldbach, then Carbus; later that night, close to mldnight of March 11, Wr. William Kepler, special deputy of Adolph Hitler and Assistant Secrebary of State for Foreign Affalrs, Dr. Selss- SLOVAKIA 9 Inquart, G-Overnor of Austria, and Joseph Biirckel, Austrian gauIeiter, who demanded that I 1mmediately proclaim the independence of the Slovak State by radlo either through the station in Bratislav•a or the one in Vienna. I replied that responsible factors of the Hlinka Party aind the Slovak Assembly had decided "to continue to build the Slovak State by an evolutionary process and not to proclaim its establishment right now." I explasined that I, too, was bound by that declslon and could not violate it without the assent of the Party and the Assembly. If lhe Assembly and the Party change thelr previous stand and on the floor of the .A;ssembly, now decide to P'ľOClaim an independent Slovak State "right now," I would comply wlth that changed attitude. My actions were governed, I said, not by expedl· ency or my persona! fancies, but by the policy of the nation according to the diirectives which I had from competent Slovak organs. I take my orders only from them, I concluded, and I will not execute the orders and commands given me by representatives of another natlon. Natura1'1y, the Germans were not satisfied with my answer. And they demonstrated their dissatisfaction in a very concrete fashion. On March 13, they vented thelr hatred of me by placlng a bomb under my horne in Bratislava to ktill me and my whole family. I thanked God that it was discovered in Ume and rendered harmless. Another bomb was placed under the Jesuit monastery in Brati!>lava where Dr. Joseph Tiso resided. That bomb actually exploded and caused quite a bit of damage to the walls and windows of the structure. No one, however, was killed. As soon as I took over the presidency of the Slovak Government all military regulations and orders, especla!ly the proclamation of Martial Law, were revoked and rendered invalid. The putsch of the Czech generals, ord8'l'ed by President Rácha and Premier Be1,an of the Centra! G-Overnment and executed by Syrový, Minister of NatiOJ1al Defense, was thus liquidated. I liberated Slovak prlsoners in Slovakia, returned all suspended persona to thelr jobs, and made certain mi!itary provisiions to pre-vent any new putsches. The orders provided for the placement of Slovak officers as supervlsors of the Slovak Government in all milltary formatlons which were headed !Jy Czeoh generals and colonels. Simultaneously, President Rácha and General Syrový ordered all commanders of the army in Slovakla not to undertake any ventures wlthout my knowlodge or wlthout the knowledge of the appointed Slovak offlcers. This provision of mine I considered most lmportant. It was thus that the Slovaks took over the command of the army in Slovakia before the proclamation of the independence of the Slovak State. That meant that the Slovaks took possession of one of the symbols of State sovereignty. How !mpo!'tant was this provision was demonstT,ated soon after the !ndependence of the Slovak State was proolaimed, when the Magyars a,ttacked the eastern borders of Slovakia, and our dlsciplined army, under the command of Lt. Colonel Augustine Malar, effectively resisted them. Without our mil!tary resistance, the Ma• gyars would have occupled the eastern area of Slovakla even beyond 10 SLOVAKIA Prešov, just as they had occupied the whole of Ruthenia. which offered no military reslstance. But even before the proclamation of the independence of the Slovak State, the knowledge that Slovak offlcers were in command of every m!llta.ry garrison In Slovakia evoked a remarkable satisfaction in the ranka of the Slovaks, who no longer had to fea.r that the barracks would agaln unload a host of soldiers who would fight agalnst the people and lts !nterests. On Monday, March 13, 1939, at 6:00 .A. M., Dr. Tiso arrlved in Bro.tňslava from Banovce to visit me. He told me that he had received an "lnv!tatlon" to vis!t Adolph Hitler in Berlin and asked me whether I would agree that he go. I answered h!m that I d!d, but wanted it approved by my whole government as well as the praesidlum of the Party and the A.ssembly. Thereupon, the Slovak Government, the praes!dium of the Assembly and the Party were called to meet In the offlce of the SLOVÁK. The conference lasted unb!l 12:30 P. M. The unanlmous decislon was: Dr. Joseph Tlso was to go to Berlin. After the conference. I issued the followlng off-icial statement for the Bratislava press and radlo: "We announce to the Slovak public that today, Monday morning, the praesldium of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party had a meeting in Bratislava. At thls meeting of the praesldlum of the Party, Dr. Joseph Tiso, former Presldent of the Slovak Government, announced that he had recefved au offlcial summons from the Relch Ohancellor, Adolph Hitler, to vis!t him at once In Berlin. The pra.esld<lum of the Party has acknowledged thls lnv!tation, and so has the Government of Karol Sldor. Consequently, Dr. Joseph Tiso crossed the border at Bratislava at noon today accompanled by the German Consul In Bratislava, deputy Stephen Danlhel and deputy Ing. Karmasin. The purpose of Dr. Joseph Tiso's trip to Berlin 1s a olarlfllcation of the present situat!on." In the instructions, which the conference gave to Dr. Joseph Tiso for hls trip to Berlin, he was told: to hear what Hitler had to say, but not to glve hlm any kind of blndlng statement; then to return to Brátlslava and report on h!s vlslt to competent Slovak factors and await the deflnite decislon of the Assembly, the Government and the Party. Dr. Joseph Tiso visited Rlbbentrop and Hitler in Berlin. After converslng w<lth them, he went to the Czecho-,Slovak embassy in llerlln, whence he phoned me and requested me to call the Slovak Assembly together. Thls telephon;, conversation took place with Tlso at 7: 30 P. M. on March 13, 1939. I lmmedlately got in touch with Presldent Hácha who, actlng in accord with Paragraph V of the ConB'titutlon of November 22, 1938, called a meeting of the Slovak Assembly on March 14, 1939. The Slovak Assembly, therefore, was convened Iegally, In the manner prescribed by the Const!tution of the Czecho-Slovak Republlc. Tuesday, March 14, 1939, at 9: 00 A. M. the Slovak Government, the praesldium of the Assembly and the Hlinka Party convened In the Government Buildlng at Bratislava. Dr. Joseph Tlso gave an exhaustlve report about hls trip to Berlin. The meeting approved h!s report enthus!ast!cally; he had done the task he was asked to do. After the meeting, the Slovak Assembly convened In 1ts quarters SLOVAKIA 11 for the session oa.Ued by the President of the Republ1c, Dr. En:(11 Rácha. Thls memorable meetlng of the Slovak A.ssembly opened at 10: 57 A. M., March 14, 1939, by the Vlce-Presldent of the Assembly, Dr. Karol Mederly. After golng through the rormallties, Dr. Mederly, in accordance to Paragraph 37 of the order or business, moved that the remaining buslness or the Assembly be conMdential. Therefore, only Deput!es of the Assemb!y and members of the Slovak Government remained in the assembly ha.11. Of the 63 duly elected representatives of the Slovak Assembly, 57 were present at this hlstorical session of the Slovak leglslature. T·h e secret session began at 11:10 A. M. The flrst order or business was my spe,ech, in wbich I deplcted events as they had developed in Slova.kla and recounted a.II that my Government had accomplished withln so short a time. In my name and in the name or the other mJnisters, I announced the reslgnation of my government. I concluded my speech In this manner: " . . . in the name of the ent.ire Government I tender our resignatione to this solemn Assembly. At thls very moment, this my decision is being ma.de kno,w n also to the constitutional factor.s in Prague and, with this, I proclaim the bTief act!v!J.ty of my Government at an end. Sir Deputles, I I)Tay that you be unlted, selt-conscious and mutually trustworthy, because only thus shall we be able to get our Slovak nation out of the present dlfficult situation and establlsh order and stablllity and a solid front. I want to assure you, gentlemen, that I sha.11 support with my whole strength and will everythlng that you sha.11 decide. Long live the Slovak natlon! Long live free Slova.kla!" Dr. Joseph Tiso then presented an extenslve report on hls trip to Berlin. In hls introduct.ion, Dr. Tlso stated that he ma.de the trip to BerMn, because the conference of March 13th had declded that he do so. In Berlin, Dr. 1'1so told forelgn minister · Joachim von Rlbbentrop: " . . . by lnltlatlve we Slova.ks will never glve the lmpulse to liquidat-e tbe Czecho-.Slovak Republic. But !! we see that the course of events ls developlng in such a way that it m!ght be more beneflclal to us, we s-hall consider it our duty to choose a suitable tlme to separate (from the Czeohs). lf our people see that events are tending In a dlrectlon lndicatlng that the only w·ay out fs to make otrrselves independent, then every Slovak wlll tlghten bis belt, live more frugally, wflll know how to bear up even under lesseT advantages, and shall say to hlmself: under the glven clrcumstances, t here was natblng else we could do. Rlbbentrop fully recognlzed and understod our posltlon." Then Dr. Tlso told about hls vlsit wlth Adolph Hitler. The iatter told hlm directly that the Magya.rs were preparing to occupy t he whole of Slovak.ia at that Ume. "And you must declare yourself agaJ!ns.t lt," sa!d Hitler ... "and declare yourself wlth llghtn1ng speed. This declaratáon must be ma.de to proper factors so that they would know that t.he Slovak natlon has lts own State, its own territory and that, therefore, it must prevent any one from ma.king clalms to enter Slovak terrltory and to the Slovak populatlon. There 1s no Ume for waiting. Not days, but hours shall declde the lssue." 12 SLOVAKIA Dr. 'l'iso thought for a moment, repeated the decision of the conference of March 13th, and ad ded: "You will pardon me, if I cannot say anything else more concrete." In short, Dr. Tiso followed the directlves given by the representatives of the Slovak nation: to un<lertake no obligatiollll, to promise nothlng In Berlin. Dr. 'l'iso concluded his repoi,t to the Assembly with the words: "Here, before the Assembly, I place the dry material gatbered in Berlin durlng my visit tb ere, the report which you •b ave just bearo, and I beg you to ponder over it and then ren der a decision !" Dr. Joseph Tlso made no proposal either for separating from the Czechs or for proclaiming an independent Slovak State. After Tiso completed his report, Dr. Martin Sokol, pres1dent of the Slovak A:ssembly, recessed the session for a few mlnutes. Durlng the recess, tbe deputles considered and d1scussed what they had hearo. When the meeting was called to order again at 12: 06 P. M., Dr. Sokol said: "You have heard the manlfestatlon of t-he President of the Slovak Government, Karol Sidor, and tbe report of Mr. Deputy Dr. Joseph Tiso about !)!!s conversaitlon with •Reich Chancellor Adolph Hitler and Reich Minister of Forelgn Affaiirs von Ribbentrop. No~v we are suppose<l to decide by voting whether the Assembly of Slovakia is for an indepen-dent Slovak State or not. We shall declare our vote by arlsing. Those In favor of proolaiming the in<lependence of the Slovak State, please rise!" lt was 12:07 P. M., March 14, 1939, when all 57 members of bhe Slovak Assembly arose from their seats and, thus, unanimously voted for the establishment of t•h e independent State of Slovakia. Thereupon, Dr. Sokol announced: "I flnd that the Assembly of Slovakia, as the only competent organ of the polltlcal will of the sovereign Slovak nation, has decided in favor of an independent Slovak State." &tm standing, the depu,ties sang t-he Slovak hymn "Hej, Slováci" (Yeah, Ye Slovaks), wMch later became the National Anthem of the Slovak State. ľt was thus that the .independence of fäe Slovak State was proclaimed. After a thousand years the Slovaks again became masters of their !and and their destiny. The hidden yearning of the natlon for its own State had come to life. Even here the words of Svetozar Hurban Vajanský are applicable: "To ascribe characteristics to the masses of people which they do not possess would be folly, indeed. But to rouse and develop the chara.cteristlcs ,..,,hfoh the native mass does possess, even though they are hi<lden, thrut is our fatal obligrution." This "fatal obUgation" was performed by the Slovak Deputies who proclaimed the independence of the Slovak State of March 14, 1939. They -had awakened the desire that was hidden in the soul of the nation, brought it out lnto the open and made lt real. And from 1939 to 1945, that Mdden desire, translated lnto reality, grew and prospered in the heart of every self-conscious and loyal Slovak. No one on this earth shall ever be able to stifle or kill this holy yearning of the Slovak nation for a new and more lasting State of its own - an Independent Slovakia. • • •  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource What Led to the Proclamation of the Slovak Republic Description An account of the resource Karol Sidor Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952 pp. 1-12 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Sidor, Karol, 1901-1953 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 LCNAF